Opinion issued November 7, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-00905-CR

———————————

LETICIA PEREZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 1

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2181639

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence, appellant, Leticia 

Perez, pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated.1 The trial court found appellant

guilty and assessed her punishment at one year of confinement, which it suspended, 

 

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04.
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placing her on community supervision for 18 months. In her sole issue on appeal, 

appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Sometime after midnight on December 15th, 2017, Harris County Deputy 

Constable T. Newsome was on night patrol in Northeast Harris County on a feeder 

road running alongside Beltway 8. There, he observed a car driven by appellant. 

There was no other traffic in the immediate vicinity of appellant. Newsome, a police 

officer trained and experienced in detecting drunk drivers, followed appellant for 

about a minute. During that short time period, appellant drifted from her lane four 

times, with distances ranging from a few inches to a few feet. Upon appellant’s 

fourth drift from her lane, Deputy Newsome turned on his siren and pulled appellant 

over. Deputy Newsome believed that appellant’s actions constituted a violation pf

section 545.060(a) of the Transportation Code, commonly known as “failure to 

maintain a single lane.” Newsome also believed that the drifting indicated that 

appellant could have been intoxicated. After detaining appellant, Newsome

questioned her and conducted a field sobriety test, which appellant failed. Having 

determined that there was probable cause to believe that appellant was intoxicated, 

Deputy Newsome arrested her, and she was charged with the misdemeanor offense 

of driving while intoxicated. 
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At trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, alleging that her 

warrantless detention violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. Specifically, she claimed that Deputy Newsome did not have 

the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the traffic stop. The trial court denied 

appellant’s motion to suppress. Shortly thereafter, appellant changed her plea to 

“guilty” as a result of this ruling. Appellant was found guilty and was sentenced to 

one year in county jail, probated for 18 months, and no fine. This appeal followed.

DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In two issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion 

to suppress, arguing that the Deputy Newsome did not have reasonable suspicion to 

detain her for either (1) driving while intoxicated or (2) violating section 545.060 of 

the Texas Transportation Code by failing to maintain a single marked lane of traffic.

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

The United States and Texas Constitutions protect against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; TEX. CONST. art. 1, §9. No evidence 

obtained in violation of the United States or Texas Constitutions can be admitted as 

evidence against the accused at trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. §38.23. A 

warrantless automobile stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure analogous to a 

temporary detention, and it must be justified by reasonable suspicion. Berkemer v. 
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McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); see Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 

914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

To suppress evidence based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 

defendant bears the initial burden of proof to rebut the presumption of proper police 

conduct by establishing that the search or seizure occurred without a warrant. Abney 

v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The burden then shifts to the 

State to prove that there was a reasonable suspicion that the person was violating the 

law. Id. If the State has not shown sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion, then 

the traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment. Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 

437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). 

When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we give almost 

total deference to the court’s determination of the historical facts that the record 

supports, especially when those fact-findings are based on an evaluation of the 

witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 562 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2016); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). At 

a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole finder-of-fact and is free to believe 

or disbelieve any or all the evidence presented. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-

25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). If the trial courtmakes express findings of fact, we view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and determine whether the 

evidence supports these factual findings. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When a trial court makes no explicit findings of historical 

fact, the appellate court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

trial court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact. See 

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

We accord almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on mixed 

questions of law and fact if those decisions turn on the credibility and demeanor of 

the witnesses. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo mixed questions 

of law and fact that do not turn on witness credibility. Id. Despite its fact-sensitive 

analysis, the “reasonableness” of a specific search or seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment is subject to de novo review. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62–63

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

Reasonable suspicion exists when the officer can “point to specific and 

articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 

reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). For an 

officer to have reasonable suspicion, these “specific and articulable” facts must 

justify the traffic stop from the inception of the stop. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 

563, 568-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). This is an objective standard that disregards 

the subjective intent of the officer and only requires some minimal level of 

justification for the stop. Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 437. However, the officer must 

have more than an inarticulable hunch or mere good-faith suspicion that a crime was 
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in progress. Id. In deciding whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion, we 

examine the facts that were available to the officer at the time of the investigation. 

Id. We disregard any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and look solely 

to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A reasonable-suspicion determination is made by 

considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 492–93.

Analysis

We first consider whether Deputy Newsome had reasonable suspicion to 

believe that appellant had committed the offense of driving while intoxicated. A 

person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated 

while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a).

Reasonable suspicion depends on the factual and practical considerations of 

everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. 

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014). Under that commonsense 

approach, we can appropriately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound indica 

of drunk driving. Id. Texas courts have recognized a wide range of behaviors that 

fall into this category and give rise to a reasonable suspicion of driving while 

intoxicated. See e.g., Leming, 493 S.W.3d at 563–65 (holding that driving well 

below the speed limit and weaving in and out of lanes gave rise to reasonable 

suspicion); Nevedomsky v. State, No. 01-12-00105-CR, 2013 WL 655194 at *4 (Tex. 
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App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (holding that drifting onto shoulder of highway and failure to signal 

gave rise to reasonable suspicion of drunk driving); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. 

Safety v. Ardoin, 515 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.) (holding 

that striking or almost striking curb gave rise to reasonable suspicion). A 

determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of 

innocent conduct. Leming, 493 S.W.3d at 565.

Appellant relies on State v. Bernard to argue that Newsome did not have 

probable cause to believe that appellant had committed the offense of DWI. 545 

S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). In Bernard, the 

State appealed after the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id.

The court of appeals, after applying the standard of review giving deference to the 

trial court’s determination of factual issues, upheld the trial court’s ruling granting 

the motion to suppress, noting that (1) the defendant “left his lane by a few inches 

only twice, which we do not characterize as weaving,” (2) “there was no evidence 

of aggressive driving or the location of the stop being near a bar district,” even 

though the stop occurred at approximately 3:20 a.m., and (3) the record did not show 

that the “trial court failed to take [the officer’s] experience and training into account 

in reaching its conclusions that [the officer] lacked reasonable suspicion for the 

stop.” Id. at 706–07. The court concluded that the officer lacked reasonable 
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suspicion to stop the defendant for DWI because “[the defendant’s] leaving his lane

by a few inches only twice, the time of the stop, and [the officer’s] training and 

experience—do not amount to specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational 

inferences from those facts, would have led [the officer] reasonably to conclude that 

[the defendant] was driving while intoxicated.” Id. at 707.

In contrast, in Curtis v. State, the defendant, Curtis, was stopped by a police 

officer after the officer witnessed him weave “at least three times out of his lane over 

a relatively short distance of a few hundred yards.” 238 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007). The police officer, who had training and experience in detecting drunk 

driving, pulled Curtis over at 1:00 AM. Id. at 380. Considering the totality of the 

circumstances, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the police officer had the 

reasonable suspicion necessary to detain Curtis and investigate him for DWI. Id. at 

381.

This case is more like Curtis than Bernard. Here, appellant drifted out of her 

lane four times in approximately one minute before Deputy Newsome pulled her 

over—with the drifting ranging in distance from several inches to several feet. At 

one point, appellant’s vehicle completely straddled the line separating the lanes of 

traffic. Deputy Newsome, experienced and trained in detecting drunk driving, pulled 

appellant over after midnight. Evaluating the totality of the circumstances and giving 

deference to the trial court’s implicit fact findings as we must, we conclude that the 
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trial court did not err in concluding that appellant’s erratic driving behavior gave rise 

to the minimal level of justification required for an investigatory detention. See 

Brodnex, 485 S.W.3d at 437. These circumstances are sufficient to meet the low 

standard required to show reasonable suspicion of a DWI offense. See Leming, 493 

S.W.3d at 565. (“We would deem it counterproductive and contrary to common 

sense to set the reasonable-suspicion bar for driving while intoxicated so high that 

law enforcement must hesitate to investigate such hazardous driving for fear that the 

stop will later be invalidated.”). 

We overrule issue one.

In issue two, appellant contends that Deputy Newsome did not have 

reasonable suspicion to detain appellant for violating section 545.060(a) of the 

Transportation Code for failing to maintain a single lane of traffic. Because Deputy 

Newsome had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant and investigate further for 

driving while intoxicated, we need not determine whether he also had reasonable 

suspicion to detain appellant for a violation of section 545.060(a) of the 

Transportation Code.

We overrule issue two.
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CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Hightower.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).