(2001). Here, the district court gave a limiting instruction before any prior 

bad act testimony was presented. However, the first witness who testified 

after that instruction did not address any prior bad acts; the next seven 

witnesses testified to prior bad acts but there was no limiting instruction 

immediately before their testimony. The district court provided another 

limiting instruction before the jury deliberated. Although Dodd did not 

object to the manner in which the district court instructed the jury, it does 

not appear that she "explicitly waive[d] the limiting instruction prior to 

the admission of the evidence" so as to relieve the district court of its duty 

to properly instruct the jury. Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 270, 182 

P.3d 106, 111 (2008). We agree with Dodd that the district court erred in 

failing to give a limiting instruction immediately before the testimony 

relating to Dodd's prior bad acts. We are not persuaded, however, that 

this error had any injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict in light 

of the instructions provided and the overwhelming direct evidence 

supporting Dodd's conviction. See id. at 269, 182 P.3d at 110 ("The failure 

of the district court to issue a limiting instruction will be reviewed for 

nonconstitutional error under NRS 178.598."). In particular, by providing 

a limiting instruction before the jury heard any testimony regarding prior 

bad acts, the district court guided the jury to avoid considering the 

evidence for an improper purpose. Tavares, 117 Nev. at 733, 30 P.3d at 

1133; see Rhymes v. State, 121 Nev. 17, 24, 107 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2005) 

(finding error harmless where the district court erred by failing to give a 

bad-act limiting instruction at the time the testimony was admitted but 

gave a limiting instruction prior to the jury being charged); Leonard v. 

State, 117 Nev. 53, 66, 17 P.3d 397, 405 (2001) (providing that the jury 

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shall be presumed to have followed its instructions). We conclude that no 

relief is warranted on this claim. 

Dodd argues further that the district court abused its 

discretion in admitting testimony about an extramarital sexual encounter 

between Dodd and Ryan Bonnenfant because this evidence of infidelity 

would unfairly prejudice the jury against Dodd. Under NRS 48.045(2), 

prior bad act evidence is not admissible to prove the character of a person, 

but may be admissible to show "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 

Here, the district court conducted a hearing outside the jury's presence as 

required by Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 51, 692 P.2d 503, 507 (1985), 

modified on other grounds by Sonner v. State, 112 Nev. 1328, 1333-34, 930 

P.2d 707, 711-12 (1996) and superseded in part by statute as stated in 

Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 45, 83 P.3d 818, 823 (2004), and determined 

that the evidence was relevant to Dodd's motive to kill her husband, that 

the prior bad act was proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that 

the evidence was more probative than unfairly prejudicial. See Bigpond v. 

State, 128 Nev. , , 270 P.3d 1244, 1250 (2012) (discussing three 

findings required to overcome presumption under NRS•48.045(2) that 

prior bad act evidence is inadmissible). The record supports each of the 

district court's determinations. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Dodd's infidelity. 

with Bonnenfant. See Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 72, 40 P.3d 413, 

416 (2002) (stating that decision whether to admit prior bad act evidence 

is discretionary and will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion). 

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We reject Dodd's argument that the district court improperly 

relied on her apparent lack of remorse in imposing its sentence. Where 

the sentencing judge considers the defendant's lack of remorse in setting a 

sentence and the defendant maintains that she is not guilty of the offense, 

the sentencing judge violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights 

because the defendant will be unable to show remorse without giving up 

her right to not incriminate herself. See Brake v. State, 113 Nev. 579, 584- 

85, 939 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1995). Although such a violation constitutes an 

abuse of discretion that requires resentencing before a different district 

judge, id. at 585, 939 P.2d at 1033, the record in this case does not reflect 

a violation of Dodd's Fifth Amendment rights. The district judge's 

explanation of his sentence clearly shows that he regarded Dodd's conduct 

during the sentencing hearing as illustrative of her capacity for 

criminality and that it was her capacity for criminality that warranted 

sentencing at the high end of the statutory limits. This explanation shows 

that the district court did not impose a harsher sentence based on Dodds 

failure to express remorse, but rather that the sentence was based on 

Dodd's life, conduct, and mental and moral propensities, which are proper 

considerations at sentencing. See Denson v. State, 112 Nev. 489, 494, 915 

P.2d 284, 287 (1996). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in imposing its sentence. See Randell v. State, 109 

Nev. 5, 8, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (1993) (reviewing the district court's 

sentencing determination for an abuse of discretion). 

We also reject Dodd's argument that her sentence shocks the 

conscience. The trial court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence, 

and this court will uphold its determination absent a showing of an abuse 

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of discretion. Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 

(1987). Regardless of its severity, a sentence that is within the statutory 

limits is not 'cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing 

punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably 

disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience." Blume v. 

State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting CuIverson v. 

State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. 

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining 

that Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between 

crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly 

disproportionate to the crime). The district court sentenced Dodd in 

accordance with the statutory parameters. See NRS 193.165; NRS 

200.030. Dodd has not challenged the constitutionality of those statutes, 

and we are not convinced that the sentence imposed is so unreasonably 

disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience. We therefore 

conclude that the sentence is not cruel or unusual and that the district 

court acted within its discretion.' 

1To the extent that Dodd argues, by footnote, that the district court 

relied on uncharged "crimes" in sentencing her, we are not persuaded that 

the record shows that the district court did, in fact, punish Dodd for 

uncharged offenses in imposing this sentence, especially as the district 

judge's explanation made clear the extent to which he was moved by his 

perception of Dodd's moral character. See Denson, 112 Nev. at 494, 915 

P.2d at 287 (holding that it is improper to impose a sentence that intends 

to punish a defendant for uncharged crimes, while noting that such crimes 

may be considered as part of a fuller assessment of the defendant's life and 

moral propensities). 

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,Cgid Gibbons 

C.J. 

, J. --7Lir AXE 

Having considered Dodd's contentions and concluding that 

they are without merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Pickering Saitta 

cc: Hon. David A. Hardy, District Judge 

Washoe County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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