Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-229 | July 8, 2019 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer L. Schrontz

Schrontz Legal Group, LLC

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of R.W. (Minor 

Child)

and

B.W. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

July 8, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-229

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Faith A. Graham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D03-1807-JT-114
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-229 | July 8, 2019 Page 2 of 14

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] B.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her

parental rights to her minor child, R.W. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on June 24, 2017, to Mother.1 Mother has a lengthy criminal 

history, and, although not incarcerated at the time of Child’s birth, she had

been arrested and posted bond just weeks before on charges of possession of 

paraphernalia, possession of methamphetamine, and forgery. On June 28, 

2017, Child was removed from Mother’s care and placed in protective custody

due to allegations of Mother’s drug use during her pregnancy. Child suffered 

from withdrawal symptoms at birth, and both Mother and Child tested positive 

for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Thereafter, the Indiana Department 

of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition 

regarding Child.2 Mother admitted the allegations in the CHINS petition, and, 

following a combined detention and initial hearing, the court continued the 

order for removal and ordered that Child remain in foster care.3 The court 

 

1 A.R., the alleged father, failed to appear at the trial level despite proper notice. The trial court heard 

evidence and entered a default judgment against him terminating his parental rights. He does not participate 

in this appeal.

2 Mother has a history of prior contacts with DCS as early as 2012 regarding an older daughter, J.A.O., due 

to Mother’s drug use, her extensive criminal history, and ongoing domestic violence between Mother and a 

boyfriend. Mother retains her parental rights to J.A.O., but J.A.O. is placed with her maternal grandparents.

3 The record indicates that Child’s maternal grandparents declined placement of Child.
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ordered Mother to submit to random drug screens and further ordered that she

not be permitted to visit Child until she tested negative for methamphetamines. 

Referrals were made for Mother to participate in assessments and services. 

DCS found Mother difficult to contact, and she failed to complete any 

assessments or participate in any services.

[3] Mother was incarcerated in July 2017. Shortly thereafter, she was transferred 

to a work release program. While in custody, in December 2017, Mother 

completed a substance abuse assessment and mental health evaluation. She has 

been diagnosed with alcohol dependence. She reported a long history of 

substance abuse including alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, and ecstasy. She further 

reported that she had participated in intensive outpatient substance abuse 

treatment in 2013. Mother was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder, 

major depressive disorder, and other stimulant dependence. She disclosed that 

she continued to abuse alcohol, cannabis, and cocaine, and she further 

disclosed that she had used methamphetamine daily over the past five years.

[4] In August 2017, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS due to Mother’s 

admitted drug use and issued interim orders for Mother to participate in 

services. A dispositional decree was entered in September 2017, ordering that 

Mother participate in services while in work release with the plan being 

reunification with Child. Mother failed to participate in services before or 

during her time in work release, and then she violated the conditions of work 

release in January 2018 by severing the strap on her ankle monitor. Mother was 
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arrested and incarcerated in February 2018. At the time of her arrest, she was 

found in possession of methamphetamine and buprenorphine. 

[5] In June 2018, Mother was convicted of level 6 felony possession of 

methamphetamine, level 6 felony theft, and level 6 felony escape. She was also 

found to be a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced her to eight years, 

with two years suspended to probation. Mother was also sentenced on a 

probation violation. She was transferred to the Indiana Women’s Prison on 

August 17, 2018. Since her arrival at the prison, Mother commenced and 

completed a parenting class, as well as participated in a culinary arts program

and other self-help curricula involving methamphetamine addiction, anger 

management, overcoming anxiety, and developing effective communication. 

Mother’s earliest possible release date is December 27, 2019; however, she has 

already received two conduct reports while incarcerated. Mother has had no 

contact with Child since Child’s birth.

[6] In August 2018, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights. After the termination hearing held on November 13, 2018, the 

trial court entered extensive findings of fact, one of which contained the 

following relevant summary:

There have been repeated concerns regarding Mother’s lack of 

stability, criminal activity, drug use, and domestic violence 

relationships with multiple DCS assessments. These issues have

extended over several years and have now spanned the lives of 

both Mother’s children. Mother’s recent participation in services 

in prison does not outweigh Mother’s lengthy history of failing to 

address these same issues before, during, and after the first 
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CHINS case or before incarceration and while on Work Release 

in the second CHINS case. Mother has displayed a long-term 

pattern of failing to comply with terms of sentencing and/or 

probation having been convicted of Escape on three (3) 

occasions. Mother has demonstrated little to no regard for the 

impact this continuous instability has on her children.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 20.

[7] Accordingly, the trial court concluded that: (1) there is a reasonable probability 

that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal and continued placement 

outside the home will not be remedied by Mother; (2) there is a reasonable 

probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother 

and Child poses a threat to Child’s well-being; (3) termination of the parentchild relationship between Mother and Child is in Child’s best interests; and (4) 

DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child’s care and treatment, which is adoption. 

Accordingly, the trial court determined that DCS had proven the allegations of 

the petition to terminate by clear and convincing evidence and therefore 

terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents but, 

instead, to protect their children. Thus, although parental rights are of a 

constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights 

when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental 

responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation 

omitted). “[T]ermination is intended as a last resort, available only when all 
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other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id. A petition for the involuntary 

termination of parental rights must allege in pertinent part:

 (B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

 (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

 (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove that termination is appropriate by 

a showing of clear and convincing evidence. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 

(Ind. 2016). If the trial court finds that the allegations in a petition are true, the 

court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[9] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving 

the termination of parental rights.” C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 

85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

We neither reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility. We 

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to 
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the trial court’s judgment. Where the trial court enters findings 

of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard 

of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings and then determine whether the findings support the 

judgment. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to 

assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a 

parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.

Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings 

do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support 

the judgment.” In re R.J., 829 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

Section 1 – Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that there is reasonable probability of 

unchanged conditions.

[10] Mother first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal from and 

continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.4 In determining 

whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child’s 

removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, we 

engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 

1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [her]

 

4 Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being. However, Indiana Code 

Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, such that, to properly effectuate the termination of

parental rights, the trial court need only find that one of the three requirements of that subsection has been 

established by clear and convincing evidence. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Accordingly, we will address only one of the three requirements.
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placement and retention in foster care.” Id. Second, “we ‘determine whether 

there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’” 

Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010) (citing In re A.A.C., 

682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))). In the second step, the trial court 

must judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking 

into consideration evidence of changed conditions, and balancing a parent’s 

recent improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine 

whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re 

E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “A 

pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with 

those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, 

support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions 

will change.” Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted), trans. denied. The evidence presented by 

DCS “need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, DCS need establish 

only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not 

change.” In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[11] Here, Child was initially removed from Mother’s care after DCS received 

reports that Mother was using methamphetamines while pregnant, Mother 

tested positive for drugs upon admittance to the hospital, and Child displayed 

signs of withdrawal at birth. Mother was not incarcerated at the time, but 

shortly after Child’s birth, Mother became incarcerated and was transferred to a 

work release program. Although Mother had a substantial prior history with 
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DCS involving her older daughter during which she failed to participate in 

offered services, DCS put numerous new services in place regarding Child that 

Mother could have participated in while in work release. Mother failed to 

complete any services and instead chose to violate work release and was again 

incarcerated. At the time of her latest arrest, Mother was found in possession of 

methamphetamine and buprenorphine. 

[12] Mother asserts that she is currently sober (while incarcerated) and that the 

record reveals that she has completed some services while in custody, including

completing a parenting class and participating in a culinary arts program. 

Accordingly, Mother essentially argues that the evidence of her good faith 

efforts at improvement coupled with her impending 2019 release date support a 

conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that conditions will change

upon her release from incarceration. See, e.g., K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 

N.E.3d 641, 647 (Ind. 2015) (finding evidence insufficient to support trial 

court’s conclusion that incarcerated Father would be unable to remedy 

conditions for removal; trial court failed to balance Father’s recent 

improvements against his habitual patterns of conduct; Father had made 

substantial efforts toward bettering his life though programs available during his 

incarceration, including establishing regular visitation with minor children). 

[13] We do not discount Mother’s recent efforts, and, contrary to her assertions, 

neither did the trial court. The trial court did not ignore Mother’s recent efforts 

and did not look simply to Mother’s incarceration and her inability to currently 

parent Child. Rather, the trial court considered Mother’s prior numerous 
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contacts with DCS, as well as her lengthy and extensive criminal history, and 

determined that Mother’s past behavior was more indicative of her future 

behavior than her minimal recent improvements while incarcerated. “We 

entrust th[is] delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a 

parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before 

termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. Although trial courts are required to give 

due regard to changed conditions, this does not preclude them from finding that 

a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior. Id.

[14] There is ample evidence that Mother began choosing criminal activity and drug 

use over the needs of her older daughter as early as 2012. Despite numerous 

opportunities over the last several years to alter her behavior and to cooperate 

with those providing social services, Mother chose to continue her negative 

behavior even after the birth of Child and a second CHINS case. Again, 

Mother’s efforts while incarcerated, while commendable, were not substantial 

when compared with her habitual patterns of conduct. Under the 

circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion in determining that 

there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation based upon 

Mother’s long-term pattern of behavior. The trial court’s conclusion that there 

is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child’s removal and 

continued placement outside the home will not be remedied is supported by 

clear and convincing evidence.
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Section 2 – Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights is in Child’s best interests.

[15] Mother next challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination of her 

parental rights is in Child’s best interests. In considering whether termination 

of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to 

look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the 

evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 

203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the 

interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. The trial court need not 

wait until the child is irreversibly harmed before terminating parental rights. Id. 

“[T]he historic inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision, 

coupled with the current inability to provide the same, will support a finding 

that continuation of the parent-child relationship is contrary to the child’s best 

interests.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The testimony 

of service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203.

[16] The original DCS family case manager, Christopher LaMar, opined that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests. He noted 

that Mother failed to engage in any services prior to her incarceration while he 

was on the case. Similarly, the more recent DCS family case manager,

Kourtney Wheeler, also opined that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

was in Child’s best interests because Child needs permanency. Wheeler noted 
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that Child had been in foster care her entire life and that Mother will continue 

to be incarcerated until at least the end of 2019. She emphasized that Mother 

and Child have zero bond because Mother has had no contact with Child since 

birth due to her drug use and continued criminal behavior.

[17] Court Appointed Special Advocate Brenda Parker also testified that she 

believed the best interests of Child would be served by termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. Parker opined that Mother had not remedied the conditions 

that led to Child’s placement outside of her care and that continuation of the 

parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child’s well-being. Parker noted 

Mother’s history with DCS and her long-term abuse of methamphetamine. 

Parker stated that Child “has been out of the home five hundred and six days. 

She has been with her foster parents five hundred and four days ... that is all 

she knows as her family and as her parents.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 58. Parker stated 

that Child had overcome “so many obstacles that she started out with” and was 

thriving in the care of her foster parents. Id. at 53. Parker was confident that 

adoption by Child’s current foster family would be best for Child. 

[18] As our supreme court has often stated, “children have an interest in terminating 

parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, 

long-term, continuous relationships.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting In re 

C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011)). Clear and convincing evidence 

supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s rights is in 

Child’s best interests.
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Section 3 – Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that adoption is a satisfactory plan for the 

care and treatment of Child. 

[19] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a 

satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child. While the trial court must 

find that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child, 

“[t]his plan need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the 

direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is 

terminated.” In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d 603, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

Generally, adoption is a satisfactory plan. Id.

[20] It is clear from the trial court’s findings that the permanency plan here is for 

Child to be adopted by her current foster family or by another adoptive family if

the current foster family is unable to adopt for any reason. Thus, there is clearly 

a general sense of direction in which Child will be going after the parent-child 

relationship is terminated. The lion’s share of Mother’s argument against this 

plan is simply that the trial court should have given more consideration to 

“alternative options” to termination of parental rights such as “guardianship or

third-party custody” with Child’s maternal grandparents, as has been done with 

Mother’s older daughter. Appellant’s Br. at 34. However, the trial court 

specifically considered these options, but ultimately rejected them in favor of 

termination, and we must defer to the trial court’s weighing of the evidence 
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here.5 Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that 

adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child.

[21] Decisions to terminate parental rights “are among the most difficult our trial 

courts are called upon to make” and are very fact sensitive. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 

640. We will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of 

“clear error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 

Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court’s termination 

of Mother’s parental rights to Child was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the 

trial court’s termination order is affirmed.

[22] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

 

5 The trial court made detailed findings supporting its decision not to place Child with her maternal 

grandparents. Namely, the maternal grandparents adamantly declined placement of Child at the outset of the 

CHINS case and then, after later expressing some interest in placement, canceled multiple scheduled visits. 

Moreover, service providers noted that the maternal grandparents, especially maternal grandmother, 

exhibited little engagement with Child even during visits they attended.