ASYLUM

Variation Exists in 

Outcomes of 

Applications Across 

Immigration Courts 

and Judges

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2016

GAO-17-72

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-72, a report to 

congressional committees

November 2016

ASYLUM

Variation Exists in Outcomes of Applications 

Across Immigration Courts and Judges

What GAO Found

GAO analyzed the outcomes of 595,795 asylum applications completed by the 

Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) 

between fiscal years 1995 and 2014, and identified outcome variation both over 

time and across immigration courts and judges. From fiscal years 2008 through 

2014, annual grant rates for affirmative asylum applications (those filed with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at the initiative of the individual and 

referred to an EOIR immigration judge) ranged from 21 to 44 percent. In the 

same period, grant rates for defensive asylum applications (those initiated before 

an immigration judge) ranged from 15 to 26 percent. Further, EOIR data indicate 

that asylum grant rates varied by immigration court. For example, from May 2007 

through fiscal year 2014, the grant rate was 66 percent (affirmative) and 52 

percent (defensive) in the New York, New York, immigration court and less than 

5 percent (affirmative and defensive) in the Omaha, Nebraska, and Atlanta, 

Georgia, immigration courts.

GAO found that certain case and judge-related factors are associated with 

variation in the outcomes of asylum applications. For example, applicants who 

were represented by legal counsel were granted asylum at a rate 3.1 

(affirmative) and 1.8 (defensive) times higher than applicants who were not 

represented. After statistically controlling for certain factors, such as judge 

experience and whether or not the applicant had dependents, GAO found 

variation remained in the outcomes of completed asylum applications across 

immigration courts and judges. For example, from May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014, GAO estimated that the affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates 

would vary by 29 and 38 percentage points, respectively, for a representative 

applicant with the same average characteristics we measured, whose case was 

heard in different immigration courts. In addition, GAO estimated that the 

affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates would vary by 47 and 57 

percentage points, respectively, for the same representative applicant whose 

case was heard by different immigration judges. GAO could not control for the 

underlying facts and merits of individual asylum applications because EOIR’s 

case management system was designed to track and manage workloads and 

does not collect data on all of the details of individual proceedings. Nonetheless, 

the data available allowed GAO to hold constant certain factors of each asylum 

application, enabling GAO to compare outcomes across immigration courts and 

judges.

EOIR provides legal resources to targeted populations, including asylum 

applicants, through the Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and Legal Orientation 

Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien Children (LOPC). EOIR and its 

contractor use LOP and LOPC site visits, monthly conference calls, and quarterly 

reports to monitor these programs. However, EOIR has not established 

performance measures, consistent with principles outlined in the GPRA 

Modernization Act of 2010, to determine whether these programs are having a 

measurable impact in meeting program objectives. Developing and implementing 

performance measures, including establishing a baseline, to determine whether 

LOP and LOPC are having a measurable impact would better position EOIR to 

make any adjustments necessary to improve the programs’ performance. 

View GAO-17-72. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Tens of thousands of foreign nationals

in the United States apply annually for 

asylum, which provides refuge to those 

who have been persecuted or fear 

persecution on protected grounds. 

EOIR’s immigration judges decide 

asylum application outcomes in court 

proceedings. In 2008, GAO reported 

that EOIR data from October 1994 

through April 2007 showed significant 

variation in the outcomes across 

immigration courts and judges (grants 

versus denials) of such applications.

The Senate Appropriations Committee 

report for DHS Appropriations Act, 

2015, included a provision for GAO to 

update its 2008 report. This report 

examines (1) variation in asylum 

applications outcomes over time and 

across courts and judges; (2) factors 

associated with variability; and (3) 

EOIR’s actions to facilitate asylum 

applicants’ access to legal resources. 

GAO analyzed EOIR data—using 

multivariate statistics—on asylum 

outcomes from fiscal years 1995

through 2014, the most current data 

available at the time of GAO’s analysis; 

reviewed EOIR policies and 

procedures; and interviewed EOIR

officials and immigration judges about

court proceedings and legal access 

programs. GAO observed asylum 

hearings in 10 immigration courts 

selected on the basis of application 

data and other factors.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that EOIR develop 

and implement a system of 

performance measures, including 

establishing a baseline, to regularly 

evaluate the effectiveness of LOP and 

LOPC. EOIR concurred with GAO’s 

recommendation.
Page i GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Letter 1

Background 7

EOIR Data Indicate that Outcomes of Completed Asylum 

Applications Varied Over Time and Across Immigration Courts 

and Judges 13

Grant Rates for Asylum Applications Can be Affected by Case 

Characteristics and Outcome Variance Persists when 

Controlling for Certain Factors 29

EOIR Has Programs in Place to Facilitate Access to Legal 

Resources for Asylum Applicants, but Could Improve Efforts to 

Measure Program Results 35

Conclusions 42

Recommendation for Executive Action 43

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43

Appendix I Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) Training for 

Immigration Judges 45

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47

Appendix III Multivariate Statistical Analysis of Outcomes of Completed Asylum 

Applications, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014 54

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 65

Tables

Table 1: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rates in Immigration Courts 

with More Than 15 Judges, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 

2014 25

Table 2: Defensive Asylum Grant Rates in Immigration Courts with 

More Than 15 Judges, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 

2014 27

Table 3: Estimated Asylum Grant Rate Variation Across Courts, 

Holding Constant Various Characteristics, May 2007 

through Fiscal Year 2014 34

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Table 4: Estimated Asylum Grant Rate Variation Across Judges, 

Holding Constant Various Characteristics, May 2007 

through Fiscal Year 2014 35

Table 5: Objectives for Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and 

Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of 

Unaccompanied Alien Children (LOPC) 37

Table 6: Changes in Training for New Immigration Judges, Fiscal 

Years 2008 to 2016 45

Table 7: Variables Used in GAO Analyses of Factors Affecting 

Asylum Outcomes 51

Table 8: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of Completed 

Affirmative Asylum Applications, October 1994 through 

September 2001 59

Table 9: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of Completed 

Affirmative Asylum Applications, September 2001 through 

September 20014 60

Table 10: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of 

Completed Defensive Asylum Applications, October 1994 

through September 2001 62

Table 11: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of 

Completed Defensive Asylum Applications, September 

2001 through September 2014 63

Figures

Figure 1: Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for 

Immigration Review Process for Adjudicating Asylum 

Applications 8

Figure 2: Outcomes of Completed Affirmative Asylum 

Applications, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014 15

Figure 3: Outcomes of Completed Defensive Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014 16

Figure 4: Asylum Grant Rates, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014 18

Figure 5: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rates by Country of 

Nationality, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014 20

Figure 6: Defensive Asylum Grant Rates by Country of Nationality, 

May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014 22

Figure 7: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rates by Court, May 2007 

through Fiscal Year 2014 23

Figure 8: Defensive Asylum Grant Rates by Court, May 2007 

through Fiscal Year 2014 24
Page iii GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 9: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rate Ranges for Judges in 

Immigration Courts, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014 26

Figure 10: Defensive Asylum Grant Rate Ranges for Judges in 

Immigration Courts, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014 28

Figure 11: Individuals Served by the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review’s (EOIR) Legal Orientation Program 

(LOP), Fiscal Years 2008 through 2015 38

Figure 12: Individuals Served by the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review’s (EOIR) Legal Orientation Program 

for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien Children (LOPC), 

Fiscal Years 2011 through 2015 39

Abbreviations

ACIJ Assistant Chief Immigration Judge

BIA Board of Immigration Appeals

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOJ Department of Justice 

EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

GPRAMA Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)

 Modernization Act of 2010

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

INA Immigration and Nationality Act 

LOP Legal Orientation Program 

LOPC Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of 

 Unaccompanied Alien Children 

OLAP Office of Legal Access Programs 

UAC unaccompanied alien children

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Vera Vera Institute of Justice

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Page 1 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 14, 2016

Congressional Committees

Each year, tens of thousands of foreign nationals in the United States 

apply for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been 

persecuted or fear persecution in their home countries on protected 

grounds. U.S. immigration law provides that foreign nationals within the 

United States may be granted humanitarian protection in the form of 

asylum if they are unable or unwilling to return to their home country 

because of past persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution 

based on their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.1 Decisions on asylum applications can carry 

serious consequences—granting asylum to an applicant with a genuine 

claim protects the asylee from being returned to a country where he or 

she has been or could in the future be persecuted, but granting asylum to 

an ineligible individual jeopardizes the integrity of the asylum system.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) within the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) share 

responsibility for the U.S. asylum system. USCIS asylum officers 

adjudicate affirmative asylum claims—that is, claims made at the initiative 

of the individual who files an application for asylum with USCIS. If the 

asylum officer does not grant asylum to an applicant who lacks lawful 

status in the United States, his or her application is to be referred to EOIR 

for adjudication during removal proceedings in immigration court.2 EOIR’s 

immigration judges adjudicate defensive claims, which are those claims 

first raised during removal proceedings in immigration court as a defense 

 1The laws governing asylum protection were first established in statute with the passage 

of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, tit. II, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102-06 (1980) 

(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-1159). The Refugee Act provided, for the first 

time, a U.S. refugee policy that stated that persecuted foreign nationals who are present in 

the United States and who meet the definition of a refugee can apply for asylum protection 

in the United States. The legal standard for a refugee and asylee are generally the same, 

but foreign nationals must apply for refugee status from outside the United States and for 

asylum status from within the United States. The final regulations implementing asylum 

and withholding of removal provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980 were issued in 1990.

28 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (where an applicant appears to be inadmissible or deportable, 

the asylum officer must refer the application to an immigration judge, together with the 

appropriate charging document).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

to removal from the United States, as well as affirmative asylum claims 

referred by USCIS.3 According to EOIR, from fiscal years 2011 through 

2015, EOIR’s immigration judges completed more than 181,000 total 

asylum applications in 58 immigration courts throughout the United 

States.4

In 2008, we reported on our analysis of EOIR data from fiscal years 1995 

through April 2007 on the outcomes of asylum applications across 

immigration courts and judges. Specifically, we reported that there was 

significant variation in such outcomes during that time period.5 For 

example, we found that the grant rate for affirmative asylum applications 

ranged from 6 percent in the immigration court in Atlanta, Georgia, to 54 

percent in New York, New York; the grant rate for defensive asylum 

applications ranged from 7 percent in Atlanta, Georgia, to 35 percent in 

San Francisco, California, and New York, New York. On the basis of our 

multivariate statistical analysis, we also reported that grant rates for 

affirmative and defensive asylum applications were more than three times 

higher for individuals who were represented by legal counsel. As a result, 

we recommended, among other things, that EOIR address disparities in 

asylum outcomes that may be unwarranted and identify immigration 

judges who may benefit from supplemental efforts to improve their 

performance. EOIR implemented this recommendation by providing 

training to all immigration judges and conducting analyses comparing 

asylum grant rates for judges before and after the training. We also 

reported that EOIR expanded access to legal resources and information 

for individuals in removal proceedings in immigration court. In addition, 

since 2008, EOIR has also expanded its training program for new 

immigration judges (see app. I for more information on EOIR’s training for 

immigration judges). In addition, we recommended that EOIR develop a 

plan for supervisory immigration judges, including an assessment of the 

 3An individual making a defensive claim may have been placed in removal proceedings 

after having been stopped at the border without proper documentation, identified as 

present in the United States without valid status, or identified as potentially removable on 

one or more grounds, such as for certain kinds of criminal convictions. In addition, when 

an affirmative applicant without valid immigration status is not granted asylum by USCIS, 

he or she is referred to removal proceedings, where the asylum claim may be renewed. 

4EOIR reports “asylum completions” in their annual statistics yearbook. U.S. Department 

of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2015 Statistics Yearbook, 

prepared by the Office of Planning, Analysis, and Statistics (Falls Church, VA: April 2016).

5GAO, U.S. Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes Across 

Immigration Courts and Judges, GAO-08-940 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 25, 2008). 
Page 3 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

resources and guidance needed to ensure that immigration judges 

receive effective supervision. In response, EOIR analyzed the duties and 

tasks performed by EOIR’s Assistant Chief Immigration Judges (ACIJ), 

who oversee EOIR’s immigration judges. Among other things, in 2010, 

EOIR published the ACIJ Handbook to assist ACIJs in carrying out their 

roles as supervisors in immigration court.6

The Senate Appropriations Committee Report that accompanied the DHS 

Appropriations Act, 2015, includes a provision for us to update our 2008 

report.7 This report (1) describes the extent of variation in the outcomes of 

completed asylum applications over time and across immigration courts 

and judges; (2) discusses the factors associated with variability in the 

outcomes of completed asylum applications; and (3) examines the extent 

to which EOIR has taken action to facilitate access to legal resources, 

including representation, for asylum applicants.

To describe the extent of variation in the outcomes of completed asylum 

applications, we analyzed record-level data from EOIR on all immigration 

court proceedings from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2014. Our 

analysis included all completed asylum applications between October 1, 

1994, and September 30, 2014, the most current data available at the 

time of our analysis, that involved asylum applicants from (1) countries 

with a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed asylum 

applications during the time period; (2) immigration courts with a minimum 

of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed asylum applications 

during the time period; and (3) judges with a minimum of 50 affirmative 

and 50 defensive completed asylum applications in their primary court 

 6EOIR updated the Handbook in 2012.

7S. Rep. No. 113-198, at 132 (June 26, 2014).
Page 4 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

during the time period.8 This combination yielded a total of 740,922 

individuals with asylum applications that were completed between fiscal 

years 1995 and 2014 included in our sample. Of those, 595,795 (or 80 

percent) were included in our analysis of asylum application completions 

and asylum grant rates. We used data from EOIR’s case management 

system to identify immigration court proceedings where an immigration 

judge had made a decision on an applicant’s asylum application. We 

assessed the reliability of the data used in our analyses through 

electronic testing, analyzing related database documentation, and 

working with agency officials to reconcile discrepancies between the data 

and documentation that we received. We determined that the data on 

completions of asylum applications were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of our reporting objectives.

To discuss the factors associated with variability in the outcomes of 

completed asylum applications, we used multivariate statistical methods 

to estimate an expected asylum grant rate for a representative applicant, 

holding constant various characteristics of individual cases, judges, and 

courts. The scope of our analysis included the outcomes of all completed 

asylum applications that met the screening criteria discussed above—

specifically, we created an indicator for each application that reflected 

whether the applicant received asylum. This allowed us to calculate 

asylum grant rates as a proportion of all completed asylum applications. 

Our analysis used a mixed logistic regression model to attribute the 

unique contribution of certain factors in each completed asylum 

application to variation in asylum grant rates. For a complete list of the 

factors used in our analysis, see table 7 in appendix II. We modeled the 

data separately by affirmative and defensive applications and time period. 

Each applicant was associated with a judge, court, country of nationality, 

 8We selected countries of nationality and immigration courts that contributed a minimum 

of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive asylum decisions on asylum applications from fiscal 

year 1995 through fiscal year 2014; a total of 41 countries and 28 immigration courts met 

this threshold. We selected the 800 minimum in each category to help ensure a sufficient 

number of completed asylum applications for our analysis. We selected immigration 

judges with a minimum of 50 affirmative and 50 defensive completed asylum applications 

from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2014. We selected the 50 minimum in each 

category to help ensure having judges who completed a sufficient number of asylum 

applications for our analysis. We excluded immigration judges who heard fewer than 50 

affirmative cases in our analyses of affirmative asylum decisions and fewer than 50 

defensive cases in our analyses of defensive asylum decision. We also excluded cases 

heard by immigration judges other than in their primary court in order to simplifythe 

presentation and avoid reaching inappropriate conclusions that can occur when 

calculations are based on small numbers of cases.
Page 5 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

and language. The results of our analysis allowed us to estimate the 

range of expected affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates for a 

representative applicant with the same average characteristics we 

measured whose case was heard in different courts or by different 

judges. EOIR’s case management system was designed to track and 

manage cases and does not collect data on all of the details of individual 

proceedings. As a result, our analysis could not hold constant the 

underlying facts and merits of individual asylum applications because 

EOIR’s case management system does not collect that information. 

Nonetheless, the data available allowed us to control for certain factors of 

each asylum application, enabling us to compare outcomes across 

immigration courts and judges. For a detailed discussion of our 

multivariate statistical methods, see appendix III.

To examine the extent to which EOIR has taken action to facilitate access 

to legal resources, we reviewed the documents on EOIR’s legal 

resources programs, including congressional budget justifications and 

EOIR documentation on individual programs and initiatives. In particular, 

we focused our review on the Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and the 

Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien 

Children (LOPC) because these are among EOIR’s longest-standing legal 

access programs, they have received more funding than EOIR’s Office of 

Legal Access Program’s (OLAP) other programs, and they have served 

tens of thousands of individuals at immigration courts throughout the 

United States. Regarding LOP and LOPC, we examined documentation 

outlining program objectives and deliverables, quarterly and annual 

reports, site visit reports and evaluation reports. In addition, we analyzed 

data on the number of individuals served by LOP (fiscal years 2008 

through 2015) and LOPC (fiscal years 2011 through 2015). We also 

interviewed EOIR officials responsible for overseeing the program. We 

analyzed all of this information in light of principles outlined in the 

Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, as updated

by the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010,9 to assess EOIR’s 

efforts to measure progress and results against performance measures.

To address all three objectives, we reviewed EOIR documents describing 

EOIR asylum applications statistics; policies and procedures related to 

immigration court proceedings; manuals and documents describing 

 9GPRA, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993), was updated by the GPRA 

Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). In particular, see 

31 U.S.C. § 1115 (relating to agency performance plans and performance measurement).
Page 6 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

EOIR’s case management system; guidance and training provided to 

judges for adjudicating asylum applications; and documentation on 

EOIR’s programs aimed at providing legal resources to individual in 

proceedings in immigration court. We also interviewed EOIR 

headquarters officials responsible for overseeing immigration court 

proceedings, EOIR’s case management system, and immigration judge 

training and guidance and legal access programs. We visited 10 

immigration courts in Tacoma, Washington; Seattle, Washington; New 

York, New York; Newark, New Jersey; Elizabeth, New Jersey; Los 

Angeles, California; Adelanto, California; Miami, Florida; Krome, Florida; 

and, Arlington, Virginia. At these locations, we interviewed supervisory 

immigration judges, immigration judges, court administrators and 

observed removal proceedings for individuals applying for asylum. We 

interviewed supervisory immigration judges, immigration judges and court 

administrators by telephone at two additional immigration courts in El 

Paso, Texas and Atlanta, Georgia. We selected these sites based on a 

variety of factors, including number of asylum cases adjudicated, courts 

with dockets of individuals who are being detained by DHS throughout the 

course of their immigration court proceedings, as well as courts with 

dockets of individuals who are not detained, and a range of grant rates, 

and circuit court jurisdiction. We also interviewed DHS attorneys 

responsible for representing the U.S. government in removal proceedings 

in immigration court and staff from pro bono/advocacy organizations 

proximate to each immigration court to gain their perspectives on (1) 

potential factors associated with changes in asylum applications 

outcomes over time and (2) immigration court efforts to facilitate access 

to legal resources for asylum seekers. The results from our site visits 

cannot be generalized more broadly to all immigration courts or 

immigration judges. However, they provided important context and 

insights into EOIR’s efforts to assist immigration judges in adjudicating 

asylum applications, perspectives on training and guidance provided to 

immigration judges, and EOIR efforts to facilitate access to legal 

resources.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to October 2016 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II provides additional 

information on our scope and methodology.
Page 7 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Immigration court hearings are adversarial proceedings in which an 

individual appears before an immigration judge for adjudication of 

charges of removability from the United States, and may raise defense to 

removal by seeking asylum and other forms of relief or protection from 

removal.10 Immigration judges are to assess whether an applicant has 

credibly demonstrated that he or she is eligible to be granted asylum, and 

whether a grant of asylum is warranted as a matter of discretion. An 

applicant is eligible for asylum if he or she (1) applies from within the 

United States; (2) suffered past persecution, or has a well-founded fear of 

future persecution, based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion; and (3) is not statutorily barred 

from applying for or being granted asylum. When making a credibility 

determination, the immigration judge is to consider the totality of the 

circumstances and all relevant factors.11 EOIR follows the same 

procedures for defensive asylum applications and affirmative asylum 

referrals from USCIS.12 For affirmative asylum referrals, the immigration 

judge reviews the case de novo, meaning that the judge evaluates the 

applicant’s affirmative asylum application anew and is not bound by the 

USCIS asylum officer’s previous determination. As shown in Figure 1, in 

conducting removal proceedings and adjudicating cases before them, 

judges in immigration courts conduct an initial master calendar hearing to, 

among other things, ensure the applicant understands the immigration 

 10Throughout this report we generally use the terms “immigration relief” or “relief” in 

reference to any form of relief or protection from removal provided for under U.S. 

immigration law.

118 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Such factors could include, among others, the applicant’s 

demeanor, candor, or responsiveness in the asylum interview or immigration court 

hearing, or any inaccuracies or falsehoods discovered in the applicant’s written or oral 

statements, whether or not an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of 

the applicant’s claim.Burden of proof requirements for asylum applicants and grounds 

upon which a trier of fact can make a credibility determination in asylum cases (see 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)) took effect on the date of enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005, 

and apply to applications for asylum made on or after such date. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, 

div. B, tit. I, § 101(a)(3), (h), 119 Stat. 231, 303, 305 (May 11, 2005).

12If USCIS grants asylum to the applicant, the asylee is eligible to apply for adjustment to 

lawful permanent resident status after 1 year. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (Statutory requirements 

for an asylee to adjust to lawful permanent resident). If USCIS does not grant asylum and 

the applicant is present in the United States unlawfully, USCIS is to refer the application to 

EOIR, together with a Notice to Appear, which requires that the applicant appear before 

an EOIR immigration judge for adjudication of the asylum claim in removal proceedings. 

Background

DOJ’s Process for 

Adjudicating Asylum 

Applications
Page 8 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

court proceedings and schedule the merits hearing, during which the 

judge hears claims for immigration relief, such as asylum.

Figure 1: Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review Process for Adjudicating Asylum Applications

An individual in removal proceedings in immigration court may request 

multiple types of relief before an immigration judge, and, if deemed 

removable, the judge makes a decision as to whether the individual 

satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements of any requested relief. 

During the merits hearing, judges hear testimony from the respondent 

and any other witnesses, oversee cross-examinations by DHS’s U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) trial attorneys, and review 

relevant evidence, including evidence related to claims for asylum or 

other relief. Additionally, the immigration judge may question the applicant 

or other witnesses. Judges render oral or written decisions at the end of 
Page 9 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

immigration court proceedings.13 As a general matter, immigration judges 

have discretion in rendering decisions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b), which 

states that “[i]n deciding the individual case before them, and subject to 

the applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise 

their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action 

consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is 

appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases.” In addition, 

asylum is a discretionary form of relief under U.S. immigration law,14 in 

contrast to a mandatory type of immigration relief or protection, such as 

withholding of removal.15 With respect to asylum, section 208(a) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that the Attorney General 

or the Secretary of Homeland Security may grant asylum to an applicant 

who meets the definition of a refugee under INA § 101(a)(42)(A).

There are five possible outcomes of an asylum application—grant, denial, 

withdrawal, abandonment, or other. If a judge grants asylum, the asylee is 

eligible to apply for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status after 

one year.16 Individuals who have been granted asylum are considered 

qualified individuals for the purpose of eligibility for federal, and state or 

local, public benefits.17 Asylees are authorized for employment in the 

 13Generally, decisions of EOIR immigration judges are subject to review by the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative appellate body within DOJ for 

interpreting and applying U.S. immigration law. The BIA’s decisions can be reviewed by 

the Attorney General. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1), (d)(1), (g), (h). After exhausting 

administrative remedies within DOJ, an individual may appeal a final order of removal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the immigration judge completed the 

initial trial-level proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. There are 13 U.S. Circuit Courts of 

Appeals (Circuit Courts), which are appellate courts that review U.S. District Court and 

certain administrative decisions, such as those made by the BIA. Circuit court decisions 

on particular issues are binding on the BIA and immigration courts in cases arising within 

the circuit court’s territorial jurisdiction.

14See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b) (Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security “may”

grant asylum to an otherwise eligible applicant), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), (b)(4)(D) (decision to 

grant relief under INA § 208 is discretionary).

15Under INA § 241(b)(3) (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)), the Attorney General may not remove a 

foreign national to a country if the foreign national’s life or freedom would be threatened in 

that country because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 

or political opinion. 

16See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (Statutory requirements for an asylee to adjust to lawful 

permanent residence). 

178 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621, 1641(b).

Potential Outcomes of 

Asylum Applications in 

Immigration Court
Page 10 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

United States as a result of their asylum status.18 The other four possible 

outcomes of an asylum application—denial, withdrawal, abandonment, 

and other—do not result in an asylum grant, and therefore do not convey 

such benefits.19 According to EOIR headquarters officials, the outcome of 

an individual’s asylum application is not necessarily determinative of the 

outcome of the individual’s overall removal case. For example, an 

individual whose asylum application ends in an outcome of denial, 

withdrawal, or other may still be granted other forms of relief or protection 

from removal, such as withholding or cancellation of removal.20 Or, the 

individual may be found removable and not eligible for any form of relief 

or protection from removal. In this latter case, the individual would be 

subject to removal pursuant to the judge’s order of removal once it has 

become administratively final.21 According to EOIR headquarters officials, 

an outcome of other for an asylum application is recorded if the judge did 

 188 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a). In addition, asylum applicants can 

receive an Employment Authorization Document after their applications have been 

pending, including in both the USCIS and EOIR adjudicative process, for 180 days, not 

including any delays requested or caused by the applicant such as requesting to 

reschedule or failing to appear at the asylum interview or, where applicable, the time 

between issuance of a request for evidence and receipt of the applicant’s response. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7(a)(1), (2), 274a.12(c), 274a.13(a)(2).

19According to EOIR headquarters officials, an asylum application is resolved with a 

completion of “denial” if the applicant did not meet the burden of proof required to be 

granted relief or is otherwise barred by statute. An asylum application is resolved with an 

outcome of “withdrawn” if the applicant requests that the claim be withdrawn; a withdrawal 

is always at the initiative of the applicant. An asylum application outcome of “abandoned”

can be made in absentia if the applicant does not appear for his or her hearing. An asylum 

application is resolved with an outcome of “other” if the judge did not reach a decision on 

the asylum application; according to EOIR headquarters officials, a judge might not reach 

a decision on an asylum application if the applicant’s removal case is administratively 

closed or if proceedings are terminated, among other scenarios.

20Withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3) prevents removal to a country where 

there is a clear probability that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in that 

country based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular 

social group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Cancellation of removal 

may also be available for certain non-permanent residents, provided the applicable

eligibility requirements are satisfied. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 

21Generally, a removal order refers to an immigration judge’s ruling that an individual is 

removable, not otherwise eligible for relief or protection from removal, and therefore is to 

be removed from the United States. An order of removal made by an immigration judge at 

the conclusion of proceedings becomes administratively final in accordance with 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1241.1.
Page 11 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

not need to reach a decision on the merits of the asylum application.22 For 

example, ICE’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor may exercise 

prosecutorial discretion in seeking, and the immigration judge may grant, 

administrative closure of removal proceedings for an individual whose 

case is not an enforcement priority for DHS.23

EOIR’s OLAP oversees various programs aimed at increasing access to 

legal services and information for individuals appearing before 

immigration court, as well as improving the effectiveness of EOIR’s 

adjudication process. According to EOIR, since April 2000, OLAP has 

worked to improve access to legal information and counseling and 

increase the level of representation for individuals appearing before the 

immigration courts. This has been carried out primarily through initiatives 

that facilitate access to information and help create new incentives for 

attorneys, non-profit organizations and their representatives, and law 

 22According to EOIR headquarters officials, “other” may include administrative closure or 

termination of proceedings. Administrative closure is a procedural tool available to an 

immigration judge that is used, as appropriate under the circumstances, to temporarily 

remove a case from the active calendar. Termination results in dismissal of the case. 

Cases that are administratively closed can be reopened, and new charges may be filed in 

cases that are terminated.

23In a 2014 policy memorandum, the Secretary of Homeland Security stated that DHS 

cannot respond to all immigration violations or remove all persons illegally in the United 

States and that DHS must exercise prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of the law, 

focusing on the enforcement priorities of national security, border security, and public 

safety. As such, DHS personnel are expected to exercise discretion based on individual 

circumstances and pursue the agency’s enforcement priorities at all stages of the 

enforcement process, including in immigration court proceedings. An EOIR policy 

memorandum, issued in April 2015, states that cases pending in immigration court 

dockets that DHS determines are not enforcement priorities, through the exercise of 

prosecutorial discretion, are subject to administrative closure or dismissal.

EOIR’s Legal Access 

Programs
Page 12 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

students to accept pro bono cases.24 In particular, OLAP established LOP 

and LOPC to provide legal information to targeted populations regarding 

immigration court processes and possible forms of relief, including 

asylum.25 LOP, which EOIR established in 2003, provides legal 

information to individuals in detention who are awaiting their removal 

proceedings regarding their rights and the immigration process to assist 

them in making better informed decisions earlier in immigration court 

proceedings. LOPC, which EOIR established in 2010, provides legal 

orientation presentations to custodians of unaccompanied alien children 

(UAC) released from custody from the Office of Refugee Resettlement, to 

ensure the child’s appearance at all immigration court hearings.26 To 

provide LOP and LOPC services, OLAP contracts with the Vera Institute 

of Justice (Vera), which subcontracts with non-profit organizations across 

the country. OLAP has also established other legal access services, 

 24OLAP-administered programs do not generally provide pro bono legal representation to 

individuals in immigration proceedings (see 8 U.S.C. § 1362); however, OLAP administers 

two programs that fund direct legal representation for specific vulnerable populations. In 

2013, EOIR established the National Qualified Representative Program, which provides 

legal representation to certain unrepresented individuals who are detained and identified 

by EOIR as unable to represent themselves due to a serious mental disorder or condition. 

If an individual in removal proceedings lacks sufficient mental capacity, the Immigration 

Judge will evaluate, and has the discretion to select and implement, appropriate 

safeguards. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3); Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011); 

Matter of M-J-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 773 (BIA 2016). In 2014, EOIR established the Baltimore 

Representation Initiative for Unaccompanied Children, which provides legal representation 

and other related services to certain unaccompanied children in immigration proceedings 

before the Baltimore Immigration Court. In 2014, EOIR, in partnership with the Corporation 

for National and Community Service, established the justice AmeriCorps Legal Services 

for Unaccompanied Children program, to provide direct representation to certain 

unaccompanied children under 16 years of age in locations throughout the United States.

25Regarding LOP, in fiscal year 2002, $1 million ofDOJ’s appropriation was provided for 

“legal orientation programs.” See Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 107-278, at 79 (Nov. 

9, 2001), accompanying the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, 

and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748 (2001). 

These programs were to be used “for non-governmental agencies to provide ‘live 

presentations’ to persons in INS [DHS] detention prior to their first hearing before an 

immigration judge.” See S. Rep. No. 107-42, at 39-40 (July 20, 2001). LOPC is provided 

for under 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(4) (“The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 

cooperate with the Executive Office for Immigration Review to ensure that custodians 

receive legal orientation presentations provided through the Legal Orientation Program 

administered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review. At a minimum, such 

presentations shall address the custodian’s responsibility to attempt to ensure the child’s 

appearance at all immigration proceedings and to protect the child from mistreatment, 

exploitation, and trafficking.”)

26UAC are children under 18 years old with no lawful immigration status and no parent or 

legal guardian in the United States, or no parent or legal guardian in the United States 

available to provide care and physical custody. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
Page 13 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

including self-help materials and other programs intended to increase pro 

bono representation and serve vulnerable populations.27

A total of 740,922 individuals with asylum applications that were 

completed between fiscal years 1995 and 2014 met the criteria to be

included in our sample.28 Of those, 595,795 (or 80 percent) were included 

in our analysis of asylum application completions and asylum grant 

 27For example, in 2001, OLAP established the BIA Pro Bono Project to increase pro bono

representation for individuals detained by ICE with immigration cases under appeal to the 

BIA. In addition, in 2001, OLAP also established the Model Hearing Program that provides 

mock trial training sessions in immigration court to attorneys and law students and other 

individuals interested in providing pro bono representation, with the goal of increasing pro 

bono representation and improving the quality of advocacy before immigration courts.

28Our sample included individuals with asylum applications that were completed between 

fiscal years 1995 and 2014 with a non-missing and valid immigration judge code 

associated with the proceeding. The lead alien number—a unique registration number 

assigned to foreign nationals by DHS—was the unit of analysis; we did not separately 

analyze outcomes for others (such as spouses or dependent children) associated with the 

lead applicant because associated cases are typically adjudicated as part of the same 

hearing process. 

EOIR Data Indicate 

that Outcomes of 

Completed Asylum 

Applications Varied 

Over Time and 

Across Immigration 

Courts and Judges

Asylum Application 

Outcomes
Page 14 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

rates.29 Since 2008, when we last reported on asylum outcomes, EOIR’s 

immigration judges granted asylum to between 4,508 and 6,090 

individuals in our sample each year.

The number of individuals granted affirmative asylum each year has 

ranged from 3,060 to 4,166. The number of individuals denied affirmative 

asylum decreased each fiscal year from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 

2014. Figure 2 illustrates outcomes of completed affirmative asylum 

applications during this period.30

 29Our analysis included all completed asylum applications between October 1, 1994, and 

September 30, 2014, that involved asylum applicants from 1) countries with a minimum of 

800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed asylum applications during the time period; 

2) courts with a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed asylum 

applications during the time period; and 3) judges with a minimum of 50 affirmative and 50 

defensive completed asylum applications in their primary court during the time period. In 

analyzing differences in completed asylum applications across immigration judges, we 

excluded cases heard by immigration judges other than in their primary court to simplify 

the presentation and avoid reaching inappropriate conclusions that can occur when 

calculations are based on small numbers of cases. We reported separately on affirmative 

and defensive completed asylum applications to control for characteristics shared by 

cases in each of those groups that could affect outcomes, such as whether the asylum 

application had already been reviewed by a USCIS asylum officer. 

30The scope of our work includes asylum completions in immigration courts. When we 

refer to outcomes of completed affirmative asylum applications, these are applications that 

are adjudicated by an immigration judge after being referred by USCIS to EOIR. 
Page 15 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 2: Outcomes of Completed Affirmative Asylum Applications, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Note: Our analysis included all completed asylum applications that involved asylum applicants from 1) 

countries w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed applications during the 

time period; 2) courts w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed applications 

during the time period; and 3) judges w ith a minimum of 50 affirmative and 50 defensive completed 

applications in their primary court during the time period.

Since our 2008 report, the number of defensive asylum applications that 

were granted by immigration judges has ranged from 1,343 to 1,924 per 

year (fiscal years 2008 through 2014). As illustrated in Figure 3, the 

number of defensive asylum applications that were denied increased 

each fiscal year from 2011 to 2014. The number of defensive asylum 

applications with outcomes of “other” increased sharply from 828 in fiscal 

year 2009 to 3,960 in fiscal year 2014. As previously discussed, an 

outcome of “other” for an asylum application is recorded if the immigration 

judge did not need to reach a decision on the merits of the application. 

EOIR officials stated that the impact of DHS’s 2011 memorandum on 

prosecutorial discretion for immigration enforcement is a key reason for 
Page 16 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

this increase—when DHS exercises prosecutorial discretion during 

removal proceedings, judges are able to administratively close removal 

cases without reaching a decision on the merits of the case, including 

associated asylum applications.31

Figure 3: Outcomes of Completed Defensive Asylum Applications, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014 

Note: Our analysis included all completed asylum applications that involved asylum applicants from 1) 

countries w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed applications during the 

time period; 2) courts w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed applications 

during the time period; and 3) judges w ith a minimum of 50 affirmative and 50 defensive completed 

applications during the time period.

 31The DHS memorandum “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil 

Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and 

Removal of Aliens” was issued by Director John Morton on June 17, 2011. The memo 

states that ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention space, and 

removal assets to ensure that the individuals it removes represent the agency’s 

enforcement priorities and that the agency must regularly exercise “prosecutorial 

discretion” if it is to prioritize its efforts. 
Page 17 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

For fiscal years 1995 through 2014, EOIR data indicate that affirmative 

and defensive asylum grant rates varied over time and across 

immigration courts, applicants’ country of nationality, and individual 

immigration judges within courts. In 2008, we reported the asylum grant 

rate as the number of asylum applications granted divided by the total 

number of all granted and denied applications. In other words, the grant 

rate depended on the number of completed asylum applications that 

ended in a decision by the immigration judge of either grant or denial. In 

this report, to provide data on all of the outcomes of completed asylum 

applications during our period of analysis, we included the five possible 

outcomes in calculating the asylum grant rate. These include applications 

that were granted and denied, as well as those that had an outcome of 

withdrawn, abandoned, or other. Thus, for the purposes of this report, we 

define the asylum “grant rate” as the number of granted asylum 

applications divided by the total number of completed applications 

(completions include applications that are granted, denied, withdrawn, 

abandoned, or end in an outcome of “other”) during the period of analysis. 

An expanded definition allows us to describe the outcomes of completed 

asylum applications, including outcomes other than granted or denied, 

and trends in those outcomes. Using this definition, annual grant rates for 

affirmative asylum applications ranged from 21 to 44 percent from fiscal 

year 2008 through fiscal year 2014. In the same time period, grant rates 

for defensive asylum applications ranged from 15 to 26 percent. Figure 4 

illustrates asylum grant rates for fiscal years 1995 through 2014.

Asylum Grant Rates
Page 18 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 4: Asylum Grant Rates, Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Note: Our analysis included all completed asylum applications that involved asylum applicants from 1)

countries w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed applications during the 

time period; 2) courts w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive completed applications 

during the time period; and 3) judges w ith a minimum of 50 affirmative and 50 defensive completed 

applications during the time period.

In 2008, we reported that affirmative asylum grant rates varied by 

applicants’ country of nationality. Country conditions vary from one 

country to another, including countries’ political climates and human rights 

records. Thus, differences in the extent to which applicants from various 

countries are granted or denied asylum in the United States is not 

unexpected. For the period since our 2008 report, from May 2007 through 

fiscal year 2014, affirmative asylum grant rates continued to vary by 

applicant nationality, as shown in Figure 5.32 For example, the grant rate 

for affirmative applicants exceeded 50 percent for asylum applicants from 

 32Our analysis included countries with a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive 

completed asylum applications from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2014. A total of 

41 countries met this threshold. We have illustrated grant rates for the period since our 

2008 report, which is May 2007 through fiscal year 2014.
Page 19 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

some countries, including Sudan, Cameroon, Burma (Myanmar), Sri 

Lanka, Yugoslavia, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Eritrea. For other 

countries, the affirmative asylum grant rate was less than 5 percent, 

including El Salvador, Cuba, Mexico, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, 

Honduras, and Philippines.
Page 20 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 5: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rates by Country of Nationality, May 2007 

through Fiscal Year 2014

Note: Our analysis included countries w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive 

completed asylum applications from fiscal years 1995 through 2014. A total of 41 countries met this 

threshold.
Page 21 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

In 2008, we reported that defensive asylum grant rates also varied by 

applicants’ country of nationality. From May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014, defensive asylum grant rates continued to vary by country of 

nationality. For example, the grant rate for defensive applicants exceeded 

50 percent for asylum applicants from some countries, including 

Cameroon, Iraq, China, Burma (Myanmar), Ethiopia, and Eritrea (see fig. 

6). For other countries, the defensive asylum grant rate was less than 5 

percent, including Laos, Philippines, and Mexico.
Page 22 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 6: Defensive Asylum Grant Rates by Country of Nationality, May 2007 

through Fiscal Year 2014

Note: Our analysis included countries w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive 

completed asylum applications from fiscal years 1995 through 2014. A total of 41 countries met this 

threshold.
Page 23 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

In 2008, we reported that affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates 

varied depending on the immigration court that heard the case. We found 

similar levels of variation from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014.33 For 

example, the grant rate for affirmative applicants in the New York 

immigration court was 66 percent, while the grant rate in the Omaha and 

Atlanta immigration courts was less than 5 percent (see fig. 7).

Figure 7: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rates by Court, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 

2014

Note: Courts in our analysis included those w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive 

completed asylum applications from fiscal years 1995 through 2014. A total of 28 courts met this 

threshold.

 33Courts in our analysis included those with a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 

defensive completed asylum applications from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2014. A 

total of 28 courts met this threshold.
Page 24 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

From May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, defensive asylum grant rates 

also continued to vary depending on the immigration court that heard the 

case. For example, the grant rate in the New York immigration court was 

52 percent, while the grant rates in the Omaha, Atlanta, and Bloomington, 

Minnesota, courts were less than 5 percent (see fig. 8).

Figure 8: Defensive Asylum Grant Rates by Court, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 

2014

Note: Courts in our analysis included those w ith a minimum of 800 affirmative and 800 defensive 

completed asylum applications from fiscal years 1995 through 2014. A total of 28 courts met this 

threshold.
Page 25 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

From May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, within each immigration court, 

the asylum grant rate for individual immigration judges varied. Affirmative 

asylum grant rates for individual judges ranged from 0 to 83 percent.34

Among the four courts with more than 15 judges in our sample, the 

difference between the lowest and highest grant rates in each court, or 

the “range,” extended from 17 percentage points in Miami to 60 

percentage points in New York, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rates in Immigration Courts with More Than 15 Judges, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014

Court

Number of

judges in sample

Minimum grant

rate (percentage)

Maximum grant

rate (percentage)

Grant rate

range (percentage)a

Los Angeles 38 0.0 31.3 31.3

Miami 24 0.0 16.8 16.8

New York 33 22.9 83.3 60.4

San Francisco 17 4.8 38.7 33.9

Source: GAO analysis of Executive Office for Immigration Review data. │ GAO-17-72

Note: This table includes those judges w ith 20 or more completed affirmative asylum applications in 

their primary court from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. At least one judge from each court in our 

analysis had 20 or more completed affirmative asylum applications from May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014. Collectively, these judges completed 74,191 affirmative asylum applications during the period, 

w hich represents 87 percent of all completed affirmative asylum applications included in our analysis.

a

The grant rate range is the maximum grant rate minus the minimum grant rate, or the range of 

asylum grant rates w ithin the court.

Figure 9 illustrates the range of affirmative asylum grant rates for judges 

in their primary immigration courts from May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014.

 34Table 1 and Figure 9 include those judges with 20 or more completed affirmative asylum 

applications in their primary court from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. At least one 

judge from each court in our analysis had 20 or more completed affirmative asylum 

applications from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. Collectively, these judges completed 

74,191 affirmative asylum applications during the period, which represents 87 percent of 

all completed affirmative asylum applications included in our analysis.
Page 26 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 9: Affirmative Asylum Grant Rate Ranges for Judges in Immigration Courts, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014

Note: This figure includes those judges w ith 20 or more completed affirmative asylum applications in 

their primary court from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. At least one judge from each court in our 

analysis had 20 or more completed affirmative asylum applications from May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014. Collectively, these judges completed 74,191 affirmative asylum applications during the period, 

w hich represents 87 percent of all completed affirmative asylum applications included in our analysis.

From May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, defensive asylum grant rates 

across individual judges ranged from 0 to 80 percent.35 Among the four 

courts with more than 15 judges in our sample, the difference between 

the lowest and highest grant rates in each court, or the “range,” extended 

from 16 percentage points in Miami to 70 percentage points in New York, 

as illustrated in Table 2.

 35Table 2 and Figure 10 include those judges with 20 or more completed defensive 

asylum applications in their primary court from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. At least 

one judge from each court in our analysis had 20 or more completed defensive asylum 

applications from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. Collectively, these judges completed 

51,605 defensive asylum applications during the period, which represents 89 percent of all 

completed defensive asylum applications included in our analysis.
Page 27 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Table 2: Defensive Asylum Grant Rates in Immigration Courts with More Than 15 Judges, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014

Court

Number of

judges in sample

Minimum grant

rate (percentage)

Maximum grant

rate (percentage)

Grant rate

range (percentage)a 

Los Angeles 38 0.6 19.6 19.0

Miami 23 0.0 16.0 16.0

New York 32 10.3 80.0 69.7

San Francisco 20 1.1 41.4 40.3

Source: GAO analysis of Executive Office for Immigration Review data. │ GAO-17-72

Note: This table includes those judges w ith 20 or more completed defensive asylum applications in 

their primary court from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. At least one judge from each court in our 

analysis had 20 or more completed defensive asylum applications from May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014. Collectively, these judges completed 51,605 defensive asylum applications during the period, 

w hich represents 89 percent of all completed defensive asylum applications included in our analysis.

a

The grant rate range is the maximum grant rate minus the minimum grant rate, or the range of 

asylum grant rates w ithin the court.

Figure 10 illustrates the range of defensive asylum grant rates for judges 

in their primary immigration courts from May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014.
Page 28 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 10: Defensive Asylum Grant Rate Ranges for Judges in Immigration Courts, May 2007 through Fiscal Year 2014

Note: This figure includes those judges w ith 20 or more completed defensive asylum applications in 

their primary court from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. At least one judge from each court in our 

analysis had 20 or more completed defensive asylum applications from May 2007 through fiscal year 

2014. Collectively, these judges completed 51,605 defensive asylum applications during the period, 

w hich represents 89 percent of all completed defensive asylum applications included in our analysis.
Page 29 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Immigration judges have discretion in rendering decisions and asylum is a 

discretionary form of relief under U.S. immigration law. Immigration 

judges we spoke with in six immigration courts stated that the judicial 

discretion provided for in U.S. immigration law is one reason that 

decisions on asylum applications, even among judges in the same court, 

could vary.36 For example, while a judge adjudicating an asylum claim is 

permitted by law to require that corroborating evidence be provided in 

support of otherwise credible, persuasive, and factually specific 

testimony, such testimony could also be legally sufficient for another 

judge to determine that the applicant has met his or her burden of proof 

without corroboration.37 In addition, researchers have offered potential 

explanations for variation in asylum application outcomes. For example, a 

study published in 2015 by researchers at the University of Texas at 

Dallas found that variation in asylum application outcomes is not 

unexpected given the institutional conditions under which judges operate, 

including the particular requirements of the law, the lack of corroborating 

evidence that is common in asylum cases, and the difficulty of assessing 

credibility.38

 36According to EOIR officials other reasons that decisions on asylum applications could 

vary, include, the increased use of prosecutorial discretion on the part of DHS, the 

proximity of the immigration court to the southwest border, and whether the immigration 

court is in a detained setting. We spoke with immigration judges in twelve immigration 

courts. In six of the twelve courts, judges did not discuss the discretion provided for in the 

law as a reason that decisions on asylum applications could vary.

378 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

38Miller, Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy, (Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

Grant Rates for 

Asylum Applications 

Can be Affected by

Case Characteristics 

and Outcome 

Variance Persists 

when Controlling for 

Certain Factors

Potential Explanations 

Offered for Variation in 

Outcomes of Asylum 

Applications
Page 30 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

On the basis of our analysis of EOIR data from fiscal years 1995 through 

2014, we found that asylum grant rates varied across courts and judges, 

holding constant various case and judge characteristics.39 While we were 

able to analyze various characteristics of cases, judges, and courts, the 

design of EOIR’s case management system did not allow us to measure 

and control for a number of factors—such as the nature or key 

characteristics of the claim of persecution or the gender of the applicant—

that may be relevant to variability in asylum grant rates. EOIR’s case 

management system was designed to manage and track workloads 

across immigration courts rather than to collect all data on the details of 

individual proceedings.40 In addition, each asylum application presents 

unique facts and circumstances that judges must consider in rendering 

their decisions. As a result, our analysis could not hold constant the 

underlying facts and merits of individual asylum applications because 

EOIR’s case management system does not collect that information. 

Further, according to EOIR officials, immigration judges are not required 

to document each factor in the case management system they consider in 

their overall adjudication of an asylum claim. Some of these factors may 

be relevant to variation in asylum application outcomes, such as whether 

there was an adverse credibility determination. In addition, there may be 

other factors that could affect variation in asylum grant rates including 

whether a particular judge was assigned to a juvenile or other docket that 

does not randomly assign cases to judges. Nonetheless, the data 

available allowed us to control for certain factors of each asylum 

application, which enabled us to compare asylum outcomes across 

immigration courts and judges.

 39We used multivariate statistical methods to hold constant various characteristics 

captured in EOIR’s case management system that could potentially be associated with 

asylum grant rates, in order to isolate variation due to judge, court, or country of nationality 

linked to each application for asylum. The current and 2008 analyses accounted for 

slightly different characteristics; in general, the current analysis excluded characteristics 

that were not associated with asylum grant rates in 2008, such as judge prior work 

experience and judge veteran status, and that were labor-intensive to measure. Appendix 

III provides more detail on the current analysis.

40According to EOIR officials, removal proceedings are recorded digitally and can range 

from 1 hour to several hours over the course of multiple days.

EOIR Data Show Variation 

in Outcomes of Asylum 

Applications Across Courts 

and Judges Persists when 

Holding Certain Case and 

Judge Characteristics 

Constant
Page 31 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

We used multivariate statistical methods to estimate an expected asylum 

grant rate for a representative applicant, holding constant various 

characteristics of individual cases, judges, and courts.41 We estimated 

rates separately for affirmative and defensive asylum applications and for 

each of four time periods across fiscal years 1995 through 2014.42

Analyzing asylum grant rates for a representative applicant, holding 

constant factors such as whether the applicant was represented by 

counsel, applicant country of nationality, and judge gender, allowed us to 

compare asylum grant rates across courts and judges (see Appendix III 

for more details about our analysis).

For the period since our 2008 report (May 2007 through fiscal year 2014), 

we estimate that, for each of the factors noted below, a representative 

affirmative asylum applicant would be granted asylum at a rate higher (or 

lower) than an applicant with differing case factors, and the difference 

would be statistically significant. The remaining factors we held 

constant—judge gender, most circuit courts, and judge and court asylum 

caseloads—had no statistically distinguishable associations with 

affirmative asylum grant rates for cases heard in immigration court. For 

example:

• Representation. Applicants who were represented by legal counsel 

were granted asylum at a rate 3.1 times higher than applicants who 

were not represented.

• Dependents. Applicants with at least one dependent were granted 

asylum at a rate 1.7 times higher than applicants without dependents.

 41We held the following characteristics constant: applicant country of nationality, applicant 

language, whether the applicant was represented by counsel, whether the applicant had 

dependents, whether the applicant sought asylum within one year of entry into the United 

States, whether the applicant was ever detained (defensive asylum only), judge gender, 

judge years of experience, presidential administration under which judges were appointed, 

circuit court, and court and judge asylum caseload.

42The periods of our analysis were: (1) October 1994 through March 1997; (2) April 1997 

through September 2001; (3) September 2001 through April 2007; and, (4) May 2007 

through fiscal year 2014. The first three periods replicate the three periods of analysis 

from our 2008 report, which included data through April 2007. The fourth period includes 

new data from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014.

Factors Associated with Grant 

Rates
Page 32 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

• Date of affirmative asylum application. Applicants who applied 

within one year of entering the United States were granted asylum at 

a rate 2.4 times higher than applicants who applied later.43

• Presidential administration under which judges were appointed. 

Judges who were appointed by the Attorney General during the 

administrations of Presidents George H.W. Bush, Reagan, Carter, 

Nixon, or Johnson were generally more likely to grant asylum than 

those appointed during the administrations of Presidents Clinton, 

George W. Bush, and Obama, holding constant years of experience 

as a judge. Judges appointed during the administrations of Presidents 

Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama granted asylum at rates that 

were statistically indistinguishable from each other.44

• Judge years of experience. Judges with more experience were less 

likely to grant asylum, holding constant the presidential administration 

of appointment. Judges with an additional 7 years of experience were 

28 percent less likely to grant asylum.45

Many of the factors we analyzed had similar associations for both 

affirmative and defensive asylum grant rates. From May 2007 through 

fiscal year 2014, we estimate that, for each of the factors noted below, a 

representative defensive asylum applicant would be granted asylum at a 

rate higher (or lower) than an applicant with differing case factors, and the 

difference would be statistically significant. Judge experience and the 

presidential administration under which judges were appointed had no 

statistically distinguishable associations with defensive asylum grant 

rates. For example:

 43An applicant must file for asylum within one year of arrival in the United States unless he 

or she can demonstrate that there are changed circumstances that materially affect the 

applicant’s eligibility for asylum or that the delay in filing an application for asylum is due to 

extraordinary circumstances. In either case, any delay must have been reasonable under 

the circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (2)(B), (D). In addition, under 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(a)(2)(E), the one year filing deadline does not apply to an unaccompanied alien child 

as defined by 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).

44Under U.S. immigration law, an “immigration judge” is an attorney appointed by the 

Attorney General as an administrative judge within EOIR, qualified to conduct specified 

classes of proceedings, including formal removal proceedings under INA § 240. See 8 

U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10.

45To put this result in context, judges with 6 to 17 years of experience heard 50 percent of 

all applications in this period. The result for judge years of experience controls for the 

administration under which the judge was appointed. For example, a judge appointed in 

the first year of a president’s administration was less likely to grant asylum than a judge 

appointed in the last year of president’s administration.
Page 33 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

• Representation. Applicants who were represented by legal counsel 

were granted asylum at a rate 1.8 times higher than applicants who 

were not represented.

• Dependents. Applicants with at least one dependent were granted 

asylum at a rate 1.7 times higher than applicants without dependents.

• Date of defensive asylum application. Applicants who applied 

within one year of entering the United States were granted asylum at 

a rate 5.0 times higher than applicants who applied later. This 

association is substantially larger than the association for affirmative 

applications made during the same time, and the difference is 

statistically distinguishable from zero.46

• Judge gender. Female judges granted asylum for defensive 

applications at a rate 1.4 times higher than male judges. There was 

no statistically meaningful association between judge gender and 

asylum grant rates among affirmative cases.

From May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, we estimated that the 

affirmative asylum grant rate would vary by 29 percentage points if 

different immigration courts heard the case of a representative applicant 

with the same average characteristics we measured.47 As shown in table 

3, the grant rate for a representative applicant in one court would be 19 

percent, whereas it would be 48 percent in another court for the same 

representative applicant. The size of this range varied across the four 

time periods we analyzed, from a low of 10 percentage points in the first 

period to a high of 37 percentage points in the second period.

 46An applicant must file for asylum within one year of arrival in the United States unless he 

or she can demonstrate that there are changed circumstances that materially affect the 

applicant’s eligibility for asylum or that the delay in filing an application for asylum is due to 

extraordinary circumstances. In either case, any delay must have been reasonable under 

the circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (2)(B), (D). In addition, under 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(a)(2)(E), the one year filing deadline does not apply to an unaccompanied alien child 

as defined by 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).

47We estimated the middle 95 percent of affirmative asylum grant rates across all courts in 

our analysis, for an applicant with the same average characteristics we measured. See 

Appendix III for more details on this estimate. We held the following characteristics 

constant: applicant country of nationality, applicant language, whether the applicant was 

represented by counsel, whether the applicant had dependents, whether the applicant 

sought asylum within one year of entry into the United States, whether the applicant was 

ever detained (defensive asylum only), judge gender, judge years of experience, 

presidential administration under which judges were appointed, circuit court, and court and

judge asylum caseload.

Asylum Grant Rates Varied 

Significantly Across 

Immigration Courts for a 

Representative Applicant After 

Controlling for Certain Factors
Page 34 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Table 3: Estimated Asylum Grant Rate Variation Across Courts, Holding Constant Various Characteristics, May 2007 through 

Fiscal Year 2014

Court A Court B Range of potential asylum grant ratea

Applicant X (affirmative asylum) 19% 48% 29 percentage points

Applicant Y (defensive asylum) 18% 56% 38 percentage points

Source: GAO analysis of Executive Office for Immigration Review data. │ GAO-17-72

Note: We held the follow ing characteristics constant: applicant country of nationality, applicant 

language, w hether the applicant w as represented by counsel, whether the applicant had dependents, 

w hether the applicant sought asylum w ithin one year of entry into the United States, w hether the 

applicant w as ever detained (defensive asylum only), judge gender, judge years of experience, 

presidential administration under w hich judges w ere appointed, circuit court, and court and judge 

asylum caseload.

a

We w ould expect the asylum grant rate to fall w ithin this range 95 percent of the time if a court heard 

an asylum claim having the same, average characteristics we measured. See appendix III for more 

details on this estimate.

For defensive asylum completions in the most recent period, we 

estimated that the defensive asylum grant rate would vary by 38 

percentage points if different immigration courts heard the case of a 

representative applicant with the same average characteristics we 

measured. As shown in table 3, the grant rate for a representative 

applicant in one court would be 18 percent, whereas it would be 56 

percent in another court for the same representative applicant. The size 

of this range varied across the four time periods we analyzed, from a low 

of 11 percentage points in the first period to a high of 38 percentage 

points in the third period.

From May 2007 through fiscal year 2014, we estimated that the 

affirmative asylum grant rate would vary by 47 percentage points if 

different immigration judges heard the case of a representative applicant 

with the same average characteristics we measured.48 As shown in table 

4, the grant rate for a representative applicant by one judge would be 13 

percent, whereas it would be 60 percent before another judge for the 

same representative applicant. The size of this range varied across the 

four time periods we analyzed, from a low of 29 percentage points in the 

first period to a high of 47 percentage points in the fourth period.

 48We estimated the middle 95 percent of affirmative asylum grant rates across all courts in 

our analysis, for an applicant with the same average characteristics we measured. 

Asylum Grant Rates Varied 

Significantly Across 

Immigration Judges for a 

Representative Applicant After 

Controlling for Certain Factors
Page 35 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Table 4: Estimated Asylum Grant Rate Variation Across Judges, Holding Constant Various Characteristics, May 2007 through 

Fiscal Year 2014

Judge A Judge B Range of potential asylum grant ratea

Applicant X (affirmative asylum) 13% 60% 47 percentage points

Applicant Y (defensive asylum) 11% 68% 57 percentage points

Source: GAO analysis of Executive Office for Immigration Review data. │ GAO-17-72

Note: We held the follow ing characteristics constant: applicant country of nationality, applicant 

language, w hether the applicant w as represented by counsel, whether the applicant had dependents, 

w hether the applicant sought asylum w ithin one year of entry into the United States, w hether the 

applicant w as ever detained (defensive asylum only), judge gender, judge years of experience, 

presidential administration under w hich judges w ere appointed, circuit court, and court and judge 

asylum caseload.

a

We w ould expect the asylum grant rate to fall w ithin this range 95 percent of the time if a court heard 

an asylum claim having the same, average characteristics we measured.

For completed defensive asylum applications in the most recent period, 

we estimated that the defensive asylum grant would vary by 57 

percentage points if different immigration judges heard the case of a 

representative applicant with the same average characteristics we 

measured. As shown in table 4, the grant rate for a representative 

applicant by one judge would be 11 percent, whereas it would be 68 

percent before another judge for the same representative applicant. The 

size of this range varied across the four time periods we analyzed, from a 

low of 22 percentage points in the first period to a high of 57 percentage 

points in the fourth period.

EOIR Has Programs 

in Place to Facilitate 

Access to Legal 

Resources for Asylum 

Applicants, but Could 

Improve Efforts to 

Measure Program 

Results
Page 36 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Through LOP and LOPC, EOIR has provided legal orientations to 

approximately 450,000 individuals. EOIR established LOP in 2003 to 

provide legal orientations to persons in detention prior to their first hearing 

before an immigration judge. In 2010, EOIR established LOPC to provide 

legal orientation presentations to custodians of UAC released from 

custody from the Office of Refugee Resettlement to help ensure the 

child’s appearance at all immigration proceedings.49 LOP and LOPC 

provide legal information through group and individual orientations, as 

well as self-help workshops and pro bono legal referrals to those in 

removal proceedings in immigration court. According to DOJ and EOIR, 

LOP and LOPC are key efforts to, among other things, increase the 

efficiency of immigration court proceedings and improve access to basic 

legal services for individuals in such proceedings. For example, DOJ’s 

Congressional Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2016 reported that 

LOP is designed to assist detained individuals in making better informed 

decisions earlier in their immigration court proceedings, thereby improving 

access to basic legal services, especially for low income individuals, while 

increasing the efficiency of the court hearing and detention process.50

Regarding LOPC, in February 2016, EOIR’s Director testified that LOPC 

“helps the immigration court process function more efficiently and 

effectively by providing valuable information to the custodians of children 

who arrive in the United States without a parent or guardian.”51

Since 2005, EOIR has contracted with the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera), 

which subcontracts with non-profit organizations, to administer LOP and 

LOPC. As of July 2016, EOIR administered LOP at 36 detention facilities, 

2 non-detained locations and LOPC in 15 cities across the United States. 

According to EOIR’s September 2011 blanket purchase agreement with 

Vera and associated statements of work, LOP and LOPC at each site, are 

to provide, among other things, individual and group legal orientations 

and the dissemination of written legal orientation materials to individuals 

 49The Office of Refugee Resettlement, within the Department of Health and Human 

Services, is responsible for taking custody of UAC from DHS and identifying qualified 

sponsors in the United States who will take custody of UAC once they leave Office of 

Refugee Resettlement shelters and are awaiting immigration proceedings.

50DOJ, FY2016 Congressional Budget Submission, Administrative Review and Appeals. 

51Department of Justice, Statement of Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office for 

Immigration Review, before the United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 

Hearing on “The Unaccompanied Alien Children Crisis: Does the Administration Have a 

Plan to Stop the Border Surge and Adequately Monitor the Children,” February 23, 2016. 

EOIR Facilitates Legal 

Resources for Asylum 

Applicants and Monitors 

Results
Page 37 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

in immigration removal proceedings.52 LOP and LOPC sites provide selfhelp workshops, pro bono referral services and individual and group 

orientations. In particular, these orientations are to review the range of 

rights available to such individuals and the forms of relief from removal 

that may or may not be available to them. Table 5 provides information on 

the goals and objectives for LOP and LOPC in the 2011 blanket purchase 

agreement.

Table 5: Objectives for Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied 

Alien Children (LOPC) 

LOP Objectives LOPC Objectives

(1) Increase the efficiency of immigration court proceedings (1) Increase the efficiency of Immigration Court proceedings

(2) Decrease the duration of detention (2) Increase the appearance rate of unaccompanied alien children 

(UAC) in immigration court

(3) Increase an individual’s ability to make a timely decision about 

his or her case through the receipt of early and accurate legal 

information and orientation

(3) Improve the custodians’ ability to assist UAC to make timely 

decisions in their immigration cases through receipt of early and 

accurate information and orientation

(4) Facilitate access to legal counsel (4) Facilitate access to legal counsel for UAC

(5) Protect UAC from mistreatment, exploitation, and trafficking

Source: EOIR 2011 blanket purchase agreement for LOP and LOPC. │ GAO-17-72

Consistent with the 2011 blanket purchase agreement, Vera submits 

quarterly reports to EOIR with data on, for example, the number of unique 

individuals who attended legal orientations and the number of referrals to 

pro bono legal services during the prior quarter. According to Vera’s 

quarterly report summarizing LOP data through fiscal year 2015, between 

about 35,000 and about 65,000 individuals attended LOP legal 

orientations per year from fiscal years 2008 through 2015 (see fig. 11).

According to EOIR headquarters officials, the decrease in the number of 

individuals attending LOP orientations since fiscal year 2011 mirrors the 

decrease in the number of individuals detained and placed in removal 

proceedings during this time period.

 52We reviewed the 2011 Federal Supply Schedule contract Blanket Purchase Agreement 

and associated statements of work covering fiscal years 2013 through 2016. The Federal 

Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 provided for cooperative purchasing by which the 

General Services Administration is to make available certain procurement and supply 

services for use by executive agencies at their request. Pub. L. No. 103-355, tit. I, subtit. 

E, pt. II, § 1555, 108 Stat. 3243, 3300-01 (codified, as amended, at 40 U.S.C. §§ 501, 

502). A blanket purchase agreement is a type of simplified acquisition method which may 

be established to obtain supplies or services from, among others, Federal Supply 

Schedule contractors. Individual purchases under blanket purchase agreements may 

exceed the simplified acquisition threshold. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 13.303-2(c)(3), 13.303-5(b).
Page 38 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 11: Individuals Served by the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s 

(EOIR) Legal Orientation Program (LOP), Fiscal Years 2008 through 2015

Note: These are unique individuals w ho attended legal orientations provided by the Legal Orientation 

Program (LOP). According to EOIR officials, a person could attend more than one orientation, but 

Vera records attendance based on the unique individual.

Regarding LOPC, according to Vera’s quarterly report summarizing 

LOPC data through fiscal year 2015, legal orientations to custodians 

increased from about 1,500 in fiscal year 2011, when the program 

started, to almost 14,000 in fiscal year 2015 (see fig. 12).
Page 39 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Figure 12: Individuals Served by the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s 

(EOIR) Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien Children 

(LOPC), Fiscal Years 2011 through 2015

Note: These are unaccompanied children on w hose behalf an adult custodian attended legal 

orientations provided by the Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien 

Children (LOPC).

EOIR headquarters officials stated that they review information that Vera 

provides through the quarterly reports to check compliance with contract 

requirements and to monitor the programs’ progress against stated 

objectives. In addition, according to EOIR officials, Vera and EOIR 

officials conduct site visits of LOP and LOPC sites to meet with local legal 

service organizations to observe presentations and workshops and 

discuss program performance.53 Vera also conducts monthly meetings 

 53According to Vera’s LOP training manual, LOP site visits are to be conducted annually. 

Vera managers and EOIR staff are to also meet with stakeholders (such as local 

immigration court and ICE personnel) to obtain their input, and record comments and 

observations about program performance and implementation challenges. After the visit, 

Vera managers and EOIR staff are to discuss their observations and subsequently provide 

feedback to LOP providers. For the LOPC, the 2011 blanket purchase agreement requires 

that Vera conduct site visits to monitor performance. In addition, Vera’s LOPC Manual 

requires that providers submit monthly narrative reports to Vera and, among other things, 

the number of custodians and others who attended an LOPC and services LOPC 

attendees received. 
Page 40 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

with site staff. EOIR officials responsible for overseeing LOP and LOPC 

also noted that they hold regular discussions with Vera staff and use the 

information collected by Vera to monitor progress. In particular, EOIR 

officials stated that they monitor Vera’s data to identify increases or 

decreases in the number of individuals served in each LOP and LOPC 

location to determine site staffing levels or changes to existing sites.

EOIR monitors LOP and LOPC through a variety of mechanisms, but has 

not established a system of performance measures, including 

establishing a baseline, to regularly evaluate the effectiveness of LOP 

and LOPC to determine whether these programs are having a 

measurable impact in meeting program objectives. EOIR officials stated 

that they have monitored LOP and LOPC performance through site visits 

and monthly conference calls with Vera, as well as Vera’s quarterly 

reports, annual reports, and budget analyses. Regarding LOP, EOIR 

officials stated that they have used many of the findings and 

recommendations from a one-time evaluation of the program in 2008 as a 

guide for monitoring LOP performance. The evaluation, conducted by 

Vera at the request of EOIR, found that LOP participants moved faster 

through immigration courts, received fewer in absentia removal orders 

and that LOP could effectively prepare individuals to represent 

themselves in immigration courts, among other things. In the 2008 LOP 

evaluation, Vera also concluded that immigration judges stated that LOP 

increased immigration court efficiency and detention facility staff stated 

that LOP improved detention conditions.54 EOIR’s 2011 blanket purchase 

agreement related to LOP and LOPC states that EOIR can request that 

the Contractor (i.e., Vera) produce various deliverables as needed and/or 

as requested by EOIR, including an evaluation of LOP program outcomes 

and a “performance outcome measurement program” to accurately and 

continuously measure and obtain quantitative and qualitative data on 

LOP’s stated objectives.55 Although the 2008 evaluation provided EOIR 

 54Vera Institute of Justice Center on Immigration and Justice, Legal Orientation Program: 

Evaluation and Performance Outcome Measurement Report, Phase II, a report prepared 

at the request of the Executive Office of Immigration Review, May 2008. The evaluation 

compiled LOP data from January 1, 2006 through August 31, 2006, and included 

interviews with LOP stakeholders, including participants, providers, immigration judges, 

court administrators, detention facility staff and ICE employees to identify differences in 

case outcomes between individuals who received and did not receive LOP services.

55EOIR can request other deliverables such as a training conference, training manuals, 

and financial status reports, among other things.

EOIR Could Improve 

Efforts to Measure LOP 

and LOPC Effectiveness
Page 41 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

officials with valuable insight into the effectiveness of the LOP program, 

EOIR officials stated that they have not requested that Vera conduct a 

similar comprehensive outcome performance measurement program 

consistent with the 2011 blanket purchase agreement. Further, as of July 

2016, EOIR officials stated that they have not required Vera to develop a 

formal performance outcome measurement program, or other formal 

performance measures, for LOP as allowed for in the blanket purchase 

agreement because of the variation in how LOP providers operate 

programs at each site.

Regarding LOPC, the 2011 blanket purchase agreement states that, as 

specified in an executed blanket purchase agreement task order, Vera is 

to develop a system for measuring the performance of the program 

against its stated objectives by collecting program data on the number of 

UAC custodians served and the number of UACs represented by counsel, 

among other things. In addition, EOIR officials stated that they requested 

that Vera evaluate LOPC’s performance in 2014, consistent with the 2011 

agreement. In August 2016, EOIR provided us a copy of the final 

evaluation report. Among other things, the report states that in absentia 

rates were lower for UAC whose custodians attended an LOPC 

orientation. In addition, custodians who Vera surveyed after attending an 

LOPC orientation reported learning about children’s legal rights and 

options for relief, as well as the importance of appearing in immigration 

court. In the report, Vera recommended that EOIR and Vera, among other 

things, consistently identify UAC in EOIR’s case management system and 

follow up with custodians to encourage attendance at orientations.56 EOIR 

officials stated in July 2016 that they do not plan to request another 

evaluation of LOPC, but will use these evaluation findings and 

recommendations to make any necessary program improvements.

Consistent with requirements outlined in GPRAMA, performance 

measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program 

accomplishments, particularly towards pre-established goals and 

agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress 

towards goals. 57 While GPRAMA is applicable to the department or 

agency level, performance goals and measures are important 

 56Vera Institute of Justice, Outcome of the Legal Orientation Program for Custodians 

(LOPC), 2014. 

57GPRA, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993), was updated by the GPRA 

Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). See 31 U.S.C. § 

1115 (relating to agency performance plans and performance measurement).
Page 42 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

management tools to all levels of an agency, including the program, 

project or activity level. Agencies can use performance measurement to 

make various types of management decisions to improve programs and 

results, such as developing strategies and allocating resources, and 

identify problems and take corrective action. Because of its ongoing 

nature, performance measurement can serve as an early warning system 

to management and as a vehicle for improving accountability to the 

public.

EOIR headquarters officials stated that they have not established 

performance measures for LOP and LOPC because of the variation in 

how providers operate these programs at detention facilities and nondetained immigration courts, which results in the inability to have a “onesize fits all” approach. Rather, EOIR headquarters officials explained that 

program managers at headquarters regularly assess LOP and LOPC 

sites on an individual basis to (1) identify the number of individuals served 

by each full time staff position with the local subcontracted organization 

and (2) determine whether demand for services has increased or 

decreased. Based on this information, headquarters officials make 

necessary adjustments, such as closing a site with decreased demand for 

services and opening a new site with new demand. EOIR officials stated 

that this process provides flexibility to make changes at LOP and LOPC 

sites as needed in response to differing conditions at each location. 

However, EOIR has not established baselines for these data it collects 

from Vera and therefore does not have adequate performance 

measurements against which to compare the data to determine whether 

the programs are achieving stated goals. Solely tracking increases or 

decreases in program data, such as changes in the number of individuals 

served in detention facilities, does not allow EOIR to fully evaluate its 

LOP and LOPC programs as such changes in the data may not be an 

indicator of program success or increased efficacy. Developing and 

implementing performance measures, including establishing a baseline, 

to independently and periodically determine whether LOP and LOPC are 

having a measurable impact would better position EOIR to make any 

adjustments necessary to improve the programs’ performance.

EOIR’s primary mission is to adjudicate immigration cases in a careful 

and timely manner while ensuring the standards of due process and fair 

treatment for all parties involved. EOIR’s LOP and LOPC aim to achieve 

the dual goals of increasing the efficiency of immigration court 

proceeding, while also increasing individuals’ ability to make timely 

decisions about their immigration cases through receipt of early and 

Conclusions
Page 43 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

accurate legal information. Our multivariate analysis of EOIR data on 

completed asylum applications from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014 

indicates that whether an applicant has legal representation, in particular, 

can have a significant effect on the outcome of the application. Since 

2008, EOIR has facilitated access to legal resources to thousands of 

individuals through LOP and LOPC legal orientations. While EOIR 

monitors LOP and LOPC through a variety of mechanisms, establishing a 

system of performance measures, including establishing a baseline, could 

better position EOIR to determine whether these programs are having a 

measurable impact in meeting program objectives and goals.

To better assess whether the LOP and LOPC are having a measurable 

impact in meeting their program objectives, the Director of EOIR should 

develop and implement a system of performance measures, including 

establishing a baseline, to regularly evaluate the effectiveness of LOP 

and LOPC and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated 

goals.

We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and DHS for their review and 

comment. DOJ did not provide official written comments to include in this 

report. However, in an e-mail received on October 24, 2016, an Associate 

General Counsel for EOIR stated that EOIR concurred with our 

recommendation. DHS did not provide written comments on our draft 

report. DOJ and DHS provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

Should you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Rebecca Gambler

Director

Homeland Security and Justice

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 44 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

List of Committees

The Honorable John H. Hoeven

Chairman

The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable John R. Carter

Chairman

The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR) Training for Immigration Judges

Page 45 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

EOIR provides training to new immigration judges and annual training to 

all incumbent judges to assist them in rendering decisions on asylum 

applications. Since 2008, EOIR has expanded its training program for 

new immigration judges (see table 6).

Table 6: Changes in Training for New Immigration Judges, Fiscal Years 2008 to 2016 

Time period 2008 to 2013 2013 to October 2015 October 2015 to present

Total required weeks Expanded from 2 to 5 weeks in 

2008

5 weeks 6 to 7 weeks

Asylum-specific lessons Two hours Two hours 7 hours

Testing 3 exams and new judges must 

score 80 percent or higher to 

demonstrate mastery of learning 

objectives.

3 exams and new judges must 

score 80 percent or higher to 

demonstrate mastery of learning 

objectives.

4 exams and new judges must 

score 80 percent or higher to 

demonstrate mastery of learning 

objectives.

In person One week of in-class training at 

the National Judicial College 

(NJC)

One week in-class training at 

EOIR headquarters

Two weeks in-class training at 

EOIR headquarters

On-the-job Three weeks of on-the-job 

training at home and visiting 

court

Three weeks of on-the-job training 

at home and visiting court

Three weeks of on-the-job training 

at home and visiting court

Advanced training One week of advanced training 

to be provided 6 to 12 months 

after completing initial four weeks

One week of advanced training to 

be provided 6 to 12 months after 

completing initial four weeks

One week of advanced training to 

be provided 6 to 12 months after 

completing initial five weeks

Source: GAO analysis of Executive Office for Immigration Review interviews and documents. │ GAO-17-72

In addition to training requirements for new immigration judges, EOIR 

holds annual conferences for all immigration judges at EOIR 

headquarters. EOIR held an annual conference in person for incumbent 

immigration judges in fiscal years 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2015. According 

to EOIR officials, EOIR did not host the annual conference in fiscal years 

2011, 2012, and 2013 due to resource constraints. In fiscal year 2014, 

EOIR planned to hold the conference, but canceled it due to the increase 

in workload that resulted from the large numbers of unaccompanied 

children and families who were apprehended at the southwest border and 

placed in removal proceedings in the summer of 2014, according to EOIR 

officials.1 According to the EOIR headquarters official responsible for 

training, EOIR decides whether to have the conference each year based 

on available funding. During years when the conference was not offered 

 1EOIR reallocated resources to prioritize cases resulting from the influx of unaccompanied 

children and families and recent border crossers. Specifically, EOIR adjusted court 

dockets to consolidate the amount of hearing time devoted to detained cases and to 

scheduling first hearings for the cases of unaccompanied children and families. 

Appendix I: Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR) Training for Immigration 

Judges
Appendix I: Executive Office for Immigration 

Review (EOIR) Training for Immigration Judges

Page 46 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

in person, EOIR video recorded conference sessions on discs and mailed 

them to immigration judges to watch.
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 47 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Our objectives were to (1) describe the extent of variation in the outcomes 

of completed asylum applications over time and across immigration 

courts and judges; (2) discuss the factors associated with variability in the 

outcomes of completed asylum applications; and (3) examine the extent 

to which the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has taken 

action to facilitate access to legal resources, including representation, for 

asylum applicants.

To address all three objectives, we reviewed EOIR documents describing 

asylum applications statistics; policies, procedures related to immigration 

court proceedings; manuals and documents describing EOIR’s case 

management system; guidance and training provided to judges for 

adjudicating asylum applications; and documentation on EOIR’s legal 

access programs. We interviewed EOIR headquarters officials 

responsible for overseeing immigration court proceedings; EOIR’s case 

management system; immigration judge training and guidance and legal 

access programs. We also visited 10 immigration courts in Tacoma, 

Washington; Seattle, Washington; New York, New York; Newark, New 

Jersey; Elizabeth, New Jersey; Los Angeles, California; Adelanto, 

California; Miami, Florida; Krome, Florida; and, Arlington, Virginia. At 

these locations, we interviewed supervisory immigration judges, 

immigration judges, court administrators and observed removal 

proceedings for individuals applying for asylum. We also interviewed 

supervisory immigration judges, immigration judges and court 

administrators by telephone at two additional immigration courts in El 

Paso, Texas and Atlanta, Georgia. Because immigration judges have 

large caseloads and constrained schedules, we interviewed judges who 

were available to speak with us during our scheduled interviews. We 

interviewed the court administrator and supervisory immigration judge for 

each immigration court we visited or contacted. During the immigration 

court interviews, we used semi-structured interview questions to ask 

about (1) potential factors associated with changes in asylum applications 

outcomes over time, (2) training and guidance provided to immigration 

judges for adjudicating asylum applications, and (3) EOIR immigration 

court efforts to facilitate access to legal resources for asylum seekers. We 

selected these sites based on a variety of factors, including courts that 

adjudicate a large number of asylum cases, detained and non-detained 

dockets, a range of grant rates, and circuit court jurisdictions. We also 

interviewed staff from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 

Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, Offices of the Chief Counsel and 

asylum pro bono/advocacy organizations proximate to each immigration 

court interviewed to gain their perspectives on (1) potential factors 

associated with changes in asylum applications outcomes over time and 

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 48 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

(2) immigration court efforts to facilitate access to legal resources for 

asylum seekers. The results from our site visits cannot be generalized 

more broadly to all immigration courts or immigration judges. However, 

they provided important context and insights into EOIR’s efforts to assist 

immigration judges in adjudicating asylum applications, perspectives on 

training and guidance provided to immigration judges and EOIR efforts to 

facilitate access to legal resources.

To describe the extent of variation in the outcomes of completed asylum 

applications, we analyzed data from EOIR about completions of asylum 

applications from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2014, the most 

current data available at the time of our analysis. We obtained EOIR 

records of all immigration court removal proceedings that occurred during 

the period covered by our analysis. We selected those records where the 

immigration judge made the decision on the asylum application and 

eliminated decisions that were made after appeals. We selected only 

records for “lead” applicants, using the applicant’s alien number—a 

unique registration number that the Department of Homeland Security 

assigns to foreign nationals in immigration court proceedings—as the unit 

of analysis. We eliminated duplicate decisions for a spouse and/or 

dependent children because they derive from the decision on the lead 

applicant. As in our 2008 report, we selected the immigration courts and 

countries of nationality that contributed a minimum of 800 affirmative and 

800 defensive asylum decisions on asylum applications from fiscal year 

1995 through fiscal year 2014; our analysis in this report included 

applicants from 41 countries and 28 immigration courts. We selected the 

800 minimum in each category to help ensure a sufficient number of 

completed asylum applications for our analysis. The results of our 

analysis cannot be generalized to asylum seekers from other countries or 

to other immigration courts. We used EOIR’s case management system 

to identify immigration court proceedings where an immigration judge had 

made a decision on an applicant’s asylum application. We assessed the 

reliability of the data used in our analyses through electronic testing, 

analyzing related database documentation, and working with agency 

officials to reconcile discrepancies between the data and documentation 

that we received. We determined that the EOIR data on completions of 

asylum applications were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

describing the extent of variation in the outcomes of completed asylum 

applications. We reported separately on affirmative and defensive 

completed asylum applications to control for characteristics shared by 

cases in each of those groups that could affect outcomes, such as 

Extent of Variation in 

Completed Asylum 

Applications
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 49 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

whether the asylum application had already been reviewed by a U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) asylum officer.

We also obtained biographical information from EOIR on those 

immigration judges who had served during the time period of our analysis. 

We merged these biographical data with the EOIR immigration court 

proceedings data. In doing so, we produced a dataset for the analysis 

that combined proceedings records with information on the characteristics 

of the applicants, the immigration judges, the immigration courts, and the 

completion or decision on the applicants’ asylum applications. We 

selected immigration judges with completions on at least 50 affirmative 

and 50 defensive asylum applications from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal 

year 2014. We selected the 50 minimum in each category to help ensure 

having judges who completed a sufficient number of asylum applications 

for our analysis. In analyzing differences in asylum decision across 

immigration judges, we excluded those immigration judges who heard 

fewer than 50 affirmative cases in our analyses of affirmative asylum 

decisions and fewer than 50 defensive cases in our analyses of defensive 

asylum decision. We also excluded cases heard by immigration judges 

other than in their primary court in order to simplify the presentation and 

avoid reaching inappropriate conclusions that can occur when 

calculations are based on small numbers of cases. We assessed the 

reliability of the data used in our analyses through electronic testing and 

working with agency officials to reconcile discrepancies between the data 

and documentation that we received. We determined that the EOIR 

immigration judge biographical data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of producing a dataset that included characteristics of 

immigration judges in order to describe the extent of variation in the 

outcomes of completed asylum applications.

In 2008, we reported the asylum “grant rate” as the number of asylum 

applications granted divided by the total number of all granted and denied 

applications. In other words, the grant rate depended on the number of 

completed asylum applications that ended in a decision by the 

immigration judge of either grant or denial. In this report, to provide data 

on all of the outcomes of completed asylum applications during our period 

of analysis, we included the five possible outcomes in calculating the 

asylum grant rate. These include applications that were granted and 

denied, as well as those that had an outcome of withdrawn, abandoned, 

or other. Thus, for the purposes of this report, we define the asylum grant 

rate as the number of granted asylum applications divided by the total 

number of completed applications (completions include applications that 

are granted, denied, withdrawn, abandoned, or end in an outcome of 
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 50 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

“other”) during the period of analysis. An expanded definition allows us to 

describe the outcomes of completed asylum applications, including 

outcomes other than granted or denied, and trends in those outcomes. 

Although we analyzed data from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 

2014, our reporting is focused on the time period from May 2007 through 

fiscal year 2014 because this is the most recent period and includes 

asylum completions since we last reported on asylum outcomes in 2008.

To discuss the factors associated with variability in the outcomes 

completed asylum applications, we used multivariate statistical modeling 

that held constant various other factors that could be associated with 

asylum grant rates. Our analysis used multivariate statistical methods to 

attribute the unique contribution of each factor to variation in asylum grant 

rates. Our analysis updated our previous work on this issue, which took a 

similar but not identical approach.1 Previously, we used multiple logistic 

regression to estimate the associations between various case, judge, and 

court factors and the probability that an applicant would receive asylum. 

Our current analysis generally takes the same approach to update our 

prior findings with more recent data on asylum applications completed 

from May 2007 through fiscal year 2014. However, we revised aspects of 

our data collection, preparation, and analysis to adjust for changes to the 

available administrative data and to allow for more precise reporting on 

the results. For a more detailed discussion of our multivariate analyses, 

see Appendix III.

As in our 2008 report, data limitations prevented us from fully isolating 

variation due to the unique judge or court. EOIR’s case management 

system collects information to meet EOIR’s administrative needs, such as 

the contact information of the applicant, the identity of the judge, and the 

languages spoken by the applicant. We used data from this system for 

statistical analysis because they are the primary data available on the 

population of interest. However, EOIR’s system does not collect data on 

all the details of individual proceedings that would be relevant to fully 

isolate variation across judges and courts. In particular, we cannot hold 

constant all relevant facts and circumstances of each case because 

EOIR’s case management system does not collect that information. Such 

facts and circumstances could be legally relevant and affect an 

 1GAO, U.S. Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes Across 

Immigration Courts and Judges, GAO-08-940 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 25, 2008).

Factors Associated with 

Variability in Completed 

Asylum Applications
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 51 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

applicant’s chance of receiving asylum. As a result, our estimates of the 

unique variation due to judges and courts may reflect circumstances of 

the cases that we cannot measure. Nonetheless, the data available 

allowed us to control for certain factors of each asylum application, 

enabling us to compare outcomes across immigration courts and judges.

The data available allowed us to hold constant certain characteristics of 

each case, such as applicant language, applicant country of nationality, 

judge experience, and court district. Accounting for these characteristics 

improves upon a simple comparison of asylum grant rates across judges 

and courts, without any adjustment. Table 7 below lists the factors used in 

our analysis and the source of the data. These characteristics may be 

correlated with the underlying facts and circumstances of each case, and 

therefore may indirectly explain factors we cannot measure. Data 

limitations prevented us from controlling for factors other than those listed 

in table 7 that could have contributed to variability in asylum application 

outcomes.

Table 7: Variables Used in GAO Analyses of Factors Affecting Asylum Outcomes

Applicant-related variables Data Source

Asylum case type

• Affirmative (filed with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Asylum Office)

• Defensive (filed at immigration court)

Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR)

Date of asylum case completion

1. 10/1/1994 – 3/31/1997

2. 4/1/1997 – 9/11/2001

3. 9/12/2001 – 4/30/2007

4. 5/1/2007 – 9/30/2014

EOIR

Nationality of asylum seeker EOIR

Language spoken by asylum seeker EOIR

Representation

• Represented by legal counsel recognized to practice in immigration court

• Not represented

EOIR

Dependents

• Has one or more dependents

• Has no dependents

EOIR

Detention status

• Currently or previously detained

• Never detained

EOIR
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 52 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Applicant-related variables Data Source

Application filed within 1 year of entry into the United States

• Yes

• No

EOIR

Asylum application outcome

• Grant

• Denial

• Withdrawal

• Abandonment

• Other

EOIR

Court-related variables

Immigration court in which the asylum case was adjudicated EOIR

Federal circuit in which immigration court is located U.S. Courts

Court asylum caseload

• Cumulative number of asylum case completions in the court from 10/1/1994 through the date of 

the decision

• Number of asylum case completions in the court in the 90 days prior to the case decision

EOIR

Judge-related variables

Immigration judge (name and code) EOIR

Gender of immigration judge

• Case adjudicated by male immigration judge

• Case adjudicated by female immigration judge

EOIR

Length of service as an immigration judge at time of adjudication EOIR

Presidential administration under which immigration judge was appointed EOIR

Judge asylum caseload

• Cumulative number of asylum case completions by the judge from 10/1/1994 through the date of 

the decision

• Number of asylum case completions by the judge in the 90 days prior to the case decision 

EOIR

Source: GAO analysis of EOIR and U.S. Courts data. │ GAO-17-72

To examine the extent to which EOIR has taken action to facilitate access 

to legal resources, we reviewed the Legal Orientation Program (LOP) and 

the Legal Orientation Program for Custodians of Unaccompanied Alien 

Children (LOPC) program documents and data, including the 2011 

blanket purchase agreement and statements of work covering fiscal years 

2013 through 2016; quarterly reports, annual reports; site visit reports, 

and evaluation reports; and, data reported by the Vera Institute of Justice 

(Vera) on the number of unique individuals served by LOP (fiscal years 

EOIR Actions to Facilitate 

Access to Legal 

Resources
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 53 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

2008 through 2015) and LOPC (fiscal years 2011 through 2015). We 

analyzed these time periods because our 2008 report2 reviewed EOIR 

data through 2007 (for LOP) and LOPC was established in 2010. We also 

reviewed documentation on EOIR’s other legal access services, including 

self-help materials and programs intended to increase pro bono 

representation and serve vulnerable populations, the BIA Pro Bono 

Project, the Model Hearing Program, National Qualified Representative 

Program and the justice AmeriCorps Legal Service for Unaccompanied 

Children program. To obtain additional context on the LOP and LOPC, we 

reviewed DOJ’s Fiscal Year 2016 Congressional Budget Submission and 

testimony statements about LOPC provided by EOIR’s director. We also 

interviewed headquarters officials responsible for overseeing the LOP 

and LOPC, as well as officials from Vera, who administer LOP and LOPC 

through a contract with EOIR. We analyzed the documentation on LOP 

and LOPC and information provided by EOIR officials on these programs 

in light of principles outlined in the Government Performance and Results 

Act (GPRA) of 1993, as updated by the GPRA Modernization Act 

(GPRAMA) of 2010,3 to assess EOIR’s efforts to measure LOP and 

LOPC progress and results against performance measures. We focused 

our review on the LOP and LOPC because these are among EOIR’s 

longest-standing legal access programs, they have received more funding 

than EOIR’s Office of Legal Access Programs’ (OLAP) other programs, 

and they have served tens of thousands of individuals since 2003 at 

immigration courts throughout the United States.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2015 to October 2016 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 2GAO-08-940.

3GPRA, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993), was updated by the GPRA 

Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). In particular, see 

31 U.S.C. § 1115 (relating to agency performance plans and performance measurement).
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 54 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

To analyze how asylum grant rates varied across immigration judges and 

courts, we used multivariate statistical modeling that held constant 

various factors that could be associated with asylum grant rates. Below, 

we describe the goals of this analysis and the design and modeling 

methods we used. We describe the scope of our analysis and the data we 

analyzed in appendix II.

The primary goal of our analysis was to isolate variation in asylum grant 

rates due to the unique immigration judge or court assigned to each case. 

Variation in asylum grant rates could arise from the facts and 

circumstances of each case, and researchers have found that variation is 

not unexpected given the institutional conditions under which judges 

operate, including the particular requirements of the law, the standard 

under which a judge may request corroborating evidence, and the 

difficulty of assessing credibility.1 We sought to hold constant relevant 

variables at the case, judge, and court levels, to estimate the amount of 

residual variation that remained across immigration judges and courts.

Variation in asylum grant rates across immigration judges and courts 

could reflect various other factors that are statistically correlated with 

them. For example, if immigration courts tended to receive applications 

from asylum-seekers of the same country of nationality, asylum grant 

rates could potentially vary systematically based on nationality rather than 

on the unique nature of the judge or court. Similarly, the quality and 

accessibility of legal representation across the United States could 

potentially affect the outcomes of asylum applications. Since immigration 

judges’ decisions on asylum applications may incorporate many factors, 

such as credibility and the facts underlying the claims, simple univariate 

comparisons of asylum grant rates across judges and courts cannot 

distinguish among these various potential sources of variation.

The data available from the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s 

(EOIR) case management system have a multilevel structure. Multiple 

applications for asylum are clustered within the same judges, courts, 

languages, and nationalities. These groups can be clustered among 

themselves, with or without nesting. Our data processing, discussed 

 1Miller, Keith, and Holmes, Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy, (Philadelphia: 

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 

Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis 

of Outcomes of Completed Asylum 

Applications, Fiscal Years 1995 through 

2014

Goals of the Analysis

Design and Modeling 

Methods
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 55 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

above, assigned one court to each judge, so that each judge was nested 

within the court in which they adjudicated the most cases. The remaining 

groups—courts, languages, and countries of nationality—were not 

necessarily nested. Each language could have been associated with 

multiple nationalities and vice versa. Each court could have been 

associated with multiple languages and countries of nationality; however, 

in practice, courts could have heard cases from a predominate 

combination of languages and nationalities, such as Chinese nationals 

who speak Mandarin and apply for asylum in New York.

The scope of our analysis included all completed asylum applications that 

met the screening criteria discussed in appendix II and that ended in 

outcomes of grant, deny, withdrawal, abandonment, or “other.” However, 

we dichotomized the outcome of interest to reflect whether the applicant 

was granted asylum or the application ended with any of the other 

outcomes. Expanding the scope of our sample to include all completed 

asylum applications rather than only applications that were granted or 

denied allowed us to analyze the outcomes of all completed asylum 

applications. Dichotomizing the outcome produced asylum grant rates as 

a proportion of applications originally filed that meet our screening criteria, 

which prevented bias from potentially changing withdrawal practices over 

time.

The data and outcome of interest suggested that a hierarchical or mixed 

logistic regression model would adequately reflect the data generation 

process. Accordingly, we developed a mixed model that represented the 

grouping variables—judge, court, country of nationality, and language, 

respectively—with random intercepts. Random effects allowed asylum 

grant rates to be correlated within and across groups, which 

parameterized our hypothesis that rates may systematically vary across 

groups, all else being equal on the factors we analyzed. Random effects 

made the model parsimonious because we could use the group variance 

parameters to concisely describe variation across groups with many 

levels. In contrast, modeling group variation with fixed effects would have 

required estimating several hundred explicit parameters, one for each 

group level, which would have consumed degrees of freedom and 

complicated model interpretation.

Substantively, random effects accurately represented the random 

assignment of judges to cases, which EOIR generally uses as an 

administrative policy. Random assignment of countries of nationality, 

languages, and courts has less of a direct substantive interpretation, but 

would be consistent with an underlying data generation process where 
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 56 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

the sample of asylum cases heard in any particular time period would be 

drawn from an underlying population distribution of immigration courts 

and applicant nationalities and languages.

We held constant case, judge, and court characteristics using covariates 

with fixed parameters. The smaller number of parameters associated with 

these covariates made a fixed effects approach easier to apply and 

interpret. We assumed that the covariate effects did not vary across 

groups, so that only the model’s intercept varies randomly. We had no 

prior expectation that specific covariate effects should have varied across 

groups. Moreover, increasing the number of random effects would have 

increased the complexity of the model and could have made it hard to 

estimate computationally.

We modeled the data separately by asylum type (affirmative and 

defensive) and time period. This allowed all model parameters to vary 

between asylum types and over time. The alternative approach, pooling 

the data, potentially would have obscured important differences in the 

affirmative and defensive asylum processes and important changes in the 

processes over the 20 years that our data spanned. Specifically, we 

modeled Yi, a dichotomous variable indicating whether applicant i in the 

affirmative or defensive processes was granted asylum. Each applicant 

was associated with a judge j, court c, nation n, and language l. 

Consistent with a hierarchical logistic model, we assumed that

xi denoted a vector of covariates with fixed coefficients β. α (.) denoted 

the group random effects, each of which was normally distributed and 

centered on zero. α was the population average intercept, with intercepts 

for each group given by α + α (.). The variances of the random effects 

around the population average were denoted by σ (.)

2

. 
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 57 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

We used most of the covariates from our 2008 report on this issue.2

However, we excluded several covariates that were unassociated with 

outcome in that report and that were labor-intensive to measure. For 

example, measuring a judge’s prior work experience for our prior report 

involved biographical research on each judge. Specifically, the covariate 

vector xi included the following:

• whether the applicant had one or more dependents (indicator);

• whether the applicant sought asylum within one year of entry into the

United States (indicator);

• whether an applicant was represented by counsel recognized to

practice in immigration court (indicator);

• whether the applicant was ever detained (indicator for being currently

detained or having been detained and released, compared to never

having been detained; defensive cases only);

• Presidential administration under which judges were appointed (vector

of indicators, with the subsample mode set as the omitted level);

• judge years of experience (linear);

• judge gender (indicator);

• judge asylum caseload since October 1, 1994, the earliest date in our

data, and in the 90 days prior to the completion of the asylum

application, respectively (linear);

• Circuit court (vector of indicators, with the subsample mode set as the

omitted level); and

• Court asylum caseload since October 1, 1994, the earliest date in our

data, and in the 90 days prior to the decision, respectively (linear).

For each subsample defined by asylum type (affirmative or defensive) 

and period, we rescaled the continuous covariates such that the vector of 

sample means equaled 0 and the vector of variances equaled 1. We 

rescaled each categorical covariate, including the groups used to define 

random effects, such that the first level identified the mode and served as 

the omitted level in a vector of indicator variables in xi for each variable. 

After rescaling, α estimates the overall asylum grant rate for an applicant 

having modal or mean values on xi and α (.) . σ(.)

2 estimates the dispersion 

2GAO, U.S. Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes Across 

Immigration Courts and Judges, GAO-08-940 (Washington, D.C: Sept. 25, 2008).
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 58 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

of asylum grant rates across judges, courts, nations, and languages 

around the population average for an applicant at the mode or mean of xi.

The center of the data at α does not necessarily correspond to a realistic 

application for asylum. For example, all judges do not practice at the 

modal court and all languages may not be spoken in the modal nation. 

Nevertheless, rescaling facilitates estimation and interpretation of the 

model. All inference can be done on α and α (.) directly, with no 

transformation required. This allowed us to easily describe variation in 

asylum grant rates for a hypothetical representative case in the 

distribution of each covariate and group.

The key parameters of interest are the variances of the group random 

effects, σ(.)

2

, and implicitly, the fitted group-level distribution of asylum 

grant rates for a modal or mean applicant:

To describe variation across groups on the probability scale, we

estimated the quantiles of this group distribution on the logit scale and 

then transformed them using the inverse logistic function.3

We estimated the model using maximum approximated likelihood 

methods, as implemented in the lme4 package in R.4 We estimated the 

confidence intervals of fixed parameters using Wald approximations and 

the fitted covariance matrix. We estimated the confidence intervals of the 

group random effect variances using profiled likelihood methods, as 

implemented in lme4.5 We transformed the estimated confidence intervals 

from the logit scale to the probability scale using the inverse logistic 

calculation described above.

3Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications 

and Data Analysis Methods, 2d ed (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 297.

4Douglas Bates, Martin Mächler, Benjamin M. Bolker, and Steven C. Walker,”Fitting 

Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4,” Journal of Statistical Software, 67 (1), 1-48.

5Ibid., 25-27.
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 59 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Tables 8 through 14 report estimates of the fixed parameters on the 

exponentiated logit scale and estimates of the random effect variances on 

the logit scale, separately for affirmative and defensive applications. The 

exponentiated scale allows us to interpret the results as odds-ratios or 

semi-elasticities for categorical or continuous variables, respectively. We 

omit estimates for the fixed effect parameters on the logit scale to prevent 

the calculation of exact grant probabilities. Please see the body of our 

report for further interpretation of the results.

Table 8: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of Completed Affirmative Asylum Applications, October 1994 through 

September 2001

October 1994

through March 1997

April 1997

through September 2001

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

Fixed (exponentiated logit scale)

Has dependents 1.88 (1.63, 2.16) 1.86 (1.75, 1.99)

Female judge 1.25 (0.9, 1.72) 1.43 (1.12, 1.86)

Applied within 1 year of entry 1.9 (1.68, 2.12) 2.01 (1.92, 2.14)

Not represented by legal counsel 0.17 (0.14, 0.2) 0.23 (0.21, 0.25)

Years of judge experience 0.73 (0.54, 0.98) 1.11 (0.92, 1.31)

Appointed under Johnson, Nixon, or Carterb 1.55 (0.5, 4.76) 0.46 (0.21, 1.04)

Appointed under Reagan 1.73 (0.87, 3.46) 0.86 (0.54, 1.38)

Appointed under Bush I 1.4 (0.85, 2.29) 1.34 (0.9, 2.01)

Appointed under Bush II 0.85 (0.44, 1.67) 1 (0.61, 1.65)

Circuit court 1c 0.75 (0.26, 2.18) 1.73 (0.45, 6.62)

Circuit court 2 0.47 (0.23, 0.98) 0.4 (0.14, 1.11)

Circuit court 3 0.5 (0.23, 1.08) 1.23 (0.44, 3.46)

Circuit court 4 1.4 (0.67, 2.94) 1.17 (0.42, 3.29)

Circuit court 5 1.51 (0.68, 3.35) 1.82 (0.68, 4.9)

Circuit court 6 0.14 (0.02, 0.83) 0.99 (0.29, 3.42)

Circuit court 7 0.81 (0.24, 2.75) 1.67 (0.42, 6.49)

Circuit court 8 NA 0.9 (0.15, 5.42)

Circuit court 9 NA NA

Circuit court 10 0.55 (0.15, 2.01) 3.25 (0.76, 14.01)

Circuit court 11 0.54 (0.23, 1.26) 0.71 (0.28, 1.8)

Circuit court missing 1.49 (0.08, 29.37) 0.83 (0.19, 3.6)

Judge asylum total caseload to date 0.97 (0.81, 1.15) 0.92 (0.82, 1.04)

Judge asylum caseload in 90 days prior 0.83 (0.73, 0.93) 0.99 (0.93, 1.04)

Court asylum total caseload to date 1.32 (1.09, 1.6) 1.82 (1.63, 2.03)

Results
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 60 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

October 1994

through March 1997

April 1997

through September 2001

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

Court asylum caseload in 90 days prior 0.92 (0.76, 1.13) 1.19 (1.07, 1.3)

Random (logit scale)

σj 0.7 (0.58, 0.84) 0.69 (0.61, 0.78)

σl 0.62 (0.38, 0.92) 0.49 (0.37, 0.64)

σn 1.33 (1.05, 1.72) 1.25 (1.01, 1.59)

σc 0.27 (0, 0.58) 0.56 (0.37, 0.84)

Group distributions (probability scale)d Mean (95% predictive interval) Mean (95% predictive interval)

Judge 0.11 (0.03, 0.32) 0.22 (0.07, 0.51)

Language 0.11 (0.03, 0.29) 0.22 (0.1, 0.42)

Nation 0.11 (0.01, 0.62) 0.22 (0.02, 0.76)

Court 0.11 (0.07, 0.17) 0.22 (0.08, 0.45)

Source: GAO analysis of data from EOIR’s case management system. | GAO-17-72

a

Model includes an intercept, but an exponentiated estimate is not meaningful. The sample has been 

rescaled, such that the intercept identifies an applicant at the sample mean or mode on all other 

covariates.

b

Estimates for all administrations of appointment are not applicable, depending on the sample’s time 

period and sample selection criteria. The reference group is the sample modal administration.

c

Estimates for all circuit courts are not applicable, because our scoping criteria for selecting the 

analysis sample excluded cases from certain circuit courts. Circuits are defined as of the time period 

of each sample. The reference group is the sample modal circuit.

d

Estimates are the population average mean probability of granting asylum, w ith the 2.5th and 97.5th 

quantiles of the group-level distribution of asylum grant rates in parentheses, for an applicant at the 

sample mean on all other covariates.

Table 9: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of Completed Affirmative Asylum Applications, September 2001 through 

September 20014

September 2001

through April 2007

May 2007

through September 2014

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

Fixed (exponentiated logit scale)

Has dependents 1.75 (1.67, 1.84) 1.72 (1.58, 1.86)

Female judge 1.27 (0.99, 1.63) 1.11 (0.9, 1.35)

Applied within 1 year of entry 1.95 (1.88, 2.03) 2.41 (2.27, 2.56)

Not represented by legal counsel 0.26 (0.23, 0.28) 0.32 (0.28, 0.36)

Years of judge experience 1.05 (0.9, 1.25) 0.72 (0.61, 0.85)

Appointed under Johnson, Nixon, or Carterb 0.25 (0.08, 0.79) 14.01 (2.51, 78.26)

Appointed under Reagan 1.04 (0.64, 1.72) 1.9 (1.22, 2.97)
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 61 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

September 2001

through April 2007

May 2007

through September 2014

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

Appointed under Bush I 1.22 (0.76, 1.95) 1.55 (1.02, 2.36)

Appointed under Bush II 0.71 (0.52, 0.97) 0.84 (0.61, 1.13)

Appointed under Obama NA 0.73 (0.47, 1.12)

Circuit court 1c 1.08 (0.41, 2.86) 0.48 (0.17, 1.38)

Circuit court 2 1.46 (0.64, 3.35) NA

Circuit court 3 0.62 (0.27, 1.4) 0.43 (0.17, 1.11)

Circuit court 4 0.97 (0.43, 2.16) 0.54 (0.21, 1.38)

Circuit court 5 0.61 (0.27, 1.35) 0.33 (0.13, 0.85)

Circuit court 6 0.42 (0.17, 1.06) 0.3 (0.12, 0.73)

Circuit court 7 1.32 (0.47, 3.74) 0.64 (0.21, 1.92)

Circuit court 8 0.44 (0.1, 1.88) 0.42 (0.14, 1.26)

Circuit court 9 NA 0.39 (0.19, 0.79)

Circuit court 10 0.99 (0.3, 3.25) 0.49 (0.14, 1.79)

Circuit court 11 0.54 (0.28, 1.03) 0.17 (0.08, 0.38)

Circuit court missing 0.63 (0.16, 2.41) 0.15 (0.04, 0.53)

Judge asylum total caseload to date 0.92 (0.8, 1.06) 1.15 (0.95, 1.39)

Judge asylum caseload in 90 days prior 0.99 (0.95, 1.02) 1.03 (0.99, 1.08)

Court asylum total caseload to date 1.39 (1.21, 1.6) 0.96 (0.76, 1.22)

Court asylum caseload in 90 days prior 0.81 (0.76, 0.86) 1.07 (0.97, 1.19)

Random (logit scale)

σj 0.78 (0.69, 0.88) 0.59 (0.52, 0.68)

σl 0.54 (0.42, 0.69) 0.91 (0.71, 1.16)

σn 1.12 (0.91, 1.43) 1.08 (0.86, 1.38)

σc 0.36 (0.14, 0.62) 0.35 (0.16, 0.58)

Group distributions (probability scale)d Mean (95% predictive interval) Mean (95% predictive interval)

Judge 0.17 (0.04, 0.48) 0.32 (0.13, 0.6)

Language 0.17 (0.07, 0.37) 0.32 (0.07, 0.74)

Nation 0.17 (0.02, 0.65) 0.32 (0.05, 0.8)

Court 0.17 (0.09, 0.29) 0.32 (0.19, 0.48)

Source: GAO analysis of data from EOIR’s case management system. | GAO-17-72

a

Model includes an intercept, but an exponentiated estimate is not meaningful. The sample has been 

rescaled, such that the intercept identifies an applicant at the sample mean or mode on all other 

covariates.

b

Estimates for all administrations of appointment are not applicable, depending on the sample’s time 

period and sample selection criteria. The reference group is the sample modal administration.

c

Estimates for all circuit courts are not applicable, because our scoping criteria for selecting the 

analysis sample excluded cases from certain circuit courts. Circuits are defined as of the time period 

of each sample. The reference group is the sample modal circuit.
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 62 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

d

Estimates are the population average mean probability of granting asylum, w ith the 2.5th and 97.5th 

quantiles of the group-level distribution of asylum grant rates in parentheses, for an applicant at the 

sample mean on all other covariates.

Table 10: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of Completed Defensive Asylum Applications, October 1994 through 

September 2001

October 1994

through March 1997

April 1997

through September 2001

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

Fixed (exponentiated logit scale)

Has dependents 1.62 (1.35, 1.93) 1.86 (1.57, 2.23)

Female judge 1.14 (0.86, 1.51) 1.67 (1.28, 2.16)

Applied within 1 year of entry 1.39 (1.21, 1.6) 2.5 (2.22, 2.86)

Not represented by legal counsel 0.5 (0.4, 0.64) 0.52 (0.43, 0.64)

Years of judge experience 0.75 (0.58, 0.96) 1.03 (0.84, 1.28)

Detained or Released 0.79 (0.68, 0.93) 0.67 (0.61, 0.75)

Appointed under Johnson, Nixon, or Carterb 1.8 (0.73, 4.48) 0.57 (0.21, 1.49)

Appointed under Reagan 1.32 (0.79, 2.2) 1.08 (0.63, 1.84)

Appointed under Bush I 1.28 (0.88, 1.88) 1.43 (0.92, 2.25)

Appointed under Bush II 0.92 (0.34, 2.46) 0.68 (0.39, 1.2)

Circuit court 1c 1.17 (0.39, 3.6) 1.36 (0.31, 5.87)

Circuit court 2 NA 0.81 (0.22, 2.94)

Circuit court 3 0.81 (0.29, 2.27) 1.51 (0.44, 5.16)

Circuit court 4 1.8 (0.74, 4.44) 1.72 (0.52, 5.64)

Circuit court 5 1.62 (0.66, 3.97) 2.86 (0.94, 8.58)

Circuit court 6 0.28 (0.06, 1.3) 1.27 (0.32, 5.1)

Circuit court 7 1.63 (0.57, 4.71) 2.05 (0.47, 9.03)

Circuit court 8 NA 0.8 (0.09, 7.54)

Circuit court 9 1.46 (0.67, 3.22) 2.01 (0.79, 5.16)

Circuit court 10 0.93 (0.24, 3.67) 2.34 (0.47, 11.59)

Circuit court 11 0.7 (0.29, 1.68) NA

Circuit court missing 0.83 (0.16, 4.31) 0.94 (0.19, 4.71)

Judge asylum total caseload to date 1.19 (1.03, 1.35) 0.98 (0.85, 1.13)

Judge asylum caseload in 90 days prior 0.87 (0.76, 0.98) 0.92 (0.85, 1)

Court asylum total caseload to date 1.11 (0.9, 1.34) 1.12 (0.9, 1.38)

Court asylum caseload in 90 days prior 0.95 (0.76, 1.17) 1.25 (1.06, 1.46)

Random (logit scale)

σj 0.52 (0.42, 0.64) 0.66 (0.56, 0.77)

σl 0.57 (0.34, 0.89) 0.42 (0.26, 0.61)
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014 

Page 63 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

October 1994

through March 1997

April 1997

through September 2001

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

σn 0.93 (0.73, 1.22) 0.97 (0.76, 1.26)

σc 0.29 (0.1, 0.55) 0.54 (0.32, 0.84)

Group distributions (probability scale)d

Judge 0.11 (0.04, 0.26) 0.16 (0.05, 0.41)

Language 0.11 (0.04, 0.28) 0.16 (0.16, 0.30)

Nation 0.11 (0.02, 0.44) 0.16 (0.03, 0.56)

Court 0.11 (0.07, 0.18) 0.16 (0.06, 0.36)

Source: GAO analysis of data from EOIR’s case management system. | GAO-17-72

a

Model includes an intercept, but an exponentiated estimate is not meaningful. The sample has been 

rescaled, such that the intercept identifies an applicant at the sample mean or mode on all other 

covariates.

b

Estimates for all administrations of appointment are not applicable, depending on the sample’s time 

period and sample selection criteria. The reference group is the sample modal administration.

c

Estimates for all circuit courts are not applicable, because our scoping criteria for selecting the 

analysis sample excluded cases from certain circuit courts. Circuits are defined as of the time period 

of each sample. The reference group is the sample modal circuit.

d

Estimates are the population average mean probability of granting asylum, w ith the 2.5th and 97.5th 

quantiles of the group-level distribution of asylum grant rates in parentheses, for an applicant at the 

sample mean on all other covariates.

Table 11: Results from Hierarchical Logistic Modeling of Completed Defensive Asylum Applications, September 2001 through 

September 2014

September 2001

through April 2007

May 2007

through September 2014

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

Fixed (exponentiated logit scale)a

Has dependents 1.95 (1.72, 2.23) 1.68 (1.46, 1.95)

Female judge 1.48 (1.12, 1.93) 1.40 (1.12, 1.77)

Applied within 1 year of entry 3.23 (2.94, 3.57) 5.00 (4.76, 5.56)

Not represented by legal counsel 0.51 (0.43, 0.61) 0.55 (0.48, 0.65)

Years of judge experience 1.25 (1.03, 1.51) 0.99 (0.83, 1.2)

Detained or Released 0.72 (0.68, 0.78) 1.03 (0.96, 1.11)

Appointed under Johnson, Nixon, or Carterb 0.18 (0.05, 0.64) 1.86 (0.31, 11.25)

Appointed under Reagan 0.74 (0.43, 1.28) 0.92 (0.56, 1.52)

Appointed under Bush I 1.42 (0.83, 2.41) 0.98 (0.6, 1.62)

Appointed under Bush II 0.88 (0.61, 1.25) 0.98 (0.7, 1.36)

Circuit court 1c 3.39 (0.53, 21.54) 1.31 (0.43, 4.01)

Circuit court 2 NA 1.58 (0.64, 3.94)
Appendix III: Multivariate Statistical Analysis of 

Outcomes of Completed Asylum Applications, 

Fiscal Years 1995 through 2014

Page 64 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

September 2001

through April 2007

May 2007

through September 2014

Parametersa Estimate (95% CI) Estimate (95% CI)

Circuit court 3 1.36 (0.29, 6.42) 0.57 (0.23, 1.38)

Circuit court 4 2.75 (0.58, 13.2) 1.15 (0.49, 2.72)

Circuit court 5 3.9 (0.91, 16.61) 0.53 (0.24, 1.2)

Circuit court 6 1.3 (0.24, 7.17) 0.31 (0.13, 0.74)

Circuit court 7 2.64 (0.4, 17.12) 0.62 (0.21, 1.86)

Circuit court 8 1.05 (0.09, 12.81) 0.7 (0.25, 1.99)

Circuit court 9 2.53 (0.73, 8.94) NA

Circuit court 10 4.71 (0.63, 35.52) 0.71 (0.22, 2.34)

Circuit court 11 1.43 (0.35, 5.99) 0.39 (0.18, 0.84)

Circuit court missing 1.25 (0.15, 10.18) 0.18 (0.05, 0.65)

Judge asylum total caseload to date 0.96 (0.82, 1.14) 1.07 (0.88, 1.31)

Judge asylum caseload in 90 days prior 1.04 (0.99, 1.09) 1.03 (0.97, 1.09)

Court asylum total caseload to date 2.46 (2.01, 3) 1.04 (0.79, 1.36)

Court asylum caseload in 90 days prior 0.91 (0.83, 1.01) 0.85 (0.75, 0.97)

Random (logit scale)

σj 0.82 (0.73, 0.93) 0.72 (0.63, 0.81)

σl 0.56 (0.41, 0.75) 0.65 (0.48, 0.86)

σn 0.81 (0.64, 1.05) 0.97 (0.77, 1.25)

σc 0.7 (0.46, 1.05) 0.44 (0.21, 0.71)

Group distributions (probability scale)d

Judge 0.19 (0.04, 0.54) 0.34 (0.11, 0.68)

Language 0.19 (0.07, 0.41) 0.34 (0.13, 0.65)

Nation 0.19 (0.05, 0.53) 0.34 (0.07, 0.78)

Court 0.19 (0.06, 0.48) 0.34 (0.18, 0.56)

Source: GAO analysis of data from EOIR’s case management system. | GAO-17-72

a

Model includes an intercept, but an exponentiated estimate is not meaningful. The sample has been 

rescaled, such that the intercept identifies an applicant at the sample mean or mode on all other 

covariates.

b

Estimates for all administrations of appointment are not applicable, depending on the sample’s time 

period and sample selection criteria. The reference group is the sample modal administration.

c

Estimates for all circuit courts are not applicable, because our scoping criteria for selecting the 

analysis sample excluded cases from certain circuit courts. Circuits are defined as of the time period 

of each sample. The reference group is the sample modal circuit.

d

Estimates are the population average mean probability of granting asylum, w ith the 2.5th and 97.5th 

quantiles of the group-level distribution of asylum grant rates in parentheses, for an applicant at the 

sample mean on all other covariates.
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 65 GAO-17-72 Asylum Outcomes

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet, Assistant 

Director; Joel Aldape, David Alexander, Emily Christoff, Dominick Dale, 

Jack Granberg, Grant Mallie, Taylor Matheson, Jan Montgomery, Jon 

Najmi, Mary Pitts, and Jeff Tessin made significant contributions to this 

report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(441274)
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