NUMBER 13-23-00040-CV

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.T.M., A CHILD

 

On appeal from the 430th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant, M.T.M., attempts to appeal a judgment signed on January 20, 2023, 

terminating her parental rights to A.C.T.M.

1 Appellant filed her notice of appeal in the trial 

court on January 31, 2023. On May 16, 2023, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant 

that it appeared that: (1) the notice of appeal was untimely, and (2) the notice of appeal 

did not comply with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.1(b), 25.1(d)(6), or 25.1(d)(8). 

1 We refer to appellant and the child by their initials in accordance with the rules of appellate 

procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2

See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.1(b), 25.1(d)(6), 25.1(d)(8). The Clerk informed appellant that, if 

these defects were not cured within ten days from the date of receipt of that notice, the 

appeal would be dismissed. Appellant filed a response on May 18, 2023. On the same 

day, this Court requested the appellee, the Texas Department of Family and Protective 

Services (Department) to respond to appellant’s response. The Department filed a 

response on May 30, 2023. We conclude that appellant attempts to appeal a void 

judgment and therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

“A judicial decree is final when it disposes of all issues and all parties in the record.” 

In re. R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2019) (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 

S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001)). “When an order ‘finally disposes of all claims and all 

parties’ in ‘clear and unequivocal language,’ it is a final order.” Id. (citing In re Elizondo, 

544 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. 2018) (origi. proceeding) (per curiam)). In addition, if no 

motion for new trial or motion to modify the judgment is filed, the trial court retains plenary 

power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform its judgment for thirty days after the judgment 

is signed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d), (e), (g). If the judgment is modified while the trial court 

has plenary power, the appellate timetable is restarted when the new judgment is signed. 

Id. R. 329b(h). However, any modified, corrected, or reformed judgment signed after the 

trial court’s plenary power has expired is a nullity. See State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 

S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“Judicial action taken after the court’s 

jurisdiction over a cause has expired is a nullity.”).

A timely notice of appeal invokes this Court’s jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1, 

26.1; see Garza v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 227 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
3

2007, no pet.). Notice of appeal of a judgment which terminates the parent-child 

relationship, as an accelerated appeal, must be filed within twenty days after the final 

judgment or order is signed. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). 

A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal is necessarily implied when an 

appellant, acting in good faith, files a perfecting instrument beyond the time allowed but 

within the fifteen-day period within which the appellant would be entitled to move to extend 

the filing deadline. Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616–617 (Tex. 1997). However, 

an appellant must provide a reasonable explanation for the late filing: it is not enough to 

simply file a notice of appeal. See Woodard v. Higgins, 140 S.W.3d 462, 462 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2004, no pet.); see also In re B.G., 104 S.W.3d 565, 567 (Tex. App.—Waco 

2002, no pet). This appeal leads us to question whether we have jurisdiction to decide 

the merits of this appeal. See Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621,

623 (Tex. 2012) (providing that appellate courts have no jurisdiction to address the merits 

of appeals from judgments that are void).

In this case, the trial court referred the termination proceeding to an associate 

judge. Following a hearing, the associate judge signed its “Order of Termination” on July 

14, 2022, which, among other things, terminated the parental rights of appellant to 

A.C.T.M. Appellant timely filed a request for a “de novo trial” before the referring trial court. 

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015.

The de novo stage of a parental termination proceeding differs from a trial de novo 

in any other case. Here, it is merely a hearing before a different tribunal and not a true 

“trial de novo”—a complete retrial on all issues. See In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 
4

277–80 (Tex. 2019). It is simply a “mechanism for reviewing an associate judge’s merits 

adjudications.” Id. at 279. “Parties must specify the specific issues presented to the 

referring court.” Id. at 280. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(b)). “Issues not 

specified need not be reviewed.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(b)). “The 

intention of section 201.015(b) is to limit the appealing party’s ability to raise new issues 

he has not specifically appealed in the de novo hearing.” Legarreta v. Alvidrez, 631 

S.W.3d 546, 549 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (citing Chacon v. Chacon, 222 

S.W.3d 909, 913 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.)). However, there is nothing in the 

statute that precludes a party from requesting review of all issues that were raised in the

trial on the merits. See In re L.R., 324 S.W.3d 885, 890 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, orig. 

proceeding) (construing a request for de novo hearing as raising all issues). “Witnesses 

may only be presented on the specified issues, but the referring [trial] court may also 

consider the record from the associate judge sua sponte.” In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d at 

280 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015(c)). “Participation in, or waiver of, a de novo 

hearing is without prejudice to ‘the right of a party to file a motion for new trial, motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or other post-trial motion.’” Id. (citing TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 201.015(h)). “In short, a de novo hearing is not an entirely new and 

independent action, but instead, is an extension of the original trial on the merits.” Id.

In this case, the associate judge’s order of termination specifically found by clear 

and convicing evidence that appellant had: 

6.2.1. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed [A.C.T.M.] to remain in 

conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional wellbeing of the child, pursuant to 161.001(b)(l)(D), Texas Family Code;
5

6.2.2. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed [A.C.T.M.] with persons who 

engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being 

of the child, pursuant to 161.001(b)(l)(E), Texas Family Code.

6.2.3. Termination is in the best interest of [A.C.T.M.].

The termination order also, among other things, appointed the Department as A.C.T.M.’s 

permanent managing conservator and terminated the parental rights of A.R.R., the 

alleged father, and “Unknown Father”. In her request for a de novo hearing, appellant

stated she “desired to appeal from all portions of the judg[]ment, specifically, but not 

limited to” the associate judge’s findings related to (1) the statutory grounds of termination

and that (2) termination was in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 201.015(b); In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d at 280; In re L.R., 324 S.W.3d at 890 n.5.

On October 24, 2022, the trial court conducted its de novo hearing and considered 

the record of the bench trial before the associate judge. The parties did not present further 

witnesses. The trial court orally pronounced its ruling “affirm[ing] the decision of [the 

associate judge]” and terminated appellant’s parental rights to A.C.T.M. On the same day, 

appellant filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s oral order, which initiated the first 

appeal involved in this case. See In re A.C.T.M., No. 13-22-00517-CV, 2023 WL 105116, 

*1 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). The District 

Clerk filed the Clerk’s record in this Court for the first appeal on November 3, 2022. A few 

days later, on November 8, 2022, the trial court signed a written order terminating the 

parental rights of appellant. The trial court’s November 8, 2022 order of termination was 

not contained in the Clerk’s record; thus, the existence of this order was unknown to this 

Court.
6

We dismissed appellant’s first appeal for want of jurisdiction as the record did not 

contain a final, appealable order. See id. We explained that on December 1, 2022, the 

Clerk of this Court notified appellant of this defect so that steps could be taken to correct 

the defect. See id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 37.1, 42.3.). Appellant was advised that the 

appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction if the defect was not corrected within 

ten days from the date of receipt of the notice. Appellant did not respond to this Court’s

notice. In addition, we explained that the District Court Clerk informed the Clerk of this 

Court that there were no signed orders or judgments memorializing the trial court’s 

October 24, 2022 oral pronouncement of its ruling. Accordingly, we dismissed appellant’s 

first appeal for want of jurisdiction as we were required to do. See id. 

When a de novo hearing of a parental termination case has been held in the 

referring court, a signed order or judgment by the referring court is required to invoke the 

jurisdiction of this Court. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.016(b). Absent exceptions not 

applicable to this case, “the date an order or judgment by the referring court is signed is 

the controlling date for purposes of appeal.” See id. § 201.016(b), (c). The referring trial 

court signed its “Order as to [appellant’s] De Novo Trial” on November 8, 2022. In this 

order, the trial court expressed the following:

On October 24, 2022, afier reviewing all the evidence, to include the zoom 

video recordings of the termination trial before the Associate Judge, 

available transcripts, and exhibits, the COURT HEREBY SUSTAINS and 

AFFIRMS the Order of Termination as granted by the Associate Judge on 

June 28, 2022 and signed on July 14, 2022 and July 11, 2022 as 

to . . . [appellant].

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

the parent-child relationship between [appellant] and the child the subject 

of this suit is in the child’s best interest. 
7

Further, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

[appellant] has:

knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in 

conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional welIbeing ofthe child, pursuant to 161.001(b)(1)(D), Texas Family Code; and

engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who 

engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being 

of the child, pursuant to 161. 001 (b)(1)(E), Texas Family Code.

Termination is in the best interest of the child.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parent—child relationship 

between [appellant] and the child the subject of this suit is TERMINATED.

A final judgment is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by 

reference and adopted as the final order of this Court as to . . . [appellant].

The November order further states that “The Order of Termination signed July 11, 2022 

and July 14, 2022 as to Respondents, [A.R.R.], alleged father, and the Unknown Father, 

remain final and were not subject to [d]e [n]ovo [a]ppeal.”

Though the November order references an attached “Exhibit A” that is not found 

in the Clerk’s Record before us, we nevertheless hold that it clearly and unequivically

“disposes of all issues and all parties in the record[.]” In re. R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 540.

The November order expressly states that it sustains and affirms the associate judge’s 

order of termination as to appellant. Furthermore, the November order specifically found, 

by clear and convincing evidence, the same grounds of termination and that termination 

was in the best interest of A.C.T.M. as espoused in the associate judge’s order of 

termination. There were no other pending issues that needed to be disposed. Thus, we 

find the November 8, 2022 order to be final.
8

More than sixty days later, the trial court rendered a subsequent order terminating 

the parental rights of appellant on January 20, 2023. Appellant’s January 31, 2023 notice 

of appeal specifically attempts to appeal the trial court’s January 20, 2023 order. In this 

case, no motion extending the trial court’s plenary power was filed after the trial court

rendered its November 8, 2022 final order; therefore, the trial court’s subsequent January 

20, 2023 order was signed well after the trial court lost plenary power and is a nullity. See 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 329a; Latty, 907 S.W.3d at 485. Because the trial court’s November 8, 

2022 order was final and started the appellate timetable, appellant’s notice of appeal was 

due within twenty days after that order was signed or after a motion for extension of time 

was due fifteen days later. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b), 28.1(b), 26.3; Verbugt, 959 

S.W.2d at 615. Appellant’s January 31, 2023 notice of appeal specifically attempts to 

appeal the January 20, 2023 order, which is void. See Freedom Commc’ns, 372 S.W.3d

at 623. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we dismiss it for want of 

jurisdiction. 

NORA L. LONGORIA 

 Justice 

Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by

Justice Benavides.

 

Delivered and filed on the

15th day of June, 2023.