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56–149 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 111–957 

FIVE YEARS AFTER THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM 

AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT: STOPPING 

TERRORIST TRAVEL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 9, 2009 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BLAS NUNEZ-NETO, Professional Staff Member 

NICOLE M. MARTINEZ, Staff Assistant 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

MATTHEW L. HANNA, Minority CBP Detailee 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 18 

Senator Ensign ................................................................................................. 22 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 29 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 35 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 39 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009 

Hon. Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................................ 5 

Hon. Janice L. Jacobs, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 7 

Hon. David F. Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 9 

Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice ......................................................... 11 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Beers, Hon. Rand: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Healy, Timothy J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 89 

Heyman, Hon. David F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 79 

Jacobs, Hon. Janice L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Ms. Jacobs ......................................................................................................... 96 

Mr. Heyman ...................................................................................................... 107 

(1) 

FIVE YEARS AFTER THE INTELLIGENCE 

REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT: 

STOPPING TERRORIST TRAVEL 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Burris, Collins, Voinovich, and Ensign. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good 

morning. We note the absence of two of our witnesses. This is not 

a protest to the hearing. But Senator Collins and I do note for the 

second time that there are Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) witnesses having trouble finding their way through the traffic to get here. We gave Secretary Napolitano a very hard time 

when it happened to her earlier, and we will not hesitate to give 

it to Mr. Beers and Mr. Heyman. 

Anyway, we are glad you are here. We are going to proceed with 

our opening statements, but we gather that the two others are very 

much on the way. 

Today’s hearing is part of our oversight responsibility and begins 

a series now 5 years after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act (IRTPA) was adopted, the so-called 9/11 Commission legislation. And in this hearing we are going to focus on a very 

important part of our comprehensive homeland security framework, 

architecture, which is: How are we doing at stopping terrorists 

from entering our country? This obviously is a most important 

homeland security responsibility that faces our government in the 

aftermath of September 11, 2001. 

We are going to hear testimony today from four key government 

officials who are on the front lines of our country’s efforts to 

achieve this mission. Their jobs are daunting, they are complex, 

and the consequence of a single mistake is a pressure I know they 

continually live with and that should weigh really on all of us in 

the government as we try to do a better job at protecting our people 

in an age of terrorists who are willing to attack us here at home. 

2 

After having made that statement, I must say, in terms of letting 

our guard down, why I and others are so concerned about the security breach at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

that was discovered over this past weekend. As you all know, I am 

sure, a highly sensitive screening manual was posted online, apparently for months, without being properly redacted. This was a serious breach because the manual includes information that could 

help terrorists to defeat and circumvent the TSA inspection process. This is actually quite relevant to what we are here to discuss 

today. In this age of freely flowing information, we simply have to 

have adequate safeguards in place to ensure that terrorists are not 

being given any advantages as they plot against us. So we will 

await with real interest and, I say, impatience the TSA review of 

how this possibly could have happened and how they are intending 

not just to make sure it does not happen again, but how they are 

intending to mitigate the potential adverse consequences of this 

mistake. 

The 19 hijackers who attacked our country on September 11, 

2001, traveled to the United States with visas, some obtained 

fraudulently, but most obtained legally. Two of the terrorists were 

at that time illegal because they had overstayed their visas. The 

arrests this fall of a number of people charged with planning terrorist attacks in the United States: Najibullah Zazi, Betim Kaziu, 

Michael Finton, and Hosam Smadi, and the arrest of David 

Headley, who was more involved in plots against foreign targets, 

but from the United States, are the most recent reminders that terrorists are still crossing our borders legally—in Headley’s case in 

and out—living among us, and plotting to attack us or, in 

Headley’s case, our allies. 

This Committee takes very seriously our obligation to ensure 

that the Executive Branch is tackling head on the challenges posed 

by violent Islamist extremists to our homeland security, and fulfilling that responsibility certainly begins with doing everything we 

can to keep terrorists from ever entering the United States. 

There really have been quite a remarkable number of additional 

laws and programs put in place to achieve this goal since September 11, 2001. A lot of them, I am proud to say, are the result 

of legislation that began in this Committee but was passed, of 

course, by the full Congress and signed by the President. The 9/11 

Commission legislation was one of those, the 2004 legislation, then 

the follow-on 2007 legislation. 

I think rather than going on at length about all the programs 

that have been established—U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT), the Terrorist Screening Center, the 

National Counterterrorism Center itself, the efforts we are making 

to establish the US–VISIT program, depending a lot on fingerprints—has really been a remarkable achievement, but I have concerns about some of the questions that it raises. And it is no substitute for a biometric exit system. The implementation of a biometric entry system at all of our Nation’s ports really has been a centerpiece of the screening system, quite remarkable, but we still, as 

I say, do not have the biometric exit system in place despite numerous congressional mandates, and that is a concern that we will 

pursue today. 

3 

I would say bottom line that I think we are a lot safer than we 

were on September 11, 2001, and we are doing a lot better from 

the initial point of contact, which is the consular interview abroad 

where people apply to come in, to all of the various databases that 

people are screened on when they get on a plane to come here, to 

the biometric entry system and to our improvements at the exit 

system as well, we are doing much better. But we have to do yet 

better than this, and, of course, as we see in error of judgment 

made by TSA over the weekend, and in some sense what may be 

some errors of judgment in the case of Major Nidal Hasan in Fort 

Hood—we do not know that conclusively, but it feels like that—the 

consequences are really catastrophic. 

So this is the pressure that we live under. This is the time in 

which we have this responsibility. But the four of you, I think, and 

the agencies and the people you represent have done a tremendous 

job to bring us to a position much better than we were at on September 11, 2001. We want to explore with you today how we can 

help you and how you can do better at improving our systems for 

stopping terrorists who enter the country in a time of rapidly 

changing technology and clear and persistent attempts by the terrorist organizations as reflected in the run of cases we have had 

this year, particularly homegrown terrorists coming and going, to 

attack our country again. 

This Committee will be vigilant in the months ahead, in this 5- 

year review of post-September 11, 2001, legislation to ensure that 

the Federal Government continues to strengthen these systems, 

and today’s hearing I think is an expression of our commitment to 

do that. 

So I thank all the witnesses for being here, and I am happy now 

to call on Senator Collins for her opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Five years ago, this 

Committee authored the most significant reform of our Nation’s intelligence community since the Second World War. Today, we recognize that this is no time to rest, no reason to pause, in our efforts 

to protect our country from terrorist attacks. 

Earlier this week, we received a chilling reminder of how a lapse 

in security can pose a serious threat to our homeland. As the 

Chairman has indicated, a version of TSA’s aviation security manual was posted on the Internet for anyone to access and read. As 

former Assistant Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Stewart Baker has said, the manual will become a textbook for 

those seeking to penetrate aviation security, and he described the 

leak as serious. 

Terrorists continually change their strategies and mutate their 

forms of attack. We know, however, that their aim remains constant, and that is, to harm our Nation and our citizens. 

The 9/11 Commission noted that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers might have been intercepted by border authorities if procedures 

had been in place to link previously accumulated information to 

their names. Several of the hijackers had been cited in intelligence 

agency files for terrorist links. Existing but untapped data on travel patterns, bogus visa applications, and fraudulent passport inforVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Apr 29, 2011 Jkt 056149 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\56149.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4 

mation could have focused attention on some of these terrorists. 

And that is why this Committee has focused so relentlessly on the 

issue of terrorist travel during the past several years. 

Following the attacks on our country, the Federal Government 

took initial steps to deploy systems and procedures to help ensure 

that terrorists would not again slip undetected across our borders. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 

which Senator Lieberman and I co-authored, expanded and 

strengthened many of these initiatives and implemented other recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We can look back at a great 

deal of progress that has been made since that time. 

One of these successes is a biometric system for screening foreign 

nationals seeking to enter the United States. The State Department now collects fingerprints of foreign nationals who apply for 

visas at U.S. embassies and consulates across the world. They compare them to databases containing fingerprints of potential terrorists and immigration violators. Those fingerprints are now checked 

at U.S. ports of entry by DHS to confirm that the individual arriving into our country is the same individual who was approved for 

the visa abroad. 

Another important accomplishment has been the creation of a 

consolidated terrorist watchlist based on terrorism-related information from all parts of the intelligence community as well as the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The consolidated list allows 

the names of individuals to be quickly checked to identify terrorism 

connections. The Intelligence Reform Act required that passengers 

on international flights to the United States and flights within the 

United States be checked against this watchlist. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended 

that DHS develop guidelines for the private sector to use the terrorist watchlist to screen their employees. These guidelines, however, have yet to be issued. The owners and operators of our critical 

infrastructure should be permitted to screen their employees 

against the terrorist watchlist on a voluntary basis, as long as appropriate civil liberties protections are in place. It is notable that 

Najibullah Zazi, who plotted the recent terrorist attacks in New 

York, was an airport shuttle driver at the Denver Airport. That 

means that he had access to critical infrastructure. 

The Federal Government also has yet to establish a mechanism 

to screen mass transit workers, such as those who drive subway 

trains and buses, against the terrorist watchlist. This was required 

in the 2007 homeland security law. But although 28 months have 

passed, no regulations have been issued by DHS. Think about it. 

Every day these employees have in their hands many lives, and a 

simple check against the watchlist, such as that already required 

for hazardous materials drivers, ferry captains, and airline pilots, 

might prevent a needless loss of lives. 

This Committee also authored the legislation in 2007 that 

strengthened the Visa Waiver Program, and I look forward to hearing more about that as well. 

As Senator Lieberman has indicated, the Federal Government 

has worked hard and the countless Federal employees are diligent 

in trying to prevent terrorists from coming across our borders to do 

us harm and to prevent them from traveling and working within 

5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Beers appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

our country. But as the incident with TSA reminds us, even what 

appeared to be an innocent posting to help Federal contractors can 

have serious consequences for our security. We need to do more to 

improve our procedures and to guard against security lapses such 

as this one. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins, for 

your opening statement. 

Mr. Beers and Mr. Heyman, we gave you a hard time about 

being late before you arrived so I need not repeat it, but we welcome you. And Senator Collins and I have amply filled the time before your arrival. 

Thanks very much for being here. We are taking a 5-year look 

now at all the things that we have done, the systems we have created to stop terrorists from being able to enter here, and to make 

sure that those who cause us trouble are noted on the way out as 

well. So we are happy to welcome you back as our first witness, 

Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs 

Directorate (NPPD) at DHS. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. RAND BEERS,1 UNDER SECRETARY, 

NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins. It is an honor for me and David Heyman and the partners in this effort from the FBI and the State Department to discuss the progress that we have made. 

We know, and fully agree with what you have said, that terrorists definitely plan and are attempting to carry out attacks on our 

homeland, and that it is our responsibility to do everything that we 

can to deny them the access. At the National Protection and Programs Directorate, we are responsible for identifying the human 

threats to our country through our US–VISIT program. US–VISIT 

plays a vital role in helping the Federal Government identify people who pose a threat before they are admitted to the United 

States, preferably, or if they are here, after they have entered the 

country. 

Our capabilities I think have come a long way in a few short 

years. Before US–VISIT, State Department and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had to rely on travel documents, documents 

that could be easily forged, to determine whether or not a visa 

should be granted or a person should be admitted to the United 

States. Today, I think using biometrics, we can verify international 

traveler identities to make fraud almost impossible, stripping terrorists and criminals of anonymity, one of their most valuable assets. 

With the power to uncover a person’s true identity and immigration and criminal history, we have been able to deny approximately 

9,000 impostors at our ports of entry in the last 5 years as well as 

identify a number of others who were required to pass through secondary screening to determine their travel history. 

6 

The four US–VISIT agencies basically lacked coordinated data 

systems, and there was no real way to exchange information easily 

or check one another’s records before making a decision to grant a 

visa, admit someone to the United States, or grant some other immigration benefit. I think the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act called on us to fully integrate the systems of 

Immigrationa nd Customs Enforcement (ICE), CBP, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) as well as the State Department and the Justice Department to enable information sharing in a timely fashion. 

Today, US–VISIT makes biometric-based information sharing between these agencies possible by providing a single source of information on criminals, immigration violators, and known or suspected terrorists. Every day, 30,000 authorized Federal, State, and 

local government agency users can query US–VISIT data and get 

a response quickly in order to help them determine, identify, mitigate, and eliminate security risks. 

And, finally, before US–VISIT, ICE officers lacked timely and accurate information about visa overstays, and while this system is 

not perfect, as I am sure we will discuss today, US–VISIT does 

analyze and match entry and exit records, identifies hundreds of 

credible leads each week on people who have overstayed their 

visas, and those leads are forwarded to ICE, who can then determine what appropriate action that they might take. 

So, together, these steps I think have made our efforts to prevent 

terrorist travel more collaborative, more streamlined, and more effective than ever before. Let me give you one example of the power 

of this system of improved screening and information sharing and 

how it is helping us to catch dangerous people. 

In 2007, a man applied for a visa at a U.S. embassy. When the 

State Department checked his fingerprints, in the database there 

was no negative information about this person, and he was granted 

a visa. Three days later, US–VISIT received from Interpol information about the criminal history of this individual. This updated 

data was then run against the existing database system and identified this person who had already been granted a visa. And that 

visa was then subsequently denied as we passed that information 

to the State Department. 

The point of making this example is to show you that this is not 

a system that is a one-time-fire-and-forget kind of system. It is a 

system that is updated on a regular basis and then run against the 

existing database. It is dynamic. New information is constantly run 

against the old to make sure that we did not miss somebody that 

we could identify as a person of interest and ensure that appropriate action was taken in a timely fashion. 

So this individual is but one of thousands of people who we have 

prevented from entering the United States, and yet we know that 

our success is not complete and that we have more work to be 

done. 

So as part of our ongoing effort, we will continue to innovate 

with new systems. We will continue to ensure that coordination 

among the various actors in the Federal Government is effective, 

and we will continue to work abroad with other countries to get 

7 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobs appears in the Appendix on page 51. 

others to also begin to use biometric identification as part of the 

international system. 

So thank you both for having us here today, and know that we 

are dedicated to protecting the United States. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Beers. That anecdote was 

both interesting and encouraging. 

Our second witness is the Hon. Janice Jacobs, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Department of State. Again, for those 

in the room, those watching, this is a system that begins way over 

there, and for most people—but not all, of course—the initial point 

of contact is a consular officer at the State Department. Thanks for 

being here. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANICE L. JACOBS,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Ms. JACOBS. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and 

distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a distinct honor to 

appear before you today. I appreciate the opportunity to share with 

you the many accomplishments of my colleagues in the Bureau of 

Consular Affairs in our continuing efforts to strengthen the security of U.S. borders through the vigilant adjudication of both U.S. 

passports and visas while maintaining America’s traditional openness to legitimate travelers. 

Through enhanced training, technology, and data sharing, today’s consular officers can more readily distinguish between highand low-risk travelers, concentrating their efforts on those requiring more scrutiny while facilitating legitimate travel, travel that 

enhances the U.S. economy and promotes mutual exchange and understanding. 

I can state with certainty that in my 20-year Foreign Service career I have not seen a transformation more dramatic than the one 

that the Bureau of Consular Affairs undertook after the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001. First as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Visas and now as Assistant Secretary, I have been personally 

involved in implementing the enormous changes that are detailed 

in my written testimony. I share the responsibility for our twin 

goals of open doors and secure borders with my esteemed colleagues at this table. Our close and fruitful cooperation is evidenced through unprecedented data sharing and interagency coordination. 

In my written testimony, I outline five pillars of how we stop terrorist travel. We rely on technological advances, biometric innovations, personal interviews, data sharing, and training. 

The first pillar, technological advances, relies on comprehensive 

databases such as the Consular Lookout and Support System 

(CLASS), and the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). CLASS 

is a database which is updated continuously. Because of improved 

data sharing, CLASS has grown more than 400 percent with almost 70 percent of records coming from other agencies. CCD allows 

Foreign Service posts, the Department, and our partner agencies 

8 

and offices to view information about visa applicants within confidentiality provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

We will soon deploy a global system for conducting and tracking 

consular fraud investigations. A new electronic platform, now deployed overseas, will provide consular and fraud officers the opportunity to analyze data in advance of the interview, enhancing their 

ability to make decisions. And security advisory opinions (SAO) are 

now processed electronically, thus facilitating the processing of 

nearly 2 million SAO requests since September 11, 2001. 

The second pillar is the use of biometrics. In fiscal year 2009, 

fingerprints of more than 6.7 million visa applicants were screened 

against DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System 

(IDENT), and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) databases. Our partnership with DHS allows Customs and Border Protection officers at ports of entry to 

verify the identity of travelers by checking against fingerprints collected during visa interviews at overseas posts. 

We also screen visa applicants against a watchlist of photos of 

known and suspected terrorists obtained from the FBI’s Terrorist 

Screening Center. Facial recognition screening has proven to be another effective way to reveal impostors. 

The third pillar relies on one of the most significant changes in 

consular practice after September 11, 2001: A reemphasis on the 

personal interview. The interview is an opportunity for consular officers to determine the credibility of an applicant and the applicant’s travel plans and the stated purpose of the visit to the United 

States. 

The fourth pillar demonstrates how we rely increasingly on our 

partners to enhance our ability to make the right decisions when 

adjudicating visa and passport applications through data sharing. 

For example, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, working with DHS, 

has provided visa adjudicating posts overseas with access to DHS’s 

Arrival/Departure Information System (ADIS), thus giving consular 

officers more information about an applicant’s travel history. 

And, finally, the fifth pillar is training. The Department of State 

is committed to providing the highest level of training to our consular officers. Over the past 6 years, the Department has lengthened and substantially improved the basic consular course required 

of all officers in consular positions and continually reviews course 

content for further enhancement. The Department also continually 

updates the hands-on anti-fraud technologies curriculum. 

Allow me to add a brief note about the safety of U.S. passports. 

Since 2005, we have been issuing state-of-the-art passport documents with advanced technological features to foil the efforts of 

counterfeiters. We are also doing everything in our power to ensure 

that passports and passport cards are issued only to U.S. citizens 

who are legitimately entitled to them. We have greatly enhanced 

our fraud prevention efforts over the past year. In coordination 

with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, we launched unannounced 

testing of the processes and procedures for passport acceptance and 

adjudication. 

Distinguished Members of the Committee, I believe that we have 

made significant improvements since the attacks of September 11, 

2001. At the same time, we are constantly looking for ways to do 

9 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman appears in the Appendix on page 79. 

better. Please be assured that the Bureau of Consular Affairs will 

continue its close cooperation with our partners to find ways to 

keep this country safe while keeping our borders open to legitimate 

visitors. We believe the record of the past 8 years shows that we 

can make advances in both spheres, and we are dedicated to implementing the best possible solutions to further these goals. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. I appreciate the 

Committee’s continued interest in our work and have enjoyed the 

chance to share some of the many accomplishes we have had over 

the past several years, and I am pleased to take your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Ms. Jacobs. 

Now we will go to David Heyman, Assistant Secretary of Policy 

at the Department of Homeland Security. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID F. HEYMAN,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. HEYMAN. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Collins, and distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity 

to be here today and to appear before you. 

I want to echo Under Secretary Rand Beers, my colleagues, the 

Chairman, and the Senator’s commitment to keeping this Nation 

safe, secure, and resilient, and the appreciation that this Committee has done to do so. 

Today I want to discuss three key areas in which the U.S. Department of Homeland Security plays a central role in disrupting 

and denying terrorist travel: Identification of known and suspected 

terrorists as well as other individuals who pose a threat to national 

security; screening of travelers and those seeking immigration benefits; and, finally, securing and verifying travel documents to prevent people from illicitly traveling to the United States. 

Let me start by putting the challenge of thwarting terrorist travel in context. To begin with, people are not born as terrorists, nor 

are extremists necessarily violent. But there are key paths along 

the way in which individuals turn to violence and terrorism to include recruitment, radicalization, indoctrination, planning, and terrorist action at the end. This process can occur in safe havens, in 

foreign countries, and even within our own borders. The U.S. Government deploys a number of strategies to counter terrorism, 

including collaborating with our foreign partners, cutting off terrorists’ financial resources, intercepting terrorist communications, targeting terrorist leadership, and countering efforts of recruitment, 

among others. 

But to paraphrase the 9/11 Commission and the Chairman’s 

opening statement, targeting terrorist travel is perhaps one of the 

most powerful weapons we have to counter the ability of terrorists 

to operate. 

As evidenced by recent events, the United States and its allies 

have made significant progress in our attempts to frustrate terrorists’ ability to communicate, to plan, to finance, and—the focus of 

this hearing—to travel to conduct operations. Focusing on these 

four areas allows multiple opportunities to interdict. 

10 

Those who seek to engage in terrorist activity rely on access to 

travel networks. Terrorists do travel in order to identify and engage in surveillance of potential targets, to plan their attacks, to 

train on tactics and operations, to collect funds and documents, and 

to communicate with other operatives. Every step along this way, 

however, presents a vulnerability to would-be attackers who must 

come out of the shadows and interact with the traveling public and 

our officers at ports of entry and abroad. 

What we have learned over the past few years is that border security and preventing terrorist travel is more than drawing a line 

in the sand and more than just preventing terrorist travel. It is the 

exercise of our authorities associated with border security and the 

fact that this can be a powerful resource to identify and thwart terrorist operations at the earliest opportunity. 

At DHS we have a number of ways in which we seek to limit and 

constrain terrorist travel, many of which are accomplished before 

a terrorist even boards a plane. First, we must know who poses a 

potential threat, and to identify those travelers who present a risk, 

we rely on the intelligence community, law enforcement, our border 

security specialists, and our international partners. These groups 

help both to populate the watchlist that is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center and understand the techniques used by 

high-risk travelers to blend into the rest of the traveling public. 

Data of known and suspected terrorists is then made available 

to DHS to screen through our system, such as the Traveler Enforcement Compliance System (TECS), through the Automated Targeting System, and US–VISIT’s IDENT. Entities such as CBP’s National Targeting Center, the Terrorist Screening Center, Human 

Smuggling and Trafficking Center, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) collaborate to ensure coordinated evaluation 

and response to potential encounters. 

Second, we must be able to expedite the entry of the vast numbers of legitimate travelers while restricting the movement of terrorists and other malicious actors. Our knowledge of who is associated with terrorism and the practices terrorist travelers adopt is 

applied through a multi-layered, end-to-end screening process. This 

is a process we have developed over the last two decades. 

The first layer of that process begins well before departure, with 

programs such as CBP’s Global Entry, with our Electronic System 

for Travel Authorization (ESTA), that, like the visa adjudication 

process, provides the DHS the ability to identify potential risks 

during the planning stage through checks of the applicants against 

watchlists, criminal history, and other derogatory information. 

The second layer is through the advanced receipt of passenger information, reservation data, and manifest information. That enables us to identify likely terrorists and criminals during their 

movements and coordinate our response. 

Finally, the third layer, at our ports of entry our officers are able 

to identify people who may be attempting to use fraudulent documents. 

Each of these steps reinforces the ones before it, allowing us to 

deny travel prior to departure, target travelers for additional inspection, and prevent entry at arrival, and/or prevent an individual 

11 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Healy appears in the Appendix on page 89. 

from remaining in the United States if they are not authorized to 

do so. 

Finally, no amount of watchlisting and screening will help us 

identify terrorist travelers if they are able to travel on an assumed 

identity with fraudulently obtained or fake documents. As a result, 

we need to ensure the security of the documents that we require 

for travel and an accurate accounting of documents that have been 

validated due to loss or theft. 

Through the Visa Waiver Program and the International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO), we have worked to develop global 

standards for the current generation of electronic passports, incorporating biometric data that reduces fraud. Through US–VISIT 

and other programs, we can verify that the presenter of the document is the same person to whom it was issued and who we have 

possibly seen before. And with Interpol, we have worked to promote 

increased use of the Stolen and Lost Travel Document database, a 

global repository of approximately 20 million records of invalid 

passports and identity documents. Today, we use this system in 

most of our border screening programs and every month identify 

cases of fraud that would have otherwise been undetectable. 

I submit my full statement for the record, but let me close by 

summarizing that by enhancing the security of travel documents, 

screening persons in advance of travel, identifying known and suspected terrorists as well as other inadmissible travelers, and denying them entry into the United States, we can limit terrorist travel. 

We can constrain their operations. This is one of a number of tools 

protecting America against terrorist attacks. 

I thank the Chairman, thank you, Senator Collins and Members, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Heyman. I look forward 

to posing some questions to you. 

Finally, we have Timothy Healy, Director of the Terrorist Screening Center at the FBI. It is good to see you again. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY J. HEALY,1 DIRECTOR, TERRORIST 

SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. HEALY. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member 

Collins, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to talk about the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and its 

role in combating terrorist travel. 

Over the past 6 years, the TSC has become a powerful tool to 

fight terrorism and integrate the law enforcement and intelligence 

communities by consolidating terrorist information into a single 

Terrorist Watchlist. We are continuing to move forward to enhance 

our partners’ ability to combat terrorism by improving the U.S. 

Government’s approach to terrorist screening and safeguarding 

civil liberties in the process. Our interagency watchlisting and 

screening efforts have matured into a true information-sharing success. With your continued support, we hope to improve upon our 

initiatives to provide critical terrorist identity information to our 

domestic and foreign partners for terrorist screening purposes. Let 

12 

me begin by telling you about where we are at today and where 

we want to be in the future. 

Established in 2003, the TSC is a multi-agency center that connects the law enforcement communities with the intelligence community. We strive to maintain the highest-quality data concerning 

known or suspected terrorists to aid in the identification process. 

We ensure the timely dissemination of that terrorist data and that 

prompt notification is made when a known or suspected terrorist 

has been identified through the screening process. We ensure that 

privacy is protected and civil liberties are safeguarded. 

The identities contained in the Terrorist Watchlist originate from 

credible information developed by our intelligence and law enforcement partners. 

TSC accepts nominations into the Terrorist Watchlist when they 

satisfy two requirements. First, the biographical information associated with a nomination must contain sufficient identifying data 

so that the person being screened can be matched to or disassociated from the watchlisted terrorist. Second, the facts and circumstances pertaining to the nomination must meet ‘‘reasonable 

suspicion’’ which requires ‘‘articulable’’ facts which, taken together 

with rational inferences, reasonably warrant a determination that 

the individual is known or suspected to be a terrorist. 

Most of the individuals on the Terrorist Watchlist are not U.S. 

citizens, but they are living abroad. The Terrorist Watchlist is 

made up of approximately 400,000 people ranging from suicide 

bombers to financiers. A small portion of the list is exported to TSA 

to create the no-fly list. In order to be placed on the no-fly list, a 

known or suspected terrorist must present a threat to civil aviation 

or national security. Consequently, the no-fly list is a very small 

subset of the Terrorist Watchlist. It contains approximately 3,400 

people; of those approximately 170 are U.S. citizens. 

The screening process leverages thousands of our law enforcement officers and other government partners to help identify, detect, and deter terrorists. Terrorist screening occurs throughout the 

world at our embassies, at our ports of entry, during police stops, 

during special events, when HAZMAT licenses are issued, or when 

guns are purchased. 

Terrorist screening occurs when processing passports or visa applications or citizenship and immigration applications. 

Our Tactical Operations Center operates 24 hours a day and receives approximately 150 calls per day. Of those, approximately 30 

to 40 percent are positive matches to the Terrorist Watchlist. All 

positive matches are forwarded to the FBI Counterterrorism Center 

for the appropriate law enforcement response. Additionally, we improve our Terrorist Watchlist by updating existing records using 

the information discovered during the encounters. 

In conjunction with the Department of State, we have completed 

bilateral agreements with 17 foreign governments and have independently provided screening support for certain international 

events such as the World Games. Over the past 2 years, our outreach teams have coordinated with all 72 State and local fusion 

centers, and we also provide terrorist-related encounter information online. 

13 

TSC notifies fusion centers when encounters occur within their 

area of responsibility. The TSC was recognized for its innovative 

information-sharing initiative at the 2009 National Fusion Center 

Conference. 

As we move forward, our watchlisting efforts must be predicated 

upon four basic operational concepts: Maintenance of the highest 

quality of terrorist identity data, timely dissemination of that terrorist identity data, responsive information sharing, and safeguarding civil liberties. 

Once a known or suspected terrorist is identified and included in 

the Terrorist Watchlist, we must ensure the timely dissemination 

of that terrorist data to our screening partners. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses the Terrorist Watchlist 

at all 327 ports of entry. Law enforcement agencies use the Terrorist Watchlist when they conduct their normal police checks. The 

TSA uses the Terrorist Watchlist when they coordinate the screening of all commercial air passenger travel. The Department of State 

uses the Terrorist Watchlist to screen aliens seeking visas and U.S. 

persons applying for passports. 

The TSC led the interagency initiative to develop an effective 

interagency redress process and maintains a separate unit dedicated to resolving redress matters. Working closely with our interagency partners, we standardize the interagency Watchlist Redress 

Procedures and provide travelers with an opportunity to receive a 

timely, fair, and accurate review of their redress concerns. A traveler who believes they were inconvenienced as a result of screening 

can submit a redress complaint through the DHS Traveler Redress 

Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). The complaint is reviewed by the 

agency that received it and referred to the TSC Redress Unit after 

it has been determined that it has a connection to the Terrorist 

Watchlist. Of note, 0.7 or less than 1 percent of the DHS TRIP 

complaints actually have some connection to the Terrorist 

Watchlist. We review all available information and work with the 

nominating agency to determine if the Terrorist Watchlist status 

should be modified. The TSC neither confirms nor denies an individual being on the watchlist. We do, however, assure the inquiring 

entity that we have examined all applicable Terrorist Watchlist 

records to ensure they contain current and accurate information 

and we have taken all reasonable measures to reduce any future 

misidentification. 

We have also established protocols to aid the individual who continuously gets misidentified because their name is similar to the 

watchlist. To provide relief in these situations, our TSC CBP employees issue what is called a Primary Lookout Override so that 

the individual will not be inconvenienced during future screening 

attempts. 

Our ongoing commitment to high-quality terrorist identity data, 

to the timely dissemination of that information, and to share that 

information once we have encounters occur is our ultimate goal. 

Our watchlisting and screening enterprise would not be where it is 

at today without the superb collaborative efforts between the TSC, 

the FBI, DHS, Department of State, Department of Defense, the 

NCTC, and members of the intelligence community. 

14 

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, I look forward to 

answering any questions you may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Healy. I must 

say, if I may paraphrase what Ms. Jacobs said, in her years in Federal service, she has not seen so dramatic a transformation as they 

have in the Consular Affairs section. I think it is generally true 

across the board. It has been quite an impressive upgrade and also 

the establishment of a series of what I would call filters, but really 

they are much more than that, particularly using modern information technology. So I think we have come a long way. 

Let me begin my questioning with you, Ms. Jacobs, because as 

we said, you are at the beginning of the process. I think one of the 

most important provisions of the terrorism prevention legislation 

that we passed in 2004 was the requirement that all individuals 

undergo a personal interview when applying for a visa. No matter 

how advanced and seamless our border screening technology becomes, these automated databases were obviously created to catch 

people that we already have reason to suspect. They cannot help 

us discover the terrorist who has never come in contact with one 

of our intelligence or law enforcement agencies. Only a trained and 

motivated consular officer is able to identify that terrorist who has 

never made himself or herself known. 

So I wanted to ask you, in the course of their interviews, consular officers obviously come across a wide variety of travel documents, not always from the country to which they are posted. What 

mechanisms are currently in place to help consular officers identify 

fraudulent documents? 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have, in fact, put in 

place since September 11, 2001 a very robust anti-fraud training 

program whereby officers who are going out in the field to do their 

first consular assignment start with the basic consular course, 

where they get training in fraud prevention and detection. Once 

they are overseas at a post, that training continues. We have an 

orientation program for all of our officers that teaches them what 

genuine documents look like from that particular country, but also 

they are given online tools and other databases that they can check 

in order to confirm the legitimacy of travel documents or documents from other countries. 

The officers in the field, and the Foreign Service nationals who 

work alongside them, really are true experts in determining whether a document is fraudulent or not. They can look, touch, feel documents. They know a wide range of documents that are issued in 

that particular country. But, again, we have tools available online 

where there are entire libraries of samples of documents from other 

countries. We use the Edison online tool database in order to verify 

the authenticity of documents. 

So I am very comfortable in saying that we have given officers 

the training and the tools that they need, and we also really stress 

interviewing techniques, the ability when you are talking to someone to even look for facial expressions to see if someone is telling 

you the truth. 

I think with all of that put together that the officers are much 

more able today than they were perhaps in the past to pick up on 

15 

clues, on irregularities, either in what someone is saying or in the 

documents that are presented. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, and obviously this is very important, 

just to stress the point that I made in offering this question. We 

have got this biometric system, fingerprint system, for entry into 

the country, but for somebody who is not in a fingerprint database, 

obviously the accuracy of the reader documents is critically important. 

Tell me a little more about the consular case management system that you referred to in your testimony and how that is different from what happens today and, if in any way, how it will improve the consular interview process. 

Ms. JACOBS. We have had basically individual tracking systems 

available at different posts for tracking fraud cases. What we are 

going to be deploying in the future is a system that will be available to everyone. It will be in our consolidated database whereby 

people will be able to look at the fraud cases that are being handled at any post around the world. We will be able to check on 

trends. We will be able to see if we have visa shoppers, people 

going from post to post, whether we are being told the same thing 

as was said at another post. 

It will give us a much better feel for the amount of fraud that 

we are encountering and, as I said, some analytical tools in order 

for us to be able to detect trends that might be occurring. 

We are very excited about this. We are seeing all kinds of different uses, both on the visa side and passport side, and we think 

that once this is in place, our ability to detect fraud will be enhanced even further. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is good. 

Under Secretary Beers, I wanted to ask you if you would talk a 

little bit about the advantages of a biometric exit system. In other 

words, do you think one is needed? And what would its benefit be 

as opposed to a biographical system for law enforcement, including 

DHS? 

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, Senator, for the question. We have been 

looking at this really for some time now. I think with respect to the 

biometric system over the biographic system, the real issue to 

make it most effective is to ensure, in fact, that all people who are 

exiting the country who are in some kind of a visa or immigration 

status, in fact, do check out with the country. The current system, 

which is biographically based, does not have that degree of certitude with respect to the checkout. The options that we are looking 

at all have as an element the assurance that people cannot exit the 

country in that visa status by air or sea without actually checking 

out. So that will increase our certainty about individuals and 

whether or not they are in status with respect to the time frame 

that their visa was available for or their entry would allow them 

to be in this country. 

It also allows us, because it is biometric, to also check effectively 

as to whether or not any activities that occurred after their entry 

into the country—for example, criminal activity—was known and 

recorded and whether or not there was, in fact, some criminal action which was incomplete with respect to that. So in the pilot 

study that we have run, we actually picked up some individuals 

16 

who are wanted in this country who were trying to leave the country because of that. So I think it is an additional degree of assurance. 

Having said that, as you well know, sir, this is only one portion 

of the way that people can exit this country, but, by and large, the 

people who come in by air go out by air. And so it will definitely 

increase our assurance over that. 

But let me just add as a final point, we do currently have a system designed to detect overstays. It is not perfect, but it is also in 

existence, and it does refer cases on a regular basis to ICE for taking further action. And a number of overstays have been arrested 

as a result of this system. But biometrics I think we believe would 

enhance this overall system. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Can you give us, even in broad terms, any 

timeline for deploying a biometric system, for instance, at airports? 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. We are in the final stages of a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security for the system to be selected from among the various options that we tried and some that 

have been put together as a result of that test, but which were not 

actually tested. And my expectation is that she will be reviewing 

this in the course of either this month or the next month. We will 

then share that with you all and with others. It is not going to be 

a free system under any circumstances, and we will have to provide 

you, as I promised Senator Voinovich, among others, an actual 

budget amount that would be forwarded. Then we would go into 

rulemaking, and my expectation is that actual implementation 

would probably not begin in this fiscal year, although we will try, 

if it is possible, with some test points to do that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is actually good news. Obviously, we wish it would have happened earlier, but you are on a 

timeline now that will take us to deployment of a biometric exit 

system at airports if not in this fiscal year, then presumably early 

in the next one. Then at another time I would be interested in 

hearing about what you think the challenges are to deploying a biometric system at land points of exit. 

Mr. BEERS. That is a much longer conversation, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is. We will come back to that. Thank 

you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Beers, I have a copy of the TSA Aviation Security Manual 

that was posted on the Internet, and every single page of this manual has at the top of it ‘‘Sensitive Security Information.’’ At the bottom of the cover page, it says ‘‘Warning: This record contains sensitive security information that is controlled. No part of this record 

may be disclosed to people without a need to know without the 

written permission of either the head of TSA or the Secretary of 

Transportation.’’ It goes on to say that ‘‘Unauthorized release may 

result in civil penalties.’’ 

So how did this happen? 

Mr. BEERS. Let me start, because we both have spent the morning—and, quite frankly, that is why we were late—in being able to 

answer the expected questions that you all quite legitimately would 

pose about this. 

17 

The first point I want to make is there is no question that this 

was inappropriately posted on this Web site and that the protections that were supposed to have been put in place were not adequate. And this, I think, represents a breach of all of the protocols 

that you just noted in indicating the nature, Sensitive Security Information (SSI), do not disclose, etc. All of those I think are correct. 

As a result of this—but let me make two other points first. 

The first thing is that this document that you are referring to is 

a document which was for supervisors. It was not for front-line 

screeners. So the actual screening procedures that a transportation 

security officer (TSO), would actually use at a screening point are 

not in that document. 

The second thing is it is an older document. It is six versions ago 

in terms of that. That does not mean that it is not an inappropriate 

release of the document, as you quite correctly said. 

Senator COLLINS. But are you saying that this has substantially 

changed in the last year and a half? Because that is not my understanding. 

Mr. BEERS. Mr. Heyman, I, and the Secretary all talked to the 

Acting Administrator of TSA. The document has changed since 

then. I am not using that as an excuse to say that this is not a 

problem. But the other part of it, quite honestly, is that the actual 

screening procedures are not in that document, and that is the procedures that individual transportation security officers actually use 

at the checkpoints. So that is, I think, an important distinction to 

make about this particular document. 

Senator COLLINS. But let me tell you what is in the document, 

and since this document is widely available now and has been discussed in the press, I do not believe I am revealing anything that 

is not already out there. And, Mr. Heyman, I will address this 

issue to you. 

There is a whole section in this document on credentials, on the 

IDs that are used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that 

are used by the U.S. Marshals, that are used by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. There are pictures of the actual IDs 

and of the badges. 

I would say to my colleagues that there is a page with a picture 

of what an ID for a U.S. Senator looks like. And, ironically, in the 

airport this weekend, I had the screener look at my ID and check 

the manual. 

So this is important. If we are talking about making sure that 

people who would do us harm do not have the ability to falsify documents, we have given them a textbook on how to do so in this 

manual because we have showed them exactly what documents 

look like for individuals who are likely to receive less screening because they have these documents, because they are law enforcement officials, for example. So there is a lot of sensitive information 

in here. 

Have you notified the agencies whose credentials are included in 

this document to tell them that the information is out there and 

that now their credentials may be vulnerable to being counterfeited? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Senator, and I suppose I should thank 

Under Secretary Beers for the opportunity to answer this question. 

18 

Let me just echo Under Secretary Beers’ comments. This is entirely unacceptable. There is no one at the Department who has 

any opinion to the contrary on this, and you bring up what are the 

next steps on this. 

First of all, there is a full investigation that is underway. In the 

last 48 hours, we have removed the information from the Web site. 

The practice of posting SSI documents in whole or part has been 

suspended pending further review. The Acting Administrator yesterday designated all operational standard operating procedures to 

be designated in whole as SSI. And the appropriate persons have 

been put on administrative leave pending the review. 

We also need to recognize that it is axiomatic to security, and 

particularly to aviation security, that we have a defense in-depth 

and a layer defense that no single security measure is the entirety 

of our security measures. As Under Secretary Beers has made 

clear, this is one of a number of manuals for securing the checkpoints, and it is also important to note that while terrorists change 

their tactics, we change our tactics, too, on security. That is why 

there are six versions of this document. That is not to say that we 

change our secure documents as you have indicated on a regular 

basis, but in the interim, we have actually already put in place interim security measures that are being deployed enterprise-wide, 

and we have, in fact, as you have asked, notified not just those who 

may be interested stakeholders in the unauthorized release of this 

information, but also other stakeholders who we work with on a 

day-to-day basis. 

Senator COLLINS. Are you conducting a damage assessment, such 

as would happen in other parts of the intelligence community when 

there is a breach like this? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. There is a review of the actual incident. There 

is an Inspector General (IG) review going on there. And we are 

looking at what the implications are to security. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

So do I understand that, therefore, you will be considering perhaps even reengineering parts of the systems to close any of the 

vulnerabilities that may have been exposed by this breach? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We are going to let the review give us the indication of where we should go. 

Mr. BEERS. But in particular on the issue of identification, there 

are additional augmented layers with respect to those exempted 

categories to ensure that there is a second official—or that TSA 

Acting Administrator Gail Rossides has put in place a second official who will ensure that to the extent that we can identify fraudulent documentation—and we do spend a lot of time looking at 

fraudulent documentation, including official identification, to make 

sure that we are having a second look, to make sure that those 

kinds of exposures, in fact, have a second layer, as Mr. Heyman indicated, in terms of our protected interests. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK, I appreciate it. I think those remembering that line from the 9/11 Commission that the events of September 11, 2001, happened because of a failure of imagination, I 

think at these moments we have to imagine—and I am sure you 

will—what a terrorist group thinking about getting into the United 

19 

States would do with information that has been released now and, 

therefore, what we can do to alter procedures or create second layers to block that from happening. Does that make sense? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Absolutely. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Next in order of arrival is Senator Burris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do not think I heard a definitive answer to Senator Collins’ 

question. Were the other agencies notified about the badges and 

the imprint in the document? Have you all made contact with them 

to reference those specific badges or identification for these various 

law enforcement persons? Yes or no. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you. 

Let me change the subject a little bit because in terms of the 

whole move of trying to protect our borders and to secure the travel 

to and from our country, we just passed legislation here called the 

Tourist Act to try to encourage tourists to come to the United 

States because we are losing so much money because more Americans are going abroad than visitors are coming here. But have we 

noticed any impact on tourism as a result of our seeking to have 

the no-fly list, the screening, the fingerprinting, and this process? 

Has anyone done any type of a study as to how it is affecting tourism coming into America? 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Senator. The Department of Commerce 

actually does keep track of the number of foreign visitors coming 

to the United States in any given year, and there is no question 

about the fact that immediately after September 11, 2001, I think 

for a variety of reasons, not simply because of new screening procedures, there was a drop in the number of people coming to the 

United States. 

For our part in Consular Affairs, after September 11, 2001, we 

knew that we had to really focus on security, but at the same time, 

we also were well aware of the need to continue to allow legitimate 

visitors into the United States. And so we set about trying to strike 

the proper balance between what we often call secure borders and 

open doors. 

We have made a number of efforts to facilitate the travel of students and exchange visitors, for example, and I would note that in 

the most recent report published by the Institute of International 

Education, the number of foreign students in the United States increased by 8 percent last year. 

We have also tried to facilitate business travel because we have 

heard loud and clear from the U.S. business community that they 

felt that somehow—— 

Senator BURRIS. I understand business travel is down. 

Ms. JACOBS. Business travel, I think, is down this year from last 

year. A lot of people attribute that to the global economy. 

Senator BURRIS. But have there been any studies attributing 

that to the increased requirements, of getting a visa to come from 

the consulate or trying to get into the country? Do the businessmen 

want to be bothered with fingerprinting and all of these screening 

20 

processes that they have to go through? Have any studies been 

done in that regard? 

Ms. JACOBS. I am not sure that there have been any sort of scientific studies. Certainly we have heard anecdotally of people who 

say that they do not want to come because they believe it is too 

hard. We have done an awful lot of outreach overseas and also here 

in the United States to various—— 

Senator BURRIS. Well, that will create a problem for this promotional legislation that we just passed. We are now putting funds 

into saying come back to America, bring us your euros or whatever 

the currencies are, because we are having an economic problem 

with travel. So that would be the Commerce Department that 

would have to promote this kind of thing in cooperation with the 

State Department? Or which agency? 

Ms. JACOBS. Well, the Department of Commerce, of course, helps 

the tourism industry here, so it tries to promote travel and tourism. We certainly try to get the word out that our borders are still 

open, our country is still welcoming of legitimate visitors here to 

the United States. 

I really do think, sir, that it is a function of the global economy 

right now. That is why we are seeing a drop in the numbers. I 

think once a recovery is underway, we are going to see those numbers come back. 

Senator BURRIS. Let us hope so, anyway. 

Mr. Healy, you named several agencies involved in this whole 

screening process, and I was listening to you as you gave the various agencies. It appears to me that there is just a bureaucratic 

boondoggle with agencies involved in this whole process. Could you 

give a list of all the agencies that are checked—Homeland Security, 

the State Department, the FBI, and then Homeland Security has 

about three or four different agencies involved, and then all that 

information is supposed to come into your database, the TSC, to 

check this person and get back to whoever is sending the information in to you. Please give me kind of a rundown of how this will 

work with all these various agencies involved. 

Mr. HEALY. Yes, Senator. Let me describe kind of how the process works, if I could. 

Senator BURRIS. Sure. 

Mr. HEALY. There are members of the intelligence agency that 

would include the FBI and the CIA; and there are members of law 

enforcement. If they have identified a known or suspected terrorist, 

this is how the process works. They have a vetting process that 

they go through. So if they identify somebody, they have their normal process that they go through. They vet that name. If it is an 

international terrorist, as an example, it would go then to the National Counterterrorism Center. The National Counterterrorism 

Center would vet that name as well. There is a process that they 

go through. There is a minimum derogatory information that they 

would go through, that they would look at, that I described, and 

I have it in much more detail in the written testimony. So NCTC 

will vet it a second time. 

After NCTC has looked at it and vetted it a second time, it goes 

to the Terrorist Screening Center where it is vetted a third time. 

So once it gets vetted at that point, it gets entered into the TerVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Apr 29, 2011 Jkt 056149 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\56149.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
21 

rorist Screening Center database. Once it is entered into the Terrorist Screening Center database, what we did was to be able—because of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD–6)—to 

be ready to be available to screening partners, we think a look at 

what existing databases they had. 

So what we do is we export it out to a database called NCIC, National Crime Information Center, that makes it available to all 

State and local police officers. We export it out to Department of 

State’s system. We export it out to DHS’s system. And so when 

they encounter an individual, they do their normal process, and 

then it will pop up that this individual has been watchlisted. 

When they see that, there is a process that they go through 

where they will eventually contact the Terrorist Screening Center 

to verify whether or not this individual is, in fact, the person. Once 

we have done that, then we notify the FBI for the operational response. 

So I know it sounds like a spaghetti soup of different agencies, 

but it actually works very effectively in terms of the process. 

Now, we have multiple agencies that work at the Terrorist 

Screening Center, from TSA, Department of Homeland Security, 

Customs and Border Protection, ICE, and the FBI. 

Senator BURRIS. So you are saying all those agencies are working 

right there in one location. You do not have to send data back and 

forth to a central location in that agency, but the agencies are right 

on site. 

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. This screening process works at the Terrorist Screening Center, and all these components are at the Terrorist Screening Center. The screening process occurs right there. 

Senator BURRIS. That makes sense. 

Mr. HEALY. It comes into the TSC. It goes out of the TSC. When 

encounters occur, you have basically all the subject matter experts 

there to work the process, to identify the individual and make sure 

that it gets out to the appropriate law enforcement agency for the 

appropriate response. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired, but 

I have to go and preside. I wonder if I may take a couple more minutes. Is that permissible? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is OK with me, and Senator Ensign, 

your colleague who is next, has graciously—— 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Senator, because I am concerned 

about a couple of friends who have been on a list, and they cannot 

get their names off the list. Who handles this list? When they go 

through the airport, their names are on the list, and they turn 

them around, and they go through this process every time they 

travel. It has not happened in the last few months, but I have 

talked with one of the young ladies who is a tall, very good-looking 

blonde. She looks as American as apple pie, but her name evidently 

is a name that is not common. I will not say her name for her own 

protection, but she has trouble every time she goes to an airport 

to travel, and she travels a lot. What is the story with that? 

Mr. HEALY. Senator, I think I can try to help you there. I was 

in a unique position because when I got to the Terrorist Screening 

Center, I was there during the early stages that we started up, and 

22 

then I left for a period of time, having different assignments within 

the FBI, and then I came back. 

One of the things that I noted when I came back was the redress 

process, and it was the first thing that they briefed me on. The redress process during the early stages of the TSC was actually kind 

of a dream, and what it allows us to do, in cooperation with the 

Department of Homeland Security, is allow the individual that 

feels that they have been watchlisted an avenue to go through. 

They go through the DHS TRIP program, the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, and they submit their name, and then that component will vet it to determine whether or not this person is on the 

watchlist. And the DHS TRIP program will work with that innocent traveler to facilitate their travel. 

Senator BURRIS. But does it go all through the system? Because 

I know that one time she was going to New York and she was trying to exit New York, and her name was in New York. And it was 

just a shock to her that—I guess the list is there because she had 

supposedly been cleared 2 or 3 months ago from some other airport, but the name had not been removed. 

Mr. HEALY. Well, the traveler redress process, when DHS vets 

that, and if it has some connection with our watchlist, it will get 

vetted to us. I have a redress component unit that goes through 

that name. What they do is they look and they work with the case 

agent—if this person is legitimately watchlisted, they will work 

with the case agent to see, is there any way that we could downgrade this person. 

Senator BURRIS. Do the names stay on the list? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Senator, the TRIP program was intended to be a 

one-stop shop so that individuals could go and not have to go out 

to all of these different agencies that are doing the security review. 

It is now available on the Web site, and your friend or colleague 

can go there. It is adjudicated by all of the agencies involved, but 

you only have to go to one place, enter your information, and it will 

be passed on. The Web site is www.dhs.gov/TRIP. 

Senator BURRIS. I hope that she—— 

Mr. HEYMAN. That she is listening. 

Senator BURRIS. Yes. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. And I do have to leave. I appreciate the extra time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Burris. Good questions. 

Senator Ensign, thanks for being here. Good morning. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENSIGN 

Senator ENSIGN. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this hearing. I come from the State of Nevada, and tourism 

is very important to my State, but also a lot of people do not realize 

how important it is to the entire country. If you combine it all together, it is either the No. 1 or No. 2 most important industry as 

far as from an economic standpoint for the United States. So it is 

critical in some of the work that is being done here to make sure 

that we have tourism being taken care of, that we have balance between security and making it easier for people to come here. 

Having said that, what Senator Collins talked about with this 

TSA document, that gets back to tourism as well. If people do not 

23 

1 Responses to the questions asked by Senator Ensign appear in the Appendix on page 117. 

2 Responses to the question asked by Senator Ensign appear in the Appendix on page 118. 

feel safe, they do not travel. As we saw after September 11, 2001, 

it is psychological. And this is an incredibly serious matter. 

Now, Mr. Beers, you mentioned that this is an old document. But 

these particular documents that we use, our identifications, these 

are current. These are not old ones. This one actually says January 

2007 to 2009. That is the one that we are using right now. And so 

I do not think that this is something that we should just dismiss. 

I realize that maybe some parts of the document may have been 

reworked, but there is a lot in there that is probably still being 

used. 

How high up did the authorization have to go before this was 

leaked? Did it go up to political appointees? Or were these just career people who leaked the documents? Mr. Heyman. 

Mr. HEYMAN. This was not leaked. It was inappropriately put up 

on the Web site. 

Senator ENSIGN. Who authorized it? 

Mr. HEYMAN. This was done in the Security Office, I believe. 

Senator ENSIGN. How high up did the authorization have to go 

before it was allowed? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I would have to get back to you on that.1

Senator ENSIGN. I think that is really important. And not only 

the people who put it on the site, you said that these people were 

put on administrative leave. I think Mr. Beers is the one who said 

that. Were the people who authorized it also put on administrative 

leave? You said you do not know who authorized it. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Again, we would have to get back to you. We are 

doing the review right now. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. But you made the statement that they were 

put on—— 

Mr. HEYMAN. People who were involved in this have been put on 

administrative leave. That is the information we got from the TSA 

Acting Director this morning before we came over here. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. Let us make sure you get back to us to find 

out whether the people who authorized it were also put on administrative leave. We do not want to just have a scapegoat out there. 

The people who authorized this need to be held responsible as well. 

I consider this a very serious breach. 

You mentioned that a review is going on. Do we have a timeline 

on the review? 

Mr. HEYMAN. No, I do not have that for you. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. Do we know when we will have a timeline? 

Is it months? Is it weeks? 

Mr. HEYMAN. No. They have been moving very quickly on this. 

There are two reviews. There is the Inspector General review as 

well as the Office of Investigations review. 

Senator ENSIGN. OK. If you could get back to us on how long you 

think it is going to take to complete the review process. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sure, happy to.2

Senator ENSIGN. Obviously, there are several aspects of the review. I realize that. But as far as at least give us the various 

timelines when people could be held accountable as well as when 

24 

the review process—what Senator Lieberman talked about, where 

some of the policies would be changed and evaluate whether or 

not—how many things need to be changed. That is something, 

whether it is in a classified forum or whatever, that we as members of the Senate should certainly be able to have access to. 

Mr. Chairman, that is the reason I attended today. I wanted to 

make a couple of points on this because I do think it is so serious 

a matter, that is seems too often that people are not thinking 

through things or whatever on our security. I agree with you, before September 11, 2001, was people did not think things were 

going to happen. We have not had a terrorist attack here in a long 

time, so people may be a little lax with security and things like 

that. I know that is normal human nature. That cannot be allowed 

in the world that we live in today, so this is a very important matter and needs to be looked at very carefully. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Of course, I agree with you, Senator Ensign. I appreciate your line of questioning and what you have just 

said. Maybe we will do one more round as we have questions. 

I wanted to ask you some questions coming from this very troubling case of the American citizen, known as David Headley, 

charged in Federal court with six counts of conspiracy to bomb public places in India, to murder and maim persons in India and Denmark, to provide material support to foreign terrorist plots, to provide material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based 

terrorist group affiliated with al-Qaeda, and six counts of aiding 

and abetting murder of U.S. citizens in India. 

He is alleged to have made five trips from Chicago, where he was 

living, to Mumbai from 2006 to 2008 to conduct pre-attack planning and surveillance for LeT on many of the targets that were 

struck in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Because Headley is 

a U.S. citizen, his travel, at least based on that, based on entry and 

exit, did not raise suspicions, although it may have in other ways, 

I understand. He was able to use the United States as a base of 

operations. In the briefings that I have had on this, without revealing anything classified, it seems, I gather, that he was not involved 

in any plots related to targets in the United States, although one 

wonders whether that would have been the case for an extended 

period of time, but that he was using this as a base from which 

to plan attacks outside of the United States. 

It just leads me to ask—and this is a difficult order, with everything else we are doing and trained to do—to what extent should 

a case such as this one lead us to think about broadening the 

screens that we have in an attempt to detect and disrupt American 

citizens or residents who are traveling overseas to carry out terrorist attacks and how one might do that? 

Mr. BEERS. Mr. Heyman, do you want to start? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sure. Look, these cases are significant, a number 

of cases recently, and I think we see that individuals and, in the 

specific, U.S. citizens are, in fact, sympathetic to al-Qaeda, to its 

affiliates, to the ideology, and as such, we can no longer assume 

that Americans are not involved in terrorism. As indicated by the 

recent indictments, we see also the nexus of travel in those who 

25 

may get further indoctrinated abroad or perhaps trained or otherwise. 

We will continue to pursue the programs that we have been pursuing to these days that I think have been effective. That is to say, 

continuing to engage with communities through our links to State 

and local partners, we need to do that. I think we need to continue 

working with our colleagues in the FBI and the intelligence community to be able to identify threats. Travel in and of itself is not 

necessarily an indicator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, that is the challenge, right? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. And so I think those are the kinds of things 

that we continue to pursue so that we can help law enforcement 

at the earliest time identify those who may be participating in 

these kinds of activities. And I know you said you had—— 

Mr. BEERS. We certainly have a constant review of those procedures going on, and they have been changing. And while I do not 

want to talk about—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Which procedures do you mean? 

Mr. BEERS. The procedures that DHS, in our responsibility for 

monitoring travel in and out of the United States or in the United 

States by air, has modified procedures based on information from 

the intelligence community in order to try to stay current with 

what we know to be the case and anticipatory in terms of trying 

to think out of the box in order to do that. 

The actual information, as you well know, sir, about the possibility of Americans or Westerners being trained in Pakistan has 

been out publicly based on the Director of National Intelligence’s 

statement of, I believe 2 years ago. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. BEERS. And that information obviously was made available 

to us, including in classified forums, and so we have looked at ways 

to try to make sure that we are ahead of the curve on this. But 

going beyond that, obviously we get into classified information. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is difficult. Is there a role to be played 

here in sharing information on potential terrorist travel with other 

nations? Mr. Heyman. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, there is a role, and we actually do collaborate, 

cooperate, and share information with partner nations, and there 

are definitely opportunities to do more of that. In the recent arrest 

in the Netherlands with the Somali, that was in close cooperation 

with the Dutch Government. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Let me ask you two questions that 

come from the Headley case for me. One, it has been reported that 

Headley changed his name. One parent was Pakistani, one parent 

was American. His original name was Daood Gilani, and he 

changed it to David Headley, allegedly to reduce scrutiny by immigration and customs officials while traveling. 

I wonder, as this is a test case, what can be done to try to block 

this kind of name change being used as a way to avoid being on 

a watchlist or being picked up by some other terrorist blockage system. You get my point. To what extent can an individual like this 

make it harder for him to be picked up by changing his name, in 

this case to an American- or English-sounding name? 

26 

Mr. HEALY. Chairman, it is difficult because, first of all, I am in 

a difficult position about commenting on a particular case. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, understood. 

Mr. HEALY. But I find challenges in my particular position because it is truly a balancing act. It is a balancing act between safeguarding civil liberties and protecting the American people. And 

the best we can do is just keep driving the intelligence and keep 

working the intelligence as much as we possibly can to get the information. 

I do not know how else you could do it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Does anyone else have a response on 

that? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I agree with Tim Healy that this is a challenge. 

Those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we 

are doing, watching what we are doing, and adapting to that. So 

changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents— 

attempting to change documents, changing even biometrics, people 

do that. So we have to constantly be working to try to counter that 

through technology, through procedures, but also through additional layers so that we are not just resting on one thing, one security solution. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. I think without making too much of 

a point of it, even though the Headley case presents challenges to 

the system or questions about it, the fact is that through quite remarkable work across law enforcement and intelligence, he was 

identified and was stopped. And, of course, though he traveled legally in and out of the country, we do have records, of course, of 

every time he traveled in and out, which are part of the case that 

has now been built against him. 

With the indulgence of my colleagues, I want to ask you another 

question. This is a fact case, and I remember it was presented to 

us as a worry by one of your predecessors in the last Administration at the Department of Homeland Security, and this is something I know people worry about. This is the dual passport issue. 

Someone with Pakistani and United Kingdom passports travels to 

Pakistan with his Pakistani documents, and then comes to the 

United States with his British passport, and we do not have any 

record that he traveled to Pakistan. I do not know if that is a question without an answer, but I pose it to you because I remember 

that as a practical fear based on the presence of all the training 

camps and centers of world terrorism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

area now particularly. 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, that continues to be a concern. I was last in London in November and had a 2-hour dialogue with a variety of British officials on this particular issue. It is one in which we are looking to work out procedures, and I cannot tell you we have worked 

them out yet, but we are absolutely aware of this and looking at 

whether or not there are ways within our systems to be able to 

catch that, because you are absolutely right. If the person left the 

United Kingdom under one passport and came back under another 

passport, being a dual citizen, that would be caught by the United 

Kingdom. But the travel under a Pakistani passport is not necessarily under the current system going to raise an alert. But they 

27 

are looking at that system, and I think we all have to be cognizant 

of that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I am encouraged that you are raising the question. It is not easy to solve, but I appreciate that you 

are on it. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Ms. Jacobs, to follow up on the question that Senator Lieberman 

just raised, I want to ask you about the status of the implementation of the stronger security requirements for the Visa Waiver Program that were enacted as part of the 2007 homeland security law. 

As you are well aware, the reason we are concerned about the visa 

waiver countries is their citizens are not required to be interviewed 

by the State Department officials overseas and submit to other 

background checks. So we have been seeking agreements with 

countries so that they share more information with us on potential 

terrorists, and that is required in order to be a member of the Visa 

Waiver Program. 

Now, it is my understanding that there are 35 countries currently participating in the Visa Waiver Program. could you tell us 

how many of the 35 are currently providing us with the enhanced 

information called for under the 2007 law? 

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Senator. I believe in my written testimony I refer to agreements with some 17 countries at this point, 

and we would be very pleased at the State Department, in conjunction with my colleagues here at the table, to come give you a closed 

briefing on how this process works and how we are going about trying to get countries to sign these agreements. 

I will say that sometimes it is a challenge because of the different laws that countries have, especially regarding privacy. It can 

be difficult for them to sometimes sign these agreements. But I 

want you to know that the State Department along with TSC and 

other colleagues, are very actively involved in trying to get more 

of these agreements. 

I would add that we were very happy to see the enhanced security measures that were put in place for the Visa Waiver Program 

in the 2007 law. We do believe that this has increased the security 

of the program. I think it has also really been a good motivating 

factor for other countries to increase law enforcement cooperation, 

sharing of data, so I think it has been a very good thing overall. 

Senator COLLINS. Just to clarify, I think in your statement you 

say that the State Department and the TSC have agreements with 

17 countries, but of those, only 13 are Visa Waiver Program countries. So it is my understanding that only 13 of the 35 countries 

that are Visa Waiver Program countries are participating. That 

really concerns me. That does not strike me as a very good sign 

that 2 years later we still do not have agreements with that many 

countries. 

Ms. JACOBS. We continue working with all of the visa waiver 

countries trying to encourage them to sign these agreement. As I 

said, for some of them it is difficult because of their laws and the 

privacy laws and procedures that they have in place. But you can 

be assured that we will continue working with all of the VWP 

countries and other countries to try to get this data. 

28 

I will say that they are sharing some data, for example, on lost 

and stolen passports. They are now sharing that data with 

Interpol, which is a very big step. We now have a centralized way 

of checking for lost and stolen passports. But we will continue to 

work on these other data-sharing agreements. 

Mr. HEYMAN. In fact, all 35 countries are sharing lost and stolen 

passport data now. 

Senator COLLINS. Good. Mr. Healy, I want to follow up on the 

questions that our colleague from Illinois asked you about how an 

individual who should not be on the terrorist screening list ends up 

on the watchlist. And it is heartening to me to hear that there is 

now a single point where an individual can appeal to. However, 

back in 2007, there was a follow-up audit of the Terrorist Screening 

Center that was performed by the Inspector General at the Department of Justice that found that, on average, it took the Terrorist 

Screening Center 67 days to close its review of a redress inquiry. 

Now, if you are on the no-fly list and you need to fly for business, 

67 days is a pretty long time to try to get your concerns resolved 

if, in fact, there has been a mistake. Is it still that long on average? 

Or has progress been made since this audit was issued? 

Mr. HEALY. Senator, we have been able to reduce that time 

frame. Again, we work with our partners, DHS, on that particular 

process. We actually established a secondary process. We took a 

look at the number of individuals that we encountered regularly 

that were properly watchlisted to see if we could help that process 

as well. We took a look at another process where we looked at individuals who have similar names but that we have encountered numerous times that were not on the watchlist. And so we actually 

proactively reach out to work that, unknown to the individuals, to 

make sure that we work with DHS in that process that I described 

so that they could have no screening issues associated with that. 

So it is a challenge. Again, when I first got to the TSC at the 

very beginning, the redress process was kind of a dream. And when 

I came back to be associated with it about 10 months ago, it was 

a dream that became a reality, and that was a lot of work, a lot 

of cooperative effort between DHS and ourselves, and then a lot of 

proactive work. The American people do not know, they do not 

have to necessarily file with the DHS TRIP program. If we get a 

congressional inquiry, it automatically starts that. If we read something in the paper about an individual that claims they have had 

a problem, we automatically start that process as well. 

So I am excited about how it works, and I am excited about how 

we were able to do it. But, again, when it finally gets to us, the 

vast majority of people that think they are on the watchlist typically are not. When you take a look at DHS TRIP, the number of 

inquiries that they had, they had over 78,000 inquiries of people 

that thought they were on the watchlist. Of that, there were just 

over 500 that were actually on the watchlist that got to us. So the 

numbers just do not work out. They are stopped for a number of 

reasons not having anything to do with the terrorist watchlist. 

But we, together with DHS, work proactively to really try to satisfy them. We take it very seriously. Again, the challenge that I 

have is protecting the American people, but safeguarding civil liberties. And if I cannot do both, then I have failed. 

29 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Voinovich, welcome. We had a conflict of events today 

where there was an announcement of legislation that I have 

worked on with Senator Voinovich, Senator Conrad, and Senator 

Gregg on deficit reduction, and so you represented me there, I am 

sure quite well, as I have attempted to represent you here. But, 

anyway, welcome and please proceed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I pointed out in 

this session that the two of us cosponsored a bill to create the 

SAFE Commission and that Senator Conrad and Senator Gregg 

took that vehicle and tweaked it to have something that is going 

to be acted upon next year, which is terrific. And I think everyone 

understands that if we do not get our debt and our budgets taken 

care of and address our fiscal responsibility, a lot of the things that 

we are trying to do to secure America, we will not have the money 

to do. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Absolutely right. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I think Senator Conrad said it well. He said 

next to our national security, the issue of the debt is the second 

most important thing we need to deal with right now because people are really questioning our credibility and our credit, and they 

are very uneasy out there. So I am really pleased that there are 

27 sponsors, and we have not even gone out to find others. Maybe 

we will get something done. It would be wonderful. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You have been a very persistent and principled leader in this, and I appreciate what you have done. So my 

goal is to make sure we get this done before you leave the Senate 

next year. 

Senator VOINOVICH. It will make my children and grandchildren 

very happy. 

When we got involved in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), I was 

very much involved in that, and I would like you to comment on 

how that has really resulted in putting the pressure on other participants in the program. Senator Collins made a point about it, 

that there are 35 countries that participate and only 13 have complied with program requirements. If we had not gone forward with 

the Visa Waiver Program expansion, would we be as far as we are 

with these other countries that really are not up to where they 

ought to be? I mean, these new countries have done a great job. 

They are almost role models, and I understand that by the end of 

this year, Greece is finally—in fact, I talked with Prime Minister 

Papandreou. He is excited that, I guess, the Greeks have finally 

done what they are supposed to do, and they are going to come on 

board with the program. But if it had not been for that 2007 VWP 

legislation, we would not have been in a position to lean on these 

people. 

Could you comment on that at all and how it has helped security, 

and also, if you might, our public diplomacy? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Sure. Thank you, Senator. I know you have been 

a terrific leader who supports this program, and we thank you for 

that. 

30 

The Visa Waiver Program is an extremely important instrument 

of institutional cooperation with our allies. From a security perspective, VWP has helped to introduce, expand, and accelerate a 

host of improved security measures. We talked about them this 

morning. We have enhanced passport requirements now the standard—not just with visa waiver countries—verifiable standards at 

airports, aviation security, and in general, greater cooperation with 

the United States on an array of law enforcement and security 

issues. 

Moreover, as I just mentioned, nearly every VWP country now 

reports lost and stolen passports to Interpol, and they do that according to Interpol standards. So from a security point of view, this 

has been a step in a very good direction. 

But it is also beyond that. It is my belief that there is the security in the national security sense that we do not talk about in 

terms of transactions, and that is, by facilitating travel to the 

United States, the VWP plays a vital role in strengthening the ties 

between nations, between peoples, and that is something we were 

talking about earlier in terms of the decline in travel to America. 

We certainly think that we are now facilitating enhanced security 

and travel between these nations. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, it is interesting. I was in Latvia in 

July, and I met with President Zatlers and some of his folks, and 

they said that General Mullen was in Latvia, and he would have 

ordinarily been on the front page of the paper, but it was the same 

day that they announced that Latvia was going to be participating 

in the Visa Waiver Program, and that was the front-page story, 

and President Zatlers also relayed how excited people were that 

they were going to be able to take advantage of this program, and 

the same thing was said in Lithuania. 

So you would think that because we moved on that legislation 

now we would try to get other countries to come on board and meet 

those high standards that have been set. But the question I have— 

and I know you may not be able to answer it today, and it follows 

upon what Senator Collins said: What kind of sanctions do you 

have? Are you in the position where you can say to a country, look, 

we have given you enough time, you are not doing what you are 

supposed to do, and, by the way, if you do not do it, we are going 

to take you off the list? That is tough. 

Mr. HEYMAN. That is a tough question, and I think the program 

has been designed to take a deliberative, continuous assessment of 

security. We continue to monitor threat situations, immigration activities, border security on a regular basis in these countries, as 

well as compliance. And there is a requirement that the Department formally review VWP designation status at least every 2 

years. These formal reviews evaluate the country’s compliance to 

the security requirements and whether the country poses a significant risk to U.S. interests. So that process is in place, and we do 

continue to review not only on a day-to-day basis but also with 

these biennial formal reviews. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I have a suggestion that may be inappropriate, but there are Members of Congress that have good relationships with some of these countries. Just maybe a telephone call 

from us or a visit to them might indicate that we understand that 

31 

they are not doing what they are supposed to do, or let them know 

that we are aware of it. That might be helpful, particularly coming 

from those of us on the Foreign Relations Committee or the Appropriations Committee. 

Mr. Beers, I understand that we are going to hear from you. You 

answered Senator Lieberman’s question about how we are going to 

handle the biometric air exit situation. 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir, and I hope to be able to come up and brief 

you all on the Secretary’s decision in the not too distant future. 

From our last conversation in your office, we did complete the pilot 

study. It was delivered as required to the Appropriations Committee. It is an indication of how that worked in the two test cases 

that we ran. 

We have since then taken that study, which we actually began 

before the formal delivery to the Hill because we had the information that we needed in order to begin our own recommendation, to 

the Secretary. Mr. Heyman and I are running that process. We 

have had several meetings, including one just recently. I think we 

are at the last stage of presenting the Secretary with the options. 

When she decides, I will come up, as I promised you, and brief you. 

I told Senator Collins the same thing, but you know it even better—it is going to cost money, and we thank you for the additional 

funds that you saw fit to add to our ability to use, at least in the 

initial stage, those funds to get this program started. And as I told 

the Senator, that will be helpful. We would hopefully both come up 

here and talk with you about the process, about the funding requirements, go through with the rulemaking that will be necessary 

in order to undertake this, and begin I think by the beginning of 

next fiscal year, at least with the first stages of that program. 

Hopefully, we will be able to do it sooner, but I do not want to 

make a promise that I do not think we can keep. But we will keep 

you, and the full Committee, of course, fully informed in terms of 

where we are in that process. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Can I follow up? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Voinovich, go ahead and take 

whatever time you need because we had a colloquy that took from 

your time. 

Senator VOINOVICH. We did put some money in the homeland security budget for that, and I was assured that it was enough to get 

you started. But I want to make it clear to you that I need to know 

how much money you do need. 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, you have made that abundantly clear. There is 

no doubt about that. [Laughter.] 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have got one more shot next year. That is 

good. I hope we can move on it. 

Senator Lieberman, one of the problems we have got here is that 

the law says that if we do not have this new process put in place 

for biomatric air exit, no new countries can come in unless they 

have a visa refusal rate of less than 3 percent, turned down. And 

so there may be countries that are not now signed up who can’t get 

in to the program. How many countries do you have that are trying 

to get in the program now? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We have 35 Visa Waiver Program countries. 

32 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, but what I am saying is you have got 

a bunch of people, I know, like the Croatians and others who are 

trying to get qualified. Do you know how many countries are waiting to come in? 

Mr. HEYMAN. There are a number of countries that are interested that do not—that are looking to have the program expanded, 

which we are not expanding at this point, but we are looking to do 

that perhaps—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. What I am interested in knowing is how 

many countries have come to DHS interested in joining the program, and you have told them what the requirements are to get in. 

Do you have any idea off the top of your head of how many there 

are? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I think it is four, but I can get back with you. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. Well, the point is that there are not 

that many right now, but you might get to the point where biometric air exit is not in place, because it is going to take a lot of work. 

Mr. Beers will be able to tell us just when it will be up and running. And if you get a big backlog of these countries that have done 

a good job of meeting our requirements and you are saying to them, 

well, we cannot admit you because we do not have biometric air 

exit done, it might be an issue and something that you want to look 

at next year or maybe even the year after. Hopefully, it will be 

done by then. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. You have one 

more official shot, but, I will always take your phone calls when 

you are back in Ohio. [Laughter.] 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have heard that before. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I will say, ‘‘George who?’’ No, it will be a 

pleasure to hear from you anytime. 

I want to ask two more quick questions. Maybe the answers are 

not so quick, but just to bring us up to date. Director Healy, the 

terrorist watchlist, as we have described, is really quite a powerful 

tool for us in detecting terrorists, denying them the ability to travel. Obviously, it is largely name based, but I understand that in recent times there has been an attempt to add fingerprints, which, 

of course, would greatly increase the utility of the system. 

Tell us a little bit about that and what more you can do to expedite that. 

Mr. HEALY. HSPD–24 talks about biometrics, and it talks very 

specifically, Senator, about three types of biometrics: Fingerprints, 

iris, and photos. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. HEALY. Right now we are working to implement HSPD-24 

and will be on time, on schedule by the end of this fiscal year. 

Currently, we now receive all three of those biometrics. We store 

them, and currently we export to Department of State photographs. 

And so we are working on that. It is a very effective tool. I could 

give you an example that I do when I talk about the Terrorist 

Screening Center that we had an individual that knew he was 

watchlisted, actually changed his identity, came into the country, 

and was applying for citizenship. And, fortunately, we had his fingerprints, and he was picked up for a driving under the influence 

33 

(DUI), was fingerprinted, and was identified as a KST, a known or 

suspected terrorist. 

So we are working in cooperative effort with the Criminal Justice 

Information Services (CJIS), the FBI, DHS, Department of State, 

and Department of Defense in making sure that we get those biometrics and that we are able to meet that deadline for HSPD–6. 

But you are exactly right. When you do have that, especially on the 

no-fly list, you can actually identify that individual before they get 

on a plane and be able to avert that travel. 

So it is a challenge, but, I think we are up to it, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So to the extent that you are able to testify in open session, how do you obtain fingerprints of people on a 

terrorism watchlist? 

Mr. HEALY. Again, in consideration that we are in open testimony, sir, I would say that we go through the normal process in 

terms of the intelligence community to see what they can do in 

terms of that. We work with the Department of Homeland Security 

and, again, CJIS and IAFIS to see if there is any type of records 

available. So we would go through the normal research process 

that we do to enhance the record as much as we possibly can. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Am I right that it may be that our troops 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, when they can, are adding fingerprints to 

the system? 

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. And that is primarily where the fingerprints 

are coming from, especially on the battlefield, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. Under Secretary Beers, I have a 

final question about US–VISIT and the fingerprint matching, 

which is really quite an extraordinary achievement and advance. 

We have heard reports, however, that it can take up to 72 hours 

for US–VISIT to, for instance, inform a Customs and Border Protection officer that a biometric match has been made with a criminal record. I understand that the typical primary inspection takes 

seconds, or minutes at most. But if I am right about this, what are 

the reasons for delay in returning matches to the inspecting officer 

at the point of entry? And is there anything being done to try to 

ensure that this happens in a more timely fashion? Obviously, the 

nightmare would be that somebody passes the initial screen, is out, 

and then there is a discovery at the point of entry that this person, 

in fact, has a criminal record, is on a terrorism watchlist, or is connected to terrorism more directly in a different way than the 

watchlist. 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. Basically, the issue now is the real-time 

compatibility with the FBI database and our US–VISIT database. 

The information is shared, but the ability of the Bureau to actually 

perform the matching requirements, while in many cases is in 

enough time to be able to do something about it, there are cases 

where it is not. Director Robert Mocney, who is sitting behind me, 

has been working assiduously with his colleagues at FBI in order 

to try to move this ball so that we can get within the 10-second 

rule, which is what we can do with our own US–VISIT database. 

So work is going forward on that. I am hopeful that we will be 

able to resolve that. We did move, I think successfully, from the 

two-fingerprint rule to the ten-fingerprint rule that we implemented on our side to make sure that we can then give the Bureau 

34 

the same ten prints that we were not able to give them before because we were only taking two prints. 

So this is an ongoing effort. I am not sure I can give you a time 

frame yet when we think that will be resolved, but I can attest because I participated—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You will work it out? 

Mr. BEERS. This is an active issue. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will ask you a question about time 

frame for the record. Maybe you have, as they say on cable news, 

breaking news. 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, but as Mr. Healy indicated—and Mr. Mocney 

just passed me a note—the KSTs, those people where we have fingerprints that are in his database, that we have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That comes up right away. 

Mr. BEERS. Right. This is the broader database that is more likely to pick up criminals rather than—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Criminal background rather than the terrorism. 

Mr. BEERS. Right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Voinovich, do you have any other 

questions? 

Senator VOINOVICH. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks to all of you. I will 

keep the record open for another 10 days, and I have some additional questions that I will submit to you to answer for the record. 

I appreciate what you are doing. Really, we have come a long 

way. Obviously, in an open country which prides itself on the ease 

of going in and out, which is something that is fundamental to our 

country, we have figured out, I think, thanks to information technology, an ability to not inhibit all the people who are coming here 

for good reasons while also figuring out how to stop the people who 

are coming here with bad motives. But, it is a constant challenge 

to be ahead of the enemy here. 

So I appreciate very much what you have done. I understand, 

based on the exchange between Mr. Beers and Senator Voinovich, 

that you know that some of these programs cost money. But, really, 

we call on you to advocate to us, because we press you constantly 

to do everything and not to make any mistakes in doing it. Therefore, you have a right to come back and say to us, hey, this is what 

it is going to cost to make it happen. Of course, this is a fundamental part of what I think continues to be our primary responsibility, no matter what else we are doing, is to promote the common 

defense, which includes, in our time, providing the best possible 

homeland security. 

Do any of you want to say anything in closing? No? If not, I 

thank you. I wish you a good day. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(35) 

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