In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-2900

CHARLES CURRY, doing business as

GET DIESEL NUTRITION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REVOLUTION LABORATORIES, LLC,

et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:17-cv-02283 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 10, 2020

____________________

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Charles Curry brought this action 

pro se1 in the district court, alleging that Revolution Labora1 We appointed Professor Allan Erbsen of the University of Minnesota 

Law School faculty to serve as amicus curiae to argue for the reversal of 

(continued ... )
2 No. 17-2900

tories, LLC (“Revolution”), Rev Labs Management, Inc. 

(“Management”), and Joshua and Barry Nussbaum (collectively the “defendants”) had infringed and diluted his 

trademark,2 violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, violated the Illinois Uniform Deceptive 

Trade Practices Act, engaged in false advertising and cybersquatting, and filed a fraudulent trademark application.3

Revolution is a limited liability company that is in the 

business of selling sports nutritional supplements and apparel. Management is a corporation that was formed for the 

sole purpose of being the manager of Revolution. According 

to Mr. Curry, Joshua and Barry Nussbaum co-founded 

Revolution and Management. Joshua Nussbaum is the President of Management and Revolution; Barry Nussbaum is 

( ... continued)

the judgment of the district court. We thank Professor Erbsen for his excellent brief and oral argument. 

2 Mr. Curry asserted trademark infringement claims falling under both 

the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and common law.

3 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Curry’s four 

claims “arising under” federal statutes related to trademarks and unfair 

competition. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a)–(b). With regard to Mr. Curry’s remaining three claims for fraud, unfair competition, and trademark 

infringement arising under state law, amicus counsel for Mr. Curry 

submits that subject matter jurisdiction exists over those claims as well 

because the state and federal claims share a “common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), and they 

are part of the “same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). We agree. 

Thus, the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state 

claims. See Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A loose 

factual connection between the claims is generally sufficient.”).
No. 17-2900 3

the Director of Management and the Chief Executive Officer 

of Revolution.

The defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Curry’s suit for 

lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the 

action, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction.4 Mr. Curry timely appealed that decision to this court.5 We respectfully disagree with the district court’s ruling and hold that 

the district court did have personal jurisdiction over Revolution. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district 

court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Charles Curry is the founder and Chief Executive Officer 

(“CEO”) of a company named “Get Diesel Nutrition” that 

sells dietary supplements to fitness enthusiasts and athletes. 

Mr. Curry contends that the “essence” of his brand is “Die4 The district court did not consider Mr. Curry’s theory that specific personal jurisdiction existed over the other defendants under the doctrine of 

piercing the corporate veil because the district court had held that Revolution’s contacts were insufficient to justify the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. Mr. Curry also contended that personal jurisdiction 

existed over Joshua Nussbaum based on the allegedly fraudulent trademark application that Joshua filed with the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The district court noted that the application was filed in Virginia, not Illinois, and held that it could not be used 

to establish jurisdiction in Illinois. R.47 at 11.

5 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4 No. 17-2900

sel.”6 Indeed, he has adopted the alter ego “Chuck Diesel,” 

and his company name, website address, and the product at 

issue, Diesel Test, all contain the word “Diesel.”7 He has 

paid for advertising for his products, including Diesel Test, 

in nationally distributed fitness magazines since 2002. He 

first manufactured Diesel Test in March 2005 and has advertised the product since June 2005.8 Diesel Test received 

awards from Planet Muscle magazine in 2015 and 2016. 

In October 2016, the defendants began to sell the product 

that is at the heart of Mr. Curry’s complaint; the defendants’ 

product is a sports nutritional supplement branded Diesel 

Test Red Series, All Natural Testosterone Booster. Like 

Mr. Curry’s Diesel Test product, the defendants’ product 

comes in red and white packaging with right-slanted allcaps typeface bearing the words “Diesel Test.” 

In November 2016, Mr. Curry received a message on Facebook from a consumer alerting him of an online “ESPN” 

article touting the defendants’ product.9 Mr. Curry alleges 

that the article is “fake” and was designed to advertise the 

defendants’ product and to “be identical in appearance to 

the real website [and] to make web visitors believe they are 

in fact on the official website of ESPN.”10 Confused consum6 Appellant’s Br. 6.

7 Id.

8 R.1 ¶ 14. The parties do not dispute that Mr. Curry has sold his Diesel 

Test product, although we could not find the date of his first sale in the 

record.

9 Id. at ¶ 35, 29, 59–64.

10 Id. at ¶ 35.
No. 17-2900 5

ers began sending Mr. Curry emails requesting free trials of 

the defendants’ product or asking for refunds because they 

were dissatisfied with the product and mistakenly believed 

the product came from Mr. Curry. 

The defendants admittedly sold their product exclusively 

online through the following websites: (1) 

www.revlabs.com; (2) www.boostedtestforyou.com; (3) 

www.amazon.com; and (4) www.ebay.com.11 Although the 

defendants did not sell their product until 2016, they 

claimed in advertisements that their product was ranked 

“Best Product and Number 1” in 2015.12 The defendants 

have not denied that they concocted a fake ESPN news 

webpage and created a fake ESPN article touting their product. The defendants conducted all their marketing and advertising for their product through the Internet. In just over 

seven months, they received more than $1.6 million in gross 

sales from their product.13 At least 767 of the sales were to 

consumers in Illinois.14

Mr. Curry promptly demanded that the defendants cease 

and desist selling their product. The defendants responded 

11 R.35-1 ¶¶ 26–27. Mr. Curry alleges that the defendants sold their Diesel Test product on various other websites, R.1 ¶ 25, but the defendants, 

through the affidavit of Joshua Nussbaum, contend that Revolution’s 

sales were exclusively made through only these four websites and that 

Revolution was not affiliated with, nor had it ever advertised or sold its 

product on, the other websites cited by Mr. Curry. R.35-1 ¶¶ 27–28. 

12 R.1 ¶ 37; Id. at 63.

13 R.44-1 ¶ 6.

14 Id. ¶ 7.
6 No. 17-2900

and said that they wished to find an “amicable resolution.”15

On November 15, Mr. Curry sent a second email to Revolution in which he renewed his claims and instructed them to 

contact his attorney. Two weeks later, however, Joshua 

Nussbaum, President of Revolution, filed a trademark application for the Diesel Test mark to be used in connection with 

dietary and nutritional supplements. In the trademark application, Mr. Nussbaum, as signatory, declared that “[he] believes that to the best of [his] knowledge and belief, no other 

persons ... have the right to use the mark in commerce.”16

He further indicated on the application that the “filing base” 

was “Intent to Use.”17 At the time he filed this application, 

however, the defendants already were selling their product 

in commerce bearing the Diesel Test mark. 

On December 9, 2016, Mr. Curry filed a federal trademark application for the Diesel Test mark for dietary and 

nutritional supplements indicating that he had first used the 

mark in commerce in April 2005.18 The United States Patent 

and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) suspended the processing 

of both applications, citing a likelihood of confusion between 

the defendants’ and Mr. Curry’s marks.

15 R.1 at 43.

16 R.1 at 49.

17 Id.

18 As amicus counsel correctly notes, federal law protects trademarks 

even if the owner has not yet sought federal registration. Appellant’s Br. 

9 n.2. It is not clear from the record whether Mr. Curry obtained registration.
No. 17-2900 7

B. Procedural History

Mr. Curry filed a pro se complaint alleging the following 

claims against the defendants: (1) a violation of the Illinois 

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 

505/1 (Counts I and II); (2) a violation of Section 1125(a) of 

the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, for false designation of 

origin and false advertising (Count III); (3) a violation of Section 1125(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), for 

trademark dilution by tarnishment (Count IV); (4) a violation of common law trademark protections (Count V); (5) a 

violation of Section 1125(d) of the Lanham Act, otherwise 

known as the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection 

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Count VI); and (6) a violation of 15 

U.S.C. § 1120, for filing a fraudulent trademark application 

(Count VII). 

The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, relying on affidavits. Joshua and Barry Nussbaum 

submitted these affidavits on behalf of themselves as well as 

Revolution and Management.19 In these affidavits, they denied knowing about Mr. Curry’s Diesel Test product before 

they began selling their own version in 2016.20 They also denied “see[ing] any advertisements for products sold by 

[Mr. Curry] until this lawsuit was filed.”21 The defendants 

19 R.35-1 ¶ 6; R.35-2 ¶ 7. 

20 R.35-1 ¶ 33; R.35-2 ¶ 21.

21 R.35-1 ¶ 34; R.35-2 ¶ 22.
8 No. 17-2900

further denied “know[ing] that [Mr. Curry] was located in 

Illinois until this lawsuit was filed.”22

According to these affidavits, “Revolution does not hold 

itself out to do business in Illinois” on its website.23 Although Revolution lists on its website several companies 

where its products can be purchased, none of the listed 

companies are located in Illinois. It is not disputed that the 

defendants (1) are not registered to do business and do not 

have a registered agent in Illinois; (2) do not have a place of 

business in Illinois, a telephone, or a mailing address in Illinois; (3) do not have any employees located in Illinois or any 

who have traveled to Illinois for business; (4) do not have 

any real or personal property in Illinois; and (5) have never 

attended any trade shows or participated in any businessrelated meetings in Illinois. 

Further, Barry Nussbaum asserted that he has never 

“been involved in the marketing, sale, distribution, or manufacturing of any of the products sold by Revolution” despite 

being its CEO.24 Joshua Nussbaum admits that he “learned 

of [Mr. Curry’s] claimed trademark ... through a Facebook 

message sent by [Mr. Curry] to Revolution on November 13, 

2016.”25

Although Mr. Curry did not submit a counter-affidavit in 

response to the defendants’ affidavits, he did file a response 

22 R.35-1 ¶ 36; R.35-2 ¶ 23.

23 R.35-1 ¶ 19.

24 R.35-2 ¶ 17.

25 R.35-1 ¶ 35.
No. 17-2900 9

to the defendants’ motion to dismiss in which he submitted 

additional evidence. For example, Mr. Curry provided evidence that Revolution’s “fully interactive website ... makes 

available various dietary supplements with shipping options 

that include the possibility to select Illinois as a ship to 

state.”26 Mr. Curry also stated that the “[d]efendants have 

shipped and sold their counterfeit DIESEL TEST to Illinois 

residents.”27 Consumers in Illinois who order from Revolution’s website receive a written acknowledgement of their 

Illinois shipping address and a note saying, “Thank you 

again for your business.”28 In their reply, the defendants 

contended that despite these contacts, jurisdiction was not 

proper. Specifically, the defendants contended that jurisdiction was not proper over Revolution because, “[w]hile Revolution does have some minimal sales to Illinois, those sales 

represent only 1.8% of Revolution’s total gross sales nationwide.”29

Without a hearing, the district court granted the motion 

to dismiss. Later, it denied Mr. Curry’s Rule 59(e) motion. 

Specifically, the district court held that it (1) could not exercise general jurisdiction over any of the defendants; and (2) 

could not exercise specific jurisdiction over Revolution. Because Revolution’s own contacts were insufficient, the dis26 R.22 at 11; R.22-2 at 2–3.

27 R.22 at 16; R.22-2 at 5 (exhibit showing a package from Revolution 

bearing a shipping label with Mr. Curry’s Illinois address and the words 

“Diesel Test”).

28 R.22-3 at 1.

29 R.44 at 5.
10 No. 17-2900

trict court declined to determine whether it could exercise 

specific jurisdiction over (1) Management under the doctrine 

of piercing the corporate veil; and (2) Barry and Joshua 

Nussbaum based on theories of fiduciary shield and piercing 

the corporate veil.30

This appeal followed.

II.

DISCUSSION

A.

We review the denial of personal jurisdiction de novo. 

See uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 424 (7th 

Cir. 2010). The court will “take the plaintiff’s asserted facts 

as true and resolve any factual disputes in its favor.” Id. at 

423–24. The plaintiff need not include facts alleging personal 

jurisdiction in the complaint, but “once the defendant moves 

to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction.” Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 

F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). “The precise nature of the plaintiff’s burden depends upon whether an evidentiary hearing 

has been held.” Id. Where, as here, the district court ruled on 

the defendant’s motion to dismiss “without the benefit of an 

evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff bears only the burden of 

30 The district court also rejected Mr. Curry’s contention that specific jurisdiction existed over Joshua Nussbaum based on the allegedly fraudulent trademark application that he filed with the USPTO because the application was filed in Virginia and had no relationship with Illinois. R.47 

at 11–12.
No. 17-2900 11

making a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction.” uBID, 

623 F.3d at 423.

When affidavits regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction are submitted, the district court may weigh the affidavits. However, “[i]n evaluating whether the prima facie 

standard has been satisfied, the plaintiff ‘is entitled to the 

resolution in its favor of all disputes concerning relevant 

facts presented in the record.’” Purdue Research, 338 F.3d at 

782 (quoting Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1123 

(7th Cir. 1983)). Thus, this court will accept as true any facts 

in the defendants’ affidavits that do not conflict with anything in the record, either by way of Mr. Curry’s complaint 

or other submissions. Where there is a factual conflict between the record and the defendants’ affidavits, we will resolve them in Mr. Curry’s favor. 

B.

With the proper standard of review in mind, we proceed 

to the issue of personal jurisdiction.

Because this case involves claims under both federal law 

and state law, the district court’s jurisdiction rested on a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In a case involving federal question 

jurisdiction, “a federal court has personal jurisdiction over 

the defendant if either federal law or the law of the state in 

which the court sits authorizes service of process to that defendant.” Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC v. Anesthesia 

Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 

2010). The only federal statute under which Mr. Curry 

brings his claims is the Lanham Act, which does not authorize nationwide service of process. See be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 
12 No. 17-2900

F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2011). Thus, “a federal court sitting in 

Illinois may exercise jurisdiction over [the defendants] in this 

case only if authorized both by Illinois law and by the United States Constitution.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)). 

The Illinois long-arm statute provides that “[a] court may 

also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter 

permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution 

of the United States.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c). We have held that 

“the Illinois long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 

693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, the question we must answer 

is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants “comports with the limits imposed by federal due 

process.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014); Mobile Anesthesiologists, 623 F.3d at 443 (noting that “there is no operative difference between” the constitutional limits of the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution in 

terms of subjecting a defendant to personal jurisdiction).

“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty 

interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a 

forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 

326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Notions of personal jurisdiction 

traditionally have been based on the defendant’s territorial 

presence within the adjudicating forum. The Supreme Court 

held in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), overruled in 

part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), that an adjudicating court’s jurisdiction over persons is established only 

when the persons have some territorial presence, actual or 

constructive, in the forum. See id. (establishing four tradi-
No. 17-2900 13

tional bases for jurisdiction: territorial service of process, seizure of the defendant’s property in the forum state, citizenship, and consent). Judgments made involving persons not 

satisfying one of the territorial bases for jurisdiction, the 

Court explained, would violate “due process of law.” Id.

The Supreme Court, through a series of decisions in the 

century following Pennoyer, significantly eroded the 

long-standing territorial-based jurisdiction test. See Daimler 

AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014). “The Pennoyer rules 

generally favored nonresident defendants by making them 

harder to sue.” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 200 (1977). The 

territorial approach became problematic with “[t]he advent 

of automobiles” and “the concomitant increase in the incidence of individuals causing injury in States where they 

were not subject to in personam actions under Pennoyer.” Id.; 

see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). To address the rising 

numbers of out-of-state drivers who were not subject to in 

personam actions, states enacted statutes that either required 

express consent from the drivers or asserted implied consent 

to personal jurisdiction in cases arising out of the drivers’ 

use of the states’ roads. See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356–57 (“[T]he 

state may declare that the use of the highway by the nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar as 

agent on whom process may be served.”). The Court thus 

modified Pennoyer’s territorial limits on jurisdictional powers “by use of a legal fiction that left the conceptual structure 

established in Pennoyer theoretically unaltered.” Shaffer, 433 

U.S. at 202.

The territorial-based approach established in Pennoyer

was strained even further as corporations increasingly engaged in multi-state commerce. Courts began to assess
14 No. 17-2900

whether a corporate entity was “doing business” in the forum state. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 

U.S. 579 (1914). The “doing business” analysis, however, was 

still very much territorial-based. Id. at 589 (“We are satisfied 

that the presence of a corporation within a state necessary to 

the service of process is shown when it appears that the corporation is there carrying on business in such sense as to 

manifest its presence within the state, although the business 

transacted may be entirely interstate in its character.”). Case 

law “became cluttered with decisions as to what constituted 

‘doing business’” as courts “drew fine lines”31 which made it 

“quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases.” Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d 

Cir. 1930).

“With doctrine in so bad a state of disrepair, ... International Shoe Co. v. Washington afforded the Court an opportunity to begin to set its house in order in this field.”32 International Shoe is regarded as a “pathmarking”33 decision because it moved away from the territorial approach and held 

that courts may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant even if 

he were “not present within the territory of the forum” as 

long as “he ha[d] certain minimum contacts with it such that 

the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 

31 Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In 

Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 584–85 (1958).

32 Id. at 586.

33 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 

(2011).
No. 17-2900 15

at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 

Such “minimum contacts” fall into two categories, the Court 

explained. The first category, which is relevant in the appeal 

before us, focuses on the sufficiency of the defendant’s contacts with the forum that “also give rise to the liabilities sued 

on.”34 Id. at 317. In the opinions following International Shoe, 

this became known as specific jurisdiction, see, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 

1779–80 (2017), and “specific jurisdiction has become the 

centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory,” Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 925 (2011) (quoting Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 

Harv. L. Rev. 610, 628 (1988)). Specific jurisdiction “depends 

on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying 

controversy,’ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes 

place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s 

regulation.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted). 

34 The second category of minimum contacts is where the defendant’s 

“continuous ... operations within a state were thought so substantial and 

of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising 

from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). This is referred to as general jurisdiction, because the defendant’s contacts need not be related to the underlying claim. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 

S. Ct. 1773, 1779–80 (2017). Because Mr. Curry does not contend on appeal that the district court had general jurisdiction over the defendants,

our analysis will focus solely on the issue of specific jurisdiction. See Appellant’s Br. 49–52; Appellees’ Br. 19. 
16 No. 17-2900

Decades later, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 

444 U.S. 286 (1980), the Supreme Court held that, where the 

defendants, an automobile wholesaler and a retailer, had no 

contacts with Oklahoma besides “the fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile [of the defendants], 

sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer 

an accident while passing through Oklahoma,” minimum 

contacts did not exist so as to permit Oklahoma courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendants consistent 

with due process. Id. at 295. The Court explained that “[t]he 

concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions.” Id. at 291–

92. One function is that “it acts to ensure that the States 

through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” Id. at 292. 35 The other function is that it “pro35 The Supreme Court later clarified that this first function 

must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due 

Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of 

the personal jurisdiction requirement and the 

Clause itself makes no mention of federalism 

concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept 

operated as an independent restriction on the 

sovereign power of the court, it would not be 

possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the 

powers of sovereignty, although the individual 

can subject himself to powers from which he 

may otherwise be protected.

Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 

702 n.10 (1982). 
No. 17-2900 17

tects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.” Id. 

This second function is achieved by ensuring that 

“maintenance of the suit ‘does not offend traditional notions 

of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe, 

326 U.S. at 316) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant 

factors include the inconvenience to the defendant, the “forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” 

“the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the 

most efficient resolution of controversies,” and “the shared 

interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Id. The Due Process Clause thus 

provides “a degree of predictability to the legal system that 

allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” Id. at 297. 

The Supreme Court subsequently made clear that (1) the 

relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation must arise out of contacts that the “defendant himself”

creates with the forum state, and (2) the defendant will not 

be “haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of 

another party or third person,” rather, there must be some 

“purposeful availment” by the defendant. Burger King, 471 

U.S. at 475 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In Burger King, the Court observed that 

“[j]urisdiction ... may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. ... [I]t is an 

inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial 

amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire 
18 No. 17-2900

communications across state lines, thus obviating the need 

for physical presence within a State in which business is 

conducted.” Id. at 476. 

In the last decade, the Supreme Court has confirmed that 

the inquiry into specific jurisdiction has not changed. See 

Walden, 571 U.S. at 291; see Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys. v. 

Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2014). In 

Walden, the Supreme Court held that a Nevada court could 

not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant Georgia 

police officer where no part of the officer’s allegedly tortious 

conduct occurred in Nevada. The plaintiffs had residences in 

both California and Nevada and provided California identification. Id. at 280. As they arrived in Atlanta on their flight 

from San Juan, the officer, who had been tipped off by a law 

enforcement officer at the San Juan airport, met the plaintiffs 

at their departure gate for their flight to Las Vegas and questioned them as to why they were carrying almost $97,000 in 

cash in their carry-on bags. The officer seized the cash and 

informed the plaintiffs that the funds would be returned to 

them if the funds came from a “legitimate source.” Id. The 

plaintiffs then boarded their connecting flight to Las Vegas. 

The plaintiffs filed suit against the officer in a Nevada 

court, and the court dismissed the action, concluding that 

“even if [the officer] caused harm to [the plaintiffs] in Nevada while knowing they lived in Nevada, that fact alone did 

not confer jurisdiction.” Id. at 281. A divided panel of the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the officer “expressly aimed” his conduct at Nevada because he knew “it would affect persons 

with a ‘significant connection’ to Nevada.” Id. at 282.
No. 17-2900 19

In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[d]ue process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third 

parties.” Id. at 284. Thus, the Court has “consistently rejected 

attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.” Id. Additionally, 

the “minimum contacts” analysis requires courts to look at 

“the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the 

defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 

285. 

The Court also clarified that its prior holding in Calder v. 

Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), was “largely a function of the nature of the libel tort” that was involved, because the “crux of 

Calder was that the reputation-based ‘effects’ of the alleged 

libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the 

plaintiff.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 287. In Calder, an actress filed a 

libel suit in a California state court against a reporter and an 

editor, both of whom worked for the National Enquirer in 

Florida, based on an article they had written about her. The 

Supreme Court held that the California court could exercise 

jurisdiction over the defendants consistent with due process 

because their “intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions 

were expressly aimed at California.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 

The Court identified the following forum contacts: “[t]he article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the 

harm, in terms both of [the plaintiff’s] emotional distress and 

the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in 

California,” in addition to the nearly 600,000 copies that 

were distributed in California. Id. at 785, 788–89. 
20 No. 17-2900

The plaintiffs in Walden contended that they, like the actress in Calder, “suffered the ‘injury’ caused by [the officer’s] 

allegedly tortious conduct (i.e., the delayed return of their 

gambling funds) while they were residing in the forum.” 

Walden, 571 U.S. at 289. The Court disagreed, explaining that 

“[t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced 

a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s 

conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id.

at 290. In Walden, the plaintiffs “lacked access to their funds 

in Nevada not because anything independently occurred 

there, but because Nevada is where [the plaintiffs] chose to 

be at a time when they desired to use the funds seized” by 

the officer. Id. In contrast, in Calder, “the reputational injury 

caused by the defendants’ story would not have occurred 

but for the fact that the defendants wrote an article for publication in California that was read by a large number of California citizens,” and, “because publication to third persons is 

a necessary element of libel, the defendants’ intentional tort 

actually occurred in California.” Id. at 287–88 (internal citation omitted). It was this unique connection to the forum 

state that “sufficed to authorize the California court’s exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 288. 

C.

We now apply the principles articulated by the Supreme 

Court to the case before us.36 This task does not require that 

36 Our analysis will focus on whether the district court can exercise specific jurisdiction over Revolution consistent with due process, because 

the district court did not make specific rulings regarding any of the other 

defendants. See Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2010) 

(“[E]ach defendant must have purposely established minimum contacts 

(continued ... )
No. 17-2900 21

we break new ground. Indeed, our course is well charted; 

our own cases implementing the Supreme Court’s precedent offer a well-marked channel. These cases have distilled 

three “essential requirements” for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant: 

First, the defendant’s contacts with the forum 

state must show that it “purposefully availed 

[itself] of the privilege of conducting business 

in the forum state or purposefully directed [its] 

activities at the state. Second, the plaintiff’s alleged injury must have arisen out of the defendant’s forum-related activities. And finally, 

any exercise of personal jurisdiction must 

comport with traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice.

Lexington Ins. Co. v. Hotai Ins. Co., Ltd., 938 F.3d 874, 878 

(2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Felland v. Clifton, 682 

F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2012)). We also note that, although 

Revolution’s sales of the allegedly infringing product to Illinois consumers all took place through either its interactive 

website or a third party’s website, we consistently have declined “to fashion a special jurisdictional test for Internet-based cases.” Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703 n.7. “[W]e think 

that the traditional due process inquiry ... is not so difficult 

to apply to cases involving Internet contacts that courts need 

( ... continued)

with the forum state such that he or she should reasonably anticipate 

being haled into court there.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Burger King 

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
22 No. 17-2900

some sort of easier-to-apply categorical test.” Illinois v. Hemi 

Grp. LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2010). 

1.

We first examine whether Revolution’s activity can be 

characterized as purposefully directed at Illinois, the forum 

state. Revolution has no physical presence in Illinois. Our 

cases make clear, however, that physical presence is not necessary for a defendant to have sufficient minimum contacts 

with a forum state. Indeed, we have noted that the “purposeful-direction inquiry ‘can appear in different guises.’” 

Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 702 (quoting Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1071 (10th Cir. 2008)). The 

essential point of the inquiry is to “ensure that an 

out-of-state defendant is not bound to appear to account for 

merely ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts’ with the

forum state.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Burger 

King, 471 U.S. at 475).

The principal approach employed to ensure that a defendant’s contacts with a state are not random, fortuitous, or 

attenuated is to inquire whether the record demonstrates 

that the defendant has “‘purposefully directed’” his activities at a forum even in the “absence of physical contacts” 

with a forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Keeton v. 

Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774–75 (1984)). Such 

“purposeful direction” may be shown by evidence that the 

defendant’s actions, even if initiated outside of the forum 

state, nevertheless were directed at the forum state. For example, a defendant may cause its product to be distributed 

in the forum state. See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774–75 (finding purposeful direction where defendant published magazines outside the forum state and circulated them in the fo-
No. 17-2900 23

rum state).37 Among our recent cases, Hemi is particularly 

instructive. There, the State of Illinois sued Hemi Group LLC 

(“Hemi”) for selling cigarettes to Illinois residents in violation of state law and for failing to report the sales in violation of federal law. Hemi was based in New Mexico; it 

“[wa]s not incorporated or organized under Illinois law, it 

[wa]s not registered to do business in Illinois, it d[id] not 

have any offices or employees in Illinois, it d[id] not bank in 

Illinois, and it ha[d] not advertised in print media in Illinois.” Hemi, 622 F.3d at 755–56. Hemi sold its cigarettes 

through its websites, and the complaint identified only one 

Illinois resident, a special senior agent of the Illinois Department of Revenue, who had purchased cigarettes from 

Hemi through its websites. This agent had purchased over 

three hundred packs of cigarettes from Hemi over the course 

of two years. Id. at 755. 

We held that Hemi’s contacts with Illinois were sufficient 

to support personal jurisdiction in that state. We based our 

decision in part on Hemi’s maintenance of “commercial 

websites through which customers could purchase cigarettes, calculate their shipping charges using their zip codes, 

and create accounts.” Id. at 757–58. Because Hemi “knowingly did do business with Illinois residents ... [,] Hemi’s argument that it did not purposefully avail itself of doing business in Illinois [rang] particularly hollow.” Id. at 758. 

37 The Supreme Court has held that an out-of-state insurer who sold only 

a single policy within the state is subject to personal jurisdiction within 

the state at least with respect to a cause of action related to that policy. 

See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
24 No. 17-2900

We are satisfied that Revolution has formed sufficient 

minimum contacts with Illinois. Like Hemi, Revolution sells 

its products only online through its website and third-party 

websites. Revolution’s interactive website for the sale of its 

products requires the customer to select a shipping address. 

Illinois is among the “ship-to” options from which the customer must choose. Illinois residents purchasing Revolution’s products also receive an email from Revolution thanking them for their business, confirming their order, and listing the Illinois shipping address. Revolution admittedly sold 

its Diesel Test product to 767 Illinois residents between October 14, 2016, and June 1, 2017. 

Revolution’s own actions in establishing these commercial contacts with Illinois fairly can be described as purposeful. Preparing to engage in commercial activity, Revolution 

created an interactive website and explicitly provided that 

Illinois residents could purchase its products through that 

website. It further arranged for the sale of its products 

through third-party websites. After the sales, Revolution 

sent written confirmation to the Illinois customers acknowledging their sale and including their Illinois shipping address, and, finally, Revolution shipped Diesel Test to its customers who were in Illinois. See Hemi, 622 F.3d at 758; uBid, 

623 F.3d at 428 (stating that defendant’s argument that its 

sales to Illinois residents were merely “automated transactions unilaterally initiated by those residents” was not persuasive because those “customers ... are not simply typing 

their credit card numbers into a web form and hoping they 

get something in return”; the defendant “itself set the system 

up this way”).
No. 17-2900 25

In the face of this sales arrangement, it is not persuasive

to say that Revolution did not exploit the Illinois market

simply because its advertising was not especially aimed at 

that state. See uBid, 623 F.3d at 428–29. There is no per se requirement that the defendant especially target the forum in 

its business activity; it is sufficient that the defendant reasonably could foresee that its product would be sold in the 

forum. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781. In Keeton, the Supreme 

Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction even 

though the defendant magazine publisher had not targeted

specifically the forum. The Court determined that, with a nationwide market, the publisher reasonably should have anticipated that it could be held accountable in the forum state 

for activities arising from the “substantial number” of sales 

in the forum state.38 Id. In Hemi, we concluded that personal 

jurisdiction was proper irrespective of the fact that Hemi 

“ha[d] not advertised in print media in Illinois.” Hemi, 622 

38 The Court of Appeals, in affirming the district court’s dismissal of the 

plaintiff’s complaint, “observed that the ‘single publication rule’ ordinarily applicable in multistate libel cases would require it to award [the 

plaintiff] ‘damages caused in all states’ should she prevail in her suit, 

even though the bulk of [the plaintiff’s] alleged injuries had been sustained outside New Hampshire.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 

U.S. 770, 773 (1984). The Supreme Court nevertheless held that there was 

“no unfairness” in haling the magazine publisher into New Hampshire 

to respond to the libel action filed against it based on the contents of its 

magazine where it had sold “a substantial number of copies” of the 

magazine in that state. Id. at 781.
26 No. 17-2900

F.3d at 756. Revolution’s nationwide advertisements were 

accessible in Illinois.39

Significant caution is certainly appropriate when assessing a defendant’s online contacts with a forum “to ensure that a defendant is not haled into court simply because 

the defendant owns or operates a website that is accessible 

in the forum state.” Hemi, 622 F.3d at 760. Here, however, 

Revolution’s 767 sales of Diesel Test to Illinois residents provides solid evidence that Revolution has “purposely exploited the Illinois market.” be2, 642 F.3d at 558 (collecting cases). 

These sales certainly distinguish Revolution from “the defendant [that] merely operates a website, even a ‘highly interactive’ website, that is accessible from, but does not target, 

the forum state.” Id. at 559 (collecting cases).

2.

The proper exercise of specific jurisdiction also requires 

that the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state 

be “suit-related.” Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 801 (quoting 

Walden, 571 U.S. at 284). There must be a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. “[E]ven regularly occurring sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of 

jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.” Goodyear, 

564 U.S. at 931 n.6. 

Revolution submits that Mr. Curry has failed to establish 

adequately that a connection exists between Revolution’s 

sales to consumers in Illinois and his claims against Revolu39 R.35-1 ¶ 26 (the defendants’ admission that Revolution marketed and 

advertised Diesel Test on the Internet).
No. 17-2900 27

tion. It maintains that our decision in Advanced Tactical supports this contention.40 Advanced Tactical, like this case, involved trademark infringement claims. Advanced Tactical 

Ordnance Systems, a manufacturer of “PepperBall-branded” 

projectile irritants, sued Real Action Paintball, Inc., a California company, for trademark infringement in the District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Advanced Tactical alleged that Real Action infringed its trademark rights in 

the “PepperBall” mark by using it in a misleading statement 

that Real Action posted on its website and sent to everyone 

on its email list.

Advanced Tactical contended that personal jurisdiction 

was proper in Indiana because Real Action had sent emails 

to customers located in Indiana and because Real Action 

“had made at least one sale to an Indiana resident.” Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 799.

40 We note that, unlike the situation in Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys. v. 

Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014), in which an evidentiary hearing was held, the district court decided the personal jurisdiction issue in this case without an evidentiary hearing. “The precise 

nature of the plaintiff’s burden depends upon whether an evidentiary 

hearing has been held.” Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 

338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). Where an evidentiary hearing is held, 

the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Where, as here, the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss based only on the submission of written materials, Mr. Curry may 

satisfy his burden by simply establishing a prima facie case. Id.
28 No. 17-2900

We held that Advanced Tactical failed to establish personal jurisdiction. Real Action’s email to its customer list, 

which included customers in Indiana, could not support jurisdiction because, we explained, any connection between 

the lawsuit and where the email was opened would be “entirely fortuitous.” Id. at 803. Although Real Action made at 

least one sale to an Indiana resident, Advanced Tactical did 

not provide evidence that the sale had any connection to the 

underlying claims of trademark infringement. No evidence, 

for example, suggested that Indiana residents saw Real Action’s email or website before purchasing products from Real Action. “The only sales that would be relevant,” we explained, “are those that were related to Real Action’s alleged 

unlawful activity,” and Advanced Tactical did “not provide[] evidence of any such sales.” Id. at 801. We emphasized 

in Advanced Tactical that the defendant’s contacts with the 

forum state must be related to the plaintiff’s claims to support specific personal jurisdiction. Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d 

at 801. 

Mr. Curry, on the other hand, certainly has met his burden. Unlike the sales in Advanced Tactical, which were made 

by the defendant in the forum state but were not related to 

the claims underlying the suit, Mr. Curry has shown that the 

direct sales that Revolution made in Illinois involved Diesel 

Test, a product that bears the allegedly infringing trademark 

that forms the very basis of this action. Mr. Curry submits

that Revolution participated in the Illinois market by selling 

its product in a manner that would lead the consumer to 

confuse Revolution’s product with his. The gravamen of his 

case is that Revolution’s advertisement and sale of its product in the national market caused confusion and consequent-
No. 17-2900 29

ly deprived Mr. Curry of the value of his trademark in those 

states, including Illinois, where the product was sold. 

Whether Mr. Curry can prove these allegations at trial is 

not the issue at this stage of the litigation. All he must establish, at this stage, is a prima facie case of specific personal 

jurisdiction over Revolution, by showing that Revolution established certain minimum contacts with Illinois by purposefully directing its activity at Illinois and availing itself of 

the benefits of conducting business there, and that these contacts are related to his claims. The defendant’s activity in the 

state is the very activity that allegedly caused the confusion 

at the heart of this litigation. 

Advanced Tactical cannot be read as requiring, at this 

stage of the litigation, anything more. As we have just noted, Revolution’s sales are inextricably linked to the alleged 

tortious activity underlying Mr. Curry’s claims. By contrast, 

the allegations of trademark infringement in Advanced Tactical appear to be based solely on statements made on the defendant’s website about its affiliations. The sales in the forum state therefore did not have, as the court noted, any 

relevance to the allegations of the complaint. Notably, Advanced Tactical made no attempt to limit our earlier decision 

in Hemi, which had upheld an assertion of personal jurisdiction based on sales of cigarettes to one individual in the forum state.

Revolution’s contacts with Illinois are clearly related to 

the claims in this suit. 

3.

In the final step of our inquiry, we must ensure that the 

district court’s exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend tradi-
30 No. 17-2900

tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe, 

326 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In making this determination, we consider: 

[T]he burden on the defendant, the forum 

State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the 

plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 

effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s 

interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of [the underlying dispute], and the 

shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.

Purdue Research, 338 F.3d at 781 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). “When the 

defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum are relatively 

weak (although existent), these considerations may militate 

in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. Nevertheless, as 

long as the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of minimum contacts, that showing is generally defeated only 

where the defendant presents “a compelling case that the 

presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.

Applying this analysis here, we see no unfairness in subjecting Revolution to jurisdiction in Illinois. Revolution is not 

physically present in the state. Nevertheless, it has structured its marketing so that it can easily serve the state’s consumers—and it has done so by selling the allegedly confusing product in substantial quantity. Revolution has held itself as conducting business nationwide through both its interactive website and other websites. Thus, the burden of requiring Revolution to defend a lawsuit in Illinois is minimal. 

Revolution “wants to have its cake and eat it, too: it wants 
No. 17-2900 31

the benefit of a nationwide business model with none of the 

exposure.” Hemi, 622 F.3d at 760. 

Moreover, Illinois has a strong interest in providing a forum for its residents, including Mr. Curry, to seek redress for 

harms suffered within the state by an out-of-state actor. If 

the allegations in this case prove to be true, then hundreds of 

Illinois residents purchased Revolution’s Diesel Test product, which is inextricably linked to the claims of this case. 

“There is no unfairness in requiring [a defendant] to defend 

[a] lawsuit in the courts of the state where, through the very 

activity giving rise to the suit, it continues to gain so much.” 

uBid, 623 F.3d at 433; see Hemi, 622 F.3d at 760 (finding that 

jurisdiction in Illinois was fair where defendant had established an “expansive, sophisticated commercial venture 

online,” held itself out to conduct business nationwide, and 

succeeded in reaching customers across the country).

Conclusion

We reverse the dismissal of claims against Revolution, 

vacate the dismissal of claims against the other three defendants, and remand the case for further proceedings. 

Mr. Curry may recover the costs of this appeal.

REVERSED in PART, VACATED in PART and 

REMANDED