COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Benton and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JESSE LEE BOLIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0954-94-2 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 AUGUST 29, 1995 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY 

Thomas V. Warren, Judge 

 John L. Squires, III, for appellant. 

 Margaret Ann B. Walker, Assistant Attorney 

 General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

 General, on brief) for appellee. 

 Jesse Lee Bolin appeals from his conviction for driving 

under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266. 

Bolin contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress 

a certificate of breath analysis and statements Bolin made to 

police prior to his arrest. We affirm the conviction. 

 The evidence proved that State Police Trooper J.A. Olinger 

received a radio call at 10:35 p.m. reporting an automobile 

accident in Powhatan County. When she arrived at the scene, the 

officer found an automobile in a ditch by the side of the road. 

Bolin's mother testified that Bolin arrived home that evening and 

told his parents that he had been in an automobile accident. His 

parents left to retrieve the automobile and discovered a number 

of police at the scene. Bolin's father remained at the accident 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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site, and his mother returned home. 

 Later, two uniformed deputy sheriffs arrived with Bolin's 

father to their home. Bolin testified that he was told by the 

deputies to accompany them to the accident scene and that he 

believed that he was not free to refuse the deputies' demand. 

His mother testified that Bolin was asked to accompany the 

deputies and that he complied. Bolin was not handcuffed and was 

transported in the rear of the deputies' vehicle to the accident 

site. 

 Trooper Olinger testified that when Bolin arrived at the 

accident site, his eyes were bloodshot and glassy, he smelled of 

alcohol, and he stumbled out of the vehicle. The officer asked 

Bolin if he had been driving the automobile at the time of the 

accident, what time the accident occurred, and whether he had 

consumed any alcohol before or after the accident. The officer 

testified that Bolin had admitted that he was driving the 

automobile at the time of the accident, that the accident had 

occurred thirty minutes prior to his return, and that he had 

consumed one beer before and none after the accident. After 

Bolin poorly performed several field sobriety tests, the officer 

arrested Bolin at 11:55 p.m. and advised him of his rights. 

Bolin took a breath test at 1:10 a.m. 

 Bolin argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to 

suppress the certificate of blood analysis and his statements 

because he was in custody and had not been given Miranda warnings 
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at the time he was interrogated. Furthermore, Bolin argues that 

the trial judge erroneously based his ruling on the officer's 

subjective belief that Bolin was free to leave up until the time 

he was arrested. 

 When a suspect is subjected to "custodial interrogation," 

Miranda warnings are required. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 

444 (1966). Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by 

law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way." Id. "The totality of circumstances must be 

considered in determining whether the suspect is in custody when 

questioned, but the 'ultimate inquiry is simply "whether there is 

a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the 

degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Wass v. Commonwealth, 

5 Va. App. 27, 32, 359 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1987) (citations 

omitted). 

 The judge believed the mother's testimony that Bolin was 

asked to accompany the police officers to the accident site. 

"The [fact finder] 'had the right to accept the evidence of one 

witness and to reject that of the defendant.'" Bryant v. 

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 421, 427, 393 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1990) 

(citation omitted). Bolin was also not restrained in any manner. 

 Thus, there is no evidence that Bolin's freedom of action was 

restricted in any way. He voluntarily went to the accident scene 

with the two deputies. See Nash v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 
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550, 553, 404 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1991). 

 Any interview of one suspected of a crime by 

a police officer will have coercive aspects 

to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the 

police officer is part of a law enforcement 

system which may ultimately cause the suspect 

to be charged with a crime. But police 

officers are not required to administer 

Miranda warnings to everyone whom they 

question. Nor is the requirement of warnings 

to be imposed simply because the questioning 

takes place in the station house, or because 

the questioned person is one whom the police 

suspect. Miranda warnings are required only 

where there has been such a restriction on a 

person's freedom as to render him "in 

custody." It was that sort of coercive 

environment to which Miranda by its terms was 

made applicable, and to which it is limited. 

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 

 "[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the 

objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the 

subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or 

the person being questioned." Stansbury v. California, ___ U.S. 

___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994). The officer testified 

that when Bolin had arrived on the scene, she had not focused her 

investigation on him. She believed that he was free to leave up 

until the time she arrested him at 11:55 p.m. However, the 

officer testified that she did not communicate this belief to 

Bolin. The objective facts in this record that the trial judge 

believed support a finding that Bolin was not in custody until 

his arrest. Thus, we hold that the trial judge did not err in 

refusing to suppress as evidence Bolin's statements and the 

certificate of analysis. 
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 Because Bolin's statements were properly admitted, we need 

not address his argument that the Commonwealth could not prove 
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that Bolin was arrested within two hours of his offense pursuant 

to Code § 18.2-268.2(A). Thus, we affirm his conviction. 

 Affirmed. 
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BENTON, J., dissenting. 

 The objective facts prove that two uniformed deputies 

employed by the sheriff's department who were at the scene of the 

automobile accident arrived at Jesse Lee Bolin's residence with 

Bolin's father. The statement of facts recites that Bolin 

testified "[h]e was told by the deputies to accompany them to the 

accident scene." The statement of facts also recites that 

Bolin's mother testified that "[t]he deputies asked [Bolin] to 

accompany them to the accident scene . . . [and Bolin] complied." 

 In ruling that Jesse Lee Bolin was not subjected to 

custodial interrogation after he arrived at the accident site, 

the trial judge relied, in part, upon "the testimony that Trooper 

Olinger had not 'focussed' her investigation upon . . . [Bolin] 

when he arrived at the accident scene and the testimony that 

Trooper Olinger believed that . . . [Bolin] was free to leave the 

scene at any time . . . [until] she placed . . . [Bolin] under 

arrest." However, in Stansbury v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 

114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994), the United States Supreme Court 

reaffirmed its previous holdings and ruled that "the initial 

determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances 

of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by 

either the interrogating officers or the person being 

questioned." As particularly pertinent to this case, the Court 

noted "that any inquiry into whether the interrogating officers 

have focused their suspicions upon the individual being 
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questioned . . . is not relevant for purposes of Miranda." Id.

at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 1530. 

 Because the record contains objective facts that tend to 

prove Bolin was in custody and because the trial judge erred in 

considering subjective factors in deciding that Bolin was not 

subjected to custodial interrogation, I would reverse the 

conviction and remand the suppression motion to the trial judge 

for reconsideration.