IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10741

Summary Calendar

STEPHEN P WALLACE, an individual and Vested beneficiary of the Lorice T

Wallace Trusts and Family LP and all those similarly situated on behalf of Lisa

F Wallace; EDITH L JACKSON

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

RONALD J SAFFA, An Individual; JAMES C MILTON, An Individual; JAMES

E POE, An Individual; TRUST COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, the shareholders

and directors; JOHN DOES 1-10, not yet known; JAMES DIMON, Individually;

GREGG STEVENS, Individually; JONES GIVENS GOTCHER & BOGAN PC;

JAMES WEGER, Individually

Defendants-Appellees

----------------------------

LISA F WALLACE; STEPHEN P WALLACE; EDITH L JACKSON

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

JAMES DIMON, individually and in his official capacity; WILLIAM

HARRISON, individually and in his official capacity; JEFF KING, individually

and in his official capacity; JOHN THIBODEAU, individually and in his official

capacity; WILLIAM R JENKINS JR; JACKSON WALKER; JOHN DOES 1-10;

JP MORGAN CHASE & CO, formerly known as Bank One NA; JAMES M

KELLEY

Defendants-Appellees

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 11, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10741

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

2

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:07-CV-229

USDC No. 4:07-CV-211

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Stephen P. Wallace seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in his

appeal challenging the dismissal of his lawsuits challenging the administration

of the Frank A. Wallace Irrevocable Trust and the Lorice T. Wallace Trust for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the imposition of sanctions against him.

The district court concluded that Wallace’s challenges to the trust

administration were barred by the doctrine established in Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The district court also ordered enjoined Wallace

from filing further suits in the court relating to the administration of the trusts.

In order to proceed IFP, Wallace must show that he is a pauper and that his

appeal is taken in good faith, involving nonfrivolous issues. See Carson v. Polley,

689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

Wallace contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the

defendants’ motions because the defendants are not in fact the proper

administrators of the trusts and cannot act on behalf of the trusts. To the extent

that Wallace is asserting that the defendants’ motions to dismiss submitted in

the district court were unauthorized, the defendants were named as parties to

the case and as such were authorized to file defensive motions. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 12. To the extent that Wallace is challenging the validity of the decisions
No. 07-10741

3

from the Oklahoma state court relied upon by the district court in its dismissal,

such challenges are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Liedtke v. State

Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).

Wallace’s conclusional assertion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is

inapplicable to his case is insufficient to overcome dismissal. See Blackburn v.

City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). Although Wallace contends

that the district court’s imposition of a sanction order enables the defendants to

continue their illegal activities, he has not established that the narrowly tailed

order constituted an abuse of discretion against a litigant who has presented

numerous challenges to the trust proceedings in numerous courts. See Jackson

v. Carpenter, 921 F.3d 68, 69 (5th Cir. 1991).

Wallace contends that the district court judge was biased against him.

The adverse judicial rulings cited by Wallace are insufficient to establish bias.

See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

Wallace contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for

appointment of counsel. He has not established exceptional circumstances

warranting such an appointment. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212

(5th Cir. 1982). For that reason, Wallace’s motion for appointment of appellate

counsel is DENIED.

Wallace’s appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous.

Accordingly, Wallace’s request for IFP status is DENIED, and his APPEAL IS

DISMISSED. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983); 5TH

CIR. R. 42.2. Wallace’s motion requesting a stay of a hearing in the Tulsa

County Court, which was scheduled to occur on July 18, 2007, is DENIED as

moot. Wallace’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to

issue a preliminary injunction against the defendants, ordering the defendants

to submit to an audit, and convening a special grand jury to investigate the
No. 07-10741

4

illegal activities of the defendants and the district court is also DENIED. See In

re Willy, 831 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1987).

Wallace has a history of challenging matters relating to theTrusts atissue

in the instant case in various federal courts unrelated to the underlying

Oklahoma state court proceedings. As a result, Wallace is WARNED that any

further filing of repetitious or frivolous appeals, on his own behalf or on behalf

of others, relating to the administration of and control over the Trusts may

result in the imposition of sanctions against him. These sanctions may include

dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions on his ability to file pleadings in

this court and any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction.