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SOUTH SUDAN’S PROSPECTS FOR

PEACE AND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 27, 2016

Serial No. 114–208

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Booth, Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 6

Mr. Bob Leavitt, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development .............................................................................................................. 18

Mr. John Prendergast, founding director, Enough Project .................................. 41

Mr. Matt Wells, program officer, Center for Civilians in Conflict ....................... 53

Luka Biong Deng Kuol, Ph.D., global fellow, Peace Research Institute Oslo .... 64

Augustino Ting Mayai, Ph.D., director of research, The Sudd Institute ............ 86

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Booth: Prepared statement .............................................. 9

Mr. Bob Leavitt: Prepared statement .................................................................... 20

Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement .......................................................... 44

Mr. Matt Wells: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 56

Luka Biong Deng Kuol, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................. 67

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 100

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 101

Mr. John Prendergast: Information on the Frontier Security Group .................. 102

(1)

SOUTH SUDAN’S PROSPECTS FOR

PEACE AND SECURITY 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. And good afternoon to everybody and thank you for 

being here. 

On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became the world’s 

newest nation. In a referendum held in January of that year, nearly 99 percent of the population voted to become independent from 

the Republic of Sudan. Although there are those who felt the South 

Sudanese were not prepared for independence, the people of that 

country believed otherwise and rejoiced in severing their ties to the 

regime in Khartoum after many years of war and efforts to undermine the South. 

Unfortunately, the people’s rejoicing was short-lived. The lack of 

infrastructure and transparent governance frustrated any hope of 

progress for this fledgling nation. Despite significant arable land, 

agricultural production did not increase largely due to a lack of 

transportation and power infrastructure needed which also prevented significant mining or manufacturing operations. 

Nearly 5 years after independence, South Sudan remains heavily 

dependent on its oil production which represents as much as 98 

percent of its revenue. As the price of oil has fallen worldwide, 

South Sudan became the producer earning the least from each barrel of oil, estimated between $9 and $12 a barrel. Although an increase in agricultural would have helped bridge the gap, the displacement of so many farmers, the continued insecurity, and the 

recent spread of violence to the agricultural heartland prevents any 

benefits agriculture could have provided. Consequently, South 

Sudan has projected that a negative growth rate this year of nearly 

8 percent. 

More than 2.4 million people have been displaced by the conflict 

just since December 2013; 706,600 of them are now refugees in 

neighboring Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. United Nations 

officials estimate that more 6 million people need humanitarian aid 

2

and nearly a quarter of the country’s population, or 2.8 million, are 

facing life-threatening hunger. 

Bob Leavitt, Deputy Assistant Administrator for USAID will testify today that ‘‘half of all Sudanese—meaning 6.1 million people—

are in need of humanitarian assistance or protection this year.’’ 

And, ‘‘Over half of all children aged 6 to 15—or 1.8 million children—are not in school in South Sudan, the highest proportion in 

any country.’’

Efforts to address the needs of the South Sudanese people have 

been blocked by various fighting forces—at least 52 relief workers 

have been killed since the civil war began—and according to 

United Nations there are numerous reports of harassment, threats 

and active hostility toward aid workers. Apparently, targeted attacks to prevent aid from reaching certain communities have 

meant that far too many people in need of help cannot be helped 

even in U.N. compounds which have also come under attack. 

Greg Simpkins and I were scheduled to visit South Sudan on a 

trip that unfortunately coincided with the eruption of the violence 

in December 2013, so that trip was cancelled at the request of the 

State Department. But for more than 20 months since, fighting between forces led by Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek 

Machar continued without stoppage despite several ceasefire agreements. In fact, the targeting of populations and oil facilities became 

worse the closer the signing of a final agreement came as both 

sides competed for territory before agreeing to halt hostilities. 

Unspeakable human rights violations have occurred as documented by the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South 

Sudan, and U.N. reports have corroborated that. The interethnic 

violence, Dinka-Nuer conflict, has now devolved into interethnic 

animosity involving clans within larger ethnic groups. 

Matt Wells of the Center for Civilians in Conflict includes a very 

touching and sad, tragic interview with Rebecca, a 29-year-old victim who lost her husband. She says in part, ‘‘[t]he government soldiers came in and were looking for Nuers; they killed all the Nuers 

they found. When the [armed opposition] attacked, they killed the 

Dinkas and other tribes . . . [o]ur dead relatives will never come 

back. But we need to know [those responsible]. Then we can decide 

to forgive them or send them to prison. I want to know why they 

killed innocent civilians, why did they kill our children,’’ she says. 

‘‘The government must recognize our suffering [and] rebuild our 

homes. Once [our homes are rebuilt,] our children [are back in] 

school, we have medicine, and the guns have stopped banging in 

my head, I will have [what I need.]’’

We should be honest that both President Salva Kiir and returning Vice President Machar don’t control all the forces still in the 

field. The burgeoning of militias into the national army has produced units more loyal to their commanders than to the government. Meanwhile, Machar’s hastily assembled rebellion also lacks 

strict chain of command, therefore achieving a lasting end to the 

fighting will take more than a peace accord that has been signed 

by these two men. 

The United States has played a major role in ending South Sudan’s long and destructive war with Sudan and was instrumental 

in its independence. Since then, the U.S. Government has been the 

3

leading donor contributing approximately $1.5 billion in humanitarian aid. 

Today’s hearing will examine the role of the United States, the 

role it has played and continues to play in search of peace, stability, and prosperity. And I want to thank our very distinguished 

witnesses for the role they have personally played in that effort. 

The State Department will describe the successes and failures 

hopefully in the nearly 5-year effort. Witnesses on both panels will 

explain how the optimism of 2013 devolved to the barbarism we are 

trying to overcome today. 

Let me just say to all my colleagues that we look forward to their 

testimony. I would like to now yield to Eliot Engel, the ranking 

member of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs, for any opening 

comments he might have. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. As the 

ranking member of the full committee, I want to once again thank 

you for calling this hearing and thank you for the good work that 

you do. Ambassador Booth, Mr. Leavitt, thank you for your service 

and for your testimony today. The two of you know as well as anyone the dire situation facing South Sudan. 

Since the war broke out more than 2 years ago, both parties, parties on both sides, have committed gross violations of human rights 

and humanitarian law. Approximately 16,000 child soldiers have 

been recruited mostly by the rebel forces, ethnically targeted rape 

has been prevalent on both sides, and in February, government 

forces were involved in an attack on the U.N. protection of a civilian’s camp at Malakal. At least 30 internally displaced persons lost 

their lives in this attack, more than 120 were injured, and about 

one third of the camp was burned to the ground. 

The humanitarian picture in South Sudan is truly catastrophic. 

Nearly 3 million people are facing starvation, yet only 17 percent 

of the funding needed to respond to this crisis has been provided. 

Amid these reports I was glad to hear that this morning the United 

States announced more than $86 million in additional humanitarian assistance to help affected people in South Sudan. 

What makes this a crime and really a pity is that we had such 

high hopes when South Sudan was formed and thought that would 

be the beginning of a new era in the area, instead unfortunately 

things have gotten worse. 

Yet even those trying to provide relief face danger. At least 52 

aid workers have been killed since the onset of violence in December 2013, and many others have been harassed, threatened, and in 

some cases savagely beaten. Humanitarian convoys are subject to 

extortion at multiple illegal checkpoints throughout the country, 

multiplying the cost of the humanitarian response the people of 

South Sudan desperately need. 

On top of everything, I have deep misgivings about the peace 

deal meant to put an end to this violence. The peace agreement 

signed in August is a bargain negotiated by the political elites who 

created this conflict in the first place. I fear that it essentially 

resets the political landscape to what it was at the outset of the 

conflict and has little to do with the millions of people who have 

been affected. 

4

So we need to ask ourselves what can we do to support reconciliation at the local and national levels to help prevent new flare-ups 

of violence. This is especially important in light of the government’s 

decision to press ahead with the division of the country’s 10 states 

into 28 states, a move that has created localized conflicts in parts 

of the country that had been relatively peaceful. 

Moreover, I worry that warring parties are simply paying lip 

service to issues of justice, reconciliation and accountability, thereby ensuring that the cycle of impunity will continue. Contrary to 

the intent of the peace agreement, the manmade conflict in South 

Sudan is expanding and the country’s people of course deserve better. 

We know there aren’t a lot of good options, but in my view we 

should go forward with an arms embargo. For months the United 

States has considered such a measure to ensure compliance with 

the peace process. However, with the return of opposition leader 

Riek Machar to Juba yesterday, implementation of such a plan has 

lagged behind schedule. All the while a supply of arms and ammunition to both sides has prolonged and escalated the conflict. 

I am glad Mr. Machar has returned and consider this an important but modest step forward. Much more needs to be done, and 

I am concerned that more weapons entering South Sudan will only 

keep the parties from making further progress. We shouldn’t think 

of an arms embargo as a point of leverage but as a means by which 

to prevent further suffering. The U.N. Panel of Experts on South 

Sudan has endorsed this approach, and Ambassadors from Angola, 

Senegal, Spain, France, New Zealand, and the UK, all members of 

the Security Council, have indicated support. 

So this is clearly far from a solution, but I think it puts us on 

the right side of history and could help move this situation in the 

right direction. I look forward to our witnesses and seeing what 

they have to say about what they think can be done, and again I 

want to applaud our chairman for shining a light on this difficult 

challenge. 

I am going to have to leave in a few minutes. I have a longstanding appointment with one of the Ambassadors, but I will be 

reading the transcript of the hearing and will keep in touch with 

Mr. Smith and work together with him as we have for many, many 

years. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses 

as well. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank Ranking Member Engel for his excellent statement, for his leadership, and for passage of his important 

bill yesterday on the floor. Congratulations on that. 

I would like to now yield to Mr. Donovan from Staten Island. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time so we have more 

time to hear from the witnesses, but I appreciate your offer. Thank 

you, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to yield to Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and I also want to 

acknowledge the leadership of Ranking Member Bass, and thank 

you for calling this hearing on South Sudan’s prospect for peace. 

And thank you to our witnesses, and I look forward to hearing from 

both of you on the situation in South Sudan. 

5

Like most observers I was optimistic when after almost 40 years 

of war between Sudan and the South Sudanese, which claimed 

more than 21⁄2 million lives and displaced more than 41⁄2 million 

people, South Sudan emerged in 2011 as the world’s newest country. However, the civil war that has ravaged the country since 2013 

has had a devastating impact. 

Today, South Sudan faces another post-conflict reconciliation 

process, massive and chronic humanitarian needs, high level corruption, and widespread displacement of its population. This conflict has displaced more than 2.3 million South Sudanese since December 2013, and the U.N. estimates that over 6.1 million people 

need humanitarian aid and 2.8 million people face life-threatening 

hunger. 

The human rights situation is horrific, with assertions from the 

U.N. and from U.N. officials that targeted attacks against civilians 

and U.N. personnel may constitute war crimes or crimes against 

humanity. The U.N. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan reports that gross violations of human rights and serious violations 

of humanitarian law have occurred on a massive scale with civilians often targeted along ethnic lines. And UNICEF estimates that 

the warring sides have recruited as many as 16,000 child soldiers 

and that conflict related sexual violence against civilians is prevalent. 

There are many serious challenges that remain as South Sudan 

moves toward implementing its peace agreement. I look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses about the prospect for peace and what 

the United States and the international community can do to improve prospects for peace in the country and begin to tackle the 

enormous humanitarian needs of the South Sudanese people. And 

with that I thank you and I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. I would like to yield to Mr. 

Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to say 

I was fortunate enough to be able to address Secretary Kerry when 

he testified before our Appropriations subcommittee, and I asked 

him if the U.S. is willing to hold war criminals in South Sudan accountable by imposing additional targeted sanctions and an arms 

embargo to show that we are actually serious about the peace 

agreement and that violating its terms will not be tolerated. I felt 

like the U.S. was about to get serious when he responded very assertively that the international community is absolutely prepared 

to put into place individual sanctions for a range of things that 

may have been committed in the course of the war. 

But since then, unfortunately, not one additional person has been 

subject to sanctions or an asset freeze by the U.N. or by the U.S. 

Russia continues to block U.S. and UK motions at the U.N. Security Council, as you know, for an arms embargo with seemingly no 

pushback from the administration. Also, the February attack on a 

protected civilian site was without question facilitated by government soldiers and aligned forces. 

This was a deliberate attack on a U.N. base, sanctioned by the 

Government of South Sudan, with its soldiers killing over 30 and 

injuring over 100, deliberately and systematically burning down 

sections of the camp occupied by ethnic groups aligned with the opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:33 Sep 22, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\042716\99948 SHIRL
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position. Government forces turned to ash 3,700 civilian shelters, 

along with clinics, water tankers, nutrition centers, schools, et 

cetera. 

I hope that you address some of these issues in your testimony 

here today. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to make a statement and I yield back. 

Mr. CAPUANO. First, I just want to appreciate the opportunity to 

sit with you and to listen. I have been involved with the Sudan 

issue for awhile. Welcome, Ambassador Booth and Mr. Leavitt. 

They do great work. And with that I am going to yield back and 

listen to them. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, and thank you for coming, for 

your longstanding leadership on Sudan. 

I would like to now welcome our two very distinguished representatives from the administration, who are themselves leaders 

when it comes to Sudan. Ambassador Donald Booth was appointed 

U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan on August 28, 2013. 

He previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia, Zambia, and Liberia. 

Prior to that he was director of the Office of Technical and Specialized Agencies at the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Booth has also served 

as director of the Office of West African Affairs, deputy director of 

the Office of Southern African Affairs, economic counselor in Athens, and division chief for Bilateral Trade Affairs at the Department of State. 

We will then hear from Bob Leavitt who serves as deputy assistant administrator for USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 

Humanitarian Assistance. Mr. Leavitt has over 20 years experience 

managing humanitarian and development assistance programs and 

national security policies. From 2012 until joining the Bureau in 

September 2014, he served as USAID’s executive secretary and 

senior advisor for national security affairs. 

While on detail from USAID, Mr. Leavitt served as the director 

of African Affairs at the National Security Council at the White 

House from 2009 to 2012. He joined USAID in 2001 as a conflict 

resolution specialist in the Bureau for Africa after he worked for 

Catholic Relief Services from 1994 to 2000. 

Ambassador Booth, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH, SPECIAL 

ENVOY TO SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking 

Member Bass, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to speak before you today. 

Yesterday, April 26th, former Vice President Riek Machar returned to Juba and was sworn in as First Vice President by President Salva Kiir. Now this represents a significant step toward formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity that both 

leaders had committed to when they signed the peace agreement 

8 months ago. We expect the Transitional Government to be formed 

and constituted within days now. However, this will not in and of 

itself deliver peace and restore national unity. To achieve those 

7

outcomes, South Sudan’s leaders will need to work together for the 

people of South Sudan. 

I would like to note that progress this week came only after 

bouts of obstructionism by both sides. The progress of the last few 

days would not have happened without the intensive personal diplomacy of Ambassador Phee and her team in Juba as well as Ambassador Haslach and her team in Addis Ababa. They worked tirelessly to overcome the many last-minute hurdles that delayed First 

Vice President Machar’s return. 

Looking forward, the parties in the Transitional Government will 

have to demonstrate that they can and will work together to make 

tough decisions, to break old habits, and accept a new and intrusive degree of international financial oversight in order to convince 

the world of their seriousness in leading South Sudan to a better 

future. 

The United States is ready to help the Transitional Government 

do right by its people, but we need to see that this government will 

not repeat past mistakes. The United States will press for full implementation of the peace agreement, particularly the reform agenda contained therein. And there I am referring to, first, economic 

reform. South Sudan needs to undertake rigorous macro economic 

reforms. It cannot spend what it doesn’t have. It is time for austerity as well as revised spending priorities. 

We are coordinating with other international donors to ensure 

that any financial commitments in support of the Transitional Government will be conditioned on its acceptance of international oversight of its revenues and expenditures. Specifically, we believe that 

an external expenditure oversight mechanism needs to be established. To be seen as a credible partner, the Transitional Government also needs to demonstrate its commitment to allowing full 

and unfettered humanitarian access to all parts of the country. 

For too long South Sudan has been the victim of some corrupt 

leaders and their mismanagement of its economy and natural resources. This cannot continue. To that end, my office and others in 

the administration are pursuing measures to identify and act 

against those responsible for wanton corruption and theft. We want 

to see a Transitional Government in which corruption is no longer 

the scourge that it has been in the past, and we will not neglect 

the possibility of trying to recover stolen money. 

Second, security sector reform. For more than a generation South 

Sudanese society has been dominated by armed groups and by the 

perception that conflict brings rewards. It is imperative that men 

under arms be able to transition to peaceful and productive citizens. This disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration effort 

will require significant resources and enormous creativity to have 

a chance of success. South Sudan, however, must emerge from the 

transitional period as a state with an army and not an army running a state. 

And third, reconciliation and accountability. We fully support the 

peace agreement’s provision for the Hybrid Court for South Sudan 

to be established by the African Union, as well as the establishment of a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing. We 

are pleased to see that the African Union has begun initial preparations to create the court and we are prepared to support it. 

8

Ethnic grievance fueled this most recent war, and to prevent another the crimes of the conflict must be addressed consistent with 

both South Sudanese values as well as international norms. It is 

easy to name the ways that this agreement might fail, and it is 

easy to find cause for pessimism. 

We were appalled by the violence at the U.N. Protection of Civilians site in Malakal in February in which men in SPLA uniforms 

opened fire on civilians. We are dismayed by the death toll of humanitarian aid workers, and we continue to be concerned about the 

government’s 28 states plan, which has complicated implementation of the peace agreement and stoked grievances among communities. We have made clear to both sides that this kind of behavior 

has to end. 

I want to be clear that if any of South Sudan’s leaders continue 

to work against implementation of the agreement, we are prepared 

to employ any measure to include sanctions and an arms embargo 

which we believe could change their behavior. I believe we must remain, however, committed to helping South Sudan work toward the 

laudable goals contained in the peace agreement. It really is more 

than just an accommodation between warring factions. It has important reform elements. 

The people of South Sudan, the people we have spent $1.6 billion 

in humanitarian assistance to support since the conflict began, are 

the reason we cannot throw up our hands in frustration. They are 

the reason we must be prepared to support the Transitional Government if and when it begins demonstrating its commitment to 

implementing the agreement. Any other course of action would 

simply abandon those South Sudanese to a future of more conflict 

and deprivation. These are the same South Sudanese who with our 

support for their right of self-determination voted for independence 

in 2011 and who deserve a country that lives up to the promise of 

its beginnings. 

Finally, I want to thank the members of the subcommittee for 

your ongoing attention to South Sudan and its people, and thank 

you for giving me the opportunity to speak before you today. I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Booth follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ambassador Booth, and thank 

you for your personal efforts that have been extraordinary. 

Mr. Leavitt. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BOB LEAVITT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. LEAVITT. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing 

and thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

Today I would like to highlight the humanitarian crisis in South 

Sudan and how USAID has adapted its response to the situation. 

We join the Special Envoy in calling the Transitional Government 

of National Unity to begin to address the country’s urgent challenges. 

South Sudan’s economy is in crisis. Its people struggle to find 

enough to eat, and human rights abuses continue with impunity. 

The recent exodus of South Sudanese into Darfur, Sudan, shows 

the desperation that many face. A total of 21⁄2 million South Sudanese have fled their homes. Approximately one in four South Sudanese are experiencing extreme, life-threatening hunger. This year 

will likely be the most food insecure since South Sudan gained its 

independence. 

The U.S. Government and our partners continue to do everything possible to help the people of South Sudan, providing nearly $1.6 

billion in humanitarian assistance since December 2013. This includes the $86 million we announced earlier today. Every month 

we reach 1.3 million South Sudanese with life-saving food assistance, protection, clean water, and sanitation. We have moved over 

344,000 metric tons of food assistance, which is enough to fill the 

equivalent of 18,000 tractor trailers back-to-back between here and 

New York City. 

Our partners also provide trauma and protection support to children and survivors of gender-based violence. I want to express our 

deep appreciation for our partners and colleagues on the ground for 

their courage and their commitment to save the lives of the South 

Sudanese. They continue to face significant security challenges and 

access challenges. 

Warring parties and armed actors have killed 52 aid workers, a 

dozen more since we testified last in December 2015. The parties 

are obligated under the peace agreement to allow humanitarian aid 

to flow without interference, yet aid workers continue to deal with 

lengthy negotiations, numerous checkpoints and other obstacles. I 

would like to thank Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Phee in 

Juba for repeatedly intervening to secure humanitarian access 

when it counts most. 

USAID has shifted its long term assistance from helping to build 

the institutions of the new South Sudanese state to investing directly in the South Sudanese people. We educate children where 

they are now, including in Protection of Civilians sites at U.N. compounds across South Sudan. We have enrolled nearly 148,000 children, more than triple the number of students in the Washington, 

DC, public school system. Despite these efforts, over half of all chilVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:33 Sep 22, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\042716\99948 SHIRL
19

dren age 6 to 15 are not in school in South Sudan, the highest proportion in any country. 

We collaborate with other donors to support basic health care including maternal and child health services and immunizations. We 

are helping the South Sudanese regain their ability to make a living. We recently announced a new effort to help communities in 

food insecured states to recover assets such as farming tools and 

seeds, and improving their nutrition. These investments will help 

reduce their dependency on emergency assistance. 

As Ambassador Booth highlighted, paving a way for transitional 

justice processes will be critical for South Sudan’s future. USAID 

has piloted a program that helps communities overcome trauma 

that perpetuates historic grievances. We are also working with the 

South Sudan Council of Churches to engage the South Sudanese in 

grassroots healing and reconciliation, and we launched a peace center to educate citizens about the peace agreement. 

We all want to see South Sudan move forward. The Transitional 

Government of National Unity must set the country on a path to 

peace and development. We expect the Transitional Government to 

prevent the extortion and physical threats of aid workers and to 

allow full freedom of movement for all civilians. We expect them to 

prioritize their country’s health and other development needs. 

As part of our mission to end extreme poverty and promote 

democratic resilient societies, we will continue to invest in the people of South Sudan and their efforts to build a more prosperous, 

peaceful future. I want to thank Congress and this subcommittee 

for your commitment to the South Sudanese people. Your support 

makes our life-saving work possible. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leavitt follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, Mr. Leavitt. 

To begin, just a few opening questions. First, Ambassador Booth, 

you talked about any measure being on the table. You might want 

to elaborate a little bit. Of course this is a time of some heightened 

hope, but we know that hope coupled with the credible threat of 

a downside, a sanction, personal especially, can sharpen the mind. 

The impact on food security, or food insecurity more appropriately termed, on vulnerable persons, since it is very hard to get 

food aid as well as medicines to targeted populations, what impact 

do we know—Mr. Leavitt, you might want to speak to this—is having on the elderly, children, particularly pregnant women? 

We know the great gamechanger of the first 1,000 days from conception to the second birthday, is any of that happening now in 

South Sudan? Are we about to see a period of stunting and other 

kinds of consequences, maladies that could be prevented? Fifteen 

thousand child soldiers, is that accurate? Is it more or less? What 

is being done to reintegrate those kids? 

John Prendergast says that one factor not addressed, and he goes 

on to talk about the main driver being unchecked greed. He talks 

about looting frenzy, violent kleptocracy, looting and killing with 

impunity, but he suggests that the one factor that has not been addressed is this issue of unchecked greed; your response to that. 

And Matt Wells in his comments points out that in February, 

Senegal, Angola, UK, and France supported an arms embargo and 

suggests that U.S. leadership has been lacking on an arms embargo. If the U.S. were to strongly support an arms embargo it is likely that the position would prevail in the Security Council; your reaction and thoughts on that. 

Mr. LEAVITT. Chairman Smith, I will begin with the impact on 

the elderly and the children regarding this situation. USAID is concentrated on the situation affecting the most vulnerable people in 

the country. 

Just to give you an example of how we are targeting children and 

elderly, in the case of children USAID provides health and nutrition assistance to some of the most vulnerable in some of the most 

dangerous and vulnerable areas of the country. What that translates into, what that looks like is an example of an 8-month-old boy 

in the State of Jonglei late last year got malaria. He got terribly 

sick, dehydrated, and became less than 10 pounds in weight. The 

mother carried that boy for 6 hours to get to the first accessible 

clinic. 

That was funded by USAID’s partner IMA, health international. 

That organization provided specialized therapeutic assistance to 

that child in nutrition support. That child gained back 3 pounds 

over the course of 5 weeks, and at that point in time the mother 

was able to care for the child and to bring the child back home. 

This assistance, the health assistance and nutrition assistance that 

USAID and its partners bring to bear sometimes in remote and 

dangerous areas makes a significant difference. 

In terms of children and elderly, also making sure that our activities do no harm and our activities support the needs of such 

vulnerable populations, we have partners that have helped train 

communities that have been vulnerable to conflict and to displacement to be prepared, when necessary, to flee. And our partners 

27

have provided training for communities to have escape plans, evacuation routes, run bags, and in one recent case that training was 

actually utilized just a day or so after it was received. And that 

training also looked at how to care for the elderly, how to make 

sure that we are caring for the needs of the children and the elderly as people flee. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 

me tackle the child soldiers question first. I don’t think there is a 

really reliable number of the numbers that have been recruited, because a lot of children who have ended up in the conflict have been 

parts of militias and other groups such as the infamous Nuer 

White Army, which is really a traditional hunting band, which has 

been suborned at times in this conflict in support of the opposition. 

But, and clearly when we look at a DDR program, one of the first 

actions and where we would like to have U.S. participation in early 

intervention is in identifying child soldiers and getting them separated and out and into some sort of psychosocial counseling so they 

can be reintegrated into society. Child soldiers——

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. For counseling? 

Ambassador BOOTH. The capacity in country does not. We would 

have to——

Mr. SMITH. Is it even close? I mean, how quickly could that be 

stood up? 

Ambassador BOOTH. You would have to bring in outside experts 

to work on this and find people in South Sudan who have some rudimentary skills and work with them to add to that. But this whole 

question of child soldiers is something that I engaged with the Minister of Defense on even before this conflict broke out, and I think 

we had a commitment from the government at that point and they 

were working toward actually tackling this problem in a serious 

way. The conflict obviously set that back. 

The question about measures to take if the leaders don’t cooperate, I mentioned in my oral remarks that really we have sort of everything on the table. We are prepared to look at sanctions. We are 

prepared to look at an arms embargo. I think one of the key elements though is what I discussed, which is we really want to make 

sure that resources of the country are going to be utilized for the 

people of the country. And so we are taking a careful look at what 

has been stolen in the past and who stole it, so we are definitely 

going to pursue that. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could interrupt briefly, is Enough Project of help 

to you, The Sentry, their project—are you working with them on 

that? 

Ambassador BOOTH. We certainly are working with them. They 

have shared information with us. We have been discussing this 

with them. I think it is a good information collection gathering effort, but we now need to take that forward in ways that the U.S. 

Government is uniquely qualified to do whether it is through our 

FinCEN at Treasury which looks at this issue on a systemic basis, 

or through the Department of Justice which would look at things 

in an individual case basis. 

And there is also an Executive order that gives us the ability to 

deny visas to people that are involved in corruption at well, so 

there are a number of tools out there we can use. 

28

Mr. SMITH. So you have sufficient authority for tools to hold individuals to account? 

Ambassador BOOTH. We have a broad range of tools that we can 

use should people be backsliding. The other big tool that we can 

use, frankly, is going to be getting those countries in the region 

who have no interest in having a failed state on their border to put 

their own pressures on, and often that is much more effective than 

what we can do from the U.S. 

This gets to the question about the unchecked greed and corruption. Again we are trying to tackle that in two ways. One is looking 

at what has happened in the past, but more importantly, as I said 

in my remarks, we want to make sure that with this government 

there is transparency in its public finances. And we have already 

put the existing government as well as the opposition before they 

came together on notice that we would be looking for some sort of 

expenditure control mechanism to be in place. Otherwise, it would 

be very difficult to justify putting additional resources in support 

of stabilization of the macroeconomy. 

So that is a push we have been working with our international 

partners on. We have had a number of meetings, most recently last 

month, here in Washington with key donors. 

And then on the events in the Security Council about the arms 

embargo last month, at that time the focus of the efforts was to ensure that former Vice President Machar returned to Juba and the 

Transitional Government was stood up. And so the idea was not to 

punish for the fact that it wasn’t stood up, but to encourage the 

parties to get it formed and to implement the peace agreement. 

And so we looked at what we could do that would have an impact 

that would incentivize both sides, and there the embargo actually 

came up short because it would incentivize the government much 

more which could have led to greater resistance from the opposition. And so that was the problem that we were dealing with at the 

time. Now that they are one government it should be easier to 

exert some of those types of pressures. 

Mr. SMITH. A deployment of 13,000 peacekeepers, is that about 

right? Is it enough? 

Ambassador BOOTH. The U.N. increased the peacekeeping ceiling 

to 12,500 troops in December 2013, and then added another 500 to 

the ceiling in December 2015. Those troops have not been found 

and recruited yet to deploy to the mission, and it took about 18 

months to even do the first bump-up. So there is a problem of finding people, troop contributing countries, and I think the role of the 

U.N. Mission, protection of civilians, will begin to change with the 

Transitional Government. 

With a Transitional Government that is functioning you should 

have people beginning to feel safe that they can now leave these 

U.N. camps, can begin to leave the IDP camps and go home. And 

that will also be the main thing, I think, that will alleviate the humanitarian crisis facing the country. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for conducting 

this hearing and also for our witnesses. 

29

While we welcome the return of Riek Machar to Juba, we recognize that for all parties concerned, including the United States, 

much hard work must be done to address effectively the current 

situation on the ground and help move this pivotal country and its 

people forward in peace. 

I had the opportunity to visit South Sudan twice over the last 

few years and the opportunity to meet with the people and the 

leaders of the world’s youngest country. During my first visit, a 

congressional delegation in May 2012, almost a year after South 

Sudan’s independence, there were high expectations of what independence could mean for the country, the region, and the diaspora. 

My last visit to South Sudan with my colleague Mr. Capuano 

was in November of last year. The difference between this visit and 

the first visit could not have been more stark. Last November there 

was an atmosphere of fear and desperation. I saw and met victims 

of physical attacks and the internally displaced all desperate for access to humanitarian assistance. 

I also heard about countless accounts of human rights abuses 

and about the degradation of women and their children in an environment where there appeared increasingly to be a lack of compassion. Against the backdrop of increasing intercommunal strife, perhaps the most telling statistics are those of South Sudanese seeking refuge in neighboring countries including Sudan. 

Since December 2013, the beginning of this crisis, the U.N. reports over 200,000 new South Sudanese arrived in Sudan. These 

refugees are in addition to the 200,000 South Sudanese who fled 

to Ethiopia, the ones who fled to Uganda, and the approximately 

100,000 that fled to Kenya. In addition, South Sudan has an internally displaced population of approximately 1 million people. 

A major concern of all of us who monitor closely humanitarian 

issues is the blatant intimidation and killings of humanitarian 

workers, the majority of whom are South Sudanese. While we were 

there, I believe it was, Mr. Capuano, 2 weeks before we got there, 

there was a humanitarian mission where the boat was hijacked 

and everybody was held hostage for a couple of weeks and everything on the boat was stolen. I am also concerned about food consumption and the increasing crisis, the food insecurity which both 

witnesses have referenced. 

But before I close I want to note what I hope is a prospect for 

peace, and that is the South Sudanese-Americans, the former Lost 

Boys and Lost Girls. We had a policy breakfast about this last 

week. There are a number of them that I am sure are here in the 

room today, and if there are they should raise their hands. These 

were former Lost Boys and Lost Girls who came to our country 

years ago and have made incredible accomplishments, becoming 

doctors and nurses and playing a very positive role in U.S. society. 

And so I am considering introducing legislation that might have 

our Government support some of them returning, and I wanted to 

know your opinions about that and how we might do that in a constructive way. Many of them in my conversations—and Mr. 

Capuano and I met with a group of, I think it was probably about 

25 who came from all over the country and they have accomplished 

a tremendous amount here, but, you know, they have left family 

back in South Sudan and many of them have expressed an interest 

30

in returning, and I want to know your thoughts on that. The leadership vacuum that exists there now, and if you think they might 

be able to return and make some contribution. 

I also want to know, I mean, I realize that Vice President 

Machar just returned, but I want to know if you have heard any 

reports of anything that has happened. I guess he has just been 

there a few days and I know he brought a tremendous number of 

forces with him. But what is the sentiment? What is happening 

now? So perhaps you could answer those couple of questions before 

I continue on. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. Let 

me answer the second, or the last part of it, first, about Riek 

Machar’s return and the impact in Juba. I think one indicator is 

the strengthening of the South Sudanese pound today, so I think 

the markets are reacting favorably as one indication. 

The reception that he was given yesterday when he went directly 

from the airport upon arrival to the presidential grounds for the 

swearing-in, and the speech that was made by President Kiir in 

particular, was very, I think, uplifting. The President apologized 

not only to the people of South Sudan for the conflict, but he apologized to the international community for——

Ms. BASS. Good. 

Ambassador BOOTH [continuing]. What has happened. And he 

raised the hands of both Riek Machar and Vice President Wani 

Igga, who is from Equatoria, so the three major regions of South 

Sudan together, and said we are going to work together and we are 

going to implement this agreement and we are going to restore our 

country. 

So I think the atmospherics initially have been very good and I 

commend the parties for that. There is still a lot of tough work 

ahead, and I anticipate that there are issues that were not fully resolved in the peace agreement and will continue to be contentious 

in going forward. But that is the real test. Can they show that they 

can work together? Can they compromise? And that is the challenge that is ahead of them and the challenge that we are putting 

to them. 

Ms. BASS. Let me interrupt you for a second. When we were 

there and we met with President Kiir, the whole idea of the new 

states that were created he left us with the impression—and Mr. 

Capuano, I think you would agree. But he left us with the impression that that was not necessarily going to be implemented right 

away, because how could these parties come together and agree to 

divide leadership and create a new government and then in the 

meantime he goes and doubles the geographic areas? And I don’t 

know how Machar is supposed share power in that situation. 

Do you, is it your impression—and we were there in November. 

Is it your impression that he moved forward with the creation of 

these new states or did he keep it to the number that is was before, 

which I think it was at 12—10? So he went from 10 to 28 states. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Unfortunately, Congresswoman, on Christmas Eve, the President did promulgate the order to create the 28 

states. And despite strong pressure that they not move forward and 

actually implement that, though, they did move forward over the 

last couple of months appointing governors and other officials. 

31

The events in Malakal at the PoC camp, the underlying tensions 

for that were most likely a result of this 28 state decision where 

the Shilluk community in particular felt they were being displaced 

because Malakal has been moved from a Shilluk dominated area to 

a Dinka dominated area. So the 28 states created not only difficulties in implementation of the agreement, which was based on 

power sharing in 10 states, but also created these additional ethnic 

tensions which have played out not only in Malakal but also in 

Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal. 

Ms. BASS. You know, practically speaking, what did they do, roll 

up on the governor’s mansion and tell the governor he has got to 

leave? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, in one case, in effect yes that did happen in Pibor, and there was fighting in Pibor town as a result of 

that as one governor replaced another. We have pushed very hard 

and with the support of the international partners and President 

Mogae, who is running the JMEC, the monitoring mechanism responsible for oversight of the implementation of the agreement, to 

push for the issue to be put off until the Transitional Government 

is formed, and for there to be a boundary commission that would 

look at what the borders of the states would be and also, frankly, 

to take a look again at the subdivision of the country. Frankly, 

South Sudan cannot afford 28 states at this point. 

Ms. BASS. Did they redo the power sharing with Machar? 

Ambassador BOOTH. That is an issue that is still complicated, because power sharing at the state level as I said was based on 10 

states. The government has said any state that, new state that 

came from one of the states that the opposition would have gotten 

the majority in, then the opposition would get the majority there. 

So instead of the opposition having a majority of the state government in 10 states it would have an opposition majority in, I believe, 6 states. Sorry, three of the 10 versus 6 of the 28. That issue 

is one of those unresolved issues that is out there. I think this 28 

state question will be something that preoccupies the Transitional 

Government in its early days, among other things. 

You also asked about security. Yes, there was provision in the security agreement that followed the peace agreement for Riek 

Machar to have security in Juba. They have now mainly deployed 

there including elements of the Joint Integrated Police that will be 

responsible for security of the city. 

Ms. BASS. Well, before I run out of time though, if you wouldn’t 

mind, the question I asked about the Lost Boys and Girls who are 

men and women and they are no longer lost, but what your 

thoughts are about that. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Clearly, there are a number of people, Lost 

Boys and Girls, others from the diaspora that have skills that 

would definitely benefit South Sudan. Some have gone back. You 

mentioned a leadership vacuum. I think the leaders there would 

argue that there is no leadership vacuum. There are plenty of potential leaders in the country. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Ambassador BOOTH. But I think I know what you were referring 

to. 

32

Ms. BASS. I wasn’t necessarily referring to the President and the 

Vice President. But I mean, I think there is lots of layers although 

that is debatable as well. Yes, right. A lot of new governors are 

needed, right? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Hopefully we won’t need as many governors 

either. There are those types of programs. The World Bank has one 

known as TOKTEN, which is the transfer of knowledge, which 

brings back diaspora members, helps fund them. So those are programs that have worked in some countries. 

There is always resistance, however, particularly when a country 

is coming out of conflict, to having people who have not been there 

come back and take over, particularly more highly paid positions. 

But South Sudan clearly does need expertise, so whenever I meet 

with diaspora I encourage them to indeed look for how they can 

contribute, whether going back or staying here and contributing 

from here. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I yield to the distinguished 

chairman of the full committee, Chairman Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Chairman, for holding this. I 

know how involved you and Congresswoman Bass have been on 

this issue and in pushing for U.S. engagement on this issue, and 

we thank you for that. And I think yesterday with the return of 

Riek Machar to Juba we see maybe, for once, a real opportunity 

here. We thank the Embassy for their work in that regard of getting him there. But I think establishing a Transitional Government 

is obviously the cornerstone of the step we have to take. 

One of my frustrations through all of this is that we have not 

utilized the arms embargo to shut down the weaponry that continues to escalate. And now that we have a peace process, I think 

it begins to lay the foundation for the administration having argued, well, it is punitive to do that. I don’t think it was punitive, 

but now it is conditional, right? It is a condition I would hope, Ambassador, it is a condition of the deal that we cut off the arms flow. 

And I think the problem is that with these factions so heavily 

armed now and spending their resources on those armaments, and 

with the deep distrust that they have, and I have spoken to both 

sides of this conflict, but they are now confined in the capital, and 

one miscommunication could spark an absolute explosion within 

the capital of not just the start of another conflict, but the loss of 

human life in that crossfire, which would really be catastrophic. 

So on that point, I think we have long used this argument of an 

embargo as an empty threat. I see some of the witness testimony 

here that shows that witnesses are going to testify to the fact that 

in the past actual imposition of an embargo has shut down the 

amount of violence. The threat of an embargo without imposing it? 

No, no. That often actually increases the conflict as these continue 

to ramp up. So I am just back to something that I have, Ambassador Booth, long been haranguing about but I just think it is really important now. 

Lastly, if they are going to respect the ceasefire why would they 

still want to build up their arsenals? So I think from that standpoint that is just one additional argument why part of this has to 

be to prevent that cycle. It has been widely reported that this past 

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33

cil. What I saw was the UK, France, our friends among African 

Union members all in support of that, so that is a good thing. And 

I don’t know how bad things have to get to get to the point where 

the U.S. is on board, but I would suggest we are past that point, 

not to belabor it. 

The last point I would make here is that the financial coffers are 

nearly empty. They are not going to be able to repay any debts, 

probably, in Juba. So Ambassador Booth, I am pleased to read in 

your testimony that the administration is coordinating with other 

international donors to ensure financial commitments to support 

the Transitional Government will be conditioned on international 

oversight of both the revenue side of this and the expenditure side. 

I think it is vital. It is vital because, frankly, both sides have a long 

history with respect to, we will just call it corruption, or misuse of 

funds. 

And I would ask what actions will the administration take if the 

South Sudan Transitional Government does not accept the prerequisite oversight mechanisms? I think that is wise to let them 

know that there will be consequences if they try to skirt that. Will 

we be ready to walk away from the table if they refuse that? And 

have we considered adding any new names to the U.S. or U.N. 

sanctions list? A lot of time has gone by. We haven’t wrapped that 

list up, and there are some pretty bad actors involved and I think 

we have to be mindful of that. We don’t want to create a perception 

of immunity. So I will allow you to respond. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you, Chairman. It is good to see you 

again. Let me address the issue about arms. We all agree that 

there are far too many arms in South Sudan and that they certainly don’t need anymore. And particularly now that they are together in a Transitional Government, there is no point in continuing to build up the arms stockpiles. 

I think one of the ways that is most effective to get at this, and 

would be more effective even than an arms embargo—if it was supported particularly by the region—and there are many in the Security Council who do not support it and it was not even a unanimous support about a month ago when it was raised by the African 

members, so it is not an easy lift in the Security Council by any 

means. But the way to get at this problem, really, is through the 

public financial management approach that we are proposing. 

I mentioned also macroeconomic reform, and one of the things in 

order to make this government budget anywhere near being 

financeable they are going to have to make major concessions. And 

one that has been recommended to them by the IMF is that capital 

expenditures need to be cut basically to zero. Now capital expenditures is weapons as well, and so if we can use the financial side 

of our approach to this to get at preventing additional weapons 

from getting into South Sudan that would be, I think, an easier 

way to do it and a more effective way to do it. 

I think, also, the Council support for this followed immediately 

after the events in the PoC site in Malakal and since then has diminished in ardor for doing this, and even more so given the fact 

that the Transitional Government is about to be formed with Riek 

Machar there. You asked what we would do if they don’t accept 

sort of the transparency of the public finances. I think the answer 

34

there is they don’t get the type of money that they would need to 

do things like stabilize the economy, to implement reconstruction, 

and really to move forward in any meaningful way on DDR. 

This country, because of the decline in the price of oil, and since 

oil had been the major, over 90 percent, source of their revenue, 

the country is now really in a very difficult position. And so they 

really are going to need the help and support of the international 

financial institutions and donor partners. So we, I think, are in a 

good position to be able to achieve the type of intrusive role that 

we have been proposing. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. 

I see John Prendergast here. I just wanted to thank him for getting me into Sudan even if it was without a visa. John, thanks. 

Thanks for being with us today. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you again to our witnesses. I want to just 

focus for a moment on the question of the child soldiers. And I am 

wondering whether you, Ambassador, or Mr. Leavitt, could talk a 

little bit about what we are doing to both prevent more child soldiers and to help secure the release of existing child soldiers, and 

to the chairman’s question how large is the problem? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, Congressman, as I said we don’t have 

a totally accurate number because these are not formal military organizations. And, you know, many of the militia groups, I mentioned the Nuer White Army as an example, where they traditionally have brought younger children in as part of their cattle-raiding 

activities, and when these cattle raiding activities become part of 

the conflict, yes, they become child soldiers. 

So the scope of the problem is something that needs to be defined 

as we go into this DDR program. As I said, one of the top priorities 

would be to get the children away from other combatants, to get 

them into some sort of psychosocial counseling program, reintegrated back into their society, hopefully with their families. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But that is not happening at all right now. 

Ambassador BOOTH. That is not happening because there hasn’t 

been a security sector reform program so there hasn’t been a start 

to DDR yet. But there has been a start of soldiers going to cantonment sites, which is a rather loose term because these are not sort 

of formal barracks but more the villages where they would be then 

registered and accounted for, and so that is when we can start that 

process. 

But that is something that we would need, you know, to probably 

work with other partners to ensure there is sufficient funding to 

get that done. But the child soldiers is clearly one of the top priorities for DDR. 

Mr. LEAVITT. As a part of USAID’s emergency education activities, 148,000 children have been enrolled, children and adolescents. 

That does not target former combatants, former child combatants, 

but there are former child soldiers who had served as combatants 

that are a part of those programs. And some of those former combatants have received psychosocial treatment. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And with respect to the issue of the 

endemic corruption that seems to plague South Sudan since the 

very days of its formation, what can we do working with the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:33 Sep 22, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\042716\99948 SHIRL
35

gional governments to help the South Sudanese leverage their natural resources to make sure that the proceeds from those resources 

actually go to the people and not line the pockets of the political 

leadership? You know, what other steps can we take to help 

incentivize or advocate for that kind of approach? 

And secondly, would you just speak a little bit on what was the 

rationale for the creation of the additional states? Was it simply to 

give more appointments of governors, or was there some underlying 

policy, and how do you think that is likely to sort of unfold? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, on the issue of corruption and—particularly how do you make sure that the resources that come to the 

state, basically the oil revenues, get used for the benefit of the 

state—that was something that we had identified during the peace 

negotiations, and we pressed hard for inclusion in the peace agreement of an intrusive public financial management oversight system. That was, I think, understandably resisted by some other 

countries in the region who are not particularly interested in setting precedents like that. 

But with the declining price of oil and the prolongation of the 

conflict, South Sudan is now in a position where it really has virtually no revenue, and so we are taking another run at this as a 

group of donors in conjunction with the international financial institutions to try to make sure that indeed what is owed to the state 

gets collected, goes to the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, 

and then is spent according to the budget so that there aren’t a lot 

of extra budgetary expenditures, no one showing up at the Central 

Bank saying where is my $200,000 that I asked for this morning? 

That has been a perennial problem in South Sudan and one that 

needs to be stopped. 

The 28 states issue is interesting. During the peace negotiations 

the opposition pushed very hard for a formal declaration that 

South Sudan would be a Federal country, a Federal system of government, and the opposition pushed for 21 states in that Federal 

system. The government at that time, Salva Kiir, supported by the 

mediation and by others such as ourselves, said the structure of a 

state is a fundamental issue that should be decided when you draft 

your permanent constitution. It shouldn’t be something decided 

around a negotiating table over a peace agreement. 

That prevailed during the negotiations, and so it was rather 

shocking that President Kiir would float this then 3 months after 

having signed the peace agreement, something he had vigorously 

opposed during the negotiations. It was really done as a political 

ploy, I think, by both sides to particularly gain support from the 

Equatorias. 

The three Equatorian states have long been supporters of a Federal approach in South Sudan, and so there was a sort of jockeying 

for political support that was going on. This unfortunately has created more ethnic tensions in parts of South Sudan and more violence. And so this has to be addressed by the Transitional Government as a priority matter. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

chairman of the full committee for letting me sit in today. I sit on 

36

the Appropriations Committee, the Subcommittee on State and 

Foreign Operations, which is why I am here today and why I have 

taken an interest in your testimony, for obvious reasons, where our 

money is going and how it is being spent. I appreciate your testimony and your job, and I also appreciate the sensitivity of diplomacy and how we must proceed forward despite certain setbacks. 

But I do find very interesting some of the things that we have 

heard today, especially from the chairman. I know we talk about 

being disappointed and condemning violations of ceasefires, attacks 

on U.N. compounds, and the killing of civilians by government 

forces. I know recently Susan Rice went so far as to demand that 

the Government of South Sudan investigate the attack it orchestrated against its own citizens itself, and bring itself to justice as 

if it was the United States. 

If we the United States aren’t publicly willing to hold those accountable for atrocities committed throughout the course of the 

war, and hold those accountable who raided the public finances to 

support the purchase of military equipment used to conduct systematic killings of civilians, it is kind of hard to fathom that this 

government is going to do that themselves. They are just not going 

to do it. It is not going to happen. 

So I think as an appropriator and somebody who votes to spend 

money on things that I think are important, that we need to send 

a message to let the people know that we are serious that we are 

on the side of the people and not the leaders, whether it be the government or opposition. And we need to really tell when we look at 

these leaders that when we say and we demand a stand-down 

order that that is what we demand, and not sort of, you know, well, 

it is a touchy situation because governments are just forming and, 

you know, we don’t want to have sanctions or an arms embargo, 

because there shouldn’t be arms coming in from either side. 

I mean, you know, we have talked in our office to people that are 

in the NGO community. If there was a real arms embargo, it would 

have a real impact. The threat or sort of like these half measures, 

I think, actually sends, as I think that Chairman Royce was saying, actually has a counterproductive consequence. 

So I guess my question is this. As an appropriator, somebody 

who votes to spend money, why are we allowing war criminals and 

war profiteers to dictate our policy while they deliberately lie, 

cheat, and steal from us? And how has the international community held those responsible accountable for these war crimes and 

what is it doing to stop attacks like this from happening again? 

And what is it going to take to hit these guys where it hurts—I 

am talking about the leaders on both sides—so that our people, our 

taxpayers in this country, feel confident that their tax dollars are 

not being wasted? Thank you. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you, Congressman. You raised two 

issues, accountability for war crimes and also accountability for the 

money that has been spent. On the issue of war crimes, gross violations of human rights, this is why the peace agreement includes 

the provision for the creation of this Hybrid Court for South Sudan 

which would be created by the African Union, and they have begun 

to work on that. It will be hybrid. It will be with South Sudan. But 

37

the leadership of it will be coming from the African Union, and 

they have started work and we are prepared to support that. Last May, Secretary Kerry pledged $5 million as an initial down 

payment if you will to support this effort. We take accountability 

for gross violations of human rights seriously and we will be in the 

forefront of pressing for that. We were the ones who pressed for the 

release of the African Union’s Commission of Inquiry report. We 

have been very active in the U.N. Human Rights Council. 

We have managed to get a resolution this past January or February that creates a panel of experts that will continue the work 

of looking at what has happened. My office, in conjunction with our 

Human Rights Bureau, is also funding a documentation center so 

that South Sudanese themselves can document what has happened 

so that information is there for accountability purposes. 

In terms of the money, you mentioned that an effective arms embargo would have an impact. We fully agree. The problem has 

been: Could you get an effective arms embargo? You need to have 

the cooperation of the immediate neighbors, and during the course 

of this conflict there were divisions in the immediate neighbors and 

those divisions played out in terms of support of arms and other 

equipment moving to both sides of this conflict. 

This is where again we worked very hard to help bring the immediate neighbors together and the Intergovernmental Authority 

on Development (IGAD), which ran the mediation. And President 

Obama’s participation in a meeting with the heads of state of IGAD 

back in July, we think really was a major element in the breakthrough of getting them on the same page, and we had a month 

after that the signing of the peace agreement. So that is what is 

absolutely required if you want to have an effective arms embargo. 

But as I mentioned, I think we can get at this problem of spending money on arms, when there needs to be money spent on food 

and medicine and roads, through the very intrusive public financial 

management controls that we are proposing to the Transitional 

Government. 

And in terms of protecting American taxpayer money that is exactly why we are proposing this. We want to make sure not just 

that we know how our money is being used, but how the money 

that is South Sudan’s money is being used for the benefit of the 

people. And until South Sudan starts to move, put much more of 

its money, in fact all of its meager resources at this point, to the 

benefit of its people and to reconstruction that would be the trigger 

for us to then look at whether we could help. But we need to make 

sure that the practices of the past, whether it is corruption or, you 

know, misaligned spending priorities, need to be corrected. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Capuano. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again I want to appreciate the opportunity to be here as well, as not a member of the 

committee but a longtime observer and supporter of the creation of 

South Sudan. 

Mr. Leavitt, I want to start out by saying thank you. I can’t tell 

you how much most of us love what the USAID does. You represent 

the best of America around the world in dangerous situations. As 

you said the 52, if I remember the last number, of your people have 

been killed and, you know, never mind all those who have been 

38

harassed and threatened with bodily harm and actually received 

bodily harm that weren’t killed. So I want to say thank you and 

appreciate that and I would love to be able to do more to help 

them. 

But I also want to be real clear though. USAID doesn’t operate 

in a vacuum, you operate with a lot of other partners around the 

world. And when we were in there, when we were in Sudan we 

watched as people were given their rations for the month and we 

were told unequivocally by the camp owners that the food that they 

were given was calculated to last 20 days for the month, not that 

the food would, but that the nutritional value of that food was 20 

days’ worth. 

So with all the work that we are doing, with all the money we 

are sending, we are still not providing people the absolute minimum to sustain themselves. And with that Ambassador, again we 

have worked together for many years now and you know how much 

I appreciate your effort and your work. And actually, more than 

anything else I appreciate your patience which I don’t have. You 

have to have it. I don’t. 

But I do want to go back to the sanctions just a little bit. I want 

to be real clear that my support for sanctions, not just general 

sanctions in arms, there are so many small arms in that country, 

the sanctions are not going to do anything to remove them. However, if the sanctions, this is my opinion, were directly focused to 

the large arms that did not exist in that country more than a year 

or 2 ago, which cost millions of dollars for helicopters, millions of 

dollars for vehicles that can pursue people through swamps, it 

changed the face of that conflict dramatically. 

It is bad enough when bad actors are doing bad things, but then 

when they chase the civilian, the unarmed civilian population out 

of a village and then they can pursue them with a helicopter and 

they can pursue them with vehicles that can get through swamps, 

that changes it dramatically. It is bad enough to be able to live in 

a swamp, live nearby in the forest to be able to not even be able 

to do that is something that I would argue that if we focus directly 

on the heavier arms, especially now, the country, no one can argue 

that they need them now. And if we can’t get sanctions through the 

U.N. there are other ways that I will trust you are more capable 

of pursuing than I am. 

But again for me the focus is, not that I wouldn’t like to give it 

up all arms, but on those heavy arms in particular, and as you 

know we have had this discussion before. I would personally like 

to see chasing particularly the worst actors. I would love to see 

their personal funds chased. And I say that because, you know, 

they aren’t just sitting in a mattress in South Sudan. They are not 

in gold bars. They are sitting in banks in Kenya and Uganda for 

the most part. And, you know, it is cash that they have stolen from 

our money, from USAID, not just like cash but items that they 

stole from you and then sold, and it is readily available. 

And again I know we have had this discussion before and we 

have to go vote, but I wanted to add my voice to that which you 

have heard before, but I wanted to do it here for the record as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Let me just conclude with one 

final, a very brief question, and elaborate for the record if you 

39

would. With regards to child survival, are children getting the vaccinations that they absolutely need to survive and to prosper? And 

the first 1,000 days of life which I know South Sudan has agreed 

to, is that a priority of USAID to ensure that that nutrition and 

supplementation to reduce maternal mortality as well as child mortality being prioritized? 

Mr. LEAVITT. Our health activities and nutrition activities do 

very much focus on women and children at this time. With regards 

to vaccinations I can take that for the record and provide you the 

details on that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. BOB LEAVITT TO QUESTION ASKED DURING

THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

For many years, USAID assistance to South Sudan has included childhood vaccinations against major vaccine preventable diseases which include polio, measles, 

and diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus Hepatitis B and Haemophilus influenza type 

B), as a core part of our basic health services. USAID helps South Sudan with the 

purchase of new vaccines through its global investment in Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and with the aim optimizing the global investment, the USAID mission in 

South Sudan supports activities to strengthen routine immunization systems, including service delivery which is necessary for the delivery the vaccines. USAID is 

an anchor donor for Gavi with more $200 million in annual contribution and South 

Sudan is one of the Gavi priority countries for vaccines and health systems. 

South Sudan’s national immunization program is largely supported by international development partners, including USAID and Gavi. USAID actively participates in the National Interagency Coordinating Committee to ensure that Gavi 

funds are used strategically in support of routine immunization activities in South 

Sudan. As part of ongoing health activities, USAID-funded programs will continue 

to work with county health departments and state ministries of health to implement 

the ‘‘Reaching Every District/County’’ strategy in all eight states covered by a multidonor health fund (supported by USAID, the United Kingdom, Canada, European 

Union, and Sweden). The eight states covered by the fund are Central, Eastern and 

Western Equatoria; Western and Northern Bahr el Ghazal; Lakes; Unity and 

Warrap. The World Bank supports basic health services in the remaining two 

states, Upper Nile and Jonglei. 

In the last three years, routine immunization activities in South Sudan have been 

significantly affected by conflict, particularly in the northern part of the country. 

Consequently, the national administrative immunization coverage (DPT–3/PENTA–

3) has dropped from nearly 70 percent in 2011 to 56 percent in 2015. USAID support has been essential in preventing these rates from dropping even further. Because strong routine immunization depends on a functional health system, improvements will take time. In the interim, USAID continues to work with other partners, 

including the World Health Organization and UNICEF, to support integrated immunization campaigns for polio, measles, and vitamin A supplementation, as well as 

to improve routine immunization through periodic accelerated vaccination outreach 

activities. 

USAID humanitarian programs support immunization campaigns for measles and 

polio as part of essential primary health care for internally displaced persons (IDPs) 

and children at risk of malnutrition, both within IDP sites and through mobile clinic 

outreach services. In addition, USAID supported cholera oral vaccination campaigns 

in congested IDP sites to respond to and mitigate cholera outbreaks in 2015. 

Preventing stunting requires a multi-sectoral approach in the first 1000 days. 

USAID supports the provision of safe water and sanitation facilities, as well as 

training on safe hygiene practices, to prevent and mitigate the negative effects of 

diarrheal disease on health and nutrition. In addition, education for caregivers on 

infant and young child feeding practices helps to promote optimal nutrition with the 

resources available to families. Psychosocial stimulation can also be an important 

factor for preventing stunting among young children. USAID provides communitybased psychosocial support services for conflict-affected children and mothers to enhance their emotional and psychosocial wellbeing, such as through provision of recreational spaces and activities. 

These activities complement USAID humanitarian and food assistance programs, 

which aim to address the immediate nutritional needs of children and pregnant and 

40

lactating women in South Sudan and save lives while mitigating the longer-term developmental impacts of the conflict. USAID supports 10 partners to deliver life-saving treatment for children aged 6 to 59 months and pregnant and lactating women 

who suffer from acute malnutrition. Since the crisis began, USAID has provided 

over 1,300 tons of Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF) to UNICEF for the treatment of severe acute malnutrition and over 3,600 tons of Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food (RUSF) through the World Food Program for the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition. USAID humanitarian funding also enables provision of 

primary health care and maternal and antenatal services in the UN Mission in the 

Republic of South Sudan Protection of Civilians sites and other locations sheltering 

large numbers of IDPs. 

In addition, in early June, the Ministry of Health, in coordination with relevant 

line ministries, donors, UN agencies, NGOs, and other civil society organizations, 

held a high-level advocacy meeting on Scaling Up Nutrition, signaling its intention 

to revitalize the movement to end malnutrition in South Sudan. USAID will work 

with other stakeholders to support this process in the coming months.

Mr. SMITH. Because, you know, in the past even when there were 

conflicts, and one of my first, I actually worked on this issue since 

I have been in Congress for 36 years, but I will never forget when 

the FMLN and President Duarte even in the height of their conflict 

in El Salvador had days of tranquility in order to vaccinate the 

children. And hundreds of thousands of children were protected 

against polio, diphtheria, and a number of other child killing diseases, and I just hope that is a priority. If you could get back to 

us on that, it is extremely important. 

We stand in recess. We have four votes and then we will reconvene for Panel II. Thank you so much. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will resume. We do have some members 

en route so I thought I would wait, but I think if we wait too long 

we will have another set of votes. So I do apologize for that set that 

intervened. I do want to say a brief statement about this prayer petition for South Sudan. 

Deborah Fikes may have left but she was with us earlier from 

the World Evangelical Alliance, 104,000 signatures on a resolution 

committing those people to prayer asking our leaders to take bold 

action to ensure peace is realized in South Sudan by doing everything in their diplomatic power to stop the flow of weapons and 

ammunition that are fueling the violence and ensuring that those 

who stand in the way of peace are held accountable, to quote from 

the petition. So I thank her for providing the subcommittee with 

that. 

I would now like to introduce our distinguished panel, and I do 

hope the members make their way. There are no more votes for at 

least 11⁄2 hours. 

Beginning first with Mr. John Prendergast who is a human 

rights activist, best-selling author, and co-founder of the Enough 

Project, an initiative to end genocide and crimes against humanity, 

John has worked for the National Security Council under President 

Clinton, the State Department, and in congressional offices. He has 

also worked for the National Intelligence Council, UNICEF, 

Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, and the U.S. 

Institute for Peace. 

He has helped fund schools in Darfurian refugee camps and 

helped launch the Satellite Sentinel Project with actor and activist 

George Clooney. Mr. Prendergast has worked for peace in Africa for 

more than 1⁄4 of a century and has been a frequent and an expert 

41

witness that this subcommittee and other subcommittees do rely on 

for insight and counsel. So thank you, John, for being here. 

We will then hear from Mr. Matt Wells who works on Africa and 

peacekeeping at the Center for Civilians in Conflict, or CIVIC, with 

a particular focus on South Sudan. Mr. Wells has undertaken extensive field research on the recent conflict in South Sudan, examining issues including the targeting of civilians by armed actors, 

the protection of civilians by the U.N. peacekeeping Mission, and 

civilian perspectives on the peace process and transitional justice. 

Prior to joining CIVIC, Matt was an Africa researcher at Human 

Rights Watch where he led work in Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Liberia, 

Zambia, and he is widely quoted in a number of major news outlets 

who seek him out for his opinion and insight. 

We will then hear from Dr. Luka Biong Deng who is a global fellow at Peace Research Institute Oslo and a fellow at Rift Valley Institute. He has taught at the University of Juba in South Sudan. 

He was a resident senior fellow at the Carr Center for Human 

Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, and visiting fellow at the 

Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in the 

United Kingdom. 

He served as director of the Center for Peace and Development 

Studies at the University of Juba, a minister in the Office of the 

President of Southern Sudan, and a national minister of Cabinet 

Affairs of the Sudan until he resigned in May 2011. 

We will then hear from Dr. Augustino Ting Mayai who is director 

of research at the Sudd Institute. His major research interests include childhood mortality differentials in Sudan and South Sudan, 

applied quantitative methodology, applied development research, 

social accountability and public service delivery, and the demography of conflicts and violence. 

Prior to co-founding the Sudd Institute, he worked in a wide 

range of research projects sponsored by the Office of the President 

of South Sudan, the World Bank, UNICEF, Integrity Research and 

Consultancy, Capacity Building Trust Fund, and the U.S. National 

Science Foundation. 

So welcome to all four of you. Please proceed, Mr. Prendergast, 

as you would like. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, FOUNDING 

DIRECTOR, ENOUGH PROJECT 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass, for your unwavering commitment to the people 

of Africa. On a personal note, and this is rather humbling, it has 

taken me now 30 years to finally identify the primary root cause 

of suffering in South Sudan and the surrounding region of east and 

central Africa. 

The international community is spending upwards of $2 billion 

a year in South Sudan, but almost nothing is being done about the 

root cause. In South Sudan, the state has been transformed into a 

predatory criminal enterprise that serves only the interests of those 

at the top of the power pyramid. Competing factions of the ruling 

party have hijacked the state itself and are using its institutions, 

along with deadly force, to finance and fortify networks aimed at 

self-enrichment and maintaining power. 

42

Corruption and violence are not aberrations; they are the system 

itself. This is the definition of a violent kleptocracy. Unless it is addressed, we are just treating the symptoms not the causes of these 

cyclical conflicts. Investigations that we have conducted with the 

Enough Project’s new initiative The Sentry have identified numerous cases of large scale embezzlement through procurement fraud, 

outright looting of the country’s natural resources, and countless 

examples of unexplained wealth. 

Funds are routinely and sometimes blatantly misappropriated 

and diverted away from South Sudan’s central bank. In other 

cases, contracts are awarded to well connected insiders. Money is 

transferred, but the services are never delivered. We are going to 

go public with some of these cases very soon. 

So addressing root causes you need to involve the building of leverage, which until now has been a cripplingly and puzzlingly insufficient part of international efforts to support peace and human 

rights in Africa. And, I say it is a puzzle because when the United 

States wants to counter terrorism or when we want to rein in nuclear ambitions, when we want to undermine drug traffickers, a 

basic element of the strategy to achieve these objectives is to build 

leverage through the use of financial statecraft tools. 

Biting enforcement of sanctions, anti-money laundering measures, prosecutions, asset seizure and forfeiture, and other economic 

tools of 21st century foreign policy are key instruments in securing 

U.S. foreign policy goals. How strange and disappointing it is that 

these tools are not utilized for promoting peace and human rights 

in South Sudan and more broadly in Africa. 

The surest way in our view to build leverage is by hitting the 

leaders of rival kleptocratic factions in South Sudan where it hurts 

the most and the place where they are most vulnerable, which is 

in their wallets. This requires a hard target, transnational search 

of dirty money and corrupt deals made by government officials, by 

rebel leaders, by arms traffickers, complicit bankers, and mining 

and oil company representatives. 

Now the bulk of my written testimony contains very specific recommendations for building that leverage to dismantle the violent 

kleptocracy in Juba, but given the time constraints I will just focus 

on a few—two for Congress, two for the administration, and one for 

countering an American war profiteer. 

First, Congress can do a lot to focus policymakers’ attention in 

the Obama administration, but I will highlight two specific recommendations. First is passing the Global Magnitsky Act. That is 

a catalytic piece of legislation, and we commend your original sponsorship of the bill, Mr. Chairman. We hope everyone on this subcommittee can be convinced over time to become a co-sponsor of 

that bill. 

Secondly, Congress can ensure that the government agencies 

that are responsible for administering and enforcing targeted sanctions and other tools of foreign policy of economic statecraft, particularly the Office of Foreign Assets Control in Treasury, have sufficient resources and staff to create peace, for real pressure for 

peace and human rights. 

Now, moving quickly to the administration to the executive 

branch, they can do so much more to create the leverage necessary 

43

for the United States to be able to support and influence the peace 

process and undergird efforts of human rights that South Sudanese 

are making. I strongly welcome what Ambassador Booth said just 

a little while ago about corruption. Those are great words. We have 

got to see action. 

First I would say, first specific thing, and again there are lots of 

specifics in the testimony, is that the proper use of targeted sanctions is really critical in all of this. We need to go after much higher level officials and then seriously enforce those sanctions working 

to freeze and seize the ill-gotten assets that are identifiable. 

Secondly, some of the South Sudanese who are already sanctioned have continued—listen to this. These are guys already sanctioned and they are continuing to openly travel and bank in international financial institutions. This is embarrassing. It completely 

undermines what we are trying to do and makes us into a paper 

tiger. 

The Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network should investigate these sanctions violations by banks and 

others and begin to discuss consequences with the sanction-busting 

countries and banks. FinCen, as it is known, should also send out 

a request to U.S. financial institutions inquiring about senior Sudanese officials suspected of grand corruption and money laundering. 

These actions could have a chilling impact on the facilitation of corrupt activities internationally. 

Finally, a word about a firm run by a U.S. citizen that feeds into 

this violent kleptocracy. Evidence obtained by our Sentry initiative 

appears to indicate that a subsidiary of Blackwater founder Erik 

Prince’s new company, Frontier Services Group, has arranged to 

provide services to South Sudan’s military—despite repeated assertions by FSG that it is not involved in security contracts in South 

Sudan—services that would require special authorization from the 

State Department that Prince’s company has reportedly not obtained. 

Congress can work to hold these war profiteers to account by 

urging the State Department and the Justice Department to thoroughly examine whether Prince and associates have violated 

United States laws and trade restrictions. Thank you for the opportunity and your commitments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much, Mr. Prendergast. 

Mr. Wells. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MATT WELLS, PROGRAM OFFICER, 

CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, 

members of the committee. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to 

testify today about South Sudan. I focus on South Sudan and 

peacekeeping for Center for Civilians in Conflict, which works to 

improve the protection for civilians caught in conflicts around the 

world. Over the last year I have interviewed several hundred civilians affected by the conflict in South Sudan, as well as officials 

from the U.N. peacekeeping Mission, the Government of South 

Sudan, the opposition, and local civil society. 

I was most recently in South Sudan in March, investigating an 

attack on a U.N. peacekeeping base that housed 47,000 internally 

displaced persons. While there, I interviewed a man named Jameis 

who first fled violence in January 2014 when the armed opposition 

captured his village. He went to Malakal town but the conflicts 

soon forced him to flee again, this time to the other side of the Nile. 

Last year, the double threat of food insecurity and attacks by 

SPLA helicopter gunships meant he was displaced once more, this 

time to the U.N. PoC site in Malakal. He thought not for the first 

time that he had found refuge from this conflict’s relentless targeting of civilians, yet on February 17 and 18, intercommunal violence within the PoC site deteriorated further when armed 

attackers including SPLA soldiers entered through a cut in the 

camp’s fencing and proceeded to shoot and kill civilians and to 

burn down systematically parts of the camp. At least 30 people 

were killed, more than 120 wounded, many by gunshot, and about 

one third of the camp was destroyed. 

This man’s experience is unfortunately far from unique. I interviewed women who were subjected to sexual violence as their 

homes were set ablaze, who have survived by eating water lilies 

after fleeing to the swamps only to be pursued even there by armed 

groups, and who after taking refuge in U.N. bases have been subjected to sexual violence and other abuses merely while trying to 

collect firewood outside the camp. 

The much delayed return of Vice President Machar represents a 

notable step in the peace process, but it is just that—a step, and 

one that does not in and of itself greatly change the risks of violence. The U.S. needs to ramp up its engagement on other key 

issues that will allow people the ability to begin rebuilding their 

lives without fear that armed groups will continue terrorizing 

them. 

In that vein I will speak quickly about five issues in particular. 

First, transitional justice. U.S. support is needed to ensure the implementation of all of the transitional justice mechanisms outlined 

under the peace agreement. In interviews that we and others have 

undertaken in South Sudan, civilians, regardless of political and 

ethnic affiliation, have widely expressed support for criminal accountability, locally driven reconciliation, and compensation. 

Criminal justice can begin to address the impunity that has 

made it acceptable to target civilians. Local reconciliation can 

54

bridge communal divisions that have been created or exacerbated 

by the conflict and by ethnic targeting. And compensation can help 

respond to communities’ urgent needs including rebuilding schools 

and clinics and returning stolen cattle, a key source of wealth in 

South Sudan but also a potential driver of violence. 

Second, conflict over land. The U.S. should use its leverage to ensure that any decision about the issue of 28 states is made through 

an inclusive process that involves all of the country’s ethnic groups 

without favoritism based on loyalty during the conflict. The February violence in Malakal PoC is linked to the 28 states decree 

issue as is recent violence around Pibor and elsewhere. 

Third, an arms embargo, which I have been glad to hear much 

discussion about today. The U.S. should support an arms embargo 

through the U.N. Security Council. Even after the peace agreement 

signing, civilians continue to be targeted in many parts of the country, including areas of the country where there previously was not 

conflict. There is little reason to believe that abuses will stop simply because the Transitional Government is formed. 

An arms embargo will help protect civilians from future attack 

and reduce unlawful attacks by both sides. As was mentioned, African countries on the Security Council, notably Senegal and Angola, 

publicly expressed support as have the UK and France, yet the 

U.S. extended any decision about an arms embargo until June. The 

time for empty threats is over. The parties to the conflict have been 

given every chance to stop targeting civilians. 

Fourth, security sector reform. U.S. support through both carrots 

and sticks is critical for meaningful reform of the SPLA and police. 

The splintering of the SPLA during the conflict has demonstrated 

that despite U.S. investment the military remains less a national 

institution than a collection of armed groups driven primarily by 

political and ethnic concerns and loyalty to specific commanders. 

The U.S. needs to learn lessons from its past engagement and 

ensure that the governments and military take serious a SPLA 

professionalization that builds a national military that protects 

rather than targets civilians. 

Fifth and finally, U.N. peacekeeping performance. The U.S. has 

shown great leadership in working to support and improve U.N. 

peacekeeping. That should continue as the U.N. Mission in South 

Sudan will continue to have a critical role in protecting civilians 

from harm. There are more than 2 million people displaced today, 

including 186,000 in six U.N. bases. The mission has saved lives, 

but it has often been limited in projecting force outside these bases. 

And during the February violence in Malakal PoC, UNMISS’s response was simply inadequate, as we detail in a recent report. 

The U.N. has encouragingly set up a Board of Inquiry. We believe it is critical that the U.N. make public a version of that report 

and address any shortcomings identified. In addition, if the board 

finds that specific units failed to intervene and protect civilians, 

the U.N. Secretariat with support from member states like the U.S. 

should ensure accountability. 

I would like to again express my appreciation to the subcommittee for holding this hearing at a critical moment. The peace 

process has focused largely on bringing back President Kiir and 

Vice President Machar and the armies that fought for them. U.S. 

55

leadership is critical to ensure the wider conflict dynamics are addressed, and that can’t wait. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Wells. 

Dr. Deng. 

STATEMENT OF LUKA BIONG DENG KUOL, PH.D., GLOBAL 

FELLOW, PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO 

Mr. DENG KUOL. Yes, first of all, thank you very much, and one 

is really honored for having this timely opportunity for to make 

this hearing on South Sudan’s prospects for peace and security. But 

it is also the time that you have a lot of pressure to keep South 

Sudan in the radar of your focus, I think this is highly appreciated. 

Maybe what I would like to share with you what went wrong in 

South Sudan, are there opportunities or challenges for ensuring 

peace and security. And third, what needs to be done to make sure 

that peace and security will be holding in South Sudan. 

I think I want to start first with this issue of what went wrong. 

I think given the fact that United States and international community and indeed the people of South Sudan they wanted to have the 

independence, hard-won independence, it raises a lot of question 

why South Sudan has slid to civil war, because better understanding of this, the genesis of this crisis, is critical for us to look 

at issues of peace and stability. 

That so many people have been putting a lot of myth about this 

conflict, sometimes being described as ethnic politics between Nuer 

and Dinka, and even sometimes it is a power struggle within the 

SPLM, or even sometimes it is being described as kleptocracy, as 

corrupt and then neo-patrimonial system of governance, I think for 

me this mystification of the bigger picture. 

South Sudan is a complex issue. It needs be understood in a very 

comprehensive way. And I think because not getting it right will—

we did some work on these issues about looking at conflict from a 

different dimension. But I think it is very important also when we 

are talking about South Sudan to highlight some of the issues, the 

conditions that resulted in why South Sudan has slid into—this is 

a country that had simultaneously three transitions. 

It transitioned from war to peace. It transitioned from liberation 

movement to government and you know in most cases could result 

into a curse of liberation, and then it transitioned from one united 

Sudan to an independent country. And they had this shock of loss 

of their leader and also coupled with the fact that they rely on the 

oil, but which I think and then coupled with the weak institutions, 

and given the fact also having a bad neighbor like Sudan. Because 

these are the things that any country subjected to these conditions 

definitely should slide toward—are there opportunities? 

Yes, indeed there are opportunities. One is this peace agreement. 

For me, this peace agreement, we made analysis in comparison of 

the CPA. It managed to address most of the root causes of the conflict and it is very important, the fact that although the government raised some concern, the people of South Sudan they see it 

as only opportunity. And even the Parliament unanimously endorsed this peace agreement. And for me, this is very important for 

us to focus on this peace agreement and there are some positive developments happening given the fact also the government took 

some measures especially on issues of investigation about atrocities. 

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Another important opportunity is the SPLM Reunification Agreement. I think, you know, it is very important for us, the crisis, the 

genesis of the crisis started from the SPLM. We cannot have democracy without politics. We cannot have politics without political 

parties. And that is why we believe the reunification of SPLM it 

is very important. I know the U.S. Government are reluctant to 

support this reunification of the SPLM, and in a sense that will 

give SPLM the monopoly of power. I think it is very important to 

revisit your look at the SPLM. 

Then one of these challenges, and now this is a few of these challenges. This agreement despite the good aspect it is elite power 

sharing agreement. It is addressing the elites. It is not addressing 

the non-state security actors so there is a very big gap between this 

agreement and the people on the ground. I think we have to be 

mindful about that one. Second, the issue of the status of the 28 

states, the two parties have irreconcilable positions but should not 

obstruct the peace agreement. 

Third, the security sector arrangement, we need to refocus on it, 

and then this is a top priority. Third, the final status of Abyei. The 

Abyei Agreement was actually authored by the United States and 

they have given the chance for the Bashir to dismantle, to obstruct 

the Abyei Boundaries Commission, the Abyei International Arbitration, and actually people say the U.S. abandoned the issue of Abyei 

and has given even Bashir the chance to do. Abyei will be coming 

a very thorn in the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. 

Third, the unfinish of the CPA. We cannot talk about peace and 

security without talking about Nuba Mountain and south in Blue 

Nile. Fourth, the role of Sudan. Sudan will continue to play a negative role in destabilizing, and in actual effect because of its diplomatic relation now it has been to defy its image to the level that 

now people want to actually to relax their relationship with Sudan. 

Sudan is central and it will continue to destabilize South Sudan, 

and I think even the issue I see to be out of the humanitarian, I 

mean, human rights abuses have been committed now as we talk 

in Nuba Mountain and south in Blue Nile and even in Darfur. So 

we cannot talk about establishing South Sudan without focusing on 

issues of Sudan. Definitely, Sudan will be quite important. What 

can be done? 

First, I believe making the cost of non-implementation more than 

the cost of implementation. The parties should be made to believe 

that by not implementing this peace agreement they will pay the 

price. And I want to appreciate the stand of the international community, the African Union, but indeed even the threat of sanctions, 

actually they are actually paying off. But let us mention also the 

peace is beneficial to the people of South Sudan. Let us focus on 

agriculture. 

Second, sequencing peace and then justice and accountability, I 

think that as looking at the fact that Government of South Sudan 

conducted its own investigation about atrocities committed in Juba, 

let us use this one as the basis for accountability in the Hybrid 

Court, but equally let us encourage the even the SPLM in a position to conduct their own investigation about these atrocities. Let 

us make them take to account for this one. 

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Third, the non-state security actors, let us focus on them, especially the youth and then the issue of defense. And I agree with 

you, the defense and security sector reform, Abyei, it is very important for the U.S. Government because you are the author of the 

peace agreement, to renew your commitment so that the people of 

Abyei actually—because they will not live within any other option 

except to conduct their own referendum. 

And then the last one, a community engagement, let this peace 

agreement be owned by the people, because these elites they are 

actually interested in their own political gains. It is when this 

peace agreement is owned by the people this is where we can be 

able to. 

And lastly, please, South Sudan is so viable, and it is very important let us look at the bright side of it. You invested heavily, and 

I believe one day these people of South Sudan will rise up to realize 

their potential. It is an investment that is worth it. And thank you 

very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Deng Kuol follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Dr. Deng, thank you very much for your testimony 

and for your insights. 

I would like to now, Dr. Mayai. 

STATEMENT OF AUGUSTINO TING MAYAI, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF 

RESEARCH, THE SUDD INSTITUTE 

Mr. MAYAI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

Ranking Member Bass. I am delighted to be here and be given the 

opportunity to present before you on the current affairs of South 

Sudan, my country. I just returned from there about a month ago. 

My contribution today focuses on the role of youth and engendering 

and sustaining peace and prosperity in South Sudan. 

This is particularly essential in the nation where well over 60 

percent of the total population constitutes persons age 30 years or 

younger. And this nation as known to many in the world, South 

Sudan is basically a country of youth who are rarely involved in 

its most important affairs such as governance. 

Although a relatively large population of youth, it is good for development, as labor economists suggest, it could also be a source 

of tragedy, especially in the absence of strategic engagement of this 

group in productive economic activities. This situation is worsened 

by the fact that South Sudan’s literacy rate is lower than 30 percent. This means that the human capital, it is really low and that 

affects the country. 

Lack of educational opportunities, high unemployment rate, and 

political subjugation, as is the case in present-day South Sudan 

make youth a liability for a sustainable peace and development. As 

we know, it has been the South Sudanese youth who have actually 

been fighting on both sides of the just concluded civil war and prior 

wars of liberation. 

This seems to be a common experience in most contexts, developing contexts, and not age reflected highly in South Sudan. As 

South Sudan returns to normalcy now that Dr. Riek has returned 

for peace to be implemented, how to turn this large population of 

youth into an opportunity will be a tremendous test. With properly 

targeted investment in this group, both locally and internationally 

with the U.S. Government being involved, South Sudan could be on 

its way to prosperity, joining the rest of the productive democracies. 

When given opportunity the youths make an incredible difference. A perfect example in our context concerned that of the Lost 

Boys and Girls of Sudan who came to the United States 15 years 

ago, displaced by a brutal civil war in the early 1990s as unaccompanied minors, this community that faced a hopeless future at the 

time lived in various refugee camps both in South Sudan and the 

neighboring eastern African nations before coming to the U.S., 

going to Canada, and Australia. Prior to resettlement opportunities, thousands of older boys joined the war of liberation, with the 

majority being either killed or wounded in action. Between 2000 

and 2004, the U.S. Government took the initiative to resettle over 

4,000 Lost Boys and Girls in the U.S. 

Being in a conducive environment and armed with adequate economic opportunities to better themselves, the Lost Boys and Girls 

quickly made an indelible mark here in the U.S. and back home. 

87

In a few years, this group acquired quality education from worldclass institutions and gained remarkable work experience including 

serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. 

A generation committed to matters of stability back home, the 

group takes education as instruments for personal and societal fortification very seriously with as many as 20 members of this group 

obtaining doctorates in medicine and philosophy, many of them 

have now returned to South Sudan to support peace and development. 

Although confronted with challenges of South Sudan’s political 

instability and personal economic opportunity responsibilities, the 

Lost Boys and Girls in their limited ways are currently making important contributions back home through, for example, the 

Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, John Dau Foundation, School of 

Public Service at the University of Juba, the SUDD Institute and 

Marol Academy and many other initiatives. Likewise, four of the 

Lost Boys that obtained their degrees between 2013 and 2015 returned to South Sudan to teach and provide services for the people 

of South Sudan, earning less than $500 a month. 

Benjamin Machar, a colleague of mine, defended his dissertation 

a week ago, he is now on his way to South Sudan to support development there. With sustainable peace and increased support from 

the U.S. Government and South Sudan and its other partners, the 

Lost Boys and Girls can continue to significantly impact lives in 

South Sudan. 

As the agreement on the resolution of conflict in South Sudan 

gets implemented in the next few years, there will be need to support the Government of South Sudan in skills development and 

strategic allocation of those skills across different sectors. With 

support from the U.S. Government, the Lost Boys and Girls who 

have already acquired both necessary academic skills and sufficient 

work experience in the U.S. could mightily assist in this endeavor. 

In particular, the U.S. Government should rejuvenate the skill 

transfer program instituted in 2006. That taps into the skilled Lost 

Boys and Girls community to augment institutional and peace 

building programming in South Sudan. 

Gladly, a former U.S. Representative, Frank Wolf of Virginia, 

was one of the first U.S. officials to recognize this necessity, introducing the return of the Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan Act in the 

House in 2007. Revisiting this program is timely if the U.S. is to 

institute a speedy and sustainable impact in South Sudan. 

This initiative not only fosters institutional strength and stability 

for an incredibly distressed nation, it also paves ways for healthy 

leadership successions, encourages the youth to have a voice in 

subnational and national policy dialogues, and amplifies young people’s involvement in local development and peace programming. It 

places young people at the center of highly desired progress, subsequently creating a sense of responsibility and ownership of their future. 

What is more assuring that many of the Lost Boys and Girls are 

ready to return home in pursuit of peace and prosperity, but their 

return is not without economic hurdles as many now have families 

to cater to and educational loans to repay. Therefore, a project 

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similar to the Yes Youth Can in Kenya that was financed by the 

U.S. Government could be replicated in South Sudan. 

In a nutshell, Mr. Chairman, as peace partner the U.S. Government may wish to consider an increased strategic investment in 

skill transfer programs and the greater involvement of youth and 

institutional initiatives, building initiatives in South Sudan. The 

U.S. Government may also wish to extend more support through 

educational and policy institutions such as School of Public Service 

at the University of Juba, the SUDD Institute, Center for Peace 

and Development Studies, and Ebony Center for Strategic Studies. 

With these few remarks, thank you very much. 

[Mr. Mayai did not submit a prepared statement.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimony, for your 

recommendations and suggestions, and for referencing one, an idea 

that was proffered by Congressman Frank Wolf who is a good 

friend of mine and certainly a great friend of Africa. 

Let me just ask a couple of questions. Before I do, I just want 

to recognize that David Abramowitz is here. David has been a longtime champion of human rights, combating trafficking, he is the 

managing director of Humanity United, and I want to thank him 

for his lifelong commitment and for being here today and for, as he 

always does, offering very valid recommendations to all of us on 

how do we proceed on these important issues. He was chief counsel 

to the Democratic side of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for 

about more than 10 years, so thank you, David, for being here. 

I would like to ask a few questions and then yield to my good 

friend and colleague from California. 

Mr. Prendergast, you talked about the one factor not being addressed. I raised it with both Ambassador Booth earlier today as 

well as with Mr. Leavitt, and that is this unchecked greed. And I 

think, you know, and all of you might want to speak to this. You 

used multiple synonyms, each one, with varying degrees of intensity, certainly looting frenzy, violent kleptocracy, looting and killing 

with impunity. And I think, you know, human nature being what 

it is, we find in countries all around the world very often at the 

core root besides just an attraction to power there is often this unbridled wealth that certain people are able to accumulate when 

they abuse power. 

If you could speak to how well or poorly the administration is 

doing. You made very specific recommendations including FinCEN, 

the access to financial institutions in terms of money laundering 

and the like, you might want to elaborate on that. I asked Ambassador Booth earlier about your program whether or not they were 

plugging in, how well or poorly has that occurred in your opinion? 

Are they looking to you for recommendations? Because it seems to 

me you take out the financial incentive, the ill begotten gains from 

abuse financially, it certainly might lead to a better governance. 

Maybe not great governance, but a better governance. 

Secondly, Mr. Wells, you mentioned criminal justice, and you 

might want to elaborate how that might proceed since so many 

acts, barbaric acts have occurred. There are so many victims. The 

case study you cited, which I repeated in part in my opening, I 

mean she said, and I thought it was interesting, Rebecca, that she 

is not sure if she wants them prosecuted but she wants to know 

89

who they are. And then you do go into the idea of a reconciliation 

process. Perhaps all of you might want to elaborate on what that 

might look like. Of course the wounds are still fresh, so justice certainly is something that is on the minds of many people, so if you 

could on that. 

Dr. Deng, you made a very excellent point about the cost of nonimplementation must be higher than implementation. If you might 

want to elaborate on what that cost entails, to whom? Are you talking about individuals, to the government itself? And you also made 

an excellent point about ensuring ownership of the peace agreement by the people themselves. How exactly does that occur? How 

do you bring the people who are, do they need to be the beneficiaries or as they have been of recent the date, the victims of bad 

governance and certainly this violence, how do you bring them into 

that equation? 

And all of you, if you might want to, because I asked the question earlier of Mr. Leavitt, the whole issue of the health and well 

being of the Sudanese people. It seems to me that I was a little disturbed that Mr. Leavitt couldn’t say chapter and verse this is what 

the vaccination program looks like, we are doing this despite the 

difficulties, there is a commitment here to vaccinate children 

against childhood killers, because we all remember the child survival revolution. One of the key pillars, one of them was oral rehydration therapy, and he did give an example of a young child 

who seems to have gotten that because of the huge dehydration 

issues. 

But vaccinations are one of the wonders of the world, and if we 

don’t adequately pay attention to that—and again with deep respect to Mr. Leavitt, he will get back to us I am sure—that should 

have just rolled off his lips that this is what they are doing on 

childhood vaccinations. And in like manner, since Sudan is part of 

the scaling up program for the first 1,000 days, that is to me the 

most transformational program ever for reducing maternal mortality in those places where women got the nutrition and the food 

as well as their unborn children and then their newly born children, maternal mortality has dropped like a rock. 

So it needs to be prioritized and I am not sure now whether or 

not it is, perhaps you have some insights on that as well. I have 

other questions, but I will yield to Ms. Bass after those questions 

are fielded. Thank you. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think 

the first point I would make is that kleptocracy, the idea that a 

system of government—in our country, in many countries around 

the world we expect government to secure the rule of law, to deliver social services and all of the things that people expect. In a 

number of countries around the world, where corruption is no 

longer an aberration but is actually the purpose and point of the 

system, unless there is an alteration of the calculations of those 

that are in power in some way—and it is hard to make those alterations and calculations purely from internal efforts. 

People work assiduously like the two folks on the panel here 

from South Sudan, to my left, who have with many, many of their 

colleagues worked for so long for human rights and peace and democracy and transparency in South Sudan, but they need help 

90

from the outside as well. And I think that accountability, basic accountability is what so many, when all of us spend time in South 

Sudan, so many people are screaming for, accountability for the 

commission of war crimes and accountability for the financial 

crimes that have left a country that is one of the most fabulously 

wealthy in natural resources completely and totally impoverished. 

Everything that wasn’t nailed down has been externalized, 

offshored by the leaders of these two factions in a variety of, 

whether in bank accounts or in opulent houses and all the other 

kinds of things that you do when you have that kind of money. 

So here is the problem, and I think that Ambassador Booth sort 

of put his finger on it unwittingly. They always talk about the importance of reining in corruption, they always talk about the importance of accountability, but when it is time to act, when it is time 

to vote for the arms embargo, when it is time to impose a targeted, 

biting, enforced sanctions on higher-level officials, when it is time 

to begin to investigate banks for money laundering for some of 

these institutions and individuals in South Sudan and their international collaborators, when it is time to do that, other competing 

priorities emerge and people say, well, wait a minute, we don’t 

want to upset the apple cart. Riek is about to come back to Juba. 

We have got to do this, we have got to do that. There is always 

something else that takes just a little higher priority than taking 

the action. 

Well, you do that long enough and suddenly, or over time, the 

parties act like they expect us not to do anything. They no longer 

take our threats seriously. We become the paper tiger that is written about so many times throughout history. And I think that is 

where we are right now in South Sudan, frankly, is we are the 

paper tiger. Threatening to do this, threatening to do that but 

never imposing. 

And then when we actually impose sanctions on a few mid-level 

officers, we don’t enforce them, so they are traveling around the region banking, doing whatever they want to do with no consequence. 

Our inaction emboldens these folks to continue to commit atrocities 

on the ground. Violence is still occurring in a number of the states 

throughout South Sudan irregardless of the machinations politically in Juba. People need to be held accountable for that. 

So the only way, in sum, the only way to reverse that dynamic 

is for us to start acting, to choose certain high profile, important 

actions that we can take that can begin to introduce a sense of accountability, to begin to chip away at the impunity that these folks 

feel in Juba that they can do anything they want to do, they can 

take anything they want to take, and they can kill anyone who 

they want to kill with absolutely no consequence. 

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On criminal justice and accountability, I think the positive thing 

is that the peace agreement in many ways gives us the foundation 

to address these issues through calling for the establishment of 

three mechanisms in particular, the Hybrid Court, the Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission, and the Compensation and Reparation 

Authority. So the foundation is there. What is key now is starting 

progress, to get these institutions set up and working. 

91

On the Hybrid Court, you know, and criminal accountability in 

particular, there was a great study done by the South Sudan Law 

Society last year that showed that 93 percent of people that they 

interviewed in a large study favored criminal prosecutions for 

crimes that had been committed. There is an overwhelming desire 

amongst the South Sudanese to see criminal accountability. And 

the African Union has taken a notable and important leading role 

to that end. They will be in charge of helping set up the Hybrid 

Court. 

What is critical to see from the U.S. is support for that—technical assistance, financial assistance—so that the Hybrid Court can 

begin to do its work. And right now what we really need to see is 

the collection and preservation of evidence. Each day that goes by 

we are losing the ability to access much of the evidence that is 

needed. So right now it can’t happen fast enough to get the process 

started for collecting and preserving evidence. 

On the reconciliation point, you know, in interviews that we have 

done around the country, the key thing that people say is that this 

has to happen both at the national level and at the local level. It 

is not enough to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 

that sits in Juba and focuses on the elite. We need a process that 

engages people around the country that addresses not only the national conflict dynamics that my fellow panelists have talked about, 

but also many of the local factors that are driving inter- and 

intracommunal violence. 

And the third thing is the Compensation and Reparation Authority that is often forgotten about. We talk a lot about criminal accountability, we talk a lot about reconciliation, but we don’t talk 

about this issue of compensation and reparations. And for many 

people, getting some sort of immediate assistance given the fact 

that their villages have been burned, their schools have been destroyed, their clinics have been destroyed, many of them have had 

their crops destroyed, their seeds for future harvests destroyed, and 

so there is an urgent need to allow people to begin rebuilding their 

lives. 

There is a lot of discussion around how to best set up this Compensation and Reparation Authority, and I think it needs to ultimately follow two tracks. One that longer term perhaps addresses 

individual reparations, but that more immediately focuses on collective issues, how to help villages begin to rebuild their lives, and 

how to address issues like the huge amount of cattle that have 

been stolen throughout the conflict and that will inevitably drive 

violence going forward. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, can I just ask you before going to Dr. Deng, on 

the Hybrid Court did you just say that the U.S. is not providing 

money? 

Mr. WELLS. No, I am saying they need to provide money. There 

has been, I think, a statement of $5 million, I think, they expressed 

last year that they would provide for the Court. Financial assistance is incredibly important. We also need to see from the U.S., 

given how many people here have experience with hybrid courts or 

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tors and prosecutors that would be involved in this, how to set up 

a witness protection program because ultimately people who come 

forward will face retaliation, so how can we set up witness protection. I think the U.S. has a critical role to play in working with the 

AU on all of those issues. 

Mr. SMITH. But, you know, there are people, and we have had 

David Crane testify several times before this subcommittee about 

the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which did magnificent things 

and Charles Taylor is now serving 50 years because of that court. 

If there is something more that we need to be doing, Ms. Bass 

and I were just talking, perhaps we need to do a letter or to be in 

touch again with the administration about making sure that money 

does flow, because you are right. As time goes on, witnesses are 

lost, information, memories fade, and then the fear of retaliation 

without the right kinds of checks, including for prosecutors and 

judges, you know, I am not sure myself what the parameters are 

in terms of how many potential people would be prosecuted. 

How high up do you go and how low, I should say, on the people 

who have killed, maimed, do you actually go? But we will follow 

up and we will do it in a totally bipartisan way because we are on 

one accord, right. I think that is——

Mr. WELLS. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Dr. Deng. 

Mr. DENG KUOL. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, for raising these issues. I think this is your non-implementation to be 

more expensive than implementation. I think this is very critical. 

One, it is very important to focus on the implementation of peace 

agreement. This is the desire of the people of South Sudan. 

And the leaders have been entered into this agreement 

lukewarmly but not fully with all calculation. And I think that it 

is very important that we should make sure for them to fill, to implement this agreement they have to pay the price. And the good 

thing that we have tools available already. For instance, I think 

the very fact that the African Union and IGAD, together with the 

international communities through the United Nations, they have 

agreed to make this the choice of international community which 

is accurately reflecting the will of the people of South Sudan. That 

by itself is a very important tool that we should capitalize on. 

Second, I think the parties they know that they have committed 

crimes and these crimes are documented, and it is very important 

to focus on this African Union Commission of Inquiry. It is a very 

important document that could be used to make them believe that 

non-implementation this is the consequence. So even without, even 

with implementation. 

And third, you have this the United Nations experts panel, they 

have been collecting very good information about some of them including the economic crimes. And as we talk now, the people of 

South Sudan, they know in details who did what, and these are the 

things that we should continue documenting them and to be available. 

We were talking about human rights abuses, but I think the 

issue of economic crimes, it may not be necessary to add the AntiCorruption Commission, but even we can focus on having a special 

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court for these crimes. The other one, the very fact that the Government of South Sudan collected some information for the atrocities, we have seen as a positive thing. 

But this information, information about atrocities, they have not 

released this information and this should be made public. And actually, from the information we have there is SPLA, they did their 

own investigation. The police did investigation, the Minister of Justice, and also the President himself. But these documents are not 

made available and these are the homegrown initiative in order to 

achieve justice. Because those factors, I think these are the tools 

that we can use in all that. 

But importantly, and I think this is something I did not mention. 

Let us make also scenario analysis. What if the peace agreement 

fails? Because we should not be taken by surprise. They cancel that 

peace—that this peace agreement may fail is quite high. Should we 

be active or should we stop learning as of now? Because site plans 

are very important, this analysis is very important for the parties 

to know the consequence of non-implementation. 

The other side of it is making the peace agreement attractive, 

and this is where I believe that we should learn a lot of things. The 

Government of South Sudan, for example, they are involved in 

what is called Comprehensive Agricultural Development Plan. This 

actually is, I think, supported by JICA, by—and this is an area 

that we need to look. When you talk about the youth, especially the 

large population, it’s about the whole of agriculture, creating opportunities. And this is an area that we should make peace agreement 

attractive. 

We may need to invest also in the two leaders, I mean, Salva and 

his Vice President, how to work with them; the way that they enter 

into this initial relationship is going to be very fragile, and we need 

to invest in making them, make sure that they are working for the 

good of the people of South Sudan. If you go for the view of some 

it is strategy, that they want to isolate each other, it is by the end 

of day the people of South Sudan will pay. 

So this is what I meant by making non-implementation more expensive than the—let me come also the issue that you raise about 

the issue of community engagement. There is an organization 

called CEPO, Community Empowerment for Progress Organization. 

When I was in the Center for Peace and Development we started 

having what can we do in order to make the engagement of the 

people in this peace agreement; let them accept the information, 

but importantly for them to know even their responsibilities. 

And actually, when we said the non-implementation to be more 

expensive, it is when the people themselves take it upon themselves and to let these people to be accountable. What do we mean, 

for example, one of the things that we need to be done for this 

peace agreement, let the public know that this what it means for 

them and for them to follow who is not implementing. Because 

these elites are relying on these people, but these people are 

equipped—so this is one of the problems, quite complex, a problem 

of community empowerment problem by this organization. 

That is, actually I am working with them, advising them also on 

this issue of—on the transition of justice, I think I talked about 

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ability and justice who we don’t have the good platform. The process should start slowly while we are creating environment for justice and otherwise will be—we have learned from the experience of 

Kenya. 

What should be done—here is an issue that these people, they 

commit themselves to peace. And this is going to be a good foundation for issues of justice and accountability. But in the process also, 

we should start immediately documenting, documenting the information about the atrocities committed and especially what John 

said about economic crimes. For me these are the things, these are, 

you can really get the people. Get with those one, and the other 

one actually come slowly. 

So let the—and then the most important thing is when you come 

for election. For me, election is a recipe for another crisis in South 

Sudan. Those are the sources really for election that we are invested. Let us invest in making sure they are laying the foundation 

for justice and accountability, but do it slowly in a way not to spoil 

the very fact that we need to focus on the—let me stop here. 

Mr. MAYAI. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Glad that you 

raised a question related to health. South Sudan, for some that 

might not be aware of its health statistics, has the highest mortality rates in the world. And we are talking of statistics that were 

collected at post-conflict time. Think of it now that the conflict has 

been going on for the last 2 years and so many people affected 

across the board. We think that the situation has worsened. Many 

people have died as a result of this conflict adding to the prevailing 

conditions, poor health conditions. 

But I also want to bring you to the attention that even with 

peace, health conditions remain to not be changing much. I conducted a study. I am a demographer in training, and I conducted 

a study that looked at the relationship between health and spending, the public spending. 

JP, I think you should know this. What we found with that there 

was no relationship in South Sudan. The more money you invest 

in health, basically did not make much of a difference. What this 

means is that the money that gets invested in health doesn’t really 

get spent on health. It goes somewhere else. So that is the relationship between corruption and health. 

What is it that is going on now, UNICEF. The U.N. is still spearheading providing services in this area. UNICEF recently was campaigning for vaccination for children. They were claiming to be pursuing over 300,000 children which is a big deal, and hopefully they 

are undergoing that. 

But again this leads us back to this, you have the U.N. You have 

the U.S. coming there temporarily, but how do you sustain all 

these activities down the road, 5 years, 10 years down the road? 

That brings us back to the idea of capacity that the return to the 

Lost Boys and the Lost Girls is called for; that they should go back 

and be doctors and be the administrators in different capacities. 

Thank you. 

Ms. BASS. Since you just finished on that note, Dr. Mayai, and 

it was very nice to meet you in South Sudan and then to see you 

here as well. You know, in the last panel I raised the question 

about the lost men and women going back, and part of the reaction 

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was, well, that could create some problems because the existing 

leadership would not take too kindly to that. But I would like to 

know your opinion of that. 

You mentioned doctors, you mentioned administrators. It just 

seemed to me, but, you know, obviously I was only there for a couple of days, it didn’t seem like there was an abundance of folks on 

that level, so that is why it didn’t seem to me like it would create 

more tension. But I would like, you know, to know your thoughts 

on that. 

And then while you are thinking about that, Mr. Prendergast, 

you started talking about, which I want more information about, 

the company that you mentioned and their involvement on the negative side. And, you know, I mean that is one of the benefits of our 

country, right, I mean, we can hold people accountable. And so I 

want more information about that. Now I have your full testimony. 

I know what you gave was abbreviated. If it is here, you know, I 

will look at it, but I wanted you to talk more about that. 

You also talked about the wealth, and I guess that wealth is 

overseas because I don’t know that it is there. I have always been 

leery about sanctions and especially targeted sanctions, because to 

me it is just difficult to see how they have any muscle behind them, 

but then, you know, you talk about the wealth, so I guess the 

wealth is being hidden overseas. 

But, you know, sanctioning somebody to tell them that they can’t 

come to the United States, it is hard for me to understand how that 

really, you know, has some punch behind it. So I would just like 

to ask those two questions right now, and then I know they are 

going to pull us away again for our last votes. 

Mr. MAYAI. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Bass. This 

is an important question, and it would have been great if Ambassador Booth was here while I respond to this question. Before I get 

into more details into this I want to reference an effort made by 

Dr. Luka Biong in 2011 to return about 11 Lost Boys from here to 

provide support for an analysis that was conducted in the Office of 

the President. Eleven of the Lost Boys that went, eight remained. 

They were supported for a year by the Office of the President with 

Dr. Luka Biong advising the team, and eight of the Lost Boys decided to stay. So that speaks to something. 

But let me say this. There is no question of challenges in terms 

of reception, but those questions are not related to what Ambassador Booth really raised earlier and that is the question of resistance. The question of resistance should be looked at from this perspective. South Sudan does not have sufficient economic resources 

to hire highly qualified individuals, people with families abroad, 

people basically that have loans to pay. South Sudan does not have 

that, but that does not translate into South Sudan not wanting 

these people to work in different arenas. 

I just made a reference to the 11 members of my group that went 

back, I also would like to make a reference to the group that was 

recruited in 2006 on the skills transfer program. Majority of these 

people did not come back. Some of them became ministers and GGs 

in the government. That also shows the commitment of the government to integrate those individuals. 

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The problem is that the few that returning and get integrated 

are not enough to exert that effort that is needed to change the system. So I think we should not be too pessimistic about the government actually trying to——

Ms. BASS. Well, how is that viewed from the other side? I mean, 

you know, that is great what you just said, but then are they 

viewed as taking sides? How does the other faction view? 

Mr. MAYAI. The other faction as in which? 

Ms. BASS. Oh, Machar. I mean, you know, the folks that split 

from the government. 

Mr. MAYAI. Each political group has its own opinion. 

Ms. BASS. I am sorry? 

Mr. MAYAI. I mean, each political group has its own opinion. And 

I think——

Ms. BASS. So at this point in time, if people were to go back 

when the government is being reformed, restructured, and both 

sides are there, would the folks that go back be viewed as taking 

Kiir’s side? 

Mr. MAYAI. I don’t see that because both sides have members 

here. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, okay. Okay. 

Mr. MAYAI. And across the board here and Australia and Canada, and the recruitment should be fair enough to include all the 

qualified individuals to be able to go back and work. I don’t think 

that would be a problem. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. And I know that they have called 

votes now, so we have just a couple more minutes. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks. Okay, four very, very quick points. 

First, on the Frontier Services Group, we will give you all the information we have——

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST [continuing]. So both of you can have that. 

Number two, The Sentry, which is this new initiative we have 

begun, George Clooney and I have hired a team of financial forensic investigators and they are following the money all throughout 

east and central Africa but into the international system. Not to 

try and blame folks on the ground, because it takes two to tango 

in corruption. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. So we are looking at the banks, the mining 

companies, the oil companies, arms dealers, logistics companies, 

anyone who is facilitating or profiting from human misery. That is 

the agenda. 

Ms. BASS. I am assuming this is our money too, right? This is 

our money, meaning U.S. taxpayers’ money? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Oh, that is being taken? Yes. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. So there are lots of different ways that these 

guys make money. Most of it is through the looting of the natural 

resource wealth. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, okay. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. So that the vast preponderance of the money 

that is being stolen from east and central Africa is gold, oil, diamonds, all the rest of it. But then they steal anything that isn’t 

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like—so the aid money that comes in. Contracting is a major thing, 

especially military contracting, you know, all that kind of stuff. 

So we have been sharing information with Treasury, Justice, and 

State, and other governments that can potentially act. We will, in 

about 2 months, begin to come up here and start briefing you guys 

on the dossiers that we are building on a number of these networks, and then we will go public later on in the year. 

Third, where did the wealth go? It is not millions, it is billions. 

I mean, the money just poured in. Remember, before independence 

there was a 6-year period when there was an interim administration. When that interim administration was stood up in 2006, the 

oil wealth sharing deal went into effect. 

So literally billions of dollars began to come into the coffers of a 

new administration that was administering the South Sudanese 

territory with no checks and balances. Of course most of it disappeared. None of it went into services, none of it went into infrastructure. It, as you said, somebody said in this thing, human nature. It is not surprising. It has happened all over the world. This 

is not a uniquely South Sudanese or African or any other thing. 

This is normal. If you don’t have the institutions then you don’t 

have the oversight. It is going to happen. 

So slowly, steadily, and these guys have talked about the very, 

very important parts of this peace deal that create these oversight 

mechanisms, that will begin to help. But in the meantime, and this 

goes to your point about why do you use targeted sanctions. Well, 

one has to assume that if there are no consequences for stealing 

millions, in fact billions, of dollars, it is going to continue. So if you 

apply very specifically targeted sanctions on folks that have benefited dramatically from the ill-gotten gains, the money that was 

meant for the people of South——

Ms. BASS. Like freezing the money. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Freezing that money, seizing it——

Ms. BASS. Okay. That makes sense, right. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST [continuing]. And returning it. That is the ultimate objective. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. Sure. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Return it to the people of South Sudan, at 

least some percentage of it. You could fund the entire development 

budget of South Sudan for the next decade with some of the money 

that was—some of it. So I think that is a really important, and 

that is fundamental to our theory of change. 

If you create those consequences for corruption, if you create 

those consequences for mass atrocities you begin to affect the calculations of people. That is the beginning, and I think that is our 

role as outsiders. And we can support folks on the inside, 

Augustino and Luka and all of their allies and organizations, but 

on the front lines of working on these problems at least the thing 

we could do is to make sure that when that money goes outside the 

country we can grab it——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST [continuing]. And say no, it has got to go back. 

It is not fair that people are living in houses with swimming pools 

all over the world, some small group of those people, and their kids 

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are going to the best schools around the world, and there is a famine in the country from which they came. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. That is just ultimately unacceptable. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I think we are out of time, but please. You know, you 

do want to answer? Sure. I apologize deeply. Thank you for your 

insights, counsel, any additional things you would like to provide 

to us, anything that prompted, you know, like a further answer to 

that question posed by Ms. Bass? 

Thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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