Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the d efense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES : JOANN M. PRICE EUGENE M. VELAZCO, JR. Merrillville, Indiana Indiana Department of Child Services Lake County Office Gary, Indiana ROBERT J. HENKE DCS Central Administration Indian apolis, Indiana 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent

- Child ) Relationship of R.H., minor child, and ) D.H., mother, ) ) D.H., ) ) Appellant

- Respondent, ) ) vs. ) No. 45A03

- 1107

- JT

- 339 ) INDI ANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, ) ) Appellee

- Petitioner, ) ) and ) ) LAKE COUNTY CASA, ) ) Co

- Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Mary Beth Bonaventura, Senior Judge

Cause No. 45D06

- 1009

- JT

- 174 March 8 , 2012 MEMORANDUM DECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION KIRSCH, Judge2

D.H. (“ Mo ther ”) appeal s the involuntary termination of h er parental rights to her child , R.H. Mother challenge s the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile
court ‟s judgment

. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mo ther is the biological mother of R.H., bo rn i n February 200 6

. The facts most favorable to the juvenile court‟s judgment reveal that in April 2010 , the Lake County office of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“ L CDCS”) was contacted by local law enforcement personnel because Mother had been arrested on C lass D felony neglect and Class D felony performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor charges for having engag ed in sexual acts with another unnamed woma n in the family home while
R.H. , another young child , and R.H.‟s biological father observed. 1 At the time of the ir arrest, both parents were intoxicated. 2 LCDCS assessment case worker Darice Shelby immediately investigated the matter and retrieved R.H. fr om the police station . R.H. was thereafter placed in foster

care, as neither parent was available to care for R.H. Upon his arrival in foster care, the foster parent observed multiple old marks and bruises on R.H.‟s back and buttocks. R.H. reported that he received the marks from his Mother who spanks him.

1 The parental rights of R.H.‟s biological father, Ro.H., were involuntarily terminated by the juvenile court in its June 2011 judgment. The biological father does not participate in this appeal. We therefore limit our re citation of the facts to those pertinent solely to Mother‟s appeal.

2 Mother later pleaded guilty to one count of C lass D felony neglect of a dependent . She was sentenced to one year of incarceration , with all time suspended and ordered served on probat ion. Additionally, the parties agreed that at the time of sentencing, the judgment of conviction would be entered as a class A misdemeanor.3

Mother has had significant involvement with LCDCS over the years and

n umerous substantiations for neglect with regard to her six older biological children.
T hree of Mother‟s older children were born testing positive for cocaine, one child was born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome 3 , and all the children had been adjudicated children in need of services (“ CHINS” ). By 2003, Mother‟s parental rights to all six of R.H.‟s older siblings had been involuntarily t erminated. Following a hearing in May 2010, R.H. was adjudicated a CHINS. The juvenile court proceeded to disposition the same day and entered an order (1) formally removing R.H. from Mother‟s custody and (2) making R.H. a ward of LCDCS , retroactive to A pril 16, 2010. Although the juvenile court‟s dispositional order directed Mother to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation, the court did not direct LCDCS to provide Mother with any additional referrals for services as it had on numerous pr evious occasions in volving R.H.‟s siblings. To the contrary, the juvenile court determined , pursuant to Indiana Code section 31

- 34

- 21

- 5.6 that “[r]easonable efforts to reunify [R.H

. ] with the parent . . . or to preserve the family are not required . . . .” State‟s Ex. E , at 2. ; see also I nd

. C ode § 31

- 34

- 21

- 5.6(b)(4) (p rovid ing that a court may determine at any time that reasonable efforts to reunify child with child‟s parent are not required if child is CHINS and parental rights of parent have been involuntarily termina ted with regard to adopted or biological sibling
of that child). Notwithstanding its finding that reasonable efforts were not required , the juvenile court recommend ed that Mother participate in drug and alcohol treatment, parenting classes, and random dru g screens for at least six months. The court‟s

3 T he record is unclear as to whether the child born with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome was one of the three children t hat was also born testing positive for cocaine.4

dispositional order further directed LCDCS to continue to monitor Mother‟s compliance with its previously ordered services. Mother remained incarcerated from A pril through June 30, 2010. Upon her release, Mo ther made monthly contact with LCDCS case workers to inquire about R.H.‟s
well

- being. Although LCDCS provided Mother with a list of service providers so that she could obtain reunification service s on her own, she failed to do so. In September 2010, the juvenile court authorized LCDCS to file a petition requesting the involuntary termination of Mother‟s parental rights to R.H.
A n evidentiary hearing on LCDCS‟s termination pe tition was eventually hel d in
J une 2011. D uring the termination hearing, L CDCS pr esented evidence establishing t hat Mother was living in a condemned building, was unemployed, had failed to complete any of the suggested reunification services and programs recommended by LCDCS, and remained unable to demonstrate that she could provide R. H. with a safe and stable home environment. In addition, LCDCS presented evidence showing R.H. was living and thriving in a pre

- adoptive foster home. A t the conclusion of the termination hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement. Late r the same day, the juvenile court entered its judgment terminating Mother‟s parental rights to R.H. This appeal ensued

. DISCUSSION AND DECISION When reviewing a termination of parental rights case , we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibili ty of the witnesses. In re D.D. , 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied . Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the5

juvenile court‟s uniqu e position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court‟s judgment terminating a parent

- child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S. , 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied

. Here, in terminating Mo ther ‟s parent al rights, the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions . When a juvenile court‟s judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two

- tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty

. Office of Family & Childr en , 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id

. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to suppor t them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen , 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court‟s decision, we must affirm. L.S. , 717 N.E.2d at 208

. The “ traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B. , 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied

. These parental interests, however, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child‟s interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. In addition, a lthough the right to raise one‟s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. In re K.S

. , 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)

.6

Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana , the
S tate is required to allege and prove, among other things : (B) that one (1) of the following is true: (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child‟s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parent s will not be remedied. (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the well

- being of the child.
* * * (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child

. . . . Ind. Code § 31

- 35

- 2

- 4(b)(2). The State‟s burden of proof for establishing these allegations in termination cases “is one of „clear and convincing evidence.‟” In re G.Y. , 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260

- 61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31

- 37

- 14

- 2). Moreover, if the court fin ds that the allegations in a petition described in Indiana Code section 31

- 35

- 2

- 4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent

- child relationship. Ind. Code § 31

- 35

- 2

- 8(a). Mother challenge s the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court ‟s findings as to subsection (b)(2)(B) & ( C ) of the termination statute cited above

. See Ind. Code § 31

- 35

- 2

- 4(b)(2).

I. Conditions Remedied/Threat to Well
- Being
T o properly effectuate the termination of parental rights under Indiana Code section 31

- 35

- 2

- 4(b)(2)(B) , the juvenile court need only find that one of the t hree requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. See e.g., L.S. , 717 N.E.2d at 209. Here, the juvenile court determined that the7

first two elem ents of subsection (b)(2)(B) had been established. Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, however, we shall only discuss whether L CDCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a reasonable probability the

co nditions resulting in R.H. ‟s removal or continued placement outside of Mother ‟ s care will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31

- 35

- 2

- 4(b)(2)(B)(i). When making such a determination, a juvenile court must judge a parent‟s fitness
to care for his or her chil d at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T. , 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied . The court must also “evaluate the parent‟s habitual patterns of conduct to
determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent‟s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children , 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied . The juvenile court may also consider any services offered to the parent by the county department of child serv i c es and the parent‟s response to those services, as evidence of whether conditions will be
remedied. Id. Moreover, L CDCS is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent‟s behavior will not change. In re Kay L. , 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). On appeal, Mother does not claim that any of the juvenile court‟s findings of fact were unsupported by the evidence. In addition, Mother “concedes ” that Indiana‟s8

termination statute permits a juvenile court to take into consideration a parent‟s previous involvement with the Indiana Department of Child Services when considering involuntary termination decisions. Appellant’s Br

. at 8. Nevertheless, Mother asserts that the juvenile court “abused its discretion in relying entirely on Mother‟s past to the complete exclusion of evidence establishing Mother‟s fitness to parent at the time o f the fact finding.” Id

. In terminating Mother‟s parental right s, t he juvenile court made numerous findings regarding Mother‟s “lengthy history of substance abuse,” noting Mother had given birth to “three drug[

- ]exposed children.” Appellant’s App . at e. The court also found that Mother had an “extensive” history of “neglect” of her children, involvement with LCDCS, and non

- compliance with “any case plan regarding the children.” Id. Additionally, the court noted that Mother “has at least seven [biological] children, none
of [whom] are in her care today.” Id

. W ith r egard to the circumstances surround ing R.H.‟s removal from the family home, t he juvenile court found that Mother had been observed engaging in a sex act with another woman “in front of [R.H.],” that four

- year old R.H. was found wearing a “very soiled diape r,” that Mother was intoxicated, and that immediately following his removal R.H. was observed with “marks and bruises on his body.” Id. at d. As for Mother‟s current ability to care for R.H., the juvenile court specifically found that Mother “does not ha ve stable housing and is currently living in a condemned building.” Id. In addition, although the juvenile court acknowledg ed that Mother was not offered any services through LCDCS in R.H.‟s CHINS case d ue to Mother‟s9

“extensive history,” the court furth er found that despite having been given “a list of services that [ Mother ] could seek out and complete on [her] own ,” she failed to complete “any” of these recommended services. Id. Finally, the court found, “It is unlikely that either parent will be in a position to properly parent this child. Relative placement was explored, but the relatives were not in a position to parent [R.H.] due to the number of [M]other‟s children that they had in their care and custody.” Id. Our review of the record leaves us convinced that ample evidence support s the juvenile court‟s findings cited above. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother ‟s circumstances remained largely unchanged. Although Mother appears to have maintained her sobriety for several months
as pa rt of the terms of her criminal probation, testimony from current LCDCS case manager Sheila Walker confirmed that Mother had failed to successfully participate in and/or complete a substance abuse treatment program at the time of the termination hearing , a nd that Mother‟s long

- term ability to maintain her sobriety without the threat of probation revocation and after so many years of addiction and abuse remained unknown. Moreover, Mother had failed to complete any parenting classes, was living in a condemne d building, and was unemployed. When asked whether she felt like Mother would ever be able to remedy the reasons for R.H.‟s removal, Walker answered in the negative. Walker further informed the juvenile court that Mother‟s ability to parent appeared to b e going “from bad to worse” in light of her “long history of neglect, extensive [past] d r

ug use,” and the more recent “physical abuse substantiations” involving R.H. Tr . at 50

.10

As noted above, a juvenile court must judge a parent‟s fitness to care for hi s or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the parent‟s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. D.D. , 804 N.E.2d at 266. Moreover, w here a parent‟s “pa ttern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation will not improve.” In re A.H. , 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Here, Mother has demonstrated a persistent unwill ingness and/or inability to take the actions necessary to show she is capable of provid ing R.H. with the safe , stable, and drug

- free home environment t he child needs

. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court‟s determination that there i s a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in R.H. ‟s removal from Mother will not be remedied is supported by clear and convincing evidence

. Mother ‟s unsubstantiated assertions to the contrary amount to an impermissible invitation to reweigh the evidence

. D.D. , 804 N.E.2d at 265.
II. Best Interests We next consider Mo ther‟s assertion that L CDCS failed to prove that termination of her parental rights is in R.H

. ‟s best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the juveni le court is required to look beyond the factors identified by
L CDCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty

. Office of Family & Children , 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the inter ests of the parent to those of the child. Id. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent

- child relationship. Id.11

In addition to the findings previously cited, the juvenile court made several additional pertinent findings relating to R.H. ‟s best interests , including the following : There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the well

- being of the child . . . for the reasons stated above. Addit ionally, the child deserves a loving, caring, stable and safe adoptive home. It is in the best interests of the child and his health, welfare, and future that the parent

- child relationship . . . be forever fully and absolutely terminated. Appellant’s App . at e. These findings, too, are supported by the evidence. In recommending termination of Mo ther‟s parental rights as being in R.H.‟s best
interests , Walker testified that “[R.H.] is in need of a permanent, loving, nurturing home in which all his needs w ill be met, and I don‟t feel that [Mother] . . . [is] able to provide that for him.” Tr. p. 56. Walker further testified that R.H. was “bonding” with his current pre

- adoptive foster family , “gets a lot of love and attention” from his foster mother, and is “doing real [sic] good.” Id. at 59. Similarly, R.H.‟s foster mother testified that R.H. presents as a “happy little boy,” that he is “always smiling,” and that he is

“ d oing really well” at school. Id. at 69. The foster mother also confirmed that R.H . was receiving treatment for his ADHD, anger issues, and impulse control issues. Based on the totality of the evidence, including Mother‟s un treated substance abuse issues, significant history of neglectful conduct toward all her children resulting in the involuntary termination of her parental rights to all seven children , and her continuing
i nability to provide R.H

. with a safe and stable home environment, coupled with the testimony from Walker recommending termination of the parent

- child relationship , we12

conclude that there is ample evidence to support the juvenile court‟s determination that
termination of Mother‟s parental rights is in R.H .‟s best interests. This court will reverse a termination of parental rights „“only upon a showing of “clear e rror”

– that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.‟” Matter of A.N.J. , 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ( quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty

. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare , 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). We fin d no such error here. Affirmed. BARNES, J., and BRADFO RD, J., concur.