Filed 3/20/23 P. v. Morales CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PEDRO ACEVEDO

MORALES,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B318720

(Super. Ct. No. 2018033565)

(Ventura County)

Pedro Acevedo Morales1 appeals from the judgment after 

the jury convicted him of four counts of forcible lewd acts upon a 

child under the age of 14 pursuant to Penal Code2 section 288, 

subdivision (b)(1) (counts 1-4) and four counts of lewd acts upon a 

1 There is a discrepancy in the record on whether 

appellant’s legal name is Pedro Acevedo Morales or Pedro 

Morales Acevedo. For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer 

to appellant as Acevedo.

2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal 

Code. 
2

child pursuant to section 288, subdivision (a) (counts 5-8). All 

acts were alleged against L.H. The trial court sentenced Acevedo 

to 20 years in state prison. 

Acevedo contends (1) there was insufficient evidence the 

offenses occurred between June 1, 2012 and September 30, 2012

and that L.H. was under the age of 14 at the time of the acts; (2) 

the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument; 

(3) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing expert 

testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome

(CSAAS); and (4) the court erred in admitting evidence of L.H.’s 

partial disclosure to her high school friend. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Prosecution evidence

L.H. was born in November 1999. In the summer of 2012, 

she was in junior high and lived in a house in Oxnard with her 

parents and brothers. Acevedo and his uncle lived with L.H. and 

her family during the summer of 2012. L.H. was on break from 

school and was often at home alone with Acevedo and her siblings

while her parents were at work. 

At the beginning of the summer, Acevedo and L.H. had 

“pretty normal” interactions, but he soon began winking and 

smirking at her and making uncomfortable comments. He would 

also caress her back while talking to her. During the rest of the

summer, Acevedo sexually molested L.H. on at least eight of the 

following instances:

1. Count 1

One evening, L.H. left her room to get water from the 

kitchen. Acevedo grabbed L.H. from behind and “forcibly 

press[ed] his penis” against her back. He fondled her breasts and 

kissed her neck and ear. He led her towards the couch, laid on 

top of her, lifted her shirt, and touched and kissed her breasts, 
3

neck, face, and stomach. He unzipped her pants and touched her 

vagina over her underwear. L.H. told him to stop, but he did not 

stop. The incident lasted about ten minutes. She was scared. 

When it was over, he told her not to tell her parents and that her 

parents would not believe her. 

2. Count 2

L.H. recalled an incident when Acevedo was sitting at the 

dinner table when she walked past him. He said to her: “Hey, 

come over here,” but she tried to walk away. He grabbed her by 

the arm, pulled her close to him, and put her in between his legs 

while he remained seated in his chair. He caressed her back and 

butt, grabbed her waist, and made her sit on his lap facing away 

from him so that her “butt was on his penis.” He then caressed 

her thighs and legs, kissed her neck and ears, and touched her 

over and under her shirt. 

3. Count 3

L.H. testified there were three instances when Acevedo 

“corner[ed]” her and kissed her body. He pushed her to the 

corner of the living room near the bookshelves, kissed her neck, 

and touched her vagina over her pants with one hand. He held 

her with his other hand. 

4. Count 4

L.H. said there were several instances when she sat next to 

Acevedo on the living room couch, and he touched her thighs and 

caressed them. L.H. said some instances occurred in August 

when her junior high school was back in session, and she recalled 

being in her school uniform when he touched her. On some 

occasions, he would grab her hand and make her touch his penis 

over his pants. He would “lead [her] hand to touch” his penis 

until he had an erection. The touching would be “on and off,”

lasting around 30 minutes.
4

5. Count 5

L.H. testified that one day, Acevedo grabbed her by the 

hands and held them behind her back. He then kissed her on her 

face and neck and touched her vagina over her pants. 

6. Count 6

L.H. recalled an instance when she was cleaning the living 

room and Acevedo approached her from behind and “grind[ed] 

himself” on top of her. He rubbed his penis on top of her back, 

and she felt him getting an erection. He grabbed her with his 

arms and hugged her as he did this. The incident lasted “a 

couple of minutes.” 

7. Count 7

L.H. said there were several occasions when Acevedo

touched her breasts while she sat on the couch. He touched her 

both over and under her clothing. 

8. Count 8

L.H. testified there were multiple occasions where Acevedo 

“smack[ed] [her] butt.” She said he would “sneak up” on her 

when there was no one else in the room. 

L.H. disclosures and investigation

L.H. said Acevedo threatened her to dissuade her from 

reporting these acts of molestation. He told her that nobody 

would believe her because she was “a little girl and was not even 

a woman” and that he would hurt her family. He also told her if 

she ever told her parents, he would “report them to the police and 

deport them.” L.H. did not tell her parents what happened 

during the summer. She said she did not report to the police 

earlier because she “still feel[s] like it was [her] fault” and 

because she did not think people would believe her. She also said 

it “hurt [her] to talk about it” and at that time she “couldn’t live 

with the fact that somebody would get punished.” 
5

While in high school, L.H. told her friend, K.R., about some 

of the molestation that occurred in summer 2012. L.H. testified 

she told K.R. that a man who used to live with her family “would 

touch [her] inappropriately” and looked at her in a “strange way.”

She did not go into detail. 

K.R. testified L.H. told her the man who rented a room in 

her family’s house made her feel “very uncomfortable in the way 

that he would look at her” and by “some things that he would say

to her.” K.R. said “when [L.H.] told me that, she started crying, 

so I don’t think she finished telling me everything.”

L.H. graduated high school in summer 2017 and left for 

college in August 2017. Acevedo contacted L.H. through 

Facebook Messenger during her senior year in high school. They 

continued communications “off and on” through her college years. 

L.H. said she communicated with Acevedo because she was 

scared he would talk to her parents and because she thought he 

cared about her. At the time, L.H. “felt like [she] was the 

problem” and blamed herself for seducing or provoking him. 

In 2018, L.H. reported Acevedo to the Oxnard Police 

Department. L.H. testified she decided to do so because she was 

feeling conflicted, was taking classes about child development, 

and was scared he might abuse other young girls or his own 

daughter. 

Before L.H. went to college, she became a recipient of the 

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which 

protected her from deportation. DACA was rescinded in 

September 2017, and in January 2018, a Northern District of 

California federal court issued a stay of the rescission. When 

L.H. reported Acevedo to the police, she applied for a U-Visa, 

which provides immigration relief for undocumented persons who 

suffered substantial physical or mental abuse due to being a
6

victim of certain crimes in the United States.3 She asked the 

investigating police officer for assistance with her U-Visa 

application, and applied based on the allegations she made 

against Acevedo. 

L.H. agreed to help law enforcement by making a pretext 

call to Acevedo. During the call, Acevedo made several 

incriminating statements, including that he was afraid his wife 

would hate him if she found out what he did to L.H. and that 

“what happened wasn’t right” because she was “still a little girl.” 

Nor did Acevedo deny L.H.’s references to the specific sex acts he 

committed against her when she was a child. 

CSAAS expert

Clinical psychologist Dr. Anthony Urquiza testified as an 

expert in child sexual abuse. He did not know the parties or the 

facts of the case. He testified about CSAAS, children’s common 

responses to sexual abuse, and the misperceptions or myths 

about child abuse. He testified that most children of abuse are 

sexually abused by someone with whom they have an ongoing 

relationship and there is a power imbalance between the 

perpetrator and the victim. 

Dr. Urquiza testified there are five stages of CSAAS: (1) 

secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) 

delayed and unconvincing disclosure, and (5) retraction and 

recantation. With respect to the “secrecy” stage, Dr. Urquiza 

explained that children often keep quiet about sexual abuse 

because they are threatened or intimidated by their perpetrator. 

At times, the perpetrator gives special attention to the victim in 

exchange for a close relationship, and the victim “get[s] stuck into 

this double life where they may like or . . . love the person who’s 

3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101, subd. (a)(15)(U).) 
7

abusing them, but they don’t want a bad thing to happen to that 

person.” With respect to the “delayed and unconvincing 

disclosure” stage, Dr. Urquiza testified delay is “a very common 

response to being sexually abused” and “one of the more common 

characteristics . . . is that it may take months or years for them to 

disclose from the very, very first time it happens to the first time 

they’re able to tell anybody about what happened.” He also 

testified the first disclosure “may not be a fully articulated, clear, 

comprehensive description of what happened,” and if a child had

been abused several times, a child’s ability to describe certain 

details or recite events in chronological order would be difficult. 

Verdict and sentencing

The jury found Acevedo guilty of all eight counts of lewd 

acts (§ 288, subds. (a) & (b)(1)) and found the special allegation of 

substantial sexual conduct (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)) on count 4 

true. Acevedo was sentenced to 20 years in state prison

(consecutive 5 years for each counts 1-4 and concurrent 3 years 

for each counts 5-8).

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of evidence

Acevedo argues the evidence was insufficient to establish 

the offenses occurred between June 1, 2012, and September 30, 

2012 (summer 2012). He points to evidence showing the 

discrepancy in L.H.’s age. The Attorney General argues the date 

of offense is immaterial because it was not an element of the 

crime, nor did the defense raise an alibi or statute of limitations 

defense where the date of the offense was relevant. We agree 

with the Attorney General.

“The precise time at which the offense was committed need 

not be stated in the accusatory pleading, but it may be alleged to 

have been committed at any time before the finding or filing 
8

thereof, except where the time is a material ingredient in the 

offense.” (§ 955.) “ ‘The law is clear that, when it is charged that 

an offense was committed “on or about” a named date, the exact 

date need not be proved unless the time “is a material ingredient 

in the offense” [citation], and the evidence is not insufficient 

merely because it shows that the offense was committed on 

another date.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (2016) 247 

Cal.App.4th 1013, 1022.) 

People v. Peyton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 642 is instructive.

There, the defendant argued there was insufficient evidence he

sexually abused the victim as charged because the information 

alleged each offense occurred “ ‘on or about October 1, 2005.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 660.) The evidence at trial, however, showed the crimes 

occurred in the fall of 2004 when the defendant was living with 

the victim, and the evidence “clearly showed” the defendant had 

moved out of the victim’s home before October 2005. (Ibid.) The 

Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s claim, reasoning the 

October 2005 date was “not material to any of the charged 

offenses. Nor has defendant shown he was prejudiced by the 

variance between the October 1, 2005 date” as set forth in the 

information and the evidence at trial that the offenses occurred a 

year earlier. (Id. at pp. 660-661.) The prosecution was not 

required to show the crimes took place on or about October 2005, 

“but only ‘reasonably close to [that day].’ ” (Id. at p. 660.)

Whether the offenses occurred in the summer of 2012 or 

2013 was not a “material ingredient” in the alleged offenses.

(§ 955). Nor has Acevedo shown how the discrepancy of the date 

range prejudiced him. In any event, substantial evidence 

supports a finding the offenses occurred in the summer of 2012. 

In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of evidence, we determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty 
9

beyond a reasonable doubt. We view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party and presume in support of 

the judgment every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from 

the evidence. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314 (Jones).) 

The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a 

conviction. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296.) 

L.H. testified the offenses occurred during the summer of 

2012 when Acevedo was living with her family. Moreover, she

testified he lived with her family through the “early semester [of]

junior high,” and one incident occurred after she had returned to 

junior high school from summer break. Since L.H. entered high 

school after the summer of 2013, her testimony that the abuse 

continued through the early semester of junior high school was 

consistent with the offenses occurring between June and

September 2012. 

In arguing there was insufficient evidence, Acevedo points 

to conflicting evidence: L.H. testified several times that she was 

13 years old at the time of the offenses; that she was 13 years old

throughout the investigation; and that her youngest brother was 

“small” at the time of the offenses, even though he was born in 

October 2013. Acevedo also points to the prosecution attempting

to amend the information after the close of evidence to reflect 

that the offense occurred a year later (between June 1, 2013 and 

September 30, 2013). Despite these discrepancies, our review on 

appeal is substantial evidence, which requires us to construe the 

evidence in a light favorable to the prevailing party—not the 

other way around. (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314.) That some 

evidence could have supported a contrary finding does not 

warrant reversal. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.) 

Moreover, the jury was aware of the discrepancies between 

the alleged dates of the offenses and the testimony regarding 
10

L.H.’s age. The jury was instructed that it “must decide what the 

facts are” and that it alone must “decide what the facts are . . . 

based only on the evidence that has been presented to you.” The 

court also instructed that the prosecution must prove the crimes 

“happened within the timeframe given of June 1, 2012 through 

September 30, 2012.” We presume the jury followed the 

instructions. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30

(Chhoun).) It is the “exclusive province” of the jury to determine 

“the truth or falsity of the facts” upon which its determination 

depends. (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “Thus, if the verdict 

is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due 

deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of 

a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.” (Ibid.) We 

conclude the evidence was sufficient to prove the offenses 

occurred between June and September of 2012. 

Acevedo also contends his convictions must be reversed 

because there was insufficient evidence L.H. was younger than 

14 years old at the time the offenses occurred. This contention 

lacks merit. The offenses occurred in the summer of 2012 when 

L.H. was in junior high school and under the age of 14. L.H.’s 

mother also testified the family lived in the Oxnard house, where 

the abuse occurred, from 2011 to 2013. L.H. would have turned 

14 in November of 2013. And although there was some 

conflicting testimony regarding L.H.’s exact age at the time of the 

acts, L.H. consistently maintained she was younger than 14 years 

old (i.e., she testified she was 13 years old at the time of the 

offenses). There is substantial evidence L.H. was under the age 

of 14 when Acevedo molested her. 

Prosecutor’s statements during closing argument

During closing argument, the prosecutor made the 

following statements to the jury: “When you talk about 
11

reasonable doubt, you have to have an abiding conviction that the 

charge is true, right. So when you go in the back, you deliberate, 

you fill out your form, you go on your way for the holidays, can 

you go to sleep at night that it was right?” 

Acevedo argues the statements amounted to prosecutorial 

misconduct which could not be remedied by a curative 

instruction. The Attorney General contends Acevedo forfeited his 

claim because he did not object at trial. We agree the claim is 

forfeited. (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 171.) “ ‘To 

preserve such a claim for appeal, “a criminal defendant must 

make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to 

admonish the jury to disregard impropriety.” ’ [Citation.] The 

lack of a timely objection and request for admonition will be 

excused only if either would have been futile or if an admonition 

would not have cured the harm.” (Ibid.) We agree with the 

Attorney General that Acevedo should have timely objected and 

requested a curative instruction. 

But even if he had objected, Acevedo’s contention lacks 

merit. The jury was properly instructed that its verdict must be 

based on the evidence, the prosecution must prove Acevedo’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt 

meant “proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the 

charge is true.” The court also instructed that if an attorney’s 

comments on the law conflict with the court’s instructions, then 

the jury must follow the court’s instructions. We presume the 

jury followed the instructions. (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 

30.) 

Expert testimony 

Acevedo argues the trial court abused its discretion when it 

allowed expert testimony on CSAAS because such testimony was 

unnecessary as “there were straightforward explanations for why 
12

[L.H.] did not report the abuse at or near the time that it 

occurred.” He asserts the delay in reporting was “easily 

understood and explained by [L.H.]’s testimony that defendant 

threatened to have her parents deported if she reported the 

abuse.” 

Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (a) permits expert 

opinion related “to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common 

experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of 

fact.” A “ ‘jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter 

of the opinion in order to justify its admission.’ ” (People v.

McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299 (McAlpin).) Expert opinion 

testimony is properly excluded only when it “ ‘add[s] nothing at 

all to the jury’s common fund of information, i.e., when “the 

subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that 

[persons] of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as 

intelligently as the witness.” ’ [Citation.]” We review a trial 

court’s admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. 

(Ibid.)

Expert testimony on CSAAS may be admissible to dispel 

misconceptions about child sexual abuse and to explain common 

stress reactions of child victims, including a child’s failure or 

delay in reporting abuse. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300-

1301; People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468 (Munch).) 

The expert testimony is not admissible to prove a child has in fact 

been sexually abused, but it “is admissible to rehabilitate such 

witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s 

conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is 

inconsistent with [their] testimony claiming molestation.” 

(McAlpin, supra, at p. 1300.) 

There was no abuse of discretion here. The CSAAS 

evidence was properly admitted to assist the jury to understand 
13

L.H.’s behaviors and reaction to the abuse, including her delay in 

reporting. L.H. testified there were multiple reasons she did not 

disclose the abuse at an earlier time. She testified Acevedo 

threatened to deport her parents, but in addition, she said she 

blamed herself, she thought no one would believe her, it hurt to 

talk about the abuse, and she “couldn’t live with the fact that 

somebody would get punished.” L.H. also testified that she 

continued to communicate with Acevedo while she was in college 

because she was scared he would tell her parents and she 

thought he cared about her. The CSAAS evidence was relevant 

to explain that a child abuse victim often fails to disclose or 

delays disclosure for a variety of reasons, such as feeling 

threatened or intimated by their perpetrator, or feeling conflicted 

because “they don’t want a bad thing to happen to that person.” 

Acevedo also argues the admission of CSAAS testimony 

was cumulative, would confuse the jury, and was unduly 

prejudicial pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. His argument 

lacks merit. 

A court may exclude evidence if its “probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 

will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or 

of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) The probative value 

of Dr. Urquiza’s testimony outweighed any prejudice. The 

testimony was probative to explain reasons for L.H.’s delayed 

disclosure. It was especially relevant because of the defense’s 

argument that the timing of L.H.’s reporting, over five years after 

the abuse occurred, was suspicious given her precarious 

immigration status and efforts to obtain a U-Visa. 

Dr. Urquiza’s testimony was not unduly prejudicial because 

he limited his testimony to general CSAAS and child sexual 
14

abuse concepts without reference to any specific allegations in 

this case. He also testified that he did not know the parties or 

the facts of this case. (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 475.) 

Moreover, the trial court instructed the jurors that the CSAAS 

testimony was “ ‘not evidence in any way that the defendant 

committed any of the crimes charged against him’ ” and that the 

limited purpose of the evidence was to assist the jury “in deciding 

whether or not an alleged victim’s conduct was not inconsistent 

with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in 

evaluating the believability of her testimony.” We presume the 

jury followed the instructions. (Ibid.; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at p. 30.)

Evidence of L.H.’s disclosure to K.R.

Acevedo contends the trial court erred when it admitted 

K.R.’s testimony regarding L.H.’s disclosure under the “fresh 

complaint” doctrine. There was no error. 

Under the fresh complaint doctrine, “proof of an 

extrajudicial complaint, made by the victim of a sexual offense,

disclosing the alleged assault, may be admissible for a limited, 

nonhearsay purpose—namely, to establish the fact of, and the 

circumstances surrounding, the victim’s disclosure of the assault 

to others—whenever the fact that the disclosure was made and 

the circumstances under which it was made are relevant to the 

trier of fact’s determination as to whether the offense occurred.”

(People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 749-750 (Brown).) 

“Evidence admitted pursuant to this doctrine may be considered 

by the trier of fact for the purpose of corroborating the victim’s 

testimony, but not to prove the occurrence of the crime. (People v. 

Ramirez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522.) We review for 

abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 

724.) 
15

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

K.R.’s testimony under the fresh complaint doctrine. “[W]hen the 

victim of an alleged sexual offense did not make a prompt 

complaint but instead disclosed the alleged incident only some 

time later, evidence of the fact and circumstances surrounding 

the delayed complaint also may be relevant to the jury’s 

evaluation of the likelihood that the offense did or did not occur.” 

(Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 761.) Here, the fact that L.H.

made a partial disclosure to K.R. was relevant because it

corroborated L.H.’s testimony and refuted the defense’s argument 

that she lied about the abuse to secure her immigration status. 

Acevedo argues K.R.’s testimony should have been excluded

because L.H.’s disclosure “do[es] not allege a sexual assault, they 

were not made near in time to the alleged assaults, nor do they 

identify defendant.” We are not persuaded. L.H. testified she 

told K.R. that a man who used to live with her family “would 

touch [her] inappropriately.” The fact that L.H. did not specify 

the sexual assault or defendant’s identity does not render the 

statement inadmissible. The limited purpose of such evidence

under the fresh complaint doctrine is to establish the fact of, and 

the circumstances surrounding, the victim’s disclosure to another 

person, and not to prove the alleged sexual act occurred. (Brown, 

supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 749-750.) Thus, it is the fact that L.H. 

disclosed to her friend and not the specificity of her disclosure 

that is relevant. 

And contrary to Acevedo’s argument, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in not excluding K.R.’s testimony pursuant to 

Evidence Code section 352. This evidence was relevant to L.H.’s 

credibility, which was challenged by the defense’s argument that 

she reported for the purpose of obtaining her U-Visa. The 

evidence was also probative to explain the delay in disclosing to 
16

law enforcement. The risk of undue prejudice or misleading the 

jury was minimal because K.R.’s statements were brief and did 

not describe any sexual abuse in detail. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Law Offices of Scott H. Bentley and Scott H. Bentley for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Theresa A. Patterson, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.