### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 10, 200 7 S es sio n
SELM A P. GRIFFIN

v. MUNFORD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND 

### CH ARLES WA LKER

An Appeal f

rom the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 6075 Joe H. Walker, Judge

No. W2007-00812-C OA-R3-C V - F iled March 6, 2008

This case involves the statute of re p o s e fo r ac t i o ns based on improve ments to real pr operty . The defe ndant deve loper purc hased a nd develope d a lot for sa le as pa rt of a residential deve lopment. The plaintiff purc hased the lot by war ranty deed. The de veloper repr esente d to the plaintiff that the lot
was s u i t ab l e for the c onstruction of a r esidential dwe lling. Relying on this re prese ntation, the pla int if f p ur c ha se d th e lot

and bu ilt a ho us e on

it. Tw o y e ars a ft e r t

he purc ha se , th e ho us e be g an to de ve lop c ra cks in the fo un datio n a nd e xter ior wa lls . O ve r t

he ne xt two y e ars , th e pr ob le ms worsene d, so the plaintiff obtained a n evaluation by profe ssional eng ineer s. The eng ineer s informed the pla int if

f that th e ho us e ’s str

uc tur a l pr ob le ms m ay

have ari se n b e c a

us e the so il o n w hic h th e ho us e was b u i l t wa s unsuitable to support such construc tion. The plaintiff then sued the development company and its president, c laiming f raudule nt misreprese ntation, brea ch of implied wa rra nty , and brea ch of e x press wa

rra nty . The de fenda

nts move d for summary

judgme nt, assertingthat the foury ear statute of re pose on cla ims invol ving improve ments to real pr operty barr ed the plaintiff’s action. The plaintiff a

rgued that the statute of repose was not applicable beca use her claims wer e base d on mi s r e p r e s e n tati o n

. T h e tr ia l c o urt gr an te d th e d e f e n d an ts ’ mo ti o n , and the p la inti f f a p p e a ls

. We aff ir m , fi nding that the plaintiff fa iled to introduce e vidence that any of the de fenda

nts had knowledg e that the soil conditions w ere unsuitable to support a re sidential dwelling at the time the alleg ed misrepr esentations were ma de. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P

. J. W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER ., J ., joined.
J. Th oma s Ca ldw e ll, Rip le y Te nn e sse e , f

or the a pp e lla nt, Se lma P. G ri ff in
Pam Warnock Gre en, Memphis, Tennessee, f or the a ppellees, Munf

ord De velopment Company and Charles Walker-2- OP IN ION
Def endant/Appe llee Munford Deve lopment Company (“Munf ord De velopment”) eng ag es i n t h e p urcha se of r eal e state that is then deve loped by others for

residential a

nd/or commerc ial purposes. De fenda

nt/Appellee Char les Walker (“ Walker”) is th e p r e s id e nt o f M u n f o r d D e v elopment
and ha s se rv e d in

thi s c a pa c ity sin c e 19 74

. Wal ke r and Munf or d De ve lop me nt w ill be re fe rr e d to collectively

as the “ Def

endants.”

M un f o r d D e v e lo p me n t o w n e d

a tr a c t o f la n d in A to k a , T ip to nCo un ty , T e n n e s s e e , w h ich included a g roup of lots called Blaydes Est ates. L ot 414 was one of the lots located in this gr oup. Af te r M un fo rd

De ve lop me nt p ur c ha se d th e tr a c t, it app are ntl y e ng a g e d Charl e s Walk e r E nte rp ri se s, Wal k e r ’ s s o le p r o p r ie to r s h ip , to c le ar , g r a d e , an d f il l L o t 4 1 4 in p r e p ar a ti o n f o r s a le

. O nJ une 5, 2001, Munford D ev el o p m ent s old L ot 414 to Pl aintiff/Appellant Selma Gr iffin (“ Griff in”) for a purcha se price of $15,000. At some point after

she purcha sed the lot, Griffin e ntere d into a verba l ag ree ment with her daug hter-in- law’s f

ather , W.C . Mabry , to construct a house on L ot 414. Mabry built the home for Gr if fi n, a t a tot a l c os t of

a pp ro ximate ly

$1 60 ,0 00 . G ri ff

in m ov e d into th e ho me soon a ft e r i ts construction. On appr ox imately

J une 1, 2003, Gr iffin beg an to observe cra cks and de fec ts in the fo un datio n, wa lls , an d flo or s of the ho us e

. Th e c ra c ks g ra du a lly be c ame wo rs e , s o in 20 05 , G ri ff

in contac ted Dexter Va

rnell (“ Var

nell”), a licensed e ng ineer . On April 5, 2005, Var nell perf ormed a structura l inspection of the house. H e obser ved seve ral c rac ks in the house’s foundation, as well as
c ra c ks in t

he wa lls and

bin din g do or s in sid e the ho us e

. Af te r he c omp le te d his i ns pe c tio n, Va rn e ll told Griffin that t he crac ks were likely cause d by

“poor soil conditions” ar ound Griff in’s house. He
rec ommended that Gr iffin have soil bori n gs perf ormed, in orde r to deter

mine the ca

use of the ho us e ’s str

uc tur a l pr ob le ms.
Griff in took Var

nell’s advice and hired Ashraf Elsay ad (“Elsay ad”) , the chief eng ineer for
ane n g i n e e r i n g c o mp an y

w i tho f f i c e s i nM e mp h i s an d N a s h v i l l e , t o d o t e s tb o r i n g s o nth e s o i l

. In J uly 2005, Elsay ad per formed f our boring s around the pe rimeter of t h e h o u s e and ga ve Gr iffin a
re po rt of his fi nd ing s. El say a d’ s r e po rt sa id t hat thre e of

the fo ur bo ri ng s in dic a te d s uit a

ble so il conditions. The fourth bor ing, how ever , indicated “ soft to marg inal soil conditions.”

On Oc tob e r 3 , 2 00 5, Gr if

fi n f ile d th is l aws uit

a g a ins t Wa lke r a

nd Munf or d D e ve lop me nt i n the Circuit Court of Tipton County

. I n her c omplaint, Griffin alleg ed that she pur chase d the lot from the Def endants by

a wa rra nty deed that repre sented that t h e l o t was fr ee of defe cts, liens, and encumbr ance s. She asser ted that the Def

endants made written and verba l statements t o her indicating that L ot 414 was suitable fo r co n s t ru ct ion of a re sidential dwelling , but that the De fe nd ants , in

pr e pa ri ngL ot 4 14 fo r s a le , c on c e a le d th e de fe c tiv e c on dit ion of the so il on

the lot

. Gri f f in a ll e g e d th a t s h e p ur c h a s e d th e lo t in r e li an c e o n th e D e f e n d an ts ’ s tate me n ts and without knowledg e of the defe ctive condition of the s o i l . I n light of the house’s struc tural problems a sT en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated § 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 2 st ates: 1

Al l a ct i on s t o r ec ov er damag es f or a n y de f

i ci en cy i n t h e des i g n , pl an n i n g , s u per v i s i on , obs er v at i on of
con s t r u ct i on , or c on s t r u ct i on of a n i mpr ov eme n t t o real pr oper t y , f or i n j u r y t o pr oper t y , r ea l or p ers o nal , ari si ng o ut o f any s uch d ef

i ci ency, or f

o r i njury t o t he p ers o n or f o r wr o ngf

ul de at h ari si ng o ut of any such d ef

i ci ency, shal l b e b rought agai nst any p ers o n pe rf o rming o r f

urni shi ng t he d esi gn, pl ann i ng , s uper vi s i on, o bse r vat i on o f co ns t r uct i on o f

, o r l and su r vey i ng i n conne ct i on wi t h, s uch an im p ro v e m e n t with in fo u r (4 ) ye a rs a fter su b sta n tial c o m p le tio n o f suc h a n im p ro v e m e n t.

T

. C

. A

. § 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 2 (20 0 0 ).

T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated § 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 5 st ates: 2

T he l i m i t at i o n hereby pro vi d ed s hal l not b e avai l ab l e as a def ense t o any pe rs o n w ho s ha l l have been gui l t y of f r aud i n pe r f

or mi n g or f

u r n i s hi ng the de s i g n , pl an n i n g , s u per v i s i on , obs er v at i on of
co nst ruct i o n, co nst ruct i o n of, or l and s urvey i ng, i n co nnect i o n wi t h s uch an i m p rovem ent , or t o any p ers o n who s hal l wrongf ul l y co nceal any such caus e o f act i o n.

T

. C

. A

. § 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 5 (b) (20 0 0 ) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ).
-3- identified by

Var nell and Elsayad, Gr iffin asser t ed that the Defe ndants’ stateme nts were willful misrepre sentations. In the alter native, Gr iffin alleg ed that the Def endants had bre ache d an implied
war ranty that L ot 414 was suitable for the purposes for which it was purcha sed, i.e. , the construc tion of a r esidential dwelling. Also in the alternative, Griffin asser ted t hat t he Defenda

nts breac hed an express warr anty

to the same e ffe ct. She soug ht damag es, “a ctual and punitive,” in the amount of $300,000.
Munford De velopment an d W al ker f iled an answ er to Gr iffin’s complaint, in which they admitted repr esentingto Griffin that the soil on L ot 414 was suit able for construction of a r esidential dwelling . Among the def enses that they

asser ted was that Griffin’s c laim was time-bar red. A fter a brief per iod of discover y , the Def

endants filed a

motion for summary

judgme nt, a statement of undisputed fac ts, and a memora ndum in support of their motion. In their statement of undisputed fac ts, the Defe ndants noted that Munford D evelopment sold L ot 414 to Griffin on June 5, 2001; that Gr if fi n b e g an s e e ingc ra c ks and oth e r d e fe c ts i n th e wa lls , f loo rs , a nd fo un datio n o f her hous e in 2003; and that Grif

fi n’s complaint was not filed until Octobe r 3, 2005. In light of the se fa cts, the Def endants a rgued that the f

our-year statute of re pose, set for

th in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28- 3-202, bar

red G riffin’s a ction. 1

In Griff in’s respons e to the De fenda nts’ motion for summary judgme nt, she argued that beca use the De fenda

nts had en gage d i n fra

ud, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 28-3- 205 prec luded them from re ly ing on se ction 28-3-202. In support of her response to the Def

endants’ motion, she 2 filed her own af fidavit, as we ll as letters and repor ts from Varnell and Elsay ad, in which they opined that th e so il o n L ot 41 4 wa s un su ita ble fo r c on str

uc tio n of a re sid e nti a l dw e lli ng

. In h e r a ff ida vit , Griff in stated that an a g ent of the D efe ndants led her to believe that the soil was suitable for building purp os e s, and

tha t sh e purc ha se d L ot 4 14 ba se d o n it s a pp e ara nc e and the De fe nd ants ’-4-

mis re pr e se ntatio ns . G ri ff in f ile d no oth e r a ff

ida vit s o r e vid e nc e in r e sp on se to t he De fe nd ants ’ motion.

I n reply to Griff

in ’ s r e s p o n s e to th e ir

s u mm a r y ju d g me n t m o ti o n , th e D e f e n d an ts f ile d a supplement to their statement of undisputed fac ts, a supplement to the memorandum in suppor t of their motion, an aff

idavit from Def

endant Walker, and an af fidavit from De wey

Rice (“ Rice”) , an employ ee of Charles Walker Enterpr ises who was pr esent duringthe clea ring , g rading , and filling of L ot 414. I n his own aff idavit, Defe ndant Walker ack n o wl edg ed that his sole proprie torship, Charles Walker E nterprise s, perf ormed the clea

ring , g rading , and fill ing of L ot 414, and asse rted that he had no knowledg e of unsuitable soil conditi ons. Rice’s af fidavit stated that he w as an e mploy ee of Charle s Walker Enterpr ises, and that he w as pre sent duringthe clea ring , g rading , and filling of L ot 414. L ike Walker, Rice a sserted that he had no knowle dg e of unsuitable soil conditions.

In th e ir su pp le me nta l memo ra

nd um, the De fe nd ants argue d that G ri ff in h a d s e t f

or th n o f a c ts ind ic a tin g th a t e ith e r M un fo rd De ve lop me nt o r Wa lke r h a d a ny kn ow le dg e of

un su ita ble so il conditions. They

argued t h at Gr i ff

i n would there fore be unable to show an esse ntial element of fra ud: the Def

endants’ know ledg e that the soil wa s u n s u i t ab le for c onstruction of a r esidential dwelling . Acc ording ly , the Def endants a rgued, Gr iffin would not be able to establish the exception to the four- y ear

statute of re pose for

defe ndants who have eng ag ed in fra ud.

In an orde r date d Marc h 19, 2007, the trial cour t gr anted the D efe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt. The trial cour

t found that L ot 414 was cle are d, g rade d, and fill ed in prepa ration for sale,
and that su c h p re pa

ratio n c on sti tut e d a

n “ imp ro ve me nt

t o r e a l p r o p e r

t y , ” makin g the fo ur -ye ar s tatut e of re po s e in s e c ti o n 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 2 a p p li c a b le to G r if

f in ’ s c a u s e o f a c ti o n

. T h e tr ia l c o urt noted that Griff in purcha sed L ot 414 on J une 5, 2001, an d fi l ed her lawsuit more than f

our y ear s later, on October 3, 2005. The trial c ourt also noted that sec tion 28 -3 -2 0 5 prec ludes a de fenda nt from
asser ting the r epose pe riod as a de fense if the defe ndant is guilty of fr aud, but found that Gr iffin had fa ile d to subm it ev ide nc e that th e De fe nd ants kn ow ing ly c on c e a le d in fo rm a tio n a

bo ut t he pr ob le ms with L ot 4 1 4 ’s soil. The trial court ther efor e re asoned that Griffin fa iled to establish an essential element of

her fraud claim. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t found that section 28-3- 202 barr ed Gr iffin’s
a c tio n. Gr if

fi n no w a pp e a ls the tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he De fe nd ants

. On appe al, Griff

in argues that the trial cour t erre d in finding that her c laim was bar red by the four- y ear statute of re pose.
A motion for summary

judgme nt should be g rante d if “the ple ading s, depositions, answers to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, t og ether with the aff

idavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and that the m oving party is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absenc e of a g enuine issue as to a

ny materia l fac t. McCarley v . West Quality Food Serv. , 960 S.W .2d 585, 5 8 8 (T en n

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g By rd v . Ha ll , 8 47 S.W. 2d 20 8, 21 4 (T e nn . 199 3) ). Th e mov ingpa rt y mus t
a lso “ e ith e r a ff

ir mativ e ly ne g a te an e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t he no n- mov ant’ s c la im o r concl us iv ely establish an af

firmative de fense .” Id. (c i t i n g By rd, 8 47 S.W. 2d a t 21 5 n .5 )) . I f t

he mov ingpa

rt yIn t he case a t b ar, M unf o rd D evel o p m ent so l d the l o t in q uest i o n to p l ai nt i f f G ri f f i n i n 20 0 1 , af

t er M unf o rd 3
D ev elo p m en t ha d b ee n sue d b y plainti f f W atkins.
-5- ne g a te s a n e sse nti a l e le me nt of the c la im o r e sta bli sh e s an a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e , th e no n- mov ingpa rt y must, to avoid losi ng on summary judgme nt, submit evidenc e sufficie nt to “esta blish the e x istence of the e ssential elements of the claim.” Id.

At the out set, we a ddress whe ther the r epose pe riod found in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 28-3-202 a

pplies in this ca s e. I n her c omplaint, Griffin see ks monetary damag es for

injuries alleg edly cause d by

the soil on which the house wa s built. The condition of the soil, she alleg es, wa s the re sult of the “g rading , filling, a nd leveling ” on L ot 414 d o n e by either the Def

endants or the Def endants’ a g ents. This Court has consider ed a c ase involving almost identical alleg ations, and, coincidenta lly , the same Defe ndants as in this appea l: Munford Deve lopment Company and Charle s W a l k e r

. InWatkin s v. Tankersley Constr., Inc. , N o

. W2 0 0 4

- 0 0 8 6 9

- CO A-R3-CV, 2 0 0 5 WL 1541869, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 29, 20 0 5 ), def endant Munfor d Deve lopment purcha sed a residential lot in Munford, Te nnessee . De fendant Charles Walker w as pre sident of Munford Deve lopment, a

nd at that time a lso owned his sole proprietor ship, Charles Walker Enter prises. As in t his c a se , Wa lke r’ s d e ve lop me nt c omp any , Munf or d D e ve lop me nt, pa id Wa lke r’ s so le proprietor ship, Charles W alker Enterpr ises, to do bulldoz er and elevation and fill ing work on t he lot to ma k e it s u it a b le to s u p p o rt th e c o n s tr

u c ti o n o f a house. Id. at * 1

. As in this case, the lot wa s owned by Munford, not by Walker individually

. Munford Deve lopment sold the lot to d ef en d ant Ta nk e rs le y Con str uc tio n, wh ic h b uil t a ho us e on it and so ld it to ind ivi du a ls wh o in tur n so ld i t to plaintiff Watkins. Id.

As i nth i s ca s e, th e p l ai n t i ff b ega n t o n o t i ce cr ac k s an d o th er i n d i ca t i o n s o f s tru ct ura l d am age from abnor

mal settlement. After obtaining a profe ssional inspe ction, the plaintiff Watkins l ear ned that th e so il o n w hic h th e ho us e wa s b uil t ha d b e e n im pr op e rl y pr e pa re d b y fi lli ngthe sit e wi th biodeg rada

ble mater ials such as tree stumps and r oots. W hen these inevitably beg an to dec ay , the house settled uneve nly , resulting in structural damag e to the house. Id. C o n s eq uently , in 2000, plaintiff Watkins filed a lawsuit ag ainst defe ndants Munford De velopment, Charles Walker , and the purcha ser of

the lot, Tanker sley

Construction. Id. at *2.

3

In Wa tki ns , as in this case, de fenda nts W alker

and Munfor d Deve lopment asserte d the foury ear statute of re pose as a

defe nse, and the trial court g rante d summary judgme nt in their favor

on that basis. Watkins appealed, a nd on appea l, we considere d the applicability of the statute of re pose. We noted that the re moval of tree s and the filling and g radingof t he lot was “intended to enha nce the utility of the prope rty ” and “nec essar y to r eady the land for

construction,” a

nd was ther efor e an “improveme nt” to the re al prope rty within the meaningof the statute of repose

. Id. at *5.

In Wa tki ns , we c ommented: Clearly , application of the four- y ear statute of re pose in this case r esults in a dis qu ie tin g outc ome , s inc e the

. . . d ama g e to t he h ou se wo uld no t be dis c ov e ra

ble-6-

un til the fo ur -ye ar t ime lim itatio n h a d r un , le avin g [the pla int iff

] wit h n o r e c ours e a g a ins t any

ne g lig e nt p art

y . N e ve rt he le ss, wh e re the statut e is c le ar, we mus t a pp ly it as written, eve n if the re sult is harsh.

Id. I n a footnote, we observe d: “This situation is l ikely to rec ur and should be a ddresse d by our L eg islature.” Id. a t *5 n. 6. Ap pa re ntl y the sit uatio n d id r e c ur , in de e d, wi th t he ve ry same de fe nd ants

. Recog nizi ng the applica

bility of the four -y ear statute of re pose in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 28-3-202, Gr iffin ra ises an issue in this case that was n o t p re s en t ed in Wa tki ns : whether Def endants W alker and Munfor d Deve lopment perpe trated a fra ud within the meaningof Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 28-3-205. I f so, this would preve nt the Defenda nts from interposingthe four- y ear statute of r ep o s e as a defe nse to Griff in’s action. Section 28-3- 205 prec ludes the asse rtion of the statute of re pose by

defe ndants “who sha ll have bee n g uilty of fr aud in . . . conne ction with . . . an im p ro v em ent” to re al prope rty , or who “ wrong fully conce aled” a ca

use of a ction. T.C.A. § 28-3- 205(b) ( 2000). Ge nera lly , to prove fr aud, the plaintiff must pre sent evidenc e of a misrepre sentation of a material fa ct, made know ingly or wit hout reg ard to its truth or fa lsity

. Tartera v. Palum bo , 453 S

. W

. 2 d 7 8 0 , 7 8 2 ( T e n n

. 1 97 0) ; S pectra Pla stics, Inc

. v . N as hob a Ba nk , 15 S.W .3d 832, 840-41 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 9) ; Sta c ks v . Sa unde rs , 812 S.W .2d 587, 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

T h is Co u r t d is c u s s e d

s e c ti on 28-3-205( b) in Je nki ns v . Brown , No. M2005-02022-COA- R3- CV, 2007 WL 4372166 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2007). I n Je nki ns , the proper

ty in question had be e n u se d to dis c ard

de br is an d tr a sh , s uc h a s tr e e br anc he s, c on str uc tio n mate ri a ls a

nd be d s pr ing s, making much of it unsuitable to support construction. The defe ndant Wright kne w that the ar ea ha d be e n th e s u

b j e c to f d e b r i s d u mp i n g , b u tth e d e v e l o p e r w h o s o l d th e l o tt o W r i g h ta

p p ar e n t l y t o ld Wright that the portion of the lot on whic h the house would be built did not contain fill materia ls and
was suitable to suppor

t suc h construction. Je nki ns , 2007 WL 4372166, at *1. W rig ht constructed a h o u s e o nth e l o t an d s o l d i t

. T h e h o u s e d ev el o p ednum er o u s p ro b l em s re l at edt o ab n o rm al s et t l i n g, and Wrig ht told the purchase rs that the house had bee n constructe d on “orig inal dirt.” He did not tell the purcha sers that portions of the lot conta ined fill material. Id. at * 1 0-11. The pur chase rs ultimately

sold the house to the plaintif fs , and after f

urther pr oblems appea

red, the plaintiffs filed
a laws uit namin g Wri g ht a s o ne of the de fe nd ants

. Wri g ht a sse rt e d th e fo ur -ye ar s tatut e of re po se in s e c tio n 2 8- 3- 20 2, and

the pla int if

f a lle g e d th a t Wr ig ht c ou ld n ot r e ly on the statut e of

re po se beca use he ha d eng ag ed in fra ud under s ec t i o n 2 8 -3-205( b). Compa re T.C.A. § 28-3-202 ( 2000) with T. C.A . § 28 -3 -2 05 (b ) (2 00 0)

. Af te r a jur y tr ia l, t he jur y c on c lud e d th a t Wr ig ht h a d e ng a g e d in fra ud, define d as “intentional or re ckless misrepr esentation or misreprese ntation by conce alment,”
an d th e tr ia l c o urt t

h e r e f o r e h e ld th a t W r igh t c o u ld

n o t a s s e rt t

h e s tatute o f

r e p o s e a s a

d e f e n s e. Je nki ns , 2007 WL4372166, at *11. Wright appe aled, a

rguing that the evidenc e was insufficient to support the jury ’s conc lusion that he was g uilty of fraud i n connec tion with the construction of the house. Id. The a ppellate c ourt noted that the plaintiffs a

rgued that Wrig ht had fraudulently conce aled f rom the orig inal purcha sers the fa ct th at t h e h ouse had be en construc ted on improperly compac ted fill material, a nd that theT he ap p el l at e co urt noted t hat t he f raudulent m i sr ep res ent at i o n und er sect i o n 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 5 (b) necessar y t o prevent 4 a def endan t f r om i nv oki ng t he f

our - y ear s t at ut e of

r epose “ nee d not be mad e di r ect l y t o t he pl ai nt i f f

. ” Jen ki ns , 2007 W L 4372166, a t * 12.
-7- ab n ormal settling pr oblems were a re sult of poorly compac ted fill under the house

. Id. The 4 evidenc e showe d that Wright wa s awa re that portions of the lot ha d compac ted fill a nd that Wright had moved the or igina l location of the house a fter unc overingfill material. Id. I t showed that, whe n the orig inal purcha sers c omplained to Wright about a bnormal settl in g

p r o b le ms , he assur ed them that there wer e no ser ious problems with the house and that it had be en construc ted on “or igina l dirt.” Id. The a

ppellate c ourt found that this was suff icient evidenc e of f

raud w ithin t h e m ea n i ng of section 28-3- 205(b), a

nd aff irmed the trial c ourt’s holding that Wright wa s not entitled to assert the four- y ear statute of repose as a de fense

. Id. a t *1 2; cf. Mulh ern v. Pulte Hom es , No. W2004-01488- COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL3021109, at * 4 (T en n

. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004) (findingno proof of intentional fraud or

conce alment in the re cord)

. In the ca se at bar, in support of t heir mot ion for summ ary judgme nt, Defe ndants Walker and Munford De velopment pre sented e vidence , in the form of aff idavits from Walker and Rice , asser ting that they had no knowledg e of unsuitable soil c onditions on L ot 414. These a ffidavits we re ma de on persona l knowledg e and indicated that eac h aff iant was competent to te stify to the fac ts set forth. Acc ording ly , the Def

endants proper ly

supported their summar

y judgme nt motion. SeeTenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06.

On c e a mov ingpa

rt y pr op e rl y su pp or ts i ts m oti on fo r sum mary jud g me nt, “ the burd e n s hif ts to the non-moving party

to ‘set forth spe cific f

acts establishing the e x istence of disputed, material fac ts .

. . .’” Chri

sm an v. Hill H

om e De v., Inc. , 9 7 8 S

. W

. 2 d 5 3 5 , 5 3 9 (T en n

. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Bai n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997) ). The non- moving pa rty can c arr y this burden by : “(1) pointing to evidenc e in the re cord which was ove rlooked or ig nored by t h e moving pa rty ; (2)
re ha bil itatin g c ha lle ng e d e vid e nc e ; ( 3) pr od uc ing a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e ; or (4 ) s ub mittin g an a ff ida vit
re q u esting additional time for discove ry .” Id. (c i t i n g McCarley v . West Quality Food Serv. , 9 60 S.W .2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998) ).

In Griff in’s response to the Def

endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt, on the issue of the Def endants’ knowledg e, Griff in did not point to overlooked e vidence , produce additional evidenc e, or re qu e st a dd iti on a l ti me fo r d isc ov e ry . We have on ly Gr if fi n’s evi de nc e of

the un su ita

ble so il
c on dit ion s and he r ba

re a sse rt ion s re g ard ing the De fe nd ants ’ kn ow le dg e and int e nt. Und er the se c ir c ums tanc e s, we mus t f ind tha t G ri ff in f a ile d to c arr

y her bu rde n to art ic ulate sp e c if ic fa c ts showing that Def

endants Walker an d Munford De velopment had suff icient knowledg e to support a findingby

the trier of fac t that the ir alleg ed misrepre sentation about the suitabilit y of the soil for construction wa s either intentional or rec kless. Acc ording ly , Griff in c annot rely

on Tenne ssee Code Anno tate d § 28 -3 -2 05 (b ), and the tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y

c on c lud e d th a t th e fo ur -ye ar s tatut e of re po se is applicable to Gr iffin’s ca use of a ction.A s we d i d i n Wat ki ns v. Tank er s l ey, w e su g g e st tha t t h e ra tio n a le o f ha v ing su c h a sh o rt sta tute o f re p o se in 5

c a se s su c h a s this sh o u ld b e re c o n sid e re d b y o u r G e n e ra l A sse m b ly.
-8- As in Watkin s v. Tankersley , a nd ind e e d e sp e c ia lly

in l ig ht o f t

he fa c t th a t Wa tki

ns involved very simil ar claims ag ainst the s ame defenda nts, we must rea ch the “disquieting ” conclusion that the four- y ear statute of re pose bar s the plaintiff’s c laim. There fore , the trial cour t did not err in its gr ant 5 of summa ry jud g me nt.
Th e de c isi on

of the tr ia l court is af

fi rm e d. Cos ts on ap pe a l ar e ta xed to t he Ap pe lla

nt, Se lma P. Griffin, for

which execution may

issue if nec essar

y
.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE