[Cite as Hopkins v. Goebel, 2023-Ohio-3040.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

TIMOTHY J. HOPKINS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

CHARLES GOEBEL, 

 and

DIANE GOEBEL,

 Defendants-Appellants.

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APPEAL NO. C-220617

TRIAL NO. A-2104001

 O P I N I O N.

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Appeal Dismissed in Part

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 30, 2023

George M. Parker, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Thomas E. Grossmann, for Defendants-Appellants.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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BERGERON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} One chapter of a protracted litigation battle between plaintiff-appellee 

Timothy Hopkins and defendants-appellants Charles and Diane Goebel seemingly 

drew to a close when the trial court dismissed the suit on venue grounds. Unwilling to 

let sleeping dogs lie, however, the Goebels moved to sanction Mr. Hopkins, insisting 

that he knew full well that he had filed in the wrong court. Following a hearing, the 

trial court denied the motion. Undeterred, the Goebels then launched a second motion 

for sanctions, alleging that counsel spun lies to the trial court during the prior hearing. 

After the trial court denied this second motion, the Goebels appealed to this court, 

seeking to challenge the ruling on both motions. But we find any appeal from the first 

motion’s denial untimely, and we accordingly dismiss aspects of the appeal implicating 

that entry. On the substance of the entry denying the second motion, we find no abuse 

of discretion by the trial court and affirm its judgment.

I.

{¶2} In November 2021, Mr. Hopkins filed suit in Hamilton County against 

the Goebels, alleging that they breached a settlement agreement the parties signed in 

March 2021. This agreement resolved an earlier lawsuit against Mr. Hopkins initiated 

by the Goebels in Warren County (the “first lawsuit”). 

{¶3} The Goebels subsequently moved to dismiss for improper venue on the 

basis that Warren County represented the “exclusive jurisdiction” over all actions 

related to the settlement agreement (and invoked the jurisdictional priority rule based 

on another case filed in Warren County). Finding improper venue in Hamilton 

County, the trial court dismissed Mr. Hopkins’ complaint in May 2022.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶4} Convinced that Mr. Hopkins and his counsel knew that they lacked 

legitimate grounds to file suit in Hamilton County, the Goebels filed a motion to 

sanction Mr. Hopkins in May 2022 for engaging in frivolous conduct. See Civ.R. 11; 

R.C. 2323.51. The trial court scheduled a hearing on this first sanctions motion 

pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(B)(2). During the hearing, Mr. Hopkins’ counsel informed 

the trial court that while his client was being “served with a post-dismissal” of the first 

lawsuit, “he was, essentially, harassed at his home in Indian Hill” by process servers, 

thus creating a potential basis for filing suit in Hamilton County. (Emphasis added.) 

The trial court denied the motion for sanctions by entry in August 2022.

{¶5} Dissatisfied, the Goebels filed a subsequent motion for sanctions on the 

basis that Mr. Hopkins and his attorney made false representations to the trial court 

at the hearing on the first motion. See R.C. 2323.51. In November 2022, the trial court 

denied the second motion as well. The Goebels filed a notice of appeal that same 

month.

II.

{¶6} In their sole assignment of error, the Goebels argue that the trial court 

erred in concluding that Mr. Hopkins did not engage in frivolous conduct when he (1) 

filed his suit in Hamilton County as opposed to Warren County (the subject of the first 

motion) and (2) made false representations to the trial court at the hearing on the first 

motion (the subject of the second motion). Before we consider these questions, Mr. 

Hopkins raises a final appealable order issue with the Goebels’ appeal that we must 

address at the outset.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶7} In challenging jurisdiction, Mr. Hopkins emphasizes that, while the 

Goebels filed their notice of appeal within 30 days of the second motion’s denial, the 

notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the first motion’s denial. According to 

Mr. Hopkins, since the denial of the first motion by the trial court constituted a final

appealable order, it would render the Goebels’ appeal untimely with respect to the trial 

court’s decision on that motion. See App.R. 4(A)(1) (“[A] party who wishes to appeal 

from an order that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal * * * within 30 

days of that entry.”). 

{¶8} To be sure, the Goebels’ brief before this court raises arguments that 

implicate the denial of both motions. Thus, we must determine whether the August 

entry denying the first motion represents a final appealable judgment, obliging us to 

consider R.C. 2505.02. See Peck v. Tokar, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0086, 2016-

Ohio-8112, ¶ 4 (“For a judgment to be final and appealable, it must satisfy the 

requirements of R.C. 2505.02 * * *.”). Consistent with the statute, an order can be 

final and appealable if it “affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or 

upon a summary application in an action after judgment * * *[.]” R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). 

{¶9} We note that “Ohio appellate courts have characterized motions for 

sanctions for frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 as ‘special proceedings’ or 

‘summary applications’ falling within the purview of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).” Zhong v. 

Liang, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109027, 2020-Ohio-3724, ¶ 15; see Victoria’s Garden 

v. Sheehy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-404, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3759, 4 (July 27, 

1993), citing R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) (“The process for filing a post-judgment motion for 

sanctions calls for a hearing, but does not call for a full-fledged trial on the claims for 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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frivolous behavior. This is the type of ‘summary application’ R.C. 2505.02 defines as 

a final order.”); Troja v. Pleatman, 2016-Ohio-7683, 65 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.) 

(“A decision granting a motion for sanctions is a final, appealable order as it affects a 

substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an 

action after judgment under R.C. 2505.02(B).”).

{¶10} Unable to dispute these principles, the Goebels instead characterize the 

August entry as merely interlocutory because the court did not rule on their motion 

for attorney’s fees pursuant to Civ.R. 11 or Civ.R. 3(D)(2). In other words, they claim 

that the court still had work left to do. But this description is completely inaccurate—

the court denied the entirety of the sanctions motion in its August 2022 entry: “A 

hearing was conducted pursuant to R.C. § 2323.51. * * * Having considered the motion 

and the oral arguments of the parties * * * the Court finds that the motion is not well 

taken and DENIES the same.” (Emphasis added.) Although the trial court only 

mentioned R.C. 2323.51 by name (because the hearing occurred pursuant to it), it 

denied all of the relief sought in the motion. See R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)(a) (“An award 

may be made [for sanctions] * * *, but only after the court * * * [s]ets a date for a 

hearing * * *.”). The Goebels fail to cite any authority requiring a trial court to 

specifically delineate each aspect of a motion in its entry denying it. Because the trial 

court denied all aspects of the motion, we hold that the August entry was a final 

appealable order under R.C. 2505.02.

{¶11} With that determination, the Goebels’ failure to file their notice of 

appeal within the requisite time of the August 2022 entry under App.R. 4(A)(2) strips 

us of jurisdiction to consider the merits of anything pertaining to the denial of the first 

motion for sanctions. We therefore dismiss the Goebels’ appeal in part for a lack of 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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timeliness, and we cannot consider any arguments relating to the denial of the first 

motion for sanctions.

B.

{¶12} We do, however, have appellate jurisdiction to consider the Goebels’ 

appeal to the extent that they challenge the denial of the second motion for sanctions 

because they filed their notice of appeal within thirty days of that entry, consistent 

with App.R. 4(A)(2). And we consider this question for an abuse of discretion: “We 

review [a] trial court’s decision on a motion for sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Polk v. Spirit Homecare, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120088, 2012-

Ohio-4948, ¶ 4, citing State ex rel. Striker v. Cline, 130 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio5350, 957 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 11.

{¶13} As evidence of frivolous conduct, the Goebels seize upon alleged factual 

misrepresentations that occurred at the hearing on the first motion. R.C. 

2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) (“ ‘Frivolous conduct’ means * * *: Conduct of an inmate or other 

party to a civil action * * * that satisfies any of the following: * * * The conduct consists 

of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if 

specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 

opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”). In this respect, they offered

documentation that, after filing a second lawsuit against Mr. Hopkins—stemming 

from his alleged breach of the settlement agreement—their process servers attempted 

service multiple times upon him at his Mason residence in Warren County, rather than 

in Hamilton County. They also provided an affidavit of their process server in which

the server claimed that he attempted to serve Mr. Hopkins in Warren County and 

never sought to do so in Hamilton County. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶14} But the Goebels’ alleged proof does not demonstrate that Mr. Hopkins 

made a false representation to the trial court. According to his counsel, the alleged 

harassment in Hamilton County related to service of a dismissal of the first lawsuit;

whereas all of the Goebels’ “proof” of sanctionable conduct concerns a second lawsuit. 

In light of this mixing of apples with oranges, the trial court acted well within its 

discretion in denying the second motion for sanctions. See Polk at ¶ 6, quoting 

Poindexter v. Grantham, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95825, 2011-Ohio-1576, ¶ 12 

(“[A]ppellate courts will find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when 

it arbitrarily denies a request for sanctions. * * * ‘An arbitrary denial occurs when * * 

* the record clearly evidences frivolous conduct * * *.’ ”).

{¶15} The Goebels further protest that the trial court should have held an 

additional hearing on the second motion. But “R.C. 2323.51 does not mandate that a 

hearing be conducted to determine whether a particular action involves frivolous 

conduct, but does require that [a hearing must be held] if attorney’s fees are to be 

ultimately awarded * * *.” Polk, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120088, 2012-Ohio-4948, 

at ¶ 6. Since attorney’s fees were not ultimately awarded, the trial court did not need 

to hold a hearing on the second motion. 

{¶16} For all the reasons discussed above, we overrule all aspects of the

Goebels’ assignment of error over which we have jurisdiction. 

* * *

{¶17} In light of the foregoing analysis, we dismiss the Goebels’ appeal in part, 

overrule their assignment of error in part and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Judgment accordingly.

BOCK and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.