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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ 

No. 11-3164

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IBEW LOCAL UNION NO. 102; IBEW LOCAL 102 WELFARE, PENSION, 

ANNUITY AND JOINT APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING FUNDS AND THEIR 

BOARDS OF TRUSTEES; IBEW LOCAL 102 DISTRIBUTION FUND, 

as collection agent for the National Electrical Benefit Fund

v.

QUALITY ELECTRIC & DATA, INC.,

 Appellant

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(Civil No. 2-09-cv-04037)

District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 22, 2012

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: July 17, 2012)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
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Quality Electric and Data, Inc. (“Quality”) appeals from the District Court’s grant 

of summary judgment in favor of IBEW Local Union No. 102 (the “Union”); IBEW 

Local 102 Welfare, Pension, Annuity and Joint Apprenticeship Training Funds and their 

Board of Trustees; and IBEW Local 102 Distribution Fund (as collection agent for the 

National Electrical Benefit Fund) (collectively, the “Funds”). Quality alleges that the 

District Court erred when it held that the company was required to make pension 

contributions to the Funds for all its employees working within the Union’s jurisdiction. 

For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.1

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and history 

relevant to our conclusion.

Quality is an electrical contractor based in Rockaway, New Jersey. Peggy Coiro is 

the President of Quality, and her husband, Louis Coiro, is the Vice President. The Union 

is a New Jersey labor organization that represents electricians. The Funds are ERISA 

multi-employer employee pension plans and are third-party beneficiaries of the Union’s 

collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2); Lewis v. 

Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960) (describing a similar pension fund as a thirdparty beneficiary of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the 

employer). The Union’s CBA requires employers to contribute to the Funds, which in 

turn pay pension benefits to workers. 

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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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In 2004, Gary Pfarr (“Pfarr”), a Union representative, met with Louis Coiro and 

insisted that Quality use Union labor on one of its jobsites. Pfarr and Louis Coiro agreed 

that Quality would sign up with the Union. In September 2004, the Union presented 

Quality with several documents known as “Letters of Assent.” Essentially, by signing 

these letters, Quality agreed to be bound by the CBA, which also covered over 200 other 

employers/members. Louis Coiro claims that Pfarr told him that the Letters of Assent 

bound Quality to the CBA exclusively for its Union employees and employees who 

worked on Union jobsites. Louis Coiro instructed Quality’s President, Peggy Coiro, to 

execute the Letters of Assent on behalf of Quality. The parties stipulated in the District 

Court that the Letters of Assent constituted a pre-hire agreement pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 

158(f) [hereinafter “8(f)”].

The Letters of Assent stated that Quality “agree[d] to comply with, and be bound 

by, all of the provisions contained in said current and subsequent approved labor 

agreements,” i.e. the CBA. JA161. Moreover, pursuant to the CBA, Quality agreed to 

“recognize[] the Union as the exclusive representative of all [its] employees performing 

work within the jurisdiction of this Union.” JA165. The CBA explained the trade and 

geographic scope of the Union’s jurisdiction and required pension contributions to the 

Funds for employees covered under the CBA.

Over the following two years, Quality sporadically used Union labor and worked 

on Union jobsites. When it did so, Quality made contributions to the Funds as required 

by the CBA. During this period, Quality also employed individuals who were not Union 
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members and who did not work on Union jobsites. Quality made no contributions to the 

Funds for these employees. 

In 2008, the Funds ran a compliance audit on Quality concerning the period from 

January 2003 through December 2006. After revision, the audit showed that Quality 

owed the Funds $201,424.40 for delinquent pension contributions. Quality refused to 

pay, and the Union and Funds thus sued Quality in the District Court, demanding 

payment of the outstanding pension contributions. Both sides moved for summary 

judgment. The District Court granted the Union and Funds motion and denied Quality’s.

The District Court concluded that the parties’ 8(f) pre-hire agreement (the Letters 

of Assent) bound Quality to the CBA. Further, it held that the CBA was unambiguous 

and made the Union the exclusive bargaining representative of all Quality’s employees 

who performed work within the Union’s trade and geographic jurisdiction. Since 

Quality’s non-union employees were covered under the CBA, Quality was required to 

contribute to the Funds for these employees. The court rejected Quality’s argument that 

the CBA was void ab initio due to fraud in the execution and awarded the Union and 

Funds the delinquent pension contributions, interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, 

and costs.

II.

We exercise plenary review over a district court’s summary judgment ruling. Twp.

of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2007).

On appeal, Quality makes the same arguments that it made to the District Court. 

First, Quality argues that the Union never became the exclusive bargaining representative 
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of all its employees. Therefore, Quality claims that it is not required to contribute to the 

Funds for all of its employees. Second, Quality argues that the CBA is void ab initio due 

to fraud in the execution. 

Quality argues that the District Court incorrectly concluded that it was obligated to 

contribute to the Funds for its non-union employees. Quality contends that the District 

Court impermissibly converted the 8(f) agreement into an agreement under 29 U.S.C. § 

159(a) [hereinafter “9(a)”]. Quality relies on language in the Letters of Assent that states, 

“[t]he Employer agrees that if a majority of its employees authorize the Local Union to 

represent them in collective bargaining, the Employer will recognize the Local Union as 

the NLRA Section 9(a) collective bargaining agent for all employees.” JA161. Quality 

argues that, because its employees did not authorize the Union as their 9(a) representative, 

the Union never became the exclusive bargaining agent for all Quality’s employees. 

Consequently, Quality insists that it was only required to contribute to the Funds for its 

employees who were Union members or who worked on Union jobsites, which it did.

The Union and Funds argue that Quality’s understanding of 8(f) agreements is 

inconsistent with well-established law, and we agree. While Quality is correct that an 

8(f) agreement cannot convert into a 9(a) agreement absent a majority election, 

conversion is not at issue in this case. See Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental 

Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1988). The Union does 

not claim to be the 9(a) representative of Quality’s employees. An 8(f) pre-hire 

agreement, unique to the construction industry, binds an employer to a collective 

bargaining agreement in relatively the same manner as a 9(a) agreement. See id. at 778. 
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The only true difference between an 8(f) agreement and a 9(a) agreement is that a 9(a) 

agreement requires an employer to bargain with the union after the agreement expires; 

whereas when an 8(f) agreement expires, the employer can walk away. See id.

The CBA validly and unambiguously requires Quality to make pension 

contributions to the Funds for all its employees working within the Union’s jurisdiction,

and we must interpret and enforce unambiguous agreements according to their terms. 

Shaver v. Siemens Corp., 670 F.3d 462, 496 (3d Cir. 2012). First, the Letters of Assent 

bind Quality to “current and subsequent approved labor agreements,” including the CBA. 

JA161. Next, the CBA clearly requires Quality to “recognize[] the Union as the 

exclusive representative of all its employees performing work within the jurisdiction of 

this Union.” JA165. Lastly, the CBA requires contribution to the Funds for “each 

employee under the jurisdiction of this agreement [the CBA].” JA180. The Union’s 

jurisdiction is defined geographically and by trade; jurisdiction “is not a subject for 

negotiations.” JA194. Quality thus cannot escape the CBA’s plain meaning that it was 

required to make pension contributions to the Funds for all its employees performing 

work within the Union’s “trade and territor[y].” JA194. 

Quality’s second argument—that the CBA is void ab initio due to fraud in the 

execution—is also unpersuasive. There are only three limited defenses available to 

employers against fund claims to recover unpaid pension contributions: (1) that the fund 

contributions themselves are illegal; (2) that the collective bargaining agreement is void 

ab initio due to fraud in the execution; and (3) that the employees have decertified the 

union as their bargaining representative. Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1505 
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(3d Cir. 1992). Fraud in the inducement is not a defense that is available to Quality, and 

fraud in the execution exists only when the agreement that is signed is radically different 

from what the defrauded party was led to believe it was signing. See Connors v. Fawn 

Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he distinction between fraud in the 

inducement and fraud in the execution is that, ‘the former induces a party to assent to 

something he otherwise would not have; the latter induces a party to believe the nature of 

his act is something entirely different than it actually is.’” (quoting S.W. Adm’rs, Inc. v. 

Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986))). Absent fraud in the execution, 

pension funds are entitled to rely on unambiguous collective bargaining agreements as 

written, unaffected by oral modifications. See Teamsters Indus. Emps. Welfare Fund v. 

Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 1993). 

Here, Louis Coiro alleges that Pfarr told him that he would only have to contribute 

to the pension fund on behalf of his Union employees and his employees who worked on 

Union jobs. However, even if Pfarr did make an oral promise to ignore the text of the 

agreement, this is insufficient to establish fraud in the execution. See Connors, 30 F.3d at 

490; Teamsters, 989 F.2d at 138. Quality was aware that the Letters of Assent bound it to 

the CBA, and it had the opportunity to review the CBA before signing. Quality does not 

claim that the Union altered or inserted terms into the CBA without Quality’s knowledge. 

Therefore, Quality does not allege sufficient facts to support its fraud in the execution 

claim.

III.
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.