NATHAN DULLv. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 39090)
Sheldon, Prescott and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 [d]), there is a rebuttable presumption that a subsequent habeas petition has been delayed without good cause if, inter alia, such petition is filed two years or more after the date on which afinaljudgment has been rendered afterthe conclusion ofappellate review on a prior habeas petition challenging the same conviction. Pursuant further to statute (§ 52-470 [e]), in cases in which the rebuttable presumption of delay without good cause under § 52-470 (d) applies, the habeas court shall issue, upon request by the respondent, an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed and not be dismissed. The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court, which dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In dismissing the petition, which followed the petitioner’s prior habeas petition challenging the same conviction, the habeas court determined, pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e), that the petition was untimely because it was filed more than two years after finaljudgment was rendered on appellate review of the habeas court’s denial of his prior petition and because the petitioner failed to demonstrate, in response to the court’s order to show cause, that his alleged mental health problems constituted good cause for the late filing. On appeal to this court, the petitioner claimed that he established good

cause for the delay in the filing ofhis subsequent habeas petition. Held thatthehabeascourtdidnoterrindismissingasuntimelythepetitioner’s subsequent habeas petition, there having been no fault in that court’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause for the late filing. Argued April 27—officially released August 1, 2017

Procedural History Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in thejudicial district ofTolland, where the court, Oliver, J., granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss and renderedjudgment thereon, from which thepetitioner, onthe granting ofcertification, appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Oliver, J ., issued an articulation of its decision. Affirmed

. RobertL. O’Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was William A. Adsit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
James M. Ralls, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Jo Anne Sulik, supervisory assistantstate’sattorney, forthe appellee (respondent).Opinion PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Nathan Dull, appeals from the habeas court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus as untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (d).1 Specifically, he argues that he established good cause for the delay in the filing ofhis thirdhabeascorpuspetition. Wearenotpersuadedand, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court. This appeal requires us to review the underpinnings of § 52-470, which concerns the summary disposal of habeas corpus petitions. In 2012, the GeneralAssembly enactedNo. 12-115ofthe2012 PublicActs (P.A. 12-115), whichamended § 52-470, byaddingnewsubsections (c) through (e), establishing procedures for the court to respond to untimely habeas filings. Included in those amendments is aprovisionthatthere shallbe arebuttable presumption that a habeas petition challenging a conviction has been delayed without good cause ifthe petition was filed two years or more after the date on which a final judgment has been entered on a prior petition, or after October 1, 2014, whichever date is later. Thestatutoryamendmentsalsoprovidethatwhen
a petition is filed in which the rebuttable presumption of untimeliness applies, the court, upon request of the respondent, may issue an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed and not be dismissed. General Statutes § 52-470 (e).2
In the matter at hand, the record reflects that the petitionerwas convicted ofmurder inviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 53a-54ain 1998afteratrialbeforeathree judge panel. In rendering judgment of conviction, the panel rejectedthe petitioner’s insanity defense, andthe conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Dull, 59 Conn. App. 579, 757 A.2d 1194 (2000). Thereafter, on December 19, 2002, the petitioner filed his first habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction. That petition
was denied in 2005, and the habeas court’s judgment
was affirmed by this court on appeal. Dull v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 96 Conn. App. 787, 901 A.2d 1239 (2006). Later, on March 30, 2010, the petitioner filed a second habeas corpus petition, through which he again challenged his conviction. The second petition was withdrawn by the petitioner on October 13, 2011. This third petition was then brought on June 11, 2015, after the October 1, 2012 effective date of P.A. 12-115 and several months after October 1, 2014.3
On the basis of the lapse of time between the judgment on the first petition and the filing of the third petition, and the fact that the third petition was filed after October 1, 2014, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a motion, pursuant to § 52- 470 (e), seeking an orderthatthe petitionerbe required to show cause whyhispetition shouldnotbe dismissed
as untimely. Thereafter, pursuant to the court’s showcause order, a hearing was conducted at which the petitioner testified to his belief that his mental health conditionpreventedhimfromtimelyfilingthispetition, and, thus, good cause existed for the delay in its filing. After considering the evidence, the court issued its order in which it determined that the petition was untimely and that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate good cause for its late filing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.
While the appeal was pending and after oral argument, this court ordered the habeas court to file an articulation setting forth whether proof of the defendant’s claim of mental health impairment constituted good cause for the untimely filing of this petition. In response, the court stated: ‘‘The petitioner’s mental health problems were not so significant as to interfere with his ability to file a timely petition.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The court explained that its reasoning was based on its assessment ofthe habeas evidence as well
as a review of the record regarding the defendant’s conviction and prior habeas petitions.
We note that the habeas court’s decision to dismiss
a habeas petition is a matter oflaw, subject to plenary review. Anderson v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 148 Conn. App. 641, 644, 85 A.3d 1240, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 945, 90A.3d976, cert. denied sub nom.Anderson

v. Dzurenda, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 201, 190 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2014). On the basis of our review of the court’s thorough articulation and our review ofthe record, we findnofaultinthe court’s conclusionthatthepetitioner has not shown good cause forhis untimely filing ofthis habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, the court did not
errin dismissingthepetitioner’sthirdpetitionforawrit of habeas corpus. The judgment is affirmed.

1 Subsection (d) of No. 12-115 of the 2012 Public Acts, codified at § 52- 470 (d), provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the case ofapetition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later ofthe following: (1) Two years after the date on which thejudgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2014

. . . . For the purposes of this section, the withdrawal of a prior petition challenging the same conviction shall not constitute a judgment.

. . .’’

2 Subsection (e) ofP.A. 12-115, codifiedat § 52-470 (e),providesinrelevant part: ‘‘In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay under subsection (c) or (d) of this section applies, the court, upon the request of the respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. The

. . . petitioner’s counsel, shall have ameaningful opportunity to investigate the basis for the delay and respond to the order. If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay, the court shall dismiss the petition.

. . .’’

3 Because the petition was filed after October 1, 2014, the habeas court found that it was untimely. In accordance with the language of § 52-470 (d);

see footnote 1 of this opinion; the filing and withdrawal of the second petition was not legally relevant to the court’s determination.