COVER: Civilian relief workers unload

food supplies at a village near Baidoa as

a Marine escort stands by.

DVIC DN-ST-93-O1 389
Restoring Hope:

In Somalia with the

Unified Task Force, 1992 - 1993

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

by

Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2005
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

Humanitarian Operations in Northern iraq, 1991. With Marines in Operation Provide

Comfort. (1995)

Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 199]. (1995)

A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 199] - 1996. (2003)

On Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990 - 2003. (2004)

PCN 190 0041 3500
Foreword

This story of Operation Restore Hope relates how many issues unique

to operations other than war were addressed and resolved by the commanding general of the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and his

staff. Because it is written specifically from the perspective of the command element and drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reports

made at the time or shortly thereafter, this is a study of command, limited to that discrete portion of American involvement in Somalia that was

the United States-led coalition under the command of Marine Lieutenant

General Robert B. Johnston. It does not follow the actions of the individual components or members of the units that made up the coalition

force beyond how they may have affected the work and mission of

UNITAF.

Modern military operations other than war are, in many ways, similar

to pacification operations conducted in Latin America and the Far East a

century ago. In fact, the lessons learned sections of many modern after

action reports are familiar to anyone who has read the Marine Corps'

1940 Small Wars Manual, a treatise of the Corps' experience in the

Banana Wars, which was written before World War ii. Sections of that

manual emphasized that civic actions often affected mission accomplishment more than military actions, and stressed that Marines must both

become attuned to local culture and remain aloof from domestic political

squabbles to be successful.

The last decade of the 20th century brought great changes to the

world, many of which affected the United States military. If the years

1980 to 1989 were a time of reformulating military doctrine and integrating new technologies, the years from 1990 to 1999 were a time for

testing those thoughts and instruments.

The final defeat of communism in Europe, the fall of the Warsaw Pact,

and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were great ends in themselves.

But they were the heralds of the new world order proclaimed shortly

after by President George H. W. Bush. On the one hand, these occurrences allowed the United States and its allies to act decisively in the

Persian Gulf against Iraq in 1990 and 1991; but the loss of the Cold War

counterbalance of the Soviet Union and its strategic aims meant the

United States would find it easier to become involved in regional conflicts and localized civil strife. For the remainder of the decade, United

States military personnel bore a burden of increasing operational tempo

rarely known in eras of peace.

Following the Persian Gulf War and its related Kurdish relief operation, the next major military commitment was to Somalia. The crisis in

that country was such that the humanitarian mission of the United States

and its coalition allies could only be met by military means. The

response to the crisis was named Operation Restore Hope and was significant for its size and international support. It also provided useful lessons for succeeding humanitarian operations. Brigadier General Anthony

C. Zinni, one of America's foremost experts on operations other than

111
war, saw the need for the Marine Corps to train a new generation of

Marines able to think in new directions to solve the problems of humanitarian operations conducted in support of sometimes obscure and limited national goals. Many of the issues faced in Somalia by planners and

executors (the Marines and soldiers on the ground) have resurfaced in

Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other hotspots.

The author, Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, retired from the United

States Marine Corps Reserve on 1 March 1999, with nearly 31 years of

service. During that time, he served in Vietnam as an artillery forward

observer with two rifle companies, as an observer and advisor with the

37th Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, and the officer in charge of an integrated observation device (laser range finder) team on an outpost in the

Q ue Son mountains. As a reservist, he later served in a variety of positions at the battery level with Battery H, 3d Battalion, 14th Marines. While on the staff of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic Reserve

Augmentation Unit, he served as a liaison officer with the British Army

on six NATO exercises. He was the G-3 plans officer with the 2d Marine

Expeditionary Brigade from 1988 to 1990. During the early days of the

Persian Gulf War, he was recalled to active duty as a senior watch team

commander in the crisis action center of the II Marine Expeditionary

Force. He later received orders to proceed to Saudi Arabia as a field historian with the 2d Marine Division. He served with that unit throughout

Operation Desert Storm. He was again recalled to active duty in

December 1992 to serve as a field historian with the headquarters of the

UNITAF in Somalia. In October 1994, he was re6alled to active duty to

serve in Haiti as the joint task force historian with the multinational

force during Operation Restore Democracy. On 1 January 1996, he

returned to active duty as the historian assigned to United States

European Command to document Operation Joint Endeavor, during

which he served in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bosnia, and Croatia. For the

last years of his military career he was the officer in charge of the Field

Operations Branch of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division.

During this time, he served with members of the general staff of the

Polish Armed Forces on three occasions in Poland and the United States

in the Partners For Peace program. He was recalled from retirement during the Global War on Terror in March 2003 and served as a historian for

the Special Operations Command. He served overseas with a special

operations air detachment and two battalions of U.S. Army Special

Forces in Kuwait and Iraq.

Colonel Mroczkowski is the author of U. S. Marines in the Persian

Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, and co-author of Fort Monroe: The Key To The

South. He also has written several articles on military subjects. In civil

life, he is the director of the U. S. Army's museum at Fort Monroe,

Virginia, a position he has held since January 1986.

C.D. Melson

Acting Director of Marine Corps History

iv
Preface

Operation Restore Hope was a complicated and unusual operation. From the

initial commitment of United. States Armed Forces on 9 December 1992 until the

turnover to the United Nations in May 1993, there was little need for direct military action by large units, although the Unified Task Force Somalia (IJNITAF)

command was not loath to use force when necessary. Rather, the need to keep a

neutral and balanced approach to the situation in Somalia was more important to

the success of the mission. Small unit actions, patrolling, maiming key points,

convoy security, and crowd control were the order of the day. For a military historian, it has been an important task to identify the critical issues, often political

in nature, which were of importance to the command and its conduct of the operation, and to follow these issues as events unfolded. This is far easier in a classic

military operation with well-defined missions and objectives, and in which the

effects of enemy actions or capabilities are readily discemible. The history of this

operation is more about the evolution of ideas and command structures than it is

about the engagement of enemy forces.

I have no reservations in claiming that the operation was successful; Lieutenant

General Robert B. Johnston and his coalition staff skillfully accomplished the

mission of the Unified Task Force, which was to create a secure environment for

the shipment of relief supplies and the establishment of the second United Nations

force in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The Unified Task Force was able to turn over to

the United Nations a country that, though still beset by problems, was beginning

to recover and in which the famine had been broken. What occurred after 4 May

1993 is another story, of which Operation Restore Hope was the prologue.

The narrative is drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reports created

at the time or shortly thereafter. As the historian assigned to UNITAF headquarters, I was in a notable position to have access to what was discussed and planned,

but was also able to directly observe the resulting operations. I attended meetings

and daily briefings and was able to travel throughout the theater, eventually reaching each of the humanitarian relief sectors. This gave me the opportunity to conduct interviews in the field with commanders, staff officers, and individual soldiers, Marines, airmen, and sailors. It also gave me the opportunity to see the

diversity of action in each sector and to appreciate the complex nature and vast

scope of operations: Somalia was not just Mogadishu, and Operation Restore

Hope was more than the daily round of patrols and spot reports. The greatest difficulty I faced was in the very size of the area of responsibility (which was itself

but a small part of the entire country of Somalia.) Travel was both time consuming and physically demanding; it could easily take at least three days to reach

some of the farther cities, conduct a few interviews, and then return. Whether

going by motorized convoy or aircraft, a day would be spent in travel each way,

and a full day or two would be spent on the ground. All had to be timed to transportation schedules that could change with little or no advance notice. Failure to

connect left one stranded until the next convoy or aircraft departed. Also, since I

could not presume to impose on the hospitality of others, I had to be prepared to

bring everything that I might require for food, water, or accommodation.

"Humping" through the dust from a dirt airfield along a desert track with a full

combat load, several liters of bottled water, a full Alice pack and a cot was not
something to look forward to. But the camaraderie shown in each sector certainly was, and the information gathered was worth the effort.

I also was fortunate to have met several persons with whom I got to work closely, or who helped me accomplish my mission. The first of these was Colonel Billy

C. Steed, the UNITAF chief of staff, who gave me the latitude to go where I needed, provided me with access to meetings, and ensured that I reviewed important

documents. Next was Captain David A. "Scotty" Dawson, who was the historian

for the Marine Forces, and who had been overseeing the UNITAF headquarters

portion as well until I arrived. He very quickly showed me around, and he was

indefatigable and always full of enthusiasm. Much of my working time was spent

in the operations center under the watchful eye of Colonel James B. "Irish" Egan,

whose colorful manner made more bearable a daily grind in uncomfortable circumstances. He also demonstrated that the more important, but less noted, part of

military professionalism often lies in the attention to routine duty and detail. I was

fortunate to share a cramped, hot and airless working space in UNITAF headquarters with a distinguished civilian, Dr. Katherine A. W. McGrady, an employee of the Center for Naval Analyses. She provided insight in what was going on

and kept me apprised on what happened while I was out traveling. More importantly, we shared the documents and information we collected, making the effort

more complete than it would otherwise have been. I had the opportunity to visit

on a few occasions with the 10th Mountain Division's historian, Captain Drew R.

Meyerowich, USA. In addition to discussing the collection of documents and

information, he spoke of his desire to get away from his desk and be more actively involved in the operation. He got his wish a few months later as the commanding officer of Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, which, as part of the

quick reaction force for the raid on General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's

headquarters on 3 October, fought its way through the streets of Mogadishu.

Captain Meyerowich was awarded the Silver Star for his valor and leadership.

Several outstanding Marine Corps combat artists also documented Operation

Restore Hope. The first of these was Colonel Peter "Mike" Gish, who had an ability to see the essence of a scene and capture it in his sketchpad in just a few

strokes. His good humor and endurance belied the age of a man whose service

extended back to his time as an aviation cadet in the latter days of World War II,

and who had seen active service during the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf,

and in the Kurdish relief operation. He and I shared many travels and many a dinner of meals, ready to eat, atop the chancery building in Mogadishu. He was an

excellent mentor who taught me how to properly use the authority of a full colonel

to accomplish one's mission. The lessons came in handy in later years in Haiti,

Europe, and eventually back in Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Donna J. Neary also

deployed to Somalia, and I had the opportunity to watch her talent in the field. A

gifted artist, she also had a knack for photography that was used to create a portfolio of coalition uniforms and arms. Captain Burton Moore brought his experience as an infantry officer during Vietnam, and worked as an artist with the

Marine Forces. He created some remarkable works of Marines in action. Two of

these artists are represented in this volume. I was very fortunate in meeting Major

Daniel M. Lizzul, who was working as a liaison officer with the Italian forces. He

not only assisted in interpreting interviews, but also ensured I got to accompany

the Italians on some of their operations. I count him as a good friend and a highly professional officer. Warrant Officer Charles G. Grow, who 1 had known during Desert Storm, continued his excellent performance as both a combat photographer and artist. He was an invaluable liaison with the Joint Combat Camera

Team. Sergeant B. W. Beard, a writer with the Joint Information Bureau, accompanied me on a memorable journey to Gialalassi in late December. His articles,

vi
written for the local coalition forces' newspaper and service magazines, captured

the spirit of what was happening for the Marines and soldiers who were out on the

streets. Finally, there were all of the officers and soldiers of the various services

of the coalition forces who responded to my requests for interviews and information. These men and women were often busy with their own duties, but they managed to find time to speak with me and help me to gather a full impression of their

work.

Of course, not everyone who contributed to my work in the field or to this history was with me in Somalia. As I left Somalia, my good friend and comrade,

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, took my place. He was leading the first

Joint History Team to deploy in support of an active operation, composed of five

men besides himself: Commander Roger T. Zeimet, USNR; Major Robert K.

Wright, Jr., USAR; Major Robert L. Furu, USAR; Major Jimmy Miller, USAFR;

and Sergeant Michael Eberle, USA. Lieutenant Colonel Cureton led a highly

organized and thorough field history program. These officers were able to conduct

scores of interviews and collect thousands of documents. Their prodigious collection effort has been compiled into a volume entitled Resource Guide: Unified

Task Force Somalia December 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope, published by the U.S Army Center of Military History. This book has been of tremendous value in researching and writing this monograph.

Back in the United States, I owed my position to Brigadier General Edwin H.

Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. When the call came

for a historian to go to Somalia with UNITAF, he selected me from a field of very

qualified candidates. His deputy, Colonel Marshall B. Darling, kept me informed

of what was happening back home and forwarded anything that I requested. The

director of the Joint History Office, Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, USA

(Retired), also provided me with briefings, information, and encouragement, and

helped me to secure the opportunity to deploy to Somalia as a historian. I certainly

wish to thank those who reviewed the draft of this history, most especially

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown.

Both of these officers have been friends and comrades in the service of the history of our Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Brown, a Basic School classmate, made several recommendations that helped with the clarity of some of the more technical

aspects of this history. Brigadier General Gregory Gile, USA (Retired), also

reviewed the chapter that details the work of the coalition forces in the relief sectors. Brigadier William J. A. Mellor DSC, AM, Royal Australian Army, did the

same for those portions that involved Australia's participation.

I also wish to thank Mr. Charles D. Melson, chief historian, Mr. Charles R.

Smith, senior historian, and Mr. Scott N. Summerill, senior editor, for their thorough review of the final draft. My gratitude also goes to Mr. W. Stephen Hill,

who designed the maps, and to Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns, who prepared the manuscript for publication, and again to Mr. Charles R. Smith for illustrating the history and preparing the index.

Not everything in the field worked as planned. A rare, sudden thunderstorm

caught me in an open vehicle shortly after I arrived. The water caused havoc with

my tape recorder. Thereafter, I was forced to use a notebook to record conversations with members of UNITAF while in the field. This is referred to as my field

notebook in the pages that follow to distinguish it from my journal. In that latter

volume, I recorded the information from briefings and meetings, as well as personal observations about the operation. Whenever I was working in the UINITAF

headquarters compound, I could use the services of the Joint Combat Camera

Team to record my interviews with commanders and staff officers. Unfortunately,

vii
most of these were unavailable to me while I was writing this history. Fortunately,

I kept notes of these interviews and have used these.

I chose to allow the materials used to guide the writing of the history and to follow the development of issues. I have endeavored to use sources collected by

myself or by others at the time of the operation, or shortly thereafter. The views

and comments presented most nearly coincide with those perceptions held by the

participants at the time. Where I have used secondary sources, I have tried to use

ones that gave insight into the more non-military aspects of the operation, such as

Somali culture, politics, United Nations participation, etc. Here again, I have used

studies that were prepared just a few years after the operation.

There are now several excellent studies of the operations in Somalia, but which

were not used for the preparation of this work. Many of these deal with the more

dramatic events of October 1993, which is outside the scope of this monograph.

Interested scholars are directed to Somalia and Operation Restore Hope by John

L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, and Policing The New World Disorder: Peace

Operations and Public Security, edited by Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic,

and Eliot M. Goldberg. Of importance for an understanding of the United

Nations' perspective and the relationships of UNITAF with UNOSOM I and II is

volume VIII of the United Nations blue book series, The United Nations and

Somalia, 1992-.i 996. Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War

is a moving account based on interviews with participants of the raid of 3 October

1993. It is by far the best of several that have been published in recent years. In

addition, there have been many excellent articles in military journals and the military forces of several of the coalition nations have written after-action reports or

official histories of their contributions to the operation.

In the middle of January 1993, shortly after the death in action of Private First

Class Domingo Arroyo, I was traveling by helicopter to an interview with Captain

John W. Peterson, USN. While waiting at the helipad near the airport, a small

group of Marines joined the party. They were members of Task Force Mogadishu.

As we waited, a first lieutenant and I struck up a conversation, as Marines often

will when thrown together for a short time. After explaining what we each did, he

asked me, referring to Private First Class Arroyo's death, "Sir, was it worth it?" I

could not answer his question then, knowing how keenly this loss had been felt.

Most certainly to Arroyo's family, friends, and comrades, the price was too great.

But there were also the scores of thousands of Somalis, many of them innocent

children, who had been saved by the efforts of Marines, soldiers, and sailors like

Private First Class Arroyo. For these and their families there could be no greater

gift. If, in the end, America and her coalition partners were repaid with callous

evil by some men, that does not mean the attempt ought not to have been made.

Someday, perhaps, one of those children, grown-up and grateful for what had

been done, will lead his country out of the fear, evil, and despair that have

engulfed it.

D. P. Mroczkowski

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

viii
Table of Contents

Foreword .iii

Preface v

Table of Contents ix

Part I - A Crisis in the Making

Chapter 1 Descent Into Despair 1

The Beginning 1 Clans and Colonization 2

A Trust Territory 4

Unification and Independence 4

A Failed State 5

Operation Eastern Exit 6

Civil War and Anarchy 7

Part II - Operation Restore Hope

Chapter 2 The Widening Mission 11

Historic Decision to Intervene 11

Initial Planning 12

First Steps 13

Organizing Tasks 15

Support Command 18

Coalition Partners 19

Chapter 3 Plans and Preparations 21

Working with Central Command 21

Somali Opposition 22

Somali Terrain 24

Specified Tasks 25

Psychological Operations 27

Phases of the Operation 27

The Flow of the Force 29

Chapter 4 Coming Ashore 31

Initial Landings 31

Logistical Buildup 35

Force Buildup 36

mb the Interior 42

Securing the Relief Sectors 43

Chapter 5 Politics, Peace Talks, and Police 51

Military-Political Cooperation 51

Weapons Control and the use of Force 52

Reconciliation Conferences 55

Somali Police Forces 58

Chapter 6 Moving to the Third Phase 63

Settling In and Daily Work 63

ix
Mogadishu .66

Bale Dogle .76

Baidoa 77

Bardera 82

Oddur 83

Gialalassi 85

Merka 90

BeletWeyne 91

Kismayo 94

Morale and Restraint 98

Chapter 7 Drawing Down the Forces 103

Naval Operations 103

Air Operations 104

End Game 110

Restructuring and Redeployment 112

UINIITAF Redeployment 113

Coalition Shifts 117

Chapter 8 Normality Begins to Return 119

Logistics 119

Medical Care and Health Issues 124

Engineering 130

Communications 134

Psychological Operations 137

Civil-Military Operations 40

Part III - Getting Out

Chapter 9 Transition and Return 147

United Nations Relationship 147

Slow Transition to U.N. Control 150

Epilogue 155

Notes 159

Appendices

Appendix A: Unified Task Force Somalia Organization 169

Appendix B: Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling 179

Appendix C: Chronology of Events and Operations 183

Appendix D: Citation 187

Index 189

x


Chapter 1

Descent Into Despair

The Beginning

By the summer of 1992, almost every

American was familiar with the problems of

Somalia. Images of sick, weak, and starving peopie had been forced into the consciousness of

even the most casual observer of the news of the

day. Television specials, photographs in magazines, newspaper articles, and even radio programs all served to focus the attention of our

nation to this devastated land on the Horn of

Africa. That people were suffering and dying in

the thousands was obvious; that something needed to be done was unquestionable. But even the

best intentions are of no consequence without

identifiable goats and the means to implement a

relevant plan. In August 1992, the United States,

responding to a great human tragedy, was ready to

act. The plan, originally quite simple, was the start

of what would develop into one of the largest

humanitarian relief efforts in the history of the

world, Operation Restore Hope.

On 18 August 1992, President George H. W.

Bush ordered the airlift of 145,000 tons of emergency food supplies to Somalia. This initial effort,

named Operation Provide Relief, was based in

Mombasa, Kenya, and was commanded by

Marine Brigadier General Frank Libutti. Military

and civilian aircraft were used to fly shipments of

food to towns inside Somalia.' From there, the

food was to be distributed to needy refugees by

humanitarian relief organizations and nongovernmental organizations such as the International

Red Cross and the World Food Program.

Unfortunately, the accomplishment of this

humane task was often frustrated by the conditions on the ground in Somalia.

As is so often the case with crises that seemingly flash across the nation's television screens

and magaziae covers, the situation that led to a

united intervention in Somalia had a long and

complex history that was not immediately apparent. Of all of the world's areas, the Horn of Africa

always has been one of the most overlooked and

least understood. Yet, an appreciation of the history and culture of this region is necessary to understand what the United States-led coalition did, and

what its accomplishments were.

DVIC DF-ST-98-04803

A Somali herds his flock of goats near the village of Belet Weyne. Unlike much of postcolonialAfrica, Somalia's borders enclosed a single ethnic group, the Samaal, which has occupied the region since biblical times.
2 RaSTORING Hou IN SorvIAuk

Clans and Colonization

One of the most important aspects of Somali

society, and perhaps the most difficult for Western

observers to understand or appreciate, are the concepts of lineage and clan affiliation. For many

Americans, the word "clan" conjures up images of

Scottish or Irish ancestry. To a Somali, however,

clan relationships define individual identity and

relationships to every person that he comes into

contact with. It is no exaggeration that Somali

children are taught their lineages for several generations back so that on meeting another person,

each can recite his ancestry and thus understand

his obligations and responsibilities to the other.

Traditionally, all Somalis trace their ancestry

back to one man, Abu Taalib, an uncle of the

Prophet Mohamed. His son, Aqiil, in turn had two

sons, Sab and Samaal. It is from these two the six

clan-families descend and

through which all ethnic

Somalis trace their ancestry.

On the Sab branch, these

clan-families are the Digil

and Rahanweyne; from

Samaal are descended the

Darod, Dir, Issaq and

Hawiye. Over generations,

each of these clan-families

was further subdivided into

clans, subclans and families.2 This fracturing of the

people by lines of descent

produced a dichotomy not

unusual in clan societies in

which there is strength

against an external foe, but

intemal national weakness.

For example, while a threat

to the overall structure

could bring about a unified

effort to combat it, the various entities could still be

fiercely antagonistic to one

another. In an area in which

resources are scarce and

competition for those

resources is very great, such

hereditary divisiveness can

assume tremendous importance. In Somalia, the

scarcity of water and arable

land for both nomadic

herdsmen and for farmers has led to a tradition of

competition among the various families and

clans.3

A unified Somali nation did not exist until the

20th century. In earlier times, the country was

under the control of various emirates, generally

centered along the coast. Cities carried on a trade

between the peoples of the hinterland and the

Arabian Peninsula. By the late 19th century, however, several other countries were colonizing or

occupying parts of the Horn of Africa that would

become Somalia. The French occupied the northernmost sector, French Somaliland, today known

as Djibouti. The Italians, seeking an empire in

Africa, colonized the southern portion and called

Italian Somaliland. The British, with an eye to the

protection of the Suez Canal and their trade

through the Red Sea, occupied an area on the Gulf

of Aden known as British Somaliland. Even the
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 3

Egyptians and Ethiopians claimed portions of the

territory inhabited by the Somalis.4 A legacy of

bitterness, particularly against the Egyptians, the

Coptic Christian Ethiopians, and the Italians, was

formed at this time and was still apparent during

Operation Restore Hope.

Life was not always tranquil for the occupying

powers, and they often fought among themselves.

In 1896, the Italians invaded Ethiopia from

Eritria, their colony on the Red Sea. The army of

the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II, stunningly

defeated them at the Battle of Adowa. Imam

Mohamed Ibn Abdullah Hassan raised an insurrection in British Somaliland in 1899 in response

to perceived threats to the Islamic religion from

foreign influences. Known to history as the "Mad

Mullah," Mohamed Abdullah waged an intermittent 22-year jihad against both the British and the

Ethiopians. This was a period in Somalia's history marked by chaos, destmction, and famine and

during which it is estimated that one-third of all

males in British Somaliland died, often at the

hands of the Mullah and his followers. It is difficult not to see a reflection of these earlier events

in those that would occur 80 years later.5

While Great Britain, Italy, and France were

allies during World War I, the rise of the Fascist

dictator Benito Mussolini was to cause a division

among the colonial powers. The Italian invasion

and conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 placed Italy

squarely in confrontation with Great Britain.

British opposition to this aggression moved

Mussolini to join Adolf Hitler, whose policies of

expansion in Europe Mussolini had formerly

opposed.6 Thus, when World War II began, the

Horn of Africa was occupied by belligerents and

was soon to become a battleground.

The Italian Fascist government recognized it

had the "chance of five thousand years" to

increase its African colonial holdings at the

expense of Great Britain.7 But Italy did not

declare war on the British Empire until the fall of

France was imminent, in June 1940. Before the

year ended, however, the British were already

planning to attack the Italian forces in Somalia, as

part of an overall strategy to clear the African con-
4 Rsioiur.jc HOPE IN SOMALIA

tinent of the enemy. Accordingly, in February

1941, British Empire forces were on the offensive

to places that would become familiar to American

servicemen 52 years later. On 14 February, the

port city of Kismayo was captured, followed by

the town of Jilib on the Jubba River on 22

February. The city of Mogadishu was attacked

next. Although it is more than 200 miles from

Kismayo and Jilib, British Empire troops entered

Mogadishu only three days later, on 25 February.

With the Italian forces retreating into the interior,

British forces advanced quickly beyond the borders of Italian Somaliland and into Ethiopia.8

As the war moved away from Somalia, the

British assumed responsibility for the administration of the entire area. During this period, the

Somali people began to develop their first modem

political organizations. The Somalia Youth Club

was formed in 1943, including in its membership

native civil servants and police officers. In 1947,

the organization changed its name to the Somali

Youth League (SYL), with the announced aims of

the unification of all Somali territory, a standardized written form of the language, and protection

of Somali interests. With branches in all Somalioccupied territories, including areas of Ethiopia

and Kenya, and with a membership from nearly

all clan-families, this party represented a true

national political organization. Other parties also

came into being at this time, but these were invariably representative individual clan-families.9

A Trust Territory

British administration continued until the end

of the war, when the Allies decided the Italian

colonies seized during the war would not be

returned. A commission composed of representatives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the

United States was formed to study the disposition

of these former colonies, including Somalia. The

SYL proposed that all Somali territories be unified and requested a trusteeship by an intemational commission for 10 years to be followed by

complete independence. While such a proposal

was agreeable to the commission, the Allied

Council of Foreign Ministers could not decide on

the proper method for preparing the country for

independence. Finally, in 1949, the General

Assembly of the United Nations assigned Italy the

trusteeship with the stipulation that Somalia must

be entirely independent before the end of 1960.

Although there were many Somalis, particularly

in the SYL, who did not want Italy to control any

of the country, they did acquiesce to the proposal.

For the next 11 years, the country was prepared

for independence as a Trust Territory. Although

there was some antagonism toward the Italians in

the early years of this period, it began to wane as

the country's economy and political structures

developed. The time was one of optimism as

enthusiasm for the new democracy raised a

national spirit without the traditional connections

to the

During the 1950s, the SYL continued to be the

most important and strongest of the political parties. By 1956, the SYL had received the majority

of the seats in the national assembly. It followed a

program that was nationalist in outlook and

sought to weaken the influence of the clans. When

drafting the constitution for the new nation as it

approached independence, the SYL sought a unitary form of government. A federal form was

believed to be too susceptible to the divisiveness

of clan interests, and even in the SYL itself there

were individuals who were more interested in the

furtherance of their particular clan than in a purely national program.'

Unification and Independence

In 1956, Britain agreed to the eventual independence of British Somaliland and its incorporation in the new nation. Accordingly, British

Somaliland was granted independence on 26 June

1960, and on 1 July it joined with the Trust

Territory to form the Somali Republic. During this

early period of independence, the new national

government had to address the differences

between the two sections' political, economic, and

social development. While clan allegiances

remained important, the development of a position with an appeal to the interests of both the

northern and southern sections helped to bring the

nation closer together.'2

The major issues facing the new country during

the 1960s were the improvement of social conditions and the nation's physical infrastructure. At

the same time, many of the nation's political leaders espoused the idea of "Pan-Somalism," a concept that called for the unification of all the

Somali peoples into one nation. Whether this

unity was to be achieved by peaceful or aggressive means was an issue of some debate among

the leaders, but the idea had a great appeal with

the people. Since many Somalis lived in the bor-
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 5

der areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, this

goal placed Somalia in confrontation with those

nations. There were several border clashes with

Ethiopia during this period, as well as guerilla

raids into Kenya. While this expansionist program

may have alienated Somalia at times from its

neighbors, the general policy did provide a broad

basis for agreement among nearly all of the political leaders.'3

The 1960s also saw the increasing dominance

of the SYL in the government. Curiously, the

party's great success was becoming a weakness.

As candidates in national elections began to recognize the SYL was the winning ticket, the party

drew persons of all political views and beliefs into

its ranks. More importantly, the party became the

means through which nepotism and clan allegiances were once again served. Ironically, the

SYL thus came to represent the very factionalism

it had originally opposed. In addition, the party

and government became corrupt as favors and

personal gain took the place of public service. By

the end of the decade, the nation was ripe for a

coup d'etat.'4

A Failed State

An assassin, apparently motivated by a clan

grievance, killed President Abdirashid Ali

Shermarke on 15 October 1969. Although the act

was an isolated incident of violence, it served as

the catalyst for events that quickly followed. The

assassination was used as an excuse for the overthrow of the democratic government. On 21

October, when Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal tried

to arrange the selection of a new president, the

military moved to take over the country. Major

General Mohammed Siad Barre quickly assumed

leadership of the new Supreme Revolutionary

Council. Members of the old government were

arrested, political parties were outlawed, the

National Assembly was abolished, and the constitution was suspended. Under the new name of the

Somali Democratic Republic, the country

embarked upon its own social experiment of scientific socialism. Specifically, the new regime

wanted to end the influence of allegiance to clans

and the corruption that had become endemic in

the government. Society was to be transformed in

accordance with a political philosophy based on

both the Quran and Marxism.'5

Among other projects begun by the new government was an attempt to raise the literacy rate of

the nation. In this they were fairly successful,

employing a program of sending those who were

already educated throughout the country to teach

others. Not as successful was the attempt of the

government to improve the economy of the country. One of the poorest of all nations, Somalia's

economy was defined by the pastoral nomadic

lifestyle of the majority of its people. Foreign

exports were limited mainly to cattle or other

foodstuffs produced in the fertile river valleys.

Most farming, however, was of a subsistence

level. Such a fragile economy was susceptible to

the droughts that would regularly strike the

region, which left the country very dependent

upon foreign assistance, particularly from the

Soviet Union.16

In this period of the Cold War, there was some

strategic significance to the position of Somalia

based upon the approaches to the Red Sea and the

Suez Canal. With many of its Army officers educated in the Soviet Union, and with its commitment to a socialist form of government, Somalia

Photo courtesy of the author

MajGen Mohammed Siad Barre took power in late

1969 in a bloodless coup following the assassination of

country's prime minister, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke.

Barre's goal of removing the clan as the primary Somali

allegiance ultimately would lead to the destruction of

the Somali state.
6 RESTORTNG HOPE IN SOMALIA

eagerly accepted Soviet military and economic

aid. In return, the Soviets were allowed to build

airfield and port facilities at Berbera, on the north

coast. While the ties to the Soviet Union were

never truly strong, they were to be severed permanently by the pursuit of Somali foreign policy.'7

The concept of Pan-Somalism had continued

into the Bare regime. In the early years of his

rule, this policy was pursued through peaceful

negotiations with neighboring countries.

Especially in regard to the Ogaden region, controlled by Ethiopia, the Somali government distanced itself from the insurgent movements that

had previously been supported there. This

changed after the 1974 overthrow of Emperor

Haile Selassie and the establishment of a Marxist

government in Addis Ababa. When attempts

failed at negotiating a settlement of the Ogaden

question, the Somali government recognized the

Western Somali Liberation Front, which was

fighting to break the Ogaden from Ethiopia. Aid

was given to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army, which was fighting a guerilla war

against the new Ethiopian government. Finally, in

July 1977, the Somali Army invaded Ethiopian

territory in an attempt to gain the Ogaden. In this

contest between two of its client states, the Soviet

Union came to the aid of Ethiopia. With large

amounts of modern Soviet equipment and a reinforcement of Cuban troops, the Ethiopians turned

the tide of battle and drove the Somalis from their

territory. In retaliation, Siad Bare ejected Soviet

personnel from Somalia and turned to the West for

support. In 1980, an agreement was reached with

the United States whereby use was given of the

port and airfield facilities at Berbera in exchange

for military and economic aid.'8 Somalia stayed

close to the United States throughout the remainder of the 1980s.

This decade was not to be an easy one for the

Bane regime, however. hi spite of its attempts to

rid the country of the influence of "tribalism," the

government was increasingly identified with the

Marehan, Bane's own clan.'9 In addition, corruption in the government created even more dissatisfaction. By 1988, armed opposition to the Bane

regime had begun with a rebellion in the north of

the country.2° There were three main opposition

groups forming in late 1990 around geographical

and clan affiliations: the Somali National

Movement (SNM), which had begun in Northern

Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM),

which was mainly recmited from the Ogaden and

was active in the southern region; and the United

Somali Congress (USC), composed mainly from

the Hawiye clan and active in the central part of

the country. By December these forces had

pushed the Somali Army back the outskirts of the

capital, Mogadishu. Violence and unrest began to

grow within the city itself, creating a dangerous

atmosphere for the foreign personnel and diplomats living there. Open fighting had begun in the

city by late in the month as the predominantly

Marehan-based army attempted to destroy USC

elements in the Hawiye enclaves. The resulting

breakdown of all order unleashed even greater

lawlessness.2'

Operation Eastern Exit

On 5 December 1990, due to escalating violence and chaos, American Ambassador James K.

Bishop ordered the departure of non-essential

embassy personnel and dependents. By midmonth, several foreign countries had joined the

United States in advising their citizens to leave.

On 30 December, Ambassador Bishop brought all

remaining official Americans into the embassy

compound, where he initially thought they could

wait out the fighting in safety. By 1 January 1991,

attacks on foreigners, including Americans, had

increased and the embassy itself had been hit by

small arms fire. Ambassador Bishop decided the

situation was too dangerous to permit embassy

personnel to remain any longer, and on New

Year's Day he requested permission from the U.S.

State Department to evacuate the embassy.

Permission was granted on 2 January.22

In a fine example of forward thinking, on 31

December 1990, Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur,

USN, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central

Command, had already alerted his staff to be prepared to conduct a non-combatant evacuation

operation (NEO) in Mogadishu. Even though

heavily involved in Operation Desert Shield and

the fmal preparations for Operation Desert Storm,

Central Command in Saudi Arabia began planning rapidly for the evacuation. After reviewing

the Central Command plan, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff issued an execute order for the evacuation

operation late on 2 January. By that time, forces

for the operation were already being assembled

from those available in the Persian Gulf.23

The operation was nanied Eastern Exit.

Planners had created a variety of potential scenar-
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 7

ios, each tailored for a specific situation. In a

preparatory move, U.S. Air Force AC-130 Specter

gunships and ground security elements deployed

to Nairobi, Kenya, in case the preferred option, a

peaceful evacuation through the Mogadishu airport, could be accomplished. This plan was not

pursued once Ambassador Bishop decided it was

too dangerous for embassy personnel to make the

nearly two-mile journey to the airport. Conditions

at the airport also had deteriorated to such an

extent that an air operation would be too risky.

These circumstances left an amphibious option.24

Admiral Arthur chose to create an amphibious

force Composed of only two ships, the amphibious

transport dock USS Trenton (APD 14) and the helicopter assault ship USS Guam (LPD 9). The

commanding general of 4th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (4th MEB), Major General Harry W.

Jenkins, Jr., designated Colonel James J. Doyle,

Jr., as the commander of the landing force. His

counterpart, the commander of the amphibious

task force, was Captain Alan B. Moser, USN.

These two officers embarked their staffs and the

task force got under way from Masirah Island, off

the tip of Oman, by 2330 on 2 January. Colonel

Doyle and Captain Moser had been informed the

use of the airport was not an option, nor was an

across-the-beach landing because of the distance

inland of the embassy from any potential landing

sites. The plan with the greatest chance of success

was, therefore, to use shipborne Marine helicopters that could land directly in the embassy compound.25

By 3 and 4 January, the threat to the embassy

and its personnel increased. The embassy guards

engaged in a firelight with looters, and small arms

fire and even a rocket propelled grenade impacted

inside the embassy grounds. At that point it was

decided that a pair of Sikorsky CH-53 Super

Stallion assault helicopters could be launched

when within 500 miles of Mogadishu. The time of

departure would be calculated to provide an early

morning arrrval at the Somali coast. This long-distance journey would require at least one aerial

refueling and cause crew fatigue, but it would get

the aircraft and security forces to the embassy

much sooner.26

*Planning for the imminent start of Operation Desert Storm

was paramount in the minds of planners at this time, and the

choice was to have as many ships available as possible in the

Persian Gulf area. It was not possible to forecast either how

long Eastern Exit would take, or when ships committed to it

would be able to return.

The 60-man evacuation force was composed

51 Marines and corpsmen from the 4th MEB, and

nine U.S. Navy special warfare personnel from

Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Team 8F. The security elements boarded the helicopters at 0330 on 5

January. At 0345 they lifted off, with an expected

arrival time of 0620. With the in-flight refueling

successfully completed, the helicopters crossed

the coast just at dawn. There was some initial difficulty in identifying the embassy, but it was

clearly distinguished on the second attempt. As

the helicopters came in for their landings, numerous armed looters were seen positioning ladders

against one side of the compound wall. Upon

landing, the SEALs immediately established the

security of the chancery building while the

Marines provided a perimeter defense for the

compound. Both helicopters were quickly filled

with evacuees and they returned to the Guam by

1040.27

Back at Mogadishu, the evacuation force and

the embassy security force assisted in bringing in

several citizens from other foreign countries. By

evening, the first of four waves of Boeing-Vertol

CFl-46E Sea Knight helicopters from the Guam

arrived at the embassy landing zone. These five

helicopters remained on the ground only 20 minutes, departing with an additional 75 evacuees. As

the first wave of helicopters returned to the Guam,

the second wave set down at the embassy. This

wave, also of five helicopters, departed after just

18 minutes on the ground, leaving only the

ambassador, his staff, and the Marine Security

Guard to be evacuated. The third wave departed at

2210, and the fourth wave carried the ambassador

and the perimeter defense force. This final wave

took off even as looters clambered over the walls

and entered the compound. The last helicopter

landed back on the Guam at 2323, and 20 minutes

later the ambassador declared the operation completed.28

Civil War and Anarchy

With the completion of this highly successful

operation, the American presence in Somalia

ended for nearly two years. Few in the United

States noticed what was happening there because

the attenti.on of Americans and most of the world

was focused on the events in Southwest Asia. By

the end of January 1991, Siad Bare was forced to

flee Mogadishu, and the country fell deeper into

anarchy and chaos as the various armed factions
8 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

continued to battle the forces of the old national

government. Finally, by May 1992, Bane's forces

were defeated and he was forced to flee the country altogether. This did not mean the end of fighting, however. Instead, the various factions and

clans that had formerly opposed Bane now sought

to achieve dominance in the new government.

When Barre was driven from Mogadishu, Ali

Mahdi Mohamed of the USC was selected as the

new president. The USC was an instrument of the

Hawiye clan, however, and Au Mahdi never

received enough support to coalesce the rest of the

country behind him. The fighting, which now pitted the clans against one another, also led to the

creation of new alliances and divisions. For

instance, the USC itself split into two factions,

one led by Ali Mahdi and the other by General

Mohammed Farah Hassan Aideed.29 No single

group was strong enough to overcome the others

in this unending fight for power. Without a central

government, anarchy, violence, and lawlessness

reigned.

To add to the suffering of the Somali people, a

severe drought had devastated the region for

about three years. As farmers were unable to raise

crops, food itself became a weapon. To have it

made one's own group strong; to deprive one's

rivals of it weakened them as it strengthened oneself The threat of losing subsistence to armed

bands of factional militias was now added to the

threat of being robbed by the increasing gangs of

bandits. With violence a reality of everyday life,

everyone had to protect himself Individuals

armed themselves, formed local militias, or hired

others for protection. Even private relief organizations became the targets of threats and extortion

and had to resort to the hiring of armed bodyguards. It truly became a case of "every man

against every man."

By the early 1990s, the history of Somalia disclosed certain disturbing patterns. First, it showed

that tribalism or clan loyalty was still a dominant

factor in society, despite earlier efforts to remove

it. It was a force to be understood and reckoned

with. The passage of time made no change in this

central fact of life. What had changed was the

general lifestyle of the people. The reforms of the

Barre regime had removed many of the old structures by which Somali society had been able to

keep clan rivalries and violence in check, or at

least within acceptable limits. In fact, it could be

argued that the Bane years actually made each

clan more jealous of the others and desirous of

achieving dominance, destroying the balance that

had existed before.3° In addition, the years during

which Somalia was a client state of the Soviet

DVIC DN-ST-93-03436

Village women gather near refugee huts outside Baidoa. The descending spiral of rape, murder, destruction of crops

and water supplies, and wholesale slaughter had led to mass starvation and forced thousands of Somalis to flee

their former homes.
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 9

DVIC DD-SD-00-O1 008 Members of the Aerial Port Squadron from Dyess Air Force Base, Abilene, Texas, and Dover Air Force Base, Dover,

Delaware, unload medical supplies from the left side of a Boeing KC- 135 Stratotanker's cargo bay. Off loaded at

Moi International Airport, Mombasa, Kenya, the supplies were transferred to U.S. Air Force C- 130s for deliveiy to

Somalia as part of Operation Provide Relief.

Union and the United States saw the accumulation

of a large amount of weapons, ranging from rifles

to tanks and artillery. Somalia thus had an abundant supply of weapons for its factional armies

and bandits.

Operation Provide Relief, begun so hopefully

in August 1992, soon was confronted with the

reality of the chaos and strife into which Somalia

had descended. The breaking of the famine could

only be achieved by the safe delivery and distribution of the food.

In November, with deaths by starvation and

related diseases numbering 350,000 and expected

to increase rapidly, the United States decided to

take action. Acting on a United Nations mandate,

President Bush announced the United States

would ensure the secure environment needed for

the safe and effective delivery of relief supplies.

However, there was no assurance the food would

ultimately be given to those for whom it was

intended, the thousands of refugees who were

driven from their homes by the drought and fighting and who now faced death by starvation.

Aircraft deliveries of relief supplies could be sent

into the country, but there was no guarantee the

aircraft would be allowed to land safely, or that

their cargoes would not be subject to extortionate

payments. In the autumn of 1992, it had become

obvious that merely providing the necessities of

life to these victims of anarchy would not suffice.

Operation Restore Hope was about to begin.

* An example of the amounts which the relief organizations

had to pay simply to accomplish their humanitarian goals

was told to the author by Lieutenant Colonel Carol J.

Mathieu, commanding officer of the Canadian Airborne

Regiment forces in Belet Weyne. The relief committee of the

International Commission of the Red Cross was required to

provide each security guard at the airport with 85 kilograms

(187 pounds) of food per month. The cost for each airplane

landing at the airport was 50,000 Somali shillings. Also, they

were forced to rent cars and trucks at the rate of $1,600 per

month.

Chapter 2

The Widening Mission

Historic Decision to Intervene

The 1992 Thanksgiving holiday brought the

usual round of family visiting and celebration to

the American people. Yet, perhaps especially at

this time, many in the United States reflected

upon the poignant differences between their fortune and the plight of the Somali people. In

Washington, D.C., the holidays were not to be a

time of relaxation or conviviality for many in the

government. President George H. W. Bush was

conferring with advisers in the State Department

and the Department of Defense about what could

be done to alleviate the suffering in Somalia. As

one official put it, "the number of deaths was

going up, and the number of people we were

reaching was going down."3'

The day before Thanksgiving, the President's

advisers provided him with three military options.

The first was a simple reinforcement of 3,500

troops to the 500 Pakistanis already in Mogadishu

as United Nations peacekeepers. The second was

to provide both air and naval support to a United

Nations force that would intervene in Somalia.

The third option, and the one the President quickly chose, was for the United States to send in a

division-sized unit under United Nations auspices.32

On 25 November, President Bush announced to

the United Nations that the United States was prepared to provide military forces to assist with the

delivery of food and other supplies. The offer of

military assistance at this point was of a "general

nature," one that required a specific request from

the U.N. Security Council.33 Without waiting for

the Security Council to act, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff sent an alert order to the commander in chief

of U.S. Central Command, Marine General

Joseph P. Hoar. Within a week, the Joint Chiefs

provided a formal planning order to Central

Command, directing General Hoar to prepare a

detailed operations plan.34

The United Nations was not long in responding

to the American offer. On 29 November, the

United Nations Secretary General, Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, stated: "any forceful action should

preferably be under U.N. command, but if that

was not feasible, a Council-authorized operation

undertaken by Member States was to be considered."35 On 3 December, the U.N. Security

Council unanimously passed Resolution 794,

authorizing military intervention in Somalia. A

multinational force led by the United States was

allowed to use all necessary force to accomplish

its humanitarian mission.36 It was the first time in

history the United Nations had elected to intervene in the internal affairs of a country without

having received a request to do so from the country's government. Of course, Somalia was unique

DoD Photo

Gen Joseph P Hoar, the Marine Corps' deputy for

operations during the Gulf War, and before that, Gen

Norman Schwa rtzkopf's chief of staff at Central

Command, in August 1991 assumed the post of

Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, the unified command that has planning and operational

responsibilities for 19 countries of the Middle East,

South Asia, and the Horn of Africa.
12 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

in that there was no legitimate government and

the situation demanded swift action.

The agreement allowing the United States to

lead the force satisfied one of the few demands

placed by President Bush upon the offer of troops.

The American government did concede the

United Nations should have a supervisory role.

However, it was anticipated the United Nations

would send in a peacekeeping force to replace the

U.S.-led force as soon as practical.37 In these early

days, there was even some discussion the turnover

could take place as early as 20 January 1993,

Inauguration Day.38

Initial Planning

While political issues were being discussed, the

military planning was already in progress. As

early as 22 November 1992, Lieutenant General

Robert B. Johnston, commanding general of I

Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) at Camp

Pendleton, California, had received indications

from Central Command he might have to form a

joint task force.39 On 27 November, by an oral

order, General Hoar designated I MEF as the

headquarters of Joint Task Force Somalia.40

DoD Photo

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, a veteran of Vietnam, Lebanon, and the Gulf War during which he sea'ved as chief of

staff of Central Command, commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force, the unit designated as the headquarters for

the joint task force as it had trained for this type of operation.
THE WIDENING MISSION 13

Fortunately, I MEF did not have to start entirely from scratch in developing such a headquarters.

During a recent exercise, CatEx 92-3, the expeditionary force had already organized and run the

headquarters for a joint task force. In the exercise,

the expeditionary force was tasked with acting as

a "Humanitarian/Peacekeeping Joint Task Force

simulating bare base conditions in a nonpermissive environment."4' While it was admittedly

difficult to describe all the requirements of such

an organization during an exercise, the work

helped validate the concept and defined some of

the needs of such a force.42

The task force had an exceptionally capable

and qualified commanding general in Lieutenant

General Johnston. Distinguished and inspiring in

appearance, he was also characterized by clarity

of perception and speech rarely found in other

individuals, regardless of rank. Trim and in excellent physical condition, he was able to meet the

harsh demands of the equatorial desert and set a

high standard for his command. These characteristics would serve both him and the joint task

force well in the months ahead as he threaded his

way through numerous political, humanitarian,

and operational considerations. But for the initial

planning stages, the general's greatest strength

may have been his own experience as a Marine

officer. He had led a battalion to Lebanon 10 years

earlier and knew what it meant to be a peacekeeper in a land in the midst of civil war. More recently, he was on the staff of Central Command during the war in the Persian Gulf. He had served in

Saudi Arabia as the Central Command Chief of

Staff. Many of the principles for organizing a joint

and combined staff, which he had seen used so

successfully in the Persian Gulf conflict, would

help him in creating his own joint task force.

First Steps

General Johnston had to first decide on the

manner of organizing his new force. Since this

was to be a joint task force, he would need to

effectively integrate personnel and units from the

other Anned Services. He had two choices by

which he could accomplish this: organize along

functional lines, as with a Marine air-ground task

force, a concept familiar to all Marines; or organize the force as components, as had been done

with the American forces during Desert Storm.

General Johnston recognized the functional

organization would require an integration of

forces at levels other than the task force headquarters. For instance, the ground forces of the

Marine Corps and Army would have to be placed

into a single ground combat element; the air assets

of the Marines, Army, Navy, and Air Force into a

single air combat element, and so on. But he saw

no need for a single commander for such elements, and he knew each service component

could be tasked to perform discrete missions.

Besides, the experience of Desert Storm had

proven it was reasonable to operate with such

components, so this was the manner in which

Joint Task Force Somalia would be organized.43

In building the headquarters staff, General

Johnston already had the I MEF staff to serve as a

nucleus. Of course, these Marines had already

served and worked together, and this familiarity

would be an added strength for the newly forming

staff. As General Hoar later wrote: "designating a

component or element headquarters as the foundation of the mission ... allowed an established

service staff to transition quickly to a Uoint task

force] with little need for start-up time."

However, the I MEF staff itself was not large

enough for the greater responsibilities that acting

as a joint task force would entail. It would require

augmentation by other Marines and personnel

from the other Services. For example, the need to

expand the intelligence and operations sections

was immediately recognized; although the mission would be essentially humanitarian, the task

force would have to be prepared for an armed

threat.

The Service components at Central Command,

which would be providing the military units for

the force, also selected individuals who would

join the joint task force headquarters. General

Johnston later said: "They sent their best players. ... I got key people."45

By late November, military personnel across

the nation were receiving orders to join the joint

task force, or were preparing themselves for the

possibility. At Fort Hood, Texas, Colonel Sam E.

Hatton, USA, was serving as the deputy commander of the 13th Corps Support Command. On

1 December 1992, he received orders to proceed

as quickly as possible to Camp Pendleton,

California, for assignment as the task force logistics officer. He immediately handed over his

responsibilities and closed out remaining tasks.

He also placed some fast telephone calls to associates and acquaintances, many of which were

now general officers and key personnel at the
14 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DA-SD-98-00361

BGen Anthony C. Zinni, a veteran of Vietnam and severa! humanitarian operations, provided assistance and

was selected to serve as chief of operations for the joint

task force.

Department of the Army, to gauge the situation in

Somalia. Proceeding to Camp Pendleton, Colonel

Hatton's first task was to organize his own section. Building on I MEF's logistics section, he

checked the existing table of organization and the

talent available to ensure "the right people were in

the right jobs."46

Similarly, Colonel William M. Handley, Jr.,

USA, was serving at Headquarters, United States

Army Forces Command, at Fort Stewart, Georgia,

when he received a call notifying him that he had

been selected to head the joint task force intelligence section. He quickly discussed the situation

with the intelligence staff and received a briefing

from the Third Army. After arriving at Camp

Pendleton, he met with Colonel Michael V. Brock,

the I MEF intelligence officer. Checking the

organization of the section, he saw little to

change. After being apprised of the task force's

mission, he realized one of his first requirements

would be the production of area studies, which he

had but a short time to prepare. In the meantime,

I MEF intelligence section's organization was

expanded with members from the other Services

and augmented with personnel from national

intelligence assets.47

One other important member of the growing

staff was Marine Brigadier General Anthony C.

Zinni. His background and experience suited him

for a responsible position within the joint task

force staff; in recent years, General Zinni had

served as operations officer for the United States

European Command. In 1991, he was the Chief of

Staff and Deputy Commander for Operation

Provide Comfort, the Kurdish relief operation at

the end of the Persian Gulf War. Shortly afterward, he served as the military coordinator for

Operation Provide Hope in the Soviet Union.

Now, in late 1992, he was the deputy commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat

Development Command at Quantico, Virginia. He

quickly volunteered to provide assistance to the

joint task force. After reporting to both the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl

E. Mundy, Jr., and Lieutenant General Johnston,

he was selected to head the operations section.

General Zinni joined the I MEF staff at Central

Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, where

he received briefs on the situation in Somalia.

From there he left for Camp Pendleton.48

The Surgeon General of the Navy personally

chose the force surgeon, Captain Michael L.

Cowan, USN. Captain Cowan was the surgeon

with Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, when he was

told of his selection on 6 December. By the 9th, he

reached Camp Pendleton, where he began to work

on planning with a staff that "had just met." His

first priority was setting the medical evacuation

plan, which included establishing alternate routes

to move the wounded out of the country.49

The process continued until the entire staff of

the MEF headquarters was transformed into the

headquarters of a joint task force. Individuals of

all ranks, be they officer or enlisted, who had any

of the required knowledge or expertise, were

selected from the various Services by the component commanders at Central Command. They

were quickly integrated into the appropriate staff

sections. Within a short time the task force headquarters staff had developed a decidedly purple
THE WIDENING MISSION 15

DVIC DN-SC-93-04559

A port bow view of the amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH 10) undetway. The second ship to be named after the

ball/c of Tripoli in 1804, she was a veteran of the Cu/f War during which she was damaged by an Iraqi contact mine.

complexion. Marines accounted only for 57 percent of the total.

Organizing Tasks

Even as the staff was coming together, the task

organization of the force itself had to be configured. Since I MEF was providing the cornerstone

of the task force headquarters, it would only be

natural that the MEF subordinate elements (1st

Marine Division; 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; 1st

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence

Group; and 1st Force Service Support Group)

should be heavily involved in the operation.

However, there also were sound operational reasons for selecting the Marines for a large role in

the mission. The Marine Corps provided its own

special capabilities, not the least of which was its

amphibious expertise. As in Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, initial supplies and

heavy equipment for Restore Hope would have to

* After the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, with its requirements

for the Services to work more closely together and its

emphasis on joint operations, the term "purple" was unofficially adopled to signify the increasing cooperation of the

Service components. The color denoted a separation from the

roles of the individual Services hy implying a blending of

their traditional colors.

arrive by ship. The joint task force could take

advantage of the support provided by one of the

Maritime Prepositioning Force squadrons. Also,

one of the MEF's organic units, the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (MEU), already was

embarked and in the Western Pacific and could

quickly arrive in the area of operations.5°

Commanded by Colonel Gregory S. Newbold,

the 15th MEU had completed its special operations training, and was therefore officially a

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable), or MEU (SOC). An expeditionary unit

is one of the smallest of the Marine air-ground

task forces. Nonetheless, the 15th MEU carried

enough personnel and equipment to make it a formidable force in most situations. The ground

combat element was formed around 2d Battalion,

9th Marines, reinforced by a light armored

infantry platoon, a combat engineer platoon, a

platoon of amphibious assault vehicles, and a battery of artillery in direct support. The air combat

element was Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron (Composite) 164, nicknamed the

"Knightriders." The squadron contained a formidable array of helicopters: Boeing CH-46E Sea

Knights, Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallions, Bell

AH-1W Super Cobras, and Bell UH-1N Iroquois

"Hueys." The combat service support element

was MEU Service Support Group 15.51
16 RESTORING HopE IN SOMALIA

With the decision for a United States-led force, it

made sense the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit

with the 15th MEU (SOC), already in the Pacific,

would be a part of the plan. They would also be

the first of the joint task force's components in

place.

05$ Tn,oliWestPac Cruise, 1993-1994

Capt John W Peterson, USN, commander of

Amphibious Squadron 3, was a graduate of Dartmouth

College and a naval aviator who had accumulated

more than 4,000 hours in three generations of carrierbased attack aircraft.

The MEU was embarked on the three ships that

comprised Amphibious Squadron 3, commanded

by Captain John W. Peterson, USN. These ships

were the 1555 Tripoli (LPH 10), 1555 Juneau

(LPD 10), and the 1555 Rushmore (LSD 47). To

provide more equipment and sustainability to the

MEU, one of the ships of Maritime Prepositioning

Squadron 3, the MV 1st Lt Jack Lummus (T-AK

3011), was assigned to the amphibious squadron.

The MEU and the amphibious squadron made up

the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, which already

was anticipating service in Somalia. In

September, the Marines of the 11th MEU (SOC)

had assisted the United Nations by providing

security to the 500 soldiers of the Pakistani

Army's 7th Battalion, Frontier Service Regiment.

This regiment established the United Nations

Organization Somalia (UNOSOM) in Mogadishu.

The 11th MEU also provided security for United

States Air Force personnel who flew the

Pakistanis into Mogadishu International Airport.

En November, it had appeared 11th MEU's successor, 15th MEU, might have to provide security

for the arrival of UNOSOM reinforcements.52

The structure of the Marine forces assigned to

the operation had to be clearly defined. With

Lieutenant General Johnston, the commanding

general of I MEF, now designated as the commanding general of the joint task force, similar

command changes would occur in I MEF's subordinate units. At first, it appeared General Johnston

would act as both the commanding general of the

joint task force and the commanding general of

the Marine component, Marine Forces Somalia.

But it was soon decided this component should be

formed around the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Charles B. Wilhelm.

This in turn redefined General Wilhelm's relationships to the other subordinate units. The elements

of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and the I st Force

Service Support Group assigned to Marine Forces

Somalia would now be subordinate to General

Wilhelm in his role as the component commander. In effect, Marine Forces Somalia would work

on the higher operational level of a Marine airground task force, with its own ground, air, and

combat service support elements.53 arrangement was unusual for a Marine division staff, but

it did have the advantage of placing Marine

Forces Somalia on a similar basis with Army

Forces Somalia.

The unit chosen by Third Army's XVIII

Airbome Corps to be the Army's component was

* At its height, Marine Forces Somalia consisted of 7th

Marines (-) Reinforced, composed of 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Battalion 11th

Marines, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, and 3d

Amphibious Assault Battalion; Marine Aircraft Group 16,

composed or Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369

(HMLA-369), Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron 352

(VMGR-352), Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363

(HMH-363), a detachment from HMH-466, Marine Wing

Support Squadron 372 (MWSS-372), and a detachment from

Marine Aircraft Group 38 (MAG-38); the 1st Force Service

Support Group (Forward), composcd of Combat Service

Support Group 1 and Brigade Service Support Group 7; the

30th Naval Construction Regiment, composed of Naval

Mobile Construction Baualion I and Naval Mobile

Construction Battalion 40; and the 1st Combat Engineer

Battalion (-). At times, Marine Forces Somalia also had operational control of 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and some

of the coalition forces.
THE WIDENING MISSION 17

the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry),

based at Fort Drum, New York. The division's

commanding general, Major General Steven L.

Arnold, USA, knew Lieutenant General Johnston

from when he had served as the United States

Army Central Command's operations officer during Desert Storm. On the operational side, the

division had recent experience in humanitarian

relief undertakings. Just a few months prior, in

August 1992, the division had been sent to Florida

to assist with the disaster caused by Hurricane

Andrew. Also, the division was light infantry, and

therefore more strategically deployable than heavier, armored units in the Army. This meant the

division was able to rapidly "go from deployment

to employment."54 Their light equipment also

made this division a good match to the Marine

forces. As Brigadier General Zinni later said, they

would complement the Marines, forming "an

agile, flexible force."55 Although designated light,

such a division carries considerable firepower and

capability. The division's normal table of distribution and allowances included attack and transport

helicopters, artillery, and hardened high mobility

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (humvees) mounting antitank missiles, machine guns, or automatic

grenade launchers.

Naval Forces Somalia was quickly mustered

from task forces in the Central Command area of

operations, or which could be ordered to the area.

The Ranger carrier battle group consisted of the

aircraft carrier USS Ranger (CV 61), the aircraft

carrier USS Valley Forge (CG 50), and the

destroyer USS Kincaid (DD 965). There also was

the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, which carried

the 15th MEU (SOC). The ships of Maritime

Prepositioriing Squadron 2, consisting of the MV

1st Li Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003), the MV FyI

Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), and the MV

PFC James Anderson Jr (T-AK 3002) would join

these forces. Throughout the operation, other

squadrons, groups and ships of the navies of the

United States and coalition partners would move

into the area of operations and become a part of

Naval Forces Somalia. The position of

Commander, Naval Forces Somalia was initially

held by Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN,

but would change hands five times during the

operation.

The Air Force's contribution to the joint task

force was highly important, but required fewer

personnel than the other Services. Air transport

would be of tremendous significance to the operation. While ships would carry the greatest poruvic DA-sc-93-00308

MajGen Steven L. Arnold, USA, right, commander of the 10th Mountain Division, discusses the Somalia deployment

of the division with U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Den Gordon R. Sullivan, at Fort Drum, New York.
18 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

JCCC DD-SD-OO-00662

BOen Thomas R. Miko!ajcik, USAF a squadron and

wing commander with more than 4,000 flying hours,

was chosen to command the Air Force component of

the joint task force.

tion of the heavy equipment, most of the personnel and much of the lighter cargo would be flown

directly into the theater. Control of all these

movements was critical, and so Brigadier General

Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, was chosen as the

commanding general of Air Force Forces

Somalia. General Mikolajcik's background and

experience suited him for the mission. His

assignment at the time was as the commanding

general of the 437th Airlift Wing, based at

Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina. This

unit's mission was the loading and airdrop delivery of supplies, equipment, and troops. It was

tasked to support special and humanitarian relief

operations worldwide. Receiving a call on 26

November to prepare for deployment, General

Mikolajcik quickly put together an initial team of

70 airmen to cover inter- and intra-theater air

movements. On the 29th he was told to proceed to

Camp Pendleton, to which he traveled after a

quick stop at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois for

briefings. After discussing mobility operations

with the operations and logistics sections of the

U.S. Transportation Command, he arrived at the

joint task force headquarters on 1 December and

was designated as the commander of Air Force

Forces Somalia and the mobility commander.

Although there would be only 500 Air Force personnel eventually working within the theater

itself, there would be literally thousands aiding

the operation at numerous stations along the air

bridge.56

The smallest of all the components would be

the Special Operations Forces. This component

was initially under the command of Colonel

Thomas D. Smith, USA. In late November, he

was the director of operations for Central

Command's Special Operations Command, where

he had already received briefings on Somalia. He

joined the joint task force by 4 December, when

General Johnston briefed his concept of operations to all component commanders. As planning

progressed, coalition warfare teams were formed

to resolve any operational problems between the

various Services and coalition countries. Teams of

six men were established to coordinate close air

support and medical evacuations, coordinate

operational boundaries, and to train some of the

allies in American operational techniques. Such

teams were requested by the joint task force for

various coalition forces, and eventually General

Johnston approved eight teams; one each for the

forces from Pakistan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,

Belgium, France, Botswana, Canada, and Italy.

The teams were sent to link up with these allied

forces as they deployed.57

Support Command

There was only one exception to the component structure of the joint task force, but it was a

very important exception. This special organization was Support Command for the joint task

force, which was formed as a functional element

rather than as a separate Service organization.

General Johnston recognized that logistics for this

operation would pose a critical challenge. Since

literally everything would come in from outside

the theater, the general had to create a robust

logistics element to provide for this important

function. In the initial planning, it was recognized

that Marine Forces Somalia, which would arrive

before the Army Forces Somalia, would have to

sustain the force with the assets of 1st Force

Service Support Group and the supplies and
THE WIDENING MISSION 19

equipment from the maritime prepositioning force

ships.s The Army Forces Somalia, as they arrived,

would carry their own logistics and support elements with them, and originally it was expected

that Army Forces Somalia would assume the theater logistics role, with a specially task-organized

unit. However, Central Command also was working on the logistics issue, and their planners had

begun to build what would become Support

Command of the task force.58 At Fort Hood,

Texas, the 13th Corps Support Command

(CosCom) had already seen its deputy commander selected to head up the logistics section for the

joint task force. When the 10th Mountain Division

was selected as Army Forces Somalia shortly

afterward, the I 3th CosCom was notified that it,

too, would have a role to play in the operation. It

would provide command and control for logistics

support in the theater. With the anny planners at

Central Command identifying requirements and

resources available, the structure of Support

Command was built around the 13th CosCom

staff, commanded by Brigadier General Billy K.

Solomon, USA. Appropriate units were selected

from the continental United States and Europe.

The major subordinate commands were the 593d

Area Support Group, the 62d Medical Group, and

the 7th Transportation Group. These were augmented in a building block concept in which

smaller units with specialties were selected and

assigned to Support Command. As the groups prepared to deploy, General Solomon recognized that

his presence on the ground in theater would be

necessary early on, even before the majority of his

command would be prepared to arrive. On 14

hours notice, he prepared to leave with a small

advance party.59 Support Command would provide tremendous capabilities to the force.

*

It also was recognized this would greatly strain the capabilities of Marine Forces Somalia and the Maritime

Prepositioning Force. A maritime prepositioning force

squadron carries enough rations, supplies, and equipment to

sustain a force of approximately 16,000 men for 30 days.

However, these assets had to stretch to cover a force that

would reach more than 23,000 by late December. For a

detailed discussion of the logistical structures for the operation, see Katherine McOrady's The Joint Task Force In

Operation Restore Hope, published by the Center For Naval

Analyses. ** Although composed entirely of United States Army units,

Support Command was not a part of Army Fnrces Somalia.

tt was a separate command on an equal basis with the Service

components.

However, it was not expected to be capable of

assuming the theater role until 50 days into the

operation. Until then, Marine Forces Somalia

would continue to carry the burden for this support, especially in the coordination of items common to all users. The commanding general of the

Army Forces Somalia, Major General Arnold,

recognized his force also needed to deploy some

of its own logistics assets quickly into the theater.60

Coalition Partners

The American elements of the force were coming together rapidly. But there remained one

major portion that still had to be assembled. The

United Nations had sanctioned a multinational

force for Somalia, and so the countries that chose

to be coalition partners with the United States

now had to come forward and make their contributions. Central Command was the first line in

determining which countries would be accepted

into this coalition, relieving the commander of

this administrative burden. Offers were screened

DVIG DA-SG-oO-00063

BGen Billy K. Solomon, USA, commissioned in

Quartermaster Corps in 1966, seried in battalion and

division support command positions before being

assigned to lead Ill U.S. Army Corps' 13th Corps

Support Command at Fort Hood, Texas.
20 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

to ensure potential partners had self-sufficiency,

mobility, and a "willingness to adhere to

American operational control and rules of engagement."6'

The creation of a cohesive coalition was to

present General Johnston with what he called "a

real challenge." But he was aided in this task by

the large contingents eventually sent by some of

the United States' traditional allies; countries such

as France, italy, Belgium, Canada, Australia, and

Turkey were all to be key contributors around

which the coalition could be built These larger

forces could also be counted on to be operationally capable and to bring some of their own support.

Many other countries would soon join in, eventually raising the total number of nations in the

coalition to 23. While the general did not have

much latitude in the acceptance of any nation's

offer, he did recognize that even the smallest contingent could be put to effective use. In these early

stages, it was thought that General Johnston

would be the commander of the United Nations

forces in Somalia, but the U.N. decided that its

own UNOSOM commander would retain operational control over all U.N. forces. General

Johnston would have operational control over all

coalition forces assigned to him, and he had coordinating authority with the UNOSOM commander, Brigadier General lmtiaz Shaheen of the

Pakistani Army.62

As units across the United States were preparing for their share in Operation Restore Hope, the

ministries of defense of many nations prepared to

give support to the United States-led effort. Some

nations, such as Canada, Australia, Belgium,

Egypt, Nigeria, and Norway, already had made a

commitment to join UNOSOM and were preparing to deploy forces as reinforcements.63 Those

who would be joining with the United States

began to assemble forces and formulate plans,

often with their own names. Eventually, there

would be French Operation Oryx, Italian

Operation Ibis, Australian Operation Solace, and

Canadian Operation Deliverance.

How all of these allied forces could be worked

effectively into the operation; how much logistic

support they would need; their operational effectiveness; and when they would actually arrive

were all questions on which General Johnston and

his staff would have to give very serious consideration in the few days remaining before the start

of Operation Restore Hope; and in that short time

there was much other work to be done.
Chapter 3

Plans and Preparations

Working with Central Command

Training in amphibious warfare has taught

Marines that planning for an operation is continuous and concurrent. In late November 1992, as the

nascent joint task force staff met with the U.S.

Central Command staff at MacDill Air Force

Base, Florida, there was a great amount of work to

be done in a short period of time to prepare the

plans that would guide the operation. Throughout

the next several days, the two staffs would work

in close cooperation to ensure the joint task force

plan would complement the one issued by Central

Command. Long hours and plenty of coffee were

the order of the day.

Central Command issued its order on 5

December. While the two staffs had worked closely together in the development of the order, the

Central Command document gave Lieutenant

General Robert B. Johnston formal authority to

complete and issue the final joint task force order.

One of the most important points to be taken from

the Central Command order was the mission, to

"conduct joint/combined military operations in

Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key

installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization

operations and to assist in providing humanitarian

relief under U.N. auspices." The "anticipated DDay" was set for 9 December, just four days

away.

task force to know when it had established a

secure environment and accomplished its mission? During these early planning stages, the end

state was defined as "creation of an environment

where U.N. and relief organizations can assume

responsibility for security and relief operations."65

Unfortunately, this was rather vague. The need to

more precisely define the operation's end state

was to be an important but difficult question for

much of the joint task force's existence.

The Central Command order described four

phases of the operation and set rules of engagement. It also formally ordered General Johnston,

as commanding general of I Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MIEF), to assume duties as

General Johnston described the Central

Command order as "very broad," and he was quite

comfortable with it.64 Even as it was being written, his staff had begged the United Nations to

identify implied tasks that would assist in accomplishing the mission. The most obvious of these

tasks was to establish some precise way to measure success. In other words, just how was the joint

* The time for preparation was even shorter when the time

zone differences are taken into account. There are eight

hours difference between Somalia and the east coast of the

United States. Thus, 05009 December in Mogadishu is 2100

8 December in Washington, D.C., or MacDill Air Force

Base, Florida.

Photo courtesy of the author

Gen Mohamed Farah A/deed rose to become the

leader of the formerly political, but now militant, Un/ted

Somali Congress. He favored a military solution to the

problems the Barre government had brought about.
22 REST0IUNG HOPE IN SOMALIA

commander of Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF

Somalia) and to establish the joint task force.

Johnston already had been doing precisely that for

some days.

But that was not all General Johnston had been

concerned with during this time of intense activity. His newly assembled headquarters and staff

sections were busy identifying needed information, solving problems, and coordinating the

preparation of the joint task force order. The final

order was to contain myriad small, but important

details, and there were some concerns that were of

greater consequence than others that demanded a

rapid understanding and resolution.

Somali Opposition

Sound military planning begins with a consideration of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and

time available. With the mission specified in the

Central Command order, General Johnston and

his staff could now concentrate on the other elements. The question of the enemy was a challenging one, filled with political and diplomatic implications. The various armed Somali factions were

regarded as a great threat to the task force and its

mission, but their reactions could not be gauged in

advance since internal Somali politics would

undoubtedly be involved. It was possible that one

faction could welcome the joint task force, while

its rival would oppose the coalition. There was a

possibility that the force might have to fight its

way ashore.66

The size of these factional, clan-based forces,

in addition to the types, numbers, and condition of

their weaponry were critical elements of information that had to be gathered. In a related matter,

there was the existence of simple, but widespread,

lawlessness. How was the joint task force to deal

with that? In a commander's estimate of the situation dated 22 November 1992, General Joseph

Hoar saw the threat as follows:

Over all, the security environment throughout Somalia is volatile. The situation may

deteriorate further because there is no centralized governmental control of Somali factions.

Mogadishu. The security situation in

Mogadishu remains uncertain. Large numbers of armed forces (estimated 5,000-

10,000 aligned under General [Mohamed

Farah Hassan] Aideed and estimated 5,000-

6,000 aligned under interim President [Au

Mahdi Mohamed]) roam the city with the

two opposing leaders ... exercising little control over their activities. While Au Mahdi

appears to welcome U.N. presence and

assistance in Somalia, General Aideed

opposes such presence and has threatened

the 500-man Pakistani force and impeded

that unit from securing the port and airfield

in Mogadishu. Further, General Aideed has

publicly stated that he will oppose any further introduction of U.N. forces into

Mogadishu.

Kismayo. The security situation in Kismayo

is uncertain but less volatile than

Mogadishu. Factional fighting occurs frequently and the general population is known

to be armed. Random shootings and violent

incidents are frequent. The two factions

claiming this area have formed a loose

alliance with about 3,000 troops, many of

whom were former Somali National Army

soldiers, reasonably well-trained and experienced with weapons. The apparent leader,

Col [Ahmed Oman Jess, appears to be minimizing his ties with General Aideed and has

indicated a willingness to have a U.N. contingent deploy to Kismayo.

Key Assumptions. The primary threat to

security will be armed lawlessness and

armed looters.67

Some of these difficulties were further

expressed in a message regarding operations in

Somalia sent from Central Command in early

November:

There does not appear to be any particular

center of gravity, no single leader or faction

or army whose defeat will bring stability.

Nor is there any geographical center of gravity, contrary to the politicians' views about

Mogadishu. ... The most assailable center of

gravity appears to be the warlords' control

over the food distribution, both in terms of

amount and location. Therefore, any effort

on our part has to defeat their control over

food distribution, and force the warlords,

should they choose to fight, to fight us on

our terms.68

Both of these issues would be addressed in the

final joint task force order.

The intelligence annex of the task force order

further described the factions and their possible

capabilities. The United Somali Congress (USC)

Aideed faction was estimated to have approximately 20,000 fighters, and USC Au Mahdi to
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 23

Photo courtesy ot the Itattan Armed Forces

Somali factional militiamen gather around a '?echnical," a pick-up truck with a modified antiaircraft artille,y or heavy

machine gun mounted in the bed. Businesses, local officials, and foreign residents were forced to hire them for protection against extortion and kidnappings by freelance gunmen.

have between 15,000 and 30,000.* Both factions

were known to possess artillery, tanks, and

armored personnel carriers. Mohamed Said Hirsi,

known as General Morgan, headed the Somali

National Front (SNF) and was thought to have a

large number of the soldiers from the old national

army of the Muhammad Siad Bane regime, totaling about 9,000 troops. It was also known to have

seven T-54/55 tanks and eighteen 122mm artillery

pieces. The rival Somali Patriotic Movement

(SPM) faction under Colonel Jess was estimated

to possess 15,000 fighters, of whom 2,000 were

trained. While well armed, they were thought to

be poorly disciplined.

* The estimates of faction strength used in this history vary

greatly over time and place. This probably reflects both the

difficulty uf acquiring timely and accurate information and

the actual changes that undoubtedly occurred within these

loose organizations.

choose the time and place of any confrontation.

Also of importance was the knowledge these

fighters had of the terrain in their areas, and the

fact that any aggressive militias or clans would be

indistinguishable from the local inhabitants. A

psychological factor that could provide another

strength to the factions would lie in their ability to

misrepresent the joint task force's mission and

actions as an invasion, thereby increasing the

aggressiveness and tenacity of their followers.

Such strengths, however, were countered by

several weaknesses. The average Somali fighter

was very young, often still in his teens, and

described as "undisciplined, illiterate, and often

under the influence of the narcotic, khat." In spite

of the seemingly large array of small arms and

heavy weapons and vehicles, there were indications of shortages of ammunition and spare parts.

Their ability to operate and maintain sophisticated

weaponry also was questionably, and the weapons

systems of the Somalis were considered antiquated and outclassed by those of the joint task force.

There were strengths

assessed to have. The first

extreme unpredictability

these factions were

among these was their

and their ability to
24 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

The factional leadership was known to be weak in

many areas, especially in command and control.69

Somali Terrain

The issue of terrai.n was equally important to

define. Some pieces of information were readily

available, but others were, as yet, unknown. The

land features and climate were known quantities.

The land was described as "undulating plains that

are interrupted occasionally by areas of dissected

terrain and isolated hills. The Webi Jubba and

Webi Shebelle are the only streams that flow yearround along most of their lengths." The climate

can be characterized as tropical, semiarid to arid,

with two short monsoon seasons. The southern

plains are hot all year, with average temperatures

ranging from 72 to 95 degrees Fahrenheit. The

rainy season varies by region and by year with

frequent droughts. The annual mean precipitation

is almost 1,000 millimeters in Mogadishu, while it

is much drier further inland. All of which is a way

of stating that Somalia would present a hot, dry,

bleak desert environment that would test the

strength and endurance of both men and equipment.

But for a military planner, terrain encompasses

far more than just the ground. Of equal importance are the man-made features that help to support a force in a hostile and unfamiliar environment. The term "infrastructure" is frequently used

to refer to all of those buildings, structures, and

systems that can be put to use. It was in this area

especiaUy that knowledge of terrain was critical.

The joint task force would be very dependent

upon a transportation network that would have to

bring aU personnel, equipment, food, water, and

consumable supplies into the theater, and then be

able to move them rapidly and effectively to

where they were needed.

Intelligence gathering on this subject already

had begun, but it did not present an optimistic picture of what the task force would face. An early

study performed by the Defense Intelligence

Agency described Somalia's transportation infrastructure in the following terms:

Highways. Somalia's road system, which

has only a few high-capacity modem routes,

has lapsed into disrepair. Of Somalia's

roughly 18,000 kilometers of roadway,

about 3,000 are bituminous and another

3,000 crushed rock. The remaining 12,000

kilometers are dirt roads or tracks. ... Surface

quality has deteriorated because of the lack

of maintenance during two years of unrest.

Conditions ... are so poor that parallel trails

available along some stretches are frequently used instead of the road itself.

Air transportation. Somalia has 40 airfields with usable runways of more than

Photo courtesy of the author

The flat, featureless desert terrain to the west of Oddur, filled with scrub brush and thorn trees, is typical of the country's interior.
PLANS AND PREPARATIoNS 25

1,969 feet. C-130s can land at only 10 of

them. Three other airfields have been

opened to C-130s but with restrictions. Six

of the 10 C-130-capable airfields can also

accommodate C-141s. C-5 aircraft can land

only at Berbera and Mogadishu. ... Airport

infrastructure at Somali airfields is rudimentary at best. Few airfields have material-handling equipment or covered storage. Air traffic control is close to nonexistent. Although

Mogadishu, [Bale Dogle], Hargeisa, and

Kismayo have maintenance and service

facilities, no airfields have the maintenance

capability to fully support modem aircraft.

Seaports. The major ports of Mogadishu,

Berbera, and Kismayo ... can handle general

bulk and small container vessels. The operational status of petroleum offloading and

storage equipment, mobile cranes, rollon/roll-off facilities, and transit sheds at

each is uncertain. Relief ship crews must be

ready to use their ship's gear to unload supplies.

Railroads. Somalia has no railroads.7°

A final, but very important, effect the environment might have on the operation was in the area

of health. The Horn of Africa presented medical

planners with a wide variety of potential problems

for which they would need to prepare the personnel of the joint task force. These included a high

potential for infectious disease, heat-related

injuries, and bites from several types of venomous

snakes and insects. Diseases were vector-borne,

such as malaria, or could be contracted from the

unsanitary conditions prevalent in the country. As

was noted in the Soldier Handbook: "the major

infectious disease risks are from food and waterborne diseases ... related to ... poor sanitation,

indiscriminate disposal of waste and decomposing

corpses."7' The Central Command order was even

more explicit:

Many of the deaths and much of the human

suffering in Somalia is directly attributable

to endemic disease, which is merely magnified and made more virulent by famine.

Numerous diseases, some of which are carried by parasites (such as malaria), are present in Somalia. Among them are AIDS

[acquired immunodeficiency syndrome],

tuberculosis, hepatitis, pneumonia, and

measles. Dysentery and gangrene are common and frequently lethal complications.

Virtually all water is unsafe for drinking

even when boiled due to the possible presence of spores, which the boiling may not

kill. The potential for cholera and related

problems from decaying cadavers is also

present.72

An effective preventive medicine program

would be necessary to safeguard the health of the

force.

Specified Tasks

Disarmament was another important issue

relating to the mission of providing a secure environmcnt.' This topic was addressed in great detail

in the Marine Corps' old Small Wars Manual.

Many members of the joint task force staff were

familiar with this interesting volume. It conveys

much of the extensive experience of the "Old

Corps" in "operations undertaken under executive

authority, wherein military force is combined with

diplomatic pressure in the internal or external

affairs of another state whose government is

unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the

preservation of life and such interests as are

determined by the foreign policy of our Nation."73

This experience had been gained in such places as

Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.

But, because the world had changed radically

since the book was written, and much of it was no

longer valid, except as a general guide.** Also,

Somalia was a unique situation, and nothing could

be accepted as a matter of form. It was determined

by General Johnston and his staff that there could

be no attempt to disarm Somalia.74 Virtually every

Somali male, to include teenagers, carried a

weapon. The personnel working for the humanitarian relief organizations hired Somalis as

guards, and many people kept arms for their own

protection. Weapons would have to be controlled

in some manner, but this was not the same as dis-

* Disarmament was initially assigned in general terms in the

original 5 December Joint Chiefs of Staff execute order to

Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command as: "provide a

secure environment: disarm, as necessary, forces which

interfere with humanitarian relief operations." This was

deleted in a modification to the order, sent by a message from

the Joint Staff to Commander in Chief, U.S. Central

Command on 6 December 1992. ** The Small Wars Manual, the last edition of which was

published in 1940, addressed such matters as civil-military

relations, the role of the State Department, creation of native

police forces, disarmament of civilian populations, tactics,

and logistics.
26 RESTORING HOPE IN SoI.LALIA

OVIC DD-SD-OO-00751

The flood of military assistance during the Barre years

meant an abundance of militaty hardware, weapons,

and ammunition for the warring clans to use. Weapons

ranged from World War II era .30-caliber machine guns

and rocket launchers to Soviet-made AK-47 rifles and

U.S.-made M16s.

armament. The task forces' operation order would

have to address the problem clearly and effectively.

The joint task force's office of the Staff Judge

Advocate was deeply involved in a related issue.

In this operation, international law and operational law would feature prominently in how the

force accomplished its mission:

As each I MEF section developed implied

taskings in preparation for the development

of the operation plan, it became clear that

U.S. forces would be operating in an austere

environment where the rule of law had been

replaced by the law of the gun. Advice and

innovative planning in a variety of nontraditional functions and activities would be

needed as the ... commander entered

uncharted waters. Clearly, specialized rules

of engagement would have to be drafted to

cover the abundance of small arms in the

hands of unstable persons and proliferation

of technical vehicles. The ability to deal successfully with these and similar challenges

would require a solid foundation under international law."75

General Johnston and his Staff Judge

Advocate, Marine Colonel Frederick M. Lorenz,

worked with Central Command in developing

rules of engagement so those promulgated in the

Central Command order were ones that could be

easily incorporated in the task force order.76

The rules of engagement, as published, were

broad and focused on the protection of the force

and its mission. General Johnston later said these

rules were ones that "every commander would

want to have on such a mission."77 Essentially,

every member of the force had the right to protect

himself not only against a hostile act, but also

against the threat of such an act. Under such rules

it was not necessary for task force personnel to be

fired upon before taking action. A weapon aimed

in a threatening manner was sufficient cause to

fire on the individual holding it. Also, of particular interest in this operation, "technicals" and

crew-served weapons were considered to be

threats at any time, regardless of the actual intent

of their crews at the time encountered.78 * To

ensure that everyone understood his rights and

responsibilities, cards were printed with the rules

and distributed, and classes were held in which

they were explained. The cards carried the

reminder that the United States was not at war,

that all persons were to be treated with dignity,

and that minimum force was to be used to carry

out the mission.

Another important implied task for this operation came from Brigadier General Anthony C.

Zimñ's recent experience. He knew that an operation of this sort would require the military to work

closely with numerous humanitarian relief organ-

* Technical vehicles, or "technicals," as they were more

commonly known, were a bizarre form of homemade

weapons platform unique to Somalia. They were generally

formed from the body of a pick-up truck or similar vehicle,

with the addition of a heavy machine gun, antiaircraft

weapon, or some other crew-served weapon mounted in the

bed. They were often encountered at roadblocks and were

employed by all factions and many gangs. The term itself

apparently derived from the euphemism used for hiring

armed guards for protection, or "technical assistance."
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 27

izations." The relief organizations were a significant part of the overall humanitarian effort. Such

organizations were already working in Somalia,

providing food, medical assistance, and relief

services to the civilian population. But they would

have requirements of their own which would have

to be provided by the military. In addition, the

work of both the military and these organizations

required close coordination to ensure a unity of

effort. In Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq,

General Zinni had achieved this coordination

through a civil-military operations center. A center definitely would be needed for Operation

Restore Hope.79

The Central Command order set a specific mission for the joint task force to conduct joint military operations in Somalia to secure the major air

and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points, and to assist in providing humanitarian operations and relief under U.N. auspices. The

order described the conduct of the operation in

four phases. It also formally ordered the commanding general of I MEF to assume the duties as

commander of JTF Somalia and to establish the

joint task force.8°

General Johnston had already begun this work.

In addition, his staff was working on completing

the task force's own order, which was issued the

day after the Central Command order, 6

December. The mission of the joint task force

remained basically the same as in the Central

Command order, with some minor changes in the

wording. The commander's intent made an important distinction: "JTF Somalia will focus on securing the lines of communication used for the

ground movement of relief supplies by U.N. and

[non-governmental organizationj agencies to distribution sites. JTF Somalia will not he primarily

involved in transporting supplies, but will assist

relief organizations by securing their operating

hases as well as the ground transportation routes

to relief distribution sites." This statement clearly

kept the task force out of the business of actually

feeding the hungry and concentrated on the more

appropriate military mission of providing the nec-

* Humanitarian relief organizations is a comprehensive term

that includes non-governmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and agencies of the United Nations and

the International Commission of the Red Cross. During the

operation the term non-governmental organization usually

was used when referring to any relief organization, but the

more appropriate organization will be used when discussing

the work of the Civil-Military Operations Center.

essary secure environment for the relief operations.81

Psychological Operations

Johnston was clear on the importance of psychological operations arid civil affairs to the success of the operation. He intended to use them to

assist in disarming technicals and bandits, and to

create a "benevolent image" of coalition forces as

they were engaged in their humanitarian, peacemaking mission.82 In the task force order, psychological operations were intended to focus upon

presenting the image of a "strong U.S./U.N./

Coalition presence, capable and willing to use

force to protect the international relief effort and

to allay fears about U.S.IU.N./Coalition intentions." The psychological operation's themes and

objectives were to assure all factions and groups

of the impartiality of the conduct of the relief

operations, and to dissuade any groups or individuals from interfering with the relief. Major themes

were credibility of the joint task force in its ability to carry out its goals and to meet force with

force if necessary, and neutrality in its dealings

with all groups in its humanitarian mission. The

methods to be used to get the word out to the local.

populace were to be "face-to-face communications, radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflets,

posters, coloring books, and other printed products."83 To perform this valuable work, a separate

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force was

formed within the joint task force.

Phases of the Operation

As in the Central Command order, the task

force's concept of operations was set in four phases. As in any properly prepared campaign, each of

these phases would lead to and set the conditions

for the next. In Phase I, the forces were to "establish a base of operations and logistics in

Mogadishu," to "gain control over the flow of

humanitarian relief supplies through the city," and

to introduce other U.N. forces throughout the

country. Amphibious forces would secure the port

and airfield at Mogadishu and establish a lodgmciii for follow-on troops. A maritime prepositioning force operation would follow. Once adequate security was established, additional forces

would deploy into Mogadishu. A second airhead

would be secured as soon as possible for the
28 RESTORiNG HOPE IN SOMALIA

deployment of additional forces, and the town of

Baidoa would also be secured. Phase II provided

for the expansion of operations at the major interior relief distribution sites to include Gialalassi,

Bardera, Belet Weyne, Oddur, and others as

required. Additional forces would expand operations to these interior sites and establish sufficient

security to allow unimpeded relief operations. In

Phase ifi, operations would expand through the

conduct of relief convoy security operations and

to additional ports and airfields, to include the

port of Kismayo. The crucial Phase IV would be a

"transition from a U.S.-led to a U.N.-controlled

effort," with a "gradual relief in place of JTF

forces."84

The area of operations was divided into eight

humanitarian relief sectors, so named in keeping

with the nature of the mission.85 Each sector was

centered on a major city that could serve as a distribution center; in fact, many of them had been

such centers during Operation Provide Relief. The

other qualification for choosing these cities was

that each was located on a main road and had an

airfield capable of handling military cargo aircraft. The original humanitarian relief sectors

were Mogadishu, Bale Dogle, Baidoa, Bardera,
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 29

Kismayo, Oddur, Gialalassi, and Belet Weyne.86

The boundaries for the sectors were not set with

regard to clan or tribal affiliation, but by simple

grid coordinates.

Because of the close cooperation of Central

Command and joint task force staffs during planning, General Johnston was able to sign and issue

the task force's order on 6 December 1992; only

one day after Central Command issued its order to

the joint task force. The completed document was

thorough and detailed and recognized that some

key elements, such as the forces to be offered by

the coalition partners, still had to be identified.

D-Day was now only three days away.

Another critical aspect, which joint task force

planners had been hurriedly working on, was the

development of the deployment timeline. With a

known date for D-Day, planners were able to

work backward in time to determine when other

critical events would have to occur for the operation to begin as planned and continue in an orderly fashion. A timeline published on 1 December

set the initial actions for 4 December, with the

establishment of the joint task force headquarters,

and worked forward 30 days, when the maritime

prepositioning force offload was to be completed.

The timeline called for the quick activation and

deployment of many units and detachments that

would have to be in place to support the impending operation. These included the naval support

element and the offload preparation party of

Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, which had

to link up with those ships at Diego Garcia. The

Mari.ne air-ground task force had to take its position in the area of operations, and many other

Marine Corps, Army, and Navy elements, and

advance parties had to be alerted for movement

within a few days.87

The Flow of the Force

This work called for close cooperation with

one of the specified commands, U.S. Transpor-

* Some countries had already offered forces as part of the

reinforcements to the U.N. Organization Somalia. Early

planning had prepared to use these units, but with the change

to a United States-led force, some of these offers were withdrawn, while other countries came forward to assist. When

the order came for the joint task force, it had not yet been

determined when the various coalition forces would actually

join the force. Some arrived concurrent with U.S. Forces,

some within a few days, and some took several weeks.

tation Command (TransCom), headquartered at

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. A separate plan

would have to be worked out to ensure the initial

landings could be made on time, that the followon forces could be brought into theater as

required, and that enough logistical support for

the force would be started on its way from the

United States to reach Somalia in an orderly

sequence. The detailed planning for this deployment called for the movement of thousands of

troops from their home bases to ports of embarkation for further transport halfway around the

world. There would have to be a sequenced

timetable, employing all the assets available for

the movement by ship and airplane, of the cargo

needed by the force. As a supporting command,

TransCom had to tailor its plans to the requirements the joint task force provided through

Central Command. These were made known in a

formal document called a time-phased force

deployment and development plan. Such a system

works best when there is an ample amount of

planning time available, so force structures and

logistical requirements can be estimated in

advance and contingency plans created. There

was no such luxury with the preparations for this

operation; TransCom would have to react quickly

as the needs of the joint task force were determined and made known.88

Since the majority of logistical support would

be coming by ship, a subordinate organization of

TransCom, the Military Sealift Command, would

have the greatest capability to support the operation. Military Sealift Command divided its

responsibilities into three phases, which it called a

"Trident of Sea Power." First, it would employ the

maritime prepositioning force ships that supported the Marine Corps and Army to bring in the unit

equipment and supplies that would be immediately needed by the first troops coming ashore. Next,

it would employ fast sealift ships and chartered

vessels to fill the surge in shipping that would

bring in the heavy equipment and critical supplies.

Finally, a sustainment phase would provide a

steady flow of logistical support. Because of the

long transit times (even the fast sealift ships

would take 14 days to reach Mogadishu from the

east coast of the United States), these assets had to

be identified and prepared as soon as possible.89

Another TransCom subordinate was equally

busy with its preparations to support the operation. The Air Mobility Command had to establish

the air bridge by which it would fly in most of the
30 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

U.S. forces, as well as those of many of the coalition countries. The command already had some

experience in this area, having established the

plan under which the aircraft carrying the relief

supplies were being brought into Kenya for

Operation Provide Relief. Now, however, it faced

a larger and more time-critical task. With the long

sailing times for the shipping, air transport would

have to carry the considerable initial burden of the

earliest portions of the deployment. The command's staff quickly provided for basing rights in

nearby countries, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia,

and created a plan for aerial refueling. These factors would decrease the flying time for individual

flights and minimize the wear on aircraft.9°

By 6 December, the forces were ready; the plan

was prepared and issued; the physical requiTements and equipment needed had been determined and identified. With a few days left before

D-Day, it was time to set the operation in motion.
Chapter 4

Coming Ashore

Initial Landings

All of the pieces of the operation came together in Somalia in the early days of December 1992.

Actually, some forces were already in place.

Teams from Special Operations Forces, as part of

Operation Provide Relief, were providing security

at airfields, as well as protecting the Air Force

combat control teams that were operating at them.

These specially trained teams also were a component of Provide Relief and were sent into the airfields to prepare the fields for subsequent air operations and to control the aircraft. Also, on 7

December, members of Company C, 2d Battalion,

The U.S. Navy and Marines were the first

underway. The Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group

(ARG), composed of the USS Tripoli (LPH 10),

USS Juneau (LPD 10), and USS Rushmore (LSD

47), left Singapore on 23 November and headed

toward the Persian GulL Commanded by Captain

John W. Peterson, USN, the ready group moved

into the waters off the southern Somali coast on 3

December. Planning for the operation by the

group began in earnest the week before, when a

warning order was received. At about the same

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00656

Marines and sailors stand at the edge of the deck of the Tripoli (LPI-1 10). In the background are four Marine CH-46

Sea Knight helicopters scouting the area before the landings at Mogadishu.

5th Special

security and

envoy when

Forces Group (Airborne) provided

sniper support for America's special

he arrived in Mogadishu.
32 RESTORING HOPE IN Sorv1uA

15th MELJ, Westpac '92-93

A Colorado native and the son of a career U.S. Air

Force officer, Cot Gregory S. Newbold commanded the

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a force in the vanguard

of the American commitment.

time, Amphibious Squadron 5, commanded by

Captain Brian Boyce, USN, based on the West

Coast of the United States, received a warning

order that it also would support the operation. In

addition, Captain Boyce would be the chief of

staff for Rear Admiral James B. Perkins Ill, USN,

who would command the maritime prepositioning

force. Amphibious Squadron 5 would have the

responsibility for maritime prepositioning ship

operations and the offload.91 The condition of the

port was still a question for these officers, as was

the infrastructure available. The ability to quickly

offload, stage, and move equipment and supplies

would be critical to the operation, but the capabilities of the port could not be determined until

coalition forces were on the ground. In the interim, U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams from

the Tripoli ready group conducted beach and port

hydrographic and reconnaissance surveys of

potential landing sites.

The amphibious group carried the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

(15th MEU (SOC)), commanded by Colonel

Gregory S. Newbold, which would make the initial landings scheduled for the early morning of

the 9th. The MEU had come under the operational

control of Central Command on 30 November. In

accord with the joint task force order, the MEU

"splashed tracks" from the Juneau at 0330 to meet

an H-Hour of 0500.92 Every available means of

landing was used. The SEALs swam in from offshore and 170 Marines assaulted in 18 "Zodiac"

boats to secure the port facility. Amphibious

OVIC DN-ST-93-02668

A Marine 5-ton truck towing a 155mm M198 howitzer disembarks from an Assault Craft Unit 5 air-cushion landing

craft at Mogadishu.
COMING ASHORE 33

assault vehicles carried the majority of the landing

force, followed by helicopters and air-cushioned

landing craft.93

The initial landings were made at 0540. The

Marines and SEALs landed across the beaches of

Mogadishu and came out of the dark surf where

they were greeted by the bright lights of television

cameras. Ignoring the disturbing presence of the

media as best they could, the reconnaissance parties pushed inland to their objectives, located at

the port and the airfield. According to plan, the

prepositioning ship MV lstLt Jack Lummus (TAK 3011), which had arrived from Diego Garcia

the previous day, was brought directly to the pier

to offload, expediting the movement of equipment.94

Other than the illuminated landing, the initial

portions of the operation went quickly and

smoothly. Colonel Newbold had stated he wanted

to "accomplish our mission by overwhelming any

opportunity for forces to oppose us. ... This is a

low intensity conflict environment requiring [a]

dramatic show of force (to create the respect that

will minimize opposition), mind-numbing speed

(so that we maintain the initiative), and a willingness to neutralize those who attack us (to deter

further violence)."95 The strength and speed he

desired were in evidence as the forces moved

beyond their initial objectives and into the city. He

was able to declare the airport open at 1145 and

the first c-i 30 aircraft landed soon thereafter.96

The Air Force Lockheed C-141 carrying members

of the task force headquarters touched down just a

few minutes later.

The Marines quickly passed through the city to

the United States Embassy compound, where they

secured the chancery. By the end of the day, they

had established their forward operations command post at the airport.97

In addition, the first of the coalition partners

arrived and were incorporated into the defensive

perimeter. This was a company of the 2d French
34 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC 00-50-00-00670

At Mogadishu airport, Marines stand guard in a light armored vehicle while cargo is unloaded from a U.S. Air Force

C-14 lB Starlifter aircraft.

Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, which

arrived by airplane from their base in Djibouti.98

The company came under American operational

control. The Legionnaires would soon be followed by thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen,

and Marines from 22 other countries.

As the coalition forces moved into Mogadishu

they encountered a city that had felt the ravages of

two years of civil war and anarchy. There was no

electricity, no running water, and no functioning

sanitation system. Law enforcement was nonexistent because there were no police or judicial system. Public buildings had been looted and

destroyed and most private homes were severely

damaged; virtually every structure was missing its

roof and had broken walls, doors, and windows.

The commerce of the city was at a standstill.

Schools were closed and gangs of youths roamed

the streets. Crowded refugee camps seemingly

filled every parcel of open land, and new graves

were encountered everywhere. The sound of gunfire could be heard throughout the city.

There had been no opposition to the landings or

the subsequent movement of forces into the

American Embassy compound. However, on this

first day, the operation's first shooting incident

took place. A vehicle containing nine Somalis ran

a checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires,

who opened fire at the fleeing automobile, killing

two and wounding seven.99 This incident was

unfortunate but within the rules of engagement.

By running the roadblock, the Somalis had posed

a threat to members of the coalition, and the

Legionnaires had to react. Soon, sniper fire was

added to the troops' list of concerns, especially

around the port area. While not causing casualties,

the desultory fire was an annoyance and an indication of what was to come.

General Johnston flew into Mogadishu on 10

December. The combined joint task force established itself inside the American Embassy compound, with the main headquarters in the chancery

building. With the arrival of coalition forces, the

joint task force became a combined joint task

force. Later, the title would change officially to

Unified Task Force Somalia (UNTTAF). En a symbolic and emotional gesture for the Marines, the

flag raised over the compound was one that had

once flown over the Marine barracks in Beirut.

The embassy compound itself was a shambles.
COMING ASHORE 35

recreated while mountains of

filth and trash needed to be

cleaned out. To make room for

the arrival and assembly area

needed for the prepositioning

force shipping to offload its

equipment, old warehouses

had to be bulldozed.

Eventually, 54 acres were

cleared for this purpose. The

U.S. Navy support element

brought in extra materials

when it arrived, and new barracks, galleys, and heads were

built over time. While the

offload of the Lum,nus continued, on a selective basis, the

Photo courtesy ot the Italian Armed Forces first priority was for engineer

A typical street in the Italian sector of Mogadishu crowded with pedestrians, equipment and materials.

vehicles, and market stalls. Combat support vehicles and

weapons like tanks and

artillery were left on board.10°

It was long and frustrating work. A maritime

prepositioning force squadron contains enough

equipment and supplies for a Marine brigade of

16,000 men. To accomplish the job smoothly and

efficiently there are several distinct units that

must participate. The first of these is the offload

preparation party; a small group of Marines who

come on board the ship while it is underway to

prepare the equipment for its eventual offload and

The buildings had literally been stripped to the

bare walls; even the paving tiles had been pried up

and carried away. The floors of the chancery were

buried in trash and debris a foot deep. Bodies

were found in some areas of the grounds. The staff

quickly went to work cleaning out work areas and

living spaces to establish a camp.

Logistical Buildup

In the critical early days,

all logistical support for the

growing coalition forces

came from what the 15th

MEU. was able to provide

through its service support

group, what the aUies could

bring themselves, and from

the maritime prepositioning

force shipping. The offload

of these important vessels

was critical. The Lummus had

arrived the previous day and

was ready to begin its

offload, which was scheduled

to last for four days. But first,

the port area itself needed

considerable attention. There

was no infrastructure, not

even wires left on the light

poles. Everything had to be

Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

The ravages of the civil war were evident in this neighborhood in the Italian sector of Mogadishu. Many of the buildings had no roofs and all were severely damaged.
36 RESTORING HOPE TN SOMALIA

use. The next is the survey, liaison and reconnaissance party, which flies into the designated port to

prepare it for the imminent operation. The next is

a U.S. Navy unit, the Navy support element that

undertakes the operation of the offload of equipment and its movement through the arrival and

assembly area. Finally, the unit that will use the

gear must arrive on time to move offloaded equipment and supplies out of the port to make room

for what is coming off next. A miss in the

sequence can mean congestion and delays. Also,

during normal operations, the entire ship will be

offloaded, but Restore Hope was not an ordinary

operation.

Every commander must balance many requirements, making the best use of limited resources.

In this case, the conflict faced by the commander

was to strike the proper balance between combat

forces and logisticians, which had to compete for

limited space on aircraft. So, in placing the priority for building up the force of fighters quickly,

the support troops had to wait. This in turn caused

additional delays at the already burdened port.

The offloading of ships took longer than projected because unneeded equipment had to be moved

repeatedly or back-loaded onto the ships.

Force Buildup

Concurrent with the logistical buildup was the

arrival of the forces. The airport quickly became a

scene of considerable activity as more aircraft

arrived, bringing in more of the UNITAF headquarters and elements of Marine Forces Somalia

(MarFor). Once again, the conditions in Somalia

caused problems for planners and operators. The

limited capacity of the Mogadishu airport meant a

strict schedule had to be maintained for arriving

and departing aircraft. This in turn affected the

scheduling of aerial refueling and the use of the

intermediate staging bases the Air Mobility Command had set up in Egypt and Yemen. Aircraft

could only be called from the staging bases once

there was a clear time slot at Mogadishu. Those

DvIc DD-SD.OO.00804

This view of the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu shows the chancery building in the center surrounded by

its own walL Another wall, in the background, enclosed the rest of the compound. By late December 1992, the area

to the top of the picture was filled with tents, mess halls, and other facilities for the UNITAF staff.
COMING ASHORE 37

DVIC DD-ST-OO-00801 This aerial view of the port of Mogadishu shows three cargo ships and a number of large, medium, and small vessels moored to the docks. The port played an important role during the relief effort.

aircraft then had to hurriedly unload passengers

and cargo and depart quickly)°' In spite of complicated and hectic scheduling, the buildup of

coalition personnel continued at a rapid pace.

On 7 December, Major General Charles E.

Wilhelm, commanding general of the 1st Marine

Division, assumed MarFor commander duties. On

10 December, he flew out of Camp Pendleton

with a small battle staff and arrived at Mogadishu

the next day)°2 MarFor would provide the basic

structure around which the task force would be

built. As other forces, American or coalition,

arrived in the theater, they would initially be

placed under the operational control of MarFor.

The largest American force after the Marines

was the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division

(Light Infantry), which would form Army Forces

Somalia. Because of the manner in which such an

Army division deploys, its movement actually

had begun on 7 December, when the first of seven

trainloads of equipment departed Fort Drum, New

York, for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey. Over

the next 10 days, 450 railcars were used to move

more than 1,500 pieces of the division's equipment to the military ocean terminal at Bayonne.103

There they were loaded on board ships for the

long joumey to the Horn of Africa. The soldiers

were preparing for their deployment at the same

time. Classes were held on the country's history,

culture, terrain, and problems soldiers could

expect. Needed equipment was brought in to fill

recognized shortages, some of it from the division's "round-out" brigade, the 27th Brigade,

New York Army National Guard. The division

helicopters were readied for use in the deserts of

Somalia with the addition of particle separators

and global positioning system equipment. Desert

camouflage utilities (known as battle dress uniforms or "BDUs" to the Army) were procured and

issued. 104 Troops were sent to the ranges to fire

and battle-sight their weapons, ironically often

firing in the snows of a New York winter as they

prepared for movement to equatorial Africa.

The division was originally expected to start its

deployment on 19 December. However, on 10

December, a decision was made by UNITAF that
38 RESTORThJG HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DD-SD-OO-00747 Among the maritime propositioning ships to dock at Mogadishu was the Algol class vehicle cargo ship, USNS Altair.

Onboard cranes unload the ship's cargo of military supplies and vehicles.

Army Forces Somalia should begin its deployment much sooner. When General Wilhelm

arrived in the theater, he immediately assumed

operational control of the 15th MEU (SO C) and

the French forces and focused efforts on securing

the port, the airfield, and the embassy compound.

With the arrival of 1st Marine Division's 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, MarFor was able to

broaden the coalition's control to areas outside

Mogadishu. This began at Bale Dogle, which

UNITAF had recognized early in its planning as

an important location from which to extend the

force into the interior of the country. The 15th

MEU (SOC)'s Battalion Landing Team, 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, supported by elements of

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, was

given the mission, which it planned and accomplished within 48 hours. The Marines seized the

airfield in a helibome assault prior to the arrival of

Army forces.'°5

The first U.S. Army unit to deploy was

Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry. The soldiers and the battalion's tactical command post

loaded on board three Lockheed C-141 Starlifter

troop transport aircraft on 11 December for a

direct flight into the airfield at Bale Dogle, now

held by the newly arrived Marines. The soldiers

arrived within 24 hours and went immediately

from deployment to employment as they relieved

the Marines who had secured the airfield.'06 * The

Army assumed full control for Bale Dogle airfield

on 15 December.

These early successes led to criticism of

UNITAF by several members of the media.

Journalists openly questioned why UN1TAF was

not pushing more quickly and aggressively into

the interior, especially to the town of Baidoa,

described as "The City of Death," where the

impact of famine and suffering were at their

worst. General Johnston, however, would not be

pressured into hasty action. The responsibility for

the accomplishment of the mission and the safety

of the members of the coalition force was his

* Due to time zone differences, the soldiers actually arrived

on 13 December.
COMING ASHORE 39

alone, and he knew LTNITAF was quickly building

in strength and would soon expand into the other

planned relief sectors. He wanted this to be done

in an orderly manner, without spreading the available forces too thinly over the ground. He

addressed the issue in a television interview,

explaining his reasons and laying the matter to

rest. 107

Meanwhile, the country began to show the

coalition soldiers all the facets of its character.

Marines, sailors, and soldiers were generally

greeted with smiles and waves from the Somalis

they encountered on the streets, but there were

some who seemed determined to test the resolve

of UNITAF. Sniping became a routine part of

daily existence; seldom more than simple harassment, it still provided an edge to the life and work

of the task force. Sniping was especially a problem at the port, which was overlooked by an old

prison the gunmen used to cover their activities.

Marines quickly secured the prison area and

ended the problem in the immediate location. But

throughout UNITAF's time in Somalia, sniping at

convoys or into the various compounds would

remain a daily occurrence.

The first direct attacks on UNITAF members

also took place during these early days. In two

separate incidents on 12 December three aircraft

of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, one

Bell TJIH-1N Huey and two Bell AH-1W Super

Cobras, were fired upon. The UH-1N Huey

received damage to its rotors. In the second incident, the attack helicopters returned fire with

20mm guns and missiles (the attack helicopters

carried tube-launched, optically tracked, wireguided, or TOW, missiles), destroying two "technicals" and damaging one American-made Ml 13

armored personnel carrier)08 Such immediate,

overwhelming, and deadly response was precisely

what General Johnston set in his commander's

guidance as the best antidote for aggression by the

factions or bandits.

Just as American forces were proceeding to

Somalia, so were the military contingents of several coalition partners. One of the first of these

forces to begin moving were the Canadians, who

had received their own warning order to participate in the U.S.-led operation on 4 December.

Originally, they had prepared to deploy their force

as a part of United Nations Operation Somalia and

DVIC DD-SD-O0-00805

The cargo from a U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy aircraft is unloaded on the flight line at Mogadishu airport while a Marine

UH- iN Huey helicopter flies overhead. Beyond the main runway is the Indian Ocean shoreline.
Starlifter at Griffis Air Force Base, New York, as equipment

Somalia.

had sent the auxiliary oil replenishment ship

HMCS Preserver (510) to Somalia. Under the

Canadian forces' Operation Deliverance, the ship

arrived at Mogadishu on 12 December. The

advance headquarters of the Canadian Joint

Forces Somalia landed at Mogadishu on 13

December and embarked on board tbe ship. Their

contribution to the forces on the ground was to be

a Canadian Airbome Regiment Battle Group, the

advance party of which arrived by U.S. Air Force

Lockheed C-S Galaxy aircraft at Bale Dogle on 14

Decem 09 The Italian contingent also began to arrive at

about this time. Their force was initially composed of two elements: two battalions of the

Folgore Airborne Brigade, a famed parachute

unit; and the San Marco Battalion, a naval

infantry unit. The Italian forces were also supported from the sea by the Italian Navy's 24th

Naval Group, which carried heavy equipment and

supplies. The first elements of the brigade, a small

special forces reconnaissance element of 23 men

led by Major Gennaro Fusco, left I taly on 11

December. They arrived in Mogadishu on 13

December and reoccupied the Italian Embassy on

16 December."° The brigade would arrive in full

force by 24 December. On the 23d, the San Marco

Battalion arrived in Somali waters with the naval

group. Brigadier General Bruno Loi arrived on 20

December and took command of the Folgore

Brigade in what the Italian forces called

Operation Ibis.

Thousands of miles to the south, on 15

December, the Prime Minister of Australia, The

Right Honorable Paul John Keating, announced

that his nation would contribute forces as well.

The Australian participation would be called

Operation Solace and their force would be formed

around a battalion group. The battalion selected

was 1st Battalion, 1st Royal Australian Regiment,

stationed in Townsville. This unit was the alert

battalion of the Australian Ready Deployment

Force. The contingent of 930 soldiers included

engineer and administrative support elements, as

40 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

ovic DA-SC-94-00321

An M998 high-mobility multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (humvee) is loaded onto an Air Mobility Command C-141B

of the 10th Mountain Division is readied for shipment to
COMING ASHORE 41

well as armored personnel carriers. The battalion's artillery battery commander and forward

observers would act as liaison and provide civil

affairs capabilities. The Australian reconnaissance

party departed on 21 December and arrived in

Mogadishu the next day.11'

Another of the United States' traditional allies

was preparing to send an important contribution

to the coalition. The Turkish army created a special task force built around an existing mechanized infantry company, 1st Company, 1st

Battalion, 28th Mechanized Brigade, stationed in

Ankara. The company was strengthened with a

quartermaster platoon, a transportation platoon, a

signal section, a medical section, and an engineer

section. In all, the reinforced company numbered

300 soldiers. The advance party left Ankara and

arrived in Mogadishu on 19 December. The

remainder of the Turkish force proceeded by rail

to the port of Mersin beginning on 17 December.

There, they boarded three Turkish Navy ships that

sailed on the 17th and brought them directly to

Mogadishu on 2 January 1993.h12

By mid-December many other forces, large and

small, were also proceeding to join UNYI'AF.

Several of these came from the Middle East and

Africa. They included a reinforced motorized rifle

company from Kuwait, an all-volunteer unit that

began arriving on 14 December.113 The Kingdom

of Saudi Arabia sent elements of its 5th Royal

Saudi Land Forces Airborne Battalion, reinforced

with medical, engineer, and maintenance platoons. Numbering up to 669 soldiers, the first

Saudis entered Mogadishu on 19 December, with

their forces fully in Somalia by the end of the

month.114 For the first time in its history,

Botswana sent soldiers to serve outside its borders. Out of an army totaling only 5,500,

Botswana sent 300 soldiers in a composite company."5 Several other countries, such as Pakistan,

the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Nigeria,

Tunisia, Morocco, and Zimbabwe, all sent liaison

officers and small advance contingents in preparation for larger contributions to be made late in

December or in January. To add to the strength of

the air forces, the German Air Force continued to

DVIC DF-SD-97-02528

Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, unload their packs after boarding a C-141B cargo aircraft, which will take them to Bale Doyle, Somalia.
42 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

provide three C-160 Transall cargo aircraft that

had been flying relief supplies out of Mombasa,

Kenya, as part of Operation Provide Relief. The

British Royal Air Force did the same with two C130 Hercules transport aircraft, which it also had

been using in Provide Relief The Royal New

Zealand Air Force sent three Andover transport

aircraft from its Number 42 Squadron to fly trans—

port within the theater.

Into the Interior

The arrival of all these forces, and the promise

of others to come shortly, gave General Johnston

the strength and flexibility to push into the interior. Bale Dogle, strongly occupied by coalition

troops, would be the springboard for the next step

into Baidoa.

With the French forces already under the operational control of MarFor, UNITAF and MarFor

planners decided to prepare a combined operation

to secure the city. Task Force Hope was formed

from the French 2d Foreign Legion Parachute

Regiment, and elements of the French Special

Operations Command and the 13th Foreign

Legion Demi-Brigade, and 15th MEU. ii 6 The task

force left Mogadishu on 15 December and

secured the airfield the next day through a com-
COMING ASHORE 43

OVIC DN-ST-93-O1 388

The day after American Marines and French soldiers

secured Baidoa, Marines of the 15th Marine

Expeditionaty Unit provide security for a convoy bringing food to the "City of Death."

bined ground and helibome movement. There was

no opposition. Relief convoys, escorted by coalition forces, began bringing supplies to Baidoa that

afternoon."7

The Marines and French soldiers immediately

established security posts and started patrols of

the city. The presence of a large number of armed

men was quickly noted and was a source of some

concern. On 18 December, Somalis fired from

inside one of their compounds upon members of

Task Force Hope. The area was quickly surrounded and entered and all arms were confiscated."8

The incident highlighted a need, both inside the

relief sectors and throughout the area of operations, for a policy concerning weapons control.

The rapid success of the Baidoa operation

brought the first phase of Operation Restore Hope

to a close. It also provided the basic framework by

which all other operations to secure objectives

would be organized and executed. The push to the

remaining humanitarian relief sectors would

involve the U.S. Marines or Army in a series of

joint and combined operations with coalition partners. Wherever possible, these operations would

use the forces of the coalition nations that had volunteered to assume responsibility for the particular sectors.

The system by which these operations were

ordered and controlled became fairly standard and

reflected how IJNITAF functioned. A series of

daily fragmentary orders were issued, or more frequently if necessary. The orders listed objectives

to be taken, forces to be employed, and dates for

accomplishment of the missions. Coordinating

instructions were provided as necessary and noted

any support that was required along with specific

force assignments. Each day, the next fragmentary

orders would contain more information, adjust

dates if necessary, and note the commanding general's additional orders or guidance. 1JNITAF

headquarters operations section thus became a

scene of continuous work as liaison officers from

various U.S. units and coalition forces attended

planning meetings within the future operations

cell, run by Colonel Peter A. Dotto. All the while,

ongoing operations were monitored in the current

operations cell under Colonel James B. Egan.

Another critical part of each operation was to

prepare the local population for the arrival of

UNTTAF forces. This task fell to Ambassador

Robert B. Oakley, who had been appointed by

President George H. W. Bush because of his experience in Africa as Special Envoy to Somalia.

Ambassador Oakley assisted the military in

understanding the Somali people and cultural

nuances. He also provided insight into the tangle

that was Somali politics."9 For each operation,

Oakley would travel to the particular city in

advance of military forces to meet with the local

elders and leaders. He would explain in detail

what was about to happen to reduce the risk of

confrontation. The following day, aircraft would

drop leaflets over the city that repeated the peaceful intentions of the coalition members and its

humanitarian purpose. They also would wam the

people not to interfere with UNITAF forces or

operations. in this manner, the coalition forces

would find a soft landing at each objective.'20

Securing the Relief Sectors

With Fragmentary Order 7, UNITAF began

planning to take the next objective: Kismayo. The
44 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-5D-00-01 031

American Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robed B. Oakley, speaks to a group of Somalis. Behind him is

U.S. Army BGen Lawson VI Magruder Ill, commander of Task Force Kismayo.

Belgian forces' 1st Parachute Battalion had

arrived in Mogadishu on 13 December. Led by

Lieutenant Colonel Marc Jacqmin, the paratroopers would have responsibility for securing the

Kismayo relief sector, then controlling it along

with elements of the Army's 10th Mountain

Division. Kismayo lies approximately 200 miles

south of Mogadishu, on the coast just below the

equator. It is the site of Somalia's second largest

port, after Mogadishu, and it had been an important base for the Somali Navy. An airfield of

appropriate size for military cargo aircraft was

only a few miles outside the city. Holding this

area would provide another port for the receipt

and onward transport of relief supplies. The

Belgian forces were placed under the operational

control of MarFor for this operation. Because of

its location on the coast, an amphibious operation

was chosen to secure the city and its facilities.

Captain John Peterson, commander of the Tripoli

amphibious group, was designated as the commander of the amphibious task force and

Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin as the commander of

the landing force. The landing force was composed of Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines,

from the 15th MEl] (SOC), and two platoons of

Belgian paratroopers. The amphibious task force

itself consisted of the Juneau and the Rushmore

from the United States Navy, and the French ship

PS Dupleix, an antisubmarine warfare guided

missile destroyer. Captain Peterson transferred his

flag to the Juneau, U.S. Navy SEALs embarked

on the Dupleix to perform pre-landing reconnaissance and surveillance of the beach and the

Marines and Belgian paratroopers embarked on

board the American ships.'2'

Because of the presence of two warring factions in the city, a preparatory political and diplomatic maneuver was very important. On 17

December, contact was made with Colonel

Ahmed Omar Jess, leader of the Kismayo region's

Somali Patriotic Front faction, and Mohamed

Said Hirsi, who was know as General Morgan and

led an independent faction in the area, setting up

an agreement whereby Kismayo would be an

open city. Jess and his troops would remain in the

city, and Morgan and his followers would move

20 kilometers to the north.'22

The Belgians already had sound experience in

amphibious doctrine and the operation went

smoothly. On the morning of 20 December, the
COMING ASHORE 45

Marines landed in amphibious assault vehicles

while the Belgians came ashore in air-cushioned

landing craft and helicopters. There was no opposition to the landing and control was passed

ashore within a few hours. Captain Peterson and

Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin went immediately to

the center of the city, where they met with Colonel

Jess, who protested the presence of the colonial

Belgians. Lieutenant Colonel Jacqnñn quickly

quieted Jess's anger and made it clear the coalition forces would not be intimidated.'23 *

By the end of that first day the overall strength

of the Belgian forces in Kismayo consisted of the

11th Company and the Close Reconnaissance

Squadron, equipped with Scimitar tracked reconnaissance vehicles. With the arrival of additional

Belgian reinforcements, the U.S. Marine company was released from tactical control and withdrew from Kismayo the next day. By 30

December, the Belgians had 550 men in the

city.124

The successful completion of the Baidoa operation made it possible for UNITAF to quickly plan

to secure another city notorious as a scene of suffeting and death; Bardera, located about 217 kilometers southwest of Baidoa, at the end of a dry

and dusty track. With the arrival of more combat

units from the 1st Marine Division (notably the

remainder of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, followed shortly thereafter by the lead elements of

3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and the headquarters of

the 7th Marines) there was enough power on the

ground to push on to this important inland city.

Colonel Emil R. Bedard, commanding officer of

the 7th Marines, departed Mogadishu for Baidoa

with his Marines on 22 December; only three and

a half days after these units began arriving in theater. 125

Prior to leaving Mogadishu, the unit meshed

with the attachment of amphibious assault and

* The issue of colonial troops was one that caused considerable anxiety and sensitivity in the UNITAF staff. Several of

the coalition allies once had colonies in Africa. France and

Italy once had colonies in Somalia itself. Where possible, use

of troops from these nations had to be done with consideration of the feelings of the local populace. For instance, in late

December, plans to secure the city of Merka originally called

for the use of Italian troops. When the local population

protested strongly about the return of the Italians, this operadon was given to Army Forces Somalia as well as the

Italians. The issue of colonialism also was a handy rallythg

call for the various factions when they organized protests

against the presence or actions of UNITAF.

OVIC DN-ST-93-o1 396

Members of Company C, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, of

the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, exit from a P-7A 1

amphibious assault vehicle after arriving to set up a

checkpoint in Kismayo.

light armored vehicles. (The advance elements of

both the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion and the

3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion had arrived

in Mogadishu on 19 December.) On Christmas

Eve, after a long road march choked with dust, the

Marines secured the airfield at Bardera. The next

day they controlled all access to the city by holding a key bridge and the river crossings over the

Jubba, as well as the principal road junctions.

Patrols were quickly sent out to provide security

for the task force as well as for the people of the

city. Coordination was made with the local nongovernmental agency to get the relief food shipments moving in. Another early concern was to

secure the market area in the center of town so it

could again open for business.'26

The next two operations were originally

planned to occur nearly simultaneously using

French and Italian forces to take control of the
46 REsiURING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIG DD-SD-OO-00987

An estimated 30,000 Somalis inhabited the town of Bardera. Ills one of the most populated towns hi the othe,wise

sparsely populated region of southwest Somalia.

humanitarian relief sectors that would become

their responsibilities. Planning for the operations

to Oddur and Gialalassi was ongoing at UNITAF

headquarters by 16 December, concurrent with

the planning for the Bardera operation.

Oddur lies 260 kilometers northwest of

Mogadishu, 110 kilometers north of Baidoa, and

close to the Ethiopian border. Its airport contains

a 4,000-foot runway capable of handling C-130

aircraft. It was noted in briefings there was a wellorganized militia in the area, as well as some old

Soviet military equipment)27 The task force for

the operation would consist of elements of the

French 5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment

and the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion,

with logistic support, and Company C, 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines, which was placed under

the tactical control of the commander of the

French forces.'28

UNTTAF Fragmentary Order 8, issued on 18

December, called for the French forces to secure

Oddur "on or about 24 December." Many of the

units to be involved, however, were still arriving.

Fragmentary Order 12, issued on the 21st,

rescheduled the date of

Christmas Day. On Christmas Eve, the same day

the Marines were moving to Bardera, French

forces began their road march to Oddur. They

passed that day on the road and arrived in Oddur

on 25 December. Over the next few days, the

remaining French forces in Somalia were brought

from Mogadishu to Oddur. From there, they were

quickly reassigned to outlying towns: the 13th

Demi-Brigade had responsibility for Wajid; the

5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment for

Ceelgasass; and the Legion for El Berde, while

the headquarters, cavalry detachment (an aviation

unit), and support battalion, were at Oddur. On the

29th, Major General Rene de l'Home, the commander of French forces in Somalia, requested the

boundary of the relief sector be moved east to

include the town of Tiyegloo. Administratively,

* if the road to Bardera was dusty, the road to Oddur was

even worse. The fine dust was like red talc in places, exploding underfoot with each step or billowing in clouds behind

vehicles. It covered men and machines in a natural camouflage.

the operation for
COMING ASHORE 47

the town had always been a part of the Oddur district and it was therefore proper to include it in

that sector. The request was approved at UNITAF.

The French forces soon dispersed themselves

throughout the relief sector, eventually occupying

21 platoon-sized advance posts from which

patrols could be made.'29

As early as 16 December, Fragmentary Order 7

had tasked the Italian forces to secure Gialalassi.

Subsequent orders refined and amplified this initial order. Gialalassi is about 115 kilometers north

of Mogadishu, and is situated on the Webi

Shebelle. In intelligence briefings, this city was

described as being on dry, flat ground, with a

small forest to the north. There were two airfields,

one of which was C-I 30 capable. Traveling on the

roads was expected to be slow. A United Somali

Congress faction under Ali Mahdi Mohamed held

the area and had a security force at the airfields

with some recoilless rifles. Bandits were reported

to he operating along the road.13° Fragmentary

Orders 9 through 14, issued between 19 and 24

December, assigned considerable force to the

operation. U.S. Air Force engineers were ordered

to provide support in inspecting and repairing the

runway if necessary. Army forces would provide

convoy security and establish a forward arming

and refueling point at the airfield. MarFor would

give helicopter, engineer, and medical evacuation

support as necessary. Navy Forces Somalia would

provide fixed-wing close air support. With the

Italian forces still arriving, the date for the operation was changed from 26 to 27 December.

By the 26th, the Italian forces were assembling

at the port. Two companies of the Folgore

Brigade, with headquarters, reconnaissance

group, and mortar and antiarmor gun sections

bivouacked in a warehouse, while motor transport

and armored personnel carriers were assembled.

A convoy of relief trucks also staged at the port,

loading grain that had just arrived on a cargo ship.

That same day, a section of U.S. Army vehicles

and a platoon of U.S. Army military police

mounted in hardened humvees armed with automatic grenade launchers also entered the port and

joined up with the Italian forces.

The operation began in the early morning of 27

December. The convoy left the port area and

Photo courtesy ot the Italian Armed Forces

Italian forces enter the town of Gialalassi on their way to secure the nearby airfield. One of the more flexible units

of the Italian military, the Folgore Brigade could operate by means of airdrops or as a light infantry brigade.
48 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DD-SD-QO-00700

Pvt Andrew Schnaubelt, USA, of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, takes a covering position on the airfield at

Belet Weyne, as a Canadian C- 130 Hercules cargo plane from Canadian Forces Base, Petawawa, Ontario, lands.

headed north on one of the few hard-surfaced

roads. This was the old "Strada Imperiale," or

Imperial Way, built by the Italians during the

1930s. As the task force left the city, the light of

dawn revealed a verdant countryside where the

road paralleled the Shebelle. Armed sentries

guarded large tracts of sorghum and other crops.

Helicopter gunships would occasionally fly low

over the length of the convoy. Interesting historical monuments were located every 10 kilometers

along the roadside; these were markers of stone,

bearing the Fascist insignia and noting the distance from the city. The condition of the road was

as bad as had been reported. Years of neglect and

battle damage from the civil war had taken their

toll. The road was frequently cratered from

artillery rounds, and in some places the paved surface was entirely gone for long stretches. The

convoy, already slowed by the presence of the

relief trucks, frequently had to drive through rutted tracks on the side of the road. Speeds averaged

only about 10 kilometers per hour. By 1800, the

assault forces in armored personnel carriers and

trucks entered the town. Crowds of waving,

singing and smiling people greeted the remainder

of the convoy. The Italian forces proceeded on to

the airfield, setting security around it for the night

with the convoy in the center, close to the landing

strip. The next day, they set up platoon-sized

defensive positions around the town and oversaw

the unloading of the grain supplies at the distribution center.131

The last of the originally planned relief sectors

to be secured was Belet Weyne. Planning for this

operation had initially called for Army Forces

Somalia to have the responsibility for the mission.'32 During this time, the Army troop build-up

was continuing. Major General Steven L. Arnold,

commanding general of Army Forces Somalia,

arrived on 22 December. At the same time, the

Canadian forces were also preparing to enter the

theater in large numbers. Fragmentary Order 14,

issued on 23 December, placed the Canadian

forces under the tactical control of Army Forces

Somalia for the operation. Upon release from tactical control, the Canadians would assume respon-
COMING ASHORE 49

sibility for the entire sector.

ation was set for 28 December.

The date for the operThe city of Belet Weyne is 320 kilometers

north of Mogadishu, and only 32 kilometers from

the Ethiopian border. Et also is situated closest of

all the relief sectors in the northern portion of

Somalia, which were outside LFNITAF's area of

operations. For these reasons, a U.S. Special

Operations Forces team would also be a part of

the operation. They would patrol along the boundary to keep the competing factions apart.'33 iii

staff meetings, the city was described as flat and

situated on the Shebelle River, which was the only

obstacle in the area. There were two bridges in

town and one C-130 capable airfield. There was

only one road into the city, but it was assessed as

good for handling traffic. The Hawadle clan controlled the city with a small security force armed

with some crew-served weapons and antiaircraft

ailIery.'34

General Arnold gave command of the operation to the 2d Brigade (Commando Brigade) of

the 10th Mountain Division. The task force would

be composed of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry,

and a battalion of the Canadian Airborne

Regiment Battle Group. The plan was to seize the

airfield with an air assault. On the 28th, the Army

flew the assault units on board Sikorsky UH 60A

"Blackhawk" helicopters, while MarFor provided

additional support with four helicopters. Almost

immediately following the securing of the airfield, Canadian C-130 aircraft began to land,

bringing additional troops and vehicles. In less

than two days, about 1,000 soldiers had been

brought to Belet Weyne. On 30 December, the

Canadians assumed sole responsibility for the

relief sector. The contingent from Army Forces

Somalia departed for Bale Dogle, to prepare for

another mission.'35

The successful completion of the Belet Weyne

operation on 28 December marked the end of the

second phase of Operation Restore Hope)36 The

purpose of this phase had been to secure the

remaining five objectives as points from which to

provide security throughout the area of operations

to allow the unimpeded distribution of relief supplies. This was four to six weeks ahead of schedule, reflective of the amount of fast paced work

accomplished by UNITAF and component level

planners, and in execution by the multinational

forces involved, It also was indicative of the flexibility of the command in the ability to prepare

each operation even as forces were arriving in theater. Logistics challenges were daunting and

required close monitoring of the time-phased

force deployment data, but it worked.

There was to be no letup in tempo and no time

for self-congratulation. As soon as the 2d

Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrived back in Bale

Dogle, they were tasked with an additional mission: to secure the port of Merka, located about 70

kilometers southwest of Mogadishu. It was a

OVIG DD-SD-OO-00793

On 31 December 1992, soldiers of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, jump from a tfl-!-60 Blackhawk helicopter in an air assault to take control of the airfield at Merka.
50 R€STORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

place where a corrupt mayor was acting in coacert

with local bandits to prevent relief supplies from

getting to the humanitarian relief organizations

for distribution to outlying towns. The relief

organizations in the city had not received any supplies for six months. For these reasons, and also to

secure another port, Merka was added to

UINITAF's objectives and an operation to secure it

was planned)37

The original plan called for an amphibious

operation, using the San Marco Battalion of the

Italian forces. The date was set for 27 December.

Unfortunately, the only good landing beaches

were 22 kilometers south of the city. Those near

the city were unsuitable, with a berm at the hightide mark and rocky ledges on both flanks.'38 The

lack of adequate landing beaches close to the

objective caused a change in the initial concept of

operations. By 28 December, Fragmentary Order

19 directed the Italian forces to place the San

Marco Battalion under the tactical control of

Army Forces Somalia for the operation, which

was scheduled for the 31st. The operation would

be a combined ground and air assault with the

Italian forces proceeding in trucks while U.S.

Army forces seized the airfield. The road leading

to the city was described as poor and very dusty

with a possible travel time of four to six hours. In

addition, there were at least five bandit-run checkpoints on the road, each generally watched by one

man armed with an AK-47 rifle; machine gun

positions were also reported on the town mosque

and along the road.'39

Control of the operation was again given to the

10th Mountain Division's 2d Brigade. The multinational task force was composed of one company of the San Marco Battalion attached to the 2d

Battalion, 87th Infantry. Supported by the 10th

Mountain Division's organic 10th Aviation

Brigade, the American soldiers conducted an air

assault to secure the airfield, and then immediately secured the port. They then linked up with the

Italian forces that were proceeding overland

escorting a convoy of relief supplies. The

American soldiers and the Italians escorted the

convoy to the outlying town of Qoryooley, the site

of a refugee camp where the food was needed.'4°

Thus, by the end of the year, and barely within

three weeks of the initial landings, all the humanitarian relief sectors had been secured by the

coalition forces. Convoys were running smoothly,

but there was already a need to improve communications between all the major cities. One answer

to this was the establishment of an intra-theater

flight schedule. Another was to establish a road

network throughout the theater that could provide

for quicker movement of convoys bearing supplies and troops. UNITAF Fragmentary Order 9,

issued on 19 December, set up a network of nine

main supply routes connecting the sectors. Each

was named for a different color. Subsequent

orders tasked particular forces with the inspection, clearance and repair of the roads. Of special

concern were landmines that were so often

encountered, thousands had been laid throughout

the country, and now they had to be found and

removed from the roads.

The UNTTAF structure was largely in place at

the end of the second phase. Its rapid success was

undoubtedly assisted by two factors. The first was

the heavy reliance on psychological operations

that General Johnston had emphasized in his initial orders. The visits by Ambassador Oakley, the

use of radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and the publication of a Somali-language newspaper all kept

the populace informed of what was happening and

why. The second factor was the quiet reaction of

Somali clan-based factions. While all claimed to

welcome the arrival of TJNTTAF, the coalition

forces' presence inserted an unknown quantity

into their political and military calculations. There

was some testing of UNITAF resolve in the early

days, but those incidents were quickly and decisively resolved. The rules of engagement allowed

for protection of the coalition forces, and Somali

faction leaders would be presented with an unacceptable loss of men, arms, and prestige if they

provoked UNITAF security elements. Such lessons kept the Somali leadership relatively quiet

and receptive to the requests of UNITAF.

As the third phase of the operation began, it

was recognized there was still much work to be

done, and many more important decisions had to

be made. In this phase, the operations were to

expand the security of the interior of the country

through the use of convoy security and the creation of additional distribution sites. This phase

would set the stage for the delicate hand-off to the

United Nations force, generally know as UNOSOM. As with a relay race, the smooth passing of

the baton is critical to success, and this is no less

true in military operations other than war. The

UNITAF staff wanted to ensure the baton was

passed without difficulty.
Chapter 5

Politics, Peace Talks, and Police

Military-Political Cooperation

The military aspects of the operation were proceeding smoothly by the end of December 1992.

The long hours of planning, bringing together a

staff, and forming the coalition were producing

rapid success. But there were considerations that

went beyond occupying and controlling territory.

There were times when military commanders, as

well as the Marines and soldiers in the field, had

to act as diplomatists, negotiators, and statesmen.

"1 suppose if there is a blueprint for how the diplomatic and political side should work with the military on an operation like this, it was perfect,"

noted Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston.

"We recognized very early that this was a very,

very complex environment."

Carl von Clausewitz, a 17th century Prussian

soldier and philosopher, defined war as "merely a

continuation of policy by other means." While

Operation Restore Hope was not truly a war, as

Ctausewitz understood it, his maxim was

nonetheless true. Even in this operation other than

war, the commanding general and his staff officers had to keep in mind that "the political object

is the goal ... and means can never be considered

in isolation from their purpose."41 Matching military means to political objectives drove much of

what the coalition did and how it continued to

structure itself. Brigadier General Anthony C.

Zinni, the operations officer, summed this up in an

interview: "Operations such as this become less

clear as far as military objectives. They become

more politically driven. The humanitarian needs

force the military to work differently. Terms must

change to suit the mission; military terms will not

work. Marines quickly and clearly moved to the

humanitarian side. The key to the operation is the

people; we must respond to their hope."42

American Ambassador Robert B. Oakley recognized at the start that one of his greatest responsibilities would be to assist the military commanders with the myriad political issues this operation brought. Accordingly, he and General

Johnston established a coordinating committee in

which they met daily or more frequently as necessary. General Johnston saw the commiUee's role

was "to tie the diplomatic-political considerations

with our military power, which allows us to pressure the factions to ... decrease violence." The

two sides of the committee got along very well,

with their mutual work seeming to progress from

a quick understanding of each other's needs. "We

simply ... didn't sit down and say 'here is our joint

strategy.' It just seemed like I knew when I was

going to do something militarily thnt I needed

diplomatic support. He [Ambassador Oakleyj

seemed to have the instincts of knowing what

needed to be done up front. We talked a lot and

that was the important thing. It was a very cooperative effort, helped a great deal by Mr. John

Hirsch, who was my political advisor, and de

nv,c DD-SD-OO-00755

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, commander of the joint task

force, stands on the tarmac of Mogadishu airport with

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley.
52 RESToRING HOPE IN SOMALIA

facto he became Ambassador Oakley's DCM

[deputy chief of mission]."44 Another important

task for the committee was to present a clear message to the factions by ensuring the coalition

spoke with one voice.'45 The faction leaders

would take advantage of any confusion in aims or

methods.

The two sides of the committee brought dual

pressures against the factious. Diplomatic initiatives were begun to get the sides talking to resolve

their differences, while the military might of the

Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) made the

Somali factions take these steps seriously. To

reduce the violence and bring the nation together,

a series of reconciliation talks were scheduled in

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was hoped these talks,

held on neutral ground, would thstill the faction

leaders with a sense of responsibility for the

future of their country. Only those who were willing to put down their arms and control their followers would take part in these talks; those who

did not would have neither voice in the talks nor a

place in the Somalia to come. As Ambassador

Oakley later said about General Morgan: "My

officers and UNITAF officers have met with him

on several occasions and told him that the way

Somalia is going today, the way to get into the

future is not by using the gun. As a matter of fact,

those who persist in taking the political power [by

force] are losing out in the political future of

Somalia. Nothing bars him from participating in

the peace process except his own behavior."46

Getting the faction leaders to accept their responsibilities and to give up their weapons would take

a deliberate plan and a lot of coercion. Ultimately,

there was a long and logical process of thought

and action by which all of these ends were to be

accomplished. It involved the issue of disarmament; defining the secure environment required

by the mission; the use of overwhelming force

when necessary; the assistance to the humanitarian organizations; the furtherance of the peace

process among the faction leaders; and the

rebuilding of Somali civil institutions. Each of

these was a thread in a tapestry of peacemaking.

Weapons Control and the use of Force

One of the first points that had to be settled was

the issue of disarmament. As explained earlier,

disarmament of Somalia was neither a specified

part of the mission nor an implied task. However,

something had to be done to reduce the number of

arms. The program decided on was one of

weapons collection or weapons control rather than

total disarmament.' Of course, from the point of

security, there were so many weapons in

Mogadishu and elsewhere that their very presence

posed a threat. General Johnston turned his attention to this matter immediately on his arrival. "At

that point [II December] we were trying to reduce

any threat to the U.S. forces. My primary mission

was security of the force ... and clearly, it was

required to disarm those elements that would

directly threaten our forces; i.e., the 'technicals'

that were in Mogadishu or Baidoa or Bardera or

anywhere on the road map."47 In a meeting with

Ambassador Oakley, the start of the weapons control program was laid out. "There were so-called

technicals in almost every block and this was

obviously a serious threat to the Somali people. It

is a significant threat to our forces and it symbolizes the power of the warlords, both military and

political, in the eyes of the Somali people. We

decided the number one objective was to get these

dangerous things out of town and at the first meeting between [General Mohamed Farah Hassan]

Aideed and Ali Mahdi [Mohamed] that took place

here with General Johnston and myself present we

got them to agree and to issue a public statement

that they would remove their heavy weapons from

Mogadishu."48 By 22 December, reports at staff

meetings noted the turn-in of technicals and heavy

weapons was proceeding well; Aideed had

already moved his, and Ali Mahdi was in the

process of moving his to a site east of the city. The

actual cantonment of all these weapons took many

days to complete, but was undoubtedly hurried by

the knowledge that coalition forces would consider the weapons fair game.'49

This initial agreement by the two major faction

leaders was used by UNTTAF as the lever to get

all heavy weapons and technicals in the country

out of circulation. The initial ceasefire agreement,

* The correctness and efficacy of this decision mr control as

opposed to disarmament is made in Somalia Operations:

Lessons Learned by Colonel Kenneth Allard, published by

the National Defense University Press in January 1995. Tn

discussing UNITAF and its successor, UINOSOM It, Colonel

Allard states: "There is a basic conceptual difference

between arms control and disarmament. Removing or limiting the major weapons of an inferior or defeated military

force can be thought of as a form of arms control, but to commit military forces to the mission of forcibly disarming a

populace is to commit those forces to a combat situation that

may thereafter involve them as an active belligerent."
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 53

signed by all faction leaders in early January,

specified these weapons would be voluntarily

impounded in cantonmentsi5° The owning faction

would identify these cantonments for UNITAF so

movement of weapons into or out of them could

be monitored. These were known as authorized

weapons storage sites. There was a noticeable initial reluctance by some elements, especially

Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess and Mohamed Said

Hirsi, known as General Morgan, in Kismayo, to

participate. Eventually, even they complied,

spurred on by pressure applied by Belgian paratroopers and American soldiers in the city. These

coalition forces in Task Force Kismayo confiscated several technicals, demonstrating the serious

intent and strong resolve of UNITAF.'51

The actions against the heavy weapons and

technicals soon noticeably decreased their numbers? There was still, however, a large number of

small arms available in the country that had to be

controlled. Again, there were no simple solutions

to the issue. The sheer volume of weapons made

total disarmament impossible. There also were

some legitimate organizations that needed to be

able to protect themselves. In many towns and villages, local militias were formed for the protection of the populace from bandits. To disarm these

groups would leave them prey to the lawless elements or rival factions. Also, as General Johnston

recognized, disarming them would convey the

erroneous assumption that IJNITAF would pick

up the burden of their security.152 He emphasized

this point to his commanders in a meeting on 5

January, when Canadian forces in Belet Weyne

voiced concern about taking weapons from a valid

militia brigade. General Johnston responded there

was no intent to disarm legitimate militias. The

weapons should be inventoried and local commanders should work with the militias, but

UNITAF could not undertake the full security

responsibility for the relief sectors.'53

Similarly, the various relief organizations had

armed guards for the protection of their personnel

or work sites. These were often moonlighting soldiers of one of the factions, which presented a

source of extra income for the faction leaders.

Simply disarming these guards posed several

problems. First of all, to take away their rifles and

* This was especially true in Mogadishu. There continued to

be reports, however, that technicals had been sent to outlying

districts, where they were out uf sight but ready for use as

needed.

machine guns and dismiss them would cause

relief personnel to be uneasy, as they could

become targets of their former guards.* Second,

the relief organizations did have legitimate security requirements in their work places and while

traveling. Finally, as with the local militias,

UNITAF did not have the resources to take up this

large security mission, not withstanding the political pressure to protect these organizations.'54 **

The question of small arms thus came down to

authorized versus unauthorized weapons. General

Johnston recognized that with the elimination of

the technicals and other heavy weapons, relief

organizations' security personnel did not have to

possess heavy machine guns or similar armament.

Rifles, such as the ubiquitous AK-47s, would now

be adequate protection against the bandits, but

would not give the guards so much firepower they

would become a threat to others.

A system of identity cards was developed.'55

These were permits to carry firearms. Their purpose was to ensure that only those who were

employed as guards could openly carry such

weapons. The cards would be issued to the relief

organizations, not to the Somalis who were in

their employ. The card system went into effect on

8 January 1993.

The first cards were colored pink, with no provision for photographs. This led to attempts to circumvent the system by some Somalis. A second

set of blue cards, with photographs, was put into

place by late February. These cards provided

greater access for the Somalis for whom they

were issued, but there were still some problems.

Soldiers or Marines who interpreted the rules too

stringently sometimes still confiscated weapons

from legitimate guards, much to the discomfort of

the relief staff and their guards. In April, UNITAF

addressed this problem by issuing a card to all

coalition troops that explained the weapons confiscation policy and the identification card system.'56

The most effective instrument to get the faction

leaders to cooperate with UNITAF's demands was

* During the course of the operation there were instances of

members of humanitarian relief organizations being wounded or killed by guards over disagreements about employment

or pay. ** UNITAF provided security to food convoys, coordinating

such work with relief organizations. These actions were

within UNITAF's explicit mission.
54 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

the willingness to use force when necessary. From

the earliest days of the operation, the coalition

partners demonstrated they would meet any

aggression or threat with an overwhelming

response. UNITAF controlled the skies and the

seas along the coast, and the patrols and convoys

of its Marines and soldiers demonstrated a strong

and professional presence. Coalition leaders were

therefore taken seriously, and if a local coalition

commander said he would take a certain action, he

was believed. This credibility allowed General

Johnston to implement the policy of arms control

in a more gradual way than might have been otherwise possible; as he later stated: "We have

incrementally ratcheted up what we've been

removing to get every weapon off the streets. To

try to take them all right away was unrealistic. We

could have imposed this militarily, but it would

have impaired the important role of getting the

Somali people to take charge of their own system."57 Ambassador Oakley also saw the advantages of this system of credibility through

strength: "We've been remarkably successful

because we come from a position of force. It's an

area [ml which you have to figure what, in our

judgment is fair, and then tell them ... what they

should do. If you negotiate, you quite frequently

find yourself ending up at a disadvantage because

they're very good at negotiations, twisting it

around different ways."58

The diplomatic negotiations and the reduction

of weapons on the streets began to make Somalia

relatively safer, but there was a need to be able to

say just how much more secure the country actually was. Nearly every Marine serving with

UNITAF had also served in Operation Desert

Storm: the same was true for many of the

American soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and some

of the other coalition troops. A concept that had

become familiar during that earlier conflict was

the definition of the end state. The internal examination that had occurred in the American armed

forces during the 1 980s reinforced the idea that

commanders had to know how an operation

should come to its conclusion and what the resulting dynamic between the opponents should be

like. The Marine Corps' FMFM 1-1,

Campaigning, published in 1989, defined the end

state as "the military conditions we must realize in

order to reach that destination, those necessary

conditions which we expect by their existence

will provide us our established aim." It also stated: "in the main, the more general the conflict, the

more predominant are the military factors, and the

easier it is to translate aims into military terms.

But the more limited the aims of conflict, the less

predominantly military is the conduct of the war,

and the more difficult it is to translate those aims

into military conditions." UNITAF was engaged

in one of these limited operations, with all of the

uncertainty that could entail.

The need to define this end state was recognized from the earliest days. If the mission was to

produce a secure environment, how could that be

measured? In the original Joint Task Force

Somalia operation order, issued 6 December, the

commander's intent stated: "The end state desired

is to create an environment in which the U.N. and

[nongovernmental organizations] can assume full

responsibility for the security and operation of the

Somali humanitarian relief efforts." As military

forces spread throughout the area of operations,

UNITAF planners sought a quantifiable definition

of security. General Johnston saw the definition

and refinement of the end state as an implied task,

although a difficult one. As he said: "[We] now

need a precise measure for success; how do you

know when a secure environment is established?

[We] need an objective measure." By Christmas

Day, the UINITAF staff was still searching for this

precise measurement of security, recognizing that

reducing the number of technicals and other arms

was certainly a contributing factor.'6°

Discussion of the secure environment tumed to

an appreciation of the relativity of the term. Some

members of the staff noted there were cities in the

United States that had problems with violent

crime. Did that mean they were not secure? At

what point was violence at an acceptable level?

When was any place secure for its citizens?

Taking that line of thought, could Mogadishu be

considered secure if its level of violent crime met

that of a major American city, such as Detroit?

Interesting as these discussions were, they led to

the recognition that the problem in Mogadishu

and throughout Somalia was unique in being

twofold. Here, violence was brought to the people

by both the warring factions and by renegade

criminal elements. The first could be controlled,

because it was organized and its leaders had their

own political goals that could be addressed. The

other was a problem of the greater society, and

while that problem might be reduced, it would

always exist. Ultimately, then, the end state of

establishing the secure environment would be
reached with the end of organized, as opposed to

criminal, violence.'6'

By 7 January 1993, UNITAF planners, led by

Colonel Peter A. Dotto, had developed a transition

matrix, which included indicators of the stability

of relief sectors. This matrix was presented to the

commanders and published in a letter of instruction on the 15th. The indicators included quantifiable criteria in five categories. These were resistance, humanitarian relief, infrastructure, populace, and transition actions. The objective criteria

included such concepts as the numbers of technicals and crew-served weapons in the sector; the

numbers of roadblocks encountered and the visibility of weapons; breaches of agreements and

actions against UNITAF; conditions of airfields,

ports, and main supply routes; the establishment

of local councils and civil-military coordination

teams; food shortages and numbers of unescorted

convoys; and the state of security for relief warehouses. With each sector commander reporting on

these indicators each week, UNITAF could take

an objective view of how its actions were aiding

the accomplishment of the mission.'62

Reconciliation Conferences

The weapons control policies and the actions of

the commanders in the relief sectors were some of

the building blocks to secure the environment.

The series of peace conferences was another. The

United Nations sponsored these with the support

of UNITAF leaders. If the faction leaders could be

kept talking to each other, with a purpose of

reconstructing their nation, they would be less

inclined to fight each other. Of course, such a plan

PoLITIcS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 55

ovic Do-SD-oo-00863

Representatives of the Magadishu c/an leaders dismantle a roadblock along the "Green Line," the border that separated both the city's north and south sections and members of opposing clans.
56 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

presupposed the willingness of these leaders to

accept the diminution of their power to secure the

common good. Such a proposition was tenuous at

best, as events eventually showed. Nevertheless,

the talks were necessary and proper if peaceful

progress was to be made.

Only two days after the arrival of UNITAF

headquarters, General Johnston and Ambassador

Oakley had already begun a first round of talks

and achieved some agreements among the faction

leaders. At that time, General Aideed and All

Mahdi "met face to face for the first time, and

reached an agreement to respect the ceasefire to

which they had agreed earlier in the year, and to

remove their heavy weapons from the streets of

Mogadishu."63 Two weeks later, in a dramatic

and well-publicized event, these two leaders met

along the "Green Line" that divided the city into

factional areas, pledging, "on this occasion the

abolition of the artificial demarcation lines in the

city that resulted from the civil war will be

declared."64

To help with these kinds of issues, and to prepare for the more formal talks that would come

later at Addis Ababa, Ambassador Oakley and the

UNITAF staff formed two committees. The first

was strictly political. It was headed by Ambassador Oakley himself, and was intended to bring

the faction leaders together so they could go over

their differences point by point. In this manner,

they moved incrementally along toward a peaceful political resolution. The second committee

was for security. It was essentially a military-tomilitary organization headed by General Zinni,

the UNITAF operations officer. Its members

included the leaders of the factional militias.

General Zinni described the committee's work:

"We worked security issues and concerns. ... We

tried to prevent problems and confrontations. It

was our way of issuing ultimatums and that sort of

thing. It was a good forum for military-to-military

kinds of issues. We were working toward a cease

fire, disarmament, cantonment of weapons, al.l

that kind of thing ... and laying the ground work

for a bigger discussion."65

The bigger discussion was a series of national

reconciliation talks. On 11 December 1992, the

Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, formally invited 11 political faction leaders to "participate in an informal preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory

meeting, which I will personally chair, will be

held at the headquarters of the United Nations

Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa

on 4 January 993•" * Also invited were representatives of the Organization of African Unity,

the League of Arab States, the Organization of the

Islamic Conference, and the Standing Committee

of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. Members

of UNITAF and United Nations Organization

Somalia (UNOSOM I) also attended. The setting

in the capitol of Ethiopia was a good choice for

two reasons. First, it was close enough that participants could travel there quickly with UNITAF

and UNOSOM support. Also, Ethiopia had just

come out of its own civil war, and its president,

Meles Zenawi, was an advocate of the peace

process. The talks would receive his strong support.

Three additional factions eventually joined

these first rounds of talks.' Although intelligence

assessments indicated not all faction leaders were

enthusiastic about the talks, none wanted to be left

out. This was especially true of Aideed, who was

at first reluctant to attend because of a mistrust of

the United Nations and Boutros-Ohali, but he

eventually realized the only way to further his

own aims and protect his political agenda was by

taking part in the discussions. Perhaps because

of mutual jealousy and mistrust, and perhaps partly from a desire by each faction to not be seen as

the spoiler of national unity, surprising progress

was made at these initial talks. Another factor was

* The original invitees were Mohamed Farah Abdullahi of

the Somali Democratic Alliance; Mohamed Qanyare Afrah

of the United Somali Congress; Abdurahman Dualeh Au of

the United Somali Front; General Mohamed Farah Aideed of

the Somali National Alliance; Haji Mahmoud Barbar of the

Somali Democratic Movement; Mahmud Khalif-Shire of the

Somali National Front; Haji Aden Hussein Mohamed of the

Somali Africans Muki Organization; General Mohanied

Abshir Musse of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front;

General Aden Abdillahi Moor of the Somali Patriotic

Movement; Ibrahim Meigag Samatar of the Somali National

Movement; and Abdi Dahir Warsame of the United Somali

Party. ** These were Ali Jsmael Abdi of the Somali National

Democratic Union; Mohamed Ragis Mohamed of the Somali

National Union; and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess of the

Somali Patriotic Movement.

Boutros-Ghali worked under a triple suspicion in the

eyes of General Aideed; he was not only the Secretary

General of the United Nations, he also was Egyptian and a

Coptic Christian.
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 57

Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

Go! Peter Dotto, UNITAF operations future plans officer, along the Green Line in Mongadishu during a route reconnaissance for a food convoy.

American determination. "Most Somali factions

appeared ready to take the disarmament process

seriously, in large part because they understood

the U.S. expectation that the process would move

forward. At General Johnston's insistence, the

U.N. organized and convened early February follow-up meetings in Mogadishu with representatives of all the factions, who were asked to identify specific cantonment and transition sites and to

establish a time table for implementation."t67

Between 8 and 15 January 1993 all participants

signed three sets of agreements. These were

broad, far-reaching, and significant. The first set

called for "an immediate and binding ceasefire in

all parts of the country under the control of the

concerned warring factions;" for "the immediate

cessation of all hostile propaganda against each

other;" for "cooperation with all international

organizations working inside and outside Somalia

to distribute humanitarian relief;" and for "the

free movement of Somali people throughout the

entire country as a measure of confidence-building." Of equal importance was the call for a

national reconciliation conference to be held in

Addis Ababa on 15 March. The second set, signed

on 15 January, provided specific agreements on

disarmament. First, all heavy weapons under the

control of the political factions were to be handed

over to a ceasefire-monitoring group. The militias

of the factions were themselves to be encamped in

areas outside the cities and towns where they

would not threaten the peace. There they would be

disarmed, and with the help of the international

community they would be retrained in civilian

skills in preparation for demobilization. The

ceasefire-monitoring group would be comprised

of troops from UNITAF and UNOSOM and

would have a committee made up of representa-
58 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

tives of all the warring factions. Finally, in a separate agreement, the factions agreed to establish

an ad hoc committee to prepare for the conference

in March. 168

There were some issues in these agreements

that would have a tremendous impact on

UNITAF. The ceasefire was not the first one the

factions had agreed to; but it was the first in which

they had voluntarily agreed to disarm and demobilize.169 This was a large task to which UNITAF

and the United Nations were now committed as

members of the ceasefire-monitoring group. The

only United Nations presence in Somalia was the

500-man Pakistani brigade, so the work of preparing the plans for cantonment and encampment and

monitoring the factions' activities fell primarily to

the UNITAF staff. Colonel Dotto explained

UNITAF's participation in the planning: "General

Johnsi:on told Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen

[the commander of the UNOSOM I force, the

Pakistani brigade] that he would provide his planning cell, [that is] us, future plans, and we'd help

him in any way to come up at least with a plan to

go back to the U.N. with."7° As General Zinni

said: "Probably the vast majority of the work in

this area is done by our staff since it was much

more robust."7' The future plans section of

Colonel Dotto's operations unit formed a cell

composed of four IJNITAF planners, plus five or

six liaison officers from coalition countries and

two planners from UNOSOM. The cell was augmented by the arrival of Colonel Mark Hamilton,

USA, and Ms. Katie Sullivan, a political officer,

both of whom had just come from El Salvador,

where a similar peace process had occurred.'72 liii

an effort to further the progress of the talks,

General Johnston and General Shaheen issued a

joint letter to all of the signees of the accords of 8

January. The letter called upon them to "begin the

disarmament process [W]e request that you

provide the commanders of UNOSOM/UNITAF a

detailed list of all weapons heavy and light, under

the control of your political movements.

Additionally, to begin the planning for transition

of armed combatants to Somalian society, we

request the general geographic locations and numbers of all forces under your control." This letter

was issued on 8 February, and the information

was requested by the 15th.'73

The problem now faced by UNITAF was to

deterniine how much of this work was within its

proper sphere. "We were asked if we could participate in the disarmament process and we felt that

our participation could only be limited to conduct

of tasks that were within our mission statement

and our mission constraints or parameters, and

also within our area of operations. If cantoning

weapons, if supporting transition sites, if picking

up weapons, if all these sorts of things happened

in our area and happened so that they coincided

with our current mission we would be glad to

accommodate within the system in doing

them."74 UNITAF would not be monitoring the

ceasefire. That task would remain a mission of the

United Nations, for which it would have to come

in quickly to take advantage of the cooperative

attitude evident at that time.'75 As General Zinni

said in March, there was a window of opportunity

for the United Nations that they could not afford

to lose, but getting the U.N. to act with resolution

and dispatch was an issue that would confront the

UNTTAF staff until May.176

The Addis Ababa talks needed more than a

good sense of timing if they were to succeed.

National reconciliation, like a fragile flower,

required the careful nurturing of trust if it was to

bloom. The United Nations would have to ensure

that trust among all players and be an impartial

moderator itself. In the end, this was a major

stumbling block.

Somali Police Forces

While national reconciliation among the

numerous factions received great attention, the

rebuilding of national structures was also important. Within a month of the initial landings,

UNITAF encouraged the rebuilding of the Somali

police force. Before the civil war, the Somali

police were a respected national force of 40,000

men and women.'77 Since they were not aligned

with any clan, they also were trusted to be impartial. But the police had left their posts with the

anarchy that came with the civil war and the rise

of bandits who were often better armed than the

police. A few did stay on at their precinct houses,

usually to try to protect the property itself, but

they performed no real police duties except in the

immediate area. Faction comrades usually liberated apprehended criminals from the Mogadishu

prison)78

The arrival of UNITAF provided these officers

a chance to regain their positions and once again

to serve a meaningful purpose. There was as yet

no government to back them, or even to pay them,

but the interest and desire to serve were still evi-
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 59

Photo courtesy of the author

Two Somali policemen, wearing their old uniforms, voluntarily returned to their posts to provide security at the

airport in Kismayo.

dent. General Johnston used one telling example

to illustrate this point. "Early in the game, this old,

gray-haired policeman showed up He was

asked, 'Who do you work for?' because we knew

there was no government, no police force, nothing

in uniform. 'I'm working for the government.'

'There is no government.' 'Well, then I must be

working for the people.' So you could see some

spontaneous interest on the part of the Somalis, of

trying to get hold of their own city again."79

* In travels throughout the area of operations, the author also

noticed Ihe emergence of the police. The first time was on a

trip to Kismayo in early January where Iwo Somali policemen were on duty at the airporl. The men were working

without official sanction but were highly visible in their

khaki uniforms with blue berets and silver badges. When

Army officers at Kismayo were asked about them, no one

could say much. They had simply shown up and kept away

the crowds of curious and especially kept an eye on the adolescent boys to ensure they did not cause trouble.

But it was more than just individual policemen

who wanted to resurrect the police force. The

security committee that worked closely with

General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley also

saw an opportunity to establish a police force with

its former reputation as an impartial agency. "The

defined Security Committee ... came to see me

and said the day after the first Marine had been

killed [13 January 1993], 'We want to assume

responsibilities for our own security. You are all

doing things in the city that we should be doing

and we'd like to help.' I said 'What kind?' "He

said 'We want some material assistance, but we

want assistance in fending off the political and

clan influences that would try to turn such a force

into their [instrument] rather than something that

is relatively independent and national."5°

This particular interest of some Somalis coincided with the interest of the leaders of IJNITAF

in the creation of a structure by which the Somalis

could start to reclaim responsibility for their own

security. The recreation of a police force would

make it easier for UNITAF to accomplish its overall security mission and prepare for the hand-off

to the United Nations. Also, it would weaken the

faction leaders. As General Johnston said: "We

felt that [the recreation of a police force] was

healthy to the extent that you can get somebody

other than the warlords providing security, then

you enfeeble the warlords. ... It is as effective as

taking away their weapons, if there's another

authoritarian figure that the Somalis recognize."t8' Of course, this effect would also assist

UNITAF by relieving the members of the coalition forces of some duties. "We'd been around

long enough to know that if you have a Somali

who is a figure of authority, then he'll take care of

the rock-throwing kids better than a Marine with

a machinegun."1t2

There were, of course, problems in the recreation of the Somali police that had to be addressed

and resolved before any work on the project could

begin. First, such an action was far beyond

1.JNTTAF's mission. It clearly fell into the category of nation building. This broad and vague term

covered several kinds of projects that could easily

become long-term and expensive measures more

properly performed by the United Nations.

However, it was recognized this project, so useful

to all parties involved with Operation Restore

Hope (UNITAF United Nations, humanitarian

relief organizations, and Somali people) should be

actively supported and encouraged. In a staff
60 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

An Italian soldier provides weapons training to a member of the Somali auxiliary security force in the Italian camp

at Ba/ad.

meeting held on 1 February, General Johnston

described this as the "most important thing right

now, even more important than the reconstitution

of the government."83

But how far could that support go? United

States law was very explicit about assistance to

foreign nations for the training and establishment

of police forces. Section 2420, Chapter 32 of the

United States Code, "Foreign Assistance;

Miscellaneous Provisions," states: "On and after

July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to

carry out this chapter, and none of the local currencies generated under this chapter, shall be used

to provide training or advice, or provide any

financial support, for police, prisons, or other law

enforcement forces for any foreign government or

any program of national intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within

the United States or abroad." Even more specifically, the 1991 Appropriations Act prohibited a

foreign military financing program or intemational military education and training programs for

Somalia, among other countries)84

as the IINITAF staff and Ambassador

worked to define the basic structure of

that could be provided under U.S. law,

contact was made with senior officers of the old

national police. The coalition's representative was

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Spataro, USA,

UNTTAF's provost marshal. By 27 January 1993,

he had met six times with the subcommittee of 10,

an informal group of senior police officials, criminal investigation division officers, and lawyers.

At these meetings, the subcommittee presented

their views on the rebuilding of the police force;

its size, transportation and communications needs,

logistics requirements, and pay and food allotments for the officers and their families. They also

took Lieutenant Colonel Spataro on a tour of all

Mogadishu police stations and the prison. From

them he learned about Somali police operating

procedures and the rules for the use of force.

Initially, the Somalis sought a national force of

6,000 to 7,000 men. Lieutenant Colonel Spataro

determined the national force was too difficult at

that time, but that a 3,000-man auxiliary security

force for Mogadishu was an appropriate and

workable start. He also noted their logistical

Even

Oakley

support

* A subcommittee of the Security Committee discussed earher.
PoLrrrcs, PEACE TALKS, AND POLJCE 61

request was bare bones, listing only 15 trucks, 42

hand-held radios, two unifonns per man (two pair

of trousers, two shirts, one pair of boots, one pair

of low-quarter shoes, two pair of socks, one pistol

belt, canteen, handcuffs, beret with rank insignia,

and nightstick) and small arms. Lieutenant

Colonel Spataro noted the old Somali police were

"armed more like soldiers with rifles and in fact

called their personnel soldiers, NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and officers." He determined

that "we need to change that. Rifle carrying personnel connote soldiers not police officers or auxiliary forces. Probably need to look at giving rifles

to selected and trained personnel for very specific

missions."85

These meetings also provided information

about the judicial and prison systems. Two judges

were still working in Mogadishu, along with two

prosecutors. This rudimentary judicial system

took care of criminals unlucky enough to be

apprehended and actually brought to justice. They

were sent for incarceration in the prison by the

port, a facility described as "built around 1905-

1910, and is really in need of repair, however, it

was really kept well ... [and] operated very professionally."86

With needs and basic structures recognized,

UNITAF could now get down to practical assistance. The new force would be called an auxiliary

security force, and senior Somalis would vet the

officers applying for positions. There were several criteria for appointment. Candidates must have

been a member of the old force for two years prior

to 26 January 1991, and would be reinstated at

their old rank. They had to be Somali nationals

and could not have been involved in any "tangible

offenses against ... Somali society." They also had

to be in good physical condition. Pay was a matter of some concern, and originally the new auxiliary force would be paid with food. This was more

practical than it might at first seem; in a land of

famine, it not only provided sustenance for the

police and their families, but they could sell or

barter any surplus to fill other needs.

There was an advantage to working with an

international coalition with respect to establishing

this auxiliary force. Foreign nations or organizations that did not have the same proscriptions as

the U.S. forces could provide what the Americans

could not. Thus, the United Nations provided

most of the funds for the program; the World Food

Program gave the food that was the initial pay; the

Italians were among the most generous of the

OVIC OA-ST-96-01221

Two Somali military policemen man a roadside checkpoint nearBuurhakaba. The men are armed with a variation of the AK-47 and FAMAS rifles.

allies, providing uniforms, money, and training in

police duties. The Australians in Baidoa also

helped with training and created an excellent program with support from their lawyers. In Oddur,

the French also participated by providing training.

The Americans provided advice to the auxiliary

security force through liaison officers. Very

specificaUy, there was no doubt about the limits of

American involvement with the force. "We're not

commanding the police. We have neither the

responsibility nor the authority to command and

control."87 *

The work of Lieutenant Colonel Spataro and

UNETAF proceeded quickly. By 30 January 1993,

3,000 officers were ready to work at 14 stations

around the city. Pending the fmal decision to start

* General Johnston emphasized this in a staff meeting held

on 1 February 1993. "We are facilitating, assisting and advising. We cannot, by law, train a national police force; therefore, we have oversight, not control. We are fulfilling this

role in UNITAF because there is no one else to take it up."

(Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 1Feb93.)
62 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

the program, coalition engineers worked on

repairs to the stations and the auxiliary security

forces were uniformed, equipped, and trained. It

was initially expected they would begin their

duties by 14 February. These would be standard

police duties, such as would be found anywhere

else in the world. Their mission was to protect

lives and property and maintain public order. This

would be accomplished through basic law

enforcement, traffic and crowd control, neighborhood patrols, and security at food distribution

sites.

By the first week in February, the new officers

were receiving refresher training in the use of

force and how to handle their batons. Their first

real test came when UNITAF and the humanitarian relief organizations implemented a massfeeding program, whereby food would be distributed at several sites throughout the city. The

auxiliary security force was needed to provide

crowd control and these officers performed well.

The program was successful and was soon feeding up to a million people a week, a number that

could not have been reached without the police

presence. Neighborhood patrols started soon after

and were not without their own dangers; two

police officers were killed in the line of duty within two weeks)88

By the end of February, UNJTAF was making

great progress on several lines. The reconciliation

talks were taking place, the auxiliary security

force was coming back into existence in

Mogadishu, and weapons were being removed

from the streets. In the relief sectors, local

UN1TAF commanders were also successfully pursuing their own missions.
Chapter 6

Moving to the Third Phase

Settling In and DaÜy Work

As the members of Unified Task Force Somalia

(UNITAF) moved throughout the area of operations, they found themselves in a part of the world

that was at once foreign and exciting, forbidding

and enticing. Except for some of the French soldiers stationed in Djibouti or the members of the

contingents from the African countries, nearly

every one of the coalition's Marines, sailors, airmen, and soldiers was a stranger to this part of the

world. In spite of the harshness of the country,

many were attracted by this unfamiliar landscape.

When they traveled outside of Mogadishu,

what they saw in equatorial Africa seemed to

match the picture that existed in everyone's imagination. Roads were often no more than tracks

across flat, barren terrain of dust and broken

stone. The beige colors of the land contrasted with

the deep blue of the sky, across which a few small,

stark, white clouds might wander.

The monotony of the landscape was broken by

an occasional grove of scrub bushes, thorn trees,

and acacias. Some of these trees grew to a height

of about 25 feet and spread their branches wide,

providing shade for the passing herders or people

walking along the roads. Convoys frequently

passed herds of camels, cattle, or goats moving to

grazing lands or to market in some remote village.

Donkeys pulled two-wheeled carts laden with

firewood or drums of water. In the early morning

hours, women would be interspersed with the

pedestrian traffic, walking in small groups or by

themselves and carrying large jugs of water or

bundles of wood on their backs. Frequently they

would be encountered miles from the nearest village, leaving one to wonder about where they

were coming from or going to.

* There were a few Marines who had been to Somalia before.

In the days of the Muhammad Siad Barre regime's ties to the

West, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit participated in

Exercise Eastern Wind in August 1987 in the area of

Geesalay. Other Marines who served in Somalia included

those attached to the embassy or who performed security

inspections.

The villages themselves were often small collections of huts fashioned of upright poles stuck in

the ground and covered with daub. The roofs were

thatched, held in place with poles forming a simple dome. The huts might be round or square,

depending on the traditions of the resident clan. In

larger settlements, houses were bigger and more

elaborate, often constructed of stone and plastered

and painted in soft colors.

Where the roads drew close to one of the rivers,

farmlands were encountered, and the resultant

green of growing crops was a relief to the eyes.

Large trees such as sycamores grew in these locations and gave welcome shade to the local inhabitants.

These areas were also the locations for larger

towns and cities. Here the buildings were of stone

or mud brick, plastered and whitewashed or painted in pastel colors. As in Mogadishu, two years of

civil war had relieved many of these structures of

their roofs and windows. The main streets of these

cities were usually tree-lined and shady and

crowded with people. In the center of town, the

markets were coming back into life, with vendors

offering such wares as were available. Often these

were limited to locally produced cigarettes, bits

and pieces of unrelated merchandise, fixtures salvaged from vehicles or buildings, small amounts

of local farm produce, surprisingly large quantities of laundry detergent, parts of rations from all

of the coalition allies (the small bottles of Tabasco

sauce from the meal ready-to-eat packet were

especially popular), and numerous bolts of brilliantly colored cloth. The women used these last

items to make their colorful dresses. Vivid reds,

blues, greens, yellows, and other bright hues

splashing against the dull brown background

made them look, as one Marine put it, "like exotic birds." The women usually did not wear a veil.

But occasionally some women were seen who

kept their faces covered, leaving only their eyes

visible, which only increased the attraction. The

men dressed much more plainly, with simple buttoned shirts or tee shirts over trousers (often of

military camouflage) or the traditional sarong-like

skirt, called "ma-awis," extending from waist to
64 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Somali women, in typical brillantly colored dresses, carry

sive role in both family and political spheres.

anides. Leather shoes were sometimes seen, but

footwear was usually leather sandals or rubber

shower shoes. Local elders generally dressed traditionally, in the ma-awis with colorful shins and

headdress. They also wore beards, which the older

men dyed with henna.

Inland, as water grew scarce, communities

might center on ancient wells. There, women and

herdsmen would gather to draw up buckets of the

life-giving liquid for their families or thirsty animals. Even farther afield, solitary houses might be

encountered. Zaribas enclosures made of interwoven branches of thorn trees and bushes protected the houses and also were used as corrals for the

herds. In these isolated places, deep pits were

often dug to hold the precious rainwater from the

wet seasons. After many dry weeks, these pits

were muddy enclosures containing pools of

green-topped liquid. Unappetizing as it appeared,

these bits of water were necessary for survival.

Nomad camps were very simple. Zaribas were

quickly set up for the protection of herds and people. The huts of these herdsmen and their families

consisted of structures about five feet in height,

made of bent poles covered with hides or sheets of

green plastic. Similar huts were seen in every

refugee camp.

Pholo courtesy of Itatian Armed Forces

firewood on a donkey cart. Traditionally, they play a pasThe climate was particularly harsh, and the

native people had to be equally hard to survive in

it. For the coalition's troops, the heat posed a real

challenge, especially before they became acclimated. During the hot, dry months, the temperatures climbed and the arid air sucked the moisture

right out of the coalition soldiers. The sun at midday felt, as one Marine later said, "like it was 10

feet over your head." For safety reasons, soldiers

on patrol or other duty outside the compounds

wore their full utility uniforms with protective

vests, helmets and other gear. This increased the

dehydrating effects of the climate. Everyone was

supposed to drink at least five liters of water a

day. When out on patrol, or doing heavy work,

this might have to be increased. Providing this

much bottled water to the thousands of Marines

and soldiers and allies scattered throughout the

area of operations was one of the most important

logistics functions of UNITAF.

In contrast to the brilliance and heat of the days

were the dark and cool of the nights. On a moonless night the desert sky assumed a deep black that

was set off by the lustrous stars, giving them a

brilliance rarely seen except at sea. Marines or

soldiers who had sweated while on patrol or while

standing guard at some sun-beaten post would
MOVING 1D THE Ti-nun PsE 65

shiver when the desert sand gave up its heat after

sundown. This was especially noticeable at those

sites near the coast, where there was a continuous

sea breeze, which added to the cooling effect. hi

the various tent areas, the constant blowing of the

wind also produced a steady flapping of canvas.

This rhythmic accompaniment to daily life

became so much a part of existence that its

absence was noticeable and a cause for comment.

The strong breezes kept tugging at the lines of the

tents, requiring the residents to pull them taut

every day, lest a sudden gust lift their canvas

homes off their poles. The same wind also

brought an unending drift of sand, which infiltrated every nook and cranny of tents, bedding, and

equipment. Weapons had to be cleaned two or

three times a day to keep them in proper order.

Native animals were sometimes encountered

along the tracks or in the compounds. Di/c-dik, a

tiny antelope, would occasionally be seen running

through the brush. More rarely, gazelles or boars

might be spotted from convoys heading to the outlying relief sectors. Large storks would alight in

the villages near the rivers, standing with equaniniity close to the people passing by. In the predawn hours, flights of silver-colored ibis would be

seen noiselessly flying just a few feet overhead.

There were rare encounters with poisonous

snakes, such as the spitting cobra and the puff

adder. At night, a flashlight might freeze a tiny

jerboa, a small rodent, in its beam, or a scorpion

might be seen scuttling across the sand.

This was the world in which UNITAF conducted its daily work. For all its exotic attraction, it

was still a dangerous place, as events would soon

prove. Sniping and harassing fire continued, with

compounds and convoys being the usual targets.

The large cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo, in

particular, were especially troublesome, since

these were the scenes of frequent factional fighting and general banditry. The 1st Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MEF) command chronology for this period notes: "Mogadishu remained

volatile. The [Marine Forces Somalial elements

Photo courtesy of the author

The village chief of El Berde, Abdil Ugas Husen, poses with elders after meeting with French officers. Husen's interpreter, Abdil Kader Abdilahi Ali, is in the center.
66 REST0RThJG HoPE IN Soru&

Photo courtesy of the author

Hastily constructed for the protection of herdsmen and thefr herds of cattle, camels, or goats, zaribas were often

encountered far from any village.

which moved into northern Mogadishu found

themselves constantly harassed by minor incidents of deliberate but inaccurate sniping and

spillover fire from factional fighting. These

attacks were particularly frequent at the newly

occupied soccer stadium and along the 21 October

Road."'89

However, while these incidents were annoying,

they were not the most serious threats.

Occasionally, a grenade would be rolled into the

path of a vehicle, causing casualties and damage

and increasing the need for being always on the

alert. As dangerous as these incidents were, in the

early days of the operation the greatest threat was

more passive. During the civil war and resultant

factional fighting, land mines had been sown in

scores of thousands all across the splintered country. These silent killers were placed on roads and

tracks or in areas the unwary might stumble into.

Efforts to report and clear these weapons began

immediately. But they soon had their deadly

effect.

The first two weeks of the operation had passed

with no fatalities, a happy circumstance for all.

But this good fortune was offset by an unspoken

question; how long would it last? It ran out on 23

December. On that day, a UNITAF vehicle struck

an old Soviet land mine near Bardera. Three people were injured and one was killed. Lawrence N.

Freedman, a United States government civilian

employee and retired U.S. Army sergeant major,

was the first member of UNITAF to be killed in

the performance of duty.t9°

Mogadishu

A more serious and direct threat to IJNITAF

personnel and mission accomplishment came two

weeks later. On 6 January 1993, a convoy moving

through Mogadishu was fired on from two of the

authorized weapons storage sites belonging to

General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's faction. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston knew

he had to take strong and immediate action

against such an egregious and violent threat.

Throughout the remainder of that day, a plan

was developed by Marine Forces Somalia

(MarFor) and coordinated with the UNTTAF staff.

The plan was simple but effective, and by using

all the types of firepower available, it was also a

dramatic demonstration of UNITAF power.

Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and

Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, would

surround the two weapons storage sites. Light

armored vehicles from the 3d Light Armored

Infantry Battalion were to screen the area, and

snipers would be positioned to overlook the target

areas. A reserve force was formed from a compa-
MOVING TO THE THino PHASE 67

fly of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and positioned at the embassy compound. The two rifle

companies (Team Alpha and Team Bravo) were

strengthened by the attachment of M1A1 Abrams

tanks and amphibious assault vehicles, as well as

high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles

(humvees) mounting tube-launched, optically

tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles and heavy

machine guns. Team Alpha, Company K, also had

four light armored vehicles. Seven helicopters

were assigned to the operation, three AH-lWs

with Hell Fire missiles and four UH-lNs with

20mm guns.191

At 2200, Colonel Michael W. Hagee of the

UNITAF staff met with Brigadier General Ali

Mohamed Kedeye Elmi, one of Aideed's chief

subordinates. Colonel Hagee informed General

Elmi that because of the recent violations, the

authorized weapons storage sites were invalidated

and were surrounded by UNITAF troops. The

Marines would enter the compounds at dawn of

the next day, 7 January, and confiscate all the

equipment and weapons located there.'92

* At the time, General Aideed was in Addis Ababa for the

preliminary reconciliation talks.

By 2300, the two storage sites were surrounded

and kept under surveillance throughout the night.

Psychological operations teams from the U.S.

Army's Company B, 9th Psychological

Operations Battalion, were attached to each of the

rifle companies. At 0553, they began to broadcast

warnings to the Somali fighters that they were

surrounded, and that if they came out with their

hands up, they would not be hurt. At about the

same time, the helicopters appeared in the sky.'93

The Somalis in weapons storage site Number 8

surrendered. But those in the other site, Number 2,

chose to resist. The helicopter crews and snipers

reported that one of the tanks in the compound

was manned and two Somalis were also preparing

to fire a heavy antiaircraft machine gun. The commanding officer of the task force, Colonel Jack W.

Klimp ordered a sniper to shoot the crew of the

machine gun. The sniper did so, and also fired a

round against the barrel of the weapon, rendering

it unserviceable. This opened the engagement,

which was short, sharp, and one-sided. Initially,

the Marines came under a heavy volume of fire

from recoilless rifles, machine guns, and small

arms, but this was quickly suppressed. At 0615,

the helicopters were cleared to fire their rockets

against targets in the compound. They continued

to fire for about 30 minutes, interrupting their fire

only once for another psychological operations
68 RESTORING HOPE IN 5orau.&

OVIC DN-ST-93-02880

Early in the multinational relief effort, Operation Restore Hope, Marines in a humvee patrol the streets of Mogadishu.

broadcast. At 0647, the tanks entered the compound, followed 14 minutes later by the Marines

of Company K.

Resistance ended except some sporadic sniping

at the aircraft. The riflemen cleared the buildings

that had not been destroyed by the helicopters.

Major General Charles E. Wilhelm declared the

area secured at 0926, by which time additional

trucks were enroute to help cany off the confiscated. weapons. In addition to numerous small

arms and ammunition, there were 4 M47 tanks, 9

howitzers of various calibers, 13 armored personnel carriers, 3 antiaircraft guns, Ii mortars, and I

recoilless rifle)94 All was accomplished at the

cost of only one casualty, a corporal wounded by

an accidental discharge.

'K Colonel Klimp referred to this part of the action as a

"bluff." The tanks had no ammunition for their main guns,

although they did have rounds for their machine guns. It was

believed the armor of the M1A1 Abrams tanks would be

proof against anything the Somalis had, and the machine

guns would be firepower enough.

The action was a blow to General Aideed 's

prestige and pride. At a staff meeting later that

day, General Johnston mentioned that Aideed

"was embarrassed by his lack of control [over his

soldiers] and regrets what happened."

The commanding general also told his staff that

"[we] told Aideed we view his initiating clan

fighting to be destabilizing. ... [We] want all to

know how we regard what they do. ... We communicated with the faction involved. They accept

responsibility and we don't expect to see it again."

More importantly, UNITAF had demonstrated to

all factions that "our reach is long."95

This strong action did reduce the more blatant

attacks against UNITAF forces by factional

forces, although the sniping continued at about the

same levels. The spot reports received every day

at the headquarters contained the tally of such

incidents. Generally, these were just random shots

into compounds, most likely fired by individuals

who were seeking to prove something. As

Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni said: "I think

it's in the Somali nature to test you. I think it's

part of the warrior ethic; maybe it's part of the
M0WNC TO 1ThW THIRD PHASE 69

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00737

As Marines take cover behmd a wall, a UH-IN Huey helicopter supports the assault on one of Gen Aideed's

weapons storage sites.

proof of manhood and bravery, and of course for

two years around here the rule of the gun had gone

about unchallenged. I think that the [reduction of

the cantonment] sent a strong message and

showed them that we weren't to be messed with

and I think that test worked well in our favor."96

The streets remained dangerous, however, precisely because the threat was random. Marines or

soldiers on patrol or at checkpoints could never be

certain when they would walk into a factional

firefight, come upon a violent criminal act, or just

be a ready target for someone's need to assert his

authority or manhood. Such an incident occurred

on 12 January and resulted in the death of

UNITAF's first serviceman. That night, a security

patrol was making a routine sweep along the

southwest border of the airport. At about 2147, the

patrol was ambushed and engaged iii a firefight

with several Somalis. In the course of the fight

Private First Class Domingo Arroyo was hit by

small arms fire. He died of his wounds about two

hours later.'

Private First Class Arroyo was a veteran of the

Persian Gulf War and was a field wireman with

Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines,

at the time of his death. His service on a security

patrol was in the Marine Corps' tradition of

"every Marine a rifleman." Although a communicator by military occupational specialty, he was

serving as a rifleman with Task Force Mogadishu,

which had been formed specifically to provide

security within the city.

By the end of December, the MarFor commander, Major General Wilhelm, recognized the

city needed to be stabilized to carry out the overall security mission. He instructed Colonel Klimp

to devise an aggressive plan that would put

MarFor ahead of the factions in terms of knowing

what was happening in the city and in prepared

* The units participating in the seizure of the weapons storage sites on 7 January were also part of Task Force

Mogadishu.
70 RESTORING HoPE IN SOMALIA

actions that may be necessary. Colonel Klimp

came up with a four-phased plan in which each

phase would "turn at the same time" as the others,

like 1.he gears in a clock, as opposed to being

sequential. The first phase was for the collection

of information; "information on the city; where

are the different clans located, where are the

gangs headquartered." The next phase established

MarFor presence by conducting foot patrols, manning checkpoints, and basically getting into the

city and being seen by the people. The third phase

was for direct action when necessary, such as

when an important target like a weapons cache

was identified. The fourth phase was for the evaluation of actions taken, assessment of new information, and formulating new tactics)98 Task

Force Mogadishu was the instrument created to

undertake this stabilization mission. It was

formed at the beginning of January from the 3d

Battalion, 11th Marines; 3d Amphibious Assault

Battalion; 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion;

Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines; and

Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Colonel

Klimp was assigned as the commanding officer of

the task force.'99

Task Force Mogadishu numbered about 2,000

Marines. It moved to the sports stadium in the

northern part of the city, where criminal activity

and fighting among factions were common, and

soon began its operations. The main activity was

patrolling, which helped Marines gather information from the local populace and provided the

presence envisioned in Colonel Klimp's original

plan. Like a cop on a beat in the United States, this

very presence helped reduce violence and reassured the majority of citizens of UNITAF's

benign intent.200 Another important task was

reducing the number of weapons on the streets by

raiding the infamous arms markets operating in

the city.

The word market cannot convey a true image

of what these bazaars were like. Set into crowded

sections of the city, the shops were little more than

huts of wood and corrugated metal inside a maze

of twisting, unpaved streets and alleys.

The ramshackle appearance of the business

locations belied the richness of types and amounts

of arms available. Rocket propelled grenades and

launchers and AK-47 assault rifles were the most

frequently encountered weapons. Machine guns,

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00731

Two Marines run for cover while being fired on by clansmen snipers protecting the weapons storage site. The Marine

in the foreground is care'ying an M16A2 rifle with a M203 grenade launcher attached.
MOVING TO TFIE THIRD PHASE 71

Supporting the Marine assault, an M1AI Abrams tank

empty but there was ammunition for the machine guns.

mortars, missiles, and even rounds for a tank's

main gun were available. Arms of every major

weapons-producing nation could be found there;

American, Soviet, Czechoslovakian, British,

French, and Chinese weaponry were available.

The two large markets in the city, the Argentine

and the Barkera, were soon targeted by Task

Force Mogadishu. The truckloads of weapons

confiscated in these sweeps were hauled away for

destruction.

The first of these raids was against the

Argentine Market on 8 January, followed by a raid

on the Barkera Market on the 11th. Although

* Fortunately, these two markets were on opposite sides of

the green line, which divided Mogadishu into sections loyal

to Aideed orAli Mahdi. A raid against one could be balanced

with a raid against the other, thus showing UNITA.F's impartiality.

DVIC DD-SD-ooo0736

approaches the weapons storage site. Its main gun was

more than 1,500 weapons were confiscated, it was

no secret that many others had been removed

from the markets before the arrival of the

Marines.201 Both markets, and other identified

arms caches, were the targets of subsequent raids.

The patrols, raids, and checkpoints did have an

effect. As the I MEF command chronology for

this period noted, MarFor's increased presence

drove weapons off the streets, transforming

Mogadishu into a much safer city.202 However,

there was still cause for concern and coalition soldiers could not afford to drop their guard. liii late

February, violent events in the Kismayo relief sector were reflected in Mogadishu.

When the Somali Patriotic Movement forces of

Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as General Morgan

and allied to Au Mahdi Mohamed, attacked the

followers of Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in a fierce

fight for the control of Kismayo, General Aideed
72 RESTORING HOPE rr'i SOMALIA

Patrolling the mean streets of Mogadishu near a possible

watch from the bed of a 5-ton cargo truck.

was quick to respond in Mogadishu. On 23

February, the day alter the attacks in Kismayo,

Aideed used his own propaganda services, such as

his radio station, leaflets, and loudspeaker broadcasts to spread the story that Morgan had only

been able to succeed because of the complicity of

UNITAF. He also called upon his followers to

attack UNITAF forces in the city.

That evening, thousands of people took to the

streets, erecting barricades, starting fires, pelting

convoys with stones, impeding the progress of

UNTTAJ2 vehicles, and noisily demonstrating. As

annoying as these activities were, the crowds were

made up mostly of women and children and represented no real threat to the coalition forces.

Nonetheless, as MarFor units attempted to clear

the roadblocks and keep traffic lanes open, they

were subjected to rock throwing that seriously

injured several Marines, sailors, and coalition soldiers. But the main roads were reopened and the

city quieted down by about 2300.203

The crowds were back the next morning.

Again, roadblocks were put up and fires started.

Again, Major General Wilhelm ordered MarFor to

ovic oo-So-oo-o0729

weapons storage area, well-armed Marines keep a sharp

keep the main roads open. On this day, the main

disturbances were centered near the United States

Embassy compound and the important traffic circle known as K-4. This circle, at the intersection

of two major roads, controlled traffic leading to

IJNITAF headquarters, the airport, and the port. It

was considered a key point and was the site of a

heavily maimed checkpoint. Rocks and Molotov

cocktails were thrown at Marines in these areas.'

Two Somali auxiliary security policemen were

killed during the disturbances and three Marines

and one Somali policeman were wounded. To provide his men all possible support, Major General

Wilhelm ordered every available MarFor attack

helicopter to provide reconnaissance and support

to the forces on the ground. He also requested,

and received from Lieutenant General Johnston,

* These are gasoline-filled glass bottles, stopped with a

soaked rag as a wick. When thrown against a vehicle or in the

area of troops, the bottles break, spreading flames. They are

an inexpensive and easy lo make incendiary device, named

for Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar

during World War II.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 73

DVIC DN-ST-93-02402

Marines man a checkpoint in Mogadishu on New Year's Day 1993. The presence of coalition troops often drew

crowds of curious Somalis, usually composed of young men and boys.

permission to distribute CS riot control agents, a

non-lethal tear gas. As an additional measure, he

called out a P-19 aviation crash fire truck from the

air base at Bale Dogle. The truck's high-pressure

hose would be useful in dispersing rioting crowds,

if necessary. In the end, these extraordinary measures were not needed. The crowds dispersed by

about noon.204 But more trouble was brewing.

On 25 February, the K-4 traffic circle was again

the center of tension. There, at about 0900, some

Somalis began to fire at the most available

UNTTAF targets: Marines and Nigerian soldiers of

the 245th Reconnaissance Battalion who were

responsible for the security of the traffic circle and

surrounding area? The Marines returned fire, and

the Nigerians also began to fire rocket propelled

grenades at the buildings where the Somali gunmen were hiding. The heavy firing continued

throughout the day. Major General Wilhelm

* At the time, and later, Aideed claimed these gunmen were

bandits attempting to use the unresl of the past two days for

their own purposes, and that he had no control over them.

ordered the area sealed off and swept within two

hours. A strong force of Marines and coalition

soldiers was called out for the mission. With the

Marines of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, and the

Nigerians as a blocking force, two companies of

the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and soldiers of the

Botswana Defense Force Contingent acted as the

maneuver element. Shortly after 1400, the

Marines and Botswana soldiers began their sweep

down three main approaches toward their comrades at the traffic circle, converging with them

shortly before sunset. The action had a salutary

effect: the firing ceased and quiet returned to the

area. Three Marines and two Nigerian soldiers

were wounded during the action.205

Valuable lessons were learned from these

events, and changes were made to better protect

coalition forces should anything similar occur

again. Some active measures, short of the use of

deadly force, were put into place. While MarFor

had received permission to distribute tear gas to

its units, this riot control agent is non-specific,

blanketing an area and affecting the innocent as

well as those engaged in hostile acts. It can also
74 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

linger. Cayenne pepper spray was determined to

be a better agent because it comes in an aerosol

can and can be directed against a specific target.

Begirtning on 1 March, pepper spray was issued to

MarFor units, although control of its use remained

with Lieutenant General Johnston and only persons trained in its use were to employ it. At about

the same time, two P-19 crash fire trucks were

moved to Mogadishu to support MarFor. One of

these was placed at the port and the other at the

stadium. A third truck was ordered for use in

Mogadishu and was available by 10 March.

More passive measures also were taken to protect troops from rocks and other thrown items.

Protective visors that attached to the Kevlar helmets were issued and combat service support personnel created wire mesh shields to be attached to

humvees to protect the windows and occupants.

These resourceful Marines also created another

special piece of gear to attach to amphibious

assault vehicles. During the February disturbances, crowds of Somalis had effectively

stopped these vehicles by simply lying down in

front of them. The drivers were naturally loath to

run over these people and risk injuring or killing

them. Service support Marines made cowcatchers

that attached to the front of the amphibious assault

vehicles and allowed them to move through

crowds or barricades with minimal harm to

demonstrators.206

With these measures in place, MarFor

increased its activities in the city and the number

of patrols was boosted to create a greater presence. MarFor officers continued to meet regularly

with neighborhood representatives and a greater

degree of order and safety was achieved in the

city. Operations to clear the streets of traffic

obstructions and debris and distribute food were

restarted as soon as possible after the February

riots. When the forces of General Morgan and

Colonel Jess again clashed in Kismayo in the

middle of March, coalition units braced for trouble, but nothing of significance occurred.

Throughout the remainder of March and April, the

efforts of MarFor and coalition allies continued to

stabilize the city. The demonstrations that took

place during this time were described as peaceful

and some were even held in support of UNTTAF.

DVIC 00-80-00-00770

As Somali civilians watch, U.S. Marines walk single file down a small alley in the capital's Bekara Market The

Marines swept the market looking for arms and munitions as part of Operation Nutcracker.
MOVJNG TO THE THIRD PHASE 75

DVIC DN-ST-93-0381 9

A Marine prepares to load a box of weapons parts onto a truck filled with munitions confiscated during a patroL

Addis Ababa meetings.207

MarFor performed other important work in

Mogadishu, not all of it related to patrolling or

manning checkpoints. When UNITAF forces first

arrived in the city the roads were choked with all

types of rubbish and the debris of war. Often only

a single narrow lane existed for the passage of

traffic, and that would be thronged with pedestrians. This was unacceptable to the military forces,

which needed to be able to move quickly throughout the city and between the important facilities at

the port, airport, embassy, and elsewhere.

Operation Clean Street started on 28 December

with the aim of clearing the main roads and opening them for the fast-moving traffic of the coalition. Marine combat engineers and members of

the U.S. Naval Construction Battalion, the

Seabees, performed the work. The operation continued until 6 January 1993 and was the first of

Another innovation used in Mogadishu was the

idea of mass distribution sites. The large numbers

of refugees, often scattered in settlements

throughout the city, made it difficult for humanitarian relief organizations to effectively distribute

food to those in need. By consolidating the distribution specified areas throughout the city, more

people could be reached more efficiently. Also, hy

flooding the city with grain, the price of food

would be lowered and the black market for stolen

food would he undermined. MarFor had the

responsibility of establishing the program with the

relief organizations.209 The program was launched

in February in conjunction with the establishment

of the Somali auxiliary security force. On 6

February, the first mass food distribution was

held. Eventually, there were 25 distribution sites

located throughout the city with Somali auxiliary

security forces providing control. Security for

A good indication of progress occurred on 24 several Clean Street operations that benefited

March, the end of the holy month of Ramadan. UNITAF as well as the citizens of the city. As

For the first time since the civil war the city was soon as the roadways were opened to traffic, the

able to spend two days in celebration of this spe- roadside markets began to come back to life, and

cial holiday. Five days later, Somalis in the city soon merchants, barbers, and tailors were operatpeacefully held a rally in support of the recent ing from small stalls.208
76 RESTORE'JG HOPE JN SOMALIA

Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 306-4-21

Combat artist Ma] Burton E Moore, a former member

of a Marine Corps scout/sniperteam, joined Jump Team

1, Recon Company, 5th Marines, atop the old U.S.

Embassy in Mogadishu as the team returned hostle fire

in 1993. Portrayed in his painting of the experience is

(left) Sgt Charles A. Johnson, LtGol Edward J.

Lesnowicz, CpI Patrick B. Ward and Cpl Tim Richards.

each site was the responsibility of MarFor units

and coalition forces guarded 18 of the 25 sites.21°

The work of the coalition in Mogadishu was

reflected, on a lesser scale, in most of the other

relief sectors. But each sector was unique, and

people traveling outside Mogadishu saw a far different side of Somalia than was apparent in the

capital city. This was largely because each

humanitarian sector generally had one dominant

clan, which meant factional rivalry and fighting

were not as prevalent as it was in the capital. Also,

the cities and towns were not nearly so large or

crowded as Mogadishu. Still, each sector had its

own challenges. Some quickly became very quiescent, and others continued to have troubles with

factional fighting and bandits. The establishment

of the first three humanitarian relief sectors outside Mogadishu provided experiences and lessons

that were used elsewhere. Bale Dogle, the important airbase; Baidoa, the "City of Death;" and

Bardera all benefited from the early attention they

received as centers of IJNITAF activities.

Bale Dogle

The control of the first sector, Bale Dogle,

passed quickly from the Marines to the soldiers of

the 10th Mountain Division. As these soldiers

flew directly into the airbase, they soon had

responsibility for its security and the Marines

were able to move on to other cities. The responsibility for this sector did not remain long with the

American soldiers, however. By early January

1993, the soldiers of the Royal Moroccan Army

began to arrive, and by the 12th of that month they

were placed under the operational control of

Army Forces Somalia.2 The Moroccan forces

were composed of two infantry companies, a cavalry company, a medical section, and other support detachments of the 3d Motorized Infantry

Regiment, under the overall command of Colonel

Major Omar Ess-Akalli. This force formed a

mobile intervention group of more than i ,000

men with 200 light vehicles equipped with crewserved weapons, as well as light tanks, artillery,

and antitank missiles.212

Their initial task was to ensure the security of

the airbase. Then, as more troops arrived throughout Mogadishu, control was extended. By 28

January, the Moroccans were responsible for most

of the sector. On 1 March, they were placed

directly under UNITAF control and given responsibility for the security of all of sector Bale

Dogle.213

Their light vehicles provided the Moroccans

with flexibility and tactical mobility, which they

used to patrol the sector and escort convoys. The

heart of their tactical mission, however, remained

the security of the important airbase.2t4 In addition to being a major aerial port for the operation,

Army Forces Somalia established a firing range

for its AR-i helicopters within the sector. The

range was a key factor in maintaining the accuracy of the weapons systems of the aircraft.215

The Moroccans had yet another mission, one

given to them by the King of Morocco himself.

The king wished to help the sick and distressed

people of Somalia, and he extended the Moroccan

* This was a highly experienced regiment, which at that time

had just come from spending several years fighting insurgents in the Western Sahara.
Movmic TO THE Trmw PRASE 77

humanitarian mission to include a large hospital

operating in support of the Somali people. The

hospital staff had many specialties, to include

nutritionists, obstetricians-gynecologists, podiatrists, ophthalmologists, oral surgeons, and specialists in digestive disorders and bone diseases.

There was also an engineering specialist for water

purification. Somali medical specialists and social

workers were hired to assist the Moroccan staff.

The hospital quickly gained an excellent reputation among the Somali people and was seeing 400

to 500 people of all ages and tribes every day.

There were five to six major surgical procedures

perfonned daily.2t6

The Moroccan contingent was intended to be

self-sufficient, which they were with food, water,

and fuel. In fact, the king ensured his men in

Somalia received fresh food every day; they carried no prepackaged rations and cooked their

meals daily. But the light vehicles, which provided the force with its flexibility, also caused its

largest logistics problem. All maintenance and

repair on these vehicles had to be performed in

Morocco.217

The Moroccan unit was one of the largest nonU.S. contingents in the coalition. With this strong

and mobile force patrolling the sector, Bale Dogle

soon became one of the quietest in the area of

operations, with few incidents reported.

Baidoa

The next sector occupied, Baidoa, presented a

very different aspect to the soldiers of the coalition, and elicited different responses. There were

more lawless elements present in this sector and,

accordingly, more violent incidents. Also, the

political situation was more complicated. The

Marines who first occupied the sector were very

aggressive patrolling, conducting raids, and making searches where threats were assessed. At

night, helicopters were used to extend the presence of the coalition forces into outlying areas and

to frighten off bandits.218

Even at this early period, Colonel Gregory S.

Newbold, as the commander of the 15th MEU, the

Marines who initially occupied the town, recognized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of creatDVIc DA-ST-96-01283

The centrally located K-4 traffic circle in Mogadishu was the site of several con frontations between local Somali factions and coalition forces.
78 REsroffiNc HOPE IN SOMALIA

ing a secure environment in the relief sector if the

bandits were allowed to carry their arms openly.

He, therefore, told the local leaders his forces

would seize any weapons seen on the streets of

Baidoa. While the aggressive actions of the

Marines quickly decreased hostile acts against the

coalition, the policy of no weapons openly carried

had equally good results. As the power of the bandits declined, the local elders could reassert their

authority. They did so within the first few days of

the Marines' arrival. Several Somalis approached

the Marines and requested assistance in establishing a security council.219

Under the direction of Colonel Werner

Hellmer, the local civil-military operations team

provided the secure and neutral venue needed to

establish such a council. Relying heavily on

humanitarian relief organizations, the team sought

out the legitimate local leaders and elders. At the

same time, Colonel Hellmer and his small staff

recognized the importance of including representatives of all major groups and clans. It was vital

to the Marine mission and its image of neutrality

that no one who should be a member would inadvertently be left out. Representatives from the

State Department and United Nations Operation

Somalia (UNOSOM) were also in attendance at

the beginning of this new security council. As

throughout the area of operations, the idea was

that the Somalis would take care of their own

internal governance. Under the protection of the

Marine policies of "no openly carried weapons,

no crew-served weapons, and no technicals with

gun mounts," the weakening of the bandits, and

the strengthening of the elders, conditions in

Baidoa soon began to improve.220

On 27 December, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,

relieved the 15th MEU of responsibility for

Baidoa. They continued their predecessors' routine activities; protection of food convoys,

patrolling in the sector, and mine clearing. The

civil-military operations team remained in place

working with the relief organizations and the local

security council. By early January, Colonel

Hellmer believed they had made good progress.

People were out on the streets again, the markets

in town were open, and the local buses were running. Fear no longer existed and people could

sleep safely, some getting a full night's rest for the

first time in years. The lingering problem that

Colonel Hellmer saw was what to do with those

who previously had made their living by banditry

and stealing relief supplies.22'

Another organization making life better in

Baidoa was Action Internationale Contre de Faini

(International Action Against Hunger). This relief

agency set up two camps, one for the most critical

refugee cases and the other for those who were

less serious. In the first, there were four servings

per day of what was described as a very rich mixture of food. This was intended to get these people back up to strength and out of danger. Those

who were in better health were placed in the other

camp, where they were fed one meal of a regular

mixture per day. In addition, there was a hospital

ward treating various illnesses, such as malaria,

cholera, tuberculosis, and other respiratory diseases.222 Such work was typical of what the

relief organizations were doing in all the sectors.

The civil-military teams provided coordination

with the military to ensure they received their

relief supplies safely and answered other legitimate needs.

By the middle of January 1993, the Marines

were ready to hand over responsibility for the sector. At 2359 on the 16th, Baidoa was transferred to

Army Forces Somalia, with the remaining

Marines placed under its control.223 However, this

situation was only intended to be temporary.

During this same period, the Australian contingent arrived by ship and airplane. By 8 January, a

portion of the advance party had already come to

Baidoa to assess the quality of the water and

determine if it could be purified. Company A,

which had left on the Royal Australian Navy's

HMAS Jervis Bay (UT 203) on 24 December,

made port at Mogadishu on 12 January. By the

17th, the main body, composed of Company B,

half of Company C, and most of the battalion

headquarters, flew straight to Baidoa on board a

Quantas Airlines 747 passenger aircraft. The

remainder of the Australian forces arrived the next

day. Company A, mounted in trucks off the ship,

motor marched to the town.224

The Australian force would soon be one of the

largest national contingents. It included

Companies A, B, C, and D of the 1st Battalion, 1st

Royal Australian Regiment, with their normal battalion headquarters, plus support and administration companies. Attached to this battalion group

were Squadron B, 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry

* Such diseases were rampant in the refugee camps through.

out the area of operations and were the result of poor saniladon, crowded conditions, and unclean water.
MOVING TO THE THIRD Pltt.sE 79

Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense

Australian soldiers move by convoy from the port of Mogadishu to Baidoa where they would relieve elements of the

15th Marine Expeditionaty Unit.

Regiment, mounted in armored personnel can-iers; the battery commander's party, Headquarters,

6th Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment; and 17th

Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat Engineer

Regiment. All were supported by a detachment of

the 103d Signals Squadron and the 1st Battalion

Support Group.225

The Australian force was intended to be as selfsufficient as possible. Therefore, when they

deployed, they tasked their support group for 30

days of supply and ammunition. The greatest concern was for water. The advance party found that

the local water could be purified. Also, HMAS

Tobruk, which was also supporting the operation,

could pump water into tankers that could then

make the overland journey to the relief sector. The

support group was a very capable organization,

which contained fuel tankers and 8-ton cargo

trucks. It also had a medical section capable of

forming a regimental aid post. The maintenance

detachment included a field workshop for electrical and general engineering maintenance, as well

as for vehicle and communications repair.226

For requirements above the capabilities of the

support group, the Australian forces could use

UNITAF's logistics assets for water, fuel, rations,

and other common consumables. These arrangements were set under cross servicing agreements

signed between the United States and Australian

governments. Anything required that was not

available from UNITAF was either purchased in

Kenya, or flown in from Australia by the Royal

Australian Air Force on regularly scheduled C130 Hercules flights.227

The handoff of responsibility for the sector was

completed on 19 January. At a simple ceremony,

the flags of both nations were lowered and raised

in reversed positions on the flagpole. At the same

time, appropriate music was played on a harmonica. "Waltzing Matilda," the Australian battalion's

quick march and the national song, is also the

division march of the 1st Marine Division, so it

was chosen and matched with "The Star Spangled

Banner." For the previous two days, Company A

of the Royal Australian Regiment had been under

*

In the author's interview with Major John Caligari, Royal

Australian Army, "Waltzing Matilda" was identified as the

regimental march of the 9th Marines, and it is so identified in

the notes of the interview. Calls to the division actually iden

tified it as the division's own march, adopted during World

War II.
80 RESTORING HOPE IN SCIMALLA

the tactical control of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.

Now the situation reversed itself as Company L,

3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was placed under the

tactical control of the Australian forces. The

Marines would retain this command relationship

until they departed Baidoa.228

By 23 January, all of the Australian force was

present in Baidoa; 888 soldiers armed with 36

M113 annored personnel carriers and eight 81mm

mortars. The Australians quickly settled into their

mission, which, as elsewhere in the area of operations, was to control the sector and provide security for the relief operations and the supply convoys. The work was divided into three parts and

rotated among the companies. One company

guarded the airfield, while another patrolled in

town. The third company patrolled in depth,

throughout the sector, to establish presence, collect intelligence, and respond to any incidents.229

About 80 kilometers from Baidoa on the main

road to Mogadishu was the town of Buurhakaba,

the second largest in the sector. A huge rock massif that rose from the plain to a height of a few

hundred feet dominated the town. This area had

been the site of much bandit activity and was

noted for the presence of several technicals. To

end these depredations, the Australians established a permanent outpost at the town. This was

occupied in company strength, with patrols

extending out to other towns in the sector. The

other companies could be called for support if

there were a need.23°

There were two intelligence gathering organizations operating in the Baidoa sector. One was a

three-man combat intelligence detachment of the

Australian force. These soldiers were responsible

for collecting human intelligence, checking the

populace, fmding out who was in the area, and the

identification of the local clans and subgroups.231

There also was a team of American Special Forces

in the sector. This team was "used to conduct area

assessments throughout the [humanitarian relief

sector], especially in those areas where conventional forces or relief agencies had not yet

Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense

LtGen Robert B. Johnston talks with an Australian soldier while visiting the Australian headquarters in Baidoa.

Behind LtGen Johnston is Col William J Me/br, commander of the Australian army contingent.
Movmc TO THE THIRD PHASE 81

Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 119.9-51

During a 1993 deployment to Somalia, combat artist Go! Donna J. Nean depicted this familiar scene of the international relief effort. In this piece, an Australian soldier is shown escorting a refugee convoy. After relieving the 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines, in Baidoa, "Diggers," the nickname adopted by Australian soldiers, took over relief escort

duties in that area.

arrived." The local commander used these assessments to plan operations in support of the humanitarian relief organizations that were providing

relief to these outlying areas. In addition, the

Special Forces team also provided intelligence

about criminal activities and sources of banditry.232 With one of the companies always operating

in the sector in a random pattern of patrolling, the

Australians were able to respond whenever and

wherever intelligence indicated that something

was afoot. The company could quickly move into

the target area and remain for a few days.233

Baidoa was not terribly plagued by the presence of waning factions during this period.' There

* There was some factional activity in the sector, but it was

relatively minor. For instance, during the visit of the author

to the Baidoa humanitarian relief sector in late January, a

representative of the Somali Liberation Army had just

appeared in town to recruit. The Australian's quick reaction

force planned to "pay him a visit" at his quarters to search for

arms and explain the weapons policy. He was not very successful in his recruiting efforts.

were some instances of armed troops passing

through the sector, but these were generally small

groups that were monitored closely as they moved

along. Lawlessness was another matter. By the

end of January, the Australians had established the

pattern by which they would operate for the next

few months. Finding the towns that were the centers of criminal activity, they used a series of cordon and search or airmobile operations to find and

confiscate weapons and make their presence felt.

The Australian forces soon were stamping out the

banditry that had been so rife in the sector. When

they discovered that the bandits had adopted the

tactic of attacking civilian traffic along the roads

at night, the Australians became equally resourceful. After dark, Australian vehicles with their

lights off would follow the civilian trucks and

buses. The drivers would use night vision goggles

to operate, and the troops would also use night

vision devices to scan the roadsides ahead to spot

any ambushes. These ambush-busting operations

were a very successful deterrent to the bandit

activity.234
82 RESToRING HOPE IN SOMALIA

The Australians were constantly busy during

their four months as a part of UNITAF. The pace

of operations was described as grueling. While the

work was hard, harsh, and unrelenting, it did help

to keep the sector more quiet and secure than

some others. The success of the Australians' operations can be measured by the fact that bandits

only engaged them on four occasions. They sustained no casualties while confiscating and

destroying almost 1,000 weapons and a vast quantity of ammunition and explosives.235

Bardera

The Bardera relief sector differed from Baidoa

in several critical ways. First, it was a smaller sector. While the town of Bardera had been ravaged

during the civil war, one clan, whose faction, the

United Somali Party, was led by General Abdi

Dahir Warsame, inhabited it. Therefore, there was

little of the factional fighting that had been so

troublesome elsewhere, and it was far simpler to

stabilize the sector once UNITAF troops arrived.

Ironically, the presence of a single faction in the

town actually increased the effects of the famine.

Most of the starving people in the sector had come

from its outlying areas, and the inhabitants of the

town felt no obligation to assist those to whom

they were not related. Those living in the town

were relatively well-off in comparison to the

refugees, who were crowded into an area called

the "Italian Village" to the south of the town. Here

they were subject to starvation from the lack of

relief supplies, from disease due to crowded and

unsanitary conditions, and from the depredations

of armed bandits. When the Marines arrived, as

many as 300 refugees were dying each day. With

the safe delivery of food and medicines to the

relief organizations and the presence of the

Marines, the death toll soon dropped to less than

10 percent of what it had been.236

After the success in Baidoa, Colonel Helimer

moved quickly to Bardera, arriving in late

December. With Colonel Emil R. Bedard, the

commanding officer of the 7th Marines, he set up

another civil-military operations center. Colonel

Hellmer's team soon was assisting the legitimate

elders of Bardera to establish a security council

and reassert their own authority. Again, the

Marines were there to provide security, not to

govern. The elders took advantage of the opportunity to reestablish an effective local government,

enforcing laws, trying criminals, and meting out

justice to those convicted of crimes. By 7

February, an auxiliary police force was brought

back into existence, and the police were soon joining the Marines at checkpoints. As a result of

these efforts, the influence of local bandits waned.

Bardera was noted for being a quiet sector for the

next four months.237

Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense

An Australian soldier uses a mine detector to search for hidden arms in the effort to stamp out banditry in the Baidoa

humanitarian relief sector.
MOVING TO THE TFmD PHASE 83

Still, there were some problems that beset the

relief efforts. The most notable of these was the

presence of mines along the main roads. Nearly

every Toad ifl the sector was mined, making it difficult to open the main supply routes into the interior. Even though few mines were encountered,

the clearance operations had to progress slowly

and thoroughly along every mile before they were

safe for the passage of convoys. Even then, the

roads needed repair. As engineers worked on the

roads, the helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group 16

lifted food and relief supplies to the humanitarian

relief organizations in outlying villages that otherwise could not have been reached.238

Toward the end of January, the restructuring of

forces in the theater allowed Major General

Wilhelm to rearrange the Marine forces in a manner he considered more in keeping with local conditions. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which had

originally occupied the Bardera sector, was

recalled to Mogadishu, where its riflemen were

advantageously used in the urban environment. Its

place was taken by a new organization, Task

Force Bardera, formed around the 3d Amphibious

Assault Battalion. This unit, with its greater

mobility, was better suited to the open terrain in

the sector. On 24 January, the task force officially

began its duties in Bardera.239

While the sector was fairly quiet, there was still

the need for vigilance. This was especially true in

late February when serious fighting erupted

among the factions in Kismayo, the humanitarian

sector bordering Bardera to the south. To ensure

that Bardera was not affected by the fighting, and

especially to ensure that Colonel Jess' Somali

Patriotic Movement forces did not enter the

Bardera sector, Task Force Bardera maintained

reconnaissance elements north and south of the

town. At the beginning of March, squad-sized

patrols were sent along the Jubba River valley as

far south as the town of Saacow. These patrols and

screens had the desired effect, and no disturbances

or significant presence of Jess' forces were noted

in the sector.24°

By the end of April, the Marines were able to

turn over responsibility for a sector that was

returning to peace and normalcy. As UNTTAF

prepared to hand off operations to the United

Nations, Task Force Bardera was brought back to

* Lawrence N. Freedman was killed when his vehicle struck

a mine in this sector.

Mogadishu to prepare for redeployment. On 18

April, the Botswana Defense Force contingent

relieved the Marines of responsibility for

Bardera.241

Oddur

As the French soldiers moved into the towns

from which they would operate in Oddur, they

brought with them great experience in operating

in this part of the world. Many of these French

soldiers and Marines had served in the neighboring state of Djibouti, formerly known as French

Somaliland. They came, therefore, with knowledge of the importance of clan and tribal allegiance in Somalia, and they tried to work within

that context in this sector.242 In addition, the

French forces in Djibouti had witnessed the civil

war that began there in 1991 between the Somali

Issas and the Ethiopian Afars.

By 28 December, the last elements of the

French forces arrived from France and Djibouti,

and moved to Oddur through Mogadishu. By this

time, the French forces consisted of a command

element, which included a special operations

company, a logistics support battalion, a military

intelligence detachment, and detachments of

security forces, military police, and communications. The ground forces were composed of one

battalion from the 5th Combined Arms Overseas

Regiment, one battalion from the 13th Foreign

Legion Demi-Brigade, and the 3d Company of the

2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. The 3d

and 4th companies of the 2d Marine Infantry

Regiment strengthened the other battalions with

organic armored personnel carriers. These forces

were supported by an aviation detachment from

the 5th Attack Helicopter Regiment, and the 3d

Company of the 6th Foreign Legion Engineer

Regiment. All told, there were about 2,200 French

soldiers, Marines, and Legionnaires in the Oddur

sector.243

As in Bardera, the natives of Oddur were mainly from one dominant clan, the Rahanweyne.

However, that does not mean there was unity

throughout the sector. The Rahanweyne clan was

described as "divided into a multitude of subclans opposed to each other and characterized by

opportunism and fragile alliances." Also, the people living in the north and near the critical

Ethiopian border were members of the rival

Ogaden clan. As in Bardera, the townspeople felt

little sympathy toward the refugees from the out-
84 RESTORTNC HOPE IN SOMALIA

Photo courtesy ot the author

French Foreign Legionnaires made their headquarters in an old Italian fort at El Berde, from which platoons and

squads were sent to villages and hamlets throughout the Oddur sector.

lying districts who were not related to them. The

local leaders looked out for their own clan, but not

the others. The French would thus have to draw

on all, their experience and skills in dealing with

the native Somalis throughout this sector.244

The French forces were deployed in their traditional "oil spot" manner. The sector was first broken down into three sub-sectors centered on major

cities or towns, which in this case were Oddur and

the Ethiopian border, Wajid, and Tiyegloo. One

battalion occupied each of these sub-sectors.

From these, 10 towns or hamlets were occupied

by company-sized forces, which then sent platoons to other locations, for a total of 20 occupied

sites. The French then were able to operate from

these strongpoints, spread throughout the sector,

show their presence, maintain a strong posture,

and conduct reconnaissance. In Oddur itself, a

mobile reaction force supported by helicopters

was kept ready to intervene in any situation.245

In the city of Oddur, the work of these coalition

forces was very similar to what was going on in

the other sectors. The Somalis soon established

local committees for security, food distribution,

school operations, and so forth. As was the case

elsewhere, the French recognized they had to get

the Somalis to take responsibility for their own

welfare and governance. The French also established their own team to work with the relief

organizations in town, notably Medecines Sans

Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) and

Concern. These organizations ran a hospital and

feeding stations. The effectiveness of the organizations' work was significantly increased by the

arrival of the French Army, which controlled the

safe shipment and distribution of food and supplies while leaving the humanitarian agencies to

carry on with their own duties.246

By 30 December, just days after their arrival in

the sector, the French special operations forces

pushed out along the axis Oddur-Ted-El Berde.

The purpose of this initial operation was three

fold: first, it provided a surveillance line toward

the Ethiopian border; next, it opened the sector to

these areas for the local humanitarian organizations; and finally, the French presence there would
MOVING TO THE THIRD PI-rASE 85

help to stop the heavy flow of refugees coming

into Oddur and other cities from the northern

towns which were hit hard by war and drought.247

This area was very important to the entire operation because its northern limit stretched along the

Somali-Ethiopian border. The flow of refugees

across the ill-defmed frontier brought with it the

possibility of armed forces from either nation

crossing into the other's territory. This, in turn,

might cause an incident that could be difficult to

contain. As early as 31 December, during a helicopter reconnaissance in the vicinity of the town

of Yet, French troops came across four armed men

in civilian clothing who were acting suspiciously.

The men were picked up, interrogated, and found

to be members of the Ethiopian Army. They were

quickly turned over to their own authorities.248

The presence of the Ogaden clan also served to

increase the volatility of this section of the border.

The town of El Berde, located just a few kilometers south of the border, was a case in point. Prior

to the civil war, a ntodus vivendi was in place

here, as elsewhere in Somalia where a smaller

clan or sub-clan had to coexist in an area dominated by a larger, stronger one. An effective police

force was active in the area and there were regional and district committees, on which the local

chiefs served. In this way, good relations were

maintained with the various national ministries

and the governor at Oddur. With the coming of the

war, however, clan was pitted against clan. The

populace of the region around El Berde, about

8,000 people, crossed into Ethiopia.* By early

1993, they were returning to fmd their homes and

villages destroyed or damaged. They needed food,

medicine, and humanitarian assistance. To compound the situation here, the returning chief of El

Berde did not recognize the legitimacy of the new

governor of Oddur. Despite the internal strife, the

French were respected and were working with

both sides to effect reconciliation and an agreement to bring back normal relations.249

The French tactic of spreading across the sector

into hamlets and villages in platoon and squad

formations allowed them to cover maximum territory. With so many soldiers in the sector, they also

relied upon the mobility of their armored personnel carriers and helicopters to move rapidly and

* The French estimated about 113 villages and hamlets in the

sector had been abandoned and roughly 40 percent of the

local population (118,000 people) had become refugees.

establish control of the zone. By late January,

their presence had created a reassuring effect on

the relief organizations, which were able to move

about with greater security. The people also began

to respond by gaining confidence, providing intelligence, and returning to their villages.250

The first contacts between the French and the

native Somalis were described as excellent, and

the local elders and chiefs were satisfied with the

French presence. By the beginning of February,

mine clearing operations had effectively been

completed throughout the sector. A police force,

armed only with batons, was established, and a

weapons registration program was in place. This

program allowed the French to confiscate unregistered firearms and to arrest any armed individuals.25' The French soldiers, Marines, and

Legionnaires settled into a daily routine of patrols,

reconnaissance, ambushes, checkpoints, searching for arms caches, and seizing unauthorized

weapons.

During February, the French already realized

they could decrease and realign their forces without losing control of the sector, and the first

French units began to rotate out of theater. The

battalion of the 5th Combined Arms Overseas

Regiment left, along with the engineers and one

company of Marine armored personnel carriers.

Helicopter support also was decreased. To accommodate fewer troops, the number of towns and

hamlets occupied was reduced to 12, but the

amount of patrols was increased. By March, the

French government decided that 1,100 men would

take part in UNOSOM II. During the remainder of

March and April, the French forces continued to

realign themselves, rotating out some of the original units while bringing in new ones to support

the United Nations mission.252

Gialalassi

As the Italian forces settled in around

Gialalassi, their responsibilities were soon

extended beyond that sector. Having reclaimed

their embassy in Mogadishu early in the operation, the Italians kept a strong force in the neighborhood for its protection. It also made sense to

the Italian commanders that they should be given

responsibility for some part of the city that included the area where they were located. Of course,

political and practical considerations were

involved in determining how the Italian forces

would be employed in the city.
86 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Italian soldiers on patrol in the Gialalassi humanitarian

em half of Mogadishu.

First, there was the question of how the

Somalis would accept the Italians, with their history as a colonial power. The issue was a delicate

one, for the Italians were a strong presence who

brought distinct benefits to the coalition. Yet,

General Johnston did not want them to be placed

in a situation or position in which they would be

counterproductive if Somali anti-Italian reaction

was strong. He saw the older Somalis, who had

lived in the period of Italian presence, would be

amenable to their return as a part of UNITAF. He

was more worried about the younger Somalis,

who might make an issue of colonialism. General

Johnston therefore followed a policy of gradualism by which the Italian forces were slowly

placed in the city and countryside and the reacPhoto courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

relief sector, which as later expanded to include the northtions of the Somalis were assessed. After the successes of the Merka and Gialalassi operations, he

decided the problem might have been overstated.

Johnston soon decided to give the Italians responsibility for a portion of the city.253

Other political considerations had to be taken

into account. MarFor and other coalition forces

had occupied areas that were mostly in the southwestern portion of the city, which was territory of

General Aideed. The Italian Embassy was in the

northeast part of the city, in an area claimed by the

forces of Ali Mahdi. While this could be a counterbalance, it was recognized that it was imperative no favoritism be shown to either faction

leader by the coalition forces in the area. Since the

Italian Embassy was nearly adjacent to the head-
MOVING TO THE THIIO PHASE 87

quarters of Mi Mahdi, General Johnston determined the Italian forces headquarters should not

be established in that area. Instead, the Italians

were given responsibility for the northeast portion

of Mogadishu, with their sector extending into

Gialalassi. Their headquarters was then established in the town of Balcad, several kilometers

out of Mogadishu along the main route heading

north. The gradual manner in which this was

accomplished, along with the professionalism of

the Italian soldiers, allayed any suspicions by the

Somalis of either neocolonialism or favoritism.254

The italian soldiers were soon conducting

patrols, arms sweeps, and other civil actions within the city of Mogadishu. The situation there

required close cooperation between all parties.

"As activity in Mogadishu picked up, MarFor and

Italian units began running into each other on

patrols and during operations, creating confusion

and potentially dangerous situations."255 Although

the creation of distinct areas of responsibility was

a major step toward solving the problem, direct

liaison between the coalition members was a

necessity. For example, early in January, Italian

soldiers had been fired at by a sniper along a route

in a section of the city called the Villagio Scibis.

To show their resolve, the Italian command

planned a major sweep through this area using

about 540 men. The operation was to start at 0430

on 12 January. But when the liaison officer

brought this to the attention of the UNITAF staff,

it was noted the MarFor also was planning to conduct an operation in a neighboring area at the

same time. UNITAF postponed the Italian operation for 24 hours, when it was successfully completed without incident.256 Major General

Wilhelm, the commanding general of MarFor, and

Major General Gianpietro Rossi, the Italian commander, also agreed on the conduct of joint operations in the city, beginning on 19 January. The

cooperation between the two coalition partners

resulted in the creation of Task Force Columbus,

composed of forces from the San Marco

Battalion, and the 571st Military Police Company,

a United States Army unit under the operational

control of MarFor. The task force conducted

patrols and provided security for humanitarian

relief warehouses in the area of the Karaan

Market.257

With such a wide and diffuse area of responsibility, the Italians had to align their units somewhat differently than those in other sectors. They

maintained a large force in their sector of

Mogadishu, around the Italian Embassy. They

also placed garrisons in the towns of Balcad,

Jawhar, and Gialalassi. These four strongpoints

controlled the main population centers in the sector and provided security along the main supply

route that ran from Mogadishu to Bulo Burti.

Three task forces (Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie)

were assigned to cover these bases. Alpha, the

smallest force with 413 soldiers, was responsible

for Mogadishu. Charlie, the next largest task

force, split its deployment between Jawhar, with

180 soldiers, and Gialalassi, with 550 soldiers.

Task Force Bravo, the largest with 1,116 soldiers,

was at the so-called transitory base in Balcad,

from which it could deploy north or south as the

situation required.

The threat to coalition forces differed in each of

these places. As might be expected, Mogadishu,

with the presence of armed memhers of the two

main Somali factions, had the highest number of

incidents. Members of Mi Mahdi's Abgal clan frequently clashed with those of the rival Habr Gedr

clan of General Aideed on the streets of the capital. These fighters also fired occasionally at the

Italian soldiers, or boldly threatened the local populace, just as they did with American servicemen

and Somali civilians elsewhere in the city. Bandits

presented the main problem in outlying towns.

The Italians quickly demonstrated their presence and strength throughout the sector with routine patrolling and checkpoints. From their

strongpoints, reconnaissance patrols protected the

main supply route, weapons caches and markets

were raided, arms were confiscated, and mines

were cleared. More importantly, the Italians

devised a series of operations that would take

place throughout the sector. The size of the force

used for each of these operations depended on the

objective. Those at the highest levels were named

"canguro" (kangaroo). They were planned and

directed by the Folgore Brigade headquarters and

executed by its subordinate units. The next level,

named "mangusto" (mongoose) comprised operations undertaken by the 186th and 187th

Parachute Regiments of the brigade. The lowest

* As with regiments in many other modem armies, these

units were not formed in the manner familiar to Americans.

Each was composed basically of one battalion, with a separate company-sized headquarters element through which she

regimental commander provided command and control,

administralion, and logistics support.
88 RESTORING HOPE TN SoL1A

DVIC DD-SD-0O-00861

U.S. Marines in a light armored vehicle from the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion join Italian soldiers in a Fiat

OTO Melara 6614 armored vehicle at an intersection along the Green Line in Mogadishu.

level operations, meant for rapid reaction to

events or intelligence, were named "hilaac"

(Somali for lightning). These were executed by

the brigade's special forces and were generally

conducted in Mogadishu.258

A fourth type of operation was named "tamburo" (drum) and took advantage of the Italian

force's large component of armored personnel

carriers and helicopters. The mobility and rapid

movement provided by these vehicles made them

especially valuable in emergency situations, the

primary goal of tamburo operations. These operations also enabled the Italians to react to situations

far from the city strongpoints, effectively controlling the entire relief sector.259

The Italian soldiers were busy with civil activities as well. In the Gialalassi sector, as elsewhere

in the coalition's area of operations, the overall

success of the mission depended on the perception

by the population that the coalition was there to

assisi: the Somali recovery and to provide general

security. The brigade engineer company cleared

mines from roads and villages, and detachments

of soldiers provided security for relief convoys

moving throughout the sector. Relief organization

warehouses and distribution points were kept

under surveillance to prevent attack or theft. The

Italians also provided direct medical aid to the

Somali people. An ambulance service carried

wounded or seriously ill civilians to the Italian

medical facilities. There they were treated in

cooperation with Somali health and medical personnel. By the end of January alone, these medical visits numbered more than 4,000.260

The Italian command worked with Somali elders and leaders to establish local committees so

order could be maintained and local governance

begun. They also were very actively involved in

the establishment of the auxiliary security force in

Mogadishu and throughout the Gialalassi sector.

These forces worked in the main population centers of Mogadishu, Gialalassi, Balcad, and

Jawhar. The auxiliaries were soon accompanying

the Italian soldiers on patrols and at checkpoints.

Weapons control within the sector was accomplished through a series of actions. First, the carrying of arms in the sector was prohibited; citizens were requested to voluntarily turn in

weapons. Next, arms were confiscated during

* The Italian forces established one military hospital and one

surgical ward. Six infirmaries in the four strongpoint cities

backed these up. They were staffed by 39 medical officers,

12 hospital corpsmen, and 170 troops.
Movmic TO THE Tr-ujw PHASE 89

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00864

An Italian soldier holding a 9mm Beretta 12S sub-machine

Line, which separated the warring factions in Mogadishu.

sweep operations in areas known or suspected to

contain weapons caches or havens for armed persons. These actions had results similar to those

taken throughout UNITAF's area of operations.

Thousands of weapons and several tons of ammunition were confiscated and destroyed.26

In addition to the work of the medical staff, the

Italians assisted the local population in several

direct ways. Wells damaged during the civil war

were cleared and repaired. Main roads were put

back into good order. Schools were reopened, and

local businesses were encouraged and given support to help restart the local economy. A postal

service between Somalia and Italy was established.262

The supply of this large force (about 3,200 soldiers) was an important issue for the Italian command. This was the Italian armed forces' first

major deployment since World War II. The

Folgore Brigade had a related unit, the 46th

Aviation Brigade, which supported the operation

gun patrols a heavily pockmarked section of the Green

with three Aeritalia G222 utility transport aircraft.263 These airplanes, along with 12 helicopters

assigned to a composite helicopter regiment, provided ample intra-theater transportation for personnel and supplies. The Italian forces were also

fortunate in Somalia's location within easy air

resupply distance of Italy itself. The Italian officers' mess at Balcad was soon renowned for the

quality of its fare; fresh pastas, meats and fish,

fruits and vegetables, and wine were all prepared

and served daily.' Potable water for drinking and

washing was a problem, as it was everywhere

else. This burden was relieved in large part by digging two wells, one in Mogadishu and the other in

Gialalassi. The combined capacity of the wells

* General Order Number 1 prohibited the consumption of

alcohol. However, this applied only to American forces.

Americans traveling in the theater were offered wine in

Oddur and Gialalassi and beer in Belet Weyne, which they

had to respectfully, and usually reluctantly, decline.
90 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00849

A sampling of the small arms and crew-served weapons confiscated by the 2d Battalion, 87th lnfantiy, at checkpoint

Condor south of Merka.

was 14,000 liters of water per day, which could be

used for washing.264 This represented a tremendous boon because more of the water that was

hauled into the relief sector every day could be

used just for drinking and cooking.

Through March and April, the Italians continued to suppress bandits and assist the local populace. By the end of the latter month, as some of the

IJNITA.F coalition partners prepared to depart, the

Italians were tasked to remain as a part of UNOSOM II. Their new area of responsibility would

continue to include Gialalassi, with an expansion

to the north to incorporate the neighboring relief

sector of Belet Weyne.

Merka

The Italian forces also had been instrumental in

establishing the Merka relief sector, but once the

port and airfield had been secured and roads

opened into the interior, Army Forces Somalia

was given responsibility for that sector. The unit

that was left for this mission, 2d Battalion, 87th

Infantry, was a part of the 2d (Commando)

Brigade, 10th Mountain Division.265 Although a

smaller sector than most of the others, Merka had

its share of challenges for the American soldiers.

Patrols uncovered some large arms caches during January. The first of these discoveries came on

14 January when elements of Task Force 2-87

seized 500,000 rounds of small arms ammunition

hidden at an airfield near the town of Afgooye.

Ten days later, Task Force 3-17, the 10th

Mountain Division cavalry squadron, uncovered a

large arms cache kept in eight half-buried conex

boxes. In both instances, the arms and ammunition were quickly destroyed. Task Force 2-87 continued cordon and search operations throughout

the sector, especially near large towns such as

Kurtunwaarey, Baraawe, and Qoryooley.266 On 29

January, these operations uncovered two more

caches.267

Although it was originally outside the Merka

relief sector, the town of Afgooye was a concern

for the soldiers in this sector. Afgooye was located within the Bale Dogle sector, which also was

under the control of the Army Forces Somalia

during January and February, and American sol-
MOVING TO THE THIRD PIiAsE 91

sector. The 984th Military Police Company

remained in place. On 9 April, the 1st (Warrior)

Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, relieved the 2d

Brigade at Merka. On 28 April, the Merka relief

sector was tumed over to the Pakistani 6th Punjab

Regiment, which had arrived as part of UNOSOM

11 forces.7°

Belet Weyne

Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

Italian soldiers exhibit some of the arms confiscated

during sweep operations in areas known to harbor

armed insurgents and contain weapons caches.

diers could therefore be transferred between sectors as needed. The problems in Afgooye centered

on banditry. The town was at a key location on a

main road to Mogadishu, and was therefore a

magnet for bandits and lawless elements wanting

to extort payments from travelers going to or from

the capital city.

On 31 January, Commando Brigade conducted

a large cordon and search operation at Afgooye.

Task Force 2-87 conducted an air assault, while

Task Force 3-17 and the 984th Military Police

Company held sectors in and around the town.

The operation continued for severa.l days. At its

conclusion, the 984th Military Police Company

was left in the town to provide a presence and

conduct stabilization operations. The operation

successfully curtailed violence and banditry in

this area, which allowed the people to reclaim

their town.26tThese operations continued in the

Merka sector, which had become relatively quiet

through February. A 60-man police force was

reestablished in the town and worked closely with

Army Forces Somalia by the end of January.269 On

1 March, as the Moroccans assumed control of the

Bale Dogle relief sector, Afgooye was removed

from that sector and incorporated into the Merka

The Canadian presence grew quickly in the

Belet Weyne sector after it was secured on 28

December. The entire Canadian Airborne

Regiment Battle Group had flown in by the first

days of January 1993. Commanded by Colonel

Serge Labbe, the battle group strength was 1,359

soldiers at its height. The group was composed of

three commandos, with a service commando and

a reconnaissance platoon in support. The Royal

Canadian Dragoons' A Squadron also was

assigned for the mission, as were an engineer

troop and a signal troop.271 * The Canadian forces were supported by

Grizzly, Cougar, and Bison armored vehicles,

which arrived by ship and were then driven overland. Such vehicles were not normally part of

the regimental equipment. Due to the long distances and the need for convoy protection, however, they were borrowed from other units specifically for this operation.272 The Canadians conducted dismounted patrols until these vehicles

began arriving in the sector on 15 January. By

early March, the Canadian 93 Rotary Wing

Aircraft Flight had provided six CH- 135 helicopters, which increased the force's mobility and

operational reach.273

* In the Canadian forces, the term battle group is analogous

to task force. In this instance, it represents the fonnation of a

battalion-sized unit specifically reinforced and formed for

this particular mission. The commandos that make up the

battle group are company-sized airborne infantry formations.

The term does not imply special operations capabilities. ** These are Canadian-made all-wheeled armored personnel

carriers. The Grizzly has eight wheels and mounted a

12.7mm machine gun and a 7.62mm machine gun. The

Cougar is a six-wheeled fire support vehicle armed with a

76mm gun and a 7.62mm machine gun mounted coaxially

with the main gun. The Bison is an eight-wheeled armored

personnel carrier mounting a 7.62mm machine gun.

Until this time, traffic moving between Belet Weyne and

the port of Mogadishu took five days for a round trip; two

days each way and one day with overnight at the port.
92 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

The Canadians divided their sector into four

security zones, each of which was assigned to a

sub-unit of the battle group. They quickly began

aggressive patrolling throughout the sector, both

dismounted and in the armored vehicles. Toward

the end of January, the Canadian command had

already assessed most of the humanitarian sectors

as generally quiet, making the patrolling of the

large security zones safer for the soldiers. It was

only to the north and east that friction was causing

concern.274

There, close to the Ethiopian border and the

town of Matabaan, the political situation was

complicated. Most of the population within the

sector was of the Hawadle clan, and the United

Somali Congress faction had a strong presence

there. Some of these faction members were supporters of General Aideed. Colonel "John"

Hussein was one of Aideed's division commanders. Aideed's first cousin, Colonel Omar Jaua, was

the chief of staff of Aideed's 1st Division, which

operated in the vicinity of Galcaio (outside of

UINITAF's area of operations). A local governor

named Harlane, in the town of Dharsamenbo,

reported directly to General Aideed. However,

there also was a United Somali Congress faction

that declared itself independent of both Aideed

and Ali Mahdi. The Somali National Front and the

Somali Salvation Democratic Front also had

strong factions in the area, and a faction of the

Somali National Movement was situated along

the Ethiopian border.275

From the start Canadian forces and U.S.

Special Operations Forces in the area began to

make contact with these groups. From these initial

talks, the coalition soldiers received information

about camps and the locations of cantonment

areas, of which there were a large number in the

sector, each guarded by 60 to 70 men. The coalition troops inspected and inventoried these camps

and cantonments. Just as important, this aggressive activity showed a strong coalition presence

throughout the sector and acted as a buffer

between the factions.

Of equal importance was the need to keep the

factions from causing trouble across the international boundary with Ethiopia or beyond the limits of UNITAF's area of operations in Somalia.

The Belet Weyne sector adjoined both of these

critical areas. Coalition patrols along these areas

was enhanced by the personal contacts of

Canadian and American soldiers with Ethiopian

and Somali leaders. In late December and early

January, the most volatile area was at the town of

Fer Fer, which lay directly astride the EthiopianSomali border. The Somali National Movement

had a strong presence there, and the Ethiopian

Army had moved more than 500 men to the area.

The Ethiopians disarmed any Somali who crossed

the border, but were refraining from attacking the

Somalis.276 UNITAF Special Operations Forces

had made contact with the Ethiopian commander

at Fer Fer by 5 January, and kept regular contact

with him.

The Special Operations Forces performed other

important functions in the sector as well. They

traveled to all the major villages to assess the attitudes of the local populations. They also noted

which clans people belonged to, the extent of bandit activities, sources of water, main crops grown,

and other information about daily life and politics.

This information was passed to the coalition commander in Belet Weyne, Colonel Labbe. It was

then passed to UNITAF, where, combined with

similar information from the other sectors, it was

processed as intelligence about the entire area of

operations.277

The Canadian forces soon established good

relations with the local populace and conducted

aggressive patrolling throughout the sector. They

also provided security for the convoys of relief

supplies coming into the sector, notably those of

the Red Cross and Save the Children. These relief

organizations took care of up to 45,000 people a

day just in the maln city of Belet Weyne. From

that center, additional supplies were distributed to

outlying areas. DependabLe stocks of food and

regular feeding at the refugee centers brought the

famine under control. Toward the end of January,

starving refugees were so far removed from danger they only required one feeding per day. Yet,

even with food stocks available elsewhere, large

numbers of refugees stayed in the city because of

the lack of water. Many wells had been destroyed

or contaminated during the civil war. With the

security provided by the Canadian soldiers, two

humanitarian relief organizations, Save the

Children and Oxfam Quebec, worked on restoring

wells and provided veterinary assistance.278 Such

measures allowed the people to return to their villages.

The Canadian command encouraged Somali

self-reliance through a series of councils. There

were separate ones established for local security,

relief, reconstruction, and political concerns.

Colonel Labbe, as the commander, met only with
MOVING TO TI-fE THIRD Pw&sE 93

OVIC DD-SD-OO-00904

A soldier from the 10th Mountain Division points an M16 rifle into an enclosure while checking for weapons during

a sweep of the small village of Afgooye. The village was a haven for weapons and bandits.

the councils, not with individuals. This discouraged any charges of Canadian favoritism. All factions and clans needed representation on these

councils and at major meetings to ensure their

respective interests were heard and protected.279

The Canadians also reached out to the Somali

people in more direct ways. As was happening in

other sectors, they helped reestablish a police

force. These local policemen did not carry

weapons, but they were soon accompanying the

Canadian soldiers on patrols. The Canadians

trained these officers in first aid and riot control

procedures and even procured uniforms for them.

The education of Somali children also received

attention. In the population centers of Belet

Weyne and Matabaan, several schools were

repaired and reopened with the help of the

Canadian soldiers. School supplies were procured

through the United Nations Children's Fund and

distributed to these institutions. Teachers were

recruited, tested, and given vocational training

and returned to their duties. The Canadians also

established a fund totaling $75,000 to pay for

local laborers working on repair projects, such as

roads. These workers were employed and managed through the local rehabilitation committee,

but the funds were controlled and disbursed by the

Canadians.28° As elsewhere in Somalia, military

engineers undertook the hazardous duty of clearing mines from roads and other areas.

Aside from the threat posed by potentially

volatile confrontations of the numerous armed

factions, the major problem in the sector was simple banditry. This usually took the forms of looting, sniping, and setting up roadblocks for the

purpose of robbery and extortion. The Canadians

sought to control these activities through the presence of their patrols. They also issued a strict

weapons control policy. All weapons in the sector

had to be registered, and none could be carried

openly.' Non-registered weapons were seized. In

this manner, small arms in the sector became less

of a problem. Then, by working closely with the

various factions, the Canadians got the Sornalis to

agree to place their heavy weapons in cantonments. By 27 March 1993, the entire sector was

rated secure.281

* This allowed humanitarian relief organizations that had

legitimate security needs to maintain their protection.
94 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

In April, the Canadians prepared for the arrival

of UNOSOM II forces. Under the transition plan,

the Belet Weyne sector was to be handed over to

the control of soldiers from India. But the Indians

would not arrive on time, and the Italians had to

temporarily extend their control into this sector.

Lieutenant Colonel Carol J. Mathieu, commanding officer of the batfie group, recognized

the sensitive position of his sector, which bordered on both Ethiopia and the portion of Somalia

that was not within the UNTTAF area of responsibility. He foresaw that difficulties could arise

from the presence of factional forces around

Galcaio and he recommended the extension of his

sector, something that was eventuaily done under

UNOSOM IJ.282 Fortunately, the Canadians

brought Belet Weyne quickly and skillfully under

control, and the possibility for violence never

became reality. The humanitarian sector on the

other flank of the coalition's area of operations,

however, would pose serious problems for

UNITAF.

Kismayo

After Mogadishu, Kismayo was the relief sector that had the greatest number of incidents. That

city also caused the greatest concern because of

the potential for inter-faction fighting. As in the

capital, these armed factions were ultimately tied

by alliance to either Aideed or Ali Mahdi. Both

groups wanted to control this important city,

which had been the scene of heavy fighting until

the arrival of UNITAF. To further exacerbate the

problem, the leader of the group loyal to Aideed,

Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, was suspected of having perpetrated a massacre among the followers of

General Said Hirsi "Morgan" just before coalition

forces landed. Tensions were high in the city and

its environs, and the need to keep the two factions

apart was critical. Morgan's Somali National

Alliance faction of the Somali Patriotic

Movement numbered only about 1,000 men, but

many of them were well-disciplined veterans of

the old national army. Jess' Somali Patriotic

Movement faction was about four or five times

larger, but was not nearly as well organized. Prior

to the arrival of UNITAF troops, Morgan had

moved his followers far up the Jubba River valley,

* This is a conservative estimate of Morgan's strength.

Various sources put his numbers at two or three times this.

near the Kenyan border. He began to move south

again in January.

Just as MarFor had responsibility for stabilizing the capital, so Kismayo was the responsibility

of the Army Forces Somalia. Major General

Steven L. Arnold decided on 17 December to

deploy his 10th Mountain Division artillery tactical operations center staff to the city, under the

command of Colonel Evan R. Gaddis, USA. The

advance party of six officers and enlisted soldiers

arrived at Mogadishu on 12 December and were

quickly informed about the situation, given their

mission, and told what was expected of them.

They traveled to Kismayo by humvee and linked

up with the Belgian and U.S. Marine units that

had just secured the port and airfield.283 Task

Force Kismayo was created from the U.S. Army's

3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, and the Belgian 1st

Parachute Battalion. The task force headquarters

was formed from the 10th Mountain Division

artillery staff, reinforced by other division assets

including an aviation detachment, a boat company, a communications platoon, a psychological

operations team, a civil affairs team, and a support

element.284 Brigadier General W. Lawson

Magruder ifi, USA, the assistant division commander for operations, was selected to be the task

force commanding general.

General Magruder moved quickly to impress

upon the faction leaders in the sector the power

and determination of UNITAF. He also wanted to

ensure they understood the coalition was neutral

and was there only to assist the Somali people.

The task force began its security operations on 28

December. The very next day, General Magruder

hosted a meeting with Colonel Jess, local elders,

clan members, and former police officers to form

an interim security council for the sector. Shortly

after this first meeting took place, two other

important steps were taken. First, the local Somali

police began to form as an auxiliary security

force. Soon they manned roadblocks with coalition forces. The second step was to issue a "no

weapons policy" on 1 January.285 This was a comprehensive policy that stated: "no one may carry a

pistol, rifle, automatic weapon or transport a

crew-served weapon within the city limits of

Kismayo." It also banned pedestal mounts for

weapons on vehicles. The only exceptions were

for legitimate bodyguards, and even they had to

be in possession of an authorized permit, and in

the presence of their employer. Their weapons had

to be carried openly (in a holster or slung over the
MOVING TO THE TWR0 PHASE 95

Photo courtesy of the author

Canadian soldiers mounted in a Bison light armored vehicle patrol the Belet Weyne sector to create and maintain a

secure environment in which to carry out their humanitarian work.

shoulder with the muzzle pointed down.) This

policy took effect on 9 January, and was enforced

through a system of routine patrols, searches of

vehicles and individuals, roadblocks, and mobile

checkpoints. Coalition forces and auxiliary security forces worked together to enforce the ban.286

The coalition forces in Kismayo would soon be

at the forefront of one of UNITAF's major challenges. The ceasefire agreement on IS January

required all factional forces to remain where they

were on that date. Barely a week after the signing

of the initial Addis Ababa accords, General

Morgan began moving his forces south from the

Kenyan border toward Kismayo. There was no

doubt that General Morgan wanted a confrontation with his rival Colonel Jess for control of the

city. General Magruder moved quickly and directly to end the possibility of fighting between the

factions and to warn General Morgan of the consequences of his actions. On 23 January, General

Magruder met personally with General Morgan at

the town of QoQaani. General Magruder

explained tiNITAF's position on the cantonment

of large weapons and technicals and told Morgan

that any such weapons found outside the cantonment areas could be destroyed. General Morgan

disclosed the locations of his forces at four towns

in the sector. General Magruder replied that four

sites were too many. Morgan stated he had already

told his forces not to engage coalition forces, and

that he would avoid having his men on roads used

for relief convoys if he was forewarned about

them. He also agreed, "not to initiate attacks

against other factions." Finally, he stated he could

be contacted on 26 January to arrange another

meeting.287 In the end, however, this proposed

meeting was overtaken by other events.

General Morgan was one of the more interesting characters in the Somali political landscape. A

former Minister of Defense, he was a son-in-law

of Siad Bare. He also had attended the United

States Army Command and Staff College at Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. As U.S. Ambassador

Robert B. Oakley said, this meant Morgan understood how we think, "but we don't have the foggiest idea of how he thinks." Ambassador Oakley
96 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

did describe him as "very cunning and totally

untrustworthy."288 As if to prove the ambassador's

assessment, General Morgan's agreement not to

attack his rivals did not last 24 hours.

Some of Colonel Jess' soldiers were in a cantonment at the town of Bir Xaani, located about

35 kilometers from Kismayo. Security was lax,

perhaps in part because these men thought

UNITAF would protect them from attack.289 On

24 January, General Morgan's fighters attacked

the outpost as part of an attempt to move against

the port city. In response, Colonel Maulin, one of

Jess' subordinates, made an unauthorized move

against Morgan's forces. UNTTAF responded

quickly with two radioed warnings to General

Morgan to desist in his aggression and to pull

back. When he paid no attention and continued

with his intentions of reducing the Jess cantonment, Task Force Kismayo was ordered to stop

him by force.

The task force planned a combined operation,

with the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, providing air

assault elements and attack helicopters and the

Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion forming the

ground assault element. An aerial reconnaissance

of Bir Xaani located General Morgan's forces and

warning shots were fired. After these were

ignored, Cobra attack helicopters fired cannons

and antitank rockets at the Somali technicals and

military equipment. The fife was described as

"accurate and deadly." Belgian soldiers, soon on

the scene, captured several technicals, artillery,

and armored vehicles.299 This preventive operation was successful; although Morgan's soldiers

did return fire, they also pulled back quickly. The

small, sharp engagement was important for two

reasons. It was the first time preemptive force had

been used against one of the Somali factions to

enforce the Addis Ababa accords, signed only 10

days before. Second, as Ambassador Oakley said

in an interview, the attack was necessary to "teach

Morgan a lesson. ... Cobra gunships went in and

took care of Morgan for not respecting the ceasefire, continuing to move south after we told him to

stop, and for general misbehavior."291 General

Morgan had to withdraw his remaining vehicles

35 kilometers from Bir Xaani, and his troops

seven kilometers from the town.

* Colonel Jess had gone to attend the talks in Addis Ababa

and had not returned. In fact, with the notoriety of the

December massacre in Kismayo, there was speculation he

might never return.

The forceful reaction of UNITAF forces produced an immediate effect. Fighting ceased, and

the opposing factions pulled away from each

other. The Kismayo relief sector entered a period

of uneasy peace. Over the next few days, the

Belgian paratroopers aggressively sought out and

confiscated weapons, and American attack helicopters destroyed technicals found outside the

compounds.292 General Morgan and his men,

some of whom claimed a right to return to homes

in Kismayo, remained a threat in the area. Colonel

Jess' followers also caused troubles in the town

and lower Jubba valley. There were several incidents of sniping and of grenade attacks against

coalition soldiers, particularly the Belgians. These

increased in intensity through the middle of

February. By that time, General Morgan and

Colonel Maulin were probing each other. In the

midst of this turmoil, Colonel Jess retumed to

Kismayo. UNTITAF had placed a lid on the situation on the southern flank, but it continued to

simmer.

In late February, General Morgan was prepared

to move against Colonel Jess' forces in Kismayo

once again. Taking advantage of the better discipline of his men, he infiltrated small groups into

the city on 22 February. Again, Jess' men were

caught napping. In a short but intense action, several of Jess' fighters, as well as some civilians,

were killed and Jess and his followers fled the

city. This clash was to have serious consequences

for IJINIITAF.

Such a daring chaUenge could not go unanswered. Both General Johnston and Ambassador

Oaldey immediately issued a strongly worded

ultimatum to General Morgan. "There can be no

excuse or pardon for the deliberate, well-planned

actions of your forces and senior commanders in

attacking Kismayo on 22 February 1993.

UNITAF condemns and holds you responsible for

killing innocent civilians and terrorizing the entire

population, threatening to destroy all the progress

toward [prosperity] and peace which has been

made in the region." UNIITAF commanders then

told General Morgan, "as a result of these inexcusable, criminal actions and the breaking of the

ceasefire, all your forces and weapons must be

moved out [of] the lower Jubba valley to locations

north of [Dhoble] no later than midnight 25

February. You must designate these locations to

UNITAF by 25 February. If any of your forces are

found outside of these locations on 26 February or
MOVING TO THE ThIRD PHASE 97

thereafter, they will be engaged. Any weapons

located will be destroyed."293

To give teeth to the ultimatum, Army Forces

Somalia's quick reaction force was ordered to

Kismayo. Other Army units were shuffled in the

theater to keep all humanitarian sectors secured.

Even as Morgan withdrew to the Dhoble area,

Colonel Jess' forces were ordered to move out of

the city, to the area of Jilib. These measures were

timely, effective, and balanced, but the damage

had been done.

hi Mogadishu, General Aideed claimed that

Morgan could not have succeeded at entering

Kismayo unless he had the cooperation of

UNITAF. He also told his followers that all of

UNITAF's actions were directed against his ally,

Colonel Jess, conveniently ignoring what the

coalition was doing to chastise General

Morgan.294 Aideed's efforts at disseminating propaganda succeeded in bringing his followers out

onto the streets of Mogadishu for three days of

disturbances.

In Kismayo, as the situation quieted down

again, the Army handed over responsibility for the

sector to the Belgians on 5 March. About 150

Americans remained out of the original 1,000-

man contingent. Their main mission was to work

with the humanitarian agencies.

But General Morgan was not done making

trouble. With the start of the next round of peace

talks scheduled to begin shortly in Addis Ababa,

there was concern violence might again erupt. On

9 March, Colonel Frederick C. Peck, the public

affairs officer, expressed UINTTAF's views in a

press statement: "We're going on intuition and

track record. We are concerned that someone

might try to derail things or make a point or get a

little bit better situation."295 After only two weeks

of relative quiet, Morgan's forces again attacked

Jess' fouowers on 16 March and tried to take over

the city. Jess' supporters fled to the north, and

UNITAF recalled its quick reaction force to the

city. This 500-man unit, under Brigadier General

Greg L. Gile, USA, was backed with 13 attack

helicopters. The belligerents were quickly pushed

out of the city. To further emphasize UNITAF

resolve to keep the factions from confronting each

other, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp

(LHD 1) and three other ships carrying the 24th

Marine Expeditionary Unit were stationed off the

city's coast on 25 March. The MEU landed the

next day and conducted patrols to the west of the

ovic DD-SD-OO-00798

A Canadian soldier manning a machine gun in a bunker guards the entrance of Belet Wayne airfield as a U.S.

Marine KC-130 lands on the dirt airstrip.
98 REsToRING HOPE IN Sov1.AuA

port city. At the same time, 200 American soldiers

and the Belgians pushed to the north, placing a

strong cordon between the forces of Morgan and

Jess.

The Addis Ababa talks, which had begun on 15

Marclh, continued through this period. With news

of General Morgan's latest actions, Aideed threatened to leave the talks, again charging IJNITAF

with complicity. Colonel Peter A. Dotto,

UNITAF's future plans officer, was also the coalition representative to the conference. He warned

Aideed that Leaving the conference would only

"play into the hands of his enemies."296 Aideed

refused to listen and left. But this time he had

overextended himself. His people in Mogadishu

did not come into the streets as they had before.

Also, several of his lieutenants disagreed with his

stubbornness and formed their own contingent to

continue representation at the conference. Faced

with this unacceptable loss of support and prestige

from his own faction, Aideed decided his interests

were best served by returning to the negotiating

table. While Aideed's resentment undoubtedly

continued, Kismayo settled into a period of quiet

for the remainder of UNITAF's time in Somalia.

Even as the city and the area of operations

began to calm down near the end of March the

events in Kismayo and their spillover in

Mogadishu had two serious consequences. For

General Aideed, loss of credibility would cause

him to seek some method to regain his stature

with his followers. For UNITAF, the Kismayo

troubles caused a reevaluation of the transition to

I.JNOSOM H and a rearrangement of the redeployinent schedule.297

Morale and Restraint

During the third phase of the operation, the

work in Somalia could be rewarding for the soldiers and Marines of the coalition. They could see

the results of their efforts, whether they were

engineers building a bridge, infantrymen on

patrol, officers assigned to the civil-military operations teams, or air traffic controllers bringing in

aircraft filled with supplies or troops. Each person

* Kismayo continued to be a source of tension and conflict.

On 6 and 7 May 1993, just two days after the departure of

UNITAF and the turn over of the operation to the United

Nations, Colonel Jess attacked General Morgan's forces in a

bid to retake the city. Belgian forces, then under the command of UNOSOM II, repelled the attack.

contributed to a situation that was noticeably

improving for the vast majority of Somalis. There

was a tedious sameness to the daily round of

work, however, and shifts were long and often

monotonous with no days off. There also was an

edge to life in the area of operations from the

occasional attacks or sniping incidents. Within a

month of the start of the operation, tension was

mounting for those who patrolled the streets of the

cities or the roads of the countryside, or who were

riding in convoys. An official document stated the

case clearly: "the strain of operating in an environment where a Marine on patrol might be met

by a waving, smiling crowd on one corner and

gunfire on the next began to tell on the individuals in MarFot Many Marines began to grow

increasingly impatient with the naturally curious

Somalis, particularly when Somalis crowded

them."298

This attitude was not peculiar to Americans or

Marines. In Baidoa, the Australians also noted:

The soldiers observed acts of corruption and

exploitation among Somalis and Somali

Non-Government Organization staff. They

became disillusioned. In many cases their

morale plummeted as they asked themselves

why they were risking their lives in a

remote, hot and dangerous country, hell bent

on its own destruction. It was an immense

challenge for the commanders within the 1 RAR Group to maintain morale, and prevent

soldiers from allowing their disillusionment

and anger to lead to overly-aggressive practices. All of those who served in Baidoa had

to dig deep to remain in touch with values

and attitudes developed at home in

Australia, while working under pressure in a

brutalized society, stricken with corruption

and violence.299

Such frustration was familiar to those senior

commanders and noncommissioned officers who

had served in Vietnam. There the enemy often hid

within, and was supported by, the civilian population. In Somalia, there was no enemy in the traditional sense, but it was just as difficult to discern

the intentions of a mob of people, or to spot within a crowd the person who might pose a real

threat. Strong leadership at all levels was required

to keep soldiers and Marines focused on their misston.

Major General Wilhelm recognized the creeping tiredness and frustration of his Marines by

mid-January, and he issued MarFor a "Thirty-Day
MovtNc TO THE THIRD PHASE 99

Photo courtesy of the author

Belgian paratroopers stand guard at the port of

Kismayo.

Attitude Adjustment Message." In addition to

calling for a brief stand down of operations to

allow his Marines to gain some respite, he

reminded them that they needed to maintain good

relations "with the 90 [percent] of the population

who welcomed the American presence." As he

noted, no matter how frustrating the situation

might become, the Marines "had to avoid alienating the citizens of Mogadishu."30° In Baidoa,

Lieutenant Colonel David W. Hurley adopted the

motto of "firm, fair, and friendly" as the guide for

the Australian soldiers. He also made it clear that

unnecessary violence would not be tolerated, and

that all actions must be within the rules of engagement.30'

The professionalism and discipline of coalition

soldiers were essential in keeping down the number of unfortunate incidents. Occasionally, some

soldier or Marine would be confronted with a situation that called for a quick decision to use deadly force, although these were rare. At such times,

the rules of engagement provided both a basis for

action and protection for the soldiers involved if

there was an obvious threat. An investigation was

held for any incident in which a member of the

coalition shot a Somali. The individuals involved

would either be upheld in their decision or recommended for a court-martial. On 4 February, a

young Somali was shot and killed by a Marine

sergeant as he rushed toward the back of an open

vehicle while carrying a closed box. The box

turned out to hold nothing dangerous. This was a

very sorrowful event, causing grief to the boy's

family and deep remorse to the Marine involved.

But since the contents of the box were not known,

and since the boy's actions were deemed to pose a

possible threat, the sergeant was determined to

have acted in accordance with the rules of

engagement and did not face a court-martial.

But there were also some who did let their frnstration and anger get out of hand, with drastic

results. On 2 February, Gunnery Sergeant Harry

Conde, shot and wounded a Somali youth who

had approached his vehicle and stolen his sunglasses. Gunnery Sergeant Conde shot the boy as

he was fleeing from the vehicle. The gunfire also

wounded another Somali. Since the boy did not

present any threat to the gunnery sergeant, he was

deemed to have used excessive force and was

tried by court-martial. He was found guilty of two

counts of assault with a firearm with intent to

inflict grievous bodily harm, was fined, and was

reduced in grade to staff sergeant.

* Riding in a convoy in the city of Mogadishu or in Kismayo

was always a tense time. Roads between major points were

kept clear by the Clean Street operations to allow for fast

movement, and routes were occasionally varied, but there

was always the chance of random sniping or a grenade

attack. Also, Somali pedestrians frequently stepped in front

of vehicles to purposely separate them from their convoy and

slow them down or stop them. Then the vehicle could be

mobbed as crowds of young men and boys rushed in to grab

whatever they could get. Passengers in the vehicles were literally sitting targets if anyone wished to take advantage of

the situation. There was a need for constant vigilance in such

situations, and coalition soldiers had to be able to protect

themselves and their property. On leaving a compound, a

magazine was inserted into one's personal weapon and a

round chambered with the safety on. Many also carried sticks

or the end poles from cots to rap the knuckles of those who

might attempt to steal. At one point it was noted that some

soldiers, such as the Tunisians, were traveling with bayonets

fixed to deter thieves, but this practice was stopped. It was

determined the very act of fixing bayonets provided a clear

message of the intent of the soldiers involved and could act

as a deterrent that would not be possible if the bayonets were

already on the rifles.
100 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00788

BGen Lawson W. Magruder Ill, USA, the 10th Mountain Division's assistance division commander and Task Force

Kismayo's commander, meets with Col Ahmed Omar Jess, the Somali faction leader in Kismayo.

The most serious set of incidents occurred in

Belet Weyne. The Canadians had problems with

Somali men and youths sneaking into their lines at

night and stealing whatever they could. The thefts

were bad enough, but no one could determine the

intentions of these intruders, and for that reason

they posed a threat to the soldiers and a danger to

themselves. Frustration and resentment mounted

against these thieves. Unfortunately, some junior

leaders took matters into their own hands in a

manner that was unjustifiable and deadly. On 4

March, soldiers of the Reconnaissance Platoon

were ordered to augment security at the engineers' camp at Belet Weyne. That evening the platoon's commander, Captain Michael Rainville, set

in motion a plan to capture infiltrators by placing

rations and equipment in a position that could be

seen by Somalis coming close to the compound.

Eventually, two unarmed Somali men were

observed entering the compound. They were challenged by members of the platoon and attempted

to flee. Warning shots were fired, but they continued to run. One of the Somalis was shot and captured. The other continued to run inside the compound until he, too, was struck by rifle fire,

knocking him to the ground. As he tried to get up,

he was shot twice again at close range and killed.

Just a few days later, Major Anthony Seward,

the commanding officer of 2 Commando, passed

on to his platoon commanders that any intruders

captured in Canadian lines were to be abused. The

intention of this poorly worded direction was that

any Somali thieves should be taught a lesson that

would deter them, or others who might be contemplating such actions, from stealing from the

Canadians. Some officers passed this word on to

their men. Unfortunately, some soldiers took it as

a license to do what they could to anyone unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. On the night

of 16 March, a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone,

was caught in the Canadian base at Belet Weyne.

He was bound and taken to a bunker that had been

used to hold such prisoners until they could be

turned over to proper authorities. There he was

tortured and beaten to death by at least two soldiers, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and

Private Kyle Brown. Several noncommissioned

officers had knowledge of the beating, although
MovING TO mrs THIRD PHASE 101

DVIC DiD-SO-OO-00946

Two Belgian militaiy police officers go through the possessions of a Somali taxi dilver at a checkpoint at the

entrance into the compound at the port of Kismayo.

they may not have known of its severity until too

late.302

Canadian authorities investigated both incidents. The result tarnished the reputation of a fine

military establishment, which had received praise

from General Johnston for "the humanitarian

focus of the Canadian troops. It has earned them

enormous good will and they have properly porfrayed themselves as having come to Somalia for

[a] noble purpose."303 The careers of many soldiers in the Airborne Regiment and in the

Canadian Ministry of National Defense were

ruined.

The initial investigations began with a commanding officer's investigation immediately after

the 4 March shooting, but this was not received at

National Defense headquarters until 23 March.

However, an investigation by Canadian military

police began in late April, just days before the

redeployment of the UNITAF headquarters. The

Canadian forces began redeploying in May and

continued to arrive back in Canada through June.

As word of the incidents began to emerge, along

with allegations of withheld or altered information, they developed into a national scandal,

reaching into the highest levels of the Canadian

Ministry of National Defense. A special

Commission of Inquiry was established in

Canada, which worked on questioning all officers

and soldiers connected in any way with either

incident. As a result of the investigation and the

scandal, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was

disbanded. Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu was court

martialed; although acquitted he retired from the

service. Several other officers and noncommissioned officers were also court martialed. Among

the most significant was Major Seward, who was

found guilty of negligent performance of duty and

received a severe reprimand, three months in

prison, and dismissal. Captain Rainville was court

martialed and found not guilty. Master Corporal

Matchee attempted to commit suicide while in

custody in Somalia, resulting in permanent brain

damage that rendered him incompetent to stand

trial. Private Brown was court martialed, found
102 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

guilty of manslaughter and torture, and sentenced

to five years imprisonment and dismissal with disgrace.

Among the 30,000 members of UNITAF, such

incidents of unwarranted violence and abuse were

rare. Generally, the soldiers and Marines of all the

coalition partners were concerned with maintaining their personal honor in a difficult situation,

and with assisting the great majority of Somalis

who needed and welcomed their efforts. The work

was not always easy, and it often required

patience and forbearance. But as MarFor's command chronology for this period stated: "The discipline of the Marines ensured that potentially

explosive situations, instead of deteriorating, were

defused. Many a young Somali who could have

been legitimately shot under the rules of engagement owes his life to the restraint of MarFor personnel."304 The great majority of the coalition's

soldiers displayed the same discipline.
Chapter 7

Drawing Down the Forces

Naval Operations

While their comrades on the ground were

working throughout the theater, the coalition

sailors were busy in various activities off the

Somali coast. The work at sea was characterized

during the third phase by patrolling, training with

coalition partners, and shipboard routine.

Situation reports for this period are filled with

the names of ships of coalition partners that

entered the waters off the Somali coast and, for a

time, became part of Navy Forces Somalia. Some,

like the Indian offshore patrol vessel Su/canya

(OPV P51), were that nation's entire contribution

to the coalition and remained as part of the force.

Others spent time in the area working with the

United States and other nations' vessels and then

departed when their limited missions were done.

Examples of such ships were the Pakistani Navy's

replenishment oiler Mowain (AOR A20), destroyer Tughril (DD 167), and fleet oiler and stores

ship Dacca (AOR A41); and the Indian Navy's

guided missile corvettes Kuthar (FSG P46) and

Khukri (FSG P49). Some of the transiting ships

were supply ships supporting their countries'

troops ashore, such as the Belgian command and

support ship Zinnia (AGF A961), and the

Australian helicopter and logistic support ship

Jervis Bay (CT 203). Other ships represented the

naval contingent of coalition allies that also provided ground troops to the operation. In this category were the Australian landing ship logistic

Tobruk (LSL L50); the Italian amphibious transport dock San Giorgio (LPD L9892), mine countermeasures support ship Vesuvio (MCS A5384),

and guided missile frigate Grecale (FF0 F571);

the Turkish landing ship tank Ertugrul (LST

L401), depot ship Derya (AD A576), and guided

missile frigate Fatih (FF0 F242); and the

DVIC DN-SN-93-06061

An Alouette Ill SA-3 16B Chetak helicopter prepares to land on board the Indian Navy's Sukanya-class offshore

patrol craft Sharda (P 55), anchored off the Somali coast
104 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DN-SD-OO-00795

A U.S. Marine KG- 130 Refueler aircraft on the ground at Belet Weyne airfield, as a Marine AH- 1 "Cobra" attack helicopter flies overhead. The mission of the KC- 130s was to refuel the Cobras, keeping them in the air to escort food

convoys.

Canadian replenishment oiler Preserver (AOR

510).

The daily work of all the vessels in the coalition was varied. There were the normal training

and drills, and underway replenishments were

common, but the more important tasks were in

direct support of the operation. Naval air was a

key factor, and Navy Forces Somalia assumed the

air traffic control mission for the operation during

its early days. Aircraft performed road reconnaissance for convoys and stood ready for close air

support if needed. Logistics and tanker flights

helped troops on the ground stay supplied, while

forward infrared radar surveillance flights kept

the commanders informed of movements within

the theater. The ships also conducted coastal surveillance and intercepted and searched merchant

vessels entering the waters of the area of operations.

This latter mission was very important in

ensuring more weapons were not smuggled into

the theater. In one notable example, an intelligence report indicated a cargo vessel named the

Maria, a ship of Greek origin laden with arms and

ammunition, was sailing from Serbia and supposedly heading for Somalia. The coalition naval

forces kept a tight watch for this ship, which was

nondescript and bore a name common to merchant vessels in the Mediterranean. The Maria

was eventually reported as seized by the

Seychelles Coast Guard in their national waters

on 5 March. The ship was carrying 90 tons of

munitions and falsified registry papers at the

time.305

Air Operations

Air support was vital to every aspect of the

operation. It provided a capability that offset the

tremendous distances of the area of operations

and served as an important and flexible supporting arm to troops on the ground.

Although a service component, the U.S. Air

Force was in some aspects similar to a functional

organization. Its primary duty as the overseer of

Air Force Forces Somalia was to provide mobility, both into the area of operations and within the

theater. It was one of the smallest components of

the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), but

there was no shortage of airframes in the country.

Most of these came from the American forces, and

all four Services (Army, Air Force, Navy, and

Marine Corps) contributed to the air armada that

was sent to Somalia. Some of the coalition part-
DItwINc DOWN THE FORCES 105

ners also used their own aircraft for resupply or as

a contribution to the overall operation.

The aircraft were used for almost every traditional mission of air power. In the initial phases

of the operation, fixed-wing attack aircraft from

the carriers flew air patrols for detachments working at distant sites and were prepared for close air

support if necessary. Medical evacuation flights

and search and rescue flights were also significant

parts of the planning. Later, Army and Marine

Corps attack helicopters provided close-in fire

support to operations against factions in

Mogadishu and Kismayo. Transport aircraft flying on the air bridge brought personnel and supplies into the country, and C-130 and C-141 intratheater flights carried fuel and supplies to the sectors.

The absence of traditional ground supporting

arms (e.g., tanks and heavy artillery) during

Operation Restore Hope was offset by the use of

attack helicopters. These aircraft filled an important void in the organizational structure. With the

decision to leave howitzers on board the maritime

prepositioning force shipping, gunships assumed

a vital supporting arms role. Marine Forces

Somalia (MarFor) used them successfully in the

attack on weapons storage sites in Mogadishu,

and the Army employed them frequently during

troubles in Kismayo in February and March. The

Army's after action report claimed: "Attack aviation provided the discriminatory firepower

required for this type of environment."306 Also,

the Somalis displayed an evident respect for the

capabilities of these weapons. "[Their] presence

also provided a psychological effect that helped in

intimidating potential threats. ... On several occasions, the mere presence of the attack helicopters

served as a deterrent and caused crowds and vehicles to disperse."307 These versatile aircraft protected convoys throughout the theater, performed

day and night reconnaissance missions, and

accompanied coalition forces on the ground. They

added appreciably to the coalition mission to create a secure environment.

* The Marine Corps lists six functions of support provided

by its air arm. These are offensive air support, antiair warfare, assault support, aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. ** See Chapter 8 for a more detailed description of medical

evacuations.

The calibration of weapons was important to

the effectiveness of the aircraft. Marine Aircraft

Group 16 (MAG-16) built a firing range five

miles northwest of Bale Dogle airfield where all

aviation weapons could be properly checked.

From 6 January to 12 January, the group conducted a battle-sight zero range to sight all of its

M16A2 rifles.308

Aircraft were also critical to the supply of

forces in the field, especially in the operation's

early days. Working with the Air Force or air

mobility element, MAG-16 set up "spoke channel" flights to the sectors of Bardera, Bale Dogle,

and Baidoa. Service began a few days before

Christmas. An average of four transport flights a

day soon delivered vital cargo of rations, miscellaneous supplies, and engineering equipment to

these areas. Lockheed KC-l 30 Hercules transports from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport

Squadron 352 delivered fuel, as did CH-53D/E

heavy lift helicopters from MAG-16. These helicopters also transported personnel and carried

oversize cargo by external lift. The spoke channel

flights served Kismayo and other sectors with fuel

deliveries. Even the French forces at Oddur benefited from these flights by driving the shorter distance to Baidoa to pick up fuel and water delivered by air.309 As the New Zealand forces came

into theater they set up scheduled "Kiwi flights"

into the various relief sectors. Their light fixedwing Andover aircraft were used to deliver passengers and light cargo on a regular basis.

The peculiarities of the desert environment

affected aircraft as well as soldiers. The

omnipresent dust was extremely damaging to

equipment, especially to the machines' sensitive

air intakes. Even the finest filters could not keep

out all the powder-like dust. The aircraft at dirt

airfields in the interior were particularly vulnerable to this problem, since every time an airplane

or helicopter took off or landed at one of these

fields it raised a storm of red or ochre dust, the

color depending on the location. One solution was

to use dust palliatives that could be put down on

the runways and adjacent surfaces to hold the particles in place. Another solution was to place AM2

interconnecting panels, a medium-duty, aluminum, landing mat capable of supporting both

fighter and cargo aircraft operations, on ramps

and taxiways.

Despite all the work to repair the runways and

keep them serviceable, problems developed rapidly. The traffic of the heavy Lockheed C-141 air-
106 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC 00-50-00-00923

Using a John Deere road grader, U.S. Air Force SSgt Robert Chandler, along with other members of the Air Force's

Red Horse civil engineering team, smoothes out the ground at Oddur airstrip.

craft rutted or broke up the surfaces. In some

cases, such as at Bale Dogle, a main air base for

the operation, this meant the suspension of C-141

flights or the transfer of cargo to the smaller C130 aircraft for delivery.

The need for continuous maintenance of the

runways was distressing. So was another common

problem, foreign object damage. This was caused

by small items, such as pebbles, screws, or trash

that could get onto an aircraft operating area and

cause damage to airframes or engines when blown

around or kicked up. Damage from foreign

objects was plentiful at Somali airfields. It often

came in the form of stones or small rocks that

were blown onto runways by propeller aircraft.

Airmen, soldiers, or locally hired Somalis

engaged in a never-ending struggle to keep the

operating areas clear and safe.

Rocks, dust and debris weren't the only problems at the airfields. Within a short time, the airport at Mogadishu became the busiest on the Horn

of Africa, resulting in serious overcrowding.

Colonel Dayre C. Lias, USAF, Air Force Forces

Somalia deputy director of mobility forces, noted

on 18 December that there were a "World Airways

DC-b, Kuwait DC-8 and C-5 on civilian ramp.

Military ramp saturated with civil and other

nations military aircraft." The next day, he noted

that "[Mogadishu Airport] operating close to the

limit." By early January, "the north ramp (old military ramp where several non-flyable MiGs are

located) was saturated with a variety of traffic.

Civilian, relief agency, coalition force and Marine

KC-130s are all using the ramp on a free flow

basis. We even saw two African Airlines 707s."

Colonel Lias was also very specific about the

cause of the crowding: a lack of what he called

visibility. By this he meant the air mobility element had no knowledge of, or control over, the

arrival of many of these aircraft.31°

Control and management of aircraft were longrunning problems during the operation. There

were several causes. First, there were actually two

operations (and thus two headquarters) responsible for sending aircraft into Somalia. One of these

was UNITAF. The other was the joint task force

for Operation Provide Relief, which was still

based at Mombasa. Establishing a chain-of-command and tracking authority between these two

entities were some of the first priorities Air Force
Dlta.wTNc DOWN THE FORCES 107

Forces Somalia had to establish. Provide Relief

headquarters was willing to work with UNITAF

man-to-man between the respective operations

sections (through U.S. Central Command, their

common superior) using information passed in

situation reports. This was a solution, but one that

was stifl fraught with difficulties.31'

Other internal problems existed. The operation

took place early in the joint era, when common

command and communications systems were still

being formed. As the components came into the

area of operations, each brought their own systems with them, and these were not always compatible. There were "lots of software problems,"

Colonel Lias noted. The Navy used the contingency theater automated planning system, while

the Marines relied on fragmentary orders, and the

Air Force employed the theater air mobility system, all of which sought to manage complex airground operations.312

The UNITAF method to manage and control

the airspace was through an airspace control

authority, established within the Air Forces directorate of mobility forces. Under normal circumstances, a control authority is the responsibility of

a sovereign nation, which, working with the

International Civil Aviation Organization, can

publish and distribute Notices to Airmen to help

control the air traffic within its airspace. But, as

with so much in Somalia, there were no normal

circumstances. No sovereign government existed

to work with the intemational aviation organization. Thus, the job fell by default to UNITAF.

Coalition commander Lieutenant General

Robert B. Johnston, working through his airspace

* Iii most joint operations, a joint force air component com- mander (JFACC) would be established. The commander is

normally charged with developing the air campaign plan for

the theater, basing it upon the assets available to him. In a

war or combat situation, this plan would address four important air functions: airspace management, airspace control, air

defense, and targeting. It was soon obvious the last two functions were not of significance to Operation Restore Hope.

UNITAF did require the first two, however, and so the airspace control authority was established. In the tirst few

weeks to the operation, Major General Harold W. Blot, commanding general of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, held this

position. In her study of UNITAF, Dr. Katherine A. W.

McGrady of the Center For Naval Analyses explained the

development of the authority and its functions. She also

notes the term "JFACC" was sometimes erroneously used.

Part of this confusion may have unintentionally come from

UNITAF itself, which listed Major General Blot as joint air

component commander on its early personnel rosters.

control authority staff, published a memorandum

to all "potential users of Somali airspace." It cited

a United Nations Resolution 794 provision to

"take all necessary means" to establish the secure

environment for relief operations. This was the

basis to assume the airspace control authority for

Somalia by UNITAF, "effective the 9th day of

December 1992," and continuing until further

notice. Having assumed this authority, General

Johnston enjoined "all countries ... to direct their

registered aircraft to strictly comply with all airspace control orders and applicable regulations

and conventions in place in Somalia. All aircraft

must strictly comply with established airspace

control procedures to ensure effective procedural

control. Violations of air traffic control directions

will be reported to the International Civil Aviation

Organization, the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency,

and other appropriate national agencies."313

Unfortunately, problems of airspace management and control continued. Not everyone saw the

clear logic in the commanding general's memorandum. At a meeting held in Nairobi on 7

January 1993 between representatives of UNIITAF

and civilian agencies, the timely dissemination of

Notices to Airman was identified as the main

problem. But there were greater, related issues

brought up at the meeting. The International Civil

Aviation Organization did not accept the joint task

force's authority to issue Notices to Airman, nor

did it acknowledge the task force's interpretation

of U.N. Resolution 794 that it controls Somali airspace except for military traffic, nor did it recognize task force air control orders where they conflicted with existing Notices. The civil aviation

organization and other participants at the meeting

further asked to discuss precise technical issues

such as air traffic control procedures over

Somalia, communications frequencies, changes in

Notices to Airman language, and the status of navigational aids.3t4 *

* Other participants included the International Air Transport

Association, a trade organization that serves the commercial

airline industry, and the National Geodetic Survey, a part of

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Among other missions, the National Geodetic Survey conducts aerial photographic surveys of airports in the United

States to locate the positions of obstructions and aids to air

travel. Since the survey agency does not function outside the

United States, it is likely that some of its personnel may have

attended this meeting to provide information and expertise in

these matters.
108 RESTORING HOPE IN SoLIA

DVIG DD-SD-OO-0091 7

A variable omni-range, meteorological navigational aids system using an AN/FRN-44 site survey van with an omnirange radio was set up at Mogadishu airport by the 485th

into what became the busiest airport in the Horn of Africa.

The tension created by the inflexibility of the

civilian authorities was made clear by the joint

task force's airspace control authority when it

threatened to impound civilian aircraft if they "did

not start complying with the air control orders."

On the other side, international organizations

claimed they could not issue Notices to Airman

based on the air control order language because

civilian operators could not understand them.315

In spite of the seeming impasse, both sides

agreed "that safety is now the paramount issue in

the critically congested airspace over Somalia."316

This one point of agreement and the willingness

of people to work to a common end were the

beginning of the solution.

Just one week later, on 14 January, representatives of UINIITAF, the International Civil Aviation

Organization, and other agencies met in

Mogadishu for a technical meeting. The commanding general of UNETAF was again designated as the airspace control authority "for all of the

territorial airspace of Somalia." Colonel Frederick

Engineering Installation Group to assist civilian aircraft

M. Lorenz, UNITAF's staff judge advocate,

explained the legal basis for this position under

United Nations Resolution 794 and passed out

copies of the memorandum by which General

Johnston assumed this authority. Difficulties with

the dissemination and publication of Notices to

Airman were identified, and the air control order

process was explained. The meeting reconvened

the next day and again on the 16th.317

One of the most important agreements reached

on the 15th was that the International Civil

Aviation Organization recognized that the

UINITAF commanding general served as the airspace control authority "on behalf' of the sovereign state of Somalia." The distinction was noted

as being academic, but it was sufficient to verify

the UNTTAF commanding general as the "sole

authority for airspace procedures in the

Mogadishu [flight instruction region]." Progress

that day and the next created a single airspace

control plan. UNTTAF air control orders were

reviewed, along with existing Notices and the
DltkwlNc DOWN THE FORCES 109

international organization's plans. From this

i.&jc, two Notices, controlling upper and lower

airspace, were circulated through the Kenyan

Civil Aviation Authority. All future Notices to

Airman would be distributed "on behalf of

Somalia at the request of the Commander, Unified

Task Force." A meeting was set between

UNIITAJ?'s airspace control authority representative, Major John D. Reardon, and those of commercial carriers flying out of Nairobi. The

International Civil Aviation Organization promised to provide plans for reconstructing airspace

control within the Mogadishu region and to hire a

permanent organizational representative in

Mogadishu. Finally, requirements for the transition of airspace control authority to the commanding general of United Nations Operation

Somalia H (UNOSOM II) would be forwarded by

the international aviation organization to

UNTTAE318

These matters essentially cleared up the question of control of the civil aircraft coming into

Somali airspace. The UNETAF staff continued to

work out other coordination problems. The most

significant of these were addressed by a series of

agreements made at the beginning of March with

the adjacent flight instruction regions (Nairobi,

Addis Ababa, Aden, the Seychelles, and

Bombay.) The agreements covered such coordination issues as radio frequencies, transfer of

responsibility from one region to another, and

established routes, flight levels and separation

between aircraft, and the acceptance of messages

and revisions. These agreements went into effect

on 31 March.319

Management of military aircraft coming into

the area of operations did not pose such drawn-out

problems, but it still had to be addressed. General

Johnston established his airspace control authority through the air mobility element's director of

mobility forces, Colonel Walter S. Evans, USAF.

By the end of December, as the tempo of air operations reached the maximum capacity for

Mogadishu airport, Colonel Evans worked

through the United States Transportation

Command and Central Conmiand to establish

time slot allocations for all aircraft coining into

Mogadishu, including those of coalition partners.

At the same time, he worked with the various

ground forces quartered in or near the airfield to

nvic DD-SD-OO-00889

A group of Ma/eel townspeople gather to await the deliver of wheat donated by Australia. The wheat was flown in

slung underneath a Marine GH-53 helicopter.
110 RESTORING HOPE uq SOMALIA

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00794

MajGen Steven L. Arnold, USA, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, meets with town elders, Red

Cross representatives, and other humanitarian relief works in Merka.

stop the growing number of near accidents caused

by unauthorized personnel and equipment on the

runways and taxiways.32°

With the establishment of these procedures and

organizational structures, UNITAF was able to

look forward and plan for the ultimate transfer of

air traffic services back to civil authorities. As

early as 18 January, an initial plan for the transition of airspace control authority functions was

published. Under it, the authority could stand

down on 22 January except for airspace management functions and "aviation services ... still

required by JTF Somalia Components." On that

date, Air Force Forces Somalia would be responsible for publication of a "combined flight schedule for U.S. and coalition forces" and the air

mobility element was to incorporate into it all

fixed-wing airlift schedules of the components

and coalition partners. Provision also was made

for UNETAF's operations air section to eventually

coordinate all air issues within the area of operations.321 Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, in

his position as the director of operations, assumed

the remaining airspace control authority for

Somali airspace on 1 February, delegating it to

Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Meara, USAF.322

Establishing air control and airspace management had been long, and at times it was very complex work within a thicket of military and international organizations and operational procedures.

But, as with many issues confronted by UNITAF,

the problems were eventually resolved in a spirit

of cooperation and mutual interest in the safety of

all aircrews and the success of the overall mission.

The best indicator of the success of these efforts

was that, in spite of the small and poorly equipped

state of the Mogadishu airport, it was accidentfree even while operating as the busiest airport on

the Horn of Africa.

End Game

The work performed during the third phase,

from the beginning of January to the end of

March, provided the basis for the transition that

would occur in early May. Throughout this phase,
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 111

Lieutenant General Johnston allowed his subordinate commanders great discretion. As he said in a

component commanders' meeting on 6 January:

"Every HRS [humanitarian relief sector] is different; commanders must be given broad missions.

[They] will have to weave [their] way through a

broad fabric of village elders and others. I'm

pleased with what I see; commanders on the

ground taking initiative and doing a splendid

job."323

All the coalition partners set up similar structures in the humanitarian relief sectors, ensuring a

standard method of working throughout the area

of operations: weapons control policies were in

place in every sector; civil-military operations

teams coordinated the needs of each sector's relief

organizations and reported through the main civilmilitary operations center in Mogadishu; former

police were vetted into auxiliary security forces;

councils of local elders and clan leaders were

established to place responsibility for Somali governance and security back into their own hands;

and patrols established the reach of UNITAF far

into the countryside. Where possible, coalition

soldiers provided medical care and worked with

the local populace to improve their lives by such

projects as digging wells or improving roads.

More importantly, a secure environment, which

was UNIITAF's primary mission, was in place.

This security allowed the delivery of food, medicines, and other relief supplies. The United

Nations acknowledged the important effects of

IJINIITAF's work during this period in its report on

Somalia:

The improved security conditions made it

possible for United Nations agencies and

NOOs [nongovernmental organizations] to

strengthen their staff in Somalia, and numerous new [nongovernmental organizations]

arrived. In addition to the WFPs [World

Food Program's] stepped-up food deliveries,

IJNTCEF expanded its operations, providing

medicines and staff to 16 hospitals, 62 mother-and-child health [centers] and 156 health

posts throughout Somalia by January 1993,

and together with its [nongovernmental

organization] partners, helped feed over

200,000 children a day. The World Health

Organization opened a central pharmacy in

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00785

Marines of 2d Platoon, Company C, 3d Light Armored Infantiy Battalion provide security for a convoy of United

Nations trucks carrying food from Mogadishu to Baidoa.
112 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DD-SD-OO-00845 Marines of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 15th Expeditionary Unit, board an American Trans Air L- 1011 for the flight back

to the United States.

Mogadishu. Indeed, by January 1993, food

and medical supplies were getting through to

almost all the towns of southern and central

Somalia, with immediate and dramatic

results. Although many hungry, weak people

were still staggering into feeding [centers],

most could now be saved. Deaths from starvation and disease fell sharply and, reflecting the greatly increased food supply, by

March 1993, cereal prices had fallen to a

third of their September 1992 level.324

While coalition forces were acting so successfully in the field, UNITAF command in

Mogadishu was heavily engaged in two important

activities: shaping the force to meet the changing

realities of the mission and preparing for the transition to United Nations control. By the end of

December, with the end of Phases I and II and the

start of Phase Ill, there was an opportunity to

oversee the development of the theater. The forces

spreading out through the area of operations needed attention and logistics support. There were

many things, small and great, which could be

done to make the deployment run more smoothly

or alleviate the harshness of daily life for the soldiers in the field.

Restructuring and Redeployment

Before the end of December, General Johnston

was ready to take an objective look at the force to

see how well it matched the mission in light of the

progress of the past few weeks. General Johnston

faced an interesting dilemma. With the success of

the first two phases, the continuing arrival of

capable coalition partners, and a less intense

threat than had been originally anticipated,

General Johnston had to decide if it still made

sense to bring in the major portions of two

American divisions. If not, he had to determine

what sort of force structure there should be in the

theater to ensure the accomplishment of the mission. As General Johnston later stated, it was a

good thing to have "the ability to refine your decisions that were made ... before you started; you've

got to have the flexibility of not feeling like you

can't change."325
Dxwjr'jc DowN THE FORCES 113

Even before the end of 1992, the composition

of the American forces within the coalition

changed greatly from what had originally been

anticipated. It was already clear there was no need

for a force incorporating armor and artillery. Also,

it was clear a smaller force could perform the mission. Accordingly, MarFor cancelled its scheduled

deployment of two of its subordinates; the 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 1st Tank Battalion.

Thus, the last Marine unit to arrive was the 3d

Battalion, 11th Marines, on 31 December 1992.

But this artillery battalion did not even draw its

howitzers from the maritime prepositioning force

ships. It operated instead as a provisional rifle battalion with assigned security duties in

Mogadishu.326 *

On 6 January 1993, General Johnston held a

meeting with his commanders and staff to discuss

restructuring and redeployment of forces. He stated the intent had always been to build up quickly

to provide overwhelming force, and then to draw

back. The question of how forces could be

reduced while maintaining a balanced structure

was freely discussed among the officers present.

General Zinni, the operations officer, remarked

that the force did not need any more combat units.

In the ensuing discussion, it was recognized that

with the scheduled redeployment of the 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines, in about two weeks,

MarFor would be at about brigade size. Looking

at the Army Forces Somalia units that were coming in behind the Marines at that time, it was also

recognized there could be a force composed of

one Army brigade and one brigade of Marines.

From an initial heavy brigade structure, Marfor

could reduce its size to a light brigade, which was

about the size of the present Army Forces

Somalia. Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA,

commanding general of Army Forces Somalia,

voiced his concern that UNITAF should remain

joint, both within its headquarters and in its organization. He saw the mix of a Marine Corps

brigade-sized force with light armored vehicles

would work well with an Army brigade containing aviation assets. General Johnston foresaw that

UNITAF headquarters would have to be drawn

back as well, but would have to remain fairly

robust to take advantage of national intelligence

* This was not unprecedented. In October 1983, during the

invasion of Grenada, H Battery, totli Marines, as part of the

22d Marine Amphibious Unit, did not land their howitzers

and served as an infantry company.

assets. His guidance was that the force would

draw back to the Army and Marine brigades,

which would mean reducing the current size of

MarFor and the UNITAF headquarters as well. He

also directed that MarFor should plan to attain its

light brigade size by 30 March.327

There were immediate changes at UNITAF

headquarters. General Johnston later said he knew

the headquarters was heavy to start, but that was

needed during in the early phases when planning

was critical. "But very quickly you don't need [a

large headquarters staff.] Once you get into the

HRS [humanitarian relief sectors], I don't need all

that command and control The guys on the

ground doing the sweeps, the convoys, didn't

need the headquarters anymore to plan all of these

operations, so I was anxious to download headquarters."328 A joint personnel processing center

had already been established within the operations

section by the end of December to take care of

non-unit line number movements out of theater.329

By the end of the year, personnel who could be

spared from the headquarters staff sections were

retuming home or to their former units. Out of an

initial headquarters of 1,008 personnel, 225 were

identified by the staff sections as excess and were

redeployed.330

General Johnston had to convince some officers in his chain-of-command that it was appropriate to scale back the size of UNITAF at this

time. As he said: "there has been some uneasiness

on the part of Joint Chiefs of Staff and even

CentCom [Central Command] with this drawing

down." But, as he also made clear: "It obviously

takes more forces to impose the security environment that we have created than it does to maintain

it." He saw the improving intelligence situation,

and the ability to maintain mobility and firepower

in the reconfigured force, allowed him to continue the security mission and prepare for the eventual turnover to the United Nations. He also knew,

however, that "I had to keep selling and convincing people [to] trust me. I'm the guy on the

ground and I know, talking to my commanders,

what we can draw down to and still be able to handle any kind of eventuality."33'

UNITAF Redeployment

By 8 January, the UNITAF staff had developed

a three-phase plan for the reduction of the

American forces. The first phase was to go from

15 January to 5 February 1993, with MarFor and
114 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIG DD-SO-OO-00874

A Mar/ne 5-ton cargo truck is driven up the stern ramp of the MV FyI Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004) at the port of

Mogadishu. By fate Januaiy 1993, the operation had accomplished its mission well enough to allow the command

to reduce the size of UNITAF

Army Forces Somalia each drawing back to their

heavy brigade configurations. This would leave

the Marine brigade with the 7th Marines, Marine

Aircraft Group 16, and a force service support

group. The Army brigade would be composed of

the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, Task Force

Kismayo, an aviation battalion, a military police

battalion, and a forward support battalion. Forces

from the Navy and Air Force would be reduced as

appropriate. Personnel from Operation Provide

Relief, in Mombasa, would also begin to redeploy

at this lime. Special Operations Forces would

remain at current strength. Also during this period, the Joint Task Force Support Command would

assume responsibility for the support of residual

forces. The second phase was to begin on 6

February and last two weeks, until 20 February. In

this phase, the UNITAF headquarters, Air Force,

and Navy Forces would continue reductions.

Special Operations Forces would begin reductions

as appropriate. The Support Command would also

begi.n to draw back its strength, except for engineer units since there was still a recognized need

for their continuing services. These important

assets would be consolidated in an engineer group

or the naval construction regiment, both reporting

directly to UNITAF headquarters. In the final

phase, lasting from 21 February to 5 March, the

ground forces would be reduced to MarFor or

Army Forces Somalia light brigades. The proposed Marine brigade would consist of the 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines (three rifle companies, a

weapons company, a tank platoon, a tight armored

vehicle platoon, an armored assault vehicle platoon, an engineer platoon, and a truck detachment), Marine Aircraft Group 16 (consisting of

eight CH-530 helicopters, four UN-iNs, and four

AH-lWs) and a combat service support group.

The Army brigade would comprise an infantry

battalion, an aviation battalion (consisting of 15

UH-60s, 6 OH-58s, and 4 AH-ls), a military

police battalion of two companies, and the forward support battalion. UNITAF headquarters,

Air Force Forces Somalia, Navy Forces Somalia,

Support Command, and the remaining personnel

of Operation Provide Relief would continue to
DItkwINc DOWN THE FORCES 115

reduce where possible. Some engineer units

would redeploy, but others would remain to continue necessary support.332

This plan was forwarded to Central Command

for approval on 11 January. Five days later,

General Joseph P. Hoar gave his approval to the

concept, but denied approval for the timeline.

General Hoar stipulated that units would redeploy

only at his direction and that redeployment would

be driven by events, not a time schedule.

Specifically, such events would be in one of two

categories; an American unit would be replaced

by an arriving member of the coalition, or the unit

would be no longer necessary to the operation, as

decided by the commanding general of

UNITAF.333

The MarFor staff immediately began work on

the redeployment plan. The concerns were twofold. They had to reduce the size of the force

while continuing to conduct operations, and they

had to maintain a balanced force throughout each

stage of the reduction. Major General Charles E.

Wilhelm had told General Johnston he could continue to conduct his mission with about a third of

the current number of troops.334 The MarFor plan

called for a reduction to a heavy brigade of about

4,000 Marines and sailors by 31 January and to a

light brigade of 2,000 troops by 1 March. In actuality, the dates were slipped in accord with circumstances, but the plan provided the basis for the

reductions as they occurred throughout the next

thTee months.335

The first unit to depart from Somalia was the

3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which began boarding

flights from Mogadishu airport on 19 January.

MarFor then had to reconfigure its forces, particularly the 7th Marines, to take the place of their

departing comrades.336

An important part of the retrograde was the

return of equipment to the maritime prepositioning force shipping. Two of the ships, the PFC

James Anderson, .Jr. (T-AK 3002) and the Pvt

Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), were scheduled

to return to the Blount Island rework facility.

Since these ships were to depart soon, equipment

that needed repair was loaded onto them. (Work

progressed so quickly that the reloaded Anderson

was able to sail on 7 February, easily making its

scheduled arrival date.) Also complicating the

operation was the possibility the maritime prepositioning force ships might be needed to support

another contingency. Equipment in good shape

was, therefore, loaded onto the lsttt Jack

Lummus (T-AK 3011) and the istLi Alex

Bonnyinan (T-AK 3003). Throughout these evolutions, any mission essential equipment was kept

ashore in support of the Marines still in the area of

operations.337

By the end of January, 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit also was putting its equipment

through a rigorous maintenance effort, preparing

to embark on board the amphibious shipping. This

unit had earned well-deserved laurels in its work

throughout the area of operations. At the beginning of February, these Marines, with pristine

equipment, back loaded onto their ships. They

departed the Somali coast on 3 February to continue their deployment in the Persian Gulf.338

On 19 February, UNITAF ordered MarFor to

commence a reduction to the heavy brigade level.

With the ilanning the Marines had already done,

and with the redeployments that had already

occurred, this was easily accomplished. With

most nonessential personnel already gone from

the theater, MarFor needed only to redeploy a

detachment of CH-53 helicopters 'from Marine

Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 to reach the goal

by the beginning of March.339

The first days of that month saw a continuation

of departures as residual detachments and personnel not part of the heavy brigade left Somalia. At

the same time, preparations went forward for

reduction to light brigade strength. On 9 March,

MarFor began validating these movements, and

on the 13th the realignment of its forces between

Bardera and Mogadishu began. By 17 March, the

7th Marines, with its attached coalition forces,

had returned to the capital city while Task Force

Bardera remained in the city for which it was

named. The same day, Colonel John P. Kline, Jr.,

and his staff from Marine Aircraft Group 16,

departed the theater, making Marine Light Attack

Helicopter Squadron 369 the MarFor aviation

combat element.34°

On 21 March, the staff of the light brigade took

over the watch schedules at the MarFor command

post. From that point on, in addition to their routine of normal duties within Mogadishu and

Bardera, the Marines began to plan for the gradual

assumption of their security mission by coalition

forces and for the transition of the operation to the

United Nations. The remaining staff of 7th

Marines performed operational planning, while

the residual MarFor staff worked on transition
116 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALL&

Turkish soldiers with an armored infantry fighting vehicle,

sector of Mogadishu.

planning.34' Major General Wilhelm departed

from Somalia on the 23d and Colonel Jack W.

Klimp assumed command of Marine Forces

Somalia.

The size and structure of Army Forces Somalia

were also changed. A field artillery battalion, an

aviation company of CH-47 helicopters, and some

subunits of the 7 10th Main Support Battalion left

their major equipment on board ship, or had it

back loaded.342 Not all of these decisions went

unquestioned. The retum of the CH-47s was a

source of complaint by the United States Army

Europe, which had sent them. As General

Johnston explained: "it seemed like a requirement, initially. But very quickly after we got here,

we began to say 'Do we need 47s?' Because

we've got C-130 capable airstrips where we need

them to be, why do we need CH-47s? We're not

going to go and make massive vertical

assaults."343

The Army Forces Somalia staff also had to plan

for the redeployment of their units, but their work

Photo courtesy of the Turkish Armed Forces

outfitted with a 25mm gun and machine gun, patrol their

was complicated because some Army units would

remain in Somalia to support UNOSOM II. Army

plans therefore had to account for residual organizations and establish a rotation schedule to allow

Army units to return home after four months in

theater? Army planners were thus responsible for

both the arrival and departure of units during this

phase. Reducing numbers while keeping up capabilities was accomplished through "constant mission analysis" to "continuously reassess each unit

and piece of equipment deployed."344

The first Army units to rotate home were a mix

of organizations from both Army Forces Somalia

and the Support Command, units that had either

completed their assigned missions or had been

replaced by coalition forces. These included two

* The Army's four-month rotation was a self-imposed

requirement to facilitate transition planning and to provide

an orderly flow of units in and out of theater. Under UNOSOM II, Army units and personnel served tours of six

months to one year.
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 117

Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

Three armed Moroccan soldiers prepare to set up a defensive position on the grounds of the abandoned Somali

National University in Mogadishu.

signal battalion mobile subscriber equipment

companies; the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation; the

710th Main Support Battalion; and selected Army

Forces Somalia staff. Later redeployments included Task Force Kismayo; the 3d Battalion, 14th

Infantry; the 41st Engineer Battalion; and the

511th Military Police Company.

Under the four-month time limit in theater, the

first rotation of units would begin in April. On 20

February, Army Forces Somalia requested that

U.S. Army Central Command identify the organization that would pick up responsibility for the

Army's mission in Somalia. On 28 February, a

reconnaissance party for the 1st (Warrior)

Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, arrived in

Mogadishu. The brigade advance party arrived on

30 March.345 Major General Arnold, the commanding general of Army Forces Somalia, had

returned to the United States on 13 March. A transition cell, under the assistant division commander for support, Brigadier General Greg L. Gile,

USA, was formed to ease the rotation. This cell

continued to work in Somalia until the middle of

April. During that time several other Army units

arrived, including the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry;

the 3d Assault Helicopter Battalion; the 10th

Forward Support Battalion; and the 4th Platoon,

300th Military Police Company. As these units

came into the area of operations, they transferred

property from their departing counterparts. On 9

April, the "Warrior Brigade" took full responsibility for all Army Forces operations in Somalia, for

the theater's quick reaction force, and for the

Merka relief sector.346

Coalition Shifts

The largest coalition forces assumed responsibility for all humanitarian relief sectors, but smaller forces sent by many nations also were put to

effective use. These units were often only compa-
118 RESTORING HOPE IN SotkLIA

ny sized, but in the aggregate they formed a considerable addition to UNITAF capabilities.

Many of these coalition units were placed

under the operational control of MarFor. These

units were from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,

Botswana, Zimbabwe, Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan,

and the United Arab Emirates.347 After working

with their Marine counterparts at first, they were

later given their own areas of responsibility. These

areas were generally within the city of

Mogadishu, and often were at some key point or

in the vicinity of the airport, which was where

most of them had their bivouacs. The Tunisian

forces worked directly with the Support

Command at the university compound that

adjoined the grounds of the American Embassy.

Toward the end of the operation, with the

departure of MarFor and portions of Army Forces

Somalia, these small units were given greater

security duties. Situation reports for the last weeks

of April and the first days of May show these units

at work throughout the city. To illustrate the scope

of their activities, the report for 1 May notes that

Turkish forces, which had previously been conducting security patrols in the vicinity of the parliament building and presidential palace, were

then providing security for the embassy compound. Tunisian forces were providing security at

the American University complex. Saudi forces

conducted night patrols and manned security positions at the airfield. Zimbabwe forces manned two

strongpoints, conducted patrols in the northwest

part of the city, and established ran- dom checkpoints. Pakistani forces (by that time composed of

four battalions) conducted motorized security

patrols in the northwest part of the city and

manned numerous checkpoints. They were

responsible for security at the pump site located

nine kilometers north of Mogadishu, and also conducted patrols in Afgooye and Merka. Egyptian

forces conducted patrols and provided security at

the airport. Kuwaiti forces conducted mounted

and dismounted patrols and provided security for

the ammunition supply point. The Botswana

forces conducted security operations in the

Bardera relief sectot Nigerian forces manned the

strongpoint at the K-4 traffic circle in central

Mogadishu and conducted patrols. They also

manned strongpoints in the northern part of the

city and worked with the Somali auxiliary security force in the vicinity of the presidential palace.

By this time, United Arab Emirate forces were

under the operational control of the Italian forces

and conducted security patrols at the New Port

and in the Villagio Bur Carole and Hamar Jab Jab

areas of the city. The Greek force, a company of

110 soldiers, arrived in early March and were

placed under the operational control of the French

forces at the Oddur relief sector to provide medical support from their base in Wajid.348

In this manner, all of the elements of the coalition helped maintain the secure environment,

which was the mission of UNITAE Those members of the coalition who were staying in Somalia

also were aligned within the humanitarian relief

sectors for their roles in UNOSOM II.

*

It should be noted that many of these coalition members

were from African or Muslim countries. Many of these contributions were made from a feeling of support for their religious or ethnic brethren in Somalia. For some it was viewed

as a distinct obligation and the United Arab Emirates contingent used that very name for their unit. As Colonel Major

Omar Ess-Akalli, the commander of the Royal Moroccan

forces told the author, Somalia was an African problem and

it was only right that Africans should be taking part in assisting in the solution.
Chapter 8

Normality Begins to Return

Logistics

For the first few weeks of the operation, the 1st

Force Service Support Group from I Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MEF) provided outstanding support to the Unified Task Force Somalia

(UNITAF) as a part of Marine Forces Somalia

(MarFor).349 However, by early January, the

group's ability to continue its prodigious effort

was under a severe strain due to two developments.

The first was the growing size of UNITAF

itself. By the middle of January, American forces

and coalition partners were approaching a total of

30,000 soldiers. Since most of the supplies they

needed were coming from maritime prepositioning force ships, of which four had been unloaded,

that figure was about 10,000 men more than what

would normally be supported from these

sources.350 A related complicating factor was the

distance that separated some parts of the coalition.

Transportation assets, such as trucks, fuel tankers,

and water trailers (commonly referred to as

"water buffaloes") were critical for the continued

success of the operation. Those available were

being run hard on lengthy and rugged roundtrips

to outlying sectors.

The other factor in the group's ability to continue to support UNITAF was inherent in its very

nature as an integral component of a Marine expeditionary force. When MarFor returned to the

United States, the support group would have to go

back as well. As Lieutenant General Robert B.

Johnston explained: "When you retrograde the

[Marine Expeditionary] Force, you retrograde the

FSSG [Force Service Support Group], because we

were part of I MEF, a package."351

These difficulties had been foreseen. The

planned answer was in the creation of UNTTAF's

one functional subordinate command, the Support

Command.' Relying on the significant combat

* The full name of this organization was the Joint Task Force

Support Command, but it was sometimes referred to as the

Joint Logistics Command.

service support assets available to the Army, this

command was organized around four specialized

groups: the 36th Engineer Group; the 62d Medical

Group; the 593d Support Group (Area); and the

7th Transportation Group.' In addition to the

organic units belonging to these groups, the

Support Command also had the 2d Chemical

Battalion, the 720th Military Police Battalion, the

240th Quartermaster Battalion, and a special signal task force. This command also included personnel and postal companies, ordnance detachments, public affairs teams, and an air traffic control team.

When fully assembled in the theater, the

Support Command could provide exceptional

support and strength to UINITAE The difficulty

was in the amount of time it would take to bring

all of these soldiers and their equipment to

Somalia; plans called for the Support Command

to become fully operational on 28 January 1993.

Until that time, UN1TAF was dependent on the

capabilities of MarFor's service support group

and the maritime prepositioning force. Although

stretched by great demands, these units were "performing their support well and exceeding expectations."352 However, before the command was

fully operational, it was necessary to task some

service support assets from Army Forces Somalia

to assist UNITAF. Selected 10th Mountain

Division units were consolidated to perform such

critical logistics functions as water production and

petroleum distribution.353 This support lasted

* These units and the support systems they used were reflective of the Army's structure and its need to provide support

to corps and army levels ("echelons above division").

Normally, a deploying Army division would be provided

with a slice of the corps' support elements and the division

would have its own structures to coordinate and work with

these higher levels. In Operation Restore Hope, however, the

entire 10th Mountain Division did not deploy, and the 1st

Marine Division did not have the same structures in place to

work with the Support Command, as did their Army comrades. The Support Command also was responsible for providing some support to the coalition partners. The command

had to adjust their traditional methods of doing business to

meet the demands of the theater and of the UNITAF structure.
waits to unload at Mogadishu airport. The aircraft was

Services Corporation, a U.S. Government contractor.

from about the middle of January until the end of

the month.

The Support Command's units began to arrive

in theater in late December, along with the commanding general, Brigadier General Billy K.

Solomon, USA. Although his command was not

expected to assume the entire theater logistics

support mission until late that month, individual

units assumed responsibility for their portion prior

to that date. For instance, on 15 January, the 7th

Transportation Group took responsibility for port

operations from Navy Forces Somalia and

MarFor.354 By 28 January, when the Support

Command assumed its total support mission,

responsibility for medical support, some food

supply (class I), water, and petroleum, oil, and

lubricant (class III) supply operations were

already performed by command units. Support

Command and MarFor ran in-theater movement

control jointly.355

Even as the elements of the Support Command

were deploying into theater and just starting to

chartered to carry a load of supplies for Brown and Root

take up their duties, its staff looked to the future.

The command was to have another, longer lasting

mission than its support of UNITAF. It would

become the main United States contribution for

United Nations Organization Somalia LI (JJNOSOM II). As General Johnston explained in

March: "When you talk about the Joint Logistics

Command, we always saw ... our U.S. role in this

thing as long term. Yes, we had a mission, but I

don't think anybody ever believed that we would

draw every American out of here: that we would

have something for UNOSOM II and really

thought it would be in the form of logistics, strategic lift, which is why we formed the Joint

Logistics Command that would come in to replace

the [Force Service Support Group]."356

On 28 January, the Support Command completed its transition of responsibilities and fully

assumed the burden of combat service support in

the entire area of operations.3" By that time, the

command had established its headquarters in the

American University compound, which adjoined

the American Embassy grounds. Tunisian soldiers

120 REsT0IUNG HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC OO-SO-OO-00879

A Russian Antonov AN- 124 Condor long-range heavy transport from the Aviation Industrial Complex, Ulyanovsk,
NoItt1ALIn BEGINS TO RETURN 121

provided the security for the compound and the

command's headquarters.*

The most important function the command

would provide was transportation, the nerve center for which was in Mogadishu. "Because most

of the force equipment and nearly all of the supplies had to flow through the Port of Mogadishu,

the port operations became the logistics center of

gravity. The design of the echelons above division] port support structure was critical to sustainment operations."358 Although the port's size and

limited berthing space caused competition

between arriving humanitarian cargo ships and

military prepositioned afloat stocks, the 7th

Transportation Group was able to establish an

effective command and control system for the terminal operations. The group not only operated the

port, it also controlled the inland distribution of

the supplies.359

The 593d Area Support Group was prominent

in establishing the logistics distribution structure.

Once again, the long distances covered by

UNTTAF were a determining factor. The area support group was specifically strengthened with

additional trucks, and those of the 7th

Transportation Group were also available for missions. To ensure supplies reached their intended

users quickly and efficiently, the support group

established a series of intermediate theater support bases. These bases complemented each of the

American Army and Marine divisions' own support facilities. This made the distribution of supplies easier since security operations in the sectors

were also conducted out of these fixed locations.

In addition, the system kept down the requirement

for additional combat troops because the logistidians could rely upon security from the combat

units in these outlying sectors. In this manner, the

Support Command was able to provide direct

supply maintenance support to the Army's nondivisional units and backup support to both the

Army and Marine divisional units, as well as provide common item supply support and services to

the units of the coalition partners.36°

In the austere Somali environment, the ability

to contract for goods and services was important

for provisioning complete logistics support. The

* The Support Command Site Security Force was originally

a Moroccan company (-), assigned to this duty on 4 January

1993. The Tunisians assumed the mission a few days later.

center of such activity for UNITAF was the task

force director of acquisitions. Under the original

joint task force plan, MarFor contracting elements

were located in Kenya, from where they provided

goods services to their brethren in Somalia. Army

Forces Somalia contractors were established in

Somalia itself As necessary, requirements could

also be forwarded to contracting elements in the

Middle East or in Europe.36'

Army contracting officers operated under a

double handicap. The Somali economy could only

be described as sparse since there was little to be

gotten from local sources. There were also structural difficulties for them to work around. Army

Forces Somalia had deployed its own field-ordering officers early in the operation, and these soldiers were able to make small purchases of sentices and supplies for their units. The U.S. Army

component of Central Command imposed stringent restrictions on its subordinates in Somalia,

most notably for the contract of labor services. A

waiver to these restrictions had been requested,

but was denied until the Army Central Command

contracting officer could confirm the needs.

Unfortunately, this officer had not yet arrived in

the theater. Army Forces Somalia's judge advocate reviewed the situation and determined the

ordering officers could make the necessary procurements. Eventually, in coordination with Army

Central Command, an acquisition officer was

warranted as a contracting officer and deployed to

the theater. This officer had the authority to make

purchases up to $lOO,000.362

Another contracting system, tried for the first

time during an active campaign in Somalia, was

the logistics civil augmentation program. The program contract with the civilian firm of Brown and

Root was started in 1992 through the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers. These civilians, working

under contract, arrived in Somalia to perform

logistics tasks that otherwise would have fallen to

the soldiers and Marines themselves. For instance,

they provided laundry services by hiring local

Somali women to do the job. They dug wells and

operated cranes and worked at the port. They generated power for the camps and they provided and

cleaned portable toilets. Overall, the program was

regarded as a major help to the operation,

although that help was expensive.363 Of a total of

$33 million originally appropriated for the contract, $7.5 million remained by 5 March, with $5

million of that fenced against the contractor's

demobilization and draw down costs. More
122 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

OVIC DD-SD-OO-00778

A tank truck is filled with fresh water from a desalinization plant for distribution inland. The U.S. Air Force's 823d

Civil Engineering Squadron, a/so known as Red Horse, set up the plant at Mogadishu airport.

money had to be requisitioned to keep these

important services functioning.36"

If transportation was a key logistics function,

the most critical commodity supplied to the troops

was water. Drinking water alone was rated at four

to five liters per man per day. Water also was necessary for basic hygiene and cleaning clothing.

There were no sources of safe, potable water in

Somalia when UNITAF arrived, so the coalition

had to take extraordinary measures to provide the

precious liquid.

At first, ships in the port manufactured potable

water. This was pumped ashore for transportation

to the soldiers and Marines in the field. The

importance of this source can be gauged from the

statistics in the situation reports of the maritime

prepositioning force. On 15 January, for instance,

the prepositioning ship MV .lstLt Jack Luminus

(T-AK 3011) pumped 13.5 thousand gallons of

water ashore. By that date, the prepositioning

* Brown and Root operated these logistics civil augmentation support programs successfully in Haiti, Rwanda, and

Bosnia.

force had delivered a total of 845.5 thousand gallons of water to the collection points.365

In those early days, when 1st Force Service

Support Group was providing the logistics support, every means available was used to carry the

water. For the 7th Marines' movement to Baidoa,

water trailers were used and supplemented by

five-gallon "jerry" cans filled with water anJ

placed "in every nook and cranny of every vehicle." This allowed the Marines to carry 8,100 gallons on that initial trip. By the end of December,

regular convoys were set for every other day,

bringing 14,000 gaUons of water to Baidoa and

Bardera on each run.366 But this effort, coupled

with the need to resupply Bale Dogle, "stretched

to the limit MarFor's ability to make and distribute water." Fortunately, Army Forces Somalia

was arriving with its bulk liquid assets by that

time. As these units became operational, they provided relief to the burdens of the Marines.367

Another important source of water was in the

ground of Somalia. The native population had

long centered some of their towns on deep wells.

Army engineers and Navy construction battalions
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETu1m 123

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00777

A water truck fills a large bladder, part of a tactical water distribution system. The 823d Red Horse Squadron set up

the system and accompanying shower facility at Mogadishu airport.

had the equipment to dig new wells or improve

those that already existed. The well water still had

to be treated before it was deemed potable, or

even usable for washing. To achieve this, reverse

osmosis water purification units were put into

operation. These specialized units used a series of

membranes, filters, and chemicals to purify the

water. They could produce potable water from

fresh sources, brackish groundwater, or seawater.

The purified water was then stored in large inflatable bladders from which it could be pumped as

needed. By setting these units up in outlying areas

with wells, additional water was provided to the

local troops.'

* There was similar work to improve the lot of the Somali

people as well. For instance, members of the 593d Area Support Group repaired 18 of 20 wells serving Afgooye, and

then improved the reservoir system of the city of Mogadishu.

The level of the reservoir was raised from eight inches to

more than two meters, increasing the total volume of available water from 100,000 gallons to more than 3 million gallons. For the first time in two years, the people of Mogadishu

had running water. (593d Area Support Group, FY93 Annual

Historical Review, Fort Lewis: Washington, Dec93, p. 2.)

Commercial bottled water provided another

source of drinking water. Veterans of Desert

Storm were familiar with the clear plastic liter

bottles containing pure water that could be easily

distributed to the troops with their rations.

Palletized loads were unloaded from ships directly onto trucks for transport throughout the theater.* Troops still carried canteens, but they were

commonly seen with bottles of water sticking out

of cargo pockets or next to them in vehicles.

The increase in water production and distribution had one other benefit for the soldiers and

Marines on the ground. By early January 1993,

bath units arrived in the theater and set up mobile

shower units. Even in the midst of the hottest day

coalition troops could look forward to a few minutes of refreshing cool showering in the evening.

To match the clean bodies, the contracts for laundry services provided clean clothing and saved the

* There was nne notable incident in which a cargo ship could

not be unloaded properly and a human chain of Marines was

used to pass bottles of water one at a time.
124 RESTORING Ho€ IN SOMALIA

OVIC DO-SD-OO-00779 A KC- 130 Hercules aircraft from Marine Aerial Transport Re fueler Squadron 352 homebased at El Toro, California,

delivers needed fuel through expeditionary distribution system at Kismayo airfield.

troops the burden of washing their uniforms by

hand.'

As water was necessary to the health of the

coalition soldiers, so fuel was necessary to run

their machines and vehicles. Like water, petroleum had been identified very early in the planning

process as a critical class of supply. An offshore

petroleum distribution system allowed this commodity to be brought to the theater by ships,

which did not have to use precious berthing space

at the port. The ships could stand offshore and

pump the fuel to a storage and distribution

point.368 By the middle of January, maritime

prepositioning force ships had pumped ashore a

total of 470,300 gallons of JP-5 (jet fuel) and

517,000 gallons of MoGas (a motor gasoline fuel

that can be used in some aircraft).369

* This chore, when performed by the troops, was not only

drudgery, it was often futile. In the early days of the operation there was not enough water to get clothing really clean

or to rinse it out properly. Leaving the damp utilities hanging

from the lines of a tent or the branches of a tree then exposed

them to the fine blowing sand, which made them stiff, gritty,

and uncomfortable.

Fuel was often delivered to outlying sectors by

air. Early in the operation, Marine Corps and Air

Force C-i 30 aircraft were used to make daily

flights to deliver fuel and other cargo. But as the

Support Command became fully operational, the

need for air delivery declined dramatically.37°

The Support Command's 593d Area Support

Group brought ample fuel transport vehicles for

the task of bulk petroleum distribution. The real

problem encountered was a shortage of trained

drivers in some of the units. Army Forces Somalia

remedied this by providing assistant drivers for

these line-haul operations.37'

Medical Care and Health Issues

Living in Somalia presented several serious

threats to the health of the coalition soldiers, and

UNITAF had to be prepared to deal with them all.

As with nearly every other logistics function,

there were two levels of support organizations at

work: the first provided the initial medical infrastructure and the second, within the Support

Command, was meant to be the long-term solution. At first, each of the American components
NORMALITY BEGiNS TO RETURN 125

had its own medical units providing first-line support. These worked under the overall guidance of

the UNITAF surgeon, Captain Michael L. Cowan,

USN. In addition, many of the larger coalition

forces had their own internal medical organizations.

After the possibility of wounds, the greatest

threat to the well being of coalition soldiers came

from the very country itself. The hot and arid climate of Somalia posed a serious threat to

UNITAF personnel. The thtensity of the sun during the daytime and any physical exertion drained

troops of fluids and electrolytes. The greatest

safeguard against dehydration and heat casualties

was a program of awareness. Leadership at all

levels was necessary to ensure preventive measures were carried out. The first of these was the

replenishment of water. But having water available could do no good if it was not consumed in

the proper amounts. Leaders, especially on the

small unit level, had to be aware of the condition

of their troops, constantly watching for signs of

heat stress. An advisory issued to UNITAF soldiers stressed that they should work on the "weak

link" principle; that when one soldier succumbed

to heat injuries or showed symptoms, the others

would not be far behind. Regulating work periods,

resting, staying in the shade when possible, and

forcing liquids were all recommended measures

to prevent heat casualties.

Another environmental threat came from the

creatures and organisms that lived there. Some of

these were obvious; venomous snakes, spiders,

and scorpions could inflict painful and dangerous

bites. Other threats were not so easily noticed.

Mosquitoes carried malaria, dengue fever, yellow

fever, and other diseases. The bites of sand fleas

could cause fevers and sores. Ticks carried hemorrhagic fever, typhus, and relapsing fever. Fleas

were vectors for typhus, plague, and relapsing

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00821

Lt Patrick Cosmajkl of the 11.5. Navy's Environmental and Preventative Medicine Unit, Naples, Italy, examines a

slide under the microscope for confirmation of a suspected Malaria case in the 1st Medical Battalion Reid Hospital

in Mogadishu.
126 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-S0-OO-00823

HM3 Anthony Pacino, USN, records a patient's vital signs in a ward of the 1st Medical Battalion Reid HospitaL The

use of mosquito nets was required because of the prevalence of malaria.

fever. Mere contact with the ground or water

could make a soldier prey to parasites and diseases. Hookworms lived in the soil, as did mudworms and whipworms that could be ingested if a

soldier did not wash his hands before eating.

Tetanus from puncture wounds was the real menace. The worms carrying snail fever could enter a

body from exposure to the water of streams,

rivers, or ponds. Mud fever came from contact

with water or mud contaminated with infected

animal urine. Prevention for all of these included

such simple practices as avoiding areas where

snakes, spiders, or scorpions might be lying.

Clothing and boots were shaken out before putting them on and all personnel were warned to

avoid sleeping on the ground (all American personne.l were issued cots) or walking barefoot.

Keeping trousers bloused and sleeves rolled down

helped avoid contact with insects, and repellants

containing DEET (N,N-diethyl-meta-toluamide)

were issued. All personnel had mosquito nets foT

their cots. If soldiers or Marines had to enter bodies of water, they were warned to keep their

trousers bloused and to cover as much of their

bodies as possible.372

Vaccines were available for the prevention of

many diseases, and troops were inoculated before

deploying. Required immunizations were immune

serum globulin, tetanus-diphtheria, oral po1 10,

influenza, typhoid, yellow fever, meningococcal,

and measles. For malaria, the prophylactic mefloquine was given to the troops on a weekly basis.373

Captain Cowan recognized the challenge he

faced in guarding the task force's health as its senior surgeon. The time-phased force deployment

caused shortages of mosquito nets and insect

spray, which had to be made up quickly. Apprising

General Johnston of the situation, Captain Cowan

received the support he needed to get these items

to the troops.374 He also began a campaign to educate the soldiers and Marines about the benefits of

so simple an act as washing one's hands frequently. Lister bags and bars of soap were placed where

they were most needed, outside of latrines and

near the entrances to mess facilities.

To combat the spread of disease, Captain

Cowan had three epidemiological units assigned

to him. These units had a sophisticated serology,

parasitology, and bacteriology laboratory. They

were responsible for monitoring the health of the

personnel of units in the field and going out to any

battalion aid station on the first sign of an epidemic to stop it before it could take hold. These
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 127

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00835

Ma] Er/c Edwards, USA, head nurse of Intensive Care Unit 1, 86th Combat Support Hospital, tends a wounded

Somali who had been caught in a crossfire during a gunfight on a Mogadishu street His left leg was severely

wounded and eventually requfred amputation.

medical specialists identified areas from which

diseases were spreading, enlisted local command

emphasis for the preventive medicine programs,

and stopped the incidents. An outbreak of dysentery was stopped in Mogadishu. In Bardera,

occurrences of malaria and dengue were swiftly

brought under control. Infected soldiers were

brought from the outlying areas back to

Mogadishu for proper treatment, and in most

cases returned to duty in four days.375

Medical evacuation was another health concern. Again, the distances in the theater were a

factor. Specific helicopters were assigned to aerial medical evacuation and were required to be

* A Center for Disease Control study indicated the effectiveness of the preventive medicine programs. Of the thousands

of American personnel in Somalia during the time of

UNITAF, there were only 131 incidents of malaria, of which

83 appeared after the troops had returned home. (Center for

Disease Control, "Malaria Among U.S. Military Personnel

Returning From Somalia, 1993," CDC MMWR Weekly,

16Jul93, pp. 524-526.)

able to transport any casualty to Mogadishu within two hours. To answer this need, MarFor helicopters from the amphibious assault ship USS

Tripoli (LPH 10) were placed forward in such

areas as Bardera, and they never missed the time

limit for a critical medical evacuation. A casualty

clearing company in Mogadishu was ready to stabilize patients and then forward them on. In the

early days of the operation, this meant going to

the Tripoli, which was the only medical backup

available in the theater. The combination of the

pervasive dust and the old style tents caused problems for the sterility of the clearing company's

modern and sophisticated equipment. As Captain

Cowan said: "This great new state-of-the-art

[equipment] is in 19th century tents, full of dust.

[The corpsmen] did a good job, but ... this [kind of

structure] is def'mitely wrong, not for this climate,

not for the desert."376

The answer to many of the captain's concerns

was within the Support Command. The initial

planning for medical support was based on the

expectation of large numbers of casualties. This in
128 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

turn dictated the structure of the medical unit, the

62d Medical Group. In addition to an evacuation

hospital, there were the three medical companies

(one each for ambulance, air ambulance, and

clearing), two sanitation detachments, an epidemiology detachment, an entomology detachment, two veterinary detachments, a dental

detachment, and one for combat stress control.

The group even contained its own medical logistics battalion. The mission of this large unit was to

provide "comprehensive care to all U.S. forces

involved in the security and humanitarian mission

and to provide limited support to other coalition

forces in the theater (i.e., on an emergency-only

basis)."377

One of the 62d Group's first challenges was

receiving its planned hospital equipment. The

Army barge-carrier vessel Green Valley (TAK

2049), which carried the 86th Evacuation

Hospital's gear, had too deep a draft for the port of

Mogadishu. Not could the ship offload at

Mombasa because its length was too great for

the docks there. So the 86th Hospital had to wait

for its equipment to be brought in by air. This

required adjustments to the time-phased deployment that interrupted the scheduled airflow, but

the operations section's movements unit worked

wonders in getting the equipment into the theater.

The hospital was up and running by 6 January

1993. The hospital consisted of four operating

rooms and more than 100 beds for patients, including an intensive care unit with 12 beds. With

the establishment of the Army hospital, the Navy

casualty clearing company was able to depart. The

62d Medical Group picked up all UNITAF medical responsibilities by 28 January.378

The number of American troops supported by

the 62d Medical Group reached a peak by midJanuary, then declined through the transition to

the United Nations at the beginning of May. The

number of combat casualties was not nearly as

great as initially planned for. So the group, like

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00858

Hospital Corpsman James Brown, USN, applies topical ointment to the arms of a Somali infant as part of the medical civic action program conducted in the streets of Mogadishu by medical personnel from MEU Service Support

Group 15.
NORMALrIY BEGINS TO REnJ 129

DVIC DD-SD-00-00697

U.S. Air Force 1st Mobile Aeromedical Staging Flight personnel cariy a patient from a Marine CH-46 Sea Knight he!-

icopter at Mogadishu airport.

other units, was able to scale back its personnel

and organization for the follow-on medical units

that arrived in early May. The surplus capability

meant the medical staff was able to provide some

services for Somalis, although this was not part of

their mission. It was always expected, however,

that the American medics would treat any Somalis

injured by American forces. Doing so had the

additional benefit of maintaining skills. There also

was a humanitarian aspect, the desire to treat an

injured fellow human being. But there was a twofold problem in providing treatment to these

Somali civilians. First, they were taking up beds,

facilities, and medical stocks that might be needed should there be a sudden surge of American

casualties.379 Second, there was the ethical dilemma of how to provide care that exceeded that

which would normally be found within the country at large. As Captain Cowan noted, "we can't

be the medical facility of Somalia." An answer lay

in assisting local doctors and care providers, and

in the use of the facilities of the hospitals provided by some of the coalition partners, such as the

Swedes and the Moroccans.

Even with American casualties lighter than

expected, the 62d Medical Group had to maintain

certain capabilities as it reduced the size of its

force. An air ambulance was retained to continue

accommodating the long distances, and since adequate fixed medical facilities would not be available in the country, the evacuation hospital also

remained. The continuing threat of disease dictated keeping a large preventive medicine capability.380 By early May, the 86th Evacuation Hospital

was replaced by the 42d Field Hospital, a smaller

facility with only 32 beds. In its time of support to

1.JNITAF, the 86th provided service to a large

number of the force's soldiers and Marines: there

were 4,914 outpatient cases with 971 Americans

admitted for treatment.381

Air evacuation was one of the most important

parts of medical planning. Original estimates

were for 200 patients per week showing up at the

battalion aid stations per 1,000 soldiers. The vast

majority of this estimate was expected to be for

disease and non-battle injuries, with a smaller portion for combat injuries; but preparations still had

to be made for the movement of these persons

within and out of the area of operations. The U.S.

Air Force's lstAeromedical Evacuation Squadron

was tasked to develop the evacuation system for

patients to third and fourth echelon medical facilities. Two aerial evacuation crews supplemented

the squadron, one each from the 183d and 156th

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadrons. The 1st

Aeromedical Squadron was located with the Air
130 RESTORING MOPE IN SOMALIA

Force's air mobility element and was composed of

an aeromedical evacuation coordination center, a

mobile aeromedical staging facility, and the

aeromedical evacuation liaison team. By 19

December, all aeromedical evacuation personnel

had arrived in Mogadishu. A separate aeromedical

evacuation operations team and six evacuation

crews deployed to Cairo West Airport, Egypt, to

support transiting evacuation missions.382

Since the battalion aid stations in the humanitarian relief sectors had only limited medical

capabilities, the evacuation plan was set for

patients to be moved to the larger and betterequipped facilities in Mogadishu and Mombasa,

Kenya. At first casualties were taken to the

Tripoli. Later, as the Army's 86th Evacuation

Hospital became operational, patients stayed at

that facility in Mogadishu or the one in Mombasa.

Evacuation aerial ports of embarkation were

established in the theater at Kismayo, Bardera,

Gialalassi, Oddur, Belet Weyne, and Baidoa. The

aerial ports of debarkation for these flights were

in Mogadishu and Mombasa. Serious cases needing even higher levels of treatment were sent out

of theater. Embarkation ports for these evacuation

missions were established at Mogadishu,

Mombasa, Djibouti, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The debarkation ports for these movements were

at Cairo West, Egypt, and Ramstein and Rhine

Main air bases in Germany. In some rare

instances, casualties were flown directly from

Somalia to Germany on board strategic airlift

using aerial refueling support)83

For the first 90 days of the operation, the

squadron moved a total of 304 casualties. Of

these, 38 were sent out of theater. By 10 March,

the size of the aerornedical evacuation system was

reevaluated in consideration of the actual needs of

the operation. On 19 March, all remaining 1st

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron personnel

redeployed and the evacuation mission was turned

over to U.S. Air Force Reserve component personnel. The reserve airmen were stationed in

Cairo West, and rotated into Somalia as

required.384

Engineering

UNITAF was provided numerous engineering

assets and capabilities. Some coalition members

brought their own engineer units, often specifically sent to clear mines and undertake local work

projects. In addition, each of the U.S. Armed

Services had internal engineer units.

Photo courtesy ot the author

A merchant ship carrying vital relief cargo arrives at the port of kismayo shortly after coalition forces reopened that

port.
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 131

The task force's engineer staff consisted of 34

individuals from all Services. Under the leadership of Colonel Robert B. Flowers, USA, the task

force engineer, they were divided into two sections. The facilities section was responsible for

real estate management and all related functions,

such as the location of the tent cities and bases,

hazardous waste storage, and coordination of

vehicle parks and wash down sites. This section

also managed critical engineer supplies such as

dust palliatives, plywood sheets, lumber, electrical, and concertina wire. The operations section

oversaw the work of the various engineer units of

the components, ensuring it all fit within the task

force's requirements. The UNITAF engineers'

mission was to "protect U.S. and allied troops;

repair and maintain needed sea and air ports, other

logistics facilities, roads and bridges, and command and control facilities; and construct bases to

support coalition forces."385

The first engineering task was

repair the theater infrastructure.

fields were given top priority. In

to improve and

Ports and airMogadishu, the
132 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

engineers cleared the port's docks and warehouses. They also acquired additional adjacent space

and more warehouses to increase the port's capacity. In Kismayo, engineer divers removed sunken

hulks and prepared the port to receive shallowdraft vessels. As the area of operations expanded,

repairs and maintenance were performed at each

of the. airfields.

As soon as the initial objectives were secured,

Marine engineer assets were quickly put to work

at Mogadishu port and the airfield. As the operation moved inland, and as the coalition grew in

numbers, these Marines brought their skills to

new sectors. Soon they were helping build a better quality of life for their comrades in the field.

They repaired roads and constructed base camps,

tent areas, heads, and mess facilities. Marine

Corps explosive ordnance disposal personnel also

destroyed confiscated ordnance and rounds and

mines discovered in the field.386

The Navy supplied two mobile construction

battalions to the engineer effort. These "Seabee"

units were a part of the 30th Naval Construction

Regiment. The first of the Seabees, a nine-man

advance party, arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December and were immediately put to use repairing

the runway lights at the Mogadishu airfield.387

The construction battalions' main mission was

to provide "vertical construction support" to the

United States forces and coalition partners. This

translated to working on base camps in the relief

sectors, to include building tent areas with wooden decks and siding, latrines, showers, and mess

facilities. Like the Marines, the Seabees worked

on the main supply routes, grading shoulders to

widen the roads and making repairs to bridges.

They also drilled wells and installed a new water

pump for a refugee camp on the banks of the

Jubba River near Bardera. They joined their

Marine counterparts in the Clean Street operations

in Mogadishu and prepared the site for the Army

evacuation hospital.388

Both mobile construction battalions were heavily involved in the repair and maintenance of the

airfields in the theater. Relief flights by C-130 aircraft into Baidoa caused that airstrip to deteriorate

early in the operation. Repairs involved removing

300,000 square feet of the runway's asphalt surface and pulverizing it. This material was then

mixed with Portland cement and poured, graded,

and compacted to make a new surface. The

Seabees then put down 600,000 square feet of

AM2 interconnecting aluminum landing mat panels for aircraft tumarounds, parking aprons, and

helipads. Similar work, but on a lesser scale, was

done at the airfields at Bale Dogle and Bardera. At

the former site, the Seabees worked alongside

Marines of Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 to

build landing and staging areas for CH-53 helicopters and taxiways and turnaround areas for C130 aircraft.389

The Air Force also had specialized engineers

for airfield repair. These airmen belonged to an

organization called "Red Horse," an acronym for

rapid engineer deployable heavy operational

repair squadron engineer. Like the Navy Seabees,

these engineer specialists provided assistance in

base camp construction. But their larger, and more

important, mission was to "perform heavy damage repair" to facilities and utilities in an expeditionary environment. The austere setting and

degraded infrastructure in Somalia made these

airmen key players in the operation.39° *

They went to work early. On 10 December, a

team was testing the airfield at Bale Dogle for

serviceability for C-14l aircraft. With an Air

Force combat control team on hand and Special

Forces soldiers for protection at the remote location, the Red Horse team used a specialized piece

of equipment to check the runway surface. This

was a large, weighted rod that could be dropped

from a set height. The weight was dropped on the

runway surface and the depth of its penetration

was measured.39' Of the 10,500-foot runway, the

first 4,500 feet were determined unserviceable

and repairs were quickly begun.

The Army's 36th Engineer Group was responsible for one of the operation's most important

construction projects. This was the repair of the

main supply network and the construction of what

became known as the "Somali Road."

The task force staff recognized that improvement of the road system would provide multiple

benefits for the entire operation. First, it would

enhance security by connecting all the humanitarian relief sectors and reducing the travel time

* Red Horse teams moved into each of the relief sectors as

they were opened, often accompanying the troops. The

author watched one such team operating the morning after

the Italians secured Gialalassi airfield. When it was determined the dirt runway was not sturdy enough to take the

wear of heavy aircraft, the Red Horse engineers discovered

an abandoned roller on a part of the field. They soon had it

in repair and running across the field in an earty attempt to

compact and upgrade it.
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 133

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00891

Soldiers of Company A, 41st Engineer Battalion, 10th Mountain Division, celebrate the completion of a Bailey Bridge

they erected between Kismayo and Jilib. The bridge was named for Sean Devereaux, a UNICEF worker killed while

endeavoring to feed thousands of starving people in southern Somalia.

between them. This in turn would mean that fewer

forces would be required in theater to cover the

same amount of ground. Rapid-moving convoys

could more efficiently deliver relief supplies. Safe

and quick movement on the roads would also benefit the people of the interior by providing them

with a means of getting their products from farms

and herds to markets in the cities. Contracted

labor would provide jobs for local Somalis and

boost the overall economy. Finally, the roads

would give the factions an easy means to move

their forces and heavy weapons to transition sites

and cantonment areas. The 36th Engineer Group

was given the mission of working on the main

supply routes and creating the Somali Road to

connect all the sectors.392 General Johnston,

through his engineering staff, specified standards

for the road system: "All supply and resupply

routes were made to carry two-way traffic at military load class 30 and used soil stabilization

where possible."393

Work began on 20 January 1993 and proceeded rapidly. Many difficulties were encountered

but overcome. Mine removal operations were

necessary on some stretches to open the way to

the interior. Mines were a persistent problem

throughout the entire area of operations and were

not limited to roadways, although they caused

considerable trouble there. Commander William

F. Boudra, USM, of the UNITAF staff described

what the engineers faced:

Massive quantities of land mines and unexploded ordnance dotted roads and the

Somalian landscape. Our forces encountered

a variety of mines and other munitions manufactured by many different countries.

Because operational procedures called for

marking and bypassing mines and unexploded ordnance, we used minesweeping teams

frequently. Marking, however, had to be austere because any valuable materials would

certainly be stolen. We settled on painting
134 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

mine warnings on rocks. Breaching mine

and Iunexploded ordnance] areas to open

routes was required on numerous occasions.

Several methods were employed. Teams

equipped with metallic mine detectors were

used but their value was limited because

most mines and ordnance were non-metallic. Therefore, we used field expedient mine

rollers made from locally procured and modified construction compactors pushed by

armored combat vehicles. This method

proved very effective. Both explosive ordnance detachments and Sappers were put to

work on countermine and [unexploded ordnance] neutralization operations.394

Other difficulties came from the condition of

the road surface in various stretches, requiring

decisions about whether these areas should be

repaired or bypassed. Where available, locally

procured surface aggregate was used to fill holes.

In other cases, the roadways were patched with

mixtures of soil and cement, and dust palliatives

were put down throughout the routes. Bridges

were repaired or strengthened as necessary. In

some areas, the road had to be entirely rebuilt.395

The portion between Jilib and Bardera had to be

laid down on a different route through new terrain. In the Kismayo sector, two Bailey bridges

were constructed and a third was set up in

Bardera.

Five weeks of heavy, hurried labor completed

the job. On 24 February, the Somali Road was finished. The engineer group had constructed or

repaired more than 1,100 kilometers of roadways,

connecting all of the humanitarian relief sectors.

The interior of the entire area of operations was

opened to the movement of relief supplies, the

transportation of local produce, and the resettlement of refugees. More importantly, driving time

between sectors dropped dramatically. It had originally taken 26 hours to travel by vehicle from

Mogadishu to Kismayo; now it took only 12.

Travel time between other sectors dropped by 50

to 75 percent. This major engineering feat was a

* In Oddur, the author saw a stockpile of several hundred

cases of such antipersonnel mines. These were simply made

of wood with a hinged top for inserting the charge and a

small opening in one side for placing the detonator. These

devices could be placed in the ground with pressure-sensitive

detonators or rigged as booby traps with trip wires. With liI.

tIc metallic content, they would have been difficult to find

with traditional metal detectors.

great success, one that contributed to the security

of the force and the completion of its mission.396

Communications

Another important method to link the area of

operations was effective communications. For

UNITAF, this responsibility fell to the communications section, whose members had to work

closely with the components and with the forces

of the coalition partners.

Colonel Robert G. Hill faced a daunting task as

the UNITAF communications officer. In early

December, as he was building his joint team

through the Central Command administration

officer, he was planning his own concept of support for the overall mission and the courses of

action. The communications section would be

responsible for identifying and sourcing needed

equipment, and then installing and operating it.

The system had to link the commander to his staff,

the components, and the coalition partners, and

had to provide support for operations, intelligence, and personnel and logistics functions.397

The communications network would have to work

over long distances in theater and be able to reach

literally around the world when needed, and be set

up within the bare infrastructure environment that

affected every other aspect of the operation.

Prior to deployment, the communications section worked with MarFor to set the basic communications plan. Communications nodes would be

established at each of the relief sectors as they

were secured. These nodes would be "constructed

around an AN/TSC-93 spoke terminal and would

consist of a switching capability, communications

center, two high-frequency radios, two tactical

satellite terminals, and a local area network sewer."39t

Equipment came from a variety of sources.

Colonel Hill knew I MEF's normal equipment

load could not meet the dual requirements placed

on it, to support both the new task force headquarters and the 1st Marine Division acting as

MarFor. He therefore asked for augmentation of

satellite communications and single-channel radio

systems through the joint communications support element, an organization under the control of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The communications element controlled a pool of equipment to support

two joint task force headquarters; some of this

was duly allotted for UNITAF's use. This equip-
U.S. Air Force's 5th Combat Communications Squadron,

tropo satellite support radio system.

ment provided the connectivity from the task

force headquarters to the components, which then

supplied the necessary equipment on their end.

Internal support came from the 9th

Communications Battalion and the communications company of the 1st Marine Division.399

Communications with the outside world were

established early in the deployment. The task

force headquarters was connected to Central

Command in Tampa, Florida, by a single-channel

tactical communications satellite. Satellite communications also were established between Fort

Meade, Maryland, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.40°

A communications support element van arrived

with limited telephone connectivity. This helped

to expand internal communications, albeit on a

small scale. As the coalition's forces moved into

the relief sectors, connectivity was provided to

keep the soldiers and Marines on the ground

linked to the headquarters at Mogadishu. An early

problem was encountered when some component

forces arrived before their command and control

assets. This led to borrowing of equipment among

U.S. forces to ensure that all missions were properly covered. As more equipment arrived, so too

did the opportunity to normalize things along

Service lines. But, even by late January, there

were still anomalies. Because of the mix of units

and missions there, the American components at

the port and airfield at Mogadishu displayed a

corresponding mix of equipment. Marine units

were using Air Force transmission systems, and

Army units were using Marine gear. Overall,

however, the ability to use whatever equipment

was at hand was judged to have worked well.401

The need to be prepared to operate in a bare

environment caused one noticeable problem. As

some units arrived they brought commercial sate]-

lite equipment with them that would ensure reliable communications anywhere in the world. By

attaching a STU-IJI, secure communications

could also be achieved.' Ironically, the convenience of this equipment was also its greatest

weakness. This was a commercial system, and

* TacSat, liiMarSat, and STU-HI (secure telephone unit,

third generation) are all communications systems and pieces

of equipment. TacSat is a military satellite system that uses

communication repeaters that work with the terminal cquipment of land, sea, and air forces. InMarSat is a commercial

satellite communications operator that provides telephone,

fax, and data transmission services to client ground, sea, and

air users. The STU-lIl is a voice encryption device that

allows speakers to discuss classified matters over a telephone

hy scrambling the sound.

Nolu&L1Tv BEGINS TO RETURN 135

DVIC DD-SD-O0-00707

On a rise overlooking Mogadishu airport, TSgt Jack Richards, Sgt Derrick Hawkins, and Al C Charles Layne, of the

conduct daily maintenance on the microwave dish of a
136 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

there was an expensive cost to its use. Some units

had borrowed the equipment from their nondeployed comrades, creating an interesting dilemma: who would pay the user fees, the owner or the

using unit? Colonel Hilt soon recognized he had

to gel: control of the number and use of these sets

in theater.402

Communications with the coalition partners

presented some challenges. Where NATO members were operating there was no great difficulty

because of the interoperability of equipment and

procedures. For the other nations, all manner of

communication issues had to be resolved.

Frequency assignment was a concern, but direct

contact with the UNIITAF frequency manager kept

all partners on separate networks. Communications security was another matter that had to be

addressed, both among the United States components and the partners. It would be inappropriate

for every organization in theater to be receiving its

own secure communications deliveries. So a joint

communications security management office was

formed as a central point for the delivery and distribution of all such messages and materials. This

office also was responsible for working with the

Defense Courier System to ensure the proper

receipt of all such materials. But the non-NATO

coalition partners were not cleared to receive such

classified information. For them, liaison officers

were assigned. These officers accompanied the

partners in the field, and they carried the appropriate U.S. communications equipment.403 In this

manner, all units of the task force, no matter what

their size or mission, were linked through

UNITAF headquarters.

A greater difficulty was communicating with

UNOSOM headquarters, even though it was

located less than a half mile from the UNITAF

compound. Telephone landlines, which would

normally be an easy method of connecting with

U.N. forces, could not be used because the wire

would have been stolen as soon as it was strung.

In addition, both headquarters used different radio

communications equipment. A solution was to

issue hand-held radios, called "bricks," for both

headquarters. Even then difficulties were encountered due to the different voltages of the battery

chargers each headquarters used. Such small matDVIC DD-5D-OO-00907

U.S. Air Force SSgt Rick Robinson of the 52d Combat Communications Squadron adjusts an SB3865 tactical telephone switch at the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu. The squadron provided communications support for the Afr

Force's Air Mobility element
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 137

DVIC DD-SD-00-00791

A soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne) hands leaflets to several Somalis on the streets

of Kismayo.

ters were difficult to foresee, but each was

resolved as it was encountered through the application of a cooperative attitude and a desire to get

the job done.404

Psychological Operations

Lieutenant General Johnston knew the successful completion of his mission would be greatly

helped by a well-mn psychological operation

effort. "Having understood the potential impact of

PSYOP [psychological operations], I was

extremely interested in having PSYOP up front

for this operation because I knew ... that it would

prevent armed conflict. ... You come in with tanks

and people think you're there to hurt them.

PSYOP worked well to convince [Somalis] that

we were there with the military capability to take

care of the factions and their little armies—that

we were going to provide support and safety."405

To ensure this valuable support was planned

and integrated into the UNITAF operation, a joint

psychological operation task force was organized

under the supervision of the director of operations, Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni. This

specialized task force, under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA, was

formed from elements of the Army's 4th

Psychological Operations Group (Airborne). The

nucleus of the task force came from the 8th

Psychological Operations Battalion and the

Product Dissemination Battalion. The 9th

Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical)

provided two brigade psychological operations

support elements and eight loudspeaker teams.

These last units were attached to the 7th Marines,

and the Army's 10th Mountain Division.406

The joint psychological operations task force

had the mission of providing information and

coordinating communications to two target audiences. The first group included those persons and

organizations General Johnston had to work

closely with to accomplish the mission: the special envoy, UNOSOM, United Nations agencies,

and the humanitarian relief sectors. The second

group was the Somalis, comprised of the general
138 RESTORThJG HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-SD-0O-00792

On the streets of Kismayo, a soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion distributes copies of Rajo, the

Somali-language newspaper. The paper proved to be an effective tool in providing UNITAF information to the Somali

people.

Somali population, the leaders of the factions, elders from the clans and villages, religious leaders,

and professionals and intellectuals.407

The task force accomplished its information

dissemination mission through a variety of products. Leaflets were easily produced and widely

distributed. These small sheets usually had a colorful picture on one side and a related message in

Somali on the other. Themes ranged from an

explanation of the purposes of the coalition forces

to information about the dangers of mines and

unexploded ordnance. These were distributed to

target areas by aircraft. Throughout the operation

several types of aircraft were used: Marine Corps

CFI-53 helicopters; USAF and Canadian C-130

Hercules airplanes; Army IJH-60 and UH-1 helicopters; Navy 5-3 Viking airplanes; and New

Zealand C-748 Andover airplanes.408

Another printed product was a Somali-language newspaper named Rajo, the Somali word

for hope. The staff of the paper included soldiers

from the 4th Psychological Operations Group,

civilian area experts, and Somali linguists. They

produced articles about military operations in

Mogadishu and the other relief sectors, relief

operations, redevelopment, and analyses of the

peace and reconciliation talks. Other features

dealt with public health information, articles

about rebuilding the educational system and

police forces, and interviews with relief staff

members. One other popular feature was a cartoon

featuring a Somali named Celmi and his camel

Mandeeq. The conversations between these two

characters emphasized the themes of the coalition's mission and what current operations were

accomplishing. The first copy of this paper was

published on 20 December 1992, and it soon had

a daily run of 15,000 to 28,000 copies, depending

on the availability of paper. It was distributed to

every town and village hi which UNITAF soldiers

were deployed. The paper was apparently effective in getting out IJINITAF information to the
NoRun BEGINS TO RETURN 139

Somalis. As U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Robert

B. Oakley later told the Rajo staff: "We are using

Rajo to get the correct information into the hands

of the Somali population and to correct distortions. ... It has made a big difference. The faction

leaders, I know, read it very, very carefully. Every

once in a while [General Mohamed Farah Hassan]

Aideed or All Mahdi [Mohamed] or one of the

other faction leaders draws to my attention something that appeared in the newspaper. So they're

very, very sensitive to it and they know its

power."409

In cooperation with the newspaper, UNITAF

established a Somali-language radio station, also

named Rajo. Radio Rajo offered the Somali people a choice from the faction-controlled radio stations as a source of information. Twice a day, the

station broadcast a 45-minute program consisting

of news stories from the Rajo newspaper, world

events, readings from the Quran, readings of

Somali stories and poetry, and Somali music. The

broadcasts were designed to encourage the Somali

factions to settle their differences and rebuild their

country. There were several specific themes the

station staff wove into the broadcasts. These were

to emphasize the neutrality of the coalition and

ensure listeners that the rules of engagement

would be applied fairly against all factions as necessary; to highlight the capabilities of the coalition and the work its members were doing, especially those from African or Islamic countries; to

encourage disarmament and highlight the agreements made by the faction leaders; to reinforce

the idea that only the Somali people could resolve

their problems and encourage the rebuilding of

the country's social infrastructure; to encourage

displaced people to retum home and harvest or

plant crops; and to emphasize that there would be

no change in the rules of engagement or capabilities during the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM 11.410

The radio station was located at UNITAF headquarters in the U.S. Embassy compound. It broadcast on a combination of midwave and shortwave

frequencies. With extensive adjustments to the

transmitting antenna, the Rajo shortwave programs could be received in every city and town in

each of the relief sectors.41'

One other method of getting out the UNITAF

message was through loudspeaker teams.

Accompanying troops during operations, these

teams broadcast surrender appeals and gave

instructions to crowds or to Somatis in arms marDVIc DD-SO-00-O081 2

A young Somali boy holds one of several leaflets prepared and distributed as part of UNITAF's psychological operations effort. The leaflet portrays a Somali man

shaking the hand of a U.S. soldier, thereby emphasizing that the United States was in Somali as a friend toying to help end the suffering.

kets or at roadblocks. The team members helped

to distribute copies of the Rajo newspaper. They

also worked closely among the people, gathering

important information and assessing the security

environment. They gave an added, personal

emphasis to the coalition messages in the Rajo

paper and radio broadcasts by meeting with village elders and local religious leaders.4t2

Psychological operations teams supported

every UNITAF action from the very start of the

operation. On 9 December, loudspeaker teams

accompanied the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

during the initial landings. A Marine CH-53 carded a team for the first leaflet drop over the city

of Mogadishu. After that, loudspeakers and leaflet

drops were a part of each movement of coalition

forces into the relief sectors. Two to three days

before the arrival of UNITAF soldiers into a town,

the teams dropped special handshake leaflets that

depicted a Somali and a coalition soldier shaking

hands and explained the mission of the coalition

to assist the relief operations. While emphasizing

the peaceful intent of the coalition, these leaflets

also clearly stated that UNITAF was prepared to

take any necessary action: "We are prepared to

use force to protect the relief operation and our

soldiers. We will not allow interference with food
140 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

distribution or with our activities." After UINTTAF

forces moved into a sector other leaflets were

dropped over the cities and villages and along the

routes leading to it. These showed Somali people

waving to a guarded convoy of relief trucks, and

explained: "We are here to protect relief convoys." They also warned: "Do not block roadways! Force will be used to protect the convoys."413

Loudspeaker teams were conspicuous during

the Marine assault against the weapons storage

sites in Mogadishu in early January and in the

Army's efforts against the forces of Mohamed

Said Hirsi (General Morgan) in Kismayo in

February. They accompanied coalition forces on

sweeps of arms markets and during Clean StTeet

operations. Special leaflets explained the intent of

these operations and in February a very specific

one was directed at the forces of General Morgan.

The leaflet explained the ultimatum issued by the

UNITAF commander and told Morgan's men they

must move by the deadline of 25 February, "or

risk destruction."414

These task force activities were of great value

to UNITAF, clearly demonstrating a benign and

neutral stance balanced with a will to use force if

necessary. Speaking of the loudspeaker teams,

Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, the MarFor

commander, summed up the value of the psychological operations efforts: "They reduced the

amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing

Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight."4t5

Civil-Military Operations

While most of the structures created by

UNITAF were internal, that is, created to assist its

own forces in accomplishing the mission, there

was one that looked externally, to the humanitarian relief organizations. These organizations,

working directly with the people of Somalia, were

the link between the military security mission and

the end of famine. They worked in a wide variety

of areas, distributing food, providing medical care

and assistance, helping with agricultural and veterinary problems, assisting refugees and displaced

persons, digging wells for clean water and working on other small civil projects. They occupied a

unique place in the mosaic of the operation;

manned by civilian staffs and controlled by individual parent organizations, they were highly

independent. They also were an important part of

the solution to Somalia's woes. They truly were

partners in the operation, and their needs had to be

considered and met.

DVIC DD-SD-OO-00790

Soldiers from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion ride in a humvee broadcasting messages to local Somalis

gathered on a street in Kisrnayo. Elements of the 10th Mountain Division walk alongside providing security
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 141

The relationships with the relief organizations

did not have to be created entirely from whole

cloth. During his time in Operation Provide

Comfort in Iraq, Brigadier General Zinni had seen

the value of establishing an entity to coordinate

civil and military efforts. He wanted to repeat the

process used in the Kurdish relief operation by

establishing a similar group in Somalia.46 Also,

the United States Government, through the State

Department, had created a number of organizations whose primary mission was to provide disaster assistance and economic aid, as well as furnish the structures by which these could operate in

foreign countries.

As early as August 1992, the United States

Government had been supporting the relief organizations in Somalia through these agencies. The

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a part of

the United States Agency for International

Development, had established a disaster assistance response team for Somalia. Two disaster

response teams also operated in Nairobi and

Mombasa, as coordinating agencies for Operation

Provide Relief.417 With the military intervention

in December the requirement grew for closer

cooperation among all parties.

During Operation Provide Relief, humanitarian

relief organizations had already begun to tax the

military command with requests for assistance. To

reduce these direct requests and to coordinate the

military response to them, a humanitarian operations center was established. This center was

staffed with military officers, workers from the

Agency for International Development and some

relief workers. This worked well for Provide

Relief, and so a center was established in

Mogadishu for Restore Hope. The operations center had a simple mission: to plan, support, and

monitor the delivery of relief supplies; but it had

a complex organization, reflecting the mix of military, governmental, international, and civilian

humanitarian aid members. The director was

Philip Johnston, a United Nations official and a

member of UNOSOM.' There were two deputy

directors; one, a civilian, was from the response

team, and the other was a military officer from

UNITAF. The center contained a standing liaison

* Philip Johnston was then the president of CARE USA, and

had been appointed by United Nations Secretary General

Boutros Boutros-Ghali to lead a 100-day action program for

accelerated humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

committee, composed of members from UNOSOM, UNITAF, the disaster assistance response

team, United Nations and Red Cross agencies,

and an executive committee to represent the nongovernmental organizations. A bloc called the

"Core Groups" represented those relief organizations with specialty interests such as agriculture,

sanitation, health, and education. The loose connections of all these groups into one organization

meant it had little real authority. The director

responded to the U.N., and the deputies to either

the Agency for International Development or

UNITAF. The relief agencies were responsible to

their parent organizations. The center was able to

do one thing well; it established the forum for all

these organizations to discuss and coordinate their

needs and efforts. The main center was established with the U.N. headquarters in Mogadishu

on 11 December. Thereafter, a center was established in each humanitarian relief sector.4

Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy, a veteran of

cyclone relief operations in Bangladesh, had been

the chief of staff for Operation Provide Relief

since August. He was, therefore, familiar with

many of the key players in the humanitarian operations community, whether they were United

States Government workers or relief organization

personnel. He was selected to be the military

deputy director of the humanitarian operations

center and head the main civil-military operations

cell in Mogadishu.419

As part of the operations center, the cell was

the clearinghouse for requests of the relief organizations for military support such as convoy

escorts, security of facilities, space-availability on

military flights, and technical assistance.42°

Colonel Kennedy saw his duties as working in

two directions. The cell was the link for the relief

organizations to the military of UNITAF and

UNOSOM. He also had to work closely with

Ambassador Oakley and the UNITAF staff to

coordinate their support. He assisted the humanitarian organizations to define their logistics

requests so they could get what they actually

needed, such as the berthing of relief ships, the

staging of containers, and setting convoy routes

and times. Colonel Kennedy saw the cell needed

to be an institution that continued beyond the life

of UNITAF. He therefore worked with the

Japanese, Germans, Canadians, and others in the

solicitation of funds. He also was involved in the

development and implementation of relief policy,

working with the United Nation's 100-Day Plan,
142 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

Representatives of the major humanitarian relief organizations gather for a daily meeting in the civil-military operations center in Mogadishu. Based on a similar organization established during the Kurdish relief effort in Iraq, the

center endeavored to coordinate the civil and military efforts.

and creating a similar plan through 1993 for presentation at the Addis Ababa conferences.42'

The main cell in Mogadishu did not have a

large staff, but it was a busy organization. There

were daily meetings to which all relief organizations were invited, along with representatives of

the United Nations and the disaster response

teams. This was in keeping with Colonel Kennedy's desire to be inclusive. These meetings

were used to discuss upcoming humanitarian

operations, exchange information, and pass on

intelligence. The main cell also had a variety of

relief-related responsibilities. It promulgated and

explained UNITAF policies to the relief organizations, and it worked closely with the UNITAF operations section in conducting mission planning

for requests that needed complicated support,

required more than one military unit, or that involved more than one organization. It chaired the

Mogadishu port shipping committee to coordinate

access to the port and pier space. It maintained a

24-hour watch to respond to emergency requests

from relief organizations and coordinate them

with the LINITAF staff. It also helped to create a

food logistics system for the organizations. This

system monitored food stocks, tracked delivery

dates, listed warehouse capacities, transport availability, and the repair and condition of the road

system.422

Just as each relief sector had a humanitarian

operations center, each also had its own civil-military cell, which maintained contact with Colonel

Kennedy's central organization in Mogadishu.

These small teams of Marine or Army officers

worked closely with the sector commanders and

helped provided the same types of support to their

local relief organizations. They also were given

latitude to work with the local security committees and councils.

Convoy escorts were probably the most visible

support the military gave the relief organizations.

When an organization was expecting to move a
NORMALITY BEGINS TO REurlmj 143

convoy of trucks loaded with relief supplies, they

filled out a standard request and submitted it to

the operations cell at least 48 hours in advance.

The cell then tasked either a U.S. or coalition partner with escort duty. The relief organization and

the military unit then had authorization for direct

liaison. The component or coalition partner controlling the relief sector that a convoy was going

to was generally tasked with escort duty. Convoys

going to those sectors closest to Mogadishu

(Baidoa, Bardera, Merka, and Gialalassi) received

security escorts all the way to their destinations,

but farther districts would split the responsibility.

For instance, if a convoy was going to Belet

Weyne, the Italians would escort it beyond

Gialalassi, and the Canadians would meet them

and take it the rest of the way.423

This was a rather simple process that worked

well. For the first 90 days of the operation,

UNITAF averaged 70 escorts a month, with

monthly averages of 700 trucks carry 9,000 metric tons. Convoy security gave the relief organizations an additional benefit; they could use

trucks to move food to distant areas, so they could

provide more food at less cost than they had been

able to bring in by airplane. This security not only

allowed the World Food Program to bring in its

own fleet of trucks, but also increased competition

among the local transportation providers, further

lowering costs.424

There were some difficulties. Coordination

between relief organizations and military units

was not always perfect. Occasionally an escort

unit was not informed of delays in the formation

and start times of convoys. Locally hired trucks

were subject to breakdowns, often the result of

deliberate sabotage by their drivers who sought to

obtain a portion of the shipment when the rest of

the convoy had to proceed without them. There

were some days when there were simply not

enough assets to provide security for all the

requested convoys. Some would have to wait, but

eventually all convoys received an escort.425

Convoys were not the only humanitarian relief

organization assets that required security. The

organization oversaw hundreds of oftices, warehouses, distribution centers, clinics, and housing

for their staff personnel. These facilities, located

throughout the country, often fell prey to bandits

* These figures are only for convoys going out of

Mogadishu, and do not count the convoys traveling inside

the city.

since they contained food, medicines, and cash.

Many of the relief organizations hired armed

guards before the arrival of UNITAF. These mercenaries were often unreliable and prone to resent

any attempt to fire them, in which case they

became a threat to their employers. While not

every place needed UNITAF protection every day,

there were times when threats, real or perceived,

made it appropriate to call for such assistance.

At such times, staffs of the relief organizations

could call a "911-type" emergency number in the

civil-military operations center. The request was

then passed on to the UNITAF joint operations

center, where it was assigned to a component or

coalition unit. Again, this was an easy process, but

it had its limitations. First, there were four levels,

the request had to go through: the relief organization; the civil-military operations center; the joint

operations center; and then on to the military unit.

Response time was increased, therefore, by the

request moving along this chain, no matter how

quickly each entity tried to pass it on. Also, there

were numerous sites that might have to be guarded. Mogadishu alone had 585, and there were

more throughout the rest of the area of operations.

Consolidation of facilities and spaces could have

eased this problem, but the relief sites remained

dispersed.426

In addition to simple security needs, the relief

organizations also required advice and, from time

to time, direct assistance. Brigadier General

Zinni, in an assessment of the operation made in

March, saw it proceeding on three tracks. There

were the obvious military and political portions.

Then there was the humanitarian aspect, which he

described as going beyond the "short-term sense

of getting food and emergency care to the people

that are in jeopardy, but it's also the long-term

reconstruction in terms of getting public services

started: hospitals, public works, that sort of

thing."427 He had praise for Philip Johnston and

his work with the United Nations in the humanitarian operations center, and the establishment of

the plan for the development of the country. But

providing the kind of actions envisioned was difficult.

The problems with giving this kind of assistance were limitations under United States law of

what the military could provide and the obscure

boundary between legitimate civil affairs-type

activities and nation-building, which was to be

left to the United Nations. Within this gray area,

however, there was room for work to be done by
144 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

UNITAF's chief engineer briefs humanitarian relief workers on

tions center in Mogadishu.

the troops in the field. As Colonel Kennedy said:

"the [Civil Affairs] program has been laissezfaire; do it if you want to, do it if you can."428 The

money that could be legally spent on such projects

was limited (a small amount of operations and

maintenance funds), as was the ability to define it

as work that benefited UNITAF and thus assisted

the overall security mission.429

Out in coalition units, soldiers and Marines had

the desire to help the Somalis in more positive

ways than simply providing security. They had

another necessary asset; time in their off-duty

hours to volunteer for such work if they so

wished. It was not long before commanders took

advantage of these attributes of their troops. On

24 December, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold, cornmanding officer of the 15th MEU (SOC), initiated Project Hand Clasp, a program to assist

schools, orphanages, and other organizations in

the town of Baidoa. Through these actions,

Colo:nel Newbold sought to maintain a benevolent

Photo courtesy ot Col Frederick M. Lorenz

new and ongoing projects at the civil-rnilitaiy operaimage of his Marines in the minds of local

Somalis. The work had the added benefit of keeping up the morale of the MarFor personnel

involved. In January, these Marines began

Operation Renaissance in Mogadishu. This civil

affairs operation combined medical and dental

assistance visits with security sweeps of the area

between the airfield and the port. These actions

helped to stabilize the neighborhood and make it

safer for UNITAF troops.43°

Later, MarFor in Mogadishu worked closely

with local schools. The Marines saw two benefits

to these actions. Schools represented a piece of

normality for the population, and they would keep

children off the streets and away from trouble and

harm. The Marines wrote to relatives and friends

at Marine Corps Bases Camp Pendleton and

Twentynine Palms, California, soliciting school

supplies. The United Nations Children's Fund

provided special educational kits for teachers,

school staff, and students. These were given to
NoiALIn BEGINS TO RETURN 145

schools close to the soccer stadium, a main

MarFor site, and one was sent on to Bardera. In a

particularly dangerous area of Mogadishu, which

warring factions claimed, the schools needed

more than just supplies. The presence and activities of a MarFor civil-military operations team at

these schools kept them from being attacked or

looted. The team also contacted the World Food

Program on behalf of the teachers and staff and

procured supplies of corn, cooking oil, and

sugar.43'

In the farther relief sectors things were happening in much the same fashion. Colonel Werner

Heilmer, the MarFor officer-in-charge of the

civil-military operations center, had established

civil-military operations teams in Bardera and

Baidoa. Working on the adage that actions speak

louder than words, the Marines in these sectors,

noted Hellmer, "get actively involved with the

people ... one on one. ... We went out there and got

involved, saw what the people wanted, how we

could help them, and we did that."432 What they

got involved in was the provision of security to

wells, protection of schools by visible patrolling,

and assistance to schools and orphanages.

Repairing water mains, leveling of school

grounds, repairing classroom spaces, and other

small maintenance projects were coordinated with

Marine combat engineers and Seabees. Materials

were not specifically requisitioned for the projects; but in a land where any building materials

were scarce, scrap lumber was kept and used for

such purposes.433

These experiences of the Marines were not

unique. They were repeated in all the other sectors, whether run by Army Forces Somalia or a

coalition member. Within a short while, the security operations, the work of the relief organizations, and that of the civil-military operations

teams all had their effect on the daily lives of the

Somali people. As Colonel Hellmer said of

Bardera and Baidoa:

You could see them blossom. ... The shops

were open, the kids were in the street, children were now taking the donkeys and water

burros and getting [containers] filled without the adults there with them. You saw

bicycles on the street, kids playing soccer,

children carrying bags of rice, which they

weren't able to do several weeks before

because they got robbed. The storefronts, the

signs were being painted. You saw electricity in Baidoa. ... They were rebuilding places.

The economy was starting to thrive. The

marketplace was open. There was music.

People in the streets sitting in front of their

houses now without barricading themselves

in the compound. Those are just the changes

we saw within thirty days.434

During the third phase of the operation, successes were observed throughout the theater.

Coupled with the decrease of violence and the

improved security situation, many members of

UNITAF felt their part of the task of restoring

Somalia to the community of nations was close to

an end. They hoped they might soon return

home, but for that to happen the United Nations

ad to be prepared to accept the mantle of responsibility.

Chapter 9

Transition and Return

United Nations Relationship

From the very beginning, United States military and civil leaders maintained close ties to their

counterparts in the United .Nations. Senior U.S.

Government officials met with the U.N. staff "two

or three times each week" about the Somalia operation.435 By January 1993, military planners from

U.S. Central Command were in New York "to

U.N. Military Staff

its concept of operarequirements. Those

planners remained available to the United Nations

while it stood up a functional staff in Mogadishu

in April."436

It was much the same in the field. Iraq's Ismat

T. Kittani, the special representative of the

Secretary General of the United Nations, met regularly with his U.S. counterpart, Ambassador

Robert B. Oakley. In particular, Kittani attended

the very first meeting between Ambassador

Oakley, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston,

and the faction leaders on 11 December.437

Thereafter, the military and political sides of

Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) worked

closely with the U.N. staff, most notably Lansana

Kouyate of Guinea, the deputy U.N. special representative, in establishing and running the Addis

Ababa conferences.438 On the military side,

General Johnston's staff maintained close cooperation and exchanged liaison officers with

Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen's United

Nations Organization Somalia (UINOSOM) staff.

The UNITAF operations staff was especially helpful to UNOSOM by drafting the plans for disarmament and ceasefire that came from the initial

Addis Ababa talks. Also, Marine Colonel Kevin

M. Kennedy, from the UNTTAF civil-military

operations cell, was the military deputy director of

the humanitarian operations center, headed by

Philip Johnston, a United Nations appointee.

This close cooperation would be strained as

time went on. By early March, LTNITAF had

accomplished much in terms of creating security,

ending famine, and helping to encourage reconciliation and the reconstruction of social structures.

The members of UNITAF also knew they were

never intended to be the long-term solution to

Somalia's problems; that work fell more appropriately to the United Nations. Unfortunately, the

U.N. was slow in coming. Brigadier General

Anthony C. Zinni summed up the general feeling

at this time: "I think the process [of reconciliation] is well along the way. I think the faction

leaders and the Somalis are ready to begin the

process. Frankly, I don't feel the U.N. is prepared

at this point ... though I feel they've got to deal

relatively quickly because they cannot lose this

window of opportunity when everyone appears

very cooperative."439 General Zinni also was clear

about what was necessary for the U.N. to be successful in taking over responsibilities in this transition period. "The key to the fourth phase is the

U.N. structures to provide security and basic

humanitarian needs. Nations of the world must

provide funding and forces. The presence of security forces will be needed for a while. The factions

must reconcile their differences and agree on how

to restructure the government. The U.N. must help

with basic services and infrastructure to allow

them to be self-sustaining: [these are] growth and

exports, security forces, police and militia, political development, humanitarian services."440

The difficulties facing the United Nations in

fielding its UNOSOM II force reflected its differences from UNTTAF in operational capabilities

and goals. The operation in Somalia presented the

U.N. with many challenges, and, as an international organization, it had to work its way through

them in accordance with its own structures and

diplomatic methods. As Secretary General

Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, the operation in

Somalia was distinct from nearly every other

operation in which the United Nations had been

involved.

There was no precedent for the organization

[U.N.] to follow as it embarked on this

course, no example but the one it was about

to set, and there were many unanswered

questions about the undertaking to which the

international community had committed

itself. Would member Governments contribute sufficient troops, including the necesassist the undermanned

Committee in developing

tions and list of logistics
148 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

sary logistics elements, and place them

under the command of the United Nations?

Would these forces be deployed ia time for a

smooth transition from UNITAF? Would the

troop-contributing countries follow through

on an enforcement mission if hostile action

by one or more of the factions led to casualties among their troops? And would member

states be willing to pay for what would

inevitably be an ex-pensive operation at a

time when the United Nations peace-keeping budget was growing faster than at any

point in its history?44'

The United Nations did not have a readily

available body of troops, nor did it have command

elements from which it could draw to construct its

new UNOSOM II force. These would all have to

be solicited from member states, and this would

take time.

Even more important to the United Nations

were the conditions it saw as necessary to be in

place for the transition. The question of building

organizations and military systems was the easier

of the U.N.'s two hurdles in taking over the operation. The second, and more difficult, concerned

specific aims for UNITAF. In a letter to President

George H. W. Bush on 8 December, the SecretaryGeneral emphasized two conditions, which he believed to be important for a successful transition:

The first was that UNITAF, before its withdrawal, should ensure that the heavy

weapons of the organized factions were

brought under international control and that

the irregular gangs were disarmed. The second essential condition for a successful transition, I believed, was for UNITAF to exercise its mandate throughout Somalia.

Countrywide deployment was indispensable

as the militias could simply withdraw their

heavy weapons to parts of Somalia where

the task force had not been deployed and

bide their time. The problems of reconciliation, disarmament, and demobilization were

national in character and thus required

UNI1TAF's presence throughout the country.442

Photo courtesy of CoP Frederick M. Lorenz

On 3 April 1993, representatives of the 16 Somali factions meet at the United Nations headquarters in Mogadishu

to discuss disarmament At the head of the table is BGen lmtiaz Shaheen, Pakistani Army, UNOSOM I military commander.
TRANSITION AND RETuRN 149

This was very different from UNITAF's perception of its mission. As General Johnston stated

in February 1993: "I had specific guidance ... that

our mission was focused on an area that required

humanitarian relief Quite frankly, disarmament

was only required for us to conduct our humanitarian mission."443 At the next level of the chainof-command, General Joseph P. Hoar, the commander in chief of Central Command, agreed with

General Johnston's assessment: "Disarmament

was excluded from the mission because it was

neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite

for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations.""

Ambassador Oakley stated the United States

Govemment's position in even more detail a few

years later:

The United States was convinced that

despite its own military superiority, the

Somalis would fight rather than give up all

their weapons under external coercion.

Complete disarmament of all the factions

would have required at least a doubling of

the UNTTAF personnel and, almost certainly, would have resulted in substantial casualties, as well as a disruption of humanitarian

operations.

The United States was prepared to support

and assist the United Nations on the broader,

long-term issue of beginning a systematic

program of volnntary demobilization and

disarmament under United Nations auspices,

but not willing to accept formal responsibility for this long-term, major program. Its

UNITAF partners agreed with this proposal

and were prepared to participate. The United

Nations, however, refused responsibility.

Consequently, the program was not undertaken.5

This wide gulf continued throughout February,

March, and April, and it would affect the eventual transition. The result was a dilemma for both

sides. For the U.N., the difference between its earlier peacekeeping missions and this one of peace

enforcement meant it had to have a military

organization of comparable size and strength to

UNIETAF working under similar rules of engagement. The time required to assemble a staff and

build a force was lengthened by U.N. reluctance

to assume responsibility before its conditions

were met by UNITAF. The coalition partners were

frustrated because they had fulfilled their own

missions, and were providing the U.N. with exactly the window of opportunity of which General

Zinni spoke.

UNITAF restructuring also caused concern.

While General Johnston had no doubts about the

ability of UNITAF to do its job as it drew back to

its two light brigades, not everyone shared his

optimism. In his mind, the two actions of reduction and transition were separate issues. He also

knew he had to keep his superiors comfortable

about what he was doing. As he put it, he wanted

to "de-link" the two actions in the minds of those

at Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Command.

That was difficult, because the lack of U.N. movement delayed high-level approval for shipping

units out of Somalia.446

The draw down was also affected by events in

the area of operations. The confrontations

between factional groups under Mohamed Said

Hirsi (known as General Morgan) and Colonel

Ahnied Omar Jess in Kismayo in February and

March were handled quickly by UNTTAF, but

they were indications the situation was still

volatile. To U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali

"the events in Kismayo were a serious violation of

the ceasefire and a setback to hopes that the factions would hand over their heavy weapons.

Action by just one faction was enough to risk

unraveling the progress made in Addis Ababa and

jeopardize the delicate stability established by

UNIITAF."447 UNITAF did not see the situation as

being so delicate as did the U.N., but these actions

did delay the return of some U.S. Army units from

Kismayo and slowed the overall reduction of

units.448

With the slower pace of the reductions and the

wait for the arrival of UNOSOM II, UNITAF continued its work from February to May. One additional aspect, on the political side, was to support

the next round of talks in Addis Ababa in March.

Lansana Kouyate led this important conference, sponsored by the United Nations. The talks

opened on schedule on the 15th and continued for

12 days. All factions were represented except the

Somali National Movement, which controlled the

northwest portion of the country it declared to be

thet independent nation of Somaliland. By 27

March, the representatives had adopted a unanimous "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First

* The Somali National Movement did send obsemvers to the

conference.
150 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Session of the Conference on National

Reconciliation in Somalia." This agreement committed all factions to ending their armed conflict

and to a peaceful reconciliation of differences.

The agreement also set a two-year transition period for a new central government that would come

into being in March 1995. All parties recognized

the need for local governments, district and

regional councils, and a national police force, Of

concern for UNITAF was the provision by which

the factions agreed to a "complete and simultaneous disarmament" throughout the country.

UNITAF and UNOSOM were asked to assist in

this process by accepting the weapons of the factions. The turn-in process was to be completed

within 90 days. These two organizations were also

asked to react strongly against those who might

violate the ceasefire.9

Despite the impressive cooperation by the factions expressed in the wording of the agreements,

success depended on the willingness of all parties

to make the accords work. No one was fooled into

an unrealistic sense of optimism, yet the next several weeks remained a quiet time throughout the

area of operations. It was during this period the

U.N. forces began to arrive.

Slow Transition to U.N. Control

UNITAF and Central Command had begun to

plan for the transition as early as 23 December

1992. On that date, a point paper was issued setting very broad guidance for the transfer of

responsibilities, the establishment of a quick reaction force, and the residual support the United

States would provide to UNOSOM II. It even

included a notional U.N. peacekeeping organization. While some points of this paper eventually

changed, this was a start for planning. The proposed plan required UNITAF to maintain control

over the entire area of operations until it was

secure; suggested that coalition partners remaining under UNOSOM II be emplaced in the

humanitarian relief sectors they would eventuaUy

control; and called for the UNITAF staff to gradually work with and give responsibility to the

UNC'SOM II staff.5° But such a broad plan left

many specifics to be worked out on the ground,

actions considered to be appropriate to the UNOSOMI II staff, and this planning would fall by

default to UNITAF. General Johnston expressed

some of the anxiety felt by UNITAF members

who had to do this work on their own in January,

February, and March:

I could see all of these frustrations that

affected our mission, of things that we knew

had to be done by UNOSOM II in the big

picture [reconstitution of the police force,

working with the humanitarian relief organizations, civil-military operations, refugee

resettlement, disarmament, and cantonment], not just our limited mission. You

know, professionally, you take some pride in

looking ahead and saying what needs to be

done. ... But for the last month at least ... I

have been making decisions for him

[Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, the

incoming UNOSOM II commander] I

don't want to make decisions on where the

cantonment areas are, where the resettlement areas are, because I won't be here.

General Bir is going to have to execute, and

should have been here to do the planning.

We are only now, in the first few days of

March ... seeing the blue hats starting to

form in here. ... The U.N. still does not have

a staff.451

General Johnston also was busy pushing his

superiors, within the bounds allowed him as a military officer, to bring pressure on the United

Nations to move more quickly. "Ambassador

Oakley was very useful in doing that I mean, he

came on publicly. I came on in message traffic.

Some of them were Ilin the form of] daily telephone calls to the [Commander in Chief of

Central Command] saying, 'We need some help.

Who is pushing the U.N.?"452

While the United Nations was not moving as

quickly as it might have, it had chosen the commander of its new UNOSOM II force. Lieutenant

General Cevik Bir was a Turkish officer,

described by General Johnston as having "a good

operational background, good reputation."453 He

was chosen to be the commanding general of

UNOSOM II because of his military background

and his religion. Placing a Muslim i.n charge was

a bow to the sensibilities of the vast majority of

the Somali people. It was hoped this would establish a bond between the populace and the new

United Nations presence.

General Bir had been on one brief inspection to

Somalia in late February. Unfortunately, the timing of this visit was poor. He had arrived at the

time of the troubles in Kismayo and Mogadishu,

and the UNITAF staff's attention was not focused
TRANSITION AND RETURN 151

on the general who would lead their replacements.

As noted in a Navy Forces Somalia situation

report: "The unfortunate timing of these clashes

near the American Embassy compound has

caused the curtailment of briefings for Gen Bit.

[General] Johnston has concluded it is difficult to

focus on briefings with this activity nearby."454

General Bir returned on 15 March, but his

command was still in an embryonic stage.

Members of the UNOSOM staff came in individually or in small groups at this time. The UNITAF

staff did its best to accommodate and inform them

about the operation and the duties they would fulfill. On 11 March, for instance, UNITAF held a

meeting for the IJNOSOM II chief of staff,

Brigadier General James S. Cox, Canadian Army,

who had arrived a few days before. He met with

the deputy commanders of the chiefs of staff of all

those forces that would participate in UNOSOM

II. Three days prior, General Cox and UNOSOM

II communications personnel had moved into the

embassy compound with their equipment. That

same day, the UNTTAF operations staff officially

started their transition to UNOSOM II. Less than

a week later, on the 14th, General Johnston

approved UNITAF's final transition plan. The

next day, UNOSOM II staff members began to

integrate with the UNITAF operations watch center in a process called "twinning."455 General

Johnston described this twinning process as "sitting counterparts next to our counterparts, and

we'll work with them ... until they're ready to take

the hand-off."456

On 3 March, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali

reported to the U.N. Security Council, "the effort

undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment is far from complete and in any case has

not attempted to address the situation throughout

all of Somalia." Following the advice given to

him by United States officials as early as 18

December, Boutros-Uhali sought a new mandate

for UNOSOM that would change it from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. UNOSOM II

should, in his words, "cover all of Somalia ... and

include disarmament."" To ensure the success of

* This was written less than one week after the KismayoMogadishu disturbances of late February, which likely influenced the Secretary General's perception. ** UNOSOM H's area of responsibility eventually extended

farther north than that of UNITAF, but only to the city of

Oalcaio.

this mission, he sought a mandate for the new

force that would achieve several goals: to monitor

all factions with respect to the ceasefire agreements; to prevent resumption of violence, using

force if necessary; to maintain control of the factions' heavy weapons; to seize the small arms of

unauthorized armed groups; to maintain the security of all ports, airfields, and lines of communications; to protect the lives of United Nations and

relief organization personnel; to clear mines; and

to assist refugees.457

With the exception of the extension of the mission to "all of Somalia" and the emphasis on total

disarmament, none of this was different from

what IJNITAF had been doing for months. The

document did, however, show that the U.N. recognized the new UNOSOM II organization needed to be very strong to match this mandate.

Boutros-Ghali proposed to the Security Council

that UNOSOM II have 28,000 troops, including

8,000 in logistics roles. Logistical support was to

come primarily from UNITAF troops already in

Somalia. This meant the Support Command

would continue to be a major contributor. Also,

the United States was asked to provide a quick

reaction force. On 26 March, the Security Council

adopted Resolution 814, which provided a mandate for UNOSOM II and included all the conditions Boutros-Ghali had asked for.458 A tentative

transition date was set for I May.

Following these actions, personnel began arriving in Somalia to prepare for the transition. Two

important additions to the United Nations staff

were both Americans. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral

Jonathan T. Howe was appointed as the new

Special Representative of the United Nations

Secretary General, and Major General Thomas

Montgomery, USA, was selected as the UNOSOM II deputy force commander.

General Montgomery's appointment revealed a

strange dichotomy in the force structure. Not only

was he UNOSOM 11 deputy commander, he also

was the commanding general of the United States

Forces in Somalia for UNOSOM. These forces

were split along two chains-of-command. Most of

the U.S. troops were part of the logistics support

to the operation as well as part of the United

Nations force. There was also the 1,100-man

quick reaction force for UNOSOM II, the 10th

Mountain Division "Warrior Brigade," which had

been filling the same role for UNITAF. It also

reported to General Montgomery. But others

reported through their own chains-of-command.
152 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Photo courtesy ot Ccl Frederick M. Lorenz

Leaders from U.S. Marine Forces Somalia, from left, Go! Jack W. Klimp, Marine Forces deputy commander, Col Emil

R. Bedard, Task Force Mogadishu commander, and Col Werner Hellmer, staff judge advocate and head of the

Marine Forces civil-military operations team, wait to meet Somali elders.

These included a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit,

which would remain on call as the theater reserve.

In August, another United States unit independent

of U.N. control was sent to Somalia. This was

Task Force Ranger and was composed of Army

Rangers and Special Forces. Major General

William E Garrison, USA, commanded the force,

which reported directly to Central Command's

commander, General Hoar.

Several of UNITAF's coalition partners would

remain to participate in UNOSOM II, which made

the United Nations' search for contributing

natio:ris easier and enabled the transition to

progress more rapidly. Pakistan, already present

in UNOSOM I and UNITAF, sent two additional

battalions, creating an infantry brigade. Several

other nations made commitments. India, Ireland,

Norway, Bangladesh, Nepal, Romania, Republic

of Korea, and Malaysia eventually sent troops.

Many of these forces were slow to join UNOSOM

II. At the time of the official transition, the force

was still 11,000 soldiers short of its goal.

UNITAF had been realigning forces to ensure

those remaining would be in place and operating

in their designated relief sectors by the time of the

transition. These included the French, Italians,

Belgians, Australians, Moroccans, Pakistanis,

Botswanans, and Turks. At the same time, United

States forces continued their redeployment schedules. Army and Marine Corps units withdrew

from the field and moved back to Mogadishu

prior to embarkation. Both Army Forces Somalia

and Marine Forces Somalia (MarFor) were down

to light brigade strengths by late March and early

April.

On 4 March, Army Forces Somalia directed

Task Force Kismayo to prepare to turn over full

responsibility for the relief sectors to the Belgians

the next day and then retum to Mogadishu. On the

11th, the task force completed this movement and

redeployed from Somalia. The 10th Mountain

Division's main command post was on the same

flight, and its commander, Major General Steven

L. Arnold, departed two days later.459 On 9 April,
TRANSITION AND RETURN 153

the Warrior Brigade, which would stay as part of

UNOSOM II, assumed all responsibility for

Merka sector, the quick reaction force, and all

remaining Army operations in Somalia. This flexible brigade was composed of the 1st Battalion,

22d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 25th Aviation; 10th

Forward Support Battalion; and other support

detachments. When the Merka sector was turned

over to the Pakistani forces on 28 April, the

Warrior Brigade moved into new quarters at the

university complex and airport in Mogadishu.46°

The Marines continued their redeployments

leading to the light brigade level, and by the 13th

they had realigned their forces between Bardera

and Mogadishu. By 17 March, the 7th Marines

had consolidated in Mogadishu, and Task Force

Bardera remained in that city for the time being.

On 21 March, the light brigade staff "assumed all

watches in the MarFor CP [Command Post],"

while the staff of the 7th Marines moved from the

soccer stadium to the embassy compound. Two

days later, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm left

for Camp Pendleton. Colonel Jack W. Klimp

replaced him as MarFor commander. Over the

next few weeks, the focus of the remaining

Marines was to work with coalition forces to turn

over responsibilities. In Mogadishu, these were

Pakistani soldiers and those of the United Arab

Emirates. In Bardera, the task force worked with

the Botswanans. On 9 April, Colonel Klimp

returned to the United States and Colonel Emil R.

Bedard, commanding officer of the 7th Marines,

assumed duties as commander of MarFor. On 18

April, the Botswanans assumed responsibility for

Bardera sector. In Mogadishu, the Marines passed

operational control of the United Arab Emirates

forces to the Italians on 15 April. On the 24th,

MarFor ceased patrolling in the city and turned

over their principle areas of interest to the

Pakistanis. On the 26th, the MarFor Marine

Aircraft Group 16 made its last flights and ceased

operations: That day, MarFor formally turned

over all its responsibilities to the Pakistani forces

of IJNOSOM II during a ceremony attended by

members of the UNOSOM H and UNTTAF staffs,

members of the Somali auxiliary security force,

and representatives of all the remaining coalition

forces. Remaining MarFor elements began redeploying the next day.46'

By the beginning of May, the work of UNITAF

was done. In five months of unrelenting effort it

had formed itself from four branches of the

American Armed Forces and 22 coalition nations;

deployed rapidly to Somalia; worked through a

Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

LtGen Robert B. Johnston transfers responsibility for operations in Somalia to Turkish LtGen Cevik Bir at a formal

ceremony held in May 1993 at the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu.
154 RESTORING HOPE IN SokLI,&

Photo courtesy of the Clinton Presidential Library (P3276-04)

President William ,J Clinton welcomes LtGen Robert B. Johnston to the White House, where he presented him with

the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. "I'm receiving the medal," LtGen Johnston said, "but a lot of 18 and 19-

year-old men and women in uniform demonstrated enormous discipline, good judgment, and a good deal of

patience in performing a rather unique mission."

number of complex issues while conducting

demanding military operations; succeeded in its

security mission; and prepared the way for its

replacement, UNOSOM H. On 4 May, in a ceremony held at the embassy compound, Lieutenant

General Johnston passed responsibility for operations in Somalia to Lieutenant General Bir.

Shortly after, General Johnston and the remaining

members of his staff boarded an airplane for the

long flight home.

They arrived in Washington the next day. There

the new U.S. president, William J. Clinton, met

them in a special ceremony on the south lawn of

the White Flouse and thanked them for all they

had done and accomplished. In his remarks, the

President summed up what had been done in a

short time:

You represent the thousands who served in

this cmcial operation—in the First Marine

Expeditionary Force, in the 10th Mountain

Division, aboard the Navy's Tripoli

Amphibious Ready Group, in the Air Force

and Air National Guard airlift squadrons,

and in other units in each of our services.

Over 30,000 American military personnel

served at sometime in these last five months

in Somalia. And serving alongside you were

thousands of others from 20 nations.

Although your mission was humanitarian

and not combat, you nonetheless faced difficult and dangerous conditions. You sometimes were subjected to abuse and forced to

dodge rocks and even bullets. You saw firsthand the honor of hunger, disease, and

death. But you pressed on with what you set

out to do and were successful. You have

served in the best tradition of the Armed

Forces of the United States.

To understand the magnitude of what our

forces in Somalia accomplished, the world

need only look back at Somalia's condition
TRANSITION AND RETutu'4 155

just six months ago. Hundreds of thousands

of people were starving; armed anarchy

ruled the land and the streets of every city

and town. Today, food is flowing, crops are

growing, schools and hospitals are reopening. Although there is still much to be done

if enduring peace is to prevail, one can now

envision a day when Somalia wilt be reconstructed as a functioning civil society.462

After the ceremony, the former members of

UNITAF continued their journey home to resume

their lives and various duties, and the Unified

Task Force dissolved back into its individual

units.

In Somalia, the forces of UNOSOM II did not

wait long to be tested. On 6 and 7 May, the forces

of factional leader General Mohamed Farah

Hassan Aideed's ally, Colonel Omar Jess, clashed

with the Belgians while trying to retake the city of

Kismayo. This was the precursor to bloody fights

in June, July, and October.

Epilogue

On 1 March 1995, Lieutenant General Anthony

C. Zinni returned to Mogadishu as the commanding general of a combined coalition task force.

Seven nations provided ships and amphibious

forces for Operation United Shield? The mission

was to protect the last UNOSOM II forces,

Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers, as they withdrew from Somalia. Earlier that day, 1,800 U.S.

Marines of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit

(Special Operations Capable) and 350 Italian

Marines landed and set up a defensive perimeter.

The operation was completed 73 hours later.

The intervening two years since the departure

of UNITAF had not been kind to either the United

Nations forces or to the Somalis. Shortly after the

departure of the Unified Task Force, a subtle but

important change in the mission came about that

had profound effects on UNOSOM II and the participation of the United States in the operation.

General Aideed had not forgotten the incidents

of late February 1993 in Mogadishu and Kismayo.

On 5 June that year, in a bold and confrontational

move, his forces attacked a contingent of

Pakistani troops, killing 24 of the UNOSOM sol-

* Nations participating in Operation United Shield were the

United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Malaysia,

Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

diers. This challenge to the United Nations was

answered by trying to destroy Aideed's power

structure. He was declared a criminal and UNOSOM II, with the support of the Clinton administration and United States forces, began to actively

seek to capture him to bring him to justice. This

action may have appeared appropriate, but it overlooked the fact that Aideed was still a respected

and influential figure to a large number of his

countrymen. This act also tore the fabric of neutrality by singling out Aideed as a specific target,

which fed his propaganda machine. Finally, it

placed UNOSOM troops in direct confrontation

with Aideed's strong political faction, and its militia forces in the city.

American forces, notably Task Force Ranger,

tracked down and captured several of Aideed's

high-ranking subordinates. In an unfortunate incident on 12 July, missiles fired from helicopter

gunships burst into a house at which leaders of

Aideed's United Somali Congress faction and elders of Aideed's Habr Gedr clan were holding a

meeting. Many Somalis were killed, some estimates of the number dead reached as high as 70.

Many previously neutral Somalis believed they

had to defend their homes and their land against

the United Nations and joined Aideed's camp.

Although lightly armed, these soldiers were aware

of American tactics and conformed their own to

make the best use of what was available. On 25

September, a militiaman shot down a helicopter

with a rocket-propelled grenade, a highly unusual

feat. Having proven it could be done, Aideed's

forces awaited their next opportunity, which came

on 3 October.

That day, Aideed was to attend a meeting with

some of his chief lieutenants. The site for the

meeting was identified and a task force of U.S.

Rangers and Special Forces was sent to capture

him. The mission ran into trouble even as the helicopters carrying the assault force approached the

* The Pakistani soldiers were on an operation to inspect one

of General Aideed's compounds in Mogadishu. During

Operation Restore Hope, these inspections were announced

shortly before they would take place, but not with enough

lead lime for the factions to move or hide anything. The

inspections were thus not a total surprise to the factions, and

they knew why they were taking place. Unlike such inspections under UNITAP, this one was unannounced. The compound also adjoined the site of Aideed's Radio Mogadishu

transmitting station. Claiming the United Nations soldiers

were there to shut down the station, Aideed was able to rally

his followers in a deadly attack.
156 REsTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

DVIC DD-SD-OQ-00884

Somali men carry bags of wheat delivered by a Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Medium

Helicopter Squadron 363.

target building. A rocket-propelled grenade struck

one helicopter, forcing it to land close to the target. Another was shot down shortly thereafter,

also by a rocket, and crashed a few blocks away.

The mission then turned from one of capturing

Somali leaders into one of also rescuing the survivors of the downed aircraft and bringing out the

force. The Rangers were soon surrounded by hundreds of Somali militiamen firing on them with

small arms and rocket-propelled grenade. The

reaction force, composed of soldiers of the 10th

Mountain Division, had to fight its way through

the streets of the city, which were now filled with

thousands of militiamen and civilians trying to

kill as many UNOSOM troops as they could.

After 15 hours of fighting, the convoys returned to

the base at the airport, bringing the survivors and

most of the dead. The price was 18 Americans

killed and 78 wounded. The cost, along with the

pictures of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged

through the streets by gloating Somalis, was more

than the administration was willing to pay.

A decision to withdraw American forces from

Somalia was made shortly after. With the most

powerful member state of UNOSOM II leaving,

other nations followed suit. By the beginning of

1995, the United Nations announced that UNOSOM II was to end on 31 March. Operation

United Shield was actually conducted weeks

before that date. As the final U.N. troops were

ready for their withdrawal from .Mogadishu,

Marines were ordered to provide security for the

operation. The last U.N. and American forces left

the country on 4 March.

After the U.N. departure from Somalia, things

continued as they had before. Aideed and Au

Mahdi Mohamed still vied for power and bloodshed continued unabated, along with suffering of

innocent people. Ml this happened as if a curtain

had descended around the country's borders.

What occurred in Somalia received little attention

in the world press. Only unusual news came out.

For instance, General Mohanied Farah Aideed

was killed in a gun battle in Mogadishu on 1

August 1996. Shortly afterwards, his son,

Hussein, who had served with UNITAF as a

United States Marine Corps corporal and translator, returned to Somalia and took over his father's

position. Somalia is still divided. The northern

portion claims its independence as Somaliland,

although it is not, as yet, recognized. In the south,

the area of Operation Restore Hope, the fighting

and dying continues. Cities and towns change

hands, and a few humanitarian relief organiza-
TRANSITION AND RETURN 157

tions still try to bring some assistance. The talks

between the factions continue amid reshuffling

alliances. The State Department still issues

strongly worded warnings about travel in

Somalia, and the country is listed as one of the

world's most dangerous places.

But, in spite of such results, some good came

from Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF did succeed in ending the famine and holding down the

violence during its time in Somalia. Some

accounts claim more than 200,000 lives were

saved by the efforts of UNITAF in getting relief

supplies through. As the Joint Meritorious Unit

Award citation to UNITAF states:

Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the

delivery of over 42,000 metric tons of relief

supplies to the starving population, disarmed

warring factions, fostered a ceasefire, and

restored police and judiciary systems.

Through the intervention and leadership of

Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts of

over 60 different aid and relief organizations

and the support of 23 nations were coordinated and focused to reverse a human

tragedy of famine and disease that was

claiming the lives of thousands each day.

Operation Restore Hope, along with its predecessor Operation Provide Comfort, opened a

decade of humanitarian relief and peacemaking

operations. The experience of each has contributed to the success of the next, and many of

the issues that were of importance during Restore

Hope have remained through subsequent opera1993. However, with each new operation commanders must consider how success depends on

keeping their soldiers safe and casualties within

acceptable limits. The measures taken to ensure

this safety can range from permissive rules of

engagement which allow individual soldiers to

take action against perceived threats to the wearing of protective vests and helmets at all times.

These latter measures especially can impose a

burden on soldiers or Marines working in tropical

or desert climes. Equally important, they can

become a physical reminder to any opposing force

of the unacceptability of loss to Americans. This

can become a weakness in itself, if only in perception. Finding the proper balance is a commander 's responsibility.

Nation building is another term that has been

heard referring to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and

Kosovo. In any situation characterized by civil

war and the destruction of civil institutions and

structures, the successful completion of the mission will depend in some part on the reconstitution of those agencies. What is appropriate in one

case may not be in another. In Somalia, the intent

of UNITAF was to encourage the Somalis to take

responsibility for their own governance and intertions. They are part of the current military world.

One of the operation's greatest strengths was

the close relationship that existed between the

military and the political sides. The cooperation

between the commanding general and the special

envoy was seamless and presented a united front

to the Somali factions. It also ensured the members of the coalition were working toward goals

established for UNITAF. The support that

Lieutenant General Johnston and Ambassador

Oaldey provided to each other set a standard for

future joint task forces assigned to such humanitarian missions.

The idea of force protection continues to permeate military planning at the beginning of the

new century. In a humanitarian or peacekeeping

role, how many casualties are Americans willing

to tolerate? This question was forcefully answered

for the specific instance of Somalia in October

ovic 00-50-00-01026

Two Somali men load large bags of Australian wheat on

the back of a truck for transport to the village of MaleeL

The distribution was a cooperative effort of U.S.

Marines, who provided the helicopter support, and the

Australian Army, which secured the delivery perimeter.
158 RESTORNC HOPE IN SofrL&LIA

nal security. In Bosnia, the active assistance with

civil structures and economic development was

more deliberate. Again, the responsible commander will have to determine how much support

to provide without entangling his unit or his government in the affairs of a recovering nation.

The reconstitution of police forces was another

issue that first became important in Somalia and

then came up elsewhere. The United States-led

intervention in Haiti quickly worked with an

intemational police component to recruit, train,

and deploy police forces throughout the country.

If this latter case was more successful, it was

because of the recent experience in Somalia.*

The long wait for the United Nations to field its

UNOSOM II force tried the patience of UNITAF.

The fact that the United Nations might have an

agenda that differed from that of the United States

and its coalition partners was hardly surprising,

but it foreshadowed the vast difference in mission

that would come after UNITAF turned over

responsibility. The nature of the relationship

between the U.N. and those U.S. forces assigned

to it was also fraught with difficulty, because the

United States tried to keep a course, which

allowed it to maintain its national objectives while

concurrently serving as part of a larger peacekeeping force. The split between United States

and United Nations forces may have been a contributing factor in the clash of 3 October 1993.

The experience of Somalia was helpful in Haiti,

where the United Nations force came in more

quickly and better prepared for its mission.

While the original mission was seemingly very

straightforward, it soon was necessary to determine the bounds of what was acceptable to

accomplish that mission. The term mission creep

was invoked as a check for every extra action

UNIITAF was asked to perform. The repair of

roads, building of bridges, and other physical

improvements were permissible if they would aid

the task force mission. The internal operation of

the country was to be left to the Somalis, with

encouragement from UNITAF. Full disarmament

was never an option for UNITAF, but with the

transition to the United Nations, the definition of

what was appropriate began to change. From the

* This operation had some of the same troops as well. The

ground component for Operation Restore Democracy was

formed around the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division.

initial goal of providing a secure environment, the

forces under the United Nations were drawn more

and more into the internal affairs of Somalia, and

eventually lost the neutrality maintained with

such rigor under UNITAF.

The experiences of the staff of I Marine

Expeditionary Force creating a joint task force

headquarters and bringing together a coalition

force have been incorporated into several missions that followed. Provisions for standing joint

task force headquarters, and the recognition of the

needs and capabilities of coalition partners, are

now a part of the joint warfare doctrine of the

United States.

Relations with civilian organizations were

important during Restore Hope. Working from the

recent experience of the Kurdish relief operation,

the staff of UNITAF quickly built an effective

civil-military operations structure that extended

throughout the country. While relations with some

of the humanitarian relief organizations or their

staff members proved difficult at times, it was recognized they had legitimate concerns, they were a

source of valuable information, and they were

important to the successful completion of the

operation. The civil-military structures in each

succeeding operation have improved based on the

experience of Somalia, and the need to work

cooperatively with these organizations is now

incorporated into service and joint doctrine.

Each military operation is unique. The conditions that existed in Restore Hope have not been

duplicated exactly in the campaigns that followed.

Each of these has been a beneficiary of the ideas,

structures, and solutions that were so carefully

thought out and implemented for the first time in

the deserts and cities of Somalia. The legacy of

Operation Restore Hope lies in these: the examples of the good work of the Unified Task Force in

difficult and dangerous conditions; the restraint

and good order of its personnel; and the maintenance of its political balance and neutrality.

The men and women, Marines, soldiers,

sailors, and airmen who served in Restore Hope

were challenged to replace anarchy and fear with

order and security. They faced situations that were

then novel, but have since become familiar. Their

efforts made them the first of General Zinni's new

thinking American military.
Chapter 1

Notes

There have not been many books available on

Somali history and culture until recently. Even the

most current books deal mainly with the events of

October 1993, and give only a cursory view of how

Somalia came to its condition of 1992. However, there

are a few official sources that deal with these topics in

some detail. Headquarters, Department of the Army,

publishes a series of area studies for the nations of the

world. The one for Somalia was published in 1982

(third edition) and updated in a fourth edition in 1993.

These books provide information about Somali culture,

clan affiliation, political and military structures, terrain

and climate, and the important history of this nation.

These are important sources for anyone researching the

history of Somalia prior to the 1990s. At the start of

Operation Restore Hope, the United States Army

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center published a

small volume entitled Restore Hope Socaliinta Rajada:

Soldier Handbook. This handy guide was intended for

troops deploying to Somalia, and provided basic information about climate and terrain, diseases and preventive medicine, weapons of the factions, and a lexicon

of basic Somali words and phrases. More importantly,

it described the Somali clans, identifying the armed

factions and their leaders. Adam B. Siegel wrote an

excellent monograph study of Operation Eastern Exit

for the Center for Naval Analyses. It was used extensively for the portion of this chapter relating to the

evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu in

January 1991.

1. "Marine Heads Somalia Relief Efforts," Marine

Corps Gazette, Oct92, p. 4.

2. Department of the Army, Somalia: A Country

Study, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1982), pp. 8-9, 81-92, hereafter DA,

Somalia: A Country Study.

3. Ibid., pp. 9, 82.

4. Ibid., pp. 12-17.

5. Ibid., pp. 14, 17-19.

6. Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm-The

Second World War, vol 1, (Boston: Houghton

Muffin Co., 1948), pp. 133-134, 165-168.

7. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance-The

Second World War, vol 3, (Boston: Houghton

Muffin Co., 1950), p. 80.

8. Ibid., pp. 80-86.

9. DA, Somalia: A Country Study, pp. 24-27.

10. Ibid., pp. 27-31.

11. Ibid., pp. 31-33.

12. Ibid., pp. 33-38.

13. Ibid., pp. 38-40.

14. Ibid., pp. 43-45.

15. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

16. Ibid., pp. 52-57.

17. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

18. Ibid., pp. 60-62, 225-227.

19. Ibid., p. 52.

20. United States Army Intelligence and Threat

Analysis Center, Restore Hope Socaliinta Rajada:

Soldier Handbook (Dec92), p. 6, hereafter Soldier

Handbook.

21. Adam B. Siegel, Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant

Evacuation Operation (NEO) Prom Mogadishu,

Somalia, January 1991, (Alexandria, Virginia:

Center for Naval Analyses, Apr92), p. 7.

22. Ibid., PP. 8-9.

23. Ibid.,pp.

24. Ibid.,pp.

25. Ibid.,pp.

26. Ibid., pp.

27. Ibid., pp.

28. Ibid., pp.

29. Soldier Handbook, pp. 6-7.

30. Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing

U.S. Policy in Somalia (Naval Institute Press:

Annapolis, Maryland, 1995), pp. 4-7.

Chapter 2

Much of the material for this chapter was taken

from notes the author made during interviews with

officers of the joint task force, which also were recorded on videotape by members of the Joint Combat

Camera Team. The policy at that time was for the tapes

to be sent to the main combat camera office in

Washington, D.C. Many of these tapes are unaccounted for. Therefore, the author's notes have been used

here. The information in this chapter is from interviews

with: LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter JohnstonMroczkowski intvw; Col Sam E. Hatton, hereafter

Hatton-Mroczkowski intvw; Col William M. Handley,

Jr., hereafter Handley-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen

Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski

intvw; Capt Michael L. Cowan, hereafter CowanMroczkowski intvw; MajGen Steven L. Arnold, hereafter Arnold-Mroczkowski intvw; BUen Thomas R.

8,11.

11-12.

12-13, 16-18.

17-19.

18, 22-25.

28-34.
160 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Mikolajcik, hereafter Mikolajcik-Mroczkowski intvw;

Col Thomas D. Smith, hereafter Smith-Mroczkowski

intvw; and Col Robert W. Tanner, hereafter TannerMroczkowski intvw.

31. Bruce W. Nelan, "Taking on the Thugs," Time,

14Dec92, p. 29, hereafter Nelan, "Taking on

Thugs."

32. Ibid.

33. David Binder, "Bush Ready to Send Troops to

Protect Somalia Food," The New York Times,

26Nov92, p. Al.

34. James Kitfield, "Restoring Hope," Government

Executive, Feb93, p. 20.

35. "UN-Mandated Force Seeks to Halt Tragedy:

Operation Restore Hope," UN Chronicle, Mar93,

Vol. XXX, No 1, p. 1-13.

Ibid., p. 13.

Nelan, "Taking on Thugs," p. 29.

Ibid., p. 13.

Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

I MEF ComC, 27Nov92 to 28Feb93, Sec 3,

"Chronological Listing of Significant Events";

U.S. Army Center of Mititary History, Resource

Guide: UnWed Task Force Somalia December

.1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope

(Washington, D.C., U.S. Army Center of Military

History, 1994), p. 105.

41. General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, "A CinC's

Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn

1993, p. 56, hereafter Hoar, "A CinC's

Perspective."

42. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

43. Thid.

44. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 58.

45. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

Hatton-Mroczkowski intvw.

Handley Mroczkowski intvw.

Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw.

Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

Capt David A. Dawson, USMC, Restore Hope

manuscript, pp. 6-7.

52. ComUSNavCent msg 06l908zNov92, subj:

Concept For Support Relief Operations In

Somalia, hereafter ComUSNavCent msg, Relief

Operations in Somalia.

53. Katherine McGrady, The Joint Task Force in

Operation Restore Hope, (Washington, D.C.:

Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), pp. 115-116,

hereafter McGrady, Restore Hope.

54. Amold-Mroczkowski intvw.

55. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

56. Mikolajcik-Mroczkowski intvw.

57. Smith-Mroczkowski intvw.

64. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

65. Briefing papers, "Joint Task Force

Relief," dtd 921 203.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

58. 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), U.S.

Army Forces Somalia, 10th Mountain Division

(LI): After Action Report Summary (Fort Drum,

New York: 10th Mountain Division (Light

infantry) and Fort Drum, Jun93), p. 68, hereafter

10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia; McOrady, Restore Hope, p. 52.

59. Tanner-Mroczkowski intvw.

60. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 67.

61. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 61.

62. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

63. ComUSNavCent msg, Relief Operations in

Somalia.

Chapter 3

The information for this chapter was taken from

official sources. Oral history interviews used were

between the author and LtGen Robert B. Johnston,

hereafter Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen

Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski

intvw; and BGen Anthony C. Zinni and LtCol Charles

H. Cureton, hereafter Zinni-Cureton intvw.

Somalia

66. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

67. USCinCCent mss, dtd 22Nov92, subj,

Commander's Estimate of the Situation.

68. CentCom AC/S G-3 to CO I MEF msg,

1956i1Nov92, subj, Somalia 0ps.

69. JTF Operation Order, 6Dec92, Annex B.

70. DLA to DIACUPInteL msg, 262333ZNov 92, subj,

Somalia: The Logistic Setting.

71. SoldierHandbook,p. 113.

72. CinCent Operation Order for Operation Restore

Hope.

73. United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual

(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1940), p. 1.

74. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

75. Col Frederick M. Lorenz, USMC, "Law And

Anarchy In Somalia," Parameters, Winter 93-94,

p. 28.

76. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

77. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

78. JTF Somalia Operation Order. 6Dec92.

79. Zirmi-Cureton intvw.

80. CentCom Order, 5Dec92.

81. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92.

82. Ibid.; Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

83. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92, Annex C.

84. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92.

85. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.
NOTES 161

86. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92.

87. Briefing papers, "JTF Deployment Timeline," dtd

921201.

88. "The Military Sealift Command in Operation

Restore Hope," pp. 11-16.

89. Ibid., pp. 6-6A.

90. Kent M. Beck and Robert deV. Brunkow, Global

Reach in Action: The Air Mobility Command and

the Deployment to Somalia (Office of History, Air

Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base,

Illinois: 15Feb94), pp. xi-xxiii.

Chapter 4

This chapter is based mainly on information taken

from interviews conducted by the author in the field.

These were with Capt John W. Peterson, USN, hereafter Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt J. W. Perkins,

USN, hereafter Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt

Brian Boyce, USN, hereafter Boyce-Mroczkowski

intvw; Col Les van den Bosch, Belgian Army, hereafter

van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Thulagalyo

Masisi, Botswana Defense Force, hereafter MasisiMroczkowski intvw; LtCol John M. Taylor, hereafter

Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Ailen Pietrantoni,

French Army, hereafter Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski

intvw; LtCol Emanuel Spagnuolo, Italian Army, hereafter Spagnuolo-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Carol J.

Mathieu, Canadian Army, hereafter MathieuMroczkowski intvw; and Maj Lelon W. Carroll, USA,

hereafter Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw. The author also

used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski

journal with appropriate date citations.

91. Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw.

92. Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw.

93. [bid.

94. Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw; BoyceMroczkowski intvw.

95. 15th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology,

lDec92-3Feb93, sec 4, Supporting Documents,

hereafter 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC.

96. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, sec 2, Narrative

Summary, p. 2-2.

97. Ibid., p. 2-3.

98. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises

en Somalie, Compte Rendu de L'Operation

'Oryx' (9 decembre 1992-12 avril 1993), sec II,

"Chronologie," hereafter Commandement

Francais des Forces Francaises en Somalie,

"Chronologie;" Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw.

99. Ibid.

100. Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw.

101. Kent M. Beck and Robert deV. Brunkow, Global

Reach in Action: The Air Mobility Command and

the Deployment to Somalia, vol. 1 (Office of

History, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force

Base, Illinois, 15Feb94), p. xix.

102. 1 MEF, ComdC, 27Nov92 to 28Feb93, sec 2,

Narrative Summary: Command, Operations, and

Training, p. 2, hereafter I MEF, ComdC.

103. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, pp. 18, 66.

104. Ibid., p.l7.

lOS. I MEF, ComdC, p. 2.

106. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 18.

107. Intvw with LtGen Robert B. Johnston on "Meet

The Press," 13Dec92.

108. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, sec 3, Sequential

Listing of Significant Events, p. 3-2; I MEF,

ComdC, sec 3, Chronological Listing of

Significant Events, pp. 2-3.

109. 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report

Operation Deliverance Somalia Dec 92-Jun 93,

dtd 4Nov93, Annex A, Part One, Background, p.

A-3/7.

110. Claudio Graziano, Operazione Somalia: 1992-

1994, "Lineamenti F Consuntivo

Dell'Operazione;" Conversation between LtCol

Daniel M. Lizzul, Liaison Officer to the Italian

Forces and LtCol Gennora Fusco, Italian Army, as

reported to the author.

111. Col William I. Mellor, Royal Australian Army,

"The Australian Experience in Somalia,"

Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, Hugh

Smith, ed. (Australian Defense Studies Center,

Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra:

1993), pp. 59-60.

112. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource

Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December

1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope

(Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center of Military

History, 1994), pp. 185-186.

113. Intvw with Capt Mosa al Anzi, Kuwaiti Army,

LtCol Charles H.Cureton, USMCR, and Maj

Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, 22Feb93.

114. Intvw with Col Ali al Shehri, Royal Saudi Army

and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, 22Feb93.

115. Masisi-Mroczkowski intvw.

116. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en

Somalie, "Chronologie."

117.1 MEF, ComdC, p.4.

118. Ibid.; Comi-nandement Francais des Forces

Francaises en Somalie, "Chronologie."

119. Intvw of Ambassador Robert B. Oakley with

LtCol Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K.

Wright, Jr., USAR.

120. Intvw of LtGen Robert B. Johnston with LtCol

Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr.,

USAR.

121. Mroczkowski-Peterson intvw.
162 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

122. van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw.

123. Peterson-Mroczkowski intv w.

124. van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw.

125. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; I MEF, ComdC.

126. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw.

127. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 21Dec93.

128. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises

en Somalie, "Chronologie;" I MEF, ComdC, sec

3, Chronological Listings.

129. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw; Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises en Somalie, "Chronologie."

130. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 23Dec92.

131. Spagnuolo-Mroczkowski intvw, trans by LI

Umberto Albarosa, Italian Army.

132. IJNITAF FragO 7, dtd 16Dec92.

133. Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw.

134. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 23Dec92.

135. 10th Mountain Division, US Army Forces in

Somalia, p. 20; Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw.

136. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 31Dec92.

137. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92.

138. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 24Dec92;

UINIITAF FragO 12, dtd 21Dec92.

139. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92.

140. 10th Mountain Division, US Anny Forces in

Somalia, p. 22.

Chapter 5

The information for this chapter was taken primarily from interviews conducted in the field by the author

and other historians. Those by the author were with

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter JohnstonMroczkowski intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski inlvw; Col Peter A. Dotto,

hereafter Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw; and LtCol

Donald C. Spiece, Jr., USA, hereafter SpieceMroczkowski intvw. A second interview between the

author and LtGen Zinni was conducted on 14 May

1994, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2.

Interviews conducted by LtCol Charles H. Cureton,

USMCR, and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, were

with LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter JohnstonCureton-Wright intvw; Ambassador Robert B. Oakley,

hereafter Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw; BGen

Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Cureton-Wright

intvw; and Col Peter A. Dotto, hereafter DottoCureton-Wright intvw. The author also used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski journal with

appropriate date citations, and his field notebook,

refentd to as Mroczkowski field notebook, which contained copies of many of the interviews.

141. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton

University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), p.

87.

142. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

143. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw; Johnston-CuretonWright intvw.

144. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

145. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

146. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.

147. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

148. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.

149. Mroczkowski journal, entries dtd 21 -22Dec92.

150. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.

journal, entry dtd

field notebook;

151. Mroczkowski

Mroczkowski

Mroczkowski intvw.

152. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

153. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 5Jan93.

154. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

155. Ibid.

156. Johnathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with

Humanitarian Relief Organizations:

Observations from Restore Hope, (Alexandria,

Virginia: Center For Naval Analyses, Oct93), pp.

28-32.

157. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

158. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.

159. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.

160. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 25Dec92.

161. Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw.

162. CJTF Somalia J-3 msg, 151701ZJan93, subj:

HRS Transition Matrix fiJI; Dotto-Mroczkowski

intvw; Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2.

163. United Nations Department of Public

Information, The United Nations and Somalia,

1992-1996, United Nations Blue Book Series,

Volume VIII (United Nations, New York: 1996),

p. 38, hereafter U.N. Public Information, United

Nations and Somalia.

164. Msg to American Embassy, Mogadishu, dtd

27Dec92, subj: Security of the Peace Rally,

signed by Hussein Sheekh Ahmed, Chairman of

the Political Reconciliation Committee of the

North Side and Ali Mohamed Ali, Chairman of

the Political Reconciliation Committee of the

South Side.

165. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2.

1 66. U.N. Public Information, United Nations and

Somalia, p. 221.

167. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia

and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on

Peacemaking and Peacekeep-ing, (Washington,

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,

1995), pp. 94-95.

168. Ibid., pp. 241-244.

169. U.N. Public Information, United Nations and

Somalia, p. 39.

170. Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw.

171. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.

6Jan93;

Spiece-
Noms 163

172. Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw.

173. Ltr from commanders of UNITAF/UNOSOM to

Chairman, United Somali Front, dtd 4Feb93, with

copies to the signees of Lhe Addis Ababa

Agreement of 8Jan93.

174. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.

175. Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw.

176. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.

177. LtCol Stephen M. Spataro, USA, UNITAF

Provost Marshal: memorandum from PM for J-3,

subj: Auxiliary Security Force, dtd 27Jan93, p.

1.

178. Ibid., pp. 3, 5.

179. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 1 2Mar93.

180. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93.

181. Ibid.

182. Ibid.

183. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 1Feb93.

184. Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-227,

The Army Lawyer, Nov91, p. 14.

185. Spataro, op. cit., p. 3.

186. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

187. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93.

188. Ibid.

Chapter 6

This chapter was based mainly on interviews the

author and other historians conducted in the field.

Those by the author were with BGen Anthony C.

Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2; Colonel

Major Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army, hereafter Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol John M.

Taylor, hereafter Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; Col.

Werner Helimer, hereafter Hellmer-Mroczkowski

intvw; Maj John Caligari, Royal Australian Army,

hereafter Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Mien

Pietrantoni, French Army, hereafter PietrantoniMroczkowski intvw; Maj Daniel M. Lizzul, hereafter

Lizzul-Mroczkowski intvw; Maj Leland W. Carroll,

USA, hereafter Carroil-Mroczkowski intvw; SFC

Kenneth W. Barriger, USA, hereafter BarrigerMroczkowski intvw; Capt Geoff Kyle, Canadian

Army, hereafter Kyle-Mroczkowskii intvw; LtCol

Carol J. Mathieu, Canadian Army, hereafter MathieuMroczkowski intvw; and LtCol Donald C. Spiece, Jr.,

USA, hereafter Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw. Many of

these interviews were copied in the author's field notebook, cited as Mroczkowski field notebook. Interviews

made by other historians included in this chapter were

by LtCol Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K.

Wright, Jr., USAR, with Ambassador Robert B.

Oakley, hereafter Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw;

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter JohnstonCureton-Wright intvw; and BGen Anthony C. Zinni,

hereafter Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw. Also used was

the oral history inter-view between Capt David A.

Dawson and Col Jack W. Klimp, hereafter KlimpDawson intvw. The author also used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski journal with appropriate date citations. He was also provided a copy of the

personal journal of Col Dayre C. Lias, USAF, hereafter

Lias joumal, with appropriate date citations.

189. I MEF, ComdC, 7Dec92-28Feb93, sec 2,

"Narrative Summary; Command Operations and

Training," p. 9, hereafter I MEF, ComdC.

190. UNIATF, "Memorandum For Correspondents,"

dtd 24Dec92; transcript of NBC "Today" intvw

with Col Fredrick C. Peck, "Spokesman in

Somalia," dtd Thursday, 24Dec92.

191. I MEF, ComdC; Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd

7Jan93; Memo from ComMarFor to CJTF

Somalia, subj: Operations Summary for the

Period O62300CJan 93 to O7l75OCJan 93, hereafter ComMarFor Memo.

192. I 14FF, ComdC.

193. ComMarFor Memo; Klimp-Dawson intvw.

194. ComMarFor Memo.

195. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 7Jan93.

196. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 11Mar93.

197. CJTF Somalia to USCinCCent, msg,

130055ZJan93, subj: Death of USMC Member.

198. Klimp-Dawson intvw, 11Jan93.

199. Ibid.

200. Sgt B. W. Beard, "Marines Relieve Suffering In

Somalia," CMC News Release, 222001ZJan93.

201. 1 MEF, ComdC, sec 2: "Narrative Summary:

Command, Operations, and Training," p. 10.

202. Ibid., p. 10.

203. ibid., pp. 15-16.

204. Ibid.. p. 16.

205. Ibid., pp. 16-17; Andrew Purvis, "In the

Crossfire," Time, 8Mar93, p. 47.

206. I MEF, ComdC, lMar-30 Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative

Summary," p. 2-2.

207. Ibid., pp. 2-3 to 2-4.

208. I 14FF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Surmnary," p. 6.

209. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 20Jan93.

210. 1 MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp.

14, 18.

211. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 23.

212. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded - in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

213. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 23.

214. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

215. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 62.

216. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.
164 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

231. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw,

Mroczkowski field notebook.

248. Ibid.

249.

Francaises en

Securisation:

217. ibid.

218. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkow ski field notebook; Gary Ramage and

Bob Breen, Through Aussie Eyes: Photographs of

The Australian Defense Force in Somalia 1993

(Canberra: Department of Defense, 1994), p. 52,

hereafter Ramage and Breen.

219. 1 MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp.

4, 37-38.

220. Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook; I MEF, ComdC, sec

2, "Narrative Summary," pp. 37-38.

221. Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebuok.

222. Personal observations of refugee camp in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

223. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 16January93.

224. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

225. Handwritten note provided to the author by Maj

John Caligari, Royal Australian Army.

226. Ibid.; Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

227. Ramage and Breen, p. 102.

228. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

229. Ibid.

230. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook; Ramage and Breen,

p. 78.

recorded in

232. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 32.

233. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

234. Ramage and Breen, pp. 78-79.

235. Ibid., p. 79.

236. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.

38.

237. Ibid., pp. 9, 12, 14, 38; 1 MIEF, ComdC, iMar30Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-3;

Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski Field Note Book.

238. I MEF, ComdC, section 2, "Narrative Summary,"

p.9.

239. Ibid., p. 12; I MEF, ComdC, sec 3,

"Chronological Listing Of Significant Events," p.

15.

240. lE MEF, ComdC, lMar-30Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative

Summary," p. 2-3.

241. ibid., p. 2-10.

242. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

243. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises

en Somalie, "Chronologie," pp. 1-3; U.S. Army

Center of Military History, Resource Guide:

Unified Task Force Somalia December 1992-May

1993 Operation Restore Hope (Washington D.C.:

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), pp.

172-17 3.

244. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en

Somalie, "Chronologie," sec B, Domaine

Operationnal, p. 2.

245. Ibid.

246. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvW, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

247. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en

Somalie, "Chronologie," p. 4.

Mroczkowski Field Note Book: intvw with Chief

Abdi Ugas Husen of El Berde, interpreted by

Abdil Kader Abdilahi Au. Also PietrantoniMroczkowski intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski

field notebook.

250. Commandement Francais des Force

Somalie, "Chronologie," sec B

Domaine Operationnel, p. 2.

251. Ibid., sec C, Consolidation: Domaine

Operationnel, p. 1; Mroczkowski journal, entry

dtd 1Feb93.

252. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises cii

Somalie, "Chronologie," sec C, Consolidation:

Domain Operationnel, p. 1, and sect D, Passage A

Oryx 2, p. 1.

253. Jobnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 16Mar93.

254. ibid.; Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93.

255. i MIEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.

12.

256. Lizzul-Mroczkowski intvw, recurded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

257. 1 MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.

13.

258. Il Volo Dell'Jbis, pp. 142-150; Briefing notes,

Commander Italian Forces to Commanding

General UNITAF, undated (about 29Jan93).

259. Il Volo Dell' Ibis, p. 148.

260. Briefing notes, Commander Italian Forces to

Commanding General IJNITAF, undated (about

29Jan93).

261. Ibid.

262. Ibid.; JI Volo Dell'lbis, pp. 104-115.

263. Jl Volo Dell'Ibis, pp. 135-136;U.S. Army Center

of Military History, Resource Guide: Unified Task

Force Somalia December 1992-May 1993

Operation Restore Hope (Washington D.C.: U.S.

Army Center of Military History, 1994), p. 174.

264. Briefing notes, Commander Italian Forces to

Commanding General UNITAF, undated (about

29Jan93).

265. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 22.
NOTES 165

266. Ibid., p. 23.

267. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 29Jan93.

268. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, pp. 23-24.

269. Mroczkowski journal, entry dated 21Jan93.

270. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 26.

271. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource

Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December

1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope

(Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military

History, 1994), pp. 169-170.

272. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

273. 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report,

Operation Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7.

274. Mathieu-Mroczkowskj intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

275. Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian

Division, After Action Report, Operation

Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7.

276. Mroczkowski journal, entries dtd 25Dec92 and

5Jan93; Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

277. Barriger-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

278. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook; Kyle-Mroczkowski

intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski field notebook.

279. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook; Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 21Jan93.

280. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 20Jan93;

Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowskj field notebook; 1st Canadian

Division, After Action Report, Operation

Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-4/7.

281. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian

Division, After Action Report, Operation

Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7.

282. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

283. Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

284. Briefing papers: "Operation Restore Hope, Task

Force Kismayo," dtd 7Jan93.

285. Task Force Kismayo, unpublished paper "Task

Force Kismayo: 10th Mountain Division

Operation Restore Hope," undated (probably

early Jan93), p. 2; 10th Mountain Division, U.S.

Army Forces Somalia, p.22.

286. Task Force Kismayo, "Gun Control in the Jubba

Valley," undated.

287. Task Force Kismayo Somalia to ComMarFor,

msg, subj: BGen Magruder Meeting with Gen

Morgan, 232324ZJan93.

288. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23June93.

289. Ibid.

290. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 23.

291. Diana Jean Schemo, "U.S. Copters Attack Rebel

Force in Southern Somalia;" The New York Times,

26Jan93.

292. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 25Jan93.

293. Ultimatum from United States Special Envoy to

Somalia and Commander, Unified Task Force

Somalia, 23Feb93.

294. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw; JohnstonCureton-Wright intvw.

295. "Troops Fear Disruption of Somali Peace Talks,"

Associated Press, 10Mar93.

296. "U.S. Sends Troops Back to Kismayu,"

Associated Press, 18Mar93.

297. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw; ZinniMroczkowski intvw.

298. I IvIEF, ComdC, sect 2 "Narrative Summary," p.

10.

299. Ramage and Breen, p. 109.

300. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.

10.

301. Ramage and Breen, p. 110.

302. The Honorable Art Eggleton, Minister of National

Defense, Report of the Somalia Commission of

inquiry, (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Government

Publishing Directorate, 1997).

303. Ltr from LtGen Robert B. Johnston to Adm

Anderson, Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff,

dtd 1May93, as quoted in the Report of the

Somalia Commission of inquiry.

304. 1 MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.

18.

Chapter 7

305. CJTF Somalia SitRep p93, dtd 081535Mar93.

306. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 61.

307. Ibid., pp. 61-62.

308. Marine Forces Somalia Air Combat Element

ComdC, 9Dec92-19Mar93, sec 2, "Narrative

Summary," p. 2.

309. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp.

26-27.

310. Lias journal, entries dtd 18-19Dec92 and 5Jan93.

311. Ibid., entries dtd 5, 15Dec92.

312. Ibid., entry dtd 16Dec92.

313. Memo for the record, from Commander (Unified

Task Force Somalia) to Potential Users of Somali
166 REsTORING HOPE N SOMALIA

315. Ibid.

316. Ibid.

345. Ibid.

346. Ibid.

347.

Ibid.

Ibid.

JTFSC SitRep, dtd 05O600ZMar93.

CMPF Somalia SitRep, dtd 15I700ZJan93.

Airspace; subj: Control of Somali Territorial

Airspace, undated.

314. American Embassy Nairobi to Secretary of State,

msg, 111337ZJan93, subj: JTF Liaison with

]ICAO.

317. Memo for the record, Air Control Representative

to International Civil Aviation Organization, subj:

Results of ICAO/UNITAF Technical Meeting, dtd

15Jan93.

318. Memo for the record, Air Control Authority

Representative to international Civil Aviation

Organization, subj: Results of ICAO/UINITAF

Working Group Sessions, dtd 18Jan93.

319. international Civil Aviation Organization, Eastern

and Southern African Office: "Informal ATS

Coordination Meeting for Air Operations in

Mogadishu FIR (Nairobi, 3-5Mar93)."

320. Memo, AME/DirMobFor to WOC Mombasa/For

all Aircrews, subj: Operations at Mogadishu

Airport, dtd 3 [Dec92; USTransCom/CAT to HQ

.AMC TACC, msg, subj: Evaluation of Air Traffic

Flow into Mogadishu Airport, dtd 1943/OlJan93.

321. CJTF Somalia to USCinCCent, msg, subj:

Transition of Airspace Control Authority

Functions, dtd 181910ZJan93.

322. Memo of introduction, dtd 1Feb93.

323. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93.

324. United Nations Department of Public

Information, The United Nations and Somalia,

1992-1996, The United Nations Blue Book

Series, Volume VIII. (New York: The United

Nations, i996), p. 35.

325. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.

326.1 MEF, ComdC, sec 2 "Narrative Summary," p. 7.

327. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93.

328. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.

329. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92.

330. Katherine A. W. McOrady, The Joint Task Force

in Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:

Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 110.

331. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.

332. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Joint Task Force

in Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:

Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), pp. 95-96;

"Drawdown Concept Paper" prepared by the

UNITAF staff, dtd 11Jan93.

333. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The .Joint Task Force

in Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:

Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 96.

334. Jotrnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.

335.1 MEF, ComdC, pp. 10-11.

336. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 16Jan93.

337. 1 MEF, ComdC, pp. 32-33.

338. Ibid., p. 14.

339. Ibid., p. 15; 1 MIEF, ComdC, [Mar-30Apr93, sec

2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-3.

340. Ibid., pp. 2-3-2-4.

341. Ibid., p. 2-4.

342. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 26.

343. Johnstori-Cureton-Wright Intvw, 12March93.

344. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 26.

I MEF, ComdC, lMar-30Apr93, sec

"Organizational Data," pp. 1-1, 1-2.

348. CJTF Somalia SitRep 147, dtd 0li455Zmay93.

Chapter 8

This chapter was based upon information obtained

through interviews conducted by the author and other

historians in the field. Those by the author were with

Capt Michael L. Cowan, USN, hereafter CowanMroczkowski intvw; Col Robert G. Hill, hereafter HillMroczkowski intvw; and Col Kevin M. Kennedy, hereafter Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw. Interviews by

other historians were with LtCol Charles 1-1. Cureton,

USMCR, and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, with

LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter JohnstonCureton-Wright intvw; BOen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw; and between Capt

David A. Dawson and Col Werner Heilmer, hereafter

Helimer-Dawson intvw. The author also used his personal journal, hereafter Mroczkowski journal with

appropriate dates.

349. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 11.

350. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6January93.

351. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.

352. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93.

353. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 11.

354. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 170600ZJan93.

355. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 280600ZJan93.

356. Johnstnn-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.

357. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 290600ZJan93.

358. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 67.

359. Ibid.. p. 69.

360. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

361. Ibid., p.71.

362.

363.

364.

365.
Noms 167

366. I MEF, ComdC, sect 2, "Narrative Summary," p.

26.

367. Ibid., p. 27.

368. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 60.

369. CMPF Somalia SitRep, dtd

370. 10th Mountain Division,

Somalia, p. 67. 371. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

372. ww.usariem.army.mil/somalia/disinsec.htm;

www.usariem.army.mil/somaIia/dissoi1.htm.

373. Ibid.

374. Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw, as recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

375. Ibid.

376. Ibid.

377. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for

Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance

(Santa Monica, California: The Rand

Corporation, 1996), p. 53.

378. Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw, as recorded in

Mroczkowski field notebook.

380. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, pp. 68-69.

381. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for

Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance

(Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1996), pp. 58, 65.

382. 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Operation

Restore Hope After Action Report, 15Jun93), pp.

1-2.

383.. Ibid., pp. 1-4.

384. Ibid., pp. 2,6.

385. Cdr William F. Boudra, USN, "Engineers Restore

Hope," The Military Engineer, Jul93, pp. 4-5.

386. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, iDec92-3Feb93, sec

2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-5; 1 MEF, ComdC,

sect 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 29.

387. Keith B. Richburg, "U. S. Envoy Tells Somalia's

Warlords Not to Interfere," The Washington Post,

8Dec92, p.2; Nava1 Mobile Construction

Battalion 40, NMCB Command History;

www.seabee.navy.mil/nmcb4Ofwelcome/history/h

tm, p. 2.

388. Naval Historical Center, Seabee History:

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq67-7fhtm, p. 5

389. Ibid.

390. Capt Brenda Campbell, USAF, "Red Horse

Celebrates 35th Anniversary," www.af.milfnews/sep2000/n2000728-

00152.shmtl, p. 1.

391. Lias journal, entry dtd 10Dec92.

392. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, pp. 64-65.

393. Cdr William F. Boudra, USN, "Engineers Restore

Hope," The Military Engineer, Jul93, p. 7.

394. Ibid.

395. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

396. 10th Mountain Division, U.S.

Somalia, p. 24.

397. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw.

398. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative

34

399. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw; I MEF, ComdC, sect 2,

"Narrative Summary," p. 34.

400. Hill-Mroczkowskj intvw.

401. Ibid.

402. Ibid.; 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 38.

403. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw.

404. Ibid.

405. Unified Task Force Somalia, Psychological

Operations in Support of Operation Restore Hope,

9Dec92-4 May93, p. 3.

Ibid., pp. 1,2.

Ibid., p. 3.

lbid., p. 4.

ibid.,

Ibid.,

Ibid.,

Ibid.,

Ibid.,

Ibid.,

Ibid., p. 6.

Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 1 1Mar93.

Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with

Humanitarian Relief Organizations:

Observations from Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 14-

15.

418. Ibid., pp. 17-20.

419. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw.

420. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with

Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:

Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 19-20.

421. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw.

422. Ibid.; Col Kenneth Allard, USA, Somalia

Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.:

National Defense University Press, Jan95), pp.

109-ill.

423. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with

Humanitarian Relief Organizations:

Observations from Restore Hope (Washington,

D.C.: Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), p. 22.

424. Ibid., pp. 2 1-22.

425. Ibid., pp. 22-24.

15l700ZJan93.

U.S. Army Forces

Army Forces

Summary," p.

379. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for

Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance

(Santa Monica, California: The Rand

Corporation, 1996), pp. 80-81.

406.

407.

408.

409.

410.

411.

412.

413.

414.

415.

416.

417.

pp. 8-9.

pp. 10-11.

p. 10.

pp. 7-8.

pp. 3,4,5.

pp. 14-20.
168 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

426. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

427. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.

428. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw.

429. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with

Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:

Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 26-27.

430. 1 MEF, ComdC, sec 2, [Narrative Summary,[ pp.

5-6, 41.

431.! MEF, ComdC, lMar93-30Apr93, sec 2,

[INarrative Summary,L] pp.2-6, 2-7.

432. Hellmer-Dawson intvw, 28Feb93.

433. Ibid.

434. Ibid.

Chapter 9

The information for this chapter was based on a

variety of sources written by participants. These

include the comments of United Nations Secretary

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in the United Nations

Blue Book Series, Volume VIII, The United Nations

And Somalia 1992-1996. Also used was the authorl

interview with BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter

Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw, and the interview between

LtCol CharlesH. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright,

Jr., USA, with LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter

Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

435. Department of Public Information United

Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,

Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia

1992-1996 (New York, New York: United

Nations, 1996), p. 33.

436. Hoar, [A CiiC[s Perspective,[ p. 62.

437. Robert B. Oakley, [Somalia: A Case Study,[ Two

Perspectives on Intervention and Humanitarian

Operations, Earl H. Tilford, Jr., editor

(Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute,

Jul97), p. 5.

438. Department of Public Information United

Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,

Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia

1992-1996 (New York, New York: United

Nations, 1996), p. 46.

439. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intyw, 11Mar93.

440. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

441. Ibid., p. 44.

442. Department of Public lnformation United

Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,

Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia

1992-1996 (New York, New York: United

443. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

444. Hoar, [A CIiCLI5 Perspective, [H p. 58.

445. Robert B. Oakley, [Somalia: A Case Studyji Two

Perspectives on Intervention and Humanitarian

Operations, Earl El. Tilford, Jr., editor

(Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute,

Jul97), p. 13.

446. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

447. Department of Public !nformation United

Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,

Volume VII!, The United Nations and Somalia

1992-1996 (New York, New York: United

Nations, 1996), p. 39.

448. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.

449. Department of Public Information United

Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,

Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia

1992-1996 (New York, New York: United

Nations, 1996), pp. 46-47.

450. CentCom Point Paper, subj: [Proposed Transition

from Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to United

Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM Il),H

dtd 23Dec92.

451. John ston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

452. Ibid.

453. Ibid.

454. ComNavFor Somalia SitRep, dtd 252000ZFeb93.

455. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource

Guide: Un(fied Task Force Somalia December

1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military

History, 1994), pp. 155-157.

456. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.

457. Department of Public Information United

Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,

Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia

1992-1996 (New York, New York: United

Nations, 1996), pp. 42-43.

458. Ibid., p. 43.

459. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource

Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December

1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military

History, 1994), pp. 154-157.

460. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces

Somalia, p. 26.

461.! MEF, ComdC, lMar-30Apr93, sect 2,

[Narrative Summary,[ pp. 2-3 to 2-5, 2-8, and see

3, [IChronological Listing of Significant Evcnts,[

p. 3-4.

462. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,

LI Remarks by the President to General Johnston

Nations, 1996), pp. 40-41. and Staft[ 5May93.
Appendix A

Unified Task Force Somalia Organization

Command and Staff Battalion Headquarters

Alpha Company

Commanding General: Lieutenant General Robert Bravo Company

B. Johnston Charlie Company

Special Envoy: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley Delta Company

Deputy Commanding General: Major General w. Support Company

D. Moore, USA Administration Company

Joint Force Air Component Commander: Major 1st Battalion, Support Group

General Harold W. Blot Battalion Headquarters

Chief of Staff: Colonel Billy C. Steed Transport Troop

Political Advisor: Mr. John Hirsch Field Supply Platoon

Administration (J-1): Colonel L. Rehberger iii Medical Platoon

Intelligence (J-2): Colonel W. M. Handley, USA Dental Section

Operations (J-3): Brigadier General Anthony C. Field Workshop

Zinni B Squadron, 3df4th Cavalry Regiment

Logistics (J-4): Colonel Sam E. Hatton, USA Battery Commander's Party, 107th Field

Plans and Policy (J-5): Colonel John W. Moffett Battery

Command, Control, Communications (J-6): 17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat

Colonel Robert G. Hill Engineer Regiment

Executive Assistant (J-8/EA): Colonel Michael Detachment, 103d Signals Squadron

W. Hagee

Joint Information Bureau: Colonel Frederick C.

Peck Naval Contingent

Joint Visitor's Bureau: Colonel R. J. Agro HMAS Jervis Bay

Civil-Military Operations Center: Colonel Kevin HMAS Tobrulc

M. Kennedy

Unified Task Force Surgeon: Captain Michael L.

Cowan, USN Belgium

Unified Task Force Engineer: Colonel Robert B.

Flowers, USA Commanding Officer

Headquarters Commandant: Major Eric C. Holt Colonel Marc Jacqmin, Belgian Army

Joint Combat Camera Detachment: Lieutenant

Commander James P. Kiser, USN 1 st Parachute Battalion (Reinforced)

Headquarters Company

Support Company

Coalition Forces 11th Company

13th Company

21st Company

Australia Reconnaissance Company

Engineer Platoon

Commanding Officer Supply Platoon (Reinforced)

Colonel William J. Mellor, Australian Army Surgical Team

Signal Platoon

1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team

Battalion Group Aviation Detachment

1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Judge Advocate General Team

Regiment
170 REST0IUNG HOPE IN SOMALIA

Naval Contingent

HMS Zinnia Composite Reinforced Company

1st Platoon (Light Armored)

2d Platoon (Light Armored)

Botswana Logistics Platoon

Medical Section

Commanding Officer Engineer Section

Lieutenant Colonel Thulanganyo Masisi, Maintenance Section

Botswana Defense Force Logistics Section

Composite Reinforced Company

Command Section France

1st Platoon (Mechanized)

2d Platoon (Light Infantry) Commanding General

3d Platoon (Light Infantry) Major General Rene Delhome, French Army

4th Platoon (Light Infantry)

Special Forces Troop Command Element, 9th Marine Infantry Division

Mortar Platoon Battalion, 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade

Medical Section Battalion, 5th Combined Arms Overseas

Transportation Section Regiment

Signals Section 3d Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment

Stores Section 4th Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment

Messing Section 3d Company, 6th Foreign Legion Engineer

Central Arms Depot Regiment

Engineer Section Detachment, 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment

Detachment, Special Forces

Detachment, Logistics Support Battalion

Canada Naval Contingent

Commanding Officer Frigate Georges Leygues

Colonel Serge Labbe, Canadian Army Light Transport La Grandiere

Amphibious Ship Foudre

Canadian Joint Force Somalia Tanker Var

Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group

1 Commando

2 Commando Germany

3 Commando

Service Commando Commanding Officer

DFS Platoon Lieutenant Colonel Meitzner, German Air

Reconnaissance Platoon Force

A Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons

Engineer Troop The German contingent consisted of three

Signal Troop Luftwaffe C-I 60 Transall aircraft operating from

Aviation Detachment Mombasa, Kenya, as a part of Operation Provide

Relief.

Naval Contingent

HMCS Preserver Greece

Egypt Commanding Officer

Colonel Spilitios, Greek Army

Commanding Officer

Colonel Al-Fakhrani, Egyptian Army

Infantry Battalion (-)
APPENDIX A 171

Logistics Section

Communications Section

Military Police Section

Post Exchange Section

Public Affairs Section

Morocco

Commanding Officer

Colonel Major (brigadier general equivalent)

Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army

Base Section

3d Motorized Infantry Regiment

Infantry Company

Infantry Company

Cavalry Company

Air Defense Artillery element

Medical Section

New Zealand

Commanding Officers

Colonel Dunne, Royal New Zealand Air

Force, 9 December 1992 to 18 March 1993

Wing Commander Duxfield, Royal New

Zealand Air Force, 18 March 1993

Detachment, 42 Squadron (Three Andover transport aircraft)

Nigeria

Commanding Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola,

Nigerian Army

245 Reconnaissance Battalion

Battalion Headquarters

Administration Company

Company Headquarters

Quartermaster Platoon

Engineer Troop

Light Aid Detachment

Signals Section

Mobile Shop

Company A (Mechanized Infantry)

Company B (Mechanized Infantry)

Company C (Reconnaissance Company)

Company D (Reconnaissance Company)

India

Commanding Officer

Commodore Sam Pillai, Indian Navy

Naval Contingent

Tanker INS Deepak

Amphibious Landing Ship iNS Cheetah

Frigate INS Kuthar

Italy

Commanding General

Major General Gianpietro Rossi, Italian

Army

Headquarters Element

Folgore Parachute Brigade

Headquarters Regiment

186th Parachute Regiment

1 87th Parachute Regiment

9th Assault Parachute Battalion

Logistics Battalion

Armored Vehicle Company

Engineer Company

Tank Company

Field Hospital "Centauro"

Surgical Detachment

San Marco Battalion (Marine Infantry)

Composite Helicopter Regiment

Detachment, 46th Aviation Brigade

Naval Contingent

Frigate ITS Grecale

Logistical Landing Ship ITS Vesuvio

Landing Ship Tank ITS San Giorgio

Kuwait

Commanding Officers

Lieutenant Colonel Mohamad al-Obaid,

Kuwaiti Army

Major Al Muzien, Kuwaiti Army

Composite Reinforced Motorized Company

Company Headquarters

Armored Car Platoon

Scout Platoon

Scout Platoon

Medical Section

Engineer Section
172 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Pakistan

(Note: Does not include Pakistani forces in Tunisia

Somalia as part of UNOSOM I)

Commanding Officer

Commanding Officers Lieutenant Colonel Sharif, Tunisian Army

Colonel Asif, Pakistani Army

Lieutenant Colonel Tariq S. Malik, Pakistani Infantry Battalion (-)

Army

6th Battalion, The Punjab Regiment Turkey

Battalion Headquarters

Company A Commanding Officers

Company B Colonel Huseyin Erim, Turkish Army, 9

Company C December 1992 to 25 March 1993

Company D Major Haldun Solmazturk, Turkish Army, 25

Support Company March 1993

Company Headquarters

Signals Platoon I Company, I Battalion Mechanized, 28 Brigade

Administrative Platoon Headquarters Section

Transport Section 1st Platoon (Mechanized infantry)

Administrative Section 2d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry

Assault Engineer Platoon 3d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry

81mm Mortar Platoon Fire Support Platoon

7th Battalion, Frontier Forces Quartermaster Platoon

10th Battalion, Baluch Regiment Transport and Maintenance Platoon

1st Battalion, Sind Regiment Signal Section

Medical Section

Engineer Section

Saudi Arabia Naval Contingent

Commanding Officer Landing Ship Tank Ertugrul

Colonel Ali al Shehri, Royal Saudi Land Logistics Ship Derya

Forces Destroyer Fatih

5th Royal Saudi Land forces Airborne Battalion

(Reinforced) United Arab Emirates

Headquarters Company

I Company Commanding Officers

2 Company Lieutenant Colonel Alkethi, United Arab

3 Company Emirates Army, 9 February 1993

Combat Service Support Element Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Ketbi, United

Medical Platoon Arab Emirates Army

Engineer Platoon

Maintenance Platoon Al Wajeb Battalion

Headquarters Company

Sweden Services Section

Combat Engineer Platoon

Commanding Officer 81Mm Mortar Platoon

Lieutenant Colonel Lars A. Hedman, Reconnaissance Company

Swedish Army 2d Company (Mechanized Infantry)

3d Company (Mechanized Infantry

1st Field Hospital
APPENDIX A 173

United Kingdom

Commanding Officer

Wing Commander Humphrey, Royal Air

Force

The United Kingdom contingent consisted of two

Royal Air Force C-130 aircraft flying out of

Mombasa, Kenya, as part of Operation Provide

Relief.

United States

Air Force Contingent

Commanding Officers

Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik,

USAF, 9 December 1992 to 29 March 1993

Colonel Wirthe, USAF, 9 March 1993

Air Force Forces Somalia

Air Force Forces Somalia Staff, Mogadishu

437th Tactical Airlift Wing

5th Combat Communications Group

823d Civil Engineering Squadron

Mogadishu Airfield Tactical Airlift Control

Element

Mogadishu Airfield Support

Deployed Tactical Airlift Control Element

Army Contingent

Commanding Generals

Brigadier General William Magruder III,

USA

Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, 22

December 1992 to 13 March 1993

Brigadier Greg L. Gile, USA, 13 March to 4

May 1993

Army Forces Somalia

10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)

2d Brigade (Commando Brigade)

3d Battalion, 14th Infantry

Headquarters Company

Company A

Company B

Company C

2d Battalion, 87th Infantry

Headquarters Company

Company A

Company B

Company C

A Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry

E Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry

(Provisional)

Scout Platoon, Headquarters, 1st

Battalion, 87th Infantry

Aviation Brigade (Falcon Brigade)

3d Battalion (Assault), 25th Aviation

Headquarters Company

Company B

Company C

Company D

3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry

Headquarters Troop

A Troop

B Troop

C Troop

D Troop

10th Mountain Division Support Command

210th Support Battalion (Forward)

Headquarters and Company A

Company B

Company C

710th Support Battalion (Main)

Headquarters and Company A

Company B

Company C

Company D

Company E, 25th Aviation

10th Signal Battalion

Headquarters Company

Company A

Company B

Company C

41st Engineer Battalion

Headquarters Company

Company A

Company B

110th Military Intelligence Battalion

Technical Control And Analysis

Element

Military Intelligence Support Team

Counter intelligence Team

Ground Surveillance Radar Team

Long Range Surveillance

Detachment

10th Military Police Company

Battery B, 3d Battalion, 62d Air Defense

Artillery

Detachment, Battery A, 3d Battalion,

62d Air Defense Artillery

Joint Task Force Support Command

Commanding General

Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, USA
174 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMAUA

(Epidemiology)

(Veterinary)

(Dental)

(Preventive

(Combat Stress

36th Engineer Group

43d Engineer Battalion

Company A

Company B

Company C

Direct Support Maintenance Unit

63d Engineer Company (Combat Support

Equipment)

642d Engineer Company (Combat Support

Equipment)

74th Engineer Detachment (Diving)

95th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)

520th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)

597th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)

33d Finance Battalion (Provisional) (FSU)(-)

602d Maintenance Company

Detachment, 514th Maintenance Company

62d Medical Group

32d Medical Battalion (Logistics)

86th Evacuation Hospital

159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance)

423d Medical Company (Clearing)

514th Medical Company (Ambulance)

61st Medical Detachment (Preventive

Medicine Sanitation)

73d Medical Detachment (Veterinary)

224th Medical Detachment (Preventive

Medicine Sanitation)

227th Medical Detachment

248th Medical Detachment

257th Medical Detachment

485th Medical Detachment

Medicine Entomology)

528th Medical Detachment

Team)

555th Medical Detachment (Surgical)

Detachment 5 13th Military Intelligence

Brigade

593d Support Group (Area)

4th Support Center Material Management)

548th Supply and Services Battalion

62d Supply Company

266th Supply Company (Direct Support)

364th Supply Company

7th Transportation Group

49th Transportation Center (Movement

Control)

6th Transportation Battalion

24th Transportation Battalion

24th Transportation Company

57th Transportation Company

100th Transportation Company

119th Transportation Company

155th Transportation Company

360th Transportation Company

710th Transportation Company (Provisional)

(Boat)

870th Transportation Company

22d Transportation Detachment

160th Transportation Detachment

169th Transportation Detachment

329th Transportation Detachment

491st Transportation Detachment

Military Traffic Management Command

"Tiger" Team

2d Chemical Battalion

720th Military Police Battalion

5 11th Military Police Company

57 1st Military Police Company

978th Military Police Company

984thMilitary Police Company

Military Police Criminal Investigation

Element

240th Quartermaster Battalion

110th Quartermaster Company (POL)

267th Quartermaster Company

18th Quartermaster Platoon

26th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU

Barge Team)

30th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU

Barge Team)

82d Quartermaster Detachment

22d Quartermaster Laboratory

Detachment, 54th Quartermaster Company

(Graves Registration)

Task Force Thunderbird (Signal)

209th Signal Company

516th Signal Company

Company C, 327th Signal Battalion

Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters

Company, 11th Signal Brigade

Detachment, 63d Signal Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment,

86th Signal Battalion

Detachment, 19th Signal Company

Detachment, 69th Signal Company

Detachment, 385th Signal Company

Detachment, 505th Signal Company

Detachment, 521st Signal Company

Detachment, 526th Signal Company

Detachment, 593d Signal Company

10th Personnel Services Company

546th Personnel Services Company

129th Postal Company

7 11th Postal Company

Detachment, Company B (Air Traffic Control),

1st Battalion, 58th Aviation

Task Force 5-158 Aviation
APPENDIX A 175

13th

60th

542d

Team)

27th Public Affairs Team

28th Public Affairs Team

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable)

Headquarters, 24th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable)

Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion,

2d Marines

Marine Wing Support

Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

Ordnance Detachment (EOD) (Control

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

Commanding Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA

8th Psychological Operations Battalion

Product Dissemination Battalion

9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical)

Marine Corps Contingent

Commanding Officers

Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, 9

December 1992 to 23 March 1993

Colonel Jack W. Klimp, 23 March 1993 to 9

April 1993

Colonel Emil R. Bedard, 9-28 April 1993

Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, 28 April 1993

to 4 May 1993

Marine Forces Somalia

1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)

Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division

(-) (Reinforced)

7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)

Headquarters Company, 7th Marines

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-)

(Reinforced)

3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-)

(Reinforced)

3d Amphibious Assault Battalion (-)

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-)

Reconnaissance Company, 5th Marines

Company C, 1st Tank Battalion (-)

(Reinforced)

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable)

Headquarters, 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations

Capable)

Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion,

9th Marines

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

164 (Composite)

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service

Support Group 15

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

263 (Composite)

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service

Support Group 24

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and

Intelligence Group

Headquarters Company, 1st Surveillance,

Reconnaissance and Intelligence

Group (-)

1st Intelligence Company (-)

1st Force Service Support Group

Headquarters, 1st Service Support Group

(Forward)

Headquarters and Service Battalion (-)

7th Engineer Battalion (-)

7th Motor Transport Battalion (-)

1st Landing Support Battalion (-)

1st Supply Battalion (-)

1st Maintenance Battalion (-)

1st Medical Battalion (-)

1st Dental Battalion (-)

Marine Aircraft Group 16

Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Group 16

Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 369

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363

Marine Aerial Transport Refueler

Squadron 352

Detachment, Marine Heavy Helicopter

Squadron 466

Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron

38 (-)

Detachment, Headquarters and

Headquarters Service Squadron

Detachment, Marine Wing

Communications Squadron 38

Detachment, Marine Air Traffic

Control Squadron 38

Detachment, Marine Air Support

Squadron 3

Detachment, Marine Air Control

Squadron 1

Detachment,

Squadron 1

Detachment, Marine Aviation

Logistics Squadron 16

30th Naval Construction Regiment
176 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

Headquarters, 30th Naval Construction

Regiment

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40

9th Communications Battalion

1st Radio Battalion

1st Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-)

MAGTF Integration Instruction Team

National Intelligence Support Team

Naval Contingent

Commanding Officers

Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, 19-

28 December 1992

Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, USN, 19-28

December 1992

Rear Admiral (LH) James B. Perkins IH,

USN, 28 December 1992 to 15 January 1993

Captain J. W. Peterson, USN, 15 January

1993 to 1 February 1993

Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, 1 February

1993 to 5 March 1993

Captain Nathan FT. Beason, USN, 5-23

March 1993

Commodore Pyle, USN, 23 March

Naval Forces Somalia

Ranger Battle Group

Cruiser Destroyer Group I

Destroyer Squadron 7

USS Ranger

Carrier Air Wing 2

Fighter Squadron 1

Fighter Squadron 2

Attack Squadron 145

Attack Squadron 155

Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 38

Tactical Electronic Warfare

Squadron 31

Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron

VAW 116

HSL 47 Detachment 2

HC 11 Detachment 10

USS Wabash

USS Valley Forge

Kitty Hawk Battle Group

Cruiser Destroyer Group 5

Destroyer Squadron 17

USS Kitty Hawk

Carrier Air Wing 15

Fighter Squadron 111

Fighter Squadron 51

YAW 114

Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron

4

Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 37

Fighter/Attack Squadron 27

Fighter/Attack Squadron 97

Tactical Electronic Warfare

Squadron 134

Attack Squadron 52

Marine Detachment

Detachment, Explosive Ordnance

Unit 3

CTF 156

USS Tripoli

USS Juneau

USS Rushmore

USS Niagara Falls

CTF 155

Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 2

Wasp Amphibious Ready Group

CTF 156

Amphibious Squadron 2

TF 156

USS Wasp

USS El Paso

USS Louisville

USS Nashville

USS Barnstable County

Naval Beach Group 1

Assault Craft Unit I

Beachmaster Unit I

Amphibious Construction Battalion 1

Cargo Handling Group 1

Military Sealift Command Office, Mogadishu

Patrol Squadron Special Project Unit

Special Operations Contingent

Commanding Officers

Colonel Thomas Smith, USA

Lieutenant Colonel William L.

Faistenhanimer, USA, after 20 January 1993

1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

Company B

ODA 526

ODA 54

ODA 543

ODA 546

0DB 560

USS

USS

USS

USS

USS

USS

Leahy

W. H. Standley

Sacramento

Tripoli

Juneau

Rushmore

14
APPENDIX A 177

ODA 561 S Company, 42 Infantry Battalion (Reinforced)

ODA 562 Headquarters Section

ODA 563 Administration

ODA 564 Operations

ODA 565 Signals

2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Engineering

Company A (Operation Provide Relief) Public Affairs

Company C Electrical and Mechanical

Engineering/Stores

Chaplain

1st Platoon

Zimbabwe 2d Platoon

3d Platoon

Commanding Officer 81mm Mortar/Antitank Platoon

Major Vitalis Chigume, Zimbabwe Army Medical Platoon

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling

AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle

ACA Airspace Control Authority

ACE Air Combat Element

ACO Air Control Order

AES Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron

AFFor Air Force Forces Somalia

AMC Air Mobility Command

AME Air Mobility Element

APOD Aerial Port Of Debarkation

APOE Aerial Port Of Embarkation

ArFor Army Forces Somalia

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

ASG Area Support Group

ATE Amphibious Task Force

AWSS Authorized Weapons Storage Site

CA Civil Affair

CentCom U.S. Central Command

CinC Commander in Chief In the United States military, used as the title of a commander of a

specified or unified command, as in CinCCent, the commander in chief of the United

States Central Command.

CJTF Combined/Joint Task Force Somalia. One of the names given to the organization responsible for Operation Restore Hope, when it included both United States Armed Forces and

coalition partners (thus making it a combined and joint force). Note that this acronym is

sometimes also used for Commander Joint Task Force Somalia, especially in message

traffic. See also JTF and UNITAF.

CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center

CMOT Civil-Military Operations Team

CoSCom Corps Support Command

CSSE Combat Service Support Element

CWT Coalition Warfare Team

FIR Flight Information Region

FSS Fast Sealift Ship

FSSG Force Service Support Group

GCE Ground Combat Element

Humvee High Mobility Multiwheeled Vehicle

HRO Humanitarian Relief Organization

HRS Humanitarian Relief Sector

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force

JTF Joint Task Force Somalia. The original name given to the organization that would conduct

Operation Restore Hope. As a joint task force, it referred only to the organization when it

was composed of United States forces. It was changed over time to CJTF Somalia and to

UNITAF
180 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

JTFSC Joint Task Force Support Command. Sometimes referred to as the Joint Logistics

Command, or JLC

LCAC Landing Craft Amphibious Cargo

MarFor Marine Forces Somalia

METT-T Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time Available

MEU (SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force

MPS Maritime Prepositioning Squadron or Ships

MSSG MEU Service Support Group

MSR Main Supply Route

NavFor Navy Forces Somalia

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NoTAm Notice to Airmen

OpCon Operational Control. It is defined as a level of command authority used frequently in the

execution of joint operations. It is the command authority, which may be exercised by

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command arid can be delegated or transferred. It is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish

the mission.

PhibRon Amphibious Squadron

PsyOps Psychological Operations

PVO Private Voluntary Organization

RoE Rules of Engagement

ROWPU Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit

SNA Somali National Army

SNF Somali National Front

SPF Somali Patriotic Front

SPM Somali Patriotic Movement

SOCCent Special Operations Command, Central Command

SOFor Special Operations Forces

SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force

SYL Somali Youth League

TaCon Tactical Control. It is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the

detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to

accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TaCon may be delegated to and exercised by

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TaCon is inherent in OpCon.

TransCom The United States Transportation Command

TPFDD Time phased force deployment data

ULN Unit Line Number. A number assigned to a unit, with its personnel and equipment, which

is to be shipped as an entity. The ULN is used to tell units when to be prepared to load

onto transport. It also informs the receiving headquarters when they can expect the arrival

of a unit in theater. It can also be used to track the unit while it is enroute.

UNITAF Unified Task Force Somalia. The name given to the organization responsible for

Operation Restore Hope, encompassing the headquarters, the United States Armed Forces

components, and the coalition partners.
APPENDIX B 181

Notes on Somali Spelling

There was no standard written form of the Somali language until the 1960s. Fortunately for those in

the West, the government decided to adopt the Latin alphabet as the basis for the written form. However,

the exact spellings of place and personal names vary from one source to another, depending on the

understanding of the phonetics by the individual transliterating. To further complicate matters, the major

clans often speak different dialects. There are also differences between Italian and English forms of the

sounds and words.

For the sake of clarity, a standard of spelling for the most common names has been used in this volume. However, where a name or word is quoted, the spelling used in the quotation may have been kept.

The following is a list of these names, with alternate spellings as they may be found in other sources,

atlases, or histories.

Afgooye; Afgoi

Aideed; Aidid

Baidoa; Baydhabo

Balcad; Balad

Bale Dogle; Bali Dogle; Baali Doogle

Bardera; Baardheere

Beer Hanni; Bir Xanni; Bir Hane

Buulobarde; Bulo Burti; Buulo Berde

Buurhakaba; Buurhabaka (note transposition of the k and b); Bur Acaba; Buur Hakaba

Belet Weyne; Beled Weyne; Belet Uen; Belet Huen

Djibouti; Djibuti

Dhoble; Doble; Dhooble

Fer Fer; Ferfer; Feer Feer

Galcaio; Galkayo; Gaalkacyo

Gialalassi; Jialalaqsi; Xialalaksi

Habr Gedr; Habir Gedirh; Habr Gidr

Hargeisa; Hargeysa

Hawadle: Xawaadle

Hussein: Huseyn

Jawhar; Giohar; Johar

Jilib; Gelib

Jubba; Juba; Giuba

Kismayo; Kismayu; Cismayo; Chisimayu; Chisimaio; Kismaayo

Merka; Marka; Merca

Mogadishu; Mogadisho; Muqdishu

Mursade; Murasade; Mursida

Oddur; Huddur; Xuddur

Shabele; Shabeele; Shabeelle; Shebelle; Shebeli; Scebeli

Tiyegloo; Tayeeglow; Tigieglo; Tayeegle

Webi: Uebe

Wajid; Waajid; Wadjid

Yet; Yeet; Yeed

Appendix C

Chronology of Events and Operations

26 June 1960 British Somaliland receives independence.

1 July 1960 British Somaliland joins with the Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic.

15 October 1969 President Shermarke is assassinated.

21 October 1969 Siad Bane takes over the government of Somalia in a military coup.

July 1977 Somali Army invades Ethiopia.

November 1977 Bane abrogates Somali treaties with the Soviet Union.

1978 Somalia signs an agreement with the United States allowing U.S. military

access to Somali military facilities.

1980 An agreement is signed between Somalia and the United States. In return for

military aid, the United States receives use of the port and airfield at Berbera.

1988 Armed opposition to the Bane government begins with a rebellion in the north

of the country.

1990 Three main opposition groups are fighting against the Bane regime. These are

the Somali National Movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement, and the United

Somali Congress.

December 1990 Fighting nears Mogadishu. Civil order breaks down in the city.

5 December 1990 U.S. Ambassador James K. Bishop orders the evacuation of all non-essential

United States Embassy personnel.

30 December 1990 All remaining Americans are brought into the United States Embassy compound.

31 December 1990 The commander of U.S. Naval Central Command orders his staff to prepare for

an evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu.

1 January 1991 Ambassador Bishop requests permission from the State Department to evacuate

the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu.

2 January 1991 The State Department grants permission for evacuation of the embassy.

2 January 1991 Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an execute order for Operation Eastern Exit.

2 January 1991 Four ships carrying Marine forces get underway from the Persian Gulf to conduct noncombatant evacuation of the embassy.

5 January 1991 Ships arrive off the coast of Mogadishu. Operation Eastern Exit begins. First

helicopters leave the ships at 0345; the last helicopters return at 2323. The operation is declared complete at 2340.

22 January 1991 Siad Bare flees Mogadishu

May 1992 Bane's forces are defeated and he flees Somalia. Fighting between the factions

for control of the country begins.

17 November 1991 Fighting and civil disorder force United Nations staff to evacuate Somalia.

18 August 1992 President George H. W. Bush orders the airlift of 145,000 tons of food to

Somalia in Operation Provide Relief.

23 November 1992 Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), carrying the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MIEU (SOC)), departs

Singapore enroute to the Persian Gulf.
184 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

25 November 1992 President Bush announces to the United Nations that the United States was prepared to provide military forces to assist in the delivery of food and relief supplies to Somalia.

27 November 1992 Commanding general of Central Command (CentCom) designates I Marine

Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as the headquarters of Joint Task Force (JTF)

Somalia.

29 November 1992 United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that the U.N.

Security Council would consider authorizing an operation by member states.

1 December 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a warning order to the commander in chief of Central

Command (CinCCent).

2 December 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff order the commander in chief, Pacific, to assign I MEF to

CinCCent.

3 December 1992 The United Nations Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 794,

authorizing military intervention in Somalia. CinCCent issues deployment to I

MER Tripoli ARG arrives off southern Somali coast.

4 December 1992 JTF Somalia headquarters established. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston

briefs his concept of operations to component commanders.

5 December 1992 CentCom issues its operation order for Restore Hope. CinCCent assigns commanding general I MEF as commanding general, JTF Somalia.

6 December 1992 JTF Somalia issues its operation order for Restore Hope.

7 December 1992 First trainload of Army equipment departs Fort Drum for the port of Bayonne,

New Jersey.

9 December 1992 At 0330, landing vehicles carrying Marines and Navy Sea, Air, Land personnel

(SEALs) are launched from the ARO for initial landings and arrive at

Mogadishu at 0540. By 1145, the Mogadishu airport is declared secure and the

first military aircraft lands. One company of the 2d French Foreign Legion

Parachute Regiment joins the JTF in Mogadishu.

10 December 1992 General Johnston arrives in Mogadishu. Headquarters for Combined JTF

Somalia is established in the United States Embassy compound. Unified Task

Force Somalia (UINITAF) decides to move up the deployment of Army forces,

originally scheduled to begin on 19 December, by eight days.

Ii December 1992 Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, commanding general of Marine Forces

Somalia (MarFor) arrives in Mogadishu. General Johnston and Ambassador

Robert B. Oakley begin talks with faction leaders. General Mohamed Farah

Hassan Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed agree to respect the ceasefire and to

remove heavy weapons from the city. United Nations Secretary General

Boutros Boutros-Ghali invites 11 political faction leaders to a preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation.

12 December 1992 Three helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 are fired on by

Somalis in two separate incidents. The helicopters destroy two "technicals" and

damage one Ml 13 armored personnel carrier. HMCS Preserver arrives at

Mogadishu port, beginning the Canadian Operation Deliverance. First Army

unit, Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrives at Bale Dogle.

13 December 1992 Bale Dogle secured by Marines of the 15th MEU (SOC). First Army unit,

Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry arrives in Bale Dogle. The Belgian 1st

Parachute Battalion arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of the Italian Folgore

Brigade, a reconnaissance unit, arrive in Mogadishu.

14 December 1992 Advance party of Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group arrives in

Mogadishu. First elements of Kuwaiti force arrive in Mogadishu.

15 December 1992 Army forces assume control of Bale Dogle sector from Marines.
APPENDIX C 185

16 December 1992 Turkish advance party arrives in Mogadishu. Task Force Hope, composed of

elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and French forces, secures the airfield at

Baidoa. Italian reconnaissance unit reoccupies the Italian Embassy. Phase I of

Operation Restore Hope is completed.

19 December 1992 Turkish reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of Saudi

Arabian force arrive in Mogadishu.

20 December 1992 Kismayo port and airfield are secured by elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and

the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion.

22 December 1992 Australian forces reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. Major General

Steven L. Arnold, commanding general of Army Forces Somalia, arrives in

Mogadishu.

23 December 1992 A mine near Bardera kills Lawrence N. Freedman, a U.S. Government civilian

employee. Mr. Freedman is the first member of the Unified Task Force to die in

the performance of duty. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl

E. Mundy, Jr., arrives at the embassy compound in Mogadishu for a formal visit.

The San Marco Battalion arrives with the Italian Naval Group.

24 December 1992 Bardera is secured by elements of the 7th Marines. Task Force Kismayo is

formed from the Army forces under the command of Brigadier General Lawson

W. Magruder, III, USA. Main body of Italian Folgore Brigade arrives.

25 December 1992 French forces secure Oddur.

27 December 1992 Italian forces secure Gialalassi. General Aideed and Au Mahdi meet on the

"green line" dividing Mogadishu, declaring it abolished. 3d Battalion, 9th

Marines, relieves the 15th MEU (SOC) of responsibility for Baidoa sector.

28 December 1992 Elements of Army Forces Somalia and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle

Group secure Belet Weyne, last of the originally planned relief sector. Phase 11

of Operation Restore Hope is completed. Operation Clean Street begins in

Mogadishu, continuing until 6 January 1993. General Aideed and All Mahdi

meet in Mogadishu and agree to dismantle the "green line" separating the city.

31 December 1992 Merka port and airfield are secured by elements of Army Forces Somalia and

the Italian San Marco Brigade. President Bush arrives in Mogadishu, visiting

units in the city and aboard ship.

1 January 1993 President Bush visits units in Baidoa and Bale Dogle.

2 January 1993 Main body of Turkish forces arrives in Mogadishu.

4 January 1993 First reconciliation conference begins at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 14 factions are

represented.

6 January 1993 Commanding general issues guidance for the draw down and restructuring of

the force. Members of General Aideed's faction fire on a UNITAF convoy traveling through Mogadishu. A plan is developed for the seizure of the weapons

storage areas involved.

7 January 1993 In a dawn assault, the two weapons storage areas are seized by Marines of Task

Force Mogadishu.

8 January 1993 Identification card system for weapons control goes into effect. Task Force

Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Argentine arms market. Australian

forces advance party arrives in Baidoa.

8-15 January 1993 All participants to the Addis Ababa conference sign a series of agreements, calling for a ceasefire, the cessation of all hostile propaganda, cooperation with

international organizations, free movement of the Somali people, and specific

agreements on disarmament.

11 January 1993 Task Force Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Barkera arms market.
186 RESTORING HOPE IN Sott&LIA

12 January 1993 Private First Class Domingo Arroyo is killed by small arms fire while on patrol

in Mogadishu. Private Arroyo is the first uniformed member of UNITAF to be

killed in action. Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the operational control of Army Forces Somalia.

13 January 1993 Somali Security Committee in Mogadishu approaches UNTTAF about the

reestablishment of the Somali National Police Force.

16 January 1993 Baidoa sector transferred to Army Forces Somalia.

17 January 1993 Main body of Australian forces arrives in Baidoa.

19 January 1993 Australian forces assume responsibility for Baidoa sector.

30 January 1993 3,000 Somali auxiliary security force personnel are reported as prepared to start

police duties.

8 February 1993 General Johnston and Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen send a joint letter to all

signatories of the 8 January Accords calling on them to begin the disarmament

process.

23 February 1993 Supporters of Aideed begin rioting in Mogadishu as a result of incidents in

Kismayo.

24 February 1993 Rioting continues in Mogadishu, especially in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic circle.

25 February 1993 U.S. Marines and Botswana soldiers conduct clearing operations in the vicinity

of the K-4 traffic circle. Calm returns to Mogadishu by the evening.

2 March 1993 Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the direct control of UNITAF and

given responsibility for Bale Dogle sector.

4 March 1993 Members of the Reconnaissance Platoon, Canadian Airborne Regiment, shoot

two unarmed intruders in the engineer compound in Belet Weyne, killing one of

them.

16 March 1993 Two Canadian soldiers torture and beat to death a Somali teenager caught infiltrating the Canadian compound in Belet Weyne.

24 March 1.993 The final day of Ramadan, and the start of two days of celebration. This is the

first time in two years the citizens of Mogadishu have been able to celebrate this

religious feast day in peace.

4 May 1993 UNITAF turns over responsibility for operations in Somalia to the United

Nations forces, under the command of Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, Turkish

Army. The last of UINITAF headquarters staff depart Somalia.

5 May 1993 President William J. Clinton welcomes General Johnston and his staff back to

the United States in a special ceremony on the White House lawn.
Appendix D

Citation

Joint Meritorious Unit Award Unified Task Force Somalia

Citation:

Unified Task Force Somalia, United States Central Command, distinguished itself by exceptionally

meritorious service in Operation RESTORE HOPE from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. During this

period, the Unified Task Force organized and deployed the largest humanitarian assistance mission in

history, a joint and combined task force of over 38,000 personnel. Rapidly establishing security in eight

Humanitarian Relief Sectors in war-tom and famine-raged Somalia, they effectively neutralized waning

factions that had paralyzed and devastated the country. Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the delivery of over 42,000 metric tons of relief supplies to the starving population, disarmed warring factions,

fostered a cease fire, and restored police and judiciary systems. It accomplished a major infrastructure

rebuilding effort, restoring roads, airfields, seaports and public utilities that had been destroyed by two

years of civil war. Through the intervention and leadership of Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts

of over 60 different air and relief organizations and the support of 23 nations were coordinated and

focused to reverse a human tragedy of famine and disease that was claiming the lives of thousands each

day. Under the stability provided by Unified Task Force Somalia, the process of reconciliation and

rebuilding began. The successes of the members of Unified Task Force Somalia in the accomplishment

of national security objectives, and their exemplary performance of duty have brought great credit to

themselves, their Services, the United States Central Command, and to the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 29th day of June 1993

Cohn L. Powell

Chairman of the John Chiefs of Staff

Abdulrahman Au Tur, 3

Abu Taalib, 2

Addis Ababa, 6, 52, 56-58, 75, 95-98, 109, 130,

142, 147, 149

Aden, 2-3, 56, 109

Afgooye, 90-91, 118, 181

Aideed, Gen Mohammed Farah Hassan, 3, 8, 21-

22, 52, 56, 66-69, 71-73, 86-87, 92, 94, 97-98,

139, 155-156

AIDS, 25, 107-108

Air Force Commands and Units

Air Force Forces Somalia, 18, 104, 106, 110,

114

156th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129

183d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129

1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129-

130

437th Airlift Wing, 18

Air Force Forces Somalia, 18, 104, 106, 110, 114

Air Mobility Command, 29, 36, 40

American University, 118, 120

Aqiil, 2

Argentine Market, 71

Army Commands and Units

Army Forces Somalia, 16, 18-19, 37-38, 48-

50, 76-78, 90-91, 94, 97, 113-114, 116,-

119, 121-122, 124, 145, 152

10th Aviation Brigade, SOlOth Forward

Support Battalion, 117, 153

10th Mountain Division, 17, 19, 37, 40-41,

44, 48-50, 76, 90-91, 93-94, 100, 110, 117,

119, 133, 137, 140, 151-152, 154, 156, 158

13th Corps Support Command, 13, 19

1st (Warrior) Brigade, 10th Mountain

Division, 91, 117

1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, 117, 153

240th Quartermaster Battalion, 119

245th Reconnaissance Battalion, 73

2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 38, 49-50, 90, 114

2d Chemical Battalion, 119

2d (Commando) Brigade, 10th Mountain

Index

Division, 90

189

36th Engineer Group, 119, 132-133

3d Assault Helicopter Battalion, 117

3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 94, 117

3d Battalion, 25th Aviation, 153

3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 96

41st Engineer Battalion, 117, 133, 173

42d Field Hospital, 129

4th Platoon, 300th Military Police Company,

117

4th Psychological Operations Group

(Airborne), 137-138

511th Military Police Company, 117

57 1st Military Police Company, 87

593d Area Support Group, 19, 121, 123-124

593d Support Group (Area), 119

5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, 117

62d Medical Group, 19, 119, 128-129

710th Main Support Battalion, 116-117

720th Military Police Battalion, 119

7th Battalion, Frontier Service Regiment, 16

7th Transportation Group, 19, 119-121

86th Evacuation Hospital, 128-130

8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 137

984th Military Police Company, 91

9th Psychological Operations Battalion

(Tactical), 137

Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 38

Company B, 9th Psychological Operations

Battalion, 67

Product Dissemination Battalion, 137

Third Army, 14, 16

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 121

United States Army Forces Command, 14

XVIII Airborne Corps, 16

Arnold, MajGen Steven L., USA, 17, 19, 48-49,

94, 113, 117, 152

Arone, Shidane, 100

Arthur, VAdm Stanley R., USN, 6-7

Australia, 20, 40, 79, 98

Australian Commands and Units

103d Signals Squadron, 79

17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat

Engineer Regiment, 79

1st Battalion Support Group, 79
190 REsTORING Hoes IN SOMALIA

1st Battalion, 1st Royal Australian Regiment, Britain, 3-4, 155

40, 78-79 British Commands and Units, 42 6th Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment, 79 British Royal Air Force, 42 Australian Ready Deployment Force, 40

HMAS Jervis Bay (GT 203), 78 British Somaliland, 2-4

HMAS Tobruk, 79 Brock, Col Michael V., 14 Royal Australian Air Force, 79

Squadron B, 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry Brown and Root, 120-122

Regiment, 78 Brown, Pvt Kyle (Canadian Forces), 100-101

Baidoa, 3, 8, 28, 38, 42-43, 45-46, 52, 61, 76, Bulo Burti, 87 77-82, 98-99, 105, 111-122, 130, 132, 143-145

Bush, President George H. W., 1, 9, 11, 43, 148 Balcad, 87-89

Buurhakaba, 80 Bale Dogle, 25, 28, 38, 40, 42, 49, 73, 76-77, 90-

91, 105-106, 122, 132 Cairo West Airport, Egypt, 130

Bangladesh, 141, 152, 155 Camp Pendleton, California, 12-14, 18, 37, 144,

153 Baraawe, 90

Canada, 18, 20, 101 Bardera, 3, 28, 45-46, 52, 66, 76, 82-83, 105,

115, 118, 122, 127, 130, 132, 134, 143, 145, 153 Canadian Commands and Units

93 Rotary Wing Aircraft Flight, 91 Barkera Market, 71 Airborne Regiment, 9, 40, 49, 91, 101

Bane, Gen Mohammed Siad, 3, 5-8, 21, 23, 26, HMCS Preserver (AOR 510), 104

63, 95 Ministry of National Defense, 101

Royal Canadian Dragoons, 91 Battle of Adowa, 3

Ceelgasass, 46 Bedard, Col Emil R., 45, 82, 152-153

Central Command, 6, 11-14, 17-19, 21-22, 25- Belet Weyne, 1,9, 28-29, 48-49, 53, 89-95, 97, 27, 29, 32, 107, 109, 113, 115, 117, 121, 134- 100, 104, 130, 143 135, 147, 149-150, 152

Belgian Commands and Units Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, 18 11th Company, 45

1st Parachute Battalion, 44,94,96 Civil-Military Operations Center, 27, 82, 111,

Close Reconnaissance Squadron, 45 142-145

Belgium, 18, 20, 155 Clan-families

Darod, 2-3 Berbera, 6, 25 Digil, 2

Bir, LtGen Cevik (Turkish Forces), 96, 150-15 1, Dir, 2-3

153-154 Habr Gedr, 3, 87, 155

Hawadle, 49, 92 Bishop, American Ambassador James K., 6-7 Hawiye, 2-3, 6, 8

Bombay, 109 Issaq, 2-3

Borchini, LtCol Charles, USA, 137 Majertain, 3

Ogadeni, 3

Bosnia, 122, 157-158 Rahanweyne, 2-3, 83

Botswana, 18, 41, 73, 83, 118 Clausewitz, Carl von, 51

Boudra, Cdr William F., USN, 133 Clinton, President William J., 154-155

Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General Boutros, 11, Conde, GySgt Harry (Canadian Forces), 99

56, 141, 147, 149, 151 Conference on National Reconciliation, 150

Boyce, Capt Brian, USN, 32 Cowan, Capt Michael L., USN, 14, 125-126,
INDEX 191

127, 129

Dacca (AOR A41), 103

Defense Courier System, 136

Defense Intelligence Agency, 24

Derya (AD A576), 103

Dharsamenbo, 92

Djibouti, 2, 5, 34, 63, 83, 130

Doctors Without Borders, 84

Dotto, Col Peter A., 43, 55, 57-58, 98

Doyle, Col James J., Jr., 7

Egal, Prime Minister Ibrahim, 5

Egan, Col James B., 43

Egypt, 20, 30, 36, 41, 118, 130

El Berde, 46, 65, 84, 85

Elmi, BGen Ali Mohamed Kedeye, 67

Emperor Haile Selassie, 6

Eritria, 3

Erlugrul (LST L401), 103

Ess-Akalli, Col Omar (Moroccan Forces), 76,

118

Ethiopia, 3-6, 52, 56, 85, 92, 94, 130

Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army, 6, 85,

92

European Command, 138

Evans, Col Walter S., USAF, 109

Fatih (FF0 F242), 103

Fer Fer, 92

Flowers, Col Robert B., USA, 131

Fort Drum, New York, 17, 37

Fort Hood, Texas, 13,19

Fort Meade, Maryland, 135

Fort Stewart, Georgia, 14

France, 3-4, 18, 20, 83

Freedmann, Lawrence N., 66, 83

French Commands and Units

13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, 42,

46, 83

2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, 33,

42, 83

2d Marine Infantry Regiment, 83

5th Attack Helicopter Regiment, 83

5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment, 46,

83, 85

6th Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment, 83

French Special Operations Command, 42

French Somaliland, 2, 83

Fusco, Maj Gennaro (Italian Forces), 40

Gabiyu, Col Aden, 3

Gaddis, Col Evan R., USA, 94

Galcaio, 92, 94, 151

Garrison, MajGen William F., USA, 152

German Air Force, 41

Gialalassi, 28-29, 46-47, 85-90, 130, 132, 143

Gile, BGen Greg, L., USA, 97, 117

Grecale (FF0 F571), 103

Green Line, 55-57, 71, 88-89

Green Valley (TAK 2049), 128

Guam (LPD 9), 7

Hagee, Col Michael W., 67

Haiti, 25, 122, 157-158

Hamar Jab Jab, 118

Hamilton, Col Mark, USA, 58

Hancock, RAdm William J., IJSN, 17

Handley, Col William M., Jr., USA, 14

Hargeisa, 25

Harlane, 92

Hatton, Col Sam E., USA, 13-14

Helimer, Col Werner, 78, 82, 145, 152

Hill, Col Robert 0., 134, 136

Hirsi, Mohamed Said (Gen Morgan), 3, 23, 44,

52-53, 71, 74, 94-98, 140, 149

Hoar, MajGen Joseph P., 11-13, 22, 115, 149,

152

Horn of Africa, 1-3, 11, 25, 37, 56, 106, 108, 110

Howe, Adm Jonathan T., USN, 151

Hurley, LtCol David W. (Australian Forces), 99

Hussein, Col John, 56, 92, 156
192 RESToRING HOPE IN SOMALIA

I'Home, MajGen Rene (French Forces), 46

Imam Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, 3

India, 94, 152

International Action Against Hunger, 78

International Civil Aviation Organization, 107-

109

International Red Cross, 1, 9, 27, 92, 110, 141

Ireland, 152

Islamic Unity, 3

Italy, 3-4, 18, 20, 40, 45, 89, 125, 155

Italian Commands and Units

186th Parachute Regiment, 87

187th Parachute Regiment, 87

24th Naval Group, 40

46th Aviation Brigade, 89

Folgore Brigade, 40, 47, 87, 89

San Marco Battalion, 40, 50, 87

Jacqmin, LtCol Marc (Belgian Forces), 44-45

Jaua, Col Omar, 92

Jawhar, 87-88

Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr., 7

Jervis Bay (GT 203), 103

Jess, Col Ahmed Omar, 3, 22-23, 44-45, 53, 56,

71, 74, 83, 94-98, 100, 149, 155

Jilib, 4, 97, 133, 134

Johnston, LtGen Robert B., 12-14, 16-18, 20-22,

25-27, 29, 34, 38-39, 42, 50-54, 56-6 1, 66, 68,

72, 74, 80, 86-87, 96, 101, 107-109, 111-113,

115-116, 119-120, 126, 133, 137, 141, 143, 147,

149-151, 153-154, 157

Johnston, Philip, 141, 143, 147

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6, 11, 25, 113, 134, 149

Joint Task Force Somalia, 12-13, 22, 54

Jubba, 4, 24, 45, 83, 94, 96, 132

Jubba River, 4, 83, 94, 132

Juneau (LPH 10), 16, 3 1-32

K-4 traffic circle, 73, 118

Kennedy, Col Kevin M., 141-142, 144, 147

Kenya, 1, 4-5, 7, 30, 42, 79, 121, 130

Khukri (FSG P49), 103

Kincaid (DD 965), 17

Kismayo, 3-4, 22, 25, 28-29, 43-45, 53, 59, 65,

71-72, 74, 83, 94-101, 105, 114, 117, 124, 130,

132-134, 137-138, 140, 149-152, 155

Kittani, Ismat T., 147

Klimp, Cot Jack W., 67-70, 116, 152-153

Kline, Col John P., Jr., 115

Kosovo, 157

Kouyate, Lansana, 147, 149

Kurtunwaarey, 90

Kuthar (FSG P46), 103

Kuwait, 41, 106, 118

Labbe, Col Serge, 91-92

League of Arab States, 56

Lias, Col Dayre C., USAF, 106-107

Libutti, BGen Frank, 1

Loi, BGen Bruno (Italian Forces), 40

Lorenz, Col Frederick M., 26, 108

Magruder, BGen W. Lawson, III, USA, 44, 94,

95, 100

Mahdi, Ali (Mohamed), 3, 8, 22, 47, 52, 56, 71,

86-87, 92, 94, 139, 156

Malaysia, 152, 155

Marine Corps Commands and Units

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 12-16, 21, 26-

27, 65, 71, 119

Marine Forces Somalia, 16, 18-19, 36, 65-66,

105, 116, 119, 152

1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 113

1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 38, 45-46, 66, 70,

73, 83, 114

1st Force Service Support Group, 15-16, 18,

119, 122

1st Marine Division, 15-16, 37-38, 45, 79,

134-135

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and

Intelligence Group, 1 5

1st Tank Battalion, 113

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, iS, 38, 44-45

3d Amphibious Assault Battalion, 16, 45, 70,

83

3d Battalion, 11th Marines, 69-70, 73, 113

3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 16, 45, 66, 70, 78,

80-81, 112-113, 115
INDEX 193

3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 45, 66, 118, 121, 127-128, 130-132, 134-135, 138-145,

70, 88, 111 147, 150, 152-153, 155-156

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 15-16, 107 Mombasa, Kenya, 1, 42, 106, 114, 128, 130, 141 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 7

7th Marines, 38, 45-46, 66, 70, 73, 82-83, Montgomery, MajGen Thomas, USA, 151

114-115, 122, 137, 153 Morgan, Gen (See Hirsi, Mohamed Said) 9th Communications Battalion, 135

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Moroccan Commands and Units

Operations Capable), 16 3d Motorized Infantry Regiment, 76

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Royal Moroccan Army, 76

Operations Capable), 155 Morocco, 18, 41, 76, 77 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), 15-17, 32, 35, 38, Moser, Capt Alan B., USN, 7

42-45, 67, 77-79, 115, 139, 144 Mowain (AORA2O), 103 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), 63, 97 Mundy, Gen Carl E., Jr., 14

Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 46, Muslim Brotherhood, 3 66, 70

Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 44-45 MV ]stLtAlexBonnyman (T-AK 3003), 17, 115

Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 66, 70 MV lstLt hick Lummus (T-AK 3011), 16, 33, 35, Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th 115, 122 Marines, 69

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron MV FEC James Anderson, Jr. (T-AK 3002), 17,

352, 105 115

Marine Aircraft Group 16, 83, 105, 114-115, MV Pvt Franklin J. Philips (T-AK 3004), 17, 153

115 Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, 14 Nairobi, Kenya, 7, 107, 109, 141

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, 115

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 136

369, 115 Navy Commands and Units

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron Navy Forces Somalia, 17, 47, 103-104, 114,

(Composite) 164, 15, 38-39 120, 151

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372, 16, 132 30th Naval Construction Regiment., 75, 132,

MEU Service Support Group 15, 15, 128 145

Masirah Island, ' Amphibious Squadron 3, 16

Amphibious Squadron 5, 32

Matabaan, 92-93 Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, 17, 29

Matchee, Master Cpl Clayton (Canadian Forces), Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3, 16

Military Sealift Command, 29 100- 101 Naval Forces Central Command, 6

Mathieu, LtCol Carol J., (Canadian Forces), 9, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, 14

94, 101 Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Teams, 7, 32-33, 44

Maulin, Col, 96 Surgeon General of the Navy, 14

Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, 31, 154

Menelik II, 3 Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, 16-17

Merka, 49-50, 86, 90-91, 117-118, 143, 153 Nepal, 152

Mikolajcik, BGen Thomas R., USAF, 18 New Port, 118

Mogadishu, 4, 6-8, 11, 16, 22, 24-25, 27-29, 31, New York Army National Guard, 27th Brigade,

33-34, 36-38, 40-42, 44-47, 49, 52, 54, 56-58, 37

60-63, 65-66, 69-72, 74-76, 78, 80, 83, 85, 87- New Zealand, 42, 105, 138 89, 91, 94, 97-99, 105-106, 108-113, 115, 117-
194 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA

New Zealand Commands and Units

Number 42 Squadron, 42

Royal New Zealand Air Force, 42

Newbold, Col Gregory S., 15, 32-33, 77, 144

Nigeria, 20, 41, 118

Norway, 20, 152

O'Meara, LtCol William J., USAF, 110

Oakley, Ambassador Robert B., 43, 50-52, 54,

56, 59-60, 95-96, 139, 141, 147, 149-150, 157

Oddur, 28-29, 46-47, 61, 83-85, 105, 118, 130

Ogaden, 6, 83, 85

Operations

Clean Street, 75

Deliverance, 20, 40

Desert Storm, 6, 54

Eastern Exit, 6

Ibis, 20, 40

Oryx, 20

Rajo, 138-139

Ranger (CV 61), 17

Reardon, Maj John D., 109

Republic of Korea, 152

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 135

Romania, 152

Rossi, MajGea GianPietro

Rushmore (LSD 47), 16, 31, 44

Sab, 2

Qoryooley, 50, 90

Rainville, Capt Michael (Canadian Forces), 100-

101

(Italian Forces), 87

Samaal, 1-2

San Giorgio (LPD L9892), 103

Saudi Arabia, 6, 13, 18, 30, 41, 118, 135

Saudi Arabia Commands and Units

5th Royal Saudi Land Forces Airborne

Battalion, 41

Save the Children, 92

Scott Air Force Base, 18, 29

Seward, Maj Anthony (Canadian Forces), 100-

101

Seychelles, 104, 109

Seychelles Coast Guard, 104

Shaheen, BGen Imtiaz (Pakistani Forces), 20, 58,

147

Shebelle River, 49

Shermarke, President Abdirashid Ali, 5

Smith, Col Thomas D., USA, 18

Solomon, BGen Billy K., USA, 19, 120

Somali Democratic Movement, 3, 56

Somali National Alliance, 56, 94

Somali National Army, 22

Somali National Front, 23, 92

Somali National Movement, 3, 6, 56, 92, 149

Somali Navy, 44

Somali Patriotic Front, 44

Somali Patriotic Movement, 3, 6, 23, 56, 71, 83,

Provide Comfort, 14, 27, 141, 157-158

Provide Hope, 14

Provide Relief, 1, 9, 28, 30-31, 42, 106, 114,

141

Renaissance, 144

Restore Hope, 1, 3, 9, 20, 27, 43, 49, 51, 59,

105, 156-157, 158

Solace, 20, 40

United Shield, 155, 156

Organization of African Unity, 56

Organization of the Islamic Conference, 56

Oxfam Quebec, 92

Pakistan, 18, 41, 118, 152, 155

Pakistani 6th Punjab Regiment, 91

Peck, Col Frederick, C., 97

Perkins, RAdm James B., III, USN, 32

Peterson, Capt John W., USN, 16, 31, 44-45

Project Hand Clasp, 144

Prophet Mohamed, 2

QoQaani, 95
94

INDEX 195

Dahir (Somali Forces), 82

Somali Road, 132-134

Somali Salvation Democratic Front, 3, 56, 92

Somali Youth League, 4

Somalia Youth Club, 4

Southern Somali National Movement, 3

Soviet Union, 4-6, 8, 14

Spataro, LtCol Stephen M., USA, 60-61

Special Operations Forces, 18, 31, 40, 49, 80-81,

84, 88, 92, 114,132,152,155

Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces

Group (Airborne), 31

Standing Committee of the Countries of the

Horn of Africa, 56

Strada Iniperiale, 48

Sakanya (OPV P5 1), 103

Sullivan, Ms. Katie, 58

Support Command, 13, 18-19, 114,116,118-

121, 124, 127, 151

Task Forces

2-87, 90-91

3-17, 90-91

Bardera, 83, 115, 153

Bravo, 87

Columbus, 87

Hope, 42-43

Kismayo, 53, 94, 96, 114, 117, 152

Mogadishu, 69-71

Ranger, 152, 155

Tiyegloo, 46, 84

Tobruk (LSL L50), 103

Trenton (APD 14), 7

Tripoli (LPH 10), 16, 31, 127

Tughril (DD 167), 103

Tunisia, 41

Turkey, 20, 118

Turkish Commands and Units

1st Company, 1St Battalion, 28th Mechanized

Brigade, 41

21 October Road, 66

U.N. Security Council, 11, 151

U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, 107

U.S. Transportation Command, 18, 29

Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), 34, 36-

39, 4 1-43, 45-47, 49-50, 52,-70, 72-76, 79, 82-

83, 86-90, 92, 94-98, 101-102, 104, 106-115,

118-122, 124-125, 128-131, 133-134, 136-147

United Arab Emirates, 41, 118, 153

United Nations, 4, 9, 11-12, 16, 19-21, 39, 50,

55-56, 58-59, 61, 78, 83, 85, 93, 107-109, 111-

113, 115, 120, 128, 137, 141-145, 147-152, 155-

156, 158

United Nation Organization Somalia (UNOSOM), 16, 20, 50, 56-58, 78, 85, 90-91, 94, 98,

109, 116, 118, 120, 136-137, 139, 141, 147-156,

158

United Nations Children's Fund, 93, 144

United Nations Economic Commission, 56

United Somali Congress, 6, 22, 47, 92, 155

United Somali Party, 56, 82

United States Agency for International

Development, 141

United States Embassy, 33-34, 72, 118, 120, 139,

151

Valley Forge (CG 50), 17

Vesuvio (MCS A5384), 103

Vietnam, 98

Villagio Bur Carole, 118

Villagio Scibis, 87

Wajid, 46, 84, 118

Warsame, Gen Abdi

Wasp (LHD 1), 97

Webi Jubba, 24

Webi Shebelle, 24, 47

Western Somali Liberation Front, 6

Wilhelm, MajGen Charles E., 16, 37-38, 68-69,

72-73, 83, 87, 98, 115-116, 140, 153

World Airways, 106
196 REsloffiNc HOPE IN SOMALIA

World Food Program, 1, 61, 111, 143, 145 Zimbabwe, 41, 118

World Health Organization, 111 Zinni, BGen Anthony C., 14, 17, 26-27, 51, 56,

58, 68, 110, 113, 137, 141, 143, 147, 149, 155, Yemen, 36 158

Zenawi, President Meles, 56 Zinnia (AGFA961), 103
The device reproduced on the back cover

is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first

appeared, as shown here, on Marine

Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the

stars changed to five points, the device

has continued on Marine Corps buttons

to the present day.