IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs April 9, 2002

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 98-09491 Carolyn Wade Blackett, Judge

No. W2001-01916-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 22, 2002

The Appellant, Christopher Campbell, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County

Criminal Court following his jury conviction for aggravated robbery. At sentencing, the trial court

ordered that Campbell’s eight-year sentence in this case be served consecutively to three prior

convictions for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Campbell argues that the trial court erred in ordering

consecutive sentences. Because the trial court failed to recite any reasons for imposing consecutive

sentences as required by Rule 32, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, we are unable to perform

appellate review of the sentencing issue. Accordingly, the case is remanded for determination of

consecutive sentencing as provided by Rule 32.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Remanded for Determination of

Consecutive Sentencing.

DAVID G. HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR., JJ., joined.

AC Wharton, Jr., Shelby County Public Defender; W. Mark Ward, Assistant Shelby County Public

Defender, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Christopher Campbell.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael Moore, Solicitor General; John H.

Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Glen

Baity, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery by forcibly taking at gunpoint

Air Jordan tennis shoes from a thirteen-year-old victim. During the robbery, the minor victim

sustained bruising to his face and body. This offense occurred on March 3, 1998, and the Appellant

was subsequently indicted in July of 1998. The Appellant’s jury trial was concluded on January 12,

2001, and approximately seven months later, the Appellant was sentenced to eight years confinement
1

The trial court’s entire pronouncement with regard to consecutive sentences is as follows: “[t]he Court is going

to sentence you to do eight years consecutive to the other sentences that you have, at thirty percent.”

-2-

to be served consecutively to three prior convictions for aggravated robbery. The pre-sentence report

reflects that in February of 2000, the Appellant pled guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery

stemming from offenses committed on July 11, 1999, and September 11, 1999. The July 11, 1999,

offenses involved the Appellant robbing two persons at gunpoint of eight hundred dollars and two

hundred dollars, respectively. The September 11, 1999, offense involved the Appellant taking a

person’s vehicle at gunpoint.

It is obvious from the dates of the three prior aggravated robbery convictions that they were

committed subsequent to the commission and the indictment of the offense currently on appeal.

Thus, it must be assumed that these offenses were committed while the Appellant was on some form

of release status or had escaped confinement. However, no mention of this fact was ever made by

the trial judge or the State at sentencing. If, indeed, the Appellant committed the three aggravated

robberies while on bail for the aggravated robbery in the present case, then, under the mandatory

consecutively sentencing provisions of Rule 32(c)(3), the Appellant must serve his eight-year

sentence consecutive to the effective sixteen-year sentence he was already serving. See State v.

Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 961 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that the order of convictions is

irrelevant as the sentences are consecutive in either case). At sentencing the State sought

consecutive sentencing based solely upon their assertion that the Appellant was a dangerous

offender. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(4). Following the conclusion of the sentencing hearing,

the trial judge recited no reasons for her ruling but circled “yes” on a sentencing form document

beside the statements: (1) [t]he Defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted

himself to criminal acts as a major source of livelihood; and (2) [t]he Defendant is an offender whose

record of criminal activity is extensive.1 Rule 32(c)(2), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure,

expressly providesin pertinent part: “[t]he judgment to make the sentences consecutive or concurrent

shall explicitly recite the judge’s reasons therefor, and is reviewable on appeal.” The circling of

“yes” or “no” on a sentencing form does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Rule 32. 

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing deficiencies, this case is remanded for a sentencing determination

supported by findings of fact with regard to imposition of permissive consecutive sentences as

provided by Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2), or mandatory consecutive sentences

as provided by Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3).

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DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE