* District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

REVISED JULY 25, 2013

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-10592

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

KENNETH WAYNE BROWN; LEAH MICHELE BROWN, 

Defendants - Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before ELROD and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges, and MARTINEZ, District

Judge.*

HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

In this direct appeal, Kenneth and Leah Brown challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting their federal jury trial convictions for conspiracy to

commit theft from a program receiving federal funds, as well as the procedural

and substantive reasonableness of their within-Guidelines sentences.

Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support their convictions, and that

their sentences are procedurally and substantively reasonable, we AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 16, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 12-10592

2

BACKGROUND

Kenneth and Leah Brown were charged in a single-count superseding

indictment with conspiracy to commit theft from a program receiving federal

funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 666(a)(1)(A). The indictment alleged that

the Browns conspired with Patricia Leathers and others to defraud the City of

Garland, Texas. Between 1999 and 2008, Leathers worked as an in-house

property and casualty claims adjuster for the City of Garland. In that capacity,

Leathers was responsible for investigating claims for property damage against

the City, evaluating the City’s liability, and negotiating claim settlements.

During that period, Leathers used her position to prepare false claims and to

direct the City to issue settlement checks for up to $10,000, the ceiling of her

authority to settle claims and authorize disbursements without supervisory

approval. By the time the conspiracy was detected, Leathers had issued checks

for hundreds of fraudulent claims resulting in a loss to the City of approximately

$1.9 million.

The indictment details that the Browns facilitated the check-cashing

scheme by submitting false insurance claims to the City of Garland for

reimbursement; fraudulently obtaining checks issued by the City of Garland and

made payable to Kenneth Brown, Leah Brown, and their friends and relatives;

endorsing the checks; cashing the checks or depositing them at banks where the

defendants or their co-conspirators held accounts; and sharing the proceeds. The

indictment specifically alleges that Leah Brown endorsed her name on the back

of two checks, totaling $11,275, and that “at least fourteen checks totaling more

than $102,000.00 were endorsed and negotiated by Kenneth Brown.” The

Browns pleaded not guilty to the indictment and proceeded to a jury trial. 

The trial lasted four days. The government called fourteen witnesses in

its case-in-chief: Robby Neill, the risk manager for the City of Garland; Steven
No. 12-10592

3

Anderson, the accounting manager for the City of Garland; Matt Ladis, a

detective for the Garland Police Department; Sheila Powell, an auditor for the

United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas; Beth Huntley,

a forensic accountant with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); Jennifer

Mullican, a Special Agent with the FBI; Jerry Diviney, Melissa Williams, Mark

Enloe, Duane Stailey, and Crystal Thompson, co-conspirators or participants in

the check-cashing scheme; and Joshua Clay, Angie Smith, and Brent Estep,

individuals whose names were used on checks without their knowledge. The

defense did not call any witnesses. The jury returned guilty verdicts against

both defendants on the sole count charged.

The district court sentenced the Browns together in a joint hearing. The

court sentenced Kenneth Brown to forty-two months of imprisonment, the

midpoint of his Guideline range, followed by two years of supervised release.

The court sentenced Leah Brown to thirty-four months of imprisonment, the

midpoint of her Guideline range, followed by two years of supervised release.

Additionally, the court ordered both defendants to pay restitution to the City of

Garland, for which they are jointly and severally liable with their

co-conspirators. The Browns filed timely notices of appeal.

DISCUSSION

The Browns argue on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support

their convictions for conspiracy to committheft from a federally funded program

and that their sentences are procedurally and substantively unreasonable. 

I. Sufficiency challenges

The Browns were convicted of a single count of conspiracy to commit theft

from a program receiving federal funds. The substantive offense of theft from

a program receiving federal funds makes it a crime for an “agent” of an

“organization,”“government,” or “agency” that “receives, in any one year period,

benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program,” to embezzle, steal,
No. 12-10592

4

obtain by fraud, or otherwise without authority knowingly convert or

intentionally misapply “property” “that is valued at $5,000 or more” and “is

owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organization,

government, or agency.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(b); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury

Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.37A (2012); United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d

152, 159 (5th Cir. 2009). “In short, . . . there must be an individual who acts as

an agent of an organization,the individual must have unlawfully obtained funds

from this organization, and the organization must receive over $10,000 in federal

funds in any one year period.” United States v. Abu-Shawish, 507 F.3d 550, 556

(7th Cir. 2007).

To obtain convictions against Kenneth and Leah Brown for conspiracy to

commit that offense, the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that each of the Browns entered into an agreement with at least one other

person to commit theft from a program receiving federal funds, knowing the

purpose of the agreement and joining in it willfully, and one of the conspirators

knowingly committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. §

371; Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.20 (2012);

United States v. Read, 710 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

On appeal, the Browns contend that the evidence adduced at trial was

insufficient to support their convictions. Specifically, they argue that the

government failed to establish the “federal funds,” “nexus,” and “knowledge”

elements. See discussion infra Parts I.A, I.B, I.C. Our standard of review of

those challenges hinges on whether they were properly preserved.

At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, counsel for Kenneth Brown

and counsel for Leah Brown separately moved for judgment of acquittal under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). Kenneth Brown “move[d] for

judgment of acquittal on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence to

establish the elements of knowingly and willfully.” Leah Brown began by
No. 12-10592

5

specifically challenging the knowledge element—“we move for a judgment of

acquittal on behalf of Ms. Leah Brown on the grounds that there’s insufficient

evidence of intentionally, knowingly, willfully”—but went on to challenge, more

broadly, that “the Government has wholly failed to establish all of the elements

necessary for conviction under conspiracy.” The district court denied both

motions.

Kenneth Brown specifically preserved his sufficiency challenge to the

knowledge element by filing a timely motion for judgment of acquittal, and,

accordingly, our review of that challenge is de novo. Read, 710 F.3d at 226. But

because he asserted “specific grounds for a specific element of a specific countfor

a Rule 29 motion,” Kenneth Brown failed to preserve sufficiency challenges to

the “federal funds” and “nexus” elements, UnitedStates v. Herrera, 313F.3d 882,

884 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam); accordingly, our sufficiency review of

those elements is for “manifest miscarriage of justice,” United States v.

McDowell, 498 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2007). Leah Brown, by contrast, objected

that the government failed to establish all of the elements of the conspiracy

offense. Because a general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence preserves

de novo review as to all potential sufficiency issues, our review of her challenge

to each of the elements of the offense is de novo. See Herrera, 313 F.3d at 885 n.*

(ruling that a defendant who “chose to make a quite specific, not a general,

motion for judgment of acquittal” did not preserve his sufficiency objection as to

all elements of the crime).

In reviewing de novo the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether “any

rationaltrier of fact could have found the essential elements ofthe crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cooper, 714 F.3d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In reviewing for

manifest miscarriage of justice, we assess whether “the record is devoid of

evidence pointing to guilt,” or “the evidence on a key element of the offense is so
No. 12-10592

6

tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” McDowell, 498 F.3d at 312

(internal quotation marks omitted). Under both standards, “we consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving the government

the benefit of all reasonable inferences and credibility choices.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the evidence satisfies the less

searching Jackson standard, it follows that there has been no manifest

miscarriage of justice.

A. Federal funds element

The federal funds element requires that “the organization, government,

or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under

a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee,

insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). To prove this

element, the government elicited testimony from Steven Anderson, the accounting

manager for the City of Garland. He testified, in relevant part, as follows: 

Counsel: And as part of the funding for the City of Garland, does

the City also receive assistance from the federal

government?

Anderson: Yes, we do.

Counsel: Specifically from the years 1998 and each successive

12-month period until the year 2008, did the City of

Garland receive more than $10,000 each one of those

years?

Anderson: Yes, we did.

The Browns assert that this testimony, without corroborating documentary

evidence, is insufficient to establish that the City of Garland received a

minimum of $10,000 in federal funds during the period of the conspiracy. The

government responds that “unchallenged testimony from a person highly

knowledgeable about and responsible for the city’s funding sources easily defeats

the [Browns’] challenge to this element.”
No. 12-10592

7

Both sides agree that United States v. Jackson, 313 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.

2002), is the closest case on point. In Jackson, as here, the defendants were

convicted of conspiracy to commit theft from a program receiving federal funds

and challenged on direct appeal the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

federal funds element. Id. at 233. To prove this element, the government offered

testimony from the City of Monroe’s director of administration that the City

received federal grants in the amount of $12,900 and $10,090 for the Louisiana

Folk Life Festival. Id. at 234. Countervailing testimony was offered by the

director of the Louisiana Folk Life Festival, which, together with supporting

documentation, “demonstrated unequivocally that the $12,900 funding came

from the Northeast Louisiana Arts Council (NELAC)” and thatthe second grant

“was from the Louisiana Endowment for the Humanities (LEH)—not [the

National Endowment for the Humanities].” Id. at 234–35. Considered in total,

the evidence “support[ed] an inference that the City received some funding

indirectly from [] federal sources,” id. at 235 (emphasis added), but it was

uncertain “how much of the grants from local or state agencies were of federal

origin, and when such funds were received,” id. at 235, 235–38. Accordingly, the

court concluded, there was insufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably

could infer—instead of speculate—that at least $10,000 of the funds came from

federal sources and was received in the calendar years charged. Id. at 238. 

The evidence in this case reveals no such uncertainty. The government

established that Anderson, the City’s accounting manager for the previous two

decades, was well informed about the City’s finances, accounts, and sources of

funding. After clarifying his basis of knowledge, Anderson testified without

equivocation that in each of the charged years, Garland received more than

$10,000 in federal funding. The defendants did not cross-examine him on this

point or offer evidence or argument rebutting it or calling it into question. 
No. 12-10592

1 While we conclude that the testimonial evidence here was adequate, we have stressed

in the past—and continue to stress today—thatitis best practice for the governmentto provide

documentary evidence to corroborate that the amount of federal funds received satisfied the

$10,000 threshold under 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). See Jackson, 313 F.3d at 238 (emphasizing, when

the government did not provide “a single record reference to suggest how much of the $11,500

was of federal origin[,]” that “[t]o meet its burden of presenting evidence from which a jury

might properly find an element of a crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the government

must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence”).

8

The Browns’ argument, therefore, reduces to a single contention: that

testimony not corroborated by documentary evidence is insufficient as a matter

of law to prove the federal funds element. Jackson does not stand for that

proposition, and defendants have not alerted us to any case that does. To the

contrary, other courts have affirmed § 666 convictions against sufficiency

challenges where, as here, proof of the federal funds element was established

through unchallenged testimonial evidence without corroborating documentary

evidence. See United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 270 (11th Cir. 2011)

(evidence “easily” sufficient where director of grants for Chicago Police

Departmenttestified that Chicago received a federal grantin the amount of $4.2

million); United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1133, 1138–39 (10th Cir.

2009) (evidence sufficient where “[t]wo individuals testified that for the fiscal

year ending June 30, 2005, Rogers County received . . . a total of $685,464.97”

in federal funds); United States v. Kranovich, 401 F.3d 1107, 1112–13 (9th Cir.

2005) (evidence sufficient where police sergeant testified that county had been

approved for a federal grant of $12,775). We agree that “[a]lthough the

government could have easily produced documentation to establish the amount

of federal funding, its failure to do so does not preclude a reasonable juror from

finding that this jurisdictional qualification was satisfied.”1 United States v.

McAllister, 141 F.3d 1181, at *1 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished); see also Robinson,

663 F.3d at 270; Baldridge, 559 F.3d at 1133, 1138–39; Kranovich, 401 F.3d at

1112–13. 
No. 12-10592

9

B. Nexus element

The crime of theft from a program receiving federal funds requires a

“nexus between the criminal conduct and the [organization, government, or]

agency receiving federal assistance.” United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325,

345 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 413–14 (5th Cir.

2000) (emphasis omitted); UnitedStates v. Moeller, 987 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir.

1993) (citation omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 666 (requiring that the property at

issue be “owned by” or “under the care, custody, or control of” an “organization,

government, or agency” that “receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess

of $10,000 under a Federal program”). 

The Browns argue that the prosecution did not carry its burden of proving the

nexus element because the evidence allows for the possibility that the City had a

separate account into which federal funds were deposited and over which Leathers

had no control. Assuming arguendo that this challenge was properly briefed, it is

unavailing. Although the prosecution bears the burden of proving each element of

a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970), it

is not required “to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; the jury is free

to choose among reasonable interpretations of the evidence,” United States v.

Perrien, 274 F.3d 936, 939–40 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, the government was not

required to offer evidence disproving the existence of a hypothetical separate

account into which federal funds could have been deposited and over which

Leathers might have had no control. See Perrien, 274 F.3d at 939–40; United States

v. Guanespen-Portillo, 514 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendants’

sufficiency challenge that “the evidence does not exclude the possibility that there

was another group in the area at the same time of their arrest”).

The Browns argue also that the required nexus is absent because “the

money that was used to pay the claims was generated from tax revenue, utility

revenue, miscellaneous fees and permits.” Assuming arguendo the Browns did
No. 12-10592

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not disclaim this challenge during oral argument, it, too, falls short. The

Supreme Court has held, and we have reiterated, that the required nexus is not

between the property and the federal funding, but between the criminal conduct

and the organization, government, or agency receiving federal assistance. See

Salinas v. UnitedStates, 522 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1997) (“The enactment’s expansive,

unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered,

does not supportthe interpretation thatfederal funds must be affected to violate

§ 666(a)(1)(B).”); Whitfield, 590 F.3d at 345 (“[S]o long as there is a nexus

between the criminal conduct and the agency, the lack of a direct connection

between the . . . funds under the judges’ control and the federal funds in question

does not preclude them from being considered agents of the [Administrative

Office of the Courts] for the purposes of section 666.”) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); Phillips, 219 F.3d at 413–14 (“[A]lthough the conduct

prohibited by section 666 need not actually affect the federal funds received by

the agency, there must be some nexus between the criminal conduct and the

agency receiving federal assistance.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moeller, 987

F.2d at 1137). The property at issue—here, City funds—“need not be purely

federal, nor must the conduct in question have a direct effect on federal funds.

The statute possibly can reach misuse of virtually all funds of [a local

government],” as long as the government received the requisite federal funding

and the agentinvolved “was authorized to act on behalf ofthe [government] with

respect to its funds.” Phillips, 219 F.3d at 411. The prosecution established with

competent evidence, and the Browns did not offer rebuttal evidence challenging,

that (1) Leathers was an agent of the City of Garland, a local government

receiving the required amount of federal funding, (2) Leathers was authorized

to act on behalf of the City with respect to its funds, and (3) the check-cashing

scheme she orchestrated and the Browns facilitated resulted in the loss of more

than $1 million in City funds. Consequently, it was reasonable for the jury to
No. 12-10592

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conclude from the evidence presented that the government proved the requisite

nexus beyond a reasonable doubt. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 56–57; Whitfield, 590

F.3d at 345; Phillips, 219 F.3d at 413–14; Moeller, 987 F.2d at 1137. 

C. Knowledge element

To prove a federal conspiracy offense, the government must establish, inter

alia, “the defendant’s knowledge of the unlawful objective and voluntary

agreement to join the conspiracy.” United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 888

(5th Cir. 2008). As the district court instructed the jury: 

Mere presence . . . at the scene of an event, even with knowledge

that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain

persons may have associated with each other, and may have

assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does

not necessarily establish proof ofthe existence of a conspiracy. Also,

a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to

act in a way that advances some purpose of a conspiracy, does not

thereby become a conspirator.

But “[a] person may be guilty as a co-conspirator even if he plays only a minor

role, and he need not know all the details of the unlawful enterprise or know the

exact number or identity of all the co-conspirators, so long as he knowingly

participates in some fashion in the larger objectives of the conspiracy.” United

States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1189 (5th Cir. 1997). “[V]oluntary

participation may be inferred from a collocation of circumstances, and knowledge

may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.” United States v. Lucas, 516

F.3d 316, 342 (5th Cir. 2008). 

1. Kenneth Brown

Kenneth Brown claims that “[t]here was no evidence that [he] had any

knowledge of the scheme that was created by Pat Leathers, Melissa Williams[,]

or Jerry Diviney” and that “Diviney and Williams were unequivocal in their

testimony that they did not tell [Kenneth] what the checks were for.”
No. 12-10592

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We conclude,to the contrary,thatthe jury’s finding that Brown was aware

of the unlawful nature of the check-cashing scheme and knowingly joined it was

well supported by the evidence. At trial, FBI Special Agent Jennifer Mullican

testified that Brown admitted to her that he had cashed three fraudulent checks

issued in his name. There is no evidence that Brown had, or believed he had, a

legitimate claim against the City; indeed, Brown admitted to Mullican that “he

felt that they were doing something wrong so he asked Mr. Diviney to stop

having checks issued in his name.” That did not stop Brown from cashing checks

payable to individuals with whom he was well acquainted and taking his share

of the proceeds. Jerry Diviney, a co-conspirator, testified that when other

individuals got “cold feet”—evidence that the scheme’s illegality was

apparent—Brown agreed to cash checks made out to them and was paid

$300–$500 for each check cashed. The government introduced into evidence

more than a dozen such checks. Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to infer

from the above evidence that Brown knew the purpose of the check-cashing

scheme and joined it willfully. See United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 322

(5th Cir. 2009) (explaining thatthe defendant’s “presence and association is part

of the circumstantial evidence that she voluntarily joined the conspiracy,”

notwithstanding her comparatively minor role); United States v. Nguyen, 504

F.3d 561, 570 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that jury could reasonably conclude from

the surrounding circumstances that the defendant knew that a property

transaction was illegal, even though she did not structure the transaction or play

a role in selling the property, where she voluntarily participated by writing

checks and distributing the proceeds).

2. Leah Brown

The same is true for Leah Brown. The government introduced into

evidence two Garland checks totaling more than $11,000 signed by, and made

payable to, Leah Brown. Jerry Diviney testified that Brown cashed those
No. 12-10592

13

checks, even though she, like her husband, had no legitimate claim against the

City. Diviney testified also that he gave Brown a share of the proceeds of the

checks she cashed, and that, upon his request, Brown successfully recruited

other individuals, including many family members, to take part in the scheme.

Evidence that Brown personally cashed fraudulent checks, received a share of

the proceeds, and recruited others to take part supports the jury’s finding that

she knew the purpose of the check-cashing scheme and joined it willfully. See

United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 719–20 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding

circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish knowing and willful participation in

conspiracy where defendant recruited others and shared in the proceeds); United

States v. Luke, 152 F. App’x 412, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished)

(affirming conviction for conspiracy against sufficiency challenge where defendant

cashed fraudulent checks and shared in the proceeds); United States v. Ismoila, 100

F.3d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that circumstantial evidence established

defendant’s “role in the illegal scheme was not limited to her marital relationship”

with a co-conspirator).

II. Sentencing challenges

The Browns next challenge the procedural and substantive reasonableness

of their within-Guidelines sentences. Because the Browns preserved these

challenges by filing objections to the PSR and renewing their objections during

sentencing, we review the district court’s interpretations of the Guidelines de

novo, and the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Le,

512 F.3d 128, 134 (5th Cir. 2007).

A. Procedural reasonableness

The Browns contend that the district court made two procedural errors at

sentencing. First, they claim that the court erroneously applied a three-level

enhancement for their managerial roles in the offense. Second, they assert that
No. 12-10592

14

the court attributed to them amounts of monetary loss for which they not are

responsible.

1. Managerial role enhancement

The Guidelines provide for a three-level increase to a defendant’s baseoffense level “[i]f the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an

organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants

or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The district court applied this

enhancement on the basis of its finding thatthe Browns assumed “a supervisory

role” in the check-cashing scheme by providing the names of new payees and

recruiting others to cash checks. We will affirm the district court’s application

of the managerial role enhancement “if it is plausible in light of the record read

as a whole,” United States v. Nava, 624 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2010), and will

reverse “only if, based on the entire evidence, [we are] left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” United States v. Rose, 449

F.3d 627, 633 (5th Cir. 2006).

The Browns argue that they were not managers or supervisors of the

scheme because, according to them, they did not “engage in decision-making

authority on how the scheme was devised or carried out”, “recruit accomplices”,

or “have a large share of the profits.” Their only role, they contend, was to cash

checks. 

We agree that the Browns were not the ones who conceived of or

principally orchestrated the check-cashing scheme, but their role was not so

minimal as to disqualify them for the three-level “manager or supervisor”

enhancement applied by the district court. The district court found at

sentencing that the Browns “recruited others to act as persons who would cash

checks.” That finding is supported by Jerry Diviney’s trial testimony that Leah

Brown gave him “family or friends’ names who were people willing to cash City

of Garland checks,” by Mark Enloe’s trial testimony that he could not remember
No. 12-10592

15

whether Diviney or Kenneth Brown recruited him to cash a check, and by

evidence that family, friends, and co-workers of the Browns who had no other

connection to Diviney or his daughter, Melissa Williams, ultimately become

involved in the scheme. That finding is not disproved by the Browns’ testimony

at sentencing that they did not recruit others; the district court was well

positioned to evaluate their credibility and was entitled to rejecttheir testimony

as self-serving and inconsistent with the balance of the evidence presented. See

United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 799 (5th Cir. 1996).

The district court’s conclusion that the managerial role enhancement was

therefore warranted is not implausible in light of the evidence as a whole,

Guidelines commentary that “the recruitment of accomplices” is one factor “court[s]

should consider,” § 3B1.1(b) cmt. n.4, and our precedent affirming role

enhancements for similar conduct, see United States v. Liu, 960 F.2d 449, 456 (5th

Cir. 1992) (finding no clear error in district court’s application of “manager or

supervisor” enhancement to defendant responsible for finding accomplices to join,

and customers to fund, an immigration fraud scheme); see also United States v.

Ramcharan, 83 F. App’x 667, 671 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished)

(finding no clear error in district court’s application of “manager or supervisor”

enhancement where the defendant recruited family members to join an insurance

fraud conspiracy and directed them in the filing of fraudulent claims).

2. Loss calculation

The Guidelines “create[] a sliding scale that increases the defendant’s base

offense level by zero to thirty [levels] depending on the amount of [actual or

intended] loss.” United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 279 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)). They provide for a ten-level increase if the offense

results in a loss of more than $120,000 but less than $200,000, U.S.S.G. §

2B1.1(b)(1)(F); and a twelve-level increase if the offense results in a loss of more

$200,000 but less than $400,000, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). The district court
No. 12-10592

16

adopted the PSR’s calculation that Kenneth Brown was responsible for a

$304,553.62 loss and Leah Brown was responsible for a $142,554.48 loss; found,

based on their particular involvementin the conspiracy,thatthose loss amounts

were “reasonably foreseeable” to each defendant; and adjusted upward their

offense levels accordingly. 

A district court’s loss calculation, and its embedded determination that the

loss amount was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, are factual findings

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Hebron, 684 F.3d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 2012)

(loss calculation reviewed for clear error); United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 269

(5th Cir. 1998) (foreseeability determination reviewed for clear error). The district

court need only make “a reasonable estimate of the loss,” Hebron, 684 F.3d at 560

(citing § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)), and, given the “unique position” it occupies to assess the

loss amount, its loss calculation is entitled to appropriate deference, id.

a. Kenneth Brown

The district court attributed to Kenneth Brown a loss amount of

$304,553.62 based on the fourteen checks he cashed and twenty-five checks

made payable to his friends, associates, and family members. Kenneth Brown

contends that he “should only have been held responsible for the loss amount of

the checks he actually endorsed.” 

Brown’s position that he is not responsible for checks cashed by others

participating in the scheme is contradicted by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), which

provides that a defendant is responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and

omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”

The district court’s finding that the loss resulting from the checks cashed by

other members of the conspiracy was reasonably foreseeable to Brown is well

supported. Brown recruited others to join, cashed checks when others backed

out, and was a central cog in the conspiracy: his spouse, children, aunt, cousins,
No. 12-10592

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in-laws, business partner, employees, and friends cashed one or more fraudulent

checks. 

b. Leah Brown

The district court attributed to Leah Brown a loss amount of $142,554.48

based on the two checks she cashed and sixteen checks made payable to her

friends, associates, and family members. She contests this amount on the sole

basis that “[t]he evidence was insufficient to show [that she] acted in concert

with others or participated in a jointly undertaken criminal activity.” Her

specific challenge that she is not liable for a loss amount of $142,554.48 because

she was notinvolved in the conspiracy is foreclosed by our earlier conclusion that

the evidence supports her conviction for conspiracy.

B. Substantive reasonableness

Having concluded that their sentences are procedurally sound, we turn to

the Browns’ contention that their within-Guidelines sentences of forty-two

months and thirty-four months of imprisonment are substantively unreasonable.

Properly calculated within-Guidelines sentences enjoy a presumption of

reasonableness that “is rebutted only upon a showing that the sentence does not

account for a factor that should receive significant weight, it gives significant

weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it represents a clear error of

judgmentin balancing sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173,

186 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The Browns do not point to any

sentencing factor improperly omitted from consideration or given inappropriate

weight; they assert, without elaboration, that their sentences were “clearly

unreasonable” considering their “entire li[ves], background, lack of criminal

history, education, [and] all of the information contained in the PSR.” The

district court took into consideration their personal circumstances when

weighing the § 3553(a) factors and arriving at sentences it deemed “sufficient

but not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes” of
No. 12-10592

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punishment. The Browns give us no reason to disturb the district court’s

considered judgment. See United States v. Diaz, 637 F.3d 592, 604 (5th Cir.

2011) (holding that defendant failed to rebutthe presumption of reasonableness

where, contrary to the defendant’s objection, the record reflected that “[t]he

district court did take into account[his] personal history”); UnitedStates v. Ruiz,

621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A defendant’s disagreement with the

propriety of the sentence imposed does not suffice to rebut the presumption of

reasonableness that attaches to a within-guidelines sentence.”). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of Kenneth and

Leah Brown are AFFIRMED.