[Cite as R.G. v. Ginn, 2024-Ohio-2033.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[R.G.] Administrator of the Estate of :

[A.G.], deceased,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: 

v.

: No. 23AP-665

Renee Ginn et al., (C.P.C. No. 22CV-3698)

:

Defendants-Appellees, (REGULAR CALENDAR)

:

Jason Mantell et al.,

:

Defendants-Appellants.

:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on May 28, 2024 

On brief: Spangenberg Shibley & Liber LLP, Jeremy A. Tor, 

Nichaols A. Dicello, and Kevin C. Hulick; Ressler & Tesh, 

Timothy Tesh, and Jonathan Van Eck, for appellee. Argued:

Jeremy A. Tor.

On brief: Teetor/Westfall, LLC, J. Stephen Teetor,

Matthew S. Teetor, and Sarah A. Lodge, for appellants.

Argued: J. Stephen Teetor.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

LELAND, J.

{¶ 1} Defendants-appellants, all employees of Scioto County Children’s Services

Board (“SCCS”), appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

denying their motions for judgment on the pleadings. Appellants are Jason Mantell, Kellie 

Stevenson, Maura Adams, Jacob Porter, Treasa Black, Geoffrey Patmore, Kelli Potts, and 

Japheth Johnson.
No. 23AP-665 2

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On May 31, 2022, plaintiff-appellee, R.G., filed a complaint against SCCS and 

13 of its employees in relation to the death of his five-year-old daughter, A.G. The complaint 

asserted claims of survivorship and wrongful death, alleging SCCS and its employees’

wanton and reckless conduct proximately caused A.G.’s death. Specifically, the complaint 

alleged SCCS and its employees wantonly and recklessly placed A.G. in the custody of her 

grandfather and step-grandmother, Richard and Sonja, and failed to remove her despite

having knowledge A.G. was in danger. 

{¶ 3} On December 27, 2022, SCCS and each appellant filed a Civ.R. 12(C) motion 

for judgment on the pleadings. SCCS claimed it was immune as a political subdivision from 

claims of survivorship and wrongful death pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), while appellants 

requested immunity as employees of a political subdivision under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). On 

January 10, 2023, R.G. voluntarily dismissed SCCS as a defendant pursuant to 

Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) while separately filing a memorandum contra appellants’ motions for 

judgment on the pleadings.

{¶ 4} On October 6, 2023, the trial court filed a decision and entry denying 

appellants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court concluded R.G. pled 

sufficient facts to put appellants on notice of claims of wanton and reckless conduct in 

relation to the wrongful death of A.G.

{¶ 5} Appellants timely appealed.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 6} Appellants present the following sole assignment of error for our review:

The trial court erred when it denied immunity for Jason 

Mantell, Kellie Stevenson, Maura Adams, Jacob Porter, Treasa 

Black, Geoffrey Patmore, Kelli Potts, and Japheth Johnson.

III. Analysis

{¶ 7} In their sole assignment of error, appellants contend the trial court erred in 

denying their respective motions for judgment on the pleadings. Specifically, appellants 

argue R.G.’s complaint did not state facts that, if proved, are sufficient to qualify for an 

exception to the immunity afforded employees of political subdivisions under 

R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).
No. 23AP-665 3

{¶ 8} Generally, Ohio law provides employees of political subdivisions with 

immunity from lawsuits and liability. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); see Maternal Grandmother,

Admr. v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 167 Ohio St.3d 390, 2021-Ohio4096, ¶ 7. An exception to that rule, however, “permits plaintiffs to sue and hold liable 

employees of a political subdivision if the employees’ acts or omissions in the course and 

scope of their employment were wanton or reckless.” Maternal Grandmother at ¶ 7, citing 

R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). Wanton and reckless conduct equates to “ ‘something more than mere

negligence.’ ” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting O’Toole, Admr. v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-

Ohio-2574, paragraph three of the syllabus. “Wanton misconduct is the ‘failure to exercise 

any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is 

great probability that harm will result.’ ” Id., quoting Anderson, Admr. v. Massillon, 134 

Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, ¶ 33. “Reckless conduct is ‘the conscious disregard of or 

indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the 

circumstances.’ ” Id., quoting Anderson at ¶ 34.

{¶ 9} Seeing as the immediate appeal involves motions for judgment on the 

pleadings, we begin by defining the pleading standard needed to state a valid claim. Ohio 

is a notice-pleading state, which means “ ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ ” is 

typically sufficient. Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Civ.R. 8(A); citing Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Horn, 

142 Ohio St.3d 416, 2015-Ohio-1484, ¶ 13. “In this context, i.e., a case in which a 

government employee’s allegedly wanton or reckless behavior is at issue, these general 

pleading rules still apply.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing Civ.R. 9(B). Thus, “when a complaint invokes 

the exception to a government employee’s immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), notice 

pleading suffices and the plaintiff may not be held to a heightened pleading standard or 

expected to plead the factual circumstances surrounding an allegation of wanton or reckless 

behavior with particularity.” Id., citing Parmertor v. Chardon Local Schools, 11th Dist. 

No. 2014-L-129, 2016-Ohio-761, ¶ 49-51; Thompson v. Buckeye Joint Vocational School 

Dist., 5th Dist. No. 2015 AP 08 0047, 2016-Ohio-2804, ¶ 31; and York, Admr. v. Ohio State 

Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-45 (1991).

{¶ 10} The question before us, then, is whether R.G.’s complaint against appellants 

was sufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. When analyzing a 
No. 23AP-665 4

Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court construes all material 

allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Provens v. Woodridge Place Apts., 10th Dist. No. 22AP-760, 2023-Ohio1388, ¶ 8, citing Zhelezny v. Olesh, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-681, 2013-Ohio-4337, ¶ 8. Then, 

“ ‘[d]ismissal is appropriate under Civ.R. 12(C) when * * * it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief.’ ” Maternal 

Grandmother at ¶ 13, quoting Reister v. Gardner, 164 Ohio St.3d 546, 2020-Ohio-5484, 

¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570 (1996). 

In other words, a court grants a motion if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Edwards v. Adrenalin Trampoline Park, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-83, 

2020-Ohio-280, ¶ 11, citing Easter v. Complete Gen. Constr. Co., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-763, 

2007-Ohio-1297, ¶ 8, citing Brown v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 79 Ohio App.3d 474, 477 

(6th Dist.1992), and Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 165-66 (1973). The 

Civ.R. 12(C) motion challenges “ ‘the allegations of the complaint and presents a question 

of law.’ ” Provens at ¶ 8, quoting Zhelezny at ¶ 9. Accordingly, we review de novo a trial 

court’s decision regarding a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id., citing

RotoSolutions, Inc. v. Crane Plastics Siding, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1, 2013-Ohio4343, ¶ 13, and Franks v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 195 Ohio App.3d 114, 2011-Ohio2048, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 11} In asserting claims for survivorship and wrongful death, R.G. contended

appellants behaved wantonly and recklessly. In particular, the complaint alleged appellants 

placed A.G. and her brothers in the custody of Richard and Sonja, disregarding R.G.’s 

specific warning they are “not only unfit to care for children, but dangerous to [A.G.] and 

her brothers.” (Compl. at ¶ 80.) The complaint also underscored appellants’ failure to 

remove A.G. from Richard and Sonja’s custody even after it became “apparent they were 

engaging in abusive behavior.” (Compl. at ¶ 81.) Citing SCCS’s own records, the complaint 

detailed specific examples of abuse suffered by A.G. and her brothers while in the custody 

of Richard and Sonja. 

{¶ 12} The complaint put appellants “on notice of the claims against them and 

rais[ed] the possibility that the exception to their statutory immunity under 
No. 23AP-665 5

R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) might apply.” Maternal Grandmother at ¶ 15. Had the complaint

more vaguely asserted that SCCS employees acted in a wanton and reckless manner, such 

an accusation may or may not have stated a valid claim. In contrast to this hypothetical, 

R.G.’s complaint involved SCCS employees who allegedly had some involvement with A.G.’s 

case. Specifically, it alleged appellants engaged in acts and omissions in the handling of 

A.G.’s case that, if proved, qualify as wanton and reckless conduct that led to her death. 

This was enough to satisfy the notice pleading standard. Construing all material allegations 

in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of R.G., we cannot 

at this early stage determine that no set of facts would entitle R.G. to relief. See Provens at 

¶ 8; Maternal Grandmother at ¶ 13. A judgment on the pleadings would therefore be

premature, and R.G. may continue his case against appellants on remand.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in denying

appellants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, appellants’ sole 

assignment of error is overruled. We affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas and remand the matter to that court for further proceedings.

Judgment affirmed; cause remanded. 

LUPER SCHUSTER and BEATTY BLUNT, JJ., concur.