DEFENSE 

INTELLIGENCE

Additional Steps 

Could Better Integrate 

Intelligence Input into 

DOD’s Acquisition of 

Major Weapon 

Systems  

Accessible Version

Report to Congressional Committees

November 2016

GAO-17-10

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-10, a report to 

congressional committees

November 2016

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Additional Steps Could Better Integrate Intelligence 

Input into DOD’s Acquisition of Major Weapon 

Systems

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed certifications and training for 

acquisition and intelligence personnel, but it does not have certifications for 

certain personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs. 

These personnel help integrate threat information on foreign capabilities and 

intelligence mission data—technical intelligence such as radar signatures and 

geospatial mapping data—into acquisition programs. DOD uses certifications to 

determine that an employee has necessary education, training, and experience. 

The lack of certifications for personnel providing intelligence support to 

acquisition programs has led to the services developing varying levels of training: 

the Air Force certifies and requires training specific to providing intelligence 

support, the Army offers training that is not required, and the Navy has no formal 

training. Without certifications for personnel providing intelligence support to 

acquisition programs, DOD does not have assurance that these personnel are 

prepared to carry out their duties.

DOD has multiple efforts underway to improve processes and procedures for 

integrating intelligence into its acquisitions but does not require prioritization of 

intelligence mission data, which would identify those data most needed for a 

weapon system to perform its mission. A task force DOD created in 2015 to 

better integrate intelligence into acquisition programs identified the need for 

prioritization and proposed processes and procedures for doing so. Without 

department-wide requirements to prioritize intelligence mission data, new 

processes and procedures such as those developed by the task force may not 

be fully implemented and weapon systems could be deployed without the 

intelligence mission data they need to perform their missions. 

DOD is developing two tools for integrating intelligence into major defense 

acquisition programs. One tool to share threat information lacks a 

communication plan to obtain feedback from users to better ensure its 

effectiveness. Without user feedback, DOD may not receive useful information to 

develop the tool. The other tool is for acquisition programs to communicate their 

intelligence needs to the intelligence community, though the services did not 

identify a need for the tool and there is no mechanism to fund its implementation 

and operation. Without assessing the need for such a tool or plans or funding for 

implementation and operation, DOD may be using funds unnecessarily to 

develop an unneeded tool.

Examples of Intelligence Mission Data

View GAO-17-10. For more information,

contact Joseph W. Kirschbaum at (202) 512-

9971, kirschbaumj@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has reported that it expects to 

invest $1.6 trillion on acquiring 80 

major defense acquisition programs, 

many of which depend on intelligence 

input both during the acquisition 

process and to effectively perform 

missions once deployed. The 

complexity of advanced weapon 

systems, such as the F-35, is creating 

increasing demand for intelligence 

mission data—such as radar 

signatures—for sensors and processes 

supporting warfighters. 

The National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2016 includes a 

provision that GAO review intelligence 

integration into DOD acquisitions. This 

report evaluates, for major defense 

acquisition programs, the extent to 

which DOD has (1) processes and 

procedures for certifying and training 

personnel providing intelligence input 

into acquisition programs; (2) efforts to 

improve processes and procedures for 

integrating intelligence into its

acquisitions; and (3) efforts to develop 

tools to integrate intelligence into its 

acquisitions. GAO compared 

certification and training to relevant 

guidance; reviewed relevant 

documents to identify intelligence 

inputs and the provision of intelligence 

input into acquisition programs; and 

interviewed cognizant officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DOD create 

certifications and training for 

intelligence support personnel, require 

that intelligence mission data be 

prioritized, develop a communication 

plan for a threat information tool, and 

determine the need to develop another 

tool. DOD concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 
Letter 1

Page i GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Background 5

DOD Has Processes and Procedures for Certifying Both 

Intelligence and Acquisition Personnel but Not for Personnel 

Providing Intelligence Support to Acquisition Programs, and 

Services’ Training Varies 11

DOD Has Multiple Efforts Underway to Improve Processes and 

Procedures for Integrating Intelligence into Major Defense 

Acquisition Programs but Faces Challenges Prioritizing 

Intelligence Mission Data Needs 17

DOD Is Developing New Tools for Integrating Intelligence into 

Acquisition Programs but Faces Challenges in Development 

and Implementation 25

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 32

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I: Information on DOD’s Efforts to Assess the Intelligence-Gathering Capability of Weapon Systems 

beyond the Scope of Their Mission 36

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 37

Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense Acquisition Process 43

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense 51

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 54

GAO Contact 54

Staff Acknowledgments 54

Appendix VI: Accessible Data 55

Agency Comment Letter 55

Tables

Table 1: Personnel Who Provide Intelligence Support to 

Acquisition Programs 9

Table 2: Intelligence-related Tasks Identified by the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics in the Better Buying Power 3.0 Initiative 18

Contents
Table 3: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense Acquisition Process 44

Figures

Page ii GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Figure 1: Intelligence Input in the Defense Acquisition System 6

Figure 2: Examples of Intelligence Mission Data 8

Abbreviations

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

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Page 1 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 1, 2016

Congressional Committees

Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have long sought to 

improve the acquisition of major weapon systems, an area that we first 

placed on our High Risk List in 1990.1 DOD reported in March 2016 that it 

expects to invest $1.6 trillion on the development or procurement of its 

portfolio of 80 major defense acquisition programs, many of which 

depend on intelligence input both during the acquisition process and 

subsequently, to effectively perform their missions once deployed.2 The 

intelligence community provides this information not only when systems 

are deployed in support of the warfighter, but also as the platforms are 

developed and procured as a defense acquisition program.3 This latter 

role of the intelligence community, known as intelligence support to 

acquisition, has become increasingly important as weapon systems have 

become more advanced and dependent on processing data from onboard sensors to perform their mission.

 

1GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2015).

2Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Reports, 

NR-106-16 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016).

3The U.S. Intelligence Community comprises 17 components. The Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence oversees the intelligence community, and is counted as one of the 17 

components. The other 16 components are as follows: the National Security Agency, 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Defense 

Intelligence Agency, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, Air 

Force Intelligence (Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), Central 

Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security (Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis), Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research), Department of 

Treasury (Office of Intelligence and Analysis), Federal Bureau of Investigation (National 

Security Branch), Drug Enforcement Administration (Office of National Security 

Intelligence), U.S. Coast Guard (Intelligence and Criminal Investigations), and Department 

of Energy (Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence). For the purposes of this report 

we use “intelligence community” to refer to the organizational elements of the Defense 

Intelligence Enterprise, which include the National Security Agency, National GeospatialIntelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, Army

Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, and Air Force Intelligence (Air 

Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), among others.

Letter
The intelligence community provides support to acquisition programs in 

two broad categories: threat intelligence on foreign capabilities, and 

intelligence mission data. Threat intelligence identifies the capability and 

strategy of an adversary’s system that could defeat or reduce the 

effectiveness of a friendly military mission. Intelligence mission data refer 

to technical intelligence information such as radar signatures or 

geospatial mapping data that weapon systems use to carry out a mission 

once deployed.

Page 2 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

4

Further, according to DOD, adversaries are developing new threats more 

rapidly than the department can develop new systems to counter them. 

There is a growing concern that the technological superiority of the United 

States over foreign adversaries has been decreasing, thereby 

representing a threat to national security and military capabilities. The 

confluence of these trends has created recognition within DOD of the 

need for more effective collaboration across the defense acquisition and 

intelligence communities. To address this issue, among others, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD(AT&L)) has implemented a series of reform efforts known as Better 

Buying Power to improve various aspects of the defense acquisition 

enterprise, such as improving collaboration between the acquisition and 

intelligence communities. In the third phase of this effort, known as Better 

Buying Power 3.0, USD(AT&L) identified a need for stronger partnerships 

among the acquisition and intelligence communities in order to maintain 

knowledge of current and potential threats.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 includes a 

provision that we review the processes and procedures for the integration 

of intelligence into the defense acquisition process.5 This report 

evaluates, for major defense acquisition programs, the extent to which 

DOD has (1) processes and procedures for certifying6 and training 

 

4

Intelligence mission data are data essential for building system models; developing 

algorithms; optimizing sensor design, system testing and evaluation; and validating sensor 

functionality. Functional areas and categories of intelligence mission data include but are 

not limited to Characteristics and Performance, Electronic Warfare Integrated 

Reprogramming, Geospatial Intelligence, Order of Battle, and Signatures.

5Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1638 (2015).

6Certification is the procedure through which DOD components determine that an 

employee meets education, training, and experience elements for each career field.
personnel assigned to provide intelligence support to acquisition 

programs; (2) efforts to improve processes and procedures for integrating 

intelligence into its acquisition programs; and (3) efforts to develop new 

tools for integrating intelligence into its acquisition programs. We also 

collected information related to DOD’s efforts to identify opportunities for 

weapon systems to collect intelligence even when unrelated to their 

primary mission, which is presented in appendix I.

To address each of our three objectives, we reviewed written directives, 

instructions, publications, guides, and briefs related to the role of 

intelligence in acquisitions. We also interviewed officials from the 

acquisition, intelligence, and requirements components of DOD, including 

the offices of the USD(AT&L) and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence (USD(I)); the Joint Staff; the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Marine Corps; and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). We 

interviewed members of the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements 

Executive Steering Group and Task Force to assess their efforts to better 

integrate intelligence into DOD acquisitions. We also interviewed officials 

from the offices of the Director of National Intelligence; Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation; Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and 

USD(AT&L) Office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause 

Analyses.

To address the first objective we reviewed DOD guidance governing the 

management of intelligence and acquisition personnel. We interviewed 

officials from USD(AT&L), USD(I), the Joint Staff, and the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Marine Corps intelligence and acquisition communities who 

participate in the development of policy and management of personnel 

regarding staffing, qualifications, certification, and training of personnel 

providing intelligence support to acquisition programs. We also 

interviewed and received written responses from Defense Acquisition 

University officials regarding changes to the acquisition curriculum that 

included additional intelligence material. We analyzed the certifications 

and qualifications established by DOD for implementing the Defense 

Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act; DOD guidance for acquisition 

personnel; and certifications and qualifications for intelligence personnel 

under USD(I) guidance, to determine whether any certifications apply to 

personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs.

To address the second objective we interviewed or requested information 

from acquisition program offices, as well as from staff who provide 

intelligence support to those programs. We selected a non-generalizable 

sample of six Acquisition Category I programs from the four services—

Page 3 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
including two each from the Navy and Air Force, and one each from the 

Army and Marine Corps—to obtain an understanding of how intelligence 

is integrated into acquisition programs.

Page 4 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

7 We discussed the questions 

orally or received written responses from each program. While the 

responses we obtained are not generalizable to all major defense 

acquisition programs, the information learned from program officials 

provided context and important insights for our understanding of the 

interaction between acquisition and intelligence personnel. To determine 

current intelligence inputs and processes for major defense acquisition 

programs, we reviewed both department-wide and service-level guidance, 

including Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System, and analyzed the guidance to determine 

where DOD guidance indicated that intelligence inputs into acquisition 

programs are to occur.8 Due to the evolving nature of the role of 

intelligence in acquisitions, we also sent a set of structured questions to 

officials from the Office of USD(I), Joint Staff, DIA, and the intelligence 

organizations of the services to confirm the key intelligence inputs into 

major defense acquisitions as of June 1, 2016.

To address the third objective, we identified two tools that DOD is 

currently developing through discussions with Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Task Force officials. We verified that these tools were in 

development through interviews with officials responsible for oversight of 

acquisitions and intelligence, including officials at USD(AT&L), USD(I), 

and DIA. We interviewed DOD officials and viewed demonstrations of the 

developmental versions of these tools. We compared the developmental 

plans and information provided to us by DIA and Performance 

 

7DOD categorizes acquisition programs into Acquisition Categories I, IA, II, and III. 

Acquisition Category I programs are major defense acquisition programs, estimated by 

USD(AT&L) as requiring an eventual total expenditure for research, development, and test 

and evaluation of more than $480 million in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars; or, for 

procurement, of more than $2.79 billion in FY2014 constant dollars; or those acquisitions 

that are designated as major defense acquisition programs or designated as Special 

Interest by USD(AT&L), the head of the DOD component, or the component acquisition

executive. The Special Interest designation is typically based on one or more of the 

following factors: technological complexity; congressional interest; a large commitment of 

resources; or criticality of a program to the achievement of a capability or set of 

capabilities, part of a system of systems, or a joint program. See DOD Instruction 5000.02, 

Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Jan. 7, 2015).

8DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Jan.7, 2015).
Assessments and Root Cause Analyses officials against standards 

developed by professional organizations, such as the Project 

Management Institute’s A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge,

Page 5 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

9

federal standards for internal controls,10 and key practices 

for collaboration among federal agencies.11 Further details of our 

objectives, scope, and methodology are presented in appendix II.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2015 to November 

2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOD manages the acquisition of weapon systems through the Defense 

Acquisition System, which is an event-based process. Acquisition 

programs proceed through a series of milestone reviews and other 

decision points that may authorize entry into the next program phase (see 

figure 1).12 Based upon DOD’s acquisition-related guidance, for major 

defense acquisition programs that begin during the materiel solution 

analysis phase, intelligence inputs into the acquisition process are 

expected to be provided prior to the Milestone A review,13 the point at 

 

9Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, 2013. PMBOK is a trademark of Project 

Management Institute, Inc.

10GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).

11Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

12Programs may enter the Defense Acquisition System prior to Milestone A, or they may 

enter directly at Milestones B or C in some circumstances. For our purposes, we are 

describing programs that entered prior to Milestone A.

13The purpose of the materiel solution analysis phase is to conduct the analysis and other 

activities needed to choose the concept for the product that will be acquired, to begin 

translating validated capability gaps into system-specific requirements, and to conduct 

planning to support a decision on the acquisition strategy for the product.

Background
which approval is sought to proceed to the next phase in the process.

Page 6 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

14

Further, most of the intelligence inputs are to be verified or updated at 

points prior to the Milestone B decision and again prior to the Milestone C 

decision, the point at which approval is sought in order to progress to the 

production and deployment phase.15 We describe the intelligence inputs 

and key DOD guidance for providing intelligence support to acquisition 

programs in appendix III.

Figure 1: Intelligence Input in the Defense Acquisition System

The USD(AT&L) is responsible for acquisition policy and oversight, and 

as the Defense Acquisition Executive has responsibility for supervising 

the Defense Acquisition System. The milestone decision authority is the 

designated individual with overall responsibility for a program and has the 

authority to approve its progression to the next phase of the acquisition 

process.16 The milestone decision authority is accountable for cost, 

schedule, and performance reporting. The service acquisition 

 

14We defined intelligence inputs as actions (such as formation of a working group or 

certification), products (such as reports or data), or processes (such as a formal review). 

15The production and deployment phase consists of three efforts—low-rate initial 

production, operational testing and evaluation, and full-rate production and deployment.

16The milestone decision authority for major defense acquisition programs can be the 

Defense Acquisition Executive, the head of the DOD component, or the Component or 

Service Acquisition Executive. The Defense Acquisition Executive is the milestone 

decision authority for Acquisition Category ID programs. The head of the DOD component 

or, if delegated, the Component or Service Acquisition Executive is the milestone decision 

authority for Acquisition Category IC programs. For the purposes of this report we are 

referring to Acquisition Category ID when we describe major defense acquisition 

programs.
communities are led by Service Acquisition Executives who are assistant 

secretaries within their respective military departments. For example, the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 

serves as the Army acquisition executive, while the Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy (Research, Development, & Acquisition) serves as the Navy 

acquisition executive. The program manager is the designated individual 

with responsibility for individual acquisition programs who has the 

authority to accomplish that program’s development, production, and 

sustainment objectives to meet the user’s operational needs, and is 

accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the 

milestone decision authority.

At the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, the J-8 Directorate 

provides support to the Joint Staff for evaluating and developing force 

structure requirements, and its director serves as Secretary of the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council and as Chairman of the Joint 

Capabilities Board. In these capacities, the director orchestrates Joint 

Staff support of the capabilities development process through the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System. One of the J-8 

Directorate’s objectives is to provide early capability development 

guidance to the services. The services have different organizational 

structures that define their respective requirements communities. For 

example, according to the Air Force, via its Major Commands, the Air 

Force has personnel responsible for 12 capability portfolios such as Air 

Superiority and Global Precision Attack that manage Air Force capability 

requirements.

According to DOD, the speed of technical innovation and the complexity 

of advanced weapon systems, such as the F-35, are creating an 

increasing demand for specialized intelligence mission data to provide 

information for sensors and automated processes supporting the 

warfighter.

Page 7 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

17 There are several types of intelligence mission data, each 

used by weapon systems in different ways, including signatures, 

electronic warfare integrated reprogramming data, characteristics and 

performance, order of battle, and geospatial intelligence (see figure 2). 

Signatures are distinct, repeating characteristics, such as radio 

frequencies or acoustic characteristics, which are associated with a 

 

17DOD, IMD Cost Methodology Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2013).
particular type of equipment, materiel, activity, individual, or event. For 

example, a weapon system may associate a specific signature with an 

enemy system, and identify it as such. Electronic warfare integrated 

reprogramming data also describe radio frequencies, and are typically 

used to attack or control other electronic systems—for example, jamming 

enemy radar capabilities. Characteristics and performance data describe 

the abilities of a particular foreign military system, while order of battle 

describes the strength and structure of armed forces. These can assist a 

weapon system and its operator to prioritize and determine appropriate 

actions against the enemy.

Figure 2: Examples of Intelligence Mission Data

Page 8 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

The title, specific duties, and organizational structure for the personnel 

providing intelligence support to acquisition programs vary by service 

(see table 1). Personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition 

programs may also coordinate, and in some cases create, the completion 

of key intelligence products that accompany the acquisition process 

through documented processes such as Threat Steering Groups, which 

assemble intelligence and acquisition representatives with knowledge of 

systems that are specific to the acquisition program.
Table 1: Personnel Who Provide Intelligence Support to Acquisition Programs

Page 9 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Service Position Title

Number of Positionsa/Job 

Classification Parent Organization

Army Threat analyst (civilian) or threat 

integration staff officer (military)

73/Intelligence Specialist Army Intelligence

Threat manager Training and Doctrine Command

Foreign intelligence officer Army Materiel Command

Navy Scientific and Technical 

Intelligence Liaison Officer,

Acquisition Intelligence 

Professional

47/Intelligence Specialist, 

Intelligence Aid and Clerk, Program 

Analyst, Engineers, Security 

Administrator, Information 

Technology Management, 

Computer Science, Operational 

Research Analyst, and Physicist

Acquisition system commands 

such as Naval Air Systems 

Command and Naval Sea Systems 

Command

Acquisition Intelligence 

Professional

12/Intelligence specialist, engineers Office of Naval Intelligence and 

Executive Support Office, OPNAV 

N2N6I

Marine Corps Intelligence analysts, Scientific 

and Technical Intelligence 

Liaison Officer

11/Intelligence Specialist Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

Air Force Acquisition intelligence specialist 

(Officers, enlisted, and civilian)

243/Intelligence Specialist, 

Engineer, Program Manager, and 

Scientist 

Air Force Headquarters, Major 

Commands,b National Air and 

Space Intelligence Center

Source: GAO analysis of Service Information. | GAO-17-10

Notes:

aNumber of positions as of July 2016.

b

Air Force Major Commands include Air Force Space Command, Air Combat Command, Air Force 

Global Strike Command, Air Mobility Command, and Air Force Materiel Command.

In the Army, during the acquisition lifecycle, the threat integration staff 

officers assigned to Army Intelligence coordinate intelligence support to 

acquisition programs through the Threat Steering Group, in which 

Training and Doctrine Command threat managers and Army Materiel 

Command foreign intelligence officers participate.18 Threat assessments 

before Milestone B are generally managed by Training and Doctrine 

Command threat managers. Threat assessments from Milestone B and 

beyond are typically managed by Army Materiel Command foreign 

intelligence officers.

 

18See generally Army Regulation 381-11, Intelligence Support to Capability Development

(Jan. 26, 2007).
In the Navy, intelligence support to acquisition programs is provided by 

intelligence personnel in the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is 

responsible for the production and validation of intelligence inputs to Navy 

acquisition programs.

Page 10 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

19 The acquisition programs are supported by 

scientific and technical intelligence liaison officers who are hired and 

funded by the Navy entities responsible for management of assigned 

acquisition programs, called system commands, and are responsible for 

coordinating between the system command and the intelligence 

community.20 For example, the scientific and technical intelligence liaison 

officer is responsible for requesting the production and validation of 

intelligence inputs such as threat assessments, which are used to obtain 

the threat intelligence required to inform acquisition cost, schedule, and 

performance decision making by program managers.

For programs that are managed by the Marine Corps acquisition agencies 

(Marine Corps System Command and Program Executive Officer Land 

Systems), intelligence support is provided by military and civilian 

intelligence analysts at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, the service 

intelligence center. Marine Corps System Command’s intelligence 

support is coordinated by a scientific and technical intelligence liaison 

officer. Marine Corps-funded programs at other Navy system commands 

follow the intelligence support processes for the hosting organization. For 

example, the Marine Corps version of the F-35 or helicopter acquisitions 

would both follow processes for intelligence support to acquisition 

programs used by Naval Air Systems Command.

The Air Force materiel commands (Air Force Space Command and Air 

Force Materiel Command) use acquisition intelligence specialists to 

support acquisition programs identified as intelligence sensitive. These 

specialists, along with intelligence analysts at the National Air and Space 

Intelligence Center, provide intelligence products and input based on their 

individual levels of experience and training.

 

19See generally Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3811.1F, Threat 

Support to the Defense Acquisition System (May 16, 2016).

20See generally Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3880.6A, Scientific and 

Technical Intelligence Liaison Officer (STILO) Program and Intelligence Support for the 

Naval Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, and Acquisition Communities (Nov. 5, 

2007).
DOD has processes and procedures for the certification of both 

intelligence and acquisition personnel, but it has not established 

certifications for personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition 

programs. Though DOD has not developed certifications specific to 

personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs, the 

Air Force and the Army have each developed certifications for these 

personnel. In the absence of department-wide certifications, the services 

have developed varying levels of training for personnel providing 

intelligence support to acquisition programs, and this training may not be 

specific to providing intelligence support to acquisition programs.

Page 11 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Neither USD(I) certifications for the defense intelligence workforce nor 

USD(AT&L) certifications for the defense acquisition workforce include a 

certification specific to those personnel providing intelligence support to 

acquisition programs. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement 

Act generally requires DOD to establish policies and procedures for the 

management of DOD’s acquisition workforce, including education, 

training, and career development.21 USD(AT&L) subsequently organized 

certain acquisition-related positions into 14 career fields and established 

a certification process by which DOD components determine that 

employees have met standard requirements for education, training, and 

experience for each field. However, personnel who provide intelligence 

support to acquisition programs are not included in the 14 career fields 

with established certifications. According to service officials, acquisition 

certifications for personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition 

programs have not been developed because there is no career field for 

intelligence support to acquisition. As a result, personnel providing 

 

21See generally Pub. L. No. 101-510, §1202 (1990) (codified as amended at chapter 87 of 

Title 10, U.S. Code); 10 U.S.C. § 1701(a). The Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act also required DOD to establish the Defense Acquisition University, 

which is responsible for designing, maintaining, and delivering certification training

courses at each level, among other course offerings.

DOD Has Processes 

and Procedures for 

Certifying Both 

Intelligence and 

Acquisition Personnel 

but Not for Personnel 

Providing Intelligence 

Support to Acquisition 

Programs, and 

Services’ Training 

Varies

DOD Has Certifications for 

Intelligence and 

Acquisition Personnel and 

the Air Force and Army 

Have Developed 

Certifications for 

Personnel Who Provide 

Intelligence Support to 

Acquisition Programs
intelligence support to acquisition programs are not required to obtain 

certification for any of the acquisition-related career fields. Officials from 

the Air Force stated that the lack of certification has resulted in critical skill 

gaps for personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs.

Similarly, USD(I) is responsible for establishing a department-level 

certification program for the defense intelligence workforce.

Page 12 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

22 As a result, 

certifications for 15 different intelligence disciplines have been developed, 

such as geospatial intelligence and collection management, and several 

other certifications are currently being developed for disciplines such as 

all-source analysis—an intelligence activity that involves the integration, 

evaluation, and interpretation of information from all available data 

sources and types.23 Intelligence officials stated that personnel providing 

intelligence support to acquisition programs may become eligible for 

fundamental intelligence certifications, such as all-source analysis 

certification. However, these officials stated that the certification is 

designed to certify fundamental competencies for all intelligence analysts, 

and is not specific to providing intelligence support to acquisition 

programs.

Though DOD has not developed certifications specific to personnel who 

provide intelligence support to acquisition programs, the Air Force and the 

Army have each developed certifications for these personnel.24 The Air 

Force has established a certification for personnel who provide 

intelligence support to acquisition programs via both service-wide 

guidance and guidance from organizations involved in acquisition, such 

as Air Force Materiel Command. The Air Force requires that, for initial 

certification, personnel assigned to positions providing intelligence 

support to acquisition programs must complete certain training, including 

Air Force and Defense Acquisition University classes, and have 1 year of 

 

22DOD Instruction 3115.11, DOD Intelligence Human Capital Management Operations, 

encl. 2, para. 1.c (Jan. 22, 2009) (incorporating change Dec. 9, 2011).

23See DOD Directive 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities, para. E2.1 (Aug. 27, 2007) 

(incorporating change and certified current through Aug. 27, 2014) (defining all-source 

analysis).

24As of July 2016, the Navy and Marine Corps had not developed certifications for 

personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs.
experience in a designated “acquisition intelligence” position.

Page 13 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

25

Additionally, individual acquisition organizations, such as the Air Force 

Life Cycle Management Center, require additional training and also 

require that intelligence managers certify that personnel providing 

intelligence support to acquisition programs have completed the required 

training, met the experience requirements, and can complete a list of 

unique tasks specific to the performance of their individual job.

The Army developed an optional certification for civilian personnel in 

intelligence positions, including intelligence support to acquisition

programs. A 2001 training plan describes a process for individuals to 

document competency in different specialty areas based on the job duties 

and seniority of the position. The plan shows that the intelligence support 

to acquisition specialty requires competency in areas such as threat 

intelligence and technical knowledge of acquisition organizations. 

Personnel may achieve these competencies through any combination of 

previous experience, classroom, and on-the-job training. Subsequently, 

they may request an optional certification from their command 

organization if a supervisor certifies the individual’s qualifications.

The services have developed varying levels of training for the personnel 

who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs in the absence 

of certifications required by DOD for these personnel. Air Force officials 

stated that training for personnel providing intelligence support to 

acquisition programs is accomplished through their certification process, 

which requires these personnel to complete a series of classroom and onthe-job training units, including Defense Acquisition University classes in 

acquisition management fundamentals, among others, and an Air Force 

4-day training course called the Acquisition Intelligence Formal Training 

Unit. Individual acquisition organizations such as the Air Force Life Cycle 

Management Center require additional training, including courses on 

intelligence acquisition life-cycle management and the Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System; a review of key acquisition 

documents; and on-the-job training based on unit-specific missions. Air 

 

25Air Force Instruction 14-111, Intelligence Support to the Acquisition Life-Cycle, paras. 

2.6.3, 2.9.1.3 (May 18, 2012) (incorporating change June 16, 2014). The Air Force refers 

to personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition programs as acquisition 

intelligence specialists.

The Services and 

USD(AT&L) Have 

Developed Some Training 

for Personnel Providing 

Intelligence Support to 

Acquisition Programs, but 

Cannot Ensure Personnel 

Are Trained to Carry Out 

Duties
Force officials also stated that experience as an active-duty intelligence 

officer and an acquisition program manager all also provided training for 

the position.

Army officials stated that threat managers and foreign intelligence 

officers, two of the three groups that provide intelligence support to 

acquisition programs, are required to take several courses through the 

Defense Acquisition University and Defense Security Service. In addition, 

the threat intelligence branch of Army Intelligence has an annual training 

course that includes training in subjects specific to providing intelligence 

support to acquisition programs, such as critical threats and technology 

protection. However, according to Army officials, Army personnel

providing intelligence support to acquisitions are not required to take this 

course. An Army intelligence official stated that the course is optional 

because of a lack of travel and training funds.

The Navy and Marine Corps have identified and required different levels 

of training relevant for their personnel. Navy officials stated that, as of 

June 2016, there was no formal training across the department for 

personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs, although 

some Navy organizations have developed training policies specific to their 

organizations. For example, according to Navy officials, Naval Air 

Systems Command, the Navy acquisition organization generally 

responsible for naval aircraft, weapons, and systems, has a training 

program for its scientific and technical intelligence liaison officers. This 

training includes intelligence community and Defense Acquisition 

University courses, computer-based training, and a certification exam, 

which requires its liaison officers to attend the Air Force’s Acquisition 

Intelligence Formal Training Unit. According to Navy officials, personnel 

providing intelligence support to acquisition programs at other naval 

system commands, such as those responsible for sea and space 

systems, receive primarily ad hoc and on-the-job training.

Marine Corps officials stated that, as of June 2016, personnel who 

provide intelligence support to acquisition programs were required to take 

an online Defense Acquisition University course on acquisition 

management fundamentals that is not specific to providing intelligence 

support to acquisition programs, in addition to on-the-job training in order 

to perform their job duties. These officials also stated that in 2016 

personnel were required to attend a version of the Air Force Acquisition 

Intelligence Formal Training Unit, and that although the Marine Corps is 

exploring the use of the Army Intelligence training course, it is not 

required for personnel to attend the training.

Page 14 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
USD(AT&L), working with the Defense Acquisition University, established 

training related to the integration of intelligence and acquisition. In May 

and June 2015, Defense Acquisition University increased the integration 

of intelligence and acquisition in its curriculum.

Page 15 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

26 For example, the 

university added a case study regarding critical intelligence parameters to 

the program manager’s course, and it also added discussion topics about 

the need for intelligence in acquisition programs to several courses 

intended for acquisition executives and senior officials.27 Both entry-level 

and advanced courses were modified to include content on the 

relationship between intelligence and acquisition organizations. For 

example, officials stated that they invited a speaker from the Joint Staff to 

an advanced course to speak about the relationship between intelligence 

and acquisition.

While this training is intended to address the identified need for greater 

intelligence training for acquisition personnel, the training may not be 

accessible to personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition 

programs. Service intelligence officials stated that because positions for 

providing intelligence support to acquisition programs are not designated 

as acquisition-related for the purposes of Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act certification, some courses are available to these 

personnel only on a space-available basis. Some other courses, such as 

those for program managers, require Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Improvement Act certification in designated career fields as a prerequisite. As described above, DOD has not required certification for 

personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs. As a 

result, these personnel may be unable to access these courses.

Without requiring certifications for personnel who provide intelligence 

support to acquisition programs, DOD has no assurance that these 

personnel are qualified and prepared to carry out their duties. The 

department has established certifications for both acquisition and 

intelligence positions in order to ensure that those respective workforces 

 

26According to Defense Acquisition University officials, these changes were in response to 

the Better Buying Power 3.0 Initiative. See table 2, task 8, below.

27Critical intelligence parameters identify thresholds that, if breached, indicate an 

adversary’s potential to substantially reduce the performance or even defeat the capability 

of the weapon system undergoing development.
are qualified to carry out their duties. Key principles for the management 

of federal employees state that agencies should develop training 

strategies and tools that, among other things, can be aligned to improve 

the critical skills needed in their workforce.

Page 16 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

28 We previously found that 

when intelligence training is not fully implemented or required, programs 

and organizations may be unable to fully succeed in their goals.29 The 

DOD Inspector General has also found that the lack of common training 

standards has resulted in difficulties for personnel in performing common 

tasks and in a critical skills gap across military intelligence services and 

agencies.30 While all four services have established or identified training 

for personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs, 

without department-wide required certifications that include training 

standards, there may be inconsistent levels of expertise and skill among 

these personnel. Without a certification process that includes required 

training for personnel who provide intelligence support to acquisition 

programs, DOD may not be able to ensure that all personnel who provide 

intelligence support to acquisition programs are familiar with and able to 

provide intelligence inputs to their assigned acquisition programs.

 

28GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

29GAO, Intelligence Community Personnel: Strategic Approach and Training 

Requirements Needed to Guide Joint Duty Program, GAO-12-679 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 20, 2012).

30U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General. Evaluation of DOD Intelligence Training 

and Education Programs for the Fundamental Competencies of the DOD Intelligence 

Workforce, DODIG-2015-015 (Oct. 31, 2014).
As of July 2016, DOD had multiple efforts underway to improve 

processes and procedures for integrating intelligence into major defense 

acquisition programs. For example, USD(AT&L) had identified several 

intelligence-related tasks in its Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative. Further, 

USD(AT&L), USD(I), and the Joint Staff had created an executive 

steering group and a task force—the Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Task Force—to improve the integration of intelligence into 

major defense acquisition programs. This task force has identified the 

need for intelligence mission data to be prioritized, but DOD has not 

required such prioritization.

Page 17 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

In order to increase the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of 

DOD’s acquisition, technology, and logistics efforts, USD(AT&L) issued 

the Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative in January 2015. This initiative 

contains nine tasks related to integrating intelligence into acquisitions, 

which are described in table 2.

DOD Has Multiple 

Efforts Underway to 

Improve Processes 

and Procedures for 

Integrating 

Intelligence into Major 

Defense Acquisition 

Programs but Faces 

Challenges 

Prioritizing 

Intelligence Mission 

Data Needs

USD(AT&L) Has Identified 

Several IntelligenceRelated Tasks to Address 

Challenges Integrating 

Intelligence into 

Acquisitions
Table 2: Intelligence-related Tasks Identified by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in 

Page 18 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

the Better Buying Power 3.0 Initiative

Task Description Status Reported By USD(AT&L) as of 

June 2016

1. Review/Revise Defense Intelligence 

Agency’s (DIA) Critical Intelligence 

Parameter Instruction

Review and, as necessary, recommend 

changes to DIA Instruction on the 

identification, monitoring, and reporting of 

Critical Intelligence Parameters. 

Stakeholder input has been adjudicated 

and final guidance is under legal review 

prior to release. 

2. Program Manager/Service 

Acquisition Executive Critical 

Intelligence Parameter Process

As appropriate, acquisition officials, with 

requirements sponsors, will establish initial 

critical intelligence parameters for their 

programs and create processes to address 

changes in foreign threats that may affect 

the performance of the weapon system 

under development.

The services have reached agreement on a 

phased approach to critical intelligence 

parameter development and monitoring 

and are developing guidance for signature. 

3. Ensure That Defense Acquisition 

Boards Evaluate Program Based 

upon Threat Projections, Intelligence 

Mission Data Requirements, and 

Critical Intelligence Parameters. 

Acquisition officials will ensure that all 

Defense Acquisition Board reviews include 

an evaluation of program plans based on 

threats, operational intelligence mission 

data requirements, critical intelligence 

parameters, and the validity of program 

requirements.

Proposals have been reviewed and 

approved by leadership but not yet 

implemented. 

4. Intelligence Mission Data Financial 

Policy

Review and recommend changes to the 

financial management policies for funding 

intelligence mission data to ensure that 

they are consistent with DOD Instruction 

5000.02, Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System, and with initiatives 

associated with intelligence support to 

acquisitions.

Proposals have been prepared for 

leadership review. 

5. Revise Department of Defense 

(DOD) Directive 5250.01: 

Management of Intelligence Mission 

Data(IMD) in DOD Acquisition

Review and prepare update to DOD 

Directive 5250.01 to ensure that processes 

are in place to enhance prioritizing of 

intelligence mission data supply and 

demand for acquisition programs. 

Stakeholder comments on the revised 

directive are under review.

6. Develop Dynamic Threat Library/ 

Validated Online Lifecycle Threat 

Report

Develop a plan for reducing latency in 

providing intelligence data to acquisitions 

by implementing the Validated Online 

Lifecycle Threat and Threat Library. DIA 

will complete on-going pilots and present 

findings and a plan for transition to the new 

system to an executive decision making 

group.

The threat library and the Validated Online 

Lifecycle Threat have been piloted with the 

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System Recapitalization program and the 

Air and Missile Defense Radar, among 

others, and development of the Validated 

Online Lifecycle Threat is underway.

7. Modeling & Simulation Evaluate options for using modeling and 

simulation capabilities to manage 

acquisition requirements and risks 

associated with foreign threats.

Meetings regarding friendly and enemy 

data have been completed. Programspecific plans are under development. 
Page 19 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Task Description Status Reported By USD(AT&L) as of 

June 2016

8. Increasing Professionalization to 

Integrate Intelligence Into Acquisition 

Defense Acquisition University will increase 

acquisition-intelligence-requirements focus 

in revised curriculum specifically in the 

program management and requirements 

areas. DIA will work with the National 

Intelligence University and Professional 

Analyst Career Education to revise 

intelligence professional training that 

supports the Acquisition Community. 

Defense Acquisition University has 

modified several courses with additional 

acquisition-intelligence content. DIA has 

completed analysis for class content and 

the results have been briefed to leadership. 

9. Develop Key Leader Positions for 

Intelligence Support

Evaluate options for establishing key 

leadership positions for intelligence support 

at the program executive office level or 

elsewhere in the acquisition chain. 

Recommendations will be provided to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics.

Data have been analyzed and leadership 

has been briefed.

Source: GAO analysis of USD(AT&L) information. | GAO-17-10

Among the nine tasks, USD(AT&L) describes the use of critical 

intelligence parameters as a key aspect of the linkage among the 

acquisition, intelligence, and requirements communities.31 Critical 

intelligence parameter thresholds, if breached, indicate an adversary’s 

potential ability to substantially reduce the performance or even defeat 

the capability of the weapon system undergoing acquisition. The 

intelligence community monitors foreign threat capabilities and informs 

the acquisition community of a breach, which triggers a review process to 

resolve or mitigate the breach.

Other intelligence-related tasks under Better Buying Power 3.0 include 

direction to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions to work 

with the Office of the USD(I) to review DOD Directive 5250.01, 

Management of Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) in DOD Acquisition. As of 

July 2016, this review is being facilitated by the Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Task Force, described below, which is coordinating a 

revised draft among stakeholder entities.

 

31Critical intelligence parameters are established and examined through the joint and 

collaborative efforts of the intelligence, acquisition, and requirements communities to aid 

in developing intelligence production requirements to support an acquisition program.
DOD created an executive steering group and task force to better 

integrate intelligence into acquisition programs. On December 4, 2015, 

the offices of USD(AT&L) and USD(I), along with the Joint Staff, created 

the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Executive Steering Group and 

the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force through a joint 

memorandum to better integrate, coordinate, and prioritize intelligence 

processes and procedures for providing intelligence support to acquisition 

programs.

Page 20 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

32 The steering group is co-chaired by senior level members of 

the offices of USD(AT&L) and USD(I), and the Joint Staff, and it is 

composed of representatives from the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation, service acquisition executives, 

military service intelligence staffs, and DIA, among other stakeholders.

The memorandum states that the steering group replaces the Intelligence 

Mission Data Oversight Board and the Intelligence Mission Data Senior 

Steering Group that were previously established in DOD Directive 

5250.01, issued in January 2013.33 A DIA official explained that the 

Intelligence Mission Data Senior Steering Group never met and that the 

Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force was created to address 

intelligence support to acquisition, including intelligence mission data 

issues.

Both the executive steering group and the task force began to meet prior 

to their formal creation in December 2015. The task force initially met in 

October 2015 and subsequent to January 2016 has generally held weekly 

meetings, while the executive steering group initially met in August 2015 

and met quarterly subsequent to December 2015. Since February 2016, a 

senior executive service-level director has led the task force composed of 

O-6 level representatives from the organizations that form the steering 

group. According to task force officials, early efforts of the task force 

included engaging major defense acquisition programs that the task force 

identified as intelligence mission data-dependent in order to identify and 

 

32Joint Staff J8, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition), Undersecretary of Defense 

(Intelligence) Memorandum, Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Executive Steering 

Group, December 04, 2015.

33DOD Directive 5250.01, Management of Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) in DOD 

Acquisition, encl. 2 (Jan. 22, 2013).

USD(AT&L), USD(I), and 

Joint Staff Created an 

Executive Steering Group 

and Task Force to Improve 

the Integration of 

Intelligence into 

Acquisition Programs
summarize intelligence supportability issues and raise them to decision 

makers prior to milestone reviews for the acquisition programs.

Page 21 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

34

Officials from USD(AT&L), USD(I), and Joint Staff stated that while there 

have previously been other weapon systems with intelligence mission 

data shortfalls, such as the F-22 and F-18G, the F-35’s greater reliance 

on intelligence mission data and concerns regarding the service 

intelligence centers’ ability to produce the needed data brought the 

problem to the forefront. For example, DOD reported in 2013 that the 

initial release of intelligence mission data requirements for the F-35 in 

2008 presented a unique challenge with regard to the amount and 

breadth of intelligence requirements for the intelligence community, and 

for the service intelligence centers specifically.35 These officials stated 

that the main impetus for creating the Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Executive Steering Group and the Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Task Force concerned the shortfall in providing intelligence 

mission data to the F-35 program—data needed for the F-35 to perform 

its mission once it became an operational weapon system. Task force 

officials stated that prioritizing intelligence mission data will ensure that 

the data provided are sufficient to meet the requirements of advanced 

weapon systems, such as the F-35.

DOD has processes and procedures related to intelligence mission data, 

such as those in DOD Instruction 5000.02 and DOD Directive 5250.01, 

but they do not require prioritization of the data.36 For example, DOD 

 

34Officials from the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force stated that its 

overall agenda is to open lines of communication and enhance coordination; improve 

prioritization of requirements; codify processes to conduct risk assessment and mitigation; 

review existing databases for redundancy and duplication; establish a baseline for 

Intelligence Mission Data production; and enhance data standardization.

35DOD, IMD Cost Methodology Guidebook (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2013).

36See, e.g., DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, at 54 

(Jan. 7, 2015); see generally DOD Directive 5250.01, Management of Intelligence Mission

Data (IMD) in DOD Acquisition (Jan. 22, 2013). According to DOD officials, both the 

directive and the instruction were under revision as of July 2016. Officials from DIA and 

the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force stated that as of July 2016 

comments to the draft revision of DOD Directive 5250.01 were being coordinated among 

stakeholders. We reviewed the version of the draft directive dated April 28, 2016, and it 

did not include specific requirements to prioritize intelligence mission data.

DOD’s Acquisition 

Intelligence Requirements 

Task Force Identified the 

Need for, but DOD Has 

Not Required Prioritization 

of, Intelligence Mission 

Data
guidance requires DOD’s intelligence mission data-dependent acquisition 

programs to develop a Lifecycle Mission Data Plan to identify anticipated 

intelligence mission data needs over the life of a weapon system, from 

program start through the life-cycle of the program to disposal. However, 

the plan categorizes the intelligence mission data needs by means of a 

spectrum arranged by data availability—that is, showing data ranging 

from those that are most available to those that are least available. That 

presentation of information does not convey a prioritization of what the 

weapon system most needs to perform its mission.

DOD Directive 5250.01 directs DIA to establish the Intelligence Mission 

Data Center, which is to serve as the focal point for intelligence mission 

data development, production, and sharing, but it does not assign the 

agency the role of prioritizing intelligence mission data needs. Task force 

officials stated that a DIA working group for intelligence mission data was 

created to oversee and coordinate intelligence mission data production 

across the defense intelligence enterprise, and that the Intelligence 

Mission Data Center will support the working group by facilitating the 

discovery and sharing of existing intelligence mission data. However, 

although it may be helpful in preventing the duplication of efforts in the 

collection of intelligence mission data, the Intelligence Mission Data 

Center’s work does not constitute a means for prioritizing mission data by 

need for individual acquisition programs.

Officials from USD(AT&L), USD(I), Joint Staff, and the task force 

described a lack of prioritization at multiple levels, to include within the 

individual acquisition programs, as well as at the service and department 

levels. Officials from USD(AT&L), USD(I), and Joint Staff, as well as 

service-level officials on the task force, stated that there were currently no 

required processes or procedures for prioritizing intelligence mission data 

needs at any of these levels. For example, at the acquisition program 

level, an F-22 will have different intelligence mission data needs and 

priorities from those of a Navy submarine. At the service level, each 

service will have intelligence mission data needs based on the types of 

weapon systems it is developing and has already deployed. At the 

department level, the Air Force and the Navy may have similar 

intelligence mission data needs for their respective fighter aircraft, but the 

Army’s intelligence mission data needs will likely differ greatly from those 

of its sister services based on the respective threats each faces.

As of July 2016, no requirements existed within DOD guidance to 

prioritize intelligence mission data, though there were efforts underway in 

2016 by the task force and within the Air Force to develop processes and 

Page 22 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
procedures for intelligence mission data prioritization. According to task 

force and Air Force officials, the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements 

Task Force worked in parallel with an Air Force effort to identify potential 

processes to prioritize intelligence mission data at the acquisition program 

and service levels, respectively. These officials presented proposals in 

June and July 2016 for potential processes and procedures to prioritize 

intelligence mission data at the acquisition program level. They also 

described how prioritization at the service and department levels may be 

accomplished, as shown below:

· Acquisition program prioritization: The task force proposal would 

involve prioritization of intelligence mission data into the following four 

levels of impact on the acquisition program’s capabilities were the 

data not acquired or unavailable:

Page 23 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

37

1. Level I denotes unacceptable degradation: intelligence mission 

data requirements that, if not satisfied, would result in 

unacceptable mission task degradation with no work-around 

possible;

2. Level II denotes significant degradation: intelligence mission 

requirements that, if not satisfied, would result in a significant 

mission task degradation that is unacceptable to the operator but 

for which a work-around is available, acceptable to the operator, 

and must be applied;

3. Level III denotes partial degradation: intelligence mission data 

requirements that, if not satisfied, would result in a partial or 

minimal degradation that is acceptable to the operator and for 

which a work-around is optional; and,

4. Level IV denotes little to no impact: intelligence mission data 

requirements that, if not satisfied, would result in little to no 

degradation to the mission.

· Service prioritization: Air Force officials described an effort undertaken 

in May 2016 to apply the individual program approach using levels 1 

 

37According to task force officials, they developed the proposed prioritization process for 

individual acquisition programs using a systems engineering approach. Task force officials 

stated that this type of approach would be familiar to acquisition professionals. Task force 

officials stated their belief that such a system would rely on computerized modeling and 

simulation tools to help inform the amount of intelligence needed for a weapon system to 

perform its mission.
to 4 described above to categorize 150 intelligence mission data 

needs at the service level. Task force officials stated that the Air Force 

effort undertaken in fiscal year 2016 would use a cost-capability 

approach to better inform the fiscal year 2017 service-wide 

prioritization effort. 

Page 24 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

38

· Department prioritization: Task force officials indicated that 

implementing prioritization at the individual program and service levels 

would be required prior to developing an enterprise-wide capability to 

prioritize intelligence mission data. Officials from USD(AT&L) stated 

that the enterprise-wide prioritization of intelligence mission data could 

also be informed by efforts related to developing Integrated DOD 

Intelligence Priorities.39 Furthermore, officials from the DIA stated that 

there is a lack of coordination regarding how the service intelligence 

centers conduct their business, and that the centers currently were 

not prioritizing, verifying, or balancing the work related to producing 

intelligence mission data. Task force officials stated that DIA was 

developing an intelligence mission data production prioritization 

process that would respond to enterprise-wide intelligence mission 

data priorities.

Though DOD has taken efforts to identify and develop processes and 

procedures to prioritize intelligence mission data, previous efforts have 

not succeeded in implementing intelligence mission data prioritization. 

Federal internal control standards state that management should 

establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate 

authority to achieve objectives.40 Per the joint memorandum that 

established the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Executive Steering 

Group, the steering group and associated task force were created to 

integrate, coordinate, and prioritize intelligence support functions and 

 

38Cost capability analysis is the process of gathering data from a range of sources to 

identify instances where small changes in capability have a large impact on cost so that 

weapon systems can be developed more affordably.

39DOD issued Directive-type Memorandum 15-004, Integrated DOD Intelligence Priorities, 

on September 3, 2015. The guidance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and 

provides procedures for internal coordination and prioritization of intelligence priorities of 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the 

military departments to improve identification of the intelligence needs of DOD.

40GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
processes. However, previous efforts have not succeeded in 

implementing a system to prioritize these data at any level. For example, 

the Intelligence Mission Data Senior Steering Group never met, and the 

DIA’s standing working group efforts may lead to a prevention of 

duplication of intelligence mission data production efforts, but would not 

lead to prioritization of the data. The Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Task Force was created to address intelligence support to 

acquisition, including intelligence mission data issues, and it has 

developed some proposed processes and procedures for prioritization of 

intelligence mission data. Without specific DOD guidance requiring 

intelligence mission data prioritization, new processes and procedures 

such as those developed by the task force and the services may not be 

fully implemented. With no required process to prioritize intelligence 

mission data, the intelligence community may continue to process 

requests for intelligence mission data as they are received, and thus 

weapon systems may not have the intelligence mission data they need to 

successfully perform their missions once operational.

As of July 2016, DOD was developing new tools to better integrate 

intelligence into acquisition programs. DIA was developing the Validated 

Online Lifecycle Threat, an online tool to provide threat information to 

acquisition programs in a more timely and effective manner than the 

current manually generated process in use. However, DIA had not 

effectively communicated with stakeholders about the tool or sought 

feedback from its intended users. Separately, officials from Performance 

Assessments and Root Cause Analyses, an office within USD(AT&L), 

were developing a tool for the acquisition community to communicate 

intelligence needs from individual acquisition programs to the intelligence 

community. However, intelligence community users had not expressed a 

need or defined requirements for this tool. If the tool does not meet the 

user’s needs, or will not be used, moving forward with its development 

could use funds unnecessarily.

Page 25 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

DOD Is Developing 

New Tools for 

Integrating 

Intelligence into 

Acquisition Programs 

but Faces Challenges 

in Development and 

Implementation
DOD began developing a new tool in fiscal year 2015 to better report 

threat information from the intelligence community to acquisition 

programs, but it has not effectively communicated with stakeholders 

about the tool or sought feedback from its intended users. As reported by 

DIA and described in USD(AT&L)’s Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative, the 

Validated Online Lifecycle Threat is a new tool that DIA began developing 

in fiscal year 2015 to develop and report threat information to acquisition 

programs. DOD guidance describes the System Threat Assessment 

Report as the primary threat document for supporting the Defense 

Acquisition Board’s milestone reviews.

Page 26 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

41 DOD officials described the 

System Threat Assessment Report as a primary intelligence input into 

major DOD acquisitions.

DOD officials described challenges regarding the timeliness and 

usefulness of the System Threat Assessment Report. Specifically, 

officials from USD(AT&L), Joint Staff, and DIA, as well as service 

intelligence officials, stated that the System Threat Assessment Reports 

historically arrived at acquisition program offices late, not until after the 

requirements for a new weapon system had been identified and approved 

as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System process 

well after the designing of the weapon system had begun. Furthermore, 

officials from DIA, USD(AT&L), and the service intelligence and 

acquisition communities stated that these reports are often several 

hundred pages in length, take as long as 9 months to produce, and are 

not substantively used by acquisition program managers. According to 

these officials, as well as officials from the Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Task Force, program managers simply used System 

Threat Assessment Reports to check off a box on a list of required 

documents for the next acquisition milestone decision meeting. 

Specifically, Air Force officials from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack 

 

41See Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 5000.002, Intelligence Threat Support for 

Major Defense Acquisition Programs, para. 4.2.4 (Feb. 1, 2013).The Defense Acquisition 

Board advises the Defense Acquisition Executive on critical acquisition decisions when 

the Defense Acquisition Executive is the milestone decision authority. DOD Instruction 

5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, para. 5.a(4)(b) (Jan. 7, 2015). The 

milestone decision authority has the authority to approve entry of an acquisition program 

into the next phase of the acquisition process, and is accountable for cost, schedule, and 

performance reporting to higher authority, including congressional reporting. DOD 

Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, para. 3.4 (May 12, 2003) (certified 

current Nov. 20, 2007).

DOD Is Developing the 

Validated Online Lifecycle 

Threat Tool but Has Not 

Effectively Communicated 

with Stakeholders and 

Intended Users of the 

Tool.
Radar System Recapitalization acquisition program stated that the 

system threat assessment reports were not usable because they did not 

contain the level of relevance and specificity needed by the acquisition 

program, and because they were too long, fragmented, and difficult to 

navigate. Lastly, DIA officials stated they had determined that as much as 

80 percent of all System Threat Assessment Reports are repetitive with 

each other and are not program specific.

According to DIA, the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat is a planned 

system-specific threat tool created by selecting relevant modules from a 

library of threat information. DIA and officials from USD(AT&L) described 

the planned threat library as consisting of dynamic modules based upon 

threat category, such as fighter aircraft, that would be updated by the 

analyst at the services’ intelligence centers with new threat information as 

it is produced within the intelligence community. DIA officials reported that 

as part of a broader piloting effort the agency completed in 2015, they 

were able to develop a Validated Online Lifecycle Threat in 3 months for 

the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System recapitalization 

program. According to DIA officials, the agency will have spent nearly 

$2.5 million from fiscal year 2015 through the end of fiscal year 2016 to 

begin developing the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat and the 

associated threat library, and it plans to have the tool completed by the 

end of fiscal year 2017.

DIA officials reported that they had not effectively “marketed” the 

Validated Online Lifecycle Threat tool to its intended stakeholders and 

users. While Marine Corps officials stated that the threat modules can be 

updated in a shorter timeframe than a System Threat Assessment 

Report, officials from the Navy and the Army did not know that DIA 

intended the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat to be a dynamic system, 

and they stated that they believed the planned tool to be a static, online 

version of the System Threat Assessment Report. For example, Army 

officials stated that the tool may be less useful than its predecessor 

because it is composed of static modules that may not provide the same 

level of individualized detail. Though some Navy officials who provide 

intelligence support to acquisition programs indicated that they had 

received briefs and other information about the new tool, other Navy 

officials expressed concerns that the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat 

would not be customizable to programs and could, similar to the System 

Threat Assessment Report, include extensive information that was not 

program-specific and could therefore be as inefficient as the System 

Threat Assessment Reports. Air Force officials from the Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System Recapitalization acquisition program stated 

Page 27 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
that the Validated Online Threat Assessment tool was intended to 

alleviate resource constraints in the intelligence community, but that the 

tool was being implemented without input from the acquisition community 

and individual program management offices.

The Project Management Institute’s A Guide to the Project Management 

Body of Knowledge states that managing stakeholders’ engagement 

helps to increase the probability of project success by ensuring that 

stakeholders clearly understand the project goals, objectives, benefits, 

and risks.

Page 28 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

42 This enables stakeholders to be active supporters of the 

project and to help guide activities and project decisions. Federal internal 

control standards state that management should communicate quality 

information externally so that external parties can help the entity achieve 

its objectives and address related risks.43 We found that some potential 

users of the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat report have not received 

information regarding the intended capabilities of the new system 

because DIA has not effectively communicated information about the tool 

with stakeholders and intended users. A communication plan would 

include processes for communicating the intended capabilities of the 

Validated Online Lifecycle Threat tool to stakeholders such as 

USD(AT&L) and USD(I) and users such as personnel who provide 

intelligence support to acquisition programs. Without effectively 

communicating such information to potential users, DIA may not receive 

useful feedback as it develops the tool, and concerns regarding 

timeliness, usability, and redundancy may not be effectively addressed.

 

42Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition (Newton Square, Pa: 2013). 

43GAO-14-704G.
Officials from Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses, an 

office within USD(AT&L), are developing a tool for communication of 

intelligence needs from acquisition programs to the intelligence 

community, but intended users have not expressed a need or defined 

requirements for the tool. The office is responsible for conducting rootcause analyses of acquisition programs that encounter Nunn-McCurdy 

breaches, among other things.

Page 29 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

44 According to these officials, the Assistant 

Secretary for Defense (Acquisitions) requested that the office perform an 

analysis of the root causes of challenges faced by the integration of 

intelligence into acquisitions. This analysis identified issues with threat 

intelligence and intelligence mission data and resulted in pilot projects of 

new tools such as the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat.

According to Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses 

officials, acquisition programs request intelligence both through informal 

means, such as conversations and emails, and through formal means via 

information systems, such as the Community On-Line Intelligence System 

for End Users and Managers.45 These officials reported that the formal 

requests for intelligence often contain vague or inaccurate information 

and do not allow the intelligence community to prioritize or fulfill requests 

efficiently. Officials told us that to resolve this issue they are developing 

an online tool called the Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment that 

would allow acquisition personnel to communicate intelligence needs to 

the intelligence community over an online system.

According to Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses 

officials, personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs 

will be able to access the online tool and determine whether particular

threat intelligence is currently available. If it is not, requests can be made 

via the tool to the intelligence community, which would then use the 

 

44A Nunn-McCurdy breach occurs when a major defense acquisition program’s unit cost 

exceeds certain thresholds. See 10 U.S.C. § 2433.

45Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers is an information 

management system managed by DIA for defense and intelligence community users from 

the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Users can 

search for past or current intelligence, determine outstanding intelligence requests or 

requirements, and submit intelligence needs to a central system, which routes the request 

to the appropriate intelligence community production center. Requests are referred to as 

requests for information or production requests.

Users Have Not 

Expressed a Need or 

Defined Requirements for 

a Tool for Acquisition 

Programs to Communicate 

Their Intelligence Needs to 

the Intelligence 

Community
tracking capabilities planned for the tool to monitor requests from multiple 

programs, and assign staff and resources as necessary. Performance 

Assessments and Root Cause Analyses officials stated that this tool 

could also be useful for personnel with limited knowledge or familiarity 

with acquisition programs due to time and resource constraints. They also 

stated that it would be useful for the intelligence community to manage 

and prioritize intelligence requests from the acquisition community.

Officials from the office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause 

Analyses stated that they were independently developing the tool for the 

acquisition and intelligence communities before integrating it into existing 

processes. These officials stated that they chose this approach after 

conducting their root cause analysis and identifying challenges related to 

integrating intelligence into acquisition programs. DOD awarded contracts 

in August and December 2015 for the initial analysis and for commencing 

development of the communication tool for a cost of approximately $1.1 

million. Officials stated that they expected to spend in total about $1.2 

million, sourced from available operational funding within the Office of 

Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses.

While Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses has funded 

the development of the Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool, 

these officials stated that there is currently no mechanism to fund future 

implementation and operation of the tool once fully developed, and they 

estimated that the system will cost $3 million to $5 million per year to 

operate. These officials reported that another office must be tasked to 

oversee the implementation of the tool, and suggested that the 

Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force or a Joint Staff office 

might assume responsibility for the system. Officials from the task force 

have recommended that the task force evaluate whether the Acquisition 

Intelligence Support Assessment tool should be used or merged with 

existing tools, but no decision regarding the planned implementation or 

operation of the tool had been made as of July 2016.

Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses officials described 

several steps they had taken to introduce the tool to potential 

stakeholders, including holding demonstration events, working groups, 

and briefings. Specifically, these officials stated that they had introduced 

the Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool to acquisition and 

intelligence stakeholders in October 2015 and June 2016, but service 

officials who are potential users of the tool told us that they had not 

identified a need for the tool. Air Force officials stated that they already 

track intelligence requests through existing information systems, and that 

Page 30 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
the new tool would likely duplicate existing processes. Officials from the 

Navy stated that the developmental nature of the tool prevents a full 

assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. Officials from the Army 

stated that they would wait until the tool is fully developed before deciding 

whether to use it, and officials from the Marine Corps stated that their 

input had not been solicited.

We have previously identified leading practices for increased 

collaboration among agencies, including defining and articulating a 

common outcome; agreeing on roles and responsibilities, and 

establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate 

across agency boundaries.

Page 31 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

46 Given that acquisition and intelligence 

personnel have not identified requirements for the Acquisition Intelligence 

Support Assessment tool, it may not fulfill the needs of acquisition 

programs and the intelligence community or work as intended, and the 

services may prefer to use existing systems. As a result, DOD may use 

funds unnecessarily to develop a tool that is not needed. Further, without 

plans or funding for implementation and operation, the Acquisition 

Intelligence Support Assessment tool may not be fully implemented or 

sustained once operational.

DOD has long recognized the need to improve its process for the 

acquisition of major weapon systems, and it has recently undertaken 

efforts to improve intelligence input both during the acquisition process 

and, subsequently, to help enable weapon systems to more effectively 

perform their missions once deployed. For example, the department has 

worked to integrate intelligence into its acquisition program manager 

courses and has developed potential processes for prioritizing intelligence 

mission data needs. Addressing gaps we identified in several key areas 

will enable DOD to better leverage its efforts. First, without a departmentwide certification process that includes training standards, DOD may not 

be able to ensure that all personnel who provide intelligence support to 

acquisition programs are familiar with and able to provide intelligence 

inputs to their portfolios of acquisition programs. Second, without specific 

requirements for intelligence mission data prioritization in DOD guidance, 

DOD may not be able to ensure that weapon systems have the data they 

 

46GAO-06-15.

Conclusions
need to successfully perform their missions once operational. Third, 

potential users of DOD’s planned Validated Online Lifecycle Threat report 

have not received information or provided feedback regarding the 

intended capabilities of the new tool because the DIA has not effectively 

communicated the intended capabilities to stakeholders and potential 

users. Without a communication plan, DIA may not receive useful 

feedback as it develops the system, and ongoing concerns regarding 

timeliness, usability, and redundancy of threat information may not be 

effectively addressed. Fourth, without conducting an assessment of the 

need for and defining requirements for development of its proposed 

Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool, DOD may be using 

funds to unnecessarily develop a tool that is not needed or, if needed, 

may not be fully implemented or sustained once operational.

To enhance DOD’s efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence 

support to major defense acquisition programs, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct—as appropriate—the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military 

departments, to take the following four actions in coordination with one 

another:

· To better enable personnel to provide intelligence inputs to their 

portfolios of acquisition programs, establish certifications that include 

having these personnel complete required training.

· To facilitate implementation of improved processes and procedures 

developed by the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force 

and by the Air Force for the integration of intelligence into major 

defense acquisition programs, revise relevant guidance and 

procedures—including DOD Instruction 5000.02 and DOD Directive 

5250.01—to require that intelligence mission data at the acquisition 

program, service, and department levels be prioritized.

· To better ensure that DOD obtains useful feedback from stakeholders 

and the intended users of the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat tool, 

instruct the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to develop a 

communication plan for the tool that includes plans for communicating 

with and obtaining feedback from stakeholders and intended users 

such as acquisition program offices and personnel providing 

intelligence support to acquisition programs.

· To ensure that it fulfills the needs of acquisition programs and the 

intelligence community and works as intended, assess the need for 

Page 32 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
the Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool and, if validated 

by this assessment, define this tool’s requirements for development 

and identify the entity responsible for providing oversight and funding 

for its continued development, implementation, and operation.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD concurred with all four of our recommendations and the responses 

are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV. Based on discussions with 

the department, we also revised our recommendations to more accurately 

characterize the relevant DOD organizations and offices. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Intelligence; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and 

Navy; and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at 

no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix V.

Joseph W. Kirschbaum

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Page 33 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard Burr

Chairman

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

Vice Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Page 34 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
The Honorable Devin Nunes

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Schiff

Ranking Member

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 35 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
Appendix I: Information on DOD’s Efforts to 

Assess the Intelligence-Gathering Capability of 

Weapon Systems beyond the Scope of Their 

Mission

We reviewed relevant acquisition-related processes and procedures and 

found that the Department of Defense (DOD) has no requirement to 

assess a weapon system’s ability to gather intelligence beyond or outside 

the scope of its mission.

DOD officials we spoke with from Joint Staff, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), and the 

services indicated that there are no requirements for them to consider the 

ability of a system to gather intelligence beyond or outside the scope of its 

mission during the acquisition process, or otherwise, and that currently 

there were no plans to consider performing such assessments. Officials 

from the Army and Marine Corps indicated that this had not been 

considered because their services were generally focused on nonadvanced weapons such as tanks that were ill-suited for this purpose. Air 

Force officials told us that current advanced weapon systems such as the 

B-2 and F-22, and future systems such as the F-35 have or will have the 

capability to gather intelligence outside and beyond the scope needed to 

perform their missions, but that there were not currently any plans to 

assess this capability during the acquisition process. These officials told 

us that these assessments may occur, such as for the non-traditional use 

of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, in the postdeployment period as opportunities and capabilities arise.

Officials from some of the service intelligence communities as well as 

from USD(AT&L) indicated that one of the challenges faced by current 

and future advanced weapon systems is the ability to store and then 

offload intelligence data in such a way as to be immediately useful to 

analysts in the intelligence community. Air Force officials we spoke with 

indicated that there have been efforts to make use of non-traditional 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems in the field as a 

way of gathering signals intelligence information, but that assessing this 

capability was not considered during the acquisition process.

Page 36 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Appendix I: Information on DOD’s Efforts to 

Assess the Intelligence-Gathering Capability 

of Weapon Systems beyond the Scope of 

Their Mission
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 includes a 

provision that we review the processes and procedures for the integration 

of intelligence into the defense acquisition process.

Page 37 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

1 This report 

evaluates, for major defense acquisition programs, the extent to which 

DOD has (1) processes and procedures for certifying2 and training 

personnel assigned to provide intelligence support to acquisition 

programs; (2) efforts to improve processes and procedures for integrating 

intelligence into its acquisition programs; and (3) efforts to develop new 

tools for integrating intelligence into its acquisition programs. We also 

collected information related to DOD’s efforts to identify opportunities for 

weapon systems to collect intelligence even when unrelated to their 

primary mission, which is presented in appendix I.

To determine the extent to which DOD has processes and procedures for 

certifying and training of personnel assigned to provide intelligence 

support to acquisition programs, we reviewed DOD guidance governing 

the management of intelligence and acquisition personnel. We 

interviewed officials from the offices identified in this appendix who 

participate in the development of guidance and management of personnel 

providing intelligence support to acquisition. We submitted written 

requests for guidance regarding staffing, qualifications, certification, and 

training of personnel to these officials, and we reviewed their responses. 

We also interviewed and received written responses from officials from 

the Defense Acquisition University regarding changes to the acquisition 

curriculum that included additional intelligence material. We reviewed the 

certifications and qualifications DOD has established in implementing the 

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, and other DOD 

guidance for the training and management of acquisition personnel, and 

Under Secretary for Intelligence (USD(I)) guidance related to certifications 

and qualifications for intelligence personnel.3 We reviewed training and 

 

1Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1638 (2015).

2Certification is the procedure through which DOD components determine that an 

employee meets education, training, and experience elements for each career field.

3Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5000.52, Defense Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program (Jan. 12, 

2005); DOD Instruction 5000.66, Operation of the Defense Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program (Dec. 21, 

2005); and DOD Instruction 3115.11, DOD Intelligence Human Capital Management 

Operations (Jan. 22, 2009) (incorporating change Dec. 9, 2011).

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

certification guidance for both acquisition personnel, as administered by 

USD(AT&L), and intelligence personnel, as administered USD(I), 

because interviews with DOD officials indicated that personnel who 

provide intelligence support to acquisition programs are managed by 

acquisition and intelligence components, depending on the service.

To determine the extent to which DOD has processes and procedures for 

the integration of intelligence into the acquisition of weapon systems, we 

reviewed department-level directives, instructions, and other guidance 

that governs intelligence input into the acquisition process. To identify 

additional processes specific to the military services, we interviewed 

officials from the offices identified in this appendix, and we submitted 

written requests for information in order to obtain the documents identified 

by these officials. To determine the validity of the document sources used 

to identify the intelligence inputs, we reviewed written responses from 

service acquisition and intelligence officials at the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Marine Corps to verify that the documents were current and in use by 

the respective services. To determine the extent to which ongoing DOD 

initiatives will address identified issues with acquisition and intelligence 

integration, we interviewed officials from offices identified in this appendix 

and requested documentation on the progress of intelligence-related 

tasks identified in USD(AT&L)’s Better Buying Power 3.0 initiatives. We 

also observed meetings of the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements 

Task Force, and we observed briefings from the task force to the 

Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Executive Steering Group. We also 

compared the proposed intelligence mission data prioritization processes 

with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which 

states that management should establish an organizational structure, 

assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve objectives.

Page 38 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

4

After receiving the documents, an analyst reviewed each document and 

identified actions (such as formation of a working group or certification), 

products (such as reports or data), or processes (such as an intelligence 

parameter breach or formal review) that could be considered as 

intelligence inputs required for an acquisition program classified by DOD 

 

4GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept., 2014).
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

as Acquisition Category I.

Page 39 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

5 We defined an intelligence input as any action, 

process, or product that involved or included the participation of an 

intelligence professional and was provided for a specific acquisition 

program. The analyst categorized those inputs with similar names or 

document sources and then entered each category and input onto a 

spreadsheet. The intelligence inputs are provided in appendix III.

To verify our identification of intelligence inputs, we created a standard 

data collection instrument based on the spreadsheet of identified 

intelligence inputs. The data collection instrument asked respondents to 

identify, for Acquisition Category I programs initiated as of June 1, 2016, 

(1) when, if at all, each of the identified intelligence inputs would be used 

throughout an acquisition lifecycle; (2) whether their office would provide 

input into the item; (3) whether these inputs were required to be provided; 

and (4) to provide any comments or additional inputs, if necessary. We 

sent this data collection instrument to officials of the intelligence 

components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the DIA; the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Joint 

Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2, for a total of seven responses. We 

selected these officials and organizations because document sources 

identified these organizations as providers of intelligence inputs, and thus 

the most likely to identify intelligence inputs. Data were reviewed by two 

analysts to ensure that all data were fully extracted and correctly 

tabulated.

To provide illustrative examples and determine how processes and 

procedures are implemented for individual acquisition programs, we 

selected a nongeneralizable sample of six major defense acquisition 

programs. We used a stratified purposeful sampling procedure in which 

 

5DOD categorizes acquisition programs into Acquisition Categories I, IA, II, and III. 

Acquisition Category I programs are major defense acquisition programs, estimated by 

USD(AT&L) as requiring an eventual total expenditure for research, development, and test 

and evaluation of more than $480 million in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars or, for 

procurement, of more than $2.79 billion in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars, or those 

acquisitions that are designated as major defense acquisition programs or designated as 

Special Interest by USD(AT&L), the head of the DOD component, or the component 

acquisition executive. The Special Interest designation is typically based on one or more 

of the following factors: technological complexity; congressional interest; a large 

commitment of resources; or criticality of a program to the achievement of a capability or 

set of capabilities, part of a system of systems, or a joint program. See DOD Instruction 

5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Jan. 7, 2015). 
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

we intentionally chose acquisition programs with particular characteristics 

to capture both important similarities and variations. We selected from a 

population of acquisition programs identified by the Acquisition 

Intelligence Requirements Task Force as having significant intelligence 

needs. Two analysts then classified each program with characteristics 

using information from a GAO assessment of major defense acquisition 

programs, including whether the program was focused on warfare 

domains of land, air, or sea; and what service was primarily responsible 

for the program.

Page 40 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

6 We excluded space and satellite programs from 

selection due to the unique differences and higher security classifications 

of these programs, as compared with other major defense acquisition 

programs. Based on these characteristics, we then selected two Air Force 

programs, two Navy programs, one Army program, and one Marine Corps 

program. The programs included the following:

· Army, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle

· Navy, Ohio-Class Replacement

· Navy, Air and Missile Defense Radar

· Air Force, F-22 Increment 3.2B Modernization

· Air Force, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

Recapitalization

· Marine Corps, CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter

We selected this number and distribution of acquisition programs 

because officials from the Air Force and Navy stated that they had many 

programs that used intelligence mission data, and officials from the Army 

and Marine Corps stated that they did not have many intelligence mission 

data-dependent programs. We submitted identical questions and 

requests for information to officials from each program management 

office, as well as individuals identified by the program as being personnel 

who provide intelligence input into the acquisition program. We discussed 

the questions orally or received written responses from officials and 

intelligence personnel from each program. While the responses we 

obtained are not generalizable to all major defense acquisition programs, 

the information obtained from program officials provided context and 

 

6Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-16-329SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2016).
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

important insights for our understanding of the interaction of acquisition 

and intelligence personnel.

To examine the extent to which DOD has efforts to develop new tools for 

integrating intelligence into acquisitions we identified two tools that were 

currently in development through discussions with Acquisition Intelligence 

Requirements Task Force officials. We verified that these tools were in 

development through interviews with officials involved in oversight of 

acquisitions and intelligence, including officials at USD(AT&L), USD(I), 

and DIA. We conducted a site visit to DIA’s Technology and Long-Range 

Assessment offices in Charlottesville, Virginia, where we interviewed 

officials and observed a demonstration of a developmental version of the 

Validated Online Lifecycle Threat tool. We also interviewed officials from 

Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses, and we viewed a 

presentation and demonstration of a developmental version of the 

Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool. We collected 

developmental plans and briefings for both of these tools, and we 

compared our observations and statements made by DIA and 

Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses officials against the 

documents, and against statements from acquisition, intelligence, and 

program management office officials. We compared the developmental 

plans and information provided to us by DIA and Performance 

Assessments and Root Cause Analyses officials against standards in the 

Project Management Institute’s A Guide to the Project Management Body 

of Knowledge,

Page 41 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

7

federal standards for internal controls,8 and key practices 

for collaboration among federal agencies.9

To examine DOD’s processes and procedures for assessing during the 

acquisition process a weapon system’s ability to gather intelligence when 

unrelated to its primary mission, we reviewed DOD reports and guidance 

for acquisition management identified for the previous objectives. We 

systematically reviewed the content of these documents for any 

information relevant to assessing during the acquisition process a 

 

7Project Management Institute, Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), Fifth Edition, 2013. 

8GAO-14-704G.

9Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

system’s ability to gather intelligence. We were unable to identify any 

process or procedure relevant to this objective. To confirm this finding, we 

interviewed acquisitions, intelligence, and requirements professionals 

from offices identified in this appendix. Further details are provided in 

appendix I.

We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed officials from the 

following organizations:

· Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence;

· Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics

· Office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses;

· Director of Operational Test and Evaluation;

· Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation;

· Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force and Executive 

Steering Group;

· Defense Intelligence Agency;

· Defense Acquisition University;

· U.S. Army;

· U.S. Navy;

· U.S. Marine Corps;

· U.S. Air Force;

· Joint Staff; and

· Office of the Director of National Intelligence

We conducted this performance audit from December 2015 to November 

2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Page 42 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

We defined intelligence input in this report as any action, process, or 

product that involved or included the participation of an intelligence 

professional and was provided for a specific acquisition program, and we 

then grouped the intelligence inputs we identified by inputs with similar 

names, document sources, or categories. To confirm our appropriate 

identification of intelligence inputs, we created a data collection 

instrument based on the spreadsheet of identified intelligence inputs. The 

instrument asked respondents to identify, for an Acquisition Category I 

program initiated as of June 1, 2016, (1) when, if at all, each of the 

identified intelligence inputs would be used throughout its acquisition 

lifecycle; (2) whether their office would provide input for each entry we 

identified; (3) whether these inputs are required to be provided; and (4) to 

provide any comments or additional inputs, if necessary.

For programs begun prior to Milestone A, the intelligence inputs that we 

identified from a review of DOD’s acquisition-related guidance are to be 

provided prior to Milestone A review, with several updated at points prior 

to subsequent milestone reviews. The responses to our data collection 

instrument from the Joint Staff, USD(I), DIA, and the service intelligence 

community indicated that each intelligence input we identified had one or 

more respondent reporting that the respondent’s office would make that 

input, which verified the individual inputs we identified (see table 3). DIA, 

and Army also remarked that the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat report 

will replace the Capstone Threat Assessment, and DIA, the Air Force,

and the Army remarked that the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat report 

will replace the System Threat Assessment Report. We have noted that 

these inputs are to be phased out once the Validated Online Lifecycle 

Threat is operational.

The responses regarding when the identified intelligence inputs would be 

used throughout the lifecycle varied among the respondents, but every 

input had one or more respondent reporting that the input would be made 

prior to Milestone A. We attribute this variance to different interpretations 

of inputs that do not align with every milestone, such as threat-related 

inputs that occur prior to Milestone A and then are continuously monitored 

for changes; or to inputs that are made through groups that meet on a 

schedule independent of acquisition milestones. The responses to the 

data collection instrument regarding whether each input is required to be 

provided for every Acquisition Category I also varied.

The threat assessment and validation category of inputs represent direct 

inputs from the intelligence community into acquisition programs. Others, 

such as Critical Intelligence Parameter and Critical Program Information, 

Page 43 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the 

Defense Acquisition Process
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

are foreign threat factors monitored by the intelligence community for 

changes that may impact an acquisition program. For the other categories 

of input, the intelligence community provides varying degrees of direct 

and indirect inputs into the acquisition process. On some of the 

responses to our data collection instrument, the respondents provided 

comments that indicated they were not familiar with the input, and on the 

others, we attribute the variance to different understandings of guidance 

among the respondents.

Table 3: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense Acquisition Process

Page 44 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Input Description of Input

DOD Intelligence 

Organization(s) Providing Input, 

as of July 2016

Threat Intelligence Support Threat intelligence support to the acquisition process provides 

an understanding of foreign threat capabilities that is integral to 

the development of future U.S. military systems and platforms. 

Identifying projected adversarial threat capabilities, to include 

scientific and technical developments that may affect a 

program’s or a capability’s design or implementation is crucial to 

a successful development process.

System Threat Assessment 

Reporta

An authoritative, system-specific threat assessment report must 

be validated by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for 

Acquisition Category ID programs. A validated System Threat 

Assessment Report is required at program initiation for 

shipbuilding programs and Milestone A for other programs, and 

updated at the development request for proposals release 

decision point, Milestone C, and the full-rate production decision 

or full deployment decision point.

DIA, Service Intelligence Centers

Validated Online Lifecycle 

Threatb

This is a planned system-specific threat summary that a threat 

analyst creates by selecting relevant modules from a library of 

threat information. 

DIA, Service Intelligence 

Organizations

Capstone Threat 

Assessmenta

This input provides the analytic foundation for intelligence 

support to the defense acquisition process. It projects foreign 

capabilities in particular warfare areas out 20 years in the 

future. These assessments constitute the primary source of 

threat intelligence for the preparation of System Threat 

Assessment Reports and for the threat portions of documents 

supporting the requirements development process. These 

assessments are maintained by the responsible production 

center and must be updated every 2 years, independent of 

acquisition decision events.

DIA, Service Intelligence Centers

Threat Steering Group This is co-chaired by the Service Intelligence Centers and DIA. 

Intelligence production centers, commands, and offices 

supporting system acquisition programs requiring DIA-validated 

threats are required to convene Threat Steering Groups during 

the System Threat Assessment Report or Capstone Threat 

Assessment production process. 

DIA, Service Intelligence Centers
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

Page 45 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Input Description of Input

DOD Intelligence 

Organization(s) Providing Input, 

as of July 2016

Threat Review and 

Intelligence Certification

Intelligence certification is required for capability requirement 

documents for certain programs to ensure that the system and 

protection threats remain valid, and that changes within the 

intelligence community will still support program development. 

Performed by the Joint Staff J283/Intelligence Requirements 

Certification Office and valid until the next acquisition milestone 

or for 2-years, depending on the circumstances. The 

intelligence certification granted for a requirements document in 

support of Milestone C sets the baseline for intelligence mission 

data production requirements for operation of the system once 

deployed.

DIA/Joint Staff (Intelligence 

Requirements Certification Office)c

Intelligence Mission Data 

Support

Intelligence mission data are essential data for building system 

models, developing algorithms, optimizing sensor design, 

system testing, and evaluation, and validating sensor 

functionality. Functional areas and categories of intelligence 

mission data include but are not limited to Characteristics and 

Performance, Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming, 

Geospatial Intelligence, Order of Battle, and Signatures (Radar, 

Thermal, and Acoustic).

Life-cycle Mission Data 

Plan 

This plan is a statement of program needs that is applied 

throughout the life of an intelligence mission data-dependent 

acquisition program and potentially influences programmatic 

decisions based on the availability of the data over the life of the 

program.

DIA/Intelligence Mission Data 

Center, Service Intelligence 

Centers 

Intelligence Certification 

Working Group 

The group convenes monthly, or as required, to address 

intelligence mission data, intelligence supportability, and threat 

assessment issues in support of intelligence certification. 

DIA/Joint Staff (Intelligence Requirements Certification Office) 

convenes Intelligence Certification Working Group, composed 

of the defense intelligence components and other agencies, as 

required, to facilitate review, coordination, and 

recommendations for intelligence supportability.

Defense Intelligence Components

Capability Requirement 

Documents Review

Capability Requirement Documents are used to articulate 

capability requirements, which are capabilities required to meet 

an organization’s roles, functions, and missions in current or 

future operations. If a capability requirement is not satisfied by a 

capability solution, there is also an associated capability gap. 

DIA/Joint Staff (Intelligence 

Requirements Certification Office)

Intelligence Certification of 

Intelligence Mission Data 

Requirements

Review and intelligence certification will be conducted as part of 

validation of each capability requirement document, in support 

of each acquisition decision point.

DIA/Joint Staff (Intelligence 

Requirements Certification Office)

Critical Intelligence Parameter 

Support

This is a threat capability or threshold established by the 

program manager, changes to which could critically affect the 

effectiveness and survivability of the proposed system. Critical 

Intelligence Parameters may be included in capability 

requirement documents and System Threat Assessment 

Reports.
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

Page 46 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Input Description of Input

DOD Intelligence 

Organization(s) Providing Input, 

as of July 2016

Critical Intelligence 

Parameter Breach 

Notification

These are made to appropriate departmental offices and 

entities when the supporting military Service Intelligence Center 

determines that an approved Critical Intelligence Parameter has 

been breached and the acquisition program office(s) will be 

impacted by the breach.

Service Intelligence Centers

Critical Intelligence 

Parameter Breach Review

This review is a collaborative assessment of the relationship 

between changes to an approved Critical Intelligence 

Parameter and associated threat-dependent capability 

requirements that have been validated.

Service Intelligence Centers

Acquisition Oversight

Defense Acquisition Board This is DOD’s senior-level forum for advising the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

on critical decisions concerning Acquisition Category ID 

programs, and selected Acquisition Category IA programs. 

National Geospatial Intelligence 

Agency (advisory) and others by 

invitation from USD(AT&L)

Counterintelligence and 

Program Protection

Supply Chain Risk 

Management 

This is a systematic process for managing supply chain risk by 

identifying susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and threats 

throughout DOD’s “supply chain” and developing mitigation 

strategies to combat those threats. It includes managing and 

producing Supply Chain Threat Assessments that provide an 

analytical foundation for counterintelligence support to supply 

chain risk management. 

DIA

Affordability Analysis

Affordability Analysis This analysis is part of the long-range planning and decision 

making that determines the resources a component can 

allocate for each new capability by ensuring that the total of all 

such allocations— together with all other fiscal demands that 

compete for resources in the component—are not above the 

component’s future total budget projection for each year.

Service Intelligence Organizations

Joint Capability 

Requirements Development, 

Review, and Certification

The intelligence certification process evaluates and analyzes a 

program’s intelligence support requirements for completeness, 

supportability, and impact on joint intelligence strategy, policy, 

and architectural planning.

Initial Capability Document, 

Capability Development 

Document, and Capability 

Production Document 

reviews

J283/ Intelligence Requirements Certification Office review and 

intelligence certification will be conducted as part of validation of 

each capability requirement document, in support of each 

acquisition decision point – i.e., the Initial Capability Document 

for Milestone A, the Capabilities Development Document for the 

developmental Request for Proposal release decision point 

before Milestone B, and the Capability Production Document for 

Milestone C.

DIA/Joint Staff (Intelligence 

Requirements Certification Office)
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

Page 47 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Input Description of Input

DOD Intelligence 

Organization(s) Providing Input, 

as of July 2016

Intelligence Supportability Supportability refers to the availability, suitability, and 

sufficiency of intelligence support required by a capability. 

Categories of support include Intelligence Manpower, 

Intelligence Resources, Intelligence Planning and Operations, 

Targeting, Intelligence Mission Data, Warning, Space 

Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence Training.

Intelligence Supportability 

Review Prior to Granting 

Intelligence Certification

This is performed to ensure that intelligence requirements have 

been identified at the earliest possible point, and that all likely 

intelligence support requirements and shortfalls (if applicable) 

have been documented.

DIA/Joint Staff (Intelligence 

Requirements Certification Office)

Intelligence Support 

Requirements

Intelligence support requirements will be reviewed by subject 

matter experts from DOD and service intelligence organizations 

for supportability prior to granting intelligence certification. 

Sponsors are to engage their supporting intelligence entities at 

the earliest stages of development to ensure understanding of 

the requirements to be levied against the intelligence 

community.

DOD and Service Intelligence 

Organizations

Testing and Evaluation This is the process by which a system or components are 

exercised and results are analyzed to provide performancerelated information. The information has many uses, including 

risk identification, risk mitigation, and the creation of empirical 

data to validate models and simulations. Testing and Evaluation 

enables an assessment of the attainment of technical 

performance, specifications, and system maturity to determine 

whether systems are operationally effective, suitable and 

survivable for intended use, and/or lethal. 

Testing and Evaluation 

Master Plan 

This plan documents the overall structure and objectives of the 

Test and Evaluation program and articulates the necessary 

resources to accomplish each phase of test. It provides a 

framework within which to generate detailed Testing and 

Evaluation plans and documents schedule and resource 

implications associated with the program.

DIA (determination of operational 

threat environment)

Testing and Evaluation 

Working Level Integrated 

Product Team 

The team develops and tracks the Testing and Evaluation 

program in all phases. The integrated product team will include 

empowered representatives of test data stakeholders such as 

Systems Engineering; Developmental, Operational, and Live 

Fire Testing and Evaluation; Product Support; the user; 

intelligence community; and certification authorities.

Intelligence Community 

(unspecified)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. | GAO-17-10

a

To be phased out when the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat is operational.

b

The Validated Online Lifecycle Threat is under development by DIA as of July 2016.

c

Intelligence Requirements Certification Office supports J-2, the intelligence component of the Joint 

Staff, and is composed of personnel from Joint Staff and DIA.

During our review of DOD guidance to identify intelligence inputs into 

acquisition programs throughout the acquisition lifecycle we identified the 
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

following key guidance documents for providing intelligence support to 

acquisition programs:

· DOD Directive 5000.01: The Defense Acquisition System, issued May 

12, 2003, provides management principles and mandatory policies 

and procedures for managing all acquisition programs, along with 

DOD Instruction 5000.02. This directive notes that intelligence and the 

understanding of threat capabilities are integral to system 

development and acquisitions decisions, and that program managers 

are to keep threat capabilities current and validated in program 

documents throughout the acquisition process.

· DOD Instruction 5000.02: Operation of the Defense Acquisition 

System, issued January 7, 2015, provides the detailed procedures 

that guide the operation of the Defense Acquisition System. 

Regarding intelligence inputs into the acquisition process, among 

others, the guidance identifies the requirement for a Lifecycle Mission 

Data Plan for acquisition programs dependent upon intelligence 

mission data.

Page 48 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

1 Additionally, the guidance describes the need to 

consider threat projections in the context of Analyses of Alternatives. 

It further notes that affordability analysis should involve a DOD 

component’s intelligence and acquisition communities. Finally, DOD 

Instruction 5000.02 lists requirements for a number of intelligence 

inputs, such as Capstone Threat Assessments, Initial Threat 

Environment Assessments, System Threat Assessment Reports, and 

Technology Targeting Risk Assessments. According to DOD officials, 

several of these inputs are being phased out.

· DOD Directive 5250.01: Management of Intelligence Mission Data 

(IMD) in DOD Acquisition, issued January 22, 2013, establishes 

policies and assigns responsibilities to provide linkages between the 

management, production, and application of DOD intelligence mission 

data and accommodation of intelligence mission data in the 

acquisition process. It helps to synchronize the acquisition, 

 

1DOD guidance describes an intelligence mission data-dependent program as any 

acquisition program that will require intelligence mission data, such as programs that carry 

out combat identification, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and targeting 

using information including, but not limited to, signatures, electronic warfare integrated 

reprogramming, order of battle, characteristics and performance, and geospatial 

intelligence. DOD Directive 5250.01, Management of Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) in 

DOD Acquisition, at 13 (Jan. 22, 2013).
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

intelligence, and requirement communities regarding intelligence 

integration into the requirements process and acquisition life cycle. 

According to Acquisition Intelligence requirements Task Force 

officials, this directive is currently under revision.

· Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01G: Charter of 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), issued February 

12, 2015, implements the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 

established by statute, which supports the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in carrying out the duties of the principal military 

advisor to the President, National Security Staff, and Secretary of 

Defense, among other functions.

Page 49 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

2 This instruction notes that the 

Secretary of Defense has designated the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence as one of the advisors to the Council, and identifies the 

Director of the Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence as an advisor on 

intelligence supportability and intelligence interoperability issues, 

among other things.

· Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System (JCIDS), issued February 12, 2015 (including 

changes through December 18, 2015): The manual provides detailed 

guidelines and procedures for the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System, and describes interactions of that process with 

several other departmental processes. Among other things, the 

manual contains a content guide for intelligence supportability, 

providing general descriptions of categories of intelligence support, to 

assist with the identification of intelligence support requirements and 

sufficiency or risk of shortfalls in intelligence infrastructure required to 

support a proposed potential acquisition program throughout its 

lifecycle. The manual indicates that in cases where the intelligence 

support requirements exceed the intelligence community’s ability to 

provide support, resources required to augment the intelligence 

support must be accounted for in program affordability documentation. 

Categories of intelligence support listed in the manual include 

intelligence manpower support, intelligence resource support, 

intelligence planning and operations support, targeting support, and 

intelligence mission data support, among others. Intelligence 

manpower support is to be addressed where the proposed acquisition 

 

2Section 181 of Title 10, U.S. Code, establishes the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

and describes its mission and composition.
Appendix III: Intelligence Inputs in the Defense 

Acquisition Process

will require intelligence personnel for development, testing, training, or 

operation. In some circumstances, the category may address 

necessary manpower changes or specific required skills. Intelligence 

resource support is to be addressed if the proposed acquisition or 

supporting efforts will require or depend upon intelligence funding.

· Defense Acquisition Guidebook: The Defense Acquisition University 

maintains this DOD best practice guide, which complements DOD 

Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02. Chapter 8 –

Intelligence Analysis Support to Acquisition—describes various 

aspects of providing intelligence support to acquisition programs such 

as threat intelligence support and signature and other intelligence 

mission data support. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook is currently 

under revision, according to Acquisition Intelligence Requirements 

Task Force officials.

· Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 5000.002, Intelligence Threat 

Support for Major Defense Acquisition Programs, issued February 1, 

2013: Referenced in guidance such as DOD Instruction 5000.02, the 

DIA instruction assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for 

DIA and DOD components to provide intelligence threat support for 

major defense acquisition programs.

Page 50 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 51 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 52 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 53 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Joseph W. Kirschbaum (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, GAO staff who made 

contributions to this report include Brian Mazanec, Assistant Director; 

Scott Behen, Pat Donahue, Ben Emmel, Amie Lesser, Jason Lyuke, C. 

James Madar, Ronald Schwenn, Michael Shaughnessy, and Cheryl 

Weissman.

Page 54 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Appendix VI: Accessible Data

Page 55 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Mr. Joseph Kirschbaum

Director, Defense Capabilities Management

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, NW

Washington DC 20548 Dear Mr. Kirschbaum,

Attached please find the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the 

GAO Draft Report GA0-17-10, "DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE: Additional 

Steps Could Better Integrate Intelligence Input into DoD's Acquisition of 

Major Weapon Systems," dated August 19, 2016 (GAO Code 100507). 

We concm with the GAO findings and their four recommendat ions.

My point of contact is Ms. Joyce Grant at 703-695 -4320 or via email at 

joyce.j.grant.civ @mail.mil.

Performing Duties of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence

Attachments: As stated

GA0-17-10 (GAO CODE 100507)

"DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE: ADDITIONAL STEPS COULD BETTER 

INTEGRATE INTELLIGENCE INPUT INTO DOD'S ACQUISITION OF 

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO 

RECOMMENDATION

Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance DoD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence 

support to major defense acquisition progra!ms, GAO recommends that 

the Secretary of Defense direct-as appropriate- the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary 

Appendix VI: Accessible Data

(100507)

Agency Comment 

Letter

Department of Defense, 

Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense

Page 1

Page 2
Appendix VI: Accessible Data

of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military 

departments, to take the following four actions in coordination with one 

another:

RECOMMENDATION 1: 

The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, to better enable 

personnel to provide intelligence inputs to their portfolios of acquisition 

programs, establish certification(s) that includes these personnel 

completing required training.

DoD RESPONSE: The Department concurs.

RECOMMENDATION 2: 

The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, to facilitate 

implementation of improved processes and procedures developed by the 

Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force and by the Air Force for 

the integration of intelligence into major defense acquisition programs, 

revise relevant guidance and procedures-including DoD Instruction 

5000.02 and DOD Directive 5250.01-to require that intelligence mission 

data at the acquisition program, service, and department levels be 

prioritized.

DoD RESPONSE: The Departments concurs.

RECOMMENDATION 3: 

The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, to better ensure 

that DOD obtains useful feedback from stakeholders and the intended 

users of the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat tool, instruct the Director of 

the Defense Intelligence Agency to develop a communication plan for the 

tool that includes plans for communicating with and obtaining feedback 

from stakeholders and intended users such as acquisition program offices 

and personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs.

DoD RESPONSE: The Department concurs.

RECOMMENDATION 4: 

The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, to ensure that it 

fulfills the needs of acquisition programs and the intelligence community 

and works as intended, assess the need for the Acquisition Intelligence 

Page 56 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence
Appendix VI: Accessible Data

Support Assessment tool and, if validated by this assessment, define this 

tool's requirements for development and identify the

entity responsible :for providing oversight and funding for its continued 

development, implementation, td operation.

DoD RESPONSE: The Department concurs.

Page 57 GAO-17-10 Defense Intelligence

Page 3
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