Research Report 1249

AUTMAEDLEVEL*

w INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR AN AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Robert W. Blum, Cathleen A. Callahan, W. Peter Cherry, Donald Kieist, Gregory Touma, and Gary Witus

Vector Research, Incorporated

HUMAN FACTORS TECHNICAL AREA

LU.

LAJ. DT:C

, - J A N 6 ! 1 ,8,

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

May 1980

Approved for public release; distribution unlimitei,.

,p (f0 04 0-3 6
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

FRANKLIN A. HART

JOSEPH- ZEIDNER Colonel, US Army

Tecitnical Director Commander

Research nerformed under contract

to the Department of the Army by

Vector Research, Incorporated

NOTICES

D IlSTR 9IS TION Ptlrvia) 0 I'ttrbu Iion of this -tport haS boon Made by AR I. P,6811 address correspondencii

concerning distribution of reporls to U S. Airr'y 1esearch Institute for the Ijehesiioral and Social Sciences.

ATTN: PERI TI. 5001 Eisenhow~r Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333.

FINAL DISPOSITIONj Thi 'v~oii may be di~trOviled when it is no longer ne,'td. Oleane do not return it to

the U. S. Army Rewearch Institute for the 94ehevorel and Scial Sciences.

Nort Ttie Iin41.rgs in this leviort are not to be -construed as an officia CeoartMent of the Army position.

un1eS% so distgnst'II by other Putharillid doscurnnts.
Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIPICATION OF THIS PAGE (W•en Data EnteOee(

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE RZAD INSTRUCTIONS

REPORT PBEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. AI VT HUM69R M .. a. GOVT ACCESSION NO: 3. ,ECIPIINTS CATALOG NUMBER

"RI Research Re rt 1249,__, _, __ _ _.._

4. TITLE (•nd Subtile) 1. TYPE OP REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR AN AUTOMATED

BATTLEFIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM Interim May 79-May 60 -. PERFORMING OtG. REPORT NUMBER

VRI-ARI-3"FRB0- 7. AUTHOR(@) S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMUER(o)

Robert W. Blum, Cathleen A Callahan, Peter

Cherry, Donald Kleist, Gregory Touma, Gary DAHCl9-78-C-0027

Witus

S, PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM AREA & WOll ELEMENT, UNIT NUMBERS PROJECT, TASK

Vector Research, Incorporated

PO Box 1506 2QI63739A793

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 It. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS It. REPORT DATE

USA Combined Arms Combat Development Activity May 1980

Attn. ATCA-TO IS, NUMBER OF PAGES

Ft. Leavenworth. KS 66027

4, MONITORING AGENCY NAME A ADORESS4'I1 different h'am Controllind Office) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)

US irmy Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences Unclassified

ATTN. PEAI-OS IIS&, DECL ASSIFIlC ATI ON/DOWN GRADINiG

5001 Eisefhower Ave., Alexandria VA 22333

1l. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved !or open release; distribution unlimited..

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (at the abeiract emtered In Block 20, If different from Report)

j

IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

This research was technically monitored by Mr. Robert S. Andrews and Dr.

Stanley M. Halpin of ARI and LTC Larry Walker of CORADCOM.

IS. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse ýida it necaesea" an.d Identify by block number)

Command and Control Information Management Standing Operating

Communications Information Summarization Procedures (SOP) Computers tMathematical Modeling Tactical Operations

Data base Management Networks System (TOS)

Design aid \Queueing

14. A~tjfXr C~erthammot f nweeey med Identify by block himabse)

L.•This executive suary presents synopses of seven documents produced in

the second phase of a p:oject to develop information management concepts and

procedures for automateý battlefield command and control (ABCC) systems.

ARI Research Report 1248 describes considerations in and procedures for the

management of contemporary ABCC systems. ARI Tecrnic~l Report 458presents

an analysis of procedures for the extraction, summarization and pr entation

of critical information .. .. .

DD) I u FJ i EDITION OF" I NOV 65, IS OSSOLIETIE S"-- 1SECURITY iUnclassifiedCLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

t//

II.
Unclassified

9ICUIITY_ CLAWFICATION OF THIII PASI6SIV DO* a

20. Abstract /

ARI Research Note 80-12 describes an analysis of information flow in the

Tactical Operations System (TOS), an example ABrC system. ARI Research

Note S0-3•describes the mathematical model used in the information flow

-ai.y-s-!? ARI Research Notes 80-14 and 80-15 describe the operation programming of the computer programs implementing the model. ARI Working

Paper HF80-XX discusses design issues associated with the emerging AllSource Analysis System (ASAS) concept.

I ,

SACooSion For

UTIS GP• t

DTIC TAB

Ujnaynnou'-•¢: Fl

Dist r

Di~t

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Date Entered)

_ . ... . ...+ + ... : •. .i + . ,+,.' .+ + •I.. _._",3.++., + .
Rusearch Rspel .1249

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR AN

AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD COMMAND

AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Robert W. 13ium, Cathleen A. Callahan, W. Pete r Cherry,

r Donald Kleist, Gregory Toumna, and Gary Vi'tus

Vector Research, Incorporated

- Submitted by: StanleM Halpin, Acting Chief

HUMANVACTORS TECHNICAL AREI

A;)proved by:

!;dgar M. Johnson, Director

:)RGANIZATIONS AND SYSTEMS

14ESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BE-HAVIORAI AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue. Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Persoi nel

* Department of the Army

May 1980

Army Project Number Information Management

20163739A793 Systems~

Approved for public re4em: distribution ji~imited.
ARI Research Reports and Technical Repoits are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and for other research and military agencies, Any findings ready

for implementation at the time of publication are presented in the last pait

of the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task, formal recom*

mendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

*1

iv

~<~- - A 
FOREWORD

The Human Factors Technical Area of the Army Research Institute aids

users and operators to cope with the ever-increasing complexity of the manmachine systems being designed to acquire, transmit, process, disseminate, and utilize tactical information on the battlefield. The research is fo- cused on the interface problems and interactions within command and control

centers and is concerned with such areas as tactical symbology, user-oriented

systems, information management, staff operations and procedures, systems

integration and utilization, as well as issues of system development.

An area of special concern is the development of procedures for effective

system control and utilization. The inevitable need for engineering tradeoffs

during system design often results in systems which are unmanageable or which

at best achieve only a small portion of their potential. Explicit attention

to the procedures to be followed by the user can compensate for some of these

problems, particularly if accomplished early enough in the development cycle.

The present publication is one of several from a project with an initial focus

on the Tactical Operations Systems (TOS) and an initial goal of the develop- ment of procedures for managing the flow of information in TOS. The present

report provides an overview of work accomplished on the second phase of the

project. The reorientation of the project, from a focus on TOS to a more

general view of automated command and control systems, is described and second

phase products are outlined.

Research in the area of information management is conducted as an in-house

effort augmented through contracts with organizations selected for their unique

capabilities and facilities for research in this area. The present study was

conducted by personnel from Vector Research Inc. under contract DAHCl9-78-C-0027

with program direction from Dr. Stanley M. Halpin and Mr. Robert S. Andrews.

This effort is responsive to requirements of Army Project 2Q163739A793 and to

the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and

Communications R&D Command (CORADOCOM), Fort Monmouth, N.J. Special requirements are contained in Human Resource Need 80-305, Information Management

Within the Tactical Operations System.

44

S PH ZEI r~

ec nical Director

i:1.1

}: -
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR AN AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL

SYSTEM

BRIEF

* Requirement:

To provide an overview of procedure guidelines produced in previous research for divisions in the field to use in developing standard operating

*' procedures for information management in the Tactical Operations System (TOS). tI

Procedure:

aT Eight reports describing research performed during the second phase of

a 36-month project are summarized. The reorientation of the project to aI

more general view of automated command in control systems is also discussed.

Section 2.1 summarizes ARI Research Notes 80-12 through 80-15, which

describe the purpose, approach, results, and methodology of an analysis of

TOS and its planned communications support systems. Secticn 2.2 summarizes

ARI Research Report 1248, which discusses considerations in and procedures for the management of contemporary Automated Battlefield Command and Control

(ABCC) systems. Section 2.3 summarizes ARI Working Paper HF80-XX, which describes design issues associated with the emerging All Source Analysis System

(ASAS) concept. Section 2.4 summarizes ARI Research Report 1250, which analyzes procedures for improving information summarization in a corps-level

scenario. Section 2.5 summariies the emerging results from ongoing research

to determine the information needs of decisionmakers.

* Utilization of Findings:

This research can be used to define and implement management procedures

in a variety of information processing systems.

H

vii

'r7.

RO,* k
PREFACE

This document is one of eight reports which describe the work performed

by Vector Research, Incorporated (VRI), and its subcontxactor, Perceptronics,

Inc., for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the behavioral &nd Sociul Sciences (ARI) under the second phase of contract nuunber DAHC!9-78-C-0027. The

work described was performed over 12 months of an anticipated 36-month threephased project. The overall objective of the project has been to produce procedural guidelines to be used by divisions in the field in developing standard

operating procedures for information management in the Tactical Operations

System (TOS). As a consequence of thL redirection of the TOS development effort in November 1979, the objective of this work was reinterpreted to include

automated battlefield command control systems (ABCCS) in general, using TOS

for an explicit example of the design, human factors, and management control

considerations which must be addressed.

The VRI study team for phase II was comprised of Dr. Robert W. Blum (Project Leader), Ms. Cathleen A. Callahan, Dr. W. Peter Cherry, Mr. Mark G.

Graulich, Mr. Donald Kleist, Mr. Mark Meerschaert, Mr. Gregory Touma, and

Mr. Gary Witus. The Perceptronics team Zor phase II consisted of Dr. Michael G.

Samet and Dr. Ralph E. Geiselman.

The autlors wish to acknowledge the helpful contributions of Dr. Stanley M.

Halpin and Mr. Robert Andrews, who monitored the study for ARIi and LTC L.

Walker, MAJ A. Edmonds, and Mr. M. Carrio, who performed a similar function

for that portion of the study effort which was jointly sponsored with ARI by

the U.S. Army Coimunications Research and Development Command (CORADCOM).

The eight report:, are as follows:

Blum et al., Information Management for an Automated Battlefield

Command and Control System, ARI Research Report 1249 -- presents

an overview of the project and the other seven reports.

Callahan et al., Guidelines for Managing the Flow of Information

in an Automated Battlefield Command and Control System, ARI

Research Report 1248 -- describes coltsLderations in and

procedures for the management of contemporary ABCC systems.

Geisalman and Samet, Guideline Development for Summarization of

Tactical Data, ARI Technical Report 458 -- an analysis of

procedures for the extraction, summarization, and presentation

of critical information.

Witus et al., Analysis of Information Flow in the Tactical

Operations System (TOS), ARI Research Note 83-12 --

describes the purpose, approach, and results of a TOS analysis

which focused on TOS when integrated with a planned

communications support system.

A.

ix

' ..... -..... ... • 2 ..•-..... ... .• ... ......... ... ... . .... .... .... ... ,
Witus et al., Description of the Tactical Operations System

information Flow Model, ARI Research Note 80-13 --

describes the representation of TOS used to develop the

analysis package and the mathematics of the model.

Witus et al., User's Manual for the Tactical Operations System

Analysis Package, ARI Research Note 80-14 -- explains the

use and operation of the analysis package.

Witus et al., Programmer's Manual for the Tactical Operations

System Analysis Package, ARI Research Note 80-15 --

describes the programming details of the package to facilitate modifications or transfer between host systems.

Cherry, WP, All Source Analysis System: Design Issues, ARI

Working Paper HF80-XX -- a discussion of design issues

associated with the emerging ASAS concept.

• I

II
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR AN AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL

SYSTEM

CONTENTS

Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION....................... . .. ...... . . .. .. .. .. .. .... 1

2.0 SUMMARIES OF PRODUCTS AND RESULTS. ................................. 3

2.1 Summary of the Division TOS Network

Model and Analysis Results. ................................... 3

2.1.1 Introduction. ........................................... 3

2.1.2 Analysis Approach. ........................... 4

2.1.3 Analysis Results. ............................. 4

2.1.3.1 Critical Components .. ......................... 7

2.1.3.2 Operating Guidelines .......................... 11

2.1.3.3 Field Conditions .............................. 13

2.1.3.4 opportunities for Improvement. ................ 13

2.1.3.5 Selection Strategies .......................... 18

2.1.3.6 Human Factors. ................................ 18

2.1.4 Model Description.......................................22

2.1.5 Description of Computer Programs. ...................... 26

2.1.6 Model and Application Area Extensions .................. 27

2.2 Summary of Guidelines for Control of

Information Flow for an Automated

Battlefield Command and Control System. ..................... 28

2.2.1 Introduction ............................................ 28

2.2.2 Management Procedures and Management Problems . . . . 29

2.2.3 Methods for Diagnosing an overload of a TOS

Component...............................................31

2.3 Summary of All-Source Analysis System (ASAS)

Design Issues .................................................. 35

2.4 Guideline Development for Improving Information

Summarization in a Corps-Level Scenario. ...................... 35

2.4.1 Introduction ............................................ 35

2.4.2 Method .................................................. 37

2.4.3 Results and Discussion. .................... ...........39

2.4.4 Conclusions.............................................40

ii ~xiI

* 77
S-• ... o• i • - •_______________________M_7= - * 

Page

2.5 Determining Decisionmaker's Information Requirements

(interim summary of work in progress) ...... ............ .. 41

2.5.1 A Methodology for Determining a

Decisionmaker's Information Requirements . . . . . . . 41

2.5.2 Summary of a Survey of Methodologies

for Determining a Decisionmaker's information Requirements .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 42

List of Exhibits

Exhibit 2-1. Division TOS network configuration .... ............ . . 5

2-2. Variations from the baseline case ....... ............ 6

2-3. Breakdown of expected delay ............... 8

2-4. Component utilizations .............. ................. 9

2-5. Effect of transmission error rate on expected

delays .............. ..... .......................... 10

2-6. Significance of 80 percent utilization ............ .... 12

2-7. Baseline capacity ................. .................... 14

2-8. Effect of retransmission stations on capacity ......... .. 15

2-9. Effect of transmission rates on capacity ... ......... .. 16

2-10. Effect of multiple blocking on capacity ... ......... ... 17

2-11. Selection strategy concept ........ ............... .. 19

2-12. CAV SQN FM net capacity ........... ................ .. 20

2-13. CAV SQN FM net capacity ......... ................. .. 21

2-14. System demand on the user:

user told net is occupied ......... ................ .. 23

2-15. System demand on the user:

user told message was garbled ....... .............. .. 24

2-16. System demand for user intervention .... ........... ... 25

2-17. Example monitor statistics ........ ................ .. 33

xii
-AI

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR AN AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1

In the first phase of the project, guidelines were drafted for the management of the information flow in TOS. The draft guidelines were to be

tested in the second phase of the project on prototype equipment to be available for a planned operational test (OT-Il) in FY80. When it became evident

during phase I that the-prototype equipment would not be available as planned,

VRI proposed that its mathematical model of TOS, intended to support the development of the draft guidelines, be expanded to a mathematical surrogate

for TOS during phase II. Concurrently, the TOS project manager's office at

CORADCOM became interested in sponsoring the extension of the VRI model to

encompass the communications system to support TOS. The model extension thus

Lecame an important feature of the phase II effort and the methodology which

it contained when completed has provided a very useful means for examining

the design characteristics of both TOS and its supporting communications.

The first application was a number of analyses of the communications

support system conducted with the TOS model during the fall. of 1979; the results of these analyses are summarized in a later section. In brief, it was

found that digital message transmission error rates of more than about 0.8

percent could have been expected tc cause significant degradations in TOS

communications performance had the system been fielded.

As the analyses progressed for determining the effectiveness of the

guideline procedures for managing TOS in the field, it became apparent that

indicators of the status of TOS would have to be available continually if the

manager were to be able to discern the nature and location of a system problem needing management attention. At the time of the Congressional Budget

Action in November 1979, TOS did not possess among its design features the

capability to provide the needed monitoring information from which to govern

the system's tactical operiLions. Ample analytical support for that observation is provided in the summary report in chapter 2.0.

In parallel with the main efforts was a separately reported project conducted under subcontract to examine various summarization techniques for collapsing the bulk of a corpus of information. Among other good summarization

procedures, shortening TOS message lengths could have had a significantly beneficial effect on reducing congestion in the communications system, as was

learned during the first analysis effort. This work is summarized also in

chapter 2.0.

Some ancillary research on determining information requirements of tactical decisionmakers was also undertaken during phase II and is still on-going.

The work to date is summarized here.

IFor an overview of the first phase of the project, see Information Management for the Tactical Operations System (TOS), ARI Research Report 1228,

October 1979.

-";;:i" 'i • "= '•"•' '• •' •' . "..',,.•;:-•: i • _" • • .
Since November 1979, the project has expanded its perspective to general- ize the research on TOS an~d its emerging conclusions to apply to the design of any automated battlefield command and control system (ABCCS). With this

view firmly in focus, the project is proceeding apace.

2
2.0 SUMMARIES OF PRODUCTS AND RESULTS

This chapter presents summaries of the eight reports produced during

j ~phase II of this project. Section 2.1 summarizes ARI Research Notes 80-12

through 80-15--describing the purpose, approach, results, and methodology of an analysis of TOS and its planned communications support systems. Section 2.2 sunmarizes ARI Research Report 1248--considerations in 6 -d procedures for the management of contemporary Automated Battlefield Command ind It Control (ABCC) systems. Section 2.3 summarizes ARI Working Paper HF80-.X--

a discussion of design issues associated with the emerging All Source Inalysis System (ASAS) concept. Section 2.4 sumrrprizes ARI Research Report 1250--

an analysis of procedures for improving information summarization in a corps

level scenario. Section 2.5 summarizes the emerging results from research

in progress on determining the information needs of decisionmakers.

2.1 SUMMARY OF THE DIVISION TOS NETWORK MODEL AND ANALYSIS RESULTS

2.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The modeling of TOS automated processing and communications was motivated by a difficulty inherent in the design of any Automated Battlefield

Command and Control System: the interactions among the subsystems and components are too complex to be understood by intuition alone, and are of such

a nature that designing subsystems or components outside of the overall system

framework leads to imbalances which impair system performance. Some design

imbalances that may result from a failure to undertake a top-down and systemwide design program are: (1) excessive reliance on human management and intervention; (2) communications congestion and failure; and (3) extreme underutilization of computer resources. As the TOS operational testing (OT II)

drew near, it became clear that a systemic analysis of the proposed TOS was

necessary to resolve certain issues including:

(1) the capability of the system to meet the user's requirements in a

field environment;

(2) the performance tradeoffs among design options; and

(3) the need for human management and intervention.

To provide a means to address these and other issues, a mathematical

model of a generic Automated Data Processing (ADP)/Communications system was

developed which could be configured via a set of inputs to represent TOS.

Computer programs were written implementing the model and supporting I/O

routines. A TOS input file was created, and the model was used to analyze

the operational behavior of the proposed TOS. The analysis approach and results are summarized in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, respectively. The generic

model and the representation of TOS are briefly described in section 2.1.4.

The computer programs are described in section 2.1.5. Section 2.1.6 discusses

some potential extensions to the model and its application areas.

3
2.1.2 ANALYSIS APPROACH

The analysis objectives for the proposed TOS were to:

(1) identify the critical s~stem compononts, the components most likely

to become choke points and cause degrad,. Lion of the system;

(2) establish operating guidelines which wculd prevent choking at the

critical components;

(3) evaluate the impacts of the field conditions on the performance of

the critical components;

(4) examine the opportunities for performance improvement;

(5) examine strategies for selecting from among design options; and

(6) explore the human factors in the system operation.

The analysis plan defined a baseline case and a set of variations under

which the system performance was examined. The baseline case and all variations used the network configuration as shown in exhibit 2-1, the user's projected peak hour traffic rates, and a realistic range of error rates for

transmitter/receiver pairs (0 to 10 bits in error per thousand bits transmitted). The table in exhibit 2-2 displays the variations from the baseline

case. These'variations, taken in different combinations, produced 255 cases

in addition to the baseline case. The analysis approach is described in detail in ARI Research Note 80-12, Analysis of the Information Flow in the

Tactical Operations System.

2.1.3 ANALYSIS RESULTS

The results obtained for each of the analysis objectives are summarized

below:

e The FM communications nets are the primary critical components and

under various conditions are incapable of supporting their projected

peak hour message traffic. The multichannel net and disk controllers

are secondary critical components.

e Choking at the critical components with the associated long delays

and likelihood of buiffer saturation can be avoided by controlling

the traffic rate'to keep the utilization below 80 percent.

0 The extent of degradation of the FM nets due to transmission interference, voice competition, and the use of retransmission stations

is quantified and analyzed.

* Improved equipment, improved error detection and correction (EDC)

procedures, and revised message formats could provide sufficient FM

net capacity even under adverse field conditions.

i:I 4

0. . I-
EXHIBIT 2-1- DIVISION TOS NETWORK CONFIGURATION

ZTYlI TO$ sD/P

~~~r I o N

DC Qaifl S2

* ~RFAC~B Sf C?

LL ENS1 smAN3

C7fl~ I-- 1,1DIV ART I .. - S

I -- C--+-M4 r- FMC (H0OX)

Source Apri 7)Secs 19791 c

1 AL C 7N7CA
EXHIBIT 2-2: VARIATIONS FROM THE BASELINE CASE

1 1

EXTENT OF NlUBER OF ERROR DETECTION MESSAGE "CHANNEL SHARING RETRANSMISSION TRANSMISSION AND CORRECTION LENGTHS

WITH VOICE, STATIONS• RATE PROCEDURES

Baseline .lone None 1.2 kbps Hamming Coce and Table .V,

Case for FM; Time-Dispersed A-Specs

32 kbps for Coding (TDC)

multichannel

Variations 25 percent 306 kbps :ercen:for Hamming Code Z5 

voice I and TOC with: across-the. i] 8.0 kbps1FM 1) 'Aultiple board

EiB1 ocki ng re.uct ion

2) Automatic I

Ret ra nsmi ss ion

cn Request jARQ)

.These factors affect only the FM nets.

6
0General guidelines are provided for selecting fromt among alternative improvements to the communications system.

*The human operator may become a system bottleneck or even reject the

system if the operator is an active part of the coimr'unications loop.

The derivation of these results is summarized in the remaind,,r of this section and documented more fully in the aforementioned research note.

2.1.3.1 Critical Components

A four stage procedure o~as used to identify the critic~al components:

I p(1) examine the sources of delay in the baseline case;

H (2) examine component utilization in the baseline case;

(3) examine the ability of the system to meet the user's delay requirements in the baseline case; andI

(4) consider impacts of further degradation from adverse field

conditions.

The chart in exhibit 2-3 shows the breakdown of the expected total delay

in transmitting and processing a message sent from a battalion in contact to

the delay at zeoerrrtand the percentage is larger at higher error

rates. The dlyathFMntconsists of the time a message-spends waiting

idj to get on the net and the transmission time. The transmission time consists

of overhead to establish the link and time to transmit the body of the message. As the error rate increases, the probability that a message must be

retransmitted due to errors increases, and hence the transmission time increases. As the transmission time increases, the fraction of the time the

net is busy increases, and consequently the waiting time increases.

A second approach to identifying the critical components is to examine

the fraction of time that the various components are engaged. A chart showing the maximum utilization of various types of network components is presented in exhibit 2-4. No components other than the FM nets are busy more

than 10 percent of the time, while at a five bits per thousand error rate the

utilization of the Cavalry Squadron FM net exceeds 80 percent.

The user's requirements statement provided a range of maximum tolerable

delays taking into account variations in message length, network configuration, and traffic intensity. As shown in exhibit 2-5, the average delays on

some of the FM nets exceed the upper limit of the tolerable range at lower

error rates than would cause the average multi-channel delay to exceed the

41 lower limits.

7
EXHISI7 2-3: BREAKO0W.•N OF EXPECTED DELAY

SII I~i __________ cc 0 o.08)

CONTACT IN Cs ,0,002..,

B3ASE" HNE

MULTICHANNEL

EXPC•CTED

30 -)

20 - c (0..%) I ! /Tcs (0,2.%)

I -CT (0,01%)

1OIL I H I MULT'I ANNEL

I (97,5%1 P.. R.O

0 317S BI•T$

PER• 1000 PE.R 1000

ERROR RATE

8i

3-

a. -".":•• •= •L
EXHIBIT 2-4: COMPONENT UTILlZATIONS

0MP0NENT UTILIZATION

60!000

BASELU CASE IEZTERO "•ERROR S. ... . RATE

8c. UPPER LIVMITS B ITS '

(PERCE.NT)

20

FM NETS OISK MULTI- CABE PROCESSORS CONTROLLER S CHANNE.L CBE POESR

A

I

• 03 7 1

9
EX.,BIT 2-5: E OEF, O, TRANSHISSON ERROR RATE ON EXPECTED CELYS

CAV C2IJTACT SUPPORT

SQN ICE !DE FM FM FM

i / /

VEP.scTER R ANEGE (_AY OF

USR'

(m I NTES •U•RESERVE

MULT l C.AN NELERROR R•ATE (B17S PER 10000'

10

.. V.
Bao•d on the foregoing analysis, the FM nets were identified as the primary critical components. Furthermore, the performance of the FM nets canbe

severely degraded ;ay adverse field conditions. For example, the FM nets are

to be shared with voice transmission and hence are not 100 percent available

for data transmissions. In addition, retransmission stations are used to extend the range of some FM nets. The use of retransmission stations requires

a longer overhead :ime to establish a link, and the multiple transmissions

produce a compoundad error rate.

The multichannel net is, like the FM nets, susceptible to transmission

errors. Due to the higher transmission rate (32 kbps for multichannel vs.

1.2 hbps for FM) and shcrter link-up overhead (0.1 seconds for multichannel

vs. 1.5 seconds for FM without retransmigsion stations), the multichannel net

is able to operate effectively at error rates much higher than could be tolerated on an FM chani.el. The multichannel net does not become seriously congested until error rates in excess of 15 bits-per-thousand are reached.

The congestion level at the disk controilers is dependent in part upon

the system software. The software design was not sufficiently mature by

November 1979 to permit definitive analsis of the congestion at the disk

controllers. The disk controllers are slow devices and unless the software I was designed to minimize the demand on the controllers, the utilizations could

easily be as high as the 8 percent shown in exhikit 2-4. This potential for

overload motivated the identification of the disk controllers, along with the

multichannel nets, as secondary critical components.

2.1.3.2 Operating Guidelines

Li The provisional ToS standard operating procedures [See ARI Working Paper

HF79-1: Information Management in the Tactical Operations System (TOS)] provide for system control via control of the rate of user access to the system.

By this means the System Controller can control the traffic rate on any net.

The FM nets exhibit a characteristic response curve relating the expected delay to the traffic r;te on the net. An example of this response curve for the

CAV SQN FM net is shcwn in exhibit 2-6. The response curves for the other FM

nets differ slightly as a consequence of the different mix of messages travelling over each net. The curves do, however, have some important characteristics in common. Expected delay responds linearly to changes in the traffic

rate when the net is operated below 80 percent utilization, the curves exhibiting a knee beyond 80 percent utilization. Traffic rate is, therefore, a nearly

linear control for expected delay so long as the net is operated below 80

percent utilization. Similar response curves define the relationship between

expected queue length and traffic rate. The operational capacity of the net

is defined to be the traffic rate which produces a utilization of 80 percent.

A guideline for avoiding performance degradation due to congestion on a communications net is to keep the demand within the operational capacity. H

a 11
EXHIBIT 2-6: GN I CANCE. 0~ 30 PER~il U 71::AT! ON

FM MET

0 100 20 ~ 0~o U 50

TRAF21C -A7 (MS&i-R),

12
2.1,3.3 Field Conditions

Various field conditions affect the performance of the FM nets. Foremost among these are the presence of transmission errors and the use of retransmission stations. Exhibit 2-7 shows the effects of the transmission

stations. The net can support the projected peak hour load up to an error

rate of approximately 5 bits-per-thousand.

It is likely that a cavalry squadron on a covering force or flank sermi curity operation will use several retransmission stations to communicate with

its division headquarters. Retransmission stations increase the link-up overhead time and produce a compounded error rate. Equipment tests and theoretical

computations indicate that at the error rates under consideration, "n-V' retransmissions produce a cumulative error rate of approximately "n" times the

error rate for a single transmission. Exhibit 2-8 presents graphs of the CAV

SQN FM net capacity with zero and three net retransmission stations. The

x-axis is the error rate for a single transmission. The retransmission stations severely degrade the net's capacity% with the retransmission stations

the net cannot support the required traffic at error rates above one bit per

thousand.

2.1.3.4 Opportunities for Improvement

A number of options for improving the net performance were examined.

These included hardware improvements, various software and transmission protocol improvements related to error detection •nd correction and message reformatting. The analysis examined the impacts of these options on the capacity

vs. error rate curves of an FM net under the baseline and adverse field conditions. The effects of two classes of improvements are shown as examples:

a higher transmission rate on FM and improved forward error correction (FEC).

The current FM radios transmit data at 1200 bits-per-second (1.2 kbps). Exhibit 2-9 shows what could be achieved with 8 kbps radios, and the limiting

case of radios with an infinite transmission rate. Increasing the transmission rate to 8 kbps achieves mLost of the potential gain since at high transmission rates the message overhead accounts for most of the transmission time.

TOS has the option of sending multiple copies of a message under one

link-up overhead. Retransmission is requested by the receiving node only if

the same character is undecipherable in each copy of the message. The default

option is single blocking (SB)--one copy per overhead. Exhibit 2-10 shows the

net capacity under single, double, and triple blocking. Multiple blocking reduces capacity at low error rates since more bits are transmitted, and as a

consequence the projected peak hour load cannot be supported with triple blocking. With double blocking the net can function at error rates above 20 bitsper-thousand--well beyond the anticipated range of error rates due to sources

other than enemy jamming. The presence of jamming or the use of retransmission stations requires the use of more effective procedures.

13
4~2-7u ---

SX327 AS~l NI C;P C 7Y

FM N E7

PROJZC7T- PEAK -jOUR

ERROR RA7Z

~, I (BITIS PER T'HOUSANZ)

14
EXHIB:T 2-8: :UýECT 0"' ?0:TR,""S 'S Si 0' S7ATIONS ON ^C.PACI7,

800 _

600 *

RA71 BASEt'INE

(MsGJ! :C UR)

0 3

ERROR RATS

(B17S PE 7HOUSANrD)

V 15
EXHIBIT 2-9: EFFECT OF TRANSMISSION RATES ON CAPACITY

uo0-- . .\••

4L4

_ __6

~Av ~

:MNR,• RRAE

500 ___ ____

- )I'FI -6

• ..... . .. - ...... , . . .. .- .•:: c .: ;.. . ', ., " '- " -'7E•':• •
EXHIBIT 2-10: -EF.FECT OF MULT PLE 3LOCKITNG ON CAPAC-1f

Ii I

CAVN ISO

6ui

7RAFý7 C

iii

2002

0 20 30 lOLou 

ERROR RAT-E

17
2.1.3.5 Selection Strategies

This section develops an approach and a set of guidelines to aid the

system designer in selecting design options to pursue from a set of alternatives. Given a set of field conditions and a shopping list of possible system improvements, the "opportunity for improvement" can be defined as the

increase in the range of error rates under which the projected peak hour load

can be supported (see exhibit 2-11). Having defined the opportunity, the

relative value of a single option is the fraction of the total opportunity

that is achieved with that single option. In some cases, a single improvement is capable of achieving as much as 70 percent of the total opportunity.

Sometimes no single improvement has significant impact, in which case pairs

of improvements must be considered. Alternative shopping lists were examined

under alternative field conditions to provide a basis for developing guide- lines for design selection.

Two illustration cases are presented. Exhibit 2-12 presents the analysis

of an FM net without retransmission stations or voice competition, with a

shopping list of various software improvements. Hardware improvements--faster

radios--were not considered. The use of the single option of double blocking

achieves about 50 percent of the opportunity for improvement. The use of two

options--triple blocking and a 25 percent reduction in message length--achieves

95 percent of the opportunity. Exhibit 2-13 examines the CAV SON FM net degraded by three retransmission stations. As shown, without a combination of

hardware and software improvements, no significant fraction of the opportunity

can be achieved.

Several strategic guidelines were developed from these and other

examples.

* Selections should be zero-based. In particular, the best single

improvement might not be a component of the best pair.

* Improvements must be selected on a case-by-case basis.

* Different hardware or field -- nditions will favor different software

options.

* The maximum increases may be far more than is required; hence the

user's requirements should be considered during system design.

o Finally, the system designer should consider an integrated program

of hardware and software development.

2.1.3.6 Human Factors

The TOS communications plan requires that operators monitor the communications system performance. If the transmitter tries and fails three successive times to access the net, or if the receiving node sends back three successive NAKs (non-acknowledgements) for a message, the transmission is

terminated and the operator notified. No further automatic processing of the

message occurs until the operator's instructions are received. These procedures

18
EXHIBIT 2-11: SELEIC7TON S7.:ATE2-^Y C. 0NCE

MAXIMUM :PROV~EMS zcss:3-

C PP CR ':N7 Y 0 R M PR ClVEYS EN--

ERROR RA7T19
EXHIBIT 2-12: CAV S'N FM NET CAPACITY

C 01

hw XMSN RATE

NO RETRANS

STATON

~~20

RAT=. i

'IL

, i20

- - - - - - --- - - -- - - -- --- - I- - - - - - - - --
EXHIBIT 2-13: CAV SQN FM NJET CAPACITY

N

S7A71CNS

KikPS

~Q P

-~ so

..PROR ;A7T

21
are a rueo-hm for commercial applications where they are intended to

provi~de a means to detect a degraded link and to prevent a degraded link from

monopolizing a channel. However, commercial applications are not required to

function under the adverse field conditions to which a military communications

system is subject. The long delays associated with human decisionmaking and

response make it imperative that the human role in data transmission be minimized in order to meet the timeliness requirements. Furthermore, the burden

placed on the operator by these requests for instructions may lead to rejec- It tion and hence failure of the system.

The graph in exhibit 2-14 plots the probability that operator intervention is requested as a consequence of the channel being unavailable. The

~i1 exact position of the curve lies in the shaded region and is determined by the amount of time between successive tries to establish the link. The figure

in exhibit 2-15 shows the probability that user interaction is required due

to three successive NAKs as a function of error rate in the baseline case.

These two charts are combined in exhibit 2-16 which shows the aggregate probability that user intervention is required each time the transmitter tries

to send a message. It is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the impact

of human factors. It is clear, however, that the system must be designed to

avoid operator overload. The role of the human in an automatic data processing system should, perhaps, be restricted to executive and input/output

functions. 1

2.1.4 MODEL DESCRIPTION

The model is a mathematical model of a generic ADP/Communications system.

The following six system functions are modeled:

(1) input/output;

(2) message routing;

(3) node-to-node communication;

(4) central data base management (storage and retrieval);

(5) human and automated message generation; and

(6) human and automated message filtering.

The purpose of the model is to provide a means to predict the steady

,tate system performance from a set of inputs describing (1) the enyineering

characteristics; (2) the network configuration; (3) the operational procedures;

(4) the user demand; and (5) the environmental factors. The steady state system performanc*. is the performance level to which the system will converge

over time when operating under stable conditions. The fundamental system

performance measures are the utilization, expected queue length, and expected

delay at selected system components. other performance measures can be calculated from these basic performance statistics.

* Utilization is the fraction of time a component is busy.

22
EXHIBIT 2-14: SYS7EM 1IAND ON 7HE US ER:

USER TOLD NET :S OCCUPIEO

>2c .

Is ,/1/i

OF THE ZRR E

SUCCESSIVyE

FAILU'RES*.AS1. /

-S --- 1 .4

- ///k'///1⁄4/'////,'

:0 20

UT~~~ L .1T

23

.I!,.,;.;7, I 4'. .
EXHIBIT 2-15: SYSTEM DEMAND ON THE USER:

USER TOLD MESSAGE WAS GARBLED

:I

I 3

i- -

J/

CASS

,4T24

S~~3A$ELIN&

(•T •. 1000)

24

, sZ. .. :, .'- 
EXHIBIT 2-16: S Y S 7-M 0 r IA. N ~CdF0R 'iS ER N 7 V N~T

3 AS~U~

08.A 2 L Y _____

ýF s ts c pt

~ \X

,A\N -W

'.32~S PRS2RJCO

25
0 Expected queue length is the average number of messages waiting for

service at a component.

'a Expected delay at a component is the sum of the average service time

for a message and the average time a message spends awaiting service. iiDue to limitations in time and resources, it was necessary to place restrictions on the scope of the model. First and foremost, the model represents the interactions among subsystems and components, but does not inoorporate engineering models of the components. Instead, the engineering

characteristics of the components are inputs to the system~ model. Second,

the performance measures are computed only for the major system components:

(1) the communications nets;, (2) distributed processing nodes; and (3) the

base. Third, within a given network configuration each terminal node is assumed to have a single route connecting him with the DCC. Fourth, all messages are assumed to be of equal priority. Fifth, the model does not repre-.

sent finite buffers at processors. Sixth, human factors are not incorporated

into the model. (Consequently, the model computes only equipment delays and

does not address the issue of whether or not humans could or would use the

system efficiently.) The load on the operator is examined, however. ii In order to perform the analysis, the model was specified to represent

TOS. Message xouting reflected the network configuration, the hierarchical

review routing rules, the use of distribution lists, and the use of SRI

(standing requests for information). Node-to-node communication reflected

the use of multichannel (FDX), cable (FDX), and FM (HDX) communications devices and their different characteristics such as transmission rate, keying

sequence overhead, and protocols. Transmission errors and the use of error

4 detection and correction procedures (such as Jamming code) are part of nodeto-node communication. Central data base management represents the storage,

search, retrieval, and accountability procedures used in the Division Computing Center (DCC) to maintain and query the data base. Human and automated

message generation represents the processes of human users generating messages

as well as automated response messages generated at the DCC. Human review and

filtering represents the hierarchical review function at Brigade and filtering

at the DCC. The model and its specification to represent TOS are documented

in ARI Research Note 80-13: Description of the Tactical Operations System

Information Flow Model.

2.1.5 DESCRIPTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS

The model was implemented as a package of four computer programs to be I run interactively from a terminal. The first program is used to create a data file specifying the system to be examined. The second program formats

and displays a data file. The third program is used to modify an existing

data file. The fourth program performs the computations required by the model

and displays the outputs. All of the programs prompt the operator for responses. All of the programs are written in ANSI standard FORTRAN with

internal commentary. The programs are documented in ARI Research Note 80-14:

User's Manual for the Tactical Operations System Analysis Package, and ARI

Research Note 80-15: Programmer's Manual for the Tactical operations System

Analysis Package.

26
* ~2.1.6 MODEL AND APPLICATION AR~EA EXTENSIONS

In order to provide a more useful design support capability, the model

can be expanded along three dimensions: (1) Generality; (2) Detail; and (3)

Diagnostic Capability. The generality of the model can be extended to represent such features as:

* distributed data base;

* packet switching;

ecommunications management;

e finite memory and memory management.I

The detail with which critical processes are represented can be increased to

provide a more realistic representation, to incorporate new data, or to repre4 sent alternative procedures. Some areas in which the detail of the model can

be extended are:

* electromagnetic environment;

* EDC procedures;

*transmission protocols;

"* data base management;

"* communications management.

Finally, the diagnostic capability of the model can be improved by producing

additional outputs such as

* transient system response;

9 memory utilization;

* frequency of undetected transmission errors;

* frequency of buffer saturation;

0 frequency of failure to access a net.

I To date, the applications of the model have been restricted to evaluation

ofteperformance of a proposed design, and the evaluation of tradeoffs dmong

alternatives. There is, however, a broader range of potential applications.

Application areas for the modal include:

* performance evaluation of a proposed design;

* tradeoff evaluations among alternative designs;

27
e support for the design of a balanced set of user's requirements;

* support for the design of system specifications;

* support for the design of operational tests;

4* support for the design of on-line management and control procedures;

9 identification of data requirements for on-line management and for

performance evaluation;

.identification of likely critical areas in system design.

2.2 SUMMARY OF GUIDELINES FOR CONTROL OF INFORMATION FLOW FOR AN

* AUTOMATED BATTLEFIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

This segment of the study is concerned with the (1) revision and expansion

of the provisional SOP guidelines;2 and (2) evaluation methodology and criteria.

The methodology for evaluating the guidelines was planned originally (1978) to

use hardware and software prototypes in a field test environment. When it became apparent that such prototypes would not be available as expected~, a generic

automated battlefield command and control, system (AECCS) was described in the

Operations System (TOS), its parameters were quantified from the developing

system design to be representative of TOS as it might have been fielded. The

evaluation criteria were developed jointly with the division TOS network model

(summarized in section 2.1). As a consequence of that research, the revised

and expanded SOP guidelines were directed toward managing and controlling the

demands imposed on each of the system components so as to avoid overloading

any of them or, if one does become overburdened, to reduce the demand to a

tolerable operating condition.

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION

The ABCC system passes information to the users and receives information

and instructions from them. Many of the instructions are for the purposes of

managing or controlling the use of the system, including its supporting communications, for one or more of the following reasons:

a a user/subscriber is overburdening some portion of the system;

* the tactical enVironment is degrading the system's capability to

perform; or

e the system is overburdening some user-operator or user-subscriber.

2

Guidelines for Information Management in the Tactical Operations System

(TOS): Provisional Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), VRI-ARI-3 FR-79-l,

Vector Research, Incorporated, May 1979.

28
Each of the above situations requires some form of management control and is t V occasioned by the capacity of some component of the extended system being less

than sufficient to accommodate the demand being placed upon it. For managing

any type of ABCC system, alternative procedures can be devised for controlling

the quantity of information handled by a given component. Human judgment,

though, is essential for choosing which alternatives are most desirable in a

given situation. Inherent in this management process is maintaining the quality

of both the information flow and the data base as the quantity of information

is reduced. Also, it is necessary that the system manager be able to discern

that a problem exists, and why. This requires that the status of the system,

both as whole and for each of its components, be monitored continually and provided to the responsible manager. Proper provisions for monitoring the status

of ABCC system components to include the network links of the supporting communications system must be included in the ABCC system hardware and software

designs. The monitoring capability is the interface between the ABCCS proper

and the system manager. If it is not an explicit part J~ the design, but is

left to field expedients, the most clever of those ad hoc methods may still be

inadequate for tracking the status of the system. To demonstrate the necessity

of including considerations for managing as part of the system design, TOS,

as it might have been described in November 1979, is used here as an example

of a contemporary ABCC system.

2.2.2 MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

The management control procedures which have been identified and investigated for controlling the burden of demand on various 1system components of TOS

include: (1) reducing the number of incoming message retrieval requests; (2)

changing the operating level of TOS users; (3) purging; (4) removing user(s)

from distribution lists; and (5) altering the current level of hierarchical

review. The choice of which management procedure(s) to implement requires

knowledge of the strengths and side effects of the procedures, knowledge of

J the cause of the problem, and knowledge of the information needs of each TOS

user. This discussion provides this information and the data and related

statistics which need to be available to understand if a particular procedure

would be effective in dealing with the problem. It is assumed that the perJ son(s) responsible for controlling the system have knowledge of the users'

information needs or that that knowledge can be easily obtained.

The system controller (SYSCON) is the overall manager of information Aprocessing in TOS, coordinating the technical capability of TOS and the operational need of its users. In this discussion the SYSCON is assumed to be 4 totally responsible for the management of TOS, although it is recognized.

that the file managers and the TOS users could be involved in the management

FI process. This involvement would likely result in increased satisfaction of

the users with the necessary management action and a decrease in the burden

on the SYSCON to perform the management task.

Reduction in the number of incoming message retrieval (IMR) requests, the

first procedure given above, will affect the demand placed on the communication nets and the TOS users by reducing the number of responses to the IMR

requests--SRI, thresholds, correlations, and filters--which are transmitted

over the links and the number which need to be assimilated by the users. The

29
:1 demands placed on the computer processors are affected by the consequent reduction in the number of criteria which must be tested, the number of data base

searches, etc. Some of the factors which determine the magnitude of the effect on each of these TOS components include the frequency that the IMR criteria associated with the deleted request are tested, the frequency that data

base searches are required, and the number of responses which are generated

from a satisfied request.

The second procedure is a tool with which the SYSCON can control the inputs (updates and queries) to the system. In the examples described, a system

of four operating levels is used to control the demands placed on the system.

To determine the effect of reducing the operating level the SYSCON needs to

have knowledge of the current operating status (the actual numbering updates

and queries submitted) of each user and the operating level guideline for

each user.

The third procedure, purging, is primarily effective in rectifying a

computer storage overload. The procedure includes methods for eliminating

irrelevant and outdated records from the data base, and methods for eliminating records in response to an indication that a file is too large or an in-Pending overload. In order to recognize when this latter method of purging is

necessary, the SYSCON needs to monitor the size of each of the files and alert

the file manager(s) as to when they are becoming too large. Further the SYSCON

and file manager(s) will need to be aware of the amounts and types of messages

contained in these files in order to be sure that the purge is effective and

timely in correcting the overloaded state of the data base disk.

Removal of a user from a distribution list will red'.-ce the DCC output

load, resulting in a reductioii of the demand placed on users to assimilate

the output messages, a reduction in the utilization of the communication links

over which the messages travel, and a reduction in the utilization of some of

the computer processors. The factor which determines the magnitude of the

impact of this action on the TOS components is the frequency at which that

particular distribution list is referenced.

The fifth management procedure identified as effective in rectifyingA

overload problems is to alter the current hierarchical review practice. Hierarchical review allows the brigade element to review for possible alteration

or deletion messages originating at a subordinate battalion. If a message

is changed or deleted, a copy of the message is sent to the originator. The

process reduces demands placed on the communications link between the DCC and

the BDE, as some messages may be deleted by the review. Consequently, the

demands on the computer processors are also reduced as the arrival rate of

messages is decreased. However, the communications nets between BN and BDE

are further burdened by hierarchical review due to the notification sent to

the originator of deleted or altered messages. Therefore, altering a hierarchical review practice may be helpful in addressing an overload problem.

In order to determine if the procedure will be effective in addressing a problem, the SYSCON will need to know the frequency that messages originating at

BN are reviewed at BDE, the frequency with which those messages are changed,

and the frequency with which they are deleted.

30
The five procedures discussed above are tools the SYSCON can use to control the quantity of information transmitted and stored by TOS. Depending on

the component. which is overloaded, the SYSCON would have a choice within this

set of management procedures for the procedures which best alleviate the problem. For example, a storage overload is perhaps most quickly alleviated by

purging, but also may be resolved by decreasing the operating levels of users.

The choice among these procedures as to which are most effect ye depends on

k! the circumstances causing the overload, the consequences of the overload,

the current battlefield situation and the role of TOS and each TOS user in

supporting the mission. For example, if a particular unit is in actual contact with the enemy, then it is likely they are providing reports which are

of value to division commanders and a reduction in their access to send infor. .tion is not appropriate. Also, the effects of the implementation of a

management procedure on the quality of information of IMR requests, particularly the number of thresholds, correlations, and filters is likely to decrease

the quality of the records stored in the data base as these functions allow

analysts to process data records into information and intelligence which is

more complete, accurate, and meaningful. The SYSCON must be able to examine

the reduction in demand which can be realized by the implementation of each

management procedure and then trade off the effects of implementing the procedure on the quality of information in order to make effective management .1 decisions in maintaining the TOS system in an operationally viable condition.

2.2.3 METHODS FOR DIAGNOSING AN OVERLOAD OF A TOS COMPONENT

Methods for analyzing an overload in order to decide on the appropriate

management action have been described, now the discussion focuses on what H conditions constitute an overload and how one is detected. The term overload

has been used to identify when the SYSCON needs to take management action to

ensure that the TOS system remains responsive to users' needs and that a system

crash is avoided. Thus, overload refers to a state of the component where its

utilization is above some desired threshold. The determination of the appropriate threshold value is complex and needs to consider three basic factors:

(1) the responsiveness that is required of the sys~tem; (2) the means by which

the utilization of a component is measured; and (3) the procedures which are

available to circumvent the problem.

The responsiveness that is required of the system includes the utilization which can be tolerated by the hardware and software without causing a

system crash and the utilization which can be tclerated by users interfacing

the system. A definition of overload suggested by the concept of operational

capacity presented by the analyses of the TOS system (see section 2.1 of this

chapter) considered primarily these requirements. operational capacity is

~1 defined by this analysis as the demand which produces a utilization of 80

percent.

Factors which might necessitate that this threshold be lower are the

means by which the utilization of the component is measured. If the utilization is computed automatically by computerized monitoring of busy and non-busy

periods, then the primary concern is the period of time over which the utilization is measured. If the utilization must be measured by some other more

31

. . ... . ...
manual means, concerns such as the degree to which acc.-.aate data on the use 1

of the system can be obtained, and the amount of manual effort required to

calculate the utilization become more important when determining the appropriate threshold value.

The third factor is the quantitative relationship between the cause of

the problem and the procedure for correcting the problem. For example, if

-adisk controller is being tasked to perform more jobs than it can handle,

an appropriate management procedure might be to reduce the'number of jobs

arriving at the controller. The time it takes to complete each job, the number of jobs "backlogged," the time it takes to implement the management procedure, and the new rate at which jobs are arriving all impact the time it

takes for the processor to return to a state where jobs are being processed

in a timely manner. In determining the appropriate value of the threshold,

these factors must be considered so that a system disaster is not incurred

between the time the overload is detected and the time the effects of the

management action are seen.

With the conditions determined for when a net is identified as overloaded,

tile SYSCON can use this guideline to determine when the employment of management controls are necessary. The SYSCON is responsible for monitoring the TOS

components and determining the state of overload. The simplest way would br.

to have automatic monitoring of the components to determine the utilizatiz' -.

and once the threshold is exceeded, the SYSCON would be notified, either bwarning message or signal. Barring any sort of automation the SYSCON is still vsable to estimate the utilization of the TOS components. For example, the

utilization of a communications net can be estimated by sampling for busy or

non-busy status and calculating the fraction of time the net is found busy. ~ I Data which needs to be made available in order for the SYSCON to make this

estimate includes the number of times the net users attempted to obtain the

net (number of sample points) and the number of times the users attempted,

but found the net busy.

Two basic types of monitoring of the TOS system are needed to effectively

manage the system: monitoring to diagnose the component overload problem and

monitoring in order to understand how to rectify the overload problem. Within this second type th~ere are three kinds of statistics: those which describe

how each type of demand (update, query, etc.) affects each type of compo-aent,

those which describe the current load (demand) on each component, and those Ii which measure the impact cif the load on each component. In addition it is

also necessary that the system manager has knowledge of the information needs

of each user of TOS within the division and the methods by which these users

obtain their information needs for ensuring that the users remain satisfied

with the management control. The monitor statistics which are needed to

diagnose an overload of the sys~tem are dependent on the degree to which the

hardware and the software of the system automatically monitor the status

(utilization) of each component. Once the overload is detected, data describing the demands placed on the system and how these demands impact the

system need to be available in order to determine the appropriate management

action. Example monitor statistics developed in this study are listed in

exhibit 2-17. The number and variety of items which must be monitored in

order for the SYSCON to control the system exemplify the need for a provision

for this monitoring capability to be included in the hardware and software

32

-. ~ IIVA*S
EXHIBIT 2-17: EXAMPLE MONITOR STATISTICS

STATISTICS FOR DETERMINING THE LOADING ON TOS COMPONENTS:

For Each User:

IMR Requests Originated

SRI (Standing Requests for Information)

THRESH (Thresholds)

CORR (Correlations)

FILTER

IMR Responses Received

SRI (Standing Requests for Information)

THRESH (Thresholds)

CORR (Correlations)

FILTER

Updates Originated

Updates Response - Total

Update Responses - Received via D/L (Distribution Lists)

D/L a Member of

Queries Originated

Messages Altered or Deleted by Hierarchical Review

Operating Level Guidelines

STATISTICS FOR DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF DEMANDS ON TOS COMPONENTS:

Demand: Incoming Message Retrieval (IMR) Requests

"* Number of SRI on the system

"* Frequency that IMR criteria for SRI are checked

(SRI) * Frequency that IMR criteria for SRI are satisfied

"* Distribution of SRI response

"* Length of SRI responses

* Number of Threshold queries on the system

* Frequency that IMR criteria for correlations are chccked

* Frequency that IMR criteria for threshold

queries are satisfied

(THRESH) e Frequency that threshold criteria are satisfied

e Distribution of threshold responses

a Length of threshold response

* Average number of keys and key values searched

* Number of correlations in the system

9 Frequency that IMR criteria for correlations are checked

(CORR) 

o 

* Average 

Frequency number that IMR 

of queries 

criteria 

triggered

for correlations are satisifed I

* Distribution of correlation responses

* Length of correlation responses

* Average number of keys and key values searched

33

+ 1+

• : '.. . .. .. • ..... ..... : . .. . • ++• •+ •,• i u+ :. . .. . .. ..... • " • .. ..- -,, .,. . . + |
EXHIBIT 2-17: EXAMPLE MONITOR STATISTICS

(Concluded)

STATISTICS FOR DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF DEMANDS ON TOS COMPONENTS:

(Concluded)

* Number of filters in the system

Frequency that IMR criteria for filters are checked

Frequency that IMR criteria for filters are satisfied

* Frequency that a data base search is triggered

(FILTER) * Frequency that a filter response is required

Distribution of filter responses I

* Length of filter response

* Average number of keys and key values searched

Demand: Update Messages (Add, Change, Delete)

* Frequency that messages are originated

Distribution of messages by type (ESDA, ESDC, UTOD, etc.) * Length of message

* Number of keys updated

* Distribution associated with messages

Demand: Queries

o Frequency that queries are originated

o Length of query

* Distribution of query response

* Length of query response

* Number of keys and key values searched

4

.....w'.j. i . .. .,J . S ,, . .",,______
design. If it is not an explicit part of the design, but is left to field

expedients, the most clever ad hoc methods may still be inadequate for tracking the status of the system. The extent to which the management interface

should be designed is g-verned by two major considerations: (1) the magnitude of the system control tasks whichi are left for the system manager to perform; and.(2) the type of status information or the detail necessary for

effective performance of those system control tasks, Further, as indicated

by this study, these two considerations are likely to change together: if

the management tasks become large, so will the amount of information necessary

to be monitored, and vice versa.

Experience with the development of battlefield automated systems, e.g.,

TSQ-73, TACFIRE, DS3, and TOS has not been uniformly satisfactory. Schedules

have slipped, costs have increased, and performance standards have been difficult to achieve. A significant reason for this is that these command control

systems operate in a process which is highly variable, dependent upon individuals, and not completely understood. However, problems have also arisen

with the interfaces among these systems and between the systems and other

components of the total command and control process. Paramount among these

problems is the fact that existing communications will not support input,

output, and exchange of data. This particular problem is further complicated by the dynamics of radio-electronic combat on the modern battlefield requiring high levels of resistance to jamming and intercept.

The ASAS system currently envisioned provides capacity but not coverage

nor communications sufficiently adequate to fulfill its mission. It is pos- sible that coverage and communication problems will be solved before the

ASAS is fielded. The primary problems in the ASAS/ECS 2 interface stem from

a lack of understanding of commanders' information needs and their relative

values. Beyond this, problems with communications and interfaces among the

components of the ECS 2 system will continue to pose a major stumbling block

to successful systems development, both for the ASAS, and the ECS 2 as a whole.

2.4 GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT FOR IMPROVING INFORMATION SUMMARIZATION

IN A CORPS-LEVEL SCENARIO

2.4.1 INTRODUCTION

The technical capability of computer-based military systems could increase the density of information to the point where it will overwhelm the

users. In particular, the Enemy Situation Data (ESD) file is likely to grow

at a rapid rate during critical periods, such as during enemy attacks. Therefore, appropriate procedures must be developed to condense and to organize

the volume of such information into a form that can be managed and used in an

efficient manner.

35

•-• ,.- , - •• ... ' -' • . " . .• .. . .:-..• - - ' 1. ,. . - '. -. , • ...... "
To obtain data to support the development of useful guidelines for the

summarization of military message content, particuiarly tactical intelligence

data, an initial experimental investigation was conducted by Geiselman and

Samet. 3 In their experiment, an attempt was made to first identify "good"

summaries of a set of ESD messages, and then to analyze the properties and

structural characteristics of these summaries. In brief, 16 Army staff officers were asked to examine a description of a tactical scenario and 30 ESD

messages. The messages described the beginning of a border crossing and

attack. The task was to rate each message in terms of how essential it was

to the understanding of the situation at hand, and to summarize the tactical

information contained in the messages in preparation for a three-minute briefing to the Corps G-2. The 16 summaries were then rated by five experienced

military personnel. In this manner, the essence of what makes an effective

summary was used to suggest guidelines for summarizing tactical data.

Three general guidelines for intelligence summaries were extracted from

the results. First, they should be prepared in conversational style. Second,

a well-founded interpretation of the information should be given if possible,

not just hard facts. Third, a dynamic portrayal of the enemy situation should

be offered to reflect the reality of the scenario; that is, information concerning enemy movement should be emphasized. However, before these guidelines could be implemented, empirical research was required to evaluate their effects upon summarization performance. Further research was also called for

to compare these guidelines with those developed for the summarization of

military messages reflecting other tactical situations, particularly an enemydefensive scenario. In addition, one procedure that could be used to complement information summarization is purging, which can be accomplished in a

number of ways including the "routine" or manual purge. However, to date

there has been no systematic investigation .3f the substantive criteria to be

used to conduct a manual purge. In this regard, guideline development would

also be valuable.

Thus, there were three major objectives of the present research: (1)

To expand the scope of the guidelines for summarizing ESD messages by examining a sec-nd basic tactical scenario in which the enemy is portrayed in a

defensix. osture; (2) To establish whether military personnel using summarization guidelines produce "better" summaries than do personnel without the

aid of guidelines; and (3) To obtain data to support the development of guidelines for conducting a routine purge of ESD files. To address each of these

objectives, a single experiment was designed. The first objective was addressed by asking two groups of staff officers to summarize a set of ESD

messages while supplying one group with the three general guidelines developed by Geiselman and Samet. The second objective was addressed by modifying

the enemy-offensive scenario previously used by Geiselman and Samet such that

the enemy would be on the defensive and U.S. forces would be said to be engaged in- !oun ittack maneuver. The summaries and ratings of essentiality

of i41_.. ':ual iges d were analyzed to derive a template or schema for summarization that could be compared with that derived using the enemy-offensive

3R. E. Geiselman a d M. G. Samet, "Information Summarization in a CorpsLevel Scenario," L Army Research Institute (Alexandria, VA), Technical

Paper 385, Octob( .979.

36
scenario. The third objective was addressed by analyses of data collected

during the final segment of the experiment. During that segment, the participants were asked to purge half of the intelligence messages (eliminating those

that are least important) and to rank order the remaining messages on the basis

of the importance of retaini~ng them. These data allowed for the derivation of

Al a template for reducing Lhte size of ESD message files by varying amounts.

2.4.2 METHOD

Thirty-two staff officers were asked to read a description of a short

tactical sceriarA o and examine 30 ESD messages. The scenario was a modified

version of that used by Geiselman and Samet where the U.S. Forces were said

to have been attacked by Warsaw Pack Forces. For the present experiment, the

U.S. Forces were described as being engaged in a counter-attack maneuver

against the enemy. The participants' task was to rate each message in terms

of how essential it is to the understanding of the situation at hand, and to

summarize the tactical information contained in the messages in preparation

for a three-minute briefing to the Corps G-2. Sixteen of the staff officers

were given three guidelines to follow in preparing their summaries. These

guidelines appeared in the instructions as follows:

(1) Prepare the intelligence summary in a conversational style. Do

not present information in the form of lists alone since this makes

understanding the information time-consuming and difficult.

(2) Provide an interpretation of the intelligence information if that

try to state what the intelligence means in terms of the enemy

(3) Povidea _dyamicortraalo the enemy situation. That is,

empaszethe speed and direction of enemy movement, rather than

merly hecurrent static position of enemy units.

Te32 hand-written summaries were typed and rated by seven knowledgeable miltar ofices wthrelevant experience in terms of content, interpretation,

accuacy orgniztio, an stle.An overall evaluation of each summary was

Following the work of Kintsch and van Dijk, i a sue htasm

mary is. representative of the summarizer's basis for evaluation and mental

organization of the message content. This basis, which is an organized knowledge structure, or schema, provides a mental outline for the learner or user

onto which the appropriate elements from the material to be learned can be

"attached." Consequently, a major anal~ytical task toward the development of

guidelines for summarization was to extract a representation of the schema that

was applied successfully to the messages by the staff officers in generating

"good" summaries.

4W. Kintsch and T. A. van Dijk, "Comments on Summaries of Stories," Languages,

1975, 40: 98-116.

37
Operationally, a schema can be defined as a two-dimentional, or hierarchical outline with the dimensions being subordination (importance) and

sequential order. Subordination, or level in the "deep structure" of material,

has typically been determined using derivational rules (e.g., a story grammar)

applied directly to the full text, but this procedure is time-consuming and

is often highly subjective. Fortunately, the subordination of information

based upon derivational rules has been found to be correlated with the likelihood that a reader will include the information in a summary of the full text

Ii (Thorndyke). 5 Therefore, in the present experiment, as in Lhe earlier Geiselman

and Samet experiment, subordination, or importance, could be determined for

each idea included in a summary in terms of the percentage of the staff officers that included some aspect of that idea in their summaries. That is,

an idea with a higher inclusion percentage was assigned a higher position in

the structure.

A list of general ideas or topics was extracted systematically from the

"good" summaries such that the list exhausted the summary contents. The topics

were identified by noting the authors' syntactical divisions (e.g., paragraphs,

listings) and transitions in subject matter within these divisions. The topic

labels were then taken from the identified summary segments. In this manner,

a particular message could support one topic in one summary and an entirely

different topic in another summary.

Sequential order was assessed by deriving an output-position percentile

for each topic included in each staff officer's summary. The output-position

percentile [(sequential position of a topic in a summary divided by the total number of topics included in the summary) X 100] is a measure c.. output position where the derived value is standardized with respect to the number of

ideas in the respective output. Within each group of participants (guidelines,

no guidelines), a median output-position percentile was computed for each topic.

To derive a schema, a median output-position percentile was computed for

each topic that was included in at least one of the "good" summaries, and the

subordination dimension was scaled in terms of the percentage of staff officers including a given topic in their summaries. The schema generated from

the "good" summaries obtained in the present experiment, involving enemydefensive activity, was compared to the schema derived by Geiselman and Samet

for an enemy-offensive scenario. In addition, the essentiality ratings given

by the present subjects were compared to those obtained by Geiselman and Samet.

A schema of the purging process was derived from the data collected during the final phase of the experiment in which the participants were asked to

delete 15 of the 30 messages and to rank-order the remaining 15 messages on (1I the basis of the importance of retaining them. To derive the schema, an inclusion percentage and a median rank order were computed for each of the 30

ESD messages that were retained by at least one participant. A point,

representing each of the 30 messages, was then plotted in the two-dimensional

space (inclusion percentage by median rank order).

5P. W. Thorndyke, "Cognitive Structures in Comprehension and Memory of Narrative Discourse," Cognitive Psychology, 1977, 9: 77-110.

38
2.4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The three guidelines appeared to have potent effects upon summarization

II performance. First, regarding interpretation, the participants with guidelines were more likely to include a statement at the beginning of their summaries about the overall strength of the enemy forces and a statement of inference concerning the enemy's intentions (retreat, delay, attack, etc.) at

the end of their summaries. Regarding style, the participants with guidelines

were less likt--y to present information in the form of a list. Regarding a

dynaic ortryalof the enemy situation, the participants with guidelines

were more likely to discuss enemy movement both away from the FEBA and toward

the FEBA. overall, then, the guideline manipulation did affect the content

of the summaries and the specific effects were in agreement with the spirit

4 of the guidelines. Further, there was significant interjudge agreement that

the summaries constructed with the guidelines were "better," on average, than

those constructed without the aid of guidelines. This result, which was obtained for four of the five evaluation scales, serves as validation both for

KI ~the three general guidelines used here and for the basic experimental method- .

ology developed by Geiselman and Samet. In addition, the fact that three

simple guidelines can be used to improve the summarization of intelligence

information has promising implications for the potential success of training

programs in the area of tactical information management.

r.'veral analyses were constructed to determine major points of departure

detrmied hatthe same types of ESD messages were considered to be most essenialfortheunderstanding of the enemy situation regardless of whether the

eney ws epitedasbeing in an offensive or defensive posture. In each

case inormaionconcerning nuclear weapons, engagements, enemy movement

toadteAEA n locations of regimental command posts were seen as most

important. Thus, with respect to the selection of "hard facts," it does not

appear that the enemy's presumed posture is a crucial factor, such that certain aggregate guidelines can be proposed concerning that distinction.

However, as noted by Geiselman and Samet, the integration of the "hard

facts" in the form of overall assessments and inferences or battlefield indicators (Johnson),6 is a process that would likely be affected by the nature

of the scenario. The fact that information integration was influenced by the

scenario was apparent in a comparison of the schema derived from the data in

the present experiment with the earlier schema derived by Geiselman and Sareet.

With an enemy-offensive scenario, inferen.,es concerning the location of the

probblepoint of main thrust and the location of the second echelon were

consieredimportant. With an enemy-defensive scenario, these inferences

were replaced by an inference regarding the enemy's likely intentions (retreat, delay, attack, etc.) and an introductory summary statement concerning

the overall strength of the enemy forces. Thus, further work in the area of

battlefield indications is crucial for the development of training programs

toward the generation of effective intelligence summaries.

K 6

E. M. Johnson, "The Perception of Tactical Intelligence Indications: A

Replication," U.S. Army Research Institute (Alexandria, VA), Technical Paper

282, September 1977.

39
Aside from differences in the inferences made in the context of each

scenario, the schemata were quite similar. Three levels of detail (subordination) could be clearly discriminated within the schema in each case, and these

three levels could provide a basis for specific guidelines regarding content

and order of presentation for general and more detailed summaries. At the

most general level, a summary should include only information of immediate

threat to friendly forces, such as engagements and enemy movement toward the 4FEBA, plus an inference regdrdinc 7 the enemy's immediate intentions. At the

next level of detail, an introductory summary statement concerning overall

enemy strength should be included plus a discussion of enemy units of less

1~] importance behind the FEBA (e.g., support units, air defense, rear unit movement). At the most detailed level, a summary could further include ancillary

information such as the location of t-he second defensive belt, instances of ii radio jamming, and locations of command Posts as targeting information.

A two-dimensional schema of the results of the purging task was also

derived, and it was apparent that the schema was linear in form rather thanj

hierarchical; that is, the correlation across messages between the inclusion

percentage dimension and the median rank order was -.89. Further, the ratings

of message essentiality collected at the beginning of the experiment accounted

for 80% of the variance in the inclusion data from the purging task. Thus,

the participants appeared to base their decisions regarding the purging of

the ESD file almost exclusively upon their perceptions of the essentiality of

the messages. This was true even though the essentiality ratings were collected by the experimenter prior to the purging task. What is particularly 4 striking about this finding is that the high degree of correlation between the

~essentiality ratings and the probability of retention of a message .in the purg- H ing task was obtained regardless of whether a participant was given guidelines

in the preceding s,.mmarization task or not. Thus, certain ESD messages were

perceived to be essential to the comprehension of the tactical situation, and

there was considerable agreement among the staff officers concerning these

perceptions. As noted by Geiselman and Samet, who also found substantial

agreement among officers on ratings of the essentiality of messages, the Army I

appears to be imparting a common core of knowledge to its officers about the

need for information of various types. Hence, it is in the areas of information organization and integration that a considerable amount of research effort should be expended.

2.4.4 CONCLUSIONS

The results of this investigation support the development of guidelines

for the summarization of tactical intelligence information, and provide valuable insight concerning the content and structure of those summaries that are

likely to be judged effective in the communication of information contained

in an ESD message file. Staff officers utilized three general guidelines developed in the first of this series of studies to produce more effective

summaries of intelligence messages, thus validating the guidelines. Further,

the content and organization of summaries judged to be "good" were found to,

be basically the same regardles,5 of whether the posture of the enemy was

portrayed as offensive or defensive. This implies that the number of variations of schemata, and thus specific guidelines needed to describe ESD files, might Tbe relatively small--such that standard routines could be developed

40

- -W
and opdrationalized to support message-summar3.zation efforts. However, significant differences between scenarios were identified in terms of information

integration and inferences, and therefore, further research on battlefield

indicators seems warranted. Additional research is also called for to cvaluate

the impact of guidelines for information management on tactical decisionn~aking,

and to investigate the degree to which these guidelines can be generalized to

the summarization of other forms of military messages (e.g., friendly situation data).

2.5 DETERMINING DECISIONMAKER'S INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (Interim

summary of work in progress)

Research to analyze and develop approaches to determining decisionmaker's

information requirements is currently in progress. Two parts of the draft

report, one developing an approach to the problem and the other surveying

techniques described in the available literature, have been produced. These

two documents are summarized in this section. A third part, still in preparation, is oriented on the current state of knowledge and thinking about divisional and corps commanders' information needs. These papers are planned to

be consolidated into a formal report during July 1980.

2.5.1 A METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMININGA DECISIONMAKER'S INFORMATION ,

REQUIREMENTS

This draft paper analyzes how a division commander and his staff assess the commander's information needs. The study was fundamentally different

from many which have been performed previously. The prior analyses postulated

an operational situation and then examined the question of what information

would a commander need to operate successfully in that situation. The investigation topic for this research was more fundamental: For a given situation,

how does the commander and his staff determine the required information?

The approach was to postulate a six step model which describes a decision paradigm which a commander could follow. This paradigm includes the

actions of the commander and his staff and displays the interrelationships

between the various activities which would occur at division headquarters

during combat operation. These six steps were monitoring the situation,

modeling situation, constructing alternatives, projecting the courses of

action by both sides, consequences of each set of actions, applying judg-.

mnt criteria to the projected outcomes and make decisions, and issue orders.

The research involved describing the activities which occur in each of

these basic steps in successively finer levels of detail until a level was

reached at which information requirements could be uncovered. This breakdown involved examining the sources and types of information, the types of

monitoring and decisionmaking which occur, and discusses in some detail the

various types of data which are produced and utilized in decisionmaking.

I

41

77)ý-
S- -, -- •iA :..-- _--_ _ _ _ _ • _ _ _ _ _ : __? .. .. - . . •_

The product of examining the detailed breakdown of the decision paradigm

$' was the identification of three basic types of data which are required by a

division commander. These data are grouped into the situation data, philoL sophical data, and value data. Situation data pertain to the physical and

operational situation which confronts the commander. Physical data consist

of terrain and meteorological data as well as order of battle anO deployment

informuation concerning both the friendly and enemy forces. Philosophical

Sdata pertain to the enemy aommanders and are uc.d to determine possible and

probable courses of action. Value data are similar to the philosophical

datai however, they pertain to the friendly commander. The value data are

H! utilized by the commander's staff to assist in determining the type of deta

the commander desires.

Examination of the contents of these data sets indicated that the philo- i]sophical and valuu data are static with respect to the given operation and

can be gathered well in advance of their need. It is also the case that many

of the situational data, such as terrain and meteorological data, are static

with respect to the division commander's time frame and thus can be gathered

prior to commencement of operations. The operational data pertaining to

deployment and order of battle, however, are highly time perishable and it

is these data which must be provided and updated frequently.

The analysis provided a means of modeling the information gathering,

processing, and disseminating activities of a division headquarters, identified the types and uses of data, and provided a means whereby a commander's

staff can translate the characteristics of a given operational situation into

the required information that its commander would need.

2.5.2 SUMMARY OF A SURVEY OF METHODOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING A

DECISIONMAKER' S INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

This draft paper reviews a variety of methods to determine and organize

a commander's information requirements. Methodologies from ARI and the civilian sector are reviewed. Some of these approaches may be directly useful in

defining a commander's information needs while others may serve as a starting

point for further studies.

Four procedures created by or for ARI address the specific problem of a

battlefield commander. They are based on the use either of survey questionnaires or of simulation exercises. McKendry, et al., uses a comprehensive

survey tool to obtain answers to the question of what information officers

believe they need. Strub and McConnaughey ask officers to request information in an environment where planning stages for tactical operation are simulated. The results offer clues as to the relative importance of cer':ain

information to the commander. Krumm uses the same simulation to tesý: the

validity of Strub's and McConnaughey's methodology. Coates and McCoýrt survey

officers to collect results on the relative sicnificance of order of battle

elements to the commander. Their results expand the body of information needs

identified by officers.

42

.. -
Six methodologies designed for business managers or for other decisionmakers are also reviewed. They are included for their ability collectively

to provide a representative cross-section of those methods currently available

for study. The sample does not pretend to be an exhaustive list of every

method available for determining a decisionmaker's information needs. Taggart

offerý a comprehensive syntactical approach, based on the analysis of words,

to the problem of identifying information needs. McDonaugh decides that information requirements are derived first by focusing on and then by analyzing

selected management problems. Heany concentrates on the decisionmaking responsibilities of the manager as the starting point for any search for specific

information requirements. Altman systematically offers a six stage procedural

analysis of the system, its functions, and how they are allocated as a way to

uncover the information needed to make accurate decisions. The problem of

documenting information needs is attacked by Tiechroew. He offers the Problem

Statement Language, a computer-aided language that uses objects and relationships to describe a system's boundaries and its content. Miller employs a

conceptual approach designed to deal with mental abstractions that present

major obstacles to managers and analysts when they ateempt to determine information requirements.

Three of these six methods are analyzed for the role a decisionmaker is

expected to play in them. Some approaches restrict the decisionmaker to descriptive contributions while others require that he fulfill important

analytic responsibilities.

Lastly, an operations research approach to the problem of determining

commander's information needs is presented. This is an example of -ow general methodology can be applied to this particular problem. Kleist models

the operational environment confronting the organization. His narticular

model breaks down the commander's decisionmaking process so that areas where

information is needed can be located.

4: 43

td - • . . - " ' • • • • .. . .. . ... . . • • - . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . .
DISTRIBUTION __ _ _ _ _ _

I US ARMY CINCIPAC bJPPUHT GHUUP WR5UN~4kL 1nIViSION

I HQI)A ATTN: PMAC

I TA(G/TAGCEN ATTN: UAAGLDU

I HlUs TCATA ATTN: ATCAT-uOPW

12 HQI)A RESE.ARCH AND STUUIt.S OFL

1 MILITAPY OCCUPATIDNAL UEVL.LOPMF.NI DIV UAPC-MSP-U, RM R52C HOFFMAN 8LOG 1

't QASO (MRA AND L)

1 HODIA ATTN: UAMO-RUR

I HQ'A CHIEF, HUiMAN~ RESOUURLS DEVLLUPMENT iIdV

I USRAUC09 STC

I HtiU)A ATTN: UAMI-T5T

I USA AVIATION SYSTEMS CURL) ATTN: UNAV-ZDR

1 USA CORAUCOM ATT'4: AMSEL-PA-RH

I USA ARQADCOM ATT4J: ATýL-LU-AC iiI HEADOUARTERS, US '4AR1NL. LUHPS ATTN: CUUF MPI-Z8

2? US ARMY EUROPE AND) SEVENTH ARMY

I IST INFANTRY OIvISIONq AND FT. WILEY ATTr'i: AAF2N-flPT-T

I L's-ý INTELLIGE.NLE ANO SECUHITY COMMAND ATTN; IAOPS-TNG

e HQ TRADOC TECHNICAL LIRkHAY

I NAVAL TRAINING EUJIPMELNT CLN AnTN2 TECHNICAL LliBRARY

1 MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL ULVt.LOIPMFNI DIV ATTN: DAPtC-MSP-St MM 852C, HOFFMAN t3LUHG I

I MILITAPY OCCUPATIONAL UEVLLOPMF"JT UIV ATTN: UAPC-MSP-D, RM 8b2C9 HOftFFMAN 8LDG I

1 MIl.ITAPY UCCUPAfIJNAL Ut~Vt.L~UMFI~ UIV ATTN: UAPC-MSP-T, MM 8b2C* -OFFMAN t6LI)I, I

I USAFACFA CHIEF, DHGN~iANATIONAl LFFECIIVVNESS 8RANCH

1 8 T H INFANTRY UlvISION

1 HQ0A yANK FORLES MANAOEMENT UIL,

I NAVAL AIR SYSTL.M COMMAND /

1 I)CiOPS (DIST 4) ATTN: UAMU-RWl * LAMJ-RNOC

I 12WO USARCOM H*SEkVE CLNILR

I FT. 8LNJAMIN HARRISON, IN 4b~o

I DIRECTORATE OF AR'40R AVIAliON ATITN: A1SH.-AAU

I AVIATION UIVISIoN ATTN: ATZK-IiPT-AVij (UH)FS)

I USA FOiRCLS COMM4~ND AFIN - UL~POjY C OF S FOR INTLLLIGFNCL

I 11Sr FORCES COMMaND AFUP - UtPuTY CHIEý OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS

I DIRECTORATE OF THA1NINU ATTN: AiLU-T

I DIRECTORATE OF COlHAI UtVEL~LUMý1415 ATTN: ATLA-U

I tIUOARCOM MARINE rCORPS LIAISON 01C;

I DEPARTmENT OF )MiE ARMY Ub) ARMY INTELLL16ýtjCE 4 SLCURITY CUMMANU

I US ARMY AGENCY lOR AVIATION SAFLIY AtINI LIBR(ARIAN* lNOG 490b

I USAý M1SSILF MATIN1IEL RK)AANE.SS LUMMANi 'ATTN: UHN)MI-NTN

L ARrAyS ATTN: UkC0m-fOh-IU

I lJSA FOPCES COHMAND)

I PM THAnE /I

IUS MILITARY Dlh]HICT OF WAbHIN(ýIlUN uFC uF LtUUAL OPPORTUNITY

I NAVIAL rIVILIAN PL4SONNLL I-UMU -')UtJTHFAN FLO DIV

21' AR! LIAISON OFFICE

I TH ARMY TRA1NIaq0 (NTLR

I ,Q USAoLUR ATTII: I)CSUPS

I HQi)A, OCS SIUDY IWFICL.

I tuSfqCUEC ATTN.' A1EC-tx-t HUMAN rACIORS

I US4FA~bnS/TAC 6FNIOR ARMY AUVISUk

i INtFk-IINIV SEMINAR ON ARMELU FOR(LLS + SUC

I USA L.LFCTHONIC PH)Vji4G uHUOND AIIN: ýOIEEgJ-MT-b

I OASA (PUA) I)EulIiy FUR SLCILNCE AND TECHNOLOGY

I OFC OF NAVAL RL'SEAHCH/

I AFHRL/i RT

I AFHRL/LRL

I AIR lFORCL HUMAN RESOURCLS LAd ATTN: AFrWL/TSR

i FE.ERAI AVIATION AUMINiIR)TATlON LLNT4AL REGION LIHRAPY, ACt-b6

45r

MDM PA XANK-M- P UM
1 6510 AMRL/HEj

I NAVY PFRSONNEL N AND U CL.NIEH/

INAVY PFFH'ONNE.L k' AND U CLNIEIR LIRLClak oF PR(AMAMS

iNAVY PFNSUNNEL R ANU U) (.tNIEH

IUS ARMY AVN ENIbINEELNUt IfLLGHT ACTIVITY ATTN:.SAVTE-Tfl

eOFC OF NAVAL RLSLAICH IP.HbUNNFL AND TRAINING RVbEARCH. PRUGHAMS

01 1NAVAL ALHOSPACL. MEUICAL Hb"H LAd ATT'4 (COUk. LSI)

1HUOEAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL SCLE1411FIC ADVISOR (PLRS-UP)

INAVAL AERUSPACL MEUICAL H$(CH LAb AENJSPACE PSYCHOLOGY DE.PAHIMENT

IUS4 TRAUOC SYS4iM5 ANALYtIl ACTIVITY ATTN: ATAA-TCA

IHEND~UU&RTERS9 CiiASI 6.UAND CHJFt's PSYCHUIOGICAL NSCtI 4p

IuSA RErLAHCH ANi) TECHNOLUUY LAH ATTN: UAVDL-AS

I LISA ENrINEER TUPU3RAHAIfH1 LAbS AITN-. UL..GSL

I USý ENGINLFR 1UPU~3HAPHIC LAB$ ATTN: hTINFO CENkLR

I tJS, ENCINEER TUPUGHAPHIC L~A13 ATTN& O.L-10-5 S

1 05S1 MORILITY LUOIDMENT H ANU U (6UMU AlTM: URUP4E-TU

I N1,;HT VISION LAri ATTN: UNSEL-NV-SULJ

I USA TRAINING dUAWD

I kUSA HUMAN FNGINkERINU LAb

I US HEL/USAAVNC/

I USA MATERIFL SYSTEMS ANALY!bIS AJIiVITY ATTN: DNA5Y-fA

I tiSý WE-EAHCH &ýC/

I NAFEC HUMAN ENqAJEEHINU, 6RANCH,

I HATTELI E-COLUMbOS LAtdOHAIUMILS IALTICAL TECHiNICAL UFC

I LISA ARrcT)C TEST CEN ATTN, AMSTt-PL-Tti

I USA ANr,11C TESI CEN ATTN; SIEAIL-L-MI

I OSA COmiCLPTS AN,%LYhb13 AOLY AI1I4. MOLA-wi,

I lJSt CONCEPTS ANiiLYSlS Au(LY ATTN: MOCA-JII HO WRATH DIV OF l~tUHUPSYLti1ATWY

i USACACnA ATINZ ATLLCA-C1L

I LJSACACIOA ATTN. ATiLCA-LI-M

I usACACo'A ATTN. ATZLCA-CI-A

I IJSACACIoA ATTN: A1ULCA-CA

I US\ LLFCTHONIC -, AREA LAb CHILl's iNILLIIbENCL MATER (rEVtL~ StJPP OFI

I USL NScH- UEVEL + SIANUANDILA iP, U.K.*

I AFFD)L/FGR (CUlL)

I LISA NATICK~ RESLAHCH ANU UtVELUPMLNI COMMAND CHIL~q bFHAV SLIINICES DL)V, FOOL) SVA LAR

HIA 0A'41)9 F ANi) L (ý. ANI) LS) MILITAK(Y ASSI PflN INGi PENS TECHNUL

I TRAJANA ATTN: SAJS-UH

I NAVAL 418 SYSTt~i~ C;UMMANu Alihi: AIH-ý41j~

1 EC,)m ATTN: AMWL-CT-O

I uSACUEcLC TLCW:ICiAL LIIHRAKY

I USAAHL LlbRARY

I H-U4AN WLSOLIWCES RSCH UN's (1UMHRU) L*4HARY

I SEVILLF HESEARL~j CURVUHAtIUN

I LISA TRADUC SYSTI-MS.ANALY.SIS A;T IvITY Arr~1 : ArAA-SL (TFCrI LIHHARY)

I tJNIFON.mU sLHVI(:ES UNIT Ut THlE MLALTH h~ DE-PARTMENT ()F PSYCHIATRY

I USA COMPUTER SyblTEMS CUMMAND Ahit CJMMAND ILCHNICAL LIBR(ARY

I H0,4AN t4LSUUIRCf-!: HSCH ONHi (H-UMRPU)

1 NUOIRHO WESTERN LIIIRAkY

I EUSTIS UINEClOmiTE* USAAMNUL TL(LHNICAL Ll"RAHY

I RA14D CONI'URAT jU1

I HAND) CokPURATIUNI ATTN! LIbkAkY U

I ILEHriEA AVIArIU~i AI)MINISIHATIUN ATTN: CAMI LIURARY AC'C-441)1

I NAIFEC I IbARAY, &\NA-64

I (,RONIN(;Lk LIbRAkY AT TN: AILI-wh-L 6L~k3 1 313

I CENITLiH ION NAVAL- ANALYSISý

46
I NAVAL HEALTH R$CH CEN LLdHAHY

I NAVAL FLLCTRONICS 013 ATTN: RFbLAkCH LIHRARY

I NAVAL PERSONNEL W ANU U CLtN LIHkARY ATTN: CODE 92CIL

I AIR FORCE HUMAN RE!S'OURCES LAB ATTN; AFHPLIDT

I HU. FT. HUACHUCA ATTN: TECH RFt UIV

I USA ACADEMY OF HE.ALTH SjCIENCES STIMSO)N LIBRARY 11DOCUMENTS)

I SCHIOOL OF SYST~tHS AND LU(3ISTcs ATTN' AFIl/LSCM

I USAMERF)C TECHNICAL LIdkAHY

I DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY TkA!NINb ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OP

I NATIONAL CFNTER FOR HEALTH STAT14TICS/

I uSm4A nEPT OF bEHAVIURAL bCI ANU LEADEHSHIP

I US NAVY CNET SUP0ORT RESEARCH LIBRARY

I OLD) UOMINiON UNIVERSITY PERFOPIAANCE A5StSSMENT LAB3ORATORY v I USA COMMAND ANU 6~ENEHAL STAFF COLLEGE ATTNt LIBRARY

I, USA THANSPORTATION4 SCHOOL USA IHANSP TECH INFO AND WSCM CEN

I NASA Ho

I NMRDC P~ROGRAM rA4ANAtiE FUH HUMAN PLHFJHmANcE

1 NAVAL MEDICAL H AND U COMMAND ('44)

I USA ADMINCEN Tt-CHNICAL kLSEARC,1 BRANCH l.IBRAHY

eHUOA IISA MED SU NI LE COMMAND

I USA FIFLU ARTY HU

I NAT CLFARINGHOUSL fOR Mb.NIAL HFALTH IqN) PARKLAWN BLDG

I U (IF TFXAS CEN FO)R COMMU1N1CATIUN RSCH

I INSTITUTE FOR OFFENSE ANALYSES

L USA TRAINING SUPP~kT CkNILk UI-IVEL SYSTEMS TNG U EVICES DIRECTORATE

I AFHRL TECHNOLOt.Y 3FC (H)

I PU.4DUE UNIV DEpT OF PbYCLOGTLMbLL scLLNCIkS

I USA MOKILITY Ewul;)MENT H ANt) U (CUMMANL) ATTN: DRumE-Zc,

I HQ. USA MOW ATTN: ANPL-ut.

I DA US ARMY RETkAdNINUi b~b. HLSFANCH + LVALUAIIUN ()IN

I USAF SC'HOOL OF tALRUSPACt MEDICINE ALNUMIA.)ICAL LIHRARY (rSK-4)

I US MILI'TARY ACAOE'4V LIdRAHY

I USA INTELLIGEN161 CtN ANU 'ILH 4IIN: SCHOOL L18RAHY

I USA INTELLIGENCt: CLN AND SLH I)LPI 0F UR(IOUD SENSORS

I MARINE CORPS INSTITUTE

I NAVAL (SAFETY CENTER- /

I USAAVNC, AND FT* HJC~tR AIIN: AIZU-ES

I US ARMY AVN TNlb LIbRARY AITN: CHIEF LlIkARIAN

I USAAVNC ATTN$ 41ZU-U

I US MILITARY ACAUEIY ON. 01 MIt ITARY LLAOIRSHIP

I US MILITARY ACAoE'4Y DIRELIOk oý INSTIhJTIONAL RSCH

I USA AIP DEFENSE SCHOUL ATTN: AISA-CU)-MS

I iJSAADS-LIBRARY-OUCUMLNTS)

I USA AIW DEFENSE HDAU ZL~N IN: fILLS RtEPOSITORY

I USA INFANTRY 8UARD ATi4 A TL8-lb1bT5-ri

I USA INTELLIGENCI- CEN AND !5LH F0UCATIJNAI- ADVISOR

I USA OHI'INANCE CLN AMj) SCti ATTN: A1SL-ILM-C

i USA ARMOR SCHOUl. ATTN: Al!)H-OT-IP

I 'JSA ARmOR CENTE-4 UILNECIONATL Ot COMP4AI 'hVELLoPMLNrS

I NAVAL POSTGRAI)UATgE SLM AIIN: IUULLY KNUX LIBRARY (C04* 1424)

I USA TRANSPORTATION SCHOOL OLPIJlY ASSI. (OMMANDANT L011CA* TECtINDLO Y

I USA SIcNAL SCHOOL jkNU fT. tOROON AIT4N AIZH-ET

I USA ARMOR SCrIOUt. EVAL SHANaCHo DIRECTJHATI- OF INSTRUCTION

I CHIEF nF NAVAL LUJCATION AND TNL. /

I IJSASIGS STAFF AN-) FACULTY DLV ANO IN;.. 0IV

I HO ATCxp1i, TNAININL SY$ILMS JlLVELLOP4Nl

I WS AI SU ATTN: ATSJt-UT-t

i 1 US ARMY ARMOR $S:H)UL DIREtLTONATL OF IRAININbo

I USA ODARTERMASIEN SCHOOL. uIHLIUHIATf. OF INAININt2 UEVFIOIRMENTS

1 US COAST GUARD ACADEMY AIIN: CAUDT CJU1'JSELOR WICK SLIMAKI

I US.% TkANSPORTAlION- SCHUOL DINFtlUR UF T-JAINING

I USA INFANTRY SL'OZDL LJbAIMAY/

47
IUSA INFANTRY SLHUDL ATTN% ATSH-L-V

IUS ARMY INFANTRY SCtH0OL ATTN: AISH-Ct)

1 USA INF.ANTRY SCHUDL ATT1N, AISH-UUI

I USA INFANTRY SCIHUDL ATTN*. ATSH-LV

I USA Nil ITARY PUL1CL SC~u0L/TRAINlN(.i CENTFN ATTNI ATZN..PTS

I USA MIg ITARY POLICL SCHUUL/IHAININ(i cENrýFo UIR. COMbAT L)EvLLOP'MEN]

I USA M411ITAkY POLICL SCHOOL/TRAINJ.N(I CENtFR OIR. TRAININU~ D&.VLLOPMtNI

I USA M1 ITAPY POLICE hCHUUL/THAININ(b CE.NTER ATTN: ATLN-ACL

I USA INsIiTkTFE OF ADMINISTRATION ATTN,. %ýSIUENT TRAINING MANA(3LMENT

I USA FIFLU ARTILLER.Y SCHOOL MUPHIS SwEIT LIBRARY

I USA INsTITUTE OF ADMINISIHATIUN A-AuEMLC LIbRARY

I USA WAR COLLEGt ATTN% LItSNARY

I USA ENGINEER SC1403L LHHRAHY ANU LLAR141NL, RESOURCES CENtTER

I USA ARMOR SCHOUL (USARMS)) ATTN: LIBRAHY

I OR5ANI7ATIONAL ýFCTIIVENLSS TN'4 CEN +5CR- ATTN* LIB3RARIAN

1 US ARMY INTELLLI.,LNC(E CENTt.R + %LHOOL ATTN: ATSI-TI

I US ARMY INTELLIGFENCE Ui,41.R * SCHOOL -ATTN: ATSI-RM-M

I US ARMY INTELLWtE%4CE CLNTLIk * SCH'OUL ATTN: AISIMOU-LI)

I US ARMY INTELLI"E"4CE CLNI.R + SCHOOL ATTN: ATSI-CU-CS-C

I US ARMY INTELL1IANCE CEýNTLH + SCHOOL ArTN: ATSI-DT-SF-IN

4 BRITISH EMBASSY *tITlsm uLFLNCL STAFF.

eCANIAUIAN JOINT STAfF

1 FRFNCH MILITARY ATTACHE.

I AUSTRIAN EMHAS5Y MILITARY AND AiR ATTACHE.

.3 CANADIAN OEFENCt. LIAISUN $TA0F ATTN: COQUNSELLORt DEFENCE P AND D

I ROYAL NETHERLANuS EMBA!)SY MILIIANY ATIACHE

i CA'JAUIAN FORCE~l BASE CUHNWALLIS ATTN% PýWSONNEL SELECTION

e CAI4AIIAN FORCES PEHSUNNLL APPL HbCH UJNIT

I AR~iY PFRSONNI.L 4ELSAHCH 1 .TAbLISHMLt4T

1 ARAIY PF-RSUNNEL wLSEAHCH 0IAdLIS#1MtNT AkI ScIENTIFIC COUONIINATIUN OFFICEý

I NLIHERI.ANUS EMdASSY OFF itL OF IRE A14 ATTACHE

b L~IRARY OF CONUHESS EXCHANbU. ANtU ilFI LDIV

I OEFENSF TL.CHNIUAL 1NFUk,,iAIION (2LN ATTN:. oTIC-TC

154 L1iiRARY OF CONURLSS UNIT UoCUmtlI4TS EX(PLOITING. PROJECT

1 EDITOR. R ANI) U MAbAZINI. ATTN: URCUE..LN

1 US LOVFRNMENI P"I'NTING UFC LIHHAHY, RUHLTC DOCUM4ENTS PEPARTMENT

I US GOVFRNMENT PH'N4I'lNG kOFC LIHIIARY A4U cTATUTORY. LIH UIV (SLI)

I THF ARmiY LIW(ARY

.3/18