PCN 17140

Does “national character” correlate with the nature of national, strategic 

intelligence across a major region of the world? This question remains 

open and important, given that the intelligence services of any country by 

defi nition ideally provide an institutional guarantee of national survival. In 

the end, public consciousness of the intelligence function can contribute 

directly to the positive evolution of intelligence as one of the oldest 

of political institutions, in such a way that we can begin to identify a 

phenomenon of “democratization” of national intelligence. 

Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy

 Editors

As may be inferred from most of the essays in this book, the emphasis 

on state security and control of violent criminal activity is a strong, 

distinctive feature of the intelligence services across the region. One 

possibility is to extend the research carried out for this book to a 

systematic comparison of the institutional framework and operational 

emphases in other regions where, as we know through an emerging 

body of comparative research, there is an impetus to institutionalize 

democratic reform and improve the integration of law enforcement and 

strategic intelligence. 

Intelligence studies are on the brink of making the leap to a level where 

they will have practical relevance. This book edited by Russell Swenson 

and Susana Lemozy holds importance for its presentation of usefully 

detailed essays and for the impetus it gives for theoretically oriented 

comparative studies. The book should be required reading for scholars 

interested in the combination of intelligence, strategic culture, security 

and democracy. 

Marco Cepik

 Professor of Comparative Politics and International Security

 Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

Visit the NDIC Press at www.ndic.edu 
Democratization 

of Intelligence

Opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not r

policies or points of view of their respective national governments.

Melding Strategic Intelligence and National Disc

Russell G. Swenson 

and 

Susana C. Lemozy

Editors

NATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, DC

July 2009

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Th e National Defense Intelligence College supports and encourages 

research on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves Intellige

Community capabilities for policy-level and operational consumers.

Democratization of Intelligence: Melding Strategic Intelligence and 

National Discourse — Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, edito

Th is abbreviated English edition of the book Democratización de la 

ción de Inteligencia—El Nexo de la Cultura y la Inteligencia Estratégica (N

Press, January 2009) presents that book’s introductory material in transla

along with essays by three U.S. and Canadian authors. Essays by the editors 

by a Peruvian observer, which make up the introductory material, provide 

reader unfamiliar with Spanish or Portuguese an overview of all essays in 

original edition. Th e original book features essays by 28 authors who repre

14 countries in the Western Hemisphere plus Spain. Th e book aims to edu

offi cials as well as students about the vicissitudes that accompany the dev

ment and execution of the government intelligence function. Th e authors 

onstrate that national, strategic intelligence in any country of the Hemisp

can experience episodes of devolution as well as positive evolution, at the s

time that the culturally modulated practices of government professionals 

oscillate between periods of repression and democratic observance.

Essays by authors who are U.S. Government employees were revie

and cleared for public release by the Department of Defense’s Offi ce of Sec

Review. Th is edition and the original book in Spanish and Portuguese are a

able at http://www.ndic.edu/press/press.htm.

Russell G. Swenson, PhD, Director, NDIC Press

Library of Congress Control Number 2008944

ISBN 978-1-932946-

ii |

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CONTENTS

 v FOREWORD

 Marco Cepik

 1 FRAMEWORK FOR A NORMATIVE THEORY OF

 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

 Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy

 27 INVITED COMMENTARY

 Jorge Serrano Torres

 SELECTED ESSAYS

 63 Refl ections on the U.S. Intelligence Culture: Career Engage

 of a Civil and Military Intelligence Offi cer—Jon Wiant

 79 Canadian Intelligence Culture: An Evaluation—Stephane L

 99 National Intelligence: Made in the U.S.A.—Bowman H. M

115 EDITORS’ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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FOREWORD

Marco Cepik*1

Th is new book edited by Russell Swenson and Susana Lemoz

ues and deepens a research partnership that has been useful to the fi eld 

ligence studies in the Americas and beyond. In the wake of contributi

as Bringing Intelligence About (Swenson 2003) and Intelligence Profes

in the Americas (Swenson and Lemozy 2004), the editors bring togeth

volume 23 essays that address the theme of national culture and its 

on the nature of the intelligence function in 15 countries of the Ame

of Spain.

As the various authors discuss why and how national cultu

ence threat perceptions, security and defense policies, and the design 

gence institutions in their respective countries, readers are treated to m

a description of the intelligence landscape. Th e editors seize on that au

circumstance to formulate a theory about the democratization of the 

intelligence function. Th e theory proposes that the strategic intelligenc

in each country contributes in its own way to the process of democr

which, in turn, infl uences the nature of intelligence activities in those c

Th is hypothesis is explicit and verifi able. Although it requires additio

ing in other national contexts (especially in Africa and Asia), the diver

presented here successfully demonstrate the applicability of the concep

America, the United States and Canada, and to Spain.

Research on culture, informal institutions, norms and values a

with intelligence is advanced by this important work, which further d

line of inquiry that has deep roots in intelligence studies (Jervis, 1985

thal, 1992; Bozeman, 1992; Boardman, 2006).

Given that intelligence culture depends, for its behavioral ex

on operationalization or codifi cation through individual initiative an

tive action, the work presented in this book complements, and does 

tradict, institutionally oriented studies that focus on the intelligence 

whether in the military arena or in criminal or police arenas.

* Professor of Comparative Politics and International Security at the Federal Unive

Grande do Sul, Brazil. He holds a doctorate in Political Science and is the author of Es

Democracia (Rio de Janeiro, FGV, 2003), as well as four other books and approximate

chapters or journal articles presented in Portuguese, Spanish or English. He also holds a 

with Brazil’s National Scientifi c Research Council.
vi |

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years, many of them centered around welldefi ned research problems and 

ported by systematic, empirical evidence (e.g., Herman, 2001, 66-158; John

2006; Bruneau & Boraz, 2007; Gill & Farson & Phythian & Shpiro, 2008). Th 

works, together with the present volume, are a fuller realization of compar

studies, building on works by the preceding generation of intelligence sch

(e.g., Richelson, 1988; Godson, 1988; Johnson, 1996, 119-145; Herman, 1

16-136).

As may be inferred from most of the essays in this book (including 

cases of Costa Rica and Colombia as two extremes in terms of the milita

tion of their intelligence services), the emphasis on State security and con

of violent criminal activity is a strong and distinctive feature of the intellig

services across the region. An interesting possibility would be to extend 

research carried out for this book to a systematic comparison of the ins

tional framework and operational emphases in other regions where, a

know through an emerging body of comparative research, there is an im

tus to institutionalize democratic reform and improve the integration of 

enforcement and strategic intelligence (e.g., Williams & Deletant, 2001; G

Brodeur & Tollborg 2003; Born & Johnson & Leigh, 2005; Wetzling, 2006; 

2006; Cepik, 2006; Burch, 2007).

Intelligence studies are on the brink of making the leap to a level w

they will have practical relevance. Th is book edited by Russell Swenson 

Susana Lemozy holds importance for its presentation of usefully detailed es

and for the impetus it gives for theoretically oriented comparative studies. 

book should be required reading for scholars interested in the combinatio

intelligence, strategic culture, security and democracy.
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BOARDMAN, Chase. (2006). “Organizational Culture Challe

Interagency and Intelligence Community Communicat

Interaction.” A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint A

Warfi ghting School in partial satisfaction of the requirem

Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and 

BORN, Hans & JOHNSON, Loch & LEIGH, Ian [editors]. (2005

Watching the Spies: Establishing Intelligence Service Accou

Dulles, Virginia, Potomac Books.

BOZEMAN, Adda. (1992). “Knowledge and Method in Com

Intelligence Studies of the Non-Western World,” in BOZ

Adda. Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essa

York, Brassey’s, pp. 180-212.

BRUNEAU, Thomas & BORAZ, Steven [editors]. (2007). Reformi

ligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness

University of Texas Press.

BRUNEAU, Thomas & DOMBROSKI, Kenneth. (2006). “R

Intelligence: the Challenge of Control in New Democra

BRUNEAU, Thomas & TOLLEFSON, Scott [editors]. Who 

the Guardians and How? Democratic Civil-Military R

Austin, University of Texas Press, pp. 145-177.

BURCH, James. (2007). “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for th

States? A Comparative Analysis of Domestic Intelligence A

and Their Implications for Homeland Security,” Homeland 

Affairs, III, no. 02 (June), pp. 01-26.

CEPIK, Marco & BRUNEAU, Thomas. (2008). “Brazilian National A

Towards Intelligence: Concept, Institutions and Conte

Challenges,” in GILL, Peter & FARSON, Stuart & PHY

Mark & SHPIRO Shlomo [editors]. Handbook of Global 

and Intelligence: National Approaches. Vol. 1—The Ame

Asia. Washington, Praeger.

CEPIK, Marco. (2007). “Political Regime and Intelligence System i

Structural Change and Democratic Control,” in BRUNEAU

C. and BORAZ, Steven [editors]. Reforming Intelligence: O

to Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin, Univ

Texas Press, pp. 149-169.
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Intelligence, Confl ict Quarterly, 9, no. 02 (Spring), pp. 52-104

FRY, Michael G. & HOCHSTEIN, Miles. (1993). “Epistemic Communi

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National Security, 8, no. 3, (July), pp. 14-28.

GILL, Peter & BRODEUR, Jean-Paul & TOLLBORG, Dennis [edit

(2003). Democracy, Law, and Security: Internal Security Servic

Contemporary Europe. Aldershot, UK, Ashgate.

GILL, Peter & FARSON, Stuart & PHYTHIAN, Mark & SHPIRO Shl

[editors]. (2008). Handbook of Global Security and Intellige

National Approaches. Washington, Praeger. ISBN: 0-275-9920

[Two vols.]

GILL, Peter. (1994). Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Lib

Democratic State. London, Frank Cass.

GILL, Peter. (2000). Rounding Up the Usual Suspects? Aldershot, 

Ashgate.

GILL, Peter. (2006). “The Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligen

In JOHNSON, Loch [editor]. Handbook of Intelligence Stu

London, Routledge, pp. 82-90.

GODSON, Roy. (1988). Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., 

U.S.S.R., the UK and the Third World. Washington, Brassey’s.

HASTEDT, Glenn. (1991). “Towards a Comparative Study of Intelligen

Confl ict Quarterly, 11, no. 03 (Summer), pp. 55-72.

HENDERSON, Robert. (1995). “South African Intelligence under de Kle

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 8

01 (Spring), pp. 36-56.

HENDERSON, Robert. (2004). International Intelligence Yearbook, 

edition. Washington, Brassey’s.

HERMAN, Michael. (1996). Intelligence Power in Peace and 

Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

HERMAN, Michael. (2001). Intelligence Services in the Information 

London, Frank Cass.
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Norms and Incentives. In MAURER, A.C., TUNSTALL, M

& KEAGLE, James M. [editors]. Intelligence: Policy and 

Boulder and London, Westview Press, pp. 113-124.

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189-199.

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Professionalism in the Americas, 2nd edition. Washingt

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Phillip. (2006). Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop 

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FRAMEWORK FOR A 

NORMATIVE THEORY OF 

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Russell G. Swenson 

and

Susana C. Lemozy

Th e Project

A spy novelist whose words are highlighted by Th e Economist 

the central theme of this book:

As that shrewd spy-chronicler, John le Carré, noted once, secret 

services can be most revealing of the deeper character of the 

countries they protect. A distinguished British practitioner of the 

craft recently agreed with him, declaring that intelligence work 

“is the last expression of national identity and sovereignty.”1

Th e present work examines the validity of these observations

tion, the book aims to determine whether national character can be a

with the nature of national or strategic intelligence in a region of the wo

of which lies outside the English-speaking realm. Th is question rema

and important, given that the intelligence services of any country by d

ideally provide an institutional guarantee of national survival and th

gic intelligence is an indispensable means toward achieving détente or 

tional co-existence. In the end, public consciousness can contribute d

the positive evolution of this primordial function, which counts as o

oldest of political institutions, in such a way that we can identify a phen

of “democratization” of national intelligence.

Th e set of essays presented here manifests increasing in

national-level, government intelligence. Public interest, combined with 

1 “Cats’ Eyes in the Dark,” Economist, 19 March 2005, p. 32. Unfortunately, the 

did not reveal the identity of the “distinguished British practitioner,” thereby re

reader to trust the messenger, ironically like a government report without explicit so

mentation. Alberto Bolivar, in an essay in the present volume, also refers to the obs

Le Carré, as presented in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974
2 |

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of whom are practicing professionals, allow us to operationalize the con

of intelligence democratization. By democratization, we mean the evolutio

process of establishing the rule of law in any given country, whereby spe

societal roles are developed for executive, legislative and judicial branch

government, along with the press or mass communications media. We sug

that the democratization of national intelligence comprises the evolution, in 

country, of a national system that ranges from the use of an institutional fra

work to address primarily internal security issues that threaten the surviv

principal offi cials of the state (a Security State), to its use to ensure the sur

of democratic principles in a State of Law as it contends with other countri

the world.2 We do not intend to judge the value of a system’s operating at 

given point along this spectrum, but rather to signal the existence of a tend

toward the democratization of this important government function.

Th e authors of these essays responded to a broad question: Ho

national culture in your country related to the status and evolution of strat

national intelligence; and how is the latter practiced, compared to how it sh

or could be employed? Each author was allowed to apply his or her own in

pretation of the concept of “culture.” To the editors, the concepts of nati

culture and national intelligence together constitute a framework of inhe

traits and key governmental, institutional adaptations that operate in the 

text of continual evolution in any society as viewed by its citizenry. Th e ed

requested that the authors focus their eff orts on: 1) the concept and applica

of “culture” within and among the intelligence institutions in the country u

examination, and 2) examples of the use of the culture concept to unders

and come to grips with national, strategic security problems in the author’s 

country. As it turned out, the authors went well beyond this initial expecta

which in the end permitted the creation of what we may call a descriptive 

normative theory of the “democratization of national intelligence.”

2 Stuart Farson, in a review article, “Schools of Thought: National Perceptions of I

gence”, Conflict Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 64-66, notes that national police are 

identified with intelligence and repression in extreme cases of the first type, whereas o

other extreme, intelligence personnel are often seen as national heroes as they defend d

cratic principles on the world stage. Available at: http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS

vol009_2spring1989/Farson.pdf. 
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ligence culture too diffi cult or too broad to address. As the authors 

various countries responded to requests from the editors to clarify o

their points, it became clear that there were several recurring elemen

essays. Th e degree to which the essays resonated with and resembled e

in several ways was not expected because they were written indepen

the authors, with no coordination—authors did not collaborate an

most part did not know each other until aft er all essays were acce

fi nalized.4 Following this initial observation, the editors began to se

tematically for theoretically signifi cant relationships among these par

cepts. Th e framework for a normative theory of intelligence democr

emerged, then, from the editors’ review of the collection of essays. Th r

theoretical approach, we intend to go beyond a simply descriptive com

of these essays toward an explanation of similarities and diff erences 

gence national culture. In the Table of Contents of the book, we presen

line of this theory through the four-part division of the collective mate

Th e essays presented here take into account the administrativ

that distinguish one state from another among those that share the 

space of the hemisphere, and that also separate the loyalties of citi

because only three or four major languages are spoken across the hem

3 The idea of a “national strategic culture” has been addressed regularly since 

by, among others, Colin S. Gray, “Comparative Strategic Culture”, Parameters (Win

pp. 26-33; Jeffrey S. Mantis, “Strategic Culture and National Security Policy,” Interna

ies Review, vol. 4, no. 3 (Fall 2002), pp. 87-113; and Elizabeth L. Stone and others, C

Strategic Culture: Conference Report, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 21-22 Septem

However, theoretical development of the concept remains elusive because of the lac

mon definition of key terms and the difficulty of operationalizing relevant variable

relationship to each other. The present study of national cultures of intelligence a

overcome these shortcomings to the degree possible through the presentation of th

voices of those with concrete experience in intelligence. The validity of these author

tions is reinforced by the fact that all of them found it possible to accept joining the 

culture with that of intelligence.

4 The concept of national cultures of intelligence is being developed in academ

associated with leading intelligence studies centers. As examples we note: María Tere

dez de la Vega, in her Foreword to Inteligencia y seguridad: Revista de análisis y prospe

1 (December 2006), p. 10, writes about “a new culture of intelligence” in Spain; 

tínez develops the concept in “Cultura política sobre inteligencia: Hacia un encue

sociedad,” in Terrorismo global: Gestión de información y servicios de inteligencia, coo

Navarro Bonilla y Miguel Ángel Esteban (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2007, pp. 165-20

Porch, in “French Intelligence Culture: A Historical and Political Perspective,” Intel

National Security 10, no. 3 (July 1995), pp. 486-511, and Peter Jackson, in a review es

ligence and the State: An Emerging ‘French School’ of Intelligence Studies,” Intel

National Security 21, no. 6 (December 2006), pp. 1061-1065, signal the emergen

demic attention to the distinctive and specifically cultural role of intelligence in Fren

politics. In the U.S., Michael Turner, in “A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity,” I

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (2004), pp. 42-61, also pro

concept.
4 |

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of a widely shared European heritage, it is not surprising that the expression 

governmental function as basic as that of intelligence should be easily recog

able across the entire region. In addition, the European sensibility, we thin

of such a nature that remaining diff erences will continue to be smoothed 

Th erefore, we have some confi dence in the validity of the theoretical const

tion and its applicability across all the countries of the hemisphere.

Schelling5 confi rms that when a social group enjoys a certain lev

cohesion among individuals, augmented through the use of a common 

guage, it begins to exhibit predictable behaviors, and we may then reason

speculate about the group in political and strategic terms, estimating its me

ends and its sense of rationality.6 We may further judge that a group’s atti

toward the future—the arena of national intelligence—is deeply associ

with its collective ethos, as suggested by Le Carré. Th is observation leads u

consider, in view of our authors’ work, and for theoretical purposes: To w

degree, at the national and strategic level, are underlying socio-cultural is

refl ected in the strategic intelligence organizations and practices of partic

countries, and further, how are these issues refl ected in a country’s vision o

future as played out through actions undertaken in the international contex

tentative answer to these questions appears in the divisions applied to the T

of Contents of this book, where we fi nd that respective countries host a ran

intelligence systems that fi rst refl ect military roots, then evolve through suc

sive organizations to accommodate the interests of civil society that in the 

both refl ect and create a national culture.

Taking into account the foregoing, the editors now present 22 essay

national culture and national intelligence. Essays focus on 14 long-indepen

countries of the hemisphere, and are accompanied by an essay from schola

Spain, the fi rst European colonizing country, which remains a kind of N

Star for many people of the Western Hemisphere.

Strategic Intelligence and National Culture

To start down the theoretical path, we can identify the paradigm

applied defi nitions of intelligence and of strategic intelligence shared by 

ernment employees throughout the region. Without doubt, during the sec

5 Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotivos y macroconducta (México, Fondo de Cultura Econó

1989).

6 Susana Lemozy and Daniel Martín Lucatti, “Proyecto Fénix, Problemas de investig

de futuro,” IV Parte, Cuadernos académicos de la Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Buenos 

2000.
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were adapted and employed by many in the hemisphere. At the sa

some countries adopted the Soviet intelligence template, itself of Euro

gin. Because of these shared forms, we can expect that the strategic int

phenomenon and how it is practiced create a context that allows a c

tive assessment of the intelligence systems in all countries of the hem

Th e possibility of a fuller, including theoretical, development of the c

strategic intelligence is highlighted by two observers who have thus 

overlooked by students of intelligence.8 As a result of its theoretical un

opment and therefore a lack of eff ective application, the intelligence se

the United States, at least, are oft en not successful at combining politic

edge with value-added, processed information that we know as intellig

Logically, strategic intelligence can only fi nd a place and opp

for development among those peoples who have well-defi ned national 

and a broad societal consensus—a national culture—so that they ca

7 In his well-known Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ

University Press, 1949), and in Spanish, Inteligencia estratégica para la política mun

cana (Buenos Aires: Círculo Militar, 1951), Sherman Kent offers the paradigm of 

academic, strategic intelligence specialists, divorced from the political world and f

on issues internal to their country, but instead exclusively oriented toward forei

Washington Platt, as well, in his Strategic Intelligence Production (New York: Frederi

ger, 1957), and in Spanish Producción de inteligencia estratégica (Buenos Aires: Ed

hart y Cia., 1983), presents his model of military intelligence at the strategic level. B

expound a vision of strategic intelligence that excludes or suppresses the contribu

lomats to the formal process of strategic intelligence. We may deduce from this, an

evidence presented in the essays in this book, that the definition of strategic intelli

the corps of personnel who carry out its process in most countries of the region, 

these paradigms.

8 One of these is Gregory D. Foster, who in “A Conceptual Foundation for a Theo

egy,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1990), pp. 43-48, recognizes that a concept 

does not exist separately from a theory of the future (a desired future). This perspec

as equivalent the concepts of national strategy and strategic intelligence, the latte

does not make sense unless it is oriented toward a desired, malleable future, ne

product of the society’s values. The other is Willmoore Kendall, in “The Function 

gence,” World Politics 1, no. 4 (July 1949), pp. 542-552. In this work, which is nothin

a critical review of Kent’s book, Kendall offered a different paradigm—a paradigm th

adopted by the intelligence services of the United States. He recommended that 

analysts and advisors take into explicit account the internal (political) context of th

means of understanding strategic challenges and communicating them directly to 

decision-makers (elected officials) at the national level (pp. 548-550). He also note

the lack of deep and theoretical thinking by Kent, and critically, that the adjective 

when used in association with “intelligence” excludes the larger and more apt conce

ligence for foreign policy” (p. 548). The United States, and its intelligence services, in 

on the civilian side, have followed the Kent paradigm, and therefore have not come 

the problem of internal, strategic challenges either in isolation or in relation 

challenges.

9 See Russell G. Swenson, “Visión Política de la Inteligencia Estratégica para lo

Nacionales de Las Américas,” Aquimindia (magazine of the Colombian Administrat

ment of Security—DAS) No. 3 (2008), 27-33.
6 |

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accords power to political rivals with their own approach to governance. 

ther, strategic intelligence will fl ourish only where long-term thinking prev

and the existence of intelligence organizations is legitimized as an anticipa

response to the need for such thinking.

A clear example of this claim can be seen in the Cuban experience

articulated by a well-placed and well-informed Cuban commentator, no

resident of the U.S., but for many years an offi cial with that island’s intellig

services, “Fidelismo” off ers the personifi cation of a “national project” that j

fi es the existence of the intelligence services, particularly of the Ministry o

Interior (MININT).10 Th is intelligence organization, a creation of Fidel 

tro and the most respected institution on the island, experiences strong o

sight, applied down to the level of individual analysts, by the national le

himself.11

Th e Cuban intelligence system exhibits some other traits distinct f

those of other “Western,” national services in the hemisphere. Accordin

Menier, Cuban agents, with the conscience and manner of a priest, bring en

siasm to their fi eld contacts, whereas fi eld operatives in other systems, suc

that of the U.S., consider their role necessary, but somewhat distasteful.1

also asserts that MININT professionals accomplish their duties with great 

ciency, in contrast to those in other, less successful services. What is not

about this comparative glimpse into the Cuban intelligence system is th

allows outsiders to better understand the value as well as the defi ciencies o

intelligence bureaucracy, as presented in this book.

Illustrative examples of variables associated with the variety 

of national intelligence institutions, as developed by the autho

and which create the theoretical context for the democratizatio

of national intelligence

1. Evolution of the phenomenon of national intelligence: Bre

of institutional space for the reform of the intelligence enterp

and redirection of its mission; existence, coverage and infl u

of public literature on intelligence in the social sciences

depth coverage of intelligence by the press; substantive, pu

10 Juan Antonio Rodríguez Menier, Cuba por Dentro [Inside Cuba] (Miami: Ediciones U

sal, 1994).

11 Ibid., pp. 31-33. For a contrasting view of the United States, for example, see J

Heilbrunn, “A Lack of Intelligence,” New York Times Sunday Book Review, 13 April 2008.

12 Ibid., p. 149.
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

legislative or executive branch; internal or external ori

or both; degree of tolerance of a loss of privacy be

intelligence activity; i.e., loss of some liberty.

2. Existence of an intelligence culture: How the int

enterprise is seen within the government and by th

society—at least by those who are politically aware; 

of attempts to communicate the value of intelligence

intelligence services and by their public spokespersons

of freedom of action, with or without offi cial oversight

analytic and operational branches of intelligence are c

or kept separate; propensity to sustain (institutionalize) 

mission of intelligence as part of national, strategic p

education of civilians on the military intelligence c

facilitate communication between government int

personnel and the leading intelligence consumers and 

decision-makers; whether an identifi able culture exist

intelligence personnel, even if not at a national level.

3. Approach to the phenomenon of globalization: Gov

intelligence institutions adopt a proactive stance, 

emphasis on innovative application of capabilities to 

segment of society; or government intelligence fun

a more traditional manner, with an emphasis on id

targets and addressing them operationally; degree of 

to international intelligence liaison; freedom of int

leadership or of fi eld operators to form and maintain inter

counterpart relationships. Degree of positive interaction 

national intelligence services and police at various lev

between intelligence and diplomatic offi cials; tend

use covert action to promote the development of de

institutions in societies of the region.

Hypothetical Relationships among Cultural Factors, on th

to a Th eory of Intelligence Democratization

Th e assertions presented here in three categories take into acc

interrelationships of the variables just identifi ed, and are the fabric for 

of national intelligence in a globalized world.

1. Origins and evolution of national intelligence: Certain continui

in national intelligence institutions. Th ese continuities correspond 

evolutionary categories or streams.
8 |

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based on military intelligence precedents; that is, they are strongly hierarch

and assign priority to military-style challenges. What does surprise is th

some cases the national intelligence system leaves the military model beh

From the studies included in this book, we can see that Guatemala, Uru

and Ecuador are among those countries that have been slow to distance th

selves from this model. Among those that can be seen as having put some 

tance between national intelligence institutions and the military mode

intelligence are Chile, Mexico, Argentina and perhaps Colombia. As the P

vian reviewer observes, in commenting on the work of the Argentinian Sill

accountability for successes and failures of intelligence can be attributed to c

ians as well as the military, and therefore we may consider that the execu

of the intelligence function is fully a refl ection at large of the country’s s

rity establishment. Argentina since 2001 has had in play a legislative act 

requires the preparation of civilian professionals in strategic intelligence, in 

National Intelligence School.

In the case of Guatemala, as indicated by Capo and Ovalle, a new 

in 2008 establishing the framework for a national security system also requ

the institutionalization of professional development among civilian intellig

personnel (Ch. 4, Art. 17). Th is abrupt change away from a military-orie

intelligence model shows that a country can move quickly from one evolut

ary category to another. Nonetheless, in countries where the military m

remains persistent, we cannot say that national intelligence institutions th

selves are strong.

In contrast, we can distinguish a second evolutionary path for nati

intelligence systems, where intelligence institutions are very strong; that is, p

licly accepted and enduring, notwithstanding indications that their operat

may not be so eff ective. Th ese operate in countries that have engaged in war

the international scene or in internal confl icts lasting more than 10 years: 

zil, Colombia and the United States. Intelligence systems can endure becau

the eff ort required, for example, to exercise control over an extensive nati

territory. In parallel fashion, they may endure because of a prolonged milit

dominated government, as these normally pay close attention to future thr

In Colombia, we see the development of a civil institution, the Administr

Department of Security (DAS) which, as in Brazil, displays an institution

ing tendency.13 In the Brazilian case, according to the author Moraes, mil

infl uence persists in the realm of national intelligence, being reinforced by 

13 Steven C. Boraz, “Intelligence Reform in Colombia: Transparency and Effectiv

against Internal Threats,” Strategic Insights 6, no. 3 (May 2007). http://www.ccc.nps.navy

si/2007/May/borazMay07.asp.
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the intelligence capabilities of the national police, which equal or su

resources and capabilities of the military.14 In the United States, the int

system oriented toward internal targets is fl ourishing, especially in the 

the new Department of Homeland Security, where, as anticipated by 

another essay, a culture of threat anticipation reigns, as offi cially ackno

by the White House.15 Carrying out an internally focused intelligence 

depends on the effi ciency of the new centers at the state level in the U.S

to fuse preventive information, as well as on the persistence of informa

lection by national agencies, especially those that specialize in the inte

of communications.16

A third category includes those countries traditionally not 

and without military governments, such as Canada and Costa Rica. As 

by Lefebvre in the Canadian case, and reinforced by Chaves, who wri

his Central American country, intelligence institutions in these places 

to have a cultural predilection toward strategic assessment because th

formative military legacy. Nevertheless, both authors suggest that th

exist a “circumscribed” intelligence culture among practicing prof

Mexico may also be placed in this category, according to the analysi

cazar. Depending on the strength of each country’s respective chang

intelligence systems may pass from any one of these categories into 

theoretical division, where greater public involvement, or a democrati

intelligence institutions can generate a national intelligence culture.

2. Change agents leading to a national intelligence culture: Severa

address the bureaucratic structure of intelligence in their country 

public oversight required for accomplishing what is beginning to g

recognition—eff ective democratization of intelligence. From the senio

of intelligence organizations, especially because of a high turnover rat

little evidence of the development of a corporate culture, as noted by 

Serrano y Gomez de la Torre Rotta. Th e development of an intelligenc

would depend rather on an expansion of the otherwise circumscribe

14 Marco Cepik y Priscila Antunes, “Brazil’s New Intelligence System: An I

Assessment,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 3 (

365-367.

15 President George Bush, The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Secur

ber 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/2007/index.html, S

“Culture of Preparedness.” Accessed 10 February 2008.

16 Department of Homeland Security, “State and Local Fusion Centers,” http:/

gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm and James Risen and Eric Lichtb

Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts,” New York Times, 16 December 2005. h

nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html.
10 |

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abet this expansion, we can include commercial books and professional jour

that are written and produced by intelligence professionals themselves, 

as the publication process, and even if the author is retired from governm

service, is subject to security oversight.17

A similar, literature-based change agent, likewise supporting 

democratization of intelligence, arises from autobiographical material rel

to intelligence. Th is literature also forges a connection between the intellig

services and the general public, although somewhat less authentically than 

direct sources noted above.18 Th is literature, oft en innovative and commerc

successful, carries some social value as a means of mass communication on 

theme of national intelligence. At a further, academic, remove, we fi nd a s

of books that contribute to the objective of public knowledge of the governm

intelligence world.19 Finally, intelligence analysts and operatives are also en

ing the realm of popular culture. In 2007, a famous Brazilian actor and 

character in a telenovela played the role of an ABIN agent in the fi ght ag

narco-traffi cking.20 Th ese developments are underway aft er many years 

17 Among them, for Colombia, see autobiographies by Evelio Buitrago Salazar, Zar

otra cara de la violencia: Memorias de un suboficial del ejército de Colombia (Bogotá, 1965)

published as Zarpazo The Bandit: Memoirs of an Undercover Agent of the Colombian Army, 

M. Murray Lasley, ed. Russell W. Ramsey (The University of Alabama Press, 1977), and 

Emilio García Acosta, El Ave del Pantano [The Bird of the Marsh] (Bogotá, Editorial la Serp

Emplumada, 2007) (fictionalized account of the author’s experiences as an agent of 

With respect to the United States, An Opaque War, by Frederick Harrison (self-published, 2

addresses the seam between police intelligence and national security intelligence, and i

nates the decisive moments when front-line supervisors have to choose between continu

withhold information from counterparts on the other side of the divide, or to undertake pr

tive actions, a choice that usually is an opportunity and responsibility of the intelligenc

vices themselves.

18 Examples of this type of literature include: Sergio Aguayo Quezada, La charola: Un

toria de los servicios de inteligencia en México [The Badge: A History of the Intelligence Se

of Mexico] (México: Grijalbo, 2001); Jorge Boimvaser, Los sospechosos de siempre: Histor

espionaje en la Argentina [The Usual Suspects: The History of Espionage in Argentina] (Bu

Aires: Planeta, 2001); Lucas Figueiredo, Ministério do silêncio: a historia do serviço secreto b

eiro de Washington Luis a Lula, 1927-2005 (Rio de Janeiro y São Paulo: Editora Record, 2

From the United States, and of interest to the hemisphere, see Jefferson Morley, Our M

Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA (University Press of Kansas, 2008).

19 Some that stand out are Diego Navarro Bonilla and Miguel Ángel Esteban Navarro

rorismo global: Gestión de información y servicios de inteligencia (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés Edi

2007); Marco Cepik, Espionagem e democracia [Intelligence and Democracy] (Rio de Ja

Editora FGV, 2003); Priscila Carlos Brandão Antunes, SNI y ABIN: Uma lectura da actuaçã

serviços secretos brasileiros ao longo de século XX (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2002).

20 According to an anonymous source in ABIN, upon initiating his role in the movie 

rança nacional [National Security] (2007), the actor Thiago Lacerda visited the agency 

spoke with agents to learn about the context in which agents work, the better to under

how to interpret the role.
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and continued use of the term araponagem in Brazil.

What do these vignettes of an intelligence professional’s life, a

institutions that give continuity to a culture of intelligence, really me

though the popular image of intelligence institutions and its operat

have been negative, for reasons detailed by Figueiredo22 in the case of 

where intelligence organizations considered certain citizens offi cial 

largely to protect governing offi cials from popular retribution—the s

now shift ed noticeably. A major reason is that intelligence instituti

depend on a steady infl ow of agents and analysts. Th e principal messag

fessionally revealing literature like that mentioned here is positive and 

ing, and the progenitor of more open studies like the present work. Suc

are multiplying in countries that maintain national intelligence scho

cially ones that focus on education of civilians, as in Argentina, Brazil

Chile, Colombia and now Peru and the United States, and perhaps ab

developed in Guatemala.

Additionally, today military intelligence is subject to anoth

change agent in view of the robust participation of many countries of t

sphere in peacekeeping operations, either under multilateral auspices 

those of the United Nations. Th is emerging phenomenon promotes 

intelligence sensibility, in this case among the military, which can speed 

lution toward democratization of this governmental function. We m

that within this international environment there are few doubts about 

pose of intelligence, given that it enjoys a clear operational and strat

pose in this environment external to the great majority of countries.23

3. National cultures sorted by the nature of their interaction with the g

world: We can distinguish three types of society in the hemisphere, a

to their democratic climate or environment that might facil

development of an intelligence culture at the national or strategic l

function of the key phenomenon of the era—globalization. For the p

21 The araponga, being a bird with a strident voice, was the name of a Brazilian 

in 1991 that mocked SNI (National Intelligence Service) agents and treated them 

spect. The title of the program was a comment on SNI and its operatives, as this b

lously loud voice was the precise opposite of the silence expected of professional i

operatives. Earlier, in the United States, a somewhat similar message came with th

television show Get Smart, as it also made fun of intelligence operatives.

22 Figueiredo, p. 16.

23 See Ben de Jong, Wies Platje and Robert David Steele, eds., Peacekeeping In

Emerging Concepts for the Future (Oakton, Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003)

ardo Aldunate Herman, Misión en Haití: Con la mochila cargada de esperanzas [Missi

With a Knapsack Full of Hope] (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2007)
12 |

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intelligence activities, it is no longer possible to separate the internal f

the international environment. Naturally, this is because of the transnati

nature of recognizable threats.

As a fi rst type, we can single out those societies primarily orie

toward a self-centered realism and infused with a strong pragmatic str

Intelligence institutions in such societies exhibit, as a cultural trait, behav

that place great value on present-day priorities, which in the case of the Un

States translates to heavy dependence on technical means of intelligence co

tion, as explained here by Miller.24 In another society, the government of C

Rica, according to Chaves, does not possess a strategic intelligence institu

of any description. Th erefore, by defi nition, any potential strategic threat w

remain unrecognized. For countries such as Costa Rica, which lack a per

tion of external threats, and lack the institutions that could address such thr

even their pragmatism would not ensure fruitful international exchange

intelligence, nor even an exchange of actionable information with such a

cies as INTERPOL, which would indicate a pragmatic accommodation 

globalization.

Th is mode of thinking and behavior corresponds, at the collective l

with policies that give priority to short-term results. Th ese societies oft en re

a certain blindness to the probable global consequences of their actions 

the United States, we have the example of the invasion of Iraq).25 On occa

the lack of a future perspective can lead to a repetition of errors, which in 

can create a vicious cycle whereby a discussion of past errors and a search 

those historically culpable can further obscure new, global opportunitie

the medium and long term. We may also infer that some countries have pa

through this stage en route to a more refi ned intelligence culture. For exam

in the Central American region, we now see a contrasting situation betw

24 The centrality of pragmatism in the culture of the United States is the abiding them

the book by political scientist John W. Kingdon, America the Unusual (Boston: St. Ma

1999). See especially chapter 5.

25 Although the U.S. Intelligence Community produces its well-known National I

gence Estimates, it is also well-known that political leaders can ignore estimates that co

dict their own preferences. A concrete example comes from the U.S. Intelligence Comm

which did produce two estimates that foresaw in detail the results of the invasion of 

These estimates were clearly politicized, some months before the invasion, as documen

the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Prewar Intelligence Assessments 

Postwar Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 110th Cong. 1st Sess., 25 May 2007), ava

(edited version) en http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf. The Executive B

either rejected or ignored the estimates, as recounted by a participant, Paul Pillar, in “I

track: Sometimes the CIA is right,” The National Interest Online, 6 June 2007, at http://

nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14564 and by journalist David Ignatius, “When th

Got It Right,” Washington Post, 23 September 2007, B7. http://www.washingtonpost.com

dyn/content/article/2007/09/21/AR2007092101941.html.
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that establishes the institutional basis for national decisions through 

national intelligence system.26 Costa Rica still does not.

As a second type of society, we can suggest that those fi rmly g

by a socio-economic foundational myth, and that can imagine or se

challenges to that foundation, including those associated with the stro

of globalization, and with values widely shared through the society, 

show a tendency to develop strategic security plans, or strategic pla

even if not precisely “strategic intelligence.”28 As Sancho Hirane not

study of Chile, we need to diff erentiate strategic planning from strate

ligence, since planning at the national level deals with actions to be 

achieve specifi c objectives, whereas strategic intelligence is oriented to

process of handling information and its interpretation with the aim 

(oft en emergency) decision making by the highest (elected) offi cials.

With their promising mixture of pragmatism and patriotic 

the intelligence culture of this second group of societies can be associ

globalization in some interesting ways. A strong tendency to observe 

tional values at any cost can bring these societies at times to achiev

on the international stage through the eff ective use of intelligence ins

For example, as Balcazar observes, the evolution of government int

services in Mexico, supported by a recognized intelligence culture, h

the reinstatement of intelligence professionals, many of whom were ea

unjustifi ably let go from their posts. Th is positive development leads 

to comment that the maturity of experienced intelligence personnel l

back in place in Mexico brings an opportunity for the fruitful develo

“more direct channels for the deepening of cooperation among cou

foreign agencies as they together confront transnational threats.” Th 

well-grounded societies, there is institutional space for the parallel dev

of globalization of the intelligence function.

26 Congreso de la República de Guatemala, Decreto Número 18-2008, publish

de CentroAmérica, 15 April 2008, no. 12, Vol. 284. http://www.congreso.gob.gt

asp?year=2008.

27 Periodically, governments of South and Central America publish “White B

are strategic planning documents for defense and national security. In the Brazilia

noted by Sancho Hirane, the Office of the President published the “Projeto Brasi

50 Temas Estratégicos” [Project Brazil: 50 Strategies in Three Stages] (Brasil: Pres

Republica, Núcleo de Assuntos Estratégicos, 2006). Ver en http://www.resdal.o

documentos/main-brasil-estrategia-def-06.html.

28 In his essay, the Argentine author Auel suggests that as a contributor to stra

ning, strategic intelligence needs to be institutionalized. In his view, this approach w

lish and maintain a degree of “cultural empathy” toward the true foundational ro

country, which may otherwise be lost.
14 |

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make a conscious strategic decision when they choose to participate with m

tary forces in multilateral peace operations, under the fl ag of the United Nat

or in rescue missions following natural disasters, under a regional security o

nization like the Organization of American States. Th ere exists no place in 

international scene better than these for a country to burnish its reputatio

a participant in the global context. Further, intelligence services should 

an important part in these activities, as noted by several of the authors w

work appears in the book Peacekeeping Intelligence,29 and which addresse

role of intelligence in peace operations. At the strategic/political level, as 

gested by an Israeli author, intelligence services that participate in peace op

tions can become a tool for the conduct of international relations, by virtu

their capacity to conduct negotiations behind the scenes toward the adva

ment of political possibilities for the maintenance of peace, backed as they 

by deployed forces.30 Th is point is reinforced by the comment of an Ar

tine observer who describes how participants in peace operations play a 

in diplomacy, even as formally accredited diplomats are now being withdr

from deployment.31

Furthermore, from the perspective of a Chilean Army general who 

the peacekeeping force (MINUSTAH) in Haiti, there is a great opportuni

multilateral missions for the development and application of skills by in

gence personnel, especially in the analysis area.32 In this environment, in

gence personnel can develop their own combination of pragmatic and idea

capabilities, and given that many of these individuals, from all participa

countries, continue on in the intelligence career fi eld, as civilian analys

operatives in the national intelligence services, the intelligence culture in 

respective countries will also grow.

In terms of their intelligence culture, this second type of society o

pies an intermediate position between those with a strong streak of prag

tism, on one hand, and those with a more utopian bent.

29 Ben deJong, Wies Platje, y Robert David Steele, Peacekeeping Intelligence, pp. 15, 

30 Shlomo Shpiro, in Peacekeeping Intelligence, p. 112.

31 See Albino Gómez, “Debilidad de la actual diplomacia”, Noticias, No. 1622 de Perfil

25 enero del 2008. http://www.revista-noticias.com.ar/comun/nota.php?art=1076&ed=1622

32 Eduardo Aldunate Herman, pp. 254-268. Included among countries of the hemis

with military personnel deployed to Haiti were Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Perú, Urugua

Bolivia.
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

tion, gives full play to ideological elements in the development of an int

culture, without the moderation aff orded by a complement of pragm

“democratization.” Th ese are the societies where “revanchist” force

regain or justify the reinstatement of their own exclusive prioritie

in intelligence terms, includes the use of intelligence services to “spy

country’s own citizens and residents. Several countries in the hemisph

experienced, as a result of revanchism, periodic, wholesale dismissal o

as well as operatives, among them the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, Cuba

and Peru. Th ese episodes engender a public disrespect for intelligence 

which is diffi cult to overcome, because intelligence services typicall

enjoy a deep reservoir of support, or even strong spokespersons, de

which correspond with a weak national intelligence culture. We ma

that this erroneous, anti-democratic, utopian approach can bring 

episodes of revanchism, with undoubted costs globally, where the p

of the country is of unending, abrupt changes in policy. Contrary to 

tions, Cuba, as a supposed bastion of utopianism, in fact has highly p

national intelligence services, according to a separate study by Menier

island, MININT personnel can count on more than token pragmatism 

interaction with the “maximum leader” if there exists confl ict between 

ing information advantages and following the path of ideological purit

we see that a society with a healthy dose of pragmatism can escape th

utopian idealism, even in the intelligence arena, in the face of global re

Th e important thing to recognize about these three categor

country’s approach to globalization, and the associated intelligence cu

that countries can and do move from one category to another over time

ing on the tendencies of the political regime. Th erefore, it remains imp

keep a close eye on change agents, as they express and enforce norm

democratic ideas.

33 Menier, Cuba por Dentro, p. 57.
16 |

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Cyclic Model of National Intelligence Democratization Process. 

Source: The editors, modified from concepts presented in Sancho Hirane, in the Span

Portuguese volume.

As indicated in the graphic model of this rudimentary, descriptive 

ory, among the three apexes of the triangle—Proclivities, Culture and Dem

ratization—only the latter is the locus of continuous, infl uential change, 

the ideas of Recovery and Feedback energizing the entire cycle from outsid

intelligence enterprise itself. As indicated graphically, the problem of inte

surveillance, along with revanchism, represent overlapping foci of democ

zation. Th e cyclical nature of the process that mediates between the intellig

enterprise and popular democracy is emphasized by the concepts associ

with each apex of the triangle: Intelligence Culture exists as an Outcome 

particular combination of Sources, Methods and Organizations. At the s

time, that culture off ers the Means for the public to interpret how the nati

intelligence system operates as it seeks democratic adjustments in the syste

Implications of the Proposed Th eory of National Intelligence 

Democratization

1. Th e theory can show us how not to impede the positive evolu

of national intelligence.

Th e experience of several countries signals the importance of av

ing the problem of “starting from zero” when a large number of intellig

personnel, analysts or operators are summarily dismissed from employm

Especially when a service is not very large, it is clearly important to keep 

Intelligence Culture

Democratization

Sources, Methods, Organizations Means and Outcome

Internal 

Surveillance & 

Revanchism

Recovery, Feedback

Pragmatism

Internationalism

Idealism

National Proclivities

Origins and Evolution

Change Agents

Typology
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

tions. Th rough this employment strategy, sources can be maintained a

methods of analysis, collection and fi eld tradecraft can be preserved. Th 

tution most suited to maintain a high level of professionalization in 

cumstances is a national intelligence school, whether civilian or militar

a school is closed, positive evolution ends.

Looking toward the future, and applying this normative th

Spanish example can be emulated. According to the essay by Velasco 

this book, that national intelligence system, complete with democra

lic participation, exemplifi es an advanced expression of intelligence cu

least, we can consider that this European state, mother country and n

state to many of the Western Hemisphere’s polities, with common lang

off ers a positive model for the continuous development of national int

systems.

2. Th e theory helps us understand how intelligence culture 

perceived threats to national existence.

As anticipated by the theory of democratization of the int

function developed here, in a world of existential threats that have spr

ally, national intelligence has been transformed from the military 

preparation for defensive wars into a “public” intelligence that require

nent vigilance, especially given the lack of time available under many 

stances for strategic planning and the need for anticipatory decision 

by civilian, public offi cials.35 Among the authors who develop this 

the present work is Sancho Hirane, who writes of intelligence as an in

democratic, “public service.” Under this framework, the purpose of gov

intelligence services is to ensure the existence of a pluralistic, natio

infrastructure, rather than of a particular regime or political party cu

power. Reyes-Alonso brings us to understand, at the same time, and in 

to the ineffi ciencies of a system oriented to public service, the great e

and eff ectiveness of intelligence systems expressly oriented toward the 

of a highly personalist arrangement such as the “fi delista” regime of C

phenomenon at play in both cases can be labeled “intelligence for pe

given the continuous need to take action against daily challenges.

34 Russell G. Swenson, “¿Qué puede ser una Escuela Nacional de la Inteligencia

National Intelligence School Can Be) AAinteligencia, 1, no. 3 (Marzo 2008), pp. 54-5

35 The principal voice arguing for greater democratization of intelligence in the 

ert Steele, continues to develop the theme of “public intelligence” in The New Cra

gence: Personal, Public and Political (Oakton, Virginia: OSS International Press, 

Collective Intelligence: Creating a Prosperous world at Peace (Oakton, Virginia: Earth 

Network, 2008).
18 |

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nent vigilance is rooted in the Cold War of the 20 century, as expresse

this passage:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose 

avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and 

at whatever cost. Th ere are no rules in such a game.... If the 

United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts 

of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop eff ective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn 

to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, 

more sophisticated and more eff ective methods than those 

used against us. It may become necessary that the American 

people be made acquainted with, understand and support this 

fundamentally repugnant philosophy.36

Of course, not all senior offi cials agreed with this assessment.37 N

theless, this call for public buy-in for more robust intelligence actions sign

decisive change in the U.S. national intelligence culture, especially on the in

nal or domestic front, a change subsequently reinforced by a renewed focu

intelligence for internal security in reaction to the events of 11 September 2

In another part of the Hemisphere, with respect to democratiza

of national intelligence, we fi nd in Chile an interesting example of a pu

exchange between alleged internal surveillance by intelligence services 

revanchist opponents.38 Th e article alleges surveillance of environmental, n

government organizations by the Chilean national intelligence system. I

allegation is accurate, from an optimistic point of view, such surveillance w

36 James H. Doolittle, “The Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intellig

Agency, September 30, 1954,” 40, quoted in Richard A. Best, Jr. and Herbert Andrew B

ling, Appendix C, CRS Report: Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization 1949-1996 (A R

Prepared for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives

presented in IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Comm

on Intelligence Staff Study, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, 28 F

ary 1996. http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21018.html.

37 Two members of a covert actions oversight commission put in place by Pres

Eisenhower remained opposed to this change because of continuing absence of strong 

sight. See Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1

pp. 445-448.

38 “ANI recluta experto para monitorear conflictos y a ONG ambientalistas” (Ch

National Intelligence Employs Expert to Monitor Conflicts and Environmentalist NGO

Tercera (Santiago), 7 December 2007, p. 26. This allegation, because it was neither adm

nor discussed more thoroughly by accusers, can be characterized as only potentially “r

chist.” In the case of Brazil, as noted in the essay by Moraes, today former revanc

receive pensions to repay earlier, inappropriate surveillance of their actions by national 

ligence elements.
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country, in a more effi cient fashion than through the examination o

hand or “processed” information about the social environment. Of no

communication channels remain open among the various participants 

like this, without restrictions, we see democratization of national int

in action.

From Brazil, another example highlights the multi-faceted res

ity to address ongoing democratization of national intelligence. In ope

sion, an advisor on intelligence aff airs to the Brazilian Congress, Joani

Goncalves (also a contributing author to the present book), counsels: 

ering that the public perception of intelligence is linked to oppressi

cal regimes...the legitimacy of the Brazilian National Intelligence Se

emerge through actions that promote a culture of intelligence not on

government organizations, but also in the private sector, where there 

to spot threats, such as industrial espionage, and in the end, to have i

system to address those threats.”39

Th e theory allows us to address a presumed rule: that the m

mented societies harbor national intelligence services oriented toward 

targets, whereas the intelligence services of countries that are more p

open tend to focus outside the homeland. As shown by several autho

book, including those from the U.S., military as well as civilian int

operatives at times focus internally. A corollary of the rule would be 

level of democratization of national intelligence would be diminish

internal surveillance is strongest. But do these presumed rules hold 

closer examination?

We can begin with a question: How could we address the co

intelligence democratization in the context of threat perception? W

contrast the national intelligence systems of two countries in the he

thought to represent opposite extremes: Cuba and the United States. 

civilian perspective, we would right away realize that the two intellig

tures do not display the simple and clear distinctions we would ex

example, in the United States, cultural acceptance of an intelligence e

ally associated with foreign, antagonistic states, aft er 11 September 

extended to an approval of internal surveillance by national intelligen

nizations, notwithstanding the revanchist complaints of principal c

39 Presidencia da Republica, Gabinete de Seguranca Institucional, III Encontro d

Desafios para a atividadede inteligencia no seculo XXI (Intelligence Challenges of the 

tury), Brasilia, 2004, pp. 143-144. Italics in the passage were added by the editors
20 |

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is based on the philosophy embodied in the Presidents Homeland Secu

Strategy, where the Bush Administration announced its intention to pu

place a “culture of preparedness,” as noted earlier. Naturally, this philoso

is under continuous debate in the larger society, as expected by the theor

forth here.

On the other hand, in Cuba, and in Venezuela, where the Cu

approach remains a desired option by President Chavez, the democratic e

consists of widespread, systematic observation and reporting on the beha

of neighbors and family members whose actions or plans may be seen as 

Presidential.41 If there exists a real distinction between the two cases, it w

be that in Cuba the intelligence focus remains on protecting the nation, w

under “fi delismo” is the same thing as the political regime. For the United St

the legitimacy of the internal information net rests on the sense that the 

is being protected, but not necessarily the political regime.42 Despite incre

internal surveillance by intelligence services, rather than being diminishe

the U.S., a powerful impetus toward increased democratization of intellig

generates an atmosphere that allows repeated leaks of intelligence repor

and subsequent public commentary on the ultimate strategic intelligence d

ments, the renowned National Intelligence Estimates.

For the most part, the national intelligence services in countries ac

the hemisphere are oriented primarily toward the internal environment. 

continued march of globalization may become a change agent in this ar

with a reorientation toward a greater outward focus corresponding to the de

40 For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published The Surveil

Industrial Complex: How the American Government Is Conscripting Businesses and Individuals 

Construction of a Surveillance Society (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesP

survillance_report.pdf. The fears expressed by the ACLU are associated with a Federal Bure

Investigation program called InfraGard, aimed at collaborating on infrastructure prote

(http://www.infragard.net/) with the National Applications Office of the Departme

Homeland Security, which manages the coordination of internal surveillance in the U.S

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1187188414685.shtm. At the same time, the iss

private sector surveillance by Internet Service Providers, among others, is also beginn

surface. See Paul Ohm, “The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance,” 30 August 2

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1261344.

41 Menier, op. cit., p. 51. This author asserts that “The agents in Cuba who produc

bulk of operational intelligence information used by the different branches of the Mi

(MININT) number about 500,000 individuals. The so-called “frozen” sources—those w

services can be accessed when necessary—approach three million (in a country of eleve

lion residents).

42 Evidence is presented that numerous youths and even famous partisans of leftist 

nizations in the United States participated knowingly and willingly as government informa

“front organizations” of the CIA for many years during the Cold War, in Hugo Wilford, The M

Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 

actions were self-justified by patriotic concerns that transcended partisan political alignm
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interests from abroad. A lesson emerges here for national intelligence 

and their respective governments, whether open or regimented: It is u

overlook the primarily internal orientation of counterpart intelligence 

nor to underestimate the importance of this internal orientation as a 

insight into perceived threats. Th us, we see still another rationale for 

tional cooperation among intelligence services: to gain further under

of the foreign internal environment, and of the degree of sincerity wi

that environment is represented by the respective intelligence service

the foreign countries of interest. Th e predominantly internal orientatio

us to understand with some perspective the observation about natio

ligence being a mirror of national culture, as presented in the Econom

of 2005 (see footnote 1 above).

To the extent that internally focused intelligence is carried out 

forces rather than intelligence services, and concentrated on the pro

of past events rather than the prevention of future threats, there will r

important, internal role for national intelligence of a political/militar

On that note, Farson suggests that we should engage in close study 

involving internal surveillance that cross the usual divide between p

national security intelligence. He recommends in particular studying 

standing, collaborative engagement by British police and national int

forces in Northern Ireland.43

3. Th e theory permits a balanced consideration of some p

questions.

Until now, some questions about personal and national secu

been considered too diffi cult to contemplate, let alone resolve, throug

mal intelligence infrastructure. For example:

1) Do national leaders and intelligence offi cials, who bear resp

for the survival of the society, need an “enemy” or an “other” on which 

their eff orts? Or could a strong and broad culture of intelligence reinforce 

native orientation toward the recognition and promotion of a society’s ce

ues through a more positive concept, such as identifying and reducing ob

the universal observation of human rights?

Th e accomplishment of this vision would not imply the end 

destine or even covert operations, but that their objective (at a gene

be known and discussed in the public domain as suggested by the m

43 Farson, op. cit., p. 80.
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of human rights issues would be of the greatest importance in this discus

to avoid the situation in recent Cuban history, where, according to Me

MININT personnel focused effi ciently on internal enemies whose cases 

resolved not by a judicial system, but personally by Fidel.44 At the same t

much of the world considers indefensible the U.S. detention over a prolon

period without due legal process, on another part of the Cuban island, o

“enemy combatants” at Guantanamo Bay.45 Th ese detentions are defended 

way of obtaining intelligence data. In the end, it may be that we still are not 

to propose a positive response to these questions. At the least, they are quest

that demand consideration in a democratic context.

2) To establish an effi cient and legitimate intelligence system, do we 

transparent accountability of intelligence institutions as well as for key individ

within these institutions?

As related by Menier, accountability to an ultimate decision maker 

Fidel confers a robust effi ciency to the work of personnel at all levels o

Interior Ministry in Cuba. He adds that in his experience, this accountab

required that Fidel be told unvarnished “truths,” whether it was good or 

with respect to his policies, with no untoward repercussions on the care

the messenger.46 In other societies, accountability among intelligence perso

has been generally less direct and less robust, with the eff ect of allowing m

liberty to professionals as they carry out their duties.47 Th e evolution of i

ligence systems and the concomitant development of democratization, acc

ing to the model presented here, will allow intelligence personnel to balanc

liberty of individual initiative in taking on strategic topics that are beyond 

immediate interests of the society’s political leaders, and the benefi ts of a c

invited relationship with leaders that might not allow for errors or judgm

in presenting “the unvarnished truth.” Clearly, direct, long-term accountab

of intelligence institutions and their key offi cials is not common, yet witho

there is too easy disregard of strategic intelligence systems by elected offi c

44 Menier, Cuba por dentro, pp. 46-48, 57-58. In a well-known instance—the pur

1989-90 – he witnessed the jailing of the Minister of the Interior José Abrantes, and the 

squad death of General Ochoa. According to Menier, both these individuals recognize

unavoidable necessity of change in Cuban politics, that is, of Fidel’s policies.

45 See Andy Worthington, The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 759 Detainees in A

ica’s Illegal Prison (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

46 Menier, Cuba por dentro, p. 45.

47 See Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies: Establi

Intelligence Service Accountability (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), a normative 

of nine countries from around the world. Also see Loch K. Johnson, “The Contemporary 

dency: Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies: Intelligence Accountability in the United Sta

Presidential Studies Quarterly, 43, no. 4 (December 2004), pp. 828-837.
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and a societys sense of fairness to expectations and repercussions, can 

age a more serious application of accountability.

What Value Does a Th eory of Democratization of Nationa

Intelligence Deliver?

National organizations and systems of intelligence serve near

where to monitor, project and oft en to prevent or counteract sources 

whether internal or external. To the extent these organizations and 

operate from the shadows, a theory that tries to shed light on intellige

cesses depends heavily on the heretofore unpublished observations o

tioners. As noted in the Lefebvre essay, it can be diffi cult to create a 

intelligence culture when the form of addressing the intelligence env

(because of ideological factors rooted in strategic culture) largely over

the true substance that comes from a consideration of the realities of 

tional power relationships. Th e model that portrays the present, norma

ligence theory acts as a reminder of the parallelism and needed balanc

the three bases of democratization—the three foundations of democr

eties—the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Th e developme

theory of national intelligence lies precisely on this foundation. Th e 

role is recognized as a function of democratization itself, the legislative 

the self-organization and ethical actions of intelligence professionals 

organizations. A new perspective developed in this book, and highligh

descriptive theory, is the development of the concept that a country’s 

intelligence culture modulates the de facto legal or juridical perception 

ligence through the history of any given society.

Like any social science theory, that presented here off ers de

a review of variables associated with the intelligence function from a 

perspective, and a categorization of national intelligence institutions in 

context. Th e formulation explains how pertinent variables relate to one 

highlights the evidence of evolutionary development trends in nation

gence, and generates a model to facilitate a projection of how those tr

continue to evolve. As the future unfolds, the theory may remain ad

may not, depending on the infl uence of a growing interest in and com

to national intelligence. At the least, we can expect an evolution of 

intelligence services that will off er ideas suitable for scientifi c resear

ing perhaps to a more empirical theory of national intelligence. As s

by Farson, for example, causal relationships among the contents of int

databases, policy formation, and covert action remain to be explored a
24 |

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toricaldata, it may be that the present normative theory, to the degree th

focuses on the present and future, will motivate some individuals to under

democratic action with respect to their country’s intelligence services. Th e p

ent theory can lead them to understand, categorize and evaluate existing 

potential interrelationships among variables, which exist in an action space 

is both dependent on detail and always undergoing change.

Point of Departure

It is commonly noted, especially among experienced personnel, th

individual’s character reveals itself most clearly when the individual is in a 

ation of extreme danger, such as on the battlefi eld, and we may expect the s

to be true in the realm of strategic intelligence when the state and its leaders 

themselves in critical situations. Referring once again to the initial parag

of this essay, where independent voices from the humanities present the c

that intelligence services reveal the true nature of the larger society, we can 

that there exists a long-term, institutional or cultural interrelationship betw

the intelligence services and the states they serve. In the essays presented 

the strong tendency of authors, each acting independently, was to ground 

work in the national history of their country as they addressed the task at h

Th e intelligence function, whether viewed from the perspective of an ind

ual or a nation-state, being by defi nition the fi rst and last means of ensu

survival through its capacity to combat competing actors and other existe

challenges, can be understood through humanistic, literary formulations as 

as through the historical lens. We believe that the combination of human

and scientifi c viewpoints, the latter being presented in this book and repres

ing the long experience of nation-states, gives full support to the concept 

individual liberty, the nature of the intelligence function, and the participa

democracy enjoyed by many states of the region together promote a pos

evolutionary outlook across the hemisphere.

48 Farson, op. cit., p. 80.
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Beginning in 1989, Susana C. Lemozy worked as professor 

demic advisor at the Argentine Army Senior War College, then at t

Intelligence School. From 2000 to 2006, she taught and served as 

advisor for the Armed Forces Joint Intelligence Institute. She is now in 

the Applied Intelligence Division of the Institute’s Research Departme

author of several publications on intelligence and future-focused analy

ods for the defense establishment. She holds a degree in political scie

the Universidad del Salvador, Buenos Aires, where she has also worke

fessor. Email: lemozy@fi bertel.com.ar.

Russell G. Swenson served from 1988 as professor, and from 

Director of Applied Research at the National Defense Intelligence Co

also directed the NDIC Press. He is author and editor of numerous 

tions on intelligence process (http://www/ndic.edu/press/press.shtm). 

years, he worked as intelligence analyst and linguist in the U.S. Air F

as professor of Geography at Western Illinois University. He holds und

ate degrees from the University of Kansas (Geography, Spanish, Lati

ica Area Studies) and from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 

and Doctorate in Geography). Following his retirement in 2008, he c

international collaboration with offi cials and researchers in the fi eld of 

intelligence. Email: Rgswenson@gmail.com.

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INVITED COMMENTARY

Jorge Serrano Torres

Th is book addresses “National Culture and Strategic Intelli

the Americas,” and its view of the historical evolution and current sit

intelligence services of the region is without precedent. Th e work com

the 2004 book, Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas, edited by 

team. All the authors take on the question: How does the national cultu

countries in the Americas relate to the status, evolution, and practice of 

intelligence there?

If it is possible to accept that there is no authentic liberty with

rity, nor true security without liberty, then the development of a dyn

vigorous culture of security and intelligence ought to be inherent to 

societies, which Ulrich Beck has characterized as “societies at risk”49 

of the new and complex threats which they face in an interdependent 

stantly evolving world.

Given that national culture by defi nition infl uences the way 

each country confronts strategic problems of security, the present b

valuable contribution to disentangling the role of culture in the evolu

deterioration, and the interrelationship of the systems and services of 

intelligence, as well as its role in the production of strategic intellige

better still for presenting the diverse views of the distinguished autho

work is brought together in this text. Th ey accomplish the objective o

ing the central question of the book in an overall comparative mann

invites the reader to consider the theme more deeply.

As a result, we are able to see that nearly all the national int

services, to a greater or lesser degree, face a critical juncture: Th ey mu

to more adequately confront the new risks and threats of the 21st c

For this, they need to construct privileged channels of communicati

world of intelligence, in academic and scientifi c communities, amon

in security and, of course, to secure legitimacy, in the society in gener

49 Ulrich Beck, La Sociedad del riesgo: Hacia una nueva modernidad (Barcelon

Paidós, 1994).

50 David J. Kilcullen, “New Paradigms in the Conflicts of the 21st Century, eJ

Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ups/kilcullen.htm.
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culture of active coordination within the national scene as well as the inte

tional environment.

Th e concepts covered by the authors generate interest, showing 

eclectic, strategic points of view can highlight shared patterns and process

well as the particular phenomena that characterize the diff erent commun

of intelligence of the region. Taking into account the overall picture mak

possible to discern elements of intersection or perhaps symbiosis that em

between the concepts of “national culture” and “national intelligence.” Equ

however, and at the other extreme, it becomes apparent that the absence 

strongly rooted culture of security and intelligence remains a diffi cult obstac

the achievement of greater institutionalization, professionalism, and operati

effi ciency of the national intelligence services, which are indispensable for 

cessfully confronting the problems of national and regional strategic securit

Th e Peruvian Case: Consequences of an Absent Culture of 

Security and National Intelligence

Th e legend says that an eagle who was shot through by an arrow consid

the feathered dart and said: it is no other than our own plumage tha

now impaled us (Aeschylus, excerpts).

Nothing other than this excerpt could better refl ect the destruc

which the intelligence system of Peru has suff ered, at the hands of the Peruv

themselves, in recent decades. Th e essays by my Peruvian compatriots, An

Gómez de la Torre Rotta and Alberto Bolívar Ocampo, confi rm that the P

vian population has not yet succeeded in understanding that security, defe

and intelligence are public services destined to preserve the existence o

nation. Despite the fact that this understanding has not been fully assimil

there is in our society a general appreciation for the values of democracy 

respect for human rights.

Th e absence of a rooted culture of security and national intellig

persists, despite the eff orts of the National Accord in the year 2002,51 wh

with the participation of many of the institutions of organized society 

the State itself, 31 policies were created, the ninth of which was devote

national security. Further, a national security culture remained unreal

51 See Documentos del Acuerdo Nacional. Available online at http:/www.acuerdonac

gob.pe/DocumentosAN/documentos.htm.
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National Policy for Security and Defense.

Despite these positive developments, there remain in Peru ma

cles to achieving social cohesion, namely: strengthening pride in natio

tity; promoting active participation by the society in achieving the obj

existing national security and defense policies; guaranteeing the full o

capacity of the Armed Forces and the National Police, together with th

of national intelligence, all oriented to deterrence, defense of internal o

zen security, prevention of confl icts and threats, and the maintenance 

and regional security; fortifying civil-military relations; creating awa

and fostering an understanding of the basic concepts of security and 

defense in the educational system; and, fi nally, craft ing the institution

of the Armed Forces and police forces, as well as the secret services.

In this context, the Peruvian population has a very valuab

cultural potential which will permit constructing a vigorous culture 

rity and intelligence in the near future and which, together with an im

economy, will permit greater inclusiveness and social equality. Th e 

which permitted the military-strategic defeat of the terrorist groups 

Luminoso (SL) and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA

a decade of subversive advances53—was sustained as part of a “new so

tract” between the State, the forces of order, and the rural populati

ant groups and self-defense committees54 joined with the urban po

(citizens who assisted the forces of order with information and mo

52 See Libro Blanco de la Defensa Nacional del Perú, April 2005, with a prologu

ter of Defense Roberto Chiabra León, who notes that “on 9 September 200

Supreme Decree No. 009/SG, it was ordered that the White Book of National D

prepared by the Minister of Defense, in coordination with the Minister of Foreign 

with the participation of the institutions responsible for security and national def

public authorities and sectors of society. The State policy for national defense wa

in March 2004 by the National Defense Council.”

53 See Conclusiones del informe final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliac

Chapter II: sobre el Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL). The CVR 

PCP-SL was the principal perpetrator of crimes and violations of human rights, 

measure of this the number of persons dead and disappeared. It was responsible 

the fatal victims reported to the CVR.” And among the conclusions regarding the r

ity of the apparatuses of the State, the CVR asserted that “the armed forces were 

extracting lessons during the process of violence, which permitted refining their st

way that would be more efficient and less disposed to massive violation of human 

lesson was revealed ostensibly in the decline of victims by the action of agents o

precisely in the most intense years of armed internal conflict (1989-1993), w

these same years the PCP-SL manifested frantic terrorist violence toward the prol

the Self-Defense Committees, the operative police intelligence, and the backing 

zenry, all of which explain the defeat of the PCP-SL.”

54 From an ethnographic perspective, the history of the “rondas” (peasant p

the self-defense committees are presented in Orin Starn, Nightwatch: The Politics o

the Andes (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999) (and additional, in Spanish
30 |

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they did have in the population.

Th is success was made possible by emphasizing operational and st

gic intelligence, but also—and in contrast with the decade of the 1980s55—

Armed Forces and the National Police closed ranks with the poorer secto

the population, looking to gain its support through humanitarian assista

social assistance and the provision of security, rather than through the in

criminate use of force. In this sense, it is worth remembering that on 5 July 

the chief of the Counterterrorism Directorate of Peru (DINCOTE) expla

the strategy for combating terrorism and insurgency in the following term

Intelligence in this fi ght is of the highest importance. Th e objecti

to dismantle the organic apparatuses of the adversary and logi

the fi rst thing there is to do is to determine who they are, how they 

organized, how they function; and the most eff ective and correct wa

accomplish this is with intelligence. In that sense, we can say, wit

fear of equivocating, that at least in the military sphere, this is a w

intelligence, in which he who makes best use of it will advance. Th is y

complying with the directives of the Minister of the Interior and of 

command of the National Police, we have introduced some substa

changes not only in the organic structure of the DINCOTE but also 

operating methodology. We can say that we are moving into an operati

phase in which the work of intelligence is central, and is compleme

with police investigative techniques.

Using this approach, the DINCOTE, through the Special Intellig

Group (GEIN), captured the SL leader Abimael Guzmán and its leader

55 See also Informe final de la CVR.. Volume II: los actores del conflicto, Chapter I. The a

forces 1.3.3.4.4. Del enfrentamiento con el legislativo al golpe de Estado de 1992, where 

affirmed: “The Directive of the Ministry of Defense (003-91-MD/SDN), referring to the p

of pacification, developed in 1991 by the National Defense Secretariat, contains a b

political program that involved the military and non-military fields of Defense.” Moreove

CVR details that: “The same directive, in its Annex 01, makes an extraordinary critiq

militarization” (of the counter-subversive process of the decade of the 1980s), expres

“The non-application of the global anti-subversive strategy and the tendencies leading 

militarization, which narrows the resources of democracy, exposes the population to 

tions violating human rights. This situation ought to be addressed by the Constitution 

laws of the State; the State is not able to concur in acts which delegitimize it. The crim

genocide is inherent to terrorist violence. Democracy is not able to respond with the 

instruments and this is why it is necessary politically that the State and its forces of ord

capable of protecting and respecting the lives of citizens.”

56 See interview with General Antonio Ketín Vidal (who headed the DINCOTE durin

capture of Abimael Guzmán), where he expounds on the strategy applied in defeating t

ism in Peru, which depended greatly on Intelligence and respecting human rights. Telev

program “La Ventana Indiscreta,” channel 2, Lima, 19 Dec 2007. Available at: http://age

peru.tv/ventana/?q--node/154.
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without using violence nor violating human rights. In parallel fashion, 

eff ort with the Armed Forces, the SL was driven from the countrysi

city, leading to the imprisonment of nearly all its leaders and thousa

followers, many of whom took advantage of the Amnesty Law to iden

members of the secretive organization.

Th is historic experience in defeating a growing terrorist thre

had called into question the survival of Peru as a Nation-State,57 certa

evidence of fertile terrain for the growth of a culture of security and int

and the value of an anti-terrorist strategy which brought together var

ments of this Andean country in an alliance to overcome mutual susp

It cannot be denied that there were unfortunate excesses in 

against terrorism, but this never formed part of the national strategy

it part of the policy of the State, backed by the population. Th ere w

isolated actions in the Valley of Mantaro and also the egregious crime

rios Altos and La Cantuta in Lima.58 Th e Peruvian Judiciary will det

there was a secret plan to apply a supposed “dirty or clandestine war” 

to human rights; but in retrospect these actions ended up being extra

the essential course of the winning strategy.59

As indicated by Andrés Gómez de la Torre and Alberto Bolí

failed eff orts, debasement, and perversion of the system or throug

ineptitude, the Peruvian intelligence system was reduced practically to 

the actions of autocrats as well as by democrats. In the wake of the abu

mitted by national intelligence in the decade of the 1990s, due to a disto

ception of the importance of national security, intermingled with irre

57 See Santiago Roncagliolo, La cuarta espada. La historia de Abimael Guzmán 

Luminoso, First Edition (Argentina: Editorial Sudamericana, 2007), pp. 140-141, 1

58 A paramilitary detachment called “Colina” was accused by the Justice Minis

ing executed extrajudicially 15 persons on the grounds of Barrios Altos in the cent

(1991), and nine students and a professor of the University of La Cantuta, al

(1992). See also Ricardo Uceda, Muerte en el Pentagonito, First Edition (Bogota

Planeta Colombiana, 2004), p. 290, where the author indicates: “This account, 

gained great force, has yet to be tested judicially. A more elaborate account is de

the report of the CVR, (1.3.4.3, The special operations of the National Intelligen

SIN), according to which the Colina Group was directed by the SIN, employing 

personnel who acted on the margin of their official chain of command.” See also

this particular issue, “Condenan a 35 años de cárcel al ex jefe del SIN,” daily E

Lima, 4 Sep 2008 – Primera Planta, where it is reported that a general of the Arm

ment, former chief of SIN, was sentenced on 4 Aug 2008 to 35 years in prison for t

ping and deaths of nine students and one professor of the University of La Cantut

Anti-corruption Court in addition sentenced former members of the Colina Group 

in prison for the same crime.

59 See also “La estrategia ganadora” by Jaime de Althaus, daily El Comerc

2007. Althaus is an anthropologist, journalist, and writer, and author of the book

ción capitalista en el Perú (Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007).
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budget for national defense diminished drastically, and a process of restruc

ing was forced on the Armed Forces and, by extension, onto the national i

ligence community.60

Despite a strong democratic consensus and what Alberto Bolivar la

“politically correct” rhetoric, neither the transition regime of president Vale

Paniagua (November 2000-July 2001)61 nor the fi ve-year term of Alejan

Toledo (July 2001- July 2006), proved capable of putting in place a national i

ligence system suitable for the security needs of the country and the regio

Both Peruvian authors describe the decline in the country’s intelligence 

vices in this period, agreeing that a cultural predilection toward informality 

permissiveness contributed to fragile intelligence institutions with a low de

of professionalism and weak operational effi ciency.63 In the failed attemp

reconstruct the intelligence system, in addition to dismissing real crim

who had infi ltrated the system, a large number of true, specialized intellig

professionals were also dismissed.

Damage Control in the DINI?

Th is situation has not been corrected, due to resistance from som

the management of the current National Directorate of Intelligence (DI

As the DINI does not have available to it personnel who are well-verse

strategic intelligence, save the half-dozen analysts who survived the in

criminate dismissals of the past six-year period, plus a small group of pro

sionals who joined the service in the chaotic period of the CNI, it would 

be prudent to commit these individuals immediately to purely strategic an

sis. What can be done, without losing a strategic and global vision, is to op

the integration of intelligence specialists who focus on internal problem

60 See also “Pronto FFAA repararán su propio armamento. Paniagua redujo inversion

tares del 20 al 5 por ciento,” the daily Expreso, Political Section, Lima, 6 Dec 2007.

61 At the end of the transition government of President Valentín Paniagua—elected 

the Fujimori administration collapsed—the Congress of the Republic promulgated in 

2001 law No. 27479, which created a new National Intelligence System (SINA), wit

National Intelligence Council (CNI) providing oversight.

62 See articles by Jorge Serrano Torres on the Red Voltaire-France and the IPI Agency 

sites: “La reconstrucción del sistema de inteligencia peruano” (11 Jul 2006); “Servicio se

¿espionaje político y corrupción?” (24 Aug 2005) and “Destrucción del sistema de intelig

peruano” (14 Sep 2004). Available at http://www.voltairenet.org./auteur4574.html?lang=e

63 There is consensus among Peruvian analysts regarding the following: an icon fo

incompetence of the CNI is the case of a chief of counterintelligence who, during the 

torship of retired general Daniel Mora, was taped, filmed, and photographed while plo

against the Minister of the Interior of the Peruvian government. See “CNI conspires ag

Minister Rospigliosi,” pp. 2 and 3, daily newspaper Correo of Lima, 18 Mar 2004.
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identify the factors driving change and evolution in the region.

Among other things, they could analyze a series of hypothes

probability, which nevertheless need to be taken into account, for 

potential impact they could have—the so-called “low probability-high 

scenarios. Also, they could identify heretofore unanticipated and impo

phenomena, or “wild cards,”65 of high potential impact. Th e diff erence 

the fi rst and second is that the latter involve issues which the regio

control nor avoid.

Another issue addressed by Andres Gomez and Alberto Boli

absence of a strong academic environment for the promotion of a c

security and intelligence in Peru. One cannot count on a serious a

intellectual debate on the importance of strategic intelligence in the 

Also lacking are specialized periodical publications, such as a journal t

be produced under the auspices of the National Intelligence School, l

in Spain, Argentina, and Brazil. Such publications help to generate a c

intelligence whereby the citizenry understands the function of the s

vices—complete with its myths and toxic prejudices—and learns that 

ligence function is a key piece of State infrastructure in its guaranteein

security and the stability of the democratic system.

Peruvians should have confi dence that the intelligence service

with absolute respect for the Rule of Law, and observe regulations a

defi ned political, legal, and judicial controls. For that reason, it should 

that some private-sector educational institutions do present academ

gence studies programs. Among them are those of Strategos, the In

Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination, led by Alberto Bolívar, and 

program managed by the Mariátegui Chair of Political and Strategic 

in association with the University Ricardo Palma of Lima, both of wh

certifi cates in Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Security, Policy, a

egy; as well as Strategic Studies in the Regional grouping of Peru-Chile

Prospectively, a Master’s in Political and Strategic Studies will be off ere

Th e Value of Human Intelligence

As the Peruvian authors here point out, the typical approac

country has been for either civilian or military agencies to apply 

64 The term “drivers” of change is developed in Latinoamérica 2020: Pe

Escenarios de Largo Plazo, proceedings of a seminar held in Santiago, Chile, 7-8 J

within the framework of the Global Trends Project 2020 of the National Intelligence 

the U.S.

65 Latinoamérica 2020: Pensando los Escenarios de Largo Plazo, ibid.
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intelligence requires multiagency, multidisciplinary work and rigorous m

odology, where the intelligence professional systematically challenges con

tional thinking, developing alternatives and scenarios to maximize the u

imagination, engages in careful study, and applies skill, experience, and eth

awareness within the framework of a somewhat mystical, patriotic theolog

Viable professionalism in intelligence will not result from addres

the struggle for primacy between the civilians and the military, but from o

coming the problem of having unsuitable or incapable professionals conduc

specialized work of intelligence. To attract and retain the best human resou

there needs to be a promising work environment where offi cials work for 

State and not primarily for the successive governments. Such ideal emplo

could be civilian or military.

In the intelligence crisis of 2001, both civilian and military perso

were dismissed on a massive scale,66 creating a vacuum in the realm of stra

intelligence analysis that has yet to be fi lled.67 On the contrary, the DIGIM

(the General Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior), along 

the Intelligence Directorate, the Antidrug Directorate, and the Counterter

ism Directorate of the National Police,68 had the foresight and the responsib

to keep their personnel, and even to recover those police agents and ana

who were in the “formal SIN” and those who had been sent into retirem

arbitrarily.69 Th is was something that did not occur either in the CNI or in m

tary intelligence.

66 See Ideele (magazine of the Institute of Legal Defense) interview in 2001 of the 

first chief of the CNI, retired Admiral Alfonzo Panizo, who in addressing the question, 

have you deactivated the famous SIN of the Fujimori and Montesinos era?” respo

“Totally, in the era of Montesinos there had been what could be called a real, effective

efficient SIN; and a false SIN, which utilized the elements of intelligence to benefit a c

and not to benefit the country.” Despite this development, nearly all of the personnel o

ex-SIN departed, both those culpable and those innocent. Please see http://www.idl.or

idlrev/revistas/142/pag55.htm.

67 See “Un mini-sistema de inteligencia en lugar de nada,” p. A-6, in the daily news

El Comercio, 12 September 2007, where it was affirmed: “It has been more than a de

that we know and feel that we do not have a system of national intelligence. And the 

part is that we the governing and those who are governed live believing that we have on

68 See “Reivindican al policia que desactivó el MRTA,” daily newspaper La Razón, 

p. 5, 9 December 2007, where it is mentioned that after his having been moved into r

ment unjustly in 2001, General Juan Gonzales Sandoval was decorated by the National P

in the Ministry of Interior due to his prominent role in the fight against terrorism.

69 See “El Operativo Volcán en Cerro Azul,” Boletín del Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL

November 2007, which highlights the successful work of operational intelligence, w

through combined teams from DINCOTE and the Special Operations Directorate o

National Police, located, captured, or brought down terrorist kingpins of Sendero Lumi

Also see “Los que vuelven a la Policía Nacional,” Department of Citizen Security of ID

November 2007, which tells the story of an experienced chief of counterintelligence 

returned to investigatory tasks with the National Police.
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DIGIMIN, compared to DINI, is not because of any incompetence o

leadership of the chiefs of the latter entity, but rather that the DIGI

exhibited a greater operational capacity through the experience and 

ity of its personnel, that is to say, of its human resources, including 

Th e DIGIMIN has been especially useful to Executive Branch decis

ers in their handling of internal security.70 Th erefore, in place of co

inter-agency disagreements, an alternative is to have the chief of the 

the offi cial with highest rank in the National Intelligence System (SIN

with the knowledge of the Prime Minister and of the President of the 

formulate plans for improving interoperability between intelligence 

DINI—and the secret police and military services which comprise t

notwithstanding the continuing need for some legal reform involving 

ligence Committee of Congress.

Identifi cation of Th reats for Peru

Th e Peruvian Libro Blanco (White Book) of National Defense

fi es as external threats 1) those which may be generated in the South 

can sub-region through the application of incompatible security doc

those which can arise from a crisis related to the scarcity of natural 

of strategic value (including water or gas supply, for example); as well 

rorism, drug traffi cking, and international crime. Among internal th

those groups which, contrary to constitutional order, opt for violen

cal groups which promote social violence and popular uprising; com

organized crime; illicit traffi c of drugs; corruption and the destructi

environment.72

In this framework, the fragility of Peruvian intelligence acquir

ing in external terms, given that an eff ective international strategy aga

phenomena as terrorism, drug traffi cking, or international organize

70 See “Cambios, movidas en el Mininter,” Instituto de Defensa Legal-IDL, 1 Feb

(http://seguridadidl.org/pe/boletin/2008/01-02.htm), which notes, “From the fall 

tatorship, the DIGIMIN was converted into the only system of intelligence whic

more or less reliable information to the diverse sectors hungry for intelligence, am

the Palace of Government.

71 See Libro Blanco de la Defensa Nacional del Perú, Chapter III, Política de Esta

Seguridad y la Defensa Nacional: Identificación de Amenazas, 15 April 2005. A

http://www.mindef.gob.pe/.

72 To be certain, one must note the worldwide threat represented by Climatic 

Global Warming, which is already affecting the Amazon watershed and the glacie

See Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the UN, “El Liderazgo y el Cambio Climático

of the UN in Peru, December 2007. Similarly, see Una verdad incómoda (An Inconven

narrated by Al Gore, ex-Vice President of the U.S. and 2007 Nobel Peace Prize win
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manifested by Michael Herman of St. Antonys College of Oxford, even a su

power such as the U.S. is unable to provide the intelligence necessary fo

own national security using only its own resources. Th e globalized world n

greater inter-governmental collaboration,73 but for that to occur governm

must build better intelligence services.

Th e Chavista-Cuban Danger in the Region and the Need for a 

Culture of Security and National Intelligence

Andres Gomez de la Torre suggests that the political divisions am

the countries of South America, which have broken free of old geopolitical 

tems and alliances, “will complicate the desirable and necessary coopera

and coordination needed to confront common threats.” He refers to the ac

ties of Venezuela’s Chavez administration, which many security and intellig

organizations and governmental elites of the region are not prepared to 

front, do not understand, or are reluctant to recognize. Th is situation refl 

the absence, in a majority of the countries of the region, of a solid national s

rity and intelligence culture.74

And despite the fact that the Venezuelan president suff ered a d

in December 2007,75 when he attempted to modify the Constitution in o

to establish a regime which would have allowed his indefi nite continuatio

power as a messianic leader, his regional ambitions remain viable, given 

tight alliance with Cuba.76

73 Preface by Michael Herman in Russell G. Swenson and Susana G. Lemozy, Ed

Compilers, Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas (Washington, DC, 2004), availab

http://www.ndic.edu/press/6921.htm.

74 See Jorge Serrano Torres, “Hugo Chávez Frías: perfíl y estrategia de gobierno,” 

page of Diario Atajo y Avizora de Argentina, November 2007, available at http://www.av

com/atajo/colaboradores/textos_jorge_serrano_torres/0010_chavez-perfíl_estrategia_gob

htm. Similarly: “Venezuela: perfíl de Hugo Chávez y su estrategia espansionista,” AAintelig

March 2008, available at http://www.aainteligencia.cl/2008/Mar2008_3_JorgeSerrano.htm

75 See “‘No pudimos ... por ahora’; acepta Hugo Chávez derrota en el referendo,” 

La Jornada-Mexico, 3 December 2007.

76 See “Firman Raúl Castro y Hugo Chávez acuerdos por cientos de millones de dóla

daily newspaper La Jornada, Mexico D.F., Sección Mundo, 16 October 2007, where the fo

ing is reported: “the president of Venezuela insists in one of his proposals to the Cubans

will be able in the near future to create a confederation of republics; two republics into 

two countries into one.’” The ties between the regime of Chavez and Cuba are found 

levels: the state business Telecom Venezuela and the Cuban company Transbit, with th

of China Popular, will lay a submarine fiber optic cable 1,552 kilometers long at a cost o

million U.S., which will unite La Guajira in the north of Venezuela and Ciboney in the pro

of Santiago de Cuba. This infrastructure project, in addition to empowering Cuban Int

communications, implements control over the national and external communications o

persons and institutions hostile to the Chavez regime, under the guidance of the Cuban 

terintelligence service. 
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StatetoState relations; in the EconomicEnergy sector (advantageou

ments or subsidies); and by direct, personal interaction with politica

as well as with Latin American social and business partners. He is s

by the General Directorate of Military Intelligence (DGIM), whose ch

strongman of Venezuelan intelligence and of Chavez’s “Praetorian G

which is being modernized and systematically strengthened.78

Chavez’s advances are not exempt from stumbles: His camp

a strong policy against dissent was derailed when, in June 2008, he 

abandon a new National Intelligence and Counterintelligence Law, w

in eff ect for only 13 days,79 leaving its fate in the hands of the Nati

liament for eventual discussion and reform. Th e aborted law violate

rights and the constitution in decreeing that Venezuelans and foreigne

refused to cooperate with his intelligence agencies as informants, could 

for up to four years.

A Possible Course of Action on the Basis of Compared 

Experience

Considering the infl uence of culture in the functioning of the 

intelligence services, the experience resulting from analyzing the evol

in some cases the deterioration) of the secret services of Mexico, V

Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, the U.S., Ru

Peru80 shows that, in instances of institutional crisis, no country is ab

assemble completely its national intelligence center—as occurred in 

77 See “El Montesinos de Chávez,” Semana magazine, Colombia, number 134

ary 2008. 

78 See Jorge Serrano Torres, “El sistema de inteligencia venezolano y la Gue

trica.” Original source: Voltairenet.org., published in el Portal de Noticias de Info

Defensa (Spain), 13 December 2005. Available at http://foroplus.net/noticias/ge

php?newsid=1693.

79 See “Henry Rangel Silva: Nueva ley de inteligencia se concibe para la segurid

el Estado,” Web page of Venezolana de Televisión, Caracas, 4 June 2008. Also s

deroga ley de inteligencia,” CNNEXPANSION.com. (Caracas-Reuters), 10 June 200

tinent to note that the Venezuelan intelligence reform initiative created four speciali

tions: the General Directorate of Intelligence and the General Directorate of Counteri

assigned to the Ministry of the Interior; and the General Directorate of Military Intel

the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, dependent on the Ministry o

Following the model and advice of Cuban intelligence, these changes responded to 

sity to create new and more powerful secret services, in order to replace the current 

the end of confronting supposed interference by the U.S. in internal Venezuelan af

with shoring up the intelligence activities of the Chavez government in the region. 

80 See Carlos Maldonado Prieto, Servicios de Inteligencia en Sudamérica: Estado d

en una perspective comparada (Fort Benning, Georgia: Western Hemisphere Institute f

Cooperation, 2002).
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serious vulnerability. In this way, the Peruvian case is projected as an 

model which ought not to be carried out in an intelligence system that un

goes a deep crisis and suff ers a loss of legitimacy.

What’s more, one can infer that during a process of “restructur

“reengineering,” “refunding,” “reconstruction,” “modernization” (or what

it may be called) of a system of intelligence, the most prudent approach 

carry out a thorough cleansing of the system through a counterintelligence 

tiative to destroy only the noxious and unserviceable elements, rather than 

ing to return to “Year Zero.”82 Most importantly, it costs a lot in money, t

and eff ort to recruit and train intelligence personnel and get them ada

successfully to organizational culture and institutional idiosyncrasies, no

mention the intelligence work itself. Th is is even more true for a countr

which the culture of national security and intelligence has not taken roo

has deteriorated.

For a country where intelligence has been implicated in the violatio

human rights, political espionage, and corruption, the most practical appr

would be to remove only the highest level of offi cials, keeping the next lo

level of managers, the most capable, experienced, and effi cient who are 

tainted. Th e ultimate aim is to have “serious but invisible middle managers” 

make an organization operate smoothly, like the distributor in a car: vital t

operation, but remaining unnoticed until it ceases to function.83

In an essay in this book, Joanisval Brito Goncalves describes w

occurred during the failed Brazilian government of Fernando Collor de M

in March 1990, with the decreed extinction of the controversial and pow

National Information Service (SNI). In the Brazilian case—as distinct f

the Peruvian one—military and police intelligence not only were maintai

but were strengthened, when the national intelligence center disappeared. 

leads one to believe that the painful period through which Brazilian in

gence passed is being fully overcome, even in a place where there remains 

siderable tension between the intelligence community and the political c

thanks to the Lula da Silva administration’s betting on the robust institut

81 See essays regarding the secret services of Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecu

Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Mexico, U.S., and Russia, published by Jorge Serran

res, in Red Voltaire, available at http://www.voltairenet.org/auteur4574.html?lang=es.

82 “Año Cero”: Term utilized by the genocidal Khmer Rouge of Cambodia in the 197

announcing the complete destruction of all that was not linked directly to the Comm

Party—with the intention of reconstructing it afterward from “nothing.”

83 See also Bob Woodward, Negar la evidencia: Bush en Guerra, parte III (Bogota: Grup

torial Norma, 2006), p. 122. In English, it carries the title, State of Denial: Bush at War, P

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
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intelligence system is perceived as one of the more effi cient and deve

all the region.84

A Look at Mexican National Intelligence and National Cu

A similar, destructive approach to handling human resources 

in Mexico during the transition of power from the Institutional Re

ary Party (PRI) to the Fox administration at the end of 2000. One r

that the chief intelligence institution, the National Security Researc

(CISEN), was unable to warn about the terrorism attacks perpetrate

People’s Revolutionary Army (EPR) against the national oil company (

in September 2007.85 In the aft ermath, the Chief of the Government 

ment had to explain to the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress that m

1,000 CISEN professionals had been removed from their posts in rec

He attributed this failure by CISEN to the simultaneous reduction in f

had suff ered. Th e administration of Felipe Calderón has taken the de

increase CISEN’s personnel numbers and to modernize its infrastruct

Without denying the weakened capability of CISEN, the 

observer Manuel Balcázar Villarreal fi nds that a national intelligence 

already in formation, thanks to greater institutional confi dence and i

professionalism in intelligence. Th is advancement permits nation

ligence organizations, as well as emissaries from private enterprise, 

stronger cooperative links with foreign counterparts, with respect to 

tional threats.

Balcázar applauds the separation of analytic and operational f

in CISEN. In his judgment, this brings greater effi ciency to both area

same time, he sees the need to achieve greater coordination betwee

tions and analysis. Th e author also recommends greater interaction 

intelligence leaders and national communications media to overc

perils of too much secrecy and a resultant ostracism by the Mexica

84 Dos de los últimos jefes de la Abin en el gobierno de Lula han sido func

inteligencia de carrera: la psicóloga Marisa Del’Isola Diniz, funcionaria que ha trab

30 años en actividades de inteligencia, habiendo sido responsable—durante siete 

la oficina de Formación de Recursos Humanos del Servicio Nacional de Info

(durante el gobierno militar). Otro jefe de la Abin fue Marcio Paulo Buzanelli, qu

rango de Comandante de Inteligencia y una experiencia y continuidad de 29 

sistema de inteligencia brasilero.

85 Cfr. Artículo: “Sumergido en su crisis sigue el Cisen: Cataño Contreras,” p

La Prensa-OEM. México, 20 January 2008.

86 Cfr. Artículos: “Fallas del Cisen evitaron prever ataques del EPR,” diario El 

México, 26/09/2007. Y “Crea Segob 200 plazas nuevas para el Cisen,” diario El U

México, 28 November 2007.
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employed as political police during the hegemonic regime that ruled the co

try for several decades.

Th e author goes on to note that his own study of Mexican intellig

institutions, based on simple organizational diagrams of successive intellig

entities, has been enriched by information available in press reports, altho

much offi cial information remains restricted despite the somewhat gre

openness in recent years.

A Revealing Glimpse of Colombian National Intelligence

In contrast to developments in Peru and Mexico, when in Oct

2005 the central intelligence institution in Colombia, the DAS (Admini

tive Department of Security), was at the center of an intelligence scandal

Colombian government did not dismantle the DAS through massive and in

criminate layoff s. Instead, the outcome was that the chief of DAS was jailed 

the deputy chief sacked, and the organization underwent a signifi cant reo

nization, as directed by the Uribe administration.87 A government commis

oversaw internal investigations that subjected 1,646 offi cials to the polygr

of whom 273 were subjected to further questioning, leading in the end to 

dismissal of 106 offi cials.88 Under the theme of “zero tolerance for corrupt

these individuals were separated without generating a rupture or great ins

tional upheaval in the DAS.89

Th is background allows a greater appreciation of the essay by Vicente Tor

of Colombia. He explains that the keys to understanding national intellig

in his country are the multiple and interconnected threats—narcotraffi ck

insurgents, paramilitaries, and organized scoffl aws—that have generated a 

responding intelligence culture accustomed to diversity, aware of the nee

conduct systematic analyses, and chiefl y, one that is receptive to education 

thereby builds institutional capital. However, the author remains uneasy a

an incomplete institutional structure in the intelligence services that restra

fuller development of an intelligence culture. Th e fragmented nature of the i

ligence community is abetted by the frequent public confrontations betw

the leadership of DAS and of military intelligence in recent years. Addition

87 Cfr. Artículo: “DAS-Gate: la detención de Jorge Noguera, ex director del DAS, dej

preguntas: por qué el presidente lo nombró, por qué duró tanto y por qué lo defendió,

sión Web de la Revista Semana de Colombia, 24 February2007.

88 Cfr. “En qué anda el DAS,” página Web de la revista Semana, Sección Nación, 24 F

ary 2007.

89 Cfr. “El director del DAS anuncia que el organismo será sometido a una completa 

ganización,” Europa Press, 04 November 2005.
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leaders have experienced a rapid rotation in and out of their positions

ship of the intelligence services seems to be a step in a career ladder ra

a long-term commitment. Th is problem also does not promote the m

of a “corporate culture” within the principal agencies.

Torrijos does not pass up the opportunity to point out that th

bian intelligence apparatus—its paradigms and procedures—is based 

on a military model. Paraphrasing Georges Clemenceau, who durin

War I commented that “war is too important to leave in the hands of 

tary,” so Torrijos suggests that “intelligence is too complex a phenom

reduce it to its military dimensions.” He emphasizes that intelligence 

a political instrument.

Cultural Infl uences in Argentine Intelligence

Th e distinguished Argentine essayist, José Manuel Ugarte, 

intriguing question: Can a country’s cultural inheritances be surmou

length, his answer is that, just as Argentina and other countries in Lat

ica have taken several steps toward institutionalizing democracy, so 

should their intelligence services become more legitimate and eff ectiv

Aft er an extensive and critical historical analysis of the Argen

Ugarte points out that a key criterion indicating progress toward that go

fi nd intelligence professionals and their organizations replacing their 

political personalities and to successive governments with a deeper 

service to the nation. Some of the signals of that progress would be: 

ing their technical capability, giving priority to the analytic function

husbanding of operating funds, and ensuring that intelligence protect 

state and the citizens from threats, thereby gaining for intelligence th

prestige and social recognition.

Finally, Ugarte tries to relieve some of his own concerns about 

ligence services in his own country by reminding us that Argentina is 

in this struggle. He suggests that the continual complaints voiced ab

ligence services across the region allow us to infer that at least in so

American countries, intelligence services do play a signifi cant role in t

cal sphere. Th is observation suggests, in turn, the ever-present risk that 

governments can “kill liberty in the name of security,” which is also th

an article by Oxford University professor Timothy Garton Ash90

90 Timothy Garton Ash, Professor of Contemporary History at Oxford Univers

la libertad en nombre de la seguridad,” El Comercio newspaper, p. b-4, 25 Novem
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that, in his country, many aspects of the intelligence services have their o

in the experience of the armed forces as national, founding institutions. 

armed forces have long been responsible to warn of threats to society. Now

fi nds that civilians are full participants in national, strategic intelligence cir

Th us, when it is appropriate to blame intelligence for a strategic mistake, 

blame can be placed on the entire culture of the society, rather than onl

military organizations.

Sillone also argues that what remains unremarked about the world 

ation today, in contrast with earlier historical periods, is that no country 

unilaterally declare itself “neutral” with respect to threats from internati

terrorism for the simple reason that this type of violence does not have a 

cause nor a recognized nation that assumes responsibility. He adds tha

unravel the threads of this confl ict locally, regionally, and worldwide, rem

the great challenge for strategic intelligence. He recommends greater inte

tional cooperation to address this challenge.

A third Argentinean essayist, Heriberto Justo Auel, presents interes

philosophical refl ections on the complex relationship between the cultu

the country and its leaders, on the one hand, and the phenomenon of stra

intelligence on the other. He charges that the “system of strategic intellige

has since the 1980s been legally paralyzed and continues in a downward sp

having lost a good part of its social capital and in addition being subjected 

retributive intelligence law that makes it less than viable. He suggests that t

who doubt this criticism only need to objectively compare Argentine re

with the rules that regulate the security, defense, and intelligence institut

He adds that the country suff ers from laws that are clearly anti-institutio

that prevent thinking about the future, and that are leading inexorably tow

“legal improvisation.” Th ese factors are leading Argentina to be a “failed st

unable to counter non-state enemies.

In a caustic manner, Auel condemns the existence of a “tolerant, sec

society” in the West which “hates itself” so much that it tries to confront n

state enemies as if we were not already at war; that is, by negotiating and ap

ing a civilian penal code to soldiers to “protect the rights of our enemies

highlight the obligation of the intelligence services in Argentina and elsewh

he quotes Ezekiel 33:6:

If the watchman sees the sword coming and does not blow the trum

to warn the people, and the sword comes and takes the life of on

them, that man will be taken away because of his sin, but I will hold 

watchman accountable.
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sentinel of Latin American states is the remnant quasiIberoA

nation-state,” which, if not reinvigorated and made capable of soun

horn—which we know to be the function of strategic intelligence—

can be heard in time to confront the new threat and defeat it, then it 

abandoned its role as essential complement to national culture.

Limitations and Challenges of Canadian National Culture 

the Canadian Intelligence Services

As a contrast to the essay in this book that compares Braz

Canadian intelligence services in the context of their national culture

ane Lefebvre contributes a separate essay on Canadian intelligence 

With a critical eye, he notes that Canadian intelligence habitually h

only a marginal role in decision making by political leaders and even h

career government offi cials, to include the diplomatic corps.

He argues that intelligence gains attention in Canada only in 

scandalous activity. Th is he attributes to the absence of a critical mas

ian specialists in security and intelligence, as well as the failure of ma

which could explain in meaningful terms the value of national intellig

also assigns blame to the lack of a national intelligence strategy and 

responding lack of a long-term view of intelligence in the national en

which would value the development of intelligence scenarios related 

dian national interests.

Lefebvre is convinced that whereas the strategic culture of Can

not recognize intelligence as part of the matrix of Canadian nation

the growth of an intelligence-oriented culture beyond that obtainin

intelligence practitioners themselves remains in doubt. Nonetheless, th

admits that, despite an erosion of intelligence capabilities prior to 9

that date Canadian intelligence has been reorganized, fortifi ed with i

resources, including both civilian and military personnel, and has eve

enced an improvement in its public image.

Th e author suggests that Canada’s political leaders were surpris

events of 9/11, not having paid attention to the Canadian Security In

Service’s (CSIS) detailed assessments that were available about the threat 

terrorism, and specifi cally about Al Qaeda. Most parliamentarians in t

try also hold only a superfi cial understanding of intelligence. Again, 

when an intelligence scandal erupts that this government function is d

One avenue toward improving this state of aff airs is through the educat
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of only nine courses are off ered that are clearly related to intelligence.

A few positive signs now appear on the horizon. Canadian intellig

agencies do not operate outside the law, as each has a legislative base fo

activities. Further, although the country’s identity is in constant fl ux, strong 

of cooperation are maintained, by all of the intelligence agencies, with allies 

the U.S., the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. Although Canadian expert

more than a decade have fought for the creation of a foreign intelligence ag

with a focus outside the country, which is beyond the purview of the CSIS

eff ort has not yet gained offi cial backing.

Lefebvre makes an important distinction: even if no recognizable i

ligence culture exists at the national level, a strong sub-culture does exist am

practitioners in the intelligence community itself. Th is sub-culture rests on 

professional foundation of a strong sense of secrecy, a dynamic relation

with intelligence communities in the Anglo-sphere, a separation of intellig

practice and police practice, and an acceptance of review and oversight by 

ernment bodies. Still, the development of a real, national intelligence cu

awaits the day when intelligence is more formally integrated into the crea

of national policies.

Th e Relationship between Culture and Intelligence in Brazil a

Canada

Th e Brazilian author Joanisval Brito Gonçalves off ers an interes

perspective, comparing the perceptions of Brazilians and Canadians about 

respective intelligence services. Both countries are challenged to convince t

population, including their leaders, that intelligence has great relevance to 

ing down organized crime and terrorism.

Th e author makes the very interesting observation that, in the turbu

years before the creation of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), sev

developed-country intelligence systems were evaluated as models for Brazil

Canadian system was found to be the most appropriate fi t, and it was ado

for the December 1999 inauguration of ABIN. However, he concludes tha

terms of intelligence transformation, and of its cultural acceptance, Canada 

surpassed Brazil. A major diff erence is that, since its creation, the Cana

Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has focused on demonstrating to the C

dian people its capacity to protect their security.

More specifi cally, Brito Gonçalves suggests that CSIS gained pu

credence from publishing a widely available report on strategic aspects o

Canadian economy. It allowed the public to understand the work of CSI

behalf of the society. Notably, ABIN has followed the same path with its pub
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it is that intelligence does. Both Canada and Brazil have increased publ

ness of their activities by hosting open seminars, granting press interv

emphasizing their responsiveness to Congress. At the same time, an ar

intelligence agencies need to be more responsive, particularly in Braz

any report of telephone tapping is automatically ascribed to the intellig

vices, is in clearly rebutting such accusations.

Another service that intelligence organizations in both coun

off er is some tailored support to private enterprises about foreign o

risks, including foreign-origin industrial espionage. Intelligence se

both countries can be of value in areas of scientifi c and technical kn

Both countries host cutting-edge technology companies in nuclear, a

and biotech industries, and the intelligence services can play a majo

safeguarding these enterprises by raising industrialists’ consciousness 

rity threats to them.

Th e CSIS, like ABIN, has taken steps to gain acceptance amo

people, especially among those who might later join the intelligence 

Both services have brought students to visit their installations and h

grams underway to maintain the interest of youths.

Th e Cultural Fabric of Brazilian Strategic Intelligence

Th e second Brazilian essayist, Glauco Moraes, agrees to som

with his compatriot in thinking that, during the democratic fl oresce

1990, the earlier actions of the powerful National Intelligence Serv

engendered a public fi restorm at the hands of those who were pursued 

secuted by the SNI, and who aft er 1990 were infl uential members of the 

class in the new democratic era.

Th e author fi nds that this fi erce prejudice against the intellig

vices, along with the political problems generated during the milit

ernment, forged a national culture that was at odds with and actively 

everything associated with national security and intelligence. He goes o

gest that such antipathy, when it prevails, comes to emphasize form o

stance and directly aff ects the functionality of national intelligence by 

public service. A notable lesson from this episode is that when an int

service bows to bureaucratic pressure to achieve success at any cost, in 

the service is treated to negative cultural consequences.

Applying this important point to the real-world environment 

terrorism, including that associated with Islamic fundamentalism, we m

that intelligence services must pay close attention to maintaining “prop

even when they are tasked to come up with a quick resolution of a 
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psychological pressure to obtain critical information through interrogatio

they must avoid “torture” of a terrorist cell member who is suspected of w

holding that information.92 In a society with a tendency to favor form over 

stance, this scenario harbors a very touchy issue for professional intellig

protagonists as well as for decision makers and the society itself, as it invo

the human rights of terrorists as well as those of terrorist victims.93

At the same time, the author also notes that, especially among inte

tuals in Brazil, an idea with considerable currency is that intelligence boils d

to “spy games” that aim at societal control, secret funding, and targeting c

peting politicians, all within a culture that sees laws as a source of punishm

rather than as a societal norm that needs to be taken into account at all ti

He attributes such misunderstandings and distrust to a limited exposure o

intelligence voice in debates on defense issues. In Brazil, there has been pr

cally no education about the intelligence function outside of the military 

the state security apparatus. Further, in those environments, technical trai

in intelligence rather than intelligence education has been the norm.

Nonetheless, the author remains optimistic, seeing that despite the 

vailing diffi culties, there is a real potential for the growth of a national i

ligence culture. Th is optimism is warranted because the individuals from 

older generation who were tainted with the intelligence excesses of the C

War are now leaving their positions of power in the country. Other reason

optimism: the increasing number of intelligence courses being off ered in 

public and private educational institutions, especially since 2001; better t

ment of the fi eld in recent years by the mass communications media; and 

creation of some 200 intelligence units in diverse public institutions at fed

state, and municipal levels.

Th is improvement is abetted by still other factors. First is the s

that police intelligence at the national level needs to be improved to cou

increased criminal activity and the corresponding dip in personal secu

among the population, especially in the larger cities. Additionally, the Br

ian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) itself is engaging in public outreach thro

91 See Gustavo Gorriti, “Tenet y el submarine,” Caretas magazine, No. 1974, 5 M

2007, which questions the application of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” as desc

by a high-level U.S. intelligence official, but who claimed such techniques do not cons

torture. Further, the official claimed that these techniques have “saved lives” in the p

after 9/11.

92 See Jerrold Pos, “Identidad colectiva: el odio que se inculca desde los huesos,” eJo

USA, electronic journal of the U.S. Department of State, May 2007. Available at http://u

state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijps/post.htm.

93 See Mohammed M. Hafez, “Caso de estudio: lo mítico del martirologio en Iraq”, 

nal USA, May 2007. Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijps/hafez.ht
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employees, although this practice carries some security risk. Since 2

agency has overcome its traditional practice of having “no commen

accusations of impropriety or calls for greater openness. It now hos

seminars, with international participation, on security issues. Th e au

fi nds that ABIN has improved its image through the publication of th

ian Intelligence Journal. All these actions have worked toward demysti

country’s intelligence establishment, with expectations of medium a

term, positive results.

Evolution of Intelligence Culture in Uruguay

Writing from Montevideo, Jorge Jouroff examines the state 

guayan security and intelligence institutions and their relationship 

country’s national culture. He cautions that any attempt to restructur

tem needs to be wary of applying theoretical models that may not fi t Ur

reality, even as he urges a careful evaluation of the resources available 

out needed reforms. He suggests that, although the country does no

unique intelligence culture, it remains on the national agenda. Further, 

he is aware that Uruguay will not likely have available to it the soph

technical resources of some other countries, he is confi dent that the 

of intelligence can be a particular strength in Uruguay, and that this c

needs to be exploited. To start in that direction, he recommends tha

identify the real reasons why the country should want an intelligenc

with an emphasis on its linkages with other tools of the state apparatu

than as an end in itself.

Recognizing that interagency cooperation in intelligence ste

a sustained consensus on common security challenges as seen by two 

countries, rather than by internal or external fi at, the author goes on 

out that, beyond such international agreements, each country has a 

defi ne its own threats. Like other authors in this volume, Jouroff ackn

the need for political backing across the society to put in place a viable

national intelligence system. Th is cannot be achieved immediately, b

depends on the commitment of a succession of governments as part 

national security policy.

Jouroff ’s own experience tells him that one of the pillars of a l

national intelligence system is having in place external oversight bodie

the national congress. Th is in turn depends on having an appropriate 

intelligence law. However, he does not call for the existence of a cadr

cialized civilians to be in change of the intelligence system itself, leav

infer that by this omission he accepts as a substitute the military an
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the region, the concept of implanting civilian intelligence administrators in 

intelligence services themselves, as a way to increase the effi cacy of nati

intelligence, remains to be accomplished.

Th e Obligation of Bolivian Society to Construct a National 

Intelligence System

Th e infl uence that Bolivian military intelligence wields in support o

further development of the state is the theme addressed by Rear Admiral 

Mejía Ibáñez. In that light, it is important to remember that Bolivia, outsid

the period of the Chaco War, has had no national intelligence system. To

according to the author, the country does have some well-developed nati

intelligence sub-systems and some under development; however, they func

in isolation from one another. What is missing is a central organization 

could integrate the eff orts of the existing entities. In his view, this situation 

resents an unacceptable danger for the state’s highest-level decision makers

is in fact a mistake.

Mejía Ibáñez fi nds that a national intelligence system is indispens

to national development as well as to national defense by allowing the sta

safeguard both its security interests and its national objectives. He rem

readers that the absence of an intelligence system derailed the plans of Presi

Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, who, as a result of depending only on the stra

intelligence advice of the Ministry of Government, reached incorrect con

sions with respect to the internal security situation. Th e result was that viol

and chaos precipitated the fall of his administration and an interruption in 

normal process of presidential succession.

In contrast, the author asserts that, even in the absence of a nati

intelligence system, the military intelligence service has made notable co

butions by providing strategic assessments for national decision making

an example, he describes the analytic capability of military intelligence in 

government of General Hugo Banzer Suárez (1997-2001) during the so

unrest that accompanied the so-called “Water War.” Military intelligence 

gested appropriate courses of action that were adopted and which reso

the problems.

To further establish the point, the author recounts that it was also m

tary intelligence that later prepared analyses used by President Carlos M

Gisbert. With these examples, Mejía Ibáñez declares in no uncertain terms 

Bolivian military intelligence contributes not only to national defense, but 

to the mitigation of internal crisis situations, working to preserve the unity 

integrity of the state as well as of the government in power. To explain the effi 
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

Military Intelligence School, attended by members of all the military se

well as police offi cers and civilians, to include students from friendly co

Th e author does express some concern about the will of th

cal class to give positive consideration to the proposed National Sec

Defense Act that is under review in the national Congress. Th is le

would lay the groundwork for obtaining societal support for a natio

ligence system. It would also begin to overcome the defi ciency in the 

of civilian professionals in the intelligence agencies and combat the sti

still affl icts intelligence organizations as a result of earlier political act

ture, and other human rights violations with which it is associated.

Taking a proactive stance, the author formulates a proposal to 

national intelligence system for Bolivia. It would establish an Intelligen

munity under the military J-2, which already embraces the intelligenc

zations of the three services, Army, Air Force, and Navy. It would bro

J-2’s jurisdiction to include the National Police and other national and 

entities. Th is arrangement would satisfy some important organizati

als: it would be focused on national security as well as defense; it wo

the President directly as part of the National Defense Council; it woul

both internal and external responsibilities, access to special funding, a 

appointed by the national Congress, and oversight by the Ministry o

and by a special Congressional Committee. Finally, the author suggests t

tional elements of the national intelligence system would include the 

of Foreign Relations for foreign intelligence issues and the Ministry of 

ment for internal issues. To those would be added offi cials from the M

Department as well as those from the elite Special Forces for narcotraffi 

Understanding the Infl uence of National Culture on Ecua

Intelligence System

Jaime Castillo of Ecuador explores Ecuadorian national cu

its infl uence on the makeup of the intelligence apparatus in that cou

begins by noting the contribution of civilian and military observers, 

of military authorities themselves, who have written insightful essa

Ecuadorian intelligence activities. Aft er 1979, intelligence at the natio

achieved considerable institutionalization as a result of the National 

Law. It established a national intelligence entity called the National Int

Directorate within the General Secretariat of the National Security 

(COSENA). However, the author also notes that, as oft en happens in 

of security and defense, requisite attention to national intelligence 

eclipsed in the sense that any issue linked to it is resolved in the conte
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legislation that refl ects the singular importance of strategic intelligence in 

national and international contexts.

Th e author considers that intelligence in Ecuador exists as a part o

armed forces, and because the society does not see it in any other light 

viewed as a threat to human rights and as a tool of governing authorities, ra

than being a function of the State per se. Th erefore, there is no concept 

intelligence needs to be “reformed” to meet the society’s needs. He noneth

asserts that, in order for intelligence services to become the professional 

ties they need to be as an instrument for eff ective decision making by lea

across the nation, its organization and equipment should be under the con

of civilian authorities.

In developing his ideas, Castillo establishes the value of “demilit

ing” the concept of intelligence, given that the range of intelligence activ

suitable for a state go beyond the military realm to involve multidiscipli

analysis related to personal security, development, education, and inte

tional relations. In this regard, he hints at an argument he is likely reser

for another essay: that despite the 1998 Border Peace Treaty between Ecu

and Perú, which settled a decades-long confl ict between the two count

the Ecuadorian armed forces have retained their hegemony over nati

intelligence, leaving little room for the development of civilian specialis

strategic intelligence.

Th e author does make a revelation that calls into question the ce

authority of the National Intelligence Directorate: he confi rms that the “E

dorian Public Forces” can undertake both internal and foreign intellig

activity without eff ective, centralized control. Rather, the NID simply serv

coordinating role.

Th e author agrees with other analysts of the region that the inte

tional exchange of information on transnational crime remains an obliga

An institutional example of such exchange exists in the “Bi-national Ecua

Colombia Border Commission.” Th e author recommends greater intellig

institutionalization in Ecuador to facilitate this type of information exch

because, otherwise, “those who feel threatened will seek other avenues to ob

it.” He cites, and is supported by, the National Intelligence Strategy of the 

in this regard.

We should not lose sight of the idea that Castillo intends to alert u

the transcendent importance of strategic intelligence in all areas of national 

ernment. When this approach is adopted, taking full advantage of techno

and knowledge, it will become a sound investment in good decision makin
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Chilean author Carolina Sancho Hirane confi rms the impres

by many in Latin America: that this country has developed in the last 

not without some hiccups—a consistent public policy concerning int

characterized by the author as being “pre-active” in intent and “incl

its formulation. She notes that three national organizations have man

evolution: the Public Security Coordinating Council (1991-1993); th

Security and Information Directorate (1993-2004); and since 2004, the 

Intelligence Agency (ANI), which also heads up the National Intellig

tem (SIE).

Th e author fi nds that the quality of intelligence produced in 

associated with the national political culture. In turn, this culture is re

the nature of the intelligence community: it abides by court decisions

the democratic nature of government and the constitutional rights of 

ple, and is guided by the principles of judicial authorization, propor

and care in the handling and use of information. Th e author gives us 

look at the intelligence system through an examination of judicial o

showing that the complex, interconnected, and changeable threats 

that populate the 21st century require a new perspective where thinkin

not only in terms of alternative future scenarios, but also in terms of fre

scenarios specifi cally tied to national objectives and interests.

Given those criteria, and despite undeniable progress in meeti

the author argues for a more thorough modernization of public po

respect to intelligence. She points out three areas for improvement: 

intelligence, the public approach to intelligence, and the national int

community itself. She goes even further in suggesting that various pu

ties that can contribute in some way to strategic intelligence need to 

part of the SIE, even though they have traditionally not been associ

intelligence. Notably, she has in mind the Foreign Ministry, whose ab

fi nds diffi cult to understand, given the country’s needs and objectives.

In a similar vein, she fi nds it inexplicable that the Ministry o

is not a part of the SIE, given the role of energy in national developm

the fact that energy security has been threatened in recent years (th

of which is abetted by supply restrictions from foreign sources). She a

an intelligence perspective in the Energy Ministry to understand the 

ity, diversity, and uniqueness of the relevant factors. Th e incorporatio

non-traditional government agencies into the National Intelligence Sy

determine the success or failure of its continuing evolution. Th e Syste

timely, precise, and trustworthy information for the highest levels of s

sion making to cut through information saturation with some effi cien
52 |

SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

insight into the political infl uence on strategic intelligence in this country

relates his conviction that, because intelligence is part of the defense polic

a country, the secret services have suff ered a fate similar to that of the Chi

armed forces: the political elite has paid little attention to national secu

issues, and thus neither the armed forces nor intelligence have been assig

a clear mission.

Th is author also suggests that, because of this absence of leader

national defense policy was mainly designed by the armed forces themse

One result is that inadequate resources have been allocated to the defense 

tor, even though for several decades strategic intelligence has been consid

a part of military intelligence. Th us, strategic intelligence has remained s

rated from the highest levels of decision making in the country. Of course

author reminds us of the tragic period of the military dictatorship in C

between 1973 and 1990, and of its signifi cance for the development of nati

intelligence. During this period, intelligence services acted as political p

dedicated to repressing and undermining opponents of the regime, thereby 

petrating grievous violations of human rights.

Th ese unfortunate circumstances distorted the perception of the i

ligence services among the political class, a fact refl ected in public opin

Military intelligence itself was accepted as a necessary evil. Indeed, sev

cases of political espionage did in fact take place between 1990 and 2005, 

petrated by Army and police intelligence operatives. Among the most not

episodes, with international repercussions, was the intelligence operation 

ried out in 2003 by military intelligence offi cials against the Argentine Con

ate in Punta Arenas.

Th is aff ront to democratic government moved the Chilean gover

coalition to carry out a gradual reform of the intelligence system, and to ap

strict legal framework. A civilian intelligence service was created with the in

tion of bringing reform to the military intelligence branches. In the end

National Intelligence Agency was created to enforce respect for human ri

as well as for legal and constitutional authorities. Th ese developments c

about aft er intense policy debates, sometimes laden with continuing prejud

against intelligence. Th e ANI was placed in charge of three areas: terror

organized crime, and counterintelligence. Other areas, such as economic i

ligence, industrial espionage, and the proliferation of weapons of mass dest

tion, remained unassigned by the enacting legislation. Additionally, ANI 

not conduct intelligence operations, nor can it penetrate banking secrecy.

Nonetheless, the weight of ongoing events has meant that ANI con

ues to gain the fl exibility to address a much greater range of issues than form
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as well as freedom to investigate neoNazi groups. Despite this prog

author recognizes the continuing need for ANI to develop public co

through its respect for legal constraints. Like Sancho Hirane, this au

ommends that other governmental institutions become a part of AN

should include the Chancellery, Customs, the Gendarmería, and the 

ment’s fi nancial analytic unit. Additionally, when a National Intelligenc

is established, it should be dedicated to the joint education of intellige

lysts from civilian, military, and police organizations.

Th e Way Ahead for Guatemala’s Intelligence Culture

Th e combined work of Grisel M. Capó and Werner F. Ovalle 

their examination of the multicultural Guatemalan scene. Th eir ow

ence and observations are supplemented by their survey of in-country 

defense, and intelligence experts. Th ey fi nd that, despite reforms un

following the extended period of armed confl ict in the country, Gua

only now beginning to implant a legal framework to overcome the 

volatile security and intelligence institutions. Th ere remains a tendenc

police intelligence over national, strategic intelligence.

Th e authors lament, like others in this book, that the chief int

agency in the country, the Strategic Analysis Secretariat, has se

directors come and go in the past eight years. Th is situation signals th

eff ective national policy. However, the authors do express approval o

in the other main intelligence institution in the country—the Genera

Intelligence Directorate—which, following the Chilean police int

model, has since 2005 had some success against organized crime an

problems of delinquency.

Th ese authors uncover another vulnerability of Guatemalan 

intelligence, again similar to what has been observed in other countr

region: that the military establishment maintains its hegemony in 

intelligence through the Military Intelligence Directorate. It is diffi cult 

ian intelligence professionals to gain a foothold because of the usual w

replacement of civilian intelligence offi cials with each change of gover

Furthermore, neither the population at large nor national polit

ers act in accord with a culture of prevention in the face of vulnerabilit

and threats, an approach which perpetuates a culture of social violence

ignorance and negativity about the intelligence function abound in the 

some individuals and groups are seeking to overcome this problem 

ing ways to improve civil-military relations. One avenue is through civ
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Democratic Security. Th e authors are convinced that the lack of an approp

intelligence culture among national leaders has undermined the existing i

tutions, permitting private intelligence groups to fl ourish.

Th e authors maintain that a culture of prevention can be implante

multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual Guatemala as part of a full im

mentation of national peace accords. With the newly promulgated Nati

Intelligence Law in place, they also see as necessary the recruitment and trai

of specialists in strategic intelligence as a way to enhance civil-military relat

National Intelligence in Costa Rica and Its Defi ciencies

Paul Chaves describes the historical evolution of the national in

gence service in his country, by name the Intelligence and Security Directo

(DIS). He recounts the several failed attempts to bring about a more eff ec

professional service. As it stands, the DIS has a police orientation, and is 

thermore linked to successive governments rather than to the state, which w

against its professionalism. Specifi cally, the author fi nds fault with the ultim

consumers of intelligence, namely the President and the Offi ce of the Presid

who tend not to have a sound understanding of the intelligence function

criticism on that score extends to many of the successive Directors of the D

Further developing this line of thought, the author suggests that C

Rican national security and its democratic institutions have thus far not 

fered appreciably from the absence of an eff ective national intelligence age

Th is is so for the same reason that the country has managed to get along wit

an army: It lacks a sense of being threatened by other countries. In fact, the 

threat seen to Costa Rican stability is that stemming from narcotraffi cking 

associated crimes. To confront that threat, several security institutions, non

them associated with the DIS, do operate with an acceptable level of profi ci

and professionalism.

Th e author sees considerable danger in not having a national in

gence agency that is capable of carrying out appropriate operations under 

and societal oversight. Th is situation results from negligence on the part of 

the civil society (the “political class”) and government leaders. Th ese gr

would ultimately be responsible if a new threat to national security and de

cratic stability were to arise without being foreseen and addressed by the 

In addition, we can observe that this security vulnerability has serious rami

tions in reducing the potential for regional cooperation against transnati

threats, to include terrorism, narcotraffi cking, traffi cking in arms and pe

and international organized crime.
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Fernando Velasco, Rubén Arcos, and Diego Navarro togethe

that in Spain a new impetus toward an intelligence culture has com

growing relationship between universities and the intelligence servic

nally stimulated by a democratic impulse fl owing from the Consti

1978. Th e new Constitution gave a boost to civil culture, which has c

with a “political socialization” of the intelligence services. Th e most not

come thus far has been the creation of the National Intelligence Cent

which has replaced the Defense Information Headquarters (CESID), a

of a 2002 law. Th is law embodied the aspirations of Spanish society

to have an eff ective, focused and modern intelligence service that can 

national and international issues, but that is also clearly subject to 

constitutional oversight.

Th e authors contend that an essential precursor to a nation

gence culture stems from the society’s understanding of why intellig

vices are needed. Th at is, the intelligence services not only provid

security and defense of the country, but also are central to the protec

advancement of the rights and interests of the entire population. Th 

do, however, recognize that to achieve this ideal, Spanish society must 

long-standing prejudices and distortions about intelligence that were f

the pre-democratic era.

Th e authors review the CNI’s attempts to foment a positive int

culture, as it has tried to acquaint the population at large with the real 

strategic, national intelligence. Th ey conclude that the eff ort is well u

and point to the intelligence curriculum in their own universities (U

of King Juan Carlos and University of Charles III of Madrid) as eviden

assertion. Th ey also contend that the publication of the fi rst academ

gence journal in Spain is an integral part of the process.

Th e authors go on to spell out four strategies that their un

are undertaking to further develop a positive intelligence culture in t

try: engaging practitioners and institutions to build on accumulate

ence; employing openness and dialogue to foster an understanding 

related to national intelligence; promoting an exchange of ideas; and 

transparency through various communications media, including the 

tion of books, articles, and other publications that bring further 

national intelligence.

Additionally, the authors allude to the importance of research

ing doctoral dissertations, to build ties with universities and research c

other countries where an intelligence culture is already well establishe
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the society at large and the countrys intelligence community.

Nature and Characteristics of the Cuban Intelligence Services

Beginning with an historical perspective, Cuban author and for

intelligence agent Juan Manuel Reyes-Alonso takes us back to 1959 to re

the origins of the government’s intelligence services. At that time, the clan

tine, revolutionary anti-Batista movement created the Investigative Servic

the Rebel Army (DIER), putting it in charge of police functions as well 

intelligence and counterintelligence. According to the author’s sources, in 1

as Fidel Castro seized power across the island, he made two new intellig

services, the State Security Agency (DSE) and the General Intelligence D

torate (DGI), subordinate to the Interior Ministry (MININT).

Th e DSE was designated to operate within Cuba, and assumed the co

terintelligence role previously assigned to the DIER. At the same time, the 

focused on foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Th e author empha

that the DGI was headed by the fearsome Comandante Manuel Piñeiro Lo

(pseudonym Barbarroja and cryptonym M-1). In contrast with the DSE, w

did not have Soviet advisors, the DGI did depend heavily on those advi

especially aft er 1965. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) 

its own secret services: the Military Intelligence Directorate (DIM) and the 

itary Counterintelligence Directorate (CIM), both of which maintained inte

tion with the DGI.

As this information shows, the author is very explicit in his descrip

and he makes it clear from the start that the Cuban intelligence services pl

a key role in the Castro regime. He notes that offi cials of the DIER, and the

the DSE, were well-educated, many of them having studied and lived in the 

before the start of the regime. Th is meant that intelligence and counteri

ligence offi cials could infi ltrate communities of Cubans and Americans in 

U.S., and gain a valuable perspective on the U.S. government and its own in

gence services. Without doubt, this operational potential was greatly reinfo

by the systematic training and technical and economic support of the So

KGB and other intelligence services of the Socialist Bloc, such as those of 

Germany and Bulgaria.

Reyes-Alonso points out that, in contrast with the KGB, the Cu

DGI emphasizes the recruitment of agents based on ideological affi nity, ra

than through cash incentives, as a way to overcome the DGI’s economic 

logistical defi ciencies. In short, its HUMINT eff ort is highly eff ective. 

dedication of Cuban HUMINT experts is essential to that success, given 

lack of a positive, socialist model for them to emulate. Among the interes
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

are Department MI, focused on the U.S.; MII, focused on Latin Ame

M-III, charged with strategic intelligence analysis.

For the author, Department M-V is not only the most secr

compartmented division of the DGI, but it is distinctive for its auto

fi nances remain a secret, even to the DGI’s comptroller. Only a very r

group in the DGI and from the highest levels of the Castro regime k

true fi nancial resources and real identities of the covert M-V opera

author indicates that these covert agents are very well-prepared and ca

ate themselves undetected in the country to which they have been 

even to the point of becoming citizens of the target country.

Th e next Department, M-VI, exists expressly to engage in c

espionage and to get around the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba.

Reyes-Alonso places a spotlight on a 1989 episode in Cuba 

been widely ignored: the secrets behind the “1st and 2nd Causes.” Th 

judicial processes against Cuban offi cials who were found to be a

with narcotraffi cking and with other corruption. He alleges that many 

government offi cials were operating on behalf of the government, an

Fidel himself. What was especially damaging to Cuban intelligence 

from this episode was the witch hunt that Raúl Castro instituted to 

those offi cials who, in his view, did not serve his purposes in the pow

he was playing.

Finally, like many critics of the Castro regime,94 the autho

vinced that the intelligence services have played a fundamental and 

role in keeping the Castro regime in power. Fidel survived the regimes 

Presidents and some 630 assassination plots against him. Th e intellig

security services have made it possible for the only communist gover

the hemisphere to survive, with the consequence that it can continue 

mine democratic rule in the entire region, now with the support of a

resources that accompany the tight relationship which the Cuban gov

is maintaining with Hugo Chavez’s administration.

Perspectives on U.S. Intelligence Culture

Jon Wiant off ers his views on U.S. intelligence culture, and 

a signifi cant duality in the way it is seen by the country’s citizens: wh

94 See the interview article, “Cuba ya vive la era post-Fidel Castro: Brian Lat

Mexico City daily El Universal, 22 January 2007, where Brian Latell, who for mo

years worked as a Latin America analyst with the CIA, and for 15 years was a mem

National Intelligence Council, asserts the following about Cuban intelligence: “It is 

five best intelligence services, in my opinión. I consider that along with that of the 

Britain, Russia and Israel, Cuba’s is among the verv best.”
58 |

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9/11 attacks to neutralize the continuing threat, there exists at the same tim

notable reluctance to see additional intelligence vigor because it can thre

Constitutional protections. Despite this ambivalence, the author fi nds tha

issue of how to apply intelligence to safeguard the internal security of the 

has contributed to fruitful discussion and action.

In further exploring this duality, Wiant concludes that there is alw

a variable, interpretive aspect in the application of the diverse laws that go

intelligence activities, whereby their interpretation does not depend on the c

system but rather on Congress itself. It is Congress that determines whethe

intelligence law has been violated. With that in mind, the author points ou

controversial interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FI

which requires a judicial order to tap the communications of an individu

the U.S. who is suspected of having contact with foreign agents—potential 

mies of the U.S. and its policies.

For Wiant, this problem comes to a head when the degree of in

gence vigilance brings about a technical violation of law, rather than a viola

of its intent, simply because the legislation in question did not foresee the 

matic changes in the means of personal communication, which in eff ect m

the law irrelevant. Th e author voices his worry that the relevance of the la

debated only in Congress, a place teeming with political partisanship, ra

than in the court system. Other than in this discontinuity between law and 

ity in the U.S., the author considers that few real, cultural diff erences exi

the approach to intelligence activities taken by the English-speaking and n

English-speaking countries of the hemisphere.

Referring back to his personal experiences in the intelligence pro

sion, the author (who was involved in the investigation of the Iran-Contra c

remains convinced of the obligation of intelligence agencies, as well as of i

vidual practitioners, to protect sources and methods. If they do not, they w

expose themselves and the intelligence system to even greater danger 

greater scrutiny by Congress. Wiant draws attention to the honesty and loy

to the country and to the profession that prevails among U.S. intelligence 

fessionals. An examplar of these virtues was Nathan Hale, whose statue is fo

in front of CIA headquarters, and who famously declared, “I regret that I 

but one life to give for my country.” Wiant then relates an interesting story a

former CIA Director Bill Casey, who expressed a somewhat diff erent vie

Hale’s intelligence professionalism.

On another plane, the author asserts that, despite the import

attached to individual initiative in the U.S., over the past 20 years, the belie

grown that a team approach to intelligence activities is required to attain 
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

tion, innovation, and a willingness to take risks. However, in this con

author expresses concern about the diffi culty of reaching a satisfactor

between individual initiative and individual responsibility.

Wiant goes on to explore other vulnerabilities of U.S. intellige

ticularly in the area of human-source intelligence (HUMINT). He arg

characteristic bureaucratic formalism as well as a “frightful impatienc

intelligence circles mean that careful and productive HUMINT activit

fl ourish. One is reminded of the Chinese proverb “Make of patience a

of hope a virtue.”

Of interest is the author’s claim that the principal collectors 

ligence for the U.S. government, in the cultural, economic, social, an

cal realm, that is, information useful for policy development, comes 

the CIA but rather from the Foreign Service of the Department of Sta

mation from this Service, in the view of the author, makes up 60 o

cent of the President’s Daily Brief. Despite this reality, the author not

recent years the intelligence role of the Foreign Service has been und

for various reasons, seriously aff ecting U.S. intelligence capabilities. I

this observation, he thinks that national-level intelligence leaders nee

greater priority to resourcing this Service, rather than other Commun

cies, to give a pragmatic boost to HUMINT.

In any event, Wiant is aware of the need to continue gathering 

tion about the intentions and policies of foreign powers through a cla

service. He does observe that the existing CIA-based Clandestine Servi

fi nd a strong complement in the Foreign Service. Such collaboration 

Foreign Service would allow formidable interoperability, possibly ove

some of the fragmentation that now characterizes the Intelligence Com

Finally, he notes that it might also be possible to take a long-term app

HUMINT programs if the planning horizon were lengthened to resem

of the more technical U.S. intelligence programs such as those involv

lite collection.

Another revealing perspective comes from Bowman H. Mi

shows that tradition, history, myths, legends, stories, anecdotes, langu

shared national image have all played a strong formative role in U.S. 

intelligence. Looking back through history, he fi nds that from Re

ary times—from 1776—many of its citizens have seen their country 

terms, imputing to it a divine obligation to lead the world and serve it 

manent guarantor of basic values such as liberty, peace, justice, and eq

opportunity. America, in the view of this author, has thus seen itself 

on the hill,” and this attitude has justifi ed U.S. intervention in other 
60 |

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democracy. Still, the author reminds us that there is not in this country a si

point of view with respect to strategic thinking, as there does not exist a un

national culture.

Th e author goes on to show that, despite some known successes, 

national intelligence has for decades suff ered from errors and poor judgm

with respect to just how the country might most fruitfully interact with o

countries. In the fi rst several years of the 21st century, the U.S. has suff ered f

two national intelligence failures: fi rst, a failure by omission, in not antic

ing the attacks of 9/11, and second, by commission, in presuming that Sad

Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. As a result of these deve

ments, the Intelligence Community was expected to improve, and found 

under greater congressional oversight. Th e author fi nds fault with an o

emphasis on security threats by defense offi cials, and with the lingering f

on the events of 9/11.

Continuing his review of the national intelligence landscape in 

country, the author points out an additional factor: the proliferation of pun

and of sources of information. Specifi cally, he considers that, despite warn

against the U.S. invasion of Iraq made by the U.S. Intelligence Community, 

especially by State Department analysts, the press and mass communica

outlets all failed to carry out their traditional, independent, and objective in

tigative mission by not reporting critically on the plans, policies, and intent

of the U.S. with respect to Iraq in 2002 and 2003. At the same time, Miller po

out that, despite the Community’s intention to remain secretive, the fact 

two to three million people in government have access to intelligence infor

tion, and live in a liberal and open society, in practice means that leaks of se

tive information are rather common.

In another area, Miller confi rms that, in the U.S., personal privacy 

tinues to be a right protected by laws, which also accord an individual acce

government information about the individual. Th is right has been tested by 

USA PATRIOT Act, which has fostered “warrantless wiretapping.” Th us

author fi nds that, although there is not a unitary culture in the country de

the call for greater unity of eff ort expressed by the National Intelligence Stra

some cultural proclivities remain very clear with respect to intelligence. M

also notes that U.S. counterterrorism experts fi nd that in the past 40 year

defense and intelligence apparatus has not kept pace with the highly mobile 

secretive networks of fourth-generation (asymmetric) warfare. He notes 

intelligence leaders do understand that such confl ict will be long-lasting 

not susceptible to being won with high explosives. Rather, the new warfa

fundamentally a war of ideas.
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

several facets of its overall culture as well as its strategic culture. Th a

as there is a focus on threats, the overriding aim is to place the country 

tion to handle the tide of globalization by ensuring global coverage fi t

global superpower. All this even as the Intelligence Community concen

resources on the most urgent issues. Th is well-placed author remains c

that U.S. political authorities will continue to demand that they not be s

by facts, threats, or other phenomena that may aff ect the country, eve

understood that this mission is supremely diffi cult to accomplish.
62 |

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Jorge Serrano Torres, a Peruvian, holds degrees in Public Admini

tion, Law, and Communications. He specialized in Strategic Intelligence 

Counterintelligence at the Peruvian National Intelligence School, and stu

at the Peruvian Diplomatic School. He is an active member of Strategos, a P

vian institute for intelligence analysis and dissemination, and off ers cours

the Army Intelligence School. He is also a faculty member at Ricardo Pa

University, where he holds the Mariátegui Chair and teaches courses in i

ligence and regional, international relations. Serrano also lectures at the P

vian National University in San Marcos, and is a consultant with the Rese

Center for the Development of Justice, which fi ghts corruption and prom

personal security within the framework of Peruvian and regional justice 

tems. He has also served as advisor to the German Agency for Internati

Cooperation and Development in its Good Government Program. He a

tionally contributes regularly to the multilingual “Voltaire” network, with h

quarters in France and links to the International Press Agency. His essays 

been published in ten countries. He may be contacted at jas_606@hotmail

and antonio3032003@yahoo.es.
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REFLECTIONS ON INTELLIGEN

CULTURE: CAREER ENGAGEMEN

OF A U.S. CIVIL AND MILITARY 

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

Jon Wiant, with Russell G. Swenson

Habitually, Americans associate secrecy with privilege and 

maneuvering, both of which go against their grain. As a result, 

trail documenting secret intelligence activities surfaces only in 

pieces combed from such unconventional sources as narrowly c

memoirs and quietly commissioned reports stored in archives.95

Why is intelligence today such a salient feature of U.S. foreign a

national security? Historically it had its importance during times of con

generally was not an activity that enjoyed public esteem or much fi nan

port. Th at changed with World War II, when for the fi rst time we mob

intellectual resources of the country to engage in intelligence work for 

security. Intelligence mobilization has remained a feature of U.S. cult

that time.

At the same time, the notion of national intelligence in pop

ture, in the chords of memory that bind the citizens of this country, 

transformed strictly from its association with secrecy—and its equa

espionage—to a point, from about 1975, where there reigns a two-sided

phrenic view of intelligence in American society. On the one hand, 

the view that national intelligence must be continually enhanced, tha

be made more extensive, that it must be made ever more pervasive, in 

meet threats such as that from terrorism—which is diffi cult to defi ne, b

fest in the events of 11 September 2001. Th e other side of the coin is 

about this enterprise, whereby it is seen as the very enemy of the Con

95 Edward F. Sayle, “The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence Co

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986)

light, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral Hist

(http://www.adst.org/index.html) has recently interviewed Jon Wiant about his i

career.
64 |

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tension, between the clear purpose of intelligence in supporting national s

rity, and the question of how much we should engage in this business at h

to make ourselves more secure.

U.S. Intelligence Culture in the Hemispheric Context

In Latin America, national intelligence, including the military in

gence apparatus, has been employed to suppress internal opposition. Fur

detailed Constitutions characteristic of many countries in the region can 

on the fl avor of regulations rather than general guiding principles. In the 

case, the Constitution, with its relatively few amendments, remains larg

repository of general principles, including the fi rst ten amendments, know

the Bill of Rights. Th us, in the U.S. it may be easier for us to fall back on t

general guiding principles than it is for intelligence professionals in the n

English speaking parts of the Hemisphere, who in intending philosophi

to support their Constitution rather than a particular political administra

may be poorly served. Th at is, in some countries, the Constitution will l

refl ect a particular administration’s view of what is permitted by governm

agents and, even if not, it is not unknown for a Constitution to be observe

the breach, leaving an intelligence operative without an ethical safety net.96

Nonetheless, while we do have a deep sense of constitutionalism in 

U.S., the sense of it may be deeper than the reality. Th at is to say, our att

ment to the Bill of Rights has great symbolic appeal, and yet, on any partic

day, we will fi nd signifi cant voices in this country that advocate positions 

seem to be fundamentally inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. But with 

having been said, we collectively share this ideal, and every intelligence offi 

is brought into service with the basic catechism that says we may be brea

the laws abroad, but it is critical to us that we be fundamentally attentive to 

own domestic laws.

An essential truth to be understood about national intelligence p

tices in the U.S. is that our intelligence-related laws are not perceived to be 

same as everyday laws. To make that point more clear: Many years ago, du

the covert action program in Central America, particularly in Nicaragua

had an amendment, the Boland Amendment, that imposed signifi cant res

tions on what activities we could conduct, and attached to that was the idea 

96 Semana.com (Colombia), “Dos Bolivias: La aprobación de la nueva Carta M

hizo que el país se polarizara más allá de lo previsible. Muchos temen guerra civil, la 

tición del país, o las dos.” 1 December 2007, URL: http://www.semana.com/wf_Info

ulo.aspx?IdArt=108049.
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

themselves were fundamentally consistent with our stated policy. Th e 

was that there was a growing gap between the stated policy and the actu

we were pursuing in Central America. At one point I was spun up a

concern, and I went to a very senior offi cial in my organization, telling 

I had been looking very closely at this activity and it appeared that we a

lation of the law. And the senior offi cial said, “Jon, this law is diff erent 

example, bank robbing laws. Th ere, it’s pretty cut and dried. But in th

of laws, you are not against the law, until a majority of Congress say

against the law, and we don’t have a majority saying that right now.”

Th ere is an interpretive aspect to the enforcement of a rang

that are central to how we conduct the intelligence business. Th e in

tion depends not so much on the court system, where we think justice 

ered, but rather on the actions of the legislative branch. Th at branch de

whether a law has been violated. Similarly, today we face concerns a

interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA

requires a legal warrant prior to “wiretapping” individuals within the 

are in communication with foreign or non-governmental opponents o

and its policies.98 So-called “warrantless wiretaps” by defi nition occur 

tion of this law, because it stipulates that any domestic electronic sur

will be conducted within the framework of this statute. Although su

ligence targeting is against the law in the technical sense of being ag

FISA, some people do argue that the problem is that the language of 

ute did not anticipate the structure of contemporary communications

because the structure of the communications systems is so changed, t

irrelevant. And if we wish to say a law is irrelevant, we have the cou

that. But the debate occurs in a Congress where political partisansh

and not so far at the highest level of the court system.

Th us, this aspect of cultural diff erence between the English-

and non-English speaking parts of the hemisphere is not so great as an

And this is for many an uncomfortable observation to make. Another 

comes from E. Howard Hunt’s recent book.99 He did not have a grea

tion at CIA; his career accomplishments were modest. But at the Whi

97 See GAO Red Book report B-201260, 11 September 1984, for a legal opinion 

General Accounting (now Government Accountability) Office. This opinion outlines t

tions identified by the Boland Amendment. URL: http://redbook.gao.gov/14/fl00672

98 For the text of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, see http://www.a

gov/uscode/title50/chapter36_.html. In 2007, a “modernization” of the FISA wa

labeled the “Protect America Act of 2007.” See http://www.whitehouse.

releases/2007/08/20070806-5.html.

99 E. Howard Hunt, An American Spy: My Secret History in the CIA (New York: Wile
66 |

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tion to establish that that earlier President was the central fi gure in the deci

to overthrow Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, as well as being involve

the Vietnamese leader’s subsequent death. Th e purpose of Hunt’s work w

provide a controlled leak of the cables to discredit Kennedy, and by exten

to discredit Ted Kennedy in his potential Presidential campaign. Th is Ex

tive wrongdoing, involving the Chief of Staff to the President, was a matt

everyday business. And nowhere in Hunt’s account does anyone consider 

approach wrong, or that “this is against the law.” Th ose involved did wo

what to do if they were caught, which is a rather diff erent question. As we p

der intelligence operatives involved in this way in the White House, we can 

back and say, “Th at was a pretty scary period.”

When Congress decides to hold hearings to bring to the attentio

the public the dimensions of such alleged illegality—we had similar h

ings about Iran-Contra—we have the secret parts of intelligence under 

spotlight of a public inquiry. In these cases, issues are raised that get 

scary for people to want to go further—questions that we simply do not w

to ask because we are afraid of the answer that might follow. Unfortuna

the examination of this dilemma has largely been left to the movies w

“Enemy of the State” has taken on a multitude of meanings, many of w

are indicative of this public fear.

I look at this situation as someone who had almost an entire year o

life consumed by the Iran-Contra inquiry. I once calculated how many h

I spent being deposed and I’m not anything but a bit player in terms of l

term involvement in the program, but I was a witness to everything. It’s 

uncomfortable if you are caught in this central dilemma of intelligence, w

in fact is reinforced in the Central Intelligence Act of 1949—that it is our st

tory obligation to protect sources and methods.100 At the same time, there 

Constitutional obligation to reveal the very things that we are sworn to pro

if that revelation is central to uncovering or explicating a potential wrongdo

Th ere is a kind of irony that the man whose name holds the greatest statu

the CIA, Richard Helms, perjured himself in front of Congress by not revea

sources and methods.101 We all look back on him as the exemplar of all th

100 According to CIA spokesman Edmund Cohen, in “Cold War Documentation, Na

Security, and the Fullest Possible Accounting: Restriction vs. Access,” at the 25 Septe

1998 Cold War Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International Hi

“The Director of Central Intelligence’s responsibility and authority to protect intellig

sources and methods is found in the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1

as amended, as well as in Executive Order 12958.” https://www.cia.gov/news-informa

speeches-testimony/1998/cohen_speech_092598.html.

101 Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New 

Knopf, 1979).
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

that the more important thing was his fi delity to the cardinal princip

intelligence business rather than to answer the questions of elected Co

nal representatives. To betray the name of a source who has provided 

us—even with the understanding that we will do things to ensure th

safety—jeopardizes the fundamental circumstances under which we 

and refl ects the potential jeopardy of detailed Congressional oversigh

other hand, we cannot have institutions that have values that are inc

and that are fundamentally in confl ict with the society which created t

which they support. In 1775 our political ancestors with the Continen

gress established a Committee of Secret Correspondence to fund secre

agents in England and France. One year later this same Committee e

reluctance to report to the newly independent Congress for fear of jeop

sources and methods.102 Th e issue has been with us a long time and c

to run like a leit motiv through the operational oversight relationship.

Cultural Values Embodied by U.S. Intelligence Offi cers

What is the appeal of the secret life? What is the appeal of a l

every morning you cross a perimeter, a boundary, a barrier, that sepa

from society? You go to the workplace, show your badge, and enter y

code, and it is not just a practical security measure, but a philosophic

a big sense. In doing this we establish ourselves as part of a secret ord

a kind of Freemasonry quality to it. And since it is not transparent, th

notion of our business is in fact made more exciting by its exclusivene

its very opaqueness. And it is rendered to the public largely through fi 

While I was initially trained at Fort Holabird in 1965 as a cou

ligence special agent, I started my operational work in intelligence aft 

cross-trained as a case offi cer—as a kind of paramilitary case offi cer

was in case offi cer training, I learned to spot, assess, develop, and recru

level offi cial in some Eastern European defense ministry. In fact, my fi r

tional assignment as a case offi cer was in Vietnam, when none of the 

seemed to have any relevance to my source, which was somebody who 

into the secret jungle zone. So instead of looking for a mid-level offi c

a person who is a rattan-maker, charcoal-maker, who could get impre

102 Center for the Study of Intelligence, Intelligence in the War of Independence, 

Techniques: Secrecy and Protection, posted 15 March 2007 at https://www.cia.g

center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/int

intelltech.html.

103 Wesley Britton, Beyond Bond: Spies in Fiction and Film (New York: Greenw

2005).
68 |

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a porter column out in the jungle and taken to where there were secrets. 

was a whole diff erent kind of agent, and it has a kind of romance to it bec

the whole concept of identity is in play and because behind this wall that s

rates us from others and from our family, we have this secret self that is kin

appealing. I always thought that one of the diff erences in the personal relat

ship versus the institutional relationship is that we are committed to a gre

fi delity in that institutional relationship—the relationship with an intellig

organization—than in the most sacred personal relationship, which is the 

of a marriage. Notably, one is compelled to be far more revelatory abou

inner self in the relationship with an intelligence institution than ever seem

be the case in a marriage.

Patriotism is expressed in our intelligence duty and is nurtured in 

mythology. We have for example the statue of Nathan Hale at the front of 

Th is spy who is about to be hung says, supposedly, that “I regret that I have 

one life to give for my country.” Director of Central Intelligence William C

wanted that statue removed. “Why should we have a statue to a man who f

on his fi rst mission, and then did not say that his regret was that he had faile

his intelligence mission?”104 In my own moments of self-refl ection I too re

that I can experience but one career in intelligence. Th is has been just a won

ful place for me to work—where else could I have done these exciting thin

things that I would like to do again? And it’s incidental that it’s public ser

104 CIA Home Page story, “A Look Back—the Story of Nathan Hale,” at https://ww

gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/nathan-hale.html, posted 20 September 2

Also see “Nathan Hale” in Masters of the Intelligence Art series at http://huachuca-

army.mil/History/PDFS/MHALE.PDF.

The author as a young 

soldier in Vietnam. 

Source: Author.
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

highest medal that comes from the Community, and as I listened to th

tion of my diverse activities, I’m thinking, “My God, that was fun!”

Intelligence as a Military or Paramilitary Function

If you are working in intelligence, there is absolutely no subs

military service prior to going into the intelligence business. Service in 

tary or in combat support gives you some intimacy with the needs of a

tional consumer. I have long thought that my success in the early pa

intelligence career was inextricably related to my success as a young 

soldier. I had come to know military subjects pretty well, and when 

a military intelligence offi cial I had some understanding of the rel

between the use of information and subsequent outcomes.

Recently, I have been working on an “anthropology in inte

study to see if we can develop a better understanding of the distinct op

and analytical cultures that are present in the 16 agencies that make up 

ligence Community. My conceptualization of culture is very much in

by work I did while a graduate student at Cornell, focusing on Burm

been impressed by the ways in which function aff ected the structure 

groups and how the demands of the larger environment in which t

group existed sharply infl uenced both power and authority in the orga

As I examined the contemporary Intelligence Community, one of th

that stood out to me as a defi ning attribute of diff erent intelligence in

was the steepness of the decision hierarchy. We can consider that suc

archy is more or less another form of asymmetric confl ict—confl ict 

superiors and subordinates. In military intelligence one negative ou

this steep hierarchy has been the opportunity aff orded high-level int

offi cials to disregard competing intelligence estimates. It was a dark 

intelligence in 1967 when intelligence estimates of enemy numbers in 

were disregarded in this way.105 When there is a hotly contested int

issue, and the boss of an organization determines such limitations to 

then the organization can never really be good. Likewise, today if you 

that you cannot use the term “insurgent” for policy reasons, then it is v

to come up with language that describes the factions that, for examp

confl ict in Iraq.

A central cultural question regarding U.S. intelligence is 

its function? Is its function primarily military, regardless of wheth

105 Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968 

ton, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1998), 140.
70 |

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1947, and the creation of the CIA, the purpose is laid out clearly to a

experiencing another Pearl Harbor-style attack. Th e primary functio

intelligence, national intelligence, strategic intelligence, therefore, is av

ing strategic surprise. But I have quibbled with that interpretation all al

because intelligence does many things.

Th e idea of all intelligence somehow being related to the military or 

military sense of national security has been very problematic for the trans

of our organizations. Maintaining a long intelligence relationship with V

nam, or interpreting the issue of changing relationships with China, invo

things that are far broader, and that are far more varied, than the issue of 

tegic warning of military capabilities. At the end of the Cold War perio

we learned with the devaluation of the Mexican peso, an economic or ban

decision can have profound strategic implications for our national well-bein

realms far afi eld from estimating military-related intentions and capabilitie

Intelligence, Surveillance, and U.S. Domestic Security

Th e question of how intelligence may be used for internal securi

the U.S. is the most important issues now facing our society. Th e outcom

that debate strongly aff ects how we envision our defi ning cultural institut

Having been deeply involved in issues of the 1960s that provoked the cal

reform in this area has caused me to consider how we got to that point

understanding of how we became involved in surveillance for homeland s

rity during the Vietnam War is both less sinister than many have made it, 

more worrisome for that fact. Th e programs evolved not out of a determina

to set the Constitution aside, but rather had their origins in things that w

make sense to anyone, and that I would argue were legal. But the programs g

to be too robust, for lack of attentiveness or of oversight.

Th e 1949 Delimitations Agreement set out the spheres of responsib

among the FBI and the counterintelligence arms of the military services—

would have the lead in responsibility for subversion, espionage investigat

sabotage, and the like in the United States.106 Th e agreement established tha

matters within the jurisdiction of a military base, the lead investigative resp

sibility is that of the counterintelligence organization of the uniformed ser

It was meant to keep intelligence “spooks” from bumping into each other, a

grew out of the concern for communist infi ltration of American institution

the early years of the Cold War period. Th us, if the incident were to take pla

106 See National Counterintelligence Center, Counterintelligence in World War II, Ed. 

J. Rafalko, Vol 2, Chapter 1, n.d. http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch1_e.htm#f
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//FRD//MR

go fi rst. Th at concept is important for understanding how the surve

antiwar demonstrations came about.

Th e fi rst action that transcended protest, moving into illega

pened in 1965, with the sabotage of the rail line going into the Oakla

fornia, Army Terminal. Army counterintelligence therefore had th

responsibility to surveil antiwar protestors, whether at Berkeley or at 

or at San Francisco City College. Later in 1965, U.S. troops were sent in

in South Los Angeles to put down serious riots and racial violence. 

transformational in the sense that the protests had escalated from the 

tational but relatively nonviolent civil rights movement in the Southeas

to what may be characterized as insurgent actions. Th e level of violence 

fi cient that the president of the U.S. decided to commit troops for the 

since 1943 to put down a domestic disturbance.107 From an intellige

spective, the interesting thing was that, when the airborne troops were 

in, the commander asked for an intelligence briefi ng on the hostile f

asked the police department—paraphrasing—“Don’t we have a milit

ligence unit here?” Th e immediate answer: “Yes, we have nationwide 

intelligence by region, and then fi eld offi ces in large cities, for the pu

doing background investigations, physical security, and occasionally e

cases.” Th e local commander from the Los Angeles fi eld offi ce admit

don’t have a clue.” So the airborne commander says, “We have U.S

forces committed here, and you’re telling me that you don’t have a clue

relieved of duty!”

Aft er that, things turned around pretty quickly. Now we had t

nal threats that we began to work on from within the military int

structure. One was the threat from the antiwar movement, which to

forms, not the least of which was the Black Panthers and their armed m

Th e other was more general unrest. Now, as a military intelligence offi 

though one was in a domestic offi ce, he had better not have any surpri

area. In any large urban area, he was courting the possibility that ther

unrest. As the genesis of surveillance by military intelligence, this w

nario sort of made sense to the American public. But it proceeded wit

real guidance.

I went into my fi rst, brief counterintelligence assignment in 

cago Loop fi eld offi ce in the fall of 1965, and we had some standing c

requests on what was happening, for instance, with a group called t

Keystone Rangers, because we had military facilities and an Army head

107 This instance occurred in the city of Detroit, MI. See David Adams, “Intern

Intervention in the United States,” Journal of Peace Research, 32, No. 2 (May 1995
72 |

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1967 and 1968 it had become a signifi cant concern, not least because a num

of National Guard armories had been raided. We had the possibility of pro

growing into insurgency. We can look back and judge that to be an overest

tion of capabilities, even if not of intentions. However, given the numbe

Guard armories that had been robbed, an insurgent capability was growing

Th e movement that was developing had as its ideology a sort of n

classical Marxism. Th is was the Mao Era. It was a non-electoral movement, 

it was the kind of movement where one could become radicalized at the 

ricades. Power came out of the barrel of a gun. I think it was one of the rea

why the New Left has such a weak legacy, in terms of the protest moveme

was because the embrace of a culture of protest was alien to America. Du

the Cold War, we wanted to get foreign peoples behind us. And part of th

that one has to look in the mirror: We had come out of the 1950s and 1960s 

we were gangbusters in covert action programs sowing subversion and un

abroad. And did it not make sense now that maybe our opponents were d

the same thing to us? In my mind, the military took on the internal surveill

role because the FBI could not fi gure out how to handle it. Th e Hoover FBI 

more accustomed to penetrating the American Communist Party than it 

dealing with these young, wild civilians and, since most of us coming into 

military service were of these students’ age, it was easier for us to penetrate 

organizations. Culturally we had quite a lot in common. For many of us, en

ing in military intelligence became a good way for bright kids to satisfy 

military obligation in an intellectually stimulating kind of organization. W

I was going through my training, there were guys with academic degrees f

Princeton, Yale, and places like that. It looked more like the intelligence c

in WWII than that of today. And it had its appeal because all of us were sub

to the draft .

Restraints on Individual Initiative in Intelligence

Consider the motto of the British Special Air Service—“who d

wins.” Th e implication, whether in operations or in intelligence, is that one 

got to dare to do something diff erent, to dare to do something new, to take 

in order to be successful. U.S. culture extols individual initiative. Allen D

would say that our whole business, particularly on the human side, and we c

say on the technical side of intelligence too, involves overcoming obstacl

getting the information we need, with our side also having the responsibili

taking initiatives to make it hard for the other side to obtain our own infor

tion. We can think of each service wondering, “What are my vulnerabilit

Th ey will then take certain measures to fi x those vulnerabilities, and the 
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the other side can invent ways of protecting them. And so there is a 

on imagination, innovation.

In the pre-intelligence reform days of the 1970s, I don’t th

were a lot of considerations of law, and of having reference to legal co

we went about our business. One of the ways to map this thought mi

determine trends in the size of the offi ce of General Counsel in the int

organization. Th is would help answer the question: How is intelligenc

ment with the rule of law refl ected? Let us say that we have a priori

gence requirement to report on violations of human rights in Guatem

can we do that? Probably the best way is to recruit somebody from i

organization who is committing the alleged violations. We would nee

some way to put them under pressure, under discipline, get them to be

trust to that organization, and develop greater trust with us. So what 

done, in a technical sense, is recruit someone who is a human rights 

and put him or her on our payroll. And, because we operate in bure

and information does leak out, we are likely to have a revelation on 

page of a major newspaper that our organization has someone on th

who is with the death squads. Th is points up the value of maintaining 

ous consultation with legal counsel in the business today.

What I am most proud of in my years of involvement in Centr

ica is a very systematic and consistent initiative to penetrate the deat

in El Salvador. To do so, we wound up dealing with some awful, awfu

And in the end, we did break the back of the death squads in that per

in doing so, we gave some positive prospects for a kind of democracy.

Farther down the Isthmus and, in my experience, when we w

aft er Manuel Noriega in the late 1980s, Congress had restricted the use 

in Panama, in its frustration over Noriega and our continued military 

ship with that country. Th us, we in intelligence had to fi gure out ho

around this funds restriction in order to succeed in the campaign again

ga’s illegitimate regime, which we all accepted as a noble goal. Even the 

was in agreement with our aims and considered we were doing a “sha

thing.”108 But my attorney said, as I made some innovative proposals 

ligence actions, “Jon, you guys right now are sitting here preparing to v

provisions of our treaty with Panama, and I must remind you that trea

the status of law in this country, and so this is a conspiracy to violate U

108 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Panama: A Country Study 

ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), Ch. 4.
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quently is found to be questionable, although everything he did was consi

with the culture in which he was operating, is it the U.S. public, which is re

sented by intelligence offi cers through the medium of federal regulations 

through Constitutional principles, or the individual offi cer who has to be 

accountable? Lawyers in the Intelligence Community do discourage innova

in the sense that their role is to determine the boundaries of what action

can take that would still be considered consistent with our laws and syste

justice, knowing that the rules vary widely by whatever organizations’ cul

rules are being observed. And who else can we ask as we face ethical questi

Do we ask the chaplain? Do we ask our spiritual advisor? Do we ask our a

ney? Our attorney should be able to say “yes” or “no.” I made my career op

ing at the edge of the envelope. But I always wanted an attorney around 

could confi dently tell me where the edge of the envelope was.

When I was growing up, I would hear my father say, “Hey, son, s

some initiative. Don’t follow the group.” We pride ourselves on our indivi

independence. We celebrate the value of the single person operating alone, 

rying out his ideas and being subject to their consequences. At the same tim

the last 15 to 20 years, we have gotten the idea that operating as an intellig

team is equally or more important. Th is idea is becoming culturally ingra

through training and experience, as we all know that there is no “I” in team

intelligence offi cer can really operate independently today. We rely on som

else to do the name traces, to do the biographical check. Th e hardest thing t

as an intelligence manager, I found, was to give my subordinates free rein to 

their initiative—this even in a situation where I had some folks with capac

that literally astounded me in how they defi ned exercising initiative! And 

responsibility overall was to hold them accountable. Accountability has b

a great check on incautious initiative. But the countervailing issue is that 

consequence it is the cautious person who rises to the top, which is not the 

outcome. My own best work was done for bosses who gave me a lot of free

to go out and “do things.”

Th e recent discussions surfacing in the press about tensions betw

CIA Headquarters and the fi eld over the limits of physical abuse or tortu

interrogations refl ects this problem. We recall the unsettledness in the 

following DCI Deutsch’s requirement that all potential recruitments mus

vetted by headquarters for human rights considerations. Th is was popu

interpreted to mean that we could not recruit “bad people.” I think that w

gross overstatement of the actual instruction but it did create a further cau
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tion. Headquarters approval was not a given. As we joked then, Wher

a will, there is also a won’t.”

A Weakness of U.S. Intelligence Culture: Impatience

Of greater concern than balancing initiative and accountab

tainly in the human source intelligence (HUMINT) realm, is a dread

tience, which is also a part of U.S. culture—we seem incapable of wai

enough to see our operations develop carefully and productively. As a 

HUMINT offi cial, I was continuously frustrated when my superiors 

we had to focus on a particular issue, and then they wanted a report 

week on the progress made! Well, one cannot do HUMINT that way

using a 90-day production plan. On the other hand, can we justify a sy

would give us fully fi ve years to develop an operation?

How would we penetrate an Islamist extremist group tod

think about all the complications. And then we think, “Well, OK, I ha

year plan to do this.” Along the way we are going to experience a norm

ing assignment schedule, and two years later there will be little or no

team continuity necessary for a dedicated operations group. Our c

in other countries may play a better game in that regard. We are so s

a cultural impatience within our bureaucracies that we seem unable 

the individual decisions that would set some people apart and give fu

their long-range initiative. Further, in an open assignment system wh

vidual employees enjoy the ability to choose their own assignments t

degree, our ability to grow hand-picked people who will come to “ac

will be limited.

An interesting issue is “Can we isolate an intelligence institut

the general social changes taking place around it?” We can look back t

cyon days for HUMINT in the United States, when our system was l

old-boy network in which a HUMINT professional was grown by a m

patron, and assignments abetted and guided the apprenticeship. Now, 

two-year or three-year assignments that follow a calendar period do n

same time follow an operational period. Even when one is involved in a 

operation, he or she can easily be pulled back to take a course on trav

ers that is required of all personnel. And that is the nature of large, bur

organizations. Bureaucratic entanglements remain diffi cult to transc

for intelligence services. Of course, this situation is certainly not uniq

U.S. cultural scene, but that does not lessen the negative impact tha

cracy imparts to the improvement of intelligence work.
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When I was heading the National Human Requirements Tasking C

ter, I would ask any audience, professional or academic, “Who are the pr

pal intelligence collectors for the U.S. government on foreign cultural, so

political, and economic aff airs that produce most of the intelligence neces

for the conduct of our foreign aff airs and national security policy planni

Each time, without hesitation, most people would say CIA. But no, the pr

pal intelligence collector for the U.S. Government abroad is the Foreign Ser

of the United States. On any given day its input probably accounts for 6

70 percent of the President’s Daily Brief. And yet, the members of the For

Service will not recognize this. Th ey think of what they do simply as repor

and they are very proud of that role. In recent years, unfortunately, this 

has for various reasons been reduced in a way that I think has had a ter

impact on our understanding of the world abroad. With all of the talk a

our needing more HUMINT, I would invest fi rst in the Foreign Service ra

than the intelligence agencies per se to address that defi cit.109 In my career, I 

the potential for a perfect complementarity of Foreign Service and Intellig

Community reporting, although it has never been managed well by bureau

at the national level.

We live in a world in which there are far more mysteries than t

are secrets. Mystery is teased out by good detective work, and that oft en st

from having people who are well plugged into local circumstances, who 

talk with host-country people and display cultural sensitivity, thereby 

placing people into incompatible or compromising positions. Th erefo

think what we most need out in the world are good Foreign Service offi 

And I remember a whole cast of individuals who, I would hold, have b

really good.

But there is a slice of information, especially in the realm of un

ering foreign intentions and policies, that we are not going to get thro

normal investigation, even using the skills of the Foreign Service Offi cer. 

there we need the capabilities of a clandestine service. For that small slice

could orchestrate resources in the fi eld to maximize our coverage—and t

ought to be a natural complementarity to it. Although clandestine and o

collectors may dress the same and look the same, each does operate w

completely diff erent ethos. Decisions can wisely be made at the national 

109 In a Landon Lecture at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense and fo

Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates on 26 November 2007 expressed a similar 

ment in suggesting that the resources of the State Department’s Foreign Service be incre

perhaps even at the expense of the Department of Defense. See http://www.defenselink

speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199.
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easy recruitment of Foreign Service offi cers into the Clandestine Se

fi nancial gain.

In the English-speaking world, my sense is that the British 

far more latitude in the fi eld than we to carry out intelligence assignm

the headquarters level, too, the fact that the UK foreign intelligence 

are all under the Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce, and they have 

system a permanent under-secretary who takes intelligence issues up 

foreign aff airs community, makes them more effi cient and perhaps m

tive than we are. No country has as fragmented a national intelligence 

we do. All in all, the ease with which diplomats and spooks interming

quite a bit among the diff erent national services. For most countries o

the U.S., I would guess that if we look at the proportion or percentag

overseas government presence that is made up of intelligence offi cial

speaking, it is a much smaller proportion than ours.

Postscript

Th ere is a great line I can paraphrase from John Le Carre’s 

sia House, where, in discussing intelligence work, the character obs

enthusiasm and resources provided good intelligence, we would be 

it.” Our technical intelligence means defi nitely provide a benefi t and t

been pretty responsive to our needs. However, if we had the patience a

petence to provide long-term direction for a foreign HUMINT pro

we broadened the same sort of planning that we apply now in prep

a new satellite system, where we have about six years to think abou

make it most productive—then we might be more culturally suited t

our profession.
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Jon A. Wiant started his career in 1962 with service in military i

ligence positions, including two tours in Vietnam. His academic prepara

included degrees from the University of Colorado and Cornell University, w

he was a Danforth Graduate Fellow. He joined the Foreign Service in 1975

initial assignments focused on Southeast Asia and he developed an internati

reputation on Golden Triangle drug traffi cking. He developed the State Dep

ment’s fi rst intelligence offi ce looking at transnational threats. In 1982, W

became Special Assistant for Special Activities, responsible for bringing p

coordination and oversight of the Reagan Doctrine covert action programs. 

continued to be his primary focus as Deputy Director for Intelligence Lia

and Director for Intelligence Coordination in the Bureau of Intelligence 

Research (INR). He subsequently occupied Intelligence Community posit

in the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National S

rity Council and became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, INR. He serve

the State Department’s Assistant Inspector General for Security and Intellig

Oversight from 1996 to 2001. He was INR’s fi rst recipient of the Directo

Central Intelligence’s Exceptional Analyst Award. Th e CIA, the Departme

State, and the Department of Defense awarded him numerous medals and 

tions. On his retirement from the State Department, he received the Nati

Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal from the Director of Central In

gence. He taught for several years at the National Defense Intelligence Co

and now lectures on intelligence issues in both government and academic 

grams. He is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University.
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CANADA’S INTELLIGENCE 

CULTURE: AN ASSESSMENT

Stéphane Lefebvre

Abstract

In Canada intelligence has traditionally played a rather insignifi can

decision-making. Political leaders, high-level public servants, and d

rarely ever mention any interest in intelligence or any use for it. In this 

argue that Canada’s intelligence culture, to the extent it can be discerned

the margins of the nation’s politics, only coming to the fore at times of p

major scandals or failures. One of the main reasons for this state of a

in Canada’s strategic culture, which privileges ideational factors refl 

international norms and discourses over the relative capability of stat

reasons include the lack of a critical mass of scholars and journalists to 

Canadian citizens and offi cials on intelligence issues from multidis

perspectives, and the lack of a national intelligence strategy or long-ter

of the role of intelligence in furthering Canada’s national interests. A

Canada’s strategic culture does not see intelligence as a major source of 

power, it will remain very diffi cult for a purely Canadian intelligence c

emerge beyond the confi nes of the intelligence community, and for a ful

independent national intelligence capability to develop. Post-9/11 cha

need more time to mature to achieve the desired eff ects.

Introduction

Intelligence contributes to a country’s sources of national po

key leadership fi gures of the major powers, including the United S

United Kingdom, France, and Russia, cannot do without it in deliberat

of strategic signifi cance. Th is is not the case for Canada, where intellig

traditionally played a rather insignifi cant role in decision-making. 

leaders, high-level public servants, and diplomats rarely ever mention a

est in intelligence or any use for it. Tellingly, former Canadian diplom

Johnston disclosed in his memoirs that in 1972 the Clerk of the Privy 

Offi ce (the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister, Secretary to the Cab
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on intelligence, what intelligence was, and whether it was needed. Two stu

were commissioned back-to-back to answer the Clerk’s concerns, both conc

ing, aft er consultations with London and Washington, that spending mone

Canada’s intelligence capabilities was money well spent aft er all.110

Th is example vividly illustrates the argument oft en put forwar

Canadian intelligence practitioners and academics that their country does 

have much of an intelligence culture, if one can be discerned aft er all. On

the main reasons for this state of aff airs lies in Canada’s strategic culture, w

privileges ideational factors refl ected in international norms and discou

over any serious attention to the relative capability of states, from whence w

emerge the concepts of international threats and opportunities which are ce

to an intelligence culture.111 In this chapter I will thus discuss Canada’s stra

culture as it provides the necessary context to assess the place of intelligen

Canada. Th e way Canadians are, their symbols (e.g., the beaver, the Royal C

dian Mounted Police, hockey), myths (e.g., Canada as a peacekeeping nat

and metaphors (e.g., honest broker, middle power, counterweight) with res

to foreign aff airs and defense, all predispose Canadians to see intelligence 

particular light.112 Canada’s strategic culture, some would quickly argue,1

itself ill-defi ned, because the country’s strategic interests are poorly unders

by politicians, and to civil servants are second to the promotion and projec

of Canadian values abroad. Th is is compounded by the fact that by and larg

historian Jack Granatstein has noted, “Canada is a nation without much s

of its history, and myths inevitably fl ourish where the facts are not taught, o

willfully forgotten or easily ignored.”114

110 Peter Johnston, Cooper’s Snoopers and Other Follies: A Memoir About Spies, Dipl

and Other Rascals (Victoria, Trafford Publishing, 2002), pp. 108-109.

111 In other words, I argue that in the Canadian context, ideas, or ideational factors (

refer to variables such as political culture, beliefs, perceptions, identity, international no

and domestic norms), have greater cultural significance than even primary material fa

(such as capabilities, alliance patterns, the balance of military power, economic resou

etc.). For an overview of the role of ideas in international affairs, see Colin Hay, Political A

sis: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).

112 See David Haglund, “What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Im

est Concept,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Assoc

(Montreal, 17 March 2004), pp. 18, 23-26.

113 The point is forcefully argued in Scot Robertson, “Years of Innocence and Drift

Canadian Way of War in the Post-Cold War Era,” in The Canadian Way of War: Serving the Na

Interest, edited by Colonel Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), pp. 359-368.

114 J.L. Granatstein, “The peacekeeping myth: ‘Canadians keep the peace; Americans 

wars,’ goes the cliché,” The National Post, January 31, 2007, p. A19.
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Today, Canada’s traditional national identity (French-English a

olic-Protestant, oft en in a tense relationship)115 is being redefi ned by in

cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity. Th e results of the 200

show that Canada does not represent an homogenous people,116 sugge

what is transcending these multiple diversities is a shared civic ident

on a set of values, connections for points of commonality (through in

ture, interaction and sectoral collaboration programs—e.g., institution

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the health care system, etc.), a

ture that accepts diff erences, all framed and promoted in large part by 

eral government. Core values, the key component of Canada’s nationa

revolve around the notions of diversity, peace, equality, fairness, and 

racy.117 Diversity, embraced by a majority of Canadians, is embodied 

pieces of federal legislation, including the Charter of Rights and Free

Offi cial Languages Act, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, and the Em

Equity Act. In 2004 a majority of Canadians tended to see Canada fi rst 

ticultural federation, with only 20 percent recognizing the country as a 

tional entity with three founding nations (French, English and Abori

In this context, the building of a national identity based on ethnicity is 

cise that has faded into the past, replaced by the idea that Canada is no

nic nation, but a civic nation whose social contract is anchored in the C

Rights and Freedom and in multiculturalism.119 Given the foregoing, 

not come as a surprise that a majority of Canadians (three in fi ve), notw

ing the acuity of the terrorist threat, oppose the practice of “ethnic pro

security and intelligence agencies. However, of those opposing such 

34 percent do so on moral grounds and 17 percent because they cons

an approach to security ineff ective, suggesting lingering tensions bet

need to feel safe and tolerance.120

115 Robert Bothwell, The Penguin History of Canada (Toronto: Penguin Cana

p. 435.

116 For instance, nearly a fifth of Canada’s population does not speak eithe

English, the two official languages; Canadians trace their origins to no less than 

cultural groups; and 85 percent of Canadians associate with 33 different world 

Joanna Anneke Rummens, “Diversity, Identity and Belonging,” Canadian Diversity, Vo

Spring 2004, pp. 39-42.

117 Erin Tolley, “National Identity and the ‘Canadian Way’: Values, Connection

ture,” Canadian Diversity, Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 11-15.

118 Jack Jedwab, “The Myth of Canada as a Multinational Federation,” Canadia

Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 2004, p. 21.

119 Chantal Bernier, “Mon pays ce n’est pas un pays, c’est une idée...,” Canadia

Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 2004, pp. 16-18.

120 Doug Fischer, “Many Canadians OK with racial profiling,” The Windsor Sta

ber 9, 2006, p. A6.
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A small power before the Second World War, Canada emerged f

that confl ict as an active participant in world aff airs. Adopting the mant

“middle power,” it divested itself of much of its military assets—Canada was 

the third largest force among Allies—as a conscious move toward relyin

infl uence rather than strict material power (economic and military) to ach

its international objectives. Collective security through international coop

tion and organizations became the cornerstone of the country’s approac

security in the belief that security at home begins with security abroad. 

approach was refl ected, in particular, in Canada’s foreign intelligence arra

ments on signals intelligence (the UK-USA Security Agreement)121 and def

intelligence arrangements with close allies (for instance in NATO, NORAD 

among Anglophone allies—CANUKUS and AUSCANUKUS).

Th at on some issues, sometimes, Canada achieved a level of infl u

exceeding its capabilities is not in doubt. However, as Jennifer Welsh argues

was mainly due to Canada’s ability to use processes and tactics to eff ect, and 

because of Canada’s ability to muster the necessary material capacity to m

things happen.122 Th e point should be well taken, as infl uence does not c

from what one says, but from the capabilities one brings to the table.123 Ind

according to Welsh, in the post-9/11 context the notion of “middle power” 

lost its luster, and to young Canadians is akin to settling for mediocrity. A 2

survey by Ipsos-Reid for the Canada Institute of the Woodrow Wilson In

national Center and the Canada Institute on North American Issues gives 

dence to her views, as 56 percent of Canadians thought that their country 

weak force in world aff airs. But this is in contradiction with another poll 

ducted the preceding year in which 76 percent of Canadians agreed with 

statement that, “Canada is a signifi cant player in world aff airs.”124 Th ese 

polls suggest that Canadians have only the faintest idea of Canada’s place in 

world, and of its ability and capacity to bring about change and to act in its 

interest. It is generally safe to argue that Canadians have little interest in for

policy and that their views on foreign policy issues are fragmented.125

121 See Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Coope

Between the UKUSA Countries (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

122 Jennifer Welsh’s response in What Is a Canadian: Forty-Three Thought-Prov

Responses, edited by Irvin Studin (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2006), p. 255.

123 Roy Rempel, Dreamland: How Canada’s Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined 

ereignty (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), p. 15.

124 Ipsos-Reid, A Public Opinion Survey of Canadians and Americans, Final Report 

2005), p. 7.

125 William Hogg, “Plus ça change: Continuity and Culture in Foreign Policy White Pap

International Journal, Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer 2004.
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nature of power and the sources of real infl uence in international a

among Canadians has allowed post-World War II Liberal governmen

sue a foreign policy focused on Canadian values and the notion that “

eralism must be Canada’s primary source of moral authority in inte

aff airs,”127 no matter what Canada’s national interests are in terms o

benefi ting ordinary Canadians. Conservative governments have had e

diffi culty reversing this pattern—including enhancing Canada’s mater

ity to be a force in the world—which has led over time to a need to diff 

Canada from the United States, and decisions that some would argue a

ter to Canada’s interests (e.g., the refusal to participate in U.S. missil

although Canada would be directly aff ected by any strategic missile 

the United States).

Th at Canada “is not a noted leader in a single domain of glob

or international public policy,”128 despite its geographical and resou

butes, is clearly baffl ing to many. For political scientist Th omas Home

this can be explained by the unwillingness of Canadians “to face the 

our second-rate performance in so many areas, and to do something 

We are too comfortable being average, even mediocre. We are too hap

complacency, and too sure in our self-righteousness.”129 To no avail, 

diplomats continue to hold the belief that Canada is eff ective on the 

tional scene because of its “middle power” status130 as was the case d

Second World War when Canada readily recognized it was not a gre

and acted accordingly in the pursuit of the country’s interest.131

Canadians and the United States

In his diaries written during an eight-year stint (1981-1989) 

ada’s ambassador to the United States, Allan Gotlieb candidly rema

Canadian foreign aff airs offi cials were largely anti-American and that t

little hope of changing their mindset as they spent their time focuse

126 This argument is fully developed and empirically supported in Rempel, D

How Canada’s Pretend Foreign Policy Has Undermined Sovereignty. The quote is fro

127 Rempel, Dreamland: How Canada’s Pretend Foreign Policy Has Underm

eignty, p. 68.

128 Thomas Homer-Dixon’s response in What Is a Canadian, p. 9.

129 Thomas Homer-Dixon’s response in What Is a Canadian, p. 9.

130 William Hogg and Andrew F. Johnson, “Canadian Foreign Policy and the M

Theory and Practice,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International St

ciation (San Diego, March 2006), p. 3.

131 Bothwell, The Penguin History of Canada, p. 360.
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mats and leaders are not necessarily out of synchronization with the Cana

population at large. Anti-Americanism in Canada today indeed appears t

a defi ning feature of being Canadian, at the same time as Canadians are 

consumers of U.S. culture and consumer products.

Barbara Ann Allen captures well the attitude of Canadians toward 

United States when she writes that, “Canadians oft en have a rather insular 

of themselves. Despite being an immigrant country, there is a sense that we 

function in a bubble, interacting with the United States in terms of trade 

claiming the benefi ts, and only committed in terms of defence when it suit

Canadians criticize the U.S. for their apparent lack of understanding of Can

and at the same time oft en claim some kind of passive moral superiority

According to a 2006 Ipsos-Reid survey for the Canada Institute of the Wo

row Wilson International Center and the Canada Institute on North Amer

Issues, 58 percent of Canadians thought of the United States as Canada’s clo

friend and ally (53 percent in 2005 and 60 percent in 2002), while 63 per

(60 percent in 2005 and 56 percent in 2002) of Americans identifi ed the Un

Kingdom as the U.S.’s best friend and ally, and only 17 percent Canada (14 

cent in 2005 and 18 percent in 2002). In matters of security and intellige

there is no closer friend and ally of Canada than the United States. Geogra

similar personality cultures, a history of working together, and similar secu

challenges make them natural intelligence allies. Th e recent Canadian C

mission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Offi cials in Relation to M

Arar, a Canadian citizen who was shipped by U.S. authorities from New 

to Syria and subsequently tortured there, is unlikely to aff ect the solid fou

tions of the Canada-U.S. intelligence partnership over the long term, altho

adjustments on the sharing of intelligence will be required on the Canadian 

to ensure that no faulty intelligence is passed on. Th e impact of the Commis

on Inquiry on public opinion is already fading, according to an August 2

survey showing that 48 percent of Canadians were in support of closer coop

tion with the United States in the war against terrorism.134

132 Paul Gessell, “Foreign Affairs Rife with Anti-Americanism: Gotlieb,” The Ottawa Ci

November 29, 2006, p. A1. See Allan Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries 1981-1989 (Tor

McClelland & Stewart, 2006).

133 Barbara Ann Allen, “Like a Sub Adrift: Defence Policy as a Litmus Test for the M

Government,” in How Ottawa Spends 2005-2006: Managing the Minority, edited by G. 

Doern (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), p. 60.

134 Max Harrold, “Quebecers not too worried about terror attack,” The Gazette (Mont

September 6, 2006, p. A11.
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Th at foreign policy provides the framework within which def

icy is formulated is now accepted practice in Canada, but it was not a

Defense reviews, very much like foreign policy reviews, have been co

on an ad hoc basis (in 1964, 1971, 1987, 1992, 1994, 2005) and certa

not result in an encompassing methodical approach to formulating la

durable defense plans that were in keeping with foreign policy.”135 Inst

largely refl ected “the preferences of the prime minister of the day.”136

Many Canadians now share the simplistic views that Canada 

military force altruistically, although in the post-Cold War era Canad

forces have been used in a variety of missions other than peacekeepi

with a tactical rather than a strategic focus. In doing so, costs, liabi

casualties have to be kept to a minimum, in line with the risk-averse 

to foreign security problems exhibited by politicians.137

Despite a rich military history and solid performances in wa

Canadians are not overwhelmingly willing to entertain huge budgets 

military or see them engaged in operations where they must use force t

order.138 For example, the belief that legal arguments are suffi cient to 

claims aff ecting Canada’s national interest is still pervasive among Ca

When asked in a February 2007 survey whether troops should be de

assert Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic, only 18 percent of Canad

ported that option, the majority, 52 percent, supporting the notion tha

should do so through legal authority.139

As Barbara Ann Allen explains:

Canadians continue to believe that despite a much weakened 

we hold a more than proportional claim to infl uence on t

stage—a claim stemming from a long since past stellar peac

record. But traditional peacekeeping is not what is neede

current environment. Th ough Canadians are patriotic, wh

comes to shove, Canadians as citizens are oft en not willing 

135 Howard G. Coombs and Richard Goette, “Supporting the Pax Americana

Military and the Cold War,” in The Canadian Way of War, p. 268.

136 Allen, “Like a Sub Adrift,” p. 61.

137 Bernd Horn, “Introduction,” in The Canadian Way of War, pp. 11-16.

138 This is the case with Canada’s current mission in Afghanistan. The Economi

the mood well: “Canadians are nowadays queasy about having an army that actu

Most would prefer their soldiers to do pleasanter things, like doling out food, rebu

tered villages or donning blue helmets for traditional UN peacekeeping.” See “Accen

positive,” The Economist, Vol. 382, No. 8518, March 3, 2007, p. 46.

139 The Ottawa Sun, February 23, 2007, p. 7.
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and subsequent sacrifi ces needed either through less generous s

spending or the higher taxation that a comprehensive rebuilding o

military requires. It is much easier to let the United States take ca

it. In defense terms Canadians are oft en classic “free riders.”140

During the Cold War, Canadian participation in military missions 

focused on tactical-level operations. Th e resulting mindset has proven diffi 

to change within the context of complex post-Cold War missions, where tac

decisions oft en have disproportionate impact at the operational and stra

levels. Canadian army commanders, responding to this new reality, are 

putting a premium on intelligence that never existed during the Cold Wa

Military intelligence is now valued more than ever, but this creates challe

for intelligence offi cers and operators who now need to adapt and respon

new requirements spanning the tactical, operational, and strategic realm

Th is is compounded, according to Canadian military intelligence offi cer

a doctrine still largely informed by its Cold War predecessors and in need 

major overhaul.143

Of note, Canada’s military intelligence branch has a long history g

back a century, of which, unfortunately, little is known in the public and 

demia at large.144 Contrary to the United States, Canada’s military intellig

eff ort, either at the strategic, operational or tactical level, is small (less th

thousand personnel), confi ned within the bureaucratic structure of the Dep

ment of National Defence and within military units (brigade-level and bel

and seldom under media scrutiny. Th at the branch lost its identity throug

140 Allen, “Like a Sub Adrift,” p. 60.

141 The 2003 Canadian Forces’ Joint Intelligence Doctrine manual recognizes intellig

as an “essential component of military capability.” Department of National Defence, 

Intelligence Doctrine, B-GJ-005-200/FP-000, May 21, 2003, p. 1-1.

142 Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Villeneuve, “A Study of the Changing Face of Canada’s 

Intelligence,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 24-25.

143 See, inter alia, Villeneuve, “A Study of the Changing Face of Canada’s Army I

gence,” p. 30; Captain Lisa Elliott, “Finding a Balance: A Study of the Canadian A

Approach to Human Intelligence in an Asymmetric Environment,” unpublished master’s d

thesis (Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada, April 2005), as republished in Major H

A. Skaarup, Out of Darkness–Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence, Volum

1998-2005 (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2005), p. 339.

144 The literature on Canada’s military intelligence history is limited to a few major w

including Major S. R. Elliott, Scarlet to Green: Canadian Army Intelligence 1903-1963 (Tor

Canadian Intelligence and Security Association, 1981); Major Harold A. Skaarup, Out of 

ness-Light: A History of Canadian Military Intelligence, 3 volumes. Volume 1, Pre-Confede

to 1982; Volume 2, 1983-1997; Volume 3, 1998-2005 (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2005)

Wesley Wark, “The Evolution of Military Intelligence in Canada,” Armed Forces & Society

16, No. 1, Fall 1989, pp. 77-98. Specialized government and professional military publica

have carried a small number of articles over the years, some of which are reprinted in S

up’s three-volume series.
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functions) in 1968 has long been forgotten. It took no less than thre

studies affi rming that police and intelligence functions are clearly d

convince the military hierarchy to recreate a distinct intelligence b

1982 (on the 40th anniversary of the creation of the original Canad

ligence Corps).145 Prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 200

and Canada’s subsequent military deployment to Afghanistan, the int

branch was reportedly suff ering from neglect, its intelligence collecti

bilities eroding and experienced personnel leaving to retirement or 

vate sector. Since then, it has been reorganized, obtained additional 

increased its personnel (both military and civilian), established the C

Forces School of Military Intelligence (in 2002), and is fully engaged i

ing intelligence support to deployed contingents.146 Military intellige

fessionals are, in the context of the global war on terrorism, widely co

to be of equal importance to the operations staff . Th is marks a cultur

the Canadian Forces. In fact, the latest issue of the Canadian Forces’ o

doctrine states unequivocally that intelligence is “command led,” requ

Commander to drive the intelligence process and have a solid under

of it.147 To inform the public about military intelligence and intelligen

generally, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch Association has dev

dedicated web page (http://www.intbranch.org/home-e.html). Line rese

ligence companies also maintain offi cial web pages where they descr

they do, albeit mostly for recruiting purposes.148

9/11

Canada’s senior political leadership was taken aback and sur

the events of 11 September 2001. Th e prime minister’s senior polic

recognized that the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda was not on the 

ment’s radar the previous day.149 Th is suggests that the prime ministe

close circle of advisers had either not read or heeded the threat assess

145 Major James D. Godefroy, “Supporting Operations–A Proud Record of S

Skaarup, Out of Darkness, Vol. 3, pp. 137-138.

146 See David A. Charters, “The Future of Military Intelligence Within the Canadi

Canadian Military Journal, Winter 2001-2002, pp. 47-52; and Skaarup, Out of Dar

3, chapters on the years 2001 to 2005.

147 Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Operations, B-GJ-005-30

November 5, 2004, p. 15-1.

148 The military’s signals branch is also involved in intelligence gathering t

Canadian Forces Signals Intelligence Operations Centre (CFSOC), which is part of t

ment of National Defence’s Information Management Group (URL: http://www.im

ca/org/cfiog/cfsoc_e.asp).

149 Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p. 264.
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Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) over the preceding years. Th is is ind

tive of the lack of an intelligence culture in the senior levels of governmen

its 2001-2002 report, the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)

review body for CSIS, indeed noted that the CSIS investigation of Al Q

and Sunni Islamic terrorism was complex, aggressive, and of long standing

Committee further concluded that CSIS had advised government of the th

posed by Al Qaeda and Sunni Islamic terrorism in a timely and compre

sive fashion. Although it was not aware of the specifi cs of 9/11 and did 

predict it, “the Service [CSIS] clearly was aware of the potential for Al Qa

inspired terrorist attacks of some kind and communicated this informatio

the appropriate bodies in government.”150 Today, CSIS produces specifi c I

ligence Briefs for the Prime Minister, which are forwarded through the Cle

the Privy Council.151

Th e government quickly recognized the necessity to address the 

security situation brought to the fore by 9/11 to preserve commerce with 

United States. Because it lacked a national security policy framework or 

trine to respond, the Liberal government did so through ad hoc measures w

pondering how a new focus on security would aff ect its immigration and m

ticultural policies.152 Th e measures it eventually took in response to 9/11 

several forms, from additional budgetary allocations to CSIS, the Commun

tions Security Establishment (CSE–Canada’s signals intelligence organizat

and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP–Canada’s federal law enfo

ment agency) to the adoption of major pieces of legislation, including the A

Terrorism Act in 2001 and the Public Safety Act in 2004 (creating, among o

things, new terrorism off ences, terrorist fi nancing off ences, and new police p

ers). In its legislative approach, the government was cautious in balancing 

150 Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC Report 2001-2002: An Operational 

of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Se

Canada, 2002), p. 7.

151 One such Brief obtained by the National Post newspaper was on “Radicalizatio

Jihad in the West.” It was forwarded by the Clerk to the Prime Minister on June 20, 2006

returned by the Prime Minister’s officer on June 29. There is no indication that the Brie

read by the Prime Minister. Although classified Secret/Canadian Eyes Only, the Brief was 

general, lacking in detail and analysis, and written in a very simplistic tone. While it note

existence of academic research on Islamic radicalization, the Brief did not reflect the ric

and contentious aspect of this literature, suggesting instead that “further investigation

research must be carried out [...].” A copy of the Brief was posted at URL: http://www.ca

com/nationalpost/pdf/pm_brief_new.pdf on March 20, 2007.

152 Goldenberg, The Way It Works, pp. 265, 267; Reg Whitaker, “Made in Canada? The 

Public Safety Paradigm,” in How Ottawa Spends 2005-2006: Managing the Minority, edit

G. Bruce Doern (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), p. 78. 

da’s first National Security Policy was published in April 2004 (http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/

Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf) and updated in April 2005 (http://www.pco

gc.ca/docs/ministers/deputypm/secure_e.pdf).
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investigative and enforcement mechanisms, and considered that its n

sures were Charter of Rights and Freedom-proof, and on solid legal 

Th ey were not. Already three subsections of the Security of Information 

the defi nition of terrorism in the Criminal Code, all enacted through 

Terrorism Act, have been declared unconstitutional, respectively for r

freedom of expression including freedom of the press and for infringin

erty of religion, expression, and association.153 Separate from these m

Canada’s security certifi cate provisions (in the Immigration and Refuge

tion Act), which allow for the detention and removal of foreign natio

ing a security threat, were recently struck down as well, but were to re

the books for an additional year so as to allow government to bring a

Supreme Court’s suggested corrections.154

By the end of 2003, the government had announced major bur

changes to the security and intelligence community, which showed, in t

of Reg Whitaker, “an overarching concern for the integration and coo

of government machinery in the national security area, and for a more 

hensive and inclusive defi nition of threats to security that goes beyon

ism alone.”155 Th e changes included creating the position of National 

Adviser to the Prime Minister to improve national security and pub

coordination and policy formulation, foster better inter-agency coo

and coordinate integrated threat assessments, and the Department 

Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC) to ensure coordinatio

all federal departments and agencies responsible for national security 

safety of Canadians. To encourage information-sharing and cooperatio

organizations that collect and analyze intelligence, the government ac

October 2004 an Integrated Th reat Assessment Centre (ITAC) within 

While it is too early to assess whether these changes have made a d

in ensuring the security of Canada and its allies, anecdotal evidence 

nicated to the author in confi dence suggests that they are works in 

enduring growing pains.

153 See O’Neill v. Canada (Attorney General), 2006 CanLII 35004 (Ontario Sup

of Justice), December 18, 2006, at http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2006/2006o

html; and R. v. Khawaja, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Case 04-G30282, Octobe

at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/special/audio/Rutherford.pdf.

154 See the Supreme Court decision, Charkaoui vs. Canada (Citizenship and Im

207 SCC 9, at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007scc9/2007scc9.html.

155 Whitaker, “Made in Canada?” p. 80.

156 See Whitaker, “Made in Canada?” p. 88; CSIS Backgrounder No. 13 on ITA

www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder13.asp. More details 

are available at http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/index-en.asp and on the NSA at http:/

bcp.gc.ca/.
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Intelligence Community

Th e foregoing suggests that Canada’s strategic culture is heavily in

enced by ideational factors fi rst and foremost, and is in need of a coherent 

tegic framework to make national security decisions in the national inte

Canada’s diplomats remain deluded that the words of a “middle power” 

infl uence the behavior of major powers. Th e military has to contend with 

fi cult missions that few among the public understand while catching up f

years of procurement neglect. Th e national security apparatus is only star

to work in a more coordinated and cooperative fashion while facing a ho

legal challenges to its post-9/11 legislation. Parliamentarians know little a

national security (especially its intelligence component) and have little in

est, with a few notable exceptions in the Senate, in discussing it, unless t

is an alleged scandal they could exploit to attack the political party form

the government.157 Th is being said, since 9/11 there has been an increas

media coverage of intelligence issues and in student demands for more un

sity courses on intelligence in a number of academic disciplines (law, poli

science, and history). Anecdotal evidence (ad hoc discussions with profes

and students) suggests that these demands are largely fueled by all the repor

on the alleged misuse of U.S. intelligence, such as the use of torture to ga

intelligence, stories of rendition (including that of Canadian Maher Arar m

tioned above), and concerns that rights are not suffi ciently balanced with 

need for security.

If there is little evidence of a strong national security focus acros

public and private sector in Canada, there is even less evidence of an in

gence culture.158 Intelligence is rarely used in strategic decision-making 

few senior offi cials appear to make any regular use of it. If they do, they 

not saying so to Canadians, unless it is to reassure them they are safe w

threats are reported. For example, Transport Canada offi cials have n

that intelligence is in fact important to the development of adequate secu

measures in the areas of rail, air, and maritime transportation.159 Th e a

tion, however, that there is “in the Canadian government, media and pu

at large, an appalling lack of understanding of the true nature of the in

157 Whitaker, “Made in Canada?” p. 89

158 Brigadier General (Retd) James S. Cox, “Canada Needs a National Security Intellig

Policy,” April 2004, posted at http://www.ccs21.org/articles/related/2004/cox_national_

rity_intell_apr04.pdf.

159 For example, see the frequent mention of intelligence in an official question-and-a

exchange at http://www.tc.gc.ca/vigilance/sep/passenger_protect/Q&A.htm.
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ducted by Ekos, which stunningly revealed that 31 percent of Canad

percent in the French province of Quebec) had never heard of CSIS, 

main intelligence agency created from the RCMP Security Service in 

the same survey, 67 percent wrongly thought that CSIS offi cers cou

or detain individuals involved in activities that threaten national sec

percent that CSIS offi cers could carry handguns (32 percent did not k

way or another); 63 percent that CSIS was collecting information on p

against the government regardless of whether or not they have viole

tions; while 82 percent agreed that it was important to have an org

like CSIS to investigate threats to national security.161 Another case 

is the candid admission of Margaret Bloodworth, Canada’s current 

Security Advisor. Refl ecting on her years as Coordinator of Security a

ligence in the Privy Council Offi ce between 1994 and 1996, she com

that “in the 1990s, the security and intelligence sector was not very we

stood, either within government or outside. Th ere’s no question tha

has never really had an ‘intelligence culture’.”162

To develop an understanding and appreciation of the role a

tions of intelligence in a democratic society like Canada, educatio

essential. But even there, despite more students’ demands for cours

media interest in conferences dealing with intelligence matters, ther

hope that an intelligence culture can be nurtured from within academ

moment. At the 2006 conference of the Canadian Association for Sec

Intelligence Studies (CASIS), Carleton University professor Martin 

commented that Canada’s academic community had little interest 

ing intelligence. To wit, he noted the following statistics: out of 530 co

attendees, there were only 20 academics, of whom only 8 were inv

intelligence studies. Collectively, Canada’s 79 universities were off erin

total of 9 courses related to intelligence. Even more startling, he added 

matter of principle, the board of governors of the Social Sciences and 

160 Brigadier General (Retd) James S. Cox, “The Essence of the Intelligence 

paper presented at the CDAI-CDFAI 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, Ro

College of Canada, 29-30 October 2004, p. 2.

161 Ekos Research Associates, Inc., Wave 10: Additional CSIS Questions. Part o

rity Monitor 2004 (Ottawa, April 2005). A similar survey conducted six months lat

obtained similar results (plus or minus 3-4 percent).

162 Speaking Notes for Margaret Bloodworth, Deputy Minister of National Def

Conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (Ottaw

ber 27, 2002), p. 3.

163 Canadian Press, “CSIS Aims to Boost Ranks by Recruiting at Canadian Univ

January 2007.
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related research agendas.

In the current bureaucratic framework, intelligence agencies are pa

government and are subject, with a few exceptions (for instance, CSIS can a

a separate employer for staffi ng purposes), to the same rules and oversight 

review mechanisms as other departments and agencies. Th e Auditor Gen

of Canada, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Privacy Com

sioner, and the Information Commissioner all can, and eff ectively do, mon

the performance of the intelligence agencies in accordance with their res

tive mandate. In addition to these general review bodies, there is at least 

specifi c review body for each of Canada’s three major intelligence agencie

Inspector General and Security Intelligence Review Committee (an inde

dent and external review body reporting to parliament) for CSIS; a Comm

cations Security Establishment Commissioner for CSE; and a Commission 

Public Complaints Against the RCMP. As a result of the Arar Inquiry, a re

of all national security review bodies is underway, which may lead to a 

all-encompassing review structure for all departments and agencies invo

in national security. No intelligence agency in Canada is thus above the 

and each has a legislative basis for its activities.165 Th e legal provisions and 

framework within which Canada’s intelligence community operates would 

gest that one aspect of a Canadian intelligence culture is that it is character

by legality. However, it was only in 2001 that a legal basis was given to the ac

ties of CSE, about a decade aft er its very existence was offi cially acknowled

by government. Th e respect for the law, along with the fact that in Canada l

and unauthorized releases of classifi ed information are very rare, suggests 

there has long been a tradition of secrecy maintained by the members o

intelligence community.

164 Dr. Rudner’s comments were reported in Cameron Ortis, Editor, CASIS 2006 Int

tional Conference: Report (Ottawa, 26-28 October 2006), p. 28, available at http://www.

ca/french/CASIS-2006-FINAL-REPORT.pdf.

165 The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act for CSIS (R.S., 1995, c. C-23

National Defence Act, Part V1 for CSE (R.S., 1985, c. N-5); and the Royal Canadian Mo

Police Act for the RCMP (R.S., 1985, c. R-10), all available on the Justice Canada webpa

http://laws.justice.gc.ca.
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a larger bureaucratic framework, they behave no diff erently from oth

departments and agencies. Th ey fi ght for their prerogatives and to pro

turf,166 and must submit Memoranda to the Cabinet and to the Treasu

to get major initiatives approved and funded. It is only very recently th

cant improvements have been made to the coordination of intelligence 

ments167 and the production of integrated threat assessments. Th e 

stovepipes are being broken slowly through better integration, but th

still has to develop and mature further before optimum effi cacy and e

are attained. Th e fi rst-ever National Security Policy, issued in 2004 

eral government, was a good starting point, but the Conservative gov

elected in 2006 has made no serious mention of it nor has there been an 

update it. With respect to intelligence, the Policy has not led to a natio

ligence strategy looking at reconciling ends and means, whereas it ha

with regard to areas such as transportation security (a Transportation 

Action Plan is expected to be released in 2007) or the response to c

biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents.168 A national intelligen

egy would arguably give “the entire community [...] a guiding vision, 

architecture and synergy.”169

While Canada’s national identity is clearly in fl ux, it is inter

note the cozy relationships Canadian intelligence agencies have with 

close allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, 

Zealand. Th at they speak the same language is a factor, but more funda

as Brigadier General Cox aptly observes, “[t]he roots of the Canadia

gence function are embedded in our British heritage and seasoned by 

mate relationship with the US.”170 All draw on liberal political tradit

for all intents and purposes share similar values, diff ering only on h

can translate them into action. As Canadian intelligence organization

more diverse in line with employment equity programs, it will be inte

see whether this “Anglosphere” of agencies will remain as cohesive as i

166 CSIS and the RCMP have reportedly squabbled with one another for yea

denials by their respective senior officials. See Andrew Meyeda, “After Years of 

RCMP, CSIS Agree on Truce,” The Ottawa Citizen, 27 October 2006.

167 “Of note, it was only in 1991 that, for the first time, the Government 

adopted an intelligence directive setting out its priority requirements for foreign 

collection.” Martin Rudner, “Canada’s Communications Security Establishment from 

to Globalization,” Intelligence and National Security, 16, No. 1 (Spring 2001), p. 11

168 For a discussion of the National Security Policy and the need for a nation

strategy, see Captain (N) Peter Avis, “Government Must Have a Clear End-state Vis

line Security, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 10-13.

169 Cox, “Canada Needs a National Security Intelligence Policy.”

170 Cox, “The Essence of the Intelligence Function,” p. 9.
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the trust they have developed over the past 6570 years. Incidentally, these 

other links seem important to Canadian air travellers, 64 percent of whom 

2006 had confi dence that Canadian authorities are receiving good intellig

concerning potential threats to air security (62 percent in 2005 and 56 per

in 2004).171

As discussed above, Canada’s strategic culture does not revolve aro

the use of force in international relations, unless it is clearly mandated u

international law or in accordance with well-delineated human security p

ciples. Th is absence of propensity for taking the off ensive is refl ected in 

debate over the creation of a foreign intelligence service. While for a de

intelligence experts have advocated the creation of a Canadian foreign i

ligence agency to gather human intelligence abroad beyond that relate

threats to Canada, which CSIS is already doing, there has been little conce

movement in that direction. Th e Conservative Party elected to governm

in 2006 had promised to do so, but because it is a minority governme

is unlikely to push the issue, knowing the negative connotation such a d

sion would have with many Canadians.172 Seeing the types of activities 

CIA has been accused of since 9/11 (CIA renditions and allegations of tor

FBI abuse of authorities, etc.), many Canadians would conclude that a C

dian foreign intelligence agency would likely fall into the same path du

the off ensive and illegal nature of spying abroad. Although all the major p

ers and several lesser powers have “off ensive” intelligence services, it w

be beneath Canada, many would argue, to develop a similar capability 

would aff ect Canada’s ability to promote its values abroad and possibly 

its diplomats and other emissaries as possible spies. Th is attitude is fur

ammunition to Rempel’s assessment that there is ambivalence and lac

understanding among Canadians about the nature of power in the world. 

debate on this issue has also highlighted the lobbying CSIS is doing to enh

its responsibility in this area.173

Just as defense policy is supposed to fl ow from foreign policy, cer

intelligence policies are subject to consultations with the Minister of For

Aff airs. Th is is the case of CSIS’s relationships with foreign agencies, w

171 Ekos Research Associates Inc., Public Perceptions of Flight Safety and the Secur

Air Travel in Canada: Wave V. Final Report (Ottawa, 31 March 2006), pp. 40-41. Of note, 

with higher education and income and flying more often were more likely to disagree.

172 For a thorough discussion of the proposal, see Barry Cooper, “CFIS: A Foreign I

gence Service for Canada”, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, November 2

http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/CFISF.pdf.

173 See Andrew Meyeda, “Conservative’s Spy Agency Promise in Limbo,” The Ottawa 

zen, 13 February 2007.
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Aff airs in accordance with Section 17 of the CSIS Act:

17. (1) For the purpose of performing its duties and functio

this Act, the Service may,

...

(b) with the approval of the Minister [of Public Safety and Em

Preparedness] aft er consultation by the Minister with the M

Foreign Aff airs, enter into an arrangement or otherwise c

with the government of a foreign state or an institution ther

international organization of states or an institution thereof.1

In light of 9/11 and the Maher Arar case, such relationships are e

now more than ever, to take into consideration the human rights r

the prospective partner before a decision is taken. Th is is in line wi

dian values.

Also in line with Canadian values, intelligence organizations h

serious attempts at refl ecting Canada’s diversity, and, following governm

islation and policy directives, have put in place programs and policies 

a higher numbers of representatives from designated groups (women

visible minorities, and the handicapped).

While there may not be much of an intelligence culture to sp

the national level, an argument can be made that such a culture can b

nized from within the intelligence community itself. Th is internal cultu

basis in the history of intelligence in Canada, which goes as far back as 

of confederation in 1867, when intelligence duties fell on the lap of the 

ion Police Force.175 In 1920, all intelligence functions were consolidate

the purview of the RCMP, which had absorbed the Dominion Police 

1984, aft er a series of wrongdoings and the subsequent recommend

two commissions (the Mackenzie Royal Commission on security in 1

the McDonald Commission of Inquiry into certain activities of the R

1984), the government decided to uncouple law enforcement and int

functions by dissolving the RCMP security service and transferring m

security service agents to a newly minted civilian service, CSIS (the De

of National Defence had made a similar move two years earlier). As a r

174 See http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/act/csisact.asp.

175 A decent historical overview is provided in A New Review Mechanism for t

National Security Activities, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 

Relation to Maher Arar (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Servic

pp. 23-53.
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culture, despite the controversy the uncoupling initially unleashed. Th e cu

of secrecy noted above aff ected the relationship between the RCMP and CS

the years to come, and may have on occasions prevented the sharing of rele

intelligence between them.176 Th e relationship between both agencies has 

dentally been one of the areas under investigation by the current Commis

of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 (

http://www.majorcomm.ca), which occurred in 1985.

In the aft ermath of 9/11, the notion that intelligence analysts acros

community are professionals has really taken off , with a Canadian Associa

of Professional Analysts (CAPIA) blossoming,177 and a core entry-level trai

curriculum in intelligence analysis now being off ered to all analysts acros

community, with further courses being planned for experienced analysts 

managers of analysts.178 In many respects, these two initiatives (largely dr

from the bottom up) were necessary because of the growth in personnel e

rienced by the community, including both core organizations (CSIS, RC

National Defence, CSE, and the International Assessment Secretariat loc

within the PCO) and smaller intelligence players such as the Departmen

Transport, Immigration, and others, and the perceived needs to strengthen 

lytical standards. Despite the impulse given to this initiative by the highly p

licized U.S. and British experience with respect to mis-estimating the exist

of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, these two initiatives have gone unnot

in the Canadian media.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have discussed Canada’s strategic culture, its applica

to foreign and defense matters, and the impact of 9/11, all in order to prov

context within which a Canadian intelligence culture could be examined. A

national level, Canada lacks a clearly identifi able or unique intelligence cul

• Intelligence is poorly understood and largely unappreciated 

by most Canadians, including government offi cials;

176 See Lessons to be Learned: The report of the Honourable Bob Rae, Indepe

Advisor to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, on outstanding 

tions with respect to the bombing of Air India Flight 182 (Ottawa: Air India Review Sec

iat, 2005).

177 CAPIA, supported by the Privy Council Office, was “created to promote trainin

high analytical standards with the Canadian intelligence community and foster network

information sharing.” The Honourable Paul Martin, Privy Council Office 2004-2005 Depart

tal Performance Report (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2005), p. 37.

178 Comments by Privy Council official Monik Beauregard, reported in Cameron Ortis

tor, CASIS 2006 International Conference: Report (Ottawa, 26-28 October 2006), p. 15, 

able at http://www.casis.ca/french/CASIS-2006-FINAL-REPORT.pdf.
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senior political leaders, bureaucrats, and diplomats;

• Th ere is no critical mass of scholars and journalists to educate 

Canadian citizens and offi cials on intelligence issues from 

multidisciplinary perspectives;

• Intelligence is not seen as a serious or important attribute of 

Canada’s national power;

• Intelligence powers are seen as something that must be 

balanced with Canadian values, in particular civil rights;

• Similar to defense, intelligence capabilities were largely 

neglected until 9/11 (huge budget and personnel cuts 

occurred in the early to the mid-1990s);

• Refl ective of Canada’s broader strategic culture, there is no 

national intelligence strategy or long-term vision of the role 

of intelligence in furthering Canada’s national interests;

• Top-level decisions related to intelligence matters are ad hoc 

in nature; and

• Th e intelligence function in Canada would quickly atrophy 

without the signifi cant input from key allies such as the 

United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

Th e intelligence culture that does appear to exist is located w

community itself and consists of the following elements (which, I wo

tend, are not necessarily unique to Canada):

• Secrecy (leaks and unauthorized releases of classifi ed material 

are rare);

• Professionalization (solid push for self-improvement across 

the community of intelligence analysts and at National 

Defence);

• Affi nities and vibrant relationships (bilateral and multilateral) 

with Anglosphere intelligence communities;

• Increased acceptance of cross-pollination of intelligence 

offi cials across agencies post-9/11;

• Diversity (and recognition, in recruitment campaigns, that it 

represents an asset);

• Dissociation of intelligence from law enforcement;

• Acceptance of review and oversight mechanisms; and

• Strong desire to protect Canadians and allies.
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will remain very diffi cult for a purely Canadian intelligence culture to em

at the national level and a full-fl edged independent national intelligence c

bility to develop. Most government offi cials do not know what they need f

intelligence, why they need it, and how to use it. Integrating intelligence 

policymaking will be an arduous process. National security laws, too, ar

need of rebuilding and consolidation aft er the challenges and losses of 2006 

2007. On the academic side, intelligence studies are diffi cult and still distru

by academia and students alike. Th e enhanced interest seen lately may ch

this, but the change will be incremental and over a long period. While t

are new trends, recent changes will need more time to mature to achieve 

desired eff ects. On the other hand, the intelligence community has its own 

ture, which is evolving positively in the post-9/11 era. Th e challenge for any

trying to better understand it is to do so from the outside rather than the in

It is hoped that in due time the community would embark on a major eff o

highlight its progress and challenges, and further involve academics and o

experts in intelligence in its eff orts to be better understood.

About the Author

Mr. Stéphane Lefebvre is Section Head—Strategic Analysis at 

Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA), Defence Research 

Development Canada (DRDC). He has written extensively on intelligence 

European security issues. Th e views expressed in this chapter are his own 

do not refl ect the offi cial position of the government of Canada or any o

departments and agencies. Th e author would like to thank Dr. Russell Swen

and Mr. Greg Smolynec for their comments and suggestions on earlier vers

of this chapter. Contact: stephane.Lefebvre@drdc-rddc.gc.ca.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, 

MADE IN USA

Bowman H. Miller

To cope with its troubles, America needs something that argu

against our national grain—a truly great intelligence service 

operate powerfully, invisibly, legally.179

Abstract

U.S. strategic culture refl ects a potent mix of ideals and self-inte

the power and secrecy of its intelligence establishment fi t within a socie

distrusts both of those traits. Th is oft en reluctant world superpowe

nothing less of its costly intelligence establishment than total knowl

accurate warning of events and trends across the globe. Policy-maker i

on analytic precision and “no surprises” clarity confronts an analytic 

nity steeped in nuance and enveloped in uncertainties—all of this in 

try which also fears an over-abundance of central power among its int

and law enforcement bodies, huge as they are. Th at massive size is al

drance to success, given the need for agility, adaptability, and creativ

face of dispersed transnational threats. Besides facing the enormous 

of tracking and anticipating the range of perils in a globalizing world

intelligence enterprise remains fi xated on technological solutions to 

lems, and the informed public and Congress demand a more assure

on their expensive intelligence investment. Although failure is a fact 

business in America and not a disincentive to taking risks, “intelligenc

in contrast, has become unacceptable and inexcusable, making the int

enterprise more conservative than it ought to be.

179 David Ignatius, “For Hayden, Repair Work at the CIA,” The Washington Post, 8 

2006, 27.
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Individuals and institutions are shaped by the culture180 into w

they are born and in which they live, and the world of collecting and an

ing intelligence181 is no exception. Th is essay relates some of America’s nati

myths, generic traits, legends, self-images, and frailties to the ways in which 

accumulation and articulation of national intelligence are carried out and to 

products of that complex set of processes and players. Cultures have much t

with how we do things and approach issues; thus, they shape both our me

processes and our conclusions, just as each culture’s language and vocabu

express ideas, facts, and judgments in unique ways. Linguists have long decl

that all meaning is contextual—and cultures are the predominant fabric of 

context. It is impossible to divorce the shape of one’s attitudes and judgm

of one’s interpretation of events and expectations of developments, from 

enveloping culture in which all of that thinking, concluding, and relatin

facts and ideas occurs.

Isolation Not an Option

With continuous CNN and other news coverage, increasing for

penetration of U.S. society, and the rising prevalence of Spanish in many a

of the country, being “isolated” or “isolationist” is, if it has any reality a

primarily an attitudinal truth in today’s United States. Th e country is as m

ticultural today as it has ever been, even though many fi nd that worrisom

at least disquieting. Th ose who worry over declining “homogeneity,” suc

Samuel Huntington and the late Arthur Schlesinger, actually evince con

over the dilution of the Anglo-Saxon predominance in U.S. social, cultural 

political life in the face of continuing immigration, much of it from bey

180 For purposes of this discussion, I will use “culture” to mean all those traits, m

shared histories and traditions which provide the essential glue and identity of a nati

people, i.e., essentially the behaviors and beliefs of a nation, or, as one author has te

them, the “software of the mind.” See Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Culture

Organizations: Software of the Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004). What George Washi

described in 1796 still constitutes the essence of America’s defining cultural commona

“With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and po

principles.” “Washington’s Farewell Address 1796,” The Avalon Project at Yale Law Sc

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm, accessed March 20, 2007. See also the 

sic study of anthropology by Franz Boas, Race, Language and Culture (New York: Macm

1940), in which he notes, inter alia, that “...forms of thought and action which we are inc

to consider as based on human nature are not generally valid, but characteristic of our sp

culture (255).” This serves as a constant reminder against mirror-imaging of others, a p

tent failing of U.S. national intelligence.

181 The concept of “intelligence” in this discussion, unless otherwise noted, will be 

to denote concealed information belonging to others that is obtained without permissio

is maintained in secrecy.
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protestant (WASP) culture explains most of this sensitivity, even if th

harbor it fi nd themselves powerless to check an unmistakable, prob

versible, trend.182

Th e last half of the 20th century thrust America into a leading

tion-forming role in world aff airs—as “witnesses at the creation,” in 

of State Dean Acheson’s terminology.183 However, more than just w

U.S. leaders in government, non-government organizations, busines

tion, science and the arts all took on roles in overseas engagement an

sion of knowledge about the United States, its values and its people. Pa

shared endeavor stemmed from competition with Soviet-led commun

it represented more than that: U.S. citizens, then and now, believe that t

things worth exporting and emulating, from ideas and forms of gover

art, music, scientifi c discoveries, high technology, and business know-h

call for making a contribution to human betterment lay at the root of P

Kennedy’s inauguration of the Peace Corps and his outreach to Latin 

It was also intrinsic in his call for U.S. citizens themselves to “ask wh

could do for [their] country.” It also imbues the notion that history 

progress and that progress, not stasis, is the norm in society.

Leader America—in the Mirror

What does national culture have to do with U.S. national int

how it comes to be produced, what those products say, and how they 

Th is author rejects the notion that nations have a national psyche (b

Somali, Cuban, or otherwise), but there are shared national traditions, 

myths, legends, stories, lexicons, and images that have an appreciable 

what becomes national intelligence. Th e United States is certainly no e

to this phenomenon. It is universal. “Americans [like most, if not al

formed their habits of government by solving a set of problems specifi 

circumstances. And we know that habits oft en outlast the circumsta

justifi ed them... .”184 Th is observation also accounts for national cult

understand it and employ it here.

182 See Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s Natio

(New York:

Simon and Schuster, 2004), and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of Ame

tions on a Multicultural Society (New York: Whittle, 1991, reprinted Norton, 1998).

183 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department 

W.W. Norton and Co., 1969).

184 Eric Rauchway, Blessed Among Nations: How the World Made America (Ne

& Wang, 2006), 5.
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public have considered the country to be indispensable for global hu

freedom and progress. Th e concept of U.S. “exceptionalism” has been 

debated, but it has two key elements: not only is the United States deemed

its proponents, to be special; the U.S. is held up to be the exception whe

behavior is compared to the traditional behavior of states, based on the un

quality, values, and resilience of its democracy. From the time of the Rev

tion in 1776, many U.S. citizens have deemed their country divinely inspire

lead the world as the enduring, primary protector and promulgator of freed

peace, justice, and equality of opportunity.

Part of this legacy has been an element of evangelizing in U.S. for

policy. From Governor John Winthrop in 1630 to Th omas Paine (in Com

Sense in the mid-18th century) and to Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, then to 

Wilsonian President George W. Bush today, America has been depicted, 

has seen itself, as the “city on the hill,” in essence as an exceptionally empow

beacon of hope and promise for all mankind.186 Th is shared belief seems to 

tify the U.S. right to intervene in other countries in order to promote univ

values through expanding the reach of liberty and democracy to others wh

oppressed. U.S. citizens have long believed—and have been told by their ele

leaders—that it is the United States which has set the norms and standard

international behavior, self-sacrifi ce, and furtherance of the highest human 

ues and aspirations.187 Th is, added to the sense of exceptionalism, makes fo

unrelenting claim to universalism, something Samuel Huntington points 

a cause of global dissension between “the West and the rest.”188 America’s 

have never been for territorial aggrandizement, so we are given to believe

rather have been waged to “make the world safe for democracy” and “to en

185 Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly called the United S

“indispensable.”

186 Paine envisaged that “...we [American colonists] have it in our power to begin the 

over again...,” quoted from A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (Washin

DC: Brookings, 62.) For a fresh, well-argued characterization of contemporary American n

alism, see Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nation

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). An even more recent book theorizes that mu

America’s failure in world affairs owes to a misguided missionizing rooted in unique visio

exceptionalism. See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, The Silence of the Rational Ce

Why American Foreign Policy is Failing (New York: Basic Books, 2007), and a critical revi

Josef Joffe, “The Big Idea,” Washington Post Book World, 8 April 2007, 5.

187 It is in their competing claims to be the herald of universal human rights, vangua

improving the world, and birthplace of modern democracy that America and France (eac

ing its own democratizing revolution in the 18th century) are so much alike, even as they 

tend in a seemingly eternal quarrel over many issues.

188 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of World Order 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 66f.
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eignty from attacks on their homeland, notwithstanding Pearl Harbor 

September 2001 terrorist assaults.

One must hasten to add, however, that even listing a number o

held views and traits common to many U.S. citizens now and in earlie

tions, by no means are any of these views universally subscribed to. Th 

single U.S. point of view or unifi ed stance on any issue, be it Iraq, abo

environment, or health care. Th ere is no single national mindset. Th 

many remind us that the United States began as and remains predo

Anglo-Saxon in its inheritance, that generalization decreases in vali

each passing year and with each wave of new immigrants, primarily 

South. What is important to note, in this context, is not just that so m

erations have heard and felt the impact of loft y claims of U.S. altruism 

sacrifi ce, but, in this author’s experience, few perceive such pronouncem

“national beliefs” to be chauvinistic or self-serving. Th ose politicians, 

and commentators who dare to question the validity of this image of a s

country run the risk of being accused of “un-American, unpatriotic” b

To get a sense of the ongoing political and cultural debat

United States, one must read Michael Scheuer, Robert Kagan, or C

stowitz.190 A value-laden debate swirls around U.S. intelligence cultu

output, a debate oft en waged by its own retired or dissenting cadre. D

its deserved plaudits, U.S. national intelligence has been the locus for d

missing or mistaken judgments about how we might best interact wit

of the world’s countries.

Is there a lasting eff ect on U.S. national intelligence capabilities 

lutionary tendencies from this culture of self-criticism? Th e work o

cited in the next section suggests the answer is “yes.”

Roots of the Prevailing Intelligence Culture in the United 

Anatol Lieven reminds us of the overwhelming U.S. security a

ligence mindsets rooted in the experience of the 1945-1989 Cold W

then that Americans developed or matured “a certain innate tendency 

189 These comments are attributed to Woodrow Wilson who, in calling for a dec

war in 1917, said: “The world must be made safe for democracy....We have no self

serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion.” “Address to the Congress Asking for 

of War,” 2 April 1917. (Reprinted in John A. Vasquez, Classics of International Rel

ed. (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), 38.

190 See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power (New York: Knopf, 2003) and 

Nation (New York: Knopf, 2006); Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is 

War on Terror (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005); and Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nat

can Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2004
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states, rather than by a potential for cooperation.... Th is Hobbesian wo

view typifi es the attitudes, priorities, and pre-occupations of U.S. national i

ligence.192 Th e focus of U.S. national intelligence is on threats; its prim

purpose, consumers, and priorities lie in the fi elds of national defense 

most recently post-9/11, in homeland security. Lieven goes on to fault 

pre-occupation with threats for blinding U.S. citizens not only to many op

tunities for international cooperation but also to new threats which lie 

side the scope of traditional “realist” categories, with global warming a p

example.193

Another commentator fi nds this same Cold War imprint on 

policies and attitudes equally compelling and points to three overarch

infl uential characteristics of that culture-shaping U.S.-Soviet confl ict. It 

a political and a military confrontation and competition, it was protrac

and it was global. Perhaps even more importantly, many of the U.S. decis

makers of today were in their formative years during the Cold War and 

its perceptual earmarks.194 Clearly, we still live in the detritus of that C

War, awaiting, as Richard Haass has pointed out, an appropriate name fo

era now dawning.195

One additional cultural pattern that might be discerned is the o

whelming association of intelligence with foreign issues, rather than inte

security, except for the memorable “McCarthy Era” of the early Cold War y

In that light, former UN Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart writes an

of the dichotomy between the Bush Administration’s international beha

especially going into and occupying Iraq, and the historic U.S. legacy of cre

leadership in fostering the “concept and the substance of international law

His complaint is that America has now turned its back on its own systemic 

ations designed to manage key elements of an otherwise anarchic world, eve

the U.S. now exhibits unbecoming hypocrisy in fl aunting some of the rules 

191 Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (New 

Oxford University Press, 2004), vii.

192 For an incisive discussion of the phenomenon of threat in a national security co

see Nobel Prize winner Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Ha

University Press), 1960.

193 Lieven, vii. His concern has been addressed by a forthcoming National Intellig

Estimate that examines the security implications of global warming. See Mark Mazzetti, 

Chief Backs Study of Impact of Warming,” New York Times, 12 May 2007. http://www.nyt

com/2007/05/12/washington/12intel.html.

194 Donald M. Snow, National Security for a New Era (New York: Pearson Longman, 2

98-124.

195 See Richard N. Haass, “This Isn’t Called the [Blank] Era for Nothing,” The Washi

Post (Outlook), 8 January 2006, B4.

196 Brian Urquhart, “The Outlaw World,” New York Review of Books, 11 May 2006, 2
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U.S. intelligence, this potent mix of ideals and selfinterest typifi es U

tegic culture.”197

Sources of a Persistent U.S. National Intelligence Malaise

Americans see themselves as risk takers and innovators. Ri

ever, entails a clear potential for failure. Failure in the contemporary 

of national intelligence can have and has had enormous, negativ

quences. In the fi rst eight years of this new century, America has exp

two notable “failures” of national intelligence. If fi guratively equated w

one (not anticipating or preventing 9/11) was of omission; the other, 

ing to know that Saddam Hussein “still had” weapons of mass destr

hand, was of commission. In both cases, untold costs and consequen

ensued, and America is a much more anxious, divided, and discomfi te

as a result.

In the aft ermath of those two seminal cases, expectati

demands directed at the massive, expensive Intelligence Commun

only grown. Congressional legislation has become a prime mover i

ing the executive branch’s Intelligence Community in terms of its o

tion and regulation, and even what it will collect and analyze. De

long and rather spotty record of carrying out its oversight functions

Congress is now a demanding player in the conduct of U.S. intellige

its disciplines and domains.198

U.S. citizens may claim to embrace risk when it comes to bus

entrepreneurship, not to mention rock climbing and sky-diving, but 

cal decision-makers have no appetite for surprise. Instead, they expe

(black and white), straightforward analysis with which to shape decisi

though the world’s complexity and potential intelligence targeting by 

ies appear to have increased. Analysts, on the other hand, generally see t

and its trends, states, and leaders in shades of gray. Th ey insist that polic

concerns and questions demand nuanced, complicated responses. Th 

197 Jennifer E. Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” Transforming U.S. Intelligenc

E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 20

198 See Anne Miles, The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Ag

gress’s Role as Overseer, and Kevin E. Wirth, The Coast Guard Intelligence Program 

Intelligence Community, Occasional Papers 9 and 16 (Washington, DC: National De

ligence College, 2002 and 2007); both available at http://www.ndic.edu. Also see Fr

Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989 (Kn

University of Tennessee Press, 1990).
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ing cultural, political, and societal informationand with some reason.

U.S. intelligence—despite the wisdom of former National Intellig

Council Chairman Joseph Nye, who cautioned that national intelligence 

tems need to focus more on unfathomable mysteries than on unearthing se

200—is caught up in a sea of rising expectations. One can fail in business, de

bankruptcy, and start over in the United States. It is an everyday occurrence

such possibilities exist for U.S. national intelligence and its thousands of pr

tioners. Th ere is neither an acceptable excuse nor place to hide in the aft erm

of an “intelligence failure.”

U.S. citizens tend to believe that they are quite intelligent and, t

that they can prosper in a world that is increasingly knowledge-based 

-driven. Th ey even pair the adjective “smart” with technology—smart w

ons, smart bombs, smart cards—and with policy ideas, such as the notion 

one can devise “smart” (meaning specifi cally targeted) economic “sancti

Above all, citizens want their government and the intelligence apparatus 

helps inform its policies to be smart and act smartly. Many of the Intellig

Community’s most vocal critics clearly consider themselves smarter 

those tasked with creating national intelligence. Th us, as Cynthia Grabo 

many others have lamented, 20-20 hindsight tends to dominate aft er a c

has ensued and others begin plowing through the intelligence reports or in

mation items received.201 U.S. intelligence analysts (and the policy-ma

they serve) have been inattentive to the debilitating ability of our targets 

adversaries, using denial and deception, to “outsmart” us. Such has prove

be the case in both the 9/11 episode and in the declared U.S. motives for g

to war against Iraq.

A further complication for the world of national intelligence in 

United States is the proliferation of information sources and commentator

part of the phenomenon called the “CNN factor,” analysts have lost to televi

and other media any monopoly on delivering news, current information, 

199 The author was personally involved in cases such as the fall of the Shah (1979

breakup of former Yugoslavia (1990), Milosevic’s will to resist (1999), and the 2003 U.S. 

sion of Iraq, all of which are examples of the mismatch between analyst and policy-m

expectations.

200 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Peering into the Future,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/A

1994), 82-93.

201 “Even when the indications were not very good, or highly contradictory, or the a

sary’s course of action was truly illogical, investigations or other critiques usually manag

make much of the various fragments of information which were given inadequate atte

when they came in or which pointed to the possibility that the adversary would take the c

of action which he actually did.” Cynthia Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Stra

Warning (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2002 (http://www.ndic

press/5671.htm) and Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2004), 158.
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airwaves; allnews, allthetime broadcasting has become a fundamen

ponent of life in the U.S. However, there is little, if any, evidence that A

know or care more about the rest of the world than in years past.202 R

evidence tends to point to the contrary, and we remain fi xated on ours

Notwithstanding the Intelligence Community’s (particularly by 

in the Department of State) warning against the U.S. invasion of Ira

was ignored by the most senior policy-makers,203 a recent example of s

encing interpretation of information was the U.S. media’s failure to ex

traditional investigative role in reporting and critiquing U.S. intentio

and policies vis-a-vis Iraq in 2002 and 2003. Th e fourth estate, a key 

the complex system of U.S. political checks and balances, failed utterly 

independent, convincing voice examining the prospects and varying 

for U.S. intervention in Iraq and its aft ermath.204

U.S. Intelligence Culture: Privacy, Openness, Speed, and th

Primacy of Collection and Technology

Th e U.S. Intelligence Community, with its 16 agencies, earn

label—colossal and expensive. Th is massive enterprise contradicts so

dard national values. Th e Community demands and defends secrecy 

what its citizens hold to be the most liberal, open society on earth. Th 

order” of intelligence now includes two to three million individuals w

202 One recent indicator pointing in this direction is the Pew Global Attitudes 

2006 which found that, on the controversial issue of U.S. prisoner abuse at Abu Gr

cent of Germans surveyed were aware of the issue but only 76 percent of Americans

on to state its overall finding: “For the most part, Americans are significantly les

events and issues than are the publics in Germany and other major industrialized 

Poll Global Attitudes Project, 13 June 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/di

ReportID=252, accessed 10 April 2007. American favorable opinion toward the Unit

fell from 77 percent in 2001 to 51 percent in the 2006 poll.

203 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Prewar Intelligence As

about Postwar Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate), 110th Cong. 1st Sess., 25 May 2

able at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf. Paul Pillar, “Inside Track: Som

CIA is Right,” The National Interest Online, 6 June 2007, http://www.nationalinterest.

aspx?id=14564, recounts how this warning was ignored.

204 Nowhere is this fact laid out more clearly or more convincingly than in “No

Us,” the critical review essay by Michael Massing in which, among others, he conclud

period before the [Iraq] war, US journalists were far too reliant on sources sympath

administration. Those with dissenting views—and there were more than a few—were 

the coverage was highly deferential to the White House....As journalists rush to ch

administration’s failings on Iraq, they should pay some attention to their own.” Wh

York Times comes in for Massing’s greatest criticism, two Knight-Ridder nation

reporters are applauded for seriously scrutinizing administration claims and consu

ing-level sources involved in the intelligence analysis being carried out, or somet

stifled. The New York Review of Books, 51, no. 3 (26 February 2004), 43.
108 |

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ligence leaks. Nonetheless, the idea that secrecy is required to protect Ame

openness from outside harm, and that the public, while entitled to know m

of what its government is doing, does not and should not have access to ev

thing, is not widely contested.

Transparency, in the form of media-covered Congressional hear

press conferences, government documents, websites, and more, charact

the U.S. approach to openness. Demands for sunshine laws and public ac

to the legislative process have ushered in the era of C-Span coverage of co

less hours of Congressional debate and more. On the other hand, protec

of intellectual property, copyrights, patents, trade secrets, proprietary for

las and techniques, and even company logos as protected trademarks are 

intrinsic to U.S. citizens’ understanding that some things and some infor

tion require and deserve protection. Indeed, one could make the argument 

there is no bigger, better kept secret in America than the formula for Coca 

syrup, a trade secret guarded as zealously as U.S. war plans.206

Privacy remains a fundamental right in the United States, one clo

guarded in the face of government intrusion brought on by resort to “

rantless wiretaps” under the USA PATRIOT Act. To assist in realizing 

right, the U.S. has enacted both privacy and freedom of information law

aff ord citizens access to internal government data—subject to security re

for redaction or selective non-release. But the default position of the gov

ment now is to declassify virtually all information not clearly requiring 

tinuing national security protection. When the PATRIOT Act and some o

more intrusive anti-terrorism measures were enacted or disclosed, many 

zens of the U.S. recoiled in anger and suspicion. Some voiced the view th

America’s security required it and a person had nothing to hide, no harm 

done. Many others were adamant that government “snooping” without 

rants and without evident probable cause was impermissible and a violatio

their most basic civil and legal rights. Despite these pressures and confl ic

attitudes, the forced marriage in the United States between maximum gov

205 Meena Thiruvengadam, “Security Clearance a Golden Ticket,” http://www.clear

jobs.com/index.php?action=article&num=16, accessed 4 June 2007.

206 In a recent case, a Coca Cola employee offered insider information about that 

stance to a rival beverage manufacturer, was apprehended, and sentenced to eight 

imprisonment—a rarity for those who leak U.S. intelligence information. A PepsiCo emp

reported the breach to Coca Cola security, further testimony of the allegiance to or sys

dependence on the sanctity of industrial secrets. See Chico Harlan, “Trade secret plot 

Coke, Pepsi together,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 7 July 2006. http://www.post-gazette.

pg/06188/704045-28.stm.
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holdings remains intact, even if continuously challenged.

Just as defi ning a unitary U.S. culture proves elusive, that sam

an over-arching culture typifi es the U.S. Intelligence Community. Ma

tures and institutional devices, such as the Community-validated 

Intelligence Strategy,208 seek to promote a common eff ort, but cultu

ers persist and are formidable. Th ere are not only 16 separate agency 

but also several competing, contending cultures within most agenci

attempt to break up, or through, the existing cultures, mindsets, and gr

tated habits and norms, reformers encounter the daunting challenge o

a Community-wide set of standards and methodologies, the seminal t

new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and his ever-growing staff 

By way of illustration, intelligence collectors zealously protec

and apply need-to-know restrictions on information distribution, and 

quite distrustful of foreign (and at times even their own U.S. analytic

terparts. Analysts, on the other hand, generally want more informat

widely shared, are eager to test their ideas and judgments with other

their own circle (given the permission and time to do so), and year

opportunity to refl ect in order to reach informed analytical judgm

interpretations. All-source analysts clamor for all of the information 

get their hands on, tasked as they are to make sense of and anticipate e

situation of perennial uncertainty. Each of these sub-cultures, moreov

to perpetuate itself by educating and training its own progeny and it

into the existing agency culture, its norms, methods, and taboos, thus 

ating cultural gaps and biases.

One key ingredient of the national intelligence culture, in keep

the infatuation of many citizens with speed and self-service, is “intelli

demand.” Th ose who collect intelligence are charged with fi nding sec

with which to make more of what they collect and process available 

and more users/consumers—and rapidly. Th is circle of users now inc

ranks and operators in the military (many of whom have minimal, if a

rity clearances); state and local police, and other “fi rst responders”; and 

body of intelligence professionals and policy- and decision-makers in 

ing federal community of users, most recently encompassing thousan

homeland security and defense personnel.

207 CIA Director General Michael Hayden made this point succinctly: “We [

gence] are a powerful, secret organization inside of a political culture that only di

things: power and secrecy.” C-Span Q&A Podcasts with Brian Lamb, 15 April 20

www.q-and-a.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1123, accessed 17 April 2007.

208 See the National Intelligence Strategy published in 2005 at http://www.dn

cations/NISOctober2005.pdf.
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bureaucratic power and spending priorities, by those who collectrather 

analyze—intelligence. And, with the collectors fi rst among equals, techno

has long been the major preoccupation of the collection disciplines, and the 

together the preferred avenue for seeking solutions to intelligence probl

Technology, however, can create vulnerabilities at the same time as it cre

new strengths. Moreover, just as conventional armies and tactics are ill-su

for eff ective counter-insurgency operations, technically acquired intellig

is not particularly well-suited for discovering well-concealed plots or fe

ing out terrorists who are astutely aware of intelligence collection capabi

and keen to insure their operational and information security. Today’s terro

remain the ultimate conundrum for all existing collection disciplines, eve

we acknowledge that “it takes a network to defeat a network.”209

A number of U.S. warfare and terrorism experts have observed ove

past 40 years that the U.S. defense and intelligence establishments are po

matched to deal with highly mobile, concealed, networked practitioner

Fourth Generation Warfare. Emphasis on massing fi repower, employing 

technology tools, and counting bodies is not the solution.210 Others, of co

fully recognize the nature of the challenge of transnational terrorism. In 

confi rmation hearing as Director of CIA, General Michael Hayden ma

clear that “[T]his is a long war, and it’s not just going to be won with heat, 

and fragmentation. It is fundamentally a war of ideas.”211 At the same time

one has ready answers to compensate for the apparent weakness of techn

209 While this observation may have various origins, I take it from the comments 

Markus Ederer, former chief of analysis of the German Federal Intelligence Service (B

made during the “New Frontiers” international intelligence analysis symposium organiz

the Global Futures Project and held in Rome, Italy, April 2004. See also the work of Rob 

ston, Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study (Washin

DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), which explores the penchant of U.S. intellig

and U.S. culture for individualism, which works against achieving networked teams of an

and others to work against networked adversaries.

210 See, among others, Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (St Paul, MN: Z

2004), and Brian M. Jenkins, The Unchangeable War, RAND Publication RM-6278-2-A

November 1970 (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 1970). Jenkins, writing about Viet

notes: “Enemy soldiers continue to die at a greater rate than our own, but we do not know 

many enemy soldiers must die before the enemy’s will cracks or his army begins to di

grate...more troubling than our apparent failures...is our inability to learn and apply le

from these failures...[by those] who believe that ‘victory’ ...could have been or still ca

accomplished with more—either more troops, more time, or more latitude in the applicat

our military power” (emphases in original), 2. Hammes, referring to Iraq and contemp

conflicts, faults Joint Vision 2010 for not confronting the “how” of achieving “inform

dominance”—the “foundation of the vision,” p. 6. Neither commentator offers novel or u

ideas on improving intelligence in support of their military proposals and critiques.

211 Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Room 216, Hart S

Office Building, http://www.dni.ic.gov/dni/sscihearingmorningsession051806.pdf, access

April 2007.
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targets which exploit global telecommunications, the Internet, and oth

use” facets of globalization.

Ever advancing, more sophisticated technology involves cos

consuming research and development, production, testing and e

before it becomes operational. A key concern, among both policy a

ligence offi cials, is the expense and delays incurred in development of 

ellites and national technical means of intelligence collection. Th at 

author has observed a tendency among policy consumers who are eage

the products of such collection fi rsthand and to analyze the data p

Also troublesome is the occasional bias toward a particular intelligen

tion discipline among analysts who ply their trade within a given U.S

intelligence collection agency. Th ere is ample, if anecdotal, evidence 

source” analysts working in an agency where HUMINT dominates th

for example, tend to place greater value and focus on that discipline 

analyses than on others; a similar observation holds for SIGINT and 

focused personnel.212

National Exceptionalism and Intelligence Sources

One facet of U.S. national culture that remains even aft er the C

is the appeal or magnetism of the country for some who live abroad. Th 

nomenon has direct intelligence relevance, as it did throughout the C

Th at is, not only are millions of individuals eager to migrate to Americ

in search of opportunities and a better, freer life, but in addition som

the motivation and courage to desert their foreign intelligence organ

military hierarchies, or scientifi c institutes to defect to the United Sta

defectors, while always subject to deception suspicions, have no doub

valuable, critical insights and information with them. While their mo

vary, those who do so most wholeheartedly tend to act primarily for 

cal and idealistic reasons. In his historical sketches of post-World War 

intelligence defectors, one author notes that the trend of defection exp

saw a rise in those persons who deserted the USSR based on an imp

was “entirely ideological, a moral revulsion against Communism becau

212 The author and colleagues observed this intermittently in national intelligen

tion debates among analysts and in analytic output from CIA counterparts respons

former National Intelligence Daily (NID). A contrary allegation is also leveled, at ti

source analysts in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (

they erred in favor of diplomatic reporting and are more given to analytical optimism 

diplomatic opportunities than are other U.S. intelligence analysts. Having worked 

source analysis for 27 years, this author was more often accused by counterpar

Department regional and functional bureaus of being unduly pessimistic.
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can be expected to continue so long as they remain confi dent of being posit

received, resettled, and given new identities or “lives.”214

U.S. Intelligence, Know Th yself

Shortly before his death, eminent U.S. historian Arthur Schlesi

reminded his fellow countrymen that “[A] nation needs to know its own his

[and] a nation denied a conception of its past will be disabled in dealing wit

present and its future.”215 Historical remnants of national culture, many Am

cans seem to believe, are too expensive to retain—or it retards economic gro

and modernization. Th e U.S. obsession with the new and the youthful is ha

overlook. Not surprisingly, then, astute awareness of history (both among in

gence analysts and policy-makers) and the application of that awareness rema

critical cultural failing.216 A glaring recent case in point was ignorance (eithe

knowing or purposefully glossing over) the British experience in Iraq in 191

Given the enduring pre-eminence of collection over analysis, 

withstanding repeated calls to rebalance their relationship, the languag

“tradecraft ” has encroached on the work of analysis, claiming to off er a m

scientifi c way to engage in the cognitive approach to analysis.218 How

expertise applied by faceless analysts is oft en not trusted. Self-service an

sis and raw intelligence interpretation by those who are not subject m

experts are no doubt widespread across the world. In the U.S., senior vete

of government have cautioned both the Intelligence Community and t

own policy-level successors against this very phenomenon.219

213 Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Stone Birds: Soviet Postwar Defectors (New York: We

feld & Nicolson, 1989), xi-xiii. Also see Pete Earley’s book on recent Russian defector S

Tretyakov, Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America after the E

the Cold War (New York: Putnam, 2008).

214 To find specifics on a range of such defectors, see The Cold War Project, link to D

tors, at http://www.videofact.com/english/defectors_en.html, accessed 4 June 2007.

215 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. “History and National Stupidity,” The New York Review of B

27 April 2006, 14.

216 A seminal work addressing this theme in intelligence terms is Ernest R. May and 

ard E. Neustadt, Thinking In Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York

Press, 1988).

217 See Robert Fisk, “Iraq, 1917,” The Independent (UK), 17 June 2004, http://www

mationclearinghouse.info/article6337.htm, accessed 4 June 2007.

218 See the seminal work of Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence An

(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), and the recent work of Da

Moore, Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Paper 14 (Washington, DC: 

Military Intelligence College, 2006).

219 Strobe Talbott, as he departed as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, made this his 

theme in meeting with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in December 2000. 

Powell, as Secretary of State, told INR’s analytic workforce that the added value for him la

of all in the judgments we would and did provide.
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Competition is a traditional hallmark of the makeup and co

U.S. public life. It applies in the commercial marketplace and in the ma

of ideas and opinions. Protection of intellectual property is a mainsta

foreign and trade policy, but it is a major hindrance to collaboratio

intelligence. While businesses rightly protect their proprietary trade se

many in the U.S. intelligence culture remain unwilling to make their 

secrets available even across the trusted community of intelligence ana

consumers whose work relies on such access.

Th is dysfunctional approach to collection and product sharin

as in collaborative analysis, has long been a feature of U.S. national int

oft entimes in ways not supportive of policy-makers. Th e U.S. recor

tures in competition and a disjointed delivery of intelligence reach bac

Harbor, to assessments of Soviet missile strengths, to gauging the pr

the Vietnam War, and much more. Th e same was again painfully in 

in both the 9/11 and Iraq invasion episodes, to the point where th

demand for collaborative (and therefore competitive) analysis becam

nized in law.220 Th e lesson the U.S. allegedly learned, unlike that of th

in their institution of the Joint Intelligence Committee and their focu

erating consensus analysis, was that groupthink and institutional bias 

biggest challenges to intelligence for national security policymaking.

We continue the quest for the golden mean, one which will 

U.S. intelligence apparatus fall victim neither to prevailing groupthin

immutable mindsets. By the same token, policy cannot eff ectively m

of analysis which presents a broad range of disparate and confl icting 

intelligence is to be an eff ective instrument for informing—not formi

national security strategy and foreign policies. For now, it seems the 

is back on competitive analysis and overlapping collection systems, ev

Offi ce of the DNI works to forge more collaboration and a greater sens

the numerous participants of being and acting as a community.

220 The most recent DNI “100-Day Plan for INTEGRATION and COLLABORATION

in original], issued April 2007, again focuses on moving toward an intelligence “cul

laboration” and of “responsibility to provide” (a semantic renovation from earlier 

mission terminology of moving from “need to know” to “need to share”). Patterne

U.S. military’s emphasis on “jointness,” the ambitious plan seeks to break down the 

ligence Community’s ingrained proprietary attitude of “information collected is i

owned,” even as demands for sources and methods protection continue as insur

hurdles to such a revolutionary cultural shift. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Act of 2004 reads, in part, “[T]he Director of National Intelligence shall...ensure t

ments of the intelligence community regularly conduct competitive analysis of ana

ucts....” (SEC. 102A (h) Analysis (1) (C), 7 December 2004.
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national culture and most assuredly the overwhelming emphases of U.S. 

tegic culture. Th at is to say, it focuses on threats, is seeking to better cope 

burgeoning global and transnational phenomena, and remains challenge

the need to ensure “global coverage” for a global superpower, even as it con

trates resources and attention on the most pressing current issues and confl 

A fear, as always, is that the huge but dispersed U.S. national intelligence c

munity and cultures will not be astute, agile, or observant enough to see st

gic and lesser problems in gestation before they confront us head-on. Deci

makers in government will continue to demand a “no surprises” capability f

intelligence, even as they and those in the Community itself realize that suc

expectation is, in fact, “mission impossible.”

About the Author

Dr. Bowman H. Miller teaches at the National Defense Intellig

College in Washington, D.C. Before joining the NDIC faculty in August 2

he served for 27 years in the U.S. Department of State, including in the Bu

of Intelligence and Research (INR). As a Senior Executive, he was Dire

of the Offi ce of Analysis for Europe. Prior to his State Department career

Miller was a U.S. Air Force offi cer. His academic background includes stud

the University of Iowa and at Cornell, assignment as a Fulbright Scholar a

Eberhard-Karls University in Tuebingen, Germany, with completion of his fo

education at Georgetown University where he received his doctorate in 1983

dissertation analyzed the language factor and revolutionary/terrorist writ

of the German Red Army Faction (aka Baader-Meinhof Group). His rese

interests include modern European history and contemporary European 

trans-Atlantic aff airs; Germany in all its aspects; terrorism and threat anal

all-source foreign aff airs analysis; cognitive barriers to analysis; the spect

of confl ict from ethnic disputes to global trends; and manipulation of lang

in politics and diplomacy. He serves on the Academic Advisory Council o

American Institute for Contemporary German Studies and has served on 

editorial board of International Studies Perspectives. In 2005, he was awarded 

German Offi cer’s Cross of the Order of Merit (Bundesverdienstkreuz). Con

Bowman.Miller@dia.mil.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Russell G. Swenson and Susana C. Lemozy, as co-editors of t

greatly appreciate the dedication of all the authors whose work appe

Each author contributed a thoughtful essay that allowed the editors 

develop the theme. Th ey also exhibited exquisite patience and under

through multiple draft s and a long gestation. We also recognize the g

and professional perspective of the seasoned intellectuals Marco Cepik 

and Jorge Serrano of Peru. For their linguistic skill and attention to d

also acknowledge the assistance of Frank Marcio de Oliveira and Hugo 

Lazar of Brazil, as well as of William Spracher, editor with the Nationa

Intelligence College. Th e editors sincerely appreciate the continuing su

offi cials, educational colleagues, and students of the NDIC in the U.

Argentina’s Instituto de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas. Th eir c

support will ensure that both institutions remain seedbeds for an e

mature understanding of intelligence.