UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4919

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

MONROE KENNY THOMAS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. William B. Traxler, Jr., 

Circuit Judge, sitting by designation. (7:01-cr-00517-GRA-1) 

Submitted: January 26, 2009 Decided: February 17, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun 

Stephens, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Monroe Kenny Thomas pled guilty to one count of bank 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000), and was 

sentenced in December 2003 to time served and five years of 

supervised release. In August 2008, the district court revoked 

Thomas’ supervised release and sentenced him to eight months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether 

the district court abused its discretion in revoking Thomas’ 

supervised release and sentencing him to eight months’ 

imprisonment. Thomas was informed of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Finding no error, 

we affirm. 

 We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s 

revocation of supervised release. United States v. Davis, 53 

F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). The district court need only 

find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 

2006 & Supp. 2008). We review for clear error the factual 

determinations underlying the conclusion that a violation 

occurred. United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th 

Cir. 2003). In this case, Thomas admitted to violating the 

terms of his supervised release by twice engaging in misdemeanor 

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criminal conduct while on supervision. Accordingly, we find 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 

Thomas’ supervised release. 

 Counsel also questions whether the district court 

abused its discretion in sentencing Thomas to eight months’ 

imprisonment. A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised 

release will be affirmed if it is within the applicable 

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Thomas’ eight-month sentence is within the advisory policy 

statement range of eight to fourteen months and is below the 

statutory maximum of three years of imprisonment. See 18 

U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3). 

 During the revocation hearing, the district court had 

available for its consideration the Probation Officer’s 

violation report. The court heard argument from Thomas, his 

counsel, and the Government. Although the court did not 

specifically reference 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) in announcing 

its sentence, it is evident from the record that the court 

considered Thomas’ history and characteristics, the level of 

seriousness of his violations, and the need to promote respect 

for the law. See United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 

(4th Cir. 2006) (the district court need not explicitly address 

each § 3553(a) factor). Accordingly, applying the analysis 

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articulated in Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39, we conclude that 

Thomas’ sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised 

release is not unreasonable, much less plainly so. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment revoking 

Thomas’ supervised release and imposing an eight-month prison 

term. This court requires that counsel inform Thomas, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Thomas requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Thomas. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED