SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0321-17T4

STEVE JONES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE

AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT

SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent.

_______________________________

Submitted1 October 7, 2019 – Decided 

Before Judges Fasciale and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and 

Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the 

Treasury, PFRS No. 3-86267.

Jacobs & Barbone, PA, attorneys for appellant (Louis 

Michael Barbone and Joel S. Juffe, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

 

1

 The parties waived oral argument. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 18, 2019
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General, of counsel; Thomas R. Hower, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Steve Jones (petitioner) appeals from an August 15, 2017 final agency 

decision by the Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System (the 

Board). The Board modified an initial determination by an administrative law 

judge (ALJ), imposed a partial forfeiture of service and salary, and determined 

that petitioner was ineligible for accidental disability retirement benefits. We 

affirm. 

Petitioner served as a police officer in the City of Millville (the City) from 

1988 through 2011. During 2005 to 2006, he attended three work-related 

conferences, where, per Millville Police Department (MPD) policy, he was 

entitled to meal expense reimbursement. Upon return, he submitted storebought expense reimbursement paperwork rather than the requisite actual 

restaurant receipts. An internal investigation into the reimbursement requests

was conducted, and investigators interviewed petitioner. On March 18, 2008, 

the MPD served petitioner with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (the 

2008 PNDA), which charged him with conduct unbecoming a police officer, 

conduct unbecoming a public employee, and violations of MPD rules and 

policies, based on the expense reimbursement submissions.
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On July 25, 2011, the MPD served petitioner with another PNDA (the 

2011 PNDA), which alleged multiple administrative charges and rule violations 

relating to false statements petitioner supposedly made in 2010. After a hearing, 

an ALJ found that petitioner committed conduct unbecoming a police officer 

under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), and violated other department rules and 

regulations for untruthfulness. The petitioner was suspended for three months, 

he appealed, and thereafter, in an unpublished opinion, we affirmed. Jones v. 

City of Millville Police Dep't, No. A-000093-10 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2011).

On December 27, 2011, petitioner applied for accidental disability 

retirement benefits, due to work-related injuries. On August 22, 2012, the Board

analyzed the eleven factors for pension forfeiture set forth in Uricoli v. Board 

of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 91 N.J. 62, 77-78 (1982),

and codified in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3, and it denied petitioner's request. The Board 

ordered the forfeiture of petitioner's entire service and salary credit, and it

disqualified him from applying for accidental disability retirement benefits. The 

Board considered the 2011 PNDA and explained that the PNDA raised questions 

about whether petitioner's service as a police officer was dishonorable.

The City and petitioner entered into a Settlement Agreement and General 

Release (the Agreement) on June 21, 2012, under which petitioner resigned his 
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employment effective December 1, 2011, settled his Civil Complaint against the 

City, and agreed to waive any right to return to work for the City in the future.

Petitioner appealed the Board's determination, and the matter was 

transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested case. On 

May 10, 2017, an ALJ (the ALJ) recommended no forfeiture of petitioner's 

salary and service credit. The ALJ also found that petitioner could apply for 

accidental disability retirement benefits. 

In its final administrative decision, the Board rejected the ALJ's 

conclusion that no forfeiture was warranted, and it repudiated the ALJ's

weighing of Uricoli factors seven, eight, and nine. Instead, the Board adopted 

a partial forfeiture of service and salary from November 28, 2007 (when 

petitioner was first untruthful to investigators) through June 30, 2011 (the last 

date of petitioner's pension contributions), in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:1-

3(b) and N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.1(c). The Board also determined that petitioner was 

ineligible to apply for accidental disability retirement benefits because, by 

agreeing to waive any right to future employment, petitioner could not comply 

with N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2), which is a mandatory return-to-work provision if the 

petitioner's disability diminishes.
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Petitioner argues three points on appeal:

POINT I

THE ESTABLISHED REASONABLE CONDUCT OF 

[PETITIONER] CONCERNING HIS MEAL 

REIMBURSEMENT RECEIPTS (1) DID NOT MEET 

THE DEFINITION OF "MORAL TURPITUDE"; (2) 

WAS OTHERWISE NOT SUBSTANTIAL OR 

GRAVE AND WAS ISOLATED; [AND] (3) . . . DID 

NOT RELATE TO HIS PUBLIC DUTY AS A POLICE 

OFFICER.

POINT II

THE BOARD ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE 2011 

DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AGAINST 

[PETITIONER] THAT WERE EXPLICITLY 

RENDERED WITHDRAWN AND MOOT IN THE 

BLACK LETTER OF A SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT BETWEEN [PETITIONER] AND 

[THE CITY].

POINT III

THE BOARD ERRED IN DETERMINING 

[PETITIONER'S] APPLICATION TO RECEIVE 

ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT 

BENEFITS IS UNWORKABLE AGAINST THE 

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK BECAUSE 

CREDIBLE EVIDENCE SHOWS [PETITIONER'S] 

APPLICATION WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY 

THE SETTLEMENT; THUS, EQUITABLE 

ESTOPPEL APPLIES.

Our review of the Board's decision is very limited. Caminiti v. Bd. of 

Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 394 N.J. Super. 478, 480 (App. Div. 2007). 

Generally, we may overturn the decision if it is unsupported by sufficient 
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credible evidence in the record, ibid., but such an inquiry is unnecessary here 

because the facts are undisputed. We are not bound by an agency's interpretation 

of a statute or a strictly legal issue; we review such questions de novo. See

Ardan v. Bd. of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 604 (2018); see also Mount v. Bd. of Trs.

Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 418-19 (2018). Ordinarily we defer

to an agency's interpretation of a statute unless it is "plainly unreasonable," 

contrary to the statutory language, or "subversive of the Legislature's intent." 

N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. AFSCME, Council 73, 150 N.J. 331, 352 (1997).

I.

Public pensions for members of Police and Firemen's Retirement System

(PFRS) are "expressly conditioned upon the rendering of honorable service[.]" 

N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(a). Our Supreme Court has held that "a balancing approach is 

required in order to determine whether forfeiture is justified under all of the 

circumstances." Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 77. Uricoli's eleven-factor flexible test 

includes:

(1) the employee's length of service; (2) the basis for 

retirement, i.e., age, service, disability, etc.; (3) the 

extent to which the employee's pension has vested; (4) 

the duties of the particular employment; (5) the 

employee's public employment history and record; (6) 

the employee's other public employment and service; 

(7) the nature of the misconduct or crime, including the 

gravity or substantiality of the offense, whether it was 
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a single or multiple offense and whether it was 

continuing or isolated; (8) the relationship between the 

misconduct and the employee's public duties; (9) the 

quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt and 

culpability, including the employee's motives and 

reasons, personal gain, and the like; (10) the 

availability and adequacy of other penal sanctions; and 

(11) other personal circumstances relating to the 

employee bearing upon the justness of forfeiture.

[Id. at 78.]

Forfeiture may be total or partial⸺if partial, benefits are generally 

"calculated as if the accrual of pension rights terminated as of the date the 

misconduct first occurred[.]" N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(d). If the resulting pension or 

forfeiture would be "excessive," then the amount should be modified to "reflect[] 

the nature and extent of the misconduct and the years of honorable service." 

Ibid.; see also N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.1(c).

Here, both the Board and the ALJ analyzed all eleven factors. Factor 

seven states, "the nature of the misconduct or crime, including the gravity or 

substantiality of the offense, whether it was a single or multiple offense and 

whether it was continuing or isolated[.]" Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 78. And factor eight 

states, "the relationship between the misconduct and the employee's public 

duties[.]" Ibid. The ALJ wrote that, "although untruthful, . . . petitioner's 
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misconduct was not substantial or grave [and] was not continuing in nature, but 

isolated to the internal investigation." 

But the Board found that petitioner had a history of being untruthful 

beginning November 28, 2007⸺regarding the receipts from 2005 and 

2006⸻and continuing to 2011; thus, it was not "isolated," but rather substantial 

and ongoing. As to factor eight, petitioner argues that the meal reimbursement 

receipts "had absolutely nothing to do with [his] duties as a police officer." 

However, the Board determined that there was a direct relationship between the 

misconduct and petitioner's police duties because he repeatedly lied about the 

receipts and, as an officer, he was held to a high degree of responsibility to

respect and uphold the laws.

Factor nine considers "the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt 

and culpability, including the employee's motives and reasons, personal gain, 

and the like[.]" Ibid. "Moral turpitude" is defined as "[c]onduct that is contrary 

to justice, honesty, or morality; esp., an act that demonstrates depravity." 

Black's Law Dictionary 515 (11th ed. 2019). We previously defined "moral 

turpitude" as an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social 

duties which a man owes to his fellow men, to society in general, contrary to the 

accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man[.]" State 
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Bd. of Med. Exam'rs v. Weiner, 68 N.J. Super. 468, 483 (App. Div. 1961)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We later stated that, 

"[g]uidelines for a determination with respect to moral turpitude, after essential 

findings of fact, may be found in our opinion in [Weiner] and the several cases 

and other authorities cited therein." Gauli v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's 

Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. Super. 480, 483 (App. Div. 1976). We added that, "[p]erhaps 

its real lesson is to be found in its acknowledgment of 'the elasticity of the phrase 

and its necessarily adaptive character,' and in its suggestion that its application 

be 'reflective at all times of the common moral sense prevailing throughout the 

community.'" Ibid. (quoting Weiner, 68 N.J. Super. at 484).

Here, the Board disagreed with the ALJ, who adopted the Weiner

definition of moral turpitude. The ALJ determined that petitioner's conduct 

regarding the meal reimbursement receipts did not rise to the level of being

baseless, vile, or depraved. But the Board, in its discretion, concluded that 

petitioner lied for personal gain and that his degrees of responsibility and 

culpability were high. Thus, the Board relinquished petitioner's pension from 

the date that he was first untruthful. The Board explained that petitioner 

received a three-month suspension for the 2005 and 2006 untruthful incidents,

and it noted his record of progressive discipline.
10 A-0321-17T4

Pensions are viewed "primarily as deferred compensation, which should 

not be completely forfeited except in the most egregious cases." Uricoli, 91 N.J. 

at 80-81. The Board argues that petitioner's reliance on total forfeiture cases, is 

"unavailing," as this case involves partial forfeiture. We agree and conclude 

that here, the Board properly analyzed the eleven factors to find that partial 

forfeiture of petitioner's pension was warranted.

II.

N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(b) states:

The board of trustees of any State or locallyadministered pension fund or retirement system created 

under the laws of this State is authorized to order the 

forfeiture of all or part of the earned service credit or 

pension or retirement benefit of any member of the fund 

or system for misconduct occurring during the 

member's public service which renders the member's 

service or part thereof dishonorable and to implement 

any pension forfeiture ordered by a court pursuant to 

section 2 of [N.J.S.A. 43:1-3.1].

Here, the Board explained:

The Legislature has empowered the Board to look at all 

misconduct, including charges like the 2011 PNDA. 

Even when civil or criminal charges or actions for 

misconduct are dismissed in exchange for a resignation 

in good standing, the Board is specifically authorized 

to review the charges for honorable service. N.J.S.A. 

43:1-3. The Board did, can[,] and should examine the 

charges contained in the 2011 PNDA.
11 A-0321-17T4

The relevant part of petitioner's Agreement with the City states, "[t]he pending 

administrative disciplinary charges against [petitioner] shall be considered[,]

dismissed[,] and withdrawn as moot, with the irrevocable waiver of return to 

employment as set forth herein."

Here, petitioner argues that, "[b]ecause of the mootness and withdrawal 

of the 2011 disciplinary charge explicit in the Agreement, it cannot be used in 

the Uricoli balancing test[.]" As a result, he contends that his pension "cannot 

be forfeited as a result of the 2011 PNDA in light of the Agreement." But the 

Board explains that "though the denial letter observed that a total forfeiture 

makes [petitioner] ineligible for accidental disability retirement benefits, the 

Board never conferred jurisdiction over whether [petitioner] could apply for 

accidental disability retirement benefits to the [OAL]." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9

details that notice of issues for a hearing in a contested case must be stated in 

the contested case notice. As such, the Board stated the ALJ "acted outside of 

that notice by finding that [petitioner] could file for accidental disability 

retirement benefits." The Board, not employers, determines eligibility for 

pension benefits. 
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III.

Here, the ALJ allowed petitioner to apply for accidental disability 

retirement benefits, but the Board did not. Petitioner contends that the Board 

erred in two respects: (1) there was no jurisdiction on the issue; and (2) there is

no mechanism to discontinue benefits. Petitioner claims that the first point can 

be "readily disposed" because "the Board only cited N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10, which 

does not stand for the proposition that 'the matter had to be transmitted to the 

OAL[.]'" As to the second point, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-8(2) states:

Any beneficiary under the age of [fifty-five] years who 

has been retired on a disability retirement allowance 

under this act, on his request shall, or upon the request 

of the retirement system may, be given a medical

examination and he shall submit to any examination by 

a physician or physicians designated by the medical 

board once a year for at least a period of five years 

following his retirement in order to determine whether 

or not the disability which existed at the time he was 

retired has vanished or has materially diminished. If 

the report of the medical board shall show that such 

beneficiary is able to perform either his former duty or 

any other available duty in the department which his 

employer is willing to assign to him, the beneficiary 

shall report for duty; such a beneficiary shall not suffer 

any loss of benefits while he awaits his restoration to 

active service. If the beneficiary fails to submit to any 

such medical examination or fails to return to duty

within [ten] days after being ordered so to do, or within 

such further time as may be allowed by the board of 

trustees for valid reason, as the case may be, the 

pension shall be discontinued during such default.
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Under the statute, an applicant for retirement disability benefits could be 

required to return to work if he is rendered fit for duty.

We have previously addressed the consequences of an irrevocable 

resignation from employment. "[E]ligibility for disability retirement benefits 

requires members to make a prima facie showing that they cannot work due to 

a disability." In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 17:1-6.4, 454 N.J. Super. 386, 394

(App. Div. 2018) (acknowledging the principle that eligibility for benefits 

depends on a prima facie showing of an inability to work due to a disability); 

see also Cardinale v. Bd. of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret. Sys., 458 N.J. Super. 

260, 268-69 (App. Div. 2019) (concluding that the officer was ineligible for 

disability benefits because he resigned irrevocably). Here, as part of the 

Agreement, petitioner voluntarily waived any right to return to work for the City 

in the future. 

"Equitable estoppel applies in circumstances where 'one may, by 

voluntary conduct, be precluded from taking a course of action that would work 

injustice and wrong to one who with good reason and in good faith has relied 

upon such conduct.'" Sellers v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 399 

N.J. Super. 51, 58 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Summer Cottagers' Ass'n of Cape 

May v. City of Cape May, 19 N.J. 493, 503-04 (1955)). Equitable estoppel "is 
14 A-0321-17T4

rarely invoked against a government entity, although it will be applied in 

appropriate circumstances unless the application would prejudice essential 

governmental functions." Ibid. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

"Principles of equitable estoppel may be applied to a government entity to 'avoid 

wrong or injury ensuing from reasonable reliance upon such conduct.'" Ibid.

(quoting Skulski v. Nolan, 68 N.J. 179, 198 (1975)). The doctrine "'is applied 

against a municipality only in very compelling circumstances, where the 

interests of justice, morality and common fairness dictate that course.'" Ibid.

(quoting Maltese v. Twp. of N. Brunswick, 353 N.J. Super. 226, 244-45 (App.

Div. 2002)).

Here, petitioner argues that there "is credible evidence that [petitioner's] 

application for an accidental disability pension would not be affected by the 

settlement." Paragraph F of the Agreement states that,

this [A]greement will be fully disclosed to the pension 

system and will be forwarded with the [e]mployer 

[c]ertification paperwork accompanying [petitioner]'s 

retirement application for any pension which 

[petitioner] sought or may seek. [The City] agrees to 

cooperate with the processing of any paperwork 

required of the [City] for the processing of any 

retirement application the [petitioner] has filed or may 

file and to provide any requested information or 

paperwork to the [petitioner] and/or the pension board 

as requested on a timely basis. The parties agree that 

the [City] shall not be required to take any position 
15 A-0321-17T4

regarding the nature, extent[,] or cause of any disability 

which [petitioner] may rely upon in support of any 

disability pension.

Petitioner claims that the Board erroneously relied on Paragraph E of the 

Agreement, which states, in part, that "regardless of any effect which it may 

have upon his pension or income status[,] and regardless of any statutory or 

regulatory provisions which may suggest to the contrary, [petitioner] shall not 

seek nor shall he be entitled to a return of employment with the [City]." 

Petitioner asserts that "[t]hroughout the Agreement, the City contemplated that 

[petitioner] would apply for pension benefits." But the Board was not a party to 

the Agreement, and, as such, was not obligated to find that the charges in the 

2011 PNDA were moot and withdrawn. In addition, petitioner did not provide 

evidence of his own good faith reliance on the Board's prior conduct. We agree

that applying equitable estoppel would "frustrate the Board's disposition of 

[petitioner]'s misconduct and prevent the Board from fulfilling its statutory role 

overseeing the accidental disability retirement process and managing the PFRS."

To the extent that we have not addressed any of the parties' remaining 

arguments, we conclude that they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

Affirmed.