Korean Futures: Challenges to U.S. Diplomacy 

of North Korean Regime Collapse

by Ferial Ara Saeed and James J. Przystup 

Strategic Perspectives 7

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Technology and National 

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who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by 

conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in 

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The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary 

of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified 

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and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the 

broader national security community. 

Cover: North Korean army soldiers watch as preparations are made for a 

ceremony marking the repatriation of U.S. Servicemember remains in 

Panmunjom Joint Security Area, November 6, 1998.

Photo by James Mossman (U.S. Air Force)
Korean Futures: Challenges to U.S. Diplomacy 

of North Korean Regime Collapse

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Series Editors: Nicholas Rostow and Phillip C. Saunders 

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

September 2011

By Ferial Ara Saeed and James J. Przystup 

Korean Futures: Challenges to U.S. Diplomacy 

of North Korean Regime Collapse
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please go to the 

National Defense University Web site at: www.ndu.edu/inss.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

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First printing, September 2011
v

Contents

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Key Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Interests and Priorities of Principal State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Venues for Decision and Dialogue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Rationales for Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Korean Collapse Scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Do the Key Findings Apply to Other Scenarios?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

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Korean Futures

Executive Summary

There is no shortage of plausible scenarios describing North Korean regime collapse or how 

the United States and North Korea’s neighbors might respond to such a challenge. Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the strategic considerations that may shape the responses 

of the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, China, and Russia to a North Korean 

crisis. These states are most likely to take action of some kind in the event the North Korean 

regime collapses. For the ROK (South Korea), North Korean regime collapse presents the opportunity for Korean reunification. For the other states, the outcome in North Korea will affect their 

influence on the peninsula and their relative weight in Asia. This study identifies the interests and 

objectives of these principal state actors with respect to the Korean Peninsula. Applying their interests and objectives to a generic scenario of North Korean regime collapse, the study considers 

possible policies that the principal state actors might use to cope with such a crisis. 

The goal of this study is to motivate policymakers to consider how the United States 

would respond to regime collapse, not to identify the most plausible scenario. It is the precrisis planning process that is necessary in order to develop a comprehensive understanding 

of the issues, choices, and priorities that will challenge U.S. diplomacy in the event of North 

Korean regime collapse. In particular, Washington must plan for the likelihood that while 

the United States and South Korea will seek to be the primary actors in a crisis induced by 

North Korean regime collapse, the actions of China and North Korea will profoundly influence U.S. decisions and room to maneuver. The United States will also need to gain the 

cooperation of Japan and Russia, as well as the support of the United Nations, to achieve 

politically acceptable outcomes.

Regime collapse in North Korea is unlikely, especially in view of China’s interest in 

preserving North Korea as a viable government and state. If it were to take place, however, 

North Korean regime collapse could fundamentally alter the strategic landscape in Asia, 

potentially in ways that would diminish U.S. influence in the region. Reduced American 

influence would constitute a serious, adverse turn of events for the United States. Asia is 

home to rising powers with which Washington must cooperate to set the global agenda in 

the 21st century. Continued American ability to shape the Asian strategic landscape will 

constitute a measure of U.S. power in the future and will be fundamental to achieving 

global stability, security, and prosperity. 

The findings of this study highlight the complexities and dilemmas the United 

States would confront in a North Korean regime collapse crisis. First and foremost, the 
2 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

study emphasizes that regime collapse does not mean state collapse, at least not in the 

short run. China will seek to keep regime collapse from becoming state collapse—the end 

of the North Korean state. The international community also will not endorse ending the 

North Korean state without the support of a North Korean majority. In fact, North Korean 

cooperation will be more critical to the achievement of U.S. and ROK goals than has been 

previously appreciated. 

Second, China will be in the most powerful position to act because it will likely be the 

first state in the region to become aware of a regime collapse crisis, having the best “eyes and 

ears” inside North Korea through its extensive commercial and diplomatic presence as well as 

pervasive party-to-party and military-to-military ties. China also will be the least conflicted 

among states in the region in its priorities, unlike the United States and South Korea. Without 

a guarantee that a unified Korea or a North Korea free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

would be politically inclined toward China, Beijing will not support ROK and U.S. intervention 

aimed at reunification or WMD elimination. In seeking to constrain U.S. and ROK actions on 

the peninsula, China may find an ally in Russia. At the same time, Russia is likely to use the 

crisis to try to expand its influence in the region at China’s expense.

Third, in this complicated environment of clashing interests and competing priorities, 

there is great potential for serious damage to U.S.-China relations, and misunderstandings 

and unmet expectations could create long-term problems for U.S. alliances with the ROK 

and Japan. 

Washington will need to make momentous and difficult decisions: whether to intervene 

in North Korea and under what auspices and for what ends; and when to introduce the North 

Korea issue into the United Nations Security Council, to name a few. While making these difficult decisions, the United States will simultaneously be undertaking sensitive diplomatic and 

political tasks: taking steps to avoid creating an adversarial relationship with China while deterring Beijing from intervening militarily in North Korea, and possibly seeking congressional 

support for outcomes Washington judges to be less than ideal. Failure to gain strong bipartisan 

support for U.S. policy could undermine diplomacy with the ROK, China, Russia, Japan, and 

North Korea. 

The realism and skill of U.S. diplomacy in the face of a North Korean regime collapse could 

determine the future of U.S. leadership in Asia and, in any event, will affect any resultant reshuffling of the strategic landscape in that region. It therefore is essential that Washington consider 

today how best to position the U.S. Government to respond intelligently to what could be the 

most serious challenge America has faced in Asia since the Vietnam War.
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Korean Futures

What I fear is not the enemy’s strategy, but our mistakes.

—Thucydides1

Introduction

Regime collapse in North Korea will be a defining moment for U.S. leadership in Asia and a 

defining event for the region. Prospects for U.S.-China confrontation and for significant damage 

to U.S. alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan will be high. Interests, alignments, 

and relationships among the states in Northeast Asia may change. Reshuffling of the strategic 

landscape will be driven by the outcome on the peninsula and the role Washington played in 

achieving it, and also by the state of U.S. relations post-crisis with the ROK, Japan, and China. As a 

consequence, interaction between the United States and the ROK during the crisis, and the effectiveness with which the two states individually and together as allies shape and respond to Chinese 

actions, will be especially critical determinants of the strategic endstate in Asia.

Given these high stakes, it is imperative that Washington defines the principles that will 

guide U.S. diplomacy in a Korean contingency. To date, however, Washington has not developed a diplomatic framework for responding to North Korean regime collapse, presumably because fundamental interests of both the United States and important regional actors are at stake, 

and it is difficult to sort out the clashing interests and competing priorities of all the principal 

state actors. In addition, a diplomatic framework is scenario-dependent, and it is impossible to 

predict the unique combination of internal and external pressures that may cause the regime in 

Pyongyang to fall. Nonetheless, diplomatic planning is essential to the success of any humanitarian and military intervention contemplated by the U.S.–ROK alliance, and it is crucial to 

orchestrating endstates acceptable to the United States and the ROK.

This paper seeks to frame the issues, choices, and priorities that will challenge U.S. diplomacy in the event of North Korean regime collapse. A generic scenario of protracted instability 

in North Korea is used to illuminate the challenges the United States will face. The goal of this 

paper is not to predict the future by attempting to identify the most plausible regime collapse 

scenario. The goal is rather to provide a framework of analysis and motivate policymakers to 

start considering how the United States would respond to regime collapse and to organize bureaucratic resources accordingly.

It must be emphasized that regime collapse is a remote possibility. If it were to occur, however, it would be immensely challenging because North Korea is a nuclear weapons–capable state, 

and a rising Asia is critically important to U.S. national interests. Pre-crisis planning should 
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

consider how best to advance and protect a range of U.S. national interests during a regime 

collapse crisis, but this process will not produce a plan that can be dusted off and applied in an 

actual crisis, which is likely to unfold in ways not predicted by any scenario. It is the process 

itself that is useful. Organizing the U.S. Government to think through the issues will illuminate 

the range of actions to be considered no matter what type of crisis occurs. 

This paper begins with our Key Findings. These are the major judgments we derived from 

considering both the interests and objectives of the principal state actors, and how these interests and objectives might influence their policy decisions in responding to the generic scenario 

of North Korean regime collapse presented later in the paper. Following the Key Findings is the 

first section of the paper, which presents the interests and priorities of the principal state actors 

in the crisis. This section is derived from extensive interviews with experts and former government officials, chiefly from South Korea and the United States,2

 as well as the authors’ combined 

expertise on Asia, and a review of relevant academic studies on North Korean regime collapse, 

North Korea’s relations with the principal state actors, reunification in other parts of the world, 

and studies on crisis response. 

The next section of the paper sets forth a generic scenario of regime collapse in North 

Korea and the likely responses of the principal state actors to this scenario, based on their 

interests and objectives, as laid out in the first section of the paper. This section also describes 

the context for responding to North Korean regime collapse—both the likely venues for decision and dialogue, and the possible rationales for intervention. Following this section is a 

brief discussion of the relevance of our Key Findings to other possible scenarios of North 

Korean regime collapse. The final section of the paper presents policy recommendations, the 

steps the United States can take to plan for a highly complex diplomatic undertaking that may 

result in military intervention.

Key Findings

Sudden collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime will not end 

North Korea as a state, at least not in the short run, because China is not likely to permit this result.

■ The North Korean ruling elite will take all available measures to ensure state survival—

state survival equals their survival.

■ The ROK, Japan, China, and Russia will seek to contain the crisis inside North Korea in 

order to prevent an international crisis.
5

Korean Futures

■ China will seek to perpetuate the North Korean state as a buffer against a democraticcapitalist ROK allied with the United States. 

■ The international community will not endorse ending the North Korean state unless 

supported by a North Korean majority.

■ The United States cannot stage-manage regime collapse.

■ We have little knowledge about North Korea, limited access to its leadership, and even 

less access to its people. 

■ China will be the first to perceive a leadership crisis in North Korea and will intervene diplomatically to structure a successor regime—likely from among the current 

ruling elite.

■ China or the United States will move the issue to the United Nations (UN) Security 

Council in order to constrain the other’s actions and seek legitimacy for intervention. 

Debate will be hard to manage and could move in diversionary directions, but keeping 

the issue out of the UN as the ROK wants is unwise and unrealistic.

■ Any intervention requires North Korean cooperation, which may be withheld.

■ Key decisions will be: whether to intervene, who will intervene, under what 

auspices, and for what ends—humanitarian relief, weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) elimination, WMD disaster (nuclear, chemical, biological), stabilization, 

or reunification.

Decisions on intervention and endstates—if they are mishandled—could risk U.S. influence and leadership in Asia.

■ China will try to avoid provoking ROK–U.S. military intervention, and vice versa. 

However, preemptive intervention is possible by either side to prevent the other from 

intervening. The risk of miscalculation will be high. China may try to cooperate with 

the ROK to outmaneuver the United States.
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

■ The endstates of U.S. bilateral relationships with the ROK, Japan, and China will be as 

important to American interests as the endstate on the peninsula.

■ U.S. national security interests mandate WMD elimination, but U.S. intervention will 

be practically difficult and politically problematic, including for our allies.

■ Absent the support of the ROK and China, the United States will find it difficult if 

not impossible to move forces north for a WMD mission. The ROK sequences WMD 

elimination after reunification and fears U.S. military intervention before reunification 

would only encourage Chinese military intervention.

■ China and Russia are more concerned about preventing U.S. unilateralism than about 

WMD elimination. They likely will press for international monitoring, using the 2005 

Joint Statement to demand peaceful denuclearization. 

■ Japan would like the United States to eliminate North Korean WMD but will hesitate to 

support Washington considering the risk of Chinese and Russian overreaction to U.S. 

troops near their borders, which could have devastating consequences for the region 

and for the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

■ Humanitarian intervention will resonate positively at the UN.

■ Food aid will contain the crisis inside the DPRK and initially will be the ROK’s primary 

tool to cope with the crisis.

■ A refugee crisis would hit China hardest because of its long, permeable border with 

North Korea. Such a crisis could provide China with a basis for intervention.

■ Humanitarian issues will be attractive and necessary areas for U.S.-China cooperation. 

Discussions to manage the risk of a tuberculosis pandemic could begin in the Strategic 

and Economic dialogue. North Korea has the highest tuberculosis infection rate outside sub-Saharan Africa, and the disease is multidrug resistant. If tuberculosis spread 

through Asia, the health and economic costs would be severe.
7

Korean Futures

■ Economic issues provide another possible arena for U.S.-China cooperation, especially 

joint efforts to encourage economic reforms that can “graduate” North Korea from requiring humanitarian assistance to just needing development aid.

U.S. diplomatic goals:

■ deny a return to the pre-crisis political and WMD status quo 

■ ensure that the ROK and Japan are not vulnerable to Chinese pressure

■ deter China from intervening militarily

■ avoid creating an adversarial relationship with China

■ steer the ROK into a lead role on humanitarian intervention

■ exploit all opportunities to maneuver the ROK into an overall leading role

■ manage ROK and Japanese expectations of the United States

■ shape the UN process to maximize U.S.–ROK flexibility 

■ avoid actions that force North Korea into greater dependence on China

■ frustrate any effort to characterize reunification as regime change

■ prevent frictions based on different priorities among Northeast Asian states from permanently undermining U.S. relationships with those states.

Interests and Priorities of Principal State Actors

This section discusses the interests and priorities of the principal state actors that 

should apply in any North Korean crisis scenario. To provide a context for the following 

discussion, however, it is useful to describe in brief the generic scenario presented later in 

the paper. This generic scenario falls between an orderly rejection of Kim Jong-eun (Kim 

Jong-il’s designated heir) by other members of the senior leadership and a more cataclysmic 
8 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

breakdown of central leadership provoking a civil war. The generic scenario in this paper 

is based on an orderly rejection of Kim Jong-eun. While the new leadership is culled from 

among the current ruling elite, the family of the founder of the North Korean state, Kim 

Il-sung, is out of power. The new leadership therefore is concerned about the loyalty of officials in the core institutions of the state, especially the military. North Korea’s new leaders 

are seeking to control the armed forces. They confront an acceleration in the breakdown 

of the public distribution system. This breakdown poses a serious challenge for the new 

government because, while it has reestablished political authority and military control over 

a majority of North Korean provinces, in order to assert authority over the entire state it 

must repair and restore the public distribution system to full operations. Regime collapse, 

defined as the end of Kim Il-sung’s dynasty, thus is distinct from state collapse, defined as 

the end of the North Korean state—the state has not collapsed.

Principal State Actors

Primary state actors in any North Korean regime collapse crisis will be the United States, 

South Korea, the DPRK, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and Russia (hereinafter 

referred to as the “Principal States”).3

 These states are participants in the Six Party Talks process. 

They have the largest stake in the outcome of a regime collapse crisis. For the ROK, North Korean regime collapse presents an opportunity for Korean reunification, and for the other Principal 

States, the outcome in North Korea will affect their influence on the peninsula and their relative 

weight in Asia. Equally important in motivating their concern over events in North Korea is 

concern that they also could be drawn into a wider conflict if there are massive refugee outflows 

from North Korea. This anxiety is particularly true for China, which has the longest and most 

porous border with North Korea.

There is a hierarchy of relevance among the Principal States. The United States and South 

Korea will play critical roles throughout the crisis as allies. Washington and Seoul will be most 

affected by the actions of North Korea and China, allies (in the narrowest sense of the term) 

with a strongly shared stake in the perpetuation of the North Korean state. Decisions made in 

the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China, therefore, will determine the course of 

the crisis, and how prolonged and violent it is.

Japan and Russia will play roles of varying significance as events unfold. For instance, assuming action moves to the United Nations, Russia will play a more prominent role as a permanent 

member of the Security Council. If the U.S.-Japan alliance declares SIASJ (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan under the 1997 Defense Guidelines),4

 Japan’s role will rise in prominence.
9

Korean Futures

Ordering of Principal State Priorities

The Principal States (minus North Korea) will share an initial focus on the humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. This humanitarian focus will resonate at the UN. For South 

Korea, the United States, and China, humanitarian concerns may become a pretext for intervention. However, it will be difficult to move from intervention to achieve humanitarian 

goals to an intervention that seeks to achieve political ends. As a consequence, while the 

Principal States will share an initial humanitarian focus and a general desire to contain and 

stabilize the crisis inside North Korea, concern over the endstate on the peninsula and the 

potential need for intervention to achieve political ends will cause each state to order its top 

priorities in the crisis differently.

The United States: (1) Pursue WMD elimination and prevent proliferation, (2) contain 

and stabilize the crisis inside North Korea, (3) incline the North Korean leadership toward the 

United States and the ROK to support ROK-led reunification, and (4) preserve Asian alliances 

and cooperation with China.

ROK: (1) Contain and stabilize the crisis inside North Korea while preventing outside 

(PRC and U.S.) intervention, (2) incline the DPRK leadership toward the ROK, preparing the 

way for reunification, (3) eliminate WMD during reunification, and (4) preserve alliance with 

United States while ensuring cooperative relations with China.

China: (1) Contain and stabilize the crisis inside North Korea, (2) preserve North Korea 

as an independent state and deter U.S.–ROK intervention, (3) incline the DPRK leadership toward China and ensure the new regime adopts Chinese-style economic reform, (4) bring North 

Korean WMD programs under international monitoring, and (5) preserve cooperation with 

the United States. 

Japan: (1) Contain and stabilize the crisis inside North Korea, (2) prevent PRC intervention, (3) eliminate WMD and prevent proliferation, (4) defer a SIASJ declaration, (5) ensure that 

Japan has a say on the endstate on the peninsula, and (6) preserve alliance with the United States 

while ensuring cooperative relations with China.

Russia: (1) Contain and stabilize the crisis inside North Korea while deterring U.S.–ROK 

and PRC intervention, (2) maximize opportunities for Russia to expand its influence in Asia 

and global role, and its influence on the endstate on the peninsula; and (3) bring North Korean 

WMD programs under international monitoring.

A discussion of the priorities of the Principal States follows.
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

U.S. Priorities

For six decades, reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and promoting peaceful reunification have been intimately tied to the paramount U.S. national security interest of maintaining peace and stability in Asia. U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea have been the 

cornerstone of this policy.

Over the past two decades, the acceleration of the North Korean nuclear program has 

starkly focused U.S. policymakers on a narrow but substantial set of dangers posed by a nuclear weapons–capable North Korea that is actively proliferating WMD and missile technology. 

North Korea’s WMD and missile cooperation with states in the Middle East and Southwest 

Asia is destabilizing to U.S. interests in these regions and poses a threat to U.S. national security. Since the threat North Korea poses has expanded beyond Asia, Washington no longer 

appears to define North Korea as a peninsula problem but rather as a global WMD and proliferation problem. By contrast, the principal states continue to see North Korea as a peninsula 

problem with a nuclear dimension. Managing these divergent definitions of the North Korea 

problem has posed a challenge to U.S. diplomacy, a challenge that will grow more difficult in 

a regime collapse crisis.

The apparent change in the way Washington defines the problem means the most important U.S. objective during a North Korean regime collapse crisis will be to eliminate or otherwise 

greatly reduce the threat posed by North Korea’s WMD and missile programs and proliferation 

activities—likely packaged as the necessary prelude to reunification. Proliferation concerns will 

drive Washington toward military intervention to secure the North Korean arsenal. A major 

obstacle to this effort, however, will be ROK concerns that U.S. intervention to secure WMD 

would provide Beijing a pretext for military intervention. Absent the support of China and the 

ROK, the United States will find it difficult, if not impossible, to move forces into North Korea 

for a WMD mission. Even if circumstances permitted U.S. military intervention, the operational difficulties of attempting to secure North Korean WMD could be overwhelming in the 

likely event of North Korean opposition and outright resistance. Washington will be forced to 

consider other, more realistic policy options. 

ROK Priorities

North Korean regime collapse would present a historic opportunity for reunification and 

for ridding South Korea of its most significant security threat. Whether the Blue House would 

seize the opportunity for reunification will depend on the government in power. A progressive 
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Korean Futures

ROK government would probably not be inclined to pursue reunification, while a conservative 

Blue House might be inclined to make the attempt. An additional component of the internal 

ROK debate will be the recognition that Seoul’s resources are limited and that any final resolution to the problem would require considerable international assistance as well as international 

acceptance and recognition of new borders.

Even if the Blue House favored a particular policy course, moreover, deep and predictable 

divisions in the ROK political landscape—along ideological, generational, and regional lines—

will surface during the contingency. Pressures from inside the ROK government, particularly 

from within the ROK military, also will push the Blue House toward (or away from) reunification, regardless of who occupies the presidency—a progressive or conservative. The Blue House 

thus will be forced into making historically significant policy decisions without strong public 

consensus. In this weak domestic political context, Seoul will look to Washington for support.

The initial ROK objective will be to contain and stabilize the situation, possibly through 

food aid alone, without intervening inside North Korea. If the situation stabilizes and the Chinese stay out of North Korea, the Blue House would need to develop a package of steps for 

eventual reunification to demonstrate that it did not allow an opportunity to slip by to unify the 

peninsula. If the situation remains unstable or if the Chinese seem poised to intervene, debate 

in Seoul would become even more contentious, divided over the merits of intervention versus 

relying on nonmilitary stabilization measures. 

In the context of Seoul struggling with these momentous and difficult policy decisions 

regarding the future of the Korean Peninsula, introducing the question of U.S. intervention to 

eliminate WMD will highlight our fundamental differences regarding the disposition of North 

Korean WMD. Seoul believes WMD elimination should be deferred to the final stage of reunification. While Seoul has sound operational arguments in defense of this sequencing of events, 

it may wish to keep open the option of retaining WMD capability after reunification. Moreover, 

for South Korea, removing the conventional military threat North Korea poses is far more important because that would materially improve ROK security.

ROK views on the pace of reunification have evolved since the end of the Korean War. The 

central question of whether to “take over” North Korea quickly or opt for a gradual “merger” 

has essentially been decided in favor of a “takeover” for the following reasons: (1) to preempt 

Chinese influence from severely setting back ROK influence in a united Korea; (2) to apply the 

lessons of the German experience, which remains a model for the ROK despite significant differences in the two cases;5

 and (3) to ensure the wholesale and most expeditious transplantation 

of ROK institutions into the DPRK. Gradualism risks the infiltration of socialist institutions 
12 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

and ideology from North Korea into South Korea. Whether a takeover is realistic, however, is 

another question that would become a major topic of debate during a North Korean crisis.

Seoul will expect unwavering U.S. support as it seeks to carve out a role of leadership in the 

crisis, especially in dealing with issues related to intervention and the endstate on the peninsula. 

However, existing legal instruments supporting ROK objectives—the ROK constitution, the 

Armistice Agreement, and UN resolutions dating back to 1948—will be subject to challenge or 

different interpretation by China and North Korea, and potentially by other UN member states. 

Separate ROK and DPRK UN membership facilitates arguments that the UN should acknowledge and affirm the interests of the North Korean state. 

China’s Priorities

Stability on China’s periphery is important to continued Chinese economic growth and 

development, which, in turn, is essential to the continued legitimacy of the Communist Party 

leadership and PRC regime stability. Instability in North Korea would be bad for business in 

China and therefore threaten core Chinese national interests. Thus, initially, Beijing’s primary 

goals will be to stabilize the situation inside North Korea and prevent a refugee crisis. However, 

regime collapse in North Korea will offer China the unique opportunity to remake North Korea 

in China’s image, something Beijing has failed to do so far.

North Korea as it is today is a limited but still significant asset to China.6

 The DPRK provides the PRC a buffer against a democratic Korea allied to the United States7

 and a source of 

raw materials, warm water ports, and, potentially, markets for Chinese goods. North Korea’s 

limited nuclear capability poses few risks to Chinese interests and gives Pyongyang bargaining leverage that indirectly accrues to Beijing as North Korea’s protector.8

 Given these existing 

advantages, a North Korea transformed into China’s image and integrated into the Chinese 

economy would be an immense asset to the PRC. In recent years, Beijing has invested considerable resources to secure a strong foothold in North Korea through a relatively robust commercial presence and extensive official engagement at multiple levels. Beijing links access to 

North Korean ports and resources to the development of China’s northeastern provinces. More 

importantly for the Chinese leadership, North Korean economic development would mean stability at China’s periphery.

While China’s core national interests will be at risk if North Korea becomes unsustainable as 

a state, the leadership will avoid any long-term entanglement in the DPRK that exhausts Chinese 

resources and risks a political backlash at home. Rather, China will aim for a minimum presence 

of a duration sufficient to stabilize the situation consonant with core PRC national interests.9
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Korean Futures

China will remain reluctant to engage in discussions with the United States on North Korea. First and foremost, Beijing distrusts Washington’s strategic intentions and does not care to 

tip its hand, suspicious that the United States seeks to constrain China’s emergence as a great 

power. In addition, China cannot afford to alienate North Korea, part of its periphery. At the 

same time, stable post-crisis U.S.-China relations are in China’s long-term interest, and Beijing 

will look for ways to cooperate with the United States.

China also will seek to protect its relationship with the ROK, which is deep and extensive 

on the economic side. This relationship sustained serious damage when China failed to condemn the DPRK in 2010 both for sinking the ROK naval frigate, the Cheonan, and for firing on 

Yeonpyeong Island.

Last but not least, PRC leaders will be concerned about the “reputational costs” of saving the 

North Korean state, which under present conditions offers the region nothing but security challenges and the potential for instability. China therefore will emphasize the principle of protecting 

the rights of a sovereign state. Tensions between the United States and China over the structure 

of regional security are likely to arise in the context of outcomes on the peninsula. There may be 

outcomes short of reunification that would allow the United States to adjust its commitments and 

deployments in the region, such as a WMD- and missile-free North Korea with a sharply reduced 

conventional military posture that, therefore, poses a significantly reduced threat to Seoul and 

Tokyo. However, it is hard to imagine any outcome that would convince the United States to shed 

its commitments and deployments altogether, at least not anytime soon.

Japan’s Priorities 

Under ordinary circumstances, regime collapse in North Korea would pose an extremely 

difficult challenge to Japan. Were it to occur over the next several years, however, the challenge 

would be exponentially more difficult as Japan also copes with rebuilding from the devastation 

of the March 2011 tsunami.

Like the other Principal States, Japan initially will support efforts to contain and stabilize 

the crisis inside North Korea. Tokyo’s longer term interests lie in emerging from the crisis with 

the U.S. presence on the peninsula intact, so that Japan is not alone in hosting U.S. troops in the 

region. In addition, Japan will likely seek greater influence on the peninsula and in the region, 

especially at China’s expense, as well as improved relations with South Korea. Tokyo will work 

toward shaping events and outcomes in the direction of a WMD-free peninsula. There will be 

a high likelihood throughout the contingency of unfulfilled demands and expectations by the 

United States and Japan that, unchecked, will undermine confidence in the alliance.
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

Japan will regard an endstate on the peninsula in which China has the upper hand as inimical to Japanese interests. Tokyo therefore will support efforts by the United States and the ROK 

to prevent PRC intervention during the crisis. On the other hand, Korean reunification evokes 

Japanese ambivalence, although it is not an outcome Japan can or would try to prevent. Reunification raises serious questions about whether the ROK will continue to be host to a substantial 

U.S. force presence.10 In the longer term, a weak but unified Korea, focused on internal reconstruction, will make Japan the strongest state in the region confronting a rising China—not a 

position in which Tokyo will be comfortable. Finally, unless historic Japan-Korea animosities 

are reduced, Japan will be concerned about how a unified Korea and Japan will interact. At the 

same time, ROK support for Japan since the March 2011 tsunami provides an important building block for improved bilateral ROK-Japan relations. 

Russia’s Priorities

Russia’s core interest is to regain relevance and prestige in Asia, a region Moscow recognizes as growing in global importance. All possible avenues to showcase Russia’s global and regional importance will be exploited. For instance, Moscow will use the contingency to highlight 

U.S.-Russian cooperation on humanitarian endeavors to contain and stabilize the crisis. Russia 

also may use the opportunity of the crisis to strengthen relations with China. On the issue of 

U.S. intervention for a WMD mission, moreover, Russia likely will side with China and insist 

on peaceful resolution.11 Like China, Russia seeks to constrain U.S. unilateralism and does not 

perceive North Korean WMD to be sufficiently threatening to Russian interests to move beyond 

calling for peaceful denuclearization. It is important to emphasize that while Russia strongly 

supports a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, Moscow consistently underscores that this outcome must be achieved peacefully, through nonmilitary means.12

Russia and China share key interests in North Korea and may seek to cooperate to constrain 

the United States and the ROK. However, Russia also seeks to undercut China’s influence on the 

peninsula and in the region, and may attempt to exploit divisions between China and the ROK, 

and China and the DPRK. Russia, therefore, will strongly support referring the matter to the UN, 

where Moscow can maximize its influence as a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security 

Council and otherwise seek to constrain the actions of China, the United States, and South Korea. 

At the same time, good relations with both Koreas are important to Moscow as it looks ahead to 

securing Russian influence on the peninsula. Russia also has important commercial ties to South 

Korea. Just as China seeks to harness the North Korean economy to its northeastern provinces, so 

Russia seeks to harness the economy of the Russian Far East to North Korea.
15

Korean Futures

Venues for Decision and Dialogue

United Nations

The UN Security Council will be the primary venue for discussions and decisions during 

the crisis. Using the UN for these purposes will be a serious bone of contention between the 

United States and the ROK. Seoul expects Washington to manage Beijing and legitimize ROK–

U.S. military intervention without recourse to the UN. However, military intervention without 

UN endorsement would be unwise and politically difficult to manage. The United States and 

South Korea would be vulnerable to charges of seeking regime change if they intervened militarily without UN cover. While China has recourse to the 1961 DPRK-China security treaty 

(discussed below) and can claim to be “invited in,” the same cannot be said of the United States 

and South Korea. Moreover, the United States and China can best constrain one another in the 

Security Council, which makes it an important venue for managing the crisis and achieving 

U.S. and ROK objectives. That said, both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the Security 

Council will become liabilities to the United States if international support for ROK–U.S. intervention is lacking. Debate at the UN will also be hard to manage. Issues may be raised that 

divert attention from U.S. goals. Seoul fears China will exercise its veto and severely constrain 

ROK actions, demonstrating in the process that Beijing has the upper hand over Seoul—a fact 

North Korean elites would duly note. The UN as a venue for decisionmaking will become a 

source of strain in the alliance.

If Washington takes the North Korea issue to the UN before Beijing does so, the United 

States can constrain Chinese actions in the DPRK. For example, by refusing to recognize any 

PRC-installed DPRK regime and declaring it “provisional,” Washington could buy time and 

possibly the opportunity to capitalize on events inside North Korea that may unfold in ways 

beneficial to the United States. The main disadvantage of acting first early in the crisis is that 

Washington may force Beijing into a hard defense of the DPRK, which could reduce room to 

negotiate issues related to endstates.

Regional Venues for Dialogue

To underscore the regional nature of the U.S. approach to the crisis and to conduct useful 

consultations with those states with a clear stake in the outcome on the peninsula, the United 

States will seek to convene the Principal States (probably minus North Korea) under the framework of the Six Party Talks. The purpose would be to discuss the crisis rather than WMD issues, 
16 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

although that subject would be a component of talks. China will be reluctant to go along, not 

wanting to alienate or further isolate the regime in Pyongyang, and Beijing is not likely to share 

its own goals or plans for responding to the crisis. However, convening a Six Party meeting will 

put some pressure on China, while reminding the international community of understandings previously reached in the Six Party process on WMD issues. China and Russia will seek to 

underscore the principle of peaceful denuclearization in the 2005 Joint Statement. The United 

States, South Korea, and Japan will meet trilaterally to project alignment among the allies, further underscoring the regional nature of the crisis response. These meetings will not satisfy 

Japan’s demands for consultation and reassurance, but will demonstrate that Japan is playing a 

role in the crisis.

Bilateral Venues for Dialogue

In any North Korean crisis, the ROK can best be positioned to assume a leading role if 

Seoul is assertive and proactive on humanitarian issues early on, possibly even approaching the 

UN Secretary General for aid to North Korea. At a minimum, the ROK could be in visible talks 

with the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and even Japan regarding contributions to humanitarian relief and for longer term commitments to North Korea. 

Actions of this kind will not guarantee South Korea a lead role in the crisis, but they could significantly shift the odds in Seoul’s favor by giving it a prominent and important platform from 

which to claim a larger leadership role.

The United States has two channels for direct contact with North Korea: through the DPRK 

mission to the UN in New York and the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. Both 

channels would be kept open during the crisis, recognizing, however, that they may be corrupted 

by groups representing independent factions or otherwise unable to speak authoritatively for the 

new regime. It may be useful to establish alternative channels through the DPRK missions in 

Vienna, Bern, and Geneva. (Risk of monitoring by third countries would need to be taken into 

account.) 

Rationales for Intervention

ROK Constitution

To justify intervention, South Korea will point to Article III of its constitution, which 

claims the entire peninsula to be under ROK administration. Seoul believes that this provision 

offers sufficient political cover for any type of intervention, military or humanitarian. However, 
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Korean Futures

the rationale of Article III is not likely to persuade an international community that recognizes 

North Korea as a separate state. Russia and China, moreover, have treaties with the DPRK that 

would make it difficult to support or allow coercive dissolution of the North Korean state. Another option is for the ROK to approach the UN Secretary General for humanitarian aid under 

Article III, thereby establishing a precedent for acceptance of Article III. However, this is just as 

likely to backfire and result in a challenge from the DPRK (whose constitution claims to represent all Koreans) and possibly from China.13

The Armistice

Reasserting the political authority and operational lead of the ROK–U.S. alliance enshrined 

in the United Nations Command and the Military Armistice Commission structures may maximize U.S.–ROK flexibility at the UN. The United States could approach the Security Council in 

its capacity as head of the UN Command and, referencing UN Security Council Resolution 85,14

seek political cover for ROK forces crossing into the DPRK to provide a safe and secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid (and the return of internally displaced persons and 

refugees). However, the UN Command has been operating independently of the UN; therefore, 

reasserting its linkage to the UN will be challenging and may have negative consequences in 

terms of UN mission management.

More importantly, the Armistice is clear that the military of one side may cross into the 

other’s territory only with the permission of the receiving command. The United States would 

need to declare the other command incapable of speaking for the DPRK. Having alternative bilateral channels to North Korea through its missions in European capitals could prove useful in 

that regard. Armistice Article IV, point 60 calls for “peaceful settlement of the Korean question.” 

If the new DPRK regime cannot control its borders and internal violence causes people to flee, 

this situation would constitute a threat to ROK security, providing a rationale for intervention. 

The important point here is that developing a rationale for intervention will require a thorough 

understanding of existing agreements and mechanisms as well as the risks of invoking and applying them.

UN Security Council Resolutions

The UN Charter is exceedingly careful in its treatment of respect for “matters which 

are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” while reserving the responsibility of the Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security.15 In 

2005, the UN General Assembly guardedly endorsed the “responsibility-to-protect.”16 This 
18 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

concept emphasizes the responsibility of states to protect their populations from genocide, 

war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.17 The first application of responsibility-to-protect to justify military intervention was in UN Security Council Resolution 

1973 on Libya (March 17, 2011). However, the invocation of responsibility-to-protect would 

potentially set back U.S. and ROK goals in the event of a North Korean regime collapse, and 

it is highly unlikely that China or Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council, 

would endorse its application to North Korea.

First, responsibility-to-protect requires that all other measures—a ceasefire, negotiation, 

and the use of economic and political incentives, for instance—be exhausted before resorting 

to military force, the last resort. China could make a good case for insisting on economic and 

political incentives, such as repairing the DPRK distribution system to contain an incipient 

humanitarian crisis, to help restore order, and to create the conditions for a negotiated end to 

any attacks on civilians by North Korean authorities. During the course of Security Council 

discussion on whether to invoke responsibility-to-protect, it would not be outside the realm 

of possibility for North Korea to threaten to use WMD against South Korea or Japan or to 

fire off missiles to “warn” the international community against military intervention. Even in 

the unlikely event that a resolution embracing responsibility-to-protect were passed because 

China and Russia abstained on the condition that a negotiated settlement would be attempted, it is hard to imagine Beijing and Moscow moving from this position to allowing the use of 

military force against North Korea.

Second, if responsibility-to-protect were invoked, how would the ROK and United 

States move from a humanitarian mandate for intervention to reunification or WMD elimination? There is already concern in the international community that powerful states will 

abuse responsibility-to-protect to justify interventions that serve their political interests 

rather than humanitarian goals.18 This accusation could easily be leveled against South 

Korea if Seoul decided to seize the opportunity to pursue reunification during humanitarian intervention.

It is an accusation that could also be leveled against the United States. In fact, invoking 

responsibility-to-protect would complicate Washington’s ability to work from humanitarian 

intervention to WMD elimination. Undertaking a separate WMD mission will rely on an 

entirely different set of UN resolutions, those condemning North Korea’s WMD and proliferation activities, as the basis for U.S. intervention to secure and eliminate WMD programs. 

The WMD mission will also not be limited to intervening militarily in North Korea. It will 

include reinvigorating the Proliferation Security Initiative and adopting new UN Security 
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Korean Futures

Council resolutions to close exit points from North Korea—requiring discussions at the UN 

that would open up the United States to charges of using responsibility-to-protect as cover 

for a political mission.

Third, it is unlikely that China or Russia would accept the application of responsibilityto-protect to North Korea for a variety of other reasons. China, in particular, consistently has 

supported negotiation over military intervention at the Security Council. In the case of Libya, 

both China and Russia abstained, apparently because of the support for intervention from the 

Arab League; however, both Moscow and Beijing issued statements “regretting” military action 

against Libya.19 Russia and China likely will oppose intervention justified by responsibility-toprotect given that they consider their own human rights practices and other matters to be internal affairs. 

1961 Sino-Korean Treaty

China has a solid legal rationale for intervention in North Korea under Article II of 

the Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Article II states 

that in the event of an armed attack by any state or several states jointly against one of the 

Contracting Parties, the other would “immediately render military and other assistance 

by all means at its disposal.” Moreover, Article VI states that Korean unification must be 

“peaceful and democratic,” and in accordance with the “national interests of the Korean 

people.” Thus, any ROK efforts toward reunification taking place under circumstances of 

disarray and chaos in the DPRK would be inconsistent with Article VI of this bilateral 

treaty, which could be cited by either China or the DPRK to challenge the ROK. In addition, Article V of this treaty underscores the principle of “mutual respect for sovereignty,” 

making it difficult for China to support any effort coercively to dissolve the North Korean 

state or forcibly seize WMD facilities and stocks. 

2000 Russia-DPRK Treaty

Similarly, under the Russia-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, both sides committed to develop relations on the principle of mutual respect for state 

sovereignty and territorial integrity. This fact will make it difficult for Russia to agree to any effort to dissolve coercively the North Korean state. Moreover, the treaty provides that in the event 

of a security emergency, both sides shall “enter into contact with each other immediately.” This 

commitment preserves Russian flexibility on whether to provide military or other assistance to 

North Korea, and on whether to intervene in North Korea.
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

While Russia has had difficulty in reenergizing relations with North Korea, the 2000 Treaty 

gives Moscow a potentially important voice on decisions on intervention and the endstate in 

North Korea. It also is a lever that North Korea could use to temper Chinese influence or to 

force China to compete with Russia for influence—especially if North Korea invoked the Treaty’s consultative mechanism and Russia agreed to talks. In that case, North Korea might seek to 

drive a deeper wedge between Washington and Moscow.

Korean Collapse Scenario

This section applies the foregoing discussion of interests and objectives of the Principal 

States to a generic scenario of regime collapse in North Korea. Under this generic scenario, the 

Kim regime falls as a result of challenge from within the current ruling elite, ending the dynasty 

of Kim Il-sung but not the North Korean state. A weak successor government politically supported by China and culled from the current ruling elite reestablishes a semblance of order. 

Scenarios based on rejection by North Koreans of the institutions of state were avoided because 

they make the decision to intervene too easy—more defensible politically because intervention 

would support internal actors seeking to change the regime. The generic scenario in this paper 

is not more plausible than others, but it is realistic and far more complex, encompassing the 

broadest possible range of issues, concerns, and political decisions. Above all, the critical decision on whether to intervene militarily would not be an easy or obvious choice.

Events within North Korea

In the scenario, a new government has reestablished political authority and military control 

over a majority of North Korean provinces but not the entire state. To consolidate its power and 

control over the state, the new regime is moving (1) to restore all significant economic activity to 

state control, (2) to gain control over the security and armed forces, and (3) to dominate public 

information media so that little information leaks in or out. The new government also faces an 

acceleration of existing challenges: the breakdown of the public distribution system intensifies, 

further weakening the state’s economic and social control and generating small but growing populations of internally displaced persons and the potential for massive refugee outflows.

Woefully inadequate information undermines the ability of the United States to make 

plausible assessments about the possible trajectory of events. However, escalating refugee flows, 

largely into China, suggest a high risk for a wider conflict engulfing neighboring states. This 

risk is prompting consideration of humanitarian intervention to stabilize and contain the crisis 

inside North Korea.
21

Korean Futures

North Korea’s External Posture

The new government is focused on preserving the North Korean state at all costs. Pyongyang will make its case to the UN, ask the Chinese to seek Security Council intervention, and/

or invite China to intervene in order to stabilize the situation. North Koreans will not welcome ROK and/or U.S. military intervention, even for the purpose of distributing humanitarian aid, and neither state will be “invited in.” The regime may invite China to intervene, but 

North Koreans over time will see the Chinese as an occupying force. A protracted Chinese 

military presence could rekindle historic Korean-Chinese hatred on both sides of the 38th

parallel, presenting serious complications for the regime and for the Chinese.20 In that case, 

the North Korean regime would need to weigh the political disadvantages of continued cooperation with China against the need to restore essential services, especially food distribution, 

to stabilize the country, especially if Chinese assistance in this area is not forthcoming or is 

ineffective or insufficient.

The new DPRK leadership will continue to project a profoundly anti-American posture 

and will find it useful politically to challenge the United States as the obstacle to Korean reunification, reprising a familiar theme in North Korean politics. Historic Korean distrust of China 

will temper the new leadership’s willingness to confront Washington, unless the United States 

shows itself, through policy and public statements, to be antagonistic to the new regime. In 

addition, the DPRK desire to play the United States and China against each other will require 

pragmatism in North Korea’s dealings with the two powers.

Republic of Korea’s Response

ROK Policy Conflicted. The ROK government and body politic will be internally at odds 

in formulating a response to regime collapse in North Korea—divided over whether to stabilize 

and contain the crisis inside the state or to seize the opportunity to intervene militarily to lay 

the groundwork for reunification. Decisionmaking paralysis in Seoul will prompt the ROK to 

seek consultations with Washington, while facing tremendous pressure domestically to respond 

quickly enough to preempt Chinese military intervention. 

ROK Concern over Chinese Influence. At the same time, China will be active in North 

Korea, driving Seoul to seek to minimize China’s opportunities to enhance its position and 

ability to shape the future of the DPRK. Seoul’s perception that China’s role and influence 

in North Korea are increasing would provoke considerable concern within the government, 

particularly within the ROK military establishment. Washington will need to engage Seoul to 
22 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

check any tendencies to intervene preemptively with military force by reassuring South Korea 

that the United States will work to prevent China from dictating the outcome in North Korea.

ROK Leadership during the Crisis. Without question, ROK influence over events and the 

endstate in North Korea will be affected by China’s role and by the extent to which South Korea 

must rely on international support. The more South Korea relies on international support to 

cope with the contingency, the weaker Seoul’s influence will be on the endstate and inside North 

Korea. Washington will need to be mindful of these realities throughout the crisis to ensure that 

steps are taken whenever and wherever possible to position the ROK into a leading role.

China’s Response

China Will Become Aware of Regime Collapse First. China will be in the most powerful position initially to influence events in North Korea and the least conflicted regarding the 

future of the North Korean state. It likely will be the first state in the region to realize that there 

is a leadership crisis in Pyongyang. China has a large diplomatic mission in North Korea with 

access to the top leadership. Party-to-party ties appear to be strong, as well as ties between 

the Korean People’s Army and People’s Liberation Army, and China’s commercial interests are 

spread throughout the country. Perhaps no other state has better “eyes and ears” on the ground 

in North Korea than China. China has contingency plans to address instability in North Korea. 

Initial Chinese intervention, however, is likely to be political and diplomatic in nature.

China will move with great subtlety, at a pace dictated by opportunity and circumstance, 

but certainly rapidly enough to forestall a widening crisis—especially one that involves North 

Korean refugees spilling across the border into China. A refugee crisis would represent a failure 

of Chinese policy. Responding wisely to China’s initial maneuvers inside North Korea will pose a 

key diplomatic challenge to the United States and South Korea. Washington will be at a disadvantage because Beijing will remain reluctant to engage in any but the most cursory discussions with 

the United States and the other Principal States regarding developments on the ground in North 

Korea and on North Korea’s future. This Chinese attitude reflects underlying mistrust between 

the United States and China as well as China’s desire not to alienate or further isolate the DPRK.

China Will Try to Delay UN Action until after a New DPRK Regime Is Installed. China 

is not likely to take the North Korea crisis to the Security Council until after a new regime is 

installed. It also will use all levers to prevent others from using UN fora to press for state collapse. If Washington tries to take the Korean crisis to the UN first, before Beijing is ready, that 

might position the United States to circumscribe China’s diplomatic maneuvering in North 

Korea. However, U.S. flexibility would be reduced, and Washington would be at odds early on 
23

Korean Futures

with Seoul, which opposes taking the North Korea issue to the UN. North Korea could appeal 

to the UN General Assembly on its own but is more likely to work through China for UN Security Council action, especially to preempt or stop ROK–U.S. military intervention or efforts to 

obtain Security Council action.

Ambiguous Chinese Posture on Reunification. China’s goal is to preserve the North Korean state. To avoid uncomfortable parallels with Taiwan, however, the Chinese public posture on 

Korean reunification will be ambiguous—supportive of the concept, but under conditions that 

will be political nonstarters for the United States and possibly South Korea (such as withdrawal 

or severe downsizing of the U.S. military presence in the ROK).

Conditions Under Which the PRC Would Intervene Military. China will take the provocative step of military intervention under any of four conditions: (1) if the crisis cannot be 

contained inside North Korea through other measures, (2) if North Korean leaders appear to be 

losing control over the WMD and missile arsenal, (3) if the United States and/or South Korea 

intervene, or (4) if the United States and/or South Korea seem about to intervene (in which case 

China would intervene preemptively).

Advancing Long-term Interests. China could advance its long-term interests in a contingency with the following outcomes:

■ China’s ideal outcome is likely to be the preservation of a separate and stable North 

Korean state that adopts Chinese-style economic reforms, is integrated into the economies of China’s northeastern provinces (Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning), and in 

which Chinese influence is preponderant. China may prefer a WMD-free North Korea 

but also believes North Korea’s limited nuclear capability poses manageable risks to 

Chinese interests and may even confer certain strategic advantages: limited nuclear 

capability gives North Korea bargaining leverage in the region that indirectly accrues 

to China as Pyongyang’s protector. Moreover, perpetuating the North Korean state offers China a continued physical and psychological buffer against the influences of a 

democratic Korea.

■ Though of extremely low probability, another option entails the withdrawal of U.S. 

forces from the ROK and the expansion of Chinese influence across the peninsula. 

North Korean regime collapse would present China with the opportunity to insist that 

North Korea relinquish its nuclear capabilities as a condition of Chinese support for 

the continuation of the North Korean state, which would give China leverage against a 
24 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

continued U.S. presence in the ROK and possibly Japan. A denuclearized North Korea 

would mean a fundamentally transformed state, one potentially moving toward normal 

relations with Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo. China could exploit this new status quo 

to put pressure on a continued U.S. military presence on the peninsula and in Japan.

■ Equally improbable is that Beijing could, with proper guarantees from South Korea 

regarding treatment of the North Korean leadership, structure an outcome that would 

result in both denuclearization and a path to unification—provided Seoul accepts an 

end to the U.S. presence on the peninsula. Strategically, this outcome would enhance 

China’s standing in the region, incline a united Korea toward China, and put pressure 

on Japan as the last bastion of a U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. 

U.S. Response 

U.S. Policy Conflicted. Politics in Washington will be polarized between those desiring to 

seize the opportunity to eliminate the North Korean WMD programs and effect regime change 

on the one hand, and those favoring stability and crisis containment on the other hand. One 

should anticipate congressional demands for sanctions against the new regime as a way to press 

for change. If adopted, sanctions would work at cross-purposes with efforts in the region to 

contain the crisis.

WMD Elimination. Absent North Korean cooperation, the United States stands to face 

serious opposition from the ROK and other states to attempt to eliminate North Korea’s WMD. 

The other Principal States may resent the effort to achieve through military intervention what 

the United States failed to achieve through diplomacy. China and Russia would seek to defer 

decisions on the North Korean WMD programs until the political situation is more settled and 

the crisis contained. Moscow and Beijing are likely to insist on a peaceful, diplomatic resolution, such as international monitoring of the North Korean WMD programs—and would need 

to ensure North Korean cooperation. This outcome would not be welcome among Washington 

policymakers who have waited two decades for regime collapse and the opportunity to dismantle these programs.

Korean Reunification. With the support of China and Russia (and likely France and the 

United Kingdom), the United States can make denuclearization and reunification principal 

goals in a UN Security Council resolution. Whether Washington can intervene militarily to accomplish these objectives is another question. That will hinge on North Korean cooperation and 

the international community’s perception of whether that cooperation is willing or coerced. If it 
25

Korean Futures

appears to be coerced, the call for reunification may be seen as regime change by another name. 

Governments otherwise comfortable with ROK intervention to permit delivery of humanitarian aid, who generally oppose the DPRK’s WMD capabilities and are thus willing to comply with 

UN resolutions and sanctions on North Korea, will not agree to overthrow the North Korean 

state. On the other hand, if North Korea complies with ROK–U.S. objectives, Washington will 

need to consider reassurances to China regarding the structure and positioning of U.S. forces in 

a unified peninsula as well as Korean commitments to drop irredentist claims previously made 

by both North and South Korea.

Relations with China. China’s role in propping up the new North Korean regime will 

provoke significant political opposition in the United States that could, unchecked, undermine post-crisis U.S.-China relations. Both sides will seek to cooperate during the crisis in 

order to temper these negative impulses. Humanitarian issues will afford opportunities for 

U.S.-China cooperation: pandemic planning, negotiating secure access with North Korea for 

humanitarian relief organizations, and possibly, late in the crisis, initiatives that will promote 

economic reform. 

Relations with the ROK. While the United States will not wish China to dictate the political future of North Korea, South Korea likely will not be able to determine North Korea’s 

future. For the duration of the crisis, this likely reality will greatly complicate alliance relations. 

Both sides will need to work hard to prevent misunderstandings and disappointed expectations 

from causing longer term damage or drift in the alliance. It will be extremely important for the 

United States to avail itself of every opportunity to position South Korea, and support South 

Korea’s positioning of itself, in a leading role in the crisis. At the same time, Washington will 

need to avoid being dragged into actions or postures by Seoul that will be inimical to U.S. and 

ROK interests over the long term.

Relations with Japan. Relations with Japan will suffer as a result of unmet expectations by 

both sides, as discussed below. Throughout the crisis, both Tokyo and Washington will need to 

undertake actions to prevent misunderstandings and disappointed expectations from causing 

longer term damage or drift in the alliance. For Washington, the challenge will be to demonstrate that the United States is doing its utmost to ensure that Tokyo’s opinions count in the 

reckoning of the endstate on the peninsula and address other Japanese concerns without being 

dragged into endless rounds of consultations or into actions that will ultimately be unproductive for U.S. and Japanese interests over the long term.

Potential for U.S. Isolation. In a conflicted domestic political environment, the United States could find itself at odds with or even isolated from the other Principal States 
26 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

seeking to resolve the crisis, despite their substantial mistrust of and hostility toward the 

new DPRK leadership and its policies as those policies develop along expected and familiar 

lines. Managing North Korean policy with Congress has been difficult for two decades. 

Obtaining congressional support for outcomes judged to be less than ideal could be among 

the most difficult of the administration’s tasks. Failure to gain strong bipartisan support for 

U.S. policy could undermine anything achieved diplomatically with the ROK, China, Russia, Japan, and the DPRK. The character of the U.S. approach will cause states in the region 

to draw conclusions about American intentions in Asia that will affect their perceptions of 

the value of U.S. leadership.

Japan’s Response

Politics in Japan Will Be Chaotic. Tokyo will be focused on quelling public anxiety over a possible North Korean attack, protecting Japanese nationals in South Korea, monitoring Chosen Soren,21

and dealing with boat people. Relentless Japanese demands for consultation will exhaust Washington and further marginalize Tokyo, particularly if the government asks that the United States obtain 

an accounting of Japanese abducted by North Korean agents in Japan to gain Japanese public support 

for declaring SIASJ under the 1997 Defense Guidelines. The alliance will be under strain.

Japanese Ambivalence about U.S. Military Intervention for a WMD Mission. Tokyo will 

hope Washington can find a way to take out North Korea’s WMD and missile programs but will 

be concerned about China’s response and the potential for a wide military conflict. The risk of 

military miscalculation will be significant if China and Russia put their nuclear forces on high 

alert due to the presence of U.S. forces close to their borders. Acknowledging the risks from 

U.S. military intervention is not sufficient: Washington should understand that Japan may reassess U.S. credibility as an ally and leader in Asia if the North Korean WMD programs are not 

eliminated. An important mitigating factor will be the extent to which Washington addresses 

other Japanese concerns, especially whether the United States is able to hold Chinese influence 

on the peninsula in check and secure a strong voice for Tokyo in determining the endstate on 

the peninsula.

Japan May Prefer that the United States Use UN Bases and Seek Permission Later. Using designated UN bases in Japan22 for intervention in North Korea requires that the United 

States and Japan declare SIASJ under the 1997 Defense Guidelines. Making such a declaration 

will be problematic for Tokyo. China likely will “warn” Japan against ROK–U.S. use of these 

bases. Japan might prefer that the United States ask permission later, observing the thinnest 

formalities and simply using the UN bases as needed, without asking the Japanese to make a 
27

Korean Futures

joint SIASJ declaration. Tokyo could then later declare that it was not given sufficient time for 

Diet deliberations.

Asking permission later also works to Washington’s advantage given that it is not in the 

U.S. interest to give China the opportunity to threaten Japan. In addition, this approach would 

avoid a potentially prolonged Diet deliberation on SIASJ that would probably not keep pace 

with ROK–U.S. military operational needs. U.S. accusations that Japan is not a reliable ally 

would then need to be managed to prevent long-term damage to the alliance.

Russia’s Response

Moscow will be under the least domestic pressure to act but will use the crisis to maximize 

its influence in the region while highlighting its prominent role in resolving a crisis of international dimensions. The Russians will be concerned that instability in North Korea may work to 

China’s advantage because China has the strongest foothold in the country. Russia’s posture will 

depend on the state of U.S.-Russia and Russia-China relations and whether siding with Washington or Beijing will improve Moscow’s influence on the peninsula and in Asia, as well as its 

global stature. Moscow may pay lip service to U.S. WMD proliferation concerns but will stop 

short of supporting U.S. military intervention to secure North Korean WMD.

Russia will act to secure its 12-mile land border with North Korea and 11-mile Tumen 

River border to preempt refugee flows into Russia, but Moscow has no interest in playing a 

role in military operations inside North Korea. That calculation would change, however, if U.S. 

troops entered North Korea, particularly near the Russian border. In that event, Russia would 

likely place its nuclear forces on alert (as would China), creating the conditions for a potentially 

disastrous military miscalculation. It is hard to gauge how Russia would react to a Chinese military presence in North Korea; much would depend on the state of Russia-China relations and 

whether China was willing to consult with Russia after its intervention (Beijing is not likely to 

consult in advance of sending forces to North Korea).

Do the Key Findings Apply to Other Scenarios?

This study has relied on a generic scenario of regime collapse in which the decision 

to intervene is not an easy or obvious choice, and the primary initial goal is to contain 

and stabilize the situation. There are a number of studies looking at alternative scenarios 

of North Korean regime collapse and regime survival.23 The type of scenario could alter the 

tactics of the principal states, although not their interests and goals. For instance, in a scenario in which some or even a majority of North Koreans decided to reject the institutions 
28 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

of the North Korean state, ROK–U.S. intervention for reunification and WMD elimination 

missions would seem to be more feasible politically. Responsibility-to-protect could be the 

starting point of an intervention that makes the transition from humanitarian to political 

objectives because of the existence of North Korean support for regime change or reunification. In other words, it could be argued under those conditions that North Koreans were 

deciding their own future for themselves, possibly easing international support for ROK–

U.S. military action. However, Chinese and Russian opposition to ROK–U.S. military intervention would remain as Moscow and Beijing sought to prevent any strengthening of U.S. 

influence on the peninsula and in the region at their expense.

This scenario of North Korean opposition to the institutions of the current North Korean 

state would not alter the Key Findings in this paper. There would still be no guarantee that the 

North Korean state would collapse. In fact, the terrain in North Korea is well suited to a long 

guerrilla struggle. The United States and South Korea would still be at an informational disadvantage at the start of regime collapse compared to China, which has the largest foreign presence in North Korea and the most extensive state-to-state ties—at multiple levels and through 

the core institutions of the North Korean state (the party and military). Decisions on intervention that were mishandled would put U.S. interests and influence at substantial risk. More importantly, the ROK would be no more likely to support a U.S. WMD elimination mission before 

reunification.

Recommendations

1. U.S. Government Institutional Organization

The National Security Council (NSC) should immediately initiate a limited interagency 

process that brings together the core agencies: State Department, Defense Department, Central 

Intelligence Agency, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of the 

Treasury, and Department of Energy. Representatives of these agencies (at the equivalent level 

of Senior Foreign Service) will comprise the Interagency Oversight Team (IOT) and periodically report to the Deputies’ Committee (comprised of the Deputy Secretaries or their equivalents of each participating agency). The goal of the IOT would be to initiate a North Korea crisis 

planning process.

The work of the IOT should be undertaken quietly, and knowledge of the group’s activities 

and existence should be on a need-to-know basis within the U.S. Government. As South Korea 

and Japan are brought into the process, the NSC, with the allies, should develop appropriate 
29

Korean Futures

public affairs guidance explaining that the basic function of the group is to conduct diplomatic 

planning—to be prepared rather than because of any assessment of the likelihood of a particular 

event occurring. The Deputies’ Committee should consider whether to share all or some of the 

conclusions of the IOT process with China.

Interagency Oversight Team Tasks.

■ Decide the composition of small working groups to tackle significant functional issues 

that would arise in a contingency: WMD elimination, humanitarian response, legal 

basis for actions, alliance relations, and policy options—operational and strategic.

■ Task the Intelligence Community to develop regular updates of the Principal States’ 

concerns and interests with respect to North Korea, producing a series of papers assessing the situation, outlining possible steps, and setting up checklists of issues to be 

considered.

■ Develop and disseminate the procedures for the small working groups and functions 

they are expected to fulfill.

Functional Group Tasks. The IOT should task the five functional groups.

WMD Elimination Group Tasks: seizure and control of WMD, seizure and control of fissile material yet to be weaponized, securing scientists involved in these programs, actions to 

close exits, and actions to reinvigorate the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The first three tasks occur in North Korea and span the entire process of locating, characterizing, neutralizing, removing, and destroying WMD. This process includes the destruction of 

weapons and related programs, as well as the physical infrastructure and the securing of WMDrelated scientists. WMD elimination will entail a geographically dispersed hunt for potential 

WMD sites in an environment where North Korean forces are likely to oppose U.S. efforts. It 

is an undertaking that will require planning for security, logistics, transportation, and other 

enabling capabilities. The WMD Elimination Group will decide the composition of assessment 

teams and their needs.

Accurate intelligence of course will be an enormous asset. Early engagement with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency will be important. The group should work with the Legal Frameworks team to consider the legal authorities necessary to initiate WMD elimination 
30 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

operations—presumably this will require a UN Security Council resolution establishing an 

international authority to eliminate North Korea’s WMD programs. This resolution will make 

reference to all past UN resolutions on North Korean WMD issues, which together form a 

powerful political rationale for addressing the threat the North Korean programs pose to the 

international community. The group will work with the Operational Policy Options team on 

the necessary diplomatic actions at the UN.

Humanitarian Response Group Tasks: antipandemic planning, food distribution, shelter 

and clothing, and sanitation and clean water. The Humanitarian Response Group will make an 

initial assessment of likely needs and integrate relevant U.S. organizations—Centers for Disease 

Control, USAID, State, Health and Human Services—into planning efforts.

Pandemic planning will be critical given the incidence of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis 

(TB) in North Korea. Based on World Health Organization estimates for 2009, North Korea has 

the highest rate of TB in the world outside of sub-Saharan Africa: an incidence rate of 345 cases 

per 100,000. TB is highly infectious and deadly. Half of those who go untreated die, and because 

of exposures to others, each case may spawn between 10 and 20 new cases. The bacteria does not 

respect borders. For instance, multidrug-resistant strains that arrived in Russia following the fall 

of the Soviet Union have turned up in Western Europe, the Middle East, and South Africa.24

Legal Frameworks Group Tasks: review existing legal instruments and determine how they 

could come into play in a Korean contingency. How should the United States position itself with 

respect to each of the documents listed below? Additionally, this group should engage Seoul at 

the earliest possible opportunity, since the ROK may take the lead on a number of efforts. The 

legal instruments include the following:

■ ROK constitution (Article III)

■ DPRK constitution

■ UN Security Council Resolutions 83, 84, 85 (from the Korean War)

■ UN Security Council Resolutions 1674, 1738, and 1706 (responsibility-to-protect)

■ UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 (Libya) and 1975 (Ivory Coast)

■ UN General Assembly Resolution 195 of December 12, 1948 (recognizes ROK as the 

sole legitimate government of Korea)
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Korean Futures

■ UN Charter Chapter 7, Article 42 (restoring international peace)

■ UN Charter Chapter 7, Article 51 (self-defense, refugees, WMD, safety of ROK citizens 

in DPRK) 

■ The Armistice

■ 1961 China-DPRK Security Treaty

■ 2000 Russia-DPRK Friendship Treaty

■ U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; 1997 Defense Guidelines (SIASJ)

■ U.S.–ROK Security Treaty

■ Inter-Korean Agreements

■ Six Party Talks understandings.

Operational Policy Options Group Tasks: translate policy decisions into achievable diplomatic steps; map the actions the United States must take, in which venues, and through what 

mechanisms. This group will focus on:

■ humanitarian relief

■ stabilization

■ WMD elimination.

Strategic Policy Options Group Tasks: this group will consider broad strategic issues:

■ management of the contingency at the UN Security Council

■ lead role of the ROK
32 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

■ alliance management issues/conflicting national priorities

■ areas for U.S.-China cooperation: examine existing dialogues, especially the Strategic 

and Economic Dialogue, for ways to integrate North Korea issues such as pandemic 

planning; stable command and control over North Korean WMD; economic reform in 

the DPRK—graduating North Korea from humanitarian to development aid; and corridors for humanitarian intervention

■ acceptable endstates of intervention.

This group should consider how to prevent a major disruption in U.S.-China relations, 

and how to manage alliance relations with South Korea and Japan during the crisis. Finding 

areas for “soft” cooperation with China—on pandemic planning, for instance—will be important to keeping Sino-American relations stable. The goal will be to try to engage China early 

and often.

This group will consider the strategic and diplomatic implications of an intervention that 

stabilizes North Korea and under what conditions this would be acceptable to the United States 

and the other principal states. A particular focus will be on how to manage alliance relationships 

if outcomes are less than optimal—defined as the continuation of both a divided peninsula and 

a North Korean state with WMD programs under some form of international monitoring. 

2. International Institutional Organization

Once the U.S. Government is organized internally, the appropriate agency members of the 

IOT should initiate quiet discussions with appropriate counterparts in international organizations such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (State and Treasury), the World 

Food Program, United Nations Children’s Fund, the UN High Commission on Refugees, the 

International Organization for Migration (State and USAID), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (State and Energy).

3. U.S.–Republic of Korea Coordination

The IOT will direct State to initiate quiet consultations with South Korea briefed to the 

IOT. It is not likely that South Korea will share its plans and thinking fully with the United 

States. However, successful intervention or political management of a North Korean contingency will require close U.S.–ROK communication and coordination.
33

Korean Futures

4. U.S.–Republic of Korea–Japan Coordination

The United States and South Korea should reach out to Japan to take the measure of Japanese internal thinking on instability/collapse in North Korea. There are a range of opinions on 

North Korean collapse within the Japanese Foreign Ministry and between the Foreign Ministry 

and other agencies such as the Ministry of Defense, the Cabinet Secretariat, and the Cabinet 

Intelligence and Research Office.

5. U.S.–ROK-Japan-China-Russia Coordination

Both the United States and South Korea will want to meet with the other principal states 

under the rubric of the Six Party Talks (minus North Korea) to project the regional nature of 

their approach and in order to coordinate pandemic planning and other cooperative initiatives. 

While the United States and South Korea will attempt to discuss substantive political issues in 

this venue, China is not likely to cooperate.

Conclusion

Regime collapse in North Korea would challenge the best political leaders in its complexity and in its potential to shift the strategic landscape in Asia in ways inimical to U.S. 

national security interests. The odds are decidedly against the regime collapsing. If it did, 

however, the ensuing crisis would be extremely dangerous and easily susceptible to escalation 

beyond North Korea’s borders. Much would need to go right in order to prevent a wider conflict from engulfing the region. This study attempts to identify what would need to go right 

by examining the political interests and diplomatic challenges that regime collapse in North 

Korea could bring into play among the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, North Korea, and Russia.

The dilemmas Washington would face are perhaps best underscored by the finding in this 

study that regime collapse does not mean state collapse, at least not in the short run. Any intervention, therefore, would be problematic. The international community will oppose actions 

seeking to dissolve the North Korean state coercively without the support of a North Korean 

majority. Even if the regime’s writ did not extend to every province, China has consistently demonstrated that it has a strategic stake in the continuation of the North Korean state and Beijing 

would presumably act to protect that stake.

This study concludes that North Korean cooperation will be more critical to the 

achievement of U.S. and ROK goals than has previously been appreciated. If cooperation is 
34 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

withheld, it is hard to imagine that Washington and Seoul could achieve WMD elimination 

or reunification, let alone humanitarian intervention. The United States and South Korea 

will not operate in a political vacuum. While both will seek to be the primary actors in a 

North Korean regime collapse crisis, the actions of China and North Korea will profoundly 

influence their decisions. The cooperation of Japan and Russia, as well as the support of the 

United Nations, will be critically important to the achievement of a politically acceptable 

and stable outcome.

While wrestling with difficult and momentous decisions regarding intervention and the 

endstate on the peninsula, domestic politics in the United States and South Korea will be conflicted over how to proceed in the crisis. Politics in Washington, in particular, could undermine 

anything achieved diplomatically with South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea. In 

addition, unmet expectations by the Republic of Korea and Japan could damage U.S. relationships with these two allies. The potential for adversarial relations with China post-crisis will be 

equally high.

In this dynamic and complex environment, the realism, finesse, and effectiveness of 

Washington’s approach to regime collapse in North Korea could well determine the future 

of U.S. leadership in Asia. It is therefore essential to consider today how best to position the 

U.S. Government to respond intelligently to what would surely be the most serious challenge 

America has faced in Asia since the Vietnam War.
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Korean Futures

Notes

1 M.I. Finley, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 

1972), 122.

2 The authors conducted interviews with former U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) officials 

and with experts in Seoul (April and October 2010), in Beijing (May 2011), and in the United States 

(in New York in November 2010, at Stanford University in January 2011, and in Washington, DC, in 

November 2010 and January 2011). They had discussions with Japanese experts and former Japanese 

officials in Tokyo (April 2010), in Seoul (October 2010), and in Washington, DC (May 2011). They also 

met with Chinese experts and former officials in Beijing (May 2011).

3 A few studies leave out Russia, or both Russia and Japan, considering them to be marginal players in a North Korean regime collapse crisis. We believe it is a mistake to exclude either 

state, especially since the advent of the Six Party Talks process in late 2003, but also for the specific 

reasons cited above. Interestingly, well before the Six Party Talks were created, a ROK military officer wrote a study on regime collapse that included all six states. See Moo Bong Ryoo, “The ROK 

Army’s Role When North Korea Collapses Without a War with the ROK,” published by the School 

of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, January 2001.

4 The revised 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines redefined U.S.-Japan defense cooperation as: 

(1) cooperation under normal circumstances; (2) action in response to an armed attack against Japan; 

and (3) cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. See General Noboru Yamaguchi, “Thoughts about the Japan-U.S. 

Alliance after the Transformation, With a Focus on International Peace Cooperation Activities,” The 

National Institute for Defense Studies News, no. 96 (January 2006), 2.

5 Among the most significant differences: unlike West and East Germany, South and North 

Korea fought a bloody war with each other; West and East Germany established diplomatic relations 

nearly two decades prior to reunification, while the two Koreas not only do not recognize each other as 

sovereign states, but also their constitutions each claim sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula; 

and East Germany had no latitude in its foreign policy as a Soviet satellite state, while North Korea appears to have considerable independence from China. 

6 Authors’ interviews with Chinese experts and former officials, May 23–27, 2011, in Beijing.

7 Despite periodic reports that China is reviewing its North Korea policy, and that there 

is increasing debate over the DPRK’s value as a strategic buffer zone, and even online surveys in 

China suggesting a majority of respondents believe North Korea undermines China’s national and 

security interests, this debate appears to have had only a limited impact on Chinese policy. See 

Scott Snyder, “China’s Nuclear North Korea Fever,” Comparative Connections, October 2009.

8 Influential Chinese analyst Shen Dingli argues that “even if China would not ask for it, a 

nuclear North Korea’s ability to pin down U.S. forces in a Taiwan Strait contingency deters America’s 

consideration of possible military intervention.... [T]his is the link between North Korea and Taiwan.” See “North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China,” China Security (Autumn 2006), 21.
36 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 7

9 See Park Changhee, “North Korean Contingency and Prospects of China’s Military Intervention,” Ilmin International Relations Institute Working Paper Series No. 5, October 2010, for a good 

discussion of Chinese strategy.

10 Japan’s concerns are strategic: Tokyo has based its security policy on the assumption of a 

divided peninsula, and is concerned that reunification might drive Korea closer to China. In addition, 

a U.S. presence in Japan is closely linked to the existence of a similar presence in the ROK. See International Crisis Group, “Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention,” Asia Report no. 100 (June 27, 2005). 

11 For a good discussion of Russia-North Korea relations, see Alexander Vorontsov, “Current 

Russia-North Korea Relations: Challenges and Achievements,” Brookings Institution, February 2007. 

Vorontsov maintains that the security of the Russian Far East would be affected by an armed confrontation in North Korea, and that the presence of U.S. military forces near the Russian and Chinese borders 

would cause elevated tensions and risk a wider conflict. 

12 Ibid.

13 For a discussion of the various possible legal justifications for intervention and stabilization, 

see Shin Beomchul, “A Review of the Legalities Associated with a Sudden Change in North Korea,” 

Ilmin International Relations Institute Working Paper Series No. 6, October 2010 (sponsored by the 

MacArthur Foundation’s Asia Security Initiative).

14 Security Council Resolution 85 of July 31, 1950, “requests the Unified Command to exercise 

responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of 

Korea and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support.” The term 

“Korea” is ambiguous in the text and contrasts with the use of “Republic of Korea” and “North Korea” 

elsewhere in this and other Security Council resolutions during the Korean War.

15 United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 2, paragraph 7.

16 Paragraphs 138–139 of this document (UN General Assembly, September 15, 2005, 

A/60/L.1) state the following:

Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 

crimes against humanity. 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect 

its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 

through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in 

accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 

help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing 

an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 

peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect 

populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 

In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter 

VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 

appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly 
37

Korean Futures

fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 

against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration 

of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 

and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the 

Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war 

crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are 

under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

17 For a review and discussion of responsibility-to-protect, see Christoph Mikulaschek, “The 

United Nations Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process, and Practice,” 

Report from the 39th International Peace Institute Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, 

available at <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/mikulaschekpdf>.

18 Ibid., 23.

19 Xinhua carried a report on the Russian statement on March 19, 2011, and on the Chinese 

statement on March 20, 2011.

20 During the authors’ May 23–27, 2011, meetings in Beijing, Chinese interlocutors expressed 

concern over what they perceive to be exaggerated claims by average South Koreans to Korean historical achievements. These Chinese interlocutors also noted that South Korean tourists to Mount Paektu 

at the China/North Korea border also tend to take pictures holding the South Korean flag—suggesting 

a Korean territorial claim. For their part, Koreans have historically opposed an expansion of Chinese 

influence on the peninsula.

21 Chosen Soren is a pro-North Korea organization composed of Korean expatriates living in Japan.

22 Seven U.S. military bases in Japan are designated as United Nations Command bases. The 

UN Command–Japan Status of Forces Agreement of 1954 formalized this arrangement. These bases 

are: Yokota Air Base (Air Force), Camp Zama (Army), Sasebo (Navy), Yokosuka (Navy), Kadena (Air 

Force), Futenma (Marine Corps), and White Beach (Navy). See Colonel Jung Won-il, Republic of Korea 

Army, “The Future of the United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 3, 2004), 5–6.

23 For a brief overview of recent studies, see See-Won Byun, “North Korea Contingency Planning 

and U.S.–ROK Cooperation” (Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation, September 2009).

24 See a discussion of the problem by Sharon Perry, Heidi Linton, and Gary Schoolnik, “Tuberculosis in North Korea,” Science (January 21, 2011), 283. 

39

Korean Futures

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank the many experts on the Korean Peninsula in the United States, 

the Republic of Korea, China, and Japan who shared their insights and perspectives with us. 

They helped us think through the implications of regime collapse in North Korea and frame 

the questions that will confront policymakers. We also benefited from the suggestions of many 

reviewers of early drafts of this paper, all of them former U.S. Government officials from various agencies and levels of government who have spent time working on North Korea. We will 

not name them in order to protect their anonymity, but we are deeply grateful for their expert 

advice. We are grateful to our peer reviewers, Bob Sutter and Bruce Klingner, also experts on the 

region, who took the time to comment extensively on later drafts of the paper. At National Defense University, Nicholas Rostow, Phillip Saunders, and Michael Mazaar provided useful comments and recommendations on structure and substance that resulted in a better final product. 

Daniel Kim deserves special thanks for his extraordinary research skills. He and Saori Takahashi kept us abreast of breaking news and undertook a number of special research projects that 

helped us develop our analysis. They are both excellent Research Assistants.

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Korean Futures

About the Authors

Ferial Ara Saeed is an American diplomat on detail from the Department of State to the 

Center for Strategic Research in the Institute for National Strategic Studies. She was Deputy 

Director of the State Department’s Korea Desk from 2001 to 2004. North Asia is her primary 

area of diplomatic expertise, especially U.S. foreign policy toward China, Japan, and the Korean 

Peninsula. She has served on the China and Japan Desks at the State Department, at the U.S. 

Embassy in Tokyo, and on the Asian Affairs staff of the National Security Council. Early in her 

diplomatic career, she had assignments to the Middle East and covered the region as an analyst 

in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. She is the author of Redefining Success: Applying 

Lessons in Nuclear Diplomacy from North Korea to Iran (National Defense University Press, September 2010). Ms. Saeed’s academic background is in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. She 

holds an M.A. in International Affairs from Columbia University and a B.A. in Political Science 

and Anthropology from the University of California at Berkeley.

James J. Przystup is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research in the Institute 

for National Strategic Studies and Director of the Trans-Pacific Forum at National Defense 

University. Throughout his career, Dr. Przystup has worked on issues related to the AsiaPacific region: as a staff member of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and 

Pacific Affairs; at the IBM World Trade Corporation; as Deputy Director of the Presidential 

Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations; on the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State; 

on the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and as Director of the 

Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. He holds a B.A., summa cum laude, from 

the University of Detroit, and an M.A. in International Relations and Ph.D. in History from 

the University of Chicago.

Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

Col Michael H. Belding, USMC

Senior Military Fellow

Ms. M. Elaine Bunn

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. John A. Cope

Senior Research Fellow

col Mark Fields, USA

Senior Military Fellow

Dr. T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow

Col Michael P. Hughes, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

Mr. Tetsuya Ito

Visiting Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Andre Le Sage

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III

Distinguished Research Fellow 

Mr. Leo G. Michel

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. John Parker

Visiting Research Fellow

Dr. James J. Przystup

Senior Research Fellow

LTC JOEL D. RAYBURN, USA

Senior Military Fellow

CAPT Mark E. Redden, USN

Senior Military Fellow

Dr. Nicholas Rostow

Senior Director

Ms. Ferial Ara Saeed

Visiting Research Fellow

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

Director of Studies

Dr. Judith S. Yaphe

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher Yung

Senior Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm.