SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

En Banc

In the Matter of: ) Arizona Supreme Court 

 ) No. JC-11-0001 

HONORABLE THEODORE ABRAMS ) 

Tucson Municipal Court ) Commission on Judicial 

Pima County, State of ) Conduct 

Arizona ) No. 10-286 

 ) 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) 

 )

 ) O P I N I O N

__________________________________)

Review from the Commission on Judicial Conduct

CENSURE AND SUSPENSION ORDERED

________________________________________________________________

OSBORN MALEDON PA Phoenix

 By Mark I. Harrison

 Mark P. Hummels

Attorneys for Theodore C. Abrams

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT Phoenix

 By Jennifer M. Perkins

Attorney for Commission on Judicial Conduct

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA Phoenix

 By Maret Vessella, Chief Bar Counsel 

 Shauna R. Miller, Senior Bar Counsel

Attorneys for State Bar of Arizona 

________________________________________________________________

P E L A N D E R, Justice

¶1 On May 25, 2011, we entered an order censuring 

Theodore Abrams for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, 

permanently enjoining him from serving as a judicial officer in 
2 

Arizona, and suspending him from the practice of law for two 

years, with an opinion to follow. This is that opinion. 

¶2 Abrams was admitted to the Arizona bar in 1990. He 

was appointed as a Tucson City Court Magistrate in 2002. In 

December 2010, the Commission on Judicial Conduct (“Commission”) 

brought formal disciplinary charges against Abrams based on 

allegations of sexual harassment. In January 2011, Abrams and 

the Commission entered into a Stipulated Resolution in which he 

“acknowledge[d] that his conduct warrants removal from the 

bench” and agreed to the imposition of a censure and to resign 

his judicial position and never again seek or hold judicial 

office. 

¶3 We granted sua sponte review of the Commission’s 

recommendation that we approve the Stipulated Resolution. 

Pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 46(d), we invited Abrams 

and the State Bar to submit briefs on whether attorney 

discipline should be imposed and, if so, the appropriate 

sanction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6.1, Section 

4 of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Supreme Court Rule 46(d), 

and Commission Rule 29. 

I. Facts 

¶4 In June 2008, Abrams began an intimate, consensual 

relationship with a lawyer (“Attorney A”) whose private practice 

included criminal defense work. They engaged in sexual contact 
3 

for several months and maintained a close personal relationship 

through April 2009. During and after the affair, Attorney A 

appeared often in cases before Abrams, who neither disqualified 

himself nor disclosed the relationship to the parties or other 

counsel. 

¶5 Attorney A introduced Abrams to an assistant public 

defender (“Attorney B”) in July 2008.1

 In August 2009, Attorney 

B, a recently admitted lawyer, was assigned to cover cases in 

Abrams’ courtroom. 

¶6 For more than a year, Abrams repeatedly pursued a 

sexual relationship with Attorney B, who persistently rebuffed 

his advances. Abrams initially made lewd comments and “slurping 

noises” to Attorney B. On one occasion, Abrams groped Attorney 

B under a table at which they were sitting with others after 

work. Between November 2009 and October 2010, Abrams left 

Attorney B at least twenty-eight voicemail messages and sent her 

at least eighty-five text messages, many of which included 

sexual innuendos or explicit sexual content. At least three 

voicemail messages contained references to cases in which 

Attorney B had appeared before Abrams. 

 

1

 Attorney A also introduced Abrams to an assistant 

prosecutor (“Attorney C”) in February 2009. Abrams contacted 

Attorney C at work to request her personal email address and 

subsequently sent her sexually explicit emails. Although 

Attorney C appeared before Abrams a few times, she did not 

appear before him after February 2009. 
4 

¶7 In December 2009, Abrams left Attorney B a voicemail 

message that even he characterized as “obscene,” in which he 

described a sexual act he wanted to perform on her. The next 

day, Abrams asked Attorney B to come to his chambers to pick up 

some paperwork. While in chambers, Abrams asked Attorney B if 

she had received the voicemail message and asked to take her to 

a friend’s condominium for sex. She declined. Abrams then 

inappropriately touched Attorney B and called her later that day 

to repeat the explicit voicemail message. 

¶8 Attorney B rejected Abrams’ overtures, telling him 

“that a sexual relationship would be improper because of his 

position as a judge, her routine appearances in his court, and 

the fact that he is married.” At some point, Abrams reminded 

Attorney B of her probationary employment status and his 

connections in the community. 

¶9 In October 2010, Attorney B appeared before Abrams in 

her first jury trial. At the end of the state’s case, she moved 

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Abrams became upset in the 

courtroom and accused Attorney B of wasting judicial resources, 

violating her duty of candor, and committing a fraud on the 

court. He denied the motion and declared a mistrial. During an 

unrelated proceeding several days later, Abrams criticized 

Attorney B in front of court staff and the prosecutor. At 

another, unrelated in-court conference, Abrams told Attorney B 
5 

that he would require her to confirm jurisdiction in future 

cases, even though the state bears the burden of establishing 

jurisdiction. 

¶10 The uncharacteristically harsh and inappropriate 

treatment of Attorney B prompted an investigation that resulted 

in the Tucson City Attorney’s office filing a sexual harassment 

complaint against Abrams in October 2010. A Pima County 

Superior Court investigator found that Abrams’ actions against 

Attorney B were in retaliation for her rejecting his sexual 

advances and telling a mutual friend about them. 

¶11 The superior court’s presiding judge upheld the claims 

of sexual harassment and retaliation in December 2010. Later 

that month, the Tucson City Council voted to remove Abrams from 

the bench, effective January 19, 2011. Soon thereafter, the 

Commission charged Abrams with judicial misconduct and 

instituted formal proceedings. On January 18, 2011, Abrams 

resigned from the bench. 

II. Judicial Discipline 

¶12 The Arizona Constitution authorizes the Commission to 

recommend judicial discipline. Ariz. Const. art. 6.1, §§ 3, 4. 

Although “we give serious consideration to the Commission’s 

findings,” the ultimate authority to discipline a judge lies 

with this Court. In re Lorona, 178 Ariz. 562, 563, 875 P.2d 

795, 796 (1994). 
6 

¶13 Because Abrams resigned, the harshest sanction 

available in judicial discipline proceedings is censure, see In 

re Fleischman, 188 Ariz. 106, 113, 933 P.2d 563, 570 (1997), to 

which Abrams agreed in the Stipulated Resolution. Accordingly, 

we accept the Commission’s recommendation to approve the 

Stipulated Resolution, censure Abrams, and permanently enjoin 

him from holding judicial office in Arizona. 

III. Attorney Discipline 

¶14 In recommending the Stipulated Resolution, the 

Commission observed that Abrams’ conduct also “reflects upon his 

capacity to practice law.” When a judge resigns from office as 

the result of judicial discipline, the judge and State Bar may 

recommend “whether lawyer discipline . . . should be imposed 

based on the record in the judicial proceeding, and if so, the 

extent thereof.” Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 46(d).2

 Abrams argues that 

 

2

 For purposes of Rule 46(d), the “record” includes “all 

documents filed in a case involving formal [judicial 

disciplinary] proceedings.” Ariz. R. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 

Terminology. Contrary to Abrams’ contention, that record is not 

limited to the Stipulated Resolution. Rather, under the 

Commission’s rules, the record includes all items presented to 

the Commission and later transmitted to this Court (including 

the City of Tucson’s sexual harassment complaint, the memoranda 

prepared by the Pima County Superior Court’s investigator and 

presiding judge, and the compact disc that contains voicemail 

messages left by Abrams on Attorney B’s cellular phone). In 

contrast, on the State Bar’s motion, this Court previously 

struck a declaration by Abrams’ wife, which was attached to a 

filing by Abrams in this Court, because it was not before the 

Commission, filed in the judicial disciplinary proceeding, or 

otherwise part of the record. 
7 

“the most appropriate sanction would be a reprimand and 

probation.” The State Bar urges us to impose a lengthy 

suspension of Abrams’ license to practice law. 

¶15 “The purpose of professional discipline is twofold: 

(1) to protect the public, the legal profession, and the justice 

system, and (2) to deter others from engaging in misconduct.” 

In re Scholl, 200 Ariz. 222, 227 ¶ 29, 25 P.3d 710, 715 (2001). 

Attorney discipline also aims “to instill public confidence in 

the Bar’s integrity.” In re Phillips, 226 Ariz. 112, 117 ¶ 28, 

244 P.3d 549, 554 (2010). Although not meant to punish the 

attorney, discipline may have that incidental effect. In re 

White-Steiner, 219 Ariz. 323, 325 ¶ 9, 198 P.3d 1195, 1197 

(2009); Scholl, 200 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 8, 25 P.3d at 712. 

¶16 In assessing sanctions, the Court is guided by the 

American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) (2005). Phillips, 226 Ariz. at 117 

¶ 29, 244 P.3d at 554 (citing In re Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 300, 303 

¶ 11, 152 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007)). ABA Standard 5.2 is 

“appropriate in cases involving public officials who engage in 

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 

Under that standard, suspension is appropriate “when a lawyer in 

an official or governmental position knowingly fails to follow 

proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential 
8 

injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.” 

ABA Standard 5.22. 

¶17 ABA Standard 3.0 prescribes four relevant factors for 

determining the appropriate sanction: “(1) the duty violated, 

(2) the lawyer’s mental state, (3) the potential or actual 

injury caused by the lawyer’s conduct, and (4) the existence of 

aggravating or mitigating factors.” Phillips, 226 Ariz. at 117 

¶ 29, 244 P.3d at 554. In addition, the Court may “look to 

other, similar cases in determining whether the sanction imposed 

is proportionate to the misconduct charged.” Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 

at 307 ¶ 39, 152 P.3d at 1190 (quoting In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz. 

62, 76 ¶ 49, 41 P.3d 600, 614 (2002)). 

A. Duty Violated 

¶18 Abrams concedes having violated Arizona Supreme Court 

Rule 41(c) (failing to “maintain the respect due to courts of 

justice”) and Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct (“ER”) 8.4(d) 

(engaging in conduct that is “prejudicial to the administration 

of justice”). See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42 (containing Arizona 

Rules of Professional Conduct). Abrams also violated Rule 41(g) 

(unprofessional conduct) and ER 8.4(c) (dishonest and deceitful 

conduct). 

¶19 In the Stipulated Resolution, Abrams also admitted 

that his misconduct violated various provisions in the Code of 

Judicial Conduct: Rules 1.2 (failing to “avoid impropriety” and 
9 

“promote[] public confidence in the independence, integrity, and 

impartiality of the judiciary”), 1.3 (“abus[ing] the prestige of 

judicial office to advance the [judge’s] personal . . . 

interests”), 2.3 (failing to perform judicial duties “without 

bias or prejudice” and refrain from sexual harassment), 2.4 

(permitting extrajudicial “interests or relationships to 

influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment”), 2.9 

(engaging in improper ex parte communications), 2.11 (failing to 

disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which the judge’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned”), and 3.1 (engaging 

in extrajudicial activities that “interfere with the proper 

performance of the judge’s judicial duties” and that “appear 

. . . to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or 

impartiality or demean the judicial office”). See Ariz. R. Sup. 

Ct. 81 (containing Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct). These 

violations are grounds for attorney discipline. See Ariz. R. 

Sup. Ct. 54(b). 

B. Mental State 

¶20 “A lawyer’s mental state affects the sanction imposed 

for ethical violations.” White-Steiner, 219 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 13, 

198 P.3d at 1197. “Because intentional or knowing conduct 

threatens more harm than does negligent conduct, it is 

sanctioned more severely.” Id.

¶21 Because mental state generally is a question of fact, 
10 

we normally defer to a hearing officer’s findings. Van Dox, 214 

Ariz. at 304 ¶¶ 14-16, 152 P.3d at 1187; see also Ariz. R. Sup. 

Ct. 59(l) (“In reviewing findings of fact, the court shall apply 

a clearly erroneous standard.”). We are, however, always the 

“ultimate trier of fact and law” in disciplinary proceedings. 

In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. 232, 236 ¶ 11, 92 P.3d 862, 866 (2004) 

(quoting In re Brady, 186 Ariz. 370, 373, 923 P.2d 836, 839 

(1996)). Here, the Commission did not conduct an evidentiary 

hearing or make findings of fact because of the Stipulated 

Resolution. Thus, we may examine the record before the 

Commission and, in the first instance, make findings of fact to 

determine an appropriate sanction. 

¶22 “Knowledge” is “the conscious awareness of the nature 

or attendant circumstances of the conduct.” Van Dox, 214 Ariz. 

at 305 ¶ 21, 152 P.3d at 1188 (quoting ABA Standards at 13). 

Abrams concedes that “he knowingly failed to inform the parties 

before him on more than one occasion of his intimate 

relationship with [Attorney A,] who appeared before his court on 

behalf of criminal defendants.” Abrams does not expressly 

concede that his sexual harassment and retaliation against 

Attorney B were knowingly committed. Nonetheless, the record 

establishes that he knowingly engaged in that misconduct. As 

the Pima County Superior Court investigator reported, Abrams 

“began to treat [Attorney B] differently in the courtroom” as 
11 

she “continued to reject his advances.” Attorney B not only 

declined those advances, but also warned Abrams that a sexual 

relationship would be improper. Abrams was thus aware that his 

sexual overtures were both unwelcome and wrong, yet persisted in 

calling and harassing Attorney B over an extended time frame. 

C. Actual or Potential Injury 

¶23 We next consider “the extent of the actual or 

potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.” ABA 

Standards at 9. “Injury” is the “harm to a client, the public, 

the legal system, or the profession which results from a 

lawyer’s misconduct.” Id. at 13. 

¶24 Abrams’ conduct caused actual injury in several ways. 

He subjected Attorney B to repeated, unwanted sexual advances, 

which undoubtedly caused stress and anxiety. When she rejected 

his overtures and confided in a mutual friend about them, Abrams 

retaliated by questioning Attorney B’s competence and 

professional integrity in open court, embarrassing, demeaning, 

and humiliating her. 

¶25 Moreover, Abrams injured the legal system by 

exploiting his judicial position in pursuit of sexual 

gratification. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 81, Rule 1.3. He 

maintained an intimate relationship with Attorney A while she 

was appearing in cases before him, despite the obvious conflict 

and impropriety and without disclosing the conflict to opposing 
12 

attorneys and their clients. See id., Rule 2.11. And after 

Attorney B repeatedly rebuffed Abrams’ sexual propositions, he 

abused his power by retaliating against her from the bench. 

“Such misuse of public office destroys public confidence in the 

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary . . . .” In re 

Jett, 180 Ariz. 103, 108, 882 P.2d 414, 419 (1994). 

D. Presumptive Sanction 

¶26 Because Abrams knowingly engaged in misconduct that 

directly conflicted with his role as a judge, adversely affected 

at least one attorney who regularly appeared before him, and 

undermined the integrity of the legal system, suspension is the 

presumptive sanction. See ABA Standard 5.22. This presumption, 

however, may be overcome by “[t]he presence of aggravating or 

mitigating factors.” Van Dox, 214 Ariz. at 306 ¶ 31, 152 P.3d 

at 1189. We next turn to those factors. 

E. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

¶27 ABA Standards 9.2 and 9.3 list aggravating and 

mitigating factors to consider in deciding an appropriate 

sanction. These factors “need only be supported by reasonable 

evidence.” In re Peasley, 208 Ariz. 27, 36 ¶ 36, 90 P.3d 764, 

773 (2004). 

¶28 The record establishes three aggravating factors. 

First, Abrams engaged in a pattern of misconduct over a 

significant period of time. See ABA Standard 9.22(c). Second, 
13 

Abrams committed multiple offenses. See ABA Standard 9.22(d). 

Finally, because Attorney B was a new lawyer who regularly 

appeared in Abrams’ court, she was a particularly vulnerable 

victim. See ABA Standard 9.22(h). 

¶29 With respect to mitigation, the record clearly 

establishes several mitigating factors, including Abrams’ lack 

of a prior disciplinary record, ABA Standard 9.32(a), his 

character and prior reputation, ABA Standard 9.32(g), and the 

imposition of other penalties, ABA Standard 9.32(k). 

¶30 Abrams’ full and free disclosure to the Commission and 

cooperative attitude in the judicial disciplinary proceedings 

also constitute a mitigating factor. See ABA Standard 9.32(e). 

The State Bar challenges this factor because Abrams’ cooperation 

enabled him to minimize the Commission’s development of the 

record and spared him the embarrassment of a formal hearing. 

But Abrams nevertheless settled the case quickly, and by doing 

so avoided subjecting his victims to a lengthy, embarrassing 

disciplinary process. In addition, Abrams’ cooperation with the 

Commission, resignation from his judicial office, and 

willingness to expeditiously resolve the judicial disciplinary 

charges did not necessarily prevent the Commission from further 

investigating the charges and developing a more extensive record 

before stipulating to a resolution. 

¶31 Based on his uncontroverted averments in the 
14 

Stipulated Resolution, Abrams claims his misconduct arose from 

personal and emotional problems. See ABA Standard 9.32(c). In 

2007, Abrams underwent open-heart surgery, after which he became 

addicted to pain medication and developed severe depression. 

Abrams argues that these problems made it difficult for him to 

control his impulses, “affected his judgment,” and “led to 

inappropriate relationships and communications.” 

¶32 Assuming the factual accuracy of these assertions, we 

give them little mitigating weight unless a causal nexus exists 

between Abrams’ personal and health issues and his misconduct. 

See In re Bowen, 178 Ariz. 283, 287, 872 P.2d 1235, 1239 (1994) 

(giving personal and emotional problems “little, if any, weight” 

when “no direct causation [existed] between [the attorney’s] 

alcoholism and his misconduct”); see also Scholl, 200 Ariz. at 

226-27 ¶¶ 25-27, 25 P.3d at 714-15. Other than Abrams’ own 

uncorroborated statements, the record contains no evidence of 

any such causal link. See In re Augenstein, 178 Ariz. 133, 137-

38, 871 P.2d 254, 258-59 (1994) (concluding that absent any 

“medical evidence to corroborate” attorney’s allegation that 

personal and “emotional problems caused his misconduct,” record 

did not support claim that such “problems constitute a 

mitigating factor”). 

¶33 Various steps that Abrams took to treat his disorders, 

however, show an effort to rectify his misconduct, a mitigating 
15 

factor. See ABA Standard 9.32(d). In the Stipulated 

Resolution, Abrams averred that he sought psychiatric treatment 

before the allegations of sexual harassment came to light. And 

once Abrams was charged with wrongdoing, he admitted himself to 

an intensive substance abuse and psychiatric treatment program. 

¶34 Three additional mitigating factors Abrams proposes 

are not supported by the record. He asserts that he did not 

have a dishonest or selfish motive. See ABA Standard 9.32(b). 

But he clearly displayed a selfish motive by pursuing his own 

sexual interests without regard for his oath and duties to the 

legal system. Abrams claims mental disability and chemical 

dependency. See ABA Standard 9.32(i). But this mitigator 

requires evidence of a “sustained period of successful 

rehabilitation,” id., which is not established here. 

¶35 Finally, Abrams asserts remorse as a mitigating 

factor. See ABA Standard 9.32(l). Abrams stipulated that his 

actions violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and alleged in the 

Stipulated Resolution “[d]eep remorse and embarrassment” as a 

mitigating factor. But the record does not clearly reflect that 

he is remorseful. Cf. Augenstein, 178 Ariz. at 137, 871 P.2d at 

258 (“Those seeking mitigation relief based upon remorse must 

present a showing of more than having said they are sorry.” 

(quotation and alteration omitted)). The memoranda of Pima 

County Superior Court’s investigator and presiding judge note, 
16 

based on that court’s investigation, that “Abrams claims that 

[Attorney B] did not necessarily object to [his] sexual 

comments,” and “continues to maintain that he does not feel he 

was harassing her.” 

¶36 Abrams’ mitigation evidence does not overcome the 

presumptive sanction of suspension. He admitted to suffering 

serious drug addiction and mental health problems, but the 

record contains no evidence suggesting he has overcome these 

disorders. We do not doubt the sincerity of his efforts to seek 

treatment, but the absence of evidence of the success of Abrams’ 

efforts at rehabilitation diminishes the weight of this alleged 

mitigator. See In re Stout, 122 Ariz. 503, 504, 596 P.2d 29, 30 

(1979) (“Our primary concern must be the fulfillment of proper 

professional standards, whatever the unfortunate cause, 

emotional or otherwise, for the attorney’s failure to do so.” 

(quotation omitted)); see also Jett, 180 Ariz. at 108, 110, 882 

P.2d at 419, 421 (“[U]sing the power of . . . judicial office 

for purely personal reasons is grossly improper,” and 

“regardless of the reasons, still constitutes willful 

misconduct.”). 

F. Proportionality Review 

¶37 “We may consider the sanctions imposed in similar 

cases ‘to preserve some degree of proportionality, ensure that 

the sanction fits the offense, and avoid discipline by whim or 
17 

caprice.’” Phillips, 226 Ariz. at 118-19 ¶ 37, 244 P.3d at 555-

56 (quoting In re Dean, 212 Ariz. 221, 225 ¶ 24, 129 P.3d 943, 

947 (2006)). 

¶38 No reported Arizona decision addresses the nature and 

extent of appropriate attorney sanctions for the type of 

judicial misconduct at issue here. But several analogous outof-state cases are helpful. In People v. Biddle, a judge who 

had an affair with a prosecutor who “occasionally appeared” in 

his court and “engaged in various trysts [with that attorney] 

both inside and outside the . . . [c]ourthouse” was suspended 

from the practice of law for three years after he resigned from 

the bench. 180 P.3d 461, 462-63, 465 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2007). 

And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, a judge who made lewd 

and offensive comments to attorneys, engaged in sexual 

harassment in open court, and made sexual advances toward an 

attorney during an in-chambers meeting was suspended from the 

practice of law for one year. 623 N.E.2d 24, 25-28 (Ohio 1993). 

¶39 In arguing against suspension, Abrams cites several 

Arizona cases that he claims involved comparable misconduct. 

But most of these cases dealt only with judicial discipline and 

are thus inapposite. See Fleischman, 188 Ariz. at 113, 933 P.2d 

at 570; Jett, 180 Ariz. at 111, 882 P.2d at 422; In re Gumaer, 

177 Ariz. 280, 283, 867 P.2d 850, 853 (1994); In re Marquardt, 

161 Ariz. 206, 217-18, 778 P.2d 241, 252-53 (1989); In re Ackel, 
18 

155 Ariz. 34, 43, 745 P.2d 92, 101 (1987), overruled in part by 

Jett, 180 Ariz. at 109, 882 P.2d at 420; In re Morales, Ariz. 

Comm’n on Jud. Conduct No. 06-154 (Mar. 13, 2007). 

¶40 The two Arizona cases Abrams cites in which attorney 

discipline was imposed for judicial misconduct also are not 

particularly helpful. In Dean, we noted that no attorney 

discipline was imposed on a judge for his two-year affair with a 

prosecutor who appeared regularly in his court, but that result 

was due to a procedural error that deprived us of jurisdiction 

to impose attorney discipline, not from a reasoned decision that 

such discipline was not appropriate. 212 Ariz. at 221-22 ¶¶ 2-

4, 223-24 ¶¶ 15-22, 129 P.3d at 943-46. And in Scholl, we 

suspended a former judge from the practice of law for six months 

after his convictions of filing false tax returns and illegal 

structuring of currency transactions, offenses committed during 

Scholl’s judgeship that arose from his gambling addiction. 200 

Ariz. at 223 ¶ 1, 228 ¶ 40, 25 P.3d at 711, 716. In Scholl, 

however, the judge’s crimes, although serious, were not 

committed in his judicial capacity, the offenses occurred 

several years before the disciplinary proceedings, and the judge 

had successfully rehabilitated himself from his gambling 

addiction. Id. at 223 ¶ 1, 224 ¶ 12, 228 ¶ 40, 25 P.3d at 711-

12, 716. 

¶41 The out-of-state cases remain the best yardstick for 
19 

measuring proportionality. Abrams’ proposal of a reprimand 

fails to acknowledge the seriousness of his misconduct and the 

harm it inflicted on the legal system. He placed his own sexual 

desires above his obligation to “exhibit the highest standards 

of honesty and integrity.” In re Savoy, 181 Ariz. 368, 371, 891 

P.2d 236, 239 (1995). 

¶42 Suspension is thus an appropriate and proportionate 

sanction for Abrams’ misconduct, despite his resignation from 

the bench and agreement to never again seek or hold judicial 

office. See, e.g., Biddle, 180 P.3d at 465; cf. Florida Bar v. 

Corbin, 540 So. 2d 105, 106-07 (Fla. 1989) (suspending attorney 

for three years after he resigned from the bench, based on his 

criminal conviction of attempted sexual activity with a minor 

while serving as a judge); In re Brooks, 449 S.E.2d 87, 88 (Ga. 

1994) (suspending attorney for three years after he left the 

bench, based on multiple misdemeanor convictions of sexual 

battery while serving as a judge); In re Higgins, 436 N.Y.S.2d 

71, 71-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (suspending attorney for two 

years after he resigned from the bench, based on his soliciting 

and agreeing to accept sexual favors from a woman whom he 

suggested would receive in return favored treatment in his 

family court). 

G. Length of Suspension 

¶43 “Judges are held to higher standards of integrity and 
20 

ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested 

with the public trust . . . . Even in a judge’s personal life, 

he or she must adhere to standards of probity and propriety far 

higher than those deemed acceptable for others.” James J. 

Alfini, Steven Lubet, Jeffrey M. Shaman & Charles Gardner Geyh, 

Judicial Conduct and Ethics, at 1-4 (4th ed. 2007). The 

judiciary’s authority fundamentally rests “on its reputation for 

impartiality.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 

(1989). Nothing threatens public confidence in the courts and 

the legal system more than a judge who abuses his power and 

exploits the prestige of his office for personal benefit. 

¶44 “[T]he judge’s role is so intimate a part of the 

process of justice that misbehavior as a judge must inevitably 

reflect upon” that person’s fitness to practice law. In re 

Mattera, 168 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. 1961); see also ER 8.4 cmt. 5 

(Effective Dec. 1, 2003) (“Lawyers holding public office assume 

legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A 

lawyer’s abuse of public office can suggest an inability to 

fulfill the professional role of lawyers.”). 

¶45 In their oath of admission, Arizona attorneys pledge 

to “maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial 

officers,” “abstain from all offensive conduct,” and “at all 

times faithfully and diligently adhere to the rules of 

professional responsibility and a lawyer’s creed of 
21 

professionalism.” See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31 (The Oath of 

Admission to the Bar), 37(b). The oath of office for Arizona 

judges similarly includes a solemn commitment to “faithfully and 

impartially discharge the duties of [one’s] office to the best 

of [one’s] ability.” Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 26. Abrams’ 

misconduct violated both oaths, and “[a] violation of his 

judicial oath aggravates the offense of disregarding his oath as 

a lawyer.” In re Hasler, 447 S.W.2d 65, 65-66 (Mo. 1969) 

(quoting State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Conover, 88 

N.W.2d 135, 138 (Neb. 1958)) (ordering disbarment of attorney 

based on his private meetings and conversations with party while 

presiding as judge over her divorce proceeding). 

¶46 Abrams engaged in “conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice that brings the judicial office into 

disrepute.” Ariz. Const. art. 6.1, § 4. His misbehavior 

severely tarnished the justice system and the legal profession. 

By abusing his office, Abrams struck at the very heart of the 

judiciary’s legitimacy, injuring not just his victims, but the 

law as an institution. 

¶47 “Faith in public officials is difficult to restore.” 

In re Koch, 181 Ariz. 352, 354, 890 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1995). 

Judicial misconduct erodes public confidence in our justice 

system, and we must help restore the public’s faith in our legal 

institutions and deter attorneys from similar misbehavior, two 
22 

of the primary purposes of professional discipline. To properly 

protect the public, we must also ensure that attorneys suffering 

from serious mental health issues or drug addiction rehabilitate 

themselves before resuming the practice of law. A reprimand or 

shorter term of suspension would not adequately address these 

objectives. For all of these reasons, we conclude that an 

appropriate sanction for Abrams’ misconduct is a two-year 

suspension from the practice of law. 

IV. 

¶48 Having accepted the Commission’s recommendation to 

approve the Stipulated Resolution between the Commission and 

Abrams, we censure him and permanently enjoin him from again 

serving as a judicial officer in Arizona. We also suspend 

Abrams’ license to practice law in this state for two years, 

effective June 1, 2011. 

 _____________________________________

 A. John Pelander, Justice

CONCURRING:

_____________________________________

Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice

_____________________________________

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice

_____________________________________

W. Scott Bales, Justice
23 

_____________________________________

Robert M. Brutinel, Justice