alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of Sub Surface Waste Management of
Delaware, Inc., (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ending September 30,
2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Conrad Nagel, Principal Accounting Officer of the Company,
certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or 15 (d)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                                   /S/ CONRAD NAGEL
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                   Conrad Nagel
                                                   Principal Accounting Officer
                                                   January 18, 2005

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate
disclosure document.
Opinion issued February 14, 201 3

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

————————————

NO. 01
- 10
- 0 1153
- CV

———————————
KAREN KRISTINE SILVIO , Appellant V. MICHAEL B . NEWMAN , Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 945,526

MEMORANDUM OPINIONAppellant, Karen Kristine Silvio, has neither paid the required filing fee for this appeal nor established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 5 (“A party who is not excused by statute or these rules from paying costs must pay

— at the time an item is presented for filing

— whatever fees are required by statute or Supreme Court order.”), 20.1 (listing requirements for establishing indigence); see al so T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 51.207 (West Supp. 2012), §

. 51.941(a) (West 2005), § 101.041 (West Supp. 2012) (listing fees in court of appeals); Order Regarding Fees Charged in Civil Cases in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals and Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Misc. Docket No. 07

- 9138 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2007), reprinted in T EX
. R. A PP
. P . app. A § B(1) (listing fees in court of appeals). The filing fee was first due on December 15, 2010

. On October 12, 2012, the Court issued an order notifying appellant that she had not established indigence and that, unless the filing fee was paid within 10 days, the appeal was subject to dismissal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 5 (allow ing enforcement of rule); 42.3 (allowing involuntary dismissal of case). A ppellant filed a response in which she again asserts that she is indigent. Because appellant has not paid the required filing fee as directed , we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution

. See T EX
. R. A P P
. P. 42.3(b) , (c) . All other pending motions are dismissed as moot.3 PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack an d Justices Higley and Brown

.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

DAY HIGH

 1,570

 1,957

 3,530

 6,709

 7,340

 8,009

 6,051

 7,752

 11,389

 11,756

 11,922

 12,589

 12,013

 9,336

 6,626

 6,323

 7,294

 7,059

 6,960

 9,472

 10,038

 7,975

 9,362

 10,145

 9,218

 9,161

 6,766

 6,926

 5,492

 6,946

 7,398

 216

 241

 286

 361

 252

 287

 523

 437

 760

 669

 944

 1,433

 1,554

 1,283

 787

 771

 807

 1,043

 1,623

 1,263

 1,540

 923

 802

 975

 814

 1,041

 1,134

 972

 1,143

 1,219

 1,653

 886

 992

 1,361

 2,103

 2,546

 2,924

 2,777

 3,229

 4,351

 5,658

 6,432

 6,257

 6,286

 5,308

 4,317

 3,703

 3,722

 3,852

 4,106

 4,475

 5,003

 4,497

 4,115

 4,149

 4,344

 4,459

 3,913

 3,882

 3,669

 4,154

 4,122

LOW MEAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION-CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT-CALIFORNIA

DECEMBER 2011 WATER QUALITY REPORT RUN DATE: February 2, 2012

ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY, UMHOS 

Comments:

0 reading indicates that the station was out of service.

COLLINSVILLE BOTTOM ON THE SACRAMENTO RIVER
(No. 77-CC-2545

#### Eugene E. Fred, *v.*State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Order filed January 19, 1978.*

Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In *Bargas v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl._*_, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of *Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1,*we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in *274
      *Bargas v. State, supra,*and *Doubling v. State, supra,*the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 10 (Friday, January 14, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 2648]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-792]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[C-570-938]


Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts From People's Republic of 
China: Extension of Time Limit for the Preliminary Results of the 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce

DATES: Effective Date: January 14, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Seth Isenberg or Patricia Tran, AD/CVD 
Operations, Office 1, Import Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 
20230; telephone (202) 482-0588 and (202) 482-1503, respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Department of Commerce (``Department'') 
published a notice of initiation of administrative review of the 
countervailing duty order on citric acid and certain citrate salts from 
the People's Republic of China, covering the period September 19, 2008, 
through December 31, 2009. See Initiation of Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Requests for Revocation 
in Part, 75 FR 37759 (June 30, 2010). The preliminary results of this 
administrative review are currently due no later than January 31, 2011.

Statutory Time Limits

    Section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (``the 
Act''), requires the Department to issue the preliminary results of an 
administrative review within 245 days after the last day of the 
anniversary month of a countervailing duty order for which a review is 
requested and issue the final results within 120 days after the date on 
which the preliminary results are published. However, if it is not 
practicable to complete the review within the time period, section 
751(a)(3)(A) of the Act allows the Department to extend these deadlines 
to a maximum of 365 days and 180 days, respectively.

Extension of Time Limit for Preliminary Results

    Due to the complexity of the issues in this case, such as new 
subsidy allegations and comments on those allegations, the Department 
requires additional time to review and analyze the respondents' 
submitted information and to issue supplemental questionnaires. Thus, 
it is not practicable to complete the preliminary results of this 
review within the original time limit (i.e., January 31, 2011). 
Therefore, the Department is extending the time limit for completion of 
the preliminary results by 120 days to no later than May 31, 2011, in 
accordance with section 751(a)(3)(A) of the Act.
    This notice is issued and published in accordance with sections 
751(a)(3)(A) and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

    Dated: January 10, 2011.
Christian Marsh,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Operations.
[FR Doc. 2011-792 Filed 1-13-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
### §652. Disbursing officer paying lesser in lieu of lawful amount

Whoever, being an officer, clerk, agent, employee, or other person charged with the payment of any appropriation made by Congress, pays to any clerk or other employee of the United States, or of any department or agency thereof, a sum less than that provided by law, and requires such employee to receipt or give a voucher for an amount greater than that actually paid to and received by him, is guilty of embezzlement, and shall be fined under this title or in double the amount so withheld, whichever is greater, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both; but if the amount embezzled is $1,000 or less, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 727; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(H), (2)(G), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147, 2148; Pub. L. 104–294, title VI, §606(a), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3511.)

#### Historical and Revision Notes

Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §172 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §86, 35 Stat. 1105).

Words "or of any department or agency thereof," were inserted after "United States" so as to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Mandatory punishment provision made in alternative.

The smaller punishment for an offense involving $100 or less was added. (See reviser's note under sections 641, 645 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1996—Pub. L. 104–294 substituted "$1,000" for "$100".

1994—Pub. L. 103–322, §330016(2)(G), substituted "shall be fined under this title or in double the amount so withheld, whichever is greater, or imprisoned" for "shall be fined in double the amount so withheld or imprisoned".

Pub. L. 103–322, §330016(1)(H), substituted "fined under this title" for "fined not more than $1,000" after "he shall be".
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

DAY HIGH

 643

 697

 908

 900

 829

 812

 798

 894

 936

 902

 756

 708

 709

 693

 637

 626

 646

 713

 720

 679

 662

 655

 742

 778

 783

 757

 774

 810

 825

 835

 820

 526

 605

 582

 625

 625

 750

 737

 804

 894

 759

 717

 649

 678

 622

 624

 589

 601

 631

 673

 648

 642

 617

 621

 742

 751

 719

 639

 717

 716

 625

 693

 567

 658

 707

 749

 740

 771

 757

 859

 920

 839

 729

 674

 700

 660

 632

 608

 630

 674

 707

 664

 654

 640

 665

 753

 770

 737

 698

 756

 739

 722

 779

LOW MEAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION-CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT-CALIFORNIA

JANUARY 2013 WATER QUALITY REPORT RUN DATE: March 15, 2013

ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY, UMHOS 

TDS

 366

 423

 453

 479

 473

 492

 484

 547

 585

 535

 467

 433

 449

 424

 407

 392

 405

 433

 453

 426

 420

 412

 427

 481

 492

 471

 447

 483

 473

 462

 497

TOTAL 22,158

Comments:

0 reading indicates that the station was out of service.

DELTA MENDOTA CANAL AT CHECK 20
EXHIBIT 4.01


VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS AND E-MAIL


November 2, 2007


Name
    -----------------------
Address
       --------------------

---------------------------

Dear Shareholder:

The Standstill Agreement dated June 21, 2004 between you and Colonial Commercial
Corp. is terminated, and there is no contractual restriction on your purchase or
sale  of  Company  securities.  However,  officers,  directors  and more than 5%
shareholders  remain required to obtain prior approval from our Counsel for each
and  every  transaction,  as  blackout  restrictions  may  apply.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



William Pagano
Chief Executive Officer
(No. 76-CV-0968

#### In Re Application of Rose Bakes

*Order filed March 22, 1979.*

Donald Hubert, Attorney for Claimant.

William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; Faith Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General.

*1089Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on December 3, 1975, at Addison, Illinois. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the applicable provisions of (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.), (“Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred as the Act.”)

The claim was filed on May 10, 1976. Based upon the investigatory report of the Attorney General and other documentary evidence the Court on July 10,1978, denied the claim for failure to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials. Claimant requested a hearing on the merits.

Commissioner Leo J. Spivack on December 19, 1978, at Chicago, Illinois conducted the hearing.

At the hearing the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Claimant’s decedent, husband Ned Bakes, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: “Murder.”

2. Claimant has failed to comply with all pertinent provisions of the Act and does not qualify for compensation thereunder, to wit:

> (a) On December 3,1975, Detective Edward Ley, in the company of two other officers, attempted to interview Claimant to further his investigation of the crime but was ordered out of Claimant’s house.

The Claimant conceded that his medical and hospital expenses were paid by Illinois Department of Public Aid.

*1090Section 3(b) of the Act requires that a Claimant suffer a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more as defined in the Act which is attributable to a violent crime causing injury. Compensation for pain and suffering is specifically excluded from any award. In the case the Claimant did not incurring pecuniary loss as defined by the Act and is therefore not entitled to compensation. His claim shall be denied.

It is hereby ordered that the order of January 31, 1978 denying the claim of Rose Bakes shall stand and the claim is denied with prejudice.
**Exhibit 32.1**

****

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the AnnualReport of Hickok Incorporated (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for theperiod ending September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Robert L.Bauman, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C.section 1350,as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

-   the Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934; and 

-   the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company. 

/s/ R. L. Bauman

R. L. Bauman

Chief Executive Officer

December 23, 2008
### §3614. Resentencing upon failure to pay a fine or restitution

(a) Resentencing.—Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), if a defendant knowingly fails to pay a delinquent fine or restitution the court may resentence the defendant to any sentence which might originally have been imposed.

(b) Imprisonment.—The defendant may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment under subsection (a) only if the court determines that—

(1) the defendant willfully refused to pay the delinquent fine or had failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay the fine; or

(2) in light of the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the person, alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate to serve the purposes of punishment and deterrence.

(c) Effect of Indigency.—In no event shall a defendant be incarcerated under this section solely on the basis of inability to make payments because the defendant is indigent.

(Added Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2006; amended Pub. L. 104–132, title II, §207(c)(5), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1240.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

For a prior section 3614, applicable to offenses committed prior to Nov. 1, 1987, see note set out preceding section 3601 of this title.

#### Amendments

1996—Pub. L. 104–232, §207(c)(5)(A), inserted "or restitution" after "fine" in section catchline.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–232, §207(c)(5)(B), inserted "or restitution" after "fine".

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104–232, §207(c)(5)(C), added subsec. (c).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1996 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 104–132 to be effective, to extent constitutionally permissible, for sentencing proceedings in cases in which defendant is convicted on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 211 of Pub. L. 104–132, set out as a note under section 2248 of this title.

#### Effective Date

Section effective Nov. 1, 1987, and applicable only to offenses committed after the taking effect of this section, see section 235(a)(1) of Pub. L. 98–473, set out as a note under section 3551 of this title.
EXHIBIT 23


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Prospectuses
constituting part of the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 33-84620 and
33-61917) and in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 33-61973,
33-61971 and 33-61975) of Royce Laboratories, Inc. of our report dated February
19, 1997, appearing on Page F-1 of this Form 10-K.




/s/ PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP
--------------------------------
    PRICE WATERHOUSE LLP
    Miami, Florida
    March 25, 1997
### Part A—Approval of Agreements and Related Provisions
### §3284. Concealment of bankrupt's assets

The concealment of assets of a debtor in a case under title 11 shall be deemed to be a continuing offense until the debtor shall have been finally discharged or a discharge denied, and the period of limitations shall not begin to run until such final discharge or denial of discharge.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 828; Pub. L. 95–598, title III, §314(k), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2678.)

#### Historical and Revision Notes

Based on section 52(d) of title 11, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Bankruptcy (May 27, 1926, ch. 406, §11d, 44 Stat. 665; June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §1, 52 Stat. 856).

The 3-year-limitation provision was omitted as unnecessary in view of the general statute, section 3282 of this title.

The words "or a discharge denied" and "or denial of discharge" were added on the recommendation of the Department of Justice to supply an omission in existing law.

Other subsections of said section 52 of title 11, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in sections 151–154 and 3057 of this title.

Other minor changes of phraseology were made.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1978—Pub. L. 95–598 substituted "debtor in a case under title 11" for "bankrupt or other debtor".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1978 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 95–598 effective Oct. 1, 1979, see section 402(a) of Pub. L. 95–598, set out as an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.

#### Savings Provision

Amendment by section 314 of Pub. L. 95–598 not to affect the application of chapter 9 (§151 et seq.), chapter 96 (§1961 et seq.), or section 2516, 3057, or 3284 of this title to any act of any person (1) committed before Oct. 1, 1979, or (2) committed after Oct. 1, 1979, in connection with a case commenced before such date, see section 403(d) of Pub. L. 95–598, set out as a note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.
§ 320.1 What definitions are used in this part? As used in this part, the term: *Adopted* means adopted pursuant to a full, final and complete adoption. If a foreign adoption of an orphan was not full and final, was defective, or the unmarried U.S. citizen parent or U.S. citizen parent and spouse jointly did not see and observe the child in person prior to or during the foreign adoption proceedings, the child is not considered to have been fully, finally and completely adopted and must be readopted in the United States. Readoption requirements may be waived if the state of residence of the United States citizen parent(s) recognizes the foreign adoption as full and final under that state's adoption laws.
*Adopted child* means a person who has been adopted as defined above and who meets the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) or (F) of the Act.
*Child* means a person who meets the requirements of section 101(c)(1) of the Act.
*Joint custody,* in the case of a child of divorced or legally separated parents, means the award of equal responsibility for and authority over the care, education, religion, medical treatment, and general welfare of a child to both parents by a court of law or other appropriate government entity pursuant to the laws of the state or country of residence.
*Legal custody* refers to the responsibility for and authority over a child. ( 1 ) For the purpose of the CCA, the Service will presume that a U.S. citizen parent has legal custody of a child, and will recognize that U.S. citizen parent as having lawful authority over the child, absent evidence to the contrary, in the case of: ( i ) A biological child who currently resides with both natural parents (who are married to each other, living in marital union, and not separated),
( ii ) A biological child who currently resides with a surviving natural parent (if the other parent is deceased), or
( iii ) In the case of a biological child born out of wedlock who has been legitimated and currently resides with the natural parent.
( 2 ) In the case of an adopted child, a determination that a U.S. citizen parent has legal custody will be based on the existence of a final adoption decree. In the case of a child of divorced or legally separated parents, the Service will find a U.S. citizen parent to have legal custody of a child, for the purpose of the CCA, where there has been an award of primary care, control, and maintenance of a minor child to a parent by a court of law or other appropriate government entity pursuant to the laws of the state or country of residence. The Service will consider a U.S. citizen parent who has been awarded “joint custody,” to have legal custody of a child. There may be other factual circumstances under which the Service will find the U.S. citizen parent to have legal custody for purposes of the CCA.