In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-18-00444-CV 

________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.M. AND I.M., CHILDREN 

 

 

On Appeal from the 100th District Court 

Childress County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 10,683; Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding 

 

March 28, 2019 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Appellant, A.V., appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his 

children, A.G.M. and I.M.1 By a sole issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in his children’s best interests. We 

affirm.

 

1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to them by their initials. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2018). See also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). The mother’s parental rights 

were also terminated but she did not appeal.
2

BACKGROUND

A.V. (father) and G.V. (mother) have two young children. G.V. has three other 

children who are not A.V.’s biological children. G.V. has a history with the Texas 

Department of Family and Protective Services. In mid-December 2016, the children, 

A.G.M. and I.M., tested positive for methamphetamine. G.V. claimed they were exposed 

to the drug by someone else. She later submitted to a hair strand drug screen test which 

showed positive results for amphetamines, cocaine, and methamphetamine. On January 

4, 2017, the Department removed the children from G.V.’s care and commenced 

proceedings seeking termination of parental rights of both A.V. and G.V. That same date, 

the trial court named the Department temporary sole managing conservator of the 

children.

Throughout the proceedings, A.V. was never located. Service of citation was 

eventually accomplished by posting. His court-appointed counsel advised the court that 

he searched the Internet and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and found no 

results. The caseworker testified that she also was unable to locate A.V. The Department 

conducted a search in the registry of paternity with no results for A.V. A Certificate of 

Paternity Registry Search for each child was filed indicating that after a diligent search of 

the registry, “no notice of intent to claim ha[d] been located . . . .” The caseworker had 

no relevant information about A.V. such as a date of birth or social security number. An 

attempt to locate A.V. through the Mexican Consulate also proved unsuccessful.

Regarding the children, the caseworker testified that it would be in their best 

interests to terminate A.V.’s parental rights for failing to register with the paternity registry 

because the children had never met him and had no relationship with him. When asked 
3

if it would be in the children’s best interests to name their mother, G.V., as sole managing 

conservator, she answered affirmatively. 

At the conclusion of a very brief hearing, the trial court named G.V. as permanent 

managing conservator of A.G.M and I.M. and dismissed the Department from the case. 

The trial court signed an order adjudicating A.V. to be the children’s father and terminated 

his parental rights pursuant to section 161.002(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code.2 The trial 

court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best 

interests.

On behalf of A.V., his court-appointed trial counsel filed a motion for new trial 

challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence and also filed a timely notice 

of appeal. By a sole issue, A.V.’s appellate counsel argues that termination of his parental 

rights is not supported by sufficient evidence under the heightened standard of clear and 

convincing evidence. The Department responds that it is not required to prove that 

termination is in the children’s best interests when termination is based on section 

161.002(b)(1). We agree with the Department.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional 

magnitude. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 

2d 599 (1982). See also Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Consequently, 

termination proceedings are strictly construed in favor of the parent. In the Interest of 

E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012). Parental rights, however, are not absolute, and 

 

2 Termination of an alleged father’s rights is authorized if, after being served, he does not respond 

by timely filing an admission of paternity or a counterclaim for paternity under chapter 160 of the Texas 

Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(b)(1) (West Supp. 2018).
4

it is essential that the emotional and physical interests of a child not be sacrificed merely 

to preserve those parental rights. In the Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). 

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and section 161.001 of the 

Texas Family Code require application of the heightened standard of clear and convincing 

evidence in cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights. See In the Interest 

of E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 

(Tex. 2002).

In a legal sufficiency challenge, we credit evidence that supports the verdict if 

reasonable jurors could have done so and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable 

jurors could not have done so. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112-13 (Tex. 2014). 

However, the reviewing court should not disregard undisputed facts that do not support 

the verdict to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 113. In 

cases requiring clear and convincing evidence, even evidence that does more than raise 

surmise and suspicion will not suffice unless that evidence is capable of producing a firm 

belief or conviction that the allegation is true. Id. If, after conducting a legal sufficiency 

review, a court determines that no reasonable fact finder could form a firm belief or 

conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then the evidence is legally 

insufficient. Id. (citing In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due consideration to 

evidence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In

the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In the Interest of C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25). 

We must determine whether the evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably form 

a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s allegations. In the Interest 
5

of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In our review, we consider whether disputed evidence is 

such that a reasonable fact finder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor 

of its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact

finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact finder could 

not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually 

insufficient. Id.

BEST INTEREST

Generally, the Department is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest. § 161.001(b)(2). The Texas 

Supreme Court has set out other factors to consider when determining the best interest 

of a child. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).

A.V. mentions each Holley factor and concludes the evidence is insufficient to 

justify the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in his children’s 

best interests. This case is, however, atypical. By the time of the final hearing, the 

children had already been in the Department’s custody for almost two years3 and had 

 

3 Prior to September 1, 2017, section 263.401 of the Family Code provided for dismissal of a 

termination proceeding upon the filing of a timely motion under section 263.402(b) if the trial court had not 

commenced the trial on the merits or granted an extension before the first anniversary of the date the court 

rendered a temporary order appointing the Department as temporary managing conservator. See Act of 

May 27, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 866, § 3, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1837,1838. This court recognizes that 

section 263.401 was amended in 2017 to terminate the trial court’s jurisdiction if a trial on the merits is not 

timely commenced before the dismissal date. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a), (c) (West Supp. 2018). 

The amendment became effective September 1, 2017; however, it applies only to suits filed after the 

effective date. Otherwise, the law in effect at the time suit was filed applies. See Act of May 28, 2017, 85th 

Leg., R.S., ch. 319, § 33, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 713, 735.

In this case, the Department was named temporary sole managing conservator on January 4, 2017, 

and the dismissal date, after an extension, was July 7, 2018. The trial court did not commence the final 

termination hearing until December 7, 2018, almost two years after naming the Department as temporary 

sole managing conservator. Because no timely motion to dismiss the suit was filed as required by former 

section 263.402(b) (law in effect at the time suit was filed), automatic dismissal for want of the trial court’s 

jurisdiction did not apply. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(c) (West Supp. 2018). See also In re T.W., 

557 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied).
6

been returned to their mother; however, A.V. had never been located. The need for 

prompt and permanent placement of the children in a stable home was a paramount 

consideration. The Department had already spent an inordinate amount of time 

attempting to locate A.V., all to no avail. 

The Department has no burden to prove that termination is in a child’s best interest 

when an alleged father fails to register with the paternity registry. § 161.002(b)(2).

4

 Only 

when an alleged father admits paternity or files a counterclaim is the Department required 

to establish a predicate ground for termination as well as a child’s best interest under 

section 161.001(b). Without such an admission or counterclaim, the trial court may 

summarily terminate an alleged father’s parental rights. See In the Interest of L.J., No. 

14-00319-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 427, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 15, 2015, no 

pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.R.L., No. 01-15-00733-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1702, at *35 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 18. 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). See also In the 

Interest of A.J.M., No. 04-17-00680-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 2202, at *9 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio March 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that without any claim of 

paternity, formal or otherwise, alleged father did not prevent the summary termination of 

his parental rights under section 161.002). Accordingly, A.V.’s sole issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s order terminating A.V.’s parental rights to A.G.M. and I.M. is 

affirmed.

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice

 

4 We observe that although termination of an alleged father under section 161.002(b)(1) does not 

require a best interest finding, the trial court nevertheless included a best interest finding in its final order.