IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 21, 2022

STERLING CARTER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2017-D-2460 Steve R. Dozier, Judge

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No. M2021-01093-CCA-R3-PC

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The Petitioner, Sterling Carter, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial 

court imposed a twenty-two year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of 

Correction. The Petitioner filed a post-conviction relief petition, alleging that he had 

received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. 

After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, finding that the Petitioner had not 

proven his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the Petitioner 

maintains his arguments. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Ryan C. Caldwell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sterling Carter.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Amy M. Hunter, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Procedural History and Facts

A. Procedural History

On November 13, 2017, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the Petitioner for 

three counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The Petitioner 

pleaded guilty on October 17, 2018, to one count of aggravated sexual battery as a lesserincluded offense of rape of a child in Count 1 of the indictment. Pursuant to the plea 

agreement, the trial court imposed a twenty-two year sentence and the remaining counts of 

the indictment were dismissed. 

08/09/2022
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B. Guilty Plea Submission Hearing

At the guilty plea submission hearing, the Petitioner confirmed that he was not under 

the influence of drugs or alcohol and was not suffering from any mental health issues. The 

trial court reviewed the charges against the Petitioner and the potential sentences. The 

Petitioner stated that he understood the charges and had discussed them with his attorneys 

(“Counsel” and “Co-counsel”). The Petitioner testified that he was satisfied with Counsel 

and Co-counsel’s representation. The trial court then reviewed the plea agreement, which 

was an amended charge to aggravated sexual battery and a twenty-two year sentence to be 

served at 100%. The trial court reviewed the Petitioner’s constitutional rights and the rights 

he was waiving to enter a guilty plea. The Petitioner affirmed his understanding and 

identified his signature on the plea agreement. The Petitioner denied that anyone was 

forcing him to enter the plea or that any promises, outside of the agreement, had been made 

to him.

The State recited the following facts in support of the trial court’s acceptance of the 

Petitioner’s guilty plea:

On August 20th of 2017, the child victim . . . was helping [the Petitioner] 

clean out an office building . . . . [The Petitioner] and [the victim] were 

cleaning an upstairs bathroom. [The victim] was standing on the counter 

cleaning a mirror when the [Petitioner] pulled her pants and underwear down 

to her[] knees and started touching her thighs with his hands. He picked [the 

victim] up and threw her on the couch where he continued to touch her body 

including her vagina with his hands. He then took out his penis, put it in 

inside [the victim]’s vagina.

[The Petitioner] eventually stopped and gave [the victim] her clothing. 

The [Petitioner] then told [the victim] to finish vacuuming and they finished 

cleaning the office and went home. 

Following the State’s recitation, the Petitioner entered a plea of guilty. The trial 

court accepted the plea, entered the agreed sentence, and the remaining charges against the 

Petitioner were dismissed. 

C. Post-Conviction Hearing

The Petitioner, pro se, timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. The postconviction court appointed an attorney to represent the Petitioner, and an amended petition 
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was filed. The Petitioner alleged, as relevant on appeal, that Counsel was ineffective 

because he failed to communicate adequately with the Petitioner in order to develop a 

proper defense strategy and that his guilty plea was involuntary. At a hearing on the 

petition, the parties presented the following evidence: 

The Petitioner testified that he met with Counsel six or seven times before his guilty 

plea hearing. He agreed that during those meetings Counsel explained the charges and the 

State’s evidence against the Petitioner. The Petitioner clarified that their discussion about 

the State’s evidence was “extremely brief” and that Counsel did not review the discovery 

with him. 

The Petitioner recalled one night when Counsel brought a laptop computer to jail to 

show the Petitioner his recorded interview with the detective. Counsel had difficulty 

playing the recording but once he was able to do so, the Petitioner was still unable to hear 

the audio. The Petitioner read the transcript of the interview and told Counsel that the 

transcript was not accurate. Counsel told the Petitioner not to worry about it because the 

interview was going to be suppressed. 

The post-conviction court asked the Petitioner what he meant when he said the 

transcript was not accurate, and the Petitioner explained that he made statements to the 

detective that were not in the transcript and that there were statements in the transcript that 

were “completely mis-worded.” As an example, the Petitioner testified that, during the 

interview, he twice told the detective “you don’t care about victims” and that those 

statements were not in the transcript. The Petitioner agreed that Counsel tried to suppress 

the interview but that the trial court had ruled the recorded interview was admissible. 

The Petitioner testified that the victim indicated to him that she had been raped but 

would not disclose who had raped her. The Petitioner urged the victim to tell someone and 

seek help, but the victim refused. Desperate to help the victim, the Petitioner went to the 

police and disclosed that he had engaged in sexual conduct with the victim in order to 

instigate an investigation. He stated that he believed his name would be cleared during the 

investigation and that the real perpetrator would be identified and arrested.

The post-conviction court read portions from the police interview transcript, and the 

Petitioner pointed out that he only responded to the detective’s questions about specific 

sexual conduct. He noted that the detective suggested specific behavior in the question, 

and the Petitioner merely agreed. The Petitioner then stated that the transcript was “totally 

wrong.” The post-conviction court responded, “the DVD was introduced as well.” The 

Petitioner maintained that none of his statements to the detective during the interview were 

true. He stated that he was only trying “to help [the victim] out.” He said he was certain 
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that the physical evidence would show that he never touched the victim, so he had not been 

concerned about his admissions during the police interview. 

About the plea agreement, the Petitioner said that he had fifteen to twenty minutes 

to consider the State’s offer of twenty-two years. Counsel told him it was “a good deal” 

and that his “recourse” after pleading was “a postconviction thing.” The Petitioner testified 

that he “felt like [he] was coerced into [pleading guilty].” The Petitioner agreed that the 

trial court reviewed his constitutional rights with him at the guilty plea hearing. 

The Petitioner testified that he requested discovery three or four times but that 

Counsel never provided it. Although he did not know her identity, the Petitioner testified 

that once he arrived at “Bledsoe” he spoke with a woman who told him he had Post 

Traumatic Stress Disorder. He said that this was the first that he learned of this diagnosis. 

On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that, in August 2017, he went “to the 

woods” the morning after he was “at the [office] with [the victim].” He hid in the woods 

for several days while wearing a GoPro to record statements and apologies to his family. 

The State played a portion of the GoPro video, and the Petitioner identified himself as the 

person speaking in the video. The Petitioner agreed that he stated in the video that he was 

“going out to the woods so that [he] could kill [him]self because [he] felt guilty about what 

[he] had done.” The Petitioner denied that any of the apologies he made during the GoPro 

recordings related to the victim. The Petitioner said that he had a Beretta with him while 

in the woods but had not intended to use it to kill himself. He thought he would die of 

starvation and dehydration.

It was after the Petitioner “failed to kill [him]self” that he confessed to the detective. 

The Petitioner reiterated that he made up his confession to the detective to keep the victim 

from killing herself. He denied giving a similar confession to his daughter while hiding in 

the woods but stated “[w]hen she asked me that I thought I was dead anyway, didn’t really 

matter, I should have been dead.” He confirmed that his daughter was the victim’s cousin. 

About his conversation with his daughter, he clarified that his daughter was adamant 

about defending him and he told her “no.” The Petitioner explained that he declined his 

daughter’s support in defending him because, while hiding in the woods, he had been 

without water for four full days and “should have been dead.” The Petitioner’s daughter 

did not accept his answer and continued to argue. In an effort to end the discussion, he 

finally responded, “yes” when she asked if he had had sex with the victim. The Petitioner 

said “the same thing” occurred when he spoke with his friend “Kevin” about the victim’s 

allegations. 
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The State called Counsel as a witness. Counsel, who had been practicing for thirtyone years in the field of criminal law, testified that he and another attorney represented the 

Petitioner. Counsel estimated that he met with the Petitioner six times but maybe as many 

as ten. Counsel reviewed the discovery with the Petitioner and believed the Petitioner had 

a good understanding of the State’s evidence against him. Counsel filed several pretrial 

motions on the Petitioner’s behalf. 

The State’s initial offer was for the Petitioner to “plead open with a sentencing 

hearing.” Counsel stated that the State would have called three other witnesses to testify 

that they also had been sexually abused by the Petitioner. This testimony in addition to the 

fact that the Petitioner was in “a position of trust” with a history of criminal behavior placed 

him at risk for a sentence well above the minimum. The victim’s parents, however, felt 

strongly that they did not want their child to testify about her sexual history which caused 

the State to make an offer involving a lesser included offense. 

Counsel recalled speaking with Co-counsel about a mental evaluation but both 

believed that the Petitioner met the standard for competency. Counsel recalled the defense 

theory the Petitioner wanted to pursue, “that [the Petitioner] had falsely confessed to a 

detective, to his own daughter, and to his best friend so that . . . the victim would receive 

mental health treatment.” Counsel stated he believed this defense to be “wildly 

implausible.” When asked if he coerced the Petitioner to plead guilty, Counsel responded:

No. I think we viewed our job as attempting to save [the Petitioner’s] life. 

He was a man in his 50’s who was facing in excess of 25-calendar years in 

prison and we hoped that we could resolve it in such a way that he would not 

die in prison. We believed the likelihood of conviction was extraordinarily 

high and that he would likely receive a sentence that would exceed his life. 

And when we obtained an offer [of] . . . approximately 18 years, that [ ] 

would give him the possibility of - - [g]etting out one day[.] 

Counsel stated that he did not present the offer as merely an option but 

recommended that the Petitioner accept the offer based upon both his and CoCounsel’s experience. Counsel stated, “he didn’t have a choice between good and 

bad options. He had a choice between bad and worse and that was due to the 

evidence.” 

On cross-examination, Counsel disagreed that the Petitioner had fifteen to twenty 

minutes to consider the State’s offer to settle the case. Referencing emails, it appeared the 

Petitioner had several days to consider the offer. 
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The post-conviction court took the matter under advisement. In a subsequent order, 

the post-conviction court denied relief. It is from this judgment that the Petitioner appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of 

counsel. He asserts that Counsel failed to properly prepare or meet with him. Further, the 

Petitioner asserts that his plea was not knowing or voluntary because he was not given 

adequate time to consider the State’s offer and his attorneys coerced him into pleading 

guilty. The State responds that the Petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and 

convincing evidence and, therefore, the post-conviction court properly denied relief. We 

agree with the State.

The right of a criminally accused to representation is guaranteed by both the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee 

Constitution. State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 

453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The following 

two-prong test directs a court’s evaluation of a claim for ineffectiveness:

First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [petitioner] by 

the Sixth Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s 

errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be 

said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the 

adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Melson, 772 

S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989). 

In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine 

whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. To 

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must show that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” House v. 

State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 

1996)).
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When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court 

should judge the attorney’s performance within the context of the case as a whole, taking 

into account all relevant circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Mitchell, 753 

S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The reviewing court should avoid the 

“distorting effects of hindsight” and “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged 

conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. In doing so, the reviewing court must be highly deferential 

and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. Finally, we note 

that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to perfect representation, only 

constitutionally adequate representation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1996). In other words, “in considering claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, ‘we address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally 

compelled.’” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 

466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)). Counsel should not be deemed to have been ineffective 

merely because a different procedure or strategy might have produced a different result. 

Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). “‘The fact that a 

particular strategy or tactic failed or hurt the defense, does not, standing alone, establish 

unreasonable representation. However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical 

choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.’” 

House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369). 

If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable 

standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by 

demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). This reasonable probability must 

be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 

Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994). 1In the context of a guilty plea, as in 

this case, the effective assistance of counsel is relevant only to the extent that it affects the 

voluntariness of the plea. Therefore, to satisfy the second prong of Strickland, the 

petitioner must show that ”is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he 

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (footnote omitted); see also Walton v. State, 966 S.W.2d 54, 55 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Petitioner asserts that Counsel failed to adequately communicate with the 

Petitioner thereby preventing development of a proper defense strategy. The State 

responds that the post-conviction court properly denied relief.
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In the order denying relief, the post-conviction court made the following findings:

The Court accredits the testimony of [Counsel], that he visited the 

Petitioner “six to ten times” in the Hill Detention Center to discuss the case 

and its facts. [Counsel] confirmed that discovery was received from the State 

and he had reviewed that material with the Petitioner. The Court notes in the 

plea agreement copy entered as an exhibit to the instant proceedings that the 

Petitioner not only signed it, but an attached, typewritten page clearly 

explained the possible sentences he faced. However, regarding the matter of 

discovery copy provision, the Petitioner has provided no proof, apart from 

his motion, that he did not receive discovery. The Court finds that the 

Petitioner has neither proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was 

not provided copies of his discovery or plea agreement, nor has he 

established how he was prejudiced by that belief.

The evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s finding that 

Counsel met with the Petitioner multiple times and kept the Petitioner well informed. The 

Petitioner’s case was handled by two experienced criminal defense attorneys who 

collaborated on various issues that arose during representation. Counsel met with the 

Petitioner between six and ten times, reviewed discovery, and filed pre-trial motions on the 

Petitioner’s behalf. Counsel negotiated a plea agreement that included a lesser included 

offense with a shorter sentence than he could have received had the Petitioner been 

convicted at trial. The trial court accredited Counsel’s testimony. 

We conclude that the evidence showed that Counsel reviewed discovery, met with 

the Petitioner, and negotiated a reasonable settlement given the facts of the case. The 

Petitioner has not provided any evidence that, absent Counsel’s alleged deficiency, he 

would have chosen to risk a much more significant sentence rather than plead to one lesser 

included offense with a shorter sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the Petitioner has 

not shown that Counsel was deficient or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced him. He is 

not entitled to relief as to this issue. 

B. Involuntary Guilty Plea

The Petitioner asserts that he only had “15-20 minutes to consider the offer 

conveyed to him” by Counsel and that “he felt that he was coerced into pleading guilty.” 

The State responds that the Petitioner failed to establish that his guilty plea was involuntary 

and unknowing. We agree with the State.

In the order denying relief, the post-conviction court made the following findings:
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[The Petitioner] averred inadequate discussions with his attorney, including 

a range of punishment assessment, and possible mental illness. During the 

instant hearing, the Petitioner stated he was given “fifteen minutes” to make 

a decision about the plea agreement. This assertion was discredited where, 

by the record and in the instant hearing, the Court calculated the final plea 

offer was made to the Petitioner’s counsel five days before acceptance, and 

some two weeks before the scheduled trial date. [Counsel] also testified as 

to the timeline established by email correspondence with the State. The copy 

exhibit of the plea agreement, as well as the original in the Court’s own case 

file, included an additional typewritten page thoroughly detailing the 

possible sentences faced by the Petitioner.

At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified about a 

“PTSD” condition with which he had been diagnosed only subsequent to the 

offenses. Petitioner alleged this condition accounted for his decision to admit 

rape of a child to multiple persons, yet not actually having committed the 

crime. The Court discredits the Petitioner’s claim that undiagnosed PTSD 

caused him sufficient duress and provoked admissions to particularly heinous 

crimes against a child. As well, the Petitioner failed to present witness or 

medical record testimony regarding the claimed mental diagnosis. Proof was 

not established on how the claimed mental condition generated a side effect 

of false admissions. While a diagnosis of PTSD could be considered 

mitigating evidence, the co-counsels were not remiss in failing to establish 

such a claim based on an unknown and undiagnosed condition. The 

Petitioner has failed to establish prejudice.

The Court considered the recorded GoPro statements made by the 

Petitioner. While these videos are not vital to denying the post-conviction 

relief sought, statements were memorialized that could easily be viewed as 

contrary to the Petitioner’s reasoning for his admission to police, his 

daughter, and his best friend. The statements included:

Video 016330: “I want you to know that I did not. . . I didn’t hurt her. 

Nothing was forced, it just happened.”

Video 026330: It’s the worse thing you could ever have done. 

“I messed up, oh sh_. I cannot forget the look on her face when she 

realized how far it had gotten. That poor girl. How in the heck can I 

have done that? But I did.”
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Video 036330: “I did it. I didn’t stop it. I’m responsible.” 

“How in the world could I have done that?”

The excerpts included above contradict the Petitioner’s testimony that 

he willingly gave false confessions solely to get professional help for [the 

victim]. The Court does not find the Petitioner’s instant claim to be credible 

where he states the victim was not “forced.” “It,” as in the sexual abuse, 

“was the worse thing you could ever have done.” And the forthright 

admission words, “I did it.”

From the transcribed record of the plea agreement, the Petitioner 

responded affirmatively to the Court’s plea colloquy. “Once the trial court 

has conducted a proper plea colloquy, it discharges its duty to assess the 

voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea and creates an adequate record 

for any subsequent review.” Mitchell v. State, No. W2014-00047-CCA-R3-

PC, 2015 WL 153844, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2015) (quoting 

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969)). Before the Court accepted 

the Petitioner’s plea, it conducted a standard plea colloquy and was satisfied 

with the responses. Therefore, the Court does not find any merit to the 

Petitioner’s contention that the guilty plea was not entered into knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently. 

The evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. 

The Petitioner was provided several days to evaluate the State’s offer for him to plead 

guilty to one lesser included offense rather than go to trial for four felony offenses with 

exponentially greater sentencing exposure. Counsel stated that he advised the Petitioner 

that he should take the offer in light of the evidence against the Petitioner, which included 

the Petitioner’s admission of guilt to three different people, and the potential of a lengthier 

sentence if convicted on all counts. Furthermore, at the guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner 

testified to his understanding of the guilty plea and his willingness to enter the plea 

agreement with the State for a lesser included offense and reduced charges. Statements 

made by a petitioner, his attorney, and the prosecutor during the plea colloquy, as well as 

any findings made by the trial court in accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier 

in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 

(1977). Statements made in open court carry a strong presumption of truth, and to 

overcome such presumption, a petitioner must present more than “conclusory allegations 

unsupported by specifics.” Id. at 74.

The trial court accredited Counsel’s testimony and the evidence shows that Counsel 

met with the Petitioner, advised him appropriately in light of the facts of the case, and 

negotiated for a reduced charge and sentence. The Petitioner testified at the guilty plea 
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hearing that he was competent and entered his plea freely. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his plea was entered involuntarily. He is not 

entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE