Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1985 | May 29, 2020 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suzy St. John

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tirrell Orr,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 29, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1985

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Helen W. Marchal, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G15-1807-F6-22202

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1985 | May 29, 2020 Page 2 of 5

[1] Tirrell Orr appeals his conviction for Level 6 Felony Theft,1 arguing that the 

evidence is insufficient. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

[2] On July 4, 2018, Jequitta Robinson attended a party near the intersection of 

37th and LaSalle Streets in Indianapolis. Her vehicle, a black 2004 Mercedes 

Benz SUV, was parked nearby. While at the party, Robinson had “quite a bit 

to drink” and fell asleep. Tr. Vol. II p. 49. When she awoke the next morning, 

her SUV was no longer parked where she had left it. She called 911 and 

reported the vehicle stolen. Robinson did not know Orr and had not given 

anyone permission to use the vehicle. She met police at the intersection and 

filed a report.

[3] On July 7, 2018, an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police detective had occasion to 

run the license plate of a vehicle being driven by Orr. When the officer learned 

from dispatch that the vehicle, which was Robinson’s SUV, had been reported 

stolen, he conducted a traffic stop. Orr was driving the vehicle and his 

girlfriend was a passenger. 

[4] The detective read Orr his rights; Orr agreed to waive his rights and answer the 

detective’s questions. Orr admitted that the vehicle did not belong to him and 

claimed that it belonged to a friend. He said that he had acquired the vehicle 

from the area of 3700 North LaSalle—the same area near the party where 

Robinson had parked the vehicle. Orr could not remember the “friend’s” 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(ii).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1985 | May 29, 2020 Page 3 of 5

name, but he had the number stored in his phone. Orr offered to let the

detective use his cell phone to call the owner; the detective did so and Robinson 

answered. She confirmed over the phone that she had reported the vehicle as 

stolen.

[5] On July 7, 2018, the State charged Orr with Level 6 felony theft.2 Orr’s jury 

trial took place on May 29, 2019. Robinson testified at trial and confirmed that 

she had not given anyone permission to take her vehicle. She stated that she 

did not know Orr and did not give him permission to use her vehicle.3 At the 

close of the evidence, the jury convicted Orr of Level 6 felony theft. The trial 

court sentenced Orr to 545 days, with 365 days executed on home detention 

and 180 days suspended. Orr now appeals.

[6] Orr’s sole argument on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences supporting the conviction and will neither assess witness credibility 

nor reweigh the evidence. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We 

will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

2 The State charged Orr with other, unrelated offenses, but the jury acquitted him on the other charges.

3 There is some discussion in the briefs about Robinson’s testimony regarding statements made by her friend, 

Dottie. But those statements were admitted only for the purpose of impeachment, rather than for the truth of 

the matter asserted. Tr. Vol. II p. 56-57. Consequently, we decline to consider the substance of those 

statements as evidence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1985 | May 29, 2020 Page 4 of 5

[7] To convict Orr of Level 6 felony theft, the State was required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he knowingly exerted unauthorized control over 

Robinson’s vehicle with the intent to deprive her of any part of the vehicle’s 

value or use. I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(ii). Orr argues that the evidence does not 

prove that he had exclusive possession of the vehicle from the time it went 

missing to the time of his arrest, that even if he had exclusive possession that is 

not enough to support a conviction, or that he knew the vehicle was stolen.

[8] It is true that our Supreme Court has said that “the mere unexplained 

possession of recently stolen property standing alone does not automatically 

support a conviction for theft.” Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ind. 

2010). But exclusive, unexplained possession is probative of guilt that should 

be considered along with the other evidence. Id.

[9] In this case, while the record does not contain direct evidence of the date on 

which Orr took Robinson’s vehicle, he told the arresting detective that he had 

taken the vehicle from the area where Robinson had parked it on the street. A 

reasonable juror could infer from this evidence that Orr took the vehicle from its 

parked location on the night it went missing and kept it for the next two days 

until he was stopped by the detective. In other words, a reasonable inference 

may be drawn that Orr had exclusive, unexplained possession of the vehicle 

from the time it went missing to the time of his arrest.

[10] While that evidence, in and of itself, would be insufficient, the record contains 

other evidence supporting the conviction. Robinson testified repeatedly and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1985 | May 29, 2020 Page 5 of 5

emphatically that she did not give anyone permission to take the vehicle; she 

stated specifically that she did not know Orr or give him permission. Orr, 

meanwhile, told the arresting detective that the vehicle belonged to a “friend,” 

but could not even remember the name of the friend.

[11] We find that a reasonable juror could find, based on this evidence, that Orr 

knowingly exerted unauthorized control over Robinson’s vehicle with the 

requisite intent. Orr directs our attention to other evidence in the record and 

attacks Robinson’s credibility, but these arguments amount to a request that we 

reweigh evidence and re-assess witness credibility, which we may not do.

[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.