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i 

98–957 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–90] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 11, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Connery, Hon. Joyce, Chairwoman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board ... 6 

Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration .............................................................................................. 3 

Regalbuto, Hon. Monica, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, 

Department of Energy ......................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Connery, Hon. Joyce ......................................................................................... 53 

Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G. .................................................................................... 27 

Regalbuto, Hon. Monica ................................................................................... 44 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 25 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Statement of Admiral James F. Caldwell, Deputy Administrator for 

Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration ..................... 65 

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Energy .................... 69 

Section 3119 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2016 ................................................................................................................ 70 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 73 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 92 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 87 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 91 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 90 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 93 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC 

ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 11, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. 

Mike Rogers (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come to 

order. We want to welcome to our hearing the President’s fiscal 

year 2017 budget request for the defense-related activities carried 

out by the Department of Energy [DOE]. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I know it 

takes a lot of time and energy to prepare for these hearings, and 

I really appreciate your commitment in doing that. 

Our witnesses today are Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, retired, Administrator, NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration]; Ms. Monica Regalbuto, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy; and Ms. Joyce 

Connery, Chairwoman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 

General Klotz, you have some very able folks here today in support of you. I would like to recognize them. Admiral Frank 

Caldwell. Brigadier General S.L. Davis. And Anne Harrington. 

Glad to have you all here. 

If any of our members have questions directly for these folks 

later in the hearing, we will ensure that they can step forward to 

the table where the microphones are and respond. And I know Admiral Caldwell has a supplemental written statement that will be 

introduced and accepted for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Before I hand the floor over to the ranking member, 

let me briefly highlight just a few key issues for today’s hearing. 

First, since this is our subcommittee’s first budget hearing for 

fiscal year 2017, let me put a marker down. Let’s start the year by 

putting to rest the notion that our nuclear deterrent is unaffordable. That is just ridiculous. A recent think tank report got it right, 

quote: ‘‘The issue is not affordability—rather, it is a matter of prioritization. Should nuclear forces, and by extension their moderni-
2 

zation programs, be given higher priority in the budget than other 

forces?’’ 

We have an answer to this question. From the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and everyone down the line, senior leaders across the board 

have stated clearly and unequivocally that our nuclear deterrent is, 

quote, ‘‘the Nation’s highest priority mission,’’ close quote. 

So our senior military and civilian leaders have shown that our 

nuclear deterrent will be robustly supported even if it is at the expense of other capabilities, because it is our top priority. These programs are not optional, and are at the core of U.S. security and 

international stability. And at the very center of the core are the 

people and the programs at NNSA that provide our Nation with 

our nuclear deterrent. 

General Klotz, we are happy to have you yet again at our subcommittee representing the dedicated individuals who work at our 

nuclear enterprise. Their important contributions to the Nation are 

largely unsung, but we certainly thank them and know what you 

do and appreciate it. And once again, the subcommittee will take 

a detailed look at the NNSA’s budget request and scrub it hard to 

ensure it is meeting the Nation’s military priorities. 

When it comes to meeting the day-to-day needs of the military, 

NNSA must also focus on the programs that set it up for the future. That means having the people and skills, the infrastructure 

and tools, and the structures and processes to meet the highly uncertain nuclear future. I fear we are focusing too much on the 

present and not enough on the future. But we will be getting into 

that during the question period. 

Thank you again to our witnesses for being here. I look forward 

to the discussion. Let me now turn it over to the ranking member 

for any opening statement he would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to also 

welcome the witnesses. 

It is rare in the modern Congress to have essentially a good news 

hearing, but I think this one of those hearings. I am thankful for 

that, because at least at the authorizing level, it looks like these 

programs are going to be fully funded. In some cases, there are increases. In a few cases, there are decreases. The leading one is the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation account, which goes down some 6 or 7 

percent. But we all have to acknowledge that Russia is not exactly 

a willing partner these days to help us contain that massive hoard 

of fissile material. 

But the key bit of good news for folks back home is here you 

have a highly contentious Congress that is agreeing on what is our 

number one defense priority, and we are agreeing on a bipartisan 

basis, and we are putting our money where our mouths are. So, 

that is good news for the American people, that is good news for 

America, that is even good news for this Congress. 
3 

† The DOE/NNSA Enterprise Strategic Vision—August 2015 can be found at https://www. 

scribd.com/document/290190538/NNSA-Enterprise-Strategic-Vision-August-2015 

So essentially we have a lot to celebrate here. We will have not 

only questions today, but also questions in the closed session to follow this. But we should not overlook the central fact that the administration and the Republican majority in Congress are keeping 

the nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and reliable. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the ranking member. 

We now will ask each of our witnesses to make an opening statement summarizing their written testimony, and I would like to ask 

you to keep it to 5 minutes so we will have time for questions. Your 

written testimony will be, without objection, accepted for the record. 

First, we will recognize General Klotz for any opening statement 

you would like to summarize. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

General KLOTZ. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers and 

Ranking Member Cooper and members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to present the President’s fiscal year 2017 

budget request for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear 

Security Administration. We value this committee’s leadership in 

national security, as well as its robust and abiding support for the 

missions and people of NNSA. And thank you especially, Chairman, for your kind words for all the people, men and women out 

there, who work in this important enterprise. 

Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of 

DOE’s budget, is $12.9 billion, an increase of nearly $358 million, 

or 2.9 percent, over the fiscal year 2016 enacted level. This budget 

request continues the administration’s unwavering commitment to 

NNSA’s important and enduring missions. 

These missions are defined in the NNSA’s Strategic Vision, 

which we released in the fall of last year. These missions include 

to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile; 

to prevent, counter, and respond to the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and to support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project power and to protect American and 

allied interests around the world. 

To succeed, NNSA must maintain crosscutting capabilities that 

enable each of these core missions. Again, as defined in our Strategic Vision, these crosscuts focus on advancing science, technology, 

and engineering; supporting our people and modernizing our infrastructure; and developing a management culture focused on safety, 

security, efficiency, and adopting the best practices across government and the commercial world. 

If you would like, Mr. Chairman, I would be very pleased to provide a copy of this document to the subcommittee for the record.† 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection. 

[The document is retained in the committee files.] 
4 

General KLOTZ. The budget materials and briefings we have provided over the past 2 days to you and to your staff describe NNSA’s 

major accomplishments in the year 2015, as well as the underlying 

rationale for our budget proposal for fiscal year 2017. Let me just 

briefly highlight a few points, given the time we have. 

First and foremost, the United States has maintained a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear explosive testing for over 20 years. As a result of consistent 

funding provided by this Congress, supported by this subcommittee, and the significant improvements that NNSA has made in program management over the past 2 years, all of our life extension 

programs are on schedule and within budget. 

NNSA’s science and technology base also continues to yield critical modeling and simulation data in support of the stockpile. In 

fact, just last year the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence 

Livermore Laboratory increased its shot rate, its experiment rate, 

from 191 in the year 2014 to 356 in the year 2015, almost doubling 

it, including the first-ever experiments involving plutonium. 

Our budget request also supports recapitalization of NNSA’s 

aging research and production infrastructure, most notably the facilities where we perform our major uranium, plutonium, tritium, 

and other commodity operations. Of significance, NNSA completed 

the first subproject for the Uranium Processing Facility, entitled 

Site Readiness, last year, on time and $20 million under budget. 

As a whole, NNSA will arrest the growth of deferred maintenance in fiscal year 2016 thanks to the appropriations bill which 

the Congress passed at the end of last year, and with your support 

for our budget request, we can begin to reduce deferred maintenance in fiscal year 2017. 

This year’s request for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, as Mr. Cooper pointed out, is 6.8 percent lower than the fiscal year 2016 enacted levels, for two reasons. First, prior year 

carryover balances are available to execute some of the programs. 

And second, as you know, we proposed terminating the Mixed 

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Project and pursuing a dilute and dispose 

approach as a faster, less expensive path to meeting our national 

commitment and international agreement to dispose of 34 metric 

tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium. 

The request for our third appropriation, the Naval Reactors Program, keeps pace with mission needs and continues NNSA’s commitment to the three major initiatives: the Ohio-Class Reactor 

Plant System Development; the Land-based S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul; and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project in Idaho. 

I am pleased to be joined by my colleague, Admiral Frank 

Caldwell, who is testifying, I believe, for the first time in front of 

this subcommittee. 

For each of these missions, NNSA is driving improvements in our 

management and governance. For all of our programs, we have instituted rigorous analyses of alternatives, defined clear lines of authority and accountability for Federal and contract program and 

project management, improved cost and schedule performance, and 

ensured that the Federal project directors and contracting officers 
5 

had the appropriate skill mix and professional certifications to effectively manage NNSA’s work. 

Our budget request for Federal salaries and expenses reflects an 

increasing emphasis on improving program and project management across all our mission pillars. 

So in closing, Mr. Chairman, the nuclear security enterprise continues to make significant progress. Through discipline, careful 

planning, and your continued and strong support, we believe we 

can make smart investments to build on that progress and meet 

new challenges in the future. Again, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. There was, as the ranking member said, 

a lot of good news in that opening statement, none better than seeing that you are finally starting to cut into the backlog of deferred 

maintenance. That is a nice milestone. I appreciate that. 

Ms. Regalbuto, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MONICA REGALBUTO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary REGALBUTO. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am 

pleased to be here today to represent the Department of Energy’s 

Office of Environmental Management and to discuss the work that 

we have already successfully accomplished and what we plan to accomplish under the Presidential fiscal 2017 budget request. 

The total budget request for the EM [Environmental Manage- ment] program is $6.1 billion, which includes $673 million of proposed mandatory funding and $5.3 billion for defense environmental cleanup activities. The request would allow EM to maintain 

a safe and secure posture across the complex, while maximizing 

our work on compliance activities. 

I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a number of 

EM’s recent accomplishments. At the Savannah River Site, the 

4,000th canister of radioactive glass was recently poured. Achieving 

the milestone enabled us to close the seven high-level waste tanks. 

At the Moab Site, half of the estimated 60 million tons of uranium 

mill tailings have been removed and shipped to an engineering disposal cell. At Hanford, we have completed cleanup of the bulk of 

River Corridor, including more than 500 facilities and 1,000 remediation sites. 

The fiscal 2017 budget request will allow us to continue to make 

progress in ongoing cleanup priorities. Among EM’s top priorities 

is the safe reopening of WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Program]. EM 

continues to support the recovery from two incidents at the facility 

that interrupted the nationwide program for the disposition of 

transuranic waste. The request will support initiating waste emplacement operations by December of 2016. 

At Idaho, the request will support the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. This facility is planned to treat approximately 900,000 

gallons of sodium-bearing waste. At the Savannah River Site, we 

will complete construction and ramp up commissioning activities at 
6 

the Salt Waste Processing Facility, which will significantly increase 

our ability to treat tank waste. In addition, we will continue to receive, store, and process spent nuclear reactor fuel. 

At the Hanford Office of River Protection, the request supports 

continued construction of the Low-Activity Waste Facility, Balance 

of Plants, and outfitting the Analytical Laboratory, which are the 

centerpiece of the Department’s plan to begin the direct feed of lowactivity waste as soon as 2022. 

The request for Richland allows us to continue important work 

on the Central Plateau and to complete the demolition of the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant, once one of the most dangerous 

buildings in the complex. 

At Oak Ridge, the request supports continuing design for the 

Outfall 200 Mercury Training Facility at the Y–12 National Security Complex and complete the demolition of Building K–27, the 

last gaseous diffusion enrichment process building. It will mark the 

first time that a gaseous diffusion enrichment site has been completely decommissioned. 

With the most challenging cleanup remaining, we understand 

the importance of technology development in reducing the lifecycle 

costs and enhancing our effectiveness. To help address many of the 

technical challenges involved, the request reflects a total investment in technology development of $33 million. The funding will 

allow us to continue to integrate robotics technologies into our efforts to help improve overall work and quality of life by easing the 

performance of physically demanding tasks. 

In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the Office 

of Environmental Management. We are committed to achieving our 

mission, and we will continue to apply innovative strategies to complete our mission safely. Thank you, and I will be very pleased to 

take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Regalbuto can be found in 

the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

Ms. Connery, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOYCE CONNERY, CHAIRWOMAN, 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

Ms. CONNERY. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify on behalf of 

the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board on the fiscal 2017 

budget request. 

My name is Joyce Connery, and I have been with the Board for 

6 months. I am joined today by two of my fellow Board members, 

Bruce Hamilton and Sean Sullivan. Bruce and I are both new to 

the Board this year. 

As you may know, the Board is the only agency that provides 

independent safety oversight to DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. 

These facilities and their operations are essential to our Nation’s 

defense, as noted by the chairman. They perform work that includes the assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons, surveillance of the stockpile, fabrication of plutonium pits and weapons 

components, production and recycling of tritium, nuclear criticality 
7 

experiments, subcritical experiments, and a host of activities to address radioactive legacy waste resulting from 70 years of nuclear 

weapons operations. 

The Board’s vitally important oversight mission is achieved with 

a relatively small budget and a cadre of technical experts. In fiscal 

year 2017, the Board’s budget request is $31 million and supports 

120 FTEs [full-time equivalents]. With these resources—and our 

staff, our people are truly the Board’s greatest resource—we will 

continue to perform independent safety oversight throughout the 

complex. 

Within our oversight responsibilities, we strive to proactively address safety issues at DOE defense nuclear facilities to eliminate 

threats to public health and safety. 

Specifically, we advise DOE and NNSA on the need to effectively 

integrate safety into the design of new facilities, strengthen the 

protection of workers through improvements in work planning and 

conduct of operations, and to improve emergency preparedness and 

safety culture at sites with defense nuclear facilities. 

In recent years, the Board has increased its emphasis on emergency preparedness and response capabilities, making recommendations both complex-wide and site-specific. The complex’s aging facilities and resultant backlog of maintenance have created additional concerns. Delays to NNSA’s efforts to modernize its infrastructure can exacerbate safety-related issues and require that ongoing work be performed in degrading nuclear facilities that do not 

meet modern safety standards. 

The Board supports DOE and NNSA’s efforts to develop new defense facilities, and we will continue to work closely with them to 

integrate safety into their designs at the earliest possible stages. 

While increasing emphasis has been placed on emergency management preparedness and response, I personally have also been 

concerned with the state of the oversight throughout the defense 

nuclear complex and staffing challenges at both the Federal and 

contractor level. 

Difficulties retaining proper technical competencies have led to 

concerns of insufficient Federal safety oversight, and similar concerns on the contractor side impact conduct of operations. 

Staffing shortages may be the result of an aging and retiring 

workforce, competition for highly skilled workers, and compounded 

by the slow pace of the clearance adjudication process. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, this concludes my 

opening statement. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here 

today. We at the Board look forward to our continued work with 

this subcommittee, and I stand ready to respond to any questions 

you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Connery can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. I thank all the witnesses. We will now 

move into questions, and I will start with myself. 

General Klotz, I want to go back to what I was just talking about 

a minute ago on that deferred maintenance issue. From our conversation yesterday, my understanding is this year’s fiscal year 

2016 budget allowed you to basically take care of deferred mainte-
8 

nance, to make sure we don’t add to the backlog, so basically level 

funded. And from my understanding, this new number in fiscal 

year 2017 will allow you to cut into the backlog. 

Can you explain that? Because there seems to be some dispute 

that this number would allow you to actually go into the backlog, 

as opposed to level funding for another year. 

General KLOTZ. Thank you very much for the question, Chairman Rogers. Thank you also very much for your leadership on this 

important issue. 

When I was in the military, I learned that when dollars are constrained, the first dollar always goes to operations and maintenance of the weapons systems, and the dollar that goes to fix infrastructure and facilities always gets deferred to the right. And if you 

keep deferring it to the right, over time you get to a point where 

your facilities and your infrastructure reach a tipping point and it 

begins to impact both operations and maintenance, as Chairman 

Connery just mentioned, in some of our facilities. This year we are asking for $3.7 billion in our ask—our backlog is at $3.7 billion—and what we are asking for will, in fact, begin 

to cut into it. I think the confusion—and I went back yesterday 

after having discussed this with you and your staff yesterday—I 

think the confusion is the chart that we used with the staff yesterday is of such a scale, that the decrease that we see—— 

Mr. ROGERS. It doesn’t show up. 

General KLOTZ [continuing]. Doesn’t show up. It doesn’t show up. 

I think that is the explanation I have been given by my staff. 

But 2 years ago, the Secretary of Energy asked all elements of 

DOE to halt the growth of deferred maintenance, and we have 

worked very hard to put that into our budget. And because of the 

support we got from you last year, we begin to level it in 2016, and 

if we get the request that we want, we will begin to see that go 

down. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

You heard me say in my opening statement that NNSA may be 

a bit too focused on the present at the expense of the future. Now, 

I am the first to admit that this subcommittee has long been asking you and your predecessors at NNSA as a whole to get on top 

of today and the issues like life extension programs and big ongoing construction projects, and to your credit, you guys have made 

some significant steps in those areas. 

So I commend you, while also encouraging you to keep reaching. 

That is the job of an oversight committee, after all. But it is very 

important that we be thinking about these future endeavors. So 

let’s talk about the future. 

Reviewing the budget request, I am deeply concerned that NNSA 

is proposing major cuts to three forward-looking, future-focused 

lines that develop and mature safety and security technology for future warheads. By quick math, it looks like the request would short 

the safety and security technology maturation activities by almost 

$140 million. That seems very shortsighted, like we are simply 

locking ourselves into current technologies. 

Why is the NNSA proposing this? Is it just lack of funds? 

General KLOTZ. Yes, sir. The short answer is yes, sir. We have 

a lot of projects we want to cover in our weapons activity account 
9 

in fiscal year 2017. I think the most important thing is we have 

very stable life extension programs, which are a very high priority 

for us and a very high priority for the Department of Defense, 

which expresses its requirements through the Nuclear Weapons 

Council. We are on important glide paths on all of those, and we 

wanted to make sure that those continue. 

So it was some tough decisions made, and of course General 

Davis is here to dig into the details if you would like. We do that. 

We felt that was the way in which we could balance the budget 

within the top line that we were issued. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Congress has recently authorized two new 

programs for NNSA that are future-focused, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program and the Prototype Nuclear Weapons for Intelligence Estimates, PNWIE, program. These programs were created 

by Congress at the urging of several expert commissions and are 

about ensuring NNSA has the capabilities and skills to respond 

quickly to new or changing environments. The Stockpile Responsiveness Program is only a few months old because of the veto silliness on the fiscal year 2016 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], but tell me what NNSA is doing to implement it in this 

year and fiscal year 2017. 

General KLOTZ. Thank you very much, Chairman. This, by the 

way, is something which we fully support. It is extraordinarily important that throughout our complex we continuously exercise all 

the capabilities associated with maintaining the stockpile from design, to development, to manufacturing, to prototype building, and 

conducting the various experiments that test the various components associated with the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Many of these activities are already exercised on a routine basis 

as we do our life extension program and as we do the routine surveillance and the science, technology, and engineering that lies 

under that. 

NNSA has recognized for some time the importance of maintaining stockpile responsiveness. And in the fall of 2014, the Defense 

Programs, which has responsibility for weapons activities, chartered what they call the Defense Program Advisory Group and 

asked them what was required to challenge the workforce and sustain the capability for the future. They have, in fact, had meetings 

up till now, and we are expecting a report early in 2016 which 

deals with that. 

One approach that we are using that I would like to highlight 

here that has not received much publicity is that we are engaged 

with the United Kingdom on a program called the Joint Technology 

Demonstration, the JTD. The United Kingdom, like us, faces many 

of the same issues associated with sustainment of their nuclear deterrence, and we are working together to craft a program in which 

designers and program managers in both the U.S., and our laboratories, and in the United Kingdom will work together through design, develop, and issues associated with manufacturing of components for nuclear weapons. 

We are also carrying out a number of hydrodynamic and subcritical experiments. We have asked for money in this budget to, in 

fact, enhance our capabilities to conduct those types of experiments 

at the Nevada National Security Site, and we have also engaged 
10 

in a number of other certification readiness exercises associated 

with it. 

So we need to come back with you—you are right, the NDAA was 

signed late in the year—and come back to you with a more fully 

fleshed-out plan about how we propose to go ahead. But we fully 

share both the sentiment and the objective as laid out in the program. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You cited some of the 

good news from General Klotz as being the work on deferred maintenance. I would like to point out another feature of his testimony, 

which as he said at least a couple of times, the magic words ‘‘on 

time and under budget.’’ We rarely hear those in Washington, but 

we are always grateful when we do, and I appreciate the good work 

that went into producing those twin excellent results, on time and 

under budget. 

I would also like to single out the Naval Reactors Program. I 

have always been fond of it. It is an amazing tradition of excellence 

the Naval Reactors has pursued over lo these many years, and I 

just appreciate Admiral Caldwell and his predecessors making that 

tradition of excellence happen. 

We have talked about some of the good news. Some of the bad 

news is a contractor, a former contractor at Y–12, B&W Y–12, now 

called B&W XT, mishandled classified documents. And one of those 

was a Security Level 1 violation, which is, quote, ‘‘actual or high 

potential for adverse impact on national security.’’ NNSA proposed a $240,000 fine, but then, apparently, according 

to this excellent article by Frank Munger of the Knoxville News 

Sentinel, NNSA decided to waive the fine, and the reasons given 

were the contractor’s timely response to the concerns, even though 

later in the article it says that employees have been saying that 

this mishandling of classified information had been going on for 

years. 

So, to me, a prompt response is pretty weak after mistakes have 

been happening for years. And then the other reason was that 

B&W was already penalized by having its management fee reduced 

for fiscal year 2014. 

This, to me, sounds like 40 lashes with a wet noodle. This is not 

going to increase contractor accountability. So is this the right way 

to handle this misdisposal of classified information? 

General KLOTZ. Thank you for the question, Mr. Cooper. We take 

the protection of classified information, as well as the security of 

our facilities, extraordinarily seriously, and that is why in this particular case the Department of Energy Enterprise Assessments Office, Office of Enforcement, inquired into this matter and came to 

the conclusions that it did. 

With respect to holding the contractor, in this case the former 

contractor, at Y–12 accountable, one of the things that the article 

said, I can’t remember if it was the one you cited or other articles, 

said that we had decided—that I had decided that somehow that 

B&W had suffered enough. That word does not show up anywhere 

in the letter which I sent to B&W on this issue. 
11 

We made our decisions based on the rules which we follow. And 

there are a number of things which can be used to mitigate the 

civil penalty that is assessed via a formula. One of those is whether 

we have already in a sense penalized or held the contractor responsible through the annual fee determination process. 

In the case of B&W Y–12, we had already subtracted from the 

fee which they were eligible for as part of the annual program review and used that as a mitigator to say, while perhaps maybe not 

under law this falls into the concept of double jeopardy, it certainly 

does in terms of principle. So we hold them accountable in terms 

of the financial fines either through the fee determination process 

or through the fine process. 

There have been a couple of instances in the past, at least since 

I have been sitting in the seat at NNSA, where we have, in fact, 

imposed a civil fine because we had not taken a fee for that particular activity. But this was specifically noted in the process of determining what their fee was for that year, and so that is why we 

mitigated that. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, it is hard to unscramble this egg and we can’t 

turn back the clock. But I am curious, I am assuming B&W and/ 

or its subsidiaries are still doing work for NNSA? 

General KLOTZ. They are. 

Mr. COOPER. The Department? 

General KLOTZ. They are, in the broader DOE, yes. 

Mr. COOPER. Are any steps taken to make sure that they treat 

classified information more carefully at their other? 

General KLOTZ. Well, we hold everybody to the same standard, 

whether it is B&W or any of our other M&O [management and operations] contractors or subcontractors. They know what the expectations are. That is why we carry out the oversight that we do, and 

that is why we thoroughly investigate, document, and make as a 

matter of public record when they have fallen short in protecting 

either the facilities or the classified information they have responsibility for. 

Mr. COOPER. I know that you have high standards, but you 

haven’t always been on duty at NNSA, and the workers here told 

the reporter that this had been going on for years. So you have to 

wonder. 

General KLOTZ. Yes, it had been, yes. 

Mr. COOPER. Assuming there is a second violation by B&W, will 

the fines be tougher the second time? 

General KLOTZ. That is I think what you call a hypothetical 

question, Congressman. So, we take this very, very seriously, and 

clearly we have to judge each and every case on the specific facts 

associated with that. But, again, protection of classified material, 

protection of the facilities which our M&O partners have responsibility for is one of our top priorities. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will withhold further 

questions at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here. 
12 

General, I always especially appreciate men like yourself who 

have given their entire life to the cause of freedom. 

General, do you believe that the need for our capability to detect, 

identify, and characterize nuclear weapons programs, illicit diversion of special nuclear materials, and nuclear detonations is something that is increasing in this environment or decreasing, that 

need to be able to do that? 

General KLOTZ. The need is always there to be able to detect, 

and particularly as more and more countries look to civil nuclear 

power as a way to solve their energy demands and needs in the future, the ability to detect whether or not the materials that are associated with civil nuclear power are being diverted for military 

uses will continue to be a challenge and a greater challenge. It is 

something that we spend a lot of time thinking about. Our laboratories and our production facilities are engaged in significant research and development to ensure that we are staying ahead of the 

power curve on this. 

Mr. FRANKS. So it is your testimony that that need for that capability is an increasing need? 

General KLOTZ. Yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. And if you were to identify any particular area, and 

I realize it is sort of a broad question, is there anything that is especially of concern to you, of special concern to you, as far as being 

able to sense any special threat out there that we face in terms of 

proliferation? 

General KLOTZ. I think if we talked about specific threats, we 

would need to do that in the classified session, which is coming 

after this. But, again, what we would look for would be those types 

of indicators which suggest that a country—or, for that matter, a 

nonstate actor—is, one, trying to acquire special nuclear materials, 

and then using those special nuclear materials, diverting those special nuclear materials either for use in nuclear proliferation or nuclear terrorism. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, notwithstanding the ranking member’s, I 

think, cogent comments related to the diminishing involvement on 

the part of Russia with us, what would you say that the diminished 

request here for the DNN [Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation] and 

R&D [Research & Development] on budget, how does that square 

with the increasing need for the capability but a lesser request for 

the funding to do that? 

General KLOTZ. I would be happy to answer that, but since we 

did invite Anne Harrington and Admiral Caldwell and General 

Davis up, would it be okay if Anne addressed that because that 

falls directly, since she came all this way? 

Mr. FRANKS. Sure. 

General KLOTZ. Would that be okay? 

Mr. FRANKS. Absolutely. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. First, thank you very much for the question 

and particularly for recognizing what is very important in my line 

of business, which is the evolving and emerging threats. 

To go back to your initial question very quickly on the R&D side, 

we have two programs specifically in the R&D area that address 

those issues. We have what we call our Material and Weapons Development Program that looks at nuclear fuel cycle, especially chal-
13 

lenges from noncooperative foreign environments. That looks at advanced technologies for detecting proliferant activities, such as nuclear material production, related facilities, equipment processes, 

and that is about $80 million that is in this budget for that. 

And then we have another area called Ground-Based Nuclear 

Event Monitoring, and that is the detection of low yield and evasive tests, seismic and radionuclide detection, and exploitation of 

what we call our dynamic sensor network data, so how do we better interpret the data that we are collecting through all of the systems that we have deployed. 

So the goal of these is to meet emerging requirements, to detect 

and significantly lower the thresholds at which we can detect evasive testing. 

Mr. FRANKS. So the reason for the decreased budget is? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. The decrease in the budget in R&D specifically? 

Mr. FRANKS. In the DNN and the R&D, yes. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. That is related to a one-time expenditure that 

we don’t have to make again. Part of it is related to a classified 

case where we have found a solution to a problem that we thought 

we were going to have to extend into future budgets. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am hoping we can maybe get 

their perspective on any characterization of the North Korean 

claim to have detonated a hydrogen bomb at some point, but in the 

closed session. And with that, my time is out. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State of 

Alabama, Mo Brooks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. I will defer, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 

Oklahoma. I am sorry. That was very disparaging. I did not 

mean to say that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I am not going to comment. I love Nebraska 

too. All right. 

General, the Secretary of Energy wrote to the Director of OMB 

[Office of Management and Budget] that because of a recent Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS, decision to not block a foreign company from buying a microchip foundry here in the U.S., NNSA will need a quarter of a billion dollars 

between fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2021 to mitigate the loss 

of this secure, trusted manufacturing capability. 

I understand these capabilities are needed both for NNSA’s nuclear weapons work as well as for its satellite programs. Since I am 

assuming this was the Mubadala Development Company out of the 

UAE [United Arab Emirates], can you explain why CFIUS didn’t 

block this transaction? 

General KLOTZ. Thank you for the question. Sorry, I am glad we 

clarified it was from Oklahoma since my mom is from there. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. She sounds like a great lady. 

General KLOTZ. Two things at first, and then I will get to your 

question. First of all, of course the responsibility for CFIUS falls 

to the Treasury Department, and our role in the Department of Energy and in the National Nuclear Security Administration is to pro-
14 

vide technical advice for decisions that they are making. The second thing is that the specifics of this case we can raise in closed 

session. 

Let me just say in general, however, you said something that 

was very, very important, and that is that a trusted supply of radiation-hardened advanced microsystems is extraordinarily important to the nuclear weapons effectiveness in our stockpile. There is 

sort of an assumption that radiation hardness is radiation hardness and that the radiation hardness for space systems also would 

apply for nuclear, but we have a much more stringent standard for 

that. 

We have done much of our work in the area of both research and 

development and fabrication of radiation-hardened microelectronics 

at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque in a facility known 

as MESA, which I think stands for Microsystems and Engineering 

Science Application. It is a facility which, quite frankly, is long in 

the tooth, to go back to the chairman and the ranking member’s 

comments, and needs to be recapitalized, and it is a facility which 

is using technology which, quite frankly, the commercial world has 

now gone beyond, for instance, using 6-inch silicon wafer processing as opposed to what is now the standard 8-inch. So we have asked for $14 million in this year—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Let me interrupt just real quick. Did DOE or 

DOD [Department of Defense] participate in the CFIUS decisionmaking process on this transaction? 

General KLOTZ. Yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And nobody recommended blocking it? 

General KLOTZ. That, I can’t go into here. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. But you do recognize that a quarter billion dollars is a lot of money to the taxpayer for this decision? 

General KLOTZ. I recognize, I would state that having a supply 

of trusted radiation-hardened advanced microsystems is very, very 

important to the United States and to the nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So you cannot comment on how much it is 

going to cost? 

General KLOTZ. No. For our specific piece of what we would do 

within the NNSA, as I said, we will spend money this year to complete analysis of alternatives to see where we go forward on the 

MESA project. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. But it will cost something. Do you know where 

that money would come from? 

General KLOTZ. It will come out of the NNSA budget, to do the 

work that we do within NNSA. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Have there been other CFIUS cases, for example, the decision to not block IBM’s sale of its server business to 

China’s Lenovo? 

General KLOTZ. That, I don’t know. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. We need to be very cognizant of these 

new liabilities for NNSA and the DOD. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes. 
15 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for allowing me to participate. 

I understand the service of each of the witnesses today, and I 

look forward to continue working with you. I especially recognize 

your dedication, as an alumnus of DOE headquarters, and as being 

the only Member of Congress who has worked at Savannah River 

Site, which I am very grateful that I represent, along with Congressman Jim Clyburn of South Carolina. 

I ask, first, the unanimous consent to distribute a memo dated 

November 20, 2015, from Secretary Ernest Moniz to the President, 

along with section 3119 of fiscal year 2016 NDAA. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 69.] 

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate Chairman Mike Rogers providing for 

discussion multiple times before this subcommittee a major issue: 

in shifting the United States plutonium disposition strategy from 

the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, MOX, at the Savannah 

River Site, this method would require, by shifting, a renegotiation 

of the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement with the 

Russian Federation. 

In a memo dated November 20, 2015, from Secretary Moniz to 

President Obama, the Secretary says in regard to the shifting of 

the disposition strategy, quote: So far we have no read on the MFA, 

the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, response. This issue will 

need further interagency work in the context of overall complicated 

U.S.-Russia relations. 

There is a proposal abandoning MOX where $4.5 billion has been 

invested for 70 percent completion, and shifting to a strategy that 

even Secretary Moniz admits we do not know or have any idea 

when the Russian Federation—what they will ask in return. 

I am concerned the admittedly complicated U.S.-Russia relations 

will lead to a swift and conciliatory negotiation which is not realistic. I am concerned that we are without a plan if Russia asks for 

concessions that the United States cannot make. If so, we risk incurring the immense cost of resurrecting MOX and reassembling 

the workforce and infrastructure that are crucial to its success. 

We know that the proposed repository for the down-blended 

weapons-grade plutonium would be with the Waste Isolation Pilot 

Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico. We know that the facility remains 

closed, yet WIPP received less funding at the request of fiscal year 

2017 than fiscal year 2016. 

Keeping this in mind, there have been assurances that WIPP 

would open as soon as possible, but how long after WIPP reopens 

will it be operational? 

Additionally, on Tuesday night, led by Governor Nikki Haley and 

Attorney General Alan Wilson, the State of South Carolina was 

forced, as required by law, to sue the Department of Energy for up 

to $100 million in 2016, payable to the State of South Carolina, as 

a result of failure to move 1 ton of plutonium from South Carolina 

despite the State twice pushing back a deadline. This puts at risk 

the people of South Carolina and Georgia as the repository. Terminating this project does nothing to move material out of the region. 

This will not save taxpayers’ dollars and will jeopardize nonprolif-
16 

eration. This committee should reject the President’s proposal to 

terminate, and we should continue to move forward with construction to convert weapons-grade plutonium into green fuel. 

And in conclusion, General Klotz, section 3119 of the fiscal year 

2016 NDAA directed the Department to submit, with the budget 

justification materials for fiscal year 2017, an updated performance 

baseline. Can you tell us what the update is on this baseline status? 

General KLOTZ. Thank you very much, Congressman Wilson. And 

let me just say at the outset, I know and respect the passion and 

the intensity which you bring to this particular issue, and I very 

much appreciate the fact that over the past couple years we have 

been able to work very closely together, in a very collegial and civil 

manner, as we work through what is an obvious difference of opinion on terms of policy. And I especially appreciate the many trips 

that you have taken to the MOX Facility with our people to discuss 

the issues that are there. 

There was a lot in your question, but let me just say that, with 

respect to the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement, the 

administration, the U.S. Government remains firmly committed to 

disposing of all 34 metric tons of excess, surplus weapons-grade 

plutonium, as we have agreed with Russia in that agreement. But 

over the last couple of years there have been several efforts to analyze the current MOX fuel approach and alternatives, such as the 

2014 DOE review, which was actually the first thing I testified—— 

Mr. WILSON. And, General, I can’t interrupt a general, because 

you are too good, but the question about the baseline, what is the 

status of that? And the reason I like visiting MOX, you have got 

a lot of professionals there that I like. 

General KLOTZ. Thank you, sir. And believe me, they appreciate 

seeing you come down and other senior leaders come down. 

The language in the NDAA was, I think, passed in November of 

2015, if I am not mistaken. I am told by my staff it takes as much 

as 18 to 24 months to do a performance baseline, and even more 

than I suggested to the chairman yesterday, several million dollars 

to do that. So there is just no way, unless we can make time stop 

between November of 2015 and to the submission of President’s 

budget, to do a full performance baseline in terms of the costs as 

requested there. 

Our sense still is, based on the reports that we have done, is that 

the dilute and dispose option is still a much less expensive and a 

faster way of disposing of this excess weapons-grade plutonium. 

Mr. WILSON. And I look forward to the baseline. 

General KLOTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I would say he does make a good point, baseline is required. So I would ask you to try to expedite that if you 

could. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

And, General, I would like to follow up on the line that Mr. Wilson was giving. I have the same concern about MOX, I am just not 

as civil as he is. But in both versions of the NDAA that was passed 

last year, including the one that was signed by your boss, it does 
17 

clearly say that you shall carry out construction and project-support activities relating to the MOX Facility. And the 3119 section 

to which Representative Wilson referred does clearly say that you 

have to include those budget justification materials submitted to 

Congress in support of the DOE budget for fiscal year 2017 and 

that updated performance line. It is not an option. 

So I do have questions. I haven’t seen that baseline either. You 

admit that it is not there. But how are you now disregarding the 

direction that was given you in the bill, in the law, and terminating 

this project? How can you respond to that? 

General KLOTZ. Well, first of all, on the construction, we understand in the 2016 Authorization, Appropriations Acts, we are to 

continue construction. We will continue construction through the 

end of 2016. And our proposal, of course, in the fiscal year 2017 

budget is to terminate the program. And the reason that we make 

that argument is because the several studies that we have done 

over the past 2 years indicate that there is a much faster, much 

cheaper way to dispose of this. The costs of—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Then let me interrupt with that one, because if 

there is indeed a cheaper way, a cheaper technology, it is not necessarily a proven technology. You have given us no specific cost estimates. There is no methodology of that. I mean, you haven’t given 

us the data that you need to do before you go in that direction. 

It seems to me that once again the administration is clearly bypassing the intent of Congress and not giving us the data that was 

required before you make that change in direction. You have no 

ability to close this facility. 

General KLOTZ. Well, the technology and the process by which 

we do it is proven. There is already close to 5—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Have you submitted that to us? 

General KLOTZ [continuing]. 5 metric tons of diluted plutonium 

currently in the facility at WIPP. So we know how to do that. 

Mr. BISHOP. But, General, that has to be part of the baseline you 

submit to us. That is the decision we get a chance to make here. 

And I think this committee has spoken several times over the past 

few years about the direction we expect you to go in that. 

General KLOTZ. Congressman, you are absolutely right. This is 

the proposal of the administration in our fiscal year 2017 budget 

proposal. We recognize, as I used to say when I taught political 

science, the President proposes and the Congress disposes. This is 

our proposal. 

Mr. BISHOP. Would you have that printed and given to some 

other people within the administration? 

Could you also, though, recognize this? Will there be a stop-work 

order coming from any of the organizations here on this project before Congress gets to once again reaffirm what we want you to do? 

General KLOTZ. We discussed this just before coming over here. 

What I have been told by my staff is we will continue construction 

all the way through fiscal year 2016 as laid out by the direction 

of Congress. 

Mr. BISHOP. Will there be a stop-work proposal after that? 

General KLOTZ. I don’t know. I don’t know the answer to that. 

Let me get back to you on that. 
18 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 73.] 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate that. But I once again would like to reaffirm, I think you have seen the direction that Congress has given 

in last year’s NDAA. Any deviation from that would be problematic 

at best. 

I will yield back. 

General KLOTZ. I take your point. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Klotz, I am going to ask you a single question, also following up on MOX, and then give the rest of my time to Representative Wilson. Regarding the termination, the possible termination 

of the MOX project, how would that be received by the Russians? 

General KLOTZ. That is a very good question, Congressman, and 

one of the issues which we have to work through. The Plutonium 

Management Disposition Agreement says that this plutonium will 

be disposed of by irradiation or by other means agreed to by the 

parties. So we can engage in a discussion with the Russians about 

this particular issue. 

In fact, we have already—the Russians came to us earlier in the 

life of this agreement and asked to change the approach that they 

were taking, and we agreed to that. In fact, then Secretary of State 

Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov signed an agreement in 2010 

which memorialized that. 

Now, I think the Secretary of Energy has said this clearly. If not, 

I will say it. We have been engaged at our level in discussions with 

our counterparts in Russia about the possibility of this particular 

approach. They have listened to us very respectfully. Quite frankly, 

their view is, when you are ready to go forward with this, we will 

sit down and we will discuss it in more detail. And I suspect, just 

like it will be on this side of the Atlantic, it will be a whole-of-government approach in Russia to what their final position will be. 

But from the technical point of view, the people that we deal 

with, they fully understand what we are doing, they understand 

the economics of it, they understand the physics and the chemistry 

of it, and agree that we have a topic that we can sit down and discuss. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I will defer the rest of my 

time to Representative Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman. 

And again, General Klotz, thank you for—all of you—for being 

here. But it does concern me that the law was clear, section 3119, 

and so I hope whatever the baseline is, it can be provided. Because 

every other report that we have received, there were flaws, as far 

as I am concerned, because each one failed to recognize that we 

have a proven technology, the mixed oxide fuel fabrication, because 

this has been done in France for nearly 50 years. 

And then I find, when they claim that there are cost overruns, 

so much of that is because there have been changes in specifications which the contractors then have, by the Department, and 

which then causes additional cost. And, sadly, it is really frus-
19 

trating to me that people would be critical when, in fact, it was due 

to changes in specifications. 

And then other issues that are just mind-numbing. When it is 

stated that for the green fuel, the fuel that will be produced, that 

there are not contracts for the fuel, well, in the industry, people 

don’t buy fuel till the last second because of the variations of price, 

which we see today in other energy fields. And when I hear that 

argument, I am thinking that is just—and you hadn’t made it, but 

other people have, other reports. 

And over and over again there are misstatements that are being 

made that I think should be addressed and to achieve what can be 

so important of nonproliferation at a time with, sadly, the rising 

tensions with the Russian Federation. Over and over again I can 

see positive of why this should be done, and so I really hope there 

will be a change of course. 

And beyond that, Dr. Regalbuto, in the budget request for 2017, 

the traditional Savannah River risk management operations control point was separated into two control points, environmental 

cleanup and nuclear material management, causing considerable 

confusion. Can you explain the Department’s rationale for this, and 

were the site contractors notified of the change? 

Secretary REGALBUTO. Thank you for your question, Mr. Wilson. 

I do recognize that this year the way the tables have been printed 

out are a little bit different than they have been done in the past, 

and we are providing in our Web site a sheet for everybody to follow and track exactly where everything is, which we will be happy 

to provide to you too. 

In general, the budget request for Savannah River went up $111 

million. This is actually a recognition of the mission of H Canyon, 

HB-Line, L-Basin, and L-Area. So with the plus-up of $111 million, 

it allows us to continue to support those decisions. 

In addition to our traditional milestones, which are related to the 

processing of tank waste, we also have an opportunity to initiate 

another in-tank technology that we will be testing starting this 

year and then into 2018. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much for referencing H Canyon Facility, a world-class treasure that not everybody knows. So thank 

you. 

Secretary REGALBUTO. I do use it every day, so I am very happy 

that our funding is properly—— 

Mr. WILSON. I am happy to meet you any time and point it out. 

Thank you. 

Secretary REGALBUTO. Thank you. 

General KLOTZ. Could I just add, Mr. Chairman, of course H 

Canyon is extraordinarily important, not only to the work on the 

Environmental Management side, but also to NNSA. This is a key 

facility and one which we need to maintain for the long term. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I thank the gentleman. I thank the witnesses. I wanted to do a second round of questions, but we are 

going to be called for votes in a little over a half an hour. So we 

will just submit those to you and ask that you provide written responses for the record in the next 10 or 12 days. 
20 

But with that, I would like to recess for about 5 minutes while 

we go to 2337 for the classified portion—oh, 2216. Faking you off 

there. We will see you in 2216 in just a few minutes. 

[Whereupon, at 3:03 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 11, 2016 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

General KLOTZ. The President’s FY 2017 budget proposes to terminate the MOX 

project. The Department will request the MOX prime contractor to determine activities required to place the facility and project in a safe and secure state, winding 

down construction, design, support, and procurement efforts as quickly as possible 

so that termination can be done efficiently and cost effectively. DOE will issue contract direction to MOX Services as early as practicable to halt construction activities 

for 90 days while the discussion and development of a termination plan take place.

[See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 11, 2016 

(77) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, the Stockpile Responsiveness Program is only a few 

months old because of the veto silliness on the FY16 NDAA, but tell me: What is 

NNSA doing to implement it this year and in FY17? How is NNSA going to adjust 

and refocus its RDT&E and stockpile activities to meet the intent of the Stockpile 

Responsiveness Program? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA recognizes the nuclear security enterprise’s need to maintain the complete set of skills and expertise to respond to future stockpile challenges. The enterprise need includes exercising all capabilities required to ensure 

that the nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, effective, reliable, and responsive 

as required by the fiscal year (FY) 2016 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA). 

Several activities within the current Stockpile Stewardship Program that meet 

the direction of Section 3112 of the FY 2016 NDAA have already been implemented. 

Relevant activities include: 

• Planning for an increased rate of hydrodynamic and subcritical experiments (at 

Nevada National Security Site, U1a facility) to test and exercise designers, engineers, and experimentalists. 

• ‘‘Certification Readiness Exercises’’ (research and development studies and experiments) for our technical experts to identify and reduce technical risks to the 

life extension programs early in the process. 

• Significant acceleration of the shot rate at the National Ignition Facility to exercise designers, experimentalists and diagnosticians. 

• Collaboration with the United Kingdom on the Joint Technology Demonstrator, 

which exercises the workforce throughout the design, develop, manufacture, and 

prototype lifecycle. 

• The Defense Programs ‘‘Capabilities for Nuclear Intelligence’’ (CNI) portfolio 

with the Research Development Test & Evaluation portfolio provides training 

and development activities for designers, engineers, and experimentalists on 

non-US nuclear weapons concepts, providing great benefit to the stockpile stewardship program. 

• 120-day studies on interoperable warhead concepts, conducted in 2012, which 

also tested the capabilities of technical experts. 

• Additionally, in early FY 2015, NNSA’s Defense Programs Advisory Committee 

began analyzing how well current stockpile stewardship activities exercise and 

challenge the workforce throughout the entire nuclear weapons life cycle. The 

committee expects to deliver a report to NNSA in 2016, providing their recommendations relevant to the Stockpile Responsiveness Program. This report 

will provide a basis to establish the scope required to ensure stockpile responsiveness in the future. The FY 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Plan will more fully address NNSA’s plan for the Stockpile Responsiveness Program based on these results and further analysis. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, unlike the newly born Stockpile Responsiveness Program, the PNWIE program has been statutorily required for three years. Just a few 

weeks ago—and almost a year late—the committee received the NNSA lab directors’ 

plan for how to carry out this program. But the cover letter states that DOE ‘‘is 

not advocating for implementation of the plan.’’ Meanwhile the law explicitly says 

‘‘the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the directors, shall carry out the 

plan,’’ but gives him the authority to adjust how it is implemented. General, I know 

we share the same goals here. We want to set NNSA up for the future and we want 

our lab scientists and engineers to do this work. What are you doing to implement 

this program? When will you begin executing an initial PNWIE effort? 

General KLOTZ. There was no funding authorized or appropriated specifically for 

the Prototype Nuclear Weapons for Intelligence Estimates (PNWIE) program in fiscal year (FY) 2016. However, DOE/NNSA is already executing activities that exercise the continuum of integrated lifecycle activities, including design, development, 

prototype building, and experimental testing. These activities include intelligenceinformed efforts conducted by Defense Program’s Capabilities for Nuclear Intelligence (CNI) program, which is coordinated with the Foreign Nuclear Weapons In-
78 

telligence Initiative (FNWII). The CNI effort includes a training and development 

practicum as well as activities that range from materials characterization to modeling to sub-system level testing. Of note, NNSA is also allocating additional funding to the Joint Technology Demonstrator (JTD) program that we recently initiated 

with the United Kingdom. The JTD program will sustain core capabilities in the design, manufacture, testing, fabrication and assembly of flight-ready hardware. Finally, we are developing a stockpile responsiveness framework to summarize and examine the FNWII, JTD and all ongoing stockpile activities that are responsive to 

the goals of section 3111 of the FY 2015 NDAA. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, what more could NNSA be doing on deferred maintenance if provided additional funding? We need to start bending this curve down and 

Congress needs to step up. Can you please provide a list of high-priority projects 

that you aren’t funding in the request? 

General KLOTZ. Over the past three years, NNSA has been successful in slowing 

the annual growth of deferred maintenance from $250M/year to $100M/year. The 

Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2016 allows us to stop the growth of deferred maintenance. Our FY 2017 request allows us to begin reducing deferred 

maintenance and arresting the decline of NNSA infrastructure by: 

• Increasing funds for recapitalization and maintenance efforts 

• Disposing of excess facilities 

• Increasing buying power via strategic procurement of common building systems 

across the enterprise (e.g., roofs, HVAC) 

• Improving project management capabilities to make risk-informed investment 

decisions 

However, additional strategic investments in infrastructure could be made to accelerate NNSA’s progress in arresting the declining state of infrastructure and reducing deferred maintenance. As requested, a list of prioritized infrastructure investments is provided below. Note that neither I nor the Secretary endorse any of 

these additional priorities given the spending limits created by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA). We have made extensive efforts to thoroughly assess, 

prioritize, and balance the program to achieve the major requirements in the FY 

2017 budget request. Any extra funding inserted into our Recapitalization program 

will come at the expense of other programs we deem more important to the effectiveness of the nuclear enterprise as a whole. 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

Infrastructure and Safety 

Unfunded FY 2017 Recapitalization Projects—As of February 2016 

Rank Site Project Name 

Total 

Project 

Cost ($K) 

1 LLNL Site 300 Electric Utility Display System Upgrade $ 7,000 

2 LANL LANSCE Sector A Tunnel Fire Suppression System Installation $ 3,000 

3 LLNL B132N HVAC System Variable Air Control Replacement $ 5,000 

4 Y–12 Bldg 9204–2E Wet Pipe Systems 1&2 50 Year Sprinkler Head Replacement $ 5,500 

5 Y–12 Bldg 9995 Air Handling Unit (AHU) 2000 Replacement $ 6,000 

6 Y–12 Area 5 15 kV Underground Cable Replacement $ 5,000 

7 KCP Kirtland Ops NC–135 Site Disposition $ 4,900 

8 LLNL Bldg 175 Characterization $ 1,500 

9 Y–12 Bldg 9204–2 Ceiling Concrete Replacement (additional scope) $ 6,000 

10 PX Bldg 12–84E Generator Replacement $ 2,000 

11 KCP Bldg 2 Specialty Welding Applications Capital Equipment Replacement and Upgrade $ 1,200 

12 LANL PF–4 Vault Storage Renovation $ 7,500 

13 LLNL Utility Safety Upgrades to Plating Shop, B322 $ 2,500 
79 

National Nuclear Security Administration—Continued 

Infrastructure and Safety 

Unfunded FY 2017 Recapitalization Projects—As of February 2016 

Rank Site Project Name 

Total 

Project 

Cost ($K) 

14 SNL C914 Seismic Upgrades to Achieve Code Compliance $ 9,720 

15 LLNL Bldg 292 Characterization $ 2,000 

16 LLNL Site 200 and 300 Transition and Disposition of 48 Trailers $ 2,500 

17 SNL SNL—Hawaii Mt. Haleakala Disposition of 3 Facilities $ 934 

18 LLNL Site-Wide Low Conductivity Water System Station/Cooling Tower Replacement $ 6,000 

19 LLNL Main Campus—Failing Underground Utility Valves and Water Distribution Piping Replacement $ 5,000 

20 PX Building 12–84E Generator Replacement $ 2,000 

21 SNL C912 Major Building Renovation, Phase 3 $ 5,000 

22 LLNL B131 Engineering’s Cornerstone Office Building Upgrade $ 7,500 

23 KCP Product Testing Area Capital Equipment Replacement $ 2,490 

24 SNL Substation 5 Loop Upgrade, Redundant Feeder Installation $ 5,000 

25 Y–12 9204–04 Deinventory $ 8,000 

26 PX Bldg 12–24E Chiller Replacement $ 2,000 

27 LANL Small Improvement Project in 3 Facilities (53–003,22–0005, 03–0039) $ 1,300 

28 LLNL B805 Classified Machine Shop Infrastructure Renovation $ 3,500 

29 LANL CMR Initial Facility Closure (additional scope) $ 1,500 

30 LLNL B327 Non-Destructive Evaluation Laboratory Renovation $ 2,500 

31 LLNL B391 HVAC Water Temperature Control Upgrade $ 3,000 

32 Y–12 Re-line Failing Sections of Sitewide Potable Water Distribution Piping $ 8,000 

33 LANL TA–03–0102 Component Manufacturing Virtual Vault Type Room Installation $ 1,599 

34 KCP Production Area Renovations for Floor Space Optimization $ 2,143 

35 LLNL Disposition of Buildings B326, B221, & B221 Retention Tanks $ 2,000 

36 SNL C911 Renovation to Convert Office to Lab Space $ 5,000 

37 PX Bldgs 12–85 and 12–96 UPS Replacements $ 2,250 

38 PX Bldg 12–44 UPS Replacement & Equipment Room Reconfiguration $ 3,000 

39 PX Bldg 11–51 Generator and UPS Replacement $ 2,250 

40 PX Bldgs 12–98E1 and E2 UPS and Generator Replacement $ 3,000 

41 LANL Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility Glovebox and Systems Renovation $ 8,250 

Total $ 164,536 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, you submitted a plan last September on three 

projects where NNSA was considering using public-private partnerships to build 

new, modern buildings and get out of some of these ancient facilities. What’s the 

status of these projects? Why can’t we get these going as public-private partnerships? 

General KLOTZ. As stated in our Public-Private Partnerships Report to Congress, 

we are required to perform an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to determine best 
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value to the government. When completed, our analysis must be reviewed by the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as consistent with the A–94 and A–11 

guidelines agreed to by OMB, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Budget Committees. 

Pantex Administrative Support Complex (ASC): 

DOE’s AoA for the Pantex ASC revealed that a public-private partnership would 

satisfy the mission need at the best value to the government. 

High Performance Computing Innovation Center (HPCIC)/Collaboration 

in Research and Engineering for Advanced Technology & Education (CREATE): 

NNSA is completing business cases for each of these projects, but has not yet submitted them to OMB review. 

NNSA Albuquerque Complex Project (NACP): 

NNSA included the NACP as a line item in the FY 2017 President’s Budget Request. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, I want to revisit with you my theme of setting NNSA 

up for the future. You’ll recall an editorial ‘‘Mr. Moniz’s Nuclear Warning’’ by the 

Wall Street Journal, published January 12th, that is based on a remarkable letter 

from your boss, Secretary Moniz, to the Director of OMB. The letter points to the 

problem we discussed—decaying NNSA infrastructure—as well as many other problems that require significant funding to address. The letter concludes by requesting 

that in the FY17 budget request OMB provide NNSA ‘‘an upwards adjustment of 

$5.2 billion over FY18–FY21 to fund the Administration’s goals and priorities’’ related to the nuclear enterprise. It goes on: ‘‘Failure to address these requirements 

in the near term will put the NNSA budget in an untenable position beginning in 

FY18, will not provide an appropriate statement of the Obama Administration legacy, and will provide a misleading marker to the next Administration as to the resource needs of the nuclear security enterprise.’’ 

So General Klotz, we’re talking about the future. And the budget request before 

us—while okay in the immediate year—the Secretary of Energy is saying it is short 

a billion dollars a year over the next 5 years. And we’ve heard GAO say that there 

is a major gap between NNSA’s programmed activities and its out-year budget profile. 

You have a duty to be clear with Congress and the American people: What are 

the no kidding budget requirements for the 5-year program at NNSA? Does the 

budget request and 5-year plan before us fix the issue the Secretary wrote about 

in his letter to OMB? 

General KLOTZ. I am confident that the FY 2017 President’s Budget for NNSA 

meets all of our national nuclear security requirements. 

We will be able to do so because the President and Congress reached an agreement last fall to raise the FY 2017 sequester cap in the Bipartisan Budget Act. This 

provided us the necessary flexibility to put together a responsible FY 2017 budget. 

The budget projections for future years, FY 2018–FY 2021, remain subject to the 

sequester caps set in the Budget Control Act of 2011. Adjustments to the Congressional sequester caps are needed so the next Administration can continue the 

progress we have made in our nuclear security programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, will NNSA submit a rebaseline on the MOX project, 

as required by the FY16 NDAA? 

General KLOTZ. Yes. The Department is in the process of updating the performance baseline. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, we see that the budget request includes a substantial 

decrease in the amount that was expected to be requested for the life extension program for the W80–4 warhead that will arm the LRSO cruise missile in the late2020s. Last year you projected you would request $312 million for this program in 

2017, but now we see you are only requesting $220 million. This is a 30% reduction 

and it’s occurring very, very early in the program. I’m worried this shows a lack 

of commitment to this incredibly important program. Our military and DOD officials 

have spoken repeatedly about the critical nature of getting LRSO in the field. So, 

to be clear, is the Obama Administration 100% committed to the 2025 date for a 

first production unit for this warhead? Is this commitment iron clad and will this 

budget request support that? Can we say we have your word on this? 

General KLOTZ. Yes, the Administration is committed to the 2025 date for a first 

production unit (FPU) of the W80–4. NNSA balances priorities among the near-term 

and long-term needs of managing the stockpile to include life extension programs; 

necessary sustainment and recapitalization of infrastructure; essential investment 

in research, development, test, and evaluation; and activities to maintain the expertise of the highly-skilled workforce to ensure a responsive capability. The W80–4 

Life Extension Program (LEP) remains a high priority. The reduction was caused 
81 

by the delay in budget execution as a result of the 2016 continuing resolutions. This 

delay slowed technology maturation activities in Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and 

Design Options) and has resulted in a projected carry-over of roughly $50 million 

that will be used to address program requirements in FY 2017. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, the B61–12 and W76–1 life extension programs are 

both well underway at this point. Please give us a status update on these programs. 

Are you confident they will finish on time and on budget? What are the major risks 

to the successful execution of these programs? Are they technical? Or are they in 

getting the funding needed to execute? 

General KLOTZ. The FY 2016 enacted budget for the B61–12 Life Extension Program (LEP) is $643.3 million and the FY 2017 budget request is $616.1 million with 

$2.9 billion planned for FY 2018–2021. That funding profile reflects the transition 

from Development Engineering (Phase 6.3) to Production Engineering (Phase 6.4), 

which occurred in June 2016, as component activities begin pilot production and 

production qualification activities. The final cost and schedule baseline for the B61– 

12 LEP will be completed in August 2016 as part of the Baseline Cost Report. 

As with each major modernization program budget, the FY 2016 budget for the 

B61–12 included an amount of management reserve to address emerging risks and 

has been used to offset shortfalls in leveraged science and engineering programs 

that are supporting technology or production readiness. The B61–12 LEP expects to 

carryover a portion of the risk based funds into FY 2017 giving it the ability to support the W88 ALT 370 reprogramming proposed in FY 2016. While there are potential concerns with reducing the B61–12 risk funds, there is a greater impact if the 

W88 ALT 370 is not fully funded in FY2016. Currently, the B61–12 LEP shares 

$250 million in common electronics development costs with the W88 ALT 370. If 

these activities were delayed, it would impact B61–12 common scope and/or increase 

B61–12 costs. On balance, it is a manageable risk to fund $5 million of the W88 

Alt 370 reprogramming. That is not to say that the reprogramming carries no risk 

to the B61–12 LEP, but this option does offer the least risk to the overall Defense 

Programs mission. 

The most significant risks to the B61–12 LEP are inconsistent funding, significantly reduced funding, and continuing resolutions of significant duration. If the 

program does not receive the funding requested through the Future Years Nuclear 

Security Program (FYNSP), the program may not be able to complete the work load 

that has been planned for each year, address risks that are realized in future years, 

or maintain the current schedule. Additionally, a year-long continuing resolution in 

FY 2018, for example, could hold the program to the FY 2017 funding level—a reduction of more than $110 million from what is planned in the FYNSP for FY 2018. 

Those unplanned and dramatic funding reductions are the most serious risk to the 

program. 

The W76–1 LEP is on schedule and within budget. The program is in its eighth 

year of full-scale production. By the end of FY 2015, NNSA had delivered almost 

60 percent of the total required W76–1 warheads to the United States Navy. The 

last production unit will be produced no later than the end of FY 2019. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to 

NNSA and its facilities are increasing in quantity and sophistication. Can you assure us NNSA can defend against all of these threats and prevent the escape of sensitive information? The DOE–IG recently reported on a host of problems NNSA is 

having implementing its ‘‘2NV’’ cloud computing solution. What did the IG find and 

do you agree with them? How are you fixing this? 

General KLOTZ. The NNSA is doing everything it can to assure that it is protecting the information and information assets with the funds appropriated and the 

resources available. Cybersecurity is one of the greatest challenges the U.S. Government faces. NNSA is always working to stay ahead of our adversaries to protect our 

networks and databases. We take this task very seriously as our program is responsible for safeguarding our Nation’s most sensitive nuclear security information. We 

are modernizing our sensors and defenses, conducting independent performance 

evaluations, and have employed a strong central control construct to reduce our risk 

and the probability of data exfiltration. 

However, there are no guarantees in cybersecurity, the adversaries are continually evolving using more advanced technology and there are always opportunities 

to improve our security posture. 

With regard to the NNSA’s challenges with 2NV, the DOE IG identified three 

basic points of failure: lack of project management, lack of oversight, and ineffective 

communication mechanisms between project teams and NNSA leadership. NNSA 

concurs with the IG’s assessment of the project and through reforms that have been 

implemented since the initial launch of the 2NV project, NNSA is confident that we 
82 

have put in place the administrative infrastructure needed to ensure effective implementation of 2NV and our other IT projects. 

NNSA has carefully reassessed project requirements and realigned the 

deliverables to mission and business functions. NNSA has also implemented numerous project management improvements. Most notably, we have issued and implemented the requirements of NNSA Supplemental Directive 415.1, Project Oversight 

for Information Technology, and established the Office of Policy and Governance to 

provide ongoing, independent oversight for our projects to ensure the principles of 

the new directive are consistently applied. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, when will NNSA submit data in compliance with subsection (f)(4) of 50 U.S.C. 2441a, regarding the number of contractor employees who 

have been employed under a service support contract to NNSA for a period of greater than two years? This information is critical to understanding whether NNSA is 

illegally employing personal service contractors. Please submit the data by to the 

committee by the end of March. 

General KLOTZ. NNSA does not have any personal service contracts, as we do not 

have statutory authority to enter into such contracts. NNSA submitted data in compliance with subsection (f)(4) of 50 U.S.C. 2441a regarding support service contracts 

with the President’s FY 2017 Budget. A copy of the appropriate section from the 

President’s FY 2017 Budget is attached (please see attached graphic). 
83 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, please elaborate on why NNSA proposes such significant cuts to technology maturation efforts within Defense Programs. What are the 

long-term effects of such cuts? 

General KLOTZ. In the FY 2017 President’s Budget Request, technology maturation (early development) funding was reduced in order to fund higher priority needs 

within the weapons program. NNSA is balancing near and long-term risks in a fiscally constrained environment, incrementally prioritizing long-term technologies for 

planned insertion opportunities in future stockpile modernization programs. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, NNSA’s staffing analysis shows that Defense Programs and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program have the same number of federal employees. But Defense Programs has four times the funding and most of the 

safety, security, and liability issues. Why is there such a huge imbalance in staffing? 

General KLOTZ. Both Defense Programs (DP) and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) require an appropriate amount of staffing to ensure their respective mission requirements are achieved. 

Since FY 2012, the DNN full-time equivalent (FTE) count has decreased from 260 

to its FY 2017 projected level of 187 (28% decrease). 
84 

The DNN business model includes managing twelve major programs to a global 

customer base supporting over 100 countries, international and USG interagency 

partners. DNN also exercises nuclear export control regulatory responsibilities 

which has significant federal manpower responsibilities. 

As DNN’s mission evolves in response to future Presidential policy guidance related to global nuclear security threat reduction, the program will continue to analyze how the future mission requirements will impact future manpower and staffing 

needs. In FY 2017, DNN will continue its efforts to meet current and future workforce needs by analyzing how evolving missions are affecting job requirements. 

NNSA, like other technically inclined agencies, faces increasing attrition numbers 

on an annual basis, due to the difficulty of attracting and retaining skilled, trained, 

and educated individuals to fill (and backfill) critical roles within the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA has embarked on a workforce and human capital strategy 

which leverages all the management tools and flexibilities at our disposal to ensure 

that we recruit, hire and retain the best workforce to execute our mission. Reshaping of the entire NNSA workforce, including DNN and DP, over the next several 

years will be essential to effectively executing our mission. This includes identifying 

and developing the appropriate skill sets as well as examining the size of the overall 

and programmatic work forces. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Regalbuto, you served on the technical team for the Waste 

Treatment Plant (WTP) under Secretary Chu and now you lead DOE’s Environmental Management program. Just this past year, DOE asked the court to amend 

the consent decree to provide the Department another two full decades before being 

required to start processing tank waste at the Hanford Site in Washington State. 

Do you believe you can get the entire WTP system, including WTP’s pre-treatment 

facility, operational by 2039? Will you have to build more double shell tanks at Hanford and at what cost? What will be the total lifecycle cost for WTP for design, construction, operation, and eventual demolition? 

Secretary REGALBUTO. The Department of Energy (DOE) had proposed milestones, 

together with conditions that could require those milestones to be modified as additional information is obtained, based in part, on the need to resolve the remaining 

technical issues at the Waste Treatment Plant’s Pretreatment and to a lesser degree, High-Level Waste facilities. The milestones proposed by DOE were also based 

on the uncertain amount of redesign activities that may be needed once technical 

issue resolution is completed. DOE informed the court that it will voluntarily initiate direct feed low-activity waste operations as soon as 2022, allowing vitrification 

to begin for the much larger low-activity portion of the tank waste prior to achievement of initial plant operations for the overall WTP complex. After the date of this 

hearing, the Court in the case of Washington v. Moniz, NO: 2:08–CV–5085–RMP, 

issued its third order regarding the parties’ proposals to modify the Consent Decree. 

DOE is currently undertaking a detailed examination of the Court’s decision. The 

tank cleanup mission at Hanford is both massive and complex. DOE remains committed to the successful completion and operation of the Waste Treatment Plant as 

a method for processing waste stored in underground tanks at Hanford as soon as 

practicable. 

DOE does not expect to have a need to build more double-shell tanks. If, however, 

the construction of new double-shell tanks becomes necessary, DOE estimates it 

would cost $85 million to $150 million to build a new, one-million gallon doubleshell tank. 

A credible estimate of total lifecycle cost for the WTP design, construction, operation, and eventual demolition is not available at this time due to a number of uncertainties and technical and programmatic issues associated with the WTP Project. 

Key issues include: resolution of technical issues with the Pretreatment and HighLevel Waste facilities; on-going efforts to re-baseline the Low-Activity Waste Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and Balance of Facility portions of the project; and assessment of the on-going litigation with the State of Washington. All of these factors 

will likely result in changes to the Total Project Cost for the WTP project and the 

costs associated with operations and eventual demolition. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Connery, what are the safety impacts of NNSA’s deteriorating 

infrastructure and $3.7 billion backlog of deferred maintenance? Is all of this decrepit infrastructure becoming a safety hazard? Has your Board held any hearings 

on this issue, or sent any letters to DOE or NNSA? Does DNFSB support efforts 

to buy-down NNSA’s backlog of deferred maintenance? 

Ms. CONNERY. The complex’s aging facilities and resultant backlog of maintenance 

are continuing safety concerns. Delays to NNSA’s efforts to modernize its infrastructure have exacerbated safety related issues and have necessitated that ongoing programmatic work be performed in degrading defense nuclear facilities that do not 

meet modern safety standards. The Board supports DOE and NNSA’s efforts to de-
85 

velop new defense nuclear facilities and will continue to work closely with them to 

integrate safety into their designs at the earliest stages. 

The Board agrees that infrastructure risk can become safety risk. It should be 

noted, however, that the overall NNSA deferred maintenance backlog of $3.7 billion 

includes nondefense nuclear facilities and infrastructure that have little or no bearing on the safety of defense nuclear operations. Many of the items in NNSA’s deferred maintenance database are roofs, office air conditioning systems, shop utilities, 

and the like. At some sites these types of deferred maintenance vastly exceed corrective maintenance backlogs or deferred preventive maintenance on nuclear safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) and processing equipment. Nevertheless, infrastructure risk in a nondefense nuclear facility can pose a nuclear safety 

risk under some circumstances. 

The number and severity of risks increases when the amount of deferred preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance backlog rises. Each nuclear facility 

has a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and accompanying Technical Safety Requirements which set forth the preventive maintenance and surveillance requirements for the safety class and safety significant SSCs credited in the DSA to prevent or mitigate hazardous accident scenarios. The implementation of these maintenance and surveillance requirements is key to ensuring the SSCs will reliably perform their credited safety functions. 

The Board has made maintenance of safety systems and management of aging infrastructure continuing areas of emphasis in recent years. In the past three years, 

this effort has included on-site reviews of maintenance programs at five NNSA facilities by our staff, multiple visits by Board Members to evaluate maintenance programs and aging infrastructure at the Y–12 National Security Complex and Pantex, 

public hearings at Pantex and Y–12 which addressed these topics, letters to NNSA 

on maintenance programs at Pantex (November 12, 2015) and Sandia National Laboratories (May 12, 2014), and a letter to NNSA on the structural integrity of aging 

production facilities at Y–12 (February 4, 2015). In addition, the Board annually receives a written report and briefing from NNSA on maintaining safety of aging facilities at Y–12 in response to a prior reporting requirement issued by the Board. 

Furthermore, the Board has also increased its focus on emergency preparedness 

and response capabilities, the last line of defense for this aging infrastructure. 

Hosting both public meetings and hearings, the Board subsequently made several 

recommendations complex wide and site specific on emergency preparedness and response capability. In September 2014, the Board issued Recommendation 2014–1, 

Emergency Preparedness and Response, to address deficiencies with DOE’s promulgation of and oversight of compliance with requirements. The Board focused staff 

reviews in 2015 on the assessment of implementation of these requirements at defense nuclear facilities. These assessments included site-specific reviews at the 

Pantex Plant and Savannah River Site as well as observation of drills and exercises 

at the Y–12 National Security Complex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Pantex Plant, Savannah River Site, and Hanford Site. The review at the Pantex Plant led to the identification of significant issues that warranted near-term resolution. As a result, on 

November 24, 2015, the Board issued Recommendation 2015–1, Emergency Preparedness and Response at Pantex, to address the identified deficiencies. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Connery, do you believe DNFSB’s enabling statute requires all 

Board Members to be provided full access to all Board information, including information on all Board employees and personnel? Congress has legislated on this matter twice and that was the clear intention. Do you agree? 

Ms. CONNERY. The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, provides that each Board 

Member shall have full access to all information relating to the performance of the 

Board’s functions, powers, and mission. I fully support individual Board Members’ 

access to information as interpreted by the Department of Justice in the memo previously provided to this Committee. I agree to be bound by the opinion from the Department of Justice to allow sharing of all information, including information on all 

Board employees and personnel, necessary for the Board to fulfill its policy making 

function and its oversight function over the Department of Energy. I further agree 

with the Atomic Energy Act language that I will not withhold from Board Members, 

information that is made available to me that relates to the Board’s policy and oversight functions. In the sharing of information, I seek the advice of the General 

Counsel to ensure that the Board complies with the Atomic Energy Act and all other 

statutory and legal requirements for the protection of information such as the Privacy Act and the protection of classified information. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Connery, what steps are you taking to address the concerns expressed by DNFSB employees in recent OPM employee surveys? 
86 

Ms. CONNERY. DNFSB took a number of actions in FY 2015 to address employee 

concerns expressed in the 2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) survey 

results. Examples include: establishment of a working group to adopt agency core 

values; use of an executive coach on an ongoing basis to develop better communication techniques; regular agency-wide and office staff meetings to provide increased 

opportunities for employee feedback and participation; and expanded leadership 

training for its executives. In 2015 DNFSB’s FEVS results indicate the agency made 

notable progress in multiple areas. DNFSB achieved a response rate of 84% (34% 

higher than the government-wide average) and experienced increases in almost all 

scores (96%), with 59% of the scores improving by double-digits. I believe this shows 

the agency is moving in the right direction to address employee concerns, and we 

will continue to build on these efforts to influence positive change. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Caldwell, you’re putting together a report to Congress on 

the potential of using low-enriched uranium fuel in navy reactors. Your predecessor 

(who is now your boss) told us last year that there are no military benefits provided 

by switching to low-enriched fuel in Navy reactors. Do you agree? 

Admiral CALDWELL. US Navy warship requirements determine naval fuel system 

design features including use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Substituting 

low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for the HEU in current naval fuel systems would 

decrease reactor energy and lead to more frequent reactor refueling. LEU fuel would 

fundamentally decrease the available energy in a naval reactor, thereby reducing a 

naval warship’s availability and longevity. The impact of LEU may be mitigated in 

aircraft carriers by developing an advanced naval fuel that could increase uranium 

loading beyond what is practical today and meet the rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors. An advanced fuel system might enable either higher performance with HEU fuel or use of LEU fuel in aircraft carriers. Advanced fuel development is estimated to take about $1 billion, 10–15 years to develop, and would 

have to begin well in advance of any ship application. Successful development of an 

advanced fuel system is not assured. 

Switching to LEU fuel in naval reactors would be beneficial in allowing the U.S. 

to take a leadership role in non-proliferation by reducing the need to produce new 

HEU. Although an LEU development program would likely not produce a more militarily desirable reactor design, the knowledge gained during the research and development work would be beneficial to advance the state-of-the-art in U.S. naval reactor design and manufacturing. Fuel development work would also help sustain and 

build the cadre of highly specialized naval fuel experts and unique fuel irradiation 

and post irradiation examination infrastructure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Admiral Caldwell, what are your top priorities for FY17? Is your 

budget aligned with that of the larger Navy? What happens if your program gets 

out of alignment with Navy programs like the OHIO-class Replacement program? 

Admiral CALDWELL. Naval Reactors’ entire budget supports the safe and effective 

operation of the nuclear-powered Fleet, today and tomorrow. Naval Reactors’ funding requests can be directly linked to this single, over-arching priority of supporting 

the safe and effective operation of the nuclear-powered fleet. In FY 2017, this entails effective oversight of the operation and maintenance of 97 reactors in 73 submarines, 10 aircraft carriers, and 4 training and research reactors. This priority will 

be met in the most effective and judicious way possible. 

The main budget components that support today’s operating fleet are Naval Reactors Operations and Infrastructure (NOI), Naval Reactors Development (NRD), Program Direction and Construction. The remainder of the budget, primarily OHIOClass Replacement Reactor Systems Development, S8G Prototype Refueling and the 

Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project, supports tomorrow’s fleet. In FY 

2017, the OHIO-Class Replacement project will continue life of the ship reactor core 

manufacturing development activities and detailed design of reactor plant heavy 

equipment to support FY 2019 GFE procurement. The S8G Prototype Refueling 

project will complete construction of the Radiological Work and Storage Building 

and commence refueling equipment checkout and training at the shipyards. The 

Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project will finalize key facility and equipment requirements and advance facility design to support establishing the Performance Baseline in FY 2018 and the start of construction in FY 2019. 

Our budget is aligned with the larger Navy. We work closely every day with our 

partners in the Navy to ensure that our budget is aligned with the mission, performance requirements and schedules. 

Specifically, for the OHIO-Class Replacement program, the Department of Energy 

and Navy efforts are directed at supporting this schedule, including development of 

the propulsion plant design to support procurement of long-lead components in FY 

2019 to support a construction start in FY 2021 and ship delivery in FY 2028. After 

completing ship operational testing, the first OHIO-Class Replacement must be on 
87 

strategic patrol by 2031 to meet STRATCOM force level requirements. Given that 

the first OHIO-Class Replacement submarine, a ship twice the size of the VIRGINIA-Class submarine, is planned to be constructed within the same span of time; 

this schedule is aggressive and requires close coupling of Department of Energy and 

Department of Navy activities to ensure on time ship delivery. 

The design and construction of OHIO-Class Replacement is a complex effort that 

requires extensive coordination between not only Naval Reactors and the Navy’s 

Shipbuilders, but also the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs that are responsible 

for the missile systems and the British Navy, who will use the Common Missile 

Compartment design in their upcoming SSBNs. Because they each depend so heavily on each other, these four design efforts must be synchronized, in close collaboration to retire risk early and minimize estimated construction costs. 

Given the criticality of Naval Reactors’ Department of Energy activities to Navy 

priorities and mission, funding cuts to Naval Reactors’ DOE budget can adversely 

impact strategic objectives and plans, especially ship design and construction and 

nuclear operator training. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. A recent NAS report recommended a clean-slate approach to building new nuclear weapons and building prototypes in order to exercise design and 

production skills. Do you agree and do you believe NNSA and the labs should focus 

on building prototypes? What would the cost be and how would it compare with 

NNSA priorities? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA recognizes the need to ensure that the nuclear security enterprise maintains the complete set of skills and expertise to respond to future challenges, exercise capabilities required to ensure that the nuclear deterrent remains 

safe, secure, effective, reliable, and responsive as required by the FY 2016 National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). For this reason, NNSA’s current Stockpile Stewardship and Stockpile Management portfolios address many of these necessary capabilities. In particular, our current portfolio includes a spectrum of strategically 

aimed efforts in prototyping from small-scale validation experiments to well-diagnosed hydro tests up to larger demonstration experiments. At the component level, 

we are prototyping new technologies for improving safety and for limited-life components that will make the stockpile easier to maintain. We are also building weapon 

prototypes at the system level and using our world-class science facilities—the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at LLNL and the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at LANL—to study how these prototypes perform 

under extreme conditions found in nuclear weapons. Lastly, NNSA has an effort to 

study how new technologies, in particular advanced manufacturing, can be used to 

accelerate the prototyping process 

In early FY 2015, NNSA charged the Defense Programs Advisory Committee with 

analyzing how well current stockpile stewardship activities exercise and challenge 

the workforce throughout the entire nuclear weapons lifecycle to ensure critical 

skills were not being neglected. When finished, the Committee’s report will be used 

to inform adjustments to future activities to include building prototypes. 

Mr. COOPER. Following up on a previous question—a recent article revealed that 

classified information, including information related to uranium operations was 

dumped in the regular garbage at Y12 for 20 years. Is NNSA doing a damage assessment? 

General KLOTZ. In conjunction with the recent issuance of the Preliminary Notice 

of Violation (PNOV), the Program Office (NA–10) is working with the Y–12 Field 

Office to review the need to conduct a damage assessment, taking into consideration 

all relevant information, to include the current circumstances of the material being 

maintained at a DOE controlled burial location. A document review is underway, 

and a fact-finding trip to Y–12 is planned, to speak with knowledgeable individuals 

first hand. 

Mr. COOPER. What dismantlement work is planned in FY17 and why is this funding necessary? 

General KLOTZ. The funding requested in the FY 2017 budget for dismantlements 

supports the President’s goal to accelerate the dismantlement rate of previously retired weapons by 20 percent. NNSA will hire and train additional technical staff in 

FY 2017 to be ready to increase dismantlement rates starting in FY 2018. This will 

allow NNSA to dismantle the weapons retired prior to 2009 by the year 2021, rather 

than the original goal of 2022. 

Mr. COOPER. What are the next steps and challenges on nonproliferation that 

NNSA is addressing? Are we laying the proper foundation to be ready to meet new 
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proliferation threats such as the expansion of nuclear know-how about the nuclear 

fuel cycle if nuclear energy spreads, or such as 3D printing? 

General KLOTZ. The work of NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

(DNN)—supporting the ‘‘Nuclear Threat Reduction’’ pillar described in the NNSA 

Enterprise Strategic Vision—is carried out within the context of a dynamic global 

security environment, which is described in NNSA’s annual report entitled Prevent, 

Counter, and Respond––A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats. This 

environment is characterized by the persistent vulnerability of nuclear and radiological materials (particularly in regions of conflict); the pressure on arms control 

and nonproliferation regimes from enduring interest in nuclear weapons capabilities 

by state- and non-state actors; the global expansion of nuclear power and possible 

spread of fuel cycle technology; the increasing opportunities for illicit nuclear material trafficking due to expanding global trade volumes and increasingly sophisticated 

procurement networks; and the rapid advance of technology (including cyber) that 

may shorten nuclear weapon development pathways and directly affect nuclear safeguards and security missions. 

Of the many developments in the global nuclear security environment relevant to 

DNN’s work, one of the most important is the possible proliferation risk associated 

with the expansion of civil nuclear energy. Ensuring that ‘‘nuclear newcomers’’ (i.e., 

states that do not currently have civil nuclear power programs and generally have 

little experience with managing nuclear technologies) are able to develop safety, security, safeguards, export controls, and emergency response systems to support their 

emerging nuclear energy programs will continue to be an important challenge. 

DNN is helping to address this challenge through various efforts, including the 

development of assured fuel supply and spent fuel take-back strategies to discourage 

newcomer states from developing indigenous fuel-cycle capabilities. DNN is also engaging partners from day one to help them build the safety, security, safeguards, 

and export control capacity and infrastructure necessary to ensure safe and secure 

nuclear programs. Finally, DNN is launching an ‘‘over-the-horizon’’ strategic study 

focused specifically on the implications to DNN programs of future trends in the 

global nuclear fuel cycle, including the expansion of nuclear energy. The results of 

this study will help inform future programmatic activities. 

Emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing represent another important development in the global security environment. On a regular basis, new technologies emerge that can significantly benefit our nuclear security enterprise but 

that also pose proliferation risks. NNSA is working within the Department and with 

other U.S. Government agencies to establish a systematic, coordinated approach to 

ensuring that the U.S. Government can reap the benefits of emerging technologies 

while mitigating associated proliferation risks. 

Last year, NNSA established an Emerging Technologies Working Group (ETWG) 

as a formal mechanism to proactively identify, analyze, and respond to emerging 

technologies of concern. The group is co-chaired by DNN and the Office of Defense 

Programs, and includes participation from various offices Department-wide and the 

DOE complex. The ETWG began its work by considering the proliferation risks associated with additive manufacturing. As an immediate measure, the ETWG is developing classification guidance to help control this particular technology. The ETWG 

also is considering whether other policy guidance or export control regulations 

would be feasible and appropriate to apply as the technology develops. 

In accordance with the requirement in Section 3139 of the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, NNSA is also working with the U.S. interagency to develop 

the President’s strategy to address additive manufacturing nonproliferation risks 

while balancing national security needs. NNSA will be briefing various congressional committees on the status of that strategy in the near future. 

Mr. COOPER. Is NNSA considering the sterilization option (which might be a simpler option that would dispose of the pits at Pantex, and which the Red Team report 

chaired by Dr. Thomas Mason referenced), in addition to the dilute and disposal option for disposing of excess weapons-grade plutonium? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA has announced that it will pursue the dilute and dispose 

option as it is a proven, demonstrated technology. Other options may be further 

evaluated as part of the NEPA process or the project management critical decision 

process, as deemed reasonable. 

Mr. COOPER. Are you confident of the contents of the drums that will be going 

to the site? Are you confident that either drums that are at WIPP, either currently 

above ground or below ground would not cause the same accident? 

Secretary REGALBUTO. The Office of Environmental Management is confident of 

the safety and the content of the transuranic (TRU) waste containers currently 

stored above-ground at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). All waste emplaced 

at WIPP has been isolated in the disposal rooms, and separated from the environ-
89 

ment and workers by steel bulkheads, in accordance with all applicable requirements. 

Regarding future shipments to WIPP, including containers at the TRU waste generator sites awaiting shipment and TRU waste containers that will be shipped to 

WIPP in the future, our TRU waste program efforts will ensure there is no threat 

of a thermal reaction similar to the breached drum containing nitrate salt-bearing 

waste from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). 

This confidence is based on rigorous changes made at WIPP which include: completion of corrective actions identified in response to the WIPP Accident Investigation Reports; enhancements to the WIPP safety envelope, the WIPP Safety Management Programs and safety basis; improvements to the oversight and assessments 

of the TRU waste program by WIPP management and operations contractor, the 

Carlsbad Field Office and DOE Headquarters; rigorous new requirements for the 

characterization of waste, chemical compatibility and waste container constituents; 

and improvements to the WIPP waste acceptance criteria. The inventory of LANL 

wastes remaining from the waste stream involved in the WIPP incident will be 

treated to ensure any risk is fully mitigated prior to shipment to WIPP. 

Mr. COOPER. Why is the DNFSB important for nuclear safety and the nuclear enterprise? 

Ms. CONNERY. The Board is the only agency that provides independent safety 

oversight of the Department of Energy’s defense nuclear facilities, ensuring safe operations for the workforce and the public. These facilities and their operations are 

essential to our Nation’s defense, performing work that includes: the assembly, disassembly, and surveillance of nuclear weapons; fabrication of plutonium pits and 

other weapon components; production and recycling of tritium; nuclear criticality experiments; subcritical experiments; and a host of activities that address the radioactive legacy resulting from 70 years of nuclear weapons operations. In operating 

the facilities that accomplish these missions, the Department of Energy functions 

predominantly as a self-regulating entity, responsible for managing cost and schedule as well as safety. The Board was established to provide a needed counterbalance 

to budgetary and schedule pressures and to serve as an extraordinarily expert technical advisor on matters of safety. The Board has assembled a technical staff of unparalleled capability that consistently identifies safety issues that eluded the Department of Energy and its contractors, enabling the Board to press DOE to correct 

problems and provide adequate protection to the workers and the public. Recent examples of the Board’s contributions to safety include the Board’s identification of the 

following major safety issues: 

• Systemic problems in DOE’s readiness to respond to emergencies at its sites 

which had persisted unaddressed despite the wakeup call of Fukushima 

Daiichi—The Secretary of Energy accepted the Board’s recommendation and 

issued an implementation plan that commits to corrective actions including a 

complex-wide assessment of problems and a rewrite of DOE’s governing directive, DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System. 

• Dysfunction of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s criticality safety program, including the exodus of the laboratory’s criticality safety staff—In response, the 

Laboratory Director paused all work involving fissile materials at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility and initiated corrective actions including rebuilding the 

lab’s criticality safety expertise, reevaluating the criticality safety evaluations 

for fissile material operations, and gradually reestablishing the lab’s ability to 

safely perform fissile material operations through a comprehensive series of 

readiness assessments. 

• DOE’s failure to manage the upkeep of the software code RADCALC, which is 

used to determine the type of packaging needed for safe shipment of various 

radioactive materials—In response, DOE alerted users to suspend use of the 

noncompliant software, audited the responsible vendor and issued a stop work 

order based on the audit’s results, and initiated an extent of condition review 

for similar software. 

• Improper analysis and control of flammable gas hazards in the Defense Waste 

Processing Facility, which converts high-level radioactive wastes into glass in 

a high-temperature melter—In response, DOE instituted compensatory measures to place the facility in a safe condition, formed a dedicated team to resolve 

the safety issues, and began the development of a new flowsheet for the facility 

to address the hazard. 

• Failure of the design strategy for Hanford’s Waste Treatment Plant to properly 

prevent erosion and plugging of process piping that DOE plans to rely on for 

transfers of highly radioactive slurries for decades without maintenance—DOE 

plans to address this issue through systematic evaluation of hazards, reas-
90 

sessing the pipeline design strategy, performing additional erosion testing, and 

establishing appropriate waste acceptance criteria for the facilities. 

In addition to identifying safety issues of such magnitude, the Board also assists 

DOE in characterizing safety concerns and developing avenues for improvement. In 

the past year, for example, the Board provided an informational report to DOE that 

systematically evaluated the structures of aging facilities at the Y–12 National Security Complex, to assist DOE in making informed decisions regarding the potential 

to use those facilities for programmatic work for several more decades. Likewise, the 

Board provided a major report to DOE on opportunities to reduce the quantity of 

radioactive material-at-risk in the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility, to reduce the 

hazard posed by this facility to workers and the surrounding communities. 

Without the expertise and needed external perspective provided by the Board, the 

Department of Energy would have a significantly reduced capacity to identify and 

resolve safety issues at its defense nuclear facilities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. Do you expect a bow-wave in terms of costs for funding the life extension programs? How is NNSA preparing to handle 4–5 concurrent life-extension 

programs? 

General KLOTZ. FY 2017 Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) funding for life extension programs (LEPs) increases from $1.340 billion in FY 2017 to 

$1.919 billion in FY 2021, with significant increases occurring in FY 2018 (+$266 

million) and FY 2021 (+$281 million). Beyond the FYNSP, the nominal cost of the 

LEPs, as reflected in Figure 4–33 of the FY 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), plateaus, varying between $1.8 billion and $2 billion per 

year. Effectively, we will have climbed the ‘‘bow wave’’ during the FY 2017 FYNSP. 

However, it is important to note that only the W76–1 and B61–12 LEPs currently 

are baselined, and the W88 Alt 370, while baselined for its original scope, is being 

re-baselined to reflect the addition of the conventional high explosive refresh. The 

estimates for all other LEPs being performed over the next 25 years (W80–4, IW– 

1, IW–2, IW–3, and B61–13) are based on planning estimates as described in the 

FY 2017 SSMP, and their cost should be viewed as a cost range. These estimates 

are done in advance of the Phase 6.2/2A studies that will establish the specific scope 

for each LEP, so they are subject to change once those studies are completed. For 

the period FY 2022–2041 this cost range varies by about +/¥$300 million per year 

around the nominal values described above. Regarding how NNSA is preparing to 

handle four to five concurrent life extension programs, the best preparation is advance planning for their execution. That’s one of the reasons the SSMP is a 25-year 

plan that lays out our entire scope of activities and current plans for the LEPs. It 

should also be noted that while multiple LEPs may be ongoing at any particular 

point in time, some will be in Engineering Development where the preponderance 

of activities fall on the labs, while others will be in production which falls more 

heavily on the plants. We are already successfully executing three LEPs simultaneously. 

Mr. LARSEN. What are the opportunities to expand R&D into technology to detect 

and better understand current and future proliferation threats? 

General KLOTZ. The DNN R&D program makes strategic contributions to DOE’s 

goal to reduce nuclear security threats through the innovation of unilateral and 

multi-lateral technical capabilities to detect and better understand: 1) foreign nuclear weapons program activities; 2) illicit diversion of special nuclear materials; 

and 3) global nuclear detonations. The program is emphasizing R&D that supports 

low-yield or evasive nuclear test monitoring, Big Data (such as data analytics and 

computation), and evaluation of emerging technologies (such as microfluidics and 

additive manufacturing) that have multiple commercial applications as well as proliferation threat potential in nuclear material production applications. 

Mr. LARSEN. The FY16 NDAA mandated transferring certain NNSA facilities that 

qualified for transfer to the Department of Energy Environmental Management program within 3 years. What additional funding would the DOE need and can the EM 

program execute? 

Secretary REGALBUTO. The Joint Explanatory Statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114–113) states that ‘‘The Office of Environmental Management shall not accept ownership or responsibility for cleanup of any National 

Nuclear Security Administration facilities or sites without funding specifically designated for that purpose. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directed to identify 

all requests for transfers of facilities or projects from other DOE offices in its budget 

request justifications in future years.’’ The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 National Defense 
91 

Authorization Act (P.L. 114–92) requires that the Department develop a plan for the 

activities relating to the deactivation and decommissioning of nonoperational defense nuclear facilities. 

DOE had already begun an effort to address excess contaminated facilities. In 

January 2015, the Secretary directed the establishment of an Excess Contaminated 

Facilities Working Group within the Department. The Working Group developed 

and executed an enterprise-wide data collection effort to obtain updated cost and 

risk assessments to deactivate, decontaminate, decommission, and demolish excess 

facilities. The Working Group is updating and validating data as a part of its efforts 

to develop policies to institutionalize a corporate approach to address issues associated with the transfer of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) facilities to the Office of Environmental Management (EM). The Working Group also will 

be finalizing and issuing a report in 2016 as required by section 3133 of the FY 2016 

NDAA. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can you explain the decrease in funding in the FY17 President’s 

Budget relative to the FY 16 enacted level and FY 16 PB level for Richland operations at Hanford? 

Secretary REGALBUTO. EM establishes its cleanup priorities considering risk, compliance milestones and life-cycle cost considerations across the EM complex. The FY 

2017 budget request reflects the progress in risk reduction at Richland and positions 

the Department to continue significant cleanup activities, which include the Plutonium Finishing Plant closure; a sustainable path toward addressing the contamination beneath the 324 Building; groundwater remediation; and K West Basin sludge 

removal. 

Mr. LARSEN. The FY 16 NDAA required a report on the feasibility of using LEU 

in naval reactors. This research was supported with $5 million in the omnibus. Can 

you provide an update on the status of this study? 

Admiral CALDWELL. The report on the feasibility of using LEU in naval reactors 

is currently in interagency review. Upon completion of the interagency review, 

Naval Reactors will formally sign out the report and provide it to the congressional 

defense committees. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the dilute and dispose option entail any concern over criticality as the MOX contractor is arguing? And now that the Department of Energy 

has terminated the program, is it still worth doing a new funding baseline for MOX? 

General KLOTZ. Sandia National Laboratory has reviewed the recent assertions of 

the risk of criticality issues at WIPP and concluded they are unfounded. According 

to Sandia, while burial at WIPP would increase the amount of weapon-grade plutonium several fold, criticality of down-blended and packaged Pu-239 cannot result. 

The assertion that Criticality Control Overpacks (CCO) would become crushed resulting in criticality is simplistic and not credible. The salt formation would squeeze 

the disposal rooms and waste, but this process cannot separate the Pu from the diluting materials to form an undiluted critical mass. 

The FY 2016 NDAA requires the Department to submit a revised Performance 

Baseline. Therefore, the Department is in the process of updating the performance 

baseline. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How much work are you doing in FY17 or how much capability 

are you retaining specifically to support the Interoperable Warhead (IW1), which 

was deferred at least 5 years in 2015 into 2020 or beyond? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA plans to restart the IW–1 Phase 6.2, Feasibility Study and 

Design Options, in FY 2020 to support an FY 2030 first production unit. NNSA is 

continually developing technologies to support a variety of options for future nuclear 

weapon alterations (Alts), modifications (Mods) and life extension programs (LEPs), 

including IW–1. As those technologies mature, individual weapon programs assume 

funding responsibilities to further develop those technologies to full maturity for 

program-specific applications. As the B61–12 LEP and W88 Alt 370 move to full 

scale production, NNSA will transition staff and other resources from those programs to the IW–1 program. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does NNSA need to produce any pits to support the current and 

planned life extension programs? 

General KLOTZ. There is no requirement to produce pits for the current life extension programs (W76–1, B61–12 and W80–4). NNSA may need to produce pits to support the first interoperable warhead (IW–1). NNSA remains committed to meeting 

the NWC requirements for plutonium pits and we are making progress on the fabrication of a development pit using existing materials. This will help exercise our 
92 

plutonium capabilities and critical skills and is a major step toward reaching pit 

manufacturing goals. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In terms of the funding profile, when does NNSA start seeing 

a bow-wave for funding the life extension programs? 

General KLOTZ. Current funding in the FY 2017 Future Years Nuclear Security 

Program (FYNSP), specifically for life extension programs (LEPs), increases from 

$1.340 billion in FY 2017 to $1.919 billion in FY 2021, with significant increases 

occurring in FY 2018 (+$266 million) and FY 2021 (+$281 million). Beyond the 

FYNSP, the nominal cost of the LEPs, as reflected in Figure 4–33 of the FY 2017 

SSMP, plateaus, varying between $1.8 billion and $2 billion per year. Effectively, 

we will have climbed the ‘‘bow wave’’ during the FY 2017 FYNSP. 

It is important to note, however, that only the W76–1 and B61–12 LEPs currently 

are baselined, and the W88 Alt 370, while baselined for its original scope, is being 

re-baselined to reflect the addition of the conventional high explosive refresh. The 

estimates for all other LEPs being performed over the next 25 years (W80–4, IW– 

1, IW–2, IW–3, and B61–13) are based on planning estimates, as described in the 

FY 2017 SSMP, whose cost should be viewed as a cost range. These estimates are 

done in advance of the 6.2/2A studies that will establish the specific scope for each 

LEP and are subject to change once those studies are completed. For the period FY 

2022–2041, this cost range varies by about +/¥$300 million per year around the 

nominal values described above. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. This committee acted through the NDAA to ensure that it is better 

informed about the authorization for export of critical nuclear technologies. The February 25 deadline for the administration to notify to Congress a list of those technologies is almost upon us. Will the administration be in compliance? 

General KLOTZ. The Department of Energy has prepared, in consultation with the 

Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

and the Director of National Intelligence, a list of technologies that should be protected from diversion to a military program in those countries that are considered 

a ‘‘covered foreign country’’ in Section 3136 of the FY 2016 NDAA. 

In order to develop this list of technologies, the Department and the consulting 

agencies considered what possible contribution would be made to a nuclear weapon 

or naval propulsion program if such technology or assistance was diverted from a 

peaceful intent to a military program. The Department is finalizing this list and its 

submission to Congress and will be prepared to brief Congress on the results of our 

consultations. 

The Department is also working to revise its 10 CFR Part 810 application review 

process to ensure that for any application that comes forward for a listed technology 

to a ‘‘covered foreign country,’’ the appropriate notifications are made to Congress 

in accordance with the NDAA. Finally, the Department also is developing a process 

to ensure that the list of technologies remains up to date and addresses technological developments within the nuclear industry and the nuclear weapon and naval 

propulsion capabilities of the ‘‘covered foreign countries.’’ 

Mr. BISHOP. Maximizing U.S. influence on global nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation is a concern of this Committee, and we cannot achieve this goal without an effective and efficient nuclear export authorization process. What is the status of the DOE’s Process Improvement Program for nuclear technology exports 

under Part 810? 

General KLOTZ. In February 2015, the Department concluded a three-year comprehensive revision of its regulations at 10 CFR Part 810 (Part 810), governing the 

transfer of nuclear technology and assistance abroad and to foreign persons. The revised Part 810 regulation clarifies and streamlines the authorization process to reflect the pace of nuclear commerce, while continuing to address proliferation risks 

associated with nuclear technology transfer. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) currently is implementing a Part 810 Process Improvement 

Plan (PIP) and e810 online authorization system to further improve and modernize 

the Part 810 application and U.S. interagency review process. 

As a part of the PIP, NNSA has committed to make the Part 810 program compliant with ISO 9001, which includes a continuous improvement program. NNSA already has implemented a number of actions intended to improve and expedite the 

review process, including: a new docketing procedure; issuing specific authorizations 

conditional on subsequent receipt of foreign assurances; and developing a procedure 

to use Atomic Energy Act (AEA) Section 57b.1 for foreign assurances for China. This 

action will eliminate the need to secure government-to-government assurances for 
93 

specific transfers authorized under the U.S.-China 123 Agreement; instead, those 

transfers will be covered by the assurances of the 123 Agreement. This not only 

eliminates the most time-consuming element of securing a specific authorization, 

but places those technology transfers under the stronger nonproliferation assurances 

of the 123 Agreement. Other areas identified in the PIP that the Department continues to work on and will implement over the next weeks and months include: improving process and data management; reforming and publishing in the Federal 

Register a new U.S. interagency process for 810 reviews; revising internal DOE review procedures to reduce time in process; improving assistance to exporters with 

more on-line guidance and technical resources; more enforcement and compliance 

monitoring of Part 810 reporting by U.S. persons; and considering implementing a 

risk-based application review approach. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. In a memo dated November 20, 2015 from Secretary Moniz to the 

President, the Secretary says—in regards to the shifting of the disposition strategy—‘‘So far, we have no read on MFA response. This issue will need further interagency work in the context of overall, complicated U.S.-Russia relations.’’ Can you 

explain the current status of talks with the Russians of shifting our plutonium disposition strategy? 

General KLOTZ. Consistent with the PMDA, the United States has been in contact 

with the Russian Government since 2013 to keep it apprised of the U.S. reviews of 

disposition methods. During July 2014 consultations in Moscow in PMDA channels, 

the Russian side advised that the two sides should re-engage in consultations after 

the United States had made a decision. In January of this year, a team apprised 

Russia of the Administration’s decision to pursue another disposition method and, 

at an appropriate date, to pursue consultations as provided for in the PMDA. 

Mr. WILSON. We have already spent $4.5 Billion on the MOX project. What is the 

Department’s plan if Russia were to ask for concessions that the United States can 

not make in order to support a change in our disposition strategy? 

General KLOTZ. The PMDA (paragraph 1 of Article III) clearly provides a path for 

the Parties to agree on methods of disposition that do not entail irradiation as fuel 

in reactors (‘‘any other methods that may be agreed by the Parties in writing’’). We 

will not speculate on what may or may not be Russian views in these consultations 

or on what legal form an agreement might take. 

Mr. WILSON. What would the overall cost be to resurrect the MOX project if Russia is ultimately unwilling to allow a change in our disposition strategy? 

General KLOTZ. While it is difficult to provide a definitive estimate, we expect it 

would take at least 1–2 years to ramp the project staff back up, which would add 

approximately $600–900 million to the total cost of the project. The projected $600– 

900 million increase to restart would be in addition to the overall lifecycle cost of 

the MOX approach estimated to be $30–50 billion. 

Mr. WILSON. WIPP received less funding in the request for FY17 than it received 

in FY16. The Department of Energy has stressed its commitment to open the facility 

as quickly as possible, but how long after WIPP reopens will it be fully operational? 

Secretary REGALBUTO. FY 2017 budget request provides funding to resume waste 

emplacement operations in December 2016, so long as it is safe to do so. The WIPP 

Recovery Plan identified that a replacement permanent ventilation system is required to support an increased rate of waste emplacement operations at WIPP. This 

will require two capital asset projects that are being implemented consistent with 

the Department’s project management requirements. The design of these projects is 

not sufficiently mature to allow estimating when WIPP will achieve this increased 

rate of waste emplacement operations. 

Mr. WILSON. In the budget request for 2017, the traditional ‘‘Savannah River Risk 

Management Operations’’ control point was separated into two new control points, 

‘‘Environmental Cleanup’’ and ‘‘Nuclear Material Management’’—causing considerable confusion. Can you explain the Department’s rationale for this and were the 

site contractors notified of this change? 

Secretary REGALBUTO. As a result of the interdependency of nuclear materials 

management and disposition activities at the Savannah River Site across multiple 

Department of Energy (DOE) missions, a new control point entitled ‘‘Nuclear Material Management’’ is being proposed for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Under this control 

point, planned work activities under the PBS 12, Spent Nuclear Fuel Stabilization 

and Disposition Program would be merged with PBS 11, Nuclear Material Stabilization and Disposition Program. 
94 

Accordingly, the scope and funding for the surveillance and maintenance of nonoperating nuclear facilities (F-Area Complex Facilities as well as the Receiving 

Basin for Off-Site Fuels Facility), disposition of source term holdup within the FArea Materials Storage Facility (235–F), and future deactivation of nuclear facilities 

currently operating at the Savannah River Site, which were previously included in 

PBS 11, would be placed into a new PBS entitled ‘‘Surveillance, Maintenance, and 

Deactivation.’’ This new PBS would be placed under the ‘‘Environmental Cleanup’’ 

control point along with the Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition and Soil and 

Water Remediation PBSs. Site contractors were notified of these proposed modifications when the FY 2017 President’s Budget Request was released. 

Æ