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**UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001**

December 15, 1998

**Addressees**

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those that have permanently ceased operations and havecertified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.

**Purpose**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alert addressees to potentialproblems caused by cavitation erosion of letdown line orifices in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). Sucherosion has contributed to failures in pipe welds downstream of the letdown line orifices. It is expected that recipients willreview the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action orwritten response is required.

**Description of Circumstances**

On September 11, 1996, Surry Power Station, Unit 2, experienced its fourth socket weld failure in 12 months. The failedwelds were located on the low-pressure portion of the CVCS letdown line, just downstream of the pressure-reducing orificeisolation valves. The licensee determined that the most likely cause of the weld failure was flow-induced vibration. Thelicensee performed a microscopic examination of the Unit 2 letdown line orifices and concluded that two of the orificesexhibited cone-shaped patterns, wider at the discharge of the orifice and tapering toward the inlet of the orifice. In addition,the orifice exhibited very rough and irregular surface profiles. The damage to the letdown line orifices is indicative ofcavitation erosion and is believed to have contributed to flow-induced vibration of the letdown line and to the socket weldfailures.

On March 15, 1997, the licensee performed radiographic examinations on the Surry Unit 1 letdown line orifices to checkfor an erosion condition similar to that previously seen in the Unit 2 letdown line orifices. The licensee concluded thaterosion was present in all three orifices and that the most extensive deterioration was present in the 45-gpm orifice. Thelicensee's microscopic examination of this orifice indicated that its nominal diameter of 0.212 inch had eroded toapproximately 1 inch. This erosion occurred over the last 5 inches of the orifice length. One of the 60-gpm orificesexhibited minor erosion, but the second 60-gpm orifice exhibited deterioration of its 0.242-inch-nominal diameter toapproximately 0.5 inch. This erosion occurred over the last 1.5 inches of the orifice length.

Socket welds have also failed at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2. From June 1989 through December 1990,four socket welds failed on two of three reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure letdown lines in the CVCS. All four failedwelds were located on the piping downstream of the RCS letdown orifice isolation valves. On March 19, 1991, DiabloCanyon Unit 2 experienced the fifth letdown leak since June 1989. During the repair effort, the licensee determined that thecause of the failures was flow-induced vibration due to a damaged letdown orifice upstream of the weld failure. Thelicensee inspected the orifice and found that the discharge end of the orifice was severely pitted, resulting in a 0.75-inchopening, reducing to the nominal 0.25-inch diameter at a depth of 1.25 inches.

**Discussion**

The CVCS letdown orifices control the amount of coolant that is let down (removed) from the RCS and provide the initialpressure reduction of this high-pressure fluid. The letdown fluid undergoes purification and filtration to maintain the RCSwithin its design activity limits.

The letdown orifice is typically a stainless steel cylinder with a 0.25-inch-diameter aperture through the center. The RCSpressure of 2235 psig is reduced to approximately 350 psig through the orifice. On the basis of the licensees' examinationof the damaged orifices, deterioration was found to have resulted from cavitation erosion.

In the case of Surry's degraded orifices, the licensee's review determined that age and operating conditions accounted forthe varying degrees of degradation among the orifices from Units 1 and 2. In addition to flow-induced vibrations associatedwith cavitation erosion of the letdown orifices, inadequate piping/support configuration, low-cycle operational events, andweld flaws may also have contributed to the socket weld failures.

The review by the Diablo Canyon licensee concluded that the cavitation erosion was the result of (1) an out-of-calibrationpressure transmitter that reduced the downstream pressure below that required to prevent cavitation; (2) an incorrectlyadjusted blowdown setting of the pressure relief valve on the downstream line; and (3) once the orifice was damaged, self-induced cavitation further damaged the orifice. The licensee's root cause determination indicated that the damaged orificewas causing flow-induced vibrations. The vibrations, in turn, caused socket welds to fail and also caused some damage topipe supports.

In summary, cavitation erosion of the letdown orifices can lead to vibration of the letdown line and, thus, to fatigue failuresof letdown line socket welds.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information inthis notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation (NRR) project manager.

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

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