Marine Forces Reserve 

Operational History Global War on Terror

(2004 – 2007)

by

Colonel David T. Watters, USMCR
In the period covered by this

book, Reserve Marines embarked

on an increasingly complex and

dangerous series of missions. While

individuals augmented

commands around the

globe, entire Reserve

battalions and

squadrons fought

alongside

their active

component

counterparts

against an

adaptively

effective

enemy in Iraq

and Afghanistan.

Decades may pass

before the Marine Corps 

produces a complete, accurate

account of the first significant era 

in our future Total Force construct;

however, this volume provides a

compelling first look at how Reserve 

units and personnel were effectively

transformed into an Operational

Reserve capable of sustained

warfighting contributions.

As Commander, I am extremely

pleased to report that Marine

Reservists continue to respond

at a sustained rate greater

and longer than

anyone would

have predicted. 

Assigned

to notably

challenging

environments,

these Citizen

Marines

consistently

demonstrated

a flexibility, 

adaptability, and

maturity that allowed

them to succeed across the

full spectrum of kinetic to non-kinetic

operations.

In Iraq, the period from 2004 to 2007

was unique. As hit-and-run guerrilla

tactics and improvised explosive

devices began taking an increasingly

Forward

by the

Commander, Marine Forces Reserve


heavy toll on American lives, Marines

in the Anbar Province were prime

targets for insurgents and foreign

fighters infiltrating along the cities that 

straddled the Euphrates River. As the

once-ambiguous concept of a Global

War on Terror transitioned slowly into

“The Long War,” many opponents of

the American effort hoped the tide

of battle was slipping away from the

Coalition that had toppled Saddam

Hussein. It was at this time that a

Marine-led force fought the decisive

battle in Fallujah. Many people

view the second battle for Fallujah

as setting the stage for a remarkable

transformation, first in the Anbar 

Province and then in much of the rest

of Iraq. Throughout this magnificent 

effort, Reserves stood shoulder-toshoulder with active component

Marines. 

This book gives many of our young

Marines the opportunity to describe

individual battles in Iraq and

Afghanistan from their perspective.

These narratives are compelling in the

rich detail that they provide.

Serving as Commander, Marine

Forces Reserve during this demanding

period has been an awe-inspiring,

motivating personal experience. I

will never forget the many Marines

and Sailors who made the ultimate

sacrifice. Such complete dedication 

and raw courage enabled Coalition

Forces to achieve remarkable

results. Our men and women have

made extraordinary contributions

to the Global War on Terror, and

the reputation of the Marine Corps

Reserve has been forever enhanced by

their actions.

Semper Fidelis,

Jack Bergman

Lieutenant General

United States Marine Corps Reserve




This book represents an effort to capture the essence

of Marine Reserve combat activities from 2004 to 2007.

While each chapter is discrete with respect to the type of

Reserve unit, the phase of the war, and the geographic

region, they collectively paint a picture of a Reserve that,

when called to action in the Global War on Terror, was

ready and relevant.

As author, it was my privilege to interview more

than 300 Marines and sailors for this book. To a person,

each exhibited the stoic attitude of, “I was just doing

my job.” But when this meant strapping on body armor,

struggling against heat or cold, and facing an adaptive

and ruthless enemy, “just doing a job” was a significant 

accomplishment.

Many were lucky to be alive. Two Cobra pilots walked

away from an emergency landing after a missile destroyed

their helicopter’s engines during a combat mission over

Fallujah. One corporal faced withering fire from inside the 

Haditha Hospital as he alternated between a machinegun

and an M-16 rifle to turn the tide of an IED-initiated 

ambush. As shown by his Silver Star citation, his actions

saved fellow Marines.

While America frequently honors those who were killed

or wounded in combat, my interviews were a constant

reminder that all who served in Afghanistan or Iraq faced

danger in their everyday lives. Operations in extreme

environments create hazards that are more dangerous

than combat. While Iraq’s heat was a constant threat,

Afghanistan’s thin mountain air forced one CH-53 pilot

to bounce his aircraft to a safe landing off of the runway

when its rotor blades simply ran out of lift. Demonstrating

its commitment to history, the Marine Corps has amassed

an extensive collection of oral interviews during the Global

War on Terror. These thousands of individual impressions

provide a vivid mosaic of the Marine Corps’ response to

21st Century Terrorism. Started within days of the 2001

terrorist attacks on America, the oral history collection

has grown to thousands of interviews, with more being

archived every day. Interviews with senior officers, like 

Gen. James Conway or Maj. Gen. Douglas O’Dell, provide

a broad overview of the accomplishments of the Marine

Corps and its Reserve. But it is the numerous interviews

with Marines of all ranks and specialties that provide

gripping details of the daily routine of war. For example,

one sergeant who did two tours in Fallujah described the

stench of death in that iconic city after Operation Al Fajr

in November, 2004. Another noncommissioned officer told 

of daytime temperatures that were so high that her aviation

ordnance teams would get blisters while loading bombs,

bullets, and missiles. As difficult and painful as it was, she 

said, these Marines knew that their comrades on the ground

were looking to them for support, and they learned to

reload an aircraft in minutes.

Many Marines described the pain of losing a fellow

Marine. One infantry squad leader told how he rushed to

the site of an attack in Fallujah after hearing the distinct

crack of two shots from an AK-47 rifle, then helped 

load two wounded Marines so they could be carried to a

nearby military hospital. In a voice that was heavy with

emotion, he described the gut-wrenching sense of futility

that enveloped him when he learned that one of them had

subsequently died on an operating table.

To date, only a few of these interviews have been

processed for release to the public. Those who are

interested in military history, particularly Marine Corps

history, should be confident that the Marine Corps has 

fulfilled its obligation to preserve, in real time, the stories 

of its heroic young men and women who served on the

front lines of the Global War on Terror. In due time, these

stories will be available to all who want to listen to them.

I cannot sufficiently thank the Marines who provided 

me with this information. For many, telling certain combat

stories exposed emotional wounds that they struggled to

suppress. Marines of all ranks wept openly when describing

what had happened to their Marines. While it was as

painful as ripping bandages from fresh wounds, they felt

compelled to suffer that burden in order to honor the lives

and deaths of their friends. By relating the stories of those

who, by luck or fate, were unable to return or were scarred

on the battlefield, these Marines have lived up to the 

warrior’s code of honoring their comrades.

This book is dedicated to those Marines and Sailors who

served their country and Marine Forces Reserve during this

challenging period. The Marine Corps’ Reserve functioned

capably and honorably during the early years of the Global

War on Terror. While the full story will not be told for some

years, this generation of Marines, both active duty and

Reserve, has earned a proud place in Marine Corps history.

David Watters

Colonel, USMCR

Preface
Table of Contents

FOREWORD

PREFACE

I. Setting the Stage................................................................................................................

	 Marines Return to Iraq in 2004....................................................................................

	 The Anbar Province.....................................................................................................

II. Reserve Contributions to the Global War on Terror.........................................................

	 1. 4th Marine Division Units in Iraq............................................................................

	 	 A. 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines.......................................................................

	 	 B. 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines.......................................................................

	 	 C. 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines........................................................................

	 	 D. 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines.......................................................................

	 	 E. 1st Battalion, 25th Marines........................................................................

	 	 F. 1st Battalion, 24th Marines.........................................................................

	 	 G. 14th Marines...............................................................................................

	 2. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing.........................................................................................

In Iraq:

	 	 A. HMLA-775.................................................................................................

	 	 B. HMM-764 and HMM-774..........................................................................

	 	 C. VMGR-452.................................................................................................

	 	 D. VMFA-112.................................................................................................

	 	 E. VMFA-142..................................................................................................

In Afghanistan:

	 	 A. HMH-769...................................................................................................

	 	 B. HMLA-773.................................................................................................

	 3. 4th Marine Logistics Group.....................................................................................

III. The Last Journey.............................................................................................................

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations...................................................................................

Endnotes...............................................................................................................................

6

6

10

11

11

13

16

20

28

40

48

55

59

61

67

70

72

74

79

82

85

93

105

106


Setting the Stage:

Marines Return to Iraq in 2004

Eighteen months after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the

Pentagon and World Trade Center, United States-led actions

in Afghanistan and Iraq seemed to have defeated the forces

that had panicked much of the world.

In those heady days in early 2003, America and the

United States Central Command claimed resounding

victories over the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam

Hussein’s forces in Iraq. High-tech communications and

precision-guided firepower had provided the means for 

quick strikes that surprised and impressed much of the

world. But enemies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of

the world proved to be elusive, cunning and determined.

Some were linked by ties to Al Qaeda, but many simply

shared a loathing of America or the west. Others were

criminals who saw opportunity amid the chaos of war.

Whatever their motive, their persistence and resilience

forced planners and policy-makers to change America’s

expectations, recasting the Global War on Terrorism into

“The Long War.”

For an economic giant like the United States, supplying

bullets, beans and bandages halfway around the world was

relatively simple. Putting boots on the ground, however,

proved to be much more difficult. In an ambiguous war 

with no clear end state or end date, planning a sustainable

flow of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines was a 

formidable challenge. “Total Force” required the Army

and Marine Corps to tap back into their Reserves just

months after America had been told that the mission had

been accomplished. For many Reserve Marines, this meant

repacking their seabags with battle-scarred utilities that had


just been stowed away.

Operation Iraqi Freedom becomes part of 

The Long War

Within a month of Marines crossing into Iraq in 2003,

United States policymakers were so confident of victory 

that they began firming up plans to dramatically reduce the 

number of American forces in Iraq.1Thinking that Marines

would not be needed in a pacified Iraq, United States 

Central Command directed the Marine Corps to withdraw

forces from Iraq that summer and fall,2and by year’s end,

fewer than 250 Marines remained in Iraq.

Before the last major Marine unit returned to the United

States, it was apparent that many assumptions involving

Iraq, including the flow of American forces, would have 

to be changed.3While debate over the Iraq war continued

in military and political circles, guerrilla tactics by homegrown insurgents and foreign fighters reminded the world 

that a diverse set of enemies still had a voice in how things

turned out.4As violence increased and security became a

paramount concern, Central Command realized that the

troop numbers in Iraq would have to return to levels that

approximated the numbers for the initial drive to Baghdad.5

In early 2004, then-Lt. Gen. James Conway led 24,000

Marines under I Marine Expeditionary Force’s colors back

into Iraq. In addition to six active-duty infantry battalions,

his 1st Marine Division was augmented by one Reserve

infantry battalion, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines. The 3rd

Marine Air Wing gained a Reserve Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron, HMLA-775. 4th Marine Logistics Group, then

known as 4th Force Service Support Group, provided

hundreds of Marines for combat support. Many other

Reserves signed on as “individual augmentees” to various

commands.

I MEF took over the Anbar Province from the U.S.

Army’s 82nd Airborne Division in March 2004.6Within

weeks, Marines faced a grave crisis with significant 

international implications. In early April, four civilian

contractors for Blackwater, a private security firm, were 

ambushed and killed in Fallujah, and their bodies were

subsequently mutilated and put on display. Photographs

showed the contractor’s charred bodies strung up from

what became known as Blackwater Bridge. This enraged

Americans, in part because the photographs reminded

the country of the “Blackhawk Down” humiliation from

Somalia in 1993. Marines were ordered to clear insurgents

from Fallujah immediately. In a week of fierce fighting that 

resulted in significant casualties from both sides, a Reserve 

squadron of Huey and Cobra helicopters added significant 

punch to the fight for Fallujah. As these Reserves worked 

seamlessly with their active-duty counterparts during

Operation Vigilant Resolve, their performance bolstered

others’ confidence that Marine Reserves were ready for 

whatever came their way.

Maj. Gen. Douglas O’Dell, Commanding General of

4th Marine Division for most of the period covered by this

book, said Reserves consistently performed as promised.7

Willing to respond on short notice, units at the battalion

and squadron level were able to function independently as

elements of much larger commands. Throughout I MEF,

individual Reserves filled staff slots. Many units whose 

military skills were not considered necessary in this type

of combat were willing to retrain and form provisional

units in high-demand fields like military police or motor 

transportation.8While the “Weekend Warriors” were

different than 365-day-a-year “regular” Marines, the

Department of Defense and the nation came to appreciate

that the Reserves brought a combination of maturity and

civilian skills to the fight that more than compensated for 

any shortcomings they may have had in military skills.

Lt. Col. Harold R. “Odie” Van Opdorp, an active duty

Marine who commanded 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, a

Reserve battalion, in Fallujah in 2006-2007, described his

Reserves as, “some of the best that America has to offer.”9

After holding his last battalion formation before sending his

Reserves to their Home Training Centers, he said, “I would

go back to Iraq in a heartbeat with a Reserve battalion,

because these guys have a unique set of capabilities, above

and beyond being good Marines. The things that they can

accomplish, and the levels of maturity and decision-making

process that they have, is just phenomenal.”10

Maj. Gen. O’Dell said senior Marines would agree.

“Every officer who has commanded Marines in combat in 

this period of time, both from [I MEF and II MEF], would

Photo By Pfc. Frans E. Labranche

Maj. Gen. Douglas V. O’Dell talks with Lt. Gen. John 

W. Bergman during 2005.


say point blank, ‘We could not have done what we have

done without elements of the Fourth Marine Division,

including its infantry battalions and artillery battalions and

associated units that were organized, trained, and equipped

to fight in a cohesive, coherent and seamless fashion 

alongside their active duty counterparts.’”11

Van Opdorp’s battalion patrolled Fallujah at a time when

many factors came together to allow Iraqi soldiers and

police to take control of much of the city. While crediting

previous Marine activities and external circumstances for

part of this success, Van Opdorp said civilian skills that

his Reserves brought to the fight helped tremendously. 

One of his key assets was a police lieutenant12 who had

spent twenty-nine years mapping gang-related activities

in Chicago. The policeman, who had served a previous

tour in Iraq’s “Triangle of Death” with a different Reserve

battalion, found that the activities of gangs and the

requirements for intelligence to fight them were remarkably 

similar to what his battalion encountered in Fallujah.

Another Reserve who had a dramatic impact on Fallujah

was a charismatic New York City firefighter who served 

as a Civil Affairs officer. Van Opdorp said the firefighter 

brought a chutzpah to his role that was effective with Iraqis,

particularly the sheiks who led tribes of various size and

influence. Van Opdorp also described one team of young 

computer-savvy Marines, known as “The Hobbits,” who

created computer models to anticipate problem areas. This

team collected data from patrols and individual Marines to

create functional systems for identifying the enemy and the

patterns they exhibited as they emplaced IEDs and attacked

Marines. With this system, Van Opdorp said, the company

was able to remove the “invisibility cloak” that insurgents

had used so effectively to their advantage. As the Chicago

policeman noted, “Identifying the enemy is very hard. Once

you do that, it’s relatively easy to kill them.”13

Community and Continuity

A significant difference between “Regular” Marines and 

their Reserve counterparts is the fact that most Reserves

are older and either have a college degree or are working

towards one. The most important advantage, however,

relates to the civilian job skills that they bring to their

Marine work. Lt. Col. Mark Smith, an Indiana State

Trooper who commanded 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines

during a 2004-2005 deployment to the northern part of

the Babil Province, said the law enforcement backgrounds

of many of his Reserves allowed his battalion to conduct

patrols that looked like “community policing” throughout

his area of operations.14 In reviewing this battalion’s

success, O’Dell said, “The value of [civilian skills] cannot

be overstated, and that has not been lost on the active

component leadership, who have grasped that intangible

value of street level police skills.”15

O’Dell also noted that the fact that many Reserve

Marines come from the same region and serve lengthy tours

in the same unit brings a long-term continuity to their work

that active duty units do not have.

“If there is one distinguishing feature of a Reserve

Marine, it is that they generally come from the same

community . . . . so there is a communal link in addition

to the fraternal link as Marines,” he said. “Moreover,

there’s a time continuum aspect to this. When a Reserve

Marine arrives at his home station from the School of

Infantry . . . he can expect to serve eight years in that unit

without interruption. The personal bonds that are formed

as a consequence over that eight years or more experience

are durable and impenetrable, and leads to greater unit

cohesion. . . . That gives [Reserves] a leg up, in the sense

that we can come on active duty, maybe not at quite the

same level of predeployment training as an active duty

battalion, but we can play catch up very quickly, to the

point that . . . our performance in combat is equal to any

rifle platoon, any rifle company, any infantry battalion in 

the Total Force.”16

Maj. Mark C. Boone, who commanded Company B of

6th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) when it was assigned

to 9th ESB in Iraq, said the strength of community in the

Marine Reserve was demonstrated clearly when one of

his Marines, Cpl. Aaron Seal, was killed by a sniper in



Photo By Cpl. Paul Leicht

Armed with a Squad Automatic Weapon and 

cold weather gear, Lance Cpl. William English of 

Company B, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, 

participates in a security patrol in the vicinity of 

Ramadi in December 2004. At the time, infantry 

Marines were trying to reinforce the relationship 

between the American military and local 

government and civilians, with foot patrols serving 

as the initial line of defense against the insurgency.
the village of Baghdadi.17 Boone, who described Seal as

“the heartbeat of the company,” said that his death had

a profound effect on the company because many of his

Marines had grown up together before joining the Marine

Reserve.

Company B is headquartered in South Bend, Indiana,

where strong family values are at the core of closely knit

communities. These factors meant that his death had a

strong impact on the Marine Reserve community there, as

well as the local community. “[Cpl. Seal’s death] was really

tough,” Boone said. “Cpl. Seal had spent his life with some

of my Marines. He had gone to kindergarten with some,

and they had gone to high school, played sports, and even

dated many of the same women along the way. Cpl. Seal’s

death really took the wind out of our sails.”18

Col. Tracy Garrett, who served as Acting Commander of

4th Marine Logistics Group in 2006-2007, said Reserves

also allow the military to bridge the gap back to their

civilian communities. Garrett said that Reserves humanize

the military because people throughout the United States

have the opportunity to see that their neighbors serve in

the military. “It becomes much less like someone who is

from outer space than the woman who lives next door,” she

said.19

Flexibility

In the ever-changing environments presented by Iraq

and Afghanistan, Reserves frequently demonstrated a

“Semper Gumby” ability to adapt.20 Many units underwent

significant retraining in order to qualify them to perform 

services in high demand fields, such as military police and 

motor transportation. While 14th Marines, the artillery

regiment for 4th Marine Division, provided some firing 

batteries to Iraq, most of its units were retrained as military

police because demand for security on bases and roads, and

with convoys and detainees was high.

Of all provisional missions assigned to 4th Marine

Division, one of the most challenging involved

the transition of Reserves from 4th Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion and 4th Amphibious Assault

Vehicle Battalion to “Dam Support Units,” responsible

for riverine operations in a strategically significant section 

of the Euphrates River. Trading their armored vehicles

for waterborne combat vessels, they learned how to fight 

in a unique environment as they protected the area that

stretched from Ramadi to the Haditha Dam.

“The enemy previously had used the Euphrates with

impunity to move reinforcements, explosives, and other

arms and equipment into the population centers from the

western borders of Iraq, into Fallujah and Ramadi and

ultimately into Baghdad,” O’Dell said. “It’s been the Dam

Support Unit, as both a mobility asset and a tactical combat

asset, that has denied them the use of that avenue that they

previously had used with impunity.”21

The willingness to adapt to a battlefield is a hallmark 

of any effective military unit, so the flexibility that many 

Reserves demonstrated in new military specialties did not

surprise commanders, O’Dell said. “Marines of every stripe

and grade and affiliation are known for their flexibility and 

adaptability. Given the opportunity to train and be trained

to the provisional mission, any Marine unit can prepare

itself for success on the battlefield.”22



Photo By Pfc. Mary A. Staes

Lt. Gen. Jack W. Bergman speaks to Marines from 

1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment, and 3rd Bn., 

14th Marine Regiment, at Marine Corps Air Ground 

Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., Aug. 22.
The Anbar Province

The geographic challenge of the Anbar Province is

demonstrated by two contrasting facts: While it is Iraq’s

largest province, it also is its most sparsely populated. For

a province that is approximately the size of California,

it was home to fewer than 1.8 million Iraqis. Most of

the population lived in the major cities, like Ramadi and

Fallujah, and almost everyone else lived within a short

distance of the Euphrates River that snaked from Baghdad

to the Syrian Border near Al Qa’im.

Its strategic challenge was demonstrated, in part, by

casualty statistics. During the first four years of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Anbar Province was the deadliest

province for American service members, claiming

approximately one-third of American fatalities.1

In a country where most were associated with the

Shi’ia branch of Islam, the Anbar Province was the Sunni

stronghold that had long provided Saddam Hussein with

the support he needed to remain in power. During the early

years of OIF, it provided an important base for Al Qaeda

and insurgent operations.2 Part of its significance came 

from the fact that the Western Euphrates River Valley

served as an important infiltration route for foreign fighters 

headed to Iraq’s heartland.3The New York Times compared

this region to the Vietnam War’s Ho Chi Minh Trail, as

foreign fighters and insurgents used the river valley to 

move in relative safety from the Syrian border to cities like

Baghdad, Ramadi and Fallujah.

The contrast between the fertile Euphrates River Valley

and the rest of the province is striking. Along the Euphrates,

groves of fruits and vegetables and acre after acre of date

palms are surrounded by a lushness that paints the area a

vivid green. Just a few miles from the Euphrates, however,

the barren landscape turns brown. With the exception of an

occasional Bedouin, the desert is essentially empty.

Whether traveling by aircraft, vehicle, or on foot, the

Anbar Province is vast. During a time when improvised

explosive devices (IEDs) became the weapon of choice

for insurgents, the need to patrol and travel throughout

the province became one of the Marine Corps’ greatest

challenges. The threat of insurgent activity, when combined

with the challenges that long-distance travel, choking dust,

and stifling heat created, made the Anbar Province one of 

the most inhospitable areas on Earth.

10
Reserve Contributions 

to the 

Global War on Terror

4th Marine 

Division 

In Iraq

11
12
3rd Battalion 

24th Marines

One week after the statue of Saddam Hussein was pulled

down in Baghdad’s Firdos Square, Central Command

considered plans to drastically reduce American forces

in Iraq, and subsequently directed the Marine Corps to

withdraw all forces during the summer and fall of 2003.2

By the end of the year, fewer than 250 Marines remained

in Iraq. But even before the last Marine infantry battalion

returned to the United States, an emerging insurgency

forced the Pentagon to reverse its flow of forces.3Guerrilla

operations conducted by a mix of Saddam loyalists

and foreign terrorists showed the world that, from their

perspective, the war was far from over.4This violence

against Coalition forces and Iraqi citizens meant that the

number of Americans in Iraq would have to stay roughly

the same.5As Marines reviewed requirements for upcoming

troop rotations, they looked to the Reserves for manpower.

The only Reserve Marine infantry battalion mobilized

for OIF Phase II was 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines. Based

primarily in Missouri, Indiana, and Tennessee, its Marines

learned in December 2003 to expect mobilization the

following month. Having heard rumors that they were

slated to go to Okinawa, most were elated with the

decision that would put them in the fight in Iraq.6They

were mobilized on January 5, 2004, and were soon en

route to Camp Pendleton for six weeks of immunizations,

training, uniforms and equipment, as well as a crash course

Photo By Sgt. Chad R. Kiehl

Marines with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines conduct a memorial service for Cpl. Bradley P. 

McCormick, who was killed in combat in An Najaf on Aug. 19, 2004. 

13
in Security and Stabilization Operations (SASO). This

Reserve battalion became part of what grew to the 24,000

Marines and Sailors of I MEF, which returned to Iraq in

February and March.7

With Operation Iraqi Freedom in transition, Marines

encountered difficulties in deciding how to prepare. 

Returning veterans knew their work would be different, but

they did not know if this

meant combat operations

against insurgents or “hearts

and minds” interactions

with civilians. Not knowing

what mission they would

be assigned to in Iraq, and

competing with active

duty battalions for limited

training opportunities, 3rd

Battalion, 24th Marines

focused on basic security

operations. Its Marines

first went through a fastpaced weapons training

cycle that familiarized each

Marine with the weapons

they might use in Iraq.8

The training plan used a

building-block approach

that trained at the fireteam 

and squad levels before

moving to company-and

battalion-level exercises.

It also gave the battalion

staff, which included many

new members, a chance to

function as a team.

The one-week SASO

training package was

held at March Air Force

Reserve Base in California.

Conducted by 1st Marine

Division and the Marine

Corps’ Warfighting 

Laboratory, SASO training

simulated the multispectrum environment

that Marines were expecting, from diehard insurgents

wearing suicide vests to peaceful citizens trying to rebuild

their country. Realizing that Marines would face vastly

different challenges each day, SASO emphasized smallunit leadership. Expanding the concept of the “Strategic

Corporal,” SASO taught the Marines that an important

element to operations in Iraq would be the young Marine

leader who had a clear understanding of his commander’s

intent while also appreciating that actions at the tactical

level could reverberate at the operational and strategic

levels.9

While awaiting transit from Kuwait to Iraq, the battalion

learned that its primary mission would be to provide

security at four sites.10

The battalion commander

assigned Company I to

Camp Fallujah, Company K

to the prison facility at Abu

Ghraib, and Company L to

the airbase at al Asad. The

remaining units, including

Battalion Headquarters,

Headquarters and Services

Company, and Weapons

Company, went to the

1st Fleet Service Support

Group’s (FSSG) large

support base at Camp

Taqqadum.

Lt. Col. Gary S. Johnston,

who became 3/24’s

Inspector-Instructor after

the deployment, described

the force protection and

convoy escort services that

3/24 provided as essential

enablers for combat to

civil-military operations.

“It may not have been a

‘sexy’ mission, but it was

absolutely a very critical

mission. . . . The manpower

drain, trying to protect

yourself while you are

still conducting SASO as

well as humanitarian-type

civil-military operations,

is significant. So [3/24’s] 

ability to do what they did,

and spread themselves out

to multiple FOBs as well as

supporting convoy operations... contributed significantly to 

the fight out there.”11

Maj. Mark A. Lamelza was Company I’s Executive

Officer when Marines took over Camp Fallujah, a former 

military base 10 kilometers east of Fallujah that served as

headquarters for I MEF and 1st Marine Division. Company

Photo By Sgt. Chad R. Kiehl

Marines with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 24th 

Marines conduct a memorial service for Cpl. Bradley 

P. McCormick who was killed in combat in An Najaf, 

Iraq.

14
I’s 170 Marines took charge of perimeter security and

the quick reaction force (QRF), as well as operations at

the base’s three entry control points (ECPs). Their most

difficult challenge, he said, was the ECP used for Iraqis 

who worked on base. This ECP used guard dogs, a cargo

inspection system, and careful searches of individuals and

vehicles to protect the base.12 During the early phase of

building a Marine presence in the Anbar Province, much

of Company I’s work involved inspecting large convoys of

personnel, supplies and equipment.13

“We had to be vigilant every day,” Maj. Lamelza said.

In addition to internal security, Company I maintained an

ambitious schedule of mounted and dismounted patrols to

thwart mortar and rocket attacks.

Using their civilian skills, Company I Marines improved

the camp’s defenses in many ways. Several civilian

contractors worked with Navy Seabees to strengthen guard

towers and other potential targets. Company I conducted

an assessment of the camp’s infrastructure and proposed

construction projects that touched all parts of the base,

Lamelza said. “We left that camp completely different

than we found it. When we built a bunker, we really built a

bunker.”14

In the middle of his tour, Lamelza was transferred to 1st

FSSG’s support base at Camp Taqqadum, where he took

command of the battalion’s Weapons Company. Camp

Taqqadum included two long runways and was surrounded

by a number of small villages. At the time, it was much

more open than Camp Fallujah, with no barriers around

much of its perimeter. Its primary protection consisted of a

series of observation towers and an active QRF.

Marines reported that the Iraqi population was, at best,

neutral to Coalition efforts; neither friendly nor hostile

to the Marines. Camp Taqqadum was hit by indirect fires 

several times during the deployment. The belief that nearby

Iraqis would not prevent insurgents from firing on the base 

prompted Weapons Company to undertake an aggressive

schedule of around-the-clock patrolling outside the base.15

Chief Warrant Officer Robert A. Bauer, a maintenance 

officer in the battalion’s logistics section, described Camp 

Taqqadum as relatively primitive in early 2004, with

Marines sleeping on cots in 25-man tents.16 Electricity was

provided by generators, which frequently failed when high

temperatures caused spikes in demand. Limited access to

water meant that water tanks for showers had to be refilled 

by truck. On a positive note, he said, the base had a small

gymnasium and good food from a contractor-serviced

dining hall.

Company K was assigned to the U.S. Army’s 16th

Military Police Brigade at Abu Ghraib prison.17 The

Marines arrived at a sensitive time, less than two months

after the Army convened an investigation into detainee

abuse at the hands of U.S. Army Reserve military

policemen.18 After negotiating their role with their Army

counterparts, Marines took responsibility for the base’s

external guard towers, ECPs, and QRF, as well as a mortar

team trained to respond quickly to indirect fire attacks. 

They hardened the base by filling thousands of sandbags, 

laying miles of concertina wire, and clearing and charting

their fields of fire. These precautions proved to be prudent, 

as Marines defended the prison during several insurgent

attacks that included mortar, rocket, RPG, and small arms

fire.19

For Company L, most of its tour involved security duties

at al Asad, a large airbase that served as headquarters and

principle airfield for 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). 

As the base’s only infantry unit, Company L earned a

reputation as the Wing’s “security blanket,” patrolling

nearby neighborhoods on foot and in Humvees. The Wing

also used Company L Marines to coordinate and provide

security for convoys throughout the Anbar Province.

During one five-week period, it conducted 26 convoys 

between al Asad and bases near al Qa’im, al Taqqadum,

Haditha, ar Rutbah, and Ramadi.20

Shortly after arriving in Iraq, Company L Marines

were given a brief opportunity to work for a regimental

combat team, relieving an active duty company to

allow it to fight with its battalion for Operation Vigilant 

Resolve in Fallujah. For three weeks, The Company

was responsible for the Haditha-Hit area near al Asad.

During foot patrols in Hit, the Marines learned that many

insurgents fleeing Coalition operations in Fallujah had 

settled in Hit. Company L also found numerous weapons

caches, including two of the largest caches that had been

located in the Anbar Province to that time, while searching

palm groves on the neighboring Euphrates River Valley.

While Company L’s operations near Hit and Haditha were

relatively small, the company’s success in these missions

helped set the stage for expanded Reserve activities during

the next rotation. 

15
2nd Battalion

24th Marines

After 3/24’s initial success as the only Reserve battalion

in Iraq during the first months of Phase II, the 4th Marine 

Division assigned two more Reserve battalions, 1st

Battalion, 23rd Marines and 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines,

to the next rotation. Both battalions received missions and

areas of operations (AOs) that were more challenging than

the security missions assigned to 3/24. 1/23 was given

an economy of force mission over a broad expanse of the

Anbar Province. Its AO included open desert and much

of the Western Euphrates River Valley, which served as

a major conduit for insurgents moving to and from Syria

and Baghdad and all points in between.1In contrast, 2/24

operated in a small, dense, and urban AO that included the

“Triangle of Death”2a few miles south of Baghdad.3For

large operations, it could request assistance from nearby

Army units. For day-to-day operations, 2/24 was stretched

thin, with too few Marines to keep a tight grip on escalating

violence. The Triangle of Death was located on a fault line

between large Sunni and Shi’ia populations.4Iraqi-on-Iraqi

violence was so common that many residents took steps to

make their religious affiliation more ambiguous, providing 

some measure of safety in areas that otherwise would be

too dangerous for travel.5

The primary mission for 2/24 was to establish conditions

for a fair and free national election on January 30, 2005.6

This carried an implied mission of keeping a main supply

route, MSR Tampa, open to Coalition traffic. With 

insurgent attacks taking place against Coalition forces and

civilians on a daily basis during its first few weeks, 2/24 

decided that the underlying mission for all operations in

its AO called for conducting the full spectrum of combat

operations against insurgents.

Lt. Col. Mark A. Smith, an experienced Indiana state

trooper and 2/24’s commanding officer, told his Marines 

to take a more forceful stance against the violence,

challenging insurgents with aggressive patrols throughout

the AO.7 With law enforcement professionals filling 

many of 2/24’s billets, incorporating the concept of

“community policing” in operations within the Triangle

of Death came naturally for 2/24. This pushed Marines

into Iraqi neighborhoods with what Smith called a “zip

code offensive.”8To him, improving security meant that

his Marines would build inroads into communities and

improve the lives of common Iraqis, even if they were not

wanted there at first. While this philosophy entailed risks, 

Smith and his intelligence section’s “Red Cell” determined

that the potential long-term gain outweighed the initial

short-term risk.9While there was no doubt that increased

patrols would cause insurgent activities to spike, the fact

that Marines were exerting control in areas previously

dominated by insurgents ultimately would curtail much of

the violence.

To accomplish these missions, Smith relied upon

distributed operations, allowing infantry companies to

conduct independent operations from satellite bases.

Having inherited a force laydown that put an entire U.S.

Army battalion in one Forward Operating Base (FOB) in

Mahmudiyah, he immediately created two smaller FOBs

in the nearby cities of Yusufiyah and Lutafiyah.10 While

the bulk of his forces would stay at FOB Mahmudiyah, the

reinforced companies in Yusufiyah and Lutafiyah were able 

to patrol remote areas around the clock.

The new force configuration provided strongpoints in the 

16

Photo By Lance Corporal Ryan B. Busse

United States Marine Corps Cpl. Erin Black directs 

Iraqi women and children to line up so that the may 

be searched in a quick and orderly fashion at Entry 

Control Point 5 on the outskirts of Fallujah, Iraq 

on December 28, 2004. Black, a Nashville, Tenn. 

native, is a Military Police reservist by trade but has 

been attached to the “Females Searching Females” 

detachment for current operations. 
three largest cities in the Triangle of Death:11 Mahmudiyah,

located only 15 kilometers south of Baghdad, was the

largest. Yusufiyah, which bordered a community of 

Islamic extremists to the west, was 10 kilometers west

of Mahmudiyah. Lutafiyah was 10 kilometers south 

of Mahmudiyah. Some considered Lutafiyah the most 

dangerous of the three, as insurgents with keffiyehs, 

or checkered scarves wrapped around their heads, and

AK-47s would intimidate Iraqis on a daily basis. They

conducted surprise checkpoints that often ended with

summary executions. Smith believed that Yusufiyah 

presented a more significant threat to Coalition efforts. 

Based upon intelligence reports that hard-core Islamists

with connections to al Qaeda were distributing money

and weapons throughout the region, Smith believed that

many anti-Coalition operations in central Iraq, including

Baghdad, Fallujah and Ramadi, were initiated in his AO.

After establishing the new FOBs, 2/24 started exploring

the AO during all hours of the day and night.12 This

earned the battalion the nickname of “The Mad Ghosts”

from Iraqis who were not used to such frequent Coalition

presence.13 Smith said that his Marines had to patrol like

this to ensure that the maps they were using accurately

reflected the terrain. Many roads were unsafe because 

they would collapse into canals, and the terrain changed

frequently as Iraqis created irrigation canals or moved

roads.

Three terrain features, clustered around the Euphrates

to the west, dominated 2/24’s activities. The first was a 

weapons manufacturing and storage facility that gave

insurgents all the ammunition they needed. Smith described

the size of the storage facilities as beyond belief, many

times larger than any ammunition supply point he had

seen during his years in the Marine Corps. After the fall

of Baghdad, the unguarded facility provided munitions to

insurgents, who used the ordinance to create an unknown

Photo By Cpl. Ben Eberle

Staff Sgt. Eric F. Gross, a 35-year-old from Sturtevant, Wis., takes a knee to chat with an interested 

toddler during a Cooperative Medical Engagement (CME) event in as Saqlawiyah. The event took place at 

the village schoolhouse and provided free medical care for more than 200 civilians in the community. Iraqi 

culture discourages male-female interaction in public, so a female team provided care and posted security 

for women and children. The CME events was part of the Iraqi Women’s Engagement program coordinated 

by the U.S. Department of State.

17
number of caches on both sides of the Euphrates. By the

end of 2/24’s tour, Marine and Army units had destroyed

hundreds of weapons caches.

The second was the Jurf as Sukhr (JAS) Bridge that

provided the only fixed crossing point over the Euphrates 

River for miles. While the bridge was sturdy enough to

handle Coalition vehicles, it was also an obvious ambush

point and had been the site of a significant battle between 

insurgents and 2/24’s predecessors. Any ground effort to

search the desert west of the Euphrates required crossing

the JAS Bridge, so the force would need to be large enough

to prevent an ambush at the bridge. For most of its tour,

2/24 did not have the assets to cross the bridge safely, so

insurgents move unchallenged in the desert. In such an

environment, it was unlikely that insurgents would be

stopped, and the desert always offered more caches of

weapons and ammunition.

The third was an affluent community of hardcore Islamists who lived in Cargoul (or Karagol), a

short distance from Yusufiyah. Intelligence reports 

showed Cargoul was under the control of Al Qaeda in

Mesopotamia. Army Times reported that, “Yusufiyah 

is [Abu Musab al] Zarqawi country.”14 Cargoul was the

site of a U.S. Army checkpoint from which two soldiers

were kidnapped during a 2006 ambush. The two were

subsequently killed and their bodies were mutilated.15

Publicity resulting from the ambush was considered a

significant public relations victory for insurgents.

Smith said that Cargoul represented a heart of insurgent

operations throughout central Iraq, as it housed the best

funded and most hard-core Islamists. Residents of Cargoul

exerted control over an area that stretched from Yusufiyah 

to the desert to the west of the Euphrates. During 2/24’s

deployment, Smith said, he came to believe that Cargoul

was the inception point for the constant upheaval in

Baghdad, as it could supply all the money, equipment, and

munitions that any group of insurgents would need.16

The wealth of the Cargoul district was a stark contrast

to the poverty that pervaded nearby Shi’ia regions. Most

Cargoul houses were elegant mansions that would compare

favorably to the finest houses in the world, and they lined 

a road that started near the JAS Bridge and followed the

Euphrates north for about 10 kilometers to the Yusufiyah 

Power Plant.17

For the Mad Ghosts, making the AO more secure was

going to be a challenge. In addition to being well armed,

the insurgency seemed to be better trained than in other

parts of Iraq, as its ranks included many from countries

outside Iraq. In addition to their equipment, the foreign

fighters could be distinguished by their advanced tactics. 

Smith said that foreign fighters knew how to maneuver and 

use suppressive fires effectively.

In 2/24’s AO, MSR Tampa was a 35-kilometer segment

of the important highway that linked Kuwait to central Iraq,

and was open at first only to military and Coalition traffic. 

Smith said 2/24 kept MSR Tampa open by providing a

small security force on the highway and convincing every

Coalition convoy that it was that convoy’s responsibility to

provide its own local security.

One platoon from Company G was assigned to MSR

Tampa, and Smith had them on the road almost all the time.

The platoon essentially lived on MSR Tampa, sleeping

under bridges, eating MREs, and going without showers

for lengthy periods as they gathered intelligence and looked

for insurgents and IEDs. By providing a constant presence,

this platoon improved security to a degree that eventually

allowed the Coalition to open MSR Tampa to civilian

traffic.

Early in its tour, Company F defended FOB Yusufiyah 

against a fierce attack from a company-sized group of 

insurgents. For six hours on November 12, Marines went

toe-to-toe with the insurgents.18 Many Marines considered

this type of force-on-force fighting to be a welcome relief 

from anonymous IED attacks, but they ultimately were

impressed with the insurgents’ ability to plan and execute

such a complicated attack.

“The insurgents took an absolute beating, but they did

not run,” Smith said. “They kept coming. We finally got 

what we wanted, because as good as our Marines are . .

. they wanted to fight. They wanted to kill a lot of these 

guys, and they did on that day. It was quite the fight.”19

The insurgents used indirect fires, then maneuvered 

under the cover of combined arms to try to advance

on FOB Yusufiyah. By the end, Company F was using 

helicopters and jets for close air support, as well as indirect

fires from artillery and 81mm and 60mm mortars. The 

results were lopsided, with approximately 70 insurgents

killed compared with only one Marine, but Smith said the

battle demonstrated to higher headquarters that insurgents

had the training and capability to conduct a large-scale

attack.

For the January 30 elections, 2/24 selected eight

polling sites, two each in the three main cities, plus two

in Rasheed, a village north of Mahmudiyah. The location

of these sites was not announced until 48 hours before

polls opened, when Marines seized the sites and imposed

protective measures that included barriers, controlled traffic 

patterns, and detailed voting procedures.20 Iraqi soldiers

were positioned at the inner cordons of the polling sites,

and hundreds of officials and election officers were posted 

at the sites.

On election day, each site experienced insurgent activity

18
designed to shut it down. For example, a site in Yusufiyah 

drew 20 separate mortar attacks, but counterbattery fire 

from Company F rendered those efforts ineffective.21

Despite these threats, thousands of Iraqis walked to polling

sites and stayed in line until they could cast their ballots.22

By the time votes were tallied, more than 16,000 Iraqis, or

71 percent of the registered voters, had cast their ballots in

the historic election.23 Smith said that the Iraqis persevered

despite the challenges because they were confident that the 

Mad Ghosts would provide protection.

A reporter for CBS News said that election day in the

Triangle of Death took on an air that was almost festive,

despite the attacks.24 She reported that Lt. Col. Ali Zahawi

Bress, an Iraqi police commander in the predominantly

Shi’ia city of Mussyiib, told her, “I am very proud because

this is the first time for the Iraqi people to express their 

opinions and the first step to a real democracy.” He added 

that he was particularly surprised by the number of women

who voted. “The people are very excited to go to the

election centers and vote. There are large numbers and

no one expected that. Even when the mortars were fired, 

people were excited to vote.”25

While most of its work was focused on small-unit

activities, 2/24 participated in several major operations.26

Operation River Walk, in December and January, was a

cordon and search operation in the Cargoul-controlled

region. It included three Army battalions from the U.S.

Army’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team. This force sufficiently 

cleared a broad area that included, for the first time, the 

desert west of the Euphrates. The Army battalion assigned

to that area found 112 large weapons caches on the west

side of the river. Since Coalition forces rarely crossed

the JAS Bridge, there was little effort to try to hide the

caches, Smith said. In most cases, the caches were dunes

created with munitions and sand, with some sort of signal

on top. By this method, any insurgent needing ammunition

could take whatever he needed from any stack. Smith

said Operation River Walk included searching Cargoul

on a house-by-house basis. This surprised residents and

allowed his Marines to destroy an IED factory and two

rigged vehicles. The operation also shut down an al Qaida

propaganda factory, which contained state-of-the-art

computers, presses, and photocopying machines.27 In a

war focused on information operations, this represented a

significant victory.

In subsequent operations, 2/24 was reinforced by

smaller Army units for a series of operations known as Red

Mayhem I, II, and III. Red Mayhem I was a cordon and

search operation similar to Operation River Walk, except

there were not sufficient forces to go into the desert. Smith 

said that this search of Cargoul confirmed that Coalition 

forces had the desire and capability to strike deep in

insurgent-controlled areas.

Red Mayhem II was another cordon and search, but

involved Company G sweeping through Lutafiyah and 

villages to its east. Lutafiyah was on the fault line between 

Sunni and Shi’ia populations. Much of 2/24’s work focused

on Sunni insurgents, so Red Mayhem II was designed to

determine what Shi’ia were doing in their neighborhoods.

Smith said Red Mayhem II was successful because it

surprised the Shi’ia community, allowing 2/24 to document

and destroy many significant weapons caches. Red 

Mayhem II also resulted in the capture of several insurgents

targeted by intelligence officials.

The final operation, Red Mayhem III, involved Company 

E and Mahmudiyah. Company E was the first of Smith’s 

companies to push platoons out in smaller FOBs in the

city. This distribution of forces tied Company E in more

closely to the community. When Company E went through

Mahmudiyah, it was able to locate targeted individuals and

weapons caches. The Marines also were able to develop

a great deal of information from Mahmudiyah residents

who became accustomed to having Marines in their

neighborhoods.

In reviewing his tour, Smith said the precipitous drop

in insurgent activity was the best measure of 2/24’s

success. At first, he said, 2/24’s AO was averaging 12 to 

18 hostile acts per day. Six months later, that number had

been reduced to approximately one per week.28 While 2/24

lost 14 Marines during the mobilization, Smith said these

losses were balanced by the measure of his battalion’s

effectiveness against the insurgency. His Marines knew

they had taken the battle to the insurgents’ doorsteps, with

aggressive patrolling that prompted insurgents to change

tactics. He estimated that 2/24 killed 400 insurgents while

detaining more than 1,200 others.29 Using civilian skills

from a number of Marines who were also law enforcement

officers, 2/24 was able to prepare detainee packages that 

resulted in the long-term detention of 970 in Abu Ghraib.

The final metric of success, he said, was the fact that 

71% of the registered Iraqis voted in the January 30

election.30 Despite the fact that insurgents were attacking

election sites, he said, Iraqis who had suffered under

tyranny in the Triangle of Death were not going to be

deprived of their right to vote.

19
1st Battalion 

23rd Marines

While operations in the Anbar Province placed many

Marines in urban settings like Fallujah or Ramadi, 1st

Battalion, 23rd Marines was assigned a huge stretch

of desert when it reported to Iraq in the fall of 2004.

Nicknamed “The Lone Star Battalion,” because of its

headquarters in Texas, its Marines were accustomed

to wide open spaces. Lt. Col. Gregory B. Stevens, the

battalion commander, understood the challenges the desert

would present as he led his battalion through a turnover

with 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. Patrolling an area that

extended from Ramadi to just south of Haditha, his Marines

would be stretched thin. At first, he considered the primary 

mission of keeping a main supply route (MSR) as being

relatively low risk,1even though it included parts of the

Western Euphrates River Valley. During this deployment,

however, his intelligence officers learned that insurgents 

were using a centuries-old smugglers route along the river

and nearby desert to move people and weapons throughout

the region.2While things appeared calm on the surface, the

Lone Star Battalion learned that problems were brewing in

parts of its AO.

The battalion that preceded 1/23 had focused much of its

attention on protecting the MSR, so it had minimal contact

with Iraqis along the Euphrates River Valley. The secondary

roads that connected villages along the river were littered

with IEDs, and the previous battalion did not have enough

Marines to clear the areas surrounding the road. While

its leaders had suspected that insurgents were operating

near the Euphrates, it did not instigate activities in these

unknown regions. By the time 1/23 arrived, intelligence

analysts had pieced together a sufficiently clear picture of 

insurgent activities to allow 1/23 to probe certain areas. For

the Lone Star Battalion, this meant sending Marines into

villages without knowing if they would be giving away

soccer balls or getting involved in firefights.3

Maj. Gen. Richard Natonski, Commanding General

of the First Marine Division and second highest ranking

Marine in Iraq, arrayed his forces so that Regimental

Combat Team 7 (RCT-7), which included three infantry

battalions, would occupy the 350-kilometer stretch of

the Euphrates River Valley from Ramadi to the Syrian

border. Stevens’ battalion would control the Hit region,

which was closest to Ramadi.4First Battalion, 8th Marines

would control the Haditha section in the middle, while 1st

Battalion, 7th Marines would cover the al Qa’im region

near the Syrian border.5

Stevens immediately lost the services of one of his

three infantry companies, when the Commander of RCT-7,

Col. Craig Tucker, instructed him to attach a company to

3rd Light Armed Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion.63rd

LAR had been assigned an even larger piece of desert in

western Iraq, bordered by Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

Its Light Armored Vehicles provided just the right balance

of protection and mobility that allowed 3rd LAR to cover

such an area. Selecting a company that he felt could operate

effectively on its own, Stevens attached Company A to 3rd

LAR, based at Camp Korean Village near al Rutbah.7The

task force covered an important area, including major roads

that connected Iraq to Jordan and Syria. The area was so

distant from more populous and troubled sections of Iraq

that it was relatively quiet.

RCT-7 and 1/23 were based at al Asad, the sprawling

Photo By Cpl. Jan M. Bender

Lance Cpl. Guillermo Munoz, a machine gunner with 

a mobile assault platoon for Weapons Company, 

1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, Regimental 

Combat Team 7, and native of Austin, Texas, scans 

the area surrounding one of the supply routes. His 

platoon worked tireless hours to protect against 

the threat of improvised explosive devices and 

mines. The efforts of the platoon were credited with 

causing an 85 percent decrease in the total number 

of mines and IEDs used in their area of operation.

20
airbase just 12 kilometers

from the Euphrates between

Hit and Haditha. Along with

his headquarters element,

Stevens assigned Company

B, elements of Weapons

Company, and Headquarters

and Services Company to

Camp al Asad. Company B’s

main task involved keeping

Route Uranium secure. A

modern road that ran parallel

to the oil pipeline to Syria,

Route Uranium served as a

major resupply route for the

Coalition. Its critical role

forced the Coalition and Iraqi

government to restrict access

to the road.

Company B assigned

one platoon to Ammunition

Supply Point (ASP) Dulab8

and another platoon to a traffic 

control point known as the

“Bronze-Uranium Split” south

of Hit.9Remaining elements

of Company B were tasked

with conducting route security

patrols. Stevens assigned

Company C to a former Iraq

Army base near Hit.10 The

company’s mission included

monitoring the nearby city

and training an Iraqi National

Guard company that lived on

the same base.

Hit, Camp Hit, and Ambush on the Division 

Jump

As the largest city in its AO, Hit quickly became the

focus of 1/23’s attention.

The base that Company C inherited had been a Coalition

base since the beginning of the occupation. Located 10

kilometers northwest of Hit and just a kilometer from the

Euphrates, the base occupied one of the few low hills that

provided a view of Hit and the Euphrates River Valley.

The Army had called it Forward Operating Base (FOB)

Eden,11 but it was no paradise. With only four buildings

standing amid the ruins of a dozen others, its hot and dusty

environment prompted one Marine to describe it as a “third

world hellhole.”12 But pieces of paradise were within sight,

as the lush nearby river valley

held groves of date palms,

pomegranates, and other fruits

and vegetables.

While the Marine Corps

renamed the base Camp

Hit, it remained primitive.

Several hundred Marines and

Iraqi National Guardsmen

worked at the base, which

was protected more by

concertina wire than barriers.

Their work frequently was

interrupted by mortar attacks

or IED strikes. While al Asad

had plenty of running water,

Marines at Camp Hit were

limited to one shower per

week, and even those were

in fiberglass containers with 

gravity-fed plumbing that

allowed the water to be too

hot in the summer and too

cold in the winter. Space in

the three buildings that served

as barracks for most Marines

was so limited that cots almost

touched each other and gear

was stowed in every possible

space. The fourth building,

on the other side of the camp,

housed the Iraqi National

Guardsmen and a platoon of

Charlie Company Marines

tasked with training them.13

To Coalition forces, the city

of Hit was an enigma. Located in the heart of the Sunnidominated Anbar Province, its crowded streets and teeming

markets gave an appearance of calm. But as Marines

patrolled Hit more frequently, they it realized Hit had

become an insurgent stronghold.

Hit provided a marketplace for the string of farming

villages that bordered the river. Its pre-war population was

100,000, but Marines estimated this number had dropped

by half since 2003.14 The main part of Hit ran for four

kilometers between the Euphrates River and a paved road

that was part of the Coalition’s Route Bronze. The city had

a low skyline, with few buildings taller than two or three

stories, punctuated by the occasional minaret. It was so

crowded that one soldier compared it to a rabbit warren.15

Hit also contained one of the few bridges in the area that

Photo By Lance Cpl. Will Lathrop

Marines with 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine 

Regiment, attached to 31st Marine 

Expeditionary Unit, move under the cover of 

M1A1 main battle tanks and helicopters in a 

patrol in the city of Hadithah, Iraq. The patrol 

was conducted to maintain a military presence 

and search for weapons and enemy activity.

21
could carry heavy military vehicles across the Euphrates

River.16 The Hit bridge connected a paved road from the

city’s main traffic circle, known as Traffic Control Point 1 

(TCP-1), to the small but affluent village of Turbah on the 

east side of the Euphrates. Since Coalition bases were west

of the Euphrates, this bridge provided the only short route

to Turbah. Marines patrolled infrequently, so insurgents

considered Turbah relatively safe.17

Many of its residents were neutral or sympathetic to

the insurgency. At some point, it became apparent that

insurgents were using a smugglers route that had existed

for centuries in and around the Euphrates River Valley to

transport fighters, weapons, and ammunition to key cities 

like Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad.18 While not as well

known as Iraq’s larger cities, Hit was important enough

in Iraq’s Sunni region that Saddam Hussein used it in his

flight from Baghdad in April, 2003. According to a study 

that remains classified, Saddam fled to Hit when a bomb 

destroyed the house next door to a purported “safe house”

during his first night outside Baghdad.19

Like most Iraqis, Hit residents were anxious to get on

with their day-to-day lives. Many seemed to hold Coalition

forces and insurgents equally in contempt, but were

powerless to complain. For them, survival meant walking

a fine line between the two sides, hoping to endure until a 

victor emerged.

At the beginning of its tour, 1/23 was focused on

maintaining security on MSRs Bronze and Uranium.20

These routes began at an intersection known as the BronzeUranium Split, located 15 kilometers southeast of Hit. The

two routes followed the same general direction towards the

Syrian border. The paved road that became Route Uranium

had been built along the oil pipeline to Syria, and even

while Saddam Hussein was in power, it had been reserved

for military and government traffic. With its controlled 

access, straight course, and frequent MAP patrols, Route

Uranium was the Iraq version of a superhighway, despite

the occasional IED crater. Route Bronze, in contrast, was

a local route of crowded roads connecting villages along

the west bank of the Euphrates. The threat of ambush

or IED was much higher on Route Bronze, so coalition

drivers simply tried to keep moving when they were on

it. Controlling civilian and military traffic at the BronzeUranium Split was critical, so Charlie Company typically

kept a platoon of Marines at the checkpoint.21

As 1/23 settled in, activities in nearby Fallujah were

changing the dynamics of the area. While not immediately

apparent, there was a significant spike in the number of 

insurgents in Hit, probably as a result of a widely-expected

Coalition operation to clear Fallujah 100 kilometers to

the southeast. 1st Marine Division had cleared parts of

Fallujahh the previous April, but had been withdrawn

before their work was complete. This time, they were

determined that Operation al Fajr would change the balance

of power in Fallujah in favor of the Coalition.22

Intelligence officers from 1/23 said that three factors 

contributed to the increase in insurgent activities in Hit.23

First, local police were inept at best, and more likely

complicit in many insurgent activities. For example, in

one firefight between insurgents and Coalition forces, 

men wearing police uniforms fought with the insurgents.24

Second, Hit’s City Council exhibited no interest in trying

to curtail insurgent activities, claiming that foreign fighters 

were a Coalition problem since the Coalition had failed

to secure Iraq’s borders after the fall of Baghdad. Third,

an informal arrangement between prior troop rotations

and the City Council limited Coalition presence in Hit,

so the Coalition lacked good intelligence. Made at a time

when Hit was relatively quiet, the arrangement provided

that so long as Hit’s police and City Council provided

security, Coalition forces essentially would stay out.25 As

a result, insurgent activities went unchecked for so long

that insurgents took control of Hit, patrolling with AK-47

assault rifles and bullying the residents. This took place at 

a time when the Coalition claimed that Hit was a model of

Iraqi self-governance.

As Marines learned more about the AO, the insurgent

threat became more evident. For example, Marines

suspected that an Iraqi known informally as, “The Mad

Mortarman,” was supplying munitions and other support

to the insurgency.26 When they conducted a search of his

home near the Euphrates River, they found, among other

items, 16 artillery rounds, 22 mortar rounds, 10 grenades,

two RPG launchers and associated rounds, two AK-47

automatic rifles, 291 blasting caps, 15 landmine detonators, 

and a variety of Iraqi police and National Guard uniforms.

By early October, the insurgent influence in Hit had 

grown to such an extent that many wore uniforms identified 

with the insurgency, including black disdashis and scarves.

At checkpoints, they intimidated Hit’s citizens and police.

Even members of the Iraqi National Guard from Turbah

complained that insurgents would harass them, confiscating 

their weapons and money as they crossed the Hit bridge en

route to Camp Hit. 27 As the MEF prepared for operations in

Fallujah, the situation in Hit deteriorated rapidly.28 Natonski

learned how brazenly uniformed insurgents were operating

in Hit when they ambushed a convoy that was en route

from Blue Diamond to al Asad to pick up Natonski after a

meeting with the Secretary of Defense.29

On the morning of the ambush, construction on Route

Uranium required that the platoon at the Bronze-Uranium

Split divert all Coalition traffic to Route Bronze. At 

22
0700, as the 1st Marine Division’s Jump Command Post

approached TCP-1 in Hit, it was attacked by insurgents

firing three RPGs and hundreds of AK-47 rounds.30 The

personal security detachment (PSD) returned fire as they 

moved through the ambush, only to come under attack

again seconds later on the north side of the traffic circle. 

The second attack was synchronized, initiated by an IED

that was a triggered blast between the second and third

vehicles, followed by an RPG round and more AK-47 fire.

No Coalition forces were wounded, but the ambush

immediately raised Hit’s visibility at all levels of command.

As information on this ambush was passed among various

headquarters, Marines realized that things in Hit were not

as they had once seemed. Understanding the dynamics of

insurgent activity in Hit became an instant priority, and

1/23 responded with an operation that would come to be

known as the “Battle for Hit.”

The difference between what Marines expected to find 

in Hit and what they encountered in the coming days

demonstrated that the Coalition’s intelligence regarding

Hit was outdated.31 Many thought that Hit held a relatively

small number of insurgents. As a result, 1/23’s initial

response included sending a relatively small force, a

reinforced platoon, to initiate the operation. As the battalion

later learned, Hit contained at least 200 to 400 insurgents,

many of whom proved they were capable and professional

fighters by their tactics of firing and maneuvering.32 These

unknown forces included a well trained insurgent group

known as “The Strike Force,” that had come to Hit in

recent weeks.33 Subsequent intelligence revealed that The

Strike Force focused its attention on the traffic circle where 

the Division’s Jump CP was ambushed.34

Wanting to learn more about the city quickly, Stevens

initiated activities in Hit within hours, inserting three twoman sniper teams and a three-man counter-sniper team on

an elevated railroad trestle more than 500 meters west of

TCP-1.35 He also sent a reinforced platoon from Company

B to Turbah with two missions: check the Police Station,

which was suspected of having fallen into insurgents’

control, and establish a blocking position at the bridge

leading from Hit into Turbah. When the larger force swept

through Hit in the days that followed, Stevens wanted the

blocking position to prevent insurgents from fleeing into 

Turbah.36

Maj. Michael A. Miller, Company B’s commanding

officer, knew Turbah presented considerable dangers to 

the Coalition.37 While little was known about the number

of insurgents in Hit or Turbah, he sensed that one platoon,

even though reinforced, might be too small. He also knew

that if Marines in Turbah came under heavy attack, getting

reinforcements to that area would be difficult. The shortest 

route from al Asad to Turbah was through Hit, which

presented numerous ambush sites. Noting these concerns,

he asked to send a second platoon with the original force.

This request was denied because the rest of his company

was needed for the planned follow-on sweep through Hit.38

Knowing he was sending a relatively small force, Miller

ordered his First Platoon, lead by Capt. R. Shane “Skinny”

McGinty, to move to Turbah, clear the Police Station, and

establish the blocking position.39 In a significant decision 

that undoubtedly prevented several casualties, Miller

required McGinty to maneuver the platoon by a long

southerly route, traveling almost to Ramadi before crossing

the Euphrates. This allowed First Platoon to enter Turbah

from the south, avoiding Hit and the Hit bridge. While the

lengthy route gave McGinty only a short time to plan his

portion of the operation, it eliminated most of the threat of

ambush while providing his platoon with the element of

surprise.40 At 2200, just four hours after receiving a warning

order, McGinty loaded 53 Marines and corpsmen onto three

Humvees and three heavily armed seven-tons for a six-hour

trip to Turbah.

Hours later, as McGinty’s force approached Turbah,

1/23’s snipers observed a burst of insurgent activity near

TCP-1.41 A sniper team leader, Sgt. Byron Hancock,

reported that he saw five insurgents with weapons near 

TCP-1. Hancock’s snipers killed one insurgent, causing the

others to sink back into the city. Over the next few hours,

between 100 and 150 insurgents positioned themselves

along Route Bronze, primarily around the traffic circle, 

positioned to counter any attack that might come from the

west. In addition to being uniformed, Hancock said, these

insurgents appeared to be disciplined, well-organized, and

well-armed.

As Hancock’s snipers observed TCP-1, First Platoon

prepared to storm the Turbah police station. Since

intelligence indicated that insurgents might control the

station, McGinty wanted to be sure his Marines were ready

to fight.42 Halting short of the police station, McGinty’s

platoon dismounted and made final preparations. At 0410, 

most of his Marines charged into the Police Station, and

to their surprise, found only a few sleepy Iraqi policemen.

While this was in process, McGinty sent a Humvee loaded

with five Marines and a sailor to the Hit bridge so they 

could begin laying concertina and other obstacles. With

everything seemingly on track, Capt. McGinty instructed

his Human Exploitation Team (HET) to tell the Iraqi

policemen to hand over their weapons and go home until

the policemen received further instructions.

In retrospect, McGinty said, releasing the police at that

point was a mistake.43 There were close ties between some

police and the insurgency, and someone apparently warned

23
the insurgents of the Marines’ arrival.

Within minutes of releasing the police, Marines heard

Arabic instructions from a mosque loudspeaker a short

distance from the police station. Sounding nothing like the

chants the Marines had become accustomed to, the words

sounded more like a call to arms than a call to prayers.

Within a minute, McGinty’s Marines started taking fire.44

From the east, the small arms fire of 15 to 20 insurgents 

came from the area surrounding the Turbah mosque. From

the west, insurgents on the far side of the Euphrates were

firing RPGs and heavy machine guns from near the Sharqi 

Mosque, just up a hill from the point where the bridge

met Hit. While these fires originated 600 meters from the 

Turbah traffic circle, they worried McGinty much more 

than the small arms coming from the rear. There were

more insurgents across the river, their weapons were

more powerful, and they were firing over his team that 

had been positioning the concertina wire. When the firing 

started, two Marines immediately drove the Humvee back

to the traffic circle, but the remaining four were trapped. 

Assessing their predicament, they quickly dropped into

a covered position behind a low but substantial metal

abutment. Huddled in this cramped space as hundreds

of rounds impacted the other side, they knew they were

relatively safe but would have to move before daybreak.

By this time, McGinty had most of his platoon in a

perimeter around Turbah’s traffic circle. Except for snipers, 

the only force outside his perimeter was the team at the

bridge. With rounds coming from the east and west, he

also started to see muzzle flashes to the south, showing 

that an intrepid group of insurgents was trying to maneuver

through the thick palm groves. With fire coming from 

three sides, McGinty decided to ask for help. He told

the battalion’s operation center to send Company B’s

reinforcements, who were standing by at al Asad. Then

he asked for immediate close air support. The Vipers of

HMLA-169 had AH-1 Cobras and UH-1 Huey gunships

standing by to provide close air support from al Asad,

and they responded quickly to McGinty’s report that

his Marines were in combat in Hit. As a former Direct

Air Support Controller, he was familiar with helicopter

capabilities. Knowing that reinforcements were several

hours away, he focused on using helicopters to turn the

tide of battle. Forty minutes later, with no Forward Air

Controller to assist him,45 McGinty guided the helicopters

into the area and directed a series of strafing runs in 

the palm groves that essentially halted the insurgents’

progress.46 Under cover of the second Cobra run, the team

that had been stranded at the bridge sprinted 300 meters

back to the traffic circle so they could rejoin the rest of the 

platoon.

With all Marines accounted for, McGinty realized that

his platoon had survived the initial onslaught intact with

only one wounded. One Marine had taken a 7.62mm round

to his leg when moving the Humvee from the bridge to the

traffic circle, but no other injuries were reported. As more 

helicopters joined the attack, McGinty felt increasingly

comfortable with his position. As helicopters stopped

the insurgents’ progress, his Marines started picking off

insurgents, including some who had climbed palm trees to

try to get better fields of fire on the Marines.

The morning also was busy for Coalition snipers on the

west side of Hit. Looking through night vision devices, the

snipers quickly realized that the insurgents controlled Hit.47

When Hit came alive with pre-dawn fires directed towards 

the Bravo Marines in Turbah, Hancock’s snipers engaged

insurgents at TCP-1. His snipers immediately became

targets for a counter attack, and insurgents along Route

Bronze opened up with mortar and heavy machine gun fire.

“I had not expected them to return fire,” Hancock said. 

“We started taking them down with our M40 rifles, which 

drove them back into buildings and behind walls. Then we

brought out our 50-caliber rifles, which could fire through 

walls. After that, the insurgents backed up into buildings,

from which they could no longer provide accurate fires.”

By mid-morning, the threat to the snipers had increased

considerably, as insurgents near TCP-1 started to range

their positions. Hancock realized that they needed to be

withdrawn immediately. Within minutes of his request,

the snipers climbed aboard the trucks of a passing mobile

Photo By Cpl. Paul W. Leicht

Marine scout snipers Sgt. Byron Hancock (left) and 

Cpl. Geoffrey Flowers conduct surveillance from a 

rooftop during a foot patrol through a Ramadi area 

village with fellow reserve Marines with Company 

B, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, Dec. 27, 

2004. Near the end of their deployment, snipers 

like Hancock and Flowers are passing on valuable 

lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

24
assault platoon and sped away.

Company B’s Second Platoon, which was the first wave 

of reinforcements and included Miller, arrived shortly

thereafter in Turbah to augment McGinty’s beleaguered

force.48 Using the same southerly approach that McGinty

had used, they were met at the Turbah traffic circle by an 

immediate surge in small arms fire from the area around the 

Turbah mosque, police station, and a nearby neighborhood.

In a hurried update, McGinty told his company commander

that insurgents were using the Sharqi Mosque, with its tall

minaret providing an unobstructed view of Turbah, to direct

mortars onto his Marines. As they were speaking, Miller

and McGinty saw a series of mortar rounds “walk” up

the road, coming closer and closer until eventually a fiveround salvo hit the Turbah traffic circle.49 This prompted an

immediate and massive Marine barrage towards the Sharqi

Mosque, followed by a request to headquarters to allow the

jets or helicopters to bomb the mosque.

As Miller reorganized the Company B Marines, he

ordered McGinty to focus on controlling air support and

let the platoon sergeant run First Platoon.50 Miller then

dispatched a team to engage the insurgents to his rear,

halting harassing fire and enabling Company B to focus 

on the increasing threat posed by insurgents maneuvering

through the palm grove south of the road that connected the

Turbah traffic circle to the Hit bridge. Helicopter and small 

arms fire had not been able to stop the insurgents in the 

thick grove, so he requested support from the F-18s flying 

nearby.

“The aviators were very concerned because they

[Company B] already were ‘danger close [for dropping

ordnance from the aircraft],’” Miller said. “We told them

[the aviators] that the machine gun rounds they were

firing were not effective, so they [the F-18s] came in 

there with two passes. . . . They dropped a five hundred 

pounder approximately two hundred to two hundred and

twenty meters off our position, between [the Marines] and

the river, and followed up with two quick strafing runs 

by the helicopters. After that, fire on our side died down 

significantly.”

With insurgents shut down to the east and south, Miller

and McGinty focused on insurgent machine gun and mortar

fire reaching the traffic circle from the Sharqi Mosque. 

Engaging a mosque required high-level approval, and RCT7 demanded proof that the mosque was being used to fire 

on Marines. “We were still getting sniped at, and we were

still getting observed fire. At this point, we could see people 

on the walls of the mosque, and we were confident the fires 

were coming from there,” Miller said.51

With permission to engage the Sharqi Mosque, Miller

decided to first attack a machine gun position in a threestory building in front of the mosque. A Cobra helicopter

fired a Maverick missile into the building, prompting 

a huge secondary explosion that destroyed it, a second

building, and an ammunition site in a nearby street. This

series of explosions took the fight out of the insurgents, as 

fires from Hit essentially ceased.52

After viewing helicopter video later, Miller said the

Maverick’s effect was devastating. “You can see the

[three-story] building blow, and you can see the building

right behind the three-story building blow, almost like a

sympathetic detonation. Then you can see this humongous

explosion and fireball in a street right behind the second 

building. That’s where we think they had their mortars.”53

The first day in Turbah and Hit had been a major 

success, as Marines killed a number of insurgents while

sustaining only two relatively minor wounds. The turning

point, Miller said, was when the bombs cut off insurgents in

the palm grove and the Maverick missile silenced activity

from the Sharqi Mosque.

There was sporadic firing, but none of consequence as 

Marines continued to reduce insurgent positions in Hit.

The Regimental Commander drove to the Turbah traffic 

circle to review the situation, and by mid-afternoon Miller

had received two more platoons, Their Third Platoon

and RCT-7’s Quick Reaction Force. With the additional

firepower, Miller expanded his perimeter throughout the 

night, maneuvering two platoons through the palm groves

to the riverbank while sending one platoon to an elevated

position that allowed it to observe much of Turbah.54 With

continued support from helicopters and jets, Miller’s

Photo By Cpl. Paul W. Leicht

Seen through night vision gear, a machine gunner 

with 3rd Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 23rd 

Marine Regiment, is positioned for security during 

a nightly cordon and knock raid around Ramadi, 

Iraq, Dec. 23. The raid was part of a larger effort 

to maintain security and stability by disrupting the 

insurgency prior to elections.

25
Marines felt secure.

To prepare for the second day of operations, Stevens

ordered his snipers to move to Camp Hit, where they linked

up with approximately a dozen sniper teams from various

reconnaissance and special forces units.55 Hancock said the

teams returned to the railroad tracks early on the morning

of October 12, where they saw more than 10 insurgents

in the vicinity of TCP-1, carrying weapons and providing

clear evidence of hostile intent. Most wore black uniforms,

but some were wearing the uniform of Iraqi police.56

Hancock said these conditions made him feel like he was

participating in a “turkey shoot.”

“The insurgents knew where we were, and they were

firing at us,” he said. “There was a big athletic field on our 

side of the city, and it had a large cache where they would

go for weapons. We would drop them while they were

en route to the weapons cache, and also when they were

coming out. Sometimes they would pop out and shoot at us,

testing our accuracy, and we would take them there.”57

Hancock had two confirmed hits during this operation, 

one at 900 yards and the other at 960 yards. For one of

those, he said, his observer spotted an insurgent using a

scope to search for Coalition snipers. Hancock quickly

shot the insurgent, but after that, “the whole city opened

up on us, and a couple of our guys got hit in the face

with shrapnel from heavy machine gun rounds that

glanced off the nearby railroad tracks.”58 The sniper teams

were withdrawn, having accomplished their mission of

disrupting the insurgents.

For Company B, the second day was very quiet.59 Miller

had improved positions, pushing his Marines into areas

along the river that would allow them to control parts of

Hit by fire. While sniper teams engaged insurgents along 

Route Bronze and at TCP-1, Miller’s Marines saw few

armed men in the eastern side of Hit on the second day. By

approximately 1700, he said, RCT-7 ordered a cease fire in 

Hit and Turbah.

Tucker decided to use the third day to clear Hit. That

morning, his staff started negotiating an agreement

with Hit’s city counsel for a truce that would allow

noncombatants to leave Hit. In the late morning, elements

of 1/8 from Haditha Dam, reinforced by a company from

3rd LAR, started sweeping through Hit from TCP-1. Within

six hours, the task force had gone through Hit without a

single shot being fired by either insurgents or Coalition 

forces. To signal that it was secure, Tucker rode through Hit

and linked up with Company B on the Hit bridge.60 While

Marines hoped insurgents would try to test their blocking

position, the insurgents instead simply melted back into the

city.

The Battle for Hit was significant on several levels. On 

the ground, Marines were able to engage insurgents in a

large-scale force-on-force battle. Using combined arms

effectively and armed with superior equipment and training,

Marines were able to inflict significant damage on the 

insurgency while sustaining only minor wounds. For senior

Marine headquarters, however, the Battle for Hit served

as an ominous warning that there were many insurgent

activities, particularly along the Western Euphrates River

Valley, that were not clearly understood or appreciated by

the Coalition.

Soon after the Battle for Hit, Company B was able to

participate in I MEF’s assault on Fallujah in November.

Attached to 3rd Light Amphibious Reconnaissance

Battalion, Company B was part of a ground attack on

a peninsula surrounded on three sides by the Euphrates

River.61 At the tip of the peninsula was a hospital that

insurgents had used effectively during Operation Vigilant

Response, the battle for Fallujah the previous April. The

hospital was connected to Fallujah by a skeletal metal

bridge that had become infamous when insurgents strung

up the mutilated bodies of two Blackwater contractors

ambushed in Fallujah in March 2004.

1st Marine Division was determined to prevent

insurgents from using the hospital area again, so it sent

a combined force of Iraqi and American troops to secure

the peninsula before initiating the main effort. The attack

was designed to complete the isolation of Fallujah from

the west, while other units isolated the city from the east

and south.62 The 36th Iraqi Commando Battalion seized the

hospital. Some insurgents thought this was the main attack,

so they called their fighters to battle stations a full day 

before the real attack began from the north.63

During the Battle for Fallujah, Hancock received credit

for the longest confirmed sniper kills since the start of 

OIF, when he shot two forward observers for an insurgent

mortar team at 1,050 yards. This happened several days

into Operation al Fajr, after insurgents had worked

themselves into a position to the rear of 1/23’s positions

on the peninsula. Hancock said that an insurgent 120mm

mortar team had been firing occasional rounds in the 

vicinity of Company B, and finally dropped rounds near the 

company’s command post. Told to report to the company

commander, Hancock said that Miller pointed his finger 

at him and said, “You find that mortar team and you kill 

them!”64

Within days, he said, he and his observer, Cpl. Geoffrey

Flowers, found a five-man team dragging the 120mm 

mortar out of a house and setting up for another salvo at

Company B. Flowers immediately requested a fire mission 

from Company B’s 60mm mortars. As Flowers worked up

data for the requested fire mission, Hancock determined 

26
that his shot to the first forward observer would be from a 

distance of 1,050 yards. Three insurgents were operating

the mortar, and the other two were forward observers.

Working with Flowers, Hancock timed his first M-40 shot 

so it would be fired when the first mortar rounds, aimed 

at the nearby 120mm mortar tube, landed. Synchronizing

these events meant that the sound of the rifle fire would 

be lost in the mortar explosions, masking the fact that

insurgents were being targeted by snipers as well as

mortars.

The first salvo of mortars missed the insurgents by 200 

meters, but Hancock’s first shot was dead on, dropping 

the first observer immediately. As Flowers struggled to 

adjust the mortars, Hancock told him to have the mortar

team shift 200 meters to the right. Within seconds, the next

salvo was en route, and Hancock again used the sound of

the exploding mortar rounds to conceal his fire. His second 

shot dropped the other forward observer, while at the same

time the 60mm mortar rounds found their targets, killing

the three insurgents who made up the 120mm mortar

team.65

Other Operations

While the Battle for Hit clearly was 2/23’s most

significant action during the deployment, the battalion 

also participated in a number of other operations. As part

of a province-wide effort to increase security, 1st Marine

Division launched Operation River Blitz in February,

2005. While much of River Blitz was focused in Ramadi,

it included activities in Hit and Haditha. Hancock was

tasked with conducting counter-sniper operations in Hit to

eliminate a sniper who was subsequently determined to be

of Syrian origin.66 Hancock said that the sniper had been

shooting at coalition forces and causing problems in Hit for

some time.

Hancock’s team was inserted into Hit on February

22, and they were impressed with their opponent’s

training. “He was using hide sites effectively and moving

frequently,” Hancock said. “He might fire only a few 

rounds each day, but he had killed several people in the

vicinity of Hit.”67

Hancock spent two days observing the sniper and trying

to consider the situation from his opponent’s perspective.

This exercise allowed Hancock to figure out where a sniper 

would position himself to target Coalition forces from

Hit. After taking the time to gain a clear understanding

of his opponent, he said, accomplishing the mission was

simply a matter of patience. Hancock’s team spent long

hours searching for their prey. The Syrian sniper helped by

firing a round in their direction. Knowing the approximate 

direction and distance to the hide site, they were able to

spot the enemy’s hide site later that day.

The following morning, the Syrian made the mistake of

returning to the same hide site. That, Sgt. Hancock said,

proved to be a fatal mistake.

As the Syrian peered through his scope at possible

Coalition targets, Hancock caught the glimmer of a

reflection off the scope. With this fix on the sniper’s 

position, he prepared for a shot. Within minutes, the sniper

fired one round. Hancock immediately fired one of his own, 

killing the sniper. Approximately an hour later, he said, six

men in black dishdashas came to the hide site and carried

off the remains of the sniper. Hancock reported that the

residents of Hit expressed their relief that the insurgent

sniper had been killed.

27
3rd Battalion

25th Marines

3rd Battalion, 25th Marines came to Iraq during a

period of great transition.1Almost two years after the

fall of Baghdad and more than a year after Marines

had returned in force to Iraq, it was clear that the three

Marine regimental combat teams (RCTs) were fighting 

remarkably different battles in their respective sectors of

the Anbar Province. Insurgents used different methods of

opposing the Coalition and fledgling Iraqi government. 

Some emplaced IEDs or targeted U.S. forces and civilian

contractors. Others kidnapped and intimidated officials 

and religious leaders who were assisting the Coalition.

Throughout the country, vastly different types and levels

of progress were being reported. In addition to these

challenges, almost all Marine staffs and units, from force

and division to battalions and squadrons, were in the midst

of a major turnover.2

During 3/25’s tour, from March to September of 2005,

the Marine Corps adjusted its approach to account for the

different experiences RCTs were reporting. A successful

operation in Fallujah the previous November allowed

Marines to reallocate some forces to the Western Euphrates

River Valley. 3/25’s parent command, RCT-2, began to

focus on river cities and insurgent havens along traditional

trade routes between Baghdad and the Syrian border.

When RCT-2 took over in March, its mission was to

disrupt insurgent activity throughout the area. This required

RCT-2 to obtain a clearer understanding of what had been

a relatively ambiguous intelligence and operational picture.

As an economy of force operation, it had 3,200 Marines

and Sailors for an area stretching over 30,000 square miles.

Early operations focused on determining the location of

insurgents in order to create opportunities for targeting Al

Qaeda in Mesopotamia networks. Other missions included

countering the IED threat, keeping the Main Supply Routes

(MSRs) open, and conducting counterinsurgency (COIN)

operations to enhance security and set the stage for the

introduction of Iraqi forces when they became available.

The incoming staffs, which had more time to prepare

for the deployment than their predecessors, brought an

increased sense of aggressiveness to counter-insurgency

operations. In the Sunni-dominated region that stretched

from Ramadi to the Syrian border, Col. Stephen W. Davis,

the RCT-2 commander, clearly wanted to “poke the hornets

nests” to determine where insurgents were located and how

they would respond.

Davis gave 3/25 an AO that extended from south of

Hit to north of the Haditha Dam. Directed to leave a rifle 

company at al Asad for base security, 3/25’s commander,

Lt. Col. Lionel Urquhart, had enough manpower to put a

reinforced rifle company at both Camp Haditha Dam, near 

the major city of Haditha in the northwest, and Camp Hit,

near the city of Hit in the southeast.3These two cities were

the anchors of his area of operations, connected by a chain

of villages along the west side of the Euphrates River, and

the occasional village on the east side. Urquhart placed

his battalion headquarters at Camp Haditha Dam and

divided Weapons Company and Headquarters and Services

Company between the two bases. This disposition allowed

him to focus on insurgent-controlled areas while trying to

keep MSR Uranium, and to some degree MSR Bronze,

clear of IEDs.

3/25 conducted most of its patrols and operations on

the west side of the Euphrates River because Coalition

bases, MSRs, and population centers were on that side and

because few bridges could handle heavy military vehicles.

Significant operational concerns, like how long it would 

take for a quick reaction force to respond to an attack,

limited the number of times 3/25 inserted Marines on the

east side. Davis encouraged his battalions to work on the

east side of the Euphrates because so little was known

about the area, but as a practical matter, it was simply more

difficult and dangerous to operate there.

While 3/25 faced a daunting series of missions, Urquhart

had a force sufficient to keep Marines on the roads and 

eventually clear Hit of insurgents and establish two bases

within the former insurgent stronghold.4

Operation al-Fajr, conducted in Fallujah just five months 

before 3/25’s arrival, had prompted many insurgents, like

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to move to smaller cities along the

Euphrates River Valley. In an effort to bring more attention

to the area between Baghdad and Syria, Davis planned to

aggressively use his battalions to test the insurgency and

determine the locations of major networks. He also planned

to use embedded media to bring attention to the region by

describing how smaller villages on the Euphrates River

Valley west of Ramadi had become home to many highvalue insurgents and their operations.5

One of 3/25’s primary missions was maintaining security

28
along MSRs and roads near the Euphrates, from just

south of Hit to just north of the Hadithah Dam. The Anbar

Province is the most sparsely populated part of Iraq, with

most of its 1.8 million people6living in villages along the

fertile land next to the Euphrates River.7With the river,

roads, and open desert providing easy mobility, the region

had been a smugglers’ paradise for centuries. Insurgents

took advantage of this by preparing weapons caches and

safe houses throughout the region.8Insurgents, especially

foreign fighters who typically crossed into Iraq from Syria, 

conducted vicious murder and intimidation campaigns

against citizens in the river towns.

Before 3/25 arrived, Reserve Marines from 1/23 had

been stretched thin along this section of the Euphrates,

conducting an economy of force mission that grew in

importance as the numbers of IEDs and casualties grew.9

In previous rotations, Marines patrolled from a few large

and very secure bases. Establishing a presence in a cleared

village was not possible because of the limited number of

available troops. When Davis took charge of this region,

he wanted insurgents to know things had changed and they

would not find this area to be an uncontested sanctuary. He 

also wanted to disrupt insurgent operations by changing any

patterns that might have been inadvertently set by previous

Coalition units. He planned to cut off the insurgents’

lifeline along the Euphrates, in part by establishing a

Marine presence in certain cities and villages.

Operation River Bridge

Davis immediately put 3/25 to work during the turnover

phase, instructing Urquhart to conduct the battalion’s

first operation in country. Considered relatively low-risk, 

Operation River Bridge was designed to get Marines out of

the camps and onto the MSRs, familiarizing 3/25 with the

area while masking the scheduled rotations of Marines at

every echelon.10

“Colonel Davis said he was going to work us hard,

and that we would be exhausted by the time we got back

home. He was true to his word,” Urquhart said. With his

smaller battlespace, Urquhart felt he had sufficient assets to 

keep insurgents off balance by increasing the number and

aggressiveness of operations.11

This aggressiveness, coupled with as a series of unusual

events, led to a significant number of casualties.12 In the

first three years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, no other 

battalion, active or reserve, had suffered such losses. With

Marines primarily from Ohio, New York, West Virginia,

Oklahoma, and Texas, 3/25 became known as the battalion

that lost 49 Marines and sailors13 by the end of its sevenmonth deployment. The battalion experienced its first 

fatality during Operation River Bridge, when Cpl. Brian

Richardson, a popular radio operator for Company K,

was killed when the Humvee he was a passenger in struck

a mine.14 Four others were injured in this explosion just

outside Camp Hit,15a deserted Iraqi military base that had

been converted for use by several hundred Marines and

Iraqi National Guardsmen.

Urquhart said Richardson’s death reinforced the fact

that every corner of 3/25’s area of operations carried a

possibility of death or injury, even the relatively secure

base camps.

“While Cpl. Richardson’s death did not stop us, it

definitely brought home the reality of what we were doing,” 

Urquhart said. “The battalion was saddened by his death,

but we drove on. We had known it was a real possibility

that we were going to take casualties going into Iraq. On

the whole, Cpl. Richardson’s death only made us more

resolved, as we were not going to be intimidated. He was

our first, but we knew he was not going to be our last.”16

Three weeks later, Cpl. Michael B. Lindemuth was killed

by a mortar round.17 An active-duty Marine on Weapons

Company’s Inspector-Instructor staff, he was killed when a

120mm mortar landed in Camp Hit’s motor pool.

Operation Outer Banks

During April, the Battalion participated in a number

of smaller operations collectively known as Operation

Outer Banks.18 With the general missions of interdicting

insurgents, locating caches, and clearing villages,

the battalion conducted a series of three and four

day operations in Barwanah, Baghdadi, Abu Hyatt,

Muhammadi, Kubasyah, Haditha, and Haqlaniyah. In

addition to throwing insurgents off stride, Outer Banks

was designed to show Iraqis that Marines were stepping

up operations throughout the Hit-Haditha Corridor.

Urquhart said that after Outer Banks, insurgents knew that

the Coalition had more Marines in the region and were

determined to prevail. To an Iraqi population forced to

hedge its bets, walking a fine line between Coalition and 

insurgent forces, the activity seemed reassuring. Operation

Outer Banks had a strong impact on the insurgency,

Urquhart said, as scores of insurgents were detained,

hundreds were forced to flee, and dozens were killed. The 

most significant aspect of Outer Banks was that insurgents 

were driven out of one of their strongpoints in the village of

Haqlaniyah, south of Haditha.

Ambush at Haditha Hospital

As they became more active throughout the area, 3/25

29
Marines accepted that they were fighting a determined 

insurgency with some innovative foreign fighters. While 

adhering to the Coalition’s Rules of Engagement and the

laws of war, their experiences quickly taught them that

insurgents were not constrained by such restrictions. That

fact was driven home on May 7, when Mobile Assault

Platoon (MAP) 7, a heavy weapons team that Urquhart

frequently traveled with, was hit by a complex attack that

included a “suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive

device” (SVBIED), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and

small arms. The attack came from prepared positions in

the Haditha Hospital, after insurgents ordered patients and

doctors away from the front of the building.19

MAP 7 consisted of 16 Marines and one corpsman

loaded into three Humvees and one seven-ton truck. Two of

the vehicles were armed with M240 7.62mm machine guns,

one with a 50-caliber machine gun, and one with a Mark

19 grenade launcher. During the evening, MAP 7 went to

Haditha as the Quick Response Force (QRF), with orders

to clear an area from which insurgents had been firing on 

Marines. Following two tanks, MAP 7 reached the city’s

center as night fell. Finding the narrow street blocked by

a vehicle and other obstacles, the Marines recognized the

signs of a prepared ambush.

Many Marines got out of their vehicles to provide

additional security and mobility as the vehicles were turned

around. Suddenly, a van wheeled into their midst from an

alley beside the Haditha Hospital. It exploded between

two vehicles, killing three Marines and seriously injured

several others.20 As Marines recovered from the blast,

RPGs, machine guns and small arms fire rained down from 

several positions, mostly from within the hospital, killing

the MAP’s corpsmen.21

Amid the chaos of a burning Humvee and heavy fires, 

Cpl. Jeffrey Schuller stepped into his Humvee’s turret to

replace his wounded gunner, Lance Cpl. Mark Kalinowski.

Over the next ten minutes, Schuller pumped out 750 rounds

of 7.62mm ammunition from the M240 machine gun, firing 

primarily into the hospital. These lengthy bursts exceeded

the gun’s capabilities, particularly in a hot environment.

But Schuller felt he had no choice, and was surprised that

the machine gun never malfunctioned. When it was time

to reload, he would fire the M-16 Kalinowski handed him 

until the injured Marine could get a new ammunition belt

into the machine gun.

While the two tanks positioned themselves for a hasty

departure, Marines discovered that only the MAP’s seventon had any chance of moving. It had three flat tires, 

an empty radiator, no headlights, and a dashboard with

warning lights blinking like a Christmas tree. As bad as

it seemed, the fact that it could move meant it was better

than the other three vehicles. With Schuller providing

machine gun cover, the few healthy Marines started

dodging fire to load their wounded friends on the truck. In 

addition to three dead Marines, they carried several with

life-threatening wounds. A staff sergeant with a tourniquet

around one thigh realized that both legs were bleeding

badly. With all but one body recovered and Schuller

providing M-16 fire from the seven-ton’s cab, Lance Cpl. 

Todd Corbin drove through the dark streets of Haditha to

the Haditha Dam to get medical assistance.22 A follow-on

QRF reached the scene of the ambush within minutes,

recovered the last Marine, and cleared the hospital of the

few remaining insurgents.

This was 3/25’s first major loss. It affirmed two lessons 

of insurgent warfare: expect the unexpected, and don’t

expect the enemy to follow the rules.

Operation Matador

On the night MAP 7 was ambushed, Company L Marines

were at Camp al Qa’im, in the final stages of preparing for 

a regimental operation. Davis designed Operation Matador

to use elements of his two infantry battalions, 3/2 and 3/25,

for a major sweep into the Ramana section on the north side

of the Euphrates.23 No Coalition forces had been in this area

for more than six months. Davis attached 3/25’s Company

L to 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, under the command of Lt.

Col. Timothy S. Mundy.24

The Ramana area is a series of villages starting near

the Syrian border and running along the north shore of the

Euphrates River for approximately 20 kilometers. Since

Photo By Cpl. Ken Melton

Sgt. James A. Angelone, a squad leader with 

Company K, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, watches as 

his younger brother, Pfc. Francis B. Angelone, sights 

in a potential threat during a mission.

30
most Iraqis lived on the south side of the Euphrates and

only one bridge in the region was capable of carrying heavy

military vehicles, the Coalition kept most missions on the

south side of the Euphrates. This allowed insurgents to use

the north side as a sanctuary, with little threat of Coalition

interference as they stored weapons, moved throughout the

region, and prepared for future operations. With Operation

Matador, Davis wanted to change that dynamic. Borrowing

elements from the Army’s 20th Engineer Brigade, Davis

instructed Mundy to set up a pontoon bridge to cross the

Euphrates near the farming village of Ubaydi.25 Once

across, the Marines were to sweep through Ramana to the

Syrian border. Supported by tanks, Amtracks, LARs, and a

powerful mixture of jets and helicopters, Mundy planned

to lead with two heavily reinforced companies, K, 3/2 and

L,3/25.

Mundy moved his massive force from al Qa’im to

Ubaydi at night so Army engineers could position heavy

equipment by first light.26 Building the 200-meter bridge

was scheduled to take only a few hours, but soft sand

thwarted that timeline.27 At 0800, as hundreds of Marines

waited impatiently in the open desert, the lead elements

came under fire from mortars and small arms from New 

Ubaydi, a modern village. The harassing fires had little 

effect on the waiting Marines, but after two hours of

intensifying fires, and with a sense that bridge would 

not be ready soon, Mundy and his operations officer, 

Maj. John Day, decided to deal with New Ubaydi. As the

fires continued, Mundy cleared his plan with Davis, then 

instructed the companies to prepare to conduct a limited

objective attack on New Ubaydi.

New Ubaydi crowded several hundred homes in a space

no larger than a square mile. While not known as a safe

haven, Marines quickly learned that it contained scores of

insurgents, including dozens of well-trained foreign fighters 

capable of fighting a withdrawing action.28 For many

Marines, this first taste of intense combat seemed chaotic, 

with heavy fires coming from all directions. Their leaders 

orchestrated the movements of the reinforced companies,

coordinating air cover from helicopters and jets. Some

insurgents tried to flee by boarding small boats to cross the 

river. These movements were seen with unmanned aerial

vehicles, allowing RCT-2 to cut them off with tactical

aircraft.

Both companies conducted house-to-house fighting to 

clear their assigned sections of New Ubaydi. 1st Sgt. Dan

Altieri of Company L described the New Ubaydi battle as

an “up-close fight,” with Marines throwing hand grenades 

and using point-and-shoot techniques throughout the builtup area. While many houses contained only women and

children, Marines frequently encountered teams of five or 

six insurgents in the streets or on the roofs. Using prepared

positions, insurgents would fire long bursts, then abandon 

both weapons and their position when ammunition ran

low.29 From narrow village streets or rooftops, they would

move to new positions and re-engage. As Altieri moved

through the city, he was surprised by the inexhaustible

supply of new AK-47 assault rifles and RPK machine guns 

available to the insurgents. This was challenging, he said,

because Marines would think they had worn down a team,

only to find that it had moved to another position with a 

fresh supply of weapons and ammunition.

Altieri said Marine snipers proved to be crucial in New

Ubaydi.30 Establishing positions on rooftops, snipers fired 

on insurgents maneuvering through streets. In some cases,

they engaged insurgents moving towards other Marine

positions before the other Marines even knew of the

threat. As the fight progressed, snipers adopted the tactic 

of jumping from roof to roof, which in many cases were

separated by only a few feet. The snipers also flushed out 

many insurgents who were then fired upon by helicopters.

Company L took no significant casualties for most of 

the day, but this good fortune ran out when a squad from

1st Platoon approached what had been designated as the

“last house” for the day. It was not until the next day that

Marines realized the house had been prepared in a way they

had never seen before, allowing insurgents to fire armor 

piercing rounds up through the cement floor.31 When the

first fireteam entered the house, Cpl. Dustin A. Derga was 

killed by an armor piercing round to his back and two other

Marines and a corpsman were wounded.32

Not knowing where the fires were coming from, Staff 

Sgt. Anthony L. Goodwin, Derga’s platoon sergeant, and

Lance Cpl. Mark Camp went in to clear the house. Their

initial bursts flushed out two insurgents, who were brought 

down outside the house by fire from nearby Marines. As 

Goodwin and Camp worked their way through the house,

they saw a staircase with a short closet underneath it. Camp

fired a burst into the closet through its door, but when Staff 

Sgt. Goodwin opened the door, he was met with a hail of

bullets that came up from the floor.33

Marines realized the foreign fighters in the house had 

planned to fight to their death. At some point, the enemy 

started screaming, “Allahu Akbar” (“God is great”) as they

fired rounds with enough punch to cut through the floor and 

walls, threatening Marines outside the house.34

Still unsure of the enemy’s location in the house,

Marines had a tank fire seven main gun rounds into it. 

With Marines still hearing voices in the house as darkness

approached, they called for an F/A-18 to silence the

insurgents with two 500-pound bombs.35 The first failed to 

explode and the second missed the house. That night, as

31
Marines tried to make sense of what had happened, they

could still hear the occasional taunt of “Allahu Akbar,”

which eventually faded out during the night.

The following morning, Marines destroyed sections

of the house with two SMAW rounds.36 As they walked

through the rubble, they discovered that positions had been

prepared in the crawl space under the closet. In essence,

the enemy had dug their own shallow graves that allowed

them to fire up through the floor.37 Seeing two bodies in the

space, Marines tossed in a final grenade to ensure that there 

were no survivors. By dawn’s light, Marines could see how

the armor-piercing rounds and a few small aiming holes cut

into the floor had allowed insurgents to create fields of fire 

from below.

This surprise from Operation Matador convinced

embedded reporters that foreign fighters were a significant 

force.38 Physical characteristics of the dead, as well as

expensive equipment that included body armor, suicide

vests, and other sophisticated explosives, convinced Altieri

that Company L’s Marines had fought the “A Team” of

foreign fighters.39

For Company L Marines, Altieri said, New Ubaydi

marked a turning point.

“This is where the Marines became combat warriors,”

he said. “Before, in places like Haditha and Barwanah, the

fighting was a hundred or two hundred meters away. There 

were no close engagements. In New Ubaydi, Marines were

getting confirmed kills from ten feet away. We were firing 

and maneuvering, with Marines throwing hand grenades

within ten or twenty meters at the insurgents, punching

through houses. One of our snipers got seven confirmed 

kills that day. In my opinion, he saved a lot of Marines,

because he picked off insurgents as they were maneuvering.

That’s where a lot of these point-blank encounters

happened. Lucky for us, our Marines were quicker at the

trigger.40

“Under those extreme conditions, [the Marines] fought

ferociously and courageously,” Altieri said. “You could

not ask for anything more of a unit. Even after they got

wounded, they were willing to expose themselves to small

arms fire and machine gun fire to save their buddies by 

pulling them out of the line of fire.”41

Lt. Col. Mundy also was impressed with the way the

Reserve Marines kept going after they took casualties in

New Ubaydi.

“Death is a wake up call, reminding you that what you’re

doing is real. While it takes you back a little bit, [Company

L] kept pressing,” Mundy said. “They had to go into the

rubble of one building and dig out the body of one of their

Marines, which has got to be a tough thing to do. But they

packed up, rolled across the river and then covered a lot of

area on the northern side.”42

With the bridge ready and no further opposition from

New Ubaydi, Marines moved across the Euphrates on May

9. They encountered little resistance, but found plenty of

improvised explosive devices and weapons caches. First

Platoon, still recovering from the deaths of Goodwin and

Derga, received a new platoon sergeant the following

day. Staff Sgt. Kendall H. Ivy II eagerly responded to a

requirement to fill the vacant position left by Goodwin’s 

death. As an experienced infantry Marine, Ivy was

comfortable taking his position in the troop commander’s

hatch. He addressed his platoon the first day, but never 

met many of his Marines. The next day, as Company L

moved to a village near the Syrian border, an IED made

from artillery shells exploded under his Amtrack. It blew

Staff Sgt. Ivy out of the troop commander’s hatch, cut

a two-foot-wide hole in the thick armor, and created an

inferno that fired off other ordinance in the Amtrack.43 Four

Marines died at the scene, and two more, including Ivy,

died shortly thereafter.

Hundreds of Marines from dozens of units participated

in Operation Matador, but fate seemed determined to

destroy one squad, the First Squad of Company L’s First

Platoon. These Marines had already lost their platoon

sergeant and a team leader just three short days before.

When Ivy’s Amtrack was destroyed, the blast killed or

injured all remaining members. At that point, Mundy

ordered all of First Platoon to return to Camp al Qa’im until

First Squad could be reconstituted.44

While Operation Matador was devastating for Company

L, Lt. Col. Mundy and Lt. Col. Urquhart agreed that it was

significant on several levels. First, it turned large numbers 

of Marines into battle-hardened fighters.45 As both 3/2 and

3/25 encountered many short-range firefights over the next 

four months, the gritty lessons learned in New Ubaydi and

Ramana proved invaluable. Second, it cleared a part of Iraq

that had been untouched during the previous six months.

Finally, the Coalition acquired a great deal of intelligence

from an eight-vehicle MAP that Mundy had placed on the

south side of the Euphrates, across from Ramana.

The MAP was positioned near the base of the “Golden

Gate Bridge” that linked Ramana on the north to Karabilah

on the south. Insurgents from Ramana were expected to

flee across this bridge. The MAP Marines confirmed that 

the “Golden Gate Bridge” was a vital conduit between

planning and preparation cells in Ramana and their

operational area in the more heavily populated southern

side of the river.46 While most Marines saw little action in

Ramana, the MAP’s operation helped lay the groundwork

for Operation Spear, a cordon and clear operation in

Karabilah that Mundy calls his battalion’s most important

32
activity.

Operation New Market

The Battalion’s next operation was in Haditha, just a

few miles south of its headquarters at the Haditha Dam.

Operation New Market was a battalion-sized operation,

involving companies L and K from 3/25 and Company

K from 3/2. It was designed to clear a portion of Haditha

where Map 7 had been ambushed on May 7. Wellplanned and seemingly on track, Operation New Market

encountered difficulty from the most unexpected source – a 

dog.

Altieri said the plan called for Company L Marines to

drive into the desert at night, dismount four kilometers

from western outskirts of Haditha, and maneuver in

darkness to the center of the city.47 Company Lwas to be

in place when the city began stirring that morning, to look

for caches and insurgents among the surprised residents.

Things were on track at 4:00 a.m., with Marines only 250

meters from the objective, when a dog suddenly awoke and

attacked one of the Marines.

Capt. Billy Brown, 2nd Platoon Commander, was within

meters of the Marine. “The dog was awakened by a squad

of Marines walking next to it,” he said. “It panicked and

attacked. The Marine had no choice in the matter.”48

The single shot that silenced the dog awakened the rest

of the neighborhood. Altieri heard the voice of a very angry

Iraqi reverberate in the narrow street, then the sound of a

bolt of a weapon sliding forward. Altieri saw a man armed

with an AK-47 step out of a house 10 yards from him, and

he responded with two quick rounds to the Iraqi’s chest.49

Other Iraqis soon began firing.

The battalion took its first casualty when a bullet 

shattered the hip of Capt. Raymond S. Lopes, the

company’s forward air controller. While Lopes was being

pulled to safety, Brown’s Marines found themselves in a

vicious fight, taking fire from both sides of the road as well 

as nearby rooftops. Since the firefight seemed to involve 

only local Iraqis armed with AK-47 assault rifles, both 

Altieri and Brown eventually concluded that it was nothing

more than a shootout with an angry neighborhood.50

Photo By Cpl. Ken Melton

An unidentified Company L Marine climbs over a wall so he can advance in his mission in Karabilah during 

Operation Spear.

33
Whatever its cause, Company L Marines were taking heavy

fire from multiple locations.

Accustomed to clearing urban buildings, Brown ordered

Sgt. David N. Wimberg to clear a nearby house that was

spitting a heavy volume of AK-47 rounds at Marines.

As Wimberg and a fireteam were approaching the door, 

a Marine kicked the door three times before Wimberg

pushed the handle to open it. When he opened the door,

his team walked into an intense barrage, and a round

penetrated Wimberg’s shoulder and lodged in his chest.51

Altieri and others immediately pulled Wimberg into a

nearby courtyard. Marines silenced nearby fires with two 

fragmentation grenades, then turned to treating the injured

Marine. Establishing a casualty collection point, Altieri

helped medevac Wimberg and Lopes from Haditha, only to

learn later that Wimberg died.52

While off to an unexpected start, Operation New Market

continued in Haditha for several days, as Marines cleared

the area and secured several weapons caches.

Months later, Brown would shake his head in amazement

when describing the losses caused by a startled dog. From

his perspective, he said, it might have started over nothing

more than a dead dog and its angry owner.

Cpl. Allen Payne of 2nd Platoon said Sgt. Wimberg’s

death brought to the surface the frustration and tension that

Marines felt while working in a nation where they did not

seem appreciated or wanted.53

“The Iraqi people really don’t care if we are in control

or if the insurgents are in control,” he said. “It is really

frustrating to know that I am here in [their] country, [their]

town, and risking my life for [them], and [they] don’t even

want to help me in any way.”54

Operation River Sweep

After New Market, elements of the battalion set their

sights on Operation River Sweep, designed to locate

weapons caches that had been taken from Ammunition

Supply Point (ASP) Dulab, an Iraqi ammunition point.55

Led by a Royal Marine commando, Maj. Richard Maltby,

the task force originally consisted of Marines from

Company K and two Weapons Company MAPS, but

two platoons from Company I were added to exploit the

operation’s early success.

Stocked while Saddam Hussein was in power, ASP

Dulab was on the west side of a bend in the Euphrates.

A team of American engineers had been tasked with

destroying ASP Dulab in 2003, but it held so much more

ammunition than expected that their plan to destroy it

with explosives did more to spread the artillary than

contain it. Although some ordnance had been subsequently

destroyed by civilian contractors, thousands of artillery

shells, rockets, and other arms was spread over 10 square

kilometers. As a result, the ASP essentially served as a

supply point for insurgents, or their proxies, who would dig

up rounds at night, transport them across the Euphrates, and

hide them for future use. Before Operation River Sweep,

Urquhart said, the area on the east side of the Euphrates

had not seen Coalition forces for some time.56 The task

force was inserted 30 kilometers northeast of Camp Hit,

and in the ensuing days its Marines walked around the bend

on the east side of the river. While River Sweep included

searching houses and collecting intelligence, much of the

operation was simply walking through fields and looking 

for evidence of weapons caches.

Lance Cpl. Stefan J. Whiteway of Company I said that

River Sweep called for Marines to line up abreast of each

other and patrol for kilometer after kilometer, looking for

things that seemed out of place.57 In addition to clearing

each house, he said, this meant checking fields for fresh 

dirt. His major contribution was spotting one corner of

a field that ultimately yielded several hundred 155mm 

artillery rounds. Whiteway said he was on patrol when

he noticed what looked like a piece of pipe. After kicking

away some dirt, he realized it might be ordnance. An

engineer with a metal detector determined that Whiteway’s

round was only one of a large field of artillery rounds 

buried a few inches below the surface. Since there were too

many rounds to destroy in the field, Whiteway’s reward for 

spotting the first round included spending the rest of his day 

loading artillery rounds onto seven-ton trucks.58

Operation River Sweep was an unqualified success, 

allowing 3/25 to clear terrain where there had been little

Coalition activity since the beginning of the war. Since

most of 3/25’s operations were on the west side of the

Euphrates, the element of surprise provided Marines with

a relatively risk-free way of locating numerous weapons

caches.59

Operation Spear

Following up on intelligence that Karabilah, near the

Syrian border, was a focus of insurgent operations, Davis

again teamed up 3/25’s Company L with 3/2’s Company

K for Operation Spear. Karabilah, which included the

southern end of the “Golden Gate Bridge,” was central to

insurgent activity in the region.

Designed as a major “cordon and knock” operation in

the al Qa’im region, Operation Spear became what Mundy

considered 3/2’s most important operation.60

“We were confident that it was a headquarters or strong 

point for the insurgents, and Regiment felt that we needed

34
to go back into Karabilah,” Mundy said.61

This assault by a reinforced battalion against an

insurgency headquarters was expected to meet significant 

resistance. Intelligence showed that there were large

numbers of foreign fighters working from Karabilah. Much 

like what Marines had done previously in Fallujah, Mundy

conducted a psychological operations program involving

leaflets and loudspeakers, telling all Karabilah residents 

that Marines were coming soon and noncombatants should

leave via certain routes to avoid the fight. While some left, 

many remained, displaying a pillow case, much like a white

banner, as the Marines approached.

Mundy characterized Operation Spear as a “run-andgun” battle between Coalition forces and insurgents,

with many insurgents conducting a determined delaying

operation. Both companies experienced significant 

resistance as they cleared houses in their respective sectors.

“We knew, because of the resistance that we encountered,

that there must be something very important to the

insurgents,” he said.62

Operation Spear uncovered the following:63

– A regional command and control headquarters for 

the insurgency. Marines found computers, passports, and

other information that described the insurgency’s training

and operational focus. This included information that

demonstrating that many of the insurgents were foreign

fighters.

– A torture house in which four Iraqis were found 

chained to a wall, having been beaten by insurgents.

A CNN camera team embedded with Lt. Col. Mundy’s

battalion broadcast this image of insurgent brutality to the

world.

– A program by insurgents to convert an elementary 

school into a weapons storage facility, with bomb-making

instructions on chalkboard.

– An elementary school that had been converted by 

insurgents as a training facility for bomb making and other

insurgent activities. Portions of the school had become a

weapons and ammunition storage facility.

– A four-bay garage that was a factory for preparing 

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs).

Intelligence showed that Karabilah had a VBIED factory

at a site that looked like an assembly line with a used car

lot. Mundy directed that his tank platoon, reinforced by a

platoon from Company L, raid the facility. After the tanks

knocked down walls, Marines saw cars with loose wires

and other indications of bomb-making equipment. Mundy

let tanks destroy much of the facility, including six vehicles

being prepared with explosives. Marine aircraft destroyed

similar facilities in other parts of Karabilah. In all, 23

vehicles in various stages of readiness, along with bombmaking equipment, were destroyed.

Mundy estimated that Operation Spear resulted in

the death of 20 to 30 insurgents. Its true value, he said,

was evidenced by the fierce delaying action that many 

insurgents fought as they pushed out of Karabilah. Their

actions helped him understand the significance of the 

insurgent headquarters to activities throughout the region.

An ancillary benefit was that Operation Spear 

demonstrated to U.S. media representatives that foreigners

and jihadists were fighting in western Iraq.64 Skeptical

reporters who had not been convinced by what they had

seen in Operation Matador understood that they could not

refute proof that included passports, travel records, and

computer files.

Operation Sword

As Company L completed Operation Spear with 3/2 in

June, Company I was relieved of its duties at al Asad by an

Army unit and allowed to rejoin 3/25. An Iraqi Army unit

also joined RCT-2 and 3/25, a move that many considered

vital to the Coalition’s counterinsurgency efforts. With

more forces than he had controlled since coming to Iraq,

Urquhart felt ready for an order he received from Davis to

have 3/25 establish a combined and permanent presence

in Hit.65 A primary goal was to signal the Coalition’s

determination to remain in charge of Hit.66 Davis said

he expected five companies, including one Iraqi Army 

company, to clear the insurgent-infested city.67 More

importantly, Davis wanted Urquhart’s battalion to establish

two firm bases inside Hit, to be occupied by American 

Marines and Iraqi soldiers. This was a first step in RCT-2’s 

counter-insurgency campaign plan, and the first opportunity 

to introduce the “new” Iraqi Army to this section of the

Anbar Province.

For a battalion that had experienced many tragedies,

Operation Sword was a welcome success. Amassing forces

at Al Asad and Camp Hit that included two reinforced

Marine rifle companies, much of 3/25’s Weapons Company, 

one light armored reconnaissance (LAR) company, one

U.S. Army mechanized infantry company, and the Iraqi

Army company, Urquhart maneuvered the task force in

a way that caught insurgents so flatfooted that few shots 

were fired.68 Realizing that Hit was an attractive target,

insurgents oriented their defenses towards Camp Hit to

the north. They emplaced dozens of IEDs along the sixkilometer stretch of paved road between Camp Hit and Hit.

By approaching at night and using the longer southerly

approach, Urquhart avoided many of the problems his

battalion could have encountered. The residents of Hit

woke up to find Americans and Iraqis sweeping up from 

35
the southern part of Hit on both sides of the Euphrates.

Insurgents provided no resistance, electing either to flee or 

blend in with the Iraqis. With its massive force, 3/25 easily

took control of this important city.69

For insurgents, the real surprise came five days after 

the initial assault, when Marines completed the clearing

operation and began setting up barriers to support the

establishment of two bases. When the first Jersey and 

Hesco barriers were set up, insurgents and residents of Hit

realized that the Marines were there to stay.70 Firm Base 1

was set up in a four-story school near the city’s main traffic 

circle at TCP-1. Company L occupied Firm Base 1 for

approximately 30 days, fortifying it before relinquishing

it to Company I v so that Company L could return to the

Haditha Dam. While Firm Base 1 provided little standoff

range for SVBIEDs, its location made a strong impression

on local Iraqis.

Firm Base 2 was two kilometers away, using a recreation

center near the city’s center. While security seemed better

due to a nine-foot-tall wall and a longer standoff range,

Marines were constantly aware that they were surrounded

by Iraqis.

Given the Coalition’s history of leaving towns once

they had cleared them so troops could move on to the next

mission or return to a secure base, insurgents must have

doubted that the improvements would be permanent. After

a couple of weeks, Urquhart said, the realization that the

Coalition would not invest in so many barriers if it did

not intend to stay began to sink in. Looking at their own

investment in the form of houses and caches throughout the

city, insurgents realized that they had too much in Hit to

abandon it without a fight with the Coalition. Insurgents no 

longer controlled the town, but tensions were rising.

Both firm bases experienced SVBIEDs. While Firm 

Base 2 was being improved by Company K in early July,

a car that looked like a government vehicle made its way

inside the perimeter. The base had several recreational

fields, including one that had been drenched by a broken 

water pipe. The car became stuck in soft sand long before

it reached its target.71 Unable to move, the suicide bomber

detonated the SVBIED where he sat, fulfilling his destiny 

but causing no injuries to Coalition forces.

Marines were not as fortunate with a two-car SVBIED

that hit Firm Base 1 during the last month of the

deployment. Company I had taken control of Firm Base 1

from Company L in mid-July. On a morning when several

Iraqi officials were scheduled to visit the base, Lance Cpl. 

Nicholas M. Johnson of Company I was assigned to man

a 50-caliber machine gun at the Entry Control Point (ECP)

on its northeast corner.72 Two suspicious vehicles worked

their way slowly through staggered barriers towards his

position, which was protected by seven feet of concrete and

sandbags. As the vehicles approached, the base suddenly

came under small arms fire from unknown positions. 

Johnson tried to fire the 50-caliber machine gun, but it 

malfunctioned. Other Marines engaged the vehicles and

responded to the small arms fire. The lead vehicle exploded 

only five meters in front of Johnson. This detonation 

causing an immediate explosion of the IED in the second

vehicle. The combined blast dug a crater eight feet deep

and 20 feet wide. The blast left Johnson unconscious but

unhurt, while injuring approximately 15 other Marines on

the base.73

To provide security around the FOBs, Marines patrolled

Hit around the clock. Sgt. Franklyn G. Metz III of

Company I said foot patrols were an essential part of the

security plan for the cramped area around Firm Base 1.74

Metz said a typical patrol included 15 to 20 Marines, sailors

and Iraqi soldiers. Depending on the temperature, patrols

would stay outside the wire for two or three hours. Most

squads conducted at least two patrols per day.

While the battalion enjoyed its success in Hit, the

fact that it established two FOBs exposed it to frequent

small arms fires, indirect fires, and IEDs. On July 10, two 

Company K Marines, Staff Sgt. Joseph P. Goodrich and

Lance Cpl. Ryan J. Kovacicek, were killed by 120mm

mortar fire.75 Five days later, a Company L corpsmen,

HM3 “Doc” Travis Youngblood, was seriously wounded

by an IED. Sgt. Guy A. Zierk, his platoon sergeant, said

that HM3 Youngblood was on the last leg of a long patrol

from Firm Base 1 when a command-detonated IED blew

chunks of cinderblock and masonry at him.76 The bomb

had been placed inside a wall surrounding a mosque, and

the detonation wire ran into the mosque. The IED killed

an Iraqi soldier, but HM3 Youngblood’s wounds did not

appear to be life-threatening. He lost a significant amount 

of blood, but he was coherent and almost cheerful as he

helped his platoon commander, Gunnery Sgt. Shawn

Delgado, administer first aid. HM3 Youngblood told 

Delgado not to get a replacement because he planned

to return to the platoon. Six days later, however, HM3

Youngblood died from his injuries.

Operation Saber

Having returned to full strength, Urquhart could have left

Company L at Firm Base 1 and assigned India Company to

Haditha Dam, but he felt that Hit was the battalion’s main

effort and that it would experience increased activity in the

final two months of their deployment. Company I wanted 

to see action after five months of providing security for 

al Asad, and he wanted to give Company L a break after

36
what had already been a difficult deployment. In late July, 

he ordered Company L to return to Haditha Dam after

Company I took over at Firm Base 1.

Within days of its return to Haditha Dam, Company

L conducted Operation Saber to clear the area near an

important oil pumping station known as the K3 station,

near Haqlaniyah and several small villages northwest of

the Haditha Dam. This included the village of Cykla, just

off a road that led from 3/25’s AO to al Qa’im. The village

needed to be checked periodically because of its proximity

to both a Coalition MSR and the Syrian border. The tiny

village held only a few thousand people, but the Coalition

felt it was important to understand what was going on in

this area. So on July 28, two rifle platoons and Company 

L’s headquarters, reinforced by two squads of Iraqi special

forces soldiers and detachments of tanks, Amtracks,

engineers, and Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company 

(ANGLICO) Marines, conducted a cordon and knock in

Cykla.77 Capt. Billy Brown, Platoon Commander for 2nd

Platoon, said the operation involved Marines maneuvering

on foot into Cykla early in the morning, with 1st Platoon

taking one side of the village and his platoon taking the

other.

The first part of the operation proceeded smoothly. 

Brown said that most Iraqis were generally receptive,

although surprised to see Coalition forces that early in the

day. As Marines moved through the village, no one warned

them that a dozen foreigners had recently infiltrated from 

Syria and had started to intimidate the residents.78 The

Marines discovered this when they reached a cluster of four

houses near the center of the village. Cpl. Andre Williams

raised his hand to knock on a door, but it never reached the

door, as insurgents cut him down from inside the house.

Within seconds, Brown said, Marines had a “major fight” 

going on against insurgents firing from the four houses. 

Brown rushed to the site where Williams was bleeding. As

he helped carry Williams through a gate, an RPG crashed

against a nearby wall, shredding Brown’s left elbow.79

As the intensity of the firefight increased, all of 2nd 

Platoon focused on the four houses, pouring fire into 

them. One fireteam chased fleeing insurgents into another 

building. A tank pumped several rounds into the buildings,

followed by jets dropping five 500-pound bombs. These 

actions killed several insurgents, but a blood trail led the

fireteam to a nearby building. Lance Cpl. Christopher 

Lyons, a radio operator who was the first to reach the door, 

was brought down by a hail of bullets from inside the

building, and died shortly thereafter.80

Brown said the insurgents in Cykla were foreign fighters 

who were well armed, well trained, and well funded.81

While they had only been in Cykla for a few weeks, they

had come to dominate the village. When the firefight 

stopped after the death of nine insurgents and the detention

of two others, the inventory of seized items surprised

Brown. In addition to standard weapons and ammunition,

there were vials of adrenalin and other medications, leading

him to believe the foreign fighters did not go down easily 

that day because they were using drugs to block any pain.82

Three Days in August

Company L had just returned from Cykla when 3/25

experienced setbacks that captured headlines throughout

the world. In the first three days of August, the battalion 

lost 21 Marines.83 Six were snipers from Headquarters and

Services Company, one was from Weapons Company, and

the remaining 14 were from Company L. The Marines died

when insurgents triggered a massive IED underneath their

Amtrack.

The death of the snipers was an event that set everyone

back. Snipers are unique, specially trained to maneuver

without being detected. For this mission, three sniper teams

of three Marines each were inserted in the middle of the

night to an area north of Barwanah, south of the Haditha

Dam and on the east side of the Euphrates.84 After the teams

were inserted, two teams decided to link up at a location

overlooking the river. The third team was a few kilometers

to their north. After preparing their respective sites, the

Marines used binoculars and scopes to observe the area.

Unable to move in the sweltering heat, the teams were

looking forward to their extraction, which would occur

under the cover of darkness. In the early afternoon, the six

Marines were ambushed by insurgents armed with AK47s.85 Five Marines died at the site. One, Lance Cpl. Jeffrey

Boskovitch, survived the initial ambush, but was killed as

he tried to escape.

The third sniper team heard the ambush but could not

respond in time. When they reported Boskovitch’s status to

the Operations Center, activities at Haditha and Hit went

into high gear, as Marines did whatever they could to find 

the missing Marine. Company L was immediately ordered

to secure the ambush site. In securing the site, Marines

detained two insurgents from a house next to the ambush

site. Company L also conducted a series of engagements

from the east side of the Euphrates against insurgents who

fired on the Marines from Haditha, on the west side of the 

Euphrates.

MAP 9, based at Camp Hit, had been patrolling the east

side of the Euphrates 60 kilometers south of where the

snipers had been ambushed when its Marines learned of

the missing Marine.86 The Marines set up a Snap Vehicle

Checkpoint on Route Trout, a lightly traveled road running

37
parallel to the Euphrates on the east side of the river. The

first vehicle, a seven-ton truck driven by Cpl. Thomas 

A. Maniccia and armed with a machine gun, set up the

northern “gate,” positioning its front in a way that signaled

for approaching traffic to stop. Two Humvees, one with a 

50-caliber machine gun and one with a Mark 19 grenade

launcher, were positioned in the middle. The last vehicle,

an armored Humvee armed with a machine gun and

containing three Marines and a corpsman, established the

southern gate. Once set up, the Marines typically allowed

10 vehicles inside the checkpoint. Then they would signal

for one vehicle to come forward

at a time for a closer inspection.

In the late afternoon, a white

Ford Bronco driven by a young

man came in as the last vehicle

in a group. After stopping, the

driver detonated an SVBIED

so large that it shredded the

nearby Humvee, sent a huge

fireball cloud into the air and 

shook the earth at Camp Hit,

several kilometers away across

the Euphrates.87 Sgt. James

R. Graham III was killed

immediately by the powerful

blast,88 and his driver, gunner

and corpsman were seriously

injured, requiring an immediate

helicopter medevac from an

improvised landing zone.

Maniccia, who was hundreds

of meters from the blast, said

the blast destroyed the armored

Humvee, flattening its tires and 

peeling back the roof like a

sardine can.

With Boskovitch still missing,

Marines at Hit and Haditha

maintained their focus on finding 

him. After MAP 9 helped the

helicopter crew evacuate Graham and the other three,

the remaining Marines had to get themselves and all four

vehicles back to Camp Hit. This meant tying the destroyed

Humvee to Maniccia’s seven-ton and limping across the

Hit bridge at a time when insurgents surely knew an IED

had damaged the Humvee. The Marines of MAP 9 were

sure they would be ambushed near the bridge. Maniccia

said the insurgents did not disappoint them.89 As MAP 9

approached Turbah, three vans sped ahead to report their

movement to others. With night vision goggles, Maniccia

could see signal lights flashing in the palm grove ahead. 

As he turned west on bridge road, the ambush was initiated

with an IED, followed by small arms and machine gun fire 

from both sides of the roads. MAP 9’s immediate response

from two machine guns and a grenade launcher slowed the

incoming fires. The Marines received additional support 

within minutes from a Coalition escort force, complete with

tanks and Amtracks. This force had the mission of ensuring

that MAP 9 got through Hit and returned safely to Camp

Hit.90

With RCT-2 controlling efforts to recover Boskovich,

and with additional support

from other Coalition elements,

Marines closed off all exits from

the ambush area. This prompted

insurgents to provide information

on where the body of the missing

sniper could be found. This

was accomplished early in the

morning on the day following

the ambush, and the Marine was

subsequently taken to al Asad for

conclusive identification.

Operation Quick Strike

RCT-2 responded to the sniper

ambush with Quick Strike, a

two-battalion operation to clear

Haditha and Haqlaniyah on the

west side of the Euphrates River

and Barwanah on the east side.

The mission was straightforward:

Find the insurgents and the

networks that had ambushed

the snipers. Mundy would take

his battalion, reinforced by an

LAR company, a tank platoon,

and an Iraqi Army company, to

the two larger cities.91 Urquhart

would focus Lima Company on

Barwanah. While Barwanah was small, the fact that it was

on the east side had provided insurgents with a measure of

protection against previous Coalition operations.

Urquhart described Barwanah as a difficult area for 

military operations, due in part to the fact that heavy

military vehicles could not negotiate the small pontoon

bridge that connected Haqlaniyah to Barwanah.92 In a

constant battle of hide-and-seek, the fact that light civilian

vehicles could cross the pontoon bridge easily gave

insurgents a significant advantage because they could 

Photo By Cpl. Ken Melton

A Marine forces his way into a house in the 

section of Haqlaniyah where Marines had 

been attacked earlier in the day.

38
move quickly between Barwanah and Haqlaniyah with

little concern that Coalition forces would follow. Heavier

vehicles had to cross the river at Haditha Dam or Hit, many

kilometers to the north or south.

Company L had secured the ambush site shortly after

the snipers were killed. It used the following day to prepare

for a clearing operation in Barwanah. In April, Marines had

fought a vicious battle against insurgents on and around

the pontoon bridge connecting Barwana to Haqlaniyah,

so they knew there might be significant resistance.93 As

Company L prepared to cross the line of departure on

the morning of August 3, it received a company of Iraqi

soldiers.94 There was no room in the Amtracks for the

Iraqis, so it was decided that the Iraqis would move in

their own trucks. Company L’s plan had been to avoid

the two-lane paved road that led from the ambush site to

Barwanah by following a parallel route in the desert. The

Iraqi trucks could not maneuver in the soft sand, prompting

Company L to adjust the plan to utilize the road.95 Earlier in

the morning, a MAP and a tank company commander had

traveled over the same section of the paved road to get into

an overwatch position. The tank commander reported that,

in his opinion, the road was clear of IEDs.96

Company L began movement to Barwanah as fast as its

Amtracks could carry the Marines. In the final leg, as the 

company turned west to go into their final positions for the 

operation, tragedy again struck the Marines of Company

L. A massive IED had been planted under the asphalt road

at a spot that the MAP and tank company commander had

passed over earlier in the morning.97 When an Amtrack

carrying 15 Marines and an interpreter passed over it, the

command-detonated IED exploded with a force that split

the Amtrack in half, flipping the 25- to 30-ton vehicle 

into the air, bringing it down on its back, and igniting in a

fireball that spewed thick black smoke straight up into the 

windless morning. Fourteen Marines and the interpreter

were killed immediately in a blast that dug a crater six feet

deep and 17 feet across.98

While the deadly blast slowed their advance, Marines

quickly secured the area around the destroyed Amtrack and

evacuated the sole survivor. They established a foothold in

Barwanah, secured the pontoon bridge over the Euphrates,

and fought a brief engagement with insurgents before

continuing with their mission of clearing Barwanah. Other

units helped recover bodies and equipment, parts of which

had been blown hundreds of meters from the blast site.99

Company L’s perseverance in clearing Barwanah proved

that Marines could push on in the face of any adversity, but

they found little of value in Barwanah. Many people had

deserted the village before Company L’s arrival, and the

remaining few professed to know nothing about the sniper

ambush or the IED that had claimed 14 Marines.

While the August losses were devastating for 3/25, the

first three days of August marked a significant turning point 

in America’s awareness of and appreciation for the troops

who were fighting Operation Iraqi Freedom. In a war that 

had lulled many into a sense of complacency, the loss of 21

Marines from a Reserve battalion from America’s heartland

shocked the nation.

As Americans pondered the impact of these tragedies,

Urquhart and his Marines continued working. He had

moved his command post from Haditha to Hit after

Operation Sword, and found that Hit was relatively quiet

for most of the reamaining 75 days of the deployment.100

Marines were patrolling Hit in significant numbers, and 

Iraqis were pleased that insurgents no longer dominated

the city. There were occasional IED incidents like the one

that had taken HM3 Youngblood’s life, but Hit had changed

dramatically since his task force had swept through the city.

39
1st Battalion

25th Marines

Like Iwo Jima and Hue, Fallujah has become an icon.

Blackwater Bridge and a pair of month-long urban

battles have fixed Fallujah in America’s consciousness.1

Consecrated by the blood of hundreds of Marines killed

or wounded there, its streets and buildings will be studied

by generations of future Marines, and the vicious fighting 

that took place in that dense and grimy environment leaves

little doubt that the city’s name will be etched beside other

famous battles on the Marine Corps War Memorial.2

Both sides fought fiercely during Operation Vigilant 

Resolve, the Coalition’s immediate response to the

Blackwater ambush in the spring of 2004, and Operation al

Fajr, a planned attack the following fall to oust insurgents

and regain control of Fallujah.

Both sides knew the stakes were high. For insurgents,

Fallujah was a safe haven and center for planning and

executing operations.3For the Coalition, Fallujah was the

Heart of Darkness, a headquarters for Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda

in Mesopotamia and the site of several torture houses.4

When Marines handed over the city to the Fallujah Brigade5

after Vigilant Resolve, many saw it as an insurgent victory

and a sign of Coalition weakness and confusion.For both

sides, Fallujah became a gauge of the war’s progress.

Reserve Marines of 1st Battalion, 25th Marines came

to Fallujah in March 2006, when the city was under firm 

Coalition control. In the months since Operation al Fajr,

active duty Marines maintained a tight grip on Fallujah,

limiting access through a series of Entry Control Points

(ECPs) ringing the city.7Iraqi police and soldiers guarded

the ECPs, which bristled with firepower. Only registered 

residents, government officials, and contractors were 

allowed to pass, and “military age males” (known by the

acronym “MAMs”) were required to provide iris scans and

thumbprints.8Rebuilding was in full swing, and Marines

were constantly patrolling on foot or in Humvees, talking

with residents and learning more about the city. The first 

five months of 1/25’s deployment were marked by the fact 

that there were remarkably few incidents. This turned out

to be the calm before a storm, as insurgents who gradually

worked their way back into Fallujah were determined to

reverse their losses.

For Reserves who had trained on videos of Vigilant

Resolve and al Fajr, it was difficult to appreciate how much 

the enviroment had changed in Fallujah between 2004

and 2006. Sgt. Maj. Bradley E. Trudell of 1/25 said many

simply could not dismiss the image of the kinetic battlefield 

as they prepared for the deployment.9

Sgt. Timothy G. Wittmer, who fought with an active duty

battalion in Fallujah during al Fajr, subsequently transferred

to 1/25 so he could return to Fallujah. The difference

between the two tours was staggering.10

“When we left [in December 2004], the city basically

reeked . . . of diesel fuel and death. Most of the buildings

were pretty well destroyed, and there was no one on the

streets until we let everyone in back in through the ECPs. It

was a ghost town. Pretty much everyone who stayed around

during [Operation al Fajr], with very rare exceptions, was

an insurgent, and most of those were killed. When we

started letting people back inside, it was still a wasteland.

There was trash and sewage and the occasional carcass, and

a lot of wild dogs were roaming the streets.”11

Over 14 months, Fallujah was quickly rebuilt. With an

economy based largely on small shops and businesses, the

downtown districts were soon humming with activity.

“There was an active population, and they had started

the rebuilding process. . . . [Fallujah] was an active city

Photo By Cpl. Brian Reimers

Maj. Vaughn L. Ward, Company C commander, 

1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, Regimental 

Combat Team 5, leads a patrol through the streets 

of Fallujah. The Marines conducted a security patrol 

and received fire from unwelcoming insurgents in 

the souk district. Vaughn is 37, from Arlington, Va.

40
at that point, which was really, really different than the

post al Fajr Fallujah. The city had completely restarted

its daily functions, the things you would see in any city.

Marketplaces. People moving to and fro and going to

and from mosques. Children in the neighborhoods. You

didn’t see a lot of that right when we left because we

were still gradually letting people back inside the city. I

just remember thinking how much busier it was, a very

claustrophobic feeling, there were so many more people

out, whereas before it was really desolate after the fight.”12

Fallujah’s census helps tell the story. Before the war,

the United Nations estimated that more than 400,000

people lived in the city.13 Most were Sunnis, and they

earned their living farming, trading, and operating small

businesses. From the start of the war to Operation al

Fajr, Fallujah’s population dwindled to 300,000. When

Marines encircled the city in November 2004, 1st Marine

Division gave most of the 300,000 a chance to leave,

and two-thirds left.14 Based on the preview provided by

Operation Vigilant Resolve, everyone knew what was

coming. Marines and insurgents alike prepared for the

showdown. Insurgents prepared hundreds of fighting 

positions from a seeming endlessly supply of weapons and

ammunition, then dug in throughout Fallujah to prepare

for battle. Marines built “iron mountains” of ammunition

and other equipment at supply points outside the city, then

maneuvered into position for the assault.15 To route the

entrenched insurgents, Marines inflicted significant damage 

on Fallujah. According to one estimate, more than half

of Fallujah’s 39,000 homes suffered damage, with some

10,000 houses rendered uninhabitable.16

After al Fajr, access to Fallujah was limited. ECPs

served as the only entry points. Before 1/25’s arrival, the

population grew to 250,000.17 As conditions continued

to improve and security remained intact, the population

grew by more than 50,000 during 1/25’s tour. This figure 

included 35,000 Iraqis who fled violence or oppression in 

other parts of the country and wanted to settle in Fallujah.18

Trudell said Fallujah was a classic example of a “Three

Block War,”19 requiring Marines to use full-scale combat to

take control of the city, mid-intensity conflict in battling the 

insurgency, and stability and support operations (SASO)

with moderate Fallujans. In such a scenario, Marines

are expected to interact in a friendly way with local

residents while knowing that IEDs are spread throughout

a neighborhood and insurgents might lurk right around the

corner. The difficulty of conducting such a complex group 

of tasks, he said, was compounded by the preconception

of a very kinetic environment many Marines brought to

Fallujah.

Even as Fallujah was rebuilt, it remained grim and

oppressive. Marines spent much of their time trying to

appeal to the Fallujans who were “on the fence,” neither

supporting nor opposing the Coalition. Trudell said

discipline proved to be a key ingredient. Marines had

to be able to transition from foot patrols, providing a

measure of interaction with Fallujans, to operations that

involved identifying, locating, and seizing insurgents. The

difficult part, according to Trudell, was accomplishing both 

missions simultaneously. It was similar to the paradox of

trying to appear non-threatening while wearing protective

gear and riding in armored Humvees.

“It was just hard work. It was hard work patrolling

every day in that heat. It was hard work putting up with

all the inconveniences. It was hard work to wear eighty

pounds of gear. It was hard work to remain motivated, to

get out there and do that every single day,” Trudell said.

“Insurgencies are hard work, with very little gratification. 

But if you quantify that at the end, there can be tremendous

satisfaction gained over a long period.”20

Amid the day-to-day problems, Marines saw many

positive indicators. A city council, chaired by Fallujah’s

mayor, met weekly to plan repairs and other improvements.

Marines provided security while Iraqi contractors cleared

debris and started rebuilding. Iraqi police and security

forces were working alongside Marines. They were better

trained, better armed, and becoming more aggressive.

Lt. Col. Christopher A. Landro, 1/25’s commanding

officer, described the battalion’s mission as making 

“Fallujah stay a safe and secure city so that we could

continue to develop the Iraqi Security Forces and conduct

the counter-insurgency campaign that [the Regimental

Combat Team (RCT) commander] had set forth. So going

Photo By Sgt. Adaecus G. Brooks

Sgt. Jeremy L. Hager, an Information Operations 

representative with 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, 

passes out handbills during a cordon and search 

operation in selected regions of Fallujah as part of 

Operation Industrial Revolution.

41
in there, I knew that it was a controlled environment that

was kept safe by the presence of Marine combat forces and

our desire to bring the Iraqi Army and the police force up to

speed as quickly as possible.”21

Marines understood that part of their job was to serve in

the role of an “older brother,” providing protection for the

developing Iraqi forces. In a figurative sense, Marines were 

crossing their arms and staring down a neighborhood bully,

giving the Iraqi forces a chance to acquire equipment and

develop tactics so they could defend themselves.

Insurgents who understood Fallujah’s impact on the

“Arab street” did not stand idly by. Having experienced

the indignity of unqualified and undeniable defeat, they 

knew allowing al Fajr’s results to stand would amount to a

strategic defeat. Each new building or re-opened business

was like a poke in the eye, as it decreased the likelihood

of an insurgent resurgence. While biding their time, the

insurgents were intent on reversing the Coalition’s success.

1/25’s Marines covered Fallujah from inside the ring

of ECPs. Most Marines lived in the government complex

in the city’s center or the train station to the north, and

almost every Marine and sailor in the battalion patrolled

regularly, either on foot or in Humvees. Landro made more

than 200 trips through Fallujah, logging more than 10,000

miles and three IED strikes on his Humvees.22 In addition

to providing an additional quick reaction force (QRF) to the

battalion, these missions gave him a detailed knowledge of

each neighborhood, alley, and possible hide site in Fallujah.

An important part of the success in Fallujah was

based on its functioning city council. Every Tuesday, the

council would meet at the government center to discuss

issues relating to security, stability, and reconstruction. In

addition to Landro and the RCT-5 commander, Col. Larry

Nicholson, it involved major leaders from throughout the

Anbar Province. Economic redevelopment was high on

the agenda, as were issues related to water, electricity,

and schools.23 In the year since al Fajr, the Coalition and

city council had worked to clear much of the debris from

Fallujah, setting the stage for a construction boom.

“Reconstruction was booming,” Landro said. “We had

one commercial truck entrance that would have two to three

hundred trucks backed up all day long, trying to get in, full

of construction materials, durable goods, and agricultural

products. The city was coming back to life, and we were

providing that stability. . . . There were whole sectors

being rebuilt from destruction, and new sectors where new

construction was occurring as well. At any given time, there

were a thousand to fifteen hundred structures being built, so 

there were Fallujans working and the city was coming back

to life.”

Landro said Fallujah operated almost as a “gated

community,” with Marines and Iraqis providing the guard

force. The ECPs were well fortified, with strict procedures 

that ensured that everyone was properly processed. These

procedures caused delays at the ECPs, but most Fallujans

accepted the delays as the price they paid for living in a

secure city.

Conducting distributed operations throughout Fallujah

required confidence in the knowledge and leadership skills 

of young Marines. Landro said that constant patrolling,

often in relatively small groups, gave junior Marines plenty

of opportunities to exercise their leadership and decisionmaking skills.

“The strategic corporal and strategic sergeant are alive

and well in AO Raleigh and in Iraq,” Landro said.24 “We

had dozens of patrols that were being led by sergeants,

four-vehicle patrols with weapons and communications

gear and the ability to reach back for other assets. At

any given time of any given day, we had that sergeant,

that squad leader, out there, leading a patrol and making

decisions on his own.”25

Deployment Chronology

During the first part of 1/25’s tour, Fallujah was 

relatively quiet. Three Marines were killed between

March and July,26 but operations during this period were

characterized by mounted and dismounted patrols that

were interrupted only occasionally by IED strikes or brief

exchanges of small arms fire.

Staff Sgt. Michael S. Maslauskas, a platoon sergeant for

Company C, summed up the feelings of most 1/25 Marines.

“Until August, we owned Fallujah. We were unopposed,

essentially. There were IEDs and small engagements,

but for the most part, our company owned our area of

operations, and we didn’t have any serious problems.”27

Maj. Raymond L. Adams, who served as platoon

commander and executive officer for Company C, agreed. 

“Prior to [August], we would foot patrol with impunity

anywhere in the city.”28

In retrospect, Fallujah’s population changed significantly 

during July. It was not until August that 1/25 appreciated

how much the change would impact their work.

The change was the result of a decision by Iraq’s new

prime minister to initiate a prisoner release program for a

significant number of the prisoners who had been detained 

during the war.29 Nuri Kamal Al Maliki, a Shi’ia, designed

the program to ease tensions between the two main

sectarian groups, as most prisoners were Sunni and most

post-war government officials were Shiites.30 The release

created significant troubles in Fallujah, as approximately 

2,000 former prisoners made their way to Fallujah during

42
July, causing an immediate and profound impact on

Coalition forces and their interactions with Fallujans.31

Marines believed the prisons were essentially insurgent

training camps. For Marines on patrol, the prisoner release

seemed like a surreal nightmare drawn from a military

exercise. Like “resetting” an opposing force in a military

war game, allowing defeated forces to rise from simulated

deaths and fight again, the prisoner release gave insurgents 

who knew firsthand what worked and what did not another 

chance.32 In Fallujah, the released prisoners seemed eager

to put their new skills to the test.

This influx of hardened young men brought what many 

Marines described as “the look,” or “the stare,” back to the

streets of Fallujah. It was the same sullen look that greeted

Coalition forces in Fallujah shortly after Baghdad fell.

When pressed to described what “the look” really looked

like, Landro said it was as though the glaring young men

were telling the Marines, “If your charred carcass were

here, we’d hang you from the [Blackwater] bridge, too.”33

The Guns of August

In early August, al Qaeda in Mesopotamia vowed to

regain control of Fallujah.34 Posting flyers in mosques 

and schools, its leaders promised to return Fallujah to the

“glory” the city had enjoyed before the U.S. attack.35 Local

leaders took this vow seriously, as it came after a spike in

insurgent activity and the murder of local religious leaders

who had pushed for reconciliation.36

For Maslauskas and the rest of the battalion, everything

changed on August 3, when two Company C Marines were

hit by a sniper.37

Maslauskas and about two dozen Marines were wrapping

up a lengthy foot patrol in area known as the “Pizza Slice,”

in southwest Fallujah. As they passed a cemetery known

as the “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” two shots rang out. Staff Sgt.

Maslauskas, who could recognize AK-47 fire, understood 

that the different sound of these gunshots was cause for

immediate concern.

“You get used to what an AK-47 sounds like, and we

heard two really strange shots. The first thing I remember 

saying to the squad leader [was], ‘Hey, man, what was that?

Get on the radio and find out what’s up.’” Learning there 

were casualties, Maslauskas rushed to the site and found

that Lance Cpl. Adam Escobar and Lance Cpl. Kurt E.

Dechen had been shot by a sniper.

“It was controlled, but it was chaotic because everyone

knew a Marine was hurt,” Maslauskas said. Other Marines

had thrown smoke grenades to limit the sniper’s view.

As Maslauskas approached the site, he was concerned

that Marines working with the casualties might fire at the 

approaching Marines. The severity of their wounds limited

what other Marines could do for the two. Maslauskas

said the QRF seemed to take an eternity, even though the

company commander, Maj. Vaughn L. Ward, was on the

scene in minutes. “Seconds feel like minutes and minutes

feel like hours when you’re waiting to get your Marines to

medical,” Maslauskas said.

Escobar had been hit in the upper leg, with the bullet

shattering his femur. He was bleeding so heavily that

Marines applied a tourniquet after they moved him to a

nearby courtyard. Dechen was hit on his side, through a gap

in his flak jacket. The bullet tore through his torso before 

exiting on the other side.

Dechen and Escobar were loaded onto Ward’s Humvee

and taken to the surgical center. The two were laid out on

adjoining tables, and medical teams immediately went to

work. Maslauskas said the next hours was an emotional

roller coaster, as people would report changes to Dechen’s

condition. Finally, someone brought him the news that

Dechen had died. For the patrol leader, everything changed

in that moment. “[It was] like someone punched me in

the stomach and there’s nothing you can do about it,”

Maslauskas said.

Capt. Sean D. Miller, Dechen’s platoon commander, had

gathered his Marines at the company headquarters to bring

them up to date when Maj. Adams learned by radio that

Dechen was dead. Adams quietly passed this information

to the platoon commander, but the platoon erupted with

emotion when Miller relayed it to them. One Marine threw

a chair across a room when he learned of Dechen’s death.

Others were simply numb.

In retrospect, Charlie Company Marines realized that

their earlier confidence in their ability to patrol safely in 

Fallujah might have been misplaced. “In the beginning, I

don’t think I really had an understanding of what it was

like,” Maslauskas said. “We were just doing our missions,

going on patrols, doing what we had to do.”

Adams, agreed that, in retrospect, the early months were

relatively easy. In addition to patrols, he monitored “snap

vehicle control points” that were put up frequently, as well

as “BOLOs,” shorthand for “be on lookout for” specific 

vehicles or people. “We knew there were snipers operating

out there because Weapons Company took a sniper KIA,

and we had a large number of single shot, very accurate

shots taken by what we thought was a sniper or snipers

operating in the city. . . . For us, everything changed August

third, because we realized that we could not just operate in

the old fashioned way, which was to put a patrol out, make

it look like a large footprint, being obvious what we were

doing, and then come back three or maybe four hours at the

most. . . . It really did change the way we operated.”

43
“It had a tremendous psychological impact, I think, on

the company as a whole,” Maslauskas said. “If I had to tell

you when the turning point to Fallujah was, psychologically

for the company, I would say it was the day they released

the eighteen hundred prisoners, because that led to what

happened with Dechen. Subsequently, there was much

debate on how best to operate as a squad or platoon in our

AO. Basically, it came down to a fifty-fifty mix. You had to 

have some armor out there with you at all times, any time

you left the wire.”

His company commander, Maj. Ward, was more blunt in

describing the impact of the prisoner release. “The prisoner

release . . . was the single biggest blunder that has resulted

in the deaths of U.S. Marines and Sailors. . . . I have no

doubts that Marines died and Sailors died because we had

the release program. Those were prisoners of war, and they

released them. You will find that there are a lot of Marines 

who are upset about that. . . All I can tell you is that they

released them, and all of a sudden we started having a hell

of a lot more problems.”

Marines noticed that the insurgents who attacked

them after the prisoner release were much more skilled.

“Company commanders were like, ‘The varsity is here,’”

Ward said. “We knew something had changed. . . [and]

there was a hell of a lot of violence over there that started

coming at us, and the lethality of it, the sophistication of it

was such that they were no longer the jayvee. The varsity

had come on board.”

Three weeks after the sniper attack on Dechen and

Escobar, another Company C Marine was killed by a

sniper, again in the vicinity of the Pizza Slice. While

providing flank security just a few steps away from Maj. 

Ward on August 25, Cpl. Jordan C. Pierson was shot once

through the shoulder. He died later in the day.

Another three weeks passed, and again Marines took

casualties. Three Marines would be killed and two others

would lose one leg apiece in separate IED attacks that

turned their Humvees into molten fireballs.

Photo By Cpl. Brian Reimers

Three Marines from to Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, kneel during a memorial 

service for Lance Cpl. Eric P. Valdepenas, Petty Officer 2nd Class Christopher G. Walsh and Cpl Jared M. 

Shoemaker, who were killed Sept. 4, 2006 while conducting combat operations in Fallujah, Iraq. Hundreds 

of Marines and sailors from the battalion met at a memorial service held at Camp Baharia to remember 

their friends and fellow servicemembers.

44
The deadly Humvee attack hit a Mobile Assault Platoon

(MAP) from Weapons Company that had been patrolling in

a residential neighborhood in the southern part of Fallujah,

looking for possible insurgent mortar sites. Towards the

end of the patrol, the Humvees turned onto a narrow dirt

alley rarely used by Coalition forces. There was a sudden

deafening roar and a brilliant flash, and one of the Humvees 

was immediately engulfed in flames. The explosion killed 

Hospitalman 2nd Class Christopher G. Walsh, Cpl. Jared

M. Shoemaker, and Lance Cpl. Eric P. Valdepenas, and

severely wounded the fourth person in the Humvee, Lance

Cpl. Cody W. Hill.

Maj. Armando Acosta, Weapons Company’s executive

officer, described Sept. 4 as a defining point for 1/25, 

because insurgents began using deadlier and more creative

tactics.38 Attributing the change to the recent prisoner

release, he said the Sept. 4 explosions introduced an IED

technique that was new to Fallujah, with a “pressure

plate” mounted on top of explosives. In this case, he said,

insurgents packed a bucket with a plastic explosive and

connected the detonator to a pressure plate that was covered

by dirt.39 When the Humvee drove over the device, the

resulting explosion shot the pressure plate up through the

Humvee’s floor, with deadly results.

That evening, a Humvee from a different MAP was

hit by a similar device, shearing off one leg from each of

the two Marines sitting in the front seats. Sgt. Wittmer,

whose Humvee passed over the IED just seconds before

it exploded, said the blast and ensuing fire lit up the 

immediate area. “This was a fireball, which made us 

instantly turn around. . . . It was like a giant bonfire.”

The blast took off the right leg of the driver, Cpl. Pat

Murray, and the left leg of his passenger, Sgt. Terrance

Burke. Lance Cpl. John Goldman, the Marine in the turret,

was blown clear of the Humvee, as was Murray. Burke,

who was on fire, initially had to drag himself from the 

burning vehicle. Cpl. Brian J. Tomsovic dashed over to

Burke and tried to pull him to safety and put out the flames, 

but that effort ceased when they came under small arms

attack from two nearby insurgent positions. Shortly there

after and aided by a corpsman, Tomsovic moved Burke to a

safe position and extinguished the flames.

Changing Tactics

In addition to increasing the number and lethality of their

attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces, the insurgents started

targeting Fallujans through a series of bomb attacks. For

example, on September 15, a bomb at a Fallujah soccer

field killed eight young men and injured more than a dozen 

others.40 While Americans took this as a sign the insurgents

Pfc. Fred M. Linck is either the luckiest Reserve in the 

Corps, or the one with the hardest head. Maybe it’s both.

While working in Fallujah on May 5, 2005, Linck was

struck in the head by a single round from an insurgent’s

rifle.47 The shot dropped him immediately, and all he

could hear was his Marines yelling, “Man down. Man

down.”

While bloodied, Linck suffered little damage. The

7.62mm round bored a hole all the way through his Kevlar

helmet. A fragment cut through the headband and into

Linck’s forehead, but that’s where the fragment stopped,

leaving little more than a scratch and a bad headache.

Linck is a Reserve from Westbrook, Connecticut,

assigned to 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. He was shot

during his first month in Iraq.

As part of a Quick Reaction Force, he was called on

to go into Fallujah after reports of an IED. Some Marines

suspected a setup, but they showed up at the site, got out 

of their Humvees and established a protective cordon.

A single shot, fired from a site not known to Marines, 

suddenly cracked through the air.

Seeing blood coming from a head wound, Marines

responded by immediately evacuating Linck. He was

taken to a Coalition hospital, where he was treated and

released without so much as a stitch for the small cut on

his forehead.

Linck said that the incident gave him a new-found

respect for his equipment.

“If it wasn’t for that helmet, I wouldn’t be standing

here right now,” Linck told a reporter. “It pays to wear all

the gear the way it’s supposed to be worn.” 

 (Story By Cpl. Brian Reimers)

Of Interest

45
were desperate, it sent a tremor through the city. Company

C’s Ward said that his Marines were able to use that attack

to the Coalition’s advantage, as they spread the news of

what the insurgents had done throughout their section of the

city.

Ward said his Marines used a public address system

to influence Fallujans and insurgents. Working with a 

U.S. Army detachment, his Marines would broadcast

news on Coalition redevelopment efforts as well as “bad

news” events tied to the insurgents. He said that the

news of the September 15 bombing of the soccer field 

turned many Fallujans against the insurgency.41 By taking

this information directly to citizens and inviting them

to compare insurgent activities to what the Coalition

was doing to improve the city, his Marines helped sway

opinions.

Ward said the public address system also was used to

incite insurgents with various insults, prompting them to

respond and therefore expose themselves to the Marines.

“My initial concept of using PsyOps was just to get the

enemy to come out and fight . . . to try to get them to try to 

shut us down immediately by going into an engagement.”42

Ward found that Fallujans were inclined to be influenced 

excessively by demonstrations of aggression and force.

When air support was available, he said, Company C would

request that F/A-18 jets fly low over the city to remind the 

Fallujans that the Marines had such assets at their disposal.

The deep sound of the .50-caliber machine gun, while

rarely used, also made a profound impression in a city that

was accustomed to violence.43

Company C’s aggressive foot patrols gave its Marines

a much clearer picture of insurgent activity in its AO than

had been provided to them. Ward said that the previous

Marine company thought there were relatively few

insurgents operating in the sector, but Company C learned

otherwise. “I think the thing that I was most proud of was

the fact that [by the end of the tour], we knew exactly what

was going on inside my AO. I knew the pulse, the Marines

knew it, and when another unit came in to take it over, I

showed them what we were doing [and] what the city was

like. . . . We went into the city aggressively, we fought on

the enemy’s ground, we stood our ground, we did not let

the enemy dictate to us what we were going to do and not

going to do.”

Maj. Brian T. Hofmann, the commander of Company

B, said the difference in Fallujah after the prisoner release

was significant. “Initially, [Fallujah had been] more passive 

than I had anticipated, especially given the well-known

history of Fallujah. . . . We all came to the conclusion that

there certainly was a significant insurgent presence when 

we got there, but Darwin had taken his toll on the more

amateur and less intelligent insurgents. The ones who

were left were far craftier and far more subversive in their

tactics. We were tasked more with actually having to hunt

them down and find them because they did not come out 

overtly and attack us.”44 Hoffman’s Marines felt relatively

secure during the first five months of the deployment, but 

Fallujah’s environment changed after the prisoner release.

On August 16, Company B suffered its only two

fatalities, both at the hands of a sniper.45 The company had

been conducting a series of saturation patrols in sections of

the center of Fallujah when a returning patrol was hit just

outside Observation Post (OP) Fenton, a compact fortress

on the main east-west road through Fallujah.46 Capt. John

J. McKenna, platoon commander for Third Platoon, was

leading the nine-man patrol back into the OP. The first 

Marine made it safely across a side road and into the OP’s

entrance, but the next one, Lance Cpl. Michael D. Glover,

was felled by a single shot to his head. This shot was a

signal to other nearby insurgents to initiate a complex small

arms attack from north and south of OP Fenton. Within

seconds, McKenna’s Marines and those in OP Fenton were

returning fire. As several Marines popped smoke grenades 

to try to conceal them from the sniper and other insurgents,

McKenna dashed into the road in an attempt to pull Glover

to safety.

Hoffman said that McKenna insisted on running to the

aid of Glover, even though rounds were snapping all around

his patrol. To try to protect the two Marines, several more

smoke grenades were tossed into the road, and Marines

increased their fires. “Capt. McKenna ran out to where 

Lance Cpl. Glover’s body was and took a knee,” Hofmann

said. “He was facing south, with his back to the sniper. At

some point, for whatever reason, he turned around and fully

looked over his shoulder, and took a round in his head.

Single shot.”

The sniper also shot two other members of the patrol, but

both were protected by SAPI plates. Lance Cpl. Joseph J.

Schiller was shot in the right side and Lance Cpl. Daniel F.

Murphy was shot in the center of his chest. Both Marines

were knocked down, but the SAPI plates stopped the

rounds and they were able to return to the fight.

Operations

For Fallujans, the constant patrolling and close

cooperation between Marines and Iraqi soldiers and

police built confidence that Fallujah would remain secure. 

This confidence became evident, Landro said, when 

1/25 Marines began to receive information that was

characterized as “actionable intelligence” of immediate

use. For example, in a series of three operations with

2nd Brigade of the New Iraqi Army, Landro’s Marines

46
conducted groups of pinpoint raids, seizing of individuals

and weapons caches.

“The Rapid Departure operations were really some of

our finer moments,” he said. “Rapid Departure was our 

first operation where we received intelligence from local 

police and local political leaders on who the bad guys were

. . . [something like], ‘Here are twenty-five names, and 

here’s where they live.’ We put together all the targeting

information and as much evidence as we could before

striking, so we could put these guys away for a while. In

conjunction with [the New Iraqi Army’s] Second Brigade,

we’d look at the map and see where all the targets were.

We’d create a dividing line, and Second Brigade would

get half the targets and [1/25] would get half the targets,

and we’d do near simultaneous operations on twenty-five 

separate locations. . . . We did three of them, and they all

went off flawlessly.”

In another intelligence-driven operation, 1/25 Marines

rescued Iraqi hostages who had been taken captive by

insurgents at checkpoints about 12 miles south of Fallujah,

near the cities of Amiriya and Ferris. Landro said that aerial

imagery showed the checkpoints, as well as hostages being

put in spider holes or other underground complexes. In

operations that included Marines from 2nd Reconnaissance

Battalion and the Iraqi Second Brigade, 1/25 rescued three

hostages, detained three insurgent guards, and found a

weapons cache that included a dozen mortar tubes, several

machine guns, and hundreds of artillery rounds. This was

accomplished with no shots being fired, as Coalition forces 

surprised the three sleeping guards.

“The hostages were uncovered in a spider hole that I

went down into myself, and I can tell you it was not a nice

place to be.” Landro said the spider hole was so small that

he could not stand up inside it, yet it still held a cage where

they found the hostages.

In their last months in Fallujah, 1/25 played a leading

role in a series of operations that provided information on

various sections of the city that were thought to represent a

threat to the Coalition.

Operation Industrial Revolution was designed to

generate information on business activities in the bustling

southeast quadrant that housed many of the city’s mid-sized

and large businesses. The operation, conducted with Iraqi

soldiers and police, produced little evidence of insurgent

activity, but census operations allowed Marines to gather

information on a broad range of small and medium-sized

businesses. The close coordination between Americans and

Iraqis impressed local businessmen, who were constantly

assessing the level of security in Fallujah.

In Operation Matador, a one-day operation in the

Andaloos district of the Pizza Slice, Marines and Iraqis

worked side-by-side to clear a portion of the city just north

of the Pizza Slice. Again, there was little evidence seized

during the operation. Landro said that the real success of

the operation was felt in the staff of the Iraqi Army, which

was demonstrating a much better grasp of command and

control techniques. He also said the Iraqis showed a marked

improvement in their ability to plan and conduct such

operations. While there was a level of frustration with any

major operation that did not produce weapons or detainees,

Landro said that the strong presence certainly disrupted

insurgent activities in that part of Fallujah.

The battalion’s final operation occurred in the “souk,” 

or market district of Falljua, just north of the Pizza Slice.

The market area contains hundreds of houses and small

businesses, and hoards of shoppers visit it each day for

basic supplies, including produce and consumer goods. In

another one-day operation, Company C Marines and their

Iraqi counterparts moved into the district, which has dozens

of narrow side streets and cramped alleys, before most

Iraqis were awake. Their painstaking building-by-building

search produced only one cache, but Landro said that the

Iraqis again demonstrated significant improvement in their 

activities. Another benefit, he said, was that Operation 

Souk took place during 1/25’s transition to another Reserve

battalion, 1/24, so it gave the incoming staff an opportunity

to see how the RCT and the Iraqi Army staff planned such

missions.

47
1st Battalion

24th Marines

First Battalion, Twenty-Fifth Marines turned over

its positions in and around Fallujah to another Reserve

battalion, 1st Battalion, 24th Marines. Building on

the improvements that 1/25 had made to Fallujah’s

infrastructure and community relations after Operation

al Fajr, 1/24 also borrowed the concept of “community

policing” from the successful Iraq tour that its sister

battalion, 2/24, had employed in the Triangle of Death two

years earlier. Using aggressive patrolling and intelligence

operations that transformed information regarding tribal

activities and relationships into “actionable intelligence,”

1/24 made major contributions to what has become known

as the “Sunni Awakening,” or the 180-degree transition of

many Sunni tribes in the Anbar Province from supporting

the insurgents to supporting the American-led effort in Iraq.

Lt. Col. Harold R. “Odie” Van Opdorp, 2/24’s battalion

commander, credited much of the battalion’s success to its

S-2 section, and how it had closely integrated intelligence

on IEDs and other enemy activities with current operations.

For 1/24’s deployment to Fallujah, it recruited two key

intelligence officers from 2/24. Capitalizing on their 

experience and the systems that they had developed in the

Babil Province, 1/24 was able to capture and understanding

of its area of operations that allowed the Marines to operate

in a coordinated and intelligence-driven fashion.

The first was Chief Warrant Officer James Roussell, 

a lieutenant in the Chicago Police Department. Roussell

had spent most of his 29 years as a policeman with

counter-gang operations, and he applied the methods

he learned from the streets of Chicago to the heart of

Fallujah. The key, he said, was turning each Marine into

an intelligence collector. Roussell said that using 1,000

Marines, empowered with the idea that their observations

were critical to the success of the battalion, allowed him to

gather an intelligence picture of Fallujah that allowed the

battalion to fight smarter.

The second Marine was Maj. Daniel P. Whisnant, who

commanded Company A. Whisnant had been the S-2 for

the earlier 2/24 deployment, so he and Roussell intuitively

understood each others’ needs and products.

Roussell said the key to countering the Iraqi insurgency

was to deprive them of their ability to hide among the

population. In the Vietnam War, he said, insurgents were

described as fish who were able to swim unnoticed in a 

pond filled with other fish. Borrowing from the popular 

Harry Potter series, Roussell said that 1/24 had to strip the

“invisibility cloak” from the insurgency. “Once we knew

where they were, we could do what we needed to do.”

While the Iraqi insurgency might have many parts,

Roussell said that for the most part it was made up of

rational and intelligent people. Expressing a level of

Photo By Lance Cpl. Stephen McGinnis

Lance Cpl. Jade A. Tanguay, a mechanic assigned 

to a personnel security detachment, shakes the 

hand of a child from Fallujah at the home of a girl 

Marines visited. A Navy physician talked with the 

family to see if the U.S. military could provide 

medical assistance. 

48
respect for the shrewdness that insurgents brought to the

battle, Roussell said that an understanding by Marines that

individual insurgents were rational made the insurgents

activities more predictable. This, he said, led to the

opportunity for 1/24 to target specific activities. With more 

than 1,000 Marine intelligence collectors maneuvering

constantly throughout the AO, the Intelligence Section’s

responsibility became collecting the information and

plotting the data so that the Intelligence Section could

“connect the dots,” and push that information out to the

using units.

“Identifying the enemy is hard,” Roussell said. “But

once you do that, you can kill him. Our goal was to drive a

wedge between the people of Fallujah and the insurgents.”

Repeated analysis of the patterns of IEDs led the

battalion to innovative ways to avoid them and also prevent

them from being employed. Roussell said the battalion

identified the following as its main threats, in order of 

importance: Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), direct

fire (particularly from snipers), indirect fire (typically 

mortars), vehicle borne IEDs, a medium-sized attack

(such as two dozen insurgents attacking a fixed position), 

a large-sized counter attack (such as a hundred insurgents

joining an attack on a patrol), and a complex attack

that might involve several of the previously-described

methods. Roussell said that simplifying the types of

threats to a manageable number, then forcing each Marine

to “war game” his response to each threat situation, was

tremendously valuable because it allowed Marines to

respond instinctively.

At this point in the Iraq War, the central and provincial

governments were providing enough police and soldiers to

provide a significant boost to American efforts. Roussell 

said that a key decision within 1/24 was to let the Iraqi

Police take a leading role in most operations. By asking the

Iraqis to take charge of daytime operations and assigning

Marines to work under the cover of darkness, 1/24

employed its Marines in a more protected environment

while pushing credit for success in Fallujah to local Iraqis.

Roussell said his concept of victory in Iraq involved

building the local police and military forces to the extent

that they would be able to counter the insurgency. At this

Official Marine Corps Photo

Actor Chuck Norris made an unscheduled stop in the battalion aid station to visit with wounded Marines 

during a visit to Camp Baharia.

49
point, he said, these forces needed American support, and

part of the trick was providing the support in a way that

gave Iraqis a dominant role.

1/24 also created opportunities for “local heros,” or

people within the communities who were willing to stand

up to the insurgents and complain about the damage that the

insurgents were causing to the community. One of these,

he said, was a new Fallujah police chief who was willing

to lead the community away from insurgents. Marines said

the police chief was just what the city needed. The Marines

also said that during 1/24’s tour, a group of tribal leaders, or

sheiks, were willing to assist the U.S.-Iraqi effort because

they had grown weary of the heavy-handed tactics of the

insurgents.

Roussell said that in his opinion, the willingness of these

tribal leaders to provide major assistance in the fight against 

al Qaeda marked a significant turning point in the war, 

when Iraqi nationalists were willing to play an important

role, in combating al Qaeda, at a significant risk to their 

lives and status.

Roussell said that much of his section’s work was

collecting data from Marines and then plotting it in a way

to create a graphic view of insurgent activities. He said that

this graphic representation was a powerful tool because it

enabled commanders and patrol leaders to envision how

insurgents would plan their attacks. Having this knowledge

allowed them to plan routes that would avoid and even

counter the IED threat.

Intelligence Officer 

as Company Commander

Maj. Daniel P. Whisnant had been a counter-intelligence

Marine during his early enlisted career before becoming an

Intelligence Officer with a specialty in collecting human 

intelligence. He put his strong intelligence background to

use when he served as Commanding Officer of Company 

A for 1/24. At a company level, he said, he felt that his

primary mission involved counter-intelligence operations

in his company’s AO, a large rural region southwest of

Fallujah. Operating remotely from the rest of the battalion,

Whisnant said that company-level counter intelligence

operations would create the opportunity for squad-sized

patrols to do what squads do best: locate, close with, and

take whatever action is necessary with respect to enemy

forces.

Company A measured success by the ability of Marines

to interact with Iraqis. While crediting “hutzpah” for part of

his company’s success, Whisnant said, the most successful

Marines in his company were those who truly enjoyed

dealing with Iraqis. With about a dozen Marines who knew

basic Iraqi Arabic phrases, and others operating from what

he called, “pointee-talkee” cards with English and Iraqi

phrases, he said that he found they could move reasonably

well throughout the area.1

Aggressive patrolling throughout the 82-squarekilometer AO gave Company A Marines a thorough

understanding of the agricultural area. Whisnant said that

census operations allowed the company’s small intelligence

section to understand the company’s challenges. Company

A was located on a boundary between areas influenced 

by tribal sheiks and areas under the control of Al Qaedarelated insurgents.

Whisnant said he was immediately struck by the

similarities between what most Iraqis wanted and what

most Americans wanted. Both wanted the Americans

to leave Iraq as soon as possible, he said, but he added

that the Iraqis also wanted the same things for their

children – security, good schools, and an opportunity for 

a prosperous future – that his friends in the United States 

want for their families. Understanding the commonality of

their goals allowed him to develop a negotiating strategy

that the Iraqis understood well and that worked during his

tenure. Described as a “something for something, nothing

for nothing,” strategy, Whisnant said that he was very open

with the Iraqis with whom he dealt. Once both sides clearly

expressed the idea that they wanted something that the

other had and that they were willing to work together, he

said, it was much easier to reach common understanding

for the benefit of both sides.

Information Operations

1/24 also benefited from the work of an Iraq War veteran 

who had served as Weapons Company Commander for

1/23 in the Hit-Haditha corridor. As 1/24’s S-3A, Maj.

Shea Russell was instructed to focus on information

operations, targeting specific people or regions with nonkinetic activities. In a manner similar to what others were

doing in putting Iraqi Police in the leading role in Fallujah,

the Information Operations team put an Iraqi wrapper on

the information that 2/24 wanted to communicate to the

Iraqi people. 2/24’s information operations focused on

newspapers, cable TV, and posters, because that is how

most people in the Fallujah area received their news.

Russell said that much of their work was directed toward

Sunni mothers, because the Marines learned that mothers

were the center of gravity for most Sunni families, and

therefore an important information point.

Russell said he quickly realized that the Iraqi Army was

less effective in Fallujah, with its strong majority of Sunni

Muslims, because the Iraqi Army was perceived to be a

50
tool of the central government, with its predominance of

Shi’ia influence. Focusing their efforts on bolstering the 

Iraqi Police, who had much greater credibility throughout

Fallujah, his Marines conducted a major campaign to

work with the Iraqi Police to promote messages that were

positive for the Marines as well as the Iraqi Police.

The most important thing, he said, was putting a Sunni

“face” on all forms of communication. This meant that

when 2/24’s team printed banners or posters to put up

throughout the city, they had to have a “look and feel” of

the Iraqi Police. This was one factor that prompted the

Marines to change a “tip” telephone line to an Iraqi Police

tips line. By making it look like a local tip line, he said, its

usage increased 160% in a short period.

Russell said his IO team borrowed information from

Al Jezeera to create “truth sandwiches.” Using printing

techniques identical to ones Iraqis were used to seeing, the

IO section would insert a Marine Corps message between

a pair of Al Jezeera stories that positively portrayed the

American effort in Iraq. By implying that this information

was generated by Iraqis, and by borrowing the credibility of

information that was also reaching Iraqi homes through Al

Jezeera, the IO section created believable news about what

the Marines were doing that kept things in a positive light.

1/24 realized that the dynamics of the Iraqi Police

Force changed significantly in December 2006, when 

a new chief took over the department. The new chief

undertook a leading role in rooting out the insurgency. With

his enthusiasm, Russell said, the information campaign

provided tremendous support to his efforts. The chief

and other Iraqi Police had messages that they needed to

push out within the community, and Russell said that 1/24

provided significant assistance. For example, he said, the 

Iraqi Police would initiate the message they wanted to

convey to the people of Fallujah, and the Marines would

provide support by printing the messages.

“The Fallujans loved it, because violence dropped

significantly under the new chief,” Russell said noting that 

the number of significant events that the battalion reported 

went from a high of 21 in one day to a period of five days 

in which the battalion reported no significant incidents, like 

IEDs or sniper attacks.

Russell said that Fallujah’s “atmospherics” also

improved dramatically during this phase. In January,

Company C moved from its downtown base near Fallujah’s

government center to the southern part of Fallujah,

allowing the Iraqi Army to take over its former base in the

city’s Government Center.

Commander’s Perspective

Lt. Col. Van Opdorp, 1/24’s Commanding Officer, said 

that his battalion assumed responsibility for a very different

Fallujah than the previous battalion, 1/25, experienced.

From the ashes of Operation Al Fajr, much of Fallujah had

been rebuilt during 1/25’s tenure over a relatively short

period, and its population had grown to more than 350,000.

Incredibly, the new residents included Iraqis from other

parts of the country who sought safety in Fallujah.

Insurgents knew how to take advantage of the dense

urban environment, Van Opdorp said, in which it was

relatively easy to “hide in plain sight.” He said that

insurgent cells would frequently have several houses from

which they would operate, moving from house to house to

stay ahead of the Marines and Iraqi Security Forces. During

times when Iraqi police and soldiers were not functioning

effectively with Marines, insurgents blended in because

American eyes and ears could not distinguish their faces or

clothes or accents from others. When local support turned

to favor the Americans, he said, it became an entirely

different battle.

Van Opdorp said that several important events took place

during 1/24’s tenure in Iraq that eventually allowed the

Marines to yield control of Fallujah to the Iraqi Security

Forces. While some thought an American withdrawal was

wrong, Van Opdorp said that the transition to Iraqi control

was the logical extension of the earlier battles for Fallujah.

The end state, he said, was for Fallujans to take control

of their own city, and he said that the degree to which

Fallujans accepted responsibility for that during 1/24’s

tenure was remarkable.

Van Opdorp said that Marine assistance allowed for

many positive events during 1/24’s tenure:

-- Col. Faisal, a former Iraqi Army Special Forces

leader, was named Chief of the Iraqi Police in Fallujah. Van

Opdorp said that Faisal was a leader by anyone’s definition. 

“He reaffirmed the belief that that one man can make a 

difference,” Van Opdorp said. “He was a Marine’s kind of

leader. He led from the front. He did not accept marginal

performance. . . . He got immediate result from his young

[Iraqi Policemen]. He really got them fired up about being 

responsible for the security of Fallujah. . . . He understood

what was required for long-term success in Fallujah, and

the fact that a robust police force is the key to the security

problem in Fallujah.”

-- Col. Ali Garza was named the commander of the Iraqi

Army’s 2nd Brigade of the 1st Iraqi Army Division, with

troops in Fallujah. Van Opdorp said the new commander

dismissed some of his subordinate commanders, eliminated

the corruption that had created such a corrosive effect on

the soldiers, and went to his leaders to obtain timely pay for

51
Iraq

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53
his troops.

-- Capt. Jason Bressler, a Civil Affairs officer, worked 

with Iraqi and American leaders at the Province and MEF

levels to bring about a significant change in the Fallujah 

City Council. As a result of his efforts, Fallujah obtained

a new mayor and new city council that were much more

responsive to the needs of average Fallujans. This, Van

Opdorp said, did much to give credibility to the new “team”

of leaders throughout Fallujah.

-- A large tribe located in the rural area west of Fallujah,

the Albu Issa tribe, made a firm commitment to support an 

independent Fallujah and oppose the al Qaeda-linked forces

operating nearby. Van Opdorp credited this to the initiative

of Maj. Whisnant, the Alpha Company Commander, who

convinced the RCT Commander to travel to Jordan and

encourage Sheik Khamis, the Albu Issa leader, to return

from a self-imposed exile to protect his tribe from the

Al Qaeda. Van Opdorp said that this was part of a larger

movement of Sunni Sheiks in the Anbar Province deciding

that it was in their interest to work against Al Qaeda. Sheik

Khamis’ immediate success encouraged nearby tribes to

join his efforts. Van Opdorp said the Marines knew that

Sheik Khamis had become a force when Al Qaeda launched

a sophisticated suicide chlorine bomb attack that came up

short just a few hundred meters from Sheik Khamis’ home.

While violence continued in and around Fallujah, Iraqi

Security Forces increasingly handled the violence. 1/24 was

in what Van Opdorp described as an “overwatch” position

on the outskirts of Fallujah, providing assistance when

needed. An important breakthrough took place, he said,

when Col. Faisal asked the Marines to provide a permanent

Quick Response Force (QRF) that would be dedicated to

supporting Iraqi Police operations. Recognizing the risks,

Van Opdorp said that he also recognized that this presented

a tremendous opportunity to let the Iraqi Police flex their 

muscles, so he tasked Bravo Company with providing

this force. Maj. Jeffrey M. O’Neill said that the QRF was

something like a portable fire station, able to respond 

immediately if the Iraqi Police got into something that

was too large for them to handle. This combination was

effective, he said, because the Iraqis knew how to get the

information and act quickly on tips, while the Americans

had the backup firepower to embolden the Iraqi Police to 

take measured risks. With Marines providing a cordon and

Iraqi Police serving as the assault team, the Iraqis detained

82 suspects in two months. This was a total turnaround, he

said, as Marines went from being very suspicious of Iraqi

Police to working side-by-side with them.

The emergence of Iraqi Security Forces throughout

Fallujah allowed the Marines to consider a Civil Affairs

“hearts and minds” program that many thought Marines

would be doing when they first returned to Iraq in 2004. 

In this operation, coordinated by Bressler, Marines

conducted a two-day operation in Sheik Khamis’ area that

included Civil Affairs Officers, Legal Officers, physicians 

and veterinarians. Van Opdorp said the physicians and

veterinarians treated hundreds of Iraqis and herds of sheep

and cattle. The Legal Officers, he said, made payments for 

various small claims that Iraqis in that area had against the

American forces. The operation was a tremendous success.

“When you do something like that . . . they come to realize

more and more that these guys aren’t occupiers, they are

just trying to continue to help us so we can help ourselves.”

Van Opdorp said, “I think that the transition of Fallujah

to the 2nd Brigade [of the Iraqi Army] and to the Iraqi

Police was a tremendous accomplishment that 1/24 will

look at.” He credited the 60% reduction in violent acts

during his battalion’s tenure in Fallujah to the work his

Marines did in creating conditions to return responsibility

for certain functions to Iraqi control.

Van Opdorp said that the Reserves lived up to their

reputations. “I am not sure that an active duty battalion can

enjoy the success that we had, because you’re not going

to have a twenty-eight-year Chicago Police officer dealing 

with anti-gangs, or a New York city firefighter who has the 

amazing charisma to go out and conduct the type of things

that he did with his CAG detachment, or a former [counterintelligence] Marine as a company commander who sets

up one of the most phenomenal intelligence databases and

situational awareness for his AO. These [Marines] are some

of the best that America has to offer, and they just did a

phenomenal job.”

54
14th Marines

In a war that created many new paradigms, the Global

War on Terrorism (GWOT) reinforced the well-known tenet

that every Marine is a rifleman.

The GWOT levied continuous large requirements

for Marines. The Marine Corps’ Table of Organization,

designed more for conventional warfare, did not match

the demands of this different type of war. In resolving

shortfalls, the fact that every Marine had basic infantry

skills gave the Marine Corps tremendous flexibility in 

shifting individuals and units to meet needs.

As planners worked to fill undermanned specialties, one 

of their first targets was the Reserves’ artillery regiment, 

14th Marines. With 3,700 Marines, it constituted the largest

regiment in the Marine Corps.1As operations transitioned

from combat to security and stability operations (SASO),

the demand for firing batteries dropped significantly.2While

some might have complained that their recruiters never

warned them they might end up driving a truck or directing

traffic, the needs of the Marine Corps made “Semper 

Gumby”3a way of life for Reserve artillery Marines. From

2003 to March 2007, more than 2,900 of those Marines

deployed.4While some used their artillery skills, most

made a transition to a different occupational specialty. In

that same period, all but two of the Regiment’s 17 batteries

received basic training in new, or “provisional,” Military

Occupational Specialties (MOSs), such as infantry, military

police, or civil affairs.5Training often was followed by an

immediate deployment to a combat environment in Iraq or

Afghanistan.

Col. Paul J. O’Leary, commanding officer of 14th 

Marines, said his Marines embraced the provisional

missions, consistently proving that they could quickly

transition to new military skills that are vastly different

from artillery. The fact that several rotations of Reserve

artillery units made similar transitions helped, he said, as

Marines learned from their predecessors and improved their

performance with each rotation.

“From what I’ve seen, artillery Marines have been very

enthusiastic about performing these provisional missions,

particularly the military police (MP) mission,” he said.

“I’ve been very impressed with their ability to make the

transition and accomplish a difficult group of subordinate 

missions that each task force has had to handle. I’ve also

been very impressed with the ability of our Marines to

accomplish the MP mission with the short amount of time

they’ve had to train to it.”

Having commanded an artillery battalion in Iraq during

Phase I, O’Leary knew there would not be a significant 

demand for firing batteries when Marines transitioned 

to SASO. While commanders and planners throughout

14th Marines were not sure what missions might be

assigned to their units, they understood the value of basic

infantry skills. Knowing that most would end up in Iraq,

they appreciated that regardless of the mission, a strong

grounding in fundamentals would pay dividends.

While some Marines from 14th Marines were assigned

to infantry or interior guard missions, most ended up in

one of three provisional MP battalions that rotated through

Iraq from September 2005 to March 2007.6Sgt. Maj.

Bobby L. Allen, sergeant major for 14th Marines, said

that the transition was facilitated by two factors that were

considered during the planning process: many artillery

Reservists had civilian jobs related to law enforcement,

and the basic artillery mission relies heavily on two skills,

moving and communicating, which are critical to MP

operations. He also noted that artillery units are responsible

for providing their own security for convoy operations, so

serving as convoy security for private Iraqi and American

contractors moving supplies throughout the Anbar Province

was a straightforward transition.7

From the start of OIF, Reserve artillery Marines

augmented units in Iraq. During Phase I, Battery A of

1/14 provided a detachment to Camp al Taqaddum to

assist 1st Force Service Support Group’s Mortuary Affairs

Detachment.8That same year, 14th Marines assigned

more than 100 individual augmentees to billets in Iraq,

Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.9

The push for artillery Marines to transition to provisional

units picked up steam when Marines returned in force to

Iraq in early 2004. More than 600 Marines and sailors

from 14th Marines deployed to Iraq that spring and

summer, typically in small units spread throughout the

Anbar Province. While the counter-battery radar platoon

retained its artillery mission, tracking indirect fires from 

detachments at al Asad, ar Ramadi, al Qa’im, and Fallujah,

other units moved to provisional roles. Headquarters

Battery of 2/14 provided two provisional truck platoons,

one to Abu Ghraib and one to al Qa’im, while Battery P of

5/14 provided part of the security force at al Asad.

The mobilization of most of 4/14 for a deployment in

the fall of 2004 demonstrated the flexibility needed for 

the type of warfare Iraq presented. Battery M retained its

artillery mission, as it provided direct support to 1st Marine

Division and fired a significant number of rounds into 

55
Fallujah and nearby areas during Operation al Fajr.10

Sister batteries, augmented by detachments from 4/14’s

Headquarters Battery, deployed in provisional roles.

Battery K served as a provisional infantry company,

supporting I MEF at Camp Fallujah and 3rd MAW at

al Asad. Before Operation al Fajr, Battery K repeatedly

defended Camp Fallujah from enemy attacks, as the

population of the base increased to more than 14,000

coalition troops. Battery L provided a provisional MP

company to 1st FSSG at Camp al Taqaddum. In addition

to conducting security and detention operations, it

distinguished itself by escorting convoys throughout the

Anbar Province under unpredictable combat conditions.11

This deployment proved to be 4/14’s last, as the battalion

was deactivated on Aug. 14, 2005.12

The next deployment of provisional units from 14th

Marines, beginning in March 2005, was similar in scope

and mission to that of the artillery units they replaced.13

Battery E was split into two provisional truck platoons,

with one attached to an active duty infantry battalion, 3rd

Battalion, 2nd Marines, while the other was attached to

a reserve infantry battalion, 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines.

These two battalions were responsible for the dangerous

Western Euphrates River Valley from Hit to the Syrian

border, which was an area of intense activity during this

rotation.14 Detachments from 14th Marines’ Headquarters

Battery and 2/14’s Headquarters Battery provided a

provisional truck platoon to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines

and 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, respectively. Battery

D, attached to 2nd MP Battalion at Camp Fallujah as a

provisional MP company,15was assigned three distinct

MP functions. One platoon provided force protection at

Camp Fallujah, one conducted detention center operations

at Camp Ramadi, and the remaining platoon conducted

convoy missions and security patrols from Camp

Taqaddum.16Battery E’s success in these distinct missions

gave 14th Marines a preview of the missions to come,

including the relief of an active duty MP battalion by one of

14th Marines’ battalions serving in the provisional role.

Artillery Battalion Assumes MP Role

The deployment of 5th Battalion, 14th Marines to Iraq

as the lead element of a provisional MP battalion marked

a significant increase in responsibilities assigned to a 

14th Marines’ unit. While Lt. Col. John C. Hemmerling’s

650 Marines were augmented by approximately 200

active duty Marines, many from the MP field,17 this

rotation demonstrated that a reserve unit could provide

the headquarters and most of the Marines needed to

staff an MP battalion, rather than simply serving as one

of its elements.18 The 5/14 (-) Reinforced MP Battalion

was responsible for much of II MEF’s AO in the Anbar

Province.

While the Marine Corps’ emphasis on combat skills

allowed individual Marines to transition quickly to

infantry or security billets, shifting to police duties, which

required more specific training, proved more difficult. 

Hemmerling called the transformation a “major mission

metamorphosis.”19 He realized that this conversion

required training that far exceeded the traditional one

weekend a month and two weeks of annual training. Before

mobilization, 5/14 used four-day drill periods to learn how

to run detention centers and participate in infantry training

that included virtual convoy combat training, indoor

simulated marksmanship training, advanced weapons

maintenance, and the Marine Corps’ Martial Arts Program.

Even after the battalion was mobilized and deployed to the

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine

Palms, Calif. for battalion-level training, Lt. Col.

Hemmerling set aside large blocks of time for small-unit

training, so individual Marines could hone their infantry

skills. His commander’s intent emphasized this focus:

“[W]e will be good at the basics and we will not advance

beyond the basics until we have them mastered. The basics

will save our lives.”20

In addition to the work of Battery D, 3/14 as military

police during the previous rotation, the work of three

companies from 4th Tank Battalion also helped set the

stage for 1/14’s success as an MP battalion.21 Company

A was assigned a force protection mission with I MEF’s

Photo By Lance Cpl. Samantha L. Jones

Marines of Gun 4 of Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th 

Marines ((left to right) Sgt. Justin Grafton; PFC 

Matthew Camp; Sgt. Mike Dasher; Lance Cpl. 

Josh Rosenberger; Cpl. Will McGee; Cpl. Jonathan 

Layman; and Lance Cpl. Jonathan Fox) firing an 

M-198 155mm howitzer from firing positions near 

Camp Fallujah into Fallujah on November 11, 2004.

56
Headquarters Group at Camp Fallujah. Company B

conducted maneuver and mobility support operations

(MMSO) as part of 2nd MP Battalion at Camp Fallujah,

while Company C performed a similar mission for 2nd

Marine Division at Camp Ramadi.

Capt. David C. Hyman, an active duty MP officer who 

joined 5/14 in Iraq as the assistant operations officer, said 

that 5/14’s transition to leading a provisional MP battalion

was made much easier by the fact that certain specialties,

like criminal investigations and dog handling, were handled

by active duty MP Marines who had worked in those

fields for many years. Marines with artillery backgrounds, 

typically assigned to convoy security or regional detention

facility missions, were able to focus on the types of basic

security principles that Marines learn from their first days 

in the Corps.22

Capt. Hyman, whose primary mission was coordinating

convoy security with II MEF’s Logistics Movement

Control Center, said there was a great deal of respect

between active and reserve Marines for the skills that each

brought to the battalion.

“When I joined the battalion, it was not clear to me who

was active duty and who was reserve,” he said. “They

meshed well together, and there was not a division between

the two.”23

When 5/14 deployed to Iraq, its Headquarters, MP, and

Area Security companies kept most of their Marines at

Camp Fallujah,24 while the Detention Company was spread

over five bases. Within Camp Fallujah, the MP battalion 

worked inside a small compound known as Camp Farrar.25

Headquarters Company included the criminal investigative

division and the military working dogs, but most of the

Marines and the 57 dogs assigned to those units were

attached to other commands.

Hemmerling said that he felt the battalion’s riskiest

mission belonged to MP Company, which had three

platoons responsible for convoy security and maintaining

clear MSRs.26 He later stated that throughout the

deployment, these Marines were constantly on the road,

conducting more than 400 missions and driving thousands

of kilometers through dangerous territory. He estimated

that MP Company Marines averaged approximately one

IED incident and one small arms attack on a convoy per

week. In addition to accompanying convoys for private

contractors, like Kellog, Brown and Root, they also were

assigned to provide security for movements of Iraqi Army

and police units, which were frequent targets for insurgent

attacks. Hemmerling said that combining escort duty with

keeping roads clear of IEDs and other insurgent activities

was, “a hell of a mission, [in which] even a moment of

complacency can be fatal.”27

While each convoy mission was unique, one from

January 2006 provides detail on the danger of operating

on certain roads, and how convoy security worked in Iraq.

On this mission, 3rd Platoon from 5/14’s MP Company

was tasked with accompanying a large convoy of Iraqi

Army vehicles from Camp Taji, just north of Baghdad, to

Habbaniyah, between Fallujah and Ramadi.28 The convoy

security team, consisting of 10 military vehicles and 40

Marines and sailors, was assigned to a convoy that included

57 vehicles and almost 300 Iraqi Army soldiers. Traveling

at night, the main body of the convoy was preceded by

a team of scout vehicles. A Marine in the lead vehicle

spotted a trash bag in the road and his driver swerved to

avoid it. This vehicle then circled back so Marines could

mark the area for the rest of the convoy. The Marines also

wanted to confirm that it was an IED and determine if 

there were others that had been emplaced in the vicinity.

As they approached the trash bag, the IED was detonated,

causing some damage to the vehicle but no significant 

injuries to the Marines. Other scouts immediately searched

for a person who could have detonated the IED and other

explosives. The main body of the convoy, which covered

six kilometers, conducted a security halt. Several teams

from the security detail swept the area for IEDs. Nothing

was found, and shortly thereafter the convoy commander

instructed them to continue their mission.29

The battalion’s Area Security Company, consisting

of Battery N, a platoon from Battery C and the TOW

Platoon from 25th Marines, provided force protection

to Camp Fallujah as well as to portions of al Asad. In

addition to providing camp security and manning the watch

towers, these Marines patrolled in the area immediately

surrounding the bases. The company that was most widely

dispersed was Detention Company, which staffed regional

detention facilities (RDFs) at al Qa’im, al Asad, Ramadi,

Fallujah, and FOB Kalsu.30 In the aftermath of the Abu

Ghraib prison scandal,31 operations at detention centers

throughout the country received a great deal of scrutiny

from all levels of command. Most detainees were captured

during local operations by infantry or reconnaissance units,

then transferred to RDFs, where they could be held for up

to 14 days, until they either were released or moved to Abu

Ghraib for further processing.

Intelligence collection was conducted at the RDFs, and

it was done by intelligence teams monitored by members of

the detention units.

Maj. Trevor D. Devine, the operations officer for 5/14, 

said that the detention centers had been created from

whatever facilities were available and most appropriate at

each of the five bases.32 These were “low-tech” prisons,

typically combining a significant number of Marine guards 

57
with a great deal of barbed wire. Detainees were provided

orange jumpsuits and were issued Korans or Bibles and

prayer rugs and provided with appropriate food and

medical attention.

Devine said that the average RDF held 150 detainees,

although this could increase if military operations required

a temporary surge. While some RDFs might provide for

one or two detainees living in one room, there were cases

in which up to eight detainees were held in a single room.

During its tour, 5/14’s Dentention Company processed

more than 6,000 detainees.

Detention centers were temporary holding points where

detainees were held after being apprehended in the field but 

before being transported to Abu Ghraib. While a detainee

might have presented a threat to coalition forces outside the

camp, Devine said that Detention Company Marines were

instructed to assume that a detainee was not a threat inside

an RDF, and therefore would be treated like an “involuntary

guest” in a “secure” hotel rather than like a prisoner in jail.

“We made sure that they did not escape, but we also made

sure that they were taken care of, and not abused or hurt.

Our Marines were strict and forceful when necessary, but

they also were fair.”33

Devine said that he attributed much of the Marines’

success at the RDFs to their ability to communicate with

the detainees. While they used non-verbal communications

when necessary, several learned enough Arabic in predeployment and on-the-job training in Iraq to allow them

to communicate at an elementary level sufficient for most 

detainee interactions.

As O’Leary and his staff planned for the final rotation 

of reserve artillery Marines in a provisional MP mission,

one of his greatest concerns was how long it might take

such a unit to return to its original artillery mission.34

While harboring no doubts that his Marines could revert to

their customary mission, he said that the enthusiasm with

which many of his Marines embraced the MP and other

provisional missions might prompt some of his Marines

to transfer to other units. This was not a reflection on 

their feelings towards artillery, but simply demonstrated

a preference to return to the current battle rather than

practice in a field for which there was not a strong demand. 

Allen said that when he spoke to provisional MP Marines

preparing to deploy in the fall of 2006, many indicated that

they had transferred into a 3/14 unit to get a second MP

tour in Iraq.35

After the last provisional MP battalion returned to 14th

Marines in the spring of 2007, O’Leary planned to have a

regimental-level annual training exercise for that summer.

As a preview to this transition back to the artillery mission,

Battery P, which deployed to Iraq as a security force in

2004, executed a significant training and firing exercise 

at Camp Pendleton in 2006. O’Leary said that evaluators

had given the battery excellent marks on all aspects of the

exercise, which supports his confidence that the regiment’s 

weapons can be readied and its Marines can regain

proficiency in a relatively short period.36

“Artillery Marines were willing to volunteer to move

into another line of work because they were anxious to

get into the fight in Iraq,” O’Leary said. “From what I’ve 

seen, they now want to get back into the business of doing

artillery missions.”37

In addition to deployments to Iraq, 14th Marines has

sent more than 60 Marines, mostly from the regiment’s

Headquarters Battery, to Djibouti to serve on the staff of

the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa

(CJTF-HOA).38 Twenty of these Marines served with the

provisional security company, which provided security to

the former French Foreign Legion base in Djibouti, a small

country tucked between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

The remaining Marines filled CJTF-HOA staff billets in 

Djibouti and other countries in the Horn of Africa.

While events in Iraq and Africa placed continuing

requirements on reserve artillery Marines, the devastation

caused by Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast of the

United States in 2005 also required significant assistance 

from various units.39 As Hurricane Katrina was poised

to come ashore, the Marine Forces Reserve and 4th

Marine Division staffs executed their respective plans for

evacuating to alternate operating sites, including reserve

training centers (RTCs) in Texas. Marine Forces Reserve

took over portions of the 14th Marines headquarters in

Fort Worth and 4th Marine Division operated out of the

headquarters of 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines in Grand

Prairie. While the Marine Reserve headquarters on

Dauphine Street in New Orleans was not badly damaged,

significant damage to the city’s infrastructure forced 

portions of the Marine Forces Reserve and 4th Marine

Division to remain with their 14th Marines hosts in Texas

for three months. While New Orleans-based Marines were

moving to these and other locations, 4th Marine Division

immediately looked to 14th Marines, whose Marines

were not in Katrina’s path, to assist in humanitarian

operations throughout the Gulf Coast region. On short

notice, 75 Marines from 14th Marines reported for duty

in Mississippi. For three months, these reserve artillery

Marines provided valuable assistance in moving supplies

and evacuees throughout the devastated area.

58
4th Marine

Aircraft Wing

In Iraq

59
60
Marine Light Attack 

Helicopter Squadron

775

When I MEF returned to Iraq in early 2004, commanders

at all levels asked their Marines to “poke the hornets nest,”

to see what came out.

The Marine aircrews of Marine Light Attack Helicopter

Squadron 775 (HMLA-775), a Reserve squadron known as

the “Coyotes,” flew right into the hornets nest of Fallujah.

Shortly after their arrival, the Coyotes learned that four

security contractors had been killed and two had been hung

from what would become known as “Blackwater Bridge”

in Fallujah. A week later, as part of Operation Vigilant

Resolve, the Coyotes provided rooftop-level close air

support to troops battling insurgents throughout Fallujah.

Their Cobras and Hueys helped shape the battlespace,

either protecting Marines or turning the tide of battle. With

a toe-to-toe slugfest on the ground, the Coyotes’ rockets,

missiles, and machine guns represented a welcome addition

to the Marines’ punch.

Veterans of Vigilant Resolve described it as one of the

fiercest battles in Iraq to that point. As a major city that 

housed more than 400,000 at one point, Fallujah provided

hundreds of fighting positions for an insurgent force 

estimated at 1,200.1In response to the Blackwater incident,

I MEF was ordered to attack insurgents inside Fallujah

before developing sufficient intelligence on the city, and it 

encountered an enemy that was larger and better prepared

than the Marines expected.2The death of more than 30

American troops demonstrated the scope and ferocity of the

fighting on the ground. In the air, eight Coyote helicopters 

received battle damage, showing the potency of the

insurgents’AK-47s, machine guns, and RPGs.

As a Reserve squadron, HMLA-775 took many

experienced pilots into Fallujah. Most were lieutenant

colonels with more than 2,500 flight hours, and many had 

previous combat experience.3This combat experience was

a significant advantage when the Coyotes were thrust into 

the Fallujah battle almost as soon as they arrived. The

squadron commander, Lt. Col. Bruce S. “Tramp” Orner,

said that Vigilant Resolve set the pace for a high-tempo

deployment that saw the Coyotes record 4,599 flight hours 

in 2,858 sorties.4

“We took a lot of our battle damage in Fallujah,” Orner

said. “As far as providing support to the Marines on the

ground, we received very good feedback. . . They said they

loved it every time the Coyotes were in the area, because

we’d stay on station until we were either out of ordinance

or out of fuel.”5

The Coyotes were based at Camp Taqqadum, between

the major Anbar cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. While

Fallujah’s reputation as a tough Sunni-dominated insurgent

hub placed it in America’s consciousness, many Marines

considered Ramadi an equal threat to the coalition. Maj.

Michael P. “Citizen” Kane, who led a two-aircraft section

consisting of his Huey and a Cobra into both Fallujah and

Ramadi on the second day of Vigilant Resolve, found out

how dangerous ground fire could be.6For both missions,

he supported infantry Marines in precarious situations. His

wingman took significant battle damage in the first mission, 

and Kane was forced to return early to Camp Taqaddum

from the second mission when parts of his engine and

transmission were shattered by small arms fire.

For the first mission, his section responded to a call for 

immediate assistance from a beleaguered patrol from 2nd

Battalion, 4th Marines that was working in the nearby city

of Ramadi. While most fighting was taking place that day 

in Fallujah, insurgents in Ramadi were creating havoc for

a small number of 2/4 Marines that had been cut off from

the rest of the battalion. The patrol was spread thinly over

two blocks, had several wounded Marines, and was pinned

down by RPGs and intense small arms fire.

After arriving on station and radioing the patrol leader,

Kane flew his section over the Marines to let each of 

them know that help had arrived. After identifying several

enemy positions, Kane’s helicopter provided close air

support from the Huey’s .50-caliber and 7.62mm machine

guns. In some cases, he reported, his helicopter fired on 

insurgent positions that were only a hundred meters from

the Marines. After suppressing insurgent fires, he further 

directed ambulances and other relief to the Marines. It

61
was only after the injured had been evacuated and the

relief force was in place that Kane’s section, including the

damaged Cobra, returned to Camp Taqqadum.

Within minutes of refueling and rearming, Kane was

ordered to conduct a similar mission in Fallujah. Flying

with a different Cobra wingman, Kane responded to a

mission from 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Learning that

a Marine platoon had been stopped by a company-sized

insurgent strongpoint, Kane made two passes over the

strongpoint and had his crewmen provide suppressive fires 

until his Huey was hit by several rounds of small arms

fire that damaged major components. One round even 

penetrated the windscreen, spraying shards of Plexiglas

throughout the cockpit and cutting Kane’s face.

Low-Level Close Air Support

Orner said that throughout the Fallujah fight, and for 

the duration of the deployment, his squadron used lowlevel flying tactics that essentially put them on top of 

Marines and insurgents. This made the helicopters more

accessible to small arms fire, but it reduced the threat 

from portable surface-to-air missiles. An added benefit, 

according to Orner, was that low-level flying allowed pilots 

to distinguish which insurgents were using non-combatants

as shields.

“There were still a lot of civilians in town, and the

insurgents, a lot of times, would use women and children to

hide behind,” he said. “We had an incident where a section

was flying low and started taking fire, and there were 

several insurgents holding women in front of them and

shooting AK-47s into the aircraft.”7

Lt. Col. Steven L. Held, a Cobra pilot who served as a

battle captain in the squadron’s operations center during

Operation Vigilant Resolve, said the squadron’s low-level

support was a significant boost to the Marines on the 

ground.

“Our pilots were flying around-the-clock close air 

support in support of those Marines,” Held said. “They

were really glad to have that type of close air support. It’s

a very personal relationship when a section of [helicopters]

shows up, because [the Marines] can hear it, they can see it

. . . and the communications are good because we’re always

line-of-sight with them.”8

While insurgents in Fallujah occasionally fired surfaceto-air missiles, most of the threat came from RPGs and

massed fires from AK-47s and machine guns. Lt. Col. Peter 

“Ditto” DiTullio piloted three helicopters over Fallujah that

received significant battle damage. He said that low-level 

flying attracted fires from insurgents who would dart into 

roads as helicopters passed overhead.

Even though all HMLA-775 helicopters returned safely

to Al Taqqadum during the intense first week of fighting 

in Fallujah, there were a number of close calls. In one

case, a single round to the cockpit of a Cobra commanded

by DiTullio came perilously close to downing his Cobra.

Flying with copilot Maj. Ronan J. “Waldo” Lasso, DiTullio

was providing early morning close air support over Fallujah

when a single AK-47 round hit the cockpit beside Lasso.

The round passed through the front seat cyclic,9destroying

it and causing the helicopter to lurch to one side before

striking a sea signal flare attached to Lasso’s vest and 

setting it off. In an instant, the cockpit filled with smoke, 

effectively blinding both pilots as flames spread to Lasso’s 

chest, lap, and legs.

As soon as the aircraft was hit, DiTullio radioed his

distress call. “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday. Tycoon is going

in!”10

DiTullio quickly recovered from the initial jolt, but it

was difficult to put the helicopter on a level course because 

smoke in the cockpit obscured both the controls and the

horizon. At one point, smoke was so thick that he could not

see his hands on the controls.11 Although his wingman, Lt.

Col. Karl F. Frost, flew his Cobra alongside DiTullio’s as 

soon as he heard the Mayday call, DiTullio knew that flying 

blind at only 400 feet created a precarious situation. With

Frost’s help, he was able to maintain level flight, stabilizing 

the situation as Lasso labored to beat down the flames, 

which were spreading to his map and seat.

As vents cleared the cockpit of smoke, Maj. Lasso

used a fire extinguisher to put out the remaining embers. 

While instinctive reactions brought various problems

under control, DiTullio realized that his vision problem

Official Marine Corps Photo

This photograph shows where the 7.62mm round 

entered the cockpit before striking Maj. Ronan J. 

Lasso’s signal flare. 

62
was caused, in part, by a grey film that the flare’s smoke 

had left on his visor. Pushing his visor up, he realized that

while much of the smoke had cleared, the same film coated 

the inside of the canopy. As he wiped off this residue, he

regained visibility outside the cockpit. After DiTullio made

sure that the major components were functioning well

enough to keep the helicopter aloft, the section returned to

Camp Taqqadum.

Because the Cobra’s contols were heavily damaged,

there was no chance the damaged Cobra would be safe to

fly without significant repairs. After a brief rest, DiTullio 

and Lasso learned the squadron had another Cobra ready

for the fight. Later that day, the two were able to extract a 

measure of revenge for the shot that almost brought them

down by firing two Hellfire missiles into an insurgent 

position in Fallujah.

Deployment to Iraq

While Vigilant Resolve set the tone for the deployment,

the high level of activity throughout the Anbar Province

kept the Coyotes busy. The 2004 deployment was the first 

of two planned seven-month deployments. The fact that the

squadron saw its heaviest fighting in the first month helped 

prepare it for the rest of the deployment.

The Coyotes learned they would be mobilized in late

2003, after rising unrest prompted the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to order Marines to return to Iraq. They received

two-year orders in January. This included a firm plan for 

the first deployment and a tentative plan for a second one 

in 2005. After recruiting additional pilots and conducting

compressed training, the squadron packed 18 AH-1W

Cobras and nine UH-1N Hueys onto Air Force C-5s, and

reached Iraq in early March 2004.

After a brief turnover, I MEF took over the Anbar

Province from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division on

March 24. A week later, plans for an orderly acceleration

of operations were abandoned when the Blackwater

contractors were ambushed in Fallujah. With the bodies

beaten and burned beyond recognition, and two hung from

a steel bridge, this attack was seen as a challenge from the

insurgents. Despite misgivings from several senior Marine

commanders,12 three battalions from 1st Marine Division,

augmented by a similar number of Iraqi security forces,

attacked insurgents in Fallujah the following week.

Orner said that helicopter operations for Vigilant Resolve

were intense. Tasked with providing 24-hour-a-day support

over Fallujah, his Cobra and Huey helicopters teamed up

to respond quickly to approved requests.13 The demands

for kinetic support were so frequent and significant that 

many pilots returned to Camp Taqqadum for ammunition

resupply long before they were low on fuel. Flying at low

altitudes, typically 200-300 feet and sometimes much

lower, the pilots used Hellfire and TOW missiles, 20mm 

cannons, 2.75-inch rockets, and .50 caliber and 7.62mm

machine guns to engage insurgents and destroy targets like

buildings and vehicles.

After several days of fierce fighting, infantry Marines 

were given an order to pull back from Fallujah to provide

senior Coalition officials the opportunity to sort through the 

situation.14 As discussions foundered in the coming weeks,

Marines returned to offensive operations in spurts, and the

Coyotes continued to support these operations. Eventually,

Vigilant Resolve sputtered to an end, and control of the

city was handed over to the infamous Fallujah Brigade.15

The first battle for control of Fallujah ended with more of a 

whimper than the expected bang.

Aviation Ordinance and Maintenance in the 

Heat of Battle

Even with confusion in political circles and between

senior military leaders regarding actions in Fallujah,16 the

pilots of HMLA-775 understood their mission to pour as

much firepower onto insurgents as they could. Staff Sgt. 

Allison R. Rosebrough, an aviation ordinance specialist,

said the amount of ordinance expended during that month

kept her Marines working at a frantic pace.17 Her 35

ordinance Marines worked 12-hour shifts, frequently in

conditions of extreme heat, to make sure that all weapons

systems worked and that helicopters were always fully

loaded. If pilots were in a rush to get back into the fight, 

a five-Marine ordinance crew could reload a Cobra in 15 

minutes. During the seven-month deployment, HMLA-775

fired more than 30,000 20mm rounds, 54 TOW and hellfire 

Official Marine Corps Photo

Two Cobra helicopters from HMLA-775 hover over 

the airfield at Camp Taqqadam in May, 2004. 

63
missiles, and 338 2.75” rockets.18

High temperatures made storing ordinance and reloading

the aircraft much more difficult than under normal 

conditions. Marines had to keep ordinance in pits near the

flightline in such a way that prevented the ammunition from 

becoming unstable. In the desert inferno, Roseborough’s

Marines had to wear gloves and other protective gear

to prevent them from being burned by hot metal on the

aircraft or the ordinance.

Maintenance was a significant issue, according to Orner. 

The fact that the Coyotes were engaged in combat meant its

helicopters accumulated large numbers of flight hours and 

significant amounts of damage. In combat, the maintenance 

section was required to keep as many helicopters mission

capable as possible. With more than 200 Marines assigned

to maintenance, many worked both day and night to keep

the helicopters flying during Vigilant Resolve.

Orner stated that most battle damage involved small

arms rounds through rotor blades. While some damaged

blades could be patched over, more serious damage

required the maintenance section to replace the rotor

blades. Exterior and interior panels also had to be patched

or replaced. The most serious maintenance issues, he said,

involved internal components ranging from engines to

radios. When these were damaged, they had to be replaced

or repaired.

The most intense part of the squadron’s deployment

was flying combat missions over Fallujah, but the 

Coyotes handled other missions throughout the Anbar

Province. These included providing armed escorts for

other helicopters, like the CH-46s and CH-53s.19 These

helicopters, designed to move personnel and equipment,

frequently require escort gunships like Cobras or Hueys to

provide additional maneuverability and firepower.

The squadron also maintained a section of Cobras on

alert at all times to escort any Army or Marine helicopters

providing casualty evacuation. Two other “mixed” sections,

consisting of one Cobra and one Huey, remained on strip

alert to provide support for troops in contact or other short

fused calls for support. While calls to support troops in

contact frequently were fruitless, because combat would be

over and insurgents long gone before the helicopters joined

the fight, the pilots said that responding to such calls among 

their the most important missions.

The Coyotes frequently provided continuous coverage

over supply convoys. These large convoys typically

traveled between coalition bases at night. Lt. Col. Held

said that a mixed section of a Huey and a Cobra typically

escorted such convoys, scouting ahead for any trouble that

might develop and looking for evidence of improvised

explosive devices. The squadron also provided intelligence,

both in the form of what they could see from above

the battlefield and from what their instruments showed 

regarding the movement of insurgents on the ground.

During the deployment, 3rd MAW decided to transfer

a detachment of Coyote Cobras to a Forward Operating

Base (FOB) in the western part of Iraq, near its border

with Jordan. FOB Korean Village20was located near the

village of ar Rutbah, near the junction of one highway that

led to Jordan and another that led to southern Syria. These

roads carried significant traffic, especially after Iraq fell 

to the Coalition. Marines tasked with controlling the area

had previously received support from helicopters based

in al Asad. The transfer of three Cobras, 12 pilots, and 25

Marines from HMLA-775 significantly improved coverage 

of the area.

Squadron Commander Downed by Missile

While many Coyote helicopters suffered battle damage,

only one was brought down by enemy fire. This occurred 

during a close air support mission near Fallujah on June

24, when the Cobra that Orner and Held were flying was 

brought down by a surface-to-air missile that struck just

behind the main rotor, destroying both engines.

Marines from 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines were fighting 

a determined group of insurgents in the vicinity of a major

highway cloverleaf east of Fallujah. Insurgents fired from a 

nearby building with small arms, RPG’s, and mortars. After

Official Marine Corps Photo

The Cobra helicopter flown by Lt. Col. Bruce S. 

Orner and Lt. Col. Steven L. Held sits in a field 

east of Fallujah shortly after it was brought down 

during combat operations. The pilots, including the 

commanding officer of HMLA-775, were rescued 

shortly after Orner used the autorotation technique 

to bring the powerless helicopter to a safe landing.

64
several passes, a section of Cobras identified the insurgents’ 

building and fired rockets into it. As the two helicopters 

flew away from the cloverleaf, the Cobra flown by Orner 

and Held was hit from behind by a surface-to-air missile,

immediately knocking out both engines.

Held said the impact was loud and unexpected, but did

not disrupt the Cobra’s flight path significantly.

“I didn’t know what it was, to be honest. At first, I 

thought we had been hit by another aircraft,” he said.

“Fortunately, Colonel Orner immediately picked up that the

engines had been blown out by the impact, and he entered

into a low-altitude, relatively high air speed autorotation.21

We had no choice as to where we were going, we could

only go straight ahead. . . . Of course, a main concern to

me was where we were landing, in regards to who might be

there.”

There were only a few seconds between when the

helicopter was hit and when it landed. As the two pilots

headed towards the ground, Held said that he was relieved

to see a Marine Humvee heading in their direction.

Just before impact, Orner pulled up on the helicopter’s

collective,22 providing just enough lift to cushion the

landing. The Cobra’s skids collapsed when it hit the

ground, then it lurched forward a final time when the main 

rotor hit the ground, ripping the transmission out of the

aircraft. When the dust settled several seconds later, the two

pilots opened the canopy, grabbed their M-4 carbines, and

scrambled from the damaged helicopter. To their relief, they

were greeted within seconds by Marines from 2/1, who

effectively rescued them while providing security for the

downed helicopter.

Held said that the landing was surprisingly soft, which

he attributed to Orner’s civilian position as a helicopter

simulator instructor. This job allowed Orner to practice the

difficult autorotation maneuver hundreds of times.23 Orner’s

instincts and training took over as soon as the aircraft was

hit, so that he had regained control of the aircraft within

seconds and flew it to a safe landing.

Death of a Pilot

In July, the squadron suffered its only fatality when Lt.

Col. David S. “Rhino” Greene was shot while piloting a

Cobra over Ramadi.24 A 1986 Naval Academy graduate

who served as the squadron’s maintenance officer, Greene 

was flying a route reconnaissance mission for a patrol 

moving into Ramadi when ground fire hit his helicopter. 

During a low-level attack in which Greene was flying while 

his copilot and gunner, Maj. Joseph H. “Snooze” Crane,

searched for targets, their helicopter took five 7.62mm 

rounds. One round caused one of the Cobra’s two engines

to shut down, and three other rounds damaged other

components. The fifth round penetrated the cockpit and 

passed through Greene’s neck, mortally wounding him.

In the front seat, Crane knew that what sounded like a

baseball bat hitting the helicopter meant the Cobra had been

hit. He did not realize that his pilot had been hit until he felt

the helicopter drift on a dangerous path only 100 feet above

the ground. Taking the controls to avoid approaching power

lines, he felt no resistance from the flight controls. A quick 

glance at the bloodied rear cockpit confirmed his thought 

that Greene had been hit.

Not wanting to broadcast that a pilot had been shot,

Crane instructed his wingman, Orner, to come alongside.

The squadron’s commander could sense there was a

problem. When they were together, Crane reported, “I am

single engine, and I think single pilot.” Seeing Greene

slumped over in the cockpit, Orner confirmed that message 

with a terse, “Yes, it looks like you are single pilot.”

For Crane, flying on one engine was complicated by 

the fact that he was flying from the Cobra’s front seat, 

or gunner’s seat. Shifting immediately to the role of the

pilot, Crane was concerned that other systems might fail

or ordinance might fire off. As he headed towards Camp 

Taqqadum, all radios went dead. Stripped of his pilot and

communications, he was enveloped by an intense sense of

isolation for the brief trip to the airfield. “I was all alone, 

with Rhino in the back seat. . . . I wonder[ed] if Rhino is

just hurt real bad, maybe he has a chance if I hurry.”25

Crane decided it would be prudent to land away from the

waiting doctors, ambulances, and fire trucks. Unable to ease 

the damaged helicopter onto the airfield, his landing ended 

with a 20-foot-long slide of aluminum skids digging into

the asphalt runway. Orner landed nearby, and his copilot, a

lieutenant, ran to Crane’s Cobra, climbed up to the rear seat

and opened the canopy. Taking care of the most important

safety issue first, the lieutenant turned off the master 

arming switch, which is only in the rear seat, or main pilot’s

seat. Then he looked at Crane and shook his helmeted head

grimly from side to side. Greene had not survived.

The impact of Greene’s death was was deeply felt

throughout the squadron. The combination of his

personable nature and his position as the squadron’s

maintenance officer meant he knew most of the Marines in 

the squadron.

“You could see the sense of loss on the faces of the

Marines,” Orner said. Speaking for the younger Marines,

Roseborough said that Greene made a point of talking with

every Marine. “He would talk to all of us, it didn’t matter

what our rank was, what our position was. The troops really

liked that, because he respected them and what they did.”26

The following month, in a ceremony that included the

65
commanding general of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, Brig.

Gen. Harold J. Fruchtnicht, the Marine Corps renamed the

Camp Taqqadum airfield in Greene’s memory.27

Second Deployment

In August, HMLA-775 was relieved by an active duty

squadron, HMLA-367. While the Coyotes’ aircraft stayed

in Iraq with the new squadron, its Marines returned to

their bases at Camp Pendleton, Calif., and Johnstown,

Pa. in early September. They enjoyed some vacation time

during this six-month break, but also focused their efforts

on training, knowing they would return to Iraq early the

following year.

When the Coyotes returned to Iraq the following spring,

it seemed that little had changed. They returned to the

same billeting and office spaces at Camp Taqqadum that 

they had relinquished six months before, as well as to the

same aircraft and essentially the same mission. Although

they still were required to maintain constant strip alerts as

well as a detachment at Korean Village, the Coyotes felt

that their 2004 experience made the workload seem lighter.

Several pilots noted that they were not fired at as often. As 

Marine infantry battalions became more active along the

Euphrates River Valley between Ramadi and the Syrian

border, the Coyotes were tasked with supporting their

operations. For example, the Coyotes supported Operation

Matador, which was a regimental-sized operation to clear

several towns between Hit and al Qa’im.28 After Operation

Matador, the Coyotes shifted the helicopter detachment

from Korean Village to FOB al Qa’im, due to the higher

level of insurgent activity near al Qa’im.

While the Coyotes’ greatest contribution came from

their firepower, the ability to view the battlefield from 

above was also very valuable. This was demonstrated

during the second deployment, when a section of Cobras

prevented a unit of Reserve Marines from maneuvering

into an insurgent ambush on May 8, 2005. Marines from

3rd Battalion, 25th Marines responded to a major ambush

of a five-vehicle civilian convoy on Route Bronze near 

the city of Hit.29 A section of tanks had previously located

the burning vehicles, along with numerous victims of the

ambush. As the 3/25 Marines moved to the site, Kennedy’s

section conducted critical area reconnaissance and spotted

numerous suspicious vehicles en route to the area.30

After refueling, Kennedy flew back to the ambush site, 

where he discovered that bodies that had previously littered

the area were now neatly stacked approximately 30 meters

from the burning vehicles. Providing this warning to the

approaching 3/25 Marines allowed them to search and

discover that wires ran under the stack of bodies. Assessing

that the bodies of the contractors had been booby-trapped,

the 3/25 Marines retreated from the site and allowed the

helicopters to engage the site with missiles.31 Kennedy’s

section fired Hellfire missiles at the sites, and both missiles 

ignited secondary explosions.

As a result of the Coyotes’ action, the tank and

infantry Marines returned to Camp Hit with no casualties.

Intelligence sources later revealed that more than 40

individuals were prepared to attack Marines responding to

the original ambush. Lt. Col. Bruce S. Orner

A Cobra helicopter flies over Iraq during low light 

conditions during HMLA-775’s tour of Iraq in 2004.

66
Marine Medium 

Helicopter Squadron-764

and

Marine Medium 

Helicopter Squadron-774

CH-46s, affectionately known as “Phfrogs,” are among

the oldest helicopters in the Marine Corps. Produced during

the Vietnam era, they are “analog helicopters in a digital

age.”1For the Moonlighters of HMM-764, the 12 CH46s that they flew during two Iraq deployments in 2004 

and 2005 were older than most Marines in the squadron.

Despite their age, the Phfrogs’ versatility and reliability

made them essential to operations in Iraq.

Col. Jeffrey L. Marshall, who commanded MAG46, the Moonlighters’ parent command during the two

deployments, said the helicopter’s flight characteristics 

made it a great choice for operations in Iraq.2In addition

to the ability to fly low and fast, thereby minimizing 

its exposure to small arms fire, a CH-46 has a smaller 

“signature” on radar and other imaging devices. This

combination meant that CH-46s could fly over parts of Iraq 

that were considered high-risk, and therefore off limits, for

other types of helicopters.3

From inserting paratroopers to moving tons of ordinance

and supplies throughout the theater, the medium lift

helicopters were indispensable. Most troops preferred

helicopters to Humvees, as the flying “air taxis” eliminated 

the risks of IEDs or ambushes that were inherent to convoy

operations. Lt. Col. Clark A. Taylor, a Moonlighter pilot

who became the squadron’s operations officer for the 2005 

deployment, said that the squadron’s primary mission

in Iraq was moving Marines and soldiers throughout the

Marine Corps’ area of operations in the Anbar Province and

the northern section of the Babil Province.4

The ability to fly with night vision goggles added a 

significant measure of safety to these operations, Taylor 

noted. “It was fairly common to get shot at, especially

during the first deployment. We got shot at almost every 

night you went out. You could see some tracers coming up

at you. The second [deployment] was not so bad, because

we had [stopped] Fallujah pretty well, and that had been the

hotbed.”5

Two Moonlighter helicopters were damaged by

small arms fire during the 2004 deployment, but they 

were repaired quickly and put back into action. Three

others were damaged more significantly during the 2005 

deployment, when shrapnel from a rocket that landed

in their midst on the al Asad flight line tore through the 

helicopters.

Taylor noted that crew fatigue was a significant issue, 

due to demands on the squadron and a dearth of pilots.

The squadron had billets for 28 pilots but took only

21 for the first deployment. The issue was exacerbated 

for the 2005 deployment because several Moonlighter

pilots had to rotate out after the first deployment. This 

prompted Marshall, despite the fact that he was the group

commander, to volunteer to fly with the Moonlighters 

for two months in Iraq while several incoming pilots

completed refresher training.

When the Moonlighters were mobilized in January

2004, their orders were for two years. Most realized that

this probably meant two seven-month deployments to

Iraq. The squadron prepared for their first deployment to 

Iraq by participating in Desert Talon at the Marine Corps

Air Station in Yuma, Ariz. In addition to allowing pilots

67
to hone their flying skills and listen to Army and Marine 

Corps pilots who had recently returned from Iraq, Desert

Talon allowed the squadrons who would be working for

3rd Marine Aircraft Wing to create relationships that would

benefit all when they reached Iraq. Several months before, 

the Marine Corps had brought all squadrons assigned

to Iraq back to the United States. The decision to return

many squadrons to Iraq by the end of February forced

logisticians to transport the aircraft by any practical means.

Some squadrons used C-17 or C-5 airplanes to carry their

helicopters to Iraq, but the Moonlighters were forced to

send theirs by ship. This required the maintenance crews

to partially disassemble the helicopters and cover them

with shrink-wrap, to prevent excessive corrosion during the

voyage from California to Kuwait.

After rebuilding the helicopters in Kuwait and flying to 

al Asad in Iraq, the Moonlighters began their mission of

the next six months – ferrying personnel and equipment 

throughout the Anbar Province and the northern part of

the Babil Province. Within weeks, they found themselves

involved in Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah. The

Moonlighters focused on hauling ordinance and other

supplies while Hueys, Cobras, and jets provided close air

support for Marines fighting in the urban environment.

Lt. Col. Jacques C. Naviaux II, a deputy operations

officer who became the squadron’s commander for the 

2005 deployment, said resupply missions for Vigilant

Response were difficult.6Supporting three reinforced

infantry battalions, the Moonlighters spent most of

their time providing tank and artillery rounds from an

ammunition supply point at Camp Taqqadum to the 1st

Marine Division’s headquarters at Camp Fallujah. These

resupply missions became so frequent that the squadron

eventually transferred seven CH-46s to Camp Taqqadum

for ease of operations.

The helicopters at Camp Taqqadum carried loads that

approached the aircraft’s weight limit under the extremely

hot weather conditions. Packing tank and artillery rounds

into the CH-46s presented a significant problem because 

certain crates would not fit into the aircraft. To resolve 

this problem, crew chiefs and aerial observers had to open

crates of artillery and tank rounds and carry individual

rounds onto smaller pallets in the aircraft. “There was a lot

of backbreaking labor,” Naviaux stated, adding that this

type of effort was continuous while his Marines supported

Vigilant Resolve.7

HMM-764 also provided general support to I MEF,

which included casualty evacuations, quick reaction force

missions, and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel

(TRAP) missions. Except for Vigilant Resolve, much of I

MEF’s mission involved Security and Stability Operations

(SASO), which the Moonlighters supported by transporting

Marines, supplies and equipment to minimize exposure to

the threats along many of Iraq’s roads.8

Part of moving personnel through the theater meant

that the Moonlighters frequently carried detainees to Abu

Ghraib Prison. Sgt. Shanahan Nelson and Sgt. Shawn

Blalock, who served as crew chiefs, said that while the

detainees were restrained before they were brought on

board the helicopter and typically were escorted by

military police, they still posed a danger to a helicopter, its

crew, and other passengers.9

“They would try to hurt us,” Blalock said. “We caught

them trying to rip out wires from the fuselage.”10

The Moonlighters had several opportunities during the

first deployment to work with special operations forces 

and reconnaissance Marines. In May, two CH-46s inserted

special operations forces into an area just north of the

border with Saudi Arabia. This raid resulted in a battle in

which 11 insurgents were killed and significant amounts 

of drugs were seized.11 For this long-range mission,

the Moonlighters had to refuel at a forward site before

delivering the troops at dawn to an objective area that had

just been hit by an AC-130 gunship. After the brief mission,

the Moonlighters retrieved the special operations forces and

returned them to their base.12

In July, the squadron conducted a low-level parachute

drop of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Marines into a

village near Abu Ghraib as part of a mission to counter IED

Photo By Sgt. Juan Vara

AL ASAD, Iraq – Two CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters 

from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764 take 

off from one of the runways here while on their 

way to one of their missions May 23, 2004. The 

squadron, based at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., 

was on its second tour in Iraq since their activation 

to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004.

68
operations originating in that region.13 In addition to having

six Marines inserted by parachute from a C-130 aircraft,

the Moonlighters inserted two six-Marine reconnaissance

teams by helicopter. This represented the first combat 

static-line jump for 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Marines

since Vietnam.

Due in part to the success of the first parachute insertion, 

the Moonlighters were called upon during August to insert

another team of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion Marines

into a position to take action against insurgents who were

putting indirect fires into Camp Fallujah. This four-aircraft 

nighttime jump was conducted without incident.14

After seven months of mishap-free flying, the 

Moonlighters turned over their helicopters, maintenance

materials and spare parts to the only other Reserve Marine

Medium Helicopter squadron, HMM-774. In essence,

HMM-764 and HMM-774 teamed up for a series of four

seven-month deployments, with both squadrons using

the same 12 helicopters that the Moonlighters shipped to

Kuwait in early 2004. While individuals could deploy with

little more than the required seabags, the two squadrons

rotated in a way that put Moonlighters in Iraq for the

summer deployments for 2004 and 2005, while the Wild

Geese of HMM-774 took over for the winter deployments

of 2004-2005 and 2005-2006.

The return to the United States in 2004 was bittersweet

for the Moonlighters, because they realized that most of

them would be returning to Iraq shortly. Navaiux said

the two-year tours were hardest on Marines who were

geographically removed from their families. For those

who lived near Edwards Air Force Base, the mobilization

included periods of calm followed by intense activity; for

those who lived away from their families, the mobilization

essentially represented two years away from home. Many

Marines were anxious to return to Iraq as soon as possible

so they could complete their mobilization and return home.

HMM-764 Returns to Iraq

“I knew I would be bringing them back to war, and

certainly the main concern was how to keep the morale

high; how do we keep the squadron together,” Naviaux

said. For those who had participated in the previous

deployment, there was an element of “Groundhog Day,”15

to their return to Iraq. The squadron arrived again at al Asad

in the spring, took over the same buildings, and conducted

similar missions.16 One difference, he said, was that there

was much less activity in Fallujah and much more in

Ramadi. Another difference was that the Moonlighters were

conducting missions along the Euphrates River Valley, west

of Ramadi and towards the Syrian border.

For Lt. Col. Navaiux, staffing for the second deployment 

had been challenging. Some Marines had reached their

rotation or end of service dates, so they had to be replaced.

Five of the 21 pilots were in this group, and this created a

shortage of pilots. Navaiux spent much of his time between

deployments recruiting new pilots, many of whom had not

flown in several years. Requalifying some of the new pilots 

meant putting them through a full training package that

took several months, and many were still in training when

the squadron left for the second deployment. Navaiux said

that the delay to complete training was worthwhile because

the seven pilots who joined the Moonlighters in Iraq in

June provided immediate relief for the others.17

During this deployment, the Moonlighters participated

in a major troop lift as part of Operation River Blitz.18

Since the closest bridge that could handle military vehicles

was more than 30 kilometers away, River Blitz called for

inserting a task force from 3/25 across the Euphrates from

the village of Baghdadi by helicopter. This operation was

successful, as Marines discovered significant quantities 

of weapons and ammunition. After River Blitz, IED and

mortar attacks on Camp Hit and Camp al Asad dropped

sharply.

Photo By Lance Cpl. Brandon L. Roach

Two CH-46 Sea Knights with Marine Medium 

Helicopter Squadron 774 stop at the Hot Pits at Al 

Asad, to get refueled. HMM-774, Marine Aircraft 

Group 16 (Reinforced), 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 

finished its second deployment to Iraq April 1, 

completing a total of 14 months in the desert over 

a period of 19 months.

69
Marine Arial

Refueler Squadron

452

For Marine Aerial Refueler Squadron 452, the Global

War on Terrorism provided an instant, continuous, and

worldwide demand for refueling capabilities.

In 2002, a detachment of “Yankee” refuelers moved

troops, cargo, and fuel throughout the Middle East, the

Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa.1Over the next

two years, parts of the squadron were mobilized for

two additional deployments, first in support of Phase I 

operations in Iraq, then in support of coalition activities

primarily in the Anbar Province.

VMGR-452 compiled a distinguished record during the

“March to Baghdad” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

While its primary mission was refueling jets supporting

Marines throughout Kuwait and Iraq, VMGR-452 probably

was best known for being the squadron that flew seven 

former American prisoners of war out of captivity in Iraq

during the first month of the war.2

The squadron demobilized in January 2004, only to be

mobilized again five months later for a second tour in Iraq.3

Lt. Col. Bradley S. James, the squadron’s commander,

said the 150 Marines and six C-130s he took to al Asad

in August 2004 represented about half of the squadron’s

aircraft and personnel.4While much of their work

involved refueling the F/A-18 and Harrier aircraft that

were supporting Marines on the ground,5the Yankees also

conducted scheduled resupply operations that moved troops

and cargo throughout the theater.

As the coalition worked to develop safer methods

of delivering supplies to troops in distant outposts, the

Yankees were instructed to participate in a series of

experiments that involved GPS-guided6parachutes.7

Developed by the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center in

Natick, Mass., the Sherpa Guided Parachute Cargo System

was part of the Joint Precision Airdrop Delivery System’s

(JPADS) “Extra Light” program. In these experiments,

the Yankees dropped MRE pallets to bases that were far

removed from any airfield that could handle a C-130.8

“Angel Flights” are Number One Priority

As with all air units, moving Coalition casualties was a

priority mission.

“Our number one priority was ‘Angel Flights.’9

Whenever we lost somebody, [the goal was] to get the

remains out of country within twenty-four hours,” James

said. “So no matter what was going on, when we knew an

“Angel” was coming, that was our number one priority.”

James said that most other flights were scheduled, both 

for refueling and for transporting people and cargo from

base to base.

On a daily basis, the squadron launched several refueling

missions, including one that would remain aloft throughout

the night to refuel jets protecting supply convoys. The

night flight also provided radio relay service for convoys, 

which had to travel great distances between coalition bases,

especially in the Anbar Province.10

Photo By Sgt. Beth Zimmerman

The first of four KC-130T Hercules aircrafts carrying 

the Marines of VMGR-452 taxis on the runway 

before arriving at the hangar in Newburgh, N.Y.

70
During Operation al Fajr, the Yankees focused their

efforts on providing refueling support to jets flying into 

Fallujah. Using four airplanes to provide 24-hour-coverage,

the Yankees flew in two refueling tracks, one between al 

Asad and Fallujah and the other just north of Fallujah.11

Because the refueling tracks were so close to al Asad, the

Yankees were able to give away most of the fuel they could

carry to Marine jets. During November, which included two

weeks of intense operations supporting al Fajr, the Yankees

pumped 4.3 million pounds of aviation fuel to more than

500 jets.12

James said that the refueling track was too far from

Fallujah for his pilots to see the aerial attacks, but their

radios and radar screens conveyed the fact that a significant 

number of coalition jets and helicopters were working

to support the infantry. There were “stacks” of close air

support aircraft circling just outside Fallujah, waiting to be

called into action.13

The bulk of the remaining Yankee missions involved

a scheduled route between several airbases in Iraq and

Kuwait. These one-day missions provided coalition units

with the ability to move troops and cargo throughout the

theater. While there was a routine quality to these missions,

they provided a vital capability to a coalition that was

trying to minimize its traffic on Iraqi roads.

Sherpa Parachutes

The Yankee loadmasters were able to work with an air

delivery system that had been in development for several

years but not fully tested in combat. James said Iraq’s

Anbar Province had a relatively small base near the border

with Jordan that presented a resupply challenge because

it was far from other bases but was not supported by a

secure airfield nearby. This prompted the Marine Corps to 

implement the regular use of the Sherpa Guided Parachute

Cargo System by VMGR-452. The Marine Corps’Air

Delivery Platoons have long had the capability to push

“dumb” cargo packs out of airplanes, but these typically

required low-altitude flights that could attract enemy fire 

and still miss a target by a significant distance.14

The “smart” parachute allowed a C-130 crew to launch

a pallet during day or night from much higher altitudes,

expectating that it would land within a short distance from

the target.15 The Sherpa system combines a rectangular

parachute with a computer, a GPS receiver, and two

steering lines that allow the cargo to be redirected to the

landing site. The system requires a small drogue parachute

to stabilize the cargo so the main parachute can open

properly.

The Yankees used the Sherpa system with great success

at the remote Korean Village FOB. James said that system

operated very well for his squadron, allowing his pilots

to drops loads very close to the base. Much of the success

was due to the Sherpa system because the accuracy of the

system from higher altitudes gave the crews great latitude

on when to launch the cargo.16

Supporting Election Operations

While Yankee missions focused primarily on carrying,

refueling, or resupplying coalition forces, one of its most

important and satisfying missions involved carrying Iraqis

to participate in the January 30, 2005 national election.17

The Yankees carried approximately 400 polling officials to 

the coalition airbase at al Taqaddum and 270 to Balad, then

brought back almost 1,100 officials from several polling 

sites to their home region surrounding Najaf after the

elections.

James said his squadron created several security teams

to provide assistance for the crews and passengers for

these special flights. The squadron combined Reserve 

Marines who had law enforcement or emergency medicine

backgrounds with instructors from the Marine Corps’

martial arts program to create four-Marine “air marshal”

teams. After a brief training period, these teams performed

in a manner that was so professional that several Iraqis

commented that they felt very secure during their trip

from a Shi’ia region of Iraq to Sunni or Kurdish regions.

The teams would supervise approximately 75 passengers

on each flight, most of whom had never flown before 

and certainly had never visited Sunni cities like Fallujah,

Ramadi, or the Kurdish city of Mosul.

On the return flights, the VMGR-452 crews hung 

banners that read, in Arabic, “Congratulations to the

World’s Newest Democracy,” along with side-by-side

American and Iraqi flags. James said that many of the 

Iraqi officials were confused at first by the greeting, but 

then realized that it symbolized the fact that the U.S. and

Iraq were working together to give individual Iraqis a

meaningful right to vote.18

71
Marine Fighter 

Attack Squadron 

112

In the early years of the GWOT, the 4th Marine Aircraft

Wing (4th MAW) used all of its aircraft in combat, except

for the one that many would describe as the most lethal

in its inventory – the F/A-18 Hornet. As the fight in Iraq 

became part of what U.S. Central Command called, “The

Long War,” against terrorism, 4th MAW decided it was

time to unleash its most potent weapons system.

Before the Marine Corps would deploy Reserve F/A-18s

to Iraq, it had to demonstrate that Reserves were up to the

task.

Pilots were not the issue, as most Reserve F/A-18 pilots

have more flight time and combat experience than their 

active duty counterparts, from places like Iraq or Bosnia.

The critical issue was whether a Reserve squadron

could fly the aircraft to a distant battlefield and maintain 

a dozen of the single-seat, multi-mission tactical aircraft

that utilized digital fly-by-wire control systems and multifunction displays. While modern F/A-18s are extremely

versatile, they also are complex.

To demonstrate that Reserve F/A-18 squadrons could

meet the challenge, 4th MAW sent a squadron of F/A18A+ Hornets from Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron 112

(VMFA-112) to the Western Pacific in 2004 for a 31⁄2-

month evaluation deployment.1With Hornets that had

been recently updated to match and even exceed some

capabilities of its active duty counterparts, the “Cowboys,”

based in Fort Worth, Texas, had the opportunity to conduct

a “proof of concept” deployment that included frequent

training and operations in Okinawa, Guam, and Australia.

Lt. Col. Steven M. Roepke, the squadron’s executive

officer during the deployment, said every Marine knew the 

deployment’s implications.2

“It was critically important,” he said. “At that time,

the active duty forces were getting pretty tired and worn

pretty thin with back-to-back deployments over to the Gulf

region, and I know that they were looking at the Reserve

for some [operational] relief.”3

The WestPac deployment gave the Cowboys four

opportunities to prove they could load up the squadron and

move to a distant location.

The Cowboys flew 12 F/A-18s to Okinawa on a route 

that included a nine-hour leg from Texas to Hawaii, a

second leg of similar length to Guam, then a relatively brief

hop to Okinawa. While it was difficult to avoid boredom 

in the cramped cockpits for such long flights, the constant 

requirement for aerial refueling, broken up by occasional

rounds of “Trivial Pursuit” over the radio, helped keep the

pilots alert.

Roepke said the deployment involved 200 Marines,

including 65 active duty Cowboys, a similar number of

Reserves, and large supporting elements from Marine

Air Logistics Squadron 41 (MALS-41) and its parent

headquarters, Marine Aircraft Group 41 (MAG-41).

Roepke credited the detachment from the logistics

squadron with keeping the aircraft in good shape. Because

F/A-18s have a maintenance schedule that requires

numerous inspections, one of the most difficult parts of 

the deployment was synchronizing maintenance so that all

12 aircraft were available to fly together to Okinawa. The 

squadron invested 15,000 maintenance hours to prepare the

jets for deployment, with one-third of that being performed

by Reserves who had been activated for the deployment.4

Before the deployment, the Cowboy Hornets were

updated with enhanced radar, night-vision, and navigational

capabilities, earning the “A+” designation that signifies 

a Hornet has received major warfighting enhancements. 

These upgrades included the Tactical Aircraft Mission

Planning System (TAMPS), a digital-based close air

support system, and the forward-looking infrared (FLIR)

pods.5TAMPS gives a crew the ability to program “smart”

weapons, like joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) and

joint stand-off weapons (JSOWs), so that information can

be transferred between the aircraft and a weapons system

during flight. The FLIR systems uses thermal imagery to 

enhance the pilot’s ability to locate potential targets.

Roepke said the deployment provided VMFA-112

pilots with excellent training opportunities. In addition

to conducting air-to-ground and air-to-air missions

72
in Okinawa, they were able to participate in Exercise

Jungle Shield in Guam and Exercise Southern Frontier in

Australia.6These joint exercises allowed the Cowboys to

improve their air-to-air skills against Air Force F-15s and

F-16s.

“Every Reserve pilot that we have, had a number of

deployments already, and had spent anywhere from eight to

twelve years on active duty,” he said. “Our average flight 

hours in the F/A-18, per Reserve pilot, was in the 1900

hour range. So you’re talking about a lot of guys with a lot

of experience who are able to pick up on some of the new

things we were learning with the “A+,” like JDAM and

JSOW, relatively easily because they are so experienced

with the airplane.”7

The Cowboys felt that this advanced training was

appropriate because they knew they could be ordered to

Iraq at any time. This pushed the pilots to hone their air-toground skills at every opportunity during the deployment.

Most of the squadron thought they would immediately

be tapped for an Iraq deployment upon their return from

WestPac, but 4th MAW decided to send another Reserve

squadron, the Flying Gators of VMFA-142. Roepke said

the Cowboys’ maintenance team worked hard throughout

the deployment to keep the jets in pristine condition, so

the squadron was able to transfer seven of its Hornets to

VMFA-142 for its deployment to Iraq. The Cowboys also

gave the Gators notebooks full of information from the

deployment, so VMFA-112 could benefit from the lessons 

that had been learned by the Cowboys. “We had a huge

number of lessons learned, and we communicated those

via voicemail and e-mail, back and forth, between their

squadron and ours.”8

Photo By Sgt. Joel A. Chaverri

The beautiful mountains of Hawaii lie in the background as Col. Juergen ‘Baron’ Lukas, commanding 

officer, Marine Aircraft Group 41 refuels his F/A-18A+ Hornet off the back of a KC-130T Hercules with 

Marine Aerial Refueler Squadron 234 during a Hawaii Combined Arms Exercise Jan. 16. Based out of the 

Naval Air Station-Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas, MAG-41 provided transport, refueling, and close 

air support for 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, who was training for deployment to Iraq

73
Marine Fighter 

Attack Squadron 

142

As a civilian commercial pilot, Maj. Robert A. “Norm”

Peterson was used to delivering large packages.

As a Reserve Marine F-18 pilot, his favorite delivery

was a single 500-pound bomb in Iraq.1

In 16 years as a Marine, including 2,500 flight hours 

and numerous combat missions, nothing came close to the

moment his pinpoint strike destroyed an insurgent position

in Hit in February 2005. In a career filled with such 

deliveries, Peterson said that supporting troops in contact

was incredibly satisfying. When his bomb exploded, he

said, enemy firing ceased.

“You go through your whole Marine Corps career

training to support Marines on the ground. I’ve been in

different contingencies in combat where I’ve dropped

ordinance on buildings, but never were there Marines two

or three hundred meters away from the building, taking

fire from insurgents like that. [It was] very fulfilling, 

professionally, to be able to support the Marines for the first 

time in a CAS (close air support) situation.”2

In this case, a platoon of Marines patrolling near the

Euphrates had come under heavy fire from insurgents 

in a nearby building and palm grove. Peterson and his

wingman, Lt. Col. Kevin M. “Wolfy” Iimes of VMFA242,3

reached Hit within minutes and began talking with a

forward air controller (FAC) assigned to the platoon.

“We checked in with the FAC, and it was a troopsin-contact situation. We could see the .50 caliber and

larger machine guns that they were firing. [The Marines 

and insurgents] were probably two or three hundred

meters from each other. When the FAC was keying the

microphone, you could hear, in the background, the mortar

rounds and the large caliber machine guns. That was

something I had never heard before. . . . You don’t get that

feeling that there is actually someone down there, shooting

and getting shot at, until you can hear those rounds going

downrange on the radio.”4

Both pilots dropped a single 500-pound bomb, one on

the building and one on the palm grove.

Peterson was part of the Flying Gators, a Reserve F/A18A+ Hornet squadron from Marietta, Ga., that made

history in 2005 when it became the first Reserve fixed wing 

tactical squadron to deploy into combat in more than 50

years.5

It was an active, exciting, and diverse deployment for the

Gators. In addition to firing all of the F-18s air-to-ground 

weapon systems,6its pilots were able to provide valuable

real-time information to ground troops approaching enemy

positions by using an enhanced infrared sighting system.7

Peterson said the Hornets repeatedly proved their

versatility by enabling pilots to adapt firepower to unique 

situations. For example, he said, he strafed an ambush site

with his jet’s 20mm cannon to disperse insurgent forces.

In this case, an unescorted convoy of civilians had been

attacked by hundreds of men who then set the vehicles on

fire and took several of the drivers as hostages. Ordered to 

clear the area, Peterson and his wingman made two lowlevel strafing runs that were perpendicular to the line of the 

convoy.

The effect, he said, was like someone might see in a

movie. The pilots could see the impact of individual rounds

in the sand as they passed over the convoy, with insurgents

scattering to the left and right of their line of fire. When 

they returned 45 seconds later for a second pass, he said,

there was no one in the area.8

Like Peterson, most of the Gator pilots had more than

2,000 hours of flight time with F-18s, and many had 

flown together for more than five years. Many had combat 

experience from previous operations like Desert Storm

or Desert Fox. Each pilot returned from this seven-month

deployment with much more experience, as they flew 

almost every day and acquired 300-400 hours apiece.

To prepare for the deployment, the Flying Gators

participated in Desert Talon in Yuma, Ariz. This exercise

allowed them to work with a Reserve infantry battalion,

3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, which they frequently would

support during the deployment. Lt. Col. J.A. Baumert, who

became the Gators’ commander during the deployment,

said the training with 3/25 was a significant benefit.9

74
The fact that pilots had met the battalion’s forward air

controllers and trained with them during predeployment

exercises meant that they had more confidence in working 

together than they otherwise might have. This teamwork

was called upon within weeks of their arrival in Iraq.

Baumert said that much of the Gators’ work involved

simply patrolling the skies and being prepared to respond

when called. Some missions were designed to provide

overhead cover for supply convoys, while others supported

Marines and special operations forces heading into areas

where combat was expected.

Maj. Eric D. Klepper described the activities of an

F-18 pilot as long periods of relative quiet mixed with

occasions of intense activity. “It’s exciting, but it can be

nerve racking. . . Sometimes there’s a lot of boredom out

there circling around, waiting for something to happen. You

had these long periods of sitting there . . . and something

comes up and everything is compressed into a small period

of time, to try to get a weapon off and do what we are there

to do.”10

Klepper spent much of his time supporting special

operations forces operating near the Syrian border. Since

they were operating in small teams deep in insurgent

territory, the support provided by the F-18s was vital.

For example, one day the special operations forces were

maneuvering towards the Euphrates River in the desert near

the Syrian border when they suddenly came under attack

from insurgents using a parked truck for cover. Klepper’s

wingman dropped two 500-pound laser guided bombs on

a palm grove, and secondary explosions showed there was

a weapons cache nearby. Klepper then fired a Maverick 

missile at the truck, eliminating the cover it had been

providing the insurgents.11

In a separate mission, Klepper fired his 5-inch Zuni 

rockets as marking rounds for his wingman in support

of special operations activities near the Euphrates River

Valley. For this mission, he said, the target was in a position

that was difficult for ground forces to observe or describe 

to the pilots. Klepper fired several 5-inch rockets to a 

designated position near the target, and ground forces were

able to use the impacts to guide his wingman to the target,

which was destroyed with two 500-pound bombs.12

Klepper also described what he called a mundane

but important mission on a planned target in the desert

near Baghdad. Intelligence showed that two houses were

covering underground bunkers containing bomb-making

operations. The pilots were provided pictures and the

location of the buildings, and the special forces team had a

controller on the ground to help guide the jets to the targets.

Klepper and his wingman dropped three 500-pound bombs

on the houses. As they roared off into the sky, the controller

reported that both houses were destroyed.13

Peterson described another mission involving a daytime

raid on an Iraqi oil refinery that gave him a better sense 

of the development of the new Iraqi Army. Conducted by

Iraqi special forces with coalition assistance, the mission

clearly was led by the Iraqis. The sensitivity of the mission

prevented the Gators from being briefed prior to the

mission, but were called on to assist the Iraqis when the

Iraqi forces started taking heavy fire from a building the 

size of the football field. Peterson said that the Iraqi troops 

were professional and aggressive, and he and others in the

An F/A-18 Hornet from 

VMFA-142 prepares for 

takeoff at the al Asad 

Airfield in September 2005.

Photo By Lance Cpl. James D. Hamel

75
squadron were delighted to see them take a leading role in

this type of the battle.14

Most Gator pilots flew practically every day during the 

six months they were in Iraq, and Peterson estimated that

he collected approximately 350 flight hours during his 

tour. While this intense schedule provided great coverage

for ground Marines, it also created extensive work for the

Marines charged with maintaining the F-18s. Master Sgt.

Steven M. King, the squadron’s maintenance control chief,

said that from the day the Gators received mobilization

orders to long after the squadron return from Iraq, his

maintenance teams were constantly working on the

aircraft.15

Lt. Col. Dwight Schmidt, the squadron’s maintenance

officer, said the squadron benefited greatly from the 

experience of its maintenance team, which consisted of

an even mix of active duty and Reserve Marines.16 The

deployment required thousands of maintenance upgrades

or tests on the jets. He cited the addition of LITENING

pods17 to each of the 12 F-18s that were taken to Iraq as

an example of the maintenance team’s proficiency. The 

upgrades were installed on all 12 Hornets in 10 days, which

was much quicker than expected.

“These guys are by far the best maintenance crew in

the Marine Corps. To pull off what they did, in time to

deploy, they had to be,” Schmidt said. As another example

of the quantity of work required of the Marines, Schmidt

stated that ordnance teams had to conduct more than

17,000 ordnance tests on the 12 aircraft to ensure that all

weapons systems would function as designed. Since the

Reserve Hornets frequently trained without live ordinance,

this testing was necessary to ensure that the aircraft were

prepared for combat operations.

Several pilots said the addition of the LITENING pod

system was critical to their ability to support troops on

the ground. The system includes a seven-foot long pod,

mounted to the underside of a jet, that contains a highresolution forward-looking infrared sensor (FLIR), a

target acquisition capability, and a laser designator for the

delivery of laser-guided ordnance. In addition to improving

a jet’s ability to target effectively in many different weather

and lighting conditions, the LITENING system also

allowed the pilots to provide intelligence on ground activity

near infantry Marines.

A great deal of the maintenance team’s work involved

periodic inspections, such as daily inspections of each

aircraft, weekly inspections of all of the ordnance systems,

and “phase” inspections that essentially require the

aircraft to be stripped down to individual parts. During the

deployment, the squadron conducted 22 phase inspections,

each of which takes several days.18 On a weekly basis, the

ordinance inspection required all ordinance to be removed

from an aircraft and all systems inspected and tested before

the ordinance was reloaded. King said this was difficult 

work, given the arduous conditions and the fact that pilots

were using significant amounts of ordinance throughout 

the deployment. He said that the Marines performed at an

incredibly high level throughout the deployment, primarily

because they realized that the ultimate consumer of their

work was the Marine infantryman who might be operating

under fire.

King stated that one of the most important members of

the maintenance team was the Plane Captain, an enlisted

Marine who is responsible for all aspects of the care of

the aircraft.19 These Marines conducted the daily and

“turnaround” inspections of each Hornet, inspecting the

aircraft from nose to tail, looking for battle damage or other

signs of wear and tear. The plane captains also coordinated

the delivery of maintenance services, which combined

the efforts of people working with fuel, ordinance, pilot

ejection seats, airframe, communications and navigation,

and electronics.

“They have the most important job out there,” King

said, describing the position of plane captain as a jack of

all trades. “They are the last guy a pilot will see as he taxis

away, and the first guy a pilot will see when he gets back. 

They are always out there.”20

Cpl. Andrew W. Bedford, an aviation mechanic who

served as a plane captain throughout the Iraq deployment,

said the all-encompassing nature of the job simplified 

things, because the plane captain essentially was

responsible for everything.21

“Basically, all of the systems, we make sure that they are

working properly,” Bedford said. Going over a Hornet both

before and after each mission, the plane captains follow

a checklist of all moving parts of the aircraft in a search

for battle damage, cracks, leaks, and other problems that

may become apparent during such inspections. The plane

captains works closely with the pilots, who report on any

issues regarding the aircraft at the end of every mission.22

76
4th Marine

Aircraft Wing

In Afghanistan

77
78
Marine Heavy

Helicopter Squadron

769

Cpl. Timothy D. Reed’s enduring image of his 2004

deployment to Afghanistan is of President Hamid Karzai

looking out of Reed’s CH-53E crew chief’s window as they

flew over the mountainous countryside.1During a two-hour

flight from Kabul to the Hindu Kush region of Central 

Afghanistan, the president spent much of the flight viewing 

the breathtaking countryside as it unfurled below him.

President Karzai cut an imposing figure in the aircraft, 

despite the fact that he had to replace his trademark

Karakul hat with a helicopter crew helmet.

“We put him on a gunner’s belt and put him in the

window, and he stood there and looked around the

country,” Reed said. “We were flying over the mountains, 

and it gave him the opportunity to look around and see, so

he was always really happy and thankful for us doing that

for him.”2

The helicopter was filled with Afghan politicians and 

security forces; most spent the better part of the trip craning

to get the best possible view of the countryside. For some,

it was their first time seeing Afghanistan from the air. Their 

pride, according to Reed, was evident.

While no passenger might have been more important

to the Road Hogs of HMH-769 than President Karzai, the

long-distance capability of the CH-53E, enhanced by its

aerial refueling capability, made it the aircraft of choice

for many important missions. Lt. Col. Rick D. Mullen,

the squadron commander, said the Road Hogs flew more 

than 1,000 sorties with only six helicopters during this

six-month deployment, averaging approximately 1.7 flight 

hours per sortie.3These missions included trips to every

corner of CJTF-180’s area, from Kandahar in the south,

Shindand and Herat in the west, Faizabad in the north, and

the mountainous region of Tora Bora near the border with

Pakistan. For many of their missions, the CH-53s were not

escorted by attack helicopters, allowing the helicopters to

reach their maximum speed and distance capabilities.

The squadron rotated into Afghanistan for the hottest

months of the year,4forcing pilots and crews to plan

missions carefully, balancing expected temperatures, lift

requirements, fuel weight, and fuel consumption rates. Lt.

Col. James D. Barich, a HMH-769 pilot, said engine power

was his crew’s main concern with each flight.5Routes that

took the CH-53s over 14,000-foot mountain peaks made

planning much more difficult.6

While HMH-769’s VIP flights included trips with 

President Karzai, Secretary of Defense Donald H.

Rumsfeld, and Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Mullen

said that the mission with perhaps the greatest international

implications involved the extraction of six United Nations

Afghanistan Military Assistance (UNAMA) observers who

were charged with observing the nation’s elections. On July

15, shortly before the 2004 elections, the U.N. decided to

abandon Afghanistan’s central province of Ghor after its

office in Chaghcharan was attacked by a mob.7

The UNAMA team realized that each member faced

significant personal risk due to their lack of friends and 

resources in the isolated area. They requested an immediate

extraction. With only two hours warning, the squadron

launched two CH-53s to Chaghcharan in the early hours of

the following morning. The pilots had only a grid reference

for a proposed landing site and information that the

UNAMA members would light chemlights when they heard

the approaching aircraft. They flew more than 200 miles 

at altitudes that occasionally approached 14,000 feet on a

moonless night to rescue the UNAMA team.8According to

Lt. Col. Mullen, the ability of the coalition and the Afghan

government to have an impact so far from Kabul played a

large role in the U.N.’s decision to continue its support for

the UNAMA mission.9

The landing at Chaghcharan was made possible by the

squadron’s extensive training for landings under conditions

of poor visibility, such as when a combination of fine 

dust and low light would eliminate a crew’s ability to see

the ground. Anticipating such conditions in Afghanistan,

Mullen required his pilots and crews to train with

equipment that would give them the ability to land in such

“brownout” conditions. This training combined the output

from two devices, an infrared and a Doppler-based sensor,

79
to provide an artificial view of a landing area even with no 

natural visibility. Flying the CH-53 that provided airborne

security during the mission, Mullen said that the other CH53 was able to land in Chaghcharan, despite disappearing

into a dustball above the dirt airfield, because its pilots were 

proficient with the new technology.10

The Road Hogs’ bread-and-butter mission was a

scheduled series of supply missions that reached all

Coalition bases in Afghanistan.11 Called the “Ring

Resupply Run,” a reference to the circular road Russians

built to connect major Afghan cities, the system provided

a scheduled route of deliveries to Coalition bases. The

routes were color-coded as blue, gray, orange, and khaki,

and allowed troops from the United States, Afghanistan,

the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, New Zealand,

and Egypt, as well as certain civilians supporting Coalition

efforts, to travel to various outposts. The flights also carried 

cargo ranging from food and ordnance to razor wire and

toilet paper.

Mullen said the Ring supply mission was a perfect match

for the Road Hogs because the primary mission of a CH53E squadron is the heavy lift of cargo and personnel. “We

were happy to do this mission because it is just what we

were trained to do.”12

Every mission along the Ring Route was a challenge

because the Road Hogs were tasked with dropping off or

picking up personnel or cargo at each stop. In a planning

environment that was unforgiving with respect to weight

and power calculations, such constraints forced pilots to

prioritize loads for each leg of a flight. Over time, the Road 

Hogs were able to get their fuel planning down to a science.

According to Mullen, the significance of cargo 

management was impressed on the squadron early in

the deployment, when overloaded aircraft encountered

problems while trying to land on two separate incidents.13

In the first, the crew brought the aircraft down with a hard 

rolling landing that carried it a short distance off of the

landing site. In the second, which involved Mullen as the

copilot, the crew had to jettison both auxiliary fuel tanks

to prevent more serious damage.14 This flight from Bagram 

included the New Zealand ambassador to Afghanistan,

Niels Holm, and a group of New Zealand soldiers returning

to their Provincial Reconstruction Team base near Bamiyan

in central Afghanistan. Bamiyan, which is at an altitude of

more than 8,000 feet, was the location of two mammoth

Budda monuments which were located there for more than

a thousand years before they were destroyed by the Taliban

in 2001.

Mullen stated that passengers had significantly 

underestimated the weight of several cargo items, so the

aircraft was carrying a heavier load than had been planned.

Temperatures were also high, despite the fact that it was a

night flight. As they approached the landing zone, everyone 

on board heard the main rotor lose power.

“I heard a sickening sound of the main rotor getting

slower, which I had never heard before, and it was a lot

more rapid than I thought, as we were coming through

about 75 feet,” said Mullen.15

The pilot, Lt. Col. Jeff Freeman, stabilized the

helicopter’s flight in a hover at 15 feet above the dirt 

field, but he was unable to land because the helicopter 

was suddenly surrounded by dust. As copilot, Mullen

immediately punched two buttons to initiate small

explosions that would blow the two auxiliary fuel tanks off

of the helicopter. With this immediate loss of such weight,

Freeman was able to land the helicopter with minimal

Photo By Lt. Col. Rick D. Mullen

80
damage.

Cpl. Dominick Castro II, a crew chief on the flight, 

said the landing was a harrowing experience. “As we

were coming into the zone, Dash One [the lead aircraft]

had brownout conditions, and we were coming in shortly

thereafter. As we were flying over them to come into the 

lead spot . . . the [main rotor] blades started slowing down,

you could actually hear them cutting through the air. At

that point, the pilots were calling for ‘power . . . power

. . . power,’ and one of the staff sergeants on board was

saying, ‘pickle the tanks, pickle the tanks,’”16 when Mullen

jettisoned the two tanks.

Castro said the damage could have been much worse.

“It was scary to all of us. I heard the pilot going, ‘there is

no power left,’ and he’s got the collective up in his armpit.

[The crew chiefs are thinking], ‘We’ve got problems

then.’”17

According to Mullen, the culprit in both cases was a

failure to know the exact weight of cargo the aircraft was

carrying. From that point on, his crewmen were required

to weigh each piece of cargo before it was loaded. By the

end of the tour, the pilots and crew chiefs had fuel-load

calculations down to a science, which allowed them to

optimize the load.

In addition to Ring Route missions, HMH-769 had

several opportunities to insert troops over long distances.

In one case, the squadron flew more than 800 miles to 

insert 50 Afghan National Army troops who recaptured

the Shindand airfield in the Herat Province of Western 

Afghanistan.18 In previous days, fighting had broken out 

near the airfield between provincial troops and an opposing 

militia. The national government decided to assert its

power by inserting its soldiers into the Shindand Airfield. 

Two CH-53s from HMH-769 flew a route, which required 

two in-flight refuelings.19 Two weeks later, two more

CH-53s flew again to Shindand Airfield to deliver more 

than 16,000 pounds of communications gear and other

equipment for follow-on operations.20 These efforts were

an important part of President Karzai’s efforts to assert

national control over western Afghanistan after he removed

a powerful warlord as the governor of the province.21

In the fall of 2004, Reed and other HMH-769 Marines

enjoyed their last flight with Karzai. During the last part 

of the flight, Karzai indicated to Reed that he knew the 

squadron would be leaving Afghanistan soon, and Reed

responded by saying, “I have appreciated the opportunity to

fly you around. I really do like your country, sir. You have a 

beautiful country.”22

The two shook hands, and Karzai resumed his position

at the window. As the President watched his country pass

below him, his face held a broad smile, filled with pride. Photo By Lt. Col. Rick D. Mullen

81
Marine Light Attack 

Helicopter Squadron

773

While the Coyotes of HMLA-775 were busy fighting 

in Iraq, their Marine Reserve sister squadron, HMLA773, was just as busy fighting Al Qaeda and Taliban in 

Afghanistan.

Cpl. M. Cory Wargofcak, a crew chief with HMLA773, learned two valuable lessons as a Huey crew chief in

Afghanistan: Never underestimate your terrain, and never

underestimate your enemy.

He learned the first when a team of U.S. Navy SEALs 

had to be extracted by helicopter from a mountainous

position, after they realized they could not maneuver

effectively on foot. This forced the pilots of Wargofcak’s

Huey to make a series of risky pickups in tight quarters,

hovering with one skid on a rooftop while the main rotor

came perilously close to a nearby mountainside.

Wargofcak learned the second when the same SEAL

detachment put two detainees on his Huey for a quick flight 

later that same day. In previous flights, the SEALs had 

accompanied the detainees. This time, however, the aircrew

was on its own. As the helicopter lifted off, one of the

detainees struggled with Wargofcak and tried to get control

of a nearby M-16 rifle. Relying partly on instinct and partly 

on training from the Marine Corps’ martial arts program,

Wargofcak fended off the detainee’s attack. He spent the

rest of the brief flight kneeling on the detainee’s hands to 

prevent another attack.1

Over an 18-month period, from October 2003 to March

2005, the Red Dogs of HMLA-773 learned that the

beautiful Afghan mountains were deceptively dangerous.

Most of the threats were from flying conditions, as the 

Red Dogs flew their AH-1W Cobras and UH-1N Hueys 

at high altitudes through narrow corridors among jagged

peaks. Less frequent but more intense threats came from a

determined enemy that operated in the Khowst Bowl near

the Pakistan border. Patrolling the skies above a series of

forward operating bases (FOBs) along the border, the Red

Dogs defended Coalition bases from sporadic attacks by Al

Qaeda and Taliban forces.

Serving as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), the Red

Dogs turned the tide of battle on several occasions.

In one incident, the Red Dogs saved five U.S. Special 

Forces personnel and most of their Afghan colleagues

when a border control point (BCP) was overrun by 300

fighters linked to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Americans 

on the ground later reported that the Red Dogs helped

the Coalition and Afghan ground forces kill 65 attackers,

wound 60 others, and capture 22 prisoners.2

Maj. Raymond “Tarzan” Mederos, a Cobra pilot who

subsequently became the Red Dogs’ commander in 2005,

said the squadron faced significant challenges from the 

environment in addition to treacherous mountains and

high altitudes. One of the challenges was the fine sand that 

permeated every opening, creating a significant hazard to 

the helicopters. The other was alternating bouts of bitter

cold and intense heat, sometimes within the same day, that

made maintaining the helicopters so difficult.3

Staffing the Red Dog rotations was challenging. 

While Combined Joint Task Force 76, which requested

a detachment of attack helicopters, did not need a full

squadron, all of HMLA-773’s Marines were eager to

deploy. Mederos said the squadron resolved the issue by

sending half of the squadron, along with seven AH-1W

Cobras and four UH-1N Hueys,4 on the first six-month 

rotation. He used the remaining Marines for the second

rotation, then put together a composite group consisting

primarily of Marines from the first rotation for the last six 

months.

Originally assigned to the large Coalition base in

Baghram, the Red Dogs were quickly relocated to FOB

Salerno, a fortified helicopter base near the AfghanPakistan border. Their main mission was providing

immediate close air support to FOBs, as well as the BCPs

that were manned by Coalition Special Forces and Afghan

National Army soldiers. While the larger FOBs were more

likely to receive indirect fires, the BCPs were the subject of 

frequent ground attacks. The Red Dogs escorted convoys

that were supplying Coalition bases. Other tasks included

supporting special operations missions against high-

82
value targets, escorting unarmed Black Hawk Medevac

helicopters, and providing strip alert coverage for aroundthe-clock protection from enemy attacks.

Red Dogs Defend Coalition Base in Khowst

Mederos better understood the value of a QRF in this

type of campaign after he led a section of two Cobras

responding to a request for immediate assistance from BCP

4 in the Khowst area. During the early hours of August 1,

2004, the BCP was subjected to a massive enemy attack.

The response by Mederos’ Cobras was credited with

preventing significant Coalition losses.5

BCP 4, which was approximately the size of two football

fields, contained five special operations troops and 70 

Khowst Provincial Force (KPF) soldiers. The Special

Forces troops knew they needed help when they came

under intense attack from several locations near the camp.

Flying from FOB Salerno, Mederos and his wingman,

Maj. Derrick R. Heyl, could spot the camp from more than

seven miles away by the glow of tracer rounds focused on

one spot. As they approached, Mederos saw tracer fire and 

RPGs flying towards the compound from several directions. 

Responding to the ground commander’s instructions,

Mederos’ Cobras first used their 20mm rounds to silence an 

enemy force on a ridgeline east of the BCP. Dodging RPGs

and small arms fire, the Cobras swept through the area to 

gain a better understanding of the enemy’s disposition. The

pilots reported to the ground commander that the enemy

had overrun the western side of the compound and was

firing at KPF troops and the Cobras from inside the wire. 

After the ground commander confirmed that only enemy 

forces occupied the western side of the camp, Mederos

led his section on a series of diving attacks on that area,

firing 2.75-inch rockets and 20mm rounds on an enemy 

force estimated at 50 to 75. The actions of Mederos and

Heyl were credited with turning back the initial attack,

then pursuing the enemy as it melted into the woods and

mountains near the border with Pakistan.

In an after action brief, the BCP’s ground commander

described the actions of HMLA-773 helicopters as being

decisive. Without them, he said, the enemy would have

overrun the BCP, killing Coalition, special operations, and

KPF forces. The Cobras’ ability to view the battlefield 

provided timely intelligence to the ground commander, and

their firepower turned the battle into a rout that caused “the 

largest destruction of enemy forces in a single engagement

since the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001.”6

Attack on FOB Salerno

Seven months later, another Red Dog section responded

to an attack on a different BCP. The sophisticated attack on

the BCP included a rocket attack on nearby FOB Salerno,

in order to delay the QRF’s response. Starting with several

enemy ground elements maneuvering under the cover of

combined arms to attack BCP 6, the enemy then fired a 

series of 122mm rockets towards FOB Salerno’s airfield.7

While rockets were exploding within 50 meters of the

helicopters, Maj. Jay D. Borella led his QRF to the two

Cobras amid shrapnel and other debris.8Minutes later, as

the Cobras were flying towards the site where the 122mm 

rockets were operating, Borella saw tracer fire near BCP 

6. Breaking immediately in the direction of the BCP,

Borella radioed for additional support from other Red

Dog helicopters. On reaching the small camp, he observed

dozens of enemy fighters attacking with small arms, 

machine guns, and RPGs. He directed the Cobras’ TOW

missiles, 2.75-inch rockets and 20mm rounds towards the

attackers. When two Hueys reached the camp, he directed

them to attack enemy forces to the west while he and his

wingman conducted a series of ferocious attack runs on

the east. Realizing that Coalition forces were fighting a 

complex battle in difficult terrain, Borella climbed to an 

overwatch position that allowed him to feed the ground

commander information on the status of the battle. After

the four helicopters helped repel the attack, he directed the

Hueys to fly to the 122mm rocket site and take command of 

efforts to shut down the rockets. Previous counter battery

fires had been ineffective because no Coalition forces had 

eyes on the target. With Huey pilots observing both the

rocket positions and the incoming fires, the adjusted fires 

had a devastating effect on the rocket site.

In the midst of this activity, two British Harriers and an

Air Force AC-130 gunship came on station, prompting the

ground commander to pass control of all aircraft to Borella

so he could direct the air-to-ground fight for the rest of the 

night. The collective efforts of these aircraft proved to be

overwhelming. At dawn, ground forces found the bodies

of 44 enemy fighters from an Al Qaeda-Taliban force 

estimated at 120.

The Beauty and Danger of 

the Afghan Mountains

While maintaining focus on Al Qaeda and Taliban

fighters, Red Dog pilots had to consider the difficulties 

of operating in the jagged mountains that the enemy

frequently used to its advantage. Lt. Col. Dan C. Nestor,

who served as the squadron’s executive officer for half of 

the 18 months it was deployed, said the terrain was both

83
Photo By Cpl. Rich Mattingly

Two AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters from 

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 

773, “Red Dogs,” fly near Salerno Forward 

Operating Base in Khowst province 

to provide Marines on the ground the 

opportunity to practice joint close air 

support. The training allowed Marines in 

squad-sized elements to practice talking 

on the radio with the pilots and call in air 

support to targets on a firing range.

the most beautiful and the most treacherous that he had

experienced in more than 20 years of flying Hueys.9

“There aren’t many roads, and what you see below you .

. . is like going back in time three thousand years,” he said.

“It’s an amazing system. It’s very feudal, with warlords and

things like that. The people out there are eking out a living.

You might see trucks and modern vehicles, but other than

that it was irrigation by hand, things dug into the sides of

mountains, and mud huts with

walls around every one of them

to protect their assets. Some of

the missions we did went way

up into the mountains. It was

pretty remote, and there had not

been Americans in a long time,

if at all. That’s where some of

the bad guys hung out.”10

The thin air at high altitudes

presented a constant challenge

to the Red Dogs. With FOB

Salerno at more than 3,500 feet,

the Red Dog helicopters flew 

most of their missions between

4,000 and 6,000 feet and

frequently climbed over 10,000-

foot peaks. Altitudes like these

made fuel consumption rates

and power issues continuous

concerns, so pilots were

balancing several competing

factors when they planned their

missions. Temperatures in the

Khowst region varied from

the brittle cold in the winter to

a blazing heat in the summer,

which made conducting the

required helicopter maintenance

incredibly difficult. To top off 

these challenges, the rugged

terrain offered few emergency

landing zones for pilots in

trouble. With areas that were

large, flat, and clear enough 

to land a troubled helicopter

being few and very far between, a pilot encountering such

mechanical problems could only hope that the helicopter

could limp back to FOB Salerno.

Nestor said that the mission to extract the SEALs, also

described by Wargofcak, was particularly dangerous due

to the steep and remote mountainous terrain.11 It required

Nestor’s Huey to fly with its rotor blades almost touching 

the side of the nearby mountain. The mission grew into

more than just a basic extraction, as the Huey crew assisted

a SEAL team who had underestimated the difficult terrain. 

The SEALs were pursuing a high-value target in the

vicinity of the Khyber Pass.

After the SEALs were inserted, they realized that the

terrain essentially prevented them from moving to the

intended objective area, and they requested that a Huey

move them to a different

location. Nestor said they were

located on an isolated finger 

surrounded by steep mountains.

Picking them up required close

coordination between the two

pilots and two crew chiefs

as they inched the helicopter

towards the mountain until

Nestor could place a skid on

to a rooftop. The Huey could

only ferry two or three SEALs

per trip, Because of power

and weight considerations, so

moving them required numerous

flights. Their alternate site was 

not much of an improvement,

as Nestor landed on a dried mud

and wooden beam rooftop that

was approximately 10 feet by 10

feet.

“It’s hard to explain how

beautiful it is, how stunningly

beautiful,” Nestor said after

describing the hardships of

maneuvering even a relatively

small helicopter in the confined 

spaces. “One thing that probably

sticks out to me, as much as all

the good we did and everything

else, is the sheer beauty of the

country.”12

84
4th Marine 

Logistics Group

85
86
As the Reserve command that sustains the warriors,

4th Marine Logistics Group (MLG) has also focused on

sustaining its operations.

Brig. Gen. Eugene G. Payne, who commanded 4th MLG

from 2005 to 2007, said that after initially sending large

numbers of 4th MLG Marines and Sailors to Iraq for Phase

I and the early days of Phase II, his command established a

troop rotation that provided a sustainable model.1Working

closely with active duty and Reserve commands, 4th MLG

formulated a mobilization schedule that he described as

appropriate for providing the required staffing for The 

Long War. For 2005 and 2006, this meant deploying

approximately 1,200 4th MLG Marines and Sailors each

year, or about 13% of 4th MLG’s total force. Based on

models of what the Marine Corps expects to need in Iraq,

Afghanistan and elsewhere in the coming years, 4th MLG

leaders believe they can maintain this level of involvement

indefinitley.

Payne used the rotation of Motor Transportation

detachments as an example of what he described as 4th

MLG’s “measured pace.”

“We were fortunate in this command . . . [that 4th MLG

was] not called upon to utilize all of our motor transport

capability in the early going. . . . When we went back [for

OIF Phase II], we did not have to put a large percentage

of our motor transport battalion into the fight in any given 

rotation. By taking smaller increments, by taking two

platoons, we feel confident that we can sustain that going 

forward,” Payne said. “If they had come to us and said, ‘We

need two companies,’ then you get a big spike, and that

would hurt you later. So we’ve been able to work with the

active component to keep a measured pace.”2

In addition to this “measured pace” of mobilizations,

Payne also noted that an important component of 4th

MLG’s success was the willingness of 4th MLG Marines

with special skills to volunteer when needed. He pointed to

the unique efforts of the Personnel Retrieval and Processing

(PRP) Unit as an example of volunteers playing a crucial

role. PRP was created during OIF in response to the Marine

Corps’ plan to play a larger role in handling the remains of

those killed in the line of duty. Its members were initially

drawn from two organizations that were being disbanded.

Payne said that the number of Marines supplied from

those two units was not sufficient to staff continuous 

PRP detachments without volunteers for second and third

deployments.

Deployment Methods

4th MLG, with its headquarters staff and eight line

battalions, has a mission and organization that requires

it to deploy its Marines and sailors in a manner that is

different than combat arms battalions or squadrons.

Instead of deploying its line units as battalions, 4th MLG

has its battalions mobilize detachments that will form

part of a task-organized Combat Service Support (CSS)

element. A CSS element will require a specific number 

of troops from various military occupational fields or 

specialties. Detachments from a functional specialty like

communications, motor transportation, or engineer support

might be task organized to form a Combat Service Support

Company (CSSC), Combat Logistics Company (CLC), or

Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB). Throughout Phase II

of OIF, 4th MLG’s battalions provided detachments like

this on a regular basis. Some detachments would become

part of a Reserve logistics or service support elements,

while detachments during other rotations would be used to

augment active-duty logistics units.

For example, during one recent rotation, 4th MLG

deployed 109 military policemen and a company of 265

Marines that would provide internal security to one of the

major Marine bases in Iraq. In addition to those security

forces, 4th MLG provided 400 Marine “Augments” from

the following units to an active duty Combat Logistics

Battalion in Iraq:

Maintenance		 127

Motor Transportation	 80

Bulk Fuel	 	 43

Communication 37

Landing Support	 36

Personnel Retrieval	 36

Medical 29

Medical Logistics 12

4th Marine 

Logistics Group

87
Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Commands Com- bat Logistics Battalion

For Lt. Col. Gregg L. Moore, OIF provided a unique

leadership opportunity when the Reserve logistician was

offered the opportunity to command an active duty Combat

Logistics Battalion. The 870 Marines and sailors assigned

to CLB-5 during 2006-2007 came from 82 different

“sourcing units” from all over the world.3Of that number,

all but 70 were from active duty units. While there were

many challenges associated with bringing together such

a unit, one of the most difficult involved the fact that the 

Marines were sourced from around the world. To prepare

his Marines for the deployment, Moore had to coordinate

predeployment training in North Carolina, California, and

Japan.

With the mission of providing combat service support to

RCT-5 (and later to RCT-7), Moore said that molding the

active and Reserve troops into a cohesive unit was much

easier than he had expected. “We were an incredibly tight

team. We melded into a cohesive, organized, focused CLB

with a clear view of our mission.”4

The battalion’s operations center was at Camp Fallujah.

While most of CLB-5’s Marines were based at Camp

Fallujah, their missions required many to travel constantly

between bases located throughout the region. CLB-5 also

had a small detachment located at a base in the vicinity

of Habbaniyah, located near the Euphrates River between

Fallujah and Ramadi.5

Operating in direct support of the RCT, CLB-5 provided

services to improve the security of Coalition forces,

ranging from welding thick sheets of metal on various

vehicles to providing security for convoys, IED teams and

vehicle recovery teams. CLB Marines also improved the

survivability of many bases or positions throughout the

region. Moore said that much of the battalion’s success

was derived from a training package that focused on every

Marine having security operation skills. “We were all

Marines first, with a mission to perform,” he said. “We 

were all riflemen.”

CLB-5 worked in the Fallujah area during a period in

which one Reserve battalion, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines,

controlled the city and then handed it over to another

Reserve battalion, 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines. Moore

said that while the atmosphere through most of the Anbar

Province was relatively calm and stable, Fallujah was

in the midst of significant transition in response to what 

became known as the “Anbar Awakening.” As insurgents

responded to Sunni tribes pledging their allegiance to the

Iraqi government, the tense atmosphere of Fallujah stood

in marked contrast to the rest of the province. Additionally,

the steadily improving Iraqi Security Forces in Fallujah

were anxious to take more responsibility for operations

in the city. After assessing several options, the Marines

decided to build a Forward Operating Base (FOB) in

the outskirts of Fallujah to allow a company of Reserve

Marines who had been operating in the center of the

crowded city to give up a significant portion of their AO to 

the Iraqi Security Forces. By building the “Southern FOB,”

CLB-5 created a secure base that could accommodate the

company. The location of this FOB allowed Marines to

patrol near their Iraqi counterparts, so they could respond

as needed, but in a manner that allowed the Iraqis to

demonstrate their own firm control of the center of the city.6

The battalion’s maintenance company, with

approximately 200 Marines and a pool of civilian

contractors, was the CLB’s largest unit, and Moore said it

probably was his busiest. Its Marines and affiliated civilians 

worked around the clock to repair and maintain vehicles

so they could get back out on the road. He also noted that

maintenance Marines frequently went off base to recover

vehicles that had been rendered inoperable, either by enemy

action or a mechanical issue.

Reserves Augmenting Senior MLG Staff

Since the beginning of OIF, senior Marine Reserve

officers and staff noncommissioned officers often deployed 

as “augments” for a senior active-duty staff, such as at the

regimental, division, and even force level. This system

allowed the “gaining force commander” to determine

where an individual Marine best fit into the staff. On an 

ongoing basis, 4th MLG sponsored Reserve detachments

located with 1st MLG at Camp Pendleton and 2nd MLG at

Camp Lejeune, to help individual Marines create working

relationships with their active-duty counterparts. These

relationships allowed Reserves to step in quickly and fill 

significant positions, such as during 1st MLG’s major 

operation relating to Operation Al Fajr in Fallujah. At that

time, Reserve Marines from MLG’s West Coast detachment

were assigned to serve as 1st MLG’s Chief of Staff, G-1,

G-3, and G-4.7

1st MLG provided combat service support to I MEF

when I MEF took over responsibility for the Anbar

Province from the 82nd Airborne Division in early 2004.

Lt. Col. Erick P. Thomas, who had drilled with 4th Marine

Logistics Group Forward-West, served as 1st MLG’s

G-4 when he was mobilized for a deployment to Iraq in

2004-2005. He said that the Marines immediately faced

significant supply issues. Thomas said the amount of 

potable water on many bases was critically low, frequently

less than what would be needed for two days of operations.

He said the MLG staff quickly learned to work closely

88
with KBR, which was the primary contractor for such

provisions, and the U.S. Army. Much of the MEF’s problem

was trying to match its changing operations with KBR’s

scheduling constraints. Marine operations were dynamic

and fluid, he said, so trying to synchronize long-term 

planning with a fluid tactical environment created daily 

challenges.8

Compounding the problem, Thomas said, was the fact

that convoy operations were difficult and very restricted 

during 1st MLG’s early days in Iraq. A major breakthrough

occurred during his deployment when Marines learned that

they could be supplied with vehicles coming from the west,

from Jordan, rather than from the south and east, from

Kuwait and Baghdad. This greatly simplified the process of 

getting supplies to Camp Taqqadum because the run from

the Jordanian border was much less treacherous than other

routes.

Thomas said that much of the MLG’s work in the early

months involved relatively short convoys from Camp

Taqqadum to the Fallujah area. While they were short,

they also were considered highly dangerous because of the

insurgent threat in the area.

Reserves helped I MEF implement a logistics strategy

for Al Fajr that ensured there would be no operational

pauses, no matter how intense the kinetic operations. To

accomplish this, 1st MLG created a series of logistics

nodes, known as “Iron Mountains” that contained levels

of combat essential sustainment supplies that ultimately

supported the operations of eight U.S. battalions and five 

Iraqi battalions during Al Fajr. Having these sustainment

supplies staged at several locations near Fallujah meant

that Coalition forces had access to sufficient supplies when 

needed.9

It was during Thomas’ tour that Coalition forces used

these supplies in the successful fight against insurgents in 

Fallujah during the fall of 2004. During the month-long Al

Fajr campaign, Marines were able to cordon off the city,

then fight their way through the remaining insurgent forces. 

It was a bloody and vicious campaign, and Thomas said

that the MLG’s resupply efforts played a significant role, 

both during and after the campaign. During the initial fight, 

he said, MLG Marines were monitoring the tactical radio

networks so they could anticipate the needs of Coalition

forces attacking the insurgents. After the battle, he said,

MLG Marines played an important role in the cleanup and

rebuilding efforts in Fallujah.10

“Our Operations Center tracked everything in combat,

and responded appropriately, really leaning into, ‘Where

are we going to need to respond to whatever had

happened.’” He said that anticipating various requirements,

like supplying various items or recovering destroyed

vehicles, allowed MLG Marines to be responsive to the

requirements of Coalition leaders.”11

Reserve Combat Service Support Company

In contrast to Moore’s command of an active duty CLB

and Thomas’ work on the MLG staff, Maj. Patrick Sweeny

took a Reserve Combat Service Support Company to

Camp Taqaddum from August 2004 to March 2005. His

210 Marines and sailors became Combat Service Support

Company 113 (CSSC-113), which was the only Reserve

element of Combat Service Support Battalion 1 (CSSB-1).

While many of Sweeny’s Marines essentially augmented

the battalion’s administrative staff, his other Marines

staffed the motor transportation detachment (approximately

60 Marines), the utilities detachment (approximately 50

Marines, primarily water and air conditioner specialists),

the bulk fuel detachment (50), the combat engineers

detachment (40), and a portion of the maintenance

detachment (36).

The timing of CSSC-113’s deployment meant that

much of the company’s work related to Operation Al Fajr

in Fallujah. Tasked with supporting 3rd Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion, Sweeny said, his Marines

supported the establishment of an “anvil” along the

Euphrates River, designed to stop insurgents from fleeing to 

the west as Coalition forces swept through the city.12

After mobilization, the company prepared for its

deployment with a three-month training cycle conducted

primarily in the vicinity of Battle Creek, Michigan. The

hands-on training was designed to prepare Sweeny’s

Marines for what they would see in Iraq. For example,

the heavy equipment platoon created, graded and paved

miles of roads during predeployment training. In Iraq, its

Marines conducted route clearance missions along 41 miles

of roads in the vicinity of Fallujah and Camp Taqaddum. In

addition to using armored TPK D-7 bulldozers to remove

debris, which frequently contained IEDs, the Marines

cleared obstacles and graded roadways, allowing for a

smoother flow of Coalition traffic.13 Sweeny also credited

predeployment training with allowing his water purification 

specialists to operate independently, thereby contributing

significantly throughout their tour in Iraq. After purifying 

thousands of gallons of water in Michigan, these Marines

were dispatched within days of their arrival in Iraq to

water purification operations at eight bases, where they 

subsequently helped purify more than 26 million gallons of

water.

I MEF’s preparation for the assault on Fallujah was

conducted over several months, and as part of that, CSSC113 built a ramp onto the Euphrates River for the division’s

89
small boat company. Sweeny said the company’s heavy

equipment platoon was able to build a ramp at Camp

Habbaniyah in one day, despite the fact that the builders

came under small arms attack during this project.14

In October, CSSB-113 was tasked with providing direct

support to 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR)

Battalion for Operation Al Fajr. 3rd LAR, which was

designated Task Force Wolfpack when it was augmented

by Iraqi Security Forces and other Coalition troops, had the 

mission of seizing of a peninsula formed by a bend in the

Euphrates River west of Fallujah and the two steel bridges

that connected Fallujah to the peninsula. By cutting off

this avenue of egress from Fallujah, the Task Force was to

serve as an “anvil,” stopping the anticipated rush of fleeing 

insurgents.

To prepare for the attack, CSSC-113 strengthened many

of the Task Force’s vehicles and fabricated numerous

obstacles that were emplaced along major routes.15 CSSC113 welders helped attach armor to the undercarriage

and sides of 18 Humvees. They also helped create six

“hedgehogs,” six “tetrahedrons,” and six spike strips from

available steel supplies.

Knowing that the long and thin peninsula would channel

vehicle traffic in a certain way, leaders of Task Force 

Wolfpack decided to establish five vehicle checkpoint sites 

just north of the area where it planned to position its rear

area headquarters. CSSC-113’s heavy equipment operators

also helped construct five large protected working and 

living areas, and established more than 40 hiding positions

for vehicles, gear, and personnel.16 These sites ultimately

served more than 325 Marines and 125 Iraqis in the days

prior to the assault on Fallujah.

Task Force Wolfpack initiated the November 7, 2004

assault on Fallujah by attacking the two bridges on

Fallujah’s west side. Within hours of the initial assault,

Marines from CSSC-113’s heavy equipment platoon

escorted elements of Task Force Wolfpack to the northern

end of the peninsula, where they helped build a forward

operations center. They also helped prepare defensive

positions for various types of vehicles along the banks of

the Euphrates River, even though they were under fire from 

insurgents just across the river.17

The next day, CSSC-113 lost four of its Marines in two

separate incidents. In the first, two Marines died when a D7 bulldozer went into the Euphrates River in the pre-dawn

hours. According to reports, Lance Cpl. Jeffrey Lam was

preparing a position for a Bradley fighting vehicle near the 

river when a large piece of shoreline apparently collapsed

into the river. Cpl. Joshua D. Palmer, who had been serving

as a ground guide for Lam, immediately stripped off his

flak jacket and helmet and dove in after Lam, but neither 

made it out of the water alive.18

Hours later, two more CSSC-113 Marines were killed by

an IED that destroyed the left side of the Humvee they were

riding in on a main road in the peninsula.19 A convoy of

engineers had established three vehicle checkpoints (VCPs)

on the peninsula’s main road, then found themselves under

frequent small arms and indirect fires attack throughout the 

day as they emplaced six serpentine berms and 120 HESCO

barriers designed to increase force protection in the vicinity

of the VCPs.20 While returning from these missions, a

HUMVEE in the convoy was hit by an integrated IEDsmall arms ambush. Lance Cpl. Thomas J. Zapp, who was

riding in the back seat, was killed immediately, while Staff

Sgt. David G. Ries, who was manning the gunner’s turret,

died shortly thereafter from wounds received in the blast.21

In addition to helping clear Fallujah after Al Fajr, CSSC113 was tasked with clearing an alternate supply route

between Camp Taqqadum and Fallujah which required

moving various debris, including disabled vehicles, dirt

roadblocks, and even a steel power transmission tower.22

For many reasons, this required extensive coordination

with an Army EOD unit and security elements from 3rd

LAR. Sweeny later reported that this mission significantly 

improved traffic flow on this route, having removed ten 

disabled civilian vehicles and numerous roadblocks from

the area.

Combat Engineers Attached to 9th Engineer 

Support Battalion

Maj. Mark C. Boone was the commander of Company

B, 6th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) when his 167

Reserves were attached to an active duty battalion,

9th ESB, in Iraq during 2006-2007.23 While he was

immediately required to detach approximately one-third of

his Marines for the benefit of other ESB sections, such as 

the administrative section or the motor transport section,

the remaining 105 combat engineers were able to fall in

on a collection of heavy equipment vehicles and other

construction tools, including many different types of route

clearing vehicles.24

Company B’s mission focused on clearing major routes

and building up or improving the survivability of many

FOBs and Observation Posts (OPs). While this work

exposed his Marines to combat operations, Boone said that

they were driven by the sense that they were significantly 

enhancing the force protection available to American and

Iraqi units. As relationships between Marines and Iraqi

Security Forces developed during the deployment, Boone

said that his engineers spent more time working with the

military transition teams (MTTs), which were small teams

of Marines that were assigned as trainers and advisors for

90
large Iraqi security forces. The MTTs wanted the Iraqis to

feel like they were being protected by the Coalition, so they

frequently requested engineering assistance to fortify Iraqi

bases.25

Boone’s combat engineers quickly realized that this

combat deployment would be much different than some of

them had experienced in Phase I. In their initial turnover

patrol, Boone said, the Reserve combat engineers were

ambushed by insurgents using IEDs. While this seemed

at first to be a significant event, Boone soon learned that 

the blast involved a comparatively small IED and was

similar to many other encounters that his Marines would

participate in during their tour. Gaining this experience and

understanding of insurgent operations, particularly during

a turnover with combat-seasoned Marines, turned out to be

very positive, as Boone’s Marines learned first-hand how 

to respond. Boone said that as soon as the IED exploded,

the veteran Marines located and pursued the men who had

triggered the IED, successfully detaining them.26

Boone, who had commanded a bridging company in Iraq

during Phase I, said this IED demonstrated immediately

that the war had changed considerably. “I remember

thinking, ‘So this is combat in the Anbar Province.’” he

said. “It was vastly different than the march up to Baghdad

[in 2003].”27

One month after Company B arrived in Iraq, it suffered

one of the few fatalities that 4th MLG has experienced in

Iraq. On October 1, 2006, Cpl. Aaron Seal was shot by a

sniper as he helped build a bunker for Marines on top of

a roof in the village of Baghdadi, near Al Asad.28 Boone

described the work as a “survivability mission,” in which

his Marines were trying to strengthen positions that were

used by Marines in Baghdadi. As Seal was working on the

bunker, Boone said, two shots from a sniper’s rifle rang out, 

with the second one hitting Seal in the head.

While most of Company B’s route clearance missions

were in the Fallujah-Ramadi area, the company was tasked

one time with a long-distance mission that required a

700-kilometer motor march from its home base at Camp

Taquaddum to the city of Rutbah near the Jordanian border.

The mission was requested by a MEU commander who had

been temporarily assigned to Camp Korean Village, just

outside Rutbah. After reviewing recent reports of numerous

incidents in the region, Marines decided that the Rutbah

needed to be cleared. Boone said that the MEU commander,

knowing that his Marines would need engineering

assistance to clear the route from the line of departure into

and throughout the city, requested support from the closest

available unit. With less than 24 hours warning, elements

of Company B began the long drive to Rutbah.29 Linking

up with the MEU at the line of departure, Boone said that

the MEU commander ordered the combat engineers to

immediately began clearing the route. While the trip from

Camp Taqaddam to Rutbah had been draining because

Marines were constantly looking for IEDs, the fact that

the combat engineers were engaged by arms and indirect

fires as soon as they started operating in Rutbah made them 

realize that the mission was going to be challenging. Boone

said that while his Marines, serving as a leading element,

were not heavily engaged during the operation, the MEU’s

movements were characterized by frequent periods of

heavy fighting.30

Boone described another challenging and unique

mission for Company B as the one that involved the

clearing of numerous routes in a small area between the

cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. Known as “al Jazerra,” or

“the island,” the area had not been actively patrolled by

coalition forces for an extended period. Although Iraqi

forces were primarily responsible for the area, the Marine

MTT requested the route clearance mission so that their

Iraqi counterparts could establish more firm control of the 

area. Boone said that five of his vehicles were attacked by 

IEDs during the two-week operation, but he added that the

work of his Marines allowed the MTTs and the Iraqi Forces

to establish control of the area.31

In the latter months of its deployment, Company B

was allowed to conduct distributed operations in support

of infantry units that were operating in relatively small

FOBs near Fallujah. Boone said that these operations

allowed him to give significant responsibilities to junior 

officers and noncommissioned officers, as they worked 

in small detachments to reinforce and expand the FOBs.

Boone said that he believed the most important aspect of

this work was that it taught relatively young Marines to

coordinate their activities with other units. He said the

young Marines quickly learned how to rely on their own

initiative to acquire the resources necessary to strengthen

the positions.32

Personnel Retrieval and Processing Unit

For Marines and others who die on the battlefield, the 

Marine Corps’ Personnel Retrieval and Processing (PRP)

Unit is charged with taking the initial steps to prepare the

remains for the final journey. It is a unique unit that has 

served with distinction in what is considered one of the

most emotionally difficult jobs in the Marine Corps. PRP 

Marines speak of the honor they feel in being allowed to

serve the deceased with the appropriate respect, but their

work is gut-wrenching. It some cases, they are called on to

search an extended area in an attempt to recover items. In

other cases, they have collected body parts from the twisted

91
hulk of a vehicle that has been destroyed by an IED.33

PRP is similar to the Army’s Mortuary Affairs units, but

it includes the difficult field work of locating and gathering 

bodily remains and other items associated with a fallen

service member. While other Marines may assist, PRP

Marines take the primary role in this difficult task because 

commanders considers it important to have Marines from

units other than that of a fallen Marine search for the

remains or other personal items.

After collecting the remains, PRP Marines would

bring them to one of three bases with PRP units – Camp 

Taqqadum, Al Asad Air Base, or Camp Fallujah – where 

they were tended to before the journey back to the United

States.

Sgt. Susannah F. Wood, who was assigned to the PRP

Platoon at Al Asad for six months in 2004-2005, said that

one of the things that made PRP work more difficult was 

that it was always done under a time constraint, as the

military tried to return the remains to the United States as

quickly as possible.34

PRP’s mission, Wood said, was to recover and process

an individual’s remains and personal property, which

included cleaning and recomposing the remains and

identifying and documenting wounds. PRP Marines worked

in teams, with one or two Marines searching each pocket

or pouch or any other related item that might be used to

confirm the identify of the remains. This search included 

a careful review of military equipment, because Marines

frequently stored personal items among their military

equipment, subsequently, PRP Marine would document

each item. The team would also look for other information,

such as scars or marks, that would help confirm an identity.

PRP helped coordinate arrangements to have the remains

evacuated to Kuwait for another flight to a centralized 

receiving point at Dover Air Force Base. At Dover AFB,

she said, the remains were checked against records for

fingerprints, dental work, and DNA. These tests allowed the 

military to conclusively identify a specific individual and 

possibly identify the cause of death.

Wood said that there was an air of reverence that

surrounded PRP’s work. Some of the work was intensely

personal, such as when property like jewelry or letters that

either had come from home or had not yet been mailed

home were inventoried. Acknowledging that it was difficult 

work, she said that she and her fellow Marines took great

pride in knowing that they were treating the remains with

extraordinary respect.35

She reiterated that working with remains took priority

over any other work throughout the theater. “Everyone goes

out of their way to ensure that we get the ‘Angel’ home,”

she said, using the name that has been adopted to identify

any deceased American service member who is being

returned to his or her home.

Brig. Gen. Payne described the PRP as a story of

dedication of Marine Reserves. With little more than

100 Marines qualified to serve in PRP, he said, the MLG 

has staffed at least one platoon of PRP Marines in every

rotation. “We ran out of Marines on paper over a year ago,”

he said. “The reason we are able to sustain [PRP operations

is] because of volunteerism, people willing to go back for

a second or third tour. A lot of our PRP Marines have been

three times now.”36

92
The 

Last Journey

93
94
The Last Journey

The Marine Corps has called on Reserve Marines for

many aspects of treating those who had been wounded

or killed in battle. At one end of the process, Reserves

from the Personnel Retrieval and Processing (PRP)

Unit gathered, identified, and processed the remains of 

a deceased service member. At the other end, Reserves

frequently were tasked with making casualty calls and

conducting funeral details. Much of the U.S.-based

casualty work was done by Reserves, in part because of the

distribution of Reserve units throughout the country. These

are missions that Marines handle with pride, respect, and

great distinction.

Lt. Gen. Jack W. Bergman, Commander of Marine

Forces Reserve between 2005 and 2008, told a U.S. Senate

subcommittee in 2006 that more than 90 percent of the

Marine Corps’ casualty calls had been handled by Marines

assigned to the Reserve.1

“In recognition of this greatest of sacrifices, there is no 

duty that we treat with more importance,” Bergman told

the Senators. “The duties of our casualty assistance officers 

go well beyond notification, . . . [and include] planning the 

return and final rest of their Marine, counseling [the family] 

on benefits and entitlements, [and] providing a strong 

shoulder when needed.”2

During the Global War on Terror, the services adopted

the respectful code name of “Angels” to refer to the

remains of service members being processed or transported

to their families and final resting sites. According to those 

who took part in such sacred duties, there was no mission

that had a higher priority, and none that received the same

level of attention or care, as a mission that involved an

“Angel.”

Flying with Angels

For Lt. Col. Jacques C. Naviaux II, who commanded

HMM-764 in Iraq in 2005, one of the most poignant

moments of his career occurred when he and his crew were

diverted to pick up the remains of five U.S. Army soldiers 

who had been killed in combat.3His section’s original

mission had been to extract a reinforced platoon of soldiers

who had been conducting field operations for more than 

two weeks, but the mission was changed en route to the

pickup site. Told that his section would be carrying the

remains of the soldiers, Naviaux made sure that the crews

understood that they had been assigned a sacred duty.4

After the bodies were loaded, the commander of the

Army unit walked up to the cockpit and extended his

hand in a simple gesture of appreciation. Naviaux, who

returned his handshake, said it was meaningful for both

men. With no words passing between them, the Army

commander made sure that Naviaux’ Marines knew that he

was entrusting them with the most precious and important

load that the Marines would ever carry, and the Marine

acknowledged the message. Both commanders conveyed to

each other that the loss of a service member is shared by all

services.

Minutes later, as the Angels began their ascent, 50

soldiers came to attention and saluted their fallen comrades

as the final journey home began.5

Personnel Retrieval and Processing Unit

Reserves often use civilian skills when called to active

duty. For Sgt. Daniel Cotnoir, his background as a funeral

director in Massachusetts provided the experience that

the Marine Corps needed when he was mobilized for a

deployment to Iraq in 2004-2005. Trained as an armorer,

he was assigned to the Personnel Retrieval and Processing

(PRP) Unit, which worked with the remains of Marines and

others who died in a war zone.6In addition to other duties,

Cotnoir regularly cleaned and recomposed the bloodied

bodies and facial features of Marines killed in combat.7

While the gruesome work is difficult from an emotional 

perspective, Cotnoir said that it was a tremendously

rewarding job. The work ranges from searching for body

parts after an explosion to combing through a service

member’s wallet before packaging personal belongings to

be shipped to the deceased’s family.

Cotnoir’s efforts as part of a unit of approximately 20

Marines that handled the remains of 182 people led to his

selection as the 2005 Marine of the Year by the Marine

Corps Times.8While his civilian training gave him the

skills to clean and recompose the remains at the outset of

the journey, he also demonstrated leadership by heading up

teams that searched large areas to recover body parts and

personal items of deceased service members. According

to the Marine Corps Times’ citation, he once crawled

into the burned-out hulk of a Light Armored Vehicle to

recover the remains of a Marine who had been trapped

in the wreckage.9While such work was physically and

emotionally taxing, Cotnoir said the PRP units took great

95
pride in knowing that the dead were treated with respect,

thereby bringing some measure of closure to the deceased’s

family.

While Cotnoir was assigned to Camp Taqaddum, other

PRP units were based at Camp Fallujah and Al Asad Air

Base. Sgt. Susannah F.

Wood, who was part of the

Al Asad unit, said that PRP

operations were constantly

under tight time constraints,

as the military tried to

return the remains to the

United States as quickly as

possible.

Despite tight timeframes,

Wood said that there was

an air or reverence that

surrounded PRP’s work.

Some of the work was

intensely personal, such as

dealing with an individual’s

combat gear or letters from

home. While it was difficult, 

she said that she and her

fellow Marines took great

pride in knowing that they

were treating the remains

with an extraordinarily high

level of respect.

She reiterated that

working with remains took

priority over any other work

throughout the theater.

“Everyone goes out of their

way to ensure that we get

the Angel home,” she said.

Notifying the Next of Kin

While an Angel was beginning the journey home,

Reserves often were called upon to notify a Marine’s family

of the death. It has been described as one of the hardest

jobs in the military, because family members understand

the meaning of uniformed Marines at their door.

Symbolized by a knock on the door, the passing of a

casualty message is the thing that military families dread

most. While its impact on the deceased’s family is apparent,

it also leaves an indelible impression on the Notification 

Officer.10 Most Notification Officers describe that the 

responsibility as a sacred duty, but they also note that it is

haunting. One Notification Officer said that simply wearing 

his Service Alpha uniform reminds him of each of the

families he has come to know through this difficult duty.11

He recalled one notification visit to a mother who originally 

thought he had simply come for a social visit. When she

looked into his eyes, he said, she immediately grasped the

somber meaning of his

visit.

When a Marine dies,

a Notification Officer 

provides the family with

the formal notification of 

the death. The Notification 

Officer is typically joined 

by a Casualty Assistance

Calls Officer (CACO), and 

possibly a chaplain. It is

done as soon as possible,

day or night, so family

members receive the

information from a Marine

Corps source rather than a

reporter or someone else.

Maj. Kirk A. Greiner

had been the InspectorInstructor for Lima

Company, 3rd Battalion,

25th Marines, for only

three days when he had to

notify the families of two

Marines that their loved

ones had been killed in

Iraq.12 Greiner said that the

OIC of Lima Company’s

Peacetime Wartime

Support Team, Chief

Warrant Officer 4 Orrin H. 

Bowman, had conducted

several notification visits 

before Greiner joined the unit. This allowed him to prepare

Greiner for the duties as well as anyone could have.

Greiner’s first question to Bowman was how to respond 

to a casualty call. “I wanted to make sure that I knew what

I was doing if, God forbid, that happened. Lo and behold,

three days later it happened, [and Bowman] had prepared

me very well.”13

Bowman had prepared emergency information folders

for each deployed Marine and Sailor that included maps

to the homes of the next-of-kin.14 Experience had taught

Bowman that each family would respond differently, so

he advised Greiner, a two-tour veteran of Operation Iraqi

Freedom, to be prepared for a broad range of possible

96
responses.

Greiner said he encouraged the families to sit down

first, while he asked a few brief questions to ensure he 

was talking with the right people. Then, he said, he would

deliver a short statement of regret from the Commandant,

such as: “The Commandant of the Marine Corps has

entrusted me to express his deep regret that your son, Lance

Cpl. John A. Marine, was killed in action in Baghdad, Iraq,

on November 10, 2005. The Commandant extends his

deepest sympathy to you and your family in your loss.”15

This is the most difficult part, he said. Until the words 

“killed in action,” are spoken, the family is hoping the

news will be that the person is wounded or missing in

action. With that one word, he said, the family’s hopes are

dashed.16

While an initial Personnel Casualty Report may have

contained a brief description of how an individual died,17

Greiner said that he preferred to provide little information

during the initial visit. To avoid confusion or the need for

later clarification, he said, most Notification Officers told 

families that the CACO would provide them with accurate

information as soon as it was available.

The CACO follows up on the Notification Officer’s 

initial visit by providing whatever assistance is needed by a

family. Greiner, who supervised many Marines who served

as CACOs, said that the Golden Rule for a CACO is to

accomplish whatever the family wants. This high standard

frequently requires numerous phone calls to the Marine

Corps’ Headquarters for special requests. For example,

Greiner said, frequently both the parents and the spouse

might request that they receive their Marine’s Purple

Heart and accompanying certificate. While Marine Corps 

directives require that this type of request be cleared at the

Headquarters level, Greiner said that CACOs keep calling

until they received the appropriate authorization.

In a war that has resulted in more U.S. fatalities than any

military action since Vietnam, Marine Notification Officers 

and CACOs have earned a reputation for doing a difficult 

job as well as possible.18 Less than a week after conducting

his notification calls for families of the two Marines who 

died on his third day as Company L’s Inspector-Instructor

staff, Greiner had to notify the families of six more Marines

that their sons or husbands had been killed in an IED

blast near Haditha on August 3, 2005. The IED destroyed

the Amtrak in which the Marines were riding, killing 14

Reserves. More than any other single incident, this IED

brought home to America the significant losses that Marine 

Reserves were suffering in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Photo By Cpl. Brian Rheimers

97
A Final Goodbye With The Lord’s Prayer

In the fall of 2006, when 1st Battalion, 25th Marines

returned from Iraq, its Marines were required to spend

two weeks at Camp Pendleton prior to returning to

their families and respective home training centers.

While this period provided ample time to take care of

routine administrative matters, it also provided some

decompression time to help Marines and Sailors make the

transition from a combat zone to a civilian environment.

Lt. Col. Christopher A. Landro, the battalion’s 

commander, used the “Liberty Weekend,” to take 13 of

the battalion’s leaders to visit some of the battalion’s most

severly wounded Marines.19 In addition to the battalion’s

Commanding Officer, Sergeant Major, and Operations 

Officer, Landro had the Company Commanders and First 

Sergeants from each of the battalion’s five companies 

participate in the visits.20 “It truly was one of the most

inspiring things that I’ve ever done,” Landro said.21

The Marines first went to San Antonio, Texas, where 

they visited two Marines who were being treated at the U.S.

Army’s burn center. Both Marines suffered severe wounds

as well as deep burns, but Landro said that their attitudes

were undaunted.22 One, he said, was essentially running

his hospital floor, making sure that every service member 

maintained high spirits while getting to all appointments

and physical therapy sessions. The other, who had grown

up in the west, told his battalion commander that he, “could

not wait to get back up on a horse.”23

The leaders then flew to Washington, D.C., where they 

first visited two of their Marines at the Bethesda Medical 

Center before spending time with a third Marine, who was

on convalescent leave with his family in the Washington

area. Still wearing their desert utilities, the 13 then drove

to Arlington to say their goodbyes to two Marines, Capt.

Brian S. Letendre and Cpl. Jordan C. Pierson, who had

been interred at Arlington National Cemetery during the

deployment.

Maj. Brian T. Hofmann, who commanded Bravo

Company, said the trip to Arlington was an important

part of his postdeployment healing process. “It was very

somber, but it was very good,” he said. “I think that there

was a little bit of a catharsis there.”24

“For those who have been in combat and lost people,

[Arlington Cemetery] becomes a monument unto itself,”

said Hofmann, who had lost two Marines to sniper fire 

in the center of Fallujah. “It definitely was an emotional 

experience for all of us who were there.”25

Capt. Letendre had been killed in an attack in Ramadi

just three weeks into his deployment, while serving on an

11-person Military Transition Team (MTT) training Iraqi

recruits.26 The standard and simple white granite headstone

had been placed at Letendre’s grave by the time battalion’s

leaders visited. Several of Landro’s colleagues knelt by

Letendre’s grave to whisper a private goodbye before

touching the headstone. “We all knew him well and were

very fond of him,” Hofmann said. “He was a very popular

captain in the battalion.”27

As the Marines gathered around the grave, Lt. Col.

Landro asked the Battalion Sergeant Major, Sgt. Maj.

Bradley E. Trudell, if he would lead them in a prayer.28

Without further words, all 13 removed their covers and

knelt around the grave.

“We gathered there and knelt and said a prayer over

Letendre’s gravesite. The Sergeant Major led it. It was

simply the Lord’s Prayer, with the thirteen of us kneeling

down around his gravesite,” Landro said.29 As Trudell

began to speak those few words, many of the Marines

joined him.

Landro said the prayer was the highlight of a trip that

provided an “absolute relief” to the battalion’s leaders.30

“It’s hard with a Reserve battalion because you know

that your opportunities are going to be limited to get to

these guys as a unit, to do it as a command, to say, ‘It’s

not just Lt. Col. Landro coming to see you, it’s [First

Battalion, Twenty-Fifth Marines] coming to see you. It’s

your brothers. If we could all be here, we would . . . but I

brought who I could.”31

98
Photos

Official Marine Corps Photo

99
On 16 April 2006, Marines 

of 4th Platoon, Company 

A, 1st Battalion, 25th 

Marines, Regimental 

Combat Team 5, kneel 

in front of a house being 

searched for weapons 

in Saqlawyia, Iraq while 

looking for possible 

improvised explosive 

devices (IED’s), and 

meeting and greeting 

Iraqi citizens. RCT-5 

was deployed with I MEF 

in support of Operation 

Freedom in the Al Anbar 

Province of Iraq (MNFW) to develop the Iraqi 

Security Forces, facilitate 

the development of 

official rule of law through 

democratic government 

reforms, and continue the 

development of a market 

based economy centered 

on Iraqi Reconstruction. 

Photo By Cpl Adaecus G. Brooks

Cpl Brian Reimers

An assault team 

from Company B, 1st 

Battalion, 25th Marine 

Regiment, Regimental 

Combat Team 5, 

conducts a raid on a 

possible suicide vehicle 

bomb workshop in 

central Fallujah. The 

Marines searched the 

vacant garage after 

receiving intelligence 

that the owner 

might be supporting 

insurgents to harm 

coalition forces and 

innocent civilians.

100
Capt. Raymond 

L. Adams, 

executive officer 

assigned to 

Company C, 

1st Battalion, 

25th Marine 

Regiment, 

Regimental 

Combat Team 

5, passes 

out candy to 

children. The 

Marines traveled 

with candy, toys 

and hygiene 

items for the 

kids in different 

neighborhoods 

in the city. 

Adams, 33, is 

from Deerfield, 

Mass.

Photo By Cpl Brian Reimers

December 30, 2004 Iraq: 

Lance Cpl. Wesley A. 

Edgemon, a Motor T Tech 

from Orangeburg, S.C. 

attached to the 4th Civil 

Affairs Group (4th CAG), 

loads rounds into a HMMWV 

before heading out on a 

convoy to the Village of 

Harwan, Iraq. The 4th 

CAG, attached to the 31st 

Marine Expeditionary Unit 

in support of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, conducted 

Security and Stabilization 

Operations in the Western 

Al Anbar Province in Iraq.

Gunnery Sgt. Kevin W. Williams

101
Photo By Cpl Brian Reimers

Staff Sgt. Joey M. 

Davis, platoon sergeant 

assigned to Company 

C, 1st Battalion, 25th 

Marine Regiment, 

Regimental Combat 

Team 5, helps hand 

out candy, hygiene 

items and toys to more 

than 100 different kids 

in Fallujah, Iraq. The 

Marines passed out the 

goods that brought upon 

smiles and laughs from 

the local children. Davis 

is 28, from Wichita Falls, 

Texas.

On 16 April 2006, Captain 

Matthew M. Hodges, 

Platoon Commander of 

4th Platoon, Company 

A, 1st Battalion, 25th 

Marines, Regimental 

Combat Team 5, hands 

out candy to an Iraqi child 

while patrolling through 

Saqlawyia, Iraq to search 

for possible improvised 

explosive devices (IED’s), 

and meeting and greeting 

Iraqi citizens. RCT-5 

deployed with I MEF in 

support of Operation 

Freedom in the Al Anbar 

Province of Iraq (MNFW) to develop the Iraqi 

Security Forces, facilitate 

the development of 

official rule of law through 

democratic government 

reforms, and continue the 

development of a market 

based economy centered 

on Iraqi Reconstruction. 

Photo By Cpl Adaecus G. Brooks

102
Cpl. Rocco DeFilippis

An F/A-18C Hornet from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 

142 receives fuel in mid-flight courtesy of the Marines 

and sailors of Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 

252. Refueling near the fight allows close-air support 

aircraft the ability to stay on station longer and assist the 

Marines on the ground.

Photo By Cpl. James D. Hamel

A CH-46 helicopter from Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 764 starts one of the squadron’s many 

daily missions. HMM-764 boasts one of the most 

experienced pilot rosters in the Marine Corps, 

despite its reserve status.

Photo By Cpl Brian Reimers

HN Cameron R. 

Cleveland, Company 

A, 1st Battalion, 25th 

Marine Regiment, 

Regimental Combat 

Team 5, makes it a point 

to stop and interact 

with the local Fallujans 

while patrolling. A few 

Marines and sailors from 

Company A joined forces 

with Company B to do a 

variety of missions inside 

the city. 

103
HMH-769 Group Photo

Official Marine Corps Photo

Sgt. Chad R. Kiehl

Marines with Company I, 3rd 

Battalion, 24th Marines conduct a 

memorial service for Cpl. Bradley P. 

McCormick who was killed in combat 

in An Najaf, Iraq.

104
Glossary of Terms

and Abbreviations

AK-47 – Kalashnikov automatic rifle

AO – Areas of Operation

ASP – Ammunition Supply Point

BCP – Border Control Point

CACO – Casualty Assistance Calls Officer

CJTF – Combined-Joint Task Force

COIN – Counterinsurgency

ECP – Entry Control Points

FAC – Forward Air Controller

FLIR – forward-looking infrared radar

FOB – Forward Operating Base

FSSG – Fleet Service Support Group

GPS – Global Positioning System

GWOT – Global War on Terrorism

HET – Human Exploitation Team

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

JDAM – joint direct attack munitions

JPADS – Joint Precision Airdrop Delivery System

JSOW – joint stand-off weapons

Jump CP – Mobile Command Post

KPF – Khowst Provincial Force

LAR – Light Armed Reconnaissance

MAG – Marine Aircraft Group

MALS – Marine Air Logistics Squadron

MAM – Military Age Male

MAP – Mobile Assault Platoon

MAW – Marine Aircraft Wing

MMSO – Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

MOS – Military Occupational Specialties

MP – Military Police

MRE – Meals Ready-to-Eat

MSR – Main Supply Route

OP – Observation Post

PSD – Personal Security Detachment

QRF – Quick Response Force

RCT – Regimental Combat Team

RDF – Regional Detention Facilities

RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade

SASO – Security and Stabilization Operations

SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive 

Device

TAMPS – Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System

TCP – Traffic Control Point

TRAP – tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel

UNAMA – United Nations Afghanistan Military Assistance

VBIED – Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

105
Endnotes

Setting the Stage

1. Michael Gordon, “The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did

Not Foresee a 2nd War,” The New York Times, 19 Oct

04, p. 1 (describing a discussion between GEN Tommy

Franks, Commander of U.S. Central Command, and his

senior subordinate commanders on April 16, 2003 in

Baghdad, regarding a possible reduction of U.S. forces in

Iraq to one Army division of 30,000 soldiers).

2. Gunnery Sgt. David A. Shackleton, “FW: MarForRes

Operation History -- RFI re personnel in Iraq.” E-mail to

author, 23Aug06, hereafter Shackleton e-mail. Gunnery

Sgt. Shackleton wrote that Central Command authorized

the Marine Corps to start returning Marine units to the

United States in May 2003. Before the last I MEF unit was

brought home in October, the Marine Corps and Central

Command prepared plans to bring Marines back to Iraq

for OIF Phase II.1. The last Phase I Marine battalion was

removed in October 2003, and six active duty battalions

and one Reserve battalion returned to Iraq in February and

March 2004.

3. Ibid.

4. GEN John Abizaid, GEN Franks’successor as

Commander of U.S. Central Command, said in a press

conference at the Pentagon on July 16, 2003 that Coalition

forces were facing a “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.”

See, e.g., Thom Shankar, “U.S. Commander in Iraq says

Yearlong Tours are Option to Combat ‘Guerrilla’War.” The

New York Times, 17Jul03, p. 1.

5. Bryan Bender, “Number of troops in Iraq to expand:

US force to grow by up to 50,000,” The Boston Globe,

6Nov03, p. 1. See also, L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in

Iraq, (New York, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 31,

hereafter Bremer, Year in Iraq (quoting GEN John Abizaid,

during a secure video teleconference with the Secretary

of Defense and Ambassador Bremer on May 14, 2003, as

saying, “No forces will be released for redeployment until

we have security in place.”).

6. Cpl. Paula M. Fitzgerald, “1st Marine Division colors

fly again in Iraq,” March 20, 2004. The relief-in-place 

ceremony was held at Division Headquarters near Ramadi.

7. Maj. Gen. Douglas O’Dell intvw, 24Jan07 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter O’Dell

intvw.

8. For examples of such transitions, see the chapter on

14th Marines, infra.

9. Lt. Col. Harold R. “Odie” Van Opdorp intvw,

27Apr07 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter Van Opdorp intvw.

10. Ibid.

11. O’Dell intvw.

12. Lt. Col. Van Opdorp identified the police officer as 

CWO-5 James Roussell.

13 CWO-5 James Roussell intvw, 24Apr07 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Roussell

intvw.

14. Lt. Col. Mark. A. Smith intvw, 16June06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Smith

intvw.

15. O’Dell intvw.

16. Ibid.

17. Maj. Mark C. Boone intvw, 16May08 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Boone intvw.

18. Ibid.

19. Col. Tracy Garrett intvw, 20Jan07, (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Garrett intvw.

20. Semper Gumby was added to the Marine lexicon

during Desert Storm, when “hurry up and wait” became

a fact of life. “Semper Gumby” translates loosely as

“Always Flexible.” It is based on the animated clay

television figure known as Gumby, which is constantly 

remolded.

21. O’Dell intvw.

22. Ibid.

The Anbar Provience

1. These statistics were compiled by icasualties.org,

which compiled information provided by various defense 

sources. Information downloaded on June 17, 2007,

showed that of 3,785 American fatalities attributed to OIF, 

1,232 were related to incidents in the Anbar Province.

(Downloaded information contained in Watters Working

Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

2. Jonathan Karl, “Pentagon Considers Moving Troops

From al-Anbar Province to Baghdad,” ABC News,

28Nov06.

3. See, generally, John Burns, “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh

Trail,” The New York Times, 5June05, The Week in

Review, p. 1. (“From Husayba on the Syrian frontier

through Qaim and the sand-blown towns of Rawa, Haditha,

106
Asad and Hit, onward through Ramadi and Fallujah to

Baghdad, the corridor has become the Ho Chi Minh trail of

this war.”)

3/24

1. Michael Gordon, “The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did

Not Foresee a 2nd War,” The New York Times, 17Jul03,

2. Gunnery Sgt. David A. Shackleton, “FW: MarForRes

Operation History -- RFI re personnel in Iraq.” E-mail to

author, 23 Aug 06,

3. Ibid.

4. GEN John Abizaid, GEN Franks’successor as

Commander of U.S. Central Command, said in a press

conference at the Pentagon on July 16, 2003 that Coalition

forces were facing a “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.”

See, e.g., Thom Shankar, “U.S. Commander in Iraq says

Yearlong Tours are Option to Combat ‘Guerrilla’War.” The

New York Times, 17Jul03, p. 1.

5. L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, (New York,

N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 31, hereafter Bremer,

Year in Iraq (quoting GEN John Abizaid, during a secure

video teleconference with the Secretary of Defense and

Ambassador Bremer on May 14, 2003, as saying, “No

forces will be released for redeployment until we have

security in place.”).

6. CWO-2 Robert A. Bauer intvw, 6Sept06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Bauer

intvw. CWO-2 Bauer estimated that the decision to deploy

to Iraq was well received by 95% of the battalion. Ibid.

7. Ibid. As a member of the battalion’s logistics

section, CWO-2 Bauer said that much of the battalion’s

predeployment focus involved collecting its equipment and

packing 120 shipping containers that carried the equipment,

via ship, to Kuwait. The fact that much of 3/24’s equipment

was en route to Kuwait and the battalion was competing

with several active duty battalions for training areas and

support at Camp Pendleton hampered its training efforts.

8. I Co 3/24 ComdC, 15Jun04, p. 3.

9. Gen Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal:

Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine,

January 1999, hereafter Krulak, Strategic Corporal. Gen

Krulak had anticipated that Marines would be participating

in more operations that mix “military operations other-thanwar” with “middle-intensity conflicts.” His “Three Block 

War” concept emphasizes the idea that future Marines

will face the entire spectrum of tactical challenges, from

major combat to middle intensity conflict to Security 

and Stabilization Operations, often in a short period an

in a limited geographic region. Gen Krulak said Marines

may face the different challenges posed by the different

environments over the course of a few hours and within the

confines of a few contiguous city blocks.

10. Lt. Col. Gary S. Johnston intvw, 6Sept06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Johnston

intvw.

11. Ibid.

12. Maj. Mark A. Lamelza intvw, 7Oct06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Lamelza intvw.

13. I Co 3/24 ComdC, 15Jun04, p. 3.

14. Lamelza intvw.

15. Ibid.

16. Bauer intvw.

17. 3/24 ComdC, 15 Jun 04,18 See, e.g., Article 15-6

Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, known

informally as the Taguba Report, after its lead investigator,

MG Antonio M. Taguba. (MG Taguba’s report can be found

online, and a copy is in Watters Working Papers, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.) MG Taguba found that between October

and December 2003, there were numerous incidents of

criminal abuses inflicted on several detainees at Abu Ghraib 

Prison.

19. K Co 3/24 ComdC, 22 Jun 04, p. 2.

20. L Co 3/24 ComdC, 15 Jun 04, p. 5.

2/24

1. See the section of this book relating to 1/23’s activities

in Iraq.

2. “The Triangle of Death” is a nickname given to an

area south of Baghdad by local residents. Its boundaries

are ambiguous. Some claim it is bounded by the towns of

Mahmudiyah, Yusufiyah, and Iskandariyah, with the most 

dangerous town, Latifiyah, located between Mahmudiyah 

and Iskandariyah. See, e.g., Anthony Shadid, “Iraq’s

Forbidding ‘Triangle of Death’: South of Baghdad, a Brutal

Sunni Insurgency Holds Sway,” The Washington Post,

23Nov04, p. A-1. Other descriptions of the Triangle of

Death are more expansive, extending from Yusufiyah in the 

northwest to the town of Jurf as Sukhr in the southwest and

to the series of sharp bends in the Tigris River southeast of

Baghdad. Whatever definition is used, 2/24 operated in the 

heart of the Triangle of Death.

3. Lt. Col. Mark. A. Smith intvw, 16June06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Smith

intvw.

4. Ken Sengupta, “The Triangle of Death,” The

Independent, 22Nov2004 (quoting Lt. Col. Smith and other

Marines to support Sengupta’s statement that following the

November 2004 assault on Fallujah, the Triangle of Death

was the most dangerous region of Iraq).

5. The Washington Post, 23Nov04, P. A-1 (noting that

107
policemen would change into civilian clothes to avoid

contact with insurgents, and describing the efforts of

one Shi’ia man to avoid conflict by removing a poster 

of a Shi’ia saint from his car and playing a cassette tape

celebrating the Sunni insurgency in Fallujah).

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Smith intvw.

9. Ibid. See also 2/24 S-2 Mid-Deployment Report,

undated, pp. 3-4 (Copy in Watters Working Papers, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.) (describing 2/24’s Combat Intelligence

Center and Threat Appreciation).

10. Smith intvw.

11. 2/24 included maps of its AO in reports. A detailed

copy is provided in a summary of the interview with Lt.

Col. Smith (Copy in Watters Working Papers, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.), p. 4, showing the relative positions of

Mahmudiyah, Lutafiyah, and Yusufiyah.

12. Smith intvw. Subsequent descriptions of 2/24’s AO

in the text come from this interview.

13. Ibid. See also, Lt. Col. Mark A. Smith, “Letter from

Mayhem Six,” E-mail and electronic document for families

of 2/24 Marines, 3Feb05, (copy in Watters Working Papers,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Smith E-mail.

14. Sean D. Naylor, “SpecOps Uit Nearly Nabs

Zarqawi,” Army Times, 28Apr06. Naylor describes several

raids by Task Force 145, consisting of Delta Force and

SEAL Team 6 members, on headquarters elements in

Yusufiyah associated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, alQaida’s leader in Iraq. Intelligence sources told Army

Times that Zarqawi probably was nearby when a raid in

Yusufiyah took place on April 16, 2006. Zarqawi was killed 

in a different part of Iraq on June 8, 2006.

15. Emma Perez-Trevino, “Army general promises to

track down soldiers’ killers,” The Brownsville (TX) Herald,

29June06, p. 1.

16. Ibid. Lt. Col. Smith said that intelligence indicated

that most significant activities in his AO had some 

connection with the Cargoul area.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Smith E-mail. (“Identification of, keeping secret 

until 48 hours out, seizing and establishing force protection

of polling sites is not an easy task. . . . But, here is what

happened: 8 sites, 2 per urban center in the Mayhem AO,

were seized and secured. Force protection barriers and

procedures were emplaced. Our Iraqi Army counterparts

assumed the inner cordons and hundreds of Iraqi Election

Workers and Officials were moved into the sites.”)

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. (“But . . . the miracle was the Iraqi people.

With all the threatened violence, and most importantly all

the REAL violence that was going on around them, they

VOTED! They never broke and ran. They never hesitated.

They stayed, and they VOTED. Why? Because, they had

tasted the power of FREEDOM.”)

23. Smith intvw.

24. Cami McCormick, “Voting in the ‘Triangle Of

Death,’” CBS News, 30Jan05 (copy in Watters Working

Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.). CBS News included

a comment that McCormick was, “reporting from one of

Iraq’s most dangerous areas, Babil Province.”

25. Ibid.

26. Smith intvw. Descriptions of Operations River Walk

and Red Mayhem I, II, and III are in the interview.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid. 2/24 AAR, OIF II-2, 17May05 (Copy in Watters

Working Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

2/24 AAR, 17May05. (“Violence and intimidation against

the Iraqi people was significantly decreased during our 

tenure.”)

29. Smith intvw.

30. 2/24 AAR, 17May05. (“On 30 January 2005, 71%

of the eligible voters (over 16,000 Iraqis) voted in National

elections.”)

1/23

1. Lt. Col. Gregory B. Stevens intvw, 10Sept05 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Stevens

intvw.

2. 1/23 1-31Sept 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 7.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. ASP Dulab was an ammunition storage facility

north of Hit. For a discussion of its significance to 

insurgents operating in this area, see the section of this

book describing the activities of 3rd Battalion, 25th

Marines. ASP Dulab was so large and contained so much

ammunition that one attempt to destroy it by American

contractors instead simply made thousands of rounds easily

available to insurgents.

9. 1/23 1-31Sept 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 6.

10. Ibid.

11. 1st Sgt. Daniel Hendrex, A Soldier’s Promise: The

Heroic True Story of an American Soldier and an Iraqi Boy

(New York: Simon Spotlight Entertainment, 2006), p. 30,

hereafter Hendrex, A Soldier’s Promise.

108
12. Sgt. Ben Christensen, “Re: Greetings.” E-mail to

author, 9June06. Hereafter Christensen correspondence no.

1.

13. Christensen correspondence no. 1. Sgt. Christensen’s

colorful descriptions of the base include the following:

“The FOB was essentially a Third World hellhole, primitive

chow hall with A-rations and tray-rations twice a day,

breakfast and supper.” “The FOB was mortared and

rocketed just about every single day, 82 mm mortars and

122-mm rockets, I believe. No casualties from any of this

type of fire except 2nd platoon’s corpsman, Doc Edes, 

who received a small bit of shrapnel in his hand once.

Mortars and rockets were an accepted part of life, and

most of the time Charlie Company’s mortarmen responded

immediately with return fire, sometimes having mortar 

duels, back and forth, with the insurgents.” “Showers were

in fiberglass cans, and were generally available only one 

per week, on rotation with different platoons.” “First FSSG

provided laundry service, once a week if you were at the

FOB, otherwise, we were just filthy all the time. It was a 

deployment spent in the dirt.”

14. United Nation’s statistics from 2003 show Hit’s

population at 105,825.

15. Hendrex, A Soldier’s Promise, p. 30.

16. Capt. Ronald Shayne “Skinny” McGinty, 16Oct04

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

McGinty intvw, and Maj. Michael R. Miller, 16Oct04 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Miller

intvw. Both interviews were conducted by CWO-3 William

E. Hutson, a Field Historian with the Marine Corps’ History

Division, within days of the action that has come to be

known as the “Battle for Hit.” Capt. McGinty led the initial

platoon into this action, and his company commander, Maj.

Miller, brought reinforcements to the scene when it was

apparent that the strength of insurgents in Hit had been

grossly underestimated. Both interviews provide excellent

descriptions of Hit and the actions of Marines during the

Battle for Hit.

17. Miller intvw. Maj. Miller indicates that previous

units had avoided Hit, so there was a significant lack of 

information regarding activities there.

18. John Burns, “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,” The New

York Times, 5June05, The Week in Review, p. 1. (“From

Husayba on the Syrian frontier through Qaim and the sandblown towns of Rawa, Haditha, Asad and Hit, onward

through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, the corridor has

become the Ho Chi Minh trail of this war.”)

19. Michael R. Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor,

USMC (Ret.), Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion

and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006),

Chapter 22, fn. 2 (citing p. 80 of a report, classified secret, 

entitled, “U.S. Joint Forces Command Combat Study: Iraqi

Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat

Operations.”)

20. Stevens intvw.

21. Stevens intvw. (The Bronze-Uranium Split required

“a reinforced squad at a minimum, but usually there was a

platoon there.”)

22. For a description of activities in Fallujah during

2004, see, e.g., Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler and Lt. Col. Daniel

H. Wilson, “Operation AL FAJR: The Battle for Fallujah—

Part II,” Marine Corps Gazette, July05, p. 12, hereafter

Battle for Fallujah, and Bing West, No True Glory: A

Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York:

Bantam, 2005), hereafter No True Glory.

23. 1/23 1-31 October 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 7.

24. Ibid. (“During engagements on 12 October, Scout

Snipers observed individuals wearing police uniforms

participating in insurgent activities.”)

25. Ibid, p. 8. (“[I]nsurgents understand the dynamics

of the policies made between U.S. Marines and the city

leadership. An informal agreement was made between

the Marines and City Counsel leadership that stated if

the Police and City Counsel could provide security in

Hit, Marines would stay out of the city. This agreement

limited Marine presence in the city that cause as influx of 

insurgents from outlying areas to gain a foothold in Hit.

With a lack of Marine presence, the insurgents were able

to fester, unchecked. The insurgents used this agreement to

foster power for their cause.”)

26. Ibid, p. 4. The Mad Mortarman, subsequently

identified as Mullah Ibrahim, was detained following a 

cordon and knock operation at a residence approximately

2.5 kilometers northwest of Camp Hit. Ibid, p. 14.

27. Stevens intvw. At one point, many ING soldiers

would not wear uniforms en route to Camp Hit, to avoid

attracting the attention of insurgents.

28. 1/23 1-31 October 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 5.

Charlie Company reported from Camp Hit that, “During

the month of October, we noticed an increase in insurgent

activity. . . . Lack of presence in Hit proper also allows

insurgent cells to gather and plan missions not only for the

Denver AO but other cities as well.” This information is

also reflected in the intelligence section’s discussion in the 

same document.

29. Maj. P. Ray Roberson, “RE: MarForRes Operational

History.” E-mail to author, 20Nov06. Maj. Roberson

was the Aide-de-Camp for LtGen Natonski, who was the

Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies & Operations.

Maj. Roberson’s e-mail contained information from LtGen

Natonski regarding the ambush on the 1stMarDiv Jump CP.

30. 1/23 1-31 October 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 8.

109
(“The insurgency’s tactical proficiency heightened as 

seen during the complex ambush, 10 Oct 2004, on the

CG 1stMarDiv convoy through Hit traffic circle number 

1. At approximately 0700, the CG’s [personal security

detachment] was traveling [north] on MSR Bronze when

it came under fire . . . . Around 100-200 small arms rounds 

and 3x RPG rounds were fired in the direction of the PSD. 

. . . [J]ust past the traffic circle, PSD was struck again; this 

time by one IED, 1x RPG and approximately 100 small

arms rounds. . . . PSD also stated that when the firefight 

started there seemed to be someone on every roof.”)

31. Stevens intvw, Miller intvw, and McGinty intvw.

Each officer describes the difference between what had 

been expected in Hit and the much larger insurgent force

that Capt. McGinty’s reinforced platoon encountered. In

expressing his surprise, Lt. Col. Stevens noted that the

insurgent force included snipers perched in palm trees.

Capt. McGinty said, “We underestimated how many

[insurgents] were in that area. . . . The S-2 told me [after the

battle] there were probably four hundred [insurgents] in the

Hit-Turbah area, and we rolled in with fifty-three. It was a 

pretty tough fight.” McGinty intvw.

32. 1/23 1-31 October 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 8. The

battalion’s intelligence officer moved from al Asad to Camp 

Hit for combat operations in Hit. He reported: “The Hit

insurgent attacks from 10 October to 16 October . . . points

to a trained and sophisticated enemy. Prior to 10 October,

5-10 man cells conducted the majority of the attacks. . . .

However, the large units that attacked Bravo Company and

Scout Snipers needed military training to orchestrate these

types of units.” Ibid.

33. 1/23 1-31 October 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 7.

(“An elite group of mujahadeen named “The Strike Force”

entered the city as insurgents occupied vehicle checkpoints

in and around Hit. . . . Insurgents stopped cars suspected of

being either ING soldiers or civilian contractors working

for coalition forces. They also interrogated the occupants,

confiscated ING weapons, money, identification, and 

beat individuals associated with the coalition or Iraqi

government.”)

34. The insurgents expected their first ambush to elicit a 

Coalition response, and were so confident of their strength 

in Hit that they conducted two more ambushes at TCP-1

within the next 24 hours. 1/23 1-31 October 2004 ComdC,

undated, p. 8. The first, involving a convoy of American 

contractors, resulted in a destroyed vehicle. The second,

against a convoy of British civilians, was more complex.

It started with three synchronized IEDs, followed by RPG,

machine gun, and small arms fire.

35. Summary of Sgt. Bryan Hancock intvw, 26June06

(Copy in Watters Working Papers, MCHC, Washington,

D.C.), hereafter Hancock intvw.

36. Stevens intvw, Miller intvw.

37. Miller intvw.

38. Ibid.

39. Miller intvw, McGinty intvw.

40. Capt. McGinty said that the decision to approach

from the south almost certainly prevented significant losses 

to his platoon. When they drove into Turbah, his Marines

saw a significant amount of insurgent activity in Hit, 

especially around the Sharqi Mosque. Most residents of

Turbah were asleep at the time, allowing Capt. McGinty’s

platoon to establish its position at the Turbah traffic circle 

without incurring the fires that they almost certainly would 

have received had they tried to drive through Hit. McGinty

intvw.

41. Hancock intvw.

42. McGinty intvw.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. The fact that Capt. McGinty’s platoon did not have

a FAC assigned to it for this operation could have proved

significant. Fortunately, Capt. McGinty had significant 

exposure to Marine aviation during his initial tour of active

duty.

46. McGinty intvw.

47. Hancock intvw.

48. Miller intvw.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. 1/23 1-31 October 2004 ComdC, undated, p. 16-17.

Perhaps anticipating a possible ramification for firing in 

the vicinity of the Sharqi Mosque, 1/23 described in the

Command Chronology’s “Sequential Listing of Significant 

Events” the battalion’s efforts to use “[e]scalatory means of

defeating AIE fires . . . against AIE firing from the mosque. 

AIE fires originating from the structure did not abate after 

several hours of 1/23 returning fire.”

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Hancock intvw.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Miller intvw.

60. Ibid.

61. Battle for Fallujah, p. 20. For a more detailed

account of the 2004 battles for Fallujah, see, No True

Glory.

62. Battle for Fallujah, p. 20.

63. Ibid.

110
64. Hancock intvw.

65. Ibid.

66. Hancock intvw. This one-on-one sniper fight is 

similar to one depicted in, “Enemy at the Gates,” a popular

2001 movie in which opposing snipers play cat-and-mouse

during the Battle of Stalingrad.

67. Ibid.

3/25

1. The underlying facts for this section were derived

primarily from 3/25’s Command Chronologies for the

periods of 1 January-30 June 2005, 1-31 August 2005,

and 1-21 September 2005. The Marine Corps Center for

Lessons Learned prepared a summary of its observations

regarding the deployment. Marine Corps Center for

Lessons Learned: Pre-Deployment Training Lessons and

Observations: 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines, 23Nov05.

Hereafter MCCLL Observations. Embedded reporters

wrote numerous articles. See, e.g., Ellen Knickmeyer,

“Demise of a Hard-Fighting Squad; Marines Who Survived

Ambush Become Casualties of Blast,” The Washington

Post, 12May05, p. A-1. Other principle sources include

a lengthy article in Cleveland Magazine on the Haditha

ambush and a two-hour documentary for the Arts &

Entertainment Networks on Lima Company. Jacqueline

Marino, “Blood Brothers,” Cleveland Magazine, June

2006, hereafter Blood Brothers; A&E Television Networks,

“Combat Diary: The Marines of Lima Company,” hereafter

Marines of Lima Company.

2. The turnover of Coalition staffs was significant. II 

Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (II MEF (Fwd)), 2nd

Marine Division, and three regimental combat team staffs

relieved their I MEF counterparts, many of whom had been

in Iraq for more than a year. Subordinate units, including

battalions and squadrons, also turned over as part of the

scheduled seven-month deployment cycle.

3. Col. Lionel B. Urquhart, memorandum of record of

interview by MarForRes, 10Jun06 (Summary in Watters

Working Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Urquhart intvw. In addition to the two main bases, Kilo

Company provided a platoon for most of the deployment to

ASP Dulab, as well as a reinforced squad or even a platoon

to the Bronze-Uranium Split, a major road intersection

south of Hit.

4. Urquhart intvw.

5. Maj. Steven J. White, Memorandum of record of

interview by MarForRes, 14Jun06 (Summary in Watters

Working Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

White intvw. Maj. White said Col. Davis believed that

the free movement of insurgents along the Western

Euphrates River Valley was contributing significantly to the 

opposition that Coalition forces were encountering in cities

like Baghdad, Fallujah, and Ramadi. Maj. White said Col.

Davis was committed to showing that aggressive operations

between Ramadi and the Syrian border could reduce

insurgent activities in central Iraq.

6. UN data indicated that four Anbar cities held most of

the population: Ramadi (445,000), Fallujah (425,000), Hit

(105,000), and Haditha (75,000). The same data showed

Al Qa’im’s population was 116,000, but this was spread

over several cities like Husaybah and Karabilah along a 10-

kilometer stretch of the Euphrates in the al Qa’im region.

Except for these population centers, the Anbar Province

was sparsely settled. (UN Data in Watters Working Papers,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

7. John Burns, “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,” The New

York Times, 5June05, The Week in Review, p. 1., hereafter

Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail (“[The Western Euphrates River

Valley in the Anbar Province] is the backdrop to one of

the most important -- and, so far, undecided -- campaigns

of the Iraqi conflict: the American drive to close off 

insurgent infiltration routes that run into the Iraqi heartland 

down the Euphrates River corridor. From Husayba on the

Syrian frontier through Qaim and the sand-blown towns

of Rawa, Haditha, Asad and Hit, onward through Ramadi

and Fallujah to Baghdad, the corridor has become the Ho

Chi Minh trail of this war. . . . Like the bane of American

commanders in Vietnam, the 300-mile stretch of river is

not so much a single route as a multi-stranded network of

passages, some hewing close to the lush silted landscape of

palms and reeds that run along the banks, others crossing

vast reaches of stony desert on either side.”)

8. Ibid, p. 16. (“American intelligence officers say that 

trails across the desert used for decades to smuggle herds

of sheep and goats, leather hides, car parts, gasoline and

sundry other commodities have now been adapted to the

insurgents’ needs.”)

9. See the section in this monograph describing the

activities of 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines.

10. Urquhart intvw.

11. Maj. White said Col. Davis warned 3/25’s staff

that the battalion is, “going to go home tired because we

are ‘stirring the pot,’ here.” Paraphrasing Col. Davis’

discussion, Maj. White said the 3/25 staff was told:

“A lot of the areas around here have not been touched

significantly, and we are going to change that. We are going 

to conduct a series of operations, like clearing, clearing and

searching, and interdiction, that will impact the insurgents.

We are going to force the enemy to engage us.”

12. “Over seven months of operations, the battalion

sustained 49 personnel killed-in-action and over 650

111
wounded-in-action. . . . Almost 50% of the corpsmen in

the battalion were awarded Purple Heart medals.” MCCLL

Observations, p. 7. Many of 3/25’s fatalities occurred in

large incidents. For example, 14 Marines were killed when

an Amtrack was destroyed by an IED near Barwanah on

August 3, six snipers were ambushed near Barwanah on

August 1, and six Marines were killed when an Amtrack

was destroyed by an IED in the Ramana area near the

Syrian border on May 11.

13. After their return to the United States, many 3/25

Marines complained that the nation’s obsession with the

battalion’s “casualty count” detracted from the battalion’s

significant accomplishments. For example, Lance Cpl. 

Trevor Smith said in the Arts & Entertainment documentary

that 3/25 was remembered primarily for its losses, rather

than the battalion’s combat operations in the Anbar

Province. “I just feel like one of the reasons we got all this

attention is because a lot of us were killed. . . . I just want

people to know about my friends. They were great people.

They died in the most horrifying way. . . . I just want them

to be remembered for what they did, and not just because

they died.” Marines of Lima Company, interview with

Lance Cpl. Trevor Smith. Operation Sword, in which 3/25

cleared the insurgent-controlled city of Hit and installed

two permanent Fixed Operating Bases, was the battalion’s

most significant accomplishment, but its significance was 

drowned out by commentary concerning the deaths of so

many of its Marines.

14. K 3/25 1 January-1Sept 2005 ComdC, 20Sept05, p.

6.

15. Ibid.

16. Urquhart intvw.

17. 3/25 1 January-30 June 2005 ComdC, 15Aug05, p. 9.

18. Ibid, p. 11, and Urquhart intvw.

19. Details regarding the Haditha Hospital ambush

are derived primarily from a lengthy article in Cleveland

Magazine, as well as interviews with Sgt. Jeffrey W.

Schuller, Cpl Stanley M. Mayer, and LT Richard E.

Malmstrom, (battalion chaplain). Blood Brothers; Cpl

Jeffrey W. Schuller intvw, 22June06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Schuller intvw; Cpl

Stanley M. Mayer intvw, 22June06 (Oral HistColl, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.), hereafter Mayer intvw; LT Richard

E. Malmstrom, USN, intvw, 21June06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Malmstrom intvw.

See also, 3/25 1 January-30 June 2005 ComdC, 15Aug05,

p. 8 (“MAP 7 of Weapons Company and a section from 1st

Platoon, Company A, 1st Tanks was ambushed in Hadithah

by insurgents with a suicide, vehicle-borne, improvised

explosive device, small arms fire and RPGs”) and pp. 9-

10 (listing one corpsman and three Marines killed in the

ambush).

20. Schuller intvw, Mayer intvw.

21. Schuller intvw. Sgt. Schuller said that while there

were some insurgent positions outside the hospital, most

of the insurgent fire came from inside the hospital or on its 

grounds.

22. For their actions in response to this ambush, Lance

Cpl. Corbin received a Navy Cross and Sgt. Schuller

received a Silver Star. The medals were awarded on July

4, 2006 at the Cleveland Indians baseball game. Tasha

Flournoy, “Local Marines Honored at Indians Game,” The

Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), 5Jul06. (“The battalion

lost [three Marines and one sailor], but witnesses said the

toll would have been much worse without the bravery of

Corbin and Schuller. . . . Under intense fire, the pair helped 

protect wounded comrades, hauled them into the vehicles

and drove them back to the base for treatment.”)

23. Note that the Euphrates River is east-west in this

section of the Anbar Province, so the author refers to

its banks as the north or south sides. In the Hit-Haditha

corridor, the river runs more north-south, so the banks are

referred to as the east and west sides at that part of the

Euphrates River.

24. Lt. Col. Timothy S. Mundy, memorandum of record

of interview by MarForRes, 19Jun06 (Summary in Watters

Working Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Mundy intvw.

25. Ibid.

26. The engineer unit was the U.S. Army’s 814th MultiRole Bridge Company.

27. Ibid. See also, 1stLt Paul L. Croom II, “Wages of

War,” San Diego Magazine, March 2006. (“In planning for

Operation Matador, the timeline for bridge completion was

a short one. However, because of the softness of the banks

on both sides of the river, the bridge was not complete even

16 hours after we arrived.”) Hereafter Wages of War.

28. Sgt. Maj. Dan N. Altieri intvw, 22June06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Altieri

intvw.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ellen Knickmeyer, “‘They Came Here to Die’;

Insurgents Hiding Under House in Western Iraq Prove

Fierce in Hours-Long Fight With Marines,” The

Washington Post, 11May05, p. A-1. (“When the Marines

entered a final time, the daylight finally showed them where 

the bullets had come from: the floor beneath their feet. The 

insurgents had lain faceup on the ground below, with barely

enough room to point their weapons upward, Marines said.

They simply blasted through the floor.”)

32. Marines of Lima Company, description of action

112
by Sgt. Samuel E. Balla, squad leader for 1st Squad, 1st

Platoon.

33. Ibid, description of action by Lance Cpl. Mark

Camp.

34. The Washington Post, 11May05, p. A-1.

35. Altieri intvw.

36. Ibid.

37. The Washington Post, 11May05, p. A-1.

38. Ibid. (“The costly equipment, as well as body

armor later recovered from the bodies of dead insurgents,

suggested that the fighters were foreigners, the military 

said. Though the level of foreigners’ involvement in the

insurgency has been disputed for nearly two years, Muslim

men have come to Iraq from neighboring countries such

as Saudi Arabia and from as far away as Chechnya and

Indonesia to fight the United States and its allies.”)

39. Altieri intvw. Shortly after Operation Matador, the

kidnapped governor of the Anbar Province was killed

during a gunfight between insurgents and Americans in 

the Ramana area. The seven insurgents who were killed or

captured were from Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia

and Syria. Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail, The New York Times,

5June05, p. 1.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Mundy intvw.

43. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Demise of a Hard-Fighting

Squad; Marines Who Survived Ambush Become Casualties

of Blast,” The Washington Post, 12May05, p. A-1. Wages

of War, pp. 197-198.

44. The Washington Post, 12May05, p. A-1. (“In 96

hours of fighting and ambushes in far western Iraq, the 

squad had ceased to be.”). Wages of War, pp. 197-198.

(“All told, over those fateful four days, 1st Squad, 1st

Platoon . . . and the AAV crew that was supporting them,

sustained 21 casualties — eight killed and 13 wounded.”)

45. Mundy intvw, Urquhart intvw.

46. Mundy intvw.

47. Altieri intvw.

48. Maj. Billy Brown intvw, 23June06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Brown intvw.

49. Altieri intvw.

50. Brown intvw, Altieri intvw.

51. Altieri intvw.

52. Sgt. Wimberg was awarded a Silver Star,

posthumously, for his efforts in Haditha that morning.

Marine Corps Times, 21Aug06, p. 10.

53. Marines of Lima Company, interview with Cpl.

Allen Payne.

54. Ibid.

55. Urquhart intvw.

56. Ibid. Col. Urquhart said that before River Sweep,

insurgents had not felt compelled to hide weapons caches

well on the east side of the Euphrates because Coalition

forces had not swept the area in some time. Therefore,

there were many caches on the east side, and many were

relatively easy to locate. Col. Urquhart said River Sweep

was one of the battalion’s most successful operations.

57. Cpl. Stefan J. Whiteway intvw, 22June06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Whiteway

intvw.

58. Ibid.

59. The size of some weapons caches and bunkers

in Iraq is staggering. In June 2005, Marines found an

underground bunker system built into a quarry near

Fallujah that measured approximately 900 feet by 550 feet.

Edward Wong, “U.S. Uncovers Vast Hide-Out Of Iraqi

Rebels,” The New York Times, 5June05, p.1 and 14.

60. Mundy intvw.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid. (“indisputable evidence of the existence of

foreign fighters”).

65. White intvw. (“Before we went into Hit, it was sort

of the ‘Badlands,’ a place you wanted to avoid,” Maj.

White said. “We rarely went in there, and we were not sure

what we would get involved in when we went there.”)

66. Urquhart intvw.

67. A partial Order of Battle for Task Force 3/25 for

Operation Sword is contained in the memorandum of

record from the interview of the battalion’s operations

officer, Maj. White. The major units included: Lima 

Company, Kilo Company, and portions of Weapons

Company from 3/25; Bravo Company of 2nd LAR

Battalion, Charlie Company (a mechanized company) of

the U.S. Army’s 9th Infantry Battalion, and one Iraqi Army

company.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid, and White intvw.

70. White intvw. An important planning factor for

Operation Sword was collecting sufficient barriers to allow 

the task force to protect the two FOBs.

71. K 3/25 1 January-1Sept 2005 ComdC, 20Sept05, p.

12.

72. Lance Cpl. Nicholas M. Johnson intvw, 22June06

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Johnson intvw.

73. Ibid.

74. Sgt. Franklyn G. Metz III intvw, 22June06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Metz intvw.

75. K 3/25 1 January-1Sept 2005 ComdC, 20Sept05, p.

113
12.

76. Marines of Lima Company, description of action by

Gunnery Sgt. Shawn Delgado. Sgt. Guy A. Zierk intvw,

23June06 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter Zierk intvw.

77. Brown intvw.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Marines of Lima Company, interview with Cpl Allen

Payne.

81. Brown intvw.

82. Ibid.

83. 3/25 1-31 August 2005 ComdC, 1Sept05, pp. 6-7.

84. Marines of Lima Company, description of action by

Gunnery Sgt. Shawn Delgado.

85. 3/25 1-31 August 2005 ComdC, 1Sept05, pp. 6.

86. Cpl Thomas A. Maniccia intvw, 22June06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Maniccia

intvw.

87. Ibid.

88. Maniccia intvw and 3/25 1-31 August 2005 ComdC,

1Sept05, pp. 7.

89. Maniccia intvw.

90. Ibid.

91. Mundy intvw.

92. Urquhart intvw.

93. The fact that this area was heavily occupied by

insurgents was demonstrated during Operation Outer

Banks, when Lima Company fought a large enemy

force near the Barwanah Bridge from 1-4 April, killing

approximately 48 insurgents. Maj. Stephen A. Lawson,

“Re: MarForRes Operational History.” E-mail to author,

15Aug06, hereafter Lawson e-mail.

94. Marines of Lima Company, description of action by

Maj. Stephen A. Lawson.

95. Ibid.

96. Lawson e-mail.

97. This command detonated IED had been emplaced in

a much more sophisticated way than usually encountered.

A subsequent investigation showed that insurgents had

removed a large section of the asphalt road, emplaced

the IED, and then repaved that section of the road. It

was estimated that this work would require several days.

Lawson e-mail.

98. 3/25 1-31 August 2005 ComdC, 1Sept05, pp. 7. John

Kifner and James Dao, “Death Visits a Marine Unit, Once

Called Lucky,” The New York Times, 7Aug05, p. 1.

99. Altieri intvw.

100. Urquhart intvw.

1/25

1. For a detailed account of the 2004 battles for Fallujah

and the politics involved with various military decisions,

see, e.g., Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of

the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam, 2005), hereafter

West, No True Glory.

2. The Marine Corps War Memorial, located near the

Arlington National Cemetery in Rosslyn, Virginia, is

dedicated to Marines who have died in defense of their

country since 1775.

3. See, e.g., Robert F. Worth, “Clues on Hostages

Emerge From Houses in Fallujah,” The New York Times,

22Nov04, p.1. (“American and Iraqi government officials 

have long said that Fallujah was a center of the Iraqi

insurgency.”)

4. Ibid.

5. For a discussion of political and military factors that

influenced the decision to allow the Fallujah Brigade to 

take control of Fallujah, see Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (New

York: The Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 344-345.

7. Lt. Col. Christopher A. Landro intvw, 24Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Landro

intvw.

8. Ann Scott Tyson, “Increased Security in Fallujah

Slows Efforts to Rebuild,” The Washington Post, 19Apr05,

p. A15.

9. Sgt. Maj. Bradley E. Trudell intvw, 24Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Trudell

intvw.

10. Sgt. Timothy G. Whittmer intvw, 23Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Wittmer

intvw.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. UN data estimated the pre-war population of Fallujah

at 425,000. (UN Data in Watters Working Papers, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.)

14. Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Fallujans in Flight: Transit

Camps Are Not Much Safer Than Siege They Left,”

The New York Times, 18Nov06. The reporter notes that

approximately 100,000 Fallujans fled to Amiriya, 12 miles 

south of Fallujah and 30,000 went to Baghdad, while other

cities took in 10,000-20,000 Fallujans. Ibid.

15. Maj. Gen. Richard S. Kramlich and Col. Tracy

L. Mork, “Battlefield Logistics Support, 1st FSSG’s 

expeditionary logistics capability was key to the MEF’s

Success in the Battle of Fallujah,” Marine Corps Gazette,

July 2005, p. 25-27.

16. Ann Scott Tyson, “Increased Security in Fallujah

Slows Efforts to Rebuild,” The Washington Post, 19Apr05,

114
p. A15.

17. Landro intvw.

18. Ibid.

19. Gen Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal:

Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine,

January 1999, hereafter Krulak, Strategic Corporal.

Acknowledging the complex nature of modern military

efforts, Gen Krulak anticipated that Marines would be

seeing more operations that mix “military operations otherthan-war” with “middle-intensity conflicts.” Borrowing the 

Marine Corps’ term, “The Three Block War,” Gen Krulak

said future Marines will face the entire spectrum of tactical

challenges, from conducting major combat and Security

and Stabilization Operations to dealing with the media

and government officials. The term comes from the fact 

that Marines may face this disparate challenges over the

course of only a few hours and within the confines of three 

contiguous city blocks.

20. Trudell intvw.

21. Landro intvw.

22. CWO-3 James L. Bailey intvw, 23Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Bailey

intvw. CWO-3 Bailey was the OIC of a five-vehicle 

personal security detachment for the battalion commander.

Lt. Col. Landro and Sgt. Maj. Trudell typically traveled

together, and CWO-3 Bailey said the commander’s intent

was to patrol Fallujah frequently, providing the battalion

with the firepower of an additional Mobile Assault Platoon 

and the response time of a Quick Reaction Force. Ibid.

23. Landro intvw.

24. See Krulak, Strategic Corporal. (“Success or failure

will rest, increasingly, with the rifleman and with his ability 

to make the right decision at the right time at the point

of contact. . . . [T]oday’s Marines will often operate far

“from the flagpole” without the direct supervision of senior 

leadership. . . . In order to succeed under such demanding

conditions they will require unwavering maturity,

judgment, and strength of character. Most importantly,

these missions will require them to confidently make wellreasoned and independent decisions under extreme stress

-- decisions that will likely be subject to the harsh scrutiny

of both the media and the court of public opinion. In many

cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous

symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially

influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but 

the operational and strategic levels as well. His actions,

therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger

operation; and he will become, as the title of this article

suggests – the Strategic Corporal.”)

25. Ibid.

26. Sgt. Matthew J. Fenton was seriously injured by an

IED on April 26, and subsequently died at Bethesda Naval

Hospital on May 5. Capt. Brian Letendre, a member of the

Inspector-Instructor staff that supported 1/25, was killed

May 3, 2006 in Ramadi during an attack on an observation

point. Although part of 1/25, Capt. Letendre had been

assigned to an 11-Marine team serving as advisors to an

Iraqi infantry battalion in Ramadi. E-mail from CWO-2

Jason Forgash to his wife, Maria Forgash, 8May06. (Copy

in Watters Working Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.) Cpl.

Paul “Nick” King was killed by a sniper on June 25.

27. Staff Sgt. Michael S. Maslauskas intvw, 24Oct06

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Maslauskas intvw.

28. Maj. Raymond L. Adams intvw, 24Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Adams

intvw.

29. John F. Burns, “Iraq to release detainees in bid to

ease tensions,” the New York Times, 7Jun07, P. 1. Dexter

Filkins, “Iraq Starts to Release Detainees in Gesture,” The

New York Times, 8Jun06, p. 6.

30. Ibid.

31. Lt. Col. Landro estimated the number of released

prisoners in Fallujah between 1,800 and 2,200. Landro

intvw. Other 1/25 Marines agreed with that estimate.

32. See, e.g., Landro intvw and Ward intvw.

33. Landro intvw.

34. Andy Mosher, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Vows to Retake

City: Insurgents Set Sights On Fallujah,” The Washington

Post, 4Aug06, p. A10.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid. An Iraqi police captain said Fallujah’s leaders

took the threat seriously because of recent assassinations of

two religious leaders and one tribal leader. Ibid.

37. Details of the sniper attack are from interviews with

Staff Sgt. Maslauskas, Maj. Ward, and Maj. Adams.

38. Maj. Armando Acosta intvw, 23Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Acosta

intvw.

39. Ibid.

40. CNN.com, “Blast kills 8 at soccer match; more

bodies in Baghdad,” 15Sept06 (Copy in Watters Working

Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

41. Ward intvw.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Maj. Brian T. Hofmann intvw, 24Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Hofmann

intvw.

45. Ibid.

46. B Co report dtd 16 Aug 2006

47. Cpl Brian Reimers, USMC, “Saved by Kevlar:

115
Marine Takes Headshot, Walks Away,” Marines, Jun06, p.

14th Marines

1. 14th Marines 2004 ComdC, 23 Feb 05, p. 7. This

number dropped after batteries from 14th Marines were

deactivated or transferred in 2005 and 2007.

2. Col. Paul J. O’Leary intvw, 17Aug06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter O’Leary intvw. The

fact that the GWOT did not demand many firing batteries 

was evidenced by the fact that 14th Marines amended

its mission in 2006 to include an “on order” mission to

conduct Civil-Military Operations if needed.

3. Semper Gumby was added to the Marine lexicon

during Desert Storm, when “hurry up and wait” became a

fact of life. “Semper Gumby” translates loosely as “Always

Flexible.” It is based on the animated clay television figure 

known as Gumby, which is constantly remolded.

4. 14th Marines Summary of Action for proposed

Meritorious Unit Commendation, 28Apr06, hereafter

MUC Summary. The deployment figures were updated 

by the Regiment’s adjutant, Capt. Matthew D. Reis. Capt.

Matthew D. Reis, “Re: MarForRes Operational History.”

E-mail to author, 22Aug06. (“By March 2007, all of the

[battalions] within 14th Marines will have been deployed in

support of GWOT. (2/14 wasn’t tasked

to go as a BN, but it has sent every battery.)”)

5. MUC summary.

6. 14th Marines 2004 ComdC, 23 Feb 05, and 2005

ComdC, 30 Jan 06. O’Leary intvw.

7. Sgt. Maj. Bobby L. Allen intvw, 17Aug06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Allen intvw.

8. In 2005, the Marine Corps changed the names of its

four Force Service Support Groups to Marine Logistics

Groups.

9. Many of the statistics for this section come from 14th

Marines’ MUC Summary.

10. MUC Summary, p. 3.

11. 4/14 2004 ComdC, 17Dec04 and 2005 ComdC,

12Nov05.

12. While 4/14 was deployed, 14th Marines learned

that the Marine Corps’ Force Structure Review Group

was planning to deactivate 4th Battalion within months of

its return. Two batteries, Kilo and Mike, were transferred

to other 14th Marine battalions (2nd and 3rd Battalions,

respectively), while Headquarters Battery and Lima Battery

were deactivated and then immediately reactivated as the

headquarters of a new infantry-based battalion, the 4th

Anti-Terrorism Battalion. MUC nomination summary. A

similar fate befell 1/14 upon its return in September 2006.

Col. O’Leary said that 1/14’s Headquarters Battery and

Bravo Battery became reconnaissance companies and

Alpha Battery moved to 5/14, while Charlie Battery was

deactivated. O’Leary intvw.

13. 2/14 2004 ComdC, 1Jan05 and 2005 ComdC, 1Jan05

(sic).

14. The account of 3/25’s work in the Hit-Haditha area is

described elsewhere in this volume.

15. MUC Summary.

16. D 2/14 2005 ComdC, 31Dec05, p. 3.

17. Lt. Col. John C. Hemmerling intvw, 10Aug06

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Hemmerling intvw.

18. 5/14’s Papa Battery had deployed to Iraq the

previous year, so 14th Marines substituted 1/14’s Charlie

Battery for Papa Battery in this rotation. MUC nomination

summary and 5/14 2005 ComdC 1Dec05, pp. 9-10

19. 5/14 2005 ComdC 1Dec05, p. 6.

20. Ibid, p.7.

21. 2nd MP Bn 1Jul05-31Dec05 ComdC 8Feb06, p. 9.

22. Capt. David C. Hyman, 28Aug06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Hyman intvw.

23. Ibid.

24. Headquarters Company and MP Company also

provided detachments to al Asad. 5/14 2005 ComdC

1Dec05, p 20.

25. The compound was named for Sgt. Andrew K. Farrar

Jr., an active duty MP who was electrocuted on Jan. 28,

2005 when he came in contact with a power line during a

raid in Fallujah.

26. Hemmerling intvw.

27. 5/14 2005 ComdC 1Dec05, p. 23 (labeled p. 2-18).

28. Undated nomination for Combat Action Ribbons for

members of 3rd Platoon of MP Company, hereafter CAR

nomination.

29. Ibid.

30. FOB Kalsu was a Marine base near the “Triangle of

Death,” approximately 35 kilometers south of Baghdad.

The distance between al Qa’im and FOB Kalsu was more

than 330 kilometers.

31. In 2003, the Abu Ghraib prison, located

approximately 45 kilometers west of Baghdad, became

known as the site of mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by

Reserve U.S. Army MPs.

32. Maj. Trevor D. Devine intvw, 10Aug06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Devine

intvw.

33. Ibid.

34. O’Leary intvw.

35. Allen intvw.

36. O’Leary intvw.

37. Ibid.

116
38. MUC Summary.

39. Ibid.

HMLA-775

1. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (New York: The Penguin

Press, 2006), p. 330-35, hereafter Ricks, Fiasco. (“The

enemy was better prepared than the Marines had been told

to expect.” Ibid, p. 333.) In his summary of events leading

to Fallujah I, Ricks noted that the Army felt constrained

not to patrol aggressively into Fallujah, while the Marine

Corps’ perspective was different. Within days, he wrote,

Marine patrols engaged in firefights that stirred up the 

city and left at least 15 Iraqis dead. A few days later, the

Blackwater contractors were ambushed. Ibid, p. 330-31.

2. LtGen John Conway, I MEF Commander, said his

plan was to allow Fallujah to calm down before his Marines

attacked in a methodical fashion. He said I MEF ordered

the immediate response only after it was ordered to do so

by Army LTG Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of U.S.

forces in Iraq. The I MEF Chief of Staff, Col. John C.

Coleman, was quoted in the same article as saying that

senior Marines did not anticipate the difficulties they would 

encounter in Fallujah. “I’m not sure we fully understood

the hardness of the city, the harshness of the elements

operating inside.”

3. Lt. Col. Bruce S. Orner intvw, 9Sept06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Orner intvw.

4. MAG-46 2004 ComdC, 10Feb05, p. 6.

5. Orner intvw.

6. Maj. Michael P. Kane award citation, undated

(RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

7. Ibid.

8. Lt. Col. Steven L. Held intvw, 9Sept06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Held intvw.

9. The “cyclic” is a helicopter control that governs

the pitch and bank attitudes. In a Cobra, both pilots have

cyclics that are connected to each other. In this case, when

the AK-47 round hit the cyclic, it caused the helicopter to

jump to one side. The round snapped Maj. Lasso’s cyclic,

but Lt. Col. DiTullio was able to regain control with his

cyclic.

10. Lt. Col. Peter DiTullio intvw, 10Sept06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter DiTullio

intvw.

11. Ibid.

12. See, e.g., Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 330-35, and Rajiv

Chandrasekaran, “Key General Criticizes April Attack In

Fallujah,” Washington Post, 13Sept04, p. A-17.

13. Orner intvw.

14. Ricks, Fiasco, p. 342. The author wrote that Maj.

Gen. Mattis, commander of 1st Marine Division, was

“furious” with this decision. Col. John Toolan, commander

of 7th Marines, said that the Division Commander could

not understand why he had been ordered to stop. Ibid.

15. Coalition forces and the CIA helped form the

Fallujah Brigade in an attempt to impose order on the city,

but the brigade was disbanded after only a few months.

Marines later said that the 800 AK-47s, 27 trucks, and 50

radios provided the brigade were given to the insurgents,

and Marines were fired on at one point by gunmen wearing 

Fallujah Brigade uniforms. Ibid, p. 344-45. See also, U.S.

Central Command News Release, “1st Battalion of the

Fallujah Brigade to have a Role in Fallujah’s Security,”

30Apr04. (Copy in Watters Working Papers, MCHC,

Washington, D.C.) (Noting that I MEF was overseeing the

formation of the Fallujah Brigade.)

16. See, e.g., Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 330-335 and Bing West,

No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for

Fallujah (New York: Bantam, 2005).

17. Staff Sgt. Allison R. Roseborough, 10Sept06

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Roseborough intvw.

18. MAG-46 2004 ComdC, 10Feb05, p. 6.

19. Held intvw.

20. The base was called Korean Village because it once

housed Korean laborers who help build the highway linking

Amman, Jordan to Baghdad.

21. Autorotation is a helicopter maneuver that allows

a pilot to trade altitude for control in a descent caused by

engine failure. The pilot effectively gives up altitude in

exchange for energy that allows the rotor blade to turn

at a rate that stabilizes the aircraft and allows the pilot

to cushion the touchdown. While it is a complicated

maneuver, it is one that helicopter pilots practice frequently.

22. The collective is a helicopter control that determines

the pitch of the main rotor blade.

23. Held intvw.

24. HMLA-775 2004 ComdC, 31Dec04, p. 16, and Katie

Nelson, “Vermont Marine killed in Iraq attack: Helicopter

pilot loved his career,” The Boston Globe, 31Jul04.

25. Maj. Joseph Crane, Diary, 28Jul04, (Copy in Watters

Working Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Crane Diary.

26. Roseborough intvw.

27. Sgt. Nathan K. LaForte, “Marines dedicate Al

Taqaddum airfield to fallen aviator,” USMC Story 

Identification #200482772511, 22Aug04.

28. HMLA-775 2005 ComdC, 1Feb06, p. 9.

29. For a description of the initial ambush, see Sharon

Behn, “Attacks hit vital security in Iraq,” The Washington

Times, 23May05. Insurgents killed 12 of 18 international

117
and Iraqi convoy guards employed by Hart Security Ltd.

and assigned to the convoy, then stacked some of the

corpses on a large bomb.

30. Maj. Brian M. Kennedy award citation, 2005

(RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

31. K 3/25 1 January-1Sept 2005 ComdC, 20Sept05, p.

9.

HMM-764 and HMM-774

1. Col. Stephen T. Ganyard intvw, 12Sept06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Ganyard

intvw. Col. Ganyard succeeded Col. Marshall as

Commanding Officer of MAG 46 in 2005.

2. Col. Jeffrey L. Marshall intvw, 4Oct06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Marshall intvw.

3. Ibid.

4. Lt. Col. Clark A. Taylor intvw, 11Sept05 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Taylor

intvw.

5. Ibid.

6. Lt. Col. Jacques C. Naviaux II intvw, 10Sept05 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Naviaux

intvw.

7. Ibid.

8. MAG 46 2004 ComdC, 10Feb05, p. 6.

9. Sgt. Shanahan Nelson and Sgt. Shawn Blalock intvw,

11Sept05 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter Nelson-Blalock intvw.

10. Ibid.

11. HMM-764 2004 ComdC, 25Jan04(sic), p. 6.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid, p. 9.

14. Ibid, p. 12.

15. “Groundhog Day” is a 1993 movie in which the

protagonist finds himself in a fictitious “time loop,” in 

which his dreaded Groundhog Day keeps repeating itself.

16. Ibid.

17. Naviaux intvw.

18. Naviaux intvw, and HMM-764 2004 ComdC,

25Jan04(sic). For a more complete description of Operation

River Blitz, see the section of this book dealing with 3rd

Battalion, 25th Marines.

VMGR-452

1. This background information came from VMGR452’s web site. A copy of the information, which is a brief

recent history of VMGR-452, is in the author’s Working

Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.

2. Staff Sgt. John C. DiDomenico, “VMGR-452 delivers

POWs to freedom,” Marine Corps News, 13Apr03.

3. VMGR-452 2004 ComdC, 31Jan05, p. 4.

4. Lt. Col. James essentially took a composite

detachment that included Marines from VMGR-452 and

VMGR-352. This included four KC-130T aircraft and more

than 100 Marines from VMGR-452 and two KC-130F/R

aircraft and 49 Marines from the active duty VMGR-352.

VMGR-452 2004 ComdC, 31Jan05, p. 5.

5. Lt. Col. Bradley S. James intvw, 17Nov06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter James

intvw.

6. GPS stands for “Global Positioning System,” a

satellite-based navigation system.

7. For details on the Sherpa Chute, see Staff Sgt. Bill

Lisbon, “GPS-guided cargo chutes touchdown after first 

combat drop in Iraq,” Marine Corps News, 16Aug04.

8. James intvw.

9. While the term “Angel” can be used to refer to the

remains of any service member being transported by

aircraft, Lt. Col. James is using it to refer to the remains of

a Coalition service member killed in Iraq.

10. The squadron’s Command Chronology described

the Convoy Security- Radio Relay mission as “long

and usually quite uneventful,” it noted that the aircrews

appreciated the fact that their aircraft were providing a

significant element of security to “many I MEF convoys 

that were always in imminent danger of enemy attacks.”

VMGR-452 2004 ComdC, 31Jan05, pp. 5-6.

11. James intvw.

12. While two weeks of surge operations to support

Operation al Fajr boosted the squadron’s statistics, VMGR452 maintained a constant workload throughout the

deployment. “For the month of November, the squadron

again set a KC-130 OIF-II record when it flew 341 sorties, 

logged 864.9 flight hours, transported 1,273,150 pounds 

of cargo and 1,980 personnel, and offloaded 4,324,300 

pounds of fuel to 502 receivers. During the period from 1

September through 31 December, VMGR-452(-)(REIN)

flew 1,049 sorties, logged 2,317.3 hours, offloaded 

7,665,600 pounds of fuel to 843 aircraft, airdropped

340,000 pounds of supplies, and transported 7,542

personnel and 4,524,033 pounds of cargo.” VMGR-452

2004 ComdC, 31Jan05, p. 6.

13. James intvw.

14. James B. Hoke, “GPS-Guided Sherpas Provide Safer

Supply Drop,” Marine Corps News, 26Apr06.

15. James intvw.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

118
VMFA-112

1. VMFA-112 2004 ComdC, 18Jan05, pp. 6-7.

2. Lt. Col. Steven M. Roepke intvw, 3Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Roepke

intvw.

3. Ibid.

4. VMFA-112 2004 ComdC, 18Jan05, pp. 6-7.

5. W.G. Ford, “‘Cowboys’ Tame the Far East,” The

Marine Corps Gazette, Oct04, p.26.

6. VMFA-112 2004 ComdC, 18Jan05, p. 6.

7. Roepke intvw.

8. Ibid.

VMFA 142

1. Maj. Robert A. Peterson intvw, 14Octt06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Peterson

intvw.

2. Ibid

3. Lt. Col. Iimes was the Commanding Officer of 

VMFA-242. This bombing occurred during a turnover

flight between pilots from the active duty VMFA-242 to the 

Reserve VMFA-142.

4. Ibid.

5. Cpl C. Alex Herron, “Gators deploy into history,”

[[MarCor News Service 20055341326]] 18Mar2005.

6. The squadron expended the following ordinance

during its deployment: 10 JDAMs, 16 LGBs, 100 LGTRs,

90 MK-82, 61 MK-83, 3 MK-84, 400 2.75” Rockets, 200

5” Rockets, and 2,200 20mm Rounds. VMFA-142 2005

ComdC, dtd 19Jan06, p. 5.

7. The LITENING pod contains a high-resolution

forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor that significantly 

enhances the F-18’s ability to attack ground targets at night

and in adverse weather conditions.

8. Peterson intvw.

9. Lt. Col. J.A. Baumert intvw, 14Octt06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Baumert intvw.

10. Maj. Eric D. Klepper intvw, 14Octt06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Klepper intvw.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Peterson intvw.

15. MSgt Steven M. King Peterson, 14Octt06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter King intvw.

16. Lt. Col. Dwight Schmidt, 14Octt06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Schmidt intvw.

17. See fn 7 supra and the accompanying text.

18. VMFA-142 2005 ComdC, dtd 19Jan06, p. 5.

19. King intvw.

20. Ibid.

21. Cpl Andrew W. Bedford, 14Octt06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Bedford intvw.

22. Ibid.

HMH-769

1. Sgt. Timothy D. Reed intvw, 11Sept06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Reed intvw.

2. Ibid.

3. HMH-769 2004 ComdC, dtd 31Jan04 (sic), p. 8.

4. BBC’s Weather Service states that the months of April

through October are the hottest months in Afghanistan,

with “discomfort due to heat and humidity” ranging from

moderate to high.

5. Sgt. Frank Magni, U.S. Army, “Marines Do Heavy

Lifting for Coalition in Afghanistan,” American Forces

Press Service, 8Nov04.

6. Col. Rick D. Mullen intvw, 11Sept06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Mullen intvw.

7. Center for Defense Information, Action Update: July

5-18, 2004, dtd 21Jul04.

8. The 200 nautical mile distance between Bagram and

Chaghcharan approached the limit of how far a CH-53

could fly without refueling. Mullen intvw. Lt. Col. Mullen 

also noted that no other helicopter had the range or speed to

escort the section of CH-53s that morning, so its escort was

a B-1 bomber. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. HMH-769 2004 ComdC, dtd 31Jan04 (sic), p. 5.

12. Mullen intvw.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid, and Cpl Dominick S. Castro II intvw, 11Sept06

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Castro intvw.

15. Mullen intvw. The precipitous drop in the speed of

the rotor blade indicated that the helicopter’s lift was not

sufficient for the load. Ibid.

16. Castro intvw.

17. Ibid.

18. Mullen intvw, and HMH-769 2004 ComdC, dtd

31Jan04 (sic), p. 7.

19. HMH-769 2004 ComdC, dtd 31Jan04 (sic),

20. Ibid,

21. Col. David Lamm, “The Right Strategy: Success

in Afghanistan Means Fighting Several Wars at Once,”

Armed Forces Journal International, Nov05. With Coalition

assistance, Lamm writes, Afghan National Army soldiers

119
stripped Provincial Governor Ismael Khan’s militia of its

heavy weapons, ending the fight between warring militias. 

Ibid.

22. Ibid.

HMLA-773

1. Cpl M. Cory Wargofcak intvw, 10Sept05 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Wargofcak

intvw.

2. Maj. Raymond Mederos intvw, 10Sept05 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Mederos

intvw.

3. Ibid.

4. The squadron originally took six Cobras and three

Hueys, but added one of each during the first rotation. 

Mederos intvw.

5. Ibid.

6. Maj. Raymond Mederos award citation, 31Jan05

(RefSec, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

7. HMLA-773 2005 ComdC, 30Jan06, p. 6.

8. Maj. Jay D. Borella award citation, 19Sept05 (RefSec,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

9. Lt. Col. Dan C. Nestor intvw, 10Sept05 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Nestor

intvw.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

4th MLG

1. BGen Eugene G. Payne intvw, 14Sept06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Payne

intvw.

2. Ibid.

3. Col. Gregg L. Moore intvw, 17May08 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Moore intvw.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Col. Tracy L. Mork served as Chief of Staff for 1st

MLG while it was preparing for Operation Al Fajr in

Fallujah in the fall of 2004. Lt. Col. Thomas said that he

served as the MLG’s G-4, while two other Reserves from

4th Marine Logistics Group Forward-West served as the

Group’s G-1 and G-3. “You couldn’t swing a cat in the

headquarters without hitting a Reserve,” Lt. Col. Thomas

said.

8. Lt. Col. Erick P. Thomas intvw, 13Sept06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Thomas

intvw.

9. MajGen Richard S. Kramlich and Col. Tracy L. Mork,

“Battlefield Logistics Support,” Marine Corps Gazette, 

Jul05, pp. 25-27.

10. Thomas intvw.

11. Ibid.

12. Maj. Patrick Sweeny intvw, 17May08 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Sweeny intvw.

13. Undated Summary of Action relating to CSSC-113’s

mobilization (hereinafter CSSC-113 Summary of Action),

prepared by Maj. Sweeny.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Undated report, titled WIA and KIA report and

hereinafter referred to as “WIA and KIA report,” provided

to author by Maj. Sweeny. A copy is in the author’s

working papers.

19. Ibid.

20. CSSC-113 Summary of Action.

21. WIA and KIA report.

22. CSSC-113 Summary of Action.

23. Maj. Mark C. Boone intvw, 16May08 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Boone intvw.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. For example, one PRP Marine, Sgt. Daniel Cotnoir,

crawled into the burned-out hulk of a Light Armored

Vehicle to recover the remains of a Marine who had been

trapped inside the wreckage. See, e.g., Marine Corps

Times, July 2005, issue naming Sgt. Cotnoir as its Marine

of the Year.

34. Sgt. Susannah F. Wood intvw, 18Jul06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Wood

intvw.

35. Ibid.

36. Payne intvw.

The Last Journey

1. Statement of LtGen Jack W. Bergman, Commanding

General, Marine Forces Reserve, to the Senate Armed

Services Committee Personnel Subcommittee-Reserve

120
Matters, 30Mar2006.

2. Ibid.

3. Lt. Col. Jacques C. Naviaux II intvw, 10Sept05 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Naviaux

intvw.

4. Ibid.

5. E-mail letter from Lt. Col. Naviaux to relatives and

friends of HMM-764, 24May05 (copy in Watters Working

Papers, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

6. See, Marine Corps Times, July 2005, Marine of the

Year article and accompanying citation.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. For a detailed description of one Notification 

Officer’s experience, see Jim Sheeler, “Final Salute,” 

Rocky Mountain News, pp. 1-24 (special section). Reporter

Jim Sheeler was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for feature

writing for the article, and the photographer, Todd Heisler,

was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for feature photography. See,

Final Salute: A Story of Unfinished Lives (New York, N.Y., 

Penguin Press 2008).

11. Maj. Kirk A. Greiner intvw, 22Jun06 (Oral HistColl,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Greiner intvw.

12. Greiner intvw.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid. Maj. Greiner noted that because the parents of

many of the fallen Marines were separated or divorced,

Notification Officers often had to provide casualty 

information to two households.

15. Marine Corps Order P3040.4E, Marine Corps

Casualty Procedures Manual, 27Feb03, P 4-18 (“The

following is suggested and may be modified as 

appropriate:”)

16. Greiner intvw.

17. The Personal Casualty Report (PCR) is an electronic

message that contains reporting information. It is the

primary source of information used to inform a Marine’s

family of the Marine’s status. Ibid, p. 1-10.

18. See, e.g., fn 10, supra, and accompanying text.

19. Lt. Col. Christopher A. Landro intvw, 24Oct065

(Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter

Landro intvw.

20. See also, Sgt. Maj. Bradley E. Trudell intvw,

24Oct06 (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.),

hereafter Trudell intvw.

21. Landro intvw.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Maj. Brian T. Hofmann intvw, 24Oct06 (Oral

HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Hofmann

intvw.

25. Ibid.

26. See, e.g., Ken Byron and Jesse Hamilton, “Captain

Mourned Like A Native Son,” Hartford (CT) Courant,

6May06, p. A-1.

27. Capt. Letendre had volunteered for the deployment,

even though his duties as Inspector-Instructor of Charlie

Company, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines in Plainville,

Connecticut, would have allowed him to remain in the

United States. His family, in a statement prepared shortly

after his death, said, “Brian just didn’t feel right being

back here in the U.S. while other Marines were serving

overseas, and wanted to get back to the front lines as soon

as he could.” While serving in Connecticut, Capt. Letendre

was the Notification Officer for the parents of Lance Cpl. 

Lawrence Philippon of West Hartford, Connecticut. Lance

Cpl.. Philippon’s mother, Leesa Philippon, said that Capt.

Letendre demonstrated a level of care and compassion that

brought light to a very difficult time in her life. See, “Cup’s 

Visit Honors Son’s Memory,” Hartford (CT) Courant,

16Aug06, p. D-1.

28. Landro intvw, Trudell intvw, and Hofmann intvw.

29. Landro intvw.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

121