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S. Hrg. 114–452 

STOPPING AN AVIAN INFLUENZA THREAT TO 

ANIMAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 8, 2015 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Staff Director 

GABRIEL S. SUDDUTH, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

ROBERT H. BRADLEY II, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 17 

Senator Ernst .................................................................................................... 20 

Senator Peters .................................................................................................. 22 

Senator Baldwin ............................................................................................... 25 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 41 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 43 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 2015 

John R. Clifford, D.V.M., Deputy Administrator, Animal and Planet Health 

Inspection Service, and Chief Veterinary Officer, U.S. Department of Agriculture ................................................................................................................... 4 

Anne Schuchat, M.D., Director, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Assistant Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services ............................................................................... 6 

Christopher P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office; accompanied by Steve D. Morris, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office .... 8 

Jack Gelb, Jr., Ph.D., Director, Avian Biosciences Center, College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of Delaware .................................. 10 

Scott Schneider, Owner, Nature Link Farm, Jefferson, Wisconsin, and President, Wisconsin Poultry and Egg Industries Association ................................. 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Clifford, John R., D.V.M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Currie, Christopher P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 

Gelb, Jack Jr., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

Schneider, Scott: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 81 

Schuchat, Anne M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

APPENDIX 

Chart referenced by Senator Johnson .................................................................... 84 

Statement submitted for the Record from Dave Rettig, Rembrandt Foods ........ 86 

Statement submitted for the Record from University of Wisconsin-Madison .... 89 

(1) 

1The map referenced by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 84. 

2The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

STOPPING AN AVIAN INFLUENZA THREAT TO 

ANIMAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 2015 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, 

McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. This hearing is called to 

order. 

I want to first thank the witnesses for taking the time to come 

here this morning and the time you have taken to provide some 

very thoughtful and, I think, important testimony. 

This hearing is really about the recent outbreak of avian influenza (AI), bird flu, that has plagued, really, primarily the Upper 

Midwest, although it has—we have a map1 here—unfortunately, 

we do not have a chart—but it has been sprinkled out west, a little 

bit further east. Fortunately for Senator Carper’s State, it has not 

gone up and down the Eastern Seaboard yet. 

But, this is a serious issue. We have a mission statement for this 

Committee: To enhance the economic and national security of this 

country. This is an economic issue, and it is a very serious one. I 

do ask for unanimous consent to offer my written opening statement for the record,2 but I do want to just cover some quick statistics here because I think we may be interrupted by votes a little 

bit later on. 

But, in terms of how this is going to effect our economy, there 

are 300 million egg-laying chickens. Over 40 million of them have 

been affected by this and have been destroyed. That is 13.3 percent 

of the total egg-laying population. There are 238 million turkeys 

raised every year. Eight million have had to be euthanized because 

of this outbreak. That is estimated to be about an $8 billion impact 

in our economy. And fortunately, we have not seen a new outbreak 

since about mid-June, and the migration period is over, but it will 

startup again in the fall. And, so, we are extremely concerned 
2 

about what is going to happen when we have the migratory bird 

pattern once again. 

The purpose of this hearing really is to examine what our initial 

reaction was to the outbreak this spring and also ask and really 

explore what our reaction is going to be, how we are going to further limit the damage for additional outbreaks that—I hate to say 

it—probable in the fall, including—we do not want to alarm anybody here, but we have all heard about bird flu potentially mutating from animals to human beings, and that is why we have a pretty good panel here to discuss that and try and minimize the concern, but also provide assurance that we are going to be monitoring 

that and do everything we can if something were to happen. 

But, we have a real good panel, people from the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture (USDA), a representative from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), from the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO), a professor from Senator Carper’s home State, and Senator 

Carper will introduce Professor Gelb, and we have a victim, not a 

direct victim—you are a human—but somebody from the State of 

Wisconsin who lost his entire egg-laying flock of 200,000 chickens. 

Scott Schneider is here to just describe what he has gone through 

and his appreciation for what the USDA has done, but also just the 

frustrations in terms of getting compensated in a timely manner, 

as well, and that is part of the hearing. 

But, again, this is, I think, a very important hearing and totally 

appropriate for this Committee. 

So, with that, I will turn it over to our Ranking Member, Senator 

Tom Carper, who, like I say, so far, Delaware has dodged the bullet, and let us hope that remains the case throughout the year. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks. We have not always dodged the bullet, 

as Jack Gelb knows. So far, we have been lucky. What is the saying, it is better to be smart—or lucky than smart. Lucky than 

smart. So far, pretty smart, and so far, we have been lucky. It does 

not mean we will always be. 

I welcome you all today. I especially want to welcome Jack Gelb 

from Delaware. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your staff, 

others who worked on this hearing, and we look forward to hearing 

from each of you. 

As some of you in the room know, the issue of avian influenza 

is important, I think to our country, to all of us. To the Delmarva 

Peninsula, which includes parts of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, it is hugely important. We raise more chickens in Sussex 

County, Delaware—we only have three counties. Sussex County is 

the third-largest county in America and we raise more chickens 

there than any county in America. We raise more soybean there 

than any county in America. And a big part of our agri-economy, 

about 80 percent of our agri-economy in Delaware is poultry. So, 

it is hugely important for us. 

My hope is we come away from this hearing more confident than 

ever in the strength and the importance of America’s poultry industry and be better prepared to respond to any further outbreaks, 

should they occur. 
3 

I think some of you know this, but I am going to say it again. 

The poultry industry is an integral part of our national economy. 

It supports over one million jobs nationwide and about $350 billion 

in total economic activity every year. Some of the industry is tied, 

as the Chairman has said, to egg production, which several of our 

colleagues know very well. Other parts of the industry, as in my 

home State of Delaware, focus on the kind of chickens we eat, and 

‘‘Delmarvalous’’ is actually a word on the Delmarva Peninsula, and 

we call the chickens we eat, we call them ‘‘broilers.’’ I do not know 

what you call them where you come from, but we call them broilers. 

As some of you know, the birthplace of the broiler industry actually comes from Sussex County, Delaware, that big county. We are 

very proud of that. And the industry brought to Delaware about $3 

billion in economic activity, I think, last year. 

And, we export our chickens all over the world. The Trans-Pacific 

Trade Partnership which we are attempting to negotiate and will 

probably have a chance to vote up or down on later this year, one 

of the pushes there is to be able to sell chickens into Canada. They 

keep us out. They impose a 200 percent tariff on our poultry products going into Canada. Needless to say, we do not sell a lot of 

chickens there. And, Senator Chris Coons has worked very hard to 

get the markets opened up to Africa, and hopefully, we can be successful in the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership and Africa and 

places like that, and instead of exporting 20 percent of our chickens 

around the world, we will take that to 25 or 30 or even higher. 

Some parts of the poultry industry, particularly in the Midwest, 

continue to grapple with the devastating impacts of the recent outbreak of avian influenza. We have lost millions of chickens and turkeys to this disease and the economic losses are staggering. If that 

is not bad enough, some of our biggest trading partners have temporarily closed their doors to our poultry exports, and in some instances these bans affect not just one State, but every State that 

produces poultry products, not just those that have had a confirmed case of avian influenza. 

Thankfully, there is also some good news. The frequency of new 

cases, as we know, has shown significant drops in recent weeks. 

Broiler chickens have yet to contract the virus. And, as of now, 

there is no evidence that there is a threat to human health. 

We have farmers all across America to thank for much of this 

fortunate news. Their efforts, their sacrifices really made a difference. I would also like to recognize our Federal and State agricultural and public health officials for all of their hard work. Our 

friends in academia and industry have also done a great job. 

It is not a time to pat ourselves on the back, not a time to rest 

on our laurels. The possibility of new outbreaks, even here on the 

East Coast, is real, and all of us need to remain on high alert. This 

is especially true as we move into the migratory season in the coming months. 

Today’s hearing provides an important opportunity to better understand the threats posed by avian flu. It will also help us examine the steps so many people are taking to not only put an end to 

this outbreak, but to ensure that new cases do not spring up somewhere else. We should also use this hearing to identify lessons 
4 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Clifford appears in the Appendix on page 45. 

learned from our response as well as any best practices that can 

make a difference in stopping future outbreaks. 

I am especially interested in hearing from Dr. Gelb about measures we have taken in Delaware and on the Delmarva Peninsula 

that could be applied nationwide to further contain the spread of 

this virus. 

At the end of the day, we all need to work together to stop the 

spread of avian influenza. We all have a dog in this fight. That is 

mixing metaphors, I think, but a dog in this fight. We must all continue to act with a sense of urgency to reassure Americans, along 

with people all over the world, that our eggs as well as the meat 

from our chickens and our turkeys are safe to eat. 

This current outbreak is a very serious matter, no doubt about 

it. We have experts around the country like those before us today 

who have dealt with these issues before and are laser focused on 

stopping the spread of this disease. With continued hard work and 

coordination and determination, we can and will solve this problem 

together. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will all rise and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee 

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 

help you, God? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I do. 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. I do. 

Mr. CURRIE. I do. 

Mr. GELB. I do. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is Dr. John Clifford. Dr. Clifford is the Deputy 

Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer for the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS). In that position, he provides leadership for safeguarding 

animal health nationwide. He has served at USDA since 1997 in 

a variety of positions across the country. Dr. Clifford. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. CLIFFORD, D.V.M.,1 DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, AND CHIEF VETERINARY OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF AGRICULTURE 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the 

United States Department of Agriculture. 

In recent weeks, the number of new detections of high path AI 

found in U.S. poultry farms has slowed considerably. In fact, it has 

been a little over 3 weeks now, I think, for Iowa and over 4 weeks 

for the State of Minnesota. A few farms impacted by this disease 

months ago have started the long process of repopulating with new 

poultry. 
5 

These are bright spots in the largest animal health emergency in 

our country’s history. While encouraging developments, the impact 

of this unprecedented disease outbreak is still being felt throughout 

our industries. Trading partners have restricted U.S. poultry exports, and the risk of disease reemerging in the fall is significant. 

Our hearts go out to the affected producers, their employees, and 

the communities they live in and support. I assure you that this 

disease has the USDA’s fullest attention and we are committed to 

standing with our producers and industry to get them back on their 

feet. 

The Secretary is leading efforts to respond to this virus, to assist 

producers and maintain trade markets. As we look to the fall, we 

will be ready for the challenge. 

More than 400 USDA staff and over 2,000 USDA contracted personnel have been working around the clock in every affected State 

on the response. We delivered over $180 million in indemnification 

payments to producers to control the spread of the disease and to 

help them recover. All told, USDA has committed over $500 million, an amount more than half of the APHIS yearly budget, in responding aggressively to this outbreak. We can and will request additional funds should we need to. 

We have carefully studied and assessed the epidemiology of this 

virus as well as our response efforts in conjunction with our State 

and industry partners. We know that wild birds brought this disease to the Western United States in late 2014. As the birds and 

the virus moved into the Midwest, we saw point source introductions as well as farm-to-farm spread of the virus. Although we cannot pinpoint a single specific practice that caused this, our epidemiological report suggests that lapses in biosecurity were a contributing factor. We have talked at length with our State and industry 

partners about our findings and the need for all of us to think more 

comprehensively about on-farm biosecurity. 

We all agree that we are in this fight together. We have a shared 

interest in eradicating this disease and getting the poultry industry 

back on its feet. 

Last week, we met with industry and State officials to ensure 

that we have a high level of preparedness to deal with the reemergence and possible spread of this virus come fall. We encouraged 

our partners to review the existing avian influenza response plans 

so that they will understand what we expect and what actions we 

will need them to take should the disease strike. 

We are also urging States and industry to develop site and county-level specific depopulation plans for landfilling or composting of 

birds. Our experience in the Midwest showed that the biggest roadblock to efficient depopulation is the lack of ready sites to receive 

and process dead birds. 

For our part, we are taking proactive steps to be ready for the 

fall. We are identifying staffing needs and hiring more than 450 

additional temporary employees, including 210 animal health technicians and 90 veterinary medical officers. We are also developing 

a potential vaccine strategy. Should we decide to use vaccine to address the outbreak, we will have the systems in place to do so. 

As part of our planning, we are also working with our partners 

to increase surveillance of wild bird populations. We need to be 
6 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Schuchat appears in the Appendix on page 52. 

able to identify the virus’ presence as quickly as possible to be able 

to stamp it out. 

Later this month, we will be meeting directly with State veterinarians and industry to discuss the need for more biosecurity. The 

meeting in Des Moines, Iowa, will help ensure that our collective 

biosecurity is more stringent and that we are as prepared as we 

can be for the fall. 

I want to thank all of our partners in the industry and the States 

for their cooperation in this process. Their efforts and their willingness to work with us are appreciated and will help us as we plan 

for the fall. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Dr. Clifford. 

Our next witness is Dr. Anne Schuchat. Dr. Schuchat is currently the Director of the National Center for Immunization and 

Respiratory Diseases with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a position she has held since 2005. She is Assistant Surgeon General within the U.S. Public Health Service. She joined the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 1988 as an Epidemic 

Intelligence Services Officer. Dr. Schuchat. 

TESTIMONY OF ANNE SCHUCHAT, M.D.,1 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

CENTER FOR IMMUNIZATION AND RESPIRATORY DISEASES, 

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, AND 

ASSISTANT SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. I am here to discuss the potential public health impact 

from the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in 

U.S. birds and CDC’s actions to prepare for human infections with 

these viruses. 

Influenza virus is a formidable adversary. The virus’s propensity 

to change presents unique challenges, and each human case of infection with an animal influenza virus represents the potential for 

a pandemic. Strong collaboration between animal and human 

health sectors and robust domestic and international partnerships 

are critical to identify, monitor, and respond to viruses of concern, 

like the highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses currently circulating in birds in the United States. 

CDC continues to assess the risk for these viruses for the general 

public as low. However, people with close or prolonged unprotected 

contact with infected birds or contaminated environments are likely at greater risk of infection. This includes poultry workers and 

workers responding to the current outbreaks in U.S. birds. 

Although there have been no reported human cases of H5 influenza among Americans to date, CDC is taking action to prepare 

and ensure that we have the systems and tools in place to protect 

the public’s health. We have issued public health guidance for testing, treatment, and prophylaxis and worker protection. 

In January, we posted guidance for clinicians and public health 

professionals on testing, specimen collection, and processing for 

people who may be infected with novel influenza A viruses. We 
7 

posted guidance on the followup and antiviral chemoprophylaxis for 

people exposed to these viruses. And the Department of Health and 

Human Service (HHS) amended its guidance on use of antiviral 

drugs stockpiled for a flu pandemic to be available for use in response to the current domestic outbreaks. 

In June, we posted recommendations for worker protection and 

the use of personal protective equipment. We recommend personal 

protective equipment (PPE), for those in direct contact or going into 

buildings with sick or dead birds and carcasses, feces, or litter from 

potentially infected poultry. Recommended personal protective 

equipment includes properly fitted safety goggles, disposable 

gloves, boots, and an appropriate respirator, as well as disposable 

fluid-resistant coveralls. 

We have protocols in place for field investigations and contact 

tracing in the event of a suspected novel flu case. State health departments are asked to investigate potential human cases of H5 

virus infection and notify us within 24 hours of identifying a person 

under investigation. The States are monitoring the health of workers who have had contact with infected poultry for signs and symptoms of illness that could occur within 10 days of their last exposure. We have also equipped and trained public health labs to detect novel flu strains, including the recent H5 strains, using test 

kits that we developed and distributed. 

We have received samples of these viruses and carry out genetic 

analyses, which do not show any markers previously associated 

with increased severity or transmissibility in people. We have also 

got ongoing studies in animals, including mice and ferrets, to 

evaluate the transmissibility and disease severity of these viruses. 

Seasonal flu vaccines do not protect against avian influenza, so we 

are preparing candidate vaccine viruses for humans, should a vaccine become necessary. 

The collaboration between CDC and the USDA is critical to our 

efforts to protect Americans from avian and other novel influenza 

viruses with pandemic potential. During the current outbreak, we 

have coordinated messaging and communications, collaborated on 

the analyses of the viruses and the development of candidate vaccine viruses, and we have embedded a CDC influenza expert with 

the USDA Incident Command Unit for this response. 

I want to emphasize the importance of our collaboration with 

USDA and our strong partner networks for successful response to 

flu and other infectious disease threats. There must be strong public health capacity at the Federal, State, and local levels. Our investments in domestic public health capacity, surveillance, communication, and public health preparedness will help protect the public in this and future outbreaks. Effective preparedness and response requires strong collaboration between public health and clinicians and the health system. 

Our global partnerships continue to protect Americans from infectious disease threats like this. We work with ministries of 

health, public health labs, and the World Health Organization 

(WHO) to strengthen global capacity to conduct flu surveillance, 

perform lab testing, and prepare to respond to influenza 

pandemics. More rapid detection and characterization of novel flu 

viruses bolsters our Nation’s preparedness. 
8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Currie appears in the Appendix on page 58. 

The current H5 avian influenza situation has caused enormous 

impact on farmers and agricultural communities in several States, 

but fortunately, it has not yet led to human infections. This is only 

one of the challenges that influenza viruses pose to our economy 

and health. We must continue the efforts to detect, respond, and 

prevent the consequences that these viruses pose here and around 

the world. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Dr. Schuchat. 

Our next witness is Mr. Chris Currie. Mr. Currie is a Director 

at the Government Accountability Office, where he leads the agency’s work in evaluating emergency management, national preparedness, and critical infrastructure protection issues. He is accompanied by Steve Morris, a Director at GAO’s Natural Resources and 

Environment Team, which leads food safety and agriculture issues. 

Mr. Currie. 

TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER P. CURRIE,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY STEVE D. MORRIS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Carper and other Members of the Committee that are here 

today. We appreciate the opportunity to testify before you. Thank 

you for the introduction. As you mentioned, I handle our work on 

emergency management and national preparedness issues. Steve, 

sitting behind me, is responsible for our work on food safety and 

agriculture and he can answer any questions that I cannot that 

may come up in that area. 

Today, I would like to discuss some key themes and recommendations across GAO’s biodefense work, particularly as it pertains to the outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in the 

Midwest. While we have not evaluated the response to the current 

outbreak yet, we plan to do so very soon, later this year. We have 

reported on efforts to prepare and respond to such outbreaks, 

though. We have also reported at the highest levels on broad national biosurveillance and defense efforts and coordination, all the 

way down to more specific efforts within sectors like food and agriculture. 

It is important to note that biodefense in the United States is a 

huge and complex effort that requires coordination and cooperation 

among different Federal agencies, various levels of government, 

and the private sector. Our work has shown that preparing for 

emergencies, whether they be natural disasters, accidents, or intentional attacks, requires careful planning to better know who is responsible for doing what, how we will coordinate, and what resources we are going to need. 

One key area we have evaluated is biosurveillance at the Federal, State, and local level, and that is a big word, but biosurveillance is the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data to better 

monitor pathogens in either humans, animals, plants, or in the 
9 

food and agriculture sector. Coordinating biosurveillance efforts is 

a challenge because it requires working across traditional agency 

boundaries and missions, such as CDC and USDA. For example, 

Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and 

Homeland Security all have separate missions and authorities but 

have common goals under the Federal framework for preparing for 

and responding to disease outbreaks. 

Planning and coordination are so important because they dictate 

the actions that will be taken in the event of a real emergency. For 

example, in 2010, we found that there was no national strategy or 

designated focal point lead for developing national biosurveillance 

capabilities. We recommended the Homeland Security Council 

(HSC), which is within the White House, develop a strategy and 

designate a focal point for coordination. 

They did issue a strategy in 2012 and designated a focal point. 

However, that strategy has not yet identified certain resource and 

investment needs and priorities, which was an element we thought 

was critical to help prioritize resources across such a complex enterprise, such as biosurveillance. 

Now, drilling down a little deeper into the area of animal and 

plant disease surveillance, our findings are very similar. In 2004, 

the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 

(HSPD–9), to better coordinate various Federal agencies’ responsibilities and efforts in animal and food surveillance. For example, 

under HSPD–9, the Homeland Security Department is responsible 

for coordinating efforts across all Federal agencies, like HHS and 

USDA. However, while DHS has made some efforts, it really has 

not yet fulfilled that role fully. 

In addition, we found that USDA had not developed a Department-wide strategy for implementing all of its HSPD–9 requirements. We recommended that they do so and they told us that they 

intended to do so, but that resource challenges and certain competing priorities have sort of stalled those efforts so far. 

So, back in 2007, we reported on various Federal efforts to prepare for and respond to an avian flu outbreak similar to the one 

we are facing now and made several recommendations. For example, we recommended that USDA, one, identify the capabilities it 

would need among Federal, State, local, and private entities to respond to an outbreak; two, develop a response plan that identified 

various responsibilities and resource needs; three, help States develop their own response plans for high path avian influenza; and 

four, conduct exercises to actually test these response plans. 

Now, USDA implemented all of these recommendations and now 

these response plans and actions are being tested during a real life 

outbreak and with some new challenges, as Dr. Clifford mentioned, 

such as the disposal issue. 

So, we will continue to monitor these efforts and will begin work 

looking at the specific response later this year. 

This completes my prepared remarks and Steve and I would be 

happy to answer any questions you have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Currie. 

I think we will have Senator Carper introduce our next witness. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 
10 

1The prepared statement of Dr. Gelb appears in the Appendixn on page 73. 

I am pleased to introduce Mr. Jack Gelb, Jr., the Director of the 

University of Delaware’s Avian Biosciences Center. As the Director, 

Dr. Gelb coordinates teaching and research activities at the center 

and participates in national and international outreach. He also receives the center’s poultry disease surveillance efforts and worked 

closely with Delaware’s agricultural sector on matters of poultry 

health. Dr. Gelb is a poultry industry-wide recognized expert. 

He is joined today by his wife of 39 years, Becky, joined by their 

11 children and their 37 grandchildren in the audience. [Laughter.] 

Well, part of that is true. [Laughter.] 

His wife of 39 years, Becky, is here. We rode down here on the 

train together. It was nice to see them. They left all their children 

and grandchildren at home. They do not have 11 children and 37, 

but when asked why they have such a healthy family, Jack and 

Becky also said, ‘‘We eat a lot of chicken.’’ [Laughter.] 

Jack, welcome. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good thing we do not swear you in. [Laughter.] 

Dr. GELB. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. There is an old saying that says, never let the 

truth get in the way of a good story. [Laughter.] 

TESTIMONY OF JACK GELB, JR., PH.D.,1 DIRECTOR, AVIAN BIOSCIENCES CENTER, COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE 

Dr. GELB. That is very true. Thank you very much, and it is a 

great pleasure and, in fact, an honor to be with you today. 

Delmarva and the Delmarva region, which includes the Eastern 

Shore counties of the States of Maryland and Virginia, experienced 

a low pathogenicity avian influenza outbreak firsthand in 2004. We 

were very fortunate to have a successful outcome because of advance planning and rapid implementation of the regional response 

plan by our incident command system. 

We are very fortunate in Delaware to have many outstanding experts in the poultry health field. These are, again, within academia, but I also want to emphasize within our poultry companies. 

We are very blessed to have those individuals working hand-inhand with us. And, obviously, members of the States and the Federal Government. 

Only three farms were positive in our Delmarva incident, which 

is remarkable given the very high densities of poultry and farms 

in the Delmarva region. 

AI outcomes, like those of cancer and other potentially fatal diseases, are time dependent. Recognition at the earliest stage of the 

disease is critical. But, unlike cancer, the situation with AI is arguably a bit more complex because the AI virus, the cause of the disease, is highly contagious and it will multiply to enormous concentrations in poultry and spread via the air and by off-farm movement of infected poultry, human carriers, and contaminated farm 

equipment. 

All normal farm activities must cease immediately when AI 

strikes, and the farm must be prepared to implement an emergency 
11 

biosecurity plan. Part of the emergency plan is that infected flocks 

must be depopulated, ideally within 24 hours, at the earliest time 

following the identification of the virus on the farm. This is important to end animal suffering and, importantly, to stop the spread 

of the virus into the environment, which represents a very significant threat in transmission. 

There are several areas that I went into more detail as far as 

things that we might look at in the future. I will just briefly refer 

to them here. 

No. 1, develop and implement educational outreach biosecurity 

programs designed to help farmers to respond to avian influenza on 

their facilities. Biosecurity is a term that describes everyday and 

emergency disease processes a farmer uses to prevent and control 

diseases. It is probably the single greatest weapon that we have 

against avian influenza. But, unfortunately, biosecurity is not consistently applied by all farmers and by all poultry companies. 

We also need to look at, as far as No. 2 is concerned, a few aspects of our current emergency response plan so we can respond 

more quickly, more rapidly, to an incident, and we can get into that 

a little bit later. 

No. 3, provide an insurance program for poultry farmers who 

contract with poultry companies to raise their flocks. Dr. Clifford 

mentioned indemnifications that have been paid, and this is very 

important. But for farmers who are contract farmers with poultry 

companies, they may or may not receive those indemnifications. So, 

there is really a need for a new program, and there are discussions 

underway on this particular topic and I think we should look into 

this area seriously. 

Vaccination for controlling avian influenza in poultry requires 

very careful consideration. Again, there was mention earlier about 

developing vaccines and utilizing them in poultry, and I am talking 

more specifically not for humans, but for poultry. But there are 

some limitations to vaccines. Vaccines have limited efficacy, even 

under somewhat the best conditions. We certainly need more research on poultry vaccines to make them more effective than they 

currently are. But, vaccination is a slippery slope and we need to 

very carefully determine whether or not we are going to go down 

this road, the effect on trade, the fact that these vaccines are not 

particularly effective, can push the virus and drive it to further 

mutations. 

Last, there is a growing body of evidence that terrestrial wild 

birds may be playing a role in the transmission of avian influenza. 

We have known for years that ducks and geese, so-called wild waterfowl, are the main reservoirs where avian influenza resides on 

a long-term basis, and we have heard earlier from Dr. Clifford they 

are the primary source for the point introductions at various parts 

of the United States. We have known this for years. 

So, these terrestrial birds, why might they be important? Well, 

there is some research that suggests that they do support virus 

replication and they could be so-called bridge vectors, carrying viruses not only to poultry—many times you see finches and sparrows in poultry houses—but maybe also to humans. 

I would like to thank Senator Carper and Senator Johnson for 

their kind invitation to be here today, and I also want to thank 
12 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider appears in the Appendix on page 81. 

Robert Bradley of Senator Carper’s office for reaching out to me 

about this opportunity. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Professor Gelb. 

Well, because Senator Carper got a witness from Delaware, I got 

one from Wisconsin. And, it is unfortunate that we have Scott 

Schneider here because you lost your flock and you are losing a lot 

of money in this process. 

Our next witness is Mr. Scott Schneider and he is the owner of 

Nature Link Farm, located in Jefferson County, Wisconsin. Unfortunately, his 200,000 chicken farm was the first egg-laying operation to be hit by the H5N2 strain that then ravaged other chicken 

farms across the Midwest. He is also the President of the Wisconsin Poultry and Egg Industries Association. 

Mr. Schneider, we are very glad you could come here and provide 

your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF SCOTT SCHNEIDER,1 OWNER, NATURE LINK 

FARM, JEFFERSON, WISCONSIN, AND PRESIDENT, WISCONSIN POULTRY AND EGG INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Carper, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me 

to discuss the impact of highly pathogenic avian influenza on poultry and egg producers. I appreciate the opportunity to be a part of 

developing a comprehensive solution to recover from the current 

outbreak and prevent the future spread of the disease. 

My farm is my livelihood. My flock of 200,000 cage-free egg-laying hens did more than produce a product. It helped me meet 

American consumer demand. My flock and my farm fed my family, 

they paid my bills, and it enabled me to help my ten-plus employees feed their families and pay their bills, too. 

I have always played by the rules and tried to ensure pristine 

conditions for my employees and for my birds. I have done my part 

to keep the American egg industry competitive. But as producers 

from around the world know all too well, hard work and strictly following regulations does nothing to protect against AI. 

My flock of 200,000 egg-laying hens has been reduced to zero in 

the face of the AI outbreak. My short-term prospects have been 

grim, and the middle-and long-term prospects are challenging, especially in the face of future AI threats. Although containment and 

biosecurity efforts have been admirable, survival of my family farm 

and the American egg industry at large depends on meaningful 

protection against future outbreaks. 

AI will cost my farm a minimum of $500,000 in revenues before 

this year is over. That is a sizable blow for any operation, but almost an unimaginable financial hit for a smaller producer such as 

myself. My farm will be completely out of production for at least 

4 months and generate no new revenue. My current plans call for 

gradual repopulation over the 4-months to follow, building my flock 

back toward its pre-AI size. When all is said and done, under a 

best case scenario, I am facing a minimum of 8 months with either 

zero or heavily reduced revenues and surviving by using my life’s 

savings. 
13 

In addition to the direct loss of revenue, I am also fronting payments for some of the costs of remediation and containment efforts 

until the USDA is able to reimburse me. 

Of course, my farm is just one of the many operations devastated 

by AI. To date, more than 48 million birds have been infected by 

the disease and 220 operations in 20 different States. AI has killed 

more birds in the egg sector than in any other to this point. 

The reported loss from the current outbreak has set egg-layer inventories back by more than a decade. Prior to the current outbreak of AI, there were just over 300 million egg-laying hens in the 

United States. Over the past 6 months, about 35 million of those 

have been lost. That loss is hurting American egg supplies and 

driving up prices, as indicated by the USDA’s 4.1 percent reduction 

of forecasted egg production for 2015. It has even led to the importation of shell eggs from Europe. This is an extreme situation that 

very seldom is seen in our industry. 

Consumers are also hurt. We have seen significant increases in 

the prices of eggs and products made with dry and liquid eggs due 

to the AI outbreak. In dollars and cents, current table egg prices 

are up 70 percent from April 2015 prices. U.S. consumers could pay 

$8 billion more to buy eggs, which is an increase of at least 75 percent from last year. 

The importance of USDA’s response efforts to date cannot be 

overstated, nor can my gratitude for the work that the government 

and its partners have done thus far. USDA resources have been integral to response efforts. What is more, the individuals and teams 

that I have worked with on the ground have been highly professional and courteous. They are people who have the best intentions 

and a true desire to help, and I appreciate that help very much. 

Despite the progress being made, the sheer bureaucracy of doing 

business with the government is challenging family farmers who, 

like me, do not interact with government bodies every day. I do not 

have administrative staff to keep up with the changing landscape 

of rules, work plans, compliance agreements, and the rotating staff 

inherent to such a recovery process. The red tape is daunting, it 

is frustrating, and it is financially draining. But, we must push on 

and work within the framework that has been established for the 

benefit of me and those like me. 

In today’s landscape, a response plan aimed at true eradication 

of the disease must be comprehensive. Biosecurity and containment 

are indispensable parts of that plan, but they are simply not 

enough. We need to stop AI and prevent future outbreaks. The fact 

that the USDA is considering use of a vaccine as a component of 

a comprehensive response strategy is encouraging. For producers 

like me, it is difficult to imagine investing the time and money necessary to repopulate our flocks without the assurance provided by 

an availability of an effective vaccine. 

This fact is made even truer in the face of upcoming bird migrations this fall which threaten to reintroduce outbreaks all over this 

country. Without the long-term protection granted by an eradication approach with a targeted use of a safe and tested vaccine, 

the path forward for my farm is far from clear. 

I am proud to be an American egg producer. I am proud to be 

a part of an industry that has done its part to feed our Nation, to 
14 

support thousands of jobs, and keep small towns vibrant. If there 

is one message I hope this Committee takes from my testimony, it 

is this. The threat of AI can take all that away in one fell swoop 

if we fail to adopt a response plan that both addresses the current 

outbreak and prevent future outbreaks. 

I thank you for your time and for the opportunity to talk with 

you today and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

I think I will start with you. I think your testimony—and first 

of all, thank you for your testimony, and we obviously are sorry for 

your loss. But, what I find interesting about your testimony is I 

think you share my perspective. I have been very impressed with 

the quality of the Federal workforce, I mean, just really dedicated 

individuals doing a great job, which is exactly what you experienced, as well, and that is a good thing. But, frustrated by the 

problems that you encounter based on the bureaucracy, the rules, 

what they are trying to follow. So, I just kind of want to followup 

on that. 

First of all, you are a contract producer, correct? Somebody else 

owns the chickens and you run the operation. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, that is correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Now, when we met yesterday—and I appreciate you coming in early—you described to me the indemnification 

process for the actual chicken owners. It took, what, 4 to 6 weeks 

for them to be indemnified against the loss of the chickens, correct? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is my understanding, yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, you are, as you say, there is no business interruption insurance. You cannot buy this kind of insurance 

in the open market. This is only provided—and it is a good thing 

that we have this indemnification through the USDA, but as Professor Gelb was talking about, there is a problem in terms of indemnifying for operational losses as well as trying to recover and 

doing what you are trying to do to remake your farm, is that correct? Can you describe how much you spent and what your frustration is in terms of being indemnified as the operator? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think one of the situations that I am running into is that I will be fronting probably close to $150,000 in terms 

of depopulation, cleanup, and disinfecting before I am able to start 

repopulating my complex. It is difficult for me to come up with that 

kind of cash, and it is difficult to try to make sure that I am dotting all the ‘‘I’’s and crossing all the ‘‘t’’s when it comes to the formats that the USDA is going to require me to do when it comes 

to expenses and identifying which expenses are recoverable for me. 

Every day goes by, I become a little bit more concerned that some 

of those expenses might be left out or forgotten or somehow not 

covered and I stand to lose a lot more money on top of what I am 

already losing. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, again, if you are not able to repopulate 

your operation for 8 months, I mean, are you going to be able to 

start generating revenue any time soon, or is it really you are not 

going to generate anything for 8 months? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. When I start repopulating, it will be an incremental process. I have the capacity of 200,000 birds on my farm 
15 

and I will start incrementally adding flocks to the tune of about 

45,000 birds every month, starting in August and October. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Now, do you buy those as egg-laying chickens right off the bat? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. They are ready to lay. Yes, that is correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. So, you will start generating revenue. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Dr. Clifford, in the private insurance 

market, you get an insurance adjustor coming out onsite, assessing 

it, verifying the claim, writing a check sometimes that day or within days, or certainly a week or two. To me, this is a pretty simple 

claim to adjudicate, particularly the chickens. I mean, here is the 

program. It is Federal law that the chickens have to be destroyed, 

and it is Federal law that the indemnification for those owners of 

those chickens. I would think, OK, we verify that this is AI and the 

chickens are destroyed, and I do not know why the government 

cannot write a check literally within a day or two to indemnify, 

first, the owners of the chickens. Can you tell me why it would take 

4 to 6 weeks for the owners of the chickens to be indemnified? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. So, with regards to indemnification, we can actually do that within a week or less. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, again, that was not the case in 

this—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. No, I understand, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. What I was going to say, though, is what we require is a flock plan to be signed, and until that flock plan is 

signed, we do not pay indemnity. What the flock plan is, is a strategy and plan for that location, specific to that location, with regards to biosecurity and restocking to ensure that we are all doing 

as much as we can to prevent reinfection. If there is not a signed 

flock plan before we pay indemnity and they get reinfected after 

they repopulate, we do not pay indemnity a second time. 

So, I think there are things that we can do together to make that 

a lot quicker process. My heart goes out to Scott and his issues, 

and we have heard this from many producers. Some of these things 

are complex because they have never dealt with them. 

So, one of the things that we are doing to combat this in the future is assigning one person to that facility from the beginning to 

the end to work with the producer and to help them get through 

these things. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. So, you are learning from that. 

Mr. Schneider, real quick, how long did it take USDA to get out 

to your operation to inspect and really order the destruction of the 

flock? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think the USDA needs to wait until the presumptive positive is actually confirmed by the national laboratory 

in Iowa before they are able to do anything. And so in my case, we 

had a presumptive positive, I think it was on maybe a Thursday 

of the week, and on Saturday evening, it was confirmed by the national laboratory in Ames, Iowa, and I think it was on that Monday, then, that we had USDA people—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. And how quickly was your flock destroyed? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It took a little—— 
16 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, Thursday, infected. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I mean, you saw chickens dying, right? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. They were. 

Chairman JOHNSON. They died quickly. And then, so, that was 

Thursday, and you started destroying your flock when? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It was probably the following Thursday or Friday, possibly. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, Professor Gelb, in your testimony, you 

said that process should be 24 hours. That is a pretty big gap. 

There is a fair amount of continuous improvement required here, 

correct? 

Dr. GELB. Yes, ideally. In Delaware back in 2004, our goal was 

24 to 48 hours, in that window. And, in fact, again, that hinges on 

the identification of the virus. If we go back to Scott’s point, that 

is a very important one, the process. The presumptive positive is 

made by a local or regional laboratory, a National Animal Health 

Laboratory Network (NAHLN) member laboratory—that is a 

mouthful, but it is a USDA, very important, very highly regarded 

USDA laboratory network system that we have nationally. They 

are based in Ames, Iowa. The confirmation must come—this is a 

very important point—from the national laboratory in Ames before 

it is actually a done deal, so to speak. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, let me just say, so in the current structure, we have these sites. Best case, if you restructured the process, 

I mean, because sometimes tests take a while. 

Dr. GELB. Sure. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sometimes they have to incubate. What is 

best case? If you could design the structure, what is the best case 

in terms of Mr. Schneider calling somebody, you collect a sample. 

How quickly could you have that confirmed, again, best case, not— 

I guess, with current structure, but if you really redesigned this 

thing. 

Dr. GELB. Yes. Once the samples are submitted to the local-regional NAHLN laboratory, those results basically are molecular 

types of tests. They can be completed in about 3 hours. Then those 

same samples, it is mandated, must be sent to the central lab in 

Ames for testing and for confirmational testing. So, at the local lab, 

they are presumptive. We are really waiting for that confirmational 

testing. 

So, frequently, they are going to be sent by overnight delivery, 

OK, so it might be another 24 hours. So, you are basically waiting, 

then, that additional 24 hours before you can take action in terms 

of initiating flock depopulation. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I want to say on this, and I want my Committee members to indulge me a little bit, in your experience—or 

maybe I will go to Dr. Clifford—how often do you have the initial 

result differ from the confirmation result? Are there instances of 

that? So, in other words, the question I am asking is could we rely 

on the initial result, and it would be destroying the flock of chickens, and all of the sudden, oh, that really was not avian flu? 

Dr. GELB. These regional NAHLN laboratories are basically laboratories of the NAHLN. They are many times, if not all, many 

times accredited laboratories with very high quality staff. I am giv-
17 

ing you a little more background. All the members that run these 

molecular tests take proficiency panels once a year, unknown proficiency panels that come from USDA. We are talking about highly 

qualified laboratories. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, again, so the point is, we could improve 

this model, so we could destroy that flock of chickens within a day 

or two, within your guidelines, 24 to 48 hours rather than 7 days, 

which, again, just increases the likelihood that these outbreaks will 

not be contained. 

Dr. GELB. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I mean, from my standpoint, for the USDA, 

if we have to write a law or improve a regulation, there is a real 

top priority of what we ought to do as a Federal Government to 

speed that process to limit the damage. I mean, would you agree 

with that, or—— 

Dr. GELB. Yes, I would. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I have plenty of other questions, but I 

will turn it over to Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. To our witnesses, you will see our colleagues 

are coming and going. We serve on three, four, five Committees, 

and the others have hearings going on, as well. I do, and I will be 

slipping in and out today. 

Senator Tester from Montana has asked to use a little bit of my 

time and I am going to yield to him and then recover my time. 

Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. I appreciate that. 

Very quickly, Dr. Clifford, is there a vaccine for the avian flu? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes, sir, there is a vaccine—— 

Senator TESTER. OK. How cost effective is it? What does it cost 

a bird? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Well, let me, if I may, there is not a well-matched 

vaccine available today—— 

Senator TESTER. OK, so there is not a—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. And we are working on well-matched 

vaccines for the fall. 

Senator TESTER. All right. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. But, you are usually talking pennies per bird—— 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. As far as the cost of vaccine. 

Senator TESTER. All right. But, we are still researching the potential of a matched vaccine? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. There is work ongoing, and I believe that we will 

have—— 

Senator TESTER. One by fall. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. Available vaccines by the fall or late 

fall. 

Senator TESTER. Mr. Schneider, first of all, thanks for raising 

cage-free chickens, No. 1, and No. 2, I am sorry about your loss. 

I am also involved in agriculture of a different kind. I deal with 

plants. But, I just kind of want to try to figure out where we are 

going here. With grains and with lentils, we buy insurance. Do you 
18 

pay a premium for the insurance we are talking about, or is this 

part of a disaster program of the USDA? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. This is part of the disaster program of USDA. 

Senator TESTER. OK. That is important to know. I mean, we buy 

insurance, that is heavily subsidized, I might add, by the taxpayer, 

so it is not totally private sector. 

What are you going to have to do to be able to raise chickens? 

Can you give me four or five things that you are going to have to 

do on your place so that you can guarantee that the avian flu is 

not going to come back? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sure. We have to follow protocols set in place by 

the USDA—— 

Senator TESTER. Yes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER [continuing]. For depopulating, for cleaning, and 

then, finally, for disinfecting. 

Senator TESTER. OK. And, is there other time elements to those 

protocols? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Not necessarily, up until the time which you are 

completed with your disinfecting. Then you are required for a 21- 

day rest period—— 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER [continuing]. In which time they are doing sampling—— 

Senator TESTER. And they are still continuing to do tests to make 

sure that—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. They are doing testing during that 21-day period. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Very good. And, you are in the middle of 

that process right now? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am completing the disinfecting, hopefully this 

week. 

Senator TESTER. And, is it up to you to destroy the chickens or 

does USDA do it? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is a reimbursable expense. 

Senator TESTER. Yes, but do you actually do the job or do USDA 

people come in and do it? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It depends on whether or not there is a contracted company to come in and do it, or we can as a farm. We can 

contract to do it, as well. 

Senator TESTER. In your particular case—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We assisted the contracted company. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Good. 

Mr. Currie, in your written testimony, you talked a little bit 

about foot and mouth disease, and I know this is about avian flu, 

but how serious is foot and mouth? 

Mr. CURRIE. It is a very serious disease. 

Senator TESTER. And we are free of that disease in this country, 

correct? 

Mr. CURRIE. That is probably a question better targeted to Mr. 

Clifford, but—— 

Senator TESTER. That is good. He is next on my list anyway. 

[Laughter.] 

We are free in this country of foot in mouth—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes, sir, we are. 
19 

Senator TESTER. OK. The USDA just opened up—authorized imports from a number of countries, including Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER [continuing]. That are not foot and mouth free 

countries. Mr. Currie just said it was a very serious disease. Do 

you guys talk before you open up trade with other countries that 

have a highly contagious disease? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Do I talk with GAO about doing that? 

Senator TESTER. Do you talk with Mr. Currie’s office? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. No. 

Senator TESTER. OK. So, if that—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Why would I talk to Mr. Currie’s office about disease mitigation? They are not veterinarians. We do risk assessments. 

Senator TESTER. OK, so that is fine. My brother is a veterinarian, so do not take this personally, but—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I know he is. [Laughter.] 

Senator TESTER. The fact is, is that why did we open up trade 

with countries that have foot and mouth disease? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Because they are free with vaccination, and what 

that means is they have not had cases, an active outbreak of foot 

and mouth disease for years. 

Senator TESTER. In regions of those countries—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. No, in all of the—— 

Senator TESTER [continuing]. Not in those entire—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. In the entire country, there has not been a verified 

case of foot and mouth disease in the entire South America for over 

2 years. 

Senator TESTER. So, why is not Uruguay considered a certified 

free foot and mouth disease? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. They still vaccinate. That is why. And, you can 

ship beef, boneless beef, safely if you vaccinate and you are free, 

and we have been doing that for years. We did it from Argentina 

years before they had an additional case quite a few years ago. 

Senator TESTER. So, let us go the other direction, then. You are 

saying that if we had an instance of foot and mouth disease in this 

country, that it would not hurt our export business? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I did not say that, sir. Of course, it would. 

Senator TESTER. We vaccinate. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. We base trade on risk mitigation. We do not vaccinate for foot and mouth disease, nor will we vaccinate for foot 

and mouth disease unless we get the disease. They vaccinate routinely to make sure that they do not have the disease. One of these 

days—— 

Senator TESTER. I have it. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. I think North America will probably—or, the region of Americas will probably be the first continent 

free of foot and mouth disease within the next 5 to 10 years. 

Senator TESTER. That would be good. My concern is it stays that 

way, and from what I hear you say, if we had foot and mouth disease in this country and we were vaccinating, we would actually 

be in better shape for exports of meat than if we did not have foot 

and mouth disease and we did not vaccinate. 
20 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. That is not correct. 

Senator TESTER. Well, now, come on—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I said boneless beef—boneless—from areas of the 

world that have foot and mouth. 

Senator TESTER. Got you. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. Free with vaccination can ship 

boneless beef—— 

Senator TESTER. Here is my concern, and you are the doctor and 

I just raise the animals. My concern is, is what happens if we get 

foot and mouth disease in this country, and you said it would have 

impacts on our exports. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. It would. 

Senator TESTER. But, you also believe strongly that the chance 

of transferring that foot and mouth disease from a country like 

Uruguay is zero. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I did not say it was zero. I said it was extremely 

low risk. 

Senator TESTER. What would it be, less than 10 percent? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Oh, it is a lot lower than that, but it is—— 

Senator TESTER. Less than 1 percent? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes. 

Senator TESTER. OK. So, nearly zero. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. As close to zero as you can get without saying 

zero. 

Senator TESTER. Perfect. Thank you very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Ernst. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Chairman Johnson and Ranking 

Member Carper, and to our witnesses today, thanks so much. 

I spent some time with Dr. Clifford yesterday as we met in the 

Agriculture Committee and discussed a number of these issues, as 

well. I do want to recognize, we do have a turkey producer from 

Iowa in our audience today. Mr. Moline, thanks for joining us again 

today. Good to have you here. 

Iowa was hit extremely hard. If you look, a number of us here 

up at the dais have a little map here, and you cannot really see 

Iowa too well because out of the millions and millions of birds that 

have been infected and destroyed, two-thirds of those birds were 

from Iowa. So, our poultry, our turkeys, have been infected quite 

heavily, and so this has been a big concern for us for a number of 

months now. And, the economic impact to Iowa will be about $1 billion, very significant. 

So, Mr. Schneider, I sympathize with you very much. A number 

of our producers have gone through the exact same thing. I just 

want to reemphasize, it is not only devastating for these producers, 

but their employees, those employees’ families, and the communities that are supported by these producers. So, thank you for 

being here today and sharing your story. I appreciate that very 

much. 

Dr. Clifford, I would like to go back and visit a little bit more 

about the vaccination process. We talked about it a little bit yesterday. Is the USDA working on the vaccination process? If you could 

explain a little bit about the process, where we are with that. I 
21 

know a number of different groups will support vaccinations, some 

will not. What we want to do is ensure that we are working with 

trade partners, as well. So, if you could talk about our trade partners, that would be very helpful. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Yes, what we are doing 

is developing, actually, a vaccine bank. We intend to go out with 

a request for proposal soon to ask companies to bid on that. We 

have several companies that are in process of developing vaccines 

and we believe that we will have a vaccine bank available sometime this fall, it may be late fall depending upon the companies’ 

ability to get that vaccine manufactured. 

It is a tool in the toolbox, as Dr. Gelb said, that we really need 

to have to use if we decide it is the right thing to do in a particular 

situation. So, we are working on those protocols and then we will 

be reaching out this summer to our trading partners to try to encourage our trading partners, under these conditions, to not shut 

off trade. And, if we are successful, then that will help us to be able 

to utilize that one tool, because right now, if we use that tool in 

our toolbox, they will shut us off and we will lose potentially up 

to $3 or $4 billion additionally in trade. And, they are not talking 

about a partial shut-off. They are talking about an entire country 

shut-off. 

So, I understand the turkey producers wanting to use vaccines. 

I can understand the layers and especially outdoor or cage-free 

birds. So, you have these different groups, from the broilers to the 

genetics groups that do not want it used because of the impact on 

trade. So, we are trying to balance all this. We are trying to get 

our trading partners to support its use in a limited way where it 

makes sense. 

An example of use would be in turkey flocks in Minnesota that 

have a very close proximity to a lot of lakes and a lot of potential 

wild waterfowl. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. No, I appreciate that very much. 

And, Dr. Gelb, you had mentioned that, of course, the growers, 

there is an indemnity fund, but some of the growers are not seeing 

the funds flowing their direction. Do you know of any mechanism 

where we would be able to follow those dollars and find out—we 

do want to make sure that if the growers are entitled to a portion 

of that indemnity payment, that they are receiving that. Do you 

know of any mechanism that we might be able to engage for followup? 

Dr. GELB. Yes. This is a little bit out of my area, but working 

with our local trade association, the Delmarva Poultry Industry, Incorporated, and speaking with William Satterfield, the Director of 

that organization, I think he, for example, could give you a better 

answer on this. 

But, my understanding, as I indicated earlier, the indemnities for 

contract growers—and there are many contract growers in this 

country where they do not own the birds. They provide the facilities, the heat, the ventilation, basically, to grow them. But, the 

birds themselves belong to a poultry company. And, frequently, 

those indemnities, they just go to the poultry company. Some of the 

companies will then share some of the indemnity funds with the 

contract grower. 
22 

So, this is kind of a contract grower issue, and I mentioned, also, 

the interest and current proceedings now in thinking about moving 

forward with an insurance program that growers could purchase 

where those funds would go directly to them rather than to the 

company. So, yes, Senator, you bring up an excellent question, and 

I am not sure I am really the best one to address it. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you. 

Dr. GELB. Thank you. 

Senator ERNST. Well, I thank you for raising the issue. 

And, just one parting point, and I know, Mr. Currie, you work 

with emergency management, and as we discussed yesterday in the 

Agriculture Committee, Iowa did have plans in place should this 

happen. We had a number of landfills that were willing to accept 

the carcasses of the birds after they were virus-free. But, I tell you, 

even the best laid plans can go awry, because we had really kind 

of an uprising amongst the people around those landfills and along 

those routes that said, how do we know that our birds will not be 

hit by this virus by moving those birds to these landfills? So, it was 

a great concern with the people of Iowa that we were not affecting 

additional farms out there. So, even the best laid plans cannot go 

the way they are intended. 

But, thank you very much to our panel for being here today. We 

appreciate it. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

panelists for your testimony. 

This is certainly an issue that is somewhat frightening to a lot 

of folks, to think that an influenza could hit the poultry industry 

so quickly, and that so many birds die and have such a massive 

impact on egg production, and we just think about, certainly, other 

produce as well, and how these bio threats are so significant. 

In fact, Michigan, the State that I am blessed to represent, became the 21st State to confirm a case of avian flu here just recently. I believe it was in wild birds, actually, some geese where 

it showed up, and I think that is possibly where it all started. I 

think we are still trying to figure that out. 

But, I guess that leads to my question for you, Dr. Clifford. How 

closely are you working with the Fish and Wildlife Service? Are 

they involved in monitoring what is happening with wild birds and 

the impact it could have on our agricultural sector? Certainly, we 

will have fall migrations that will be involved with some of these 

wild birds. So, do you work with the Fish and Wildlife Service, and 

if so, what are you doing? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes, sir, we do. We work directly with them. Our 

Wildlife Services Division of APHIS leads this effort for us and 

they work directly with the State Departments of Natural Resources (DNR), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and other entities with regards to wild bird surveillance. 

We have actually been doing wild bird surveillance for a long 

time. We began doing a lot more surveillance during the H5N1 occurrence quite a few years ago in Asia, when it became a human 

health issue and concern, as well, and we increased our surveil-
23 

lance. As that became less of a concern for the United States from 

the flyways—and we did a lot of testing and monitoring and no 

cases were found of that H5N1—then we reduced the level of monitoring because of the lack of threat from that particular agent. 

Based upon these recent findings, we have increased surveillance 

in wild birds and we actually have plans out there available that 

includes Fish and Wildlife, DNRs, and APHIS Wildlife Services on 

the collection of these samples, and it will occur across all four 

flyways. In addition, we take samples from up north of Alaska, 

there in the Bering Strait area where these birds currently are to 

see what is happening right now, today. 

Senator PETERS. Very good. Well, as I looked at the spread of 

this and looked at the industry and the concentration of the industry, which I think is very interesting I want to direct this question 

to Dr. Schuchat, probably Dr. Clifford, as well, and Dr. Gelb. The 

statistic that I think is very interesting is that there are 56 privately held farms that account for about 90 percent of all of the egg 

production in the United States—90 percent. So, we have some 

small family farms, but there are not very many small family 

farms anymore. That has faded away. We have large family farms 

and we have large corporate farms. And now we have just 56 farms 

that have 90 percent of the production. So, that is an incredible 

concentration of animals. 

So, I want to kind of get your sense. We have a very large 

amount of birds in a very small space, and this is not just in poultry, it is in other types of agricultural production, as well. Does 

that put us at greater risk when it comes to disease, because you 

have that kind of concentration, or does it not? If you could kind 

of address that for me as far as what we are looking at in terms 

of our challenges. 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Yes, I can just briefly comment from the human 

health perspective, but I think Dr. Clifford will be better. We need 

biosecurity to be strong at every level, and one level is really what 

is the geographic location of the establishments. But we need within any establishment, concentrated or not, the right kind of procedures and protocols and the workforce practicing those, because 

there is risk of spread between the facilities. 

So, the specifics of the agricultural practices would be in the 

USDA arena. What I need to just say is that the workers on those 

premises and the contractors and so forth who help with remediation really need to be tracked to make sure that they are OK following their exposures and that they do not develop illness that 

could be a human case of avian influenza. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. So, with regards to issues of whether you have intensive farming practices or less so, this virus really does not care. 

Granted, the more birds you have in a location, the more virus production, the wider the spread can occur. 

What we need to be thinking about in the way of biosecurity is 

why this outbreak is different than what we have seen before. This 

is the first time in North America that we have had a high path 

AI virus travel through wild birds from Europe and Asia to North 

America, the first time, and it is because it has adapted itself to 

these dabbling ducks and it has moved across the Bering Strait. It 
24 

never happened before in a high path. Low path, maybe, but not 

high path. 

So, what is different now is we have to consider biosecurity, 

where it was fine and well and good for what we were dealing with 

prior to this, we have to consider now that this is different. You 

have to look where there are wild waterfowl as the entire environment being affected, potentially. It does not mean it is, but you 

have to consider that as a potential. Every single house that birds 

exist in, or every single location, you have to think in ways of trying to protect from house to house to house. And it is not about the 

facility being safe, it is only the safety within each of those houses 

where those birds are kept, and they have to be looked at as single 

biosecurity facilities, which is much different than what we have 

had to do prior. 

Senator PETERS. So, it is better to have a few large concentrations or more—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. It is really more about the biosecurity. But, obviously, in any viral infection, the more birds you have, the easier 

the virus can spread, the more virus production. That is why it is 

critically important to get birds put down quickly. 

Senator PETERS. Right, especially when you have 56 operations 

that are 90 percent of all the eggs in America. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. These are highly integrated—— 

Senator PETERS. Yes. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. Operations. 

Senator PETERS. Dr. Gelb, do you want to mention—— 

Dr. GELB. Yes. I will kind of answer this from the broiler or the 

meat-type chicken perspective in Delaware, where, as Senator Carper indicated, it was the birthplace of the modern broiler or meattype industry in the United States. It has continued to be very productive there and we often brag about the efficiency of our poultry 

production in Delaware and Delmarva. 

But, this concept of having highly density of poultry within a 

given house, but even more importantly the density of farms in 

that area, that does facilitate the potential for more rapid transmission. We are dealing with a very contagious virus. We are dealing with a situation where the ventilation fans that are used to 

maintain the proper environment of the chickens are turned on virtually all the time, and material—dust, other material that is coming out of the air of those barns—will have virus. 

And, that virus will travel to some degree, not miles and miles, 

but in Delaware, within a one square mile area, we might have 

four or five farms, and each of those farms might have 60,000 to 

80,000 chickens on them. They are all contract growers. They may 

be—and those contracts are probably with—there are four different 

integrated operations, four different companies. 

So, you have a situation, as Dr. Clifford indicated, where you 

may have these very large single farms, layer operations, for example, but on some other areas of the country, you have independent 

facilities owned by different companies, but it is essentially the 

same thing. Even though maybe the travel on and off those particular farms is different, when birds are taken to market, they are 

caught, they are put in cages, those trucks take them to what we 

call processing plants or slaughterhouses, and they may go by 15 
25 

different other farms. And, the dust and the feathers are coming 

from these live haul trucks, as they are called. 

So, there are a lot of complexities here and we really need to 

kind of think this all through. That is why in Delaware, we 

are—‘‘concerned’’ is not the right word, thinking about what might 

happen here this fall. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Peters. 

A real quick point of clarification for Dr. Clifford. There may be 

56 poultry companies, but there are a lot of locations, right? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Sure. I mean, there are 20 States that we would 

consider to be major poultry producing States across the United 

States. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, we are not talking about 56 locations. 

We are talking about probably thousands of locations, correct? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, just multiple—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. But, there are areas across the country where 

there are higher concentrations than others. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Right. Got you. Great. Senator Baldwin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BALDWIN 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This year’s avian flu outbreak has had a deep impact in my home 

State of Wisconsin. The outbreak has wreaked havoc on our farms, 

where producers have faced the devastating reality of sick and 

dying birds, I am so pleased that we are joined today by 

Mr. Schneider of Lake Mills, Wisconsin, to share his story of his 

farm and livelihood. 

The impacts, as we have discussed, of avian flu are really broad 

on farm workers, on individuals working at processing and packing 

plants whose jobs depend on those lines running, as well as on the 

broader farm community, which depends upon demand for grain, 

supplies and services from our poultry growers. And, so, this avian 

flu crisis is also a community crisis. 

Wisconsin is proud to play a role as host to research labs that 

are laser focused on the key questions that are in front of 

us—questions about how the virus mutates, how it is harbored in 

wild birds, as well as diagnostic labs that help us track its spread 

and track viral strains as they emerge. 

Dr. Clifford, producers in my State have relied on the tireless 

work that you do, and your team has put in lots of time and energy 

into addressing this crisis over the past many months. I want to 

thank you for your leadership. 

We know that research labs responding to this virus span several 

different Federal agencies and are supported, by State labs. Madison, Wisconsin is home to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) National Wildlife Health Center and conducts research to determine 

which wild bird species might carry and spread various viral 

strains. I want to note parenthetically that I am quite concerned 

that the lab’s aging infrastructure is not allowing it to fully perform as needed during this crisis. This is something that I have 

paid great attention to. 

Dr. Clifford, as you know, this Wildlife Health Center conducts 

research that supports the industry focused research at USDA. I 
26 

am wondering if you could share some general comments about the 

importance of interagency collaboration and research investments 

as well as coordination to address this crisis. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I think interagency, across agencies, across States 

and the industry, the collaboration across all of them is extremely 

important. I think that was well stated earlier by the testimony of 

Chris Currie with regards to the importance of collaboration. 

We actually collaborate on an ongoing basis with CDC. We work 

very closely with USGS. We work very closely with the Department 

of Interior as a whole. The money and funding we provide for the 

wild bird surveillance, some of that money would go to help support that testing that USGS and others would be doing in collection 

and testing of those samples. We work with Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), the DHS, the Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA), I mean, a whole host of—Food Safety Inspection Service 

within our own agency. We have an internal MAC group within the 

Department of Agriculture that is stood up that brings across all 

the agencies to help address this issue, as well as with the State 

agencies. 

So, it is critically important that all this is coordinated. As Senator Ernst was talking about with the landfills, there are issues 

with the Envirionmental Protection Agency (EPA). There are issues 

with transportation. There are issues with a lot of these things that 

have to be coordinated across. 

There could be issues with availability of water. These foamers 

that we use for depopulation of birds requires a water source for 

foaming. You would not think that you would run out of water in 

certain areas. Certainly in small rural areas, you very well may not 

have an effective water source. You cannot go take it out of the 

lake because it has to be filtered water or otherwise it shuts down 

your machines. You have to have carbon sources for composting 

and things. So, this really is a massive effort that requires coordination among a lot. 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you, Dr. Clifford. 

Dr. Schuchat, the University of Wisconsin hosts a large team of 

researchers studying pathogens that endanger human, animal, and 

plant health. We have pioneers in developing research efforts that 

could potentially help us understand or treat avian influenza viruses. 

However, some of these efforts have been put on hold by a Federal pause on gain of function research. This continued research 

pause is delaying the potential benefits of studying these viruses, 

including research that could protect human, animal and economic 

health. When does the CDC plan to issue final guidance on this research to be able to end the pause? 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Yes. I will need to get back with you with the 

specifics on that, but what I would like to say is that the public 

safety is really important, and public support for research is very 

important, and we take very seriously the need to make sure that 

the scientific experiments that CDC or research partners are doing 

are done in the safest possible way. 

Influenza virus research is critical to make sure that we have 

safe treatments and effective vaccines and really get ahead of these 

viruses before we get the kind of problem that we are seeing right 
27 

now with the avian outbreaks here. And, so, I know that across 

government, with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), CDC, 

FDA, the question of the moratorium is important and we can get 

back with you with the specifics of timing. 

Senator BALDWIN. I would appreciate that. 

Dr. Clifford, I understand that State veterinarians are considering restrictions on the movement of birds and poultry separate 

from guidance by the USDA. I know that I have heard from farmers in my State who have contracts to deliver birds across State 

lines. We all clearly share the common goal of containing and 

eradicating this viral outbreak, but our producers facing substantial economic strain. These uncertainties make things even more 

difficult to conduct business when it is safe to do so. 

Dr. Clifford, what steps is the USDA taking to ensure that quarantine and shipping practices are safe and effective while also facilitating these contracts and ongoing commerce? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator. So, within our approach, we 

have what we call an infected zone and then a control zone. The 

control zone is around an infected flock. It goes out 10 kilometers. 

Basically, products that are negative in that area are tested regularly, and so nothing can move out of those zones unless we permit that product to move. And, there are regular testing requirements for those products within that to be able to be safely moved 

in and out of those zones. So, that occurs ongoing. We issue, actually, thousands of permits out of those zones to allow that safe 

movement. 

We share that. We have weekly calls with the industry and the 

States across the entire United States and we explain these things 

to them. They know how it is happening. Some States have taken 

additional action because of concern, for example, because of the 

live bird marketing systems that we have in the United States, and 

some of those have caused some issues. We intervene on behalf of 

States such as Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, in that area, to try to 

help facilitate the movement of those birds into those States and 

we do the best we can. But, as you know, the States do have oftentimes rights to go above and beyond our requirements, and so we 

try to work through that with the industry. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much. This is a great hearing and 

we really appreciate your being here and your participation. 

I want to come back and revisit the issue of, I will call it crop 

insurance. We have had a crop insurance program in this country 

for a long time and it is a shared partnership between the Federal 

Government, which helps subsidize the crop insurance. We changed 

it in the farm bill, the last farm bill we passed here. We changed 

it up some so that it would cover, as I am sure Mr. Clifford remembers, it would cover, I think, fruits and vegetables, if farmers want 

to participate in that. 

And Senator Coons, my colleague from Delaware, I think, offered 

an amendment adopted and included in the bill that called for 

maybe trying a demonstration program with respect to insurance 

for poultry growers and other livestock growers. That was in the 

bill. I think we adopted it maybe a year or so ago and I do not 
28 

know if we have had enough time to actually get it up and running. 

Is that something you are at all familiar with? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Senator, I am aware of the discussions, but I am 

not involved in the specifics of those. That is kind of outside of my 

range of areas of responsibility. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Well, I will just ask you for the record. We 

will just ask you to respond for the record. Maybe some of your colleagues there can give us an update to let us know how it is going. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. OK. 

Senator CARPER. And, as Dr. Gelb was saying, in our experience 

with contract growers and broilers on the Delmarva Peninsula is 

if there is an avian influenza outbreak, the chickens are owned by 

the integrators and the Perdues, Mountaires, and companies like 

that, and the contractors, they do not get indemnified, as far as I 

know. But, they have, as Mr. Schneider has said, some real costs 

to bear. 

And, I want to go back to something you said, Mr. Schneider, 

and I will bounce it over to Mr. Clifford. You were very gracious 

in your comments about the support you have gotten from, we will 

say, the Federal Government, the Department of Agriculture and 

others, and we were very encouraged to hear that. You indicated 

there is a lot of bureaucracy, a lot of red tape, and it can be very 

frustrating, time consuming. 

I thought I heard you say, Mr. Clifford, that there is an effort 

to try to identify one person, like a go-to person, for Mr. Schneider 

or anybody else who might be affected, whether it is in Minnesota 

or Iowa or Wisconsin or Delaware. Is that something we are actually doing now, where we have, like, one designated person, so you 

do not, like, call a call center and get switched from person to person to person? Do we have that in effect now, because that sounds 

like a great idea. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. It is actually in effect, but not in the way that we 

want it to be finalized for the fall and spring. Right now, it is one 

person, but because of our rotations of personnel in and out of 

those areas, because most of these people come from different parts 

of the United States and we have them on a 3-or 4-week rotation 

so they can go back home for a period of time before they are redeployed, so—— 

Senator CARPER. OK. It would be great if we could figure out—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. Right now, it is, like, a 3-or 4-week 

turnaround, so—— 

Senator CARPER. I understand. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. So for the fall—— 

Senator CARPER. Yes. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. What we are doing for the fall and 

spring migrations is we will assign a single person that will stay 

with that producer for the entire period. 

Senator CARPER. Great. One of my favorite sayings, if it is not 

perfect, make it better—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes, sir. 

Senator CARPER [continuing]. And I think you have taken a good 

idea and made it better. 

I would like to ask a question about lessons learned. This would 

be for Dr. Gelb. Is it Dr. Clifford or Mr. Clifford? 
29 

Dr. CLIFFORD. It is Dr. Clifford—— 

Senator CARPER. Dr. Clifford, OK. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. But it is OK either way. 

Senator CARPER. We have a lot of doctors up here. But, I want 

to ask, can each of you take a minute, Dr. Gelb, Dr. Clifford, and 

Mr. Schneider—I will call you Dr. Schneider, too—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I have been called worse. 

Senator CARPER. I am sure. [Laughter.] 

So have we. [Laughter.] 

But, would the three of you just take a minute and share with 

us maybe one key lesson that we have learned, that you have 

learned so far from this outbreak, that can better prepare us for 

further infections, should they occur later this year? And, Jack, 

would you go first. 

Dr. GELB. Senator, thank you. I have not had any direct experiences in this current outbreak, so we have had some people, experts from the University of Delaware travel and participate in depopulation efforts, because that happens to be one of our real 

strengths, that we helped develop that technology years ago. So, I 

get stories and reports from other individuals. 

So, I really feel that biosecurity is really a key issue. I think that 

has been repeated several times today, an area that—biosecurity is 

not sexy. It is not something that is easily accomplished. It is a 

challenge and you sometimes do not see results from it. But, certainly, we know it is not the entire answer, as Mr. Schneider indicated. You can do biosecurity, almost everything right, really, and 

sometimes it is, maybe it is an act of God if you have the introduction of the virus here. But, I still think biosecurity is a really key 

weapon in this process. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thanks. Dr. Clifford. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Senator, if I may expand on that for more than 

one—I would like to hit a few, if I may. 

Senator CARPER. Yes. Just do it quickly, please. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes. First and foremost, the questions that Senator Johnson, the Chairman, was asking earlier about the timeframe of depopulation due to positive testing at our National Veterinary Services lab, the confirmatory testing, we have already implemented plans quite a while ago to base the depopulation of 

those birds on presumptive positives by the NAHLN laboratory 

where it was taken. So, we do not require confirmation anymore. 

So, that is one lesson learned—— 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. And one action we have taken. 

In addition, one of the things we will be looking at in the future 

is clinical signs where we already know we have virus in the area, 

not even waiting necessarily on a presumptive positive. 

On the area of disposal, we need State, local plans in place that 

we know will work before they occur. Biosecurity, it is based upon 

new biosecurity. Air filtration systems—these air handling systems 

in these facilities have to have some type of filtration to reduce the 

amount of dust and potential for virus particles to enter through 

the ventilation system itself. Those are just some, but there are 

others. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks. 
30 

Mr. Schneider, just very briefly. Give us one good take-away, one 

lesson learned that you think we ought to share with the country. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, in addition to all the biosecurity efforts—— 

Senator CARPER. Yes. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER [continuing]. We have just been talking about, I 

would suggest that the increase of funding for Agricultural Research Service to identify areas that those specific biosecurity protocols need to be implemented to help us prevent this from happening again would be a wonderful place to start. 

Senator CARPER. OK, good. My time has expired. I hope we will 

have a chance to ask a few more. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you all. 

Chairman JOHNSON. You will. 

Mr. Clifford, real quick, because I want to get into the insurance 

or the emergency funding. Is there a program in place to indemnify 

Mr. Schneider as an operator? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. There is a program in place that pays right now 

for the owner of the birds. So, if Mr. Schneider is a contract grower, 

what we have been doing is working with the companies to make 

sure that payments do go to the contract growers or contract raisers. I am not sure—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. That is something you try and do working with a law that does not contemplate indemnifying the operator. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Well, actually, sir, what we did in the low path AI 

situation quite a few years ago in Virginia, it is part of our regulations on low path. It requires the contract growers to be paid. The 

problem is with this particular high path, that particular regulation is written into the AI rules for low path, not for high path. 

And, so, we paid the owner of the birds. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Correct. So, Mr. Schneider, you have a problem there and we need to work with the Ranking Member to figure 

out what we need to do to address that, because that is, obviously, 

devastating for the operator when it is just the owner being paid, 

and maybe there is an agreement between the owner versus the 

operator, but that is something that needs to be addressed. 

Dr. Clifford, you talked about personnel rotation. How many 

USDA offices do we have around the country? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Veterinary Services offices or USDA offices? 

Chairman JOHNSON. I mean, where you have qualified personnel 

to respond to this—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Well—— 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. Because I am surprised we are 

rotating personnel versus just having—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. We do not have that many trained people to do 

this. You are talking about animal health technicians and veterinary medical officers. I have about 1,800 people that serve in veterinary services. I am not talking about just any USDA person. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, again, if you are talking about a point 

person to manage a case, I mean, you really need somebody who 

is skilled in management, not necessarily in the hard sciences. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. No, sir. They need to understand the science as 

well. In this case, when they are working with them and helping 
31 

them develop a flock plan and a compliance agreement, they not 

only need to understand the red tape, as you call it, but also the 

science. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Well, again, I mean, that could be an 

interesting discussion to have in terms of—again, if the whole purpose of this is to coordinate an effort with one point person that 

an owner or operator is dealing with, I think you could certainly 

have an interesting discussion as to whether or not that person has 

to be trained in all the—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. It is—— 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. As opposed to just trained in 

managing and coordinating the different expertises. But, let me 

move on. 

Dr. Schuchat, I want to talk a little bit about the virus itself and 

vaccinations. First of all, how robust is the flu virus? I mean, how 

long can it survive if it gets on a dust particle and gets blown into 

other farms? I mean, is this a virus that is going to last days, 

weeks, months? Or is this pretty fragile? 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. The virus will not last that long, but the conditions are quite important. So, the colder weather and the dryer 

weather permits—is favorable to the virus. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Talking about—— 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. So, right now, we are sort of in a quiet period 

for—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Talking to Mr. Schneider, he said the virus 

can actually be on a snowflake, as well, and so it will last a 

little—but, again, are we talking days, then, that the virus will 

last? 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Yes. I think the issue with the disinfection is to 

make sure that you have reached everything and that it is not coming back. 

Chairman JOHNSON. In terms of the vaccines, so we are concerned about trade, the implications of that. I think, just as Professor Gelb was talking about, of the potential mutation of the 

virus with vaccines. Can you speak to that a little bit. 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. That is right. Influenza changes constantly, and 

that is why it is so difficult. It can mutate and it can also reassort, 

so swap parts of its genes with other influenza viruses. And, two 

of the three H5 strains that we are dealing with, the avian strains 

in the United States, are these reassortants, where we had high 

pathogenic H5 avian influenza from Eurasia that swapped out 

parts of its genes with the low pathogenic avian influenzas that we 

had here in the United States already. 

And, so, the virus is just constantly changing, which makes vaccine development difficult. The vaccines that we have for humans 

as well as for animals are not as highly effective as some of the 

other vaccines and the virus can kind of mutate away from or escape from the vaccines. 

There is a lot of balance about the avian vaccines. In the human 

vaccines, of course, we do work to prepare candidate vaccine viruses and have stockpiled vaccine against the original H5 strains 

from Asia, but those are really preparing for pandemic readiness 

rather than vaccines that we are using every day. 
32 

Chairman JOHNSON. We are always expecting just a technological miracle to save us from all these things, but again, what 

you are talking about with the vaccine, those are only going to be 

a certain percentage effective to begin with. Plus, we have a real 

problem with vaccine production in this country, do we not? I 

mean, we have a hard time producing enough vaccine sometimes 

for human flu. Would we have—I mean, if we start trying to vaccinate, 300,000 chickens, or 300 million chickens, a couple hundred 

million turkeys, do we even have even close to the capacity for 

that, and can we ramp it up quickly enough to respond to the 

changing virus? 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Let me answer about the human vaccines and let 

Dr. Clifford respond about avian vaccines. The United States has 

invested an enormous amount in expanding our manufacturing 

base and the investment in influenza vaccine production and distribution. We actually have had an 80 percent increase in the flu 

vaccines produced and distributed annually in the past decade as 

well as a much stronger infrastructure for pandemic vaccine production for humans. But, the animal vaccine production works differently. 

Chairman JOHNSON. No, let me quickly stay on the human vaccine, because I think this is important. We had a pretty robust vaccine production capability, correct, but then it was reduced dramatically, a lot of those lawsuits, that type of thing, and 

people—it just was not an attractive business to be in, so 

people—drug manufacturers exited the vaccine business, correct? 

So, we had to have almost government intervention to try and 

boost that production in case of a pandemic or in reaction to some 

of these outbreaks, correct? 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. That is right. There has been a lot of U.S. Government investment in stimulating the vaccine industry, both for 

influenza vaccines, and then actually for routine vaccines, we have 

a very strong public-private partnership right now where vaccine 

companies actually are making pretty good profits right now. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, again, I want to go back to sort of the 

root cause of why we did not have the amount of capacity we really 

needed for vaccine, is it really was because it was a very unattractive business. People were being sued and people just exited the 

business, correct? 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Well, I think it was less the suits than the issue 

of the profitability, because when you are producing drugs, people 

will take medicines for their whole life, and successful vaccines, 

you need a couple doses of, perhaps, forever to prevent diseases 

from occurring. Flu vaccines you have to give every year right now. 

But, the market was not that favorable. But, things have changed 

a bit and we are in much better shape for pandemic readiness right 

now. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, is the manufacturing capacity different 

for animals versus humans? Dr. Clifford, answer that, please. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes, it is, and our Centers for Veterinary Biologics 

works with the companies here. So, I am not concerned about capacity. It is more economics with the companies, knowing that we 

would use the vaccine. 
33 

Chairman JOHNSON. It is still the same production technique, 

though, correct, by and large? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. By and large, but there are some new techniques 

being used, as well, that—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Can speed the production and the development? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, there is more capacity available for animal vaccines because you just do not really risk the liability problem? Why would we have so much more capacity for animal vaccines versus human? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I really cannot say that from the standpoint of the 

human side, but we have a lot of companies that are both domestic 

and international. If they do not have the capacity here, they have 

approved products that they can move here. So, if it cannot be produced here, it can be produced somewhere else. So, the capacity is 

there to produce the vaccine. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Just a quick question for you, Mr. Currie. 

You are going to have a GAO audit on this. Dr. Clifford, how do 

you think the USDA is going to fare in that audit, and I will ask 

Mr. Currie the same thing. I realize it is a little unfair, but I have 

had my facility audited. I have a general sense of, this is going to 

be a good one, or I might have some problems. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. I think they will find some good things and I think 

they will find some areas that we need to improve on, and I think 

you oftentimes find that kind of situation. And, some of those lessons learned, we are definitely taking those and working with the 

industry and States to move those lessons learned so we do not repeat those same mistakes in the fall and spring. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Currie, do you think you are going to 

see some improvement from the last time you looked at this thing, 

that they have already learned from lessons and amended some 

things and—— 

Mr. CURRIE. Well—— 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. What is your general sense? 

Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir. I think—well, we know—for instance, we 

issued a report on the potential response to an outbreak like this 

in 2007 and made a number of recommendations that touched on, 

almost to a tee, all of these challenges that we are facing. I do not 

know if any of us expected it to be this big and this bad. USDA 

addressed all of those recommendations, and so they are being tested now. 

In any emergency, whether it is a natural disaster or an outbreak like this, there are going to be challenges and lessons 

learned and things we did not expect and after action reporting 

that we are going to have to study, too, so—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, again, there has been a good reaction to 

your prior report, so, hopefully—but, again, there will always be 

lessons learned. It is never perfect. Always room for improvement. 

Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much. 

We have talked about this a couple of times already in the hearing. I want to come back and nail it one more time, and maybe for 
34 

Dr. Clifford. I am talking about how do we mitigate—let me just 

back up. 

When we have a farm that goes down in Delmarva because of the 

avian influenza, a lot of times, countries around the world will just 

say they are not going to take any of our chickens. And, we also 

have concerns when we hear from countries, and part of the trade 

negotiations going on right now with the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership is the use of vaccinations in livestock or birds and to what 

extent does that impair our ability to sell to a lot of different countries. Some countries just do not want to have animals imported 

into their countries that have been vaccinated. You know how it is. 

How can we mitigate the impact of vaccine-related export bans 

that are imposed on the United States? Dr. Clifford. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. So, I think one of the ways to do that is to have 

the plans available to share with certain countries so that they can 

see those firsthand, how we would use it, and they would have the 

knowledge that we are not just going to rely on vaccine. In other 

words, there would be an end game so you are not continuing to 

use vaccine, because, as already stated, the virus mutates. These 

vaccines do not remain highly effective for long periods of time. So, 

other countries, if you use a lot of vaccine, will see that as a weakness to control or eradicate the disease. They have to understand 

that we are using it only as a tool, and if we can convince them 

to do that, that would be the first step. 

But, if I may just expand on this—— 

Senator CARPER. Just briefly. 

Dr. CLIFFORD [continuing]. Just to Senator Tester’s questions 

earlier about foot and mouth—— 

Senator CARPER. He asked a lot of questions, did he not? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes, about foot and mouth disease. 

Senator CARPER. I told him he holds the record for asking questions in a 7-minute period. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. This is the same thing. We would take no action 

to put our industry at risk. We care about our mission and we care 

about American agriculture and we would not do that. But, the fact 

is, there is a lot of concern out there about the use of vaccine in 

a country that is free of FMD with vaccination. It is the same thing 

with high path AI. So, we cannot go around the world and say one 

thing to one country because of our position and do something different to somebody else. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CARPER. You have all heard the term, this is not our 

first rodeo, or this is not my first rodeo, and when it comes to avian 

influenza, this is not our first rodeo this year. This one we see from 

time to time, probably a lot more than we want to. 

One of the things we try to focus on in this Committee is not 

dealing with symptoms of problems, but how do we deal with root 

causes of the problems. A good example of that is all these people 

trying to get into our country from Latin America and how do we 

deal with not just the symptoms of problems on the border, but the 

root causes of their illegal migration. 

Just talk to us about root causes here. Is there any way to address this challenge, this problem with the avian influenza by ad-
35 

dressing not just the symptoms of the problem, but by addressing 

root causes, or is that just not possible? And, Jack, would you lead 

off, and then we will just ask the others—— 

Dr. GELB. Yes. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CARPER. I will ask you to be brief, if you will. 

Dr. GELB. I think, if you consider the root cause the introduction 

from wild bird populations, this is a new normal for us, as Dr. 

Clifford mentioned earlier on. We have not seen this. So, this is a 

new situation, and what we need to do, if possible, is to institute 

the biosecurity at the farm level, for example—and this is not only 

commercial farms, but backyard farmers, which are increasingly 

important in our country and numerous, as well. So, on several 

fronts, this is very important. 

Senator CARPER. Yes. One of the things we have done in Delmarva, we found that some of our earlier avian influenza outbreaks 

came not from wild birds, but literally from live bird auctions in 

places like New York—— 

Dr. GELB. Yes, that is correct. 

Senator CARPER. They cleaned those up. They have been cleaned 

up a lot. That has helped a lot. 

Dr. GELB. Yes. USDA has done a wonderful job, along with the 

State of New York, State of New Jersey, because that metropolitan 

New York area was once very heavily involved with certain H7 

types of avian influenza viruses. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Mr. Currie, this is probably not a fair question for you. If you want to jump in, please do. 

Mr. CURRIE. No, sir. I mean, as I said, we have not evaluated the 

current response, but we are very aware of the new challenges and 

I think there are going to be new challenges identified. Monitoring 

of wild birds is a challenge, and I know that USDA, I think just 

last week, issued a couple new strategies to help determine how 

this should actually be done in wild birds and waterfowl—— 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Mr. CURRIE [continuing]. So that is just a new element that is 

going to have to be addressed. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

Dr. Schuchat, has your name ever been mispronounced, Dr. 

Schuchat? 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Once or twice. 

Senator CARPER. What is the wildest mispronunciation of your 

name that you recall? [Laughter.] 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. I am not really sure. 

Senator CARPER. You do not want to go there, huh? [Laughter.] 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. I did not prepare for that question. I am sorry. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. We will hold that to the next hearing. 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Thank you. Yes. I think to step back and generalize a little bit, we think of this as an emerging infection where 

global threats are local threats and where the human-animal interface is very important. So, with influenza, we are always worried 

because the virus is constantly changing and we very much are 

worried about what is happening in the rest of the world. With 

avian influenza, we obviously are very keen to know what is going 

on in the animal surveillance as well human surveillance. 
36 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Dr. Clifford, just very briefly. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Yes. Senator, I think it is important to make one 

critical point here. 

Senator CARPER. OK. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. This virus came from a virus that was found in 

1997 in China and it was in an H5N1 outbreak in Europe and Asia 

when there was the concern about the human pandemic. We put 

money around the world into that area. We did not put enough and 

we did not do the job. If we would have eradicated H5N1 from 

Asia, this would not have happened today. 

Senator CARPER. Oh, really? That is a great point. 

All right, Scott. I am going to call you Doctor one more time. Dr. 

Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is OK. I kind of like it. [Laughter.] 

If I can learn one thing, I think that I am going to be rethinking 

my entire biosecurity plan on my farm. I am going to be reallocating funds toward increasing the structural, operational, and cultural protocols that I have in place for my farm. Ultimately, it is 

my problem and it is my farm and I need to do something about 

it. I am going to be training my employees a little bit better. I am 

going to be controlling traffic on and off my farm. And, I am even 

going to take steps to try to control dust. And, I would love to include the use of a vaccine in my toolbox when I come to biosecurity 

efforts on my farm. 

Senator CARPER. That was a great response. 

I will just close with this thought. I am an old Navy guy. I think 

in terms of nautical terms. In the Navy, we had to face a big challenge, it is like all hands on deck, and this is all hands on deck, 

and I am pleased to see that the hands, some of the hands and the 

minds that are here, represented here today, are focused big time 

on this and, I think, working collaboratively together, and I commend you for that. 

I appreciate very much what you said, Scott, about taking responsibility yourself, and that is clearly what needs to be done. 

What I like to say, at Home Depot—I do not know if you have 

Home Depot in Minnesota, if you have the ad campaign that says, 

‘‘You can do it. We can help.’’ And, this sort of applies. You can do 

it, but we can help. We all have a role and a responsibility to play. 

It is going to come again. It is going to come again, in maybe a 

different mutation. It may come again this fall, and we just have 

to learn from our mistakes, and stuff that works, figure out what 

works, do more of that, that which does not work, do less of that. 

Great hearing. Thank you all very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

And, one thing we like to do is offer the witnesses one last comment. 

But, I have to first go to Dr. Clifford. How would we have wiped 

out that virus in Eurasia? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. We talk about one world, one health, and global 

health security. We have to be able to address these issues and 

make sure that they are done. We addressed the human pandemic 

concern, but we basically reduced the funding and support necessary to continue to fight it there. 
37 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, how would we have done it? I mean, 

you can always throw money at something—— 

Dr. CLIFFORD. How? 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. But how would we have done 

it, when you have migratory birds, and how would we have done 

it? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. You have to eradicate it from the poultry. It was 

in the poultry. It was killing the wild birds, but what happened, 

because of its allowance to continue in the continual lineage, when 

it became an H5N8, it adapted itself to wild waterfowl and would 

not kill some of these ducks. That is the problem. So, we had to 

get rid of it in the poultry so you would stop this exchange of virus 

back and forth. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, are the protocols in other countries not 

as rigorous as ours, so they do not destroy flocks, that type of 

thing? 

Dr. CLIFFORD. It depends upon the country, and in Asia, in parts 

of Asia, people will actually sleep with their birds and may have 

pigs outside and it is a whole different world. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Yes. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. But, if we do not help in those cases, many of 

those kinds of diseases that are of zoonotic potential may come 

back to this country. 

Chairman JOHNSON. That is my point. You are saying we did not 

spend enough money to eradicate it. I am not sure we could. That 

was my only question. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Well—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, anyway, I will give you, again, closing 

comments. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. We could have tried. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I understand. But, we will start with you, 

Dr. Clifford. 

Dr. CLIFFORD. Again, just thank you, and I think that we have 

learned lessons and we want this process to be faster. It is critical 

that we get in there, kill birds quickly, and get the producers back 

on their feet faster, and that is something we have taken to heart. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Schuchat, and I think one of the reasons that Senator Carper 

talked about the pronunciation, I actually had a phonetic pronunciation, but we do not have a real good track record ourselves 

here in terms of—— [Laughter.] 

So, if there is a really bad pronunciation, it probably came from 

this Committee. But, anyway, Dr. Schuchat. 

Dr. SCHUCHAT. Influenza has been around for a really long time 

and continues to be a major challenge. I think that the big picture 

here is continued investment in improved vaccines, including the 

so-called universal influenza vaccine, is really important to get 

ahead of these kinds of problems for the future. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Mr. Currie. 

Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir. I talked about in my opening statement 

how important coordination and plans are, and it is very easy to 

sit here and talk about those types of things, but it is very difficult 

to address a real life situation like this. However, this is somewhat 

unique in that we have had an outbreak. It seems to be slowing, 
38 

but we expect and we are worried about the next outbreak. So, we 

can actually learn many lessons learned, coordination lessons 

learned, now and figure out what our capabilities need to be in 

other parts of the country that may be impacted by this. So, we can 

potentially learn from this quickly and be ready for what we think 

might be coming in the fall. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Professor Gelb. 

Dr. GELB. Thank you, Senator. I think we need to help and protect the Mr. Schneiders of our country. We have seen the number 

of people involved directly in agriculture fall for many years. We 

have these large, highly efficient means of producing food and poultry, but I think, really, the producers and the farmers, the family 

farmers—this is a wake-up call for us, I think, because we have enjoyed the best quality food, safest food supply in the world. Now, 

we are importing some shell eggs here from other countries. What 

is wrong with that picture? And, we sometimes get into a problem 

when we have to import food, not to mention some other kinds of 

materials—drugs, et cetera. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Well, first of all, let me say you took the 

words right out of my mouth. My own background, my parents 

were both raised on small dairy farms. That tradition of the family 

farm is dwindling and we cannot allow that to happen, but we also 

cannot allow people like Mr. Schneider to remain exposed. 

I think in this hearing, I have learned that he is exposed. I 

thought we had coverage. I thought he was just having a hard time 

obtaining that coverage. I am afraid he is completely exposed, so 

I think both Senator Carper and I will certainly work together to 

see what we can do to help those in Mr. Schneider’s position, and 

not just Mr. Schneider, but everybody affected by this now and in 

the future. So, that is, I think, the real commitment of this Committee. 

It is not necessarily in our jurisdiction, but this is certainly our 

ability to hold an oversight hearing, to expose that particular problem. As I said before the panelists sat down, this is about getting 

people to admit we have a problem. I think this is a real problem 

that needs to be addressed urgently. Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. One of the things that I think that might be able 

to help people like me is just in the indemnity payment formula, 

and one of those things is specific to egg-laying farmers, but the indemnification could be based on the future value of the eggs that 

are supposed to be produced from those hens. 

That is where the egg industry is just a little bit different than 

the broilers and the turkeys, whereas over a period of weeks, those 

animals are raised and then sent to market. In the egg industry, 

those animals are in my facility for over a year, sometimes even 

2 years, and it is the value of those eggs that are going to be produced, that is where, if there was an indemnity payment based on 

that future value, that would have helped me out an awful lot. 

Chairman JOHNSON. No, as we discussed in my office, too, there 

has to be something like—in my business, I purchased business 

interruption insurance. If you have a catastrophic loss, and let us 

face it, you destroy your flock, that is a catastrophic loss, so we 

have to do something—there has to be some indemnification, some 

insurance that will keep you in business, business interruption in-
39 

surance. Honestly, I am shocked that we do not have that either 

as a government program or in private insurance for that capability. So, again, that is, to me, a real take-away of this hearing. 

So, again, I just want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony. I will state again, this Committee really does have a great 

deal of sympathy for your loss, Mr. Schneider, and we are dedicated to doing what we can to help you out of your predicament. 

But, this hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until July 

23 at 5 p.m., for the submission of statements and questions for the 

record. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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