Present: Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and Koontz, 

JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

CHARLES E. SMITH MANAGEMENT, INC. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

v. Record No. 950266 March 1, 1996 

DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

 In this case, we determine the validity of a tax assessment 

imposed pursuant to Code § 58.1-1502 on a non-resident owner of a 

large private aircraft hangared at Washington National Airport 

(National Airport), which is a federal enclave. 

 The facts of the case are not in dispute. Charles E. Smith 

Management, Inc. (CES) is a District of Columbia corporation with 

its principal place of business in Arlington County. Since 1990, 

CES has hangared and maintained an aircraft at National Airport. 

The purchase of the aircraft and all other transactions related 

thereto occurred outside the Commonwealth. 

 On March 4, 1991, the Department of Taxation of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia (the Department) assessed against CES an 

aircraft use tax of $300,000, a $75,000 penalty, and $34,084.93 in 

interest pursuant to Code § 58.1-1502. On March 20, 1991, 

exercising its right pursuant to Code § 58.1-1821, CES protested 

the assessment. On June 29, 1992, the Tax Commissioner ruled the 

assessment valid. 

 Thereafter, under protest, CES paid the assessment, penalty, 

and accrued interest. On November 2, 1993, CES filed an 

"Application for Correction of Erroneous and Improper Assessments 

of State Taxes" in the circuit court pursuant to Code § 58.1-1825 
et seq. CES asserted that the Commonwealth was without power to 

assess a use tax on aircraft hangared at National Airport and 

owned by nonresidents because the airport is a federal enclave 

ceded to the United States by the Commonwealth under the Act of 

Cession, Code § 7.1-10. Recognizing that subsequent enactments of 

the federal government had returned certain powers of sovereignty 

to the Commonwealth, CES further asserted that none of these 

powers permitted the assessment of the tax authorized by Code 

§ 58.1-1502. 

 The Department filed a motion for summary judgment on August 

16, 1994, and CES filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 

September 1, 1994. The issues were briefed and the trial court 

heard oral argument. On November 21, 1994, the trial court 

granted the Department's motion for summary judgment on the ground 

that aircraft hangared at National Airport are subject to 

licensure by the Commonwealth pursuant to Code § 5.1-5, and thus 

to assessment for taxation pursuant to Code § 58.1-1502. We 

awarded this appeal to review the action of the trial court. 

 Code § 58.1-1502 levies a tax on "the use in the Commonwealth 

of any aircraft required to be licensed by the Department of 

Aviation pursuant to [Code] § 5.1-5." In pertinent part, Code 

§ 5.1-5(a) requires that "every nonresident owning a civil 

aircraft based in this Commonwealth over sixty days during any 

twelve-month period. . . shall, before the same is operated in 

this Commonwealth, obtain from the Department [of Aviation] an 

aircraft license for such aircraft." 

 CES apparently and appropriately recognizes that the 
Commonwealth has the power to enact a use tax on aircraft based at 

National Airport. See Commonwealth v. United Airlines, Inc., 219 

Va. 374, 387-92, 248 S.E.2d 124, 131-34 (1978) (holding that 

Commonwealth may assess use and sales taxes on personal property 

based at National Airport). 

 However, since the Commonwealth conditioned such tax 

liability on an aircraft being "required to be licensed by the 

Department of Aviation pursuant to [Code] § 5.1-5," CES contends 

that it is not liable for the tax because the Commonwealth has no 

power to license aircraft based at National Airport. CES bases 

this contention on the claim that the power to license aircraft 

was not retroceded to the Commonwealth by the Metropolitan 

Washington Airports Act of 1986 (the 1986 Act).1

 In response, the Department contends that the Commonwealth's 

right to require licensure of aircraft based at National Airport 

 

 1In pertinent part, the 1986 Act provides: 

 The Commonwealth of Virginia shall have concurrent 

police power authority over the Metropolitan Washington 

Airports, and the courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia 

may exercise jurisdiction over Washington National 

Airport. 

Public L. No. 99-591, § 6009(c), 100 Stat. 3341-387 (codified at 

49 U.S.C. App. § 2458(c)). 

 In accepting this grant of concurrent police power authority, 

the General Assembly provided: 

 The Commonwealth hereby grants, accepts and agrees to 

concurrent police power authority over the Metropolitan 

Washington Airports as provided in § 6009(c) of the 

Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986. 

Acts 1987, ch. 665 § 7(A). 
is a part of the police power that was retroceded to the 

Commonwealth in the 1986 Act. Thus, we must decide whether the 

Commonwealth's licensure of aircraft based at National Airport is 

a valid exercise of the police power retroceded to it in the 1986 

Act. 

 To decide this issue, we consider the scope of the police 

power retroceded in the 1986 Act. Although CES claims that this 

power is limited to "public safety, crime and law enforcement" and 

"increasing safety and security," we did not so limit it in 

Singleton v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 240 Va. 403, 397 

S.E.2d 856 (1990). There, we held that under its concurrent 

police power, Virginia courts could enforce Virginia's right-towork laws as those laws pertain to private employment contracts at 

National Airport. Id. at 407, 397 S.E.2d at 859. And we think 

that the licensure of aircraft is clearly an exercise of the 

Commonwealth's police power. See C.I.T. Corp. v. W.J. Crosby & 

Co., 175 Va. 16, 21-22, 7 S.E.2d 107, 109-110 (1940)(licensure of 

nonresident's motor vehicle authorized under police power); Board 

of Aeronautics v. Sims, 41 S.E.2d 506, 509 (W. Va. 1947) 

(regulation of aviation part of state's police power). 

 Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth, exercising 

its police power retroceded in the 1986 Act, could require 

aircraft hangared at National Airport to be licensed pursuant to 

Code § 5.1-5.2

 Thus, CES's aircraft was taxable pursuant to Code 

 

 2We find no merit in CES's argument that its aircraft was 

not "based in this Commonwealth," Code § 5.1-5, when it was 

hangared at National Airport. Nor do we agree that Code 

§ 58.1-1502 "masquerade[s] as a police power regulation" because 

a tax is assessed only on those airplanes subject to Code § 5.1-
§ 58.1-1502. 

 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court will be 

affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

 

5.