69–010 

Calendar No. 654 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 2d Session 114–394 

HOLOCAUST EXPROPRIATED ART RECOVERY ACT OF 2016 

DECEMBER 6, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. GRASSLEY, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 2763] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill 

(S. 2763) to provide the victims of Holocaust-era persecution and 

their heirs a fair opportunity to recover works of art confiscated or 

misappropriated by the Nazis, having considered the same, reports 

favorably thereon, with an amendment, and recommends that the 

bill, as amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Background and Purpose of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery 

Act ............................................................................................................... 1 

II. History of the Bill and Committee Consideration ....................................... 6 

III. Section-by-Section Summary of the Bill ...................................................... 7 

IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 11 

V. Regulatory Impact Evaluation ...................................................................... 12 

VI. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 12 

VII. Changes to Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 12 

I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE HOLOCAUST EXPROPRIATED ART

RECOVERY ACT OF 2016

From 1933, when Hitler and his National Socialist German 

Workers Party, the ‘‘Nazis,’’ took power in Germany, until 1945, 

when the Allied Forces vanquished the Third Reich, the Nazis stole 

hundreds of thousands of artworks from museums and private collections throughout Europe. This systematic looting of the artwork 

and other cultural property of Jews and other persecuted groups— 

one of the Nazis’ many crimes against humanity—has been deVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:10 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 069010 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR394.XXX SR394

lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
2 

1 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts 

202 (NYU Press 2003)). 2 American Alliance of Museums, Standards Regarding the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects 

During the Nazi Era, http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/collections-stewardship/objects-during-the-nazi-era. 3This policy is not limited to the theft of art by the Nazis. For instance, the FREEDOM Support Act, signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on October 24, 1992, prohibits assistance to an independent state of the former Soviet Union that refuses to comply with a final 

court judgment that it is ‘‘withholding unlawfully books or other documents of religious or historical significance that are the property of United States persons.’’ FREEDOM Support Act, 

Pub. L. 102–511, 106 Stat. 3320 (1992). That legislation, which responded to a refusal by the 

Russian government to return the stolen library of the Lubavitcher Rebbe in Agudas Chasidei 

Chabad v. Russian Federation, expressed the clear policy of the United States that items of religious and cultural significance taken in violation of international law should be returned to 

their rightful owners. 4 Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 957–58. 5The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their Lost Heritage: 

Hearing on S. 2763 The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act Before the S. Comm. on the 

Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal 

Rights and Federal Courts, 114th Cong., Hr’g Tr. at 40 (2016) (statement of Agnes Peresztegi, 

President, Commission for Art Recovery); id. at 43–46 (statement of Simon Goodman). 6 Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 958. 7 Review of the Repatriation of Holocaust Art Assets in the United States: Hearing Before the 

H. Comm. on Financial Services, Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, 

Trade, and Technology, 109th Cong. 105–6 (2006) (statement of Stuart Eizenstat, Former Commissioner, Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the U.S.). 

scribed as the ‘‘ ‘greatest displacement of art in human history.’ ’’1

According to the American Alliance of Museums: 

the Nazi regime orchestrated a system of theft, confiscation, coercive transfer, looting, pillage, and destruction of 

objects of art and other cultural property in Europe on a 

massive and unprecedented scale. Millions of such objects 

were unlawfully and often forcibly taken from their rightful owners, who included private citizens, victims of the 

Holocaust; public and private museums and galleries; and 

religious, educational, and other institutions.2

Since World War II ended, the United States has pursued policies to help restore artwork and other cultural property lost in the 

Holocaust to its rightful owners.3 The Holocaust Expropriated Art 

Recovery (HEAR) Act is the latest step in that pursuit. 

The first step was the post-war effort of the United States and 

its allies to return property that was stolen or misappropriated by 

the Nazis and their allies. At the Potsdam Conference in 1945, 

President Truman approved a policy of ‘‘external restitution,’’ 

under which the United States would return the looted art to the 

countries of origin—not directly to the individual owners. Those 

countries would then be responsible for returning the art. But, despite these efforts, many pieces were never reunited with their 

owners.4

In the aftermath of the war, many families whose property was 

misappropriated by the Nazis or lost during the Holocaust simply 

lacked the information, resources, and sometimes wherewithal to 

locate and pursue litigation to obtain their property.5 Even for 

those with the resources, determining the provenance of Nazilooted art proved to be extremely difficult since many changes of 

ownership went undocumented, and many of the transactions took 

place on the black market.6 Adding to the difficulty, the Soviet 

Union also engaged in plundering. Responsible for the looted property in the territories they controlled, the Soviets often refused to 

provide any provenance information.7 The trauma of the Holocaust 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
3 

8The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their Lost Heritage: 

Hearing on S. 2763 The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act Before the S. Comm. on the 

Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Constitution and Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Federal 

Rights and Federal Courts, 114th Cong., Hr’g Tr. at 25, 27 (2016) (statement of Helen Mirren). 9Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, Principles 7 & 8, Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm. 10Pub. L. No. 105–158, 112 Stat. 15 § 202 (1998). 11Pub. L. No. 105–186, 112 Stat. 611 (1998). 12 American Alliance of Museums, Standards Regarding the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects 

During the Nazi Era. 

also made it psychologically difficult for victims and their heirs to 

pursue lost property in the aftermath of the war.8

As the twentieth century came to a close, nations and civil society groups expressed a renewed interest in addressing the restitution of art lost in the Holocaust. The United States led these efforts. In 1998, over 50 years after the end of the war, the United 

States convened a conference with forty-three other nations to address the restitution of art lost in the Holocaust: the Washington 

Conference. The participating countries unanimously approved 

what are known as the Washington Conference Principles on NaziConfiscated Art, which, inter alia, declared that Holocaust victims 

and their heirs ‘‘should be encouraged to come forward and make 

known their claims to art that was confiscated by the Nazis and 

not subsequently restituted’’ and that ‘‘steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution’’ to such claims.9

The same year, Congress enacted the Holocaust Victims Redress 

Act, which expressed the sense of Congress that ‘‘all governments 

should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of private and public property, such as works of art, to the rightful owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period of Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof that the 

claimant is the rightful owner.’’ 10 Congress also enacted the U.S. 

Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, which established the 

Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets (PACHA) to 

conduct research on the fate of Holocaust-era property that came 

into the possession of the U.S. Government and to advise the President on policies to ensure the restitution of this property.11

Following the Washington Conference, the Alliance of American 

Museums (AAM) adopted Standards Regarding the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era. These non-binding 

standards were ‘‘intended to assist museums in addressing issues 

relating to objects that may have been unlawfully appropriated 

during the Nazi era (1933–1945) as a result of actions in furtherance of the Holocaust or that were taken by the Nazis or their collaborators.’’ 12 In order to facilitate the discovery and identification 

of misappropriated art, the Alliance, along with the Association of 

Art Museum Directors (AAMD) and the PACHA, agreed 

that museums should strive to: (1) identify all objects in 

their collections that were created before 1946 and acquired by the museum after 1932, that underwent a 

change of ownership between 1932 and 1946, and that 

were or might reasonably be thought to have been in continental Europe between those dates (hereafter, ‘covered objects’); (2) make currently available object and provenance 

(history of ownership) information on those objects accesVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:10 Dec 08, 2016 Jkt 069010 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR394.XXX SR394

lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
4 

13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16Simon J. Frankel & Ethan Forrest, Museums’ Initiation of Declaratory Judgment Actions 

and Assertion of Statutes of Limitations in Response to Nazi-Era Art Restitution Claims—A Defense, 23 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 279 (2013). 17 American Alliance of Museums, Standards Regarding the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects 

During the Nazi Era. 18 Review of the Repatriation of Holocaust Art Assets in the United States: Hearing Before the 

H. Comm. on Financial Services, Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, 

Trade, and Technology, 109th Cong. 116 (2006) (statement of Stuart Eizenstat, Former Commissioner, Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the U.S). 19Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference: Terezin Declaration, Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs (June 30, 2009), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm. 20Douglas Davidson, Remarks at Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs Symposium on 

‘‘Should Stolen Holocaust Art be Returned?’’ at the New York County Law Association, ‘‘Should 

Nazi-Looted Art Works Be Returned? The View from the State Department’’ (Mar. 25, 2013), 

http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2013/mar/206719.htm. 

sible; and (3) give priority to continuing provenance research as resources allow.13

The art museum community, in cooperation with the State Department, has established the Nazi-Era Provenance Internet Portal, which publishes provenance information on tens of thousands 

of Nazi-era works, to assist potential claimants. When a claim of 

ownership to a covered object is asserted, the standards provide 

that the claim ‘‘should be considered on its own merits.’’ 14 Furthermore, ‘‘[w]hen appropriate and reasonably practical, museums 

should seek methods other than litigation (such as mediation) to 

resolve claims.’’ 15 And the historical record reflects that many restitution claims made against museums result in amicable purchase 

or lending agreements, or voluntary restitutions.16

But if litigation results, the Standards state that ‘‘museums may 

elect to waive certain available defenses’’ in order to ‘‘achieve an 

equitable and appropriate resolution.’’ 17 In his 2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary 

Policy, Trade and Technology of the House Committee on Financial 

Services, Stuart E. Eizenstat, former Deputy Secretary of the 

Treasury and former commissioner of the PACHA, testified that 

American museums choosing to litigate cases of art lost in the Holocaust should do so ‘‘on the merits, and not to rely upon technical 

defenses, like the statute of limitations.’’ 18

In 2009, 48 nations, including the United States, participated in 

the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference to follow up on the 

work of the Washington Conference. Participants issued the 

Terezin Declaration, which urged the signatories 

to ensure that their legal systems or alternative processes, 

while taking into account the different legal traditions, facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated and looted art, and to make certain that claims to 

recover such art are resolved expeditiously and based on 

the facts and merits of the claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all parties.19

Several years later, in 2013, the State Department’s Special 

Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Douglas Davidson, explained that the 

intent of the Terezin Declaration and the Washington Principles 

was ‘‘to coax the parties to a particular dispute to seek to determine the facts of the matter and to avoid if possible resorting to 

legal arguments grounded in procedural matters.’’ 20 ‘‘[W]e believe,’’ 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
5 

21 Id. 22 Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 958. 23See, e.g., Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 806–07 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (explaining that the limitations period for a restitution or conversion claim in Ohio begins ‘‘when 

the claimant ‘discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the complained-of injury’ ’’); Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, Civ. Action No. 08– 

10097–RWZ, 2009 WL 6506658, *7 (D. Mass. June 12, 2009) (same for Massachusetts). New 

York is an outlier in that its statute of limitations does not begin to run until a demand for 

the return of the allegedly stolen property is refused. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 

77 N.Y.2d 311, 316–18 (1991) (‘‘The rule in this State is that a cause of action for replevin 

against the good-faith purchaser of a stolen chattel accrues when the true owner makes demand 

for return of the chattel and the person in possession of the chattel refused to return it’’ (citation 

omitted)). In some cases, application of the statute of limitations may result in the expiration 

of claims before the Holocaust even ended. In Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin, for instance, the 

court held that the discovery rule did not apply and that Michigan’s three-year limitations period began to run in 1938—when the alleged unlawful taking occurred—and expired well before 

the conclusion of the war. Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06–1033, 2007 WL 1016996, at 

*3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007). 24 Cf., e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (‘‘Vindicating victims injured 

by acts and omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is thus within the traditional subject 

matter of foreign policy in which national, not state, interests are overriding, and which the National Government has addressed.’’). 25 Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 957. 26 Id. at 965–68. In the wake of the Von Saher decision, the California legislature extended 

the State statute of limitations from three to six years for all stolen art claims, not just Holocaust-era claims. Because the statute, on its face, had nothing to do with the foreign affairs 

power and there was no ‘‘evidence in the record’’ that the State was attempting to carry out 

its own foreign policy with respect to the resolution of war-related claims, the Ninth Circuit 

upheld the law. See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation, 737 F.3d 613, 619 

(9th Cir. 2013). 

he went on to say, ‘‘that the best way to arrive at a just and fair 

solution to a dispute over Nazi-confiscated art is for the parties to 

resolve it where appropriate, based on the facts of the claims.’’ 21

Despite these representations and commitments, the United 

States has not fulfilled its promise to ensure that claims to art lost 

in the Holocaust are resolved on their merits. As the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed, ‘‘[m]any obstacles face 

those who attempt to recover Holocaust-era art through lawsuits,’’ 

including ‘‘procedural hurdles such as statutes of limitations’’ that 

prevent the merits of claims from being adjudicated.22

Each State has different rules governing the operation of their 

statutes of limitations, with varying periods and different triggering circumstances—e.g., the loss of the property or discovery of 

the identity and location of the stolen art, among other things. A 

victim’s knowledge may also be imputed to the victim’s heirs. As 

a practical matter, many statutes of limitations operate to bar modern claimants seeking restitution of art lost in the Holocaust.23

Because of the unique and horrific circumstances of World War 

II and the Holocaust, State statutes of limitations can be an unfair 

impediment to the victims and their heirs, contrary to United 

States policy. Yet states have been unable to remedy this injustice 

because the regulation of war-related disputes is within the powers 

of the Federal Government.24 In Von Saher, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated a California law that extended the State limitations period specifically for Nazi-confiscatedart claims.25 The court held that the law was unconstitutional because it infringed on the Federal Government’s exclusive authority 

over foreign affairs, including its authority to resolve war-related 

claims.26

A Federal limitations period, appropriately tailored to the unique 

circumstances of Holocaust-era claims, is therefore needed to guarantee that the United States fulfills the promises it has made to 

the world to ‘‘facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to NaziVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:30 Dec 07, 2016 Jkt 069060 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR394.XXX SR394

lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
6 

27Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference: Terezin Declaration, Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs (June 30, 2009), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm. 

confiscated and looted art’’ and to ‘‘make certain that claims to recover such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts 

and merits of the claims.’’ 27 The HEAR Act thus serves two purposes: first, to ensure that laws governing claims to Nazi-confiscated art and other property further United States policy as set 

forth in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated 

Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the Terezin Declaration; and, second, to ensure that claims to artwork and other property stolen or misappropriated by the Nazis are not unfairly barred 

by statutes of limitations but are resolved in a just and fair manner. 

The HEAR Act is not intended to displace other forms of dispute 

resolution for Holocaust-era claims. The legislation expresses the 

sense of Congress that the private resolution of claims by parties 

involved, on the merits and through the use of alternative dispute 

resolution such as mediation panels established for this purpose 

with the aid of experts in provenance research and history, will 

yield just and fair resolutions in a more efficient and predictable 

manner. 

II. HISTORY OF THE BILL AND COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On April 7, 2016, Senator Cornyn introduced S. 2763, the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016. Senators Cruz, Schumer and Blumenthal were original cosponsors. The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 

The Committee’s Subcommittees on the Constitution and Oversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal Courts held a 

hearing on S. 2763 entitled ‘‘S. 2763, the Holocaust Expropriated 

Art Recovery Act—Reuniting Victims with Their Lost Heritage’’ on 

June 7, 2016. Testimony was received from Ambassador Ronald S. 

Lauder, Chairman of the Council of the World Jewish Restitution 

Organization; Dame Helen Mirren; Ms. Monica Dugot, International Director of Restitution at Christie’s, Inc.; Ms. Agnes 

Peresztegi, President of the Commission for Art Recovery; and Mr. 

Simon Goodman. Additional material was submitted by Laura L. 

Lott, President and CEO of American Alliance Museums; Brian J. 

Ferriso, President, Association of Art Museum Directors; Richard 

T. Foltin, Director of National and Legislative Affairs, AJC Global 

Jewish Advocacy; Carla Shapreau, Senior Fellow, Institute of European Studies, University of California, Berkeley; Karen Silberman, 

Executive Director, Federal Bar Association; Robert Singer, Chief 

Executive Officer, World Jewish Congress; and Gideon Taylor, 

Chair of Operations, World Jewish Restitution Organization. 

The Committee considered S. 2763 on September 15, 2016. Senator Cornyn offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute, 

which was adopted by voice vote. The amendment adds a sense of 

Congress favoring the resolution of disputed art claims without litigation and using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms involving experts in art research. It specifies the kinds of artwork covered by the operative language of the bill, discussed infra. The 

amendment broadens the knowledge standard that triggers the 

running of the limitations period established in Section 5(a). It 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
7 

clarifies that members of any group persecuted by the Nazis may 

avail itself of the benefits of S. 2763. The amendment removes the 

reference precluding the availability of equitable defenses and the 

doctrine of laches. It further enables claims previously barred to be 

brought within the period established by the bill. The amendment 

creates an exception that bars claims known on or after January 

1, 1999 and for which the claimant (or the claimant’s predecessor 

in interest) could have brought a claim, because the claim was not 

time barred under the then-applicable statute of limitations, but 

failed to do. Finally, the amendment clarifies that the bill sunsets 

in ten years. 

The amendment was accepted by voice vote without objection. 

The Committee then voted to report the Holocaust Expropriated 

Art Recovery Act, with the amendment in the nature of a substitute, favorably to the Senate by voice vote. 

III. SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY OF THE BILL

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides that the legislation may be cited as the 

‘‘Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016.’’ 

Section 2. Findings 

This section makes findings about the historical basis of and the 

need for the legislation. 

Congress finds that the Nazis, as part of the Holocaust, carried 

on a massive campaign to expropriate art and other cultural property from Jews and other persecuted groups, which one historian 

dubbed the ‘‘greatest displacement of art in human history.’’ 

It finds that, while the United States and its allies attempted to 

return the art and other cultural property to its rightful owners 

after World War II, some was not returned. Some of the art and 

other cultural property expropriated by the Nazis has since been 

discovered in the United States. 

Congress finds that, in 1998, the United States and forty-three 

other nations convened in Washington, D.C. for the ‘‘Washington 

Conference,’’ which produced principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art. 

One of the principles stated that ‘‘steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution’’ to claims involving art 

or other cultural property lost by the victims of the Holocaust. 

It finds that, also in 1998, Congress enacted the Holocaust Victims Redress Act (Public Law 105–158, 112 Stat. 15), which expressed the sense of Congress that ‘‘all governments should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of private and public 

property, such as works of art, to the rightful owners in cases 

where assets were confiscated from the claimant during the period 

of Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof that the claimant is the 

rightful owner.’’ 

Congress finds that, in 2009, the United States participated in 

a Holocaust Era Assets Conference in Prague, Czech Republic, with 

forty-five other nations, Serbia, and the Holy See. At the conclusion 

of this conference, almost all of the participating nations (including 

the United States) issued the Terezin Declaration, which reaffirmed the 1998 Washington Conference Principles and urged all 

participants ‘‘to ensure that their legal systems or alternative procVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:30 Dec 07, 2016 Jkt 069060 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR394.XXX SR394

lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
8 

28See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2009). 

esses, while taking into account the different legal traditions, facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated and 

looted art, and to make certain that claims to recover such art are 

resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and merits of the 

claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all parties.’’ 

The Declaration also urged participants to ‘‘consider all relevant 

issues when applying various legal provisions that may impede the 

restitution of art and cultural property, in order to achieve just and 

fair solutions, as well as alternative dispute resolution, where appropriate under law.’’ 

Congress finds that victims of Nazi persecution and their heirs 

have taken legal action in the United States to recover art and 

other cultural property lost in the Holocaust. While most such 

claims are settled amicably, lawsuits that proceed may face procedural obstacles due to State statutes of limitations. The unique and 

horrific circumstances of World War II and the Holocaust make 

time-based defenses especially burdensome to the victims and their 

heirs. Those seeking recovery of Nazi-confiscated art must painstakingly piece together their cases from a fragmentary historical 

record ravaged by persecution, war, and genocide. This costly process often cannot be done within the time constraints imposed by 

existing law. 

Congress finds that Federal legislation is needed because the 

only court that has considered the question held that the U.S. Constitution prohibits States from making exceptions to their statutes 

of limitations to accommodate claims involving the recovery of 

Nazi-confiscated art.28 In light of this precedent, the enactment of 

a Federal law is necessary to ensure that claims to Nazi-confiscated art are adjudicated in accordance with United States policy 

as expressed in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the Terezin 

Declaration. 

Finally, Congress expresses its sense that the private resolution 

of claims by parties involved, on the merits and through the use 

of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation panels established for this purpose with the aid of experts in provenance research and history, will yield just and fair resolutions in a more efficient and predictable manner than litigation. 

Section 3. Purposes of the Act 

This section establishes the purposes of the legislation: (i) first, 

to ensure that laws in the United States governing claims to art 

and cultural property confiscated by the Nazis further United 

States policy, as expressed in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act 

and the Terezin Declaration; and (ii) second, to ensure that such 

claims are not unfairly barred by statutes of limitations and are resolved in a just and fair manner. 

Section 4. Definitions 

Subsection (1) defines ‘‘actual discovery’’ to mean knowledge, 

which in subsection (4) is defined as having actual knowledge of a 

fact or circumstance or sufficient information with regard to a relVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:30 Dec 07, 2016 Jkt 069060 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR394.XXX SR394

lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
9 

evant fact or circumstance to amount to actual knowledge thereof. 

For purposes of the limitations period established in Section 5(a), 

this is intended to require more than access to the information 

with regard to relevant facts and circumstances. The party must 

have the knowledge itself or have sufficient information to constitute actual knowledge. 

Subsection (2) defines with specificity what ‘‘artwork and other 

property’’ sought by plaintiffs are subject to the legislation. The 

definition extends to include not only fine art, but applied art, written texts, musical art and Judaica. 

Subsection (3) defines a ‘‘covered period,’’ within which losses are 

covered by the legislation. That period is defined as the period beginning on January 1, 1933 and ending on December 31, 1945. This 

period covers the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany and concludes following the Allied victory in World War II. 

Subsection (5) defines the Nazi persecution that may cause the 

loss of art or other cultural property caused by the bill. It applies 

to ‘‘any persecution of a specific group of individuals based on Nazi 

ideology by the Government of Germany, its allies or agents, members of the Nazi Party, or their agents and associates, during the 

‘‘covered period.’’ The Nazis persecuted many groups, and that persecution was executed by the Nazi Party, the government of Germany at the time, governments allied with Germany, private 

agents and others. This definition is intended to be broad, to facilitate the restitution of art and other cultural property lost during 

the covered period. 

Section 5. Statute of limitations 

Subsection (a) is the focus of the legislation, a uniform, national, 

limitations period for covered claims to recover artwork and other 

cultural property. It applies to claims in Federal or State court and 

applies notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State 

law, or any defense at law relating to the passage of time. Subsection (a) states that ‘‘a civil claim or cause of action against a defendant to recover any artwork or other property that was lost during the covered period because of Nazi persecution’’ can be brought 

within six years after the actual discovery by the claimant or their 

agent of two pieces of information: 

(1) the identity and location of the artwork or other cultural 

property; and 

(2) a possessory interest of the claimant in the artwork or 

other cultural property. 

The purpose of this section is to open courts to claimants to bring 

covered claims and have them resolved on the merits, consistent 

with the Terezin Declaration. While defenses at law related to the 

passage of time are not merely procedural, the special circumstances created by Nazi persecution necessitate an opportunity 

for their temporary waiver. The legislation provides that claims 

may be brought within six years of actual knowledge by the claimant or the claimant’s agent of the identity and location of the artwork, as well as the claimant’s possessory interest. 

Subsection (b). Possible misidentification 

Subsection (b) addresses the situation where works of art are 

produced in multiples, such as a print of which several virtuallyVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:30 Dec 07, 2016 Jkt 069060 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR394.XXX SR394

lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
10 

identical copies are made. It states that, for cases in which the 

‘‘artwork or other cultural property is one of a group of substantially similar multiple artworks or other cultural property,’’ ‘‘actual 

discovery’’ is deemed to occur when there are facts sufficient to 

form a basis to believe the work discovered is the work that was 

lost. Thus, if a claimant sees an identical print to one that was expropriated by the Nazis from the claimant or the claimant’s predecessor in interest, the six years period will only start to run when 

the claimant has sufficient knowledge that the particular version 

of the artworks is the one that was taken. 

Subsection (c). Preexisting claims 

Because much information about art lost to the Nazis surfaced 

only decades after the fact and because of the historical, psychological and other barriers that prevented claims from having been 

brought, subsection (c) gives an opportunity to claimants to resuscitate claims that may have been barred in the past. It states that 

claims are deemed to have been ‘‘actually discovered’’ on the date 

of enactment if, before that date, the claimant had knowledge of 

the identity and location of the property and the possessory interest but the claim was barred by an applicable statute of limitations. Subsection (2) makes clear that claims that were not barred 

under preexisting law on the date of enactment can also be brought 

within the limitations period established under Section 5. Claims 

that were dismissed pursuant to, or litigated to, a final judgment 

from which no appeal lies on the date of enactment are unaffected 

by this provision. 

Subsection (d). Applicability 

Subsection (d) establishes that Section 5 applies to claims pending on the date of enactment but that it ceases to apply to claims 

commenced after December 31, 2026. 

Subsection (e). Exception 

While the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act is animated 

by clear United States policy to facilitate the return of artwork and 

other cultural property lost in the Holocaust, Congress also recognizes the importance of quieting title in property generally and the 

importance that claimants assert their rights in a timely fashion. 

Because the events surrounding and including the Washington 

Conference occurred decades after the Holocaust and led to the 

publication of information about artwork and other cultural property that may have been expropriated by the Nazis, subsection (e) 

bars the application of the subsection (a) national limitations period in instances in which claimants acquired the requisite knowledge but failed to bring claims within a defined period. Subsection 

(e) states that claims do not benefit from the HEAR Act limitations 

period if the claimant had the relevant actual knowledge on or 

after January 1, 1999, not less than six years have passed from the 

date the claimant (or the claimant’s predecessor in interest) had 

such knowledge, during any portion of that time the claim was 

timely and, nonetheless, the claimant failed to bring it. Nothing, 

however, bars the claimant from asserting claims that remain 

timely under applicable State law. 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
11 

The six year period in subsection 5(e) reflects that in subsection 

5(a), but it is not intended to extend shorter limitations periods 

that came and went prior to the enactment of the HEAR Act. For 

instance, if the relevant conditions are met and the claim arose 

after 1999; the applicable limitations period was three years; and 

three years elapsed before the HEAR Act was enacted, the claim 

would fall under the 5(e) exception. The claimant must have had, 

however, an opportunity to bring a claim that was not time-barred 

during that six year period. 

Subsection (f). Rule of construction 

This subsection clarifies that nothing in the legislation should be 

construed to create a cause of action, under Federal or State law. 

Subsection (g). Sunset 

This subsection states that the limitations period established by 

the legislation comes into effect on January 1, 2017, and ends on 

January 1, 2027. After the ten-year window created by the legislation, claims that could have been brought under it are governed by 

applicable preexisting Federal or State law. 

IV. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

The Committee sets forth, with respect to the bill. S, 2763, the 

following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the 

Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974: 

NOVEMBER 21, 2016. 

Hon. CHUCK GRASSLEY, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2763, the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Robert Reese. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 

S. 2763—Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 

S. 2763 would create a new statute of limitations for filing civil 

claims in state or federal courts to recover artwork and other items 

misappropriated or stolen by the German government, or its allies 

or agents, between 1933 and 1945 in connection with the persecution of a specific group of individuals based on Nazi ideology. 

Under the bill, individuals could file such claims for up to six years 

after they discover the location of such items or, if discovery occurred prior to enactment of this bill, six years after enactment of 

S. 2763. This statute of limitations would remain in effect until 

January 1, 2027, at which point new claims to recover such artwork would be subject to any other applicable statutes of limitations. 

Based on information provided by the Administrative Office of 

the United States Courts, CBO estimates that implementing S. 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS
12 

2763 would have no significant effect on the federal budget in any 

year. 

Enacting the bill could increase the number of civil cases filed in 

federal courts and increase the collection of civil filing fees, which 

are recorded in the budget as revenues. A portion of those revenues 

would be spent without further appropriation. CBO estimates that 

any additional fees collected would not exceed $500,000 in any year 

because of the small number of anticipated additional case filings 

under the bill. Furthermore, because such amounts would be partially offset by a corresponding increase in direct spending, CBO 

estimates that enacting the bill would have a negligible net effect 

on future deficits. Because enacting S. 2763 could affect revenues 

and associated direct spending, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. 

CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase 

net-direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027. 

S. 2763 would preempt state laws governing the passage of time 

for certain civil claims. The preemption would be a mandate as defined by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and may result in a higher number of civil claims in state courts. However, because of the small number of claimants for such civil cases, CBO 

estimates that the cost of the mandate would be well below the 

threshold established in UMRA ($77 million in 2016, adjusted annually for inflation). 

The bill contains no private-sector mandates as defined in 

UMRA. 

The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Robert Reese (for 

federal costs) and Rachel Austin (for intergovernmental mandates). 

The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

V. REGULATORY IMPACT EVALUATION

In compliance with rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no significant regulatory impact will 

result from the enactment of S. 2763. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, S. 2673, addresses 

the need to provide the victims of Holocaust-era persecution and 

their heirs a fair opportunity to recover works of art confiscated or 

misappropriated by the Nazis or lost during the Holocaust. 

VII. CHANGES TO EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing 

law made by S. 2673, as ordered reported. 

Æ 


lotter on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with MISCELLANEOUS