IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30849

NICOLE REYES, individually and as Representative of two classes, the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act class and the Louisiana usurious class, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

STEEG LAW, L.L.C.; MARGARET V. GLASS, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:12-CV-2043

Before JONES, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The plaintiff appeals from the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to the defendant law firm and decertifying a class of plaintiffs under 

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Her primary argument is that the 

defendant is a “debt collector” for the purposes of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act. We disagree and AFFIRM. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 17, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Nicole Reyes filed a class action lawsuit against Steeg Law and one of its 

associates, Margaret Glass. She alleged repeated violations of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA” or “the Act”). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. 

Steeg Law is a law firm in New Orleans that has a specialty practice in real 

estate and condominium law. Steeg Law’s clients include several 

condominium associations, including Julia Place Condominiums, where Reyes 

owned a unit. 

The parties agree that Steeg Law is not primarily engaged in debt 

collection activity. The firm stated that it provides “commercial litigation, 

transactional, and real estate services to . . . condominium association clients, 

who on occasion request[] assistance in recording privileges under La. 

R.S. § 9:1123.115.” Privileges under Louisiana law are a form of security. 

Before recording a privilege, Steeg Law’s practice is to transmit lien letters to 

unit owners. These letters relate to disputes concerning “unpaid condominium 

assessments, violations of the condominium owner declarations, or any other 

basis permitting the association to record a privilege.” 

Reyes alleges that the letters Steeg Law sent to her and others who 

belong to condominium associations represented by Steeg Law constitute facial 

violations of the FDCPA. That is because Steeg Law’s standard form letter 

demands payment within seven days, rather than the thirty days the Act 

provides. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Further, Reyes alleges that Steeg Law 

“regularly makes demand for amounts that are not ‘expressly authorized by 

the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law’. . . and for amounts that 

violate state law” in violation of Section 1692f. Reyes also claims that Steeg 

Law violated the Act as to her because it continued to communicate directly 

with her even after learning she had legal representation with respect to this 

matter. See id. § 1692c(a)(2). 

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After initial discovery, the district court certified a class of condominium 

owners for the purposes of claims under the FDCPA. The class was defined as 

“individuals who received lien letters from Steeg Law in the year preceding the 

filing of the complaint.” As the case progressed through discovery and pretrial 

motions, its scope narrowed as Steeg Law successfully sought dismissal of 

some members of the FDCPA class and additional defendants reached 

settlement agreements with Reyes. 

The district court ordered the parties to inform the court which of the 

pending motions were mooted by the settlements and “whether, in light of the 

recent settlement, there [was] a proposed class that satisfie[d] Rule 23(a)-(b) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

After receiving the requested briefing, the district court decertified the 

FDCPA class. The next day, the court granted summary judgment to Steeg 

Law, holding that it did not qualify as a debt collector for the purposes of the 

Act because it was not “regularly” engaged in debt collection activity. Reyes 

timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard that the district court applied.” Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 

F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one “that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute regarding a material 

fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “The court must view the evidence 

introduced and all factual inferences from the evidence in the light most 

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favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Hightower v. Tex. Hosp. 

Ass’n, 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995). “A party opposing summary judgment 

may not,” however, “rest on mere conclusory allegations or denials in its 

pleadings” to avoid an adverse ruling. Id. 

The FDCPA imposes civil liability on “debt collectors” for certain 

prohibited debt collection practices. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. It regulates 

interactions between a debtor and a debt collector, the latter being defined as 

“any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails 

in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or 

who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed 

or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” Id. § 1692a(6). “Attorneys 

qualify as debt collectors for purposes of the FDCPA when they regularly 

engage in consumer debt collection, including but not limited to litigation on 

behalf of a creditor client.” Mahmoud v. De Moss Owners Ass’n, Inc., 865 F.3d 

322, 330 (5th Cir. 2017). 

As a panel of this court previously acknowledged, this circuit has not 

developed a bright-line rule to determine when a law firm is a debt collector 

for the purposes of the FDCPA. Hester v. Graham, Bright & Smith, P.C., 289 

F. App’x 35, 41 (5th Cir. 2008). We decline to adopt such a standard today and 

instead continue to consider a variety of factors. One district court listed

factors we have identified in our caselaw as including

the number of lawsuits filed and collection letters mailed, the 

percentage of time debt collection activities consume, the share of 

total lawsuits filed that were dedicated to debt collection, the 

number of creditor clients and the length of the firm’s relationship 

with them, the frequency and nature of the non-collection work in 

which the firm engages, and the number of firm attorneys and 

other employees dedicated to debt collection activities.

Kirkpatrick v. Dover & Fox, P.C., No. 4:13-cv-00123, 2013 WL 5723077, at *5 

(S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2013) (collecting cases). 

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Reyes emphasizes that we have previously held that an attorney “who, 

during a single nine-month period, attempts to collect debts owed another by 

639 different individuals ‘regularly’ attempts to collect debts owed another, 

and thus is a debt collector under [Section] 1692a(6),” although the debt 

collection work for that client constituted 0.5% of his practice during that ninemonth period. Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 1997). 

We resolve these issues on a case-by-case basis for a reason. In the cited 

precedent, Derbes’s collection activity was “regular” although it constituted a 

small percentage of his firm’s overall practice. Labeling the work as “regular” 

was a reflection of the nature of Derbes’s practice. Steeg Law, though, sent 

only 36 letters (related to 34 liens) in the year before Reyes filed her complaint. 

That level of activity pales in comparison to the 639 letters Derbes sent in three 

quarters of that time. See id. While it is certainly true that the lien letters 

and the negotiations, research, and drafting work associated with each letter 

made up more than 0.5% of Steeg Law’s practice during the relevant period, 

this work did not represent a large part of the firm’s overall practice. 

During the three years before Reyes filed her complaint, less than 1.3% 

of Steeg Law’s overall revenue was “attributable to fees accrued through the 

representation of condominium associations in perfecting and enforcing liens 

and recovering delinquent balances.” During that same period, all of the work 

that Steeg Law attorneys undertook for its condominium association clients 

constituted less than 1.5% of the firm’s total billable hours. Even adopting an

expansive definition of “debt collection activity,” that activity constituted less 

than 3.5% of that 1.5%. Neither this court’s precedent nor common sense 

compel a determination that these circumstances constitute regularly 

engaging in debt collection activity. The district court did not err in holding 

that Steeg Law is not a debt collector as defined by the Act.

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This determination moots Reyes’s argument that the district court erred 

in decertifying her FDCPA class.

AFFIRMED. 

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