### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE January 15, 2003 Se ssion STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERRANCE W. PRICE Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County Nos. 2002-A-56 and 2001-B-1022 Cheryl Blackburn, Judge

No. M2002-00991-CCA-R3-CD - F iled May 9, 2003

Pursuant to anegotiated plea

agree ment, Def endant, Terranc e W. Price , pled guilty to fiftee n counts of money launder ing, a Cl ass B felon

y, a nd one count of con spiracy to commi t mon ey launder ing, a Class C fel ony . He pled guilt y res erving the right to appeal a c ertified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The certified question of law on appeal is whether Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-14-901, - 903, Money Laundering A

ct of 1996, violates Article XI, Section 8 or Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution by exempting from its application violation of gambling laws, found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-501 et seq . After a

careful review, we conclude that the statutes do not violate the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court. Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed T HO MAS T. W OODA LL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID H

. W ELLES an d R OBER T W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined. Dale M. Q uill en a nd M ich ael

J. Flanag an, N ashv ille, Tenn esse e, fo r the appellant , Ter

ranc e W. Price. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter; Renee

W. Turner , Assistan

t Attorne y General ; Victor S. Johnson, I

II , Distric t Attorne

y General ; John Zimme

rman, Ass istant Dist

rict Attorney Genera l; and Tammy Mea

de, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION Defendant

pled gu ilty to variou s crimina

l a cts in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-90 3(b)(1) , which pr ohibits “k nowingl y us[ing] pro ceeds de

rived dir ectly or indirectly from a specifie d unlawful ac tivity with the intent to promote, in whole or in part, the carry

ing on of a specified unlawful activity .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-903(b)(1) (1997) (e mphasis added).-2-

“Specif ied unlaw ful activ

ity” is define d as follo ws: (5)(A) “Specified unlawful activity” means a ny act, including

any preparatory

or completedoffense, committed for financial gain that is pun ishable as a felony under the laws o f th i s state, or if the act occurred outside this state, would be punishabl e by confinement for more than one ( 1) y ear unde r the law s of the sta

te in which it occurred; and (B) “Specified unlawful activity” does not mean an act, including any preparatory or completed off

en se, committed for financial gain that is punishable under chapter 17, part 5 o

f this title , or similar provisions of law i n another state; and

. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-902(5)(A) and (B ) (1997) (emphasis added) (Chapter 17, part 5 of Title 39 of Tennessee Code Annotated pertains to illegal g ambling.). The crux of De

fendant ’s argument is tha t th e legis lature’ s exclusion of crimin al acts in violation of the gambling statutes from those criminal activitie s which c an lead t o punishment for prohibited acts of mo ney

launderi ng v io lat es t he e qua l p rot ect io n of law pro vi si ons of A rti cle XI, § 8 an d Article

I, § 8 of the Te

nnessee Constitution . The “sp ecified unlawful activity

” whic h underlies Defendant’s convictions for money laundering

is the promotion

of prostit ution, a Cla ss E felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-515 (1997). Article XI, § 8 of the Te

nnessee Constitution

providesin pertine

nt part a s follows: General laws only to be passed. — The Legislature sha ll have no power to suspend any g eneral law for t he benefit of any

particular indivi dual, nor to pass any law fo r the b enefit of ind ivid uals i ncons isten t wit h the ge nera l laws of the land; nor to pas s any

law gr anting t o any indivi dual or individuals , rights , privileg es, immunitie, [immunities] or exemptions other than such as may be, by the same law extended to any me mber of th

e community, who may

be able t o bring himself within the provisions of such law. Article I, § 8 of the Te

nnessee Constitution

providesas follow s: No man to be disturbed but by law. — That no man shal l be t aken or imprisoned, or disseized of his fre ehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner

destroyed or de

prived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgme

nt of his peers or the law of the land. Defendant

argues that there is no

rational basis for

excluding the laws prohibiting gambling from the crimes which can trigger a pplication of the statutes prohibiting and punishing acts of money laund ering. Thus, argues Defendant, the statutes which pr ohibit money laundering are unco nstitutiona

l, and his co nvictionsfor mone y la undering and cons piracy

to commit

mone y-3-

laundering must be re

versed a nd dismisse d. Our re

view is the

refore limi t ed to the question of whether the legislature ran afoul of the Tenness ee Constitution when it excluded acts in violation of gamblin g laws f

rom the de

finition of

a “sp e cified unlawful activity ” as that term is used in the Money L aundering Act. Our supreme court has noted that these two provisions of the Tennessee Constitution, Article XI, § 8 and Article I, § 8, provide for the equal protection of laws. State v. Tester , 879 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tenn. 1 994). The se provisions of the Tennessee Constitution provide the same protection as the equal pr

otection clause in the United States Constitution. Id . Unless the legislative classification disadvantages a “suspect class” or interferes with the e xercise of a “fundament al ri ght,” requiring strict scrutiny analy sis, the challenged statute is examined under the “rational basis test.” Id . at 828. As noted above, D efenda

nt conce des that th

e statute s involved

in this app eal must

be analyzed unde

r the “rational basis” test. In the recent

case of State v. Robinson , 29 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Tenn. 2000), the supreme court reliedupon and quoted Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWhe rter , 851 S.W.2d 139, 153 (Tenn. 1993), as follow s: Equal protect io n c onstitutional provisions guarantee that “‘all persons simi larly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’” Tennessee Small Sch. Sys . v . McWherter

, 851 S.W.2d 139, 153 (Tenn. 1993) (quot ing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia , 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 562, 64 L. Ed. 989 (1920 )). This Court has said: The initial discretion to determine what is ‘dif ferent’ and what is ‘the same’ resides in t he leg islature s of the Sta tes, and l egisla

tures ar e given consider able latitude in determining what groups are different

and what groups are the same.

. . . In most instances the judicial inquiry into the le gislativ e choice is limited to whethe r the clas sificati ons have

a reaso nable re

lationship to a leg itimate sta

t e interest

. In Tennessee Small Sch oo l Sys. v. McWherter , 851 S.W.2d 139, 153-54 (Tenn. 1993), the supreme court quoted from Harrison v. Schrader , 569 S.W.2d 8 22 (Tenn . 1978), a s follows: In Harrison v. Schrader , 569 S.W.2d 822, 825-826 (Tenn. 1978), the Cou rt al so found tha t the dete rminative issue is wh

ether the factsshow some reasona ble basis for the d isparate state action. The C ourt stated as follo ws: Under this standard, if some reasona ble basis can be found for the classification, or if any

state of facts may

reasonably

be conceived

to justify it, the classification will be upheld. * * * * * *-4- The te st to be applied has been set forth in numerous cases . Th e classification must rest u

pon a rea sonable

basis. If it has a reaso nable ba sis, it is not unconstitutional merely because it resu lt s i n s om e i ne qu al it y. Reasona bleness depends upon the facts of the case and no ge neral rule can

be formulated for its determination. The burden o f showing

that a cla ssificat

ion is unreaso nable and arbitra ry is placed upon the individua l chall enging the statut e; and if any s tate of fac ts can reasonably be concei ved to justify the classification or if the reasonab leness

of the class is fairly

debatable

, the statu te must be

upheld

. (Emphasis added). A transcript of the legislative history of the Money

Laundering

Act was made an exhibit at the hearing in the trial court. Our review o f this exhibit indicates that the gambling laws were exempted from the definition of “specified unlawful activity ” because a majority of the members of the Tenness ee House

of Repre sentative s did not feel th at the money launde ring statute should be applied to gambling acts which might be considered minor offenses. The clear implication is that the House of Representatives approved the act in orde r to enable law enfo rcemen t to combat money launderi ng in oth er offe

nses cons idered t

o be more serious b y th

e legis lative bo dy. This suppo rts the constituti onality

of the statute by establishing that the reasonableness of the classification is at least “fairly

debatable.” See Tennessee Small School Sys. v. McW herter , supra (quot ing Harrison v. Schrader , supra ). In light of the above authority , we conclude that the“money launder ing” sta tutes are not in violation of the Tennessee Constitution. CONCLUSION For the foregoing r

easons, the judgments of the trial court are af firmed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODALL , JUDGE