United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 22-3659

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jacob Allen Monteer

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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Submitted: September 22, 2023

Filed: October 17, 2023

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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. 

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Jacob Allen Monteer was charged in a five-count indictment with attempted

bank robbery involving assault with a dangerous weapon (Count I); knowingly

brandishing and using a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count II);

knowingly discharging and using a pistol during and in relation to a crime of violence

(Count III); knowingly discharging and using an AR-15 rifle during and in relation

to a crime of violence (Count IV); and being an unlawful drug user in possession of
a pistol and an AR-15 rifle (Count V). After a one-day bench trial, the district court1

found Monteer guilty of the five offenses and sentenced him to 230 months

imprisonment. Monteer appeals his conviction, arguing the evidence was insufficient

to convict him of any offense; the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress involuntary custodial statements he made to an FBI agent; and the district

court erred by failing to include the term “knowingly” in reciting the elements of the

Count II, III, and IV offenses when explaining its decision during a post-trial hearing. 

We affirm. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

On November 30, 2017, Monteer attempted to rob a bank in Versailles,

Missouri, demanding money and showing bank tellers part of a pistol in his sweatshirt

pocket. Leaving the bank empty-handed, Monteer led police on a high speed chase,

driving a stolen pickup truck and firing his pistol from the vehicle at a police officer

who had set up a roadblock. The vehicle crashed, and Monteer fled on foot. An

officer caught Monteer and attempted to subdue him. During the struggle, the

officer’s AR-15 rifle discharged. Monteer was then restrained and arrested by

additional officers. While in custody, he waived his Miranda rights and made

numerous incriminating statements to an FBI agent during a videotaped interview. 

The government presented testimony by thirteen witnesses during the one-day

bench trial -- three bank employees, a bank customer who initially followed Monteer

as he fled, the man from whom he stole the pickup truck, six law enforcement officers

involved in the pursuit and arrest, a bystander who saw Monteer shoot from the

vehicle, and the interviewing FBI agent. The government also introduced video from

the bank’s security camera and the recorded interview. Monteer, representing

1The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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himself, did not testify nor call any defense witnesses. The district court denied his

motions for acquittal and issued a written order finding him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt on all counts. 

Monteer argues the evidence was insufficient. As to Counts I and II, no bank

employee could positively identify him as the robber who brandished a gun, only

describing the clothing the robber wore. As to Count III, neither witness who saw a

gun being fired from inside the truck could identify the driver. As to Count IV, no

witness saw Monteer discharge the officer’s rifle during the scuffle. And there was

insufficient evidence as to Count V if Monteer’s admissions are suppressed. 

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence after a bench trial, we apply the

same standard that we apply when reviewing a jury verdict,” reviewing the evidence

“in the light most favorable to the verdict, upholding the verdict if a reasonable

factfinder could find the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States

v. Morris, 791 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 2015). Here, because in Part II we uphold

denial of his motion to suppress statements made during the custodial interview, there

was ample evidence to convict Monteer on all five counts. He admitted that he

attempted to rob the bank, that he led police on a vehicle chase, that he fired a pistol

as he approached an officer who had set up a roadblock, that he fled on foot when the

vehicle crashed, that he wrestled with an officer who attempted to arrest him, that he

touched the officer’s rifle during the scuffle (but denied discharging it), and that he

had used methamphetamine the morning of the incident. 

In addition to Monteer’s admissions, the bank’s security camera video showed

a man wearing a brown hoodie sweatshirt, plaid shorts, black socks with no shoes,

and a red bandana covering his lower face enter the bank and interact with tellers. It

showed the man pull a black pistol from his sweatshirt pocket so that the tellers could

see it. When arrested, Monteer was wearing clothes identical to what the robber in

the surveillance video wore. The government introduced eyewitness testimony that

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accounted for almost all the robber’s movements as he entered the bank, interacted

with tellers, and fled in a black truck and then on foot after the truck crashed. Two

witnesses saw the robber fire shots through the truck’s windshield at an officer who

had set up a roadblock. The officer who pursued Monteer on foot and wrestled with

him after the crash testified that Monteer tried to grab his rifle, that he heard the

safety switch click off, and that the rifle then discharged. Another officer saw

Monteer’s hand on the trigger just before the rifle discharged.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we must,

it was sufficient to support Monteer’s conviction on all five counts. 

II. Were Monteer’s Custodial Statements Involuntary?

Monteer asserts that incriminating statements made during a custodial FBI

agent interview were involuntary because he was suffering from mental health issues

that were “sufficient to overbear [his] will and critically impair his capacity for

self-determination.” United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (en

banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005). Months after the interview, the court

ordered an evaluation of Monteer’s competency to stand trial. Two psychologists

conducted the evaluation and found some evidence that Monteer was experiencing

paranoia and delusional thinking stemming from frequent methamphetamine use prior

to his arrest. Monteer argues this established a mental health condition rendering his

statements involuntary and their admission at trial a violation of his constitutional

right to due process. 

“We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal

conclusion as to whether a confession was voluntary de novo.” Id. We examine the

totality of the circumstances, “including both the conduct of law enforcement in

exerting pressure to confess on the defendant and the defendant's ability to resist that

pressure.” United States v. Sandell, 27 F.4th 625, 630 (8th Cir. 2022) (quotations

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omitted). The defendant’s mental condition is one factor we assess. Id. This

standard of review is “very demanding.” LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 726. 

The district court reviewed the video of the FBI agent’s interview before

denying Monteer’s motion to suppress. Throughout the interview, Monteer appeared

alert and spoke coherently. He followed the agent’s questions and described the

robbery and his subsequent flight in detail. While he made some odd statements, he

did not appear to be distracted or hallucinating at any point. The psychologists

assessed Monteer’s competency to stand trial. They considered the FBI agent’s

interview but were not asked to opine, and did not opine, on Monteer’s mental

condition on the day of the interview or whether the statements were voluntary. The

psychologists’ evaluations do not undermine the district court’s finding that Monteer

had the mental capacity to make voluntary statements. 

Moreover, “[a] statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats,

violence, or express or implied promises.” LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 724. Thus, as

Monteer concedes, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding

that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Thunderhawk, 799 F.3d 1203, 1206

(8th Cir. 2015), quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). There must

be some coercive police activity exerted upon the defendant for the defendant’s

statements to be involuntary, even if the defendant’s mental condition is in a

weakened state. See Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 893 (2003); Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 333 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 822 (1993). 

Here, Monteer’s statements were not the product of coercive police conduct. 

Monteer points to the FBI agent’s statement early in the interview: “This [interview]

is really a courtesy for you to explain why we’re in this situation, so I can go back to

a federal prosecutor and say ‘Met with him, cool dude, he’s being honest, this is why

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he’s in this position, what can we work out?’” Monteer asserts that his mental health

issues cause him to “read hidden meaning into the behavior of others” and he read

this statement as an implied promise of leniency. But the agent’s statement was at

most a promise to tell a prosecutor that Monteer was cooperating and may warrant a

favorable plea agreement. A promise to make a defendant’s cooperation known to

the prosecutor does not render an otherwise voluntary statement involuntary. See

United States v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347, 1350 (8th Cir. 1996). And a mistaken belief

in an implied promise of leniency does not render statements that follow involuntary. 

See LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 725. Thus, even if Monteer’s mental health issues reduced

his ability to resist pressure to make incriminating admissions, that does not warrant

suppressing the admissions as involuntary. The district court did not err in denying

Monteer’s motion to suppress.

III. The Knowingly Issue

At the close of the one-day bench trial, the district court denied Monteer’s

motion for judgment of acquittal, took the case under advisement, and scheduled a

remote post-trial hearing at which the court would “make a record of the facts and the

findings that I make with particular Counts.” The court held that hearing two days

later, finding Monteer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing each of the

five charged offenses. Three days later, the court issued a written Order finding,

“consistent with the ruling on the record,” that Monteer was guilty of each of the five

counts as charged in the indictment.

Monteer argues the district court “proffered an incorrect instruction” at the

post-trial hearing by failing to include the term “knowingly” in its recitation of the

elements of Counts II, III, and IV. Monteer argues this “instruction” was based on

Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instructions but omitted a “knowingly” mens rea element

that is required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and was included in a “pro se verdict

director” Monteer submitted before trial.

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This contention is without merit. There are no jury instructions in a bench trial. 

The district court considers the evidence submitted at trial and makes findings of fact

and conclusions of law in determining whether the government has proved the

offenses charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the indictment

charged that Monteer “knowingly” brandished and used a pistol during and in relation

to a crime of violence (Count II), “knowingly” discharged and used a pistol during

and in relation to a crime of violence (Count III), and “knowingly” discharged and

used an AR-15 rifle during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count IV). The

district court in its written Order found that Monteer “knowingly” committed each of

these offenses and recited that its findings were consistent with the court’s oral ruling

at the post-trial hearing. Neither Monteer nor stand-by trial counsel, who attended

the post-trial hearing, objected to the court’s oral summary of the elements of the

charged offenses. Neither filed a post-trial motion challenging the court’s findings

and conclusions even though stand-by counsel was granted a one-month extension

of time to do so. The evidence that Monteer committed these three offenses

“knowingly” was overwhelming. There was no error, plain or otherwise. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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