NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JANDIN ANTHONY RAUL MUÑOZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0270

1 CA-CR 17-0283

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-137390-001

CR2015-121642-001

The Honorable Alfred M. Fenzel, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Edward F. McGee

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 6-5-2018
STATE v. MUÑOZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Jandin Anthony Raul Muñoz appeals from a sentence entered

after the superior court revoked his probation. Muñoz argues the sentence 

constituted a consecutive sentence improperly imposed for "a single act"

under Arizona law. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Muñoz with one count of stalking (Count 

1) and one count of aggravated harassment (Count 2), both committed 

against his ex-wife, J.R., between January 4 and May 11, 2015. Muñoz pled

guilty to both charges.1

¶3 At the change-of-plea hearing, Muñoz provided a factual 

basis for the convictions. For Count 1, Muñoz admitted that between 

January 4 and May 11, 2015, he knowingly engaged in a "course of conduct"

directed at J.R. "that would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety, 

and in so doing, did cause [J.R.] to fear for her physical safety." Muñoz

stated the offense in Count 1 involved "text messages sent to the victim 

where he stated . . . 'snitches and hoes get killed on sight'" and "I will handle 

this myself." Muñoz added that "over a course of time," he sent "a number 

of other Facebook messages and texts" with the "same type of content."

¶4 For Count 2, Muñoz agreed that between January 4 and May 

11, 2015, J.R. had a valid order of protection against him, and that, in 

violation of that order, he contacted J.R. by "various means" and by doing 

so, he "harassed her and disturbed her."

¶5 According to the presentence report, J.R. and her family 

members contacted police about Muñoz on five different dates in January, 

February and May 2015. Over this time period, Muñoz sent J.R. at least 55 

text messages, numerous Facebook messages, slashed her and her father's 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
STATE v. MUÑOZ

Decision of the Court

3

tires, followed her vehicle from her residence, and parked outside of her

parents' residence. Muñoz also sent J.R.'s sister the text message, "I kill for 

fun . . . we love sacrificing bitches like you." In the presentence report, 

Muñoz admitted contacting J.R. and making derogatory statements.

¶6 Upon acceptance of the plea, the superior court suspended 

sentence on Count 1 and imposed a three-year probation term. On Count 

2, the court sentenced Muñoz to one year in prison. Muñoz completed his 

prison sentence on Count 2 in March 2016 and then began his term of 

probation for Count 1.

¶7 Later in 2016, in Maricopa County Superior Court cause 

number CR2016-137390-001, the State charged Muñoz with new crimes: 

One count of criminal damage (Count 1), two counts of assault (Counts 2

and 4), one count of kidnapping (Count 3), and one count of sexual assault 

(Count 5). A jury found Muñoz guilty of Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 and of a lesserincluded offense in Count 3. The jury also found Muñoz committed the 

crimes in the 2016 case while serving his probation term on Count 1 of the 

2015 case.

¶8 At sentencing in the 2016 case, the superior court imposed 

concurrent sentences of incarceration, the longest of which was 10.5 years.

The court also found the 2016 convictions constituted grounds to revoke the

probation imposed on Count 1 of the 2015 case, and sentenced Muñoz to a 

slightly mitigated consecutive one-year term of imprisonment. The court 

explained that it imposed a mitigated term because Muñoz "already served 

one year in state prison on the other count" in the 2015 case. Muñoz did not 

object to imposition of a consecutive sentence.

¶9 Muñoz timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018),2 13-4031

(2018), and -4033(A)(1) (2018).3

 

2 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

the current version of a statute or rule.

3 Under circumstances present here, a defendant who is placed on 

probation pursuant to a plea agreement may appeal a resulting sentence

imposed upon revocation of probation. State v. Regenold, 226 Ariz. 378, 380, 

¶¶ 11-12 (2011).
STATE v. MUÑOZ

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DISCUSSION

¶10 On appeal, Muñoz argues the superior court erred in 

imposing consecutive sentences on Counts 1 and 2 of the 2015 case. Muñoz

contends the underlying crimes of stalking and aggravated harassment in 

the 2015 case were so interrelated they constituted "a single act," rendering 

consecutive sentences impermissible under A.R.S. § 13-116 (2018).

¶11 Because Muñoz failed to raise this issue in the superior court, 

we review for fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567-68, 

¶¶ 19-20 (2005). Imposition of an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental 

error. State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 221, 224, ¶ 17 (App. 2011).

¶12 In relevant part, § 13-116 states, "[a]n act or omission which is 

made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be 

punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than 

concurrent." To determine whether § 13-116 bars consecutive sentences, we 

look to the three-part test developed in State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 315 

(1989).

¶13 Under Gordon, we first consider the facts of the underlying 

crimes, subtracting the evidence needed to establish "the ultimate charge –

the one that is at the essence of the factual nexus and that will often be the 

most serious of the charges." Id. at 315. If what remains is sufficient to 

prove the elements of the secondary crime, then § 13-116 may not bar 

consecutive sentences. Id. Second, we determine whether "it was factually 

impossible to commit the ultimate crime without also committing the 

secondary crime. If so, then the likelihood will increase that the defendant 

committed a single act under A.R.S. § 13-116." Id. Third, we consider 

whether the secondary crime exposed the victim to "additional risk of harm 

beyond that inherent in the ultimate crime. If so, then ordinarily the court 

should find that the defendant committed multiple acts and should receive 

consecutive sentences." Id.; see also State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360, 370-71, 

¶¶ 57-62 (2005).

¶14 Applying Gordon, we turn first to the underlying crimes of 

stalking and aggravated harassment. To prove Muñoz committed the 

crime of stalking, the State had to show that he (1) intentionally or 

knowingly engaged in a course of conduct directed toward J.R. that would 

cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety or the safety of an immediate 

family member; and (2) J.R. did in fact fear for her safety or the safety of her 
STATE v. MUÑOZ

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5

immediate family. A.R.S. § 13-2923(A)(1) (2015).

4 A "course of conduct"

includes "[m]aintaining visual or physical proximity to a specific person or 

directing verbal, written or other threats, whether express or implied, to a 

specific person on two or more occasions over a period of time, however 

short." A.R.S. § 13-2923(C)(1)(a)(i) (2015). An "immediate family member"

includes a sibling. A.R.S. § 13-2923(C)(2) (2015).

¶15 To prove Muñoz committed the crime of aggravated 

harassment, the State had to show that (1) with the intent to harass, he

contacted, communicated or caused a communication with J.R., continued 

to follow J.R. in a public place for no legitimate purpose after being asked 

to stop, or repeatedly committed an act or acts that harassed J.R.; and (2)

did so while there was a valid order of protection against Muñoz. A.R.S. §§ 

13-2921(A)(1)-(3) (2018), -2921.01(A)(1) (2018). The relevant statute defines 

"harassment" as "conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would 

cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed 

and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person."

A.R.S. § 13-2921(E).

¶16 Applying the first test under Gordon, we determine whether,

after subtracting evidence needed to establish the "ultimate charge" of

stalking, evidence remains to prove aggravated harassment. In the two text 

messages cited in the presentence report and at the change-of-plea hearing, 

Muñoz threatened to hurt or kill J.R. and her sister. Muñoz also sent 

Facebook messages, damaged property, followed J.R., and went to her 

parents' residence. For the crime of stalking, the State needed to prove

Muñoz directed threats toward J.R. on only two occasions. See A.R.S. § 13-

2923(C)(1)(a)(i) (2015). The text messages specifically cited in the record, by 

themselves, would have supported the stalking conviction if (and Muñoz 

does not dispute this) they caused J.R. to fear for her and her sister's safety.

Subtracting the text messages, sufficient evidence remained to prove 

Muñoz repeatedly contacted, followed and communicated with J.R. in a 

harassing manner in violation of a valid order of protection.

¶17 Under the second prong of Gordon, the record shows it was 

factually possible for Muñoz to commit each of the underlying crimes

without committing the other. Again, Muñoz repeatedly contacted and 

communicated with J.R. on several occasions over the course of four 

months. Because Muñoz could have committed stalking by sending only 

two of these communications, he could have committed the crime of 

 

4 The relevant crimes pre-date the 2016 amendment to A.R.S. § 13-

2923. See H.B. 2419, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., Ariz. Laws 2016, Ch. 44, § 1.
STATE v. MUÑOZ

Decision of the Court

6

aggravated harassment by his other harassing conduct. Similarly, the 

validity of the order of protection is relevant only to the crime of aggravated 

harassment.

¶18 Evaluating the facts under the final issue from Gordon, we 

reach a similar result. Although both of Muñoz's crimes occurred over the 

same four-month period, they caused separate and distinct types of harm 

to the victim and the community. In committing stalking by sending the 

two cited text messages, Muñoz caused J.R. to live in fear for her and her 

sister's safety. In committing aggravated harassment, Muñoz's repetitive 

conduct and utter disregard for a court order caused J.R. to suffer additional 

emotional harm. Moreover, a violation of a court order undermines the 

efficacy of the judicial system and harms the community.

¶19 Based on the foregoing principles, the crimes of stalking and

aggravated harassment in this case did not constitute "a single act," and the 

superior court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences.

CONCLUSION

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed on

the stalking conviction.