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AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARITIME NUCLEAR 

SMUGGLING THREAT AND OTHER PORT SECURITY AND SMUGGLING RISKS IN THE UNITED 

STATES 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

Serial No. 114–48 

Committee on Homeland Security 

Serial No. 114–79 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 

TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME 

SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 7, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and 

the Committee on Homeland Security 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

CRESENT HARDY, Nevada 

RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

MIKE BOST, Illinois 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

JANICE HAHN, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon (Ex Officio) 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (Ex Officio) 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JOHN DICKHAUS, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter from the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 

Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure ............................................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL 1 

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Deputy Commandant for Operations, Policy, 

and Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard .................................................................... 4 

L. Wayne Brasure, Ph.D., Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 4 

Todd C. Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection .................................................................. 4 

Anne Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration ............................................... 4 

PANEL 2 

Jennifer A. Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 24 

Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratories ...................................................................................................................... 24

David A. Espie, Director of Security, Maryland Port Administration, Port 

of Baltimore, on behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities ....... 24 

James H.I. Weakley, President, Lake Carriers’ Association ................................ 24 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hon. John Garamendi of California ....................................................................... 45 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan ................................................................................ 49 

L. Wayne Brasure, Ph.D. ........................................................................................ 53 

Todd C. Owen ........................................................................................................... 59 

Anne Harrington ...................................................................................................... 69 

Jennifer A. Grover ................................................................................................... 78 

Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D. .................................................................................... 96 

David A. Espie ......................................................................................................... 104 

James H.I. Weakley ................................................................................................. 109 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Rear Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Deputy Commandant for Operations, Policy, 

and Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, responses to requests for information 

from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Bob Gibbs of Ohio .................................................................................... 17 

Hon. Carlos Curbelo of Florida ........................................................................ 22 

Article entitled, ‘‘U.S. Ports Want More Action on Dirty Bomb Prevention,’’ 

Maritime Executive, July 6, 2016, submitted by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 116 

Letter of July 1, 2016, to Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, from 47 Members of Congress, submitted by witness David 

A. Espie ................................................................................................................. 118 

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(1) 

AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARITIME NUCLEAR SMUGGLING THREAT AND OTHER 

PORT SECURITY AND SMUGGLING RISKS IN 

THE UNITED STATES 

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

JOINT WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in 

room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 

Transportation) presiding. 

Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the efforts of the 

Department of Homeland Security to prevent the smuggling of nuclear materials in U.S. ports and other port security risks. This 

hearing follows last year’s hearing which examined the prevention 

and response to a dirty bomb at a U.S. port. And we had a classified hearing yesterday. We are going to make sure and skirt 

around those topics which we talked about yesterday and we are 

not going to talk about today in an open hearing. 

It seems clear that Islamic extremists aspire to carry out a radiological or nuclear attack, so this is a threat that we obviously need 

to take seriously. If anybody succeeds even once, the consequences 

would be catastrophic. To be prepared, we must ensure that we 

have the proper screening and response protocols in place. 

Today we will continue to review these efforts as well as the 

broader governmental efforts to reduce threats to our ports and our 

borders. I want to thank Chairwoman Martha McSally, who will be 

here momentarily, and the House Committee on Homeland Security for agreeing to explore this important topic in a joint hearing. 

The security of our maritime ports and borders remains a serious 

concern for the United States. Our Nation relies on the commerce 

that flows through our ports including the more than 41 percent 

of foreign trade that is moved on vessels every year. Providing adequate security requires an innovative, multifaceted approach which 

has to begin far from U.S. shores and has to be flexible enough to 

keep pace with the ever-changing threats to our national security. 

2 

After 9/11, security measures were enacted to better protect our 

homeland by expanding efforts to detect and deter threats overseas. These efforts include screening cargo manifests before containers are loaded onto a U.S.-bound ship, scanning shipping containers that have been determined to be high-risk, screening ship 

personnel data, and tracking ships and their cargo as they make 

their way to our shores. Despite these efforts, we want to make 

sure that we are still employing the best technology to detect the 

presence of nuclear or radiological material in containerized cargo. 

However, containers are not the only avenue for smuggling 

harmful materials and weapons into the U.S. ports. Small vessels 

pose an equally devastating threat and are just as difficult as containers to determine legitimate uses from potential threats. Commercial and recreational small vessels can easily blend into the 

daily activity of U.S. waterways and can be converted to stand-off 

weapons platforms, or used as direct attacks to deliver a waterborne IED [improvised explosive device]. 

We will hear from our witnesses today on how the Federal Government deploys a whole-of-government, layered approach including law enforcement, technology, and intelligence to detect, deter, 

and interdict potential threats. These internal measures are combined with treaties and agreements with foreign governments to 

conduct cooperative enforcement efforts overseas. That is one of the 

things that I found most interesting about what we are going to 

hear about today, is how far out we reach and the nations that 

work with us to make us safe back here at home. 

I look forward to continuing our discussion from last year and 

learning more about the ongoing efforts to keep our ports and Nation safe. 

With that, I yield to Chairwoman McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for our 

witnesses’ comments today on this very important topic. We had a 

good discussion in the classified realm yesterday, and look forward 

to a good discussion today on this very serious threat. 

We know that terrorist organizations, in my lifetime, in 26 years 

in the military, have been plotting and wanting to do the maximum 

amount of harm to our country and our way of life and our interests. The worst-case scenario that both my colleague and I, as we 

served in the military, was always a combination of terrorist organizations and weapons of mass destruction of various kinds. And 

in my role in homeland security we have addressed some of these 

other biological, chemical threats. Today I appreciate that we are 

highlighting the radiological and nuclear potential threats of that 

nexus between terrorist organizations getting access to these deadly weapons. 

We learned in my time in the military that threat equals capability plus intent. We have seen, through open-source reporting, 

that they clearly have the intent, you know, to maximize harm 

against America, the West, and our way of life. Certainly they have 

declared that intent through whatever means possible, and the 

devastation that would come from having such a capability in an 

attack would be severe, as we know, not just for the death and the 

loss of life and the impact on the economy, but also the fear that 

3 

it would invoke, which is, you know, certainly a motivation of the 

terrorists. 

So, as we look at now the capability—and I know we are in an 

unclassified realm—I look forward to hearing from our experts 

today about what the threat is. Now, we don’t want to be tipping 

our hand or highlighting to the enemy any of our vulnerabilities, 

so we need to be very careful as we are highlighting what these 

threats are, so that we can make sure that we are doing everything 

we can through a whole-of-society, whole-of-government, with our 

partners, in order to address and mitigate and detect and interdict 

these threats. 

We need to make sure that we highlight this in hearings like 

today so that we are doing all that we can to make sure that we 

are stopping any sort of attack from a radiological or a nuclear 

weapon from a terrorist organization like ISIS [Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria]. 

There are many pathways that these individuals could use in 

order to bring a weapon like this into our country. I live in a southern border district. That is certainly one pathway. Coming in 

through air, coming in through maritime, through our seaports of 

entry, small boats, all these types of things are ones that—we have 

seen the drug supply come through. And so I am interested to, you 

know, hear from our witnesses specifically about the threat. And 

again, to the maximum extent possible in the unclassified realm, 

you know, what we are doing about it and what more we could do 

about it. 

We do know that there has been just, again, recent reports revealing radiological nuclear material being lost or stolen several 

times a year, especially in Russia and other former Soviet States. 

Just as an example, several years ago FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] was involved in a sting operation that disrupted the 

sale of cesium which would have been enough to contaminate several city blocks. So this is the type of threat. 

The weapons-grade nuclear capability and the radiological threat 

that we are very interested in investigating further today, we appreciate the expertise and the service of our witnesses. And I yield 

back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Garamendi is recognized. You are all lucky. You get four opening statements instead 

of two today. You’re welcome. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Reviewing my statement earlier today and realizing there are four opening statements, Mr. Chairman, I would 

ask unanimous consent that my statement be in the record, and I 

will simply summarize very, very quickly, so that we can get on 

with hearing from the witnesses. 

We have got about 95,000 miles of coastal area in the United 

States. We have got 360 ports of various sizes around the Nation, 

and islands, and so forth, all of which present an opportunity for 

bad things to happen. We are going to talk about those nuclear 

issues, the biological issues, all of those, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

A very complex issue in many, many ways, but one that we have 

to deal with. Dirty bombs, real bombs, biological issues, and quite 

possibly we are now learning with Zika and yellow fever that it 

4 

may just be a human that is infected coming in from an African 

port or a South American port that could initiate a major public 

health crisis in the United States. 

And so these threats are real, they have to be addressed. The 

witnesses are well versed in these issues, and I am looking forward 

to hearing from them. And with that I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Vela is recognized. 

Mr. VELA. I would essentially adopt the comments of my colleagues and, for the sake of time, I would just say that I represent 

about 200 miles of the Gulf of Mexico along the—right along the 

U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas. But for the sake of time I would 

also yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. All right. We begin our first panel today with Rear 

Admiral Linda Fagan, the Coast Guard’s Deputy Commandant for 

Operations, Policy, and Capabilities. 

Rear Admiral Fagan, you are recognized to make your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LINDA L. FAGAN, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, POLICY, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST GUARD; L. WAYNE BRASURE, PH.D., ACTING 

DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE; TODD 

C. OWEN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE 

OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; AND ANNE HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Admiral FAGAN. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, thank you. 

Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi, Ranking Member 

Vela, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, it is my 

pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s efforts in 

preventing smuggling in U.S. ports. I thank you for your strong 

support of the Coast Guard and our men and women in uniform. 

It is a pleasure to be here alongside my Department of Homeland 

Security colleagues, Assistant Commissioner Owen, Director 

Brasure, as well as our Department of Energy partner, Deputy Administrator Harrington. 

My complete statement has been provided to the subcommittee 

and I ask that it be entered into the record. 

By leveraging our expansive legal authorities, offshore maritime 

presence, and utilizing a layered approach to maritime border security, the Coast Guard pushes maritime border security and enforcement out well beyond the Nation’s shoreline and exclusive economic zones. As a member of the intelligence community, and 

through strategic relationships with our interagency and international partners, we detect, deter, and counter threats as early 

and as far from the U.S. shores as possible. 

The persistent threats that we face include illegal migration, 

human trafficking, illicit flow of drugs, and smuggling of weapons 

of mass destruction. My testimony today will focus on the layered 

Coast Guard efforts to prevent smuggling of nuclear devices into 

U.S. ports. However, many of the initiatives, programs, and capabilities I will highlight enable the Coast Guard to prevent and respond to a multitude of threats we face. 

5 

The Coast Guard’s efforts to prevent smuggling of nuclear devices into U.S. ports and shores begins overseas. By leveraging 

international partnerships, as well as the International Port Security Program, the Coast Guard performs in-country port security 

assessments to determine the effectiveness of security and 

antiterrorism measures of our foreign training partners. 

Since the program’s inception in 2004, we have visited 150 countries and evaluated 1,200 port facilities. The Coast Guard maintains more than 40 maritime bilateral law enforcement agreements 

and 11 bilateral proliferation security initiative ship-boarding engagements. These agreements facilitate international cooperation 

and allow Coast Guard teams to board and search vessels at sea 

suspected of carrying illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or related materials. 

The Coast Guard’s membership within the intelligence community provides global situation awareness, analysis, interagency collaboration, opportunities with various counterterrorism components, including the Central Intelligence Agency, National 

Counterterrorism Center, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Direct, timely intelligence is a key enabler across a broad spectrum 

of threats. 

Cargo crosses the ocean and nears our shores. Coast Guard personnel located with the Customs and Border Protection National 

Targeting Center screens ship, crew, and passenger information. In 

2015 there were over 121,000 notice-of-arrivals and 32 million crew 

and passenger records screened by this team. 

As ships arrive in American waters, our authorities through the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act provide a robust regime of 

security plan approval and compliance inspections for both maritime facilities and vessels. 

Area Maritime Security Committees provide a recurring forum 

for key agencies and partners to address risks at each port. 

Through these committees we have training programs that focus on 

preventing and responding to transportation security incidents, and 

these are regularly exercised in the ports. And, for example, since 

2003 the Coast Guard has partaken or participated in over two 

dozen dirty bomb scenarios through this exercise program. 

Focusing specifically on the nuclear threat, in 2004 the Coast 

Guard developed and implemented a Servicewide Maritime Radiation Detection Program, partnering with the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office. We use their standards in all of our ships, and 

boarding officers are equipped with detection devices. 

Providing significant and unique maritime response capabilities, 

the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Response Teams are able to 

detect and identify nuclear and radiological material and protect 

personnel in both routine and hostile situations. Should the country face a—knowledge of a radiological or nuclear device being suspected of smuggling, we would use the interagency maritime operational threat response protocols to bring in interagency coordination together to ensure an appropriate Government response. 

The Coast Guard’s response to a nuclear detonation in the maritime domain would be part of a larger interagency effort to bring 

the most appropriate national resources and capabilities to bear. 

We focus on the safety of American lives and the swift restoration 

6 

of commerce. Our unique maritime authorities, jurisdiction, and capabilities ensure the Coast Guard can provide security, commandand-control, transportation, and support to other agencies that 

need to operate in the maritime today. 

For over two centuries the U.S. Coast Guard has safeguarded our 

Nation’s maritime interests. A nuclear threat response scenario 

would require a whole-of-government coordinated interagency effort. The Coast Guard’s layered security strategy, day-to-day operations, and coordination across the Government ensure that we are 

well-positioned to address the broad range of offshore and coastal 

threats. 

I have only touched on a few of these layers in my opening comments, and I look forward to discussing these and other vital work 

the men and women of the Coast Guard do every day during your 

questions. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

thank you for your continued support of the United States Coast 

Guard. Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Admiral. Our next witness is Dr. Wayne 

Brasure, the Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. 

Dr. Brasure, you are recognized. 

Dr. BRASURE. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman 

McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi, Ranking Member Vela, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the 

opportunity to be here with my colleagues from the Department of 

Homeland Security and the Department of Energy to discuss efforts to prevent smuggling at U.S. ports. 

An attack on U.S. territory with a nuclear device or radiological 

dispersal device would have grave consequences. At the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, we have a singular focus: preventing nuclear terrorism. It cannot be accomplished by any one 

agency. In fact, it takes a whole-of-enterprise approach. We work 

closely with our Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and international partners, as well as those in the national laboratories, industry and academia. 

DNDO was established to develop, in coordination with the interagency, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, or the GNDA. 

The GNDA is a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting 

nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory 

control. 

In our work to enhance the GNDA we rely on a critical triad of 

intelligence, law enforcement, and technical capabilities. Our strategy is to provide effective technologies to well-trained law enforcement and public safety officials as they conduct intelligence-driven 

operations. Through a multilayered, multifaceted defense-in-depth 

approach, our objective is to make nuclear terrorism a prohibitively 

difficult undertaking for the adversary. We take into account the 

geographic layers of the GNDA, both international and domestic, as 

well as the pathways through which the material can be transited, 

such as the maritime and aviation pathways. 

And so, our efforts to secure the homeland begin overseas, working closely with our interagency partners which have responsibility 

for implementing the international component of the GNDA. With 

7 

these partners and with multilateral organizations, the DNDO 

works to develop and share guidance, best practices, and training 

for the international community. 

Ultimately, building a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture relies on sovereign foreign partners developing and enhancing their 

own national detection programs. The collective efforts abroad help 

ensure that illicit nuclear or other radioactive material or devices 

can be interdicted before they arrive at our shores. 

As part of DNDO’s responsibilities to implement the domestic 

component of the GNDA, we equip DHS [Department of Homeland 

Security] operational components with radiation detection systems 

for use at our ports of entry, along our land and maritime borders, 

and within the United States. In particular, DNDO equips both 

U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection with radiation detection equipment. 

Today all Coast Guard boarding parties are equipped with detection devices. At our seaports of entry, CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] scans nearly 100 percent of all incoming containerized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO has acquired 

systems for the Coast Guard and CBP to detect threats when encountering small vessels. We recently procured a new technology 

called Human Portable Tripwire to enable our partners to more 

quickly detect, identify, and adjudicate alarms relating to nuclear 

and other radioactive sources. 

Building operational capability across the Federal, State, and 

local enterprise is also critical. DNDO is presently working with 36 

of the Coast Guard’s Area Maritime Security Committees. Through 

these committees we can share information and intelligence, assist 

with alarm adjudication, and provide technical support to our operational partners as they build their nuclear detection programs. 

In the event of an interdiction of radioactive materials or an act 

of radiological or nuclear terrorism, the U.S. Government would 

need rampant accurate attribution based on sound scientific evidence. For this reason, we enhance the Nation’s capabilities in 

technical nuclear forensics which, when coupled with intelligence 

and law enforcement information, support such determinations. 

To bolster readiness of the U.S. Government’s nuclear forensics 

capability in the maritime environment, we recently led the planning for and also participated in an exercise where an interagency 

task force coordinated the collection of simulated forensic evidence 

at sea. 

Advancing the operational readiness of partners will ensure that 

leadership has the evidence so they can hold fully accountable any 

State, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction. 

An act of nuclear terrorism would have profound consequences for 

our Nation and the world. With your support, we will continue to 

work with our partners to bolster defenses to secure maritime ports 

and our homeland from nuclear terrorism. 

Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Doctor. Our next witness is Mr. Todd 

Owen, Executive Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

8 

Mr. Owen, you are recognized. 

Mr. OWEN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Members Garamendi and Vela, and esteemed members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today to discuss the role of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection in the prevention and detection of smuggling activities at our ports of entry, an important responsibility we share 

with our partners here today. 

As the lead DHS agency for border security, CBP works closely 

with our domestic and international partners to protect the Nation 

from a variety of dynamic threats, including those posed by containerized cargo arriving at our air, land, and sea ports. Before my 

appointment as the Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations in February of 2015, I served in numerous 

capacities within CBP, most recently as the Director of Field Operations for the Greater Los Angeles area, including the L.A./Long 

Beach seaport. I have also served as the Executive Director over 

all of CBP’s cargo security programs, and I know firsthand how 

complex cargo security operations are, and how valuable our programs and partnerships are to our national security. 

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, CBP has established 

security partnerships, enhanced our targeting and risk assessment 

programs, and invested in advance technology, all essential elements to our multilayer approach to protecting the Nation from the 

arrival of dangerous materials, including radiological and nuclear 

materials, at our ports of entry. CBP has several key programs 

that enhance our ability to assess cargo for risk, examine high-risk 

shipments at the earliest possible point, and increase the security 

of the supply chain. And I would like to highlight just a few of 

these efforts today. 

First, CBP receives advanced information on every cargo shipment, every vessel, and every person before they arrive at our ports 

of entry. 

Second, our advance targeting techniques use the advanced data 

to enhance our ability to assess risk associated with these cargo 

shipments and with the entities involved. The National Targeting 

Center, using the Automated Targeting System, has developed 

state-of-the-art capabilities to assess cargo shipments before they 

are laid and on board vessels destined for the United States. 

Third, our partnerships, those with DHS and our other Federal 

partners, private industry, and foreign counterparts, increase information-sharing and enhance our domain awareness, our targeting 

capabilities, and the ability to intercept threats approaching our 

borders. 

Pushing our security efforts outward, the Container Security Initiative, which was established specifically to prevent the use of 

maritime containerized cargo to transport a weapon of mass effect 

or destruction, enables CBP to work with foreign authorities to 

identify and examine potentially high-risk maritime containers at 

the first foreign ports, before they are laid and on board a vessel 

destined for the U.S. CBP now has 60 Container Security Initiative 

ports in 35 countries, and we screen over 80 percent of the maritime containerized cargo before it heads to the United States. 

9 

And finally, in partnership with DNDO, CBP has deployed nuclear and radiological detection equipment, including radiation portal monitors, radio isotope identification devices, and personal radiation detectors, nationwide. Using radiation portal monitors at our 

ports of entry, CBP is able to scan 100 percent of all mail and express consignment parcels, 100 percent of all truck cargo and personally owned vehicles arriving from Canada and Mexico, and 100 

percent of all arriving maritime containerized cargo for the presence of radiological or nuclear materials. 

CBP’s detection technology, targeting capabilities, and partnerships are strategically aligned to prevent the arrival of dangerous 

materials or a dangerous weapon at a U.S. port. However, if such 

an event were to occur, CBP has established contingency plans and 

standard procedures to ensure a coordinated and effective response. 

In the event CBP detects a suspected radioactive source, all personnel are trained in secure, isolate, and notify protocols. The cargo 

is secured, the immediate area is isolated, and the scientific experts are notified. CBP scientists at the CBP Teleforensic Center 

in northern Virginia will confer with the Department of Energy, 

and, when necessary, refer the findings to the FBI to coordinate 

the appropriate response. All of these elements are part of a comprehensive cargo security strategy that enables CBP to identify and 

address the potential use of containerized cargo to transport 

radiologic weapons before they arrive at our Nation’s ports of entry. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I will be 

happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Owen. Our next witness is Ms. Anne 

Harrington, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Ms. Harrington, you are recognized. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you. Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman 

McSally, Ranking Members Garamendi and Vela, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for giving me 

the opportunity to discuss the Department of Energy’s National 

Nuclear Security Administration’s efforts to detect, deter, and investigate the illicit smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials. My full statement has been provided and I ask that it be 

entered into the record. 

I am also very pleased to be appearing today with colleagues 

from the Department of Homeland Security. You should look at the 

four witnesses in front of you as a team, because that is, indeed, 

how we work. 

Securing nuclear and radiological materials from theft, diversion, 

or trafficking is a critical element of U.S. national security strategy. Despite significant progress over the last 20 years by international cooperative programs, gaps remain and interest in acquiring these materials persist. 

The threat landscape as we see it today includes over 30 countries with weapon-usable nuclear material stored at hundreds of 

sites, with the largest inventory in Russia; more than 100 countries 

with radiological material stored at thousands of sites, many of 

which lack adequate security; a demonstrated black market for nuclear and radiological materials, as shown by recent interdictions 

in Georgia and Moldova; and terrorist groups that have taken root 

10 

in ungoverned or undergoverned spaces, compounded by the emergence of Daesh or ISIL [Islamic State of Irag and the Levant], a 

pseudostate with demonstrated capability to conduct international 

terrorist operations and an expressed interest in acquiring and 

using radiological and possibly nuclear materials against Western 

interests. 

We take our job seriously because the consequences are so high. 

The use of a high-yield, improvised nuclear device, or IND, in a 

major U.S. city would cause hundreds of thousands of fatalities. 

The use of a radiological dispersal device, or RDD, would not cause 

the same loss of human life, but would be highly destabilizing, with 

broad physical, economic, and psychological consequences, demanding significant resources and a multifaceted response. 

To counter this threat, the U.S. Government uses multiple means 

to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radiological materials. Within my organization, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, our Global Material Security program specializes in 

collaborating with partners worldwide to build sustainable capacity 

to secure nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, and radiological material, and to detect and investigate illicit trafficking of 

those materials. 

We serve as the farthest exterior ring of protection for the United 

States. Our approach is simple: our first line of defense is to secure 

nuclear and radiological material at the source, and not allow it to 

be removed from regulatory control. Recognizing that this may not 

be enough, we have a second line of defense: our Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program, or NSDD. 

NSDD is a critical component of the Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture. We deploy radiation detection systems internationally 

at official crossing points along rugged, unofficial borders in disputed territories which we call green borders, and along maritime 

borders, or blue borders, and at internal locations for law enforcement operations, working with our foreign partners, much the way 

the Department of Homeland Security works within the United 

States. 

More importantly, our goal is to build the capacity, infrastructure, and relationships necessary to sustain these efforts into the 

future, and to cooperate with us in those efforts. The GNDA is 

predicated on a layered defense of law enforcement, intelligence, 

and technology to maximize a system of detection and deterrence 

capability. In the words of DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, NSDD is the largest single program in the exterior layer, and 

provides significant potential to stop a U.S.-bound terrorist attack 

outside our borders. 

We have equipped 585 sites, including 46 large-container seaports, have provided 104 mobile radiation detection vans, and 

countless other handheld equipment. With this technology comes 

training, exercises, and sustainment support. 

We also focus on sustainability, and have already transitioned 85 

percent of our installations to full support by the host countries. 

We have taken important steps in countering the nuclear and radiological smuggling threat by developing a range of technologies, as 

already mentioned by our friends in DNDO, and we work closely 

together to establish the standards for those technologies. 

11 

NSDD’s ability to adapt to an evolving threat, engage diverse 

international partnerships, and its ongoing collaboration with the 

interagency and with international organizations uniquely position 

this program to remain a leader in deploying and sustaining core 

elements of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, with the ultimate goal of preventing the use of a nuclear weapon or dirty 

bomb in the United States. 

Thank you for your attention, and I will be happy to respond to 

your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Ms. Harrington. I am now going to recognize Members for questioning. 

I guess the one thing that I am going to comment on is this. 

With terrorism and Islamic extremism where it is now, and the 

ability for nonstate actors to get ahold of nuclear weapons, or to get 

ahold of radiological weapons, or let’s just say weapons of mass destruction of any kind, to have it nonattributable to any State, so 

there is no reciprocity, there is no mutually assured destruction, 

there is no deterrent for a nonstate actor to do something bad to 

the United States on a grand scale, because we would have no answer. If they came from Syria, we are not going to nuke Syria. If 

they came from a bad part of the world and they were nonstate actors, there is nothing we can do back to them as a deterrent. And 

these are people that will kill themselves and blow themselves up 

to kill 20 Americans, let alone 20,000 Americans. 

So I guess my question is this. Do you see—and this is for everybody—do you see a weapon of mass destruction going off in the 

United States as inevitable in the next 25 years? Do we need to 

get right of the boom, as opposed to left of the boom? We talk about 

getting left, going out as far as we can for the materials and everything. But do you think that it is inevitable that you will have a 

device go off at some point in the United States by a nonstate 

actor, and there is nothing we can do about it? So that is my question. 

Dr. BRASURE. I will begin to attempt to answer that question. I 

would say my answer focuses on we are doing everything we can 

to prevent that from happening. So in my world, my strategy, our 

teamwork is designed to prevent that by taking a holistic, riskbased, and multifaceted approach to securing the materials domestically and abroad, as well as setting up the detection and interdiction infrastructure to preclude that from actually occurring. 

I would also say that I cannot speak for the consequences, but 

what I can speak to are the technical capabilities in the national 

technical nuclear forensics arena, and I will assure you we are developing and we have a capability that we continue to improve to 

attribute the either interdicted materials or, with our interagency 

colleagues and some of the other programs, a post—you know, 

right-of-boom event to actually do the attribution to find out the 

source of the material. 

And so, I would say between those two elements, with respect to 

the prevention as well as the very real threat of an attribution 

through various means, including technical nuclear forensics, that 

again we strive to avoid that scenario from happening in the next 

25 years and beyond. 

12 

Ms. HARRINGTON. If I could add briefly to that, Mr. Garamendi 

mentioned the biological threat in his opening remarks, and that 

certainly is a very serious one. But unlike biological and chemical 

and even conventional explosive threats, where the material to 

make a weapon is so ubiquitous that it is difficult to control, in our 

universe it is all about the material. Without the material, nothing 

happens. 

And you can have all the expertise and all the accompanying 

technology you want, but without the material, the damage doesn’t 

happen. So our focus is, first and foremost, identifying where the 

material is—and that, as we discussed yesterday, is an issue between us and the intelligence community, but that is a very close 

collaboration; identify what the opportunities are to either eliminate the material, preferably, all together, or if not eliminate it, secure it. 

If we can’t secure it, then make sure we have a detection ring 

around that material or around that country to give us the highest 

level of confidence that we will see that material move if it is out 

of regulatory control. It doesn’t necessarily mean it always will be 

stopped, but as long as we know that something is in motion, then 

we can work with our partners, you know, in the United States in 

ports around the world, because of the partnerships we have developed, for that early warning system to kick in. 

But that is why it is so absolutely critical to push this protective 

ring that we are developing as far beyond our borders as humanly 

possible. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is all I have got. If no one else has an answer 

to that one, I am going to recognize Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I just want to scope 

the threat again, just—based from your testimonies. So we know 

there is, you know, basically 30 countries that we are working 

with, or are available for nuclear material as source, 100 with radiological is what you mentioned. We have got a very active black 

market, as you all mentioned. According to some open source reports, since December 31, 2014, there have been 2,700 cases reported to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] voluntarily by 100 countries of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material. So those are the ones that are voluntarily reported. 

Just, you know, one example, again, from an article in Moldova, 

in 2011 an informant was able to buy a highly enriched uranium 

in a green sack out of a Lexus parked near a circus in Moldova’s 

capital. This is just an example of the challenge that we are dealing with. 

ISIS is now present in—with affiliates, organized affiliates—in at 

least 20 countries, with foreign fighters coming from 120 different 

countries from all over the world. So this is just scoping the challenge. 

You talk about partnering with countries in order to make sure 

we are preventing on the outer ring. So, in my mind, if—who are 

the—I guess I would think Russia would be a big challenge. I think 

Moldova is a country of concern. So, in your expertise, who are the 

most challenging countries for either lack of capacity, lack of posiVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:13 Nov 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-7-16~1\20639.TXT JEAN
13 

tive control, or lack of partnership that we are talking about here 

for source of material? 

And I don’t know if—whoever wants to answer it, Ms. Harrington or Dr. Brasure. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Well, let me try to answer that in an unclassified way. 

One of the big challenges that we confront is, again, the shifting 

nature of the challenge. So in the past, we have been extremely focused, for example, on the very large stockpile of defense-related 

material in Russia. And we invested over 20 years of cooperative 

activity. We feel that, as a result of that cooperative activity, the 

standards and the practices were improved significantly. 

We don’t have insight into how those are being sustained any 

longer, and that causes us concern. But in response to that we have 

significantly accelerated—and I would say done so with a number 

of other partners, our European colleagues, Japan, Australia—we 

have an organization called the Global Partnership, where we 

bring funds and pool funds in order to improve these capabilities, 

for example, in Moldova, in Georgia, Ukraine, et cetera. So those 

activities are underway, and—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So if I hear you, I mean, Russia is a concern now 

due to lack of cooperation, mostly, lack of insight into what is really going on, whether there is positive control or not. Is that fair? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. That is a fair statement. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. And other countries of concern in the unclassified realm—I mean Moldova—I mean, just looking at an article 

why Moldova might be the most dangerous place on earth, because 

of this issue. That is a concern to me. I mean can you just share 

some other perspectives, whether you can in the unclassified, of the 

countries of concern? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Well, I would say, in general, we have excellent cooperation, for example, with countries like Moldova, like 

Georgia, like Ukraine, those perimeter countries, because they 

don’t want this—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. HARRINGTON [continuing]. Material passing through them, 

either. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So that is a good cooperation, but maybe lack of 

total positive control. But at least they are cooperating with us, 

right? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Absolutely. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Absolutely. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Mr. Owen, could we clarify? In your testimony you talked about 100 percent of containers, 100 percent of vehicles are scanned when they are coming in to the country. But you 

are talking about the radiological scanning. But the physical, the 

x-ray scanning, is more like 3 or 4 percent, is what I understand. 

And concerns about shielding or false positives, and what are we 

doing to maybe close the gap between what is actually being physically scanned versus, you know, what is being radiologically 

scanned, I just want to clarify it. 

Mr. OWEN. Right, and that is correct, 100 percent of the cargo 

does pass through a radiation portal monitor at whichever border 

14 

crossing it is coming through. So we do have 100 percent coverage 

for the radiation scanning. A much smaller subset of those containers that we determine to be higher risk are then sent for an 

x ray, if you will, a large-scale—different types of intrusive systems 

to see what is inside the containers. 

Those decisions are based on the targeting information that we 

receive, and our National Targeting Center has a very strong protocol, if you will, where we take not only the manifest information 

that the shipper provides, the importer information that the importing company will provide, we marry that up with our law enforcement databases, our trade databases, and most importantly, 

the information that we have from our intelligence community, as 

well as our international partners. All of those factors will determine that smaller subset, which is about 3.7 percent right now of 

those containers that we look at for highest risk. 

Now, overseas we look at—of that 3.7 percent, about 1 percent 

of that is actually inspected overseas as part of our Container Security Initiative. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Of the 3 percent, 1 percent—— 

Mr. OWEN. Of the 3 percent, so it is about 1.1 percent overseas 

before it heads our way, and about another 2.6 upon arrival, so 

about 3.7 in total. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK, great. My time has expired. Thanks, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. The ranking member from 

California is recognized. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to thank the witnesses for all of their 

testimony. There are so many pieces to this puzzle. The outer ring, 

Ms. Harrington, and the work that you have done there—my colleague, Congresswoman McSally, went into the Russia issue in 

some detail. Just one additional question on that. 

What efforts, if any, are being made to reengage with Russia on 

this issue? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. Thank you for that question. We have never 

completely disengaged from Russia, particularly in the nonproliferation, disarmament, threat reduction sphere. We have kept 

some of that interaction alive, mostly through technical exchanges, 

best practices exchanges, because if the geopolitics ever permit, we, 

of course, would want to be working with Russia again, not only 

in Russia but perhaps teaming with Russia to work in other challenging places of the world. We are the two big players in the nuclear world. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, having said that, it appears as though the 

engagement is at a very low level. That is, not terribly active. Is 

that the case? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. It is at a marginal level right now, yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What steps are being made to—are being undertaken to enhance the engagement? 

Ms. HARRINGTON. In—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Like, when is your next trip to Russia? 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. HARRINGTON. I have not been to Russia in a while. But we 

have staff on the ground in Russia, literally, every week. So it is 

not that we are not present. We—— 

15 

Mr. GARAMENDI. This issue of engagement with Russia goes way 

beyond this particular set of concerns. And it seems to me that it 

is in the interest of Russia and the United States to enhance our 

engagement at every level: parliamentarian, military, nuclear, and 

the rest. And so I would encourage you to get on the airplane. 

Next question, Mr. Owens. And maybe this goes beyond you to 

Dr. Brasure also, and that has to do with the secure freight initiative, which was at one point in six ports, and now appears to be 

only one port. Could you describe that situation, and why it has 

gone from six to one? And should it be more than just the port in 

Pakistan? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, absolutely. Back in 2006, 2007, we began to explore the idea of 100 percent scanning, where you would have the 

radiation screening as well as the x-ray screening before the container was put on the ship. We piloted this in six locations. We 

were in Qasim, Pakistan; we were in a terminal in South Korea; 

a terminal in Hong Kong; Port of Cortes, Honduras; Salalah, 

Oman; and in Southampton in the U.K. 

Lots of different challenges that came up from the diplomatic, to 

having our personnel overseas. There were environmental issues, 

there was the biggest, which was the throughput of the cargo and 

the impact at having 100 percent x raying would take place. 

The way these two systems work, the passive scanning of radiation is very—quite simple. The container passes through. If there 

is any radiation emitting, the technology will detect that. The challenge becomes with the x raying of the cargo, because that is a very 

manual process. Using the different technologies, an operator has 

to do different things to try to see if there is a threat. And that 

will slow down the process of the cargo flowing through the ports. 

When you have gate traffic—and some of these ports we piloted 

in it was all gate traffic, so the cargo all arrived at an entry gate 

in—you can set up a suite of technology that will allow you to perform 100 percent scanning, realizing there will be some impact. 

However, in most of your largest container ports around the 

world, it is transshipment ports. You have ship-to-ship, barge-toship, rail-to-ship, which presents a whole other challenge in terms 

of the flow of the cargo. So, after 4 years of testing this, we documented all of the different challenges, again, along the diplomatic, 

the operational, the impact, the limitations to the technology, and 

we decided that we would continue in the places that offer the 

greatest strategic benefit, that being Qasim, Pakistan—68,000 containers last year that came out of Qasim. Every one of those was 

scanned for radiation and an x ray was performed, the data being 

sent to our National Targeting Center here, in Virginia, where a 

U.S. CBP officer makes that go/no-go decision if that cargo is loaded on the vessel. 

In the last year we have also expanded that same operation to 

Port of Aqaba in Jordan for obvious reasons. So that is the approach that we are taking. Where can 100 percent scanning add 

the greatest value to enhance our overall security overseas? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And that takes us to yesterday’s hearing on the 

classified—— 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. Piece of it. Good. 

16 

A question to all of you, and that is resources, as in money. And 

I would like all of you to address this issue of funding, which is 

our problem. Do you have adequate funding to carry out the tasks 

that you have been assigned? Let’s start with the Coast Guard. 

Admiral FAGAN. Thank you. As you know, the Coast Guard participates in this mission from a layered approach. And as you go 

from the overseas international arena into the offshore, the approach is in the transit zone, and you know we are engaged in a 

major recapitalization of some of our aging cutter fleet designed to 

deploy exactly into those approaches in the—thinking specifically of 

the offshore patrol—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I don’t need to hear all the task of the Coast 

Guard. The question was do you have adequate funding for this 

specific task that we are discussing today? 

Admiral FAGAN. We are doing everything that we can within the 

mission zone with the resources that we have today. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, you danced around the answer. The answer is not appreciated. Either you have adequate funding or you 

do not. If you do not, we need to know. I mean that is our job. It 

is our job to provide the funding necessary to protect America, and 

your job is to carry it out. And right now your job is to answer the 

question. Do you have adequate funding to carry out this specific 

task? 

Admiral FAGAN. We have adequate funding to carry out the 

task—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. 

Admiral FAGAN [continuing]. As Coast Guard. 

Dr. BRASURE. Yes, sir. We also apply the resources we have. And 

in DNDO we apply them using a risk-based strategy across all 

areas. And we support the President’s budget submission. 

Mr. OWEN. And we have a workload staffing model that identifies the resources that we need, and the resource staffing model 

shows that we are 2,107 officers below what we need to carry out 

the resources. About 500 of those are directed towards seaports. So, 

on the personnel side, we do have a model that has been validated 

by independent groups that show we need additional resources, 

about 500, for the seaports. 

Also concerned about the aging technology that we have in our 

ports of entry, as well. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Ms. HARRINGTON. We have adequate funding for the mission requirements, but I would point out that affecting the budget of one 

piece of this layered defense affects how everybody is able to implement, because this is really that integrated. So, if the Coast Guard 

or Customs and Border Protection, or particularly DNDO is affected in the budget world, then that has an impact on our ability 

to execute. 

Also, I don’t want to get into this—it is as painful for Congress 

as it is for us—but CRs [continuing resolutions] are not a good way 

to plan and execute programs. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I yield. 

Ms. MCSALLY [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes 

Mr. Gibbs from Ohio. 

17 

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you, Chairwoman. I represent the Great Lakes 

region, and I realize ports are their major economic drivers, and 

understand it is important to make sure of port security. 

I want to talk a little bit about container security. In 2010 there 

was a GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] report that 

said that some countries are reluctant to comply with the international port security code due to concerns over sovereignty. And 

can you kind of give us—any one of you, I guess—this international 

port security is now—is it uniformly followed by our U.S. trading 

partners, or is there still concerns with sovereignty? 

Admiral FAGAN. The—as I mentioned in my opening comments, 

the—one of the programs the Coast Guard operates is the International Port Security Liaison Officer Program, where we have visited 150 countries and 1,200 ports, and have generally found quite 

good compliance as we have made those visits. There have been a 

small number of ports that have not adequately met that international standard, and we have protocols in for identifying those 

countries and increasing the scrutiny, the inspection, and the 

screening regime for ships that would have called from those particular ports. 

But generally, compliance is generally good with a few small exceptions. 

Mr. GIBBS. What kind of numbers on an annual basis that, you 

know—that—ships been refused entry or—you know, what is kind 

of—how often has this occurred, it is a problem that they are not 

in compliance? 

And then also, you know, what—is there a particular country or 

area that has been more of a problem for clients? 

Admiral FAGAN. I will get you the specifics on which countries 

and what numbers of ship arrivals we experienced from those countries. This is part of the advance notice of arrival screening process. 

The last five ports of call we look at crew, you know, passengers, 

containers, part of the National Targeting Center—the Customs 

and Border Protection mentioned we have a Coast Guard contingent over there. It becomes part of a seamless screening process, 

looking at the risk profile of a vessel before it comes to the United 

States, and decisions are made as to whether that vessel needs to 

be boarded offshore, allowed in port. Again, looking at the totality 

of the risk profile. 

I can get you specifics on what number of ship calls we have had, 

particularly from the countries that have had a port that is problematic from a compliance—— 

[The information follows:] 

If a country is found to have poor implementation of the ISPS code’s security recommendations, it may be considered by the Coast Guard as having 

inadequate antiterrorism measures and as authorized by law, the Coast 

Guard may impose conditions of entry (COE) on vessels arriving from that 

country or a particular port or facility. Such vessels are subject to a range 

of port State control actions, beginning with a COE verification of their security measures to mitigate risks, up to and including denial of entry. 

In 2015, 8,925 individual foreign vessels from 81 different flag administrations made 73,752 port calls to the United States. The Coast Guard conducted 1,712 COE verifications. In 2015, the bulk of the COE verifications 

were aboard vessels that visited Venezuela, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and 

Equatorial Guinea in their last five ports of call before arriving in the 

18 

United States. Of the 1,712 COE verifications, 24 vessels were issued ‘‘denial of entry’’ operational controls. None of the 24 were issued due to the 

vessels’ noncompliance with the COEs, or due to noncompliance with the 

ISPS code. 

With regards to ISPS compliance (not COE), there were 15 ‘‘IMO-related’’ 

denial of entry operational controls since the ISPS code was adopted. Only 

one was recorded as being issued to a vessel for failure to implement the 

ISPS code. That occurred in 2011. 

Mr. GIBBS. But you feel pretty comfortable that the program is 

working, that compliance with our trading partners is improving? 

Or is there something we can do more to enhance that? 

Admiral FAGAN. No, the program is quite mature and is working 

quite well, and I am very comfortable with the interagency coordination and communication that occurs as that vessel approaches 

the United States, and that there will not be a—sort of no surprise 

when a ship actually arrives then in the U.S. waters with regard 

to what the potential risk profile—be it from a last port of call that 

may have had a compliance issue. 

Mr. GIBBS. Thank you. I yield back, Chairman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Hahn from California. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you. I appreciate us holding this hearing 

today. Port security has really been my top issue since I have come 

to Congress. I represent the Port of Los Angeles and the complex 

of Long Beach in Los Angeles is within my backyard. So, as America’s port, you know, representing almost—you know, it depends. 

Using around 42 percent of all the trade coming into this country 

comes through our ports; Todd and I have worked together on a 

number of issues. 

But I will tell you, since 9/11 my concern has really increased in 

terms of something happening at one of our ports. Because of the 

nature of 9/11, certainly Congress has been more focused on aviation security because that was the nature of the attacks that day. 

And I think we have done a pretty amazing job at really changing 

the way we behave, and changing the way people fly. 

But I really believe that we have not done the same for the ports 

in this country. I take it very personal and very—I am very responsible about keeping the people of my district safe, but also understanding what an attack at one of our ports would mean to our national and, dare I say, global economy. 

I was happy 2012 that my legislation called the GAPS Act [Gauging American Port Security Act], which would have required DHS 

to identify remaining gaps in our Nation’s port security, passed the 

House. And in last year’s appropriations bill, my amendment requiring an assessment of cybersecurity risks at our Nation’s most 

at-risk ports was included and passed. And I am looking forward 

to seeing the findings that are going to come out in August of that 

report. 

And I am hoping, after today’s hearing, Congress will also seriously take into consideration my other bill called the SCAN Act 

[Scan Containers Absolutely Now Act], which would create a pilot 

program to test the implementation of 100 percent scanning technology at two selected ports in this country. 

19 

And Todd, I am going to direct my questions to you. It is a little 

disturbing when you keep saying 100 percent scanning, because 

that is really not the intent of the law that Congress passed in 

2006 called the SAFE Port Act [Security and Accountability for 

Every Port Act]. That was 100 percent scanning using radiation 

and x ray. So for you to keep saying 100 percent scanning of all 

containers coming in our ports is really not accurate, and I wish 

you wouldn’t say that, because it makes people believe that we are 

following what Congress intended. 

And it was unfortunate that Secretary Jeh Johnson has said 100 

percent screening and scanning is not the best use of taxpayer resources, and they are delaying yet again Congress’ will by another 

3 years. 

You know, the CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimated that meeting that mandate would cost about $22 billion to $32 billion 

over the course of 10 years, but we know—and that seems like a 

lot of money, but we know in 2002, when the west coast ports 

locked out the workers, we finally quantified that it was a $1 

billion- to $2 billion-per-day hit to our economy. That lockout lasted 

10 days, so there is your $20 billion right there. And if something 

were to happen at one of our ports, I think the economic risk, not 

to mention the loss of lives, would be enormous to this country. 

Let’s say—you know, I really want to know what you think 

about—because people say—you are included—most everybody 

here said it would slow down commerce if we did 100 percent scanning the way Congress intended. But I have never seen that to be 

proven, one way or another. And my bill would say, fine, let’s test 

it at two ports. Let’s have 100 percent scanning, radiation and x 

ray. Let’s see. Because I believe there is technology that exists 

today that will accomplish both, that will keep us safe but will not 

slow commerce down. 

If Congress decided to pass my bill, and we had a pilot program 

at two ports, what do you think—is there—do you think there is 

equipment that you would recommend that we could purchase or 

could use in testing this thing? I want somebody to prove me 

wrong, because I don’t think I am wrong on this one. 

Mr. OWEN. Well, again, with the—the way the law defined 100 

percent scanning, it was the radiation and the x ray. 

Ms. HAHN. Right. 

Mr. OWEN. The radiation piece is doable, we are already doing 

that. 

Ms. HAHN. Right. 

Mr. OWEN. We are doing that all around the world. It is the xray piece. 

Ms. HAHN. Right. 

Mr. OWEN. I have not seen a piece of x-ray technology that has 

yet to offer automatic anomaly detection. Every piece that I have 

seen still requires intervention from an operator to identify where 

the anomalies are, and that takes time. 

As you know, Los Angeles, Long Beach, 13,000 containers a day. 

Under your act we would scan and x ray 13,000 containers a day. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection currently has 10 pieces of nonintrusive inspection equipment to do that. We cannot do 13,000 

containers a day in Los Angeles with the equipment that we have. 

20 

So I think it is still an issue of the technology—— 

Ms. HAHN. Do you think there is technology out there that could 

solve this problem that maybe you have not tried yet? 

Mr. OWEN. I have not yet seen technology that can solve the 

problem. I know the vendors are working towards technology that 

can solve the problem, but I have not yet seen it deployed or in an 

operational setting, where it would not add to the further congestion of the ports. So I think that is something we need to keep in 

mind, too. 

You mentioned the $22 billion to $32 billion that the CBO report 

last month mentions. That does not include the reciprocal costs if 

foreign governments require the same actions in our ports. So if we 

had to scan every container leaving the U.S. to go foreign—because 

that is the requirement we have placed on them—I would argue 

there would be a detrimental impact on the throughput of the commerce through our ports, as well. 

Ms. HAHN. You know, and I know my time is up, and—but, you 

know, I will tell you I just don’t buy that. And I am sorry, and I 

will say every single day that I think our ports are some of our 

most vulnerable entryways into this country. And until we act on 

what Congress decided, 100 percent scanning, I don’t think we are 

going to have the safety and security we need. And I think slowing 

down commerce is certainly not my first option, but the alternative, 

what would happen to slow down commerce in this country, nationally and globally, if one of our major ports were to have an incident 

that shut them down, is unthinkable to me. 

And I hope we move forward with 100 percent scanning some 

day. I think that that should be our goal. I think we should move 

toward it. And I think there is technology out there. And the more, 

by the way—and this is my last statement—but the more, by the 

way, we begin to agree to that goal, we are opening up a great opportunity for entrepreneurs and businesspeople to begin developing 

technology. But as long as we are shutting the door on that market, I don’t think we are going to see the kind of technology that 

I know we are capable of creating to do both, keep us safe and 

move commerce. 

Thank you very much for the extra time. You know my passion 

about this. 

Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady. And our next 

panel is going to be a bunch of super-smart people on technology. 

So I hope you will stick around for that. 

With that, Mr. Curbelo is recognized. 

Mr. CURBELO. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity, and 

I thank all the witnesses for coming this morning. 

Admiral, a question for you. What is the Coast Guard doing to 

monitor potential risk from small-vessel attacks in U.S. ports, and 

distinguish between legitimate vessel operators and those engaged 

in illicit activities? This is of particular interest to us in south Florida. We have many small vessels in our waters. Please, go ahead. 

Admiral FAGAN. Thank you. As you know, the small-vessel threat 

is exceedingly complex, and there is no one single agency that can, 

you know, counter the threat from small vessels and, you know, 

constant vigilance is a—is an important element in the small-vessel 

threat realm. 

21 

Within the ports—and I can speak specifically from my time as 

the captain of the port in New York—there are a number of, you 

know, coordinating and communicating mechanisms through the 

Area Maritime Security Committee and others that help bring the 

other entities together to look at and understand what the risk and 

the threat streams may be. 

I am confident that within the law enforcement and the intelligence information flow into those coordinating communicating 

mechanisms, that we have got a whole-of-government, including 

Federal, State, and local partner, look at this threat stream, as 

well as others that may confront a port community in the United 

States. 

Mr. CURBELO. So it seems a daunting task to track small-vessel 

activity. Can you get into the degree of coordination you have with 

local authorities to help extend the Coast Guard’s reach and really 

monitor this as much as possible? 

Admiral FAGAN. Yes. So the Coast Guard coordination—you 

know, we have talked about at the international level, I will talk 

very specifically now at the port level. And again, to my personal 

experience in the Port of New York, there were over 200 agencies 

that we were regularly coordinating and communicating with. 

There are daily phone calls with some of the key law enforcement 

partners and agencies to get at and share information exactly on 

threat streams, small vessels or otherwise. 

That level of information and collaboration and coordination has 

never been better. There are other—you know, whether AIS [automatic identification system] and other technical means that then 

also allow insights into the number of vessels that are out there, 

and where that threat stream may be. Intelligence and law enforcement information really become powerful enablers as we look to 

counter threats from small vessels. 

Mr. CURBELO. Also your testimony states the Coast Guard conducts over 400 routine inspections in general law enforcement 

boardings every day to ensure vessels comply with international 

maritime law and safety standards, applicable U.S. law and regulations, and any control procedures required to access the Nation’s 

ports. 

Well, what are the infractions that are typical of one of these 

boardings or inspections? 

Admiral FAGAN. So if it is a large commercial vessel, we have 

talked about the screening, the advance notice screening. The infraction could be denial of entry into the United States of the vessel. The captain of the port has a broad range of authorities and 

responsibilities, and would be well within that individual’s authority to prevent a vessel from entering, to hold a vessel in port requiring certain safety and security and environmental compliance 

regulations be met before that vessel moves, all the way down to— 

and in the small recreational vessel community it could be a violation for failure to carry lifejackets. It runs the full breadth of safety, security, environmental, and the sort of follow-on actions are 

commensurate with what—— 

Mr. CURBELO. Do you have a rough estimate of how many of 

these approximately 400 daily boardings are small vessels? 

Admiral FAGAN. I do not have it, but I can get that for you—— 

22 

Mr. CURBELO. Sure. 

Admiral FAGAN [continuing]. Exactly what, you know, the number of large-vessel boardings, the small-vessel—what we call a 4100 

boarding, how many of those are occurring each day. And I will 

provide you a more detailed breakdown. 

[The information follows:] 

The Coast Guard averaged over 400 boardings or inspections per day in 

FY15. The below table includes confirmed boardings of small (less than 300 

gross tons) and/or recreational vessels, large (greater than 300 gross tons) 

vessels, and Safety/Security/Compliance Inspections of U.S.-flagged or foreign-flagged vessels. 

FY2015 Total Large Vsl 

Boardings 

Small Vsl 

Boardings 

U.S.-Flagged 

Vsl Inspections 

ForeignFlagged Vsl 

Inspections 

Annual 157,169 15,512 52,495 56,378 33,079 

Daily Avg. 434 42 144 156 92 

Mr. CURBELO. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mrs. Torres is recognized. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate myself with the comments given by my colleague that represents the 

Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach. I represent the 35th Congressional District. Everything that comes through those two ports 

makes its way to my district. We have lots of warehouses. Logistics 

is the business of the district. 

So, yes, I am very, very concerned about containers coming 

through, whether it is coming through the Alameda corridor or it 

is coming through by truck on the I–10 or the Route 60 freeway, 

which are regularly overcrowded with commuters trying to make 

their way to and from their jobs in Los Angeles to the Inland Empire. 

It is alarming to me that we have continued to ask for extensions. In this last request to extend this 100-percent check, is this 

your last request? I mean what assurances do we have that you actually have the technical expertise to deliver on your promise to 

Congress that you could meet the requirement given? 

Dr. BRASURE. So what we are doing in response to the Secretary’s new look at the legislation is to—we have put out an RFI, 

request for information, to look broadly at both material and nonmaterial solutions to the 100-percent overseas scanning. And we received—we targeted not just technology solutions, but broadly look 

into the private sector, for instance, to gain their insights, port operators, trade unions, just broadly and innovatively across the overall enterprise. 

We received approximately 30 responses back last month, and 

my team at DNDO is right now evaluating those responses. And 

indeed, they came from not only technology companies, but all the 

entities I just mentioned, they responded. 

So, once we evaluate those, we expect to hold meetings in sessions with the successful respondents in the August-to-September 

23 

timeframe, and we would be happy to come back and brief you 

on—— 

Mrs. TORRES. So these 30 new responses, they are different from 

what previously you have received? And how are they different? 

Dr. BRASURE. So they are different because we looked, again, 

more broadly beyond technology companies. And I would like to 

point out that, with respect to technology companies, we are currently piloting and evaluating technologies that could be applied to 

100 percent scanning, and we are in various stages of evaluation 

in pilots for such technology solutions. 

But again, the RFI is addressing more broadly inputs from, 

again, the private sector and looking to them for their solutions, 

and they are sharing in this 100-percent scanning activity. 

Mrs. TORRES. Rear Admiral, in your testimony you state that the 

Coast Guard conducts foreign port assessments and have visited 

more than 1,200 port facilities. Does the Coast Guard share those 

results of the security assessments with U.S. ports, such as the 

Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach? 

Admiral FAGAN. So the outcome of those port visits and port assessments factor into our risk-based screening, as we determine 

what the risk portfolio around a large commercial—presenting to 

the United States from a passenger and cargo and crew standpoint, 

and that is then factored in to, you know, the decisions on whether 

you are going to do boarding offshore at the anchorage, or into the 

port. 

In cases where there is a particular concern, say, with a crewmember that you are concerned may get off the ship, there are 

then, you know, additional security measures that are coordinated, 

you know, through the Coast Guard and the captain of the port authorities. I am not sure how much is publicly shared in the unclassified realm, but I do know it is very fundamental to our valuation 

of risk associated with a ship because of having called at one of 

those—— 

Mrs. TORRES. I am more concerned—— 

Admiral FAGAN [continuing]. A port that might not—— 

Mrs. TORRES [continuing]. Ma’am, about sharing lessons learned, 

you know, what you are learning about potential risks, not necessarily attached to, you know, personnel, but logistics types of 

risks, where we could do a better job sharing information with the 

port authorities, as well as—I want to make sure that you are including—and this is for all of you—don’t forget that, you know, the 

shipments that you are not inspecting eventually make their way 

to districts like myself, putting millions and millions of people at 

risk. 

And I think, you know, we really need to look at and consider 

what is the life—the cost of the lives of these millions of people 

that are being put at risk when we fall down and continue to ask 

for extensions? I understand, you know, that there are technical 

challenges, but at some point we need you to deliver on what Congress has asked you to do. 

And with that I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. And I would like to point 

out, too, to Ms. Hahn, we have the RFI that the Department of 

Homeland Security has put out to—an open RFI that said, ‘‘Hey, 

24 

come one, come all, bring your technology, bring your best stuff, we 

want to see it, we want to do this,’’ right? It is right here. If anybody would like to see this, too, we have it on hand. 

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your time, for 

your service to our Nation, and for doing what you do. Because 

without you we wouldn’t have—we would not be as safe as we are 

now. And I just hope that you are always seeing the new challenges coming up and—especially when, once again, when people 

will kill themselves to kill 20 Americans, they will happily sacrifice 

their lives to Allah to kill thousands of Americans. I think that 

that raises the stakes. Like Ms. McSally said, when you put in— 

when you combine terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, it 

is a whole new ball game. And that is where we are right now. 

So thank you very much, and we can have our next panel of witnesses come up. Thank you. And I will go ahead and introduce 

them now. 

On our second panel of witnesses, Ms. Jennifer Grover is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice for the U.S. GAO. She will 

be the first to present testimony. Then we have Dr. Gregory 

Canavan, a senior fellow of the Los Alamos National Laboratories; 

Mr. David Espie, the director of security at the Port of Baltimore; 

and the final witness, Mr. James Weakley, president of the Lake 

Carriers’ Association. 

And I would like to preface this next panel. I would hope that 

everybody that was on the next panel was present here during the 

first panel. And if you could, let’s talk about what we just heard. 

We had a classified hearing yesterday, we just had this hearing 

now, and you just heard how our Government offices are trying to 

treat any kind of weapons of mass destruction, from the far-flung 

areas of Moldova and Georgia and Ukraine all the way to our 

shores, checking small boats and also checking with other countries 

and having them help us by checking stuff as it leaves their nations. 

So, Ms. Grover, if you would start, and I don’t necessarily have 

any questions specifically for this panel, but I would like you to 

comment on what you just heard. Because, I mean, that is the 

American security system you just saw for weapons of mass destruction. They were just here, they just talked, so I am curious 

what your take is. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER A. GROVER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; GREGORY H. CANAVAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORIES; DAVID A. 

ESPIE, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, MARYLAND PORT ADMINISTRATION, PORT OF BALTIMORE, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES; AND JAMES H.I. 

WEAKLEY, PRESIDENT, LAKE CARRIERS’ ASSOCIATION 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Garamendi. I will focus most of 

my comments today on the perspectives that you heard from CBP. 

With about 12 million cargo shipments arriving each year, the 

U.S. maritime ports do indeed remain vulnerable to smuggling. 

CBP has determined that it does not have the resources to examine 

25 

every shipment. So, instead, what they are doing is counteracting 

the smuggling threat by identifying and examining the high-risk 

shipments. Yet, ensuring that this approach functions properly is 

indeed still a work in progress. 

So, I will focus on two points. First of all, how does—how well 

does CBP do in identifying those high-risk shipments for examination? And then, secondly, how well do they do in actually examining the high-risk shipments that have been identified? 

So, the automated targeted system is the heart of CBP’s ability 

to identify those high-risk shipments that could contain weapons of 

mass destruction, illegal drugs, counterfeit goods, or other prohibited items. The system works by designating every shipment as 

low, medium, or high risk, based on a broad range of information 

that is submitted by importers, vessel carriers, intelligence, and 

other Government and public sources. It is used to identify the 

high-risk cargo before it is loaded onto vessels at the foreign ports, 

as well as to identify high-risk shipments approaching the U.S. 

ports. Thus, it is essential that the system be accurate. 

In 2012, GAO found that CBP updated this system without evaluating the impact of the update on the accuracy of the targeting. 

At the time, CBP’s data on its targeting accuracy suggested considerable room for improvement. Specifically, of all the shipments 

found during examination to include contraband, such as guns or 

drug shipments, only 6 percent had been identified by the targeting 

system as high risk. Now, this is data from 2011 and 2012, because 

this was from a 2012 report. 

In other words, the remaining 94 percent of shipments that were 

actually found to have contraband during examination had been 

identified as low or medium risk by the system. Also, at the time, 

CBP did not have a target accuracy rate, which was limiting their 

ability to monitor progress in the area. 

Now, last year, CBP responded to GAO’s recommendations by 

setting a target accuracy rate, and by requiring that future system 

updates should evaluate the impact that it would have on accuracy, 

as well as on workload. And therefore, they are in a better position 

to monitor the accuracy, going forward. And I can tell you that the 

targeting accuracy rate now is significantly improved over where it 

was in 2012, and the component continues to refine the targeting 

and the method for analysis. 

So now let me just take a minute or two and talk about how well 

CBP does at ensuring that those high-risk shipments are actually 

examined after they have been identified. So CBP’s policy is that 

every high-risk shipment must be examined, unless the exam has 

been waived by a CBP officer. In a 2015 report we found that, of 

the roughly 120,000 high-risk maritime shipments that are processed each year—that were processed each year, 2009 through 

2013, most, about 90 percent, were actually examined. 

But CBP did not have good data on the disposition of the other 

10 percent that should have been waived. Our review of the data 

showed that some of those shipments weren’t actually high risk, so 

they would not have needed to be examined. Some were examined 

and recorded improperly, but there were some that were not 

waived, but also not examined, in violation of CBP policy. And 

among those that had been waived, we found that the CBP officers 

26 

varied in their understanding of the waiver categories and criteria, 

which could lead some shipments to be examined unnecessarily in 

a waste of resources, and other shipments waived that should have 

been examined. 

So, we made several recommendations which CBP has addressed. 

They have new guidance and policy that should enhance consistency across CBP officers, thus leading to greater assurances that 

all of the high-risk cargo will either be examined or waived, as appropriate. 

So just one or two other points on some of the issues that came 

up today, and that is to acknowledge that maritime ports are indeed vulnerable to smuggling by means other than cargo containers. 

Small-vessel securities was one of the topics that was discussed 

by the previous panel; that does indeed remain a challenge because 

small vessels are unregulated. They are just hard to track. 

Another example of a different type of vulnerability besides the 

cargo containers is that ports remain vulnerable to illegitimate access through weaknesses in the TWIC [Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential] access card program, which is the way 

that—the system that is used to control access to the ports. 

So DHS does have multiple initiatives in place to address both 

of those issues. They are aware of the concerns, and they are making progress, although more work needs to be done. 

So, to conclude, DHS does indeed have multiple systems in place 

intended to ensure port security, to identify and examine cargo 

shipments at high risk for smuggling, but in this area of Government operations, as in many others, it is essential that the Department implement the programs as intended and, very importantly, 

monitor outcomes to maximize security. 

Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to any questions you may have. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Ms. Grover. 

Dr. Canavan, good to see you again. You are recognized. 

Dr. CANAVAN. It is nice to be back. I am here to talk about the 

detection of clandestine nuclear weapons. 

The last time I was here I made the argument, which I think has 

held up pretty well, that fast neutrons could be used to detect bare 

nuclear weapons in things of the size of, say, a TEU [twenty-foot 

equivalent unit] or two TEU, for weapons that were in with a 

manifest of ordinary things, normally in one of those containers. 

This time I want to extend that to say I believe that the same approach can be used to detect nuclear weapons which are in TEUs, 

but instead of just the bare core itself, something with a basketball 

size of moderator or absorber around it to minimize its signatures 

to make it harder to detect. 

I am talking about nuclear weapons rather than the dirty bombs 

which have been primarily discussed up to this point. And I am 

emphasizing weapons, because nuclear weapon material—uranium 

or plutonium—has essentially no useful and reliable signature that 

can be detected passively. Uranium and plutonium have a few 

gammas that are easily screened out by a thin layer of lead. So you 

really do need to do something to excite the system in order to get 

27 

a signal out—in this case a fission, a unique and discernable signature that leads to high-confidence detection. 

I am sorry Ms. Hahn left, because it is also a very fast detection 

system. It has a very low false alarm ratio. Therefore, it would be 

suitable to inspection of everything that goes through a port, rather 

than just a fraction of it, because it is fast and doesn’t have the 

false alarm problems for reasons that I will come back to in just 

a minute. 

It is largely the same story as the previous testimony. Fast neutrons scatter around inside the container. If they encounter nuclear 

material, they produce fission. The fission neutrons diffuse out as 

a distinct and pervasive signal that is easily detected. 

The reactions that produce the fission neutrons produce a big 

separation in energy between the source neutrons and the fission 

neutrons, which is the basis for high signal-to-noise ratio detection. 

Filtering between the two energies detects the signal. 

A couple of quick points. One is that the fast neutrons penetrate 

a large portion of material to produce this direct signal. Even when 

something is buried in an enormous amount of moderator, the high 

signal return from the moderator itself still reveals the composition 

and thickness of that moderator, which signals the object’s intended purpose. 

A related point that I thought would have come up the last time, 

but didn’t, is that when someone puts additional moderator around 

a weapon to hide its signature from the weapon, that increases its 

signature and criticality. 

As an example, if you take a solid-core device, the kind Pakistan 

has put into international commerce now, back off about 10 percent 

margin for safety, but then add another 15 centimeters of moderator around it for signature reduction, you return it right back up 

to criticality. That won’t hurt us, but might be a problem for the 

person who assembles it at the point of origin. 

A related point is that when you put fast neutrons into a nuclear 

assembly, it produces fewer fast neutrons than you put in. So you 

cannot generate a critical assembly, or a nuclear explosion, by nuclear interrogation itself of a subcritical device. So that is not an 

additional concern. 

A related point is that when you interrogate a nuclear assembly 

with a moderator around it, the neutrons bounce back and forth between the core and moderator and produce fission many times. The 

net result is that you get a signal that persists many—10, 100— 

times longer than the length of the exciting pulse. It is a distinct 

signal with high energy that persists for long times and propagates 

long distances from the device. 

A technical point is that the detection on the basis of energy depends on the ratio of the difference in energy between the fission 

and the source neutrons divided by their variance. I am sorry, this 

is statistics 101, I can see you are not appreciating this, sir. No 

more math, no more math. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. CANAVAN. But the point is that fission produces a big energy 

separation, and for fundamental reasons, the variances of the fission neutrons become smaller in time as they go down in energy. 

Their signal-to-noise ratios get to be 100, 1,000, 10,000. With very 

28 

high signal-to-noise, you have very low false alarm ratios, which is 

what Ms. Hahn was alluding to. 

And so, it is everything that you would like to have. Plus, as it 

turns out, the way the statistics go together, the high signal-noise 

ratios that you generate are quite insensitive to the statistics of the 

noise, so the signals remain exceedingly high. 

To put this into context, x rays can tell you that there is mass, 

but can’t tell you what it is. Passive sensors can’t detect nuclear 

materials with low signals. There is nothing to detect. And thermal 

neutrons, which is what the DOD [Department of Defense] spent 

most of its money on after 9/11, produce complicated detection 

schemes with low statistics that are easy to counter measure. 

Overall, fast neutron interrogation offers an approach that would 

fit well with the sensors and mountings for these existing systems, 

and would produce what I think is an exceedingly high signal 

noise, low false alarm, high throughput system, based on fairly 

straightforward physics that is used in reactors and experiments 

every day, sensors that are used today for down-hole well-hole logging, and detectors that are used for reactors and experimental 

physics for measurements are made at fairly low and benign energies. 

Thank you very much, sir, and I am sorry about the math. 

Ms. MCSALLY [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Canavan. I am having 

flashbacks to my physics classes at the Air Force Academy. I won’t 

sleep well tonight. But we got some good questions based on the 

technology that you discussed. 

And Mr. Espie, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ESPIE. Thank you, Chairmen Hunter and McSally, and 

Ranking Member Garamendi, for convening this hearing today. I 

am testifying today through your invitation, and on behalf of the 

American Association of Port Authorities, where I am a member of 

the Security Committee. This is a vital topic, which could ultimately impact the safety and security of the United States if not 

addressed in a cohesive and expedited manner. 

In my role as director of security for the Port of Baltimore, the 

prevention of maritime nuclear smuggling into the United States is 

a top priority, and it requires a multifaceted approach. It requires 

the input of diplomatic resources, technical assets, human capital, 

and appropriate funding to facilitate subsequent preventative 

methodologies. All this requires a strong partnership with the Federal Government. 

As a retired FBI agent and former special agent with the National Security Agency, I also view our security from a national and 

international perspective that must empower ports to be more engaged in our national security apparatus. In my experience, it is 

vital that our Government have sound diplomatic relationships 

with countries that will cooperate with the United States in not 

only applying necessary security measures to secure their own nuclear materials, but will also assist in countering a neighboring 

country or one in the certain region that may possess such material 

and may have negative intentions against our country and others. 

Global diplomacy and policies impact local port security enforcement. Positive measures currently in play are the State Department’s Counter Nuclear Smuggling Unit, the Department of EnerVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:13 Nov 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-7-16~1\20639.TXT JEAN
29 

gy’s partnership with nearly 50 countries providing radiation detection and nuclear forensics equipment, and the recent Nuclear Security Summit held here in Washington. 

I cannot emphasize enough the importance of technical aspects 

of our intelligence and Federal law enforcement agencies that must 

be continually deployed and refined. 

Existing capabilities and resources must be deployed and fully 

capable in order to maximize our country’s opportunity to readily 

identify and neutralize potential threats. Development and tasking 

of domestic and international sources must remain a priority for intelligence agencies and services and our local State and Federal 

law enforcement agencies. In some cases I believe it would be beneficial for our port security directors in the United States to receive 

FBI briefings. 

The threat of maritime terrorist smuggling appears to be increasing, possibly in correlation with the flight of Syrian refugees to and 

from Europe. Recently, a stowaway on a roll-on, roll-off vessel destined for the Port of Baltimore was located by a ship’s crew and 

taken into custody by CBP and HSI [Homeland Security Investigations]. The stowaway admitted that he boarded the vessel while it 

was docked at a German port. Approximately 1 week prior to this 

event, a shipping lines manager in Baltimore advised me that his 

lines had experienced several stowaway attempts by Syrian nationals in Germany, as well. 

Directors of port security in the United States are not routinely 

granted a security clearance with the Federal Government, and 

hence are not provided classified briefings regarding threats to 

their ports. In addition, port security directors are unaware of any 

type of unique intelligence centers wherein maritime nuclear smuggling intelligence is specifically received and analyzed in an effort 

to connect the dots, if you will, and prevent such an incident. 

The suspects of maritime nuclear smuggling efforts are numerous. The actions and aggressiveness of ISIL, for example, are challenging all aspects of our port security procedures. The threat from 

ISIL emerges on several fronts. First, the size of ISIL’s force is substantial. Secondly, ISIL is not a congruent entity. Its leadership remains in a fractured state and, subsequently, subfractions form 

that are very difficult to identify or even trace. Third, ISIL’s use 

of the Internet and related systems to recruit both actual soldiers 

or lone wolves has proven to be extremely successful. 

As a former police officer, now as a port security director, resources that can be utilized at the local level are vitally important. 

FEMA’s [Federal Emergency Management Agency’s] Port Security 

Grant Program has been instrumental in coordinating port-specific 

security needs with national and global threats. 

The AAPA [American Association of Port Authorities] encourages 

Congress to continue to fund the Port Security Grant Program, but 

also insist that grant funding be directed to ports and not diluted 

to other law enforcement entities that are not associated specifically with ports. 

Cybersecurity is also a prime example of emergency security concerns since 9/11. Ports are working with stakeholders in addressing 

this very complex issue. For example, in a recent survey conducted 

by the AAPA, it was found that 52 percent of our ports have conVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:13 Nov 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-7-16~1\20639.TXT JEAN
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ducted a cybersecurity assessment within the last 3 years and 67 

of our ports’ Area Maritime Security Committees have formed a 

cybersecurity working group. 

Cargo containers have been identified as the most plausible 

mechanism for smuggling nuclear material into the United States. 

Over 11 million containers are shipped to our Nation’s 300 sea and 

river ports on an annual basis. With the recent completion of the 

Panama Canal expansion, the number of containers from foreign 

ports will dramatically rise. 

Congress previously mandated that all incoming containers to 

the United States be screened overseas. To date, this law has not 

procedurally been incorporated wherein exemptions have been employed by the Department of Homeland Security. Recently, an extension of the law’s implementation was again approved by DHS 

with the support of the AAPA and by also 100 supply chain industry stakeholders. It has been estimated that it would cost approximately $20 billion to deploy scanning procedures and technology at 

the 700 foreign ports which ship cargo to the United States. 

And I mentioned containers. This does not cover what we call 

roll-on, roll-off cargo—RoRo cargo—vehicles. In the Port of Baltimore we receive over a half million vehicles a year. They are not 

scanned as they come to the United States. 

In sense of time, I would just like to go to the conclusion to 

whereas—again, our—in summary, our Nation’s strategy to prevent maritime nuclear smuggling must utilize a holistic approach. 

This strategy should continue to incorporate diplomatic engagement; utilize the intelligence community, human and technical assets; continue the examination of port security protocols to include 

those which are federally mandated and those imposed by port operators themselves; increase funding of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency’s Port Security Grant Program to ensure 

ports are and remain in Federal compliance; and the investment of 

appropriate funding levels for Federal agencies, particular CBP, in 

order for current and future legislative mandates to be properly implemented. 

Again, I thank you for this opportunity, and I am glad to answer 

any questions directly and explicitly. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Espie. The Chair now recognizes 

Mr. Weakley for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WEAKLEY. Good morning. There is a tremendous interest in 

the intersection between our maritime industry and homeland security. Our Nation’s water borders far exceed our land borders. 

The Great Lakes demonstrate the importance of marine homeland security. The southern land border of the United States is 

about 2,000 miles long. However, the Canada-U.S. border is three 

times as long, and much of that is water. I represent 14 American 

companies who operate 56 vessels on the Great Lakes. We carry 

the raw material that drives our economy: iron ore and flux stone 

for steel, aggregate and cement for construction, coal for power, 

and other cargoes. We transport 100 million tons of cargo a year, 

and employ 1,600 Americans. Our cargoes generate 103,000 jobs 

with an economic impact of $20 billion. 

I will focus the majority of my testimony on how my members 

transition their vessels from homeland security risks to resources. 

31 

The Great Lakes are tied together by connecting channels and 

locks. The St. Lawrence Seaway connects us to global trade. The 

navigation channel crosses the U.S.-Canadian border 17 times in 

the Detroit-St. Clair River alone. Canadian and American fleets 

compete for the cross-lake cargo. In 2013 it was 37 million tons. 

Canadians carry 93 percent of it; Americans carried only 3 million 

tons. 

Foreign-flagged vessels primarily import steel and export grain 

via the Great Lakes. DHS warns an interruption of domestic shipping through a single lock in Michigan would have catastrophic impacts on the regional and national economy, and would plunge 

North America into a severe recession. DHS estimates that 11 million Americans would become unemployed if this lock were inoperable for 6 months. The resulting loss of 60 million tons of cargo 

would drive Michigan’s unemployment to 22 percent, exceeding its 

peak unemployment rate of 15 percent during the 2009 recession. 

The Jones Act is the fundamental law of American maritime industry, and also a fundamental law of American homeland security. It requires that any cargo moving between our ports be carried on U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, and U.S.-crewed vessels. In other 

words, American vessels. One of the most important benefits of the 

Jones Act is homeland security, which includes the prevention of 

smuggling and much more. 

Former Senator Slade Gorton wrote, ‘‘helping to plug a porous 

border is a benefit of the Jones Act that is far too often overlooked.’’ 

The single most important thing you can do to promote maritime 

homeland security is to support the Jones Act. I have worked for 

the Coast Guard, for an American shipping company, and now for 

LCA [Lake Carriers’ Association]. I strongly believe the Jones Act 

is our best line of maritime homeland defense. 

Risk is a combination of threat and vulnerability. The Coast 

Guard uses the MARSEC [Maritime Security Threat Level] system 

to relay threat levels. Once notified, we take action. The second aspect of risk is vulnerability. LCA members use our Coast Guardapproved alternative security plan to minimize our vulnerability. 

We deploy many security measures, including access control, perimeter expansion, personnel screening, vessel security sweeps, 

random baggage searches, inspections of cargo, and inspections of 

ship stores. We adjust our security profile based on threat level, 

vessel operations, and operational area. 

Professional mariners recognize something afoul, and notify the 

Coast Guard via the Eyes on the Water program. Shipboard radars 

can detect and monitor uncooperative aircraft and vessels. We are 

partnering with a vendor to record radar screens and to allow remote access. Providing historical pictures can reveal suspicious activity. Remote access provides actionable information. These lowcost programs make our homeland more secure. We are proud to 

be full partners. 

Threats to homeland security are daunting. Every day we execute security plans, cooperate with law enforcement, implement innovative programs, and defend the Jones Act. 

Our goal, as Americans, is to transition from security risk to security resource. Thank you. 

32 

Mr. HUNTER [presiding]. Thanks, Mr. Weakley. It is kind of 

funny. We were talking about privateering, actually, when James 

Madison—and how he gave—he basically deputized American merchant mariners to go protect America’s shores and ocean, something we are looking at, a little bit tongue in cheek, but not really. 

I mean, because that is what—in San Diego we had the same 

thing, where our sport fishermen are out there on the water every 

day, watching boats going in from Mexico, and they know who is 

good and who is bad. And CBP relies on them massively because 

a lot of these guys are former cops, former security specialists, military, and they are on the water every day. So thank you. 

Two things. Ms. Grover, one, do you know—has GAO looked at— 

let’s look at this, let’s look at 90 percent of what the Coast Guard 

does in terms of interdicting drugs and stuff and people, compared 

to what would happen if you have a nuclear device go off. Have you 

looked at the percentage of resources, time, and assets that are 

used for a—for homeland security, meaning stopping a weapon of 

mass destruction, versus all the other stuff that the Coast Guard 

does? 

Ms. GROVER. In terms of the Coast Guard’s assets, I believe that 

the intent was to dedicate about 18 percent of all of the asset resource hours to the ports and coastal waterway security missions. 

So roughly 20 percent off the top. Now, that would include more 

than just port security, strictly. 

So, for a $9 billion-a-year organization—that is just the entity 

part of it, not the personnel part of it, but the people go along with 

entity, so they—that is a significant area of work for the Coast 

Guard. 

Mr. HUNTER. So 20 percent, then. 

Ms. GROVER. About 18 percent, yes, for 2016 was their intent for 

the resource allocation for the assets. 

Mr. HUNTER. I am just trying to balance out the outcome of a 

weapon of mass destruction going off versus what they—how much 

time they spend on this. Because if you combine all the other bad 

stuff that the Coast Guard stops coming in, I was just—in Colombia you have got cocaine flowing in like water to the U.S. Doesn’t 

seem to be any way to stop it. And a lot of the Members that were 

with us asked a question, ‘‘Well, hey, what if we took our focus off 

the drugs and put it on the weapons of mass destruction? What 

more could we interdict, and how much safer would we be?’’ 

I am curious if the GAO would look at that at some point in the 

future, saying if the Coast Guard spends 40 percent of its time 

interdicting weapons of mass destruction, or trying to, and keeping 

an eye out for those things specifically, how much does that decrease the probability or likelihood of a weapon like that being put 

on U.S. soil? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, we would be happy to do that in the future. 

Mr. HUNTER. That would be great. I think that is important, because then the Coast Guard could look at what they are doing and 

say, ‘‘Hey, maybe we should spend more time on this.’’ 

Dr. Canavan, I guess the big question is this. Ms. Hahn asked— 

what is the gentleman’s name from CBP? Mr. Owens. He said that 

they have devices, they have technology right now to be able to 

33 

look at everything, but not without a human person there, without 

a person there. And I have seen this stuff. 

SAIC in San Diego has got a system that they are selling all over 

the world—not to us, but all over the world, but it still takes a person there, trained to recognize that that thing—that there is something shielded, that the neutrinos are acting weird around some 

circular device, or that there’s weapons or drugs or—it still takes 

a person. And I guess their answer is, if you have a person that 

slows things down massively—that was basically their answer to 

Ms. Hahn’s question was it makes things too slow, it is going to 

back it up. It is going to be like TSA [Transportation Security Administration] at the airport, but in our ports. And nobody wants 

that. Nobody wants a TSA in our ports, right? They are doing bad 

enough already, just with humans, right? 

So I guess the question is what exists, if anything, right now, 

where it doesn’t take a person? 

Dr. CANAVAN. Well, that is what I am saying. It is unfortunate 

Ms. Hahn stepped out, because that—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Turn your mic on, please. 

Dr. CANAVAN. Have I done it again, sir? The—that is exactly 

what I was shooting for, was a system that had a—if you have a 

very high signal-to-noise ratio, which is what you can get from 

math that I won’t go into here—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Dr. CANAVAN. Then you have a very low false alarm rate to 

where you don’t have any need for a human intervention. So that 

is—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I see. 

Dr. CANAVAN. At the top level, that is the answer. The other answer is that whether you use x rays or whatever, the—they are 

only sensitive to mass. They don’t know what the mass is. To them 

a bomb looks—has the same kind of material in it—as a ball bearing. The reason you have a human operator there to look at these 

from all different angles, having seen all this many times before, 

to add human experience, is because you have a lousy signal to 

start with. All you know is that something bounced a lot of x rays 

back. With fast neutron interrogation, you actually are stimulating 

the core of the thing you are looking for to release fission neutrons, 

which have a unique and specific and high signature, which can’t 

be confused with hardly anything else in the universe. 

So you have a great signature to start with, a real signature, and 

not just some x rays getting bounced around. Plus you have a very 

high signal-to-noise ratio. That is why the goal that I had was not 

only to find a nuclear weapon, but to be able to candle everything 

that went through a port. And I think that is what I have tried 

to demonstrate in the testimony that I prepared. 

Incidentally, I would like to ask that that be submitted for the 

record. I forgot to ask before. 

Mr. HUNTER. Say again. Oh, without objection. 

So I think my last thing is I think what the Coast Guard is going 

to do, and what DHS is going to do, is try to get the 100-percent 

perfect solution, which will take them a decade. It will take billions 

of dollars, and they are going to try to be able to find everything 

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34 

posed to just really narrowing it down to weapons of mass destruction, which is what I think they should totally focus on to the detriment of some of the other sectors, like drug interdiction and 

human smuggling and weapons. 

But you are saying that it is possible to not have a human to 

check for weapons of mass destruction, nuclear devices, with a very 

low false positive rate, everything that comes in very quickly? 

Dr. CANAVAN. Yes, sir. That is what I was shooting at. And like 

I say, there are two things. One thing is that there is a real nuclear signature from a nuclear weapon. Nothing else looks like it 

when you hit it with fast neutrons. So the one thing is you have 

a real signature that you don’t with all the others. I am not criticizing what these other groups are doing. You do what you can. If 

they just have systems that have very indirect signatures, I think 

they are working very hard to get the very best they can out of 

that. 

What I am saying here is that for reasons that nobody bothered 

to look at for some reason, there is a system that gives you the 

combination of a unique nuclear signature and a very high signalto-noise ratio, low false alarm rate that sort of gets you away from 

reliance on all of these other signatures that are very indirect. 

Mr. HUNTER. What system is that? 

Dr. CANAVAN. Sir? 

Mr. HUNTER. What system is that? Does that system exist? I 

mean does a company make that? 

Dr. CANAVAN. No. This is my own little research project. Well, 

maybe I should form a company. 

Mr. HUNTER. You want to talk to Gene Ray in San Diego. They 

have a neutrino system that I have seen tested. They had a leadencased nuclear device—not a nuclear device, but lead-encased 

nuke stuff in a car, and they have a system where it does exactly 

what you say. And they are selling it to other countries, not to us. 

Dr. CANAVAN. Well, the neutrinos are nice, but they don’t interact very well, and the sources are terrible. But the thing that is 

popular right now, the closest thing, is muon detection, and that 

is what a company is testing in Freeport, in the Bahamas. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. 

Dr. CANAVAN. And that works well. But again, it just measures 

mass, it does not measure nuclear signatures. 

And so, you know, I don’t want to criticize what other people are 

doing. You do—you try—everybody is trying to put together a good 

system, based on whatever we have, which ain’t much. After 9/11 

it was basically nothing, right? 

Mr. HUNTER. Right. 

Dr. CANAVAN. So people are trying very hard to do the right 

thing. I am just saying I think this is a very nice system which, 

for some reason, we just skipped over. And I would like to see 

somebody pick it up and do it. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Doctor. 

Ms. McSally? 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Grover, CBP testified that they are scanning—although 

there is limitations to that—3 to 4 percent of containers that are 

coming in, based on their high-risk designation. You just testified 

35 

that in the sample that you were talking about from a couple years 

ago, of the group that they called high risk, it only successfully 

identified 6 percent accurately to be high risk, missing 94 percent 

of the actual high-risk containers is what I understood. That is a 

pretty dismal number. 

You since said that they have improved. Are we now at 7 percent 

and we are missing 93 percent, or where are we right now? That 

was very disconcerting to hear. 

Ms. GROVER. So let’s take a minute and talk about this. The 3- 

to 4-percent scanning, I think what they were referring to is the 

percentage of containers that are ultimately subject to the x-ray 

exam, the nonintrusive inspection exam—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Right, that takes an image—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. But their whole briefing and everything yesterday 

was based on them identifying high threat, high risk. 

Ms. GROVER. Right. So roughly 1 percent of the cargo shipments 

are identified as high risk. And those are the ones that then are 

required to go through the NII [nonintrusive inspection] so that 

there is an image that is taken, and the image has to be read by 

a person. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. GROVER. And the question is then do we unpack the container to find out what this is, or does it look like it is OK and we 

can let it go through, right? And the procedure varies at the different ports, based on what the rules are. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. GROVER. So, I think we are all in agreement that that is, for 

the most part, occurring as intended, right? Some room for improvement in the accurate identification of high-risk—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. But you said previously—— 

Ms. GROVER. Right. Right, right—— 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. It was 94 percent missed. 

Ms. GROVER. Right. So this is a proxy measure that CBP uses 

to get a handle on how well does this ATS [Advanced Targeting 

System] do at identifying high-risk cargo, right? Because they don’t 

really know the true accuracy of that system, because you don’t 

know what you—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. What you missed. 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Have missed, right? 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. GROVER. Because 99 percent of the shipments—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Are determined to be low or medium 

risk, and generally speaking, moving on through. So we don’t actually know what we have missed. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So did I misunderstand—— 

Ms. GROVER. But—— 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. That 6 percent and 94 percent? 

Ms. GROVER. So—well, of the containers that are unpacked, 

right, of the shipments that are actually subject to physical exam, 

some number of those have contraband. And CBP keeps records of 

that. And then they go back and they look and they say, OK, this 

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risk or random or for some other reason. Of the ones that we actually looked at, how many had contraband? And then let’s go back 

to the original designation and say was it originally designated as 

high risk by the system or not. 

And so, yes, for the 9 months or so of data that we looked at in 

2011, 2012, the system had only identified 6 percent as high risk. 

So 94 percent were not. Now, subsequent to that, in the process of 

responding to our recommendations, the last two quarters of data 

that I saw were somewhere more in the neighborhood of 25 to 50 

percent, which is significantly better. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Twenty-five to fifty correctly? There are 50 to 75 

percent still missed? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, and that is data from the, you know, roughly 

late 2014—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Time period. So I don’t have current 

data. But, yes, those are the last numbers we—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So this is still a problem. If our whole model is 

based on them identifying high risk, and we are still somewhere in, 

you know, less than 50 percent being correctly identified, then that 

is still a problem. 

Ms. GROVER. They are still working on it. 

Ms. MCSALLY. OK. Mr. Espie, what you shared about not getting 

access to classified information, you know, port directors not having 

a sense of what the risks are, we have heard similar things across 

the private sector in homeland security related to those running 

sports arenas and other potential targets and vulnerabilities for 

terrorist attack or terrorist activity. This has been of high interest 

to me. 

So you have no access to fusion centers, no—I just want to make 

sure we clarify. No access to fusion centers. Would you be interested in having access to fusion centers, you know, classified information briefings for appropriate people at the port? I mean this 

seems like a gaping hole. We have done better sharing information 

across Federal agencies, but where we are really missing is Federal 

down to State and local, and then with the private sector is the 

real gaping hole. 

So, could you just clarify what you would desire, as a solution? 

Mr. ESPIE. Thank you, yes. I am fortunate, though. I will note 

that I do have a secret clearance, and the only reason I do is because I pushed for it through our Baltimore FBI office and through 

my previous holdings of certain clearances. So I am one of the fortunate ones, probably one of the maybe three or four in the country 

that have a clearance, in terms of port security directors. So I 

would look for a model following 9/11 when you saw local police departments at the captain level or so gaining clearances through becoming members of the executive JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task 

Force] structure within the FBI offices. I would certainly support 

that. 

But overall, even though I have that clearance, I receive nothing. 

I do not—I am not invited to classified briefings, I do not receive 

classified information via DHS, Coast Guard. The Bureau, they 

have just recently offered me to come to classified executive-type 

37 

briefings. They are held once a month, so I am going to take advantage of that. 

I am confident that if there was information I needed to know, 

that I would be provided that from our Maryland fusion center. 

However, I have been here 5 years and have received zero. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area to follow 

up on. You know, we have been addressing this issue with trying 

to increase access for the private sector. I think we could probably 

work together across our committees to maybe work on some initiatives on this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is an easy fix. That is a quick, easy fix, fixing 

that. 

Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Chair McSally, you seem to always anticipate 

my questions. And you were on to one that is very important. I was 

just thinking as you were asking your question about the recent report that was produced by the French Government on the terrorist 

attack in France. And the one thing that was most prominent in 

that report and in other reports is the inability or the lack of sharing of information between the various elements of the safety net, 

the various police, the intelligence community, and the like. And 

this is a question that Mr. Espie just raised, and it is one that really needs to have our attention. In all of these situations it comes 

back to the lack of information being passed on through the various 

organizations. 

Leaving that aside, which does require our continued attention, 

I want to go to an issue that I know you raised, Mr. Espie, and 

that is the funding for port security. We heard from the earlier testimony from the Customs and Border Protection that they needed 

additional funding. I think they talked some 500 personnel. It 

wasn’t clear where they needed to use that. I suspect that—I hope 

that that is in the ports. 

Mr. Espie, can you speak directly to that issue? 

Mr. ESPIE. Yes, sir. Two issues. CBP, first of all, at the Port of 

Baltimore, particularly after the budget concerns a few years ago 

to whereas it appeared that DHS was negating some of their requests, we have a sense of feel at the Port of Baltimore that CBP 

is very strapped. In their inspections of cargo within the sheds at 

our marine terminal, number one, the—we see personnel working 

the RPMs [radiation portal monitors] during the day, it is a long 

day. I think they are very bored. I don’t think they have enough 

changeover during the day. 

So basically, when these containers leave our ports through going 

through the RPMs, you are going to have a GS–11 or GS–12, in 

terms of their morale, motivation, to safeguard a potential nuclear 

weapon leaving our port and going out to Chicago or the Midwest 

or—as far as the way we ship. 

And also we have had issues at our cruise terminal. We have 

over 115 cruises through Carnival and Royal Caribbean, through 

our cruise terminal there. And when there is a shortage, seemingly, 

when we have—we mandate more power, they advise that they do 

not have the overtime to pay their officers. So that is a concern. 

So that is where you see that CBP is going to start potentially 

38 

charging port operators for extra services, to include the RPMs. We 

have been advised that if the RPMs are replaced, that it will be 

the port operator paying for those and not CBP. So right now we 

are going through the maintenance phase. So those are concerns. 

Secondly, the Federal Port Security Grant Program, we live and 

die by that. That is our physical security. We would have no physical security at the Port of Baltimore, or at least not in the realm 

that we have now, which we feel we have one of the most innovative physical security programs in the country. We would be in desperate needs. The State budgeting for that right now, we do—when 

we receive a match or a grant, it is 25 percent. So the State’s ability to cover the physical security necessary is very difficult and 

short. So we would hope that that program would stay intact. 

And also we see—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am going to interrupt you. 

Mr. ESPIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Because I am out of time, literally out of time. 

I would appreciate it if the—your association, the Port Security Association, could develop a specific memo to us on those kinds of 

shortcomings, and it is nationally as well as with the Port of Baltimore. 

Mr. ESPIE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. A final point is that the layer—the security 

through layered operations, beginning way off in Kazakhstan all 

the way back home, becomes really important. There is a funding 

issue in each one of these layers, and we really need to get at the 

funding issues, as well as the efficiency of those particular units 

along the way. 

And so, these kinds of hearings are very, very important, and 

particularly important that we do the combined hearing that the 

two chairmen have put together here. That is really an important 

piece of this, so that we are—at least we are coordinated and 

knowledgeable with what we are doing here. I want to really 

focus—and I will ask a series of questions, if the chairs would allow 

me to do so, to the various witnesses about specific funding shortfalls and the efficiency of the programs that you are operating. 

Final point is, Mr. Canavan, you have been here twice and you 

have talked about a specific type of detection advice—device. 

We had earlier Ms. Harrington from NNSA [National Nuclear 

Security Administration] here. Now, as far as I know, Los Alamos 

is part of NNSA. And I am curious, and I will get into it from Ms. 

Harrington as well as from you, about your device and the applicability of that and the utility of that particular mechanism that you 

have talked about as a detection mechanism. 

So, with that, I yield. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Gibbs? 

Mr. GIBBS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I represent the Great Lakes 

region, so I want to talk to Mr. Weakley. 

Great to see you, Jim. In your testimony you talk about the 

Great Lakes States, and the two Canadian provinces; if they were 

an entity in themselves, they would be the third largest economy. 

So we know how important the Great Lakes is, and all the commerce you move. And I am really concerned. 

39 

And my other subcommittee, I am chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Water Resources and Environment. I have stressed so much 

with the Army Corps of Engineers about the importance of the Soo 

lock and the Poe lock, and that is—Poe lock is over 100 years old. 

And my understanding, they built cofferdams years ago and it is 

just sitting—seems like there is a reluctance with the administration to want to, you know, build new locks there and replace them. 

So there’s kind of two questions here, two themes. We have the 

infrastructure issue, and then we have security of the locks. I want 

to get both of that. But the first part of that is on the Poe lock or 

the Soo locks there, if that were to shut down, what happens to the 

Great Lakes? 

Mr. WEAKLEY. Well, sir, according to the DHS report, if the lock, 

a single lock—the Poe, as you point out—is down for 6 months, 

North America is in a recession equal to or greater than the one 

that we just experienced. 

And also in a resource-based recession there is no fiscal policy 

you can do to countermand that. So the closest thing we have experienced as a Nation is the oil embargo from the 1970s. It will wipe 

out the automobile industry, it will wipe out the domestic steel industry. And really, it is a—it is the most critical piece of infrastructure—— 

Mr. GIBBS. I think we got the picture. I think during World War 

II they were so concerned about that I think they had, I don’t 

know—— 

Mr. WEAKLEY. I think it was 20,000 troops stationed in Michigan—— 

Mr. GIBBS. 20,000 troops regarding that. 

Mr. WEAKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GIBBS. So I have stressed so much on the Army Corps how 

important this is, and there is this reluctance. 

Do you know if there has been any initial cost estimates to do 

the work there? 

Mr. WEAKLEY. So where we are at now is the Corps is engaged 

in a 2-year economic reevaluation report, basically to recalculate 

the benefit to cost ratio. To give the Corps credit, they have acknowledged that they made some egregious false assumptions in 

their latest 2004 report. That was a 10-year process for them to 

make that admission. And now they are recalculating the ratio. 

They said they could condense the 3-year process into 2 years, 

which means in December of 2017 they should be done with their 

math, which means probably December—— 

Mr. GIBBS. I told Secretary Darcy in my subcommittee hearing 

that we could sit down right now and in 15 minutes get a cost estimate benefit ratio. That should be a no-brainer. 

Mr. WEAKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GIBBS. There is just a huge reluctance, I think, with the administration to want to move forward on that. 

OK. So that is the infrastructure issue. We know what happens. 

This ought to be a top priority for our national economic security 

and security in general. 

What are your thoughts in the Great Lakes are, in the St. Lawrence and all that, on overall security of our—of those assets? We 

know if that lock breaks the economic catastrophe it would be to 

40 

the country. But are you satisfied with the security arrangements 

by the Coast Guard, whoever, to make sure that the lock isn’t attacked, or any of the locks? 

Mr. WEAKLEY. Well, I think they could do more. I know the 

Coast Guard has a security zone in the area. The Corps owns the 

facility, so they have got primary responsibility. I was just up there 

a couple weeks ago. They are executing a new security contract. 

They do, to their credit, make a distinction between the American-flag vessels and the foreign vessels that go through. They 

don’t allow the foreign sailors off the ships. We are allowed off our 

ships to handle lines, and stuff like that. Clearly, they don’t have 

the 20,000 troops that they did in World War II. 

I think the Corps is beginning to recognize the criticality of that 

piece of infrastructure. And from a—I am very excited about what 

we are doing with our radar to create more of a visibility and provide real actionable material to the—— 

Mr. GIBBS. And my last question—we are out of time, but are 

you—your companies that you represent, I think you said 15 of 

them, I forget how many you represent, working with Customs and 

Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and all their law enforcement 

moving this commerce from the Great Lakes, are you satisfied with 

the relationship? What are your thoughts? 

Mr. WEAKLEY. So, as a former Coast Guard officer, I will expose 

my bias. We work really well with the Coast Guard. I think with 

CBP it varies from port to port, and actually it varies from cargo 

to cargo, and sometimes the distance, whether you are within the 

Federal-recognized port, as well. I think that relationship could be 

better. 

Giving the Coast Guard credit, they are more centralized. So if 

there is a problem with the Coast Guard, we can go to the district 

commander. With CBP there is no regional office. So there is a 

headquarters level and then they are very autonomous at the local 

level. I think there could be room for improvement along the CBP 

from the relationship aspect, as well as the ability to execute. 

Mr. GIBBS. OK, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Thanks for your service. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. For a minute I thought you 

were talking about Polacks. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HUNTER. Now I know you weren’t. Poe lock. 

Mr. GIBBS. You know, I know San Diego is important, but Great 

Lakes are really important, too. 

Mr. HUNTER. Ms. Jackson Lee, you are recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman and ranking member for 

their courtesies, and thank the witnesses as well as the witnesses 

on panel 1. I was delayed because of a markup in the Judiciary 

Committee, which fell under my subcommittee. But this is an important hearing, and I want to acknowledge panel 1 and thank 

panel 2 for their testimony. 

Let me start by just citing part of the words said by Director 

Dave Espie in his testimony, that the threat of maritime terrorist 

smuggling appears to be increasing, possibly in correlation with the 

flight of Syrian refugees to Europe. And he noted an incident, I 

41 

think, that occurred in Baltimore. But I believe that it is clearly 

an important hearing that we are addressing today in an examination of the maritime nuclear smuggling threat and other port security and smuggling risks in the United States. 

I think our challenge, as Members of Congress, is to find the 

how-to’s or how does, but also the solutions to protect the American 

people. I am particularly interested, of course, as a former ranking 

member of our Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee, but as 

well as a Member of Congress that has as part of her jurisdiction 

one of the major ports of the United States, and that is the Houston port. 

I am a strong supporter of the Securing the Cities program, and 

as well the monies that you all need, Mr. Espie, in doing your job. 

So let me start off first by saying we will not solve this problem 

by ignoring the fact that resources are needed, not throwing money 

away, but fully funding the potential of what our ports and what 

the Nation faces. 

The Securing the Cities program mandated legislation to assist 

State, local, tribal, and territorial governments in creating and implementing and perfecting existing structures for coordinated and 

integrated detection and interdiction of nuclear or other radiological materials that are out of regulatory control, and to support 

a wide matrix to deal with identifying reporting on nuclear and 

other radioactive materials, provide resources for detection analysis 

communication, facilitate the establishment of protocol and processes of effectively responding to threats—responding to threats is 

key—and designating participating jurisdiction from high-risk 

areas. 

Our city has now received $30 million over a 5-year period, 

which I am very glad to advocate and secure under the Securing 

the Cities grant, and just received $3.5 million. And in his absence 

I want to thank Dr. Brasure, who was in my district, as we announced this very important step by Houston, creating or working 

with the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to build a robust 

regional nuclear detection capability. 

So, I am going to pursue a line of questioning in the time that 

I have remaining, and let me quickly do so—is to Dr. Canavan, if 

you can remember my questions, please, I would appreciate it. How 

accurately can the signature of radiological and nuclear material 

tell the source of that material? That is very important because we 

are talking about ships and smuggling. 

To Ms. Grover, thank you for your work in the GAO. In your testimony you cite GAO’s 2013 report which concluded that CBP had 

not regularly assessed foreign ports for risk to cargo since 2005. It 

is my understanding that they have since developed a port risk matrix and priority map to help assess whether changes need to be 

made to contain a security in each of their ports. Is CBP utilizing 

this matrix and map to assess CSI [Container Security Initiative] 

ports? Are there other changes that should be made to ensure the 

CSI program is functioning as intended? There lies a source of potential nuclear material. 

And finally, to Mr. Espie, you are one of the first responders outside of the beltway. All across America you are dealing with port 

security, formerly with the FBI. Are resources going to local entiVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:13 Nov 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-7-16~1\20639.TXT JEAN
42 

ties like yourself crucial in making sure that we have the cover, the 

resources, the detection that needs to be in place for something as 

particularly indicting, explosive, and, if you will, catastrophic, as a 

particular or potential nuclear incident by something being smuggled into your port? 

I would yield first to Dr. Canavan. Thank you. 

Dr. CANAVAN. To me, ma’am? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield first to you, sir, for the question. Did 

you hear the question that I asked? 

Dr. CANAVAN. Well, I thought the question had to do with—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me read your question, sir. How accurately can the signature of radiological and nuclear material tell 

the source of that material? 

Dr. CANAVAN. With radiological material, it is a little bit difficult, 

because that is just sort of nuclear garbage, and there is lots of it 

around the world. And you might get lucky, and you might make 

an attribution, but I find that unlikely. 

With nuclear weapons material, attribution is a little bit cleaner—particularly if you intercept it before detonation—because 

with—particularly with plutonium, the different groups that make 

plutonium have different preferred ways of doing it, so there might 

be some intermediate group that got control of it or delivered it, 

but you have a fighting chance of knowing who made it in the first 

place. 

So, the attribution is kind of all across the spectrum. I would say 

very little likelihood of attribution on the garbage side, reasonable 

chance on the plutonium. For uranium, which is a big problem 

right now, you know, it is just how long you want to spend your 

centrifuges, your—and they are all derivatives of Urenco’s. Some 

people try to argue that you can do an attribution there on the 

basis of their details. I kind of doubt it, although that last statement is just my personal guess. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Not at all, Doctor, thank you. Just one followup. Can the trash that is hardest to detect provide major damage and danger? 

Dr. CANAVAN. No, ma’am. I didn’t mean to say it couldn’t cause 

damage. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No, I am just asking. 

Dr. CANAVAN. The thing is that the radiological threats, the dirty 

bombs that we—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Right. 

Dr. CANAVAN [continuing]. We have been working on for quite 

some time, can cause a lot of economic damage because you can 

spread them on somebody’s street, or throw them in a building, and 

then that is a real cost problem. But once that happens, people will 

generally get the heck out of the way, so the loss of life is smaller 

for that kind of weapon. 

I come from a place where we worry a little bit less about radiological insults than other places. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Dr. CANAVAN. When I first went to Los Alamos, I think we had 

the universe’s only known open pit plutonium mine. We dug up the 

old plutonium residue from the war, moved it out, and covered it 

with a thick layer of dirt. It took time and effort, but worked well. 

43 

So I may have a more casual attitude than others towards dirty 

bombs. They are a real problem because their materials are more 

accessible than those for weapons, but they are not as catastrophic—particularly in terms of loss of life. But I have experts 

here, right? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy. 

If I can just—thank you, Doctor—if I could just allow both Ms. Grover and Mr. Espie to finish, and I would be happy to yield back. 

Ms. Grover, you heard my question? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, your question was about CBP’s Container Security Initiative program? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Ms. GROVER. Which is an initiative under which CBP targeters 

are placed at foreign ports, and it is operating at about 60 ports 

right now. And so your observation is that in 2013 GAO found that 

while those ports had initially been selected based on volume and 

other risk factors that, indeed, the circumstances across the world 

can change, and we found that CBP had not revisited the risk 

issues since around 2005. 

And so, when GAO went in and looked at the situation, we found 

that there were—some of the ports participating were not high risk 

and, in fact, that there were not CBP targeters at other very highrisk ports. 

And so, yes, as you noted, CBP has developed a port risk matrix 

and a map. They plan to update it every year, and to apply that 

knowledge against the locations of the 60 ports where they are 

working. And so if they follow through on that, and use it, then 

they will at least have a good understanding of the extent to which 

the program was operating at the highest risk ports. But that remains to be seen, going forward, and then to the extent to which 

they can make adjustments as appropriate. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So we need to be monitoring that. And are you 

going to be assessing them again? 

Ms. GROVER. We will continue to keep track of their use of that, 

yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Mr. Espie, on your—— 

Mr. ESPIE. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. Comments along with resources. 

Mr. ESPIE. Regarding funding—yes, ma’am. Regarding funding, 

of course, at the port we have certain mandates we must follow, 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act, and then we have Federal mandates that come under the CBP jurisdiction, specifically 

screening for nuclear smuggling, for example. 

Do we have the resources, Port of Baltimore? No. You heard the 

percentages of the screening that takes place overseas, or once it 

comes to the port. I am there every day. I watch this. I see a container ship have 8,000 TEUs on it. How many do they screen a 

day? Twenty-five, thirty, maybe. You line up in a row, they go 

through the VACIS [Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System] machine, the x-ray machine, and they—while the other ones are put 

into storage and units and they are shipped out the next couple 

days. So the only security device you have left is the RPM machine, 

which in some cases is 10 years old, the quality is a question, and 

so forth. 

44 

The manpower is certainly a question for CBP because, again, 

you watch the VACIS, the screening operation going on. You have 

usually two or three CBP personnel there, the rest are at the 

screening sheds. And then you will have one or two or three at the 

RPM exits out of the terminal. So it is a great problem for us and 

CBP, for the State of Maryland, and really, the citizens of the 

United States. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. On the overall issue, then, resources are needed across—you are talking about your State, but if you are an example, it would mean that it happens elsewhere, as well. 

Mr. ESPIE. Yes, ma’am. I am a member of the AAPA Security 

Committee. It is consistent throughout the United States. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like— 

thank you for your testimony—Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask 

unanimous consent to put into the record an article by MarEx 

dated July 6, ‘‘U.S. Ports Want More Action on Dirty Bomb Prevention.’’ 

Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. 

[The article is on pages 116–117.] 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. Well, here is what we are 

trying to do here. We are trying to shape what we feel is going to 

be probably the most dangerous thing that we can encounter as a 

country, which is a nuclear device on American soil. It is worse 

than someone shooting up a mall, it is—I mean that is catastrophic. We all agree on that. And I think we are on the precipice 

of a—let’s call it nuclear material being ubiquitous, much more 

than it is now. Once the Iranians start getting more material, once 

the North Koreans get better at creating more bad stuff, you are 

going to have nuclear devices, nuclear material, weaponized nuclear material, I think, throughout the entire world. 

And I think if we all focus on a lot of different stuff, but nothing 

that can affect the American people in the country like a nuclear 

device going off that is possibly attributable to a nation-state or 

possibly not. We have no retaliation, no way to get back at somebody—nonstate actors, of course—that will easily and happily 

throw their lives away to kill Americans. 

Anyway, that is what we are doing here. That is why Ms. 

McSally and I are trying to shape this, because we are—I think we 

are still in a relative safe zone where there is not a lot of material 

out there, and we know who has it, we know where they have it, 

we know how to stop it in the furthest reaches of the world before 

it even gets to the U.S. or gets in the hands of bad actors, right? 

But I think that is coming to an end. I think we probably have a 

5- to 10-year window, and then we need to have something where 

we check everything, because it only takes once, right? 

And with that, thank you all for being here. Thanks for your testimony, thanks for traveling out here. And the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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