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*********************************************** 
HALINA OSTAPOWICZ v. JERZY WISNIEWSKI

(AC 43944)

Alexander, Clark and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her

marriage to the defendant. She claimed that the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ premarital agreement, erred

in finding that certain property constituted the defendant’s separate

property under that agreement and abused its discretion in assigning

to her the debt on the parties’ home equity line of credit. Held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ premarital agreement:

although the defendant did not comply with the specific pleading requirements of the rule of practice (§ 25-2A), as he did not file a demand for

enforcement of the agreement in his prayer for relief, the court, noting

that § 25-2A permits the court to exercise its discretion with respect

to the time to demand enforcement of an agreement, found that the

defendant’s filing of a notice containing the agreement constituted a

demand for the enforcement of the agreement; moreover, the court

had statutory (§ 46b-1) jurisdiction over the dissolution of the parties’

marriage, including the premarital agreement, and the rules of practice

do not implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in classifying and assigning

the defendant’s separate property interests pursuant to the parties’ premarital agreement: the plaintiff did not challenge the court’s findings

that the defendant had complied with the provisions of the agreement

related to record keeping and that the plaintiff had removed certain of

the defendant’s financial records from the marital home, making it difficult for the defendant to trace his property interests in detail; moreover,

the court credited the testimony of witnesses that the defendant’s family

business was an informal venture, and it made detailed findings concerning the value of the family business assets at the time of the parties’

marriage and at trial; furthermore, the court did not assign to either

party the other party’s interest in the family business, thus, the court

did not err in not placing a total value on the defendant’s interest in

the family business pursuant to statute (§ 46b-81 (c)).

3. The trial court abused its discretion in assigning to the plaintiff the entire

outstanding debt on the parties’ home equity line of credit; the court

found that the defendant borrowed $10,000 under this line of credit to

pay his attorney’s fees in the dissolution proceeding, thus, its order

assigning the plaintiff to pay the entire outstanding debt was irreconcilable with its order that the parties were solely responsible for the

payment of their respective attorney’s fees.

Argued October 7, 2021—officially released February 1, 2022

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Caron, J.;

judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain

other relief in accordance with the parties’ premarital

agreement, from which the plaintiff appealed to this

court. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; further proceedings.

Keith Yagaloff, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kevin B. F. Emerson, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The plaintiff, Halina Ostapowicz, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the defendant, Jerzy Wisniewski. On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the court (1) lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ premarital

agreement, (2) erroneously found that certain property

constituted the defendant’s separate property under the

premarital agreement and failed to assign a specific

value to that property, and (3) abused its discretion in

assigning to her the debt on the parties’ home equity

line of credit. We agree with the plaintiff’s third claim

and, therefore, affirm in part and reverse in part the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s appeal. The parties were married on August 21,

2006. Prior to their wedding, they both signed a premarital agreement (agreement). The plaintiff commenced

the present action for dissolution of the marriage on

October 20, 2017, alleging that the marriage had broken

down irretrievably. On May 14, 2018, the defendant

simultaneously filed an answer in which he alleged that

the marriage should be annulled on the basis of fraud,

a cross complaint,1 and a ‘‘notice’’ to which he attached

the agreement. The court tried the case on several days

between April 16 and July 19, 2019. The parties and

the defendant’s daughter, Alice Vautour, and his sister,

Barbara Szczypinski, testified at trial.

Following the presentation of evidence and submission of posttrial briefs, the court issued a lengthy and

comprehensive memorandum of decision on December

30, 2019. The court found that the plaintiff was fiftytwo years old, in good health, and the mother of two

adult children. She was born in Poland and came to

the United States in 2004 on a tourist visa, but later

secured a student visa and attended Central Connecticut State University. When she arrived in the United

States, she worked as a private duty nurse. At the time

of trial, she was working as a certified nurse’s aide

at the University of Connecticut Health Center. The

plaintiff attained permanent resident status when she

married the defendant; she became a United States citizen in 2014.

The defendant was seventy years old and in poor

health. He, too, had been born in Poland and came to

the United States with his parents when he was fourteen

years old. He earned a bachelor’s degree in mechanical

engineering in 1974. He and his brother owned a

machine shop that they sold in 1987. He later was

employed by two other businesses. In 2013 and 2014,

the defendant had quadruple bypass surgery and two

venous thrombectomies. He has difficulty walking and

takes a dozen medications daily for his multiple health
problems.

The court also found that, beginning fifty years ago

with his parents, continuing with his brother and sister,

and now with his children, the defendant and his family

have pooled their money, resources, and labor to buy,

maintain, and sell investment real estate. At one time,

the family owned and maintained twelve investment

properties. To further their business, the family has

held various bank and investment accounts, each in the

name of more than one member of the family. The court

found that the family business is an informal venture,

and through the generations, there have never been

any contracts or written agreements between family

members. Names were added to and removed from

titles on properties as needed to further the growth of

the business. Family members pool their money, putting

in and taking out what is necessary, and working

together to purchase, renovate, maintain, and sell properties. The court made detailed findings with respect

to the family’s business assets, both real property and

monetary, and related transactions.

The court did not find it surprising that there were

no contracts or written agreements between and among

members of the defendant’s family, stating: ‘‘The first

generation of immigrants from Poland worked hard and

invested well and passed down to their children assets

they had accumulated as a family. The next generation,

immigrants themselves, continued in the same vein,

following the example of their parents, investing money,

time and labor as a family. The court does not ascribe

any nefarious motives to the informal way the family

has conducted its business, nor does it question the

fact that there are no written agreements or contracts.’’

With respect to the parties’ relationship, the court

found that they had lived together for eleven months

in the defendant’s Fenwick Street apartment in Hartford

before they married. The defendant helped the plaintiff

obtain a student visa and eventually permanent residency. He also helped the plaintiff’s daughter and sonin-law attain legal status. The court found that the parties had approximately nine years of a good marriage.

In November, 2015, the defendant asked the plaintiff,

for probate purposes, to sign an addendum to the agreement so that there would be contemporaneous documentation that the plaintiff would not make any claim

against any of the properties or accounts the defendant

acquired through his family business prior to or since

the date of marriage. The court found the timing of the

defendant’s request significant, as it occurred shortly

after he experienced serious health issues. The plaintiff

refused to sign the addendum. Multiple events between

2015 and 2017 put a strain on the parties’ relationship,

including the defendant’s health issues and the death

of the plaintiff’s mother in Poland. The court found

that disagreements and arguments over money and real
estate ultimately led the plaintiff to file for divorce.

The court determined that neither party was primarily

responsible for the end of the relationship. The court

also concluded that the defendant had failed to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff married

him solely to attain legal status for herself and her

family. The court thus found no fraud on the part of

the plaintiff and that the parties’ marriage was valid.

With respect to the agreement, the court found that,

when the defendant asked the plaintiff to sign the agreement, he made clear that his intention was to protect

his interest in the family’s business. He testified that

he would not have married the plaintiff if she had not

signed the agreement. At the time the agreement was

drafted, the defendant showed the plaintiff bank and

account statements regarding the family business.2 During the marriage, the statements were mailed to the

marital home and, according to the defendant, the plaintiff had full access to and knowledge of the contents

of the statements. The plaintiff also accompanied the

defendant to the bank on several occasions.

The plaintiff testified that the defendant probably

told her that he would not marry her if she did not sign

the agreement. According to her, the defendant went

through his financial affidavit and told her that most

of the money was family money and the Fenwick Street

apartment house where they were living was a family

house. She acknowledged that the defendant and his

family worked hard for their money and kept it together

but claimed that the defendant never told her how much

of the family money was his.

The defendant helped the plaintiff prepare her financial affidavit and explained the agreement to her in

Polish. The plaintiff later met with Jacek I. Smigelski,

a Polish-speaking attorney, to review the agreement;

the defendant, who had separate counsel, was not present at the meeting. The plaintiff asked Smigelski a few

questions about the agreement, which he answered.

The defendant signed the agreement on July 5, 2006;

the plaintiff signed it on July 7, 2006. The parties were

married on August 21, 2006.

The court noted that General Statutes § 46b-36a et

seq. governs premarital agreements. Under that act, a

premarital contract is not enforceable under the following conditions: it was not signed voluntarily; it is unconscionable; a party was not provided fair and reasonable

disclosure of the amount, character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party;

or a party was not provided a reasonable opportunity

to consult with independent counsel before signing it.

General Statutes § 46b-36g.

The plaintiff acknowledged that both parties signed

the agreement, and she did not claim that it is unconscionable. Instead, she claimed that the defendant did
not tell her that the bank accounts he disclosed were

co-owned by family members and that she did not have

a meaningful opportunity to review the agreement with

counsel.

The court rejected both claims. It noted that, although

they were not required by statute to do so, the parties

appended financial affidavits to the agreement. The

defendant reviewed his financial affidavit with the plaintiff prior to the time she signed the agreement and

explained to her that much of the money listed in that

financial affidavit belonged to his family and that they

had always held those assets together. The plaintiff also

testified that, at the time she signed the agreement, she

understood that she was giving up any future claim for

family money in the event of a dissolution. ‘‘Given that

background and crediting the defendant’s testimony

that, at the time of the drafting and prior to the signing

of the agreement, he showed the plaintiff all of the bank

and account statements regarding his family money and

business (which bank accounts contained other family

members’ names as well as the defendant’s),’’ the court

found that the defendant provided the plaintiff with a

fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character

and value of his property.

The court also found that the plaintiff had an opportunity to meet with a Polish speaking attorney to review

the agreement approximately one and one-half months

before the wedding, which the court considered a reasonable period of time for review. It was the plaintiff’s

responsibility to ensure that the legal consultation was

meaningful to her. The court, therefore, concluded that

the agreement was valid and enforceable.

The court then turned to the substance of the agreement. The court noted that, under section A of paragraph IX of agreement, titled ‘‘Termination of Marriage,’’

‘‘[n]either party [is entitled to] receive any portion of

the separate property of the other . . . and/or replacements of such property.’’ Section B of paragraph IX

further provides that the ‘‘parties shall have no right

against each other by way of claims for . . . division

of property existing of this date . . . or acquire[d] in

the future separately from separate [funds].’’

3

(Emphasis altered.) As a result, the court construed the agreement to mean that ‘‘neither party shall have a claim

against the separate property (the real estate in schedules C and D [of the agreement]) or a claim against the

property existing as of the date of the [a]greement/

subsequent marriage (all the assets in schedules A and

B), or of any future real estate or investments that

flow from these original assets.’’ (Emphasis added.)

On the basis of the court’s construction of the agreement and its finding that ‘‘family business assets listed

on the defendant’s current financial affidavit [were] a

direct result of the premarital assets he was in possession of at the time of the marriage, as they were acquired
after the marriage, separately from separate funds,’’ the

court concluded that the plaintiff had no right or claim

to the defendant’s interest in the family business assets

he had listed in his current financial affidavit.

With respect to the marital home, however, the court

found that the parties had commingled funds to purchase the home and that the plaintiff had helped to

maintain it and assisted with improvements. She also

had paid the debt on the home equity line of credit.

The court concluded, therefore, that the marital home

was marital property in which the plaintiff had a legitimate, legal interest.

In dissolving the marriage on the grounds of an irretrievable breakdown, the court ordered, among other

things, that the parties are responsible for their respective health insurance and unreimbursed medical

expenses; neither party shall receive alimony; the defendant shall quitclaim the marital home to the plaintiff,

who ‘‘shall be solely responsible for payment of the

[home equity line of credit],’’ taxes, insurance, and

maintenance; the plaintiff has no interest in the defendant’s family business; the parties shall retain their

respective bank and retirement accounts and pay their

respective debts; the defendant shall retain his rights

in the family business; the parties shall retain their

respective automobiles; and ‘‘[e]ach party shall be

solely responsible for payment of their respective attorney’s fees incurred during the course of this case.’’

(Emphasis added.)

The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue on the grounds

that the court had erred in classifying and assigning the

property it determined was the defendant’s separate

property and in ordering the parties to be responsible

for their own attorney’s fees while also assigning the

debt on the home equity line of credit to her. The defendant objected to the motion to reargue, arguing, among

other things, that assigning the home equity loan to the

plaintiff was not an order that the plaintiff pay the

defendant’s attorney’s fees, but the ‘‘[c]ourt’s calculation as to the appropriate award to the defendant (value

of property less balance of the [line of credit]).’’ The

court summarily denied the motion to reargue, and the

plaintiff did not move for an articulation. This appeal

followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to enforce the agreement because

the defendant did not comply with the requirements of

Practice Book § 25-2A.4 We disagree.

We begin with the standard of review. ‘‘Subject matter

jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action

before it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aley v.

Aley, 97 Conn. App. 850, 854, 908 A.2d 8 (2006). Subject
matter jurisdiction ‘‘may be raised by a party, or by

the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings,

including on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. A determination of a court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, and, therefore, our

review is plenary. See, e.g., Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65

Conn. App. 813, 846, 784 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 258

Conn. 946, 788 A.2d 95 (2001), and cert. denied, 258

Conn. 947, 788 A.2d 95 (2001), and cert. denied sub

nom. Vernon Village, Inc. v. Giulietti, 258 Conn. 947,

788 A.2d 97 (2001), and cert. denied sub nom. Giulietti

v. Vernon Village, Inc., 258 Conn. 947, 788 A.2d 96

(2001).

The following procedural facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. The plaintiff commenced the

present action in October, 2017. The complaint contained no allegation regarding the agreement. On May

14, 2018,5

the defendant simultaneously filed three

pleadings: an answer, a cross complaint, and a ‘‘notice’’

to which he attached a copy of the parties’ agreement,

including schedules. The defendant did not expressly

reference or demand enforcement of the agreement in

his prayer for relief.

On October 18, 2018, approximately six months after

the defendant had filed with the court the notice and

agreement and just twelve days before trial was scheduled to commence, the plaintiff filed a motion to preclude the agreement on the grounds that the defendant

had failed to comply with Practice Book § 25-2A, which

provides that a party seeking to enforce a premarital

agreement ‘‘shall specifically demand the enforcement

of that agreement, including its date, within the party’s

claim for relief’’ within sixty days of the return date

‘‘unless otherwise permitted by the court.’’ The plaintiff

argued that the defendant did not include a demand for

enforcement of the agreement within his claim for

relief, did not file the agreement itself within sixty days

of the November 21, 2017 return date, and did not seek

permission from the court to file any such claim for

relief after the deadline for doing so had passed. As a

result, she argued that the agreement was not properly

before the court and could not be enforced, citing Warren v. Gardel, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. FA-15-6048865-S (November 28, 2016),

and Olderman v. Olderman, Superior Court, judicial

district of New Britain, Docket No. FA-14-4034221-S

(August 13, 2014).6

On the following day, October 19, 2018, the court

heard and denied the plaintiff’s motion to preclude the

agreement. In its order, the court acknowledged that

the rules of practice required the defendant to file with

his answer and cross complaint a demand for enforcement of the agreement on or before January 21, 2018.

The court noted, however, that Practice Book § 25-2A

(a) permits ‘‘the court to exercise its discretion’’ with
respect to the time to demand enforcement of an agreement. The court also found that the defendant’s filing

of the ‘‘notice’’ and agreement ‘‘constitute[d] a demand

for the enforcement of [the] agreement.’’ The court further found that the plaintiff did not file a timely reply

pursuant to Practice Book § 25-2A (b) but, instead,

waited until the eve of trial to file her motion to preclude

the agreement. As a result, the court denied the motion

to preclude but continued the trial in order to provide

the parties with more time to conduct discovery regarding the agreement.7

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the agreement

because the defendant did not comply with the specific

pleading requirements of Practice Book § 25-2A. As a

result, she argues that any orders flowing from the

agreement are void. We disagree.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-1, the Superior

Court has broad jurisdiction over family matters involving dissolution of marriage, including prenuptial agreements.8

‘‘Jurisdiction of the [subject matter] is the

power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of

the general class to which the proceedings in question

belong. . . . A court has subject matter jurisdiction if

it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of

legal controversy. . . . It is a familiar principle that a

court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under

the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Muller v. Muller, 43 Conn.

App. 327, 331, 682 A.2d 1089 (1996). Under § 46b-1, there

is no question that the court had jurisdiction over the

dissolution of the parties’ marriage, including whether

the agreement should be enforced. SeeAmodio v.Amodio,

247 Conn. 724, 729, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999) (Superior Court

as general jurisdiction tribunal has plenary and general

subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family

matters). Moreover, it is well settled that the rules of

practice, including those pertaining to pleading requirements, do not implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See General Statutes § 51-14 (a) (‘‘[s]uch rules

shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive

right or the jurisdiction of any of the courts’’).

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim that the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the agreement

fails.9

II

The plaintiff’s second claim is that there was insufficient evidence for the court to find that, at the time

of the dissolution, certain properties constituted the

defendant’s ‘‘separate property’’ under the agreement.

See footnote 3 of this opinion. The plaintiff argues that

the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence for
the court to trace the properties he owned at the time

of trial to the separate properties he owned at the time

the parties signed the agreement and were married. She

also claims that the court erred by failing to assign a

specific value to the defendant’s ownership interest in

the family business. We disagree.

We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘[I]n

domestic relations cases . . . this court will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused

its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable

basis in the facts. . . . As has often been explained,

the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is

in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal

factors significant to a domestic relations case . . . .

In determining whether a trial court has abused its

broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we

allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the

correctness of its action. . . . Notwithstanding the

great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution

proceedings, a trial court’s ruling . . . may be reversed

if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies

the wrong standard of law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn.

80, 87–88, 995 A.2d 1 (2010). ‘‘When a trial court has

evidence in a dissolution action sufficient for its decision, garnered from the testimony, exhibits and financial affidavits, its rulings will not be disturbed even

though the memorandum of decision is silent as to that

evidence.’’ Russo v. Russo, 1 Conn. App. 604, 606–607,

474 A.2d 473 (1984).

In its memorandum of decision, the court quoted in

relevant part the following provision of the agreement:

‘‘Neither party shall receive any portion of the separate

property of the other . . . and/or replacements of such

property. . . . The parties shall have no right against

each other by way of . . . division of property

existing [as] of this date . . . or acquire[d] in the

future separately from separate [funds].’’ (Emphasis

added.) The court found that the ‘‘family business assets

listed on the defendant’s current financial affidavit

[were] a direct result of the premarital assets he was

in possession of at the time of the marriage, as they were

acquired after the marriage, separately from separate

funds.’’ As a result, the court concluded that, under the

agreement, the plaintiff had no right or interest in any

of those family business assets.

At trial, the defendant introduced evidence of the

premarital family business assets that he owned on the

date the parties married, including the agreement with

the attached schedules setting forth each parties’ assets

at the time of the marriage and the value thereof. The

defendant’s daughter and sister also testified about the

family business and how it operated during the parties’

marriage, including the family’s acquisition of numerous investment properties during that time frame.
The plaintiff argues that the court was required to

trace more precisely the defendant’s current assets

back to the separate property he owned at the time the

parties married. She points to paragraph C of section

III of the agreement, titled ‘‘Separate Property,’’ which

provides that the ‘‘parties shall keep adequate records

of their transactions in such separate property and shall

make such records available to the other from time to

time, the intent being that at all times the separate

property will be effectively updated by each of them

in such financial records.’’ She also argues that the

agreement, in effect, required the court to sit as a ‘‘community property state’’ and not as an ‘‘equitable distribution state’’ and that courts in community property jurisdictions have held that a party seeking to claim assets

as separate property ‘‘bears a heightened burden of

proof to trace any allegedly converted assets to premarital assets.’’

In making this claim, however, the plaintiff ignores

the court’s findings that (1) the defendant complied

with the agreement’s record keeping provision during

the course of the marriage and (2) upon commencing

these divorce proceedings and without the defendant’s

consent, the plaintiff removed from the marital home

several boxes of documents containing the defendant’s

financial records and information on the defendant’s

computer. According to the court, the plaintiff’s failure

to produce this information during discovery made it

‘‘difficult and at times impossible for the defendant to

trace in detail and with specificity all of the family

business accounts and premarital assets transactions

from the date of the marriage to the present.’’ The plaintiff has not challenged these findings on appeal.

As noted earlier in this opinion, the court heard and

credited the testimony of witnesses who described the

family business as an informal venture. Family members pooled their money, working together to purchase,

renovate, maintain, and sell properties. The court did

not find it surprising that there were no contracts or

written agreements between and among members of

the defendant’s family and did not ascribe any nefarious

motives to the informal way the family conducted its

business. The court made detailed findings concerning

the value of the family business assets at the time of

the parties’ marriage and at trial. It also found that

five separate properties in which the defendant had an

interest were acquired by the family business during

the course of the marriage. With the exception of one

such property,10 the court found that the plaintiff did

not contribute any funds toward the purchase of those

properties or contribute money or labor toward the

renovation, maintenance or upkeep of the properties.

The court stated that its findings were based on the

evidence and testimony presented at trial and on its

observations and assessments of the credibility of the
witnesses. ‘‘[I]t is within the province of the trial court,

when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence

presented and determine the credibility and effect to

be given the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zilkha v. Zilkha, 167 Conn. App. 480, 487–88, 144

A.3d 447 (2016).

On the basis of our review of the entire record, we

conclude that, under the circumstances of this case,

there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

findings with respect to the defendant’s separate property. We reach that conclusion in part because the court

determined that the plaintiff’s removal and failure to

produce the defendant’s financial records prevented

him from performing the kind of detailed tracing the

plaintiff claims was required. See Certo v. Fink, 140

Conn. App. 740, 743, 749–50, 60 A.3d 372 (2013) (court

did not commit error in relying on plaintiffs’ estimate

of damages when court credited plaintiffs, discredited

defendant, and found that plaintiffs had to rely on estimate of damages as result of defendant’s failure to

provide discovery).

We also reject the plaintiff’s claim that the court

improperly failed to place a total value on the defendant’s interest in the family business, in violation of

General Statutes § 46b-81 (c). That statute concerns the

court’s authority to assign to either spouse all or part

of the estate of the other spouse. In this case, the court

determined that the defendant’s interest in the family

business constituted his separate property under the

agreement and, in accordance with the agreement,

ordered that, upon dissolution, the defendant shall

retain his interest in that separate property. Thus, § 46b81 (c) had no applicability because the court did not

assign to either party the other party’s interest in the

family business. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim that

the court improperly classified and assigned the defendant’s separate property interest in the family business fails.

III

The plaintiff’s third and final claim is that the court

abused its discretion in assigning to her the entire outstanding debt on the parties’ home equity line of credit.

We agree because that order conflicts with the court’s

order regarding attorney’s fees.

‘‘The construction of a judgment is a question of law

for the court. . . . As a general rule, judgments are

to be construed in the same fashion as other written

instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may

involve the circumstances surrounding the making of

the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which

is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.

. . . The judgment should admit of a consistent con-
struction as a whole.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn.

189, 196–97, 496 A.2d 491 (1985).

‘‘Our standard of review for financial orders in a

dissolution action is clear. The trial court has broad

discretion in fashioning its financial orders, and [j]udicial review of a trial court’s exercise of [this] broad

discretion . . . is limited to the question of whether

the . . . court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Hammel v. Hammel, 158 Conn. App.

827, 835–36, 120 A.3d 1259 (2015). ‘‘This deferential

standard of review is not, however, without limits.

There are rare cases in which the trial court’s financial

orders warrant reversal because they are, for example,

logically inconsistent . . . or simply mistaken . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 836.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. In December, 2015, the parties obtained a home

equity line of credit and used some of the funds to pay

off the plaintiff’s personal line of credit, totaling $24,271.

The parties also drew on the line of credit for their

respective attorney’s fees in this dissolution matter. The

court specifically found that the defendant borrowed

$10,000 under this line of credit to pay his own attorney’s fees in this matter but also ordered, among other

things, that the ‘‘plaintiff shall be solely responsible for

payment of the [home equity line of credit],’’11 and that

‘‘[e]ach party shall be solely responsible for payment

of their respective attorney’s fees incurred during the

course of this case.’’

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court’s order

regarding the home equity line of credit conflicts with

its order that the parties are responsible for the payment

of their respective attorney’s fees. We agree that the

two orders are irreconcilable. We, therefore, reverse

the judgment only with regard to the order that the

plaintiff is solely responsible for the debt on the home

equity line of credit and remand the case with direction

to resolve the inconsistency.12

The judgment is reversed only as to the order regarding the home equity line of credit and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The cross complaint alleged that the marriage should be annulled on

the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation because the plaintiff allegedly

entered the marriage with the sole intent of using the defendant’s citizenship

to gain permanent residency and citizenship for herself, her children and

her son-in-law.

2 Four schedules, which listed the parties’ respective assets and liabilities,

were attached to the agreement.

3 Section III of the agreement, titled ‘‘SEPARATE PROPERTY,’’ provides

as follows: ‘‘Each of the parties agrees that the property described hereafter,

shall be defined as the separate [property] of the other party.

‘‘A. All property of [the defendant] listed on ‘Schedule C’ attached hereto

and all property listed of [the plaintiff] listed on ‘Schedule D’ attached hereto.
‘‘B. All property, whether real or personal or whatsoever nature and

wheresoever situated acquired by either party out of the proceeds or income

from the separate property or any replacements thereof, or attributable to

appreciation in value of said property, or their replacements, whether the

enhancement is due to market conditions or to the services, skills or efforts

of either of the parties.

‘‘C. The parties shall keep adequate records of their transactions in such

separate property and shall make such records available to the other from

time to time, the intent being that at all times the separate property will be

effectively updated by each of them in such financial records.’’

Schedules A and B are the parties’ respective financial affidavits that were

appended to the agreement. Schedules C and D document the title holders

of the real estate that was listed in the parties’ respective financial affidavits.

4 Practice Book § 25-2A provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) If a party seeks

enforcement of a premarital agreement . . . he or she shall specifically

demand the enforcement of that agreement, including its date, within the

party’s claim for relief. The defendant shall file said claim for relief within

sixty days of the return date unless otherwise permitted by the court.

‘‘(b) If a party seeks to avoid the premarital agreement . . . he or she

shall, within sixty days of the claim seeking enforcement of the agreement,

unless otherwise permitted by the court, file a reply specifically demanding

avoidance of the agreement and stating the grounds thereof.’’

5

In its order denying the plaintiff’s motion to preclude the agreement,

the court cites different dates on which the answer, cross complaint, and

notice were filed. Those dates appear to be the dates the documents were

signed or captioned, however. According to the docket prepared by the

clerk, all three documents were filed on May 14, 2018.

6

In Warren, the court noted that Practice Book § 25-2A ‘‘requires that a

party seeking to enforce a pre- or post-nuptial agreement plead the agreement in the prayer for relief.’’ Warren v. Gardel, supra, Superior Court,

Docket No. FA-15-6048865-S. Because neither party had done so, the court

concluded that it did ‘‘not have the authority to issue orders enforcing the

terms of the pre-nuptial agreement itself.’’ Id. Similarly, in Olderman, neither

party had pleaded or demanded enforcement of the premarital agreement

in accordance with Practice Book § 25-2A. The court concluded, without

discussion or analysis, that, ‘‘[c]onsequently, a claim for enforcement of

the premarital agreement is not properly before this court.’’ Olderman v.

Olderman, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. FA-14-4034221-S. Neither court

suggested that a party’s failure to comply with Practice Book § 25-2A

deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the agreement, which

is the plaintiff’s claim in the present appeal.

7 The trial was rescheduled for April 16, 2019.

8 General Statutes § 46b-1 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Matters within the

jurisdiction of the Superior Court deemed to be family relations matters

shall be matters affecting or involving: (1) Dissolution of marriage, contested

and uncontested . . . (15) actions related to prenuptial . . . agreements

. . . .’’

9 The plaintiff’s claim on appeal is that the defendant’s failure to comply

with the pleading requirements of Practice Book § 25-2A deprived the court

of subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. The only hint of

an alternative, nonjurisdictional claim challenging the court’s authority to

enforce the agreement appears in the following sentence of her reply brief:

‘‘Since [the] [d]efendant never pleaded the agreement, the trial court was

without [subject matter] jurisdiction to hear it, or, in the alternative, could

not enforce it.’’ (Emphasis added.) Because the plaintiff did not make such

a claim in her principal brief, we need not decide the separate question of

whether the pleading requirements of § 25-2A are mandatory, as opposed

to directory, and whether the defendant’s alleged failure to comply strictly

with those provisions deprived the court of the authority, as opposed to

the jurisdiction, to enforce the premarital agreement. See, e.g., Calcano v.

Calcano, 257 Conn. 230, 244, 777 A.2d 633 (2001) (arguments cannot be

raised for first time in reply brief).

10 With respect to the Fenwick Street property in Hartford, the court found

that the plaintiff paid utilities and contributed toward the rent from the time

the building was sold out of the family’s business in 2014 until the parties

moved to the marital home in December, 2015.

11 The court also ordered that no further funds were to be drawn on the

home equity line of credit.

12 During oral argument before this court, counsel for the parties agreed

that the order regarding payment of the home equity line of credit was
severable from the mosaic of the court’s financial orders. We agree. See

Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 214, 61 A.3d 449 (2013) (financial

order severable when not interdependent with other orders).