J-S83020-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANNA SIGORENKO,

Appellant No. 3798 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 9, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010627-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON AND DUBOW, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2018

Appellant, Anna Sigorenko, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on December 9, 2016. In this direct appeal, Appellant’s courtappointed counsel filed both a petition to withdraw as counsel and an 

accompanying brief pursuant to Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 

1185 (Pa. 1981), and its federal predecessor, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967). We conclude that Appellant’s counsel complied with the 

procedural requirements necessary to withdraw. Furthermore, after 

independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the appeal is wholly 

frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the 

judgment of sentence. 

The factual background and procedural history of this case are as 

follows. Early in the morning on August 29, 2015, Amanda Maraj (“Maraj”) 
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left a restaurant and placed her wallet in her vehicle. She then spoke with 

family for approximately two hours in the area around her vehicle. When 

Maraj reentered her vehicle, her wallet was missing. 

One week later Appellant contacted Maraj and informed her that she 

knew who stole the wallet. When the two met, Appellant told Maraj that she 

had some of the twenty credit cards that were in Maraj’s wallet and provided 

the name of the alleged thief. Appellant also offered to return all of Maraj’s 

property in exchange for $100.00. Maraj agreed to this arrangement and they 

scheduled a later meeting. Prior to the scheduled meeting, Appellant 

increased her demand to $120.00. Appellant was arrested when she, along 

with her son, appeared to make the exchange with Maraj. 

On November 2, 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant via 

criminal information with receiving stolen property.1 On August 10, 2016, 

Appellant was convicted of that offense. On December 9, 2016, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to one year of probation. This timely appeal followed.2 

Appellant’s counsel raises one issues in his Anders brief:

Was the evidence sufficient to prove [Appellant] guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt?

Anders Brief at viii. 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).

2 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925.
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Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, we must first determine 

whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural requirements for 

withdrawing as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Blauser, 166 A.3d 428, 

431 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). To withdraw under Anders, courtappointed counsel 

must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious 

examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly 

frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth 

issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any 

other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation 

thereof. Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders

petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional 

points worthy of this Court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cook, 175 A.3d 345, 348 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned up).

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the 

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal 

is in fact wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 355 

n.5 (Pa. 2009), quoting McClendon, 434 A.2d at 1187. It is only when both 

the procedural and substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be 

permitted to withdraw. In the case at bar, counsel has met all of the above 

procedural obligations. We now turn to whether this appeal is wholly 

frivolous.3

 

3 Appellant did not file a response to counsel’s Anders brief.
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The lone issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief is whether there was 

sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of receiving stolen property. “The 

determination of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a 

question of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160 A.3d 127, 136 (Pa. 

2017) (citation omitted). In assessing Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, we 

must determine “whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the [Commonwealth], there is sufficient evidence to enable 

the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 806 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. . . . [T]he finder of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Waugaman, 167 A.3d 153, 155–156 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted).

“The elements of receiving stolen property [are]: (1) intentionally 

acquiring possession, control or title, retaining, disposing, or lending on the 

security of movable property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it 

was probably stolen; and (3) intent to deprive permanently.” 

Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 807 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 72 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). In this case, the 
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Commonwealth produced overwhelming evidence to prove all three elements. 

First, Appellant was apprehended with Maraj’s moveable property and 

Appellant admitted to possessing her moveable property. Second, Maraj 

informed Appellant that the wallet was stolen. Nonetheless, Appellant 

retained possession of the wallet. Finally, Appellant intended to permanently 

deprive Maraj of her moveable property. Appellant had the opportunity to 

return the wallet and its contents on two occasions but failed to do so. 

Instead, she demanded that Maraj pay a ransom in exchange for return of the 

property. At the third meeting, where Appellant was ultimately arrested, she 

had her son hold the wallet while she attempted to extort funds from Maraj in 

exchange for the wallet. Hence, any argument that the evidence was 

insufficient is wholly frivolous. 

In sum, we conclude that the sole issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief 

is wholly frivolous. Furthermore, after an independent review of the entire 

record, we conclude that no other issue of arguable merit exists. Therefore, 

we grant counsel’s request to withdraw. Having determined that the sole issue

raised on appeal is frivolous, we affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of sentence 

affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/18