2020 IL App (2d) 170517-U 

No. 2-17-0517 

Order filed November 10, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 13-CF-1791 

) 

MICHAEL ZAKY BASSALY, ) Honorable 

) Daniel P. Guerin, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Hutchinson and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court properly rejected defendant’s request for an involuntary 

manslaughter instruction where no evidence supported a finding that defendant 

acted recklessly; the State’s cross-examination questions and closing argument 

remarks did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.

¶ 2 In the direct appeal of his first-degree murder conviction, defendant, Michael Zaky 

Bassaly, raises two issues. The first is whether he should have received an involuntary 

manslaughter instruction where he testified that he lunged for a gun that his mother had placed to 

her temple, attempted to jam his finger between her finger and the trigger, and thereby caused the 

gun to discharge, unintentionally killing his mother. The second is whether he should be granted 
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a new trial where the State, in its closing argument, “relied heavily on propensity evidence to 

obtain a conviction” and “used a prior bad act not resulting in a conviction” to impeach defendant’s 

testimony. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Defendant was charged by indictment with the first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),

(2) (West 2011)) of his mother, Yvonne Bassaly. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial 

and sentenced to 55 years’ imprisonment. 

¶ 5 At the trial, Burr Ridge Police Officer Louis Moravecek testified that at about 12:53 a.m. 

on August 29, 2013, he received a dispatch regarding a possible gunshot victim at St. Mark’s 

Coptic Church. The 911 caller reported that he had just shot his mom. Moravecek drove to the 

church and saw a parked, four-door Cadillac. Both rear doors were open, and defendant stood by 

the open rear passenger door holding a cell phone and a gun. When Moravecek told defendant to 

put the gun down, defendant complied and slid it toward Moravecek, who kicked it under the squad 

car for safety purposes.

¶ 6 Defendant stated that his mother had a pulse and asked for an ambulance. He was sobbing, 

and when Moravecek asked him what happened, he responded, “she made me do it” and “the gun 

went off.” After a second officer, Corporal Glosky, arrived, Moravecek checked on the woman 

in the car, Yvonne Bassaly, who was seated upright in the backseat behind the driver’s seat. Her 

head was slumped back and she was breathing, making a gurgling sound. Moravecek could see 

wounds on the right and left sides of her head, and there was blood. Moravecek advised dispatch 

that he had a gunshot victim and requested medical assistance.

¶ 7 Moravecek heard Corporal Glosky ask defendant what happened, and he responded, “along 

the lines of, she made me do it, she wanted me to do it.” Moravecek then asked defendant if she 
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shot herself, and defendant said “no.” Defendant asked Glosky to get an ambulance for his mom 

and also to look for an envelope and a flash drive that were in the car and to call the FBI. 

Moravecek then saw an envelope on the dashboard. 

¶ 8 More officers arrived on the scene. As Moravecek put pressure on Yvonne’s wound with 

gauze from a first aid kit, he heard defendant describe to Glosky “how he put the gun where his 

hand was, talked about where his finger placement was, said that he couldn't believe that he did it, 

and in describing his hand and finger placement, he said that -- he said, I shot her.” Within 

approximately seven minutes, an ambulance arrived. Yvonne, who was still breathing, was taken 

to Hinsdale Hospital, and defendant was transported to the Burr Ridge Police Station. The parties 

later stipulated that Yvonne was pronounced dead at Hinsdale Hospital, and her body was 

transported to the Du Page County Coroner’s Office.

¶ 9 Moravecek’s squad car video and a transcription of the video were admitted and published

to the jury. The parties stipulated that defendant’s gun was recovered from under the squad car 

and contained one bullet in the chamber and fourteen bullets in the magazine.

¶ 10 Detective Jeffrey Romstedt, a forensic detective with the Du Page County Sheriff’s Office, 

testified that he believed the passenger side doors of the Cadillac were open when he arrived at the 

scene at 2:02 a.m. He photographed the car and, at approximately 7:00 a.m., began collecting 

evidence pursuant to a search warrant. He recovered a sealed United States Postal Service 

envelope with “FBI” written on it from the front dashboard and a 9 mm Luger shell casing from 

the backseat of the car. He also recovered a fired bullet that appeared to have hair on it from the 

floor of the back seat behind the driver’s seat. Romstedt observed a hole in the side lining of the 

pillar in the back seat behind the driver’s seat. “You could see the foam behind the lining, as well 
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as what appeared to be brain matter.” Romstedt also recovered a black purse and a brown briefcase 

from the front passenger’s seat of the car.

¶ 11 Special Agent Louis Chesla of the Department of Homeland Security, Office of the 

Inspector General, testified that he investigates fraud and corruption against the department. Prior 

to August 29, 2013, Chesla was involved in an investigation into possible asylum fraud being 

committed by defendant and immigration attorney Robert DeKelaita. Chesla interviewed 

defendant as part of the investigation into DeKelaita, who was ultimately indicted and convicted 

of various offenses related to asylum fraud. After learning that defendant had been taken into 

custody on August 29, 2013, Chesla assisted in the search of defendant’s apartment in Downer’s 

Grove. As part of his investigation, Chesla reviewed documents and computers seized pursuant 

to the search warrant, as well as the envelope and a thumb drive recovered from the dashboard of 

the Cadillac. 

¶ 12 Dr. Hilary McElligott, a forensic pathologist with the Du Page County Coroner’s Office, 

testified she performed Yvonne’s autopsy on August 29, 2013. Her external examination revealed 

no defensive injuries and no soot on Yvonne’s hands. There was a contact range gunshot entrance 

wound on the right side of Yvonne’s head, with visible soot. The entrance wound was above the 

right temple; the exit wound was straight across her head, on the left side. The cause of death was 

a gunshot wound to the head. 

¶ 13 The parties stipulated that a Du Page County Crime Laboratory forensic scientist would 

render expert opinions that a full DNA profile from the hand grip of the gun matched defendant’s 

DNA profile and a partial DNA profile from the end of the barrel was consistent with Yvonne’s 

DNA profile.
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¶ 14 Burr Ridge Police Officer John Helms testified that he received the items recovered from

the Cadillac on August 29, 2013. He opened the sealed United States Postal Office envelope, 

which contained a signed two-page letter, seven copies of the same letter, and a USB flash drive. 

The envelope and its contents were admitted into evidence, and Helms read the two-page letter to 

publish it to the jury. Handwriting on the outside of the envelope says, “to the F.B.I.” and “to 

F.B.I.” The unedited typewritten letter states:

“TO: the FBI and police, department of homeland security department of 

immigration and specially the Chicago asylum office located in 181 W Madison st. 

Chicago, IL 30th floor. · 

If you are reading this letter that means I have killed my mother and myself, the 

reason for doing this is: 

I killed my mother to protect her from the result of the investigation as you are 

reading the letter and the evidence that I am providing, you will find out that I had no 

choice but to kill her to protect her. As for me every asylum case that I have done is fake 

there is about 120 to 130 cases none of them really happened. Egyptian would come to me 

I make up their story and apply for asylum for them and most stories are repeated more 

than once or twice or even more. If you think that is a lot well I am just a small guy. 

Included with the evidence a lot of recordings(file named Robert in my google drive) to 

attorney ROBERT W. DEKELAITA, he is the one who has been faking asylum cases for 

years with hundreds if not' thousands of fake ·cases, to give you an idea of how long he 

has been doing that, he did my mother and I asylum cases in 2002 and none of what is 

written in our cases is remotely true, he wrote it and gave it to my mother to memories, 

also he used to pay me to solicit clients for him and bill him as translation fees, he used to 

pay me 15% of whatever that client paid. He taught me a lot about faking cases and he is 

the one that introduced me to Mark Shoukhman the doctor who faked all the medical 

reports that some of the clients that I had and some of Robert's bought from him at $500 

per report.” 

Also Robert Dekelaita hides a lot of money from the IRS, whoever is reading this 

letter should ask the IRS to look into that, but this is not my issue. 

I got to the point where my conscious got the better of me and I could not stay 

silent, I had to report everything, knowing full well that is most likely I will spend the rest 

of my life in a jail cell or get killed by someone in the Egyptian community, I decided to 

take my own life. 

All the.evidence that the FBI and homeldnd security and ICE needs to investigates 

the cases that I have done and to investigate Robert dekelaita are located as follow: my 
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apartment 2035 prentiss Dr. C211 downers Grove, IL and most important my hard drive 

Of my laptop and my desktop and also on my Google drive and my Gmail accounts ( I 

have 2 accounts with Gmail, the main account that have all the evidence in it is Google 

drive is mikebassaly@grnail.com, password:fuckyoufuckyousamir and the second 

account is mhdaurora@gmail.comPassword: m2994381808b but this one only email, there 

is nothing on the google drive for this account. 

There is also on this laptop a copy of most if not all of the people I did fake statement 

and asylum for on an encrypted drive it is drive (f) to open it you have to do the following, 

open program called truecrypt, select the drive f and click mount the password is 

(299438180159119773127254459) 

And in case you cannot open it, I left a folder on my desktop screen of my laptop 

with a copy of the same thing in the crypted drive. Folder called ( for the fbi and homeland 

security). I also sent a copy of this letter to CNN and the asylum office in Chicago and the 

FBI. 

I hope that you investigate Robert W Dekelaita office too because he is 20 times worse 

than me, he does this on a massive scale for Egyptian and Iraqi and others. 

Law office of Robert w dekelaita 

5811 west dempster ave 

Morton grove, il 

Note: I know very well what I have done is wrong, I am sorry for what I have done.” 

¶ 15 Handwriting on page two of the letter states: “I also include with this letter a USb drive 

that have some info” and, at the end, “God Bless USA,” with the signature, “Michael Bassaly.”

¶ 16 After the State rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied his 

motion as to the first degree murder charge and the allegation that he personally discharged a 

firearm, proximately causing the death of another. The court granted defendant’s motion with 

respect to the additional allegation that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated manner 

and pursuant to a pre-conceived plan.

¶ 17 Defendant testified that he was born a Christian in Cairo, Egypt, where he lived with his 

mother until he was about 14 years old. They came to the United States in about 2001 because his 

mother wanted a better life for him, and they applied for asylum because his mother was “a little 
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afraid” of the Muslim Brotherhood, which persecuted Christians in Egypt. They were represented 

by attorney Robert DeKelaita. Their asylum petition contained untruthful statements.

¶ 18 After high school, and continuing until August 29, 2013, defendant worked for DeKelaita 

as a translator and also did translation work on his own. He falsified Christian Egyptian asylum 

cases mainly after the Egyptian revolution in 2011 when the Muslim Brotherhood took over most 

of Egypt. He wanted to aid Christian Egyptians, who were experiencing a “bloodbath, massacre.” 

In 2013 he was under a lot of pressure because he learned that he was under investigation by the 

FBI and Homeland Security. 

¶ 19 Defendant testified that he had a close relationship with his mother; his father died when 

he was young, and he has no brothers or sisters. His mother knew about the investigation and 

came to Chicago from her home in Florida to “deal with the problem” she and defendant had, 

namely, the fear that they would lose their green cards and be deported to Egypt and be killed. 

¶ 20 On the day that his mother was shot, defendant met with his defense attorney and then 

returned to the hotel room in Naperville where he and his mother had been staying since the night 

before. Defendant ate and went to sleep and woke up at approximately 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. to his 

mother’s crying. His mother wanted to pray and drove them both to St. Mark’s church in the 

Cadillac defendant had bought for her.. Defendant testified that he had a gun and a FOID card and 

that the gun was in the dresser at the hotel; he did not bring it with him when they went to the 

church. He sat in the front seat of the car, and once they arrived at the church parking lot, his 

mother moved to the back seat to rest her head on the front seat headrest while she prayed.

¶ 21 Defendant testified that he sat in the front passenger seat waiting for his mother while she 

prayed. That is when she pulled out his gun, told him that she loved him and held the gun to her 

head. Defendant “jumped out of the front seat and *** went to the back seat to try to grab the gun 
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from her hand” by jamming his finger in the trigger to pull it away, and “the gun went off.” 

Defendant then called 911 because he wanted to save his mother.

¶ 22 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he said, “I shot my mom” twice to the 911 

dispatcher and that he also said, “I shot her in the brain.” He did not tell the dispatcher that it was 

an accident. He had the gun in his hand when the first officer arrived because he took it from his 

mother. He told the officer that the “the gun went off,” and when the officer asked, “how did it go 

off,” he responded, “my mom wanted me to do it.” Defendant did not tell the responding officers 

that it was an accident. He also testified that when asked if his mother shot herself, he responded, 

“no.” 

¶ 23 Defendant confirmed the contents of the envelope on the dashboard. He testified that he 

typed the letter a couple of days before the incident, signed it, and put it in the car. He further 

testified that he “exaggerated” about 120 or 130 asylum cases and that he did this for a living for 

about two and a half years. He “participated in a lie” and knew that it was wrong “in the way that 

it was fraud,” but he was “okay” with “saving those people from what was happening at the time” 

in Egypt. 

¶ 24 On re-direct examination, defendant testified that he did not use the word “accident” with 

the police officers on the scene because:

I was - - my state of mind at the time was not something - - I mean, I just - - First 

of all, the gun went off, I just saw my mom - - You heard the sounds, you heard how my 

mom was and how she’s - - I mean, I was - - all I was thinking about at the time was an 

ambulance. I wasn’t like - - I felt - - The gun went off. I felt - - First of all, I felt guilt for - 

- for this just happened because of what I was doing. I felt that I just - - First of all, up to 

this day I don’t know if the gun went off because of me trying to pull this gun from her or 

me trying to jam my finger or because of - - I - - I don’t know, and I felt that guilt goes 

from me – 

* * * 
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And at the same time the first thing that was on my mind is get her some - - get her 

help. So, yes, I felt - - I felt guilt. I mean, I was - - I was - - I wasn’t trying to justify myself 

at the time, I didn’t really care, all I cared about was just getting some help for my mom. 

¶ 25 During the instruction conference, defendant requested an instruction on involuntary 

manslaughter. In opposing the instructions, the State argued that if defendant’s testimony that the 

gun accidentally went off were believed, then that would not constitute recklessness but rather an 

accident, and the verdict would be not guilty because defendant lacked the requisite mental state 

for first degree murder. The court agreed with the State and denied the request for an involuntary 

manslaughter instruction. 

¶ 26 The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and found proven the allegation that 

during the commission of the offense, defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately 

caused death to another person. 

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 A. Involuntary Manslaughter 

¶ 29 Defendant argues first that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for 

an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. According to defendant, his testimony that he “lunged 

for a firearm that was pointed at his mother’s temple and attempted to jam his finger at the gun to 

block the trigger” shows that he acted recklessly. The State responds that defendant’s testimony 

did not show he acted recklessly because his “alleged act of shoving his finger into the trigger area 

of the gun was deliberate and done for the purpose of trying to stop his mom from shooting 

herself.”

¶ 30 Due process requires that a lesser-included-offense instruction be given when the evidence 

warrants such an instruction. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982). The court’s examination 

of the evidence should focus on whether there was any evidentiary basis to support a conviction 
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of the lesser included offense. Id. “Although the lesser included offense doctrine developed at 

common law to assist the prosecution in cases where the evidence failed to establish some element 

of the offense originally charged, it is now beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an 

instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him 

guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.” Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 

208 (1973). Our supreme court recently stated that

“the appropriate standard for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury 

instruction on a lesser-included offense is whether there is some evidence in the record 

that, if believed by the jury, will reduce the crime charged to a lesser offense, not whether 

there is some credible evidence. It is not the province of the trial court to weigh the 

evidence when deciding whether a jury instruction is justified. [Citations.] Requiring that 

credible evidence exist in the record risks the trial court invading the function of the jury 

and substituting its own credibility determination for that of the jury.” (Emphases in 

original.) People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 25. 

¶ 31 We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision that there is insufficient 

evidence to justify giving a jury instruction. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 42. An abuse of 

discretion occurs “where the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the 

degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.” Id. at ¶ 32.

¶ 32 The issue here is whether there was “some evidence” presented at trial, whether through 

express testimony or through inference from the testimony, that would have permitted the jury 

rationally to find defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. A defendant commits involuntary 

manslaughter when he “unintentionally, but recklessly, performs an act that is likely to cause death 

or great bodily harm to another.” People v. Castillo, 2018 IL App (1st) 153147, ¶ 27 (citing 
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McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 50); see 720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2017). Reckless conduct occurs 

when an individual “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will 

follow and such disregard is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person 

would exercise under the same circumstances.” Id.; see 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2017). 

¶ 33 “A mental state is seldom proved by direct evidence and must generally be inferred from 

the surrounding circumstances.” People v. Lissade, 403 Ill. App. 3d 609, 613 (2010). Here,

defendant testified that when he saw his mother pointing the gun at her head, he “jumped out of 

the front seat and *** went to the backseat to try to grab the gun from her hand.” According to 

defendant, he did not bring the gun with him when they went to the church. By jamming his finger 

in the trigger guard, he intended “to pull [the gun] away” before she shot herself. As alleged, 

defendant’s urgent attempt to save his mother’s life does not comport with his claim that he 

“consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that his conduct would result in 

her death. The evidence does not suggest he acted in conscious disregard of a risk. To the contrary, 

according to his testimony, he was attempting to eliminate, or at least mitigate, a risk by getting 

the gun away from his mother. Moreover, an inference may be drawn from defendant’s testimony 

that the risk was justified by his urgent need to save his mother. See People v. Callaham, 60 Ill. 

App. 3d 1020, 1025 (1978) (“[t]he question remain[s] *** whether th[e] risk was justifiable or 

reasonable under the circumstances”). Because defendant did not act recklessly as defined under 

the statute, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for 

involuntary manslaughter instructions. 

¶ 34 Citing People v. Luckett, 339 Ill. App. 3d 93, 101 (2003), defendant argues that 

“[p]roviding instructions on a defense supported by the evidence ‘enables the jury to use the 

applicable law in making a full and fair evaluation of the competing theories presented by the State 
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and the defense.’ ” Here, however, the defense of involuntary manslaughter is not supported by 

the evidence, and the trial court correctly determined that instructions on this theory would not be 

appropriate. See People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 42 (the decision that there is insufficient 

evidence to justify giving an instruction lies within the trial court’s discretion).

¶ 35 Defendant argues that Illinois courts have “repeatedly held that evidence a decedent was 

killed during a struggle over a firearm supports a finding of recklessness,” citing People v. 

Consago, 170 Ill. App. 3d 982 (1988), People v. Robinson, 163 Ill. App. 3d 754 (1987), and People 

v. Sibley, 101 Ill. App. 3d 953 (1981). However, in People v. Castillo, 298 Ill. App. 3d 839 (1998), 

the court factually distinguished Consago and Sibley on grounds that are equally applicable here. 

In those cases, “the defendant was entitled to a recklessness instruction when defendant introduced 

a gun into the argument, pointed the loaded gun at another, and then the gun was discharged after 

a struggle.” (Emphasis added.) Castillo, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 844-45 (citing Consago, 170 Ill. App. 

3d at 986 (“defendant drew a gun from desk drawer and victim killed by bullet as she reached for 

the gun”), and Sibley, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 956 (“defendant, who had drawn gun and held it on father, 

shot boy when struggling with boy’s father”)). Here, according to defendant’s own testimony, he 

did not bring his gun to the church but, rather, his mother did, and it was she who introduced the 

weapon during her prayers. Thus, Consago and Sibley are distinguishable from this case. 

¶ 36 Robinson is distinguishable on a different factual basis: although a person other than the 

defendant produced the weapon, the defendant claimed that he struggled with that person in selfdefense. No such struggle occurred in this case. Indeed, all three of defendant’s cases are 

distinguishable in that each involved a struggle over a weapon. Defendant’s testimony in this case 

does not suggest resistance on the part of his mother, or any struggle whatsoever between 

defendant and his mother. 
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¶ 37 Defendant also arguesthat it was the trial court’s function to determine whether his conduct 

was accidental or reckless, citing Consago, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 986. An accident, however, “is not 

to be equated with recklessness.” People v. Olivieri, 2016 IL App (1st) 152137, ¶ 28 (insufficient 

evidence supported reckless discharge of a firearm where defendant accidentally pulled trigger 

while attempting to unload pistol). Although the Consago court stated that the distinction between 

recklessness and accidental “is generally one for the trier of fact,” it also stated that a defendant 

“is entitled to a jury instruction on manslaughter if the record sets forth a basis for it.” (Emphasis 

added.) Id. Because we find that the record in this case does not set forth a basis for giving an 

instruction on involuntary manslaughter, we reject defendant’s argument that he was improperly 

denied the opportunity to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case. 

¶ 38 As to whether the record supports a finding that defendant’s conduct was accidental, we 

will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See People v. Banks, 287 Ill. App. 3d 273, 

286 (1997) (“It is the function of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and assess 

the weight to be afforded evidence, and we may not lightly set aside such findings, nor substitute 

our own judgment for that of the jury.”). The jury heard defendant’s testimony, as well as his 

counsel’s arguments, that the shooting was accidental. It also considered defendant’s letter to the 

FBI; his statements to the 911 operator and the police at the scene; DNA evidence on the gun 

showing that defendant, not his mother, handled it; and the forensic pathologist’s testimony that 

defendant’s mother did not have soot on her hands. Ultimately, the jury rejected the possibility 

that defendant accidentally killed his mother by finding him guilty of first-degree murder beyond 

a reasonable doubt and finding proven that, during the commission of that offense, defendant 

personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death to another person. 

¶ 39 B. Admission of Asylum Fraud Evidence 
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¶ 40 Prior to trial, the State moved to admit defendant’s two-page letter describing his 

involvement in the asylum fraud scheme as proof of defendant’s motive for killing his mother. At 

the hearing on the motion, the court and both parties agreed that the letter was relevant and 

admissible at trial, subject to the requisite foundation and a limiting instruction because defendant 

was never charged with fraud. Defendant now argues that he was deprived of a fair trial by the 

State’s closing argument comments and cross-examination questions regarding defendant’s 

asylum fraud activity. The State replies that defendant failed to preserve his arguments for review 

and can establish neither that error occurred nor that any “plain error” was so serious that it 

prevented him from obtaining a fair trial.

¶ 41 Our supreme court has held that a “defendant must both specifically object at trial and raise 

the specific issue again in a posttrial motion to preserve any alleged error for review.” People v. 

Woods, 214 Ill.2d 455, 470 (2005). Defendant concedes that he did not object to the prosecutors’ 

closing remarks or cross-examination questions at trial and did not raise these issue in his posttrial motion. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited his claims. Id. 

¶ 42 The plain error rule, however, allows a reviewing court to address a forfeited error affecting 

substantial rights in two circumstances: (1) where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced 

that the jury’s guilty verdict might have resulted from the error and not the evidence and (2) where 

the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right and the consideration of the 

forfeited error would uphold the validity of the judicial process. People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 

178–79 (2005. Here, defendant argues only the second prong of the plain error doctrine. Under 

this prong, “the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that 

it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” 
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Id. at 187. “Prejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, 

regardless of the strength of the evidence.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 

¶ 43 We must first, however, determine whether error occurred at all. People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 

2d 592, 621 (2000). In reviewing defendant’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, it is 

appropriate to examine the closing arguments of both parties in their entirety and place the 

complained-of comments in their proper context. People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175–76 

(1987). The supreme court has held that our review is de novo. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 

121 (2007) (“Whether statements made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious that 

they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews de novo.”). It has also held that the 

appropriate reviewing standard is abuse of discretion, reasoning that “the trial court is in a better 

position than a reviewing court to determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks.” People v. 

Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993); see also People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000) (applying 

an abuse of discretion standard). We need not resolve this issue, however, as our holding in this 

case would be the same under either standard. See People v. Phillips, 392 Ill. App. 3d 243, 275 

(2009). 

¶ 44 Twice during the trial, and again at the end, the trial court instructed the jury that it could 

consider the evidence relating to asylum fraud only for the limited purpose of motive. The State 

argues, and defendant does not dispute, that both parties relied on this evidence to support their 

theories of the case: the State’s theory was that “defendant planned to kill his mother and himself 

to avoid the consequences of his involvement in multiple asylum fraud cases”; defendant’s theory 

was that “his mother came to Illinois to visit him because she was distraught over the asylum fraud 

investigation and its possible impact on her and defendant, and that this led her to attempt to take 

her own life.” The State further notes that, during the trial and in his closing argument, defendant 
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correlated his efforts to save persecuted Christian Egyptians with his attempt to save his mother’s 

life. 

¶ 45 On direct examination, defendant testified that he falsified applicant’s statementsin asylum 

cases because Christians in Egypt were suffering a “bloodbath” and “massacre” after the Muslim 

Brotherhood took over most of Egypt, and he wanted to help them. On appeal, defendant objects 

to the following cross-examination questions: (1) “Because basically what you did was you 

committed a fraud upon the asylum officers or basically this country; isn’t that correct?” and (2) 

“Okay. So you thought the rules could be bent as long as you liked [sic] them, correct?” We 

disagree with defendant that these questions had no relevance to his motive under the State’s theory

that he intended to kill his mother and himself to “avoid the consequences of his involvement in 

multiple asylum fraud cases.” We further find the questions to be responsive to defendant’s 

testimony that he falsified the applications because he wanted to help Christian Egyptians. See

Beard v. Barron, 379 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17–18 (2008) (“The scope of cross-examination does not refer 

to the actual material discussed during direct examination, but rather to the subject matter of the 

direct examination.”).

¶ 46 In his letter to the FBI and on cross-examination, defendant conceded that “it was a fraud” 

to falsify applicant’s statements in 120-130 cases, but he was “okay” with “saving those people 

from what was happening at the time” in Egypt. He further admitted that he basically altered the 

statements for a living. On appeal, defendant contends that the following closing remarks were 

not limited to motive: (1) “[Yvonne] didn’t participate in any asylum fraud. She didn’t 120 times 

walk in and deceive. No her crime for which her life should be sacrificed is the cowardice [sic] 

acts of her son”; (2) “asylum fraud, why it’s telling fake sympathetic stories to get what you want. 
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Telling fake sympathetic stories to get what you want, something the defendant practiced for years 

for a living, over 120 times”; and (3) “Sell the sad story. And that was just to make money.” 

¶ 47 Again, we cannot say that these remarks were unrelated to defendant’s motive under either 

parties’ theory of the case. Nor were they otherwise unfair. See People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 

104, 121 (2005) (“[a] prosecutor has wide latitude in making a closing argument [and] may 

comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it yields, even if such inferences 

reflect negatively on the defendant” (citations omitted)). 

¶ 48 Defendant’s closing argument contained the following remarks: 

“So Mike falsifies 120, 130 asylum petitions. Why does he falsify these petitions? 

Because Christians in Egypt are being vilified because they’re being persecuted, and that’s 

a fact. Christians are persecuted. They are -- you know, how do you say, tortured. The 

Muslims in Egypt were not very supportive of the Christian religion, and so he felt he was 

helping other Egyptians. And, yes, he justified falsifying these petitions in that regard, so 

this makes Mike Bassaly a horrible person. Terrible guy.” 

The closing argument also related that defendant’s attempt to prevent his mother from killing 

herself in the backseat of the car resulted in a “horrible situation, horrible accident.” 

¶ 49 Defendant objects to the following passage in the State’s rebuttal argument:

“he did this morning what he did at least 120 times in front of the asylum officer, 

he perpetrated a fraud. He had no problem coming in, telling a story to get what he wanted. 

Do you know what? Because in his mind I want to protect these Egyptian people even 

though they don’t fit the rules of asylum, you know what, that’s what I want, so I’m going 

to twist the rules, bend the rules, tell a little lie because I’m going to get what I want. So 
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do you really think he had any problem coming in front of Judge Guerin and you and 

pretending to take an oath and telling you a story to get what he wants? Absolutely not.” 

¶ 50 Even if overstated, these remarks were responsive to defendant’s arguments that he saved 

Christian Egyptians and his only motive was to save his mother. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 121. To 

the extent that the State’s remarks were directed to defendant’s credibility in maintaining that the 

death was an accident, they were not improper. See People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 122745, 

¶ 12 (prosecutor may comment on the evidence and “reasonable inferences from the evidence, 

including a defendant’s credibility or the credibility of the defense’s theory of the case”).

¶ 51 Having carefully considered the unpreserved remarks and the cited authorities, we find that 

defendant's claims of error are largely without merit. The complained of comments were relevant 

to motive, invited by defendant’s testimony or his counsel’s arguments, or legitimate inferences 

drawn from the evidence, including credibility. We further find that, to the extent the prosecutor 

may have exceeded the bounds of proper argument, any error was cured by instructing the jury 

that its consideration of the asylum fraud evidence was limited to motive, and admonishing it that 

“closing arguments are not evidence, that they were to disregard any comments not supported by 

the evidence, and by receiving written instructions to the same effect.” People v. Ivey, 267 Ill. 

App. 3d 310, 311 (1994). See also People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶49 (“Absent some 

indication to the contrary, we must presume that jurors follow the law as set forth in the instructions 

given them.”) In particular, the limiting instruction was necessary to ensure that the jury 

considered this evidence only on the issue of motive and not as evidence of defendant's criminal 

propensity. See, e.g., People v. Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2011) (instructing jury to consider 

evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for the limited purpose of impeachment *** “ensures 

that the jurors understood the narrow reason for which the convictions were admitted”).
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¶ 52 Finally, defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

State’s arguments. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show both that 

counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant; 

more specifically, defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was objectively 

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the 

result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984); People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶24. 

Defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to prevail. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728 at 

¶24. 

¶ 53 Defendant cannot satisfy either prong. As noted above, the evidence related to the fake 

asylum cases was central to the defense trial strategy, and defendant has not demonstrated that he 

was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to closing argument comments or cross-examination 

questions. Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is without merit.

¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed. 

¶ 56 Affirmed.