[Cite as Sheffield v. Sheffield , 2012-Ohio-4607.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 98308

DANETTE L. SHEFFIELD

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

JAMES G. SHEFFIELD

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. D-317868 

BEFORE: Celebrezze, P.J., Jones, J., and Cooney, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 4, 2012 
FOR APPELLANT

James G. Sheffield, pro se 

16204 Valleyview Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44135 

FOR APPELLEE

Danette L. Sheffield 

26101 Country Club Boulevard 

Apt. 229 

North Olmsted, Ohio 44070
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J.: 

{¶1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to 

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1, the trial court records and briefs of counsel. 

Defendant-appellant, James G. Sheffield, appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his motion to 

modify spousal support. After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶2} Appellant and plaintiff-appellee, Danette L. Sheffield, were married on 

December 1, 1984, in Cleveland, Ohio. On September 14, 2007, plaintiff filed a 

complaint for divorce. The parties were divorced pursuant to the Agreed Judgment Entry 

journalized October 3, 2008. The 2008 Agreed Judgment Entry of divorce ordered 

appellant to pay $800 per month directly to plaintiff for 48 months from July 1, 2010, to 

June 1, 2014, as permanent spousal support. 

{¶3} On July 14, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to show cause for nonpayment of 

support, alleging that appellant owed $20,954 as of June 1, 2011. Several pretrials were 

held to determine the exact amount of the arrearage and to resolve the contempt issue. 

On January 19, 2012, appellant filed a motion to modify spousal support. He requested a 

reduction in the award of spousal support due to a change in circumstances arising from a 

decrease in his annual income since the time of the parties’ divorce. The matter 

proceeded to trial on January 20, 2012, before a magistrate. 
{¶4} On February 27, 2012, the magistrate issued its decision finding appellant in 

contempt for nonpayment of support. The magistrate found that appellant owed 

arrearages in the amount of $21,287.60 as of December 31, 2011. 1

 The magistrate 

sentenced appellant to 30 days in jail or, in the alterative, to perform not less than 200 

hours of community service or until the contempt was purged, whichever occurred first. 

{¶5} Furthermore, the magistrate denied appellant’s motion to modify spousal 

support, finding that the court was unable to modify the spousal support obligation 

because the order did not expressly reserve jurisdiction to modify the amount or term of 

the obligation. 

{¶6} On March 9, 2012, appellant filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision. 

On April 4, 2012, the trial court overruled appellant’s objections and adopted the 

magistrate’s decision without modification. 

{¶7} Appellant brings this timely appeal, pro se, raising one assignment of error 

for review. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to modify spousal support. 

{¶9} Initially, we note that appellant states in his appellate brief that he is entitled 

to relief from the trial court’s order under Civ.R. 60(B). However, this issue was not 

 1

The trial court calculated that $4,587.60 was owed for child support, while $16,700.00 was 

owed for spousal support. 
raised in the trial court, and we cannot consider it in this appeal. See Easterling v. 

Ameristate Bancorp, Inc., 2d Dist. No. 23980, 2010-Ohio-3340, ¶ 60. Accordingly, we 

limit our review to appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to consider 

his inability to pay the spousal support order. 

{¶10} As a general matter, we review spousal support issues under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See Dunagan v. Dunagan, 8th Dist. No. 93678, 2010-Ohio-5232, ¶ 

12. An abuse of discretion signifies an attitude on the part of the trial court that is 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 

219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶11} This court has previously stated that “[t]he appropriate remedy, when there 

is a change in a party’s circumstances after a divorce decree, is to file a motion to modify 

under R.C. 3105.18(E).” Hirsh v. Hirsh, 8th Dist. No. 67977, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 

5174, at *11 (Nov. 22, 1995). R.C. 3105.18 governs a trial court’s authority to terminate 

or modify a spousal support order. In order for a trial court to modify the amount or terms 

of spousal support, the court must have jurisdiction to make the modification, as provided 

in R.C. 3105.18(E). Calabrese v. Calabrese, 8th Dist. No. 88520, 2007-Ohio-2760, 

¶ 19. R.C. 3105.18(E) provides in pertinent part: 

(E) * * * the court that enters the decree of divorce or dissolution of 

marriage does not have jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of the 

alimony or spousal support unless the court determines that the 

circumstances of either party have changed and unless one of the 

following applies: 

(1) In the case of a divorce, the decree or a separation agreement of the 

parties to the divorce that is incorporated into the decree contains a 
provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms 

of alimony or spousal support. 

{¶12} In the seminal case of Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, the Ohio Supreme 

Court clarified that 

a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a prior order of spousal support 

unless the decree of the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to make the 

modification and unless the court finds (1) that a substantial change in 

circumstances has occurred and (2) that the change was not contemplated at 

the time of the original decree. 

121 Ohio St.3d 433, 2009-Ohio-1222, 905 N.E.2d 172, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Thus, pursuant to Mandelbaum, it is only after jurisdiction is established that the trial 

court may examine whether the existing support order should be modified in light of the 

change in circumstances that has occurred. Tufts v. Tufts, 9th Dist. No. 24871, 

2010-Ohio-641. 

{¶13} In the present case, appellant’s four-year spousal support obligation was 

designated as “permanent,” and the provision did not reserve jurisdiction for 

modification. Absent such a reservation, R.C. 3105.18(E)(1) deprives the trial court of 

jurisdiction to hear appellant’s motion to modify spousal support. McLaughlin v. 

McLaughlin, 4th Dist. No. 00CA14, 2001-Ohio-2450. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the trial court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction to modify spousal support in this 

matter. 

{¶14} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶15} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR