UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL TERRAYE WINDOM, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL TERRAYE WINDOM, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-1077

(D.C. No. 1:20-CR-00068-CMA-1)

(D. Colo.)

No. 22-1119

(D.C. No. 1:15-CR-00202-RM-1)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 21, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2019, a confidential informant notified Denver police detective, 

Joshua Vance, that someone named Trey “was selling” methamphetamine from his 

apartment in south Denver. The tipster, who Vance described as previously reliable, 

said he or she had purchased methamphetamine “in the past” from Trey’s apartment 

and had observed firearms and drugs inside his residence “during the past six 

months.” Further investigation revealed the identity of “Trey” to be Appellant, 

Samuel Windom. Authorities successfully arranged a controlled buy to corroborate 

this information, at which Windom was observed selling methamphetamine to a 

confidential informant.1 As a result, Vance submitted an affidavit to support the 

search of Windom’s residence. A warrant was issued, and officers executed a search 

of Windom’s home on December 2, 2019. The search yielded approximately 78 

grams of methamphetamine and two semi-automatic guns. Windom admitted to 

police that he owned both guns and had previously sold methamphetamine.

Windom was charged with possession of a gun by a previously convicted felon 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 1); knowingly and intentionally 

possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

1 At one point in its description of the controlled buy, the affidavit appears to 

refer to the dealer of drugs as “Anthony” and not Samuel or Windom. R. Vol. I, at 

45. The same paragraph correctly identifies the subject of the controlled buy as 

Samuel seven times. Id. Further, the name Anthony appears at no other point 

throughout the affidavit. Given the context of the description and the singularity of 

the reference, this court interprets the use of Anthony as a simple error that does not 

affect the substance of the affidavit. Therefore, we do not conclude the affidavit is 

inherently suspect on these grounds.

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§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii) (Count 2); and knowingly using and carrying a firearm 

in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) 

(Count 3). Prior to trial, Windom moved to suppress the evidence recovered during 

the search of his apartment. He argued the warrant failed to establish probable cause 

for two reasons: first, it did not prove a sufficient nexus between the purported drug 

sales and his residence; and second, the information provided by the informant was 

several months old and, thus, stale. In turn, he asserted the affidavit was so lacking in 

probable cause that executing officers could not have relied upon the resulting 

warrant in good faith. Windom requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 

suppression, which the district court denied on the grounds that his motion did not 

raise any material factual dispute.

The district court denied Windom’s motion to suppress. It determined the 

informant’s tip was not stale because it demonstrated ongoing drug activity and was 

effectively corroborated by the controlled buy. Further, the district court concluded 

an appropriate nexus was formed by an investigation linking Windom to the 

apartment and the informant’s direct implication of Windom’s residence. A jury trial 

was set for July 26, 2021, and concluded with guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 2 of 

the superseding indictment. On appeal, Windom argues the district court erred in 

denying a hearing on the motion to suppress and renews his probable cause 

challenges. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by forgoing a 

suppression hearing and affirm the district court’s rulings that neither staleness nor 

lack of nexus undermined the probable cause supporting a search of Windom’s home. 

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II. ANALYSIS

Review of a district court’s analysis on the validity of a warrant is de novo. 

United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 970–71 (10th Cir. 2014). This court, 

however, “must accord ‘great deference’ to the probable-cause assessment of the 

state court judge who issued the warrant.” Id. at 971. Probable cause requires “only a 

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such 

activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). When making such a 

probable cause determination “we look to the totality of the circumstances as detailed 

in the affidavit accompanying the application for the search warrant.” Pulliam, 748 

F.3d at 971.

a. SUPPRESSION HEARING

This court reviews the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress 

for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408 (10th Cir. 

1997). A trial court is required to grant a suppression hearing only when a defendant 

both presents facts justifying relief and demonstrates disputed issues of material fact.

Id. An evidentiary hearing on suppression is warranted when the motion raises 

“factual allegations that are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and 

nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to 

the validity of the search are in issue.” United States v. Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d 

259, 261 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). A hearing is not required 

when a motion only challenges questions of law and not any underlying facts. United 

States v. Mathews, 928 F.3d 968, 978 (10th Cir. 2019).

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Rather than outline factual disputes, Windom’s motion to suppress offered 

three legal arguments—staleness, nexus, and lack of good faith—for why the 

affidavit was insufficient to support a search warrant. These arguments contained 

only perfunctory factual references, with none rising to the level of definite, detailed, 

and nonconjectural allegations. See United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 358 F.3d 1263, 

1266–67 (10th Cir. 2004). This absence of disputed facts and primary reliance on 

issues of law alone demonstrate the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

proceeding without a hearing. Recognizing this deficiency in his motion, Windom 

argues on appeal that the affidavit raised several material factual disputes on its face,

including the exact timing and number of drug sales between the informant and 

Windom, and whether the original tipster was the same informant who participated in 

the controlled buy. Not only was this argument not presented to the district court, 

thereby subjecting it to the heightened standard of plain error review, but it also lacks 

definite, material facts “that, if established, would entitle [Windom] to relief.” 

Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d at 261. Given the totality of the circumstances, the timing, 

numerosity, and party identity of Windom’s drug exchanges do not alter the probable 

cause determination in this case. Thus, even if disputed facts were present on the face 

of the affidavit, the district court did not err in bypassing a suppression hearing. 

b. STALENESS

“[P]robable cause to search cannot be based on stale information that no longer 

suggests that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched.” United 

States v. Burkhart, 602 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations 

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omitted). Whether staleness exists depends “on the nature of the criminal activity, the 

length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized.” United States v. 

Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 

Indication of “ongoing and continuous activity makes the passage of time less 

critical” when making determinations of staleness. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Additionally, “otherwise stale information may be refreshed by more recent events” 

for the purpose of probable cause analysis. United States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173, 

1178 (10th Cir. 2005).

As the district court articulated, staleness is not at issue here because the 

allegations offered by the informant indicated Windom’s drug activity was ongoing 

and the controlled buy effectively refreshed the information provided. The informant 

offered three critical pieces of information: a) Windom “was selling” 

methamphetamine from his apartment; b) he or she had purchased methamphetamine 

“in the past from [Windom’s] apartment;” and c) he or she had observed drugs and 

guns inside Windom’s apartment “during the past six months.” Although these details 

are not highly specific, they collectively suggest the type of ongoing trafficking that 

diminishes the significance of when the alleged activity took place. See United States 

v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2001). Despite Windom’s arguments to the 

contrary, there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the informant. The affidavit 

clearly contains hallmark indicia of trustworthiness: the informant had provided prior 

accurate tips to police and gave ample facts that were successfully corroborated by 

authorities. United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 

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2009). Most significantly, the officers fully corroborated the informant’s core drug 

trafficking allegation through a carefully constructed controlled buy. To the degree 

any information offered by the informant was in danger of being stale, the controlled 

buy cured this threat by comprehensively refreshing the allegation that Windom was, 

in fact, dealing methamphetamine. 

c. NEXUS

Probable cause also requires a nexus between the suspected criminal activity 

and the place to be searched. United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th 

Cir. 2005). Personal knowledge of illegal activity taking place in the area to be 

searched is not required to establish nexus. United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 

1279 (10th Cir. 2009). Rather, “a sufficient nexus is established once an affidavit 

describes circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the 

belief that ‘the articles sought’ are at a particular place.” Id. (internal quotations 

omitted).

Although the controlled buy did not take place at Windom’s home, the 

informant’s tip directly implicated his apartment. The tip referenced purchasing and 

observing drugs inside Windom’s residence. Further, independent investigation by 

police makes it clear that the apartment searched both belonged to Windom and was 

the scene of the tip’s allegations. This court has held it is “merely common sense that 

a drug supplier will keep evidence of his crimes at his home.” United States v. 

Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910, 914 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Garcia, 707 

F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 689–90 

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(10th Cir. 2002). Given this context, the strong evidence that Windom was engaged 

in drug trafficking, and the direct implication of his residence as a part of his drug 

activity, a reasonable person could certainly believe Windom kept drugs in his home. 

Accordingly, the affidavit successfully established a proper nexus to support the 

search warrant.2

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment3 of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado 

is hereby AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge

2 Windom argues that if this court were to deem the search warrant invalid, the 

“good-faith exception” should not apply. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 

922 (1984). This court concludes the warrant in this case is valid, and therefore, it 

need not reach the application of the exception.

3 Because no party makes any argument about the second appeal, we dismiss 

that appeal as abandoned. See Johnson v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kan. 

City, 371 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The cross-appeals were not briefed and 

deemed to have been abandoned. Accordingly we dismiss the cross-appeals.”).

Similarly, Appellant’s Second Unopposed Motion to Supplement the Record on 

Appeal is denied as moot because it only supplemented the second appeal and did not 

implicate any argument made to this court. 

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