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S. HRG. 114–429 

REGIONAL NUCLEAR DYNAMICS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015

Page 

REGIONAL NUCLEAR DYNAMICS ............................................................................... 1 

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr., President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments .......................................................................................................... 2 

Kroenig, Matthew, Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, 

Field Chair of International Relations at Georgetown University, and Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council ...................................................................... 21 

Tellis, Ashley, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace ..................................................................................................................... 27 

Perkovich, George, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ...................................................................................................... 38 

(III) 

(1) 

REGIONAL NUCLEAR DYNAMICS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in room SR– 

220, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer, Nelson, 

Donnelly, and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay, the subcommittee would come to order, 

and I appreciate the good witnesses that we have. Senator Donnelly, thank you for your leadership and participation and dedication to helping us get this issue right. 

I think we are close to having a bipartisan policy on this, which 

is not always possible in this body, but we have been able to operate pretty well as a subcommittee for quite a number of years, 

since I have been in the Senate now 18 years. Hard to believe. 

Senator DONNELLY. I have almost been here that long. 

Senator SESSIONS. It seems like it. So we had—our subcommittee 

on February 11th received a classified briefing on worldwide nuclear capabilities and threats, which revealed the scope and extent 

to which other nuclear powers are modernizing their weapon nuclear capabilities and increasing, it appears, reliance on nuclear 

weapons for their security. 

Today’s open hearing is meant to explore the implications of this 

global nuclear renaissance, renewal around the world, for U.S. nuclear strategy forces and declaratory policy. While the size and 

composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is driven primarily by the 

nuclear and conventional might of Russia and agreements with 

Russia, the expansion of nuclear arsenals across the globe, coupled 

with a growing regional tension, suggests that there are other factors that should inform U.S. nuclear policy and strategy. 

We divided the world between four prominent think tank scholars. You each have the world in your hands. Dr. Andrew 

Krepinevich will look at the Middle East. Dr. Matthew Kroenig will 

focus on NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]/Europe, while 

Dr. George Perkovich and Dr. Ashley Tellis will tackle Asia. They 

have been asked in general—we have asked you in general to look 

out about 10 years. Where are we, and where should we go? 

2 

A summary—and think about the following—a summary of the 

nuclear capabilities and doctrine of the nuclear and potential nuclear powers in their region, to include the rationale for acquiring 

nuclear weapons, the likelihood for a nuclear escalation, and implications for nuclear proliferation, which is a real—is reality, I am 

afraid. 

Why is it important for the United States to manage nuclear stability in the regions, how difficult such a task might be? What 

might be the role of the United States during a regional crisis or 

conflict that could escalate to nuclear use? Finally, any recommendations for U.S. national security policy, nuclear force policy, and nuclear doctrine derived from your analysis. 

On the President’s budget request, I think it is fair to say affirms 

a policy of modernization. We will be looking to make sure that we 

are sufficiently funded for that. We are behind, some would suggest, at about $2.5 billion from what we agreed to when we started 

this bipartisan effort several years ago. 

So this will be the order, as I understand it—Dr. Krepinevich, 

Dr. Kroenig, Dr. Tellis, and Dr. Perkovich. In that order we would 

go. All right. 

Do you have any comments? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

Chairman Donnelly and Senator Sessions for holding this hearing, 

which is to set the policy context for many of the issues that we 

face in the subcommittee this Congress. It follows on the footsteps 

of a highly successful hearing we had last year on how we deal 

with nuclear proliferation outside the United States-Russia context. 

Let me also thank all of you for taking the time to testify here 

today. We very much appreciate your ideas, your thoughts, and 

your recommendations. 

I want to concentrate first on the India-Pakistan nuclear question. This region seems to be an area where nuclear weapons are 

growing, with great potential for possible instability from a conventional conflict or from terrorism. 

I also want to find out what these countries and their nuclear 

programs mean for the United States. We now know that India and 

China are developing ballistic submarines. What does this mean for 

the region and for the United States? 

Finally, how can countries surrounding North Korea react to 

their nuclear program, and how can we help them? 

Again, thank you for coming today. I look forward to the dialogue. Mr. Chairman, off we go. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Krepinevich? 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., PRESIDENT, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Donnelly, 

for the opportunity to be here today and offer my views on these 

important issues. I will try and summarize my remarks in the form 

of four brief points. 

First, of course, looking at the Middle East, which is my area. 

Right now, there is only one undeclared nuclear power in the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:36 Nov 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING\22491 WILDA
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gion. However, obviously, there is the issue of Iran. While the negotiations to forestall Iran from becoming a nuclear power are in 

progress, from what is being reported in the press it seems likely 

that should an agreement along these lines be made, Iran will likely be a threshold nuclear power in 10 years. This perhaps is not 

surprising. 

Given the current state of Iran’s nuclear program, the immense 

cost Iran’s leaders have invested in it, the great lengths to which 

they have gone to deceive the international community regarding 

their nuclear program, and the substantial advantages that would 

accrue to Teheran from possessing nuclear weapons, it seems unlikely that anything short of the threat or the use of force would 

deflect the current regime from its objective of achieving a nuclear 

weapons capability. 

Second, while we can and should certainly hope for a positive 

breakthrough in the current negotiations, hope is not a strategy. 

Prudence dictates that we contemplate what challenges we might 

confront should these negotiations fail to arrest Iran’s progress toward the bomb. 

Should Iran acquire a nuclear capability, which is certainly plausible within the 5- to 10-year timeframe that you have asked us to 

examine, the initial bipolar nuclear competition between Iran and 

Israel, I would think, would be far less stable than the bipolar nuclear competition that existed between the United States and the 

Soviet Union during the Cold War for several reasons. 

First, given the state of relations between Israel and Iran, there 

seems relatively little chance that the two sides will engage in mutual confidence-building measures, things such as hotlines or arms 

control or intrusive inspection regimes. 

Second, the geography of the two countries means that missile 

flight times between the two would be far less than even 10 minutes, whereas during the Cold War we had arguably 20 to 30 minutes warning time of an attack by the Soviet Union. 

Third, particularly with respect to Iran, early warning systems 

and command and control structures are likely to be limited at 

best, which may lead one or both sides to place their forces on hairtrigger alert or to extend nuclear weapons release authority down 

the chain of command, increasing the risk of unauthorized or accidental launch of a nuclear attack. 

Fourth, the potential—with the rise of cyber warfare, the potential to covertly insert cyber weapons into command and control or 

early warning systems may further reduce the confidence either 

the Israelis or especially the Iranians might have in their ability 

to detect an attack. Again, all this may push both sides, particularly in a crisis, to a very hair-trigger kind of nuclear force posture, 

if you will, one that would certainly compromise efforts to reduce 

the risk of a nuclear use. 

My third point is that a nuclear-armed Iran, or even an Iran that 

is a nuclear threshold state, could trigger a proliferation cascade in 

the region. If there is an Israeli bomb and a Persian Shia bomb, 

one could surmise that for their security, Arab states and perhaps 

the Turks as well would seek a nuclear capability. 

Certainly in the open press, there are reports that, given the relationship that the Saudis have with the Pakistanis, Pakistan 

4 

could, for example, deploy nuclear weapons on Saudi soil, somewhat similar to the way that we have nuclear weapons on Turkey’s 

soil right now. Only the difference could be that the Saudis would 

have de facto control over those weapons. Or you could find an unraveling of the NPT regime, where the transfer of nuclear-related 

technology, the barriers to those transfers could become a lot lower. 

In particular, even transfers of technology that do not relate directly to nuclear weapons themselves—such as the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to fit on a ballistic missile, or the ability 

to develop cruise missiles and place them offshore, say, offshore of 

Israel or to provide even less warning time than Israel would have 

today, or of course precision guidance that would enhance the effectiveness of these weapons—could further destabilize an already unstable situation. 

Fourth, should—I am sorry—should other states in the region besides Iran and Israel acquire nuclear weapons, of course, warning 

times could be reduced even further. Consider the example of Saudi 

Arabia and Iran. The two countries are very, very close together, 

obviously, and it seems difficult to imagine that you could have an 

effective early warning and command and control system to respond effectively to an attack. 

So attack attribution may be difficult as well. In the sense that 

if early warning systems and command and control systems are 

limited, and there are four or five actors in the region and you are 

attacked, under certain circumstances it may be very difficult in 

the wake of an attack to accurately determine exactly who the perpetrator was. 

My fourth point is that these could have significant effects on the 

U.S. military posture. One effect, certainly, would be an Iran that 

can operate behind a nuclear shield may be an even more aggressive sponsor of terrorism proxy war than it is today not only within 

the region, but perhaps beyond the region as well. Should we decide to pursue a strategy of extended deterrence, we may run into 

difficulties as well. 

As you have pointed out, other states are modernizing their nuclear forces. China and Russia modernizing their forces as well, 

moving particularly the Russians toward smaller-yield weapons, 

weapons with focused effects. This provides them with more options in terms of how they might respond in a nuclear crisis. Right 

now, we are denying our President the ability to have that kind of 

flexibility in responding to a crisis. 

Second, as one senior Arab statesman pointed out to me when we 

were discussing the issue of extended deterrence, ‘‘You Americans 

talk about extended deterrence. You extend deterrence to protect 

your allies against the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans, 

and now prospectively the Iranians. But you keep reducing your 

nuclear arsenal. So at the same time you are increasing your commitments, you are reducing your capabilities, and we find that a 

bit disturbing.’’ 

My final point is that Thomas Schelling once remarked that he 

felt it took U.S. strategists well over a decade following the introduction of nuclear weapons to arrive at a reasonably good understanding of the character of the United States-Soviet nuclear competition. This was achieved only after long and dedicated effort by 

5 

talented strategists such as Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Henry 

Kissinger, Andrew Marshall, and Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, 

to name but a few. 

While considerable effort by many talented analysts has been devoted to assessing how we might preclude Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, given current trends, it seems prudent to hedge our 

bets and work to obtain as best we can a sense of what it means 

for our security to live in a world in which these efforts fail to 

prove out. 

This completes my summary, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich follows:] 

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Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Dr. Kroenig? 


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STATEMENT OF MATTHEW KROENIG, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR 

OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE, FIELD CHAIR OF 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, 

AND SENIOR FELLOW AT THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Dr. KROENIG. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to participate 

in this important hearing. I am pleased to be here alongside my 

distinguished colleagues Andrew Krepinevich, George Perkovich, 

and Ashley Tellis. I would like to commend the committee for initiating this timely discussion of regional nuclear dynamics. 

I have worked closely on nuclear issues both in and out of government for over a decade, and my recent work at Georgetown University and the Atlantic Council has focused increasingly on Russian nuclear capabilities and its implications for the United States 

and NATO. It is this subject on which I have been invited to speak 

today. In my opening remarks, I will make several brief points. 

More detail on each can be found in my written testimony. 

First, I will begin with Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Along with 

the United States, Russia is one of the world’s foremost nuclear 

powers. At the strategic level, it possesses a triad of nuclear bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarines. 

In addition to its strategic forces, Russia retains an arsenal of 

around 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use. This includes nuclear-armed torpedoes, depth charges, short-range missiles, air-to-surface missiles and bombs, and surface-to-air missiles 

for use in air defense. 

Russia has made the thoroughgoing modernization of its nuclear 

forces and the development of new nuclear capabilities a national 

priority, even in difficult economic circumstances. Among the new 

capabilities is Russia’s recent test of an intermediate-range ground 

launch cruise missile. This development is of particular concern because it is in violation of Russia’s commitments under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty, the only arms 

control treaty ever to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. 

Second, turning to Russian doctrine, it is important to emphasize 

that, unlike the United States, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has moved nuclear weapons toward the center of its national 

security strategy. Beginning in the early 2000s, Russian strategists 

have promoted the idea of ‘‘de-escalatory’’ nuclear strikes. 

According to this ‘‘escalate to de-escalate’’ concept, Moscow will 

threaten or, if necessary, carry out limited nuclear strikes early in 

a conventional conflict in order to force an opponent to sue for 

peace on terms favorable to Moscow. In addition, at least as telling 

as public documents are how military forces actually plan and exercise, and nearly all of Russia’s major military drills over the past 

decade have concluded with simulated nuclear strikes. 

In some ways, it is not surprising that Russia, as the conventionally inferior power, would consider the use of nuclear weapons 

early in a conventional war, as this is essentially the reverse of 

NATO strategy during the Cold War, when it faced a conventionally superior Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russia’s nuclear capabilities and strategy pose a serious threat to the United States and our 

allies, which brings me to my third point, the possibility of escalation. 

22 

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is very much a nuclear crisis. 

Throughout the crisis, President Putin and other high-ranking officials have repeatedly issued thinly veiled nuclear threats. Moreover, these threats have been backed up by an explicit brandishing 

of Russian nuclear forces at a level we have not seen since the end 

of the Cold War. The message is clear. The West must not interfere 

lest things escalate to catastrophic levels. 

If the conflict in Ukraine were to escalate or President Putin 

were to rerun his playbook of hybrid warfare from Ukraine against 

a NATO member, the United States could find itself in a direct 

military confrontation with Russia. In the event of such a conflict, 

Russia will likely issue nuclear threats in a bid to force NATO capitulation, and if on the losing end of a conventional conflict, Moscow may conduct a limited nuclear strike in an effort to de-escalate 

the conflict. To be sure, these scenarios may not be likely, but nuclear deterrence is, by definition, about unlikely, but possible and 

terribly dangerous contingencies. 

This brings me to my final point, recommendations for U.S. nuclear strategy and posture. So long as nuclear weapons retain such 

a prominent place in Russian strategy, the United States and 

NATO must retain a policy of, and a serious capability for, nuclear 

deterrence. At a minimum, U.S. nuclear doctrine needs to be clear 

and firm that any use of nuclear weapons against the United 

States or an ally would result in a nuclear counterstrike. 

In addition, the United States should leave on the table the possibility of a nuclear response to a strictly conventional Russian assault against a NATO ally. The reason for eschewing a no first-use 

policy is not that an early nuclear response would be necessary or 

automatic, but rather because there is no reason to assure Russia 

that this would not happen. 

Moreover, the possibility of nuclear response to non-nuclear attack has a critical assurance element, as NATO’s easternmost 

neighbors would prefer that any Russian attack be deterred by the 

threat of nuclear response, rather than needing to wait for a costly 

and lengthy conventional war of liberation. To make these threats 

credible, the United States and NATO must maintain a sufficiently 

large, flexible, and resilient nuclear force, including capable nuclear 

delivery systems and a supporting infrastructure. I, therefore, urge 

this body to fully fund the much-needed modernization of this 

country’s nuclear forces and infrastructure as planned. 

In addition, the United States should upgrade its homeland and 

theater missile defense systems. While missile defenses could not 

meaningfully blunt a large-scale Russian nuclear attack, an upgraded system could better provide a defense against, and thus 

complicate Russian calculations for, a more limited strike on the 

United States or its allies. 

The United States must also make sure that it has a credible response to any Russian battlefield use of nuclear weapons, and it is 

not at all clear that it does at present. Yields of strategic warheads 

may be too large for a credible response to a tactical strike, and 

their use would risk escalation to a catastrophic strategic nuclear 

exchange. The B61 gravity bombs in Europe are out of range of potential conflict zones in the East without redeployment and/or reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:36 Nov 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING\22491 WILDA
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fueling, and the aircraft in which they are delivered would be highly vulnerable to Russian air defenses. 

American B–52 bombers and nuclear-armed air launch cruise 

missiles are based in the United States, reducing their utility for 

deterrence and assurance missions in Europe. 

The United States should, therefore, consider additional options 

to deter Russian nuclear aggression, assure regional allies, and if 

necessary respond to a limited Russian nuclear strike. The options 

could include—I will just list them quickly—placing lower-yield 

warheads on strategic missiles, training European crews to participate in NATO nuclear strike missions, forward basing B61 gravity 

bombs in Eastern Europe, rotationally basing B–52 bombers and 

nuclear air-launched cruise missiles in Europe, developing a sealaunched cruise missile, or designating the planned long-range 

standoff weapon, LRSO, for delivery by both air and sea. 

The United States must also convince Russia to return to compliance with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty 

and, if that fails, to prevent Russia from gaining a military advantage from its violation. Washington should, therefore, study the development of new intermediate-range missiles and their deployment to Europe. It should also consider the deployment of cruise 

missile defenses in Europe to defend against Russian nuclear aggression. 

Following through on some of these proposals would reverse U.S. 

and NATO policy of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons as an objective in and of itself. This policy was justifiable so long as Russia 

remained cooperative, but given increased Russian nuclear aggression, we no longer have the luxury of reducing reliance on nuclear 

weapons for its own sake and arguably never did. 

Some of these proposals, if adopted, would also run counter to 

promises made to Russia in the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 

1997. But Putin has already violated key provisions of this act, and 

it would be foolish for the United States to be constrained from 

taking action necessary for its national security by a document that 

Russia routinely ignores. 

Nuclear weapons are tools of great power, political competition, 

and they remain the ultimate instrument of military force. With 

long-dormant tensions among the great powers resurfacing, nuclear 

weapons will again feature prominently in these confrontations, 

and the United States must be prepared to protect itself and its allies in these conditions. 

I know this committee will help ensure the maintenance of the 

strong American nuclear forces that have undergirded international peace and security for nearly 70 years. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kroenig follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. MATTHEW KROENIG

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me to participate in this important hearing. I am pleased to be here 

alongside my distinguished colleagues Andrew Krepinevich, George Perkovich, and 

Ashley Tellis. 

I would like to commend the committee for initiating this timely discussion of regional nuclear dynamics. I have worked on nuclear issues both in and out of governVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:36 Nov 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING\22491 WILDA
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1For my recent work in this area, see Matthew Kroenig and Walter Slocombe, ‘‘Why Nuclear 

Deterrence Still Matters to NATO,’’ The Atlantic Council (August 2014), available at http:// 

www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Why—Nuclear—Deterrence—Still—Matters—to— 

NATO.pdf and Matthew Kroenig, ‘‘Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,’’ 

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (February/March 2015), pp. 49–70. 2For more detail on Russia’s nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, 

‘‘Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 70, No. 2 (2014), pp. 75– 

85. 3 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), April 8, 2010, available at http:// 

www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm. 4On Russian nuclear modernization, see also Kristensen and Norris, 2014. 

5Michael R. Gordon, ‘‘U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,’’ The New 

York Times, July 28, 2014. 6Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics 

On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), December 8, 1987, available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm. 7Krisetenen and Norris, 2014. 

8 Nikolai N. Sokov, ‘‘Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘de-escalation,’ ’’ Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, available at http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation. 9 Ibid. 

10Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2000, available at http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/ 

001/502378.pdf. 11 Elbridge Colby, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a Blind Spot in 

the Pentagon’s New Initiative,’’ Center for a New American Security (February 2015), pp. 6, 

ment for over a decade and, as a professor at Georgetown University and a senior 

fellow at the Atlantic Council, I have focused increasingly on Russian nuclear capabilities and strategy and its implications for the United States and NATO. 1 It is 

this subject on which I have been invited to speak today. 

I will begin with Russia’s nuclear capabilities. Along with the United States, Russia is one of the world’s foremost nuclear powers. At the strategic level, it possesses 

a triad of nuclear bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarines. 2 Under the New START Treaty, signed in 2010, Russia has committed to 

deploying no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads by 2018. 3

Russia has made the thoroughgoing modernization of its nuclear forces and the 

development of new nuclear capabilities a national priority even under difficult economic circumstances. 4 Russia is updating its bomber fleet, which will carry a new 

precision-strike, long-range, nuclear-armed cruise missile. A new generation of nuclear submarines is set to enter service and they are designed to deliver a new, more 

advanced submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), intended to penetrate 

enemy missile defenses. Moscow is also developing new silo-based and road-mobile 

ICBMs capable of carrying warheads with multiple independently-targetable reentry 

vehicles (MIRVs), also designed to defeat enemy defenses. 

In addition, Russia has tested a new intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise 

missile (GLCM). 5 This development is of particular concern because it is in violation 

of Russia’s commitments under the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 

Treaty, the only arms control treaty ever to eliminate an entire class of nuclear 

weapons. 6 In addition, Russia’s RS–26 ballistic missile, although tested at longer 

ranges, can be operated at intermediate range, providing a technical circumvention 

of the INF Treaty. 

In addition to its strategic forces, Russia retains an arsenal of around 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use. 7 This arsenal includes nuclear-armed: torpedoes, depth charges, short-range surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles and bombs, and surface-to-air missiles for use in air defense. Although Russia 

has not publicized plans to modernize its tactical nuclear forces, it is possible that 

Russia is also upgrading some of these systems as it modernizes its strategic forces. 

Turning next to Russian strategy and doctrine, it is important to emphasize that, 

unlike the United States, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has moved nuclear 

weapons toward the center of its national security strategy and military doctrine. 

In the past, Moscow maintained a nuclear ‘‘no first use’’ doctrine, but this policy was 

abandoned in the year 2000. Since the early 2000s, Russian strategists have promoted the idea of ‘‘de-escalatory’’ nuclear strikes. 8 According to this ‘‘escalate to deescalate’’ concept, Moscow will threaten, or, if necessary, carry out, limited nuclear 

strikes early in a conventional conflict in order to force an opponent to sue for peace 

on terms favorable to Moscow. 9 Russia’s 2000 military doctrine stated that nuclear 

strikes might be conducted in any situation ‘‘critical to the national security’’ of the 

Russian Federation. 10 The more expansive language about nuclear preemption was 

excluded from Russia’s most recent public documents, but the idea remains firmly 

engrained in Russian thinking and some speculate that the language remains in 

classified annexes. 11

25 

available at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/Nuclear%20Weapons%20 

in%20the%203rd%20Offset%20Strategy.pdf. 12Sokov, ‘‘Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation.’ ’’ 13 Alexey Nikolsky, ‘‘Putin Holds Military Drills to Repel Nuclear Strike,’’ RT, May 8, 2014, 

available at http://rt.com/news/157644-putin-drills-rocket-launch/. 14For more on this point, see Kroenig, ‘‘Facing Reality.’’ 15On Russia’s claims about nuclear weapons in Crimea, see Sergei L. Loiko, ‘‘Russia Says it 

Has a Right to Put Nuclear Weapons in Crimea,’’ Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-nuclear-crimea-20141215-story.html. 

On Russia’s threats to deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, see Bruno Waterfield, ‘‘Russia 

Threatens NATO with Military Strikes over Missile Defence System,’’ The Telegraph, May 3, 

2012, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russia-threatens-Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html. 

At least as telling as public documents, however, are how military forces actually 

plan and exercise. Nearly all of Russia’s major military drills over the past decade 

have concluded with simulated nuclear strikes. 12 Moreover, President Putin himself 

has personally overseen such nuclear exercises. 13

In some ways, it is not surprising that Russia, as the conventionally inferior 

power in relation to the United States and NATO, would consider the use of nuclear 

weapons early in a conventional war, as this is essentially the reverse of NATO 

strategy during the Cold War when it faced a conventionally superior Soviet Union. 

Nevertheless, Russia’s nuclear capabilities and strategy pose a serious threat to the 

United States and should be a cause of concern. 

This brings me to my next major subject, the possibility of nuclear escalation. For 

years, Western analysts assumed that Russia’s heavy reliance on nuclear weapons 

was envisaged in the context of a defensive war, but recent events have shown that 

these tactics can also be employed as part of an offensive campaign. The ongoing 

conflict in Ukraine is very much a nuclear crisis. 14 Throughout the crisis, President 

Putin and other high-ranking officials have repeatedly issued thinly-veiled nuclear 

threats. Moreover, these threats are backed up by explicit brandishing of Russia’s 

nuclear forces at a level we have not seen since the end of the Cold War. Russia 

has also reserved the right to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea and Kaliningrad. 15

The message is clear: the West must not interfere in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 

lest things escalate to catastrophic levels. 

If the conflict in Ukraine were to escalate or President Putin were to rerun his 

playbook of hybrid warfare from Ukraine against a NATO member, the United 

States could find itself in direct military confrontation with Russia. In the event of 

such a conflict, Russia will likely issue nuclear threats in a bid to force NATO capitulation and, if on the losing end of a conventional conflict, Moscow may conduct a 

limited nuclear strike in an effort to ‘‘de-escalate’’ the conflict. 

I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of these developments for 

U.S. nuclear strategy and posture. So long as nuclear weapons retain such a prominent place in Russian force structure, procurement priorities, doctrine, and political 

rhetoric, it remains an important deterrence mission for the United States and 

NATO to retain a policy of, and a serious capability for, nuclear deterrence as a potential instrument for dealing with the remote but calamitous contingency of a military confrontation with Russia. 

At a minimum, U.S. nuclear deterrence doctrine needs to be clear and firm that 

any use of nuclear weapons against the United States or an ally would result in 

a nuclear counterstrike. In addition, the United States should leave on the table the 

possibility of a nuclear response to a strictly conventional Russian assault against 

a NATO ally. The reason for not foregoing this option is not that an early nuclear 

response would be necessary or automatic, but rather because there is no reason to 

assure Russia that this would not happen. Moreover, the possibility of nuclear response to nonnuclear attack has a critical assurance element as NATO’s easternmost neighbors would prefer that any potential Russian attack be deterred by the 

threat of nuclear strike, rather than needing to wait for a costly and lengthy conventional war of liberation. 

To make these threats credible, the United States must field a sufficiently large, 

flexible, and resilient nuclear force, including capable nuclear delivery systems and 

supporting infrastructure. I, therefore, urge this body to fully fund the much-needed 

modernization of this country’s nuclear forces and infrastructure as planned. 

In addition, the United States should upgrade its homeland and theater ballistic 

and cruise missile defense systems. While missile defenses could not meaningfully 

blunt a large-scale Russian attack, an upgraded system could better provide a defense against, and thus complicate Russian calculations for, a more limited strike 

on the United States or its allies. 

26 

16For information on U.S. nuclear forces and further details on the items in this paragraph, 

see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol. 70, no. 1 (2014), pp. 85–93. 17 ‘‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,’’ May 27, 1997, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official— 

texts—25468.htm. 

At the sub-strategic level, the United States must seek to negate Russia’s overwhelming battlefield nuclear advantage as this is a major contributing causes to 

Russia’s belief that it can achieve escalation dominance through a limited nuclear 

strike. Ideally, this would be done through arms control negotiations, but the Russians have refused to discuss the reduction of their tactical nuclear weapons and 

striking an agreement under current conditions would be extremely challenging. 

The United States must make sure, therefore, that it has a credible response to 

any Russian battlefield use of nuclear weapons and it is not at all clear that it does 

at present. 16 The yields of strategic warheads may be too large for a credible response to a tactical strike and their use would risk escalation to a catastrophic, strategic nuclear exchange. The B61 gravity bombs in Western Europe are out of range 

of potential conflict zones in the East without redeployment and/or refueling, and 

the aircraft on which they are delivered would be highly vulnerable to Russian air 

defenses. American B–52H bombers and nuclear-armed ALCMs are based in the 

United States, reducing their utility for deterrence and assurance missions in Europe. 

The United States should, therefore, consider additional options to deter Russian 

nuclear aggression, assure regional allies, and if necessary, respond to a limited 

Russian nuclear strike. The options could include: placing lower-yield nuclear warheads on SLBMs and ICBMs, training European crews to participate in NATO nuclear strike missions, forward basing B61 gravity bombs in Eastern Europe, 

rotationally basing B–52 bombers and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles in Europe, and developing a new sea-launched cruise missile, or designating the planned 

long-range standoff weapon (LRSO) for delivery by both air and sea. 

The United States must also convince Russia to return to compliance with the 

INF Treaty and, if that fails, to prevent Russia from gaining a military advantage 

from its violation. Washington should, therefore, study the development of new 

GLCMs and their deployment to Europe. It should also consider the deployment of 

cruise missile defenses in Europe to defend against Russian nuclear aggression. 

Following through on some of these proposals would reverse longstanding U.S. 

and NATO policy of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons as an objective in and 

of itself. This policy was justifiable so long as Russia remained cooperative, but 

given increased Russian nuclear aggression, we no longer have the luxury of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons for its own sake and arguably never did. 

Some of these proposals, if adopted, would also run counter to promises made to 

Russia in the NATO–Russia Founding Act of 1997, but Putin has already violated 

key provisions of this act, including the commitment to refrain ‘‘from the threat or 

use of force against . . . any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner.’’ 17 It would be foolish for the United States to 

be constrained from taking action necessary for its national security by a document 

that Russia routinely ignores. 

I know this Committee will help ensure the maintenance of the strong American 

nuclear forces that have undergirded international peace and security for nearly 

seventy years. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator SESSIONS. We got notice that a vote has already started. 

I am inclined to think that we should just break because your 

statements are very important, and I would like to hear them. So 

we will take a break for the vote. 

I guess that is the signal that the vote has started. So why don’t 

we just go and make a quick return in 10–12 minutes for one vote. 

So we will be back. 

[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 3:07 p.m., the same day.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay, we will reconvene. That was not as long 

as sometimes it takes. Senator Donnelly and King got their business done and got out of there. 

27 

Senator DONNELLY. We have young legs. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let us see. Dr. Tellis, thank you for coming 

again, and now we look forward to hearing from you. 

STATEMENT OF ASHLEY TELLIS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Dr. TELLIS. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, 

members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify 

today. 

My testimony focuses on a segment of the Asian nuclear space, 

namely China, India, and Pakistan. My written testimony looks at 

different dimensions of the nuclear programs in these countries, 

but in my oral remarks I am going to focus mostly on the drivers 

that have pushed these countries to modernize their nuclear programs. I want to end by identifying some contingencies that would 

be of importance to the United States and the challenges for protecting the U.S. strategic deterrent as we go forward. 

I would be grateful if you include my written statement into the 

record. 

Senator SESSIONS. We will make all of your statements a part of 

the record. Thank you. 

Dr. TELLIS. Thank you. 

Let me start by noting that although China, India, and Pakistan 

are modernizing their nuclear deterrence comprehensively, only 

China’s nuclear expansion is driven fundamentally by concerns 

about the United States. China aims to create a nuclear force that 

is sufficiently immune to both United States nuclear and conventional weapons systems, while also intending to deter direct United 

States attacks and coercion against China, while contributing to 

deterring United States intervention on behalf of its allies in any 

regional crisis, especially in East Asia. 

Satisfying these multiple aims requires China to have a substantial and a survivable deterrent, one that is also intended to deter 

India, Russia, Japan, and other regional powers simultaneously. 

India’s nuclear program, which historically began in response to 

China’s, is intended today primarily to correct its abject vulnerability, vis-&-vis Beijing, while also deterring Pakistan, India’s two 

principal adversaries. The principal thrust of India’s nuclear weapons modernization, therefore, is focused on increasing the range 

and survivability of its delivery systems primarily to deter China. 

Pakistan’s nuclear program, which is perhaps the fastest-growing 

program of the three countries, is aimed, as it has been from the 

beginning, at checkmating India’s conventional superiority. In contrast to both China and India, which view their nuclear weapons 

primarily as second-strike systems, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine conceives of its weapons as being used first, mainly in response to a 

conventional attack by India. Hence, Pakistan has invested heavily 

in developing a diverse set of capabilities ranging from the strategic to the tactical. 

The bottom line is that nuclear weapons programs in the greater 

South Asian region are alive and well and will be so for some time 

to come. 

There are two sets of contingencies that arise from the expansion 

of nuclear weapons in this part of the world. The Chinese effort to 

28 

undermine United States extended deterrence in East Asia, especially with respect to Japan, Taiwan, and our other treaty allies, 

and the risks to nuclear security in Pakistan remain direct threats 

to the United States. 

Pakistan’s support for terrorism against India under cover of its 

nuclear weapons program and the possible employment of nuclear 

weapons in an Indo-Pakistani or Sino-Indian conflict, while undoubtedly serious dangers, remain indirect threats to United States 

interests. To my mind, there are three implications for U.S. strategic forces that flow from these realities. 

First, U.S. strategic forces remain the ultimate backstop for 

American security and, hence, must be modernized and maintained 

at New START numbers, at least at New START numbers, given 

the prospect of continued nuclear expansion in Asia. In other 

words, given the onerous United States extended deterrence commitments in Europe and Asia, United States nuclear parity with 

Russia must not diminish to a point where parity with China appears within reach. 

Second, the United States must maintain the requisite superiority of the total force that permits it to achieve conventional success in regional contingencies, while consciously integrating nuclear options into current planning for successful power projection 

in Asia, especially in the efforts now underway to defeat China’s 

anti-access area denial programs. United States regional allies 

need the assurance that the growing Chinese nuclear capability 

will not paralyze the United States or prevent it from coming to 

their defense in a crisis. 

Third, the desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weaponry in 

global politics is estimable. But that desire should not extend to devaluing the utility of nuclear weapons for deterrence, damage limitation, and sometimes use against difficult conventional targets. 

Maintaining this balance is admittedly challenging, but successful 

deterrence inevitably involves the management of difficult and 

complex contradictions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Tellis follows:] 

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Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Perkovich? 


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STATEMENT OF GEORGE PERKOVICH, VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

STUDIES, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL 

PEACE 

Dr. PERKOVICH. Thank you to the chairman and ranking member 

and Senator King. 

I am just going to follow on my friend Ashley’s comments because we are both working on Asia and so burrow into them a little 

bit. In my written testimony, I hit on five themes. Here, I am just 

going to focus on a couple of them. 

The first is to highlight that the threat perceptions and nuclear 

requirements and policies of the states in Northeast Asia and 

South Asia are causally linked to each other and to what the 

United States does. In my written testimony, I have got a diagram 

of this dynamic here, but I think it is often lost sight of. 

You can think of it in terms of two triangles. So you have the 

United States, Russia, and China in a triangle. The United States 

benchmarks historically what it needs in terms of what Russia had. 

More recently, we have been benchmarking our requirements to 

what China is doing. 

China, in turn, calculates what its strategic requirements are in 

terms of not only United States nuclear capabilities, but also 

United States cyber capabilities, United States strategic conventional capabilities, and ballistic missile defenses. So they are all 

feeding off each other, and it is not just nuclear for nuclear. 

There is a second triangle, which includes China, India, and 

Pakistan. So these two triangles meet in China. As Ashley talked 

about, China is the benchmark for India’s requirement, what it 

needs in terms of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. As already mentioned, though, that target that China presents is being 

affected by China’s effort to balance the United States. 

India is also balancing against Pakistan—to deter Pakistan. 

China is helping Pakistan. So India has got to be thinking about 

China, Pakistan, and the help that China provides Pakistan. 

Pakistan looks at India and calibrates what it needs, but Pakistan is also looking at the United States and India collaborating 

and say, ‘‘Okay, what we need is also the product of this United 

States-India collaboration.’’ 

So you have got these two triangles operating in a very keen 

way, and so I think one take-away for U.S. policymakers and the 

policymakers in the region is to realize that anything that we or 

they do, in terms of capabilities or actions, will affect all of the others. That would include force modernization. It is not an argument 

against doing it, but it is to understand that there will be reverberations beyond China, but into South Asia with whatever is 

done. 

Second point I want to highlight is that—and Ashley referred to 

it also—the most complicated challenges facing U.S. nuclear policymakers today are about extended deterrence. In particular, reassuring Japan that the United States has the resolve and the capabilities to defend it against armed attack from China or any other 

threat. 

Now, extended deterrence is often conflated with extended nuclear deterrence. They are related, but they are not necessarily the 

same thing. It is tempting to believe that the potential use of nuVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:36 Nov 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING\22491 WILDA
39 

clear weapons always strengthens extended deterrence, but the 

issue is actually problematic, and that is true in Asia as well as 

in Europe. 

Potential use of nuclear weapons in an escalating conflict can indeed strengthen the potency of our guarantee to the countries that 

we protect. But the very destructiveness that the specter of nuclear 

weapons portends also can weaken the resolve of our own society 

and the prote ́ge ́’s society. So the classic line, should we trade Los 

Angeles for Okinawa? Or if you are in Japan, if the United States 

uses a nuclear weapon against China, China is going to nuke us. 

So this can be divisive and can be exploited by a potential aggressor, and I think we have been seeing this with what Russia has 

been doing in Ukraine. That you make a nuclear threat to see if 

you can split either the guarantor from the prote ́ge ́ or weaken the 

resolve of the prote ́ge ́. So it is not an automatically positive deterrent effect. It can, in fact, be divisive and a weakening one. 

But there is also an opposite problem in extended deterrence. 

That is if the guarantor’s resolve is unquestioned—our resolve in 

this case—in the face of a countervailing nuclear threat, a nuclear 

moral hazard may be created. It is like a finance company whose 

managers believe that the government will bail them out if they 

get into ruinous losses. The prote ́ge ́ may take risks in its policies 

towards the adversary, feeling that the nuclear threat that we offer 

to defend them will bail them out from any crisis. That is a moral 

hazard. 

The other moral hazard, which we also see in finance, is that relying on the magic of nuclear deterrence, our allies may under invest in conventional capabilities. We can save a little money here 

because we are counting on the nukes to do the trick. That is like 

banks that do not keep adequate Reserves to cover their commitments. We have seen that historically in NATO, and we have seen 

it historically with Japan. 

So all of this comes together, I believe, in the situation in the 

Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands, where Japan and China are in a sovereignty dispute over these uninhabited islands, and where there 

is a potential of crisis or escalation either on purpose or by accident. In 2010, they had two ships collide accidentally. Now, you 

have got two highly nationalistic, kind of strongmen leaders in both 

countries, and if you have one of these collisions, it is easy to imagine a potential escalation. 

Obviously, you want to do deal with that by diplomacy, but it is 

worth thinking through the implications of a potential conflict and 

having the conventional capability to prevent China from being 

able to change the facts on the ground. 

It is a conventional issue that they not be able to set foot on one 

of those islands and hold it. Because if you have to fight to take 

it back, and you get into that kind of potentially escalating conflict 

and we are not prevailing, someone in this town or someplace else 

is going to say we ought to make a nuclear threat. That is what 

nuclear deterrence is for. 

But then it raises the issue, is it credible or advisable for the 

United States to think about first use of nuclear weapons, because 

that is what we are talking about here, over some islands that 99 

percent of the U.S. population has never heard of and could not 

40 

find on a map? It seems to me that is an invitation for a real disaster in terms of U.S. credibility and extended deterrence. 

The way to prevent it is with convention capabilities, both ours 

and the Japanese, and through exercising those capabilities. The 

current U.S. nuclear posture, in terms of the numbers envisioned 

in New START, is totally sufficient to deal with that kind of scenario. It is not a nuclear problem. 

Last thing I would say is on South Asia, picking up on what Ashley said. Here, I think there really are challenges for U.S. policy 

that have not been well addressed. The dynamic Ashley is talking 

about is an unprecedented one, where you have—the conflict starts 

with a terrorist attack. Then India makes a conventional military 

response. Pakistan says it would respond with battlefield nuclear 

weapons. India, which does not have battlefield nuclear weapons, 

said they will respond with massive retaliation. 

There is no theory to deal with that. All the theories of deterrence do not deal with the possibility that terrorism is this thing 

that starts it. The theories and practices about how you deal with 

terrorism have never been applied with antagonists with nuclear 

weapons. 

So we are all kind of groping in the dark in this challenge, and 

I think it would behoove the committee and the Congress and others in the United States Government to ask, if we do get into a situation of a conflict, and the United States detects Pakistan to be 

preparing nuclear weapons for use against India—where there are 

a lot of Americans at all times, where American investment is very 

heavy, we have got a very strong Indian-American population in 

the United States. You see Pakistan getting ready, what does the 

United States do? 

I do not think we have prepared for that. We have not thought 

about it. Do you intervene? How? If not, what do you tell India? 

How do you do it? 

If, God forbid, a conflict like that happens, I am willing to bet 

that the Senate, or the Congress more broadly, will conduct an inquiry to ask: What did the President know? When did he or she 

know it? What did they do to prevent it? 

We are not taking the steps now to analyze how you work back 

from that kind of scenario. It has nothing to do with U.S. forces. 

U.S. nuclear forces are irrelevant to this problem, but it is a clear 

and present problem, I would submit, that ought to be addressed. 

Let me stop there. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perkovich follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. GEORGE PERKOVICH

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you. 

I have worked on nuclear-weapons-related issues since 1982, first with a focus on 

the Soviet Union, then, after 1992, on India, Pakistan and Iran. I have written extensively on each of these countries’ nuclear programs and policies. Over the past 

ten years I also have analyzed nuclear dynamics in Northeast Asia, particularly 

Chinese and Japanese perspectives on them. 

Because time here is short and the range of topics you have asked my colleagues 

and me to address is extensive, I concentrate my testimony on what I think are 

some cutting-edge strategic challenges in Northeast Asia and South Asia that need 

to be more creatively addressed by U.S. policy-makers. These are problems to which 

no one has tidy, feasible solutions—that is, solutions that would change to our complete satisfaction the military capabilities and behaviors we want other states to 

41 

change, and thereby significantly reduce risks of conflict that could escalate to the 

use of nuclear weapons. This is largely because the other states involved have different interests and objectives than the U.S. does and will search for ways to pursue 

them. Knowing that they cannot compete directly and symmetrically with U.S. conventional and strategic forces, these states will often seek to develop and apply 

asymmetric capabilities and strategies to balance U.S. power. This is especially true 

of two of the states under consideration—the DPRK and China—whose governments 

fear the U.S. seeks ultimately to displace them. The challenge, then, for the U.S. 

and these states is to achieve tolerable stability, avoid escalatory warfare, and establish ways of getting along through political-diplomatic processes backed by balances of power. 

I have divided my testimony into five key points that describe the regional dynamics at play and suggest priority policies the U.S. could pursue to mitigate instabilities and risks of nuclear escalation. 

1. Complex causal dynamics drive the threat perceptions and nuclear requirements and policies of states in Northeast Asia and South Asia. 

This is an analytic and conceptual point that must be recognized if the U.S. and 

others are to devise policies and deploy capabilities that will improve security and 

ameliorate instability in these two inter-related regions. Setting North Korea to the 

side for a moment, it may help to conceptualize the Northeast Asian and South 

Asian nuclear ‘‘system’’ in the form of two strategic triangles that are connected by 

a common node, which is China. The following diagram represents this idea. 

The first triangle includes the U.S., Russia and China. Each of these state’s nuclear requirements and policies (as well as non-nuclear instruments of force, deterrence and coercion) affects and is affected by the other two states. For example, the 

U.S. has long seen Russia as a benchmark for determining U.S. nuclear posture and 

policy, and recently has factored China more heavily into policy calculations, including regarding strategic conventional weapons, cyberwarfare capabilities, and ballistic missile defenses. China in turn calculates its strategic military requirements 

and options by reference to current and potential threats that it perceives emanating from the U.S., and to a lesser extent from Russia. 

The second triangle includes China, India and Pakistan. India seeks strategic capabilities to deter major aggression from China and from Pakistan today and in the 

future. Many of the delivery systems and nuclear warhead capabilities India seeks 

are intended to increase its capacity to deter China, whose current and future capabilities in turn are driven in large part by perceptions of threat from the U.S. Pakistan then seeks nuclear and other capabilities to balance what it perceives India to 

be acquiring. Many Indian analysts perceive that China is assisting Pakistan’s strategic acquisitions, so India seeks not only to balance China, but also to balance the 

gains Pakistan may achieve in cooperation with China. For its part, Pakistan increasingly perceives the U.S. and India to be cooperating in buttressing Indian military capabilities with which Pakistan must contend. 

From the perspective of the United States, the main takeaway from this depiction 

of the strategic force dynamics involving these states is that policies, capabilities, 


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42 

1The third communique, in August 1982, states in part: ‘‘The United States Government attached great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of 

infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of ’’Two Chinas’’ or ’’one China, one Taiwan.’’ The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of 

the Taiwan question as indicated in China’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on Jan. 

1, 1979, and the nine-point proposal put forward by China on Sept. 30, 1981. 

and operational plans we develop to affect one of these states may cause others also 

to react in turn. 

For example, a former commander of India’s strategic forces recently explained to 

me that ‘‘what the U.S. does to extend deterrence to its allies in East Asia affects 

China which then acts in ways that challenge India. The Chinese note and build 

up capability, strategy and philosophy to deal with what the U.S. is doing. The Chinese have deployed large numbers of conventionally armed ballistic missiles and 

cyber capabilities and anti-satellite weapons to deny U.S. forces access into areas 

sensitive to them, primarily around Taiwan. Those capabilities could be used 

against India, too.’’ 

Pakistanis constantly assert that the so-called U.S.-India nuclear deal could significantly boost India’s stockpile of fissile material that could be used to build up 

its nuclear forces. Similarly, they say, potential U.S. cooperation with India on ballistic missile defenses could require Pakistan to further increase the numbers and 

diversity of its missile armory and nuclear warhead inventory. 

Of course, much the same could be said about China’s cooperation with Pakistan 

and Russia’s cooperation with India. This is not to suggest that the U.S. and these 

other states should desist from all such policies and activities. Rather, the point is 

that these policies and activities are inter-related more than is commonly recognized. If strategic instability is going to be redressed in Northeast and South Asia, 

each state, including the U.S. must be more willing than they heretofore have been 

to acknowledge and address how their own capabilities and actions affect the others. 

Among other things, this means that prospective policies must be considered in a 

regional context, not merely a bilateral one. 

2. Regarding China, the most fundamental challenge for U.S. policy is to engage 

Beijing in tempering several forms of security dilemmas and affirming that 

neither state will initiate the use of force to change the territorial status quo 

in Northeast and South Asia. 

In John Herz’s famous words (at least amongst wonks), the security dilemma is 

‘‘A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as 

each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially 

threatening.’’ 

The U.S. and China confront security dilemmas of their own making in at least 

three domains. 

One pertains to concerns of the U.S. and its protectorates—most acutely Taiwan 

and Japan—that China may use its growing economic and military power to coerce 

them in territorial and political disputes. China, for its part, has countervailing concerns that the U.S. and its allies may seek to apply military power to advance their 

preferred positions vis a vis China, particularly in case of a crisis over the political 

evolution of Taiwan as it relates to China. (China has a deeper concern that the 

U.S. seeks to subvert its political order and foster democratization. It is difficult for 

the U.S. to convince Chinese leaders that while we desire political change in their 

country we do not intend to use our military capabilities and policies to bring this 

change about). The famous ‘‘three communiques’’ issued by the U.S. and China between 1979 and August 1982 1 created a modus vivendi on these questions related 

to Taiwan, but both countries remain wary that it could be fragile. Each side in this 

security dilemma builds military power, and, in the U.S. case occasionally sells arms 

to Taiwan. Each also sometimes makes political declarations intended to preserve 

its defensive positions, but which the other side may interpret as expressions of intent to change the status quo. 

A second security dilemma arises from each side’s build-up of non-nuclear forces— 

conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, naval and air forces, ballistic missile defenses, and cyberwarfare capabilities—which each justifies as means to defend 

against the presumed offensive intentions of the other. This dynamic creates arms 

race instability, whether of a symmetric or asymmetric nature. For example, China 

for years has steadily augmented its arsenal of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles and anti-satellite weaponry to offset the United States’ superior naval power 

projection capabilities. The United States’ ongoing ballistic missile defense program 

can be seen as an effort to maintain a long-standing asymmetric advantage in the 

43 

nuclear domain, and as a way to offset China’s build-up of conventionally armed ballistic missiles. Both states, led by the U.S., are developing conventional promptstrike weapons. Additionally, the U.S. and China both are engaged in a 

cyberweapon arms race, with China trying to catch up to the U.S. 

A third security dilemma exists in the domain of nuclear policy. China fears that 

the U.S. seeks to acquire means to negate its nuclear deterrent, through some combination of offensive nuclear forces, future hypersonic conventionally-armed missiles, ballistic missile defenses, and cyberwarfare capabilities. 

China is assessed to possess approximately 250 nuclear warheads. It is assessed 

to deploy between 50–75 ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons to 

the United States, and another approximately 60 intermediate range ballistic missiles suited for use against India, Japan or Taiwan. By comparison the United 

States’ operationally deploys 2,200 nuclear weapons. China is estimated to possess 

an additional 16 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium and 1.8 tonnes of non-civilian 

separated plutonium, compared to the United States’ stockpile of 604 tonnes and 87 

tonnes, respectively. The U.S. and its prote ́ge ́s fear that China may someday add 

dramatically to its nuclear forces in ways that would undermine—along with conventional anti-access area-denial capabilities—the American deterrent extended to 

Taiwan and Japan. Each side in this competition does not adequately acknowledge 

how its own actions drive the other to take the actions that it sees as threatening. 

To deal with these challenges, the U.S. does not need more or different nuclear 

forces than it already possesses and plans to possess after implementation of the 

New Start Treaty with Russia. In terms of capabilities, the greater imperative is 

to acquire and/or deploy non-nuclear instruments to preserve the United States’ capacity to quickly defend its protectorates against and to deter Chinese actions to initiate changes in the territorial status quo in the region. Such potential Chinese actions are very unlikely to involve its nuclear forces, and it is thus in the U.S. interest to counter with strong, symmetrical conventional capabilities. 

A more immediately pressing need is to motivate Chinese leaders to join the U.S. 

and, where appropriate its allies, in articulating and authenticating policies that 

would reassure all sides in these security dilemmas that they will not initiate the 

use of force to change the territorial or political status quo or to otherwise coerce 

each other. To this end, it will be necessary for Chinese officials to understand the 

concept of the security dilemma and recognize how their words and deeds sometimes 

exacerbate it. 

With regard to nuclear policy, the key dilemma concerns first-use of nuclear weapons. Retaliatory use of nuclear weapons is a comparatively straightforward proposition; the destabilizing factor is the prospect that the U.S. or China would initiate 

attacks—by nuclear, conventional, or cyber means—on the other’s nuclear deterrent 

forces and/or their command and control systems. The U.S. would be wise to overcome its politically motivated reluctance to assure China that it will not seek to negate China’s nuclear deterrent. Washington should do this out of recognition that 

mutual nuclear vulnerability is a fact of 21st century life with China, and attempting to negate this fact through a combination of new offensive and defensive systems would not succeed at a cost that the U.S. would find acceptable to itself. The 

language authored by a 2009 Council on Relations Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy chaired by William Perry and Brent Scowcroft could be a model: ‘‘mutual vulnerability with China—like mutual vulnerability with Russia—is not a policy choice to 

be embraced or rejected, but rather a strategic fact to be managed with priority on 

strategic stability.’’ 

For its part, China should be motivated to reciprocate constructively by clarifying 

that as long as U.S. policies and military capabilities reflect this assurance China 

will not significantly increase its nuclear weapon arsenal and threaten to use force 

to alter the territorial status quo and/or resolve ‘‘the Taiwan question.’’ 

Such declarations of fundamental policy would not preclude the U.S., China, or 

other states from modernizing and bolstering their strategic offensive and defensive 

capabilities, but they would provide a framework within which each party could explain to the other how its actions are not inconsistent with fundamentally defensive 

intentions and assurances. This would be constructive on its own terms, and could 

eventually create conditions for possible negotiation of arms limitations. 

3. One of the most complicated challenges facing U.S. policy-makers today is to 

reassure Japan that the U.S. has the resolve and capabilities to defend it 

against armed attack from China or any other state. 

Extended deterrence is never easy to provide or depend upon. The prote ́ge ́ often 

will fear that its protector will abandon it. At other times, the prote ́ge ́ may fear that 

the protector will entrap it in a war that the prote ́ge ́ would otherwise seek to avoid. 

The guarantor, on the other hand, must convince the prote ́ge ́ as well as the adverVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:36 Nov 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING\22491 WILDA
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sary that the guarantor will put its soldiers and citizens and treasury at risk in 

order to defend another. This is especially problematic insofar as the prote ́ge ́ may 

itself act in ways that instigate a potential conflict, raising legitimate questions 

about whether the guarantor should or would invite the costs of coming to its defense in such a situation. 

Extended deterrence is often conflated with extended nuclear deterrence. While 

it may be tempting to believe that the potential use of nuclear weapons always 

strengthens extended deterrence, the issue is problematic. Potential use of nuclear 

weapons in an escalating conflict can indeed strengthen the potency of the guarantor’s deterrent against a potential aggressor. But the very destructiveness that this 

portends also can weaken the resolve of the guarantor state’s population (should we 

trade Los Angeles for Taipei?) as well as the prote ́ge ́’s population (if the U.S. uses 

nuclear weapons on China, China will respond first by targeting nuclear weapons 

at Japan). These possible reactions may tempt a potential aggressor into thinking 

that the mere threat of aggression that could escalate to nuclear use can split an 

alliance, or demonstrate the guarantor’s weak resolve, constituting a bluff that may 

be called. 

On the other hand, if the guarantor’s resolve is unquestioned in the face of a 

countervailing nuclear threat, nuclear moral hazards may be created. Like a finance 

company whose managers believe that the government will bail them out if they 

face ruinous losses, the prote ́ge ́ may take unwise risks in its policies toward its adversary, feeling that the nuclear threat proffered by the guarantor will deter the adversary from reacting forcefully. The prote ́ge ́ also may under-invest in non-nuclear 

defensive capabilities that would otherwise obviate the need to resort to nuclear 

threats to deter the adversary, like a bank that does not maintain conservative levels of reserves to cover its commitments. 

This sort of hazard has long affected the United States’ relations with its NATO 

allies, most of whom do not meet their commitments to devote two percent of their 

GDP to defense. Japan, too, has not always carried its full share of the defense burden with the United States. Its defense spending declined between 2002 and the arrival of the new Abe government in 2013. Now Japan is pursuing plans for an increase in procurement of major systems, and the U.S. and Japan have intensified 

exercises and other cooperative activities to solidify defense in the East China Sea. 

Still, the national government in Tokyo has not successfully overcome local governments’ reluctance to cooperate in relocating U.S. military bases on Okinawa. It is 

common in Washington to hear complaints that an administration is not doing 

enough to reassure Japan of the United States’ commitment to defend it; it is less 

common to hear of even private congressional remonstrances to Japanese officials 

that they should do more to buttress the alliance materially and diplomatically (vis 

a vis Japan’s neighbors). A careful complementarity is required to match increases 

in defense preparedness with political and diplomatic sensitivity to the concerns this 

can cause in states that experienced Japanese aggression in the 1930s. 

These considerations can be applied to the issue that currently poses the greatest 

risk of potential conflict involving Japan and China, and implicating the U.S. as Japan’s protector. There is a cluster of islands and rock outcroppings in the East 

China Sea that Japan calls the Senkaku Islands and China calls the Diaoyu Islands. Japan incorporated the islands under the administration of Okinawa, in January 1895, during the first Sino-Japanese War. The U.S. took control of these 

outcroppings as a result of World War II, and returned them to Japanese control 

in 1972. China disputes Japan’s right to sovereignty over these islands. The U.S. 

does not offer a judgment on the disputed claims to sovereignty, but says that the 

islands fall within the territory the U.S. is obligated by treaty to help Japan defend. 

The Japanese government in late 2012 bought the islands from a private owner, explaining that it did so to prevent the nationalist governor of Tokyo from acquiring 

and developing them. Reflecting the logic of security dilemmas, China intensified its 

contestation over the issue, and deployed naval vessels and aircraft around and over 

the islands in order to manifest its claim and pressure Japan to proceed carefully. 

A non-trivial risk now appears that either state could act physically to change the 

status quo on or around these islands, and/or that the naval vessels or aircraft could 

collide, as happened with a Chinese fishing vessel and a Japanese Coast Guard ship 

in 2010. Such collisions could create a severe crisis that the highly nationalistic Chinese and Japanese governments could find difficult to de-escalate. 

Were such a crisis to occur when China and Japan are led by strength-projecting 

nationalistic figures, the U.S. would face excruciatingly complex challenges. The 

first priority would be to resolve the crisis diplomatically. But this could be very difficult to do, depending on the circumstances. Japan and China would dispute whose 

actors and actions were to blame for the precipitating action. If the U.S. did not 

take its ally Japan’s side, whatever the merits of the case, some faction in WashVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:36 Nov 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING\22491 WILDA
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ington would decry the abandonment of an ally. If Japan were at fault and the U.S. 

did not acknowledge this for political-diplomatic reasons, China would become even 

more determined to press its claims on this dispute and others that involve U.S. 

allies. If evidence held that China was at fault, the political-diplomatic position of 

the U.S. would be simpler, but then the U.S. and Japan would likely find themselves in a potentially escalating conflict with China. 

In either case, to augment diplomacy and strengthen deterrence, and to prevail 

in case diplomacy fails, the U.S. and Japan would need to have the conventional 

military means to prevent China from creating new ‘‘facts on the ground,’’ for example by physically taking control of the islands. Failure to ensure this initial defense 

could create a situation where the U.S. and Japan would feel compelled to fight 

China to reverse its gain. Such a conflict could escalate and expand to a wider naval 

battle or blockade contest as each leadership would feel its credibility and political 

survival at stake. Were the U.S. and Japan not prevailing, someone in Washington 

or Tokyo would at least raise the prospect that the conflict could escalate to the use 

of nuclear weapons. After all, that’s how nuclear deterrence is supposed to work. 

Yet, would even implying a nuclear threat be advisable and therefore credible? 

Would and should the United States be willing to risk nuclear war over uninhabited 

rocks in East Asia that 99 percent of the American people have never heard of and 

could not find on a map? Recall, the issue here would be first-use of nuclear weapons: if China, despite its commitment and force posture of no-first-use, took steps 

signaling that it would break the nuclear taboo, U.S. recourse to retaliatory nuclear 

weapons reasonably would be on the table. But threatening to initiate the use of 

nuclear weapons in conflict that erupted over these disputed outcroppings—no matter how far it escalated—would constitute a profound over-reaction. 

Japanese leaders and citizens may not appreciate this analysis. They may prefer 

to over-rely on the magic of nuclear deterrence. But statesmanship requires realism, 

dealing with facts and assessing strategic risks. Japan and the United States must 

recognize the imperative of developing and deploying diplomacy and conventional 

military power to prevent efforts by anyone to forcibly change the status quo surrounding this territorial dispute. The combination of clear commitments not to upset 

the status quo and demonstrable non-nuclear means to prevent anyone else from 

physically changing it constitutes the strongest possible extended deterrent, for it 

reaffirms a fundamentally defensive posture that augments national and international resolve. 

The current and projected nuclear arsenal of the United States is more than sufficient to perform the physical requirements of extending nuclear deterrence to Japan 

against China. Nor is it evident that ‘‘strengthening’’ U.S. declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons would enhance (and not otherwise undermine) the 

feasibility and durability of the extended nuclear deterrent. 

4. North Korea will not in the foreseeable future agree to relinquish all of its nuclear weapons and related capabilities. The near-term imperative should be to 

negotiate constraints on the buildup of DPRK nuclear capabilities and enforceable commitments not to transfer them to others. 

Japanese and South Korean leaders are politically and psychologically unprepared 

to negotiate anything less than complete DPRK disarmament, for complex reasons. 

This in turn intensifies political pressures on any American administration not to 

deviate from this stated objective. This motivates North Korea to demand an exorbitant price for cooperation, which its interlocutors doubt the DPRK will fully implement in any case. 

A more realistic alternative would be to bargain for incremental steps by the 

DPRK to stop increasing its nuclear stockpile and to eschew proliferation of nuclear 

materials and know-how to other actors. These forms of restraint by the DPRK 

could be more achievable at a lower price than the DPRK seeks for the illusory objective of total nuclear disarmament. 

Acknowledging that DPRK will retain some nuclear weapons for the foreseeable 

future offends our sense of virtue, as does embarking on what amounts to a protection-racket arrangement to pay the DPRK for not damaging the neighborhood. But 

the perfect may be the enemy of the somewhat tolerable here: by acknowledging 

that the DPRK would retain a limited nuclear capability to satisfy its regime’s need 

to deter U.S. and other efforts to displace it, the U.S. and other negotiating parties 

would strengthen their leverage to obtain North Korean cooperation in mitigating 

its other threatening behaviors. Arguably, this is the best outcome that might be 

achieved today. 

For such an adjustment in negotiating objectives to be sustainable, the U.S., 

Japan, South Korea, China and Russia would need to devise a formula that would 

affirm their ultimate goal to be the creation of a regional security environment free 

46 

of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. Such a goal is necessary to satisfy the 

political-psychological needs of South Korea and Japan. Yet, the prospect of freeing 

the Korean Peninsula of all nuclear weapons and (still to be defined) supporting infrastructure would be more realistic after the relevant parties had incrementally 

built mutual confidence by stopping the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal 

and infrastructure and authenticating that the DPRK was not transferring weapons, material, and know-how to others. 

In terms of U.S. nuclear force requirements and posture, the nuclear threat posed 

by the DPRK is a lesser-included challenge that can be more than adequately covered by nuclear (and non-nuclear) forces that the U.S. will retain as part of its larger requirement to deter Russia and China. 

5. India and Pakistan will continue to augment their nuclear arsenals. The imperatives now are to prevent another major terrorist attack from Pakistan 

against India and reduce the risks of escalation to nuclear war. 

South Asia is the most likely place nuclear weapons could be detonated in the 

foreseeable future. This risk derives from the unusual dynamic of the India-Pakistan competition. The next major terrorist attack in India, emanating from Pakistan, may trigger an Indian conventional military riposte that could in turn prompt 

Pakistan to use battlefield nuclear weapons to repel an Indian incursion. India, for 

its part, has declared that it would inflict massive retaliation in response to any nuclear use against its territory or troops. Obviously, this threatening dynamic— 

whereby terrorism may prompt conventional conflict which may prompt nuclear 

war—challenges Indian and Pakistan policy-makers. India and Pakistan both tend 

to downplay or dismiss the potential for escalation, but our own history of close nuclear calls should make U.S. officials more alert to these dangers. The U.S. is the 

only outside power that could intervene diplomatically and forcefully to de-escalate 

a crisis. 

India, is believed to possess approximately 90–110 nuclear weapons. It plans to 

deliver them via aircraft and/or a growing fleet of ballistic and perhaps cruise missiles. Available information suggests it keeps the nuclear bombs and warheads separate from their aircraft and missile delivery systems. With a historically entrenched 

doctrine of No First Use, and a strict insistence on civilian control over nuclear policy, India plans to mate weapons and delivery systems only when the need for their 

potential use appears imminent. While India retains significant quantities of plutonium outside of civilian control, which it conceivably could use to dramatically expand its nuclear arsenal, India thus far rejects ideas of nuclear war-fighting and 

corresponding development of a large nuclear arsenal, much as China does. 

Pakistan is estimated to have 100–120 nuclear weapons, with a continually growing capacity to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium to expand this arsenal if it chooses to. Pakistan continues to add new missile delivery capabilities to 

its arsenal. Most noteworthy has been the development of the NASR 60-kilometre 

range missile, which Pakistan projects as a battlefield weapon to deter Indian 

ground-force incursions into its territory. Pakistan proffers the threat of initiating 

nuclear use if and when it would be necessary to defeat what it would perceive as 

Indian aggression from land, air and/or sea. 

India faces two inter-related strategic challenges vis a vis Pakistan: to compel 

Pakistani authorities to curtail the operations of anti-Indian terrorists; and to deter 

Pakistan from engaging in escalatory warfare if and when India responds violently 

to a terrorist attack. The new prime minister of India, Narendra Modi came to 

power with a reputation for strong action, which he and his supporters juxtapose 

to the perceived weakness of his predecessors. Indeed, Modi’s government recently 

unleashed the Indian Army to retaliate with disproportionate force against traditional Pakistani artillery shelling across the disputed Line of Control in Kashmir. 

Senior advisors to the prime minister have said that there should be little doubt 

he will respond forcefully if India is attacked again by terrorists associated with 

Pakistan. 

The questions are, what strategy (or strategies) and capabilities would be feasible 

and effective to enable India to motivate Pakistan’s security establishment to demobilize anti-India terrorist groups? If terrorist attacks cannot be prevented, how 

can India respond to them in ways that minimize risks of escalation that would be 

unfavorable to India? 

Since the major Indo-Pak crisis of 2001–2002 following a terrorist attack on India’s parliament building, Indians have debated options ranging from Army-centric 

ground thrusts into Pakistan, precision air strikes, covert operations, and non-kinetic efforts to isolate and sanction Pakistan. 

Clearly, some actions that could most probably satisfy one of India’s multiple domestic and bilateral objectives would lessen the chances of achieving others. For exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:36 Nov 17, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\USERS\WR47328\DESKTOP\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING\22491 WILDA
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ample, satisfying the desire to punish Pakistan could be achieved by a relatively 

wide range of military actions and international economic sanctions. But the more 

destructive of possible military actions could raise the overall scale and costs of the 

conflict to levels disproportionate to the harm done by the initial attack on India, 

and invite unwelcome international responses. For example, a successful ground 

campaign into Pakistan would be most likely to prompt Pakistan to use battlefield 

nuclear weapons to stop Indian forces and compel them to leave Pakistani territory. 

No theories in the existing international literature or in other states’ practices 

offer guidance regarding how India could most effectively proceed here. Studies of 

strategies and tactics to deter and defeat terrorism have not addressed situations 

when the major antagonists possess nuclear weapons. Theories and case studies of 

nuclear deterrence and escalation management in a nuclearized environment have 

not involved cases where terrorists with unclear relationships to one of the state antagonists are the instigators of aggression and the ‘‘unitary rational actor’’ model 

may not apply. The Indo-Pak competition features both sets of challenges with the 

added complication that third states—primarily the U.S. and China—also figure 

heavily in the calculations of decision-makers. 

All of this has implications for U.S. policy-makers. Historically and today, the U.S. 

has not planned for its nuclear forces to serve deterring or war-fighting roles against 

Pakistan and/or India. Thus, South Asian scenarios do not figure in calculating the 

adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces. 

However, there are possible scenarios in which the U.S. could become directly implicated in nuclear crises with Pakistan and/or between India and Pakistan. Pakistan fears that the U.S. in certain circumstances might conduct military operations 

to capture or otherwise neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear forces and fissile materials. Indeed, one of the most telling Pakistani reactions to the U.S. raid that killed Osama 

Bin Laden was to intensify efforts to hide and secure their nuclear assets. Some of 

these protective steps could be welcome insofar as they also could help secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets against possible efforts by militant non-state actors or rebelling 

military units to capture them. This scenario—radicals in Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons and/or fissile materials—has alarmed successive U.S. administrations. Given fears of nuclear terrorism, it would be reasonable for relevant U.S. government actors to aspire to have the precise intelligence and capabilities required 

to, in a crisis, locate Pakistan’s nuclear assets and seek to remove or disable them. 

Whether the U.S. has the requisite capabilities cannot be gleaned from public 

sources, but the task would be extremely daunting given the number of Pakistan’s 

nuclear weapons, the volume of its fissile material, and their dispersal to well-hidden and defended facilities. 

In any case, while some Pakistani authorities might welcome a successful U.S. operation during an internal Pakistani crisis to keep the country’s nuclear weapon capabilities from falling into the hands of anti-state groups, the possibility of such an 

operation would generally be seen as deeply threatening to Pakistan. Few would be 

confident that the U.S. would only intervene when it might be welcomed; all would 

worry that the U.S. might intervene in a very different scenario in which Pakistan 

was embroiled in a conflict with India. Indeed, the worst nightmare for Pakistani 

strategic planners is a combined U.S.-Indian effort to negate, or at least degrade, 

their nuclear deterrent. 

This may seem far-fetched today, and I am unaware of scholarly or official analyses of such a possibility. However, I think the following questions suggest that it 

would behoove the U.S. government to work discreetly on this problem. If India and 

Pakistan become embroiled in a major military conflict following a major terrorist 

attack on India attributed to Pakistan, and the U.S. detects Pakistan to be readying 

nuclear forces for use, should the U.S. intervene to prevent the use of nuclear weapons? 

Consider that the U.S. and India are now self-proclaimed strategic partners, and 

many thousands of Americans live in India or regularly visit it, reflecting ever-increasing U.S. commercial investments and interests in India. Consider also the large 

and prominent Indian-American community who feel passionately about their native 

home and participate ever more actively in American politics. If nuclear weapons 

were being readied for use, with a real prospect of escalation to nuclear war between India and Pakistan, would U.S. leaders feel they should simply stand back 

and watch? If, God forbid, nuclear weapons were detonated and Americans were 

among the casualties, would not Congress demand an inquiry to learn ‘‘what did the 

president know and when did he know it, and why did he or she not act to try to 

prevent it?’’ Would there not be an expectation that the government had done contingency planning for such an emergency, given how long Pakistan and India have 

had nuclear weapons and how central the U.S. has been in resolving earlier crises 

between them? 

48 

Members of Congress are much better positioned to answer these questions than 

I am. But I would wager that there is some prospect that U.S. leaders would at 

least be expected to have prepared for such a contingency, even if the preparations 

concluded there was little that could be done physically to prevent it. 

Indeed, we should assume that Pakistani military strategists are thinking of scenarios in which the U.S. might alone, or in cooperation with India, intervene in a 

looming nuclear conflict to stay Pakistan’s hand. In this case, Pakistani planners 

will be considering whether and how they could deter the U.S. from such intervention. Of course, inviting war, possibly nuclear war, with the United States would 

be a terrible risk. But in a scenario in which Pakistani military leaders were considering nuclear war with India already, and the U.S. was seen to be denying this recourse to a perceived existential necessity, this could be a risk that they could be 

willing to threaten to run. 

I close by suggesting that, as in the earlier discussion concerning Northeast Asia, 

the nuclear challenges in South Asia will not be redressed by more or newer U.S. 

nuclear weapons or changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine. There is no evidence to the 

contrary. The most immediately pressing objective of U.S. policy should be to apply 

vigorous, creative diplomatic and political energy to prevent another crisis between 

India and Pakistan, and if one cannot be prevented, to enhance the preparation of 

Indian, Pakistani and American officials to manage it with minimal escalation. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, those are thoughtful and great issues to 

discuss. Thank you for sharing your thoughts and leadership with 

us. 

Dr. Krepinevich, Henry Kissinger testified a few weeks ago before the Armed Services Committee, and he was pretty animated— 

and it is in his book, too—about what he considers an alteration 

of our initial negotiating policy with Iran, to accept them getting 

within months of having a nuclear weapon. He expressed the concern at the hearing that this creates a circumstance where Turkey, 

Saudi, Egypt may feel if they are within months of weapon, then 

they practically have one, and they need to have one. 

What thoughts would you have about that danger and what we 

can do to prevent it? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, certainly if I were a neighbor of Iran’s, 

and we are looking at a short sprint to a nuclear weapon, if the 

declared goal now is to keep them a year out, that assumes, I believe the Deputy Secretary of State said, an unprecedented level of 

intrusion and verification to keep them at that level. The question 

is, can we achieve that? 

So far, I think the history has been that the cheaters often seem 

to have an advantage. Even President Reagan, who was famous for 

saying ‘‘trust but verify,’’ during his presidency, the Soviets were 

cheating on the ABM Treaty and on the biological conventions treaty. 

Our success in trying to impose constraints on countries like 

North Korea and Iran has been limited at best and unfortunate at 

worst. So I think it would be very difficult, as I said in my testimony, absent a clear threat of military action or military action, to 

get the Iranians, at this point, given the investment they have 

made, the trouble they have gone through, the damage to their reputation they have sustained, to deflect them. 

You can see that there are clear benefits to Iran from having a 

nuclear capability, both in terms of regime preservation, which I 

assume is probably their top priority, and then advancing their 

aims throughout the region. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think, so if you are a Saudi Arabian, 

and you think you have the ability to achieve a nuclear weapon 

through research or money, then if you think your adversary is 

49 

within months, 12, 9, I believe—actually, I think Kissinger used 

the word ‘‘9 months,’’ then you could have a proliferation. 

How dangerous would it be if we ended up with Turkey, Saudi 

Arabia, and Egypt with nuclear weapons? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, I would say it is certainly—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Anything that our nuclear arsenal should be 

altered to deal with that? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Under those circumstance where, say, you had 

a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia next to Iran, as I mentioned earlier, 

the ability to have an effective attack warning system and command and control system would certainly test the limits of technology, test the resources of both countries, both in terms of financial and in terms of the manpower resources. 

During the Cold War when we were placing the Pershing 2s into 

Western Europe, the Soviets at the time, according to the documentation that has come out, actually explored an option called the 

‘‘dead hand,’’ which is—if you have seen the movie ‘‘Dr. Strangelove,’’ it is an automated nuclear response mechanism, because 

they were concerned that the Pershings would give them such little 

warning time that they might be faced with a decapitation attack. 

They eventually moved toward something I understand called ‘‘perimeter,’’ which is semi-automated. 

In this case, I think what we might be able to offer countries like 

Saudi Arabia, hopefully, is, to the extent that we can, effective attack warning. Perhaps a willingness, hopefully, to dissuade them 

from acquiring their own nuclear weapons by offering extended deterrence. The possibility of missile defense, although I am skeptical 

about missile defense for a couple of reasons. 

One is in the Cold War, we had nuclear plenty before we had 

missile plenty, and we went to MIRV systems. So the problem we 

faced right now is opposite, in the sense that Iran has missile plenty, but not nuclear plenty. 

So in a short-range attack on Saudi Arabia, if they did not 

need—if they could go beyond the Shahab-3 missiles and use some 

1s and 2s, they may create a problem for us in terms of having a 

lot of decoys—maybe 4 or 5 missiles with nuclear warheads on it, 

20 or 30 missiles in the attack overall, and force our missile defenses to actually engage them all. We would be at the losing end 

of a missile defense proposition. 

Senator SESSIONS. You do think providing a nuclear umbrella to 

our allies in the region is something that would have to be considered? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Certainly, I think so. Again, this is—I think 

there is a lot of virgin strategic territory here. 

Senator SESSIONS. Would we then need to move advance locations for our nuclear weapons, if that were to occur? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Again, I would want to think through the 

issue. I was about to say that if you had, as you said, multiple 

states—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran—and just for a thought experiment, each had 50 nuclear weapons, then if you are the Saudis, 

you may have to plan against an attack by 100 nuclear weapons. 

You cannot have parity with everyone in an end-state competition. 

To the extent the United States provides nuclear guarantees, 

that could offset some of the fears that, in fact, even though I am 

50 

inferior numerically in terms of nuclear weapons, the United States 

can help make up the difference. 

So, again, we have never really, to my knowledge, gotten into a 

detailed analysis of end-state nuclear competitions, especially when 

warning times are extremely short, and as George points out, you 

are looking at other factors, such as the ability of conventional 

weapons to substitute for nuclear weapons, advanced defenses, 

cyber weaponry, and so on. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it is definitely a complex thing. It seems 

to me that if you have got now Iran, Saudi Arabia, other nations 

with nuclear weapons, you have got four Nations perhaps who 

would use nuclear weapons if their existence is at threat. So you 

have increased danger of a first use in the ways that we maybe 

have not thought through. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Certainly, you have more triggers—fingers on 

the trigger. I would be interested in my colleagues’ reaction, too. 

One thing, of course, that concerns some folks is the Saudi-Pakistani connection. Should Pakistan, for example, deploy weapons in 

Saudi Arabia, certain countries—Israel included—might view that 

as weapons, even though they are under nominal Pakistani control, 

actually being under the de facto control of the Saudis. While, at 

the same time, what is the view of India? Does India view this 

move as an effort by Pakistan to create strategic depth in terms of 

its nuclear forces? 

So I think George was getting to this point. You cannot just segment these particular problems by region. In some cases, they are 

transregional problems. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. These are so complex, but I think 

we better give up my time to Senator Donnelly. I have hogged too 

many minutes. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Perkovich, you know we have spoken to General Campbell 

recently, and he talked about how relations between he and the 

Pakistan army are better than they have been in a very, very, very 

long time. Then you flip to the nuclear side, and you have Pakistan 

increasingly perceiving the United States and India to be cooperating together, and it puts them in a tougher spot, Pakistan feels. 

How do you balance off this? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. It is a great question, and you might get a good 

debate going with Ashley and me, but I do not—— 

Senator DONNELLY. On the one side, we are supposedly working 

better than ever, and it is like going down the hall into another 

room, and you have a completely 180 perspective. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. I think I work back from—and this does not go 

over really well in Pakistan, but sometimes, you know, you just 

stick with something if you believe it is true. 

Senator DONNELLY. We just want to know what you think. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. The good news is India has no desires for any 

Pakistani territory or anything in Pakistan. So, the ‘‘threat from 

India’’ is only in response to Pakistani aggression in India, or terrorism in India. 

That is a basis for the United States in our relations with the 

Pakistanis to say, look, if we can cooperate in getting at the terrorism problem within Pakistan, what you are worried about from 

51 

India goes away, number one. Number two, the influence that we 

might have in India can help reassure you of that, which, by the 

way, did happen in 2001 and 2002. Ashley was out in Delhi in the 

embassy there—there was a crisis—where the U.S. was trying to 

stay both of their hands. 

So there is a basis, if you can get at the terrorism problem. If 

Pakistan cannot commit itself to working against the terrorists 

that have operated in India, then there is not much we can do to 

reassure them, but I would argue there is probably not much we 

should do to reassure them because that really is a problem. 

Senator DONNELLY. Let me ask you—and this is not exactly on 

the nuclear topic, but do you see it as a long-term gamechanger 

what happened with the Army Public School in Pakistan recently, 

to their children, when the attack took place? 

Do you see them having like a long-term commitment to eliminating the Taliban, or is that something that you think 6 months, 

a year from now may fade away? 

Dr. Tellis? 

Dr. TELLIS. It is a difficult question to answer at this point, but 

what we have certainly seen is that the Pakistan army seems to 

be much more energized about going after terrorist groups that are 

wrecking havoc within Pakistani society. I think that is welcome, 

and of course, it has been long overdue. 

The question that cannot be answered today is whether the Pakistanis will now extend this effort to groups that do not directly 

threaten Pakistan but threaten others—groups that threaten Afghanistan, United States forces in Afghanistan, and India. Thus 

far, we have seen a very energetic Pakistani response to their own 

state enemies. All things being equal, we would want to see that 

rather than the absence. 

But I think we would declare victory only when Pakistanis begin 

to think of terrorism in a sort of broader context and begin to focus 

their attentions on all terrorist groups, and not pick and choose between groups that support their interests and groups that support 

them. 

Senator DONNELLY. How strong are their security efforts around 

their nuclear weapons? How good are their programs and processes, as you have seen, compared to other nations? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. On this one, I could say nuclear weapons are the 

most secure thing in Pakistan. That is good news and bad news. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, I am the tallest person in my family. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. I am the shortest in mine. 

Senator DONNELLY. Everything is degree. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. But the issue is, is that—that is not the problem 

I would focus on precisely because it is one that they care about 

more than anything, the army. They have capabilities, and capabilities are acquirable to deal with that. So they may not be perfect 

at it, but they are on the job, and there is a reason to think they 

can manage it. 

The problem that is much harder is, again, the terrorism leads 

to the war, which leads to escalation. So it is not the loss of nuclear 

weapons, it is actually the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict to 

me is a more probable scenario. It has implications for us that are 

not as dire as a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, but 

52 

that are pretty dire when you start going through the calculation. 

So that is the unattended-to problem that I think we need to focus 

on. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Doctor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Fischer? 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to open this up for any of you if you would like to 

make a comment on it. 

I would like to know what influence we have as a country if we 

see the confidence of our allies being eroded over what they would 

view as the protection of a nuclear umbrella that we would have 

in the region. 

Also what influence we would have over trying to prevent proliferation amongst our allies in different regions, when we see conflicts continuing to grow, and the ability of our allies to acquire nuclear capabilities, either on developing them on their own or being 

able to purchase them elsewhere. 

If I will open that up. 

Dr. KROENIG. Well, it is an important question, and I think our 

extended deterrent depends in part on our capability. Do we have 

the capability to follow through? It also depends on the credibility. 

Will we do it? 

So going back to the question that was asked of Dr. Krepinevich 

on Iran, I think that is one of the things that would make deterring 

a nuclear-armed Iran very difficult and would make reassuring our 

allies in the region very difficult, would be the lack of United 

States credibility in that situation. After three successive United 

States presidents said a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable, Iran 

will not acquire nuclear weapons, and in the end, we allow them 

to acquire nuclear weapons. 

A deterrence and containment regime would rest on U.S. threats. 

It would rest on U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, 

to stop Iran, to go to war with a nuclear-armed Iran. So who would 

believe that we would be prepared to go to war with a nucleararmed Iran if we were not prepared to go to war with a non-nuclear Iran? 

Also, capability is important. So when we think about Asia, and 

in Dr. Perkovich’s testimony he said that China has a secure second-strike capability. We are vulnerable to China, whether we like 

it or not, and I think that is true. But we need to think about reassuring the allies in the region as well, and something that the allies say is that they would be very uncomfortable with nuclear parity between the United States and China. 

So I think one way to square the circle is to make sure, even if 

China has a secure second-strike capability, to make sure that we 

maintain nuclear superiority over China. I think that would be one 

way that China could feel secure that it is not going to be vulnerable to a nuclear strike, but also our allies in the region would feel 

confident under the American nuclear umbrella. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. Yes? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. I will add a little to this. 

A big part of the—as Matt said—of the reassurance, which goes 

to the heart of your question, Senator, you know, is our resolve. 

53 

This is something that you all would have to address, and it is a 

political issue. How much do you think the American people should 

be willing to sacrifice to defend Saudi Arabia? How would you sell 

that politically? 

Most of the terrorists that we have dealt with have an ideology 

that was propagated by Saudi Arabia, often in facilities funded by 

Saudis. The human rights record in Saudi Arabia is whatever it is. 

I remember the House years ago would not let the UAE [United 

Arab Emirates] buy a port facility in—now we are going to talk 

about extending security guarantees? 

So it is a political issue that is first and foremost. They do not 

doubt our military capabilities. They see what we can do with conventional. They saw what we did in Iraq, 3 weeks gone. The issue 

is political, and do they think that the United States would actually defend them to the hilt, life or death, is a political issue, much 

more than it is a hardware issue. 

Senator FISCHER. But do you not think it ties into a hardware 

issue when we know we need to modernize our arsenal, and we are 

not stepping forward and providing the resources necessary to do 

even that? 

You know, it was said earlier that we are increasing America’s 

commitments and decreasing America’s capabilities. That was, in 

my opinion, a statement that hit the nail on the head. That is 

where the focus, I think, needs to be for us to be able to move forward with any kind of credibility in this world. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. Absolutely. You absolutely have to modernize it, 

and everything else. 

But if you are talking about, for example, in the Middle East, an 

Iran with 1 weapon—or 10 weapons or 20 weapons—whatever scenario you have about the United States force, which is at 2,200 

now, it is probably going to be adequate as long as it is modernized, it is up to date. No one is questioning that. 

Senator FISCHER. But as we continue to make commitments 

around the world, though? 

Dr. TELLIS. Can I take a crack at that? 

I think the point you are making is a very important one, and 

particularly in East Asia. The best anti-proliferation measure we 

have is the robustness of our nuclear umbrella. To the degree that 

the allies feel reassured by the resilience and the strength of the 

nuclear umbrella, their incentives to go the nuclear route independently are diminished. 

Now, we have been blessed with allies, at least in East Asia, 

which are advanced industrial societies. If they choose to go the nuclear route, they could go there very, very quickly. So it becomes 

extremely important for us to be able to maintain our nuclear assets in good repair so that we do not have to incur the temptation—or they do not have to incur the temptation of going there. 

Having said that, however, to my mind, when one thinks about 

this strategically, the real challenge actually is for us to beef up 

our conventional capabilities, so that if they ever get into a fistfight 

with some adversaries, we have the capacity to defend them conventionally, such that we do not press too strongly on our nuclear 

assets. 

54 

Let me put it this way. If you get into a fistfight in East Asia, 

I would rather be in a position where we are so good and so robust 

conventionally that the other guy has to think about using nuclear 

weapons first. If somebody else has to start thinking about using 

nuclear weapons first, then I have the nuclear Reserves necessary 

to deter them. 

If I end up being in a position where I have to use nuclear weapons first because my conventional capabilities are essentially less 

than robust, then I end up in a very, very uncomfortable and unfavorable world. That is the world we want to avoid. 

So we have to do two things simultaneously. You have to make 

certain that the big stick that is essentially our U.S. strategic Reserves are kept in good shape. But it is our usable forces that we 

will employ in the course of any conventional problem that really 

have to be beefed up so that we never have to use our own nuclear 

weapons if we are forced to. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator King? 

Senator KING. You guys are full of good news. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. Kroenig, I have never heard anybody deliver such appalling 

information so calmly before. The sentence that I seized on that 

you said in your testimony was, ‘‘The ongoing conflict in the 

Ukraine is very much a nuclear crisis.’’ 

That is a very important piece of information. I have been to 

probably a dozen hearings in the last couple of months where the 

issue of arming the Ukraine has come up, and for a while, at least 

2 or 3 weeks ago, it was sort of the wise guy consensus. Oh, yes, 

this is what we have to do. 

I sense there is a bit of a pause, but my question is do you see 

a danger of escalation, a risk of miscalculation? Given Russia’s historic paranoia about the West, all those factors, give me your 

thoughts on arming the Ukrainians and danger of escalation. 

Dr. KROENIG. Well, I think this feeds in a little bit to the point 

that Dr. Tellis was just making, where if you can deter an adversary at the conventional level or defeat the adversary at the conventional level, you may be able to prevent the conflict from escalating up to the nuclear level. So I am less concerned about 

Ukraine, in part because the United States does not have as great 

a stake in Ukraine. 

What I worry about a little bit more is if President Putin were 

to kind of re-run this playbook against a NATO ally, against a Baltic State. Those—if they are NATO allies, we would be compelled 

to come to their defense. In those kind of situations, if President 

Putin were making these same kind of nuclear threats, I think the 

stakes would be much higher because it is a NATO ally, and I 

think there is a much greater risk for escalation in that kind of scenario. 

Senator KING. I understand that. A point well taken. 

I guess to get back to Ukraine, though, my concern is that we 

do not live in a static universe, and we cannot assume that our escalation is the end of the story. To me it appears, as an outsider, 

that this is of more vital interest to the Russians than it is to us. 

55 

Whatever we do, they can match and raise us. That, I said in a 

hearing the other day, if you are playing chess with a Russian, you 

better think at least three moves ahead. 

Changing the subject briefly. The danger of a terrorist group getting a nuclear weapon somehow—buying, stealing, whatever. Our 

whole theory of nuclear deterrence over the past 70 years has rested upon a premise of state actors who are somewhat rational and 

fear death. 

What is our strategy to deal with people who are not state actors 

and want to die? Anybody? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. It has to be prevention. The stuff we are doing 

and probably can always do well. 

I mean, the good news on the nuclear piece of terrorism is to actually get a device that will go boom in a very big way requires 

highly enriched uranium or plutonium, which exists in finite quantities in knowable locations. So it is a problem that governments 

can actually redress with some degree of confidence. It is not like 

ending poverty or a lot of other things that one might want. 

Senator KING. It is a technical challenge. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. It is a technical challenge and a political will 

challenge. I mean, and this administration has—especially with all 

the nuclear security summits has really applied a lot of heft and 

energy to it. There is a political will issue because there are a lot 

of states that need to do things that look at it and say, I mean, 

they are not going to go off in my territory if somebody gets a hold 

of it. So what is in it for me? 

Senator KING. Didn’t the Pakistanis sell nuclear technology? Or 

somebody? One of their scientists, as I recall. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. Yes. Yes. So that is a real problem. He sold them 

to states, where there is a distinction. So Iran, North Korea, Libya 

did not know what to do with it. So it just all sat in a box someplace. So terrorist capability to take all of that and integrate it and 

produce a weapon is a pretty good stretch. But they did not sell 

fissile material, which again goes to the point of that. 

So as problems go, this one is relatively manageable. It is not to 

say do not lose sleep over it, you know, but it is relatively—and 

there is detection. A lot of money has been thrown at detection. It 

was a good business to be in to make detectors. So, you know, a 

lot of effort has gone into it. 

Senator KING. Dr. Tellis, your thoughts? Are you as sanguine as 

your colleague? 

Dr. TELLIS. Well, I think we have been lucky so far that the kind 

of proliferation that occurred in Pakistan did not occur in terms of 

sales to a terrorist group. It occurred to states, and thankfully, as 

George pointed out, the states essentially did not do very much 

with it. 

But to my mind, as one looks at the nuclear future, this is a risk 

to which we do not have good answers. Because you could imagine 

a North Korea-like entity down the line actually taking the fatal 

step of making certain that some of its nuclear capabilities go to 

pretty bad people. These are non-state actors, could move to nonstate actors. 

Senator KING. For whom deterrence is not a concern. 

56 

Dr. TELLIS. For whom deterrence—and to deter non-state actors 

who do not have a sort of certifiable address and who can do things 

under the cover of darkness is really, you know, that is a hard case 

to deter. 

So what is the strategy? I think the strategy first has to be prevention as best one can. Second, you have to invest a lot in strategic intelligence. Because when people sell things, hopefully, they 

use telephones, they use computers, they use the Internet. These 

are things that, in principle, can be intercepted. So you need strategic intelligence. 

Third, you need to have a government that is agile enough to, 

either unilaterally or in collaboration with the international community, to come up with political strategies of interdiction. Sometimes those political strategies may require military components. 

So we have to work at all levels. This is not a problem susceptible to a single-point solution. 

Senator KING. Yes. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Kroenig, just one of the things that we 

have talked about—I do not believe it is fair to say we are acting 

on—is the possibility of configuring our nuclear arsenal with more 

specialized weapons that might be usable in a circumstance that 

would be more targeted and less devastating or have other capabilities. 

Have you given any thought to the wisdom of the United States 

proceeding in that fashion? 

Dr. KROENIG. Well, this is an area where I am doing some research now, and I think I share your concerns that it does seem 

like the United States has a gap in its capabilities at present—a 

very strong conventional force, a very strong strategic nuclear 

force, assuming we modernize it—but I think a gap in terms of usable nuclear capabilities. 

So the scenario I laid out in my testimony was a conflict between 

the United States and Russia. Russia is planning and exercising to 

use nuclear weapons on the battlefield. If that were to happen, if 

there were—— 

Senator SESSIONS. So they are planning and exercising in their 

war games the utilization of nuclear weapons? 

Dr. KROENIG. That is right. Nearly—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Which is beyond what we do? 

Dr. KROENIG. President Putin himself sometimes directly participates in these things. 

So, if this were to happen, I am afraid that the United States 

does not really have a good response. We could try to fight through 

it with conventional capabilities. We could escalate to strategic nuclear warheads, but those are very large warheads. It risks the escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange. 

It calls to mind something Dr. Henry Kissinger said in the 1950s, 

that we could be faced with this choice between suicide or surrender. His argument then was that we needed limited options in 

between. I think we are in a similar situation now, where we need 

to think about what are the limited nuclear options we might be 

able to deploy in response to a limited Russian nuclear attack. Of 

course, with the point of deterring that attack in the first place. 

57 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Krepinevich, do you want to comment on 

that? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Yes, to add to what Dr. Kroenig said, and in 

a sense to draw on what George Perkovich said, if you look at the 

what some people are calling the second nuclear age or the second 

nuclear era, it is the ability to assess the balance, if you will, is 

much more difficult because, as George said, of the introduction of 

advanced precision weapons, advanced defenses, cyber, and so on. 

Also because you are looking at a different range of contingencies. You know, a lot of times during the Cold War, we would 

look at Armageddon. You know, a massive Soviet attack on the 

United States, and if you could not deter it, it would be the end 

of the world. We are looking at a wide range of contingencies. We 

are also, I think, looking at a different—needing to, in a sense, to 

reconstruct the escalation ladder, and I think that is what a number of these questions are getting at. 

If somebody is competing with us at a particular level in the conflict in the Ukraine, as Dr. Kroenig said, could we escalate horizontally? Do we have an advantage in doing so? Can we escalate 

vertically or horizontally to a different geographic area? 

Absent knowing that, absent knowing whether you have the ability to escalate and not jump—not need to jump a number of rungs 

to—I think Dr. Kroenig’s point is to using large-yield, large-scale 

nuclear weapons, you may preclude yourself from having important 

options. 

I think, personally speaking, the fact that we have not matched 

what some of our competitors are doing in terms of exploring the 

options for relatively low-yield weapons or weapons with focused effects limits our options, limits the President’s options. I am not 

talking about more nuclear weapons. I am talking about a greater 

range of nuclear options, if you will. 

One thing I would just add, apropos of what was said earlier in 

terms of, I guess, what Dr. Tellis said, is I think absolutely what 

he is talking about, and George as well, about having a strong conventional capability so you have options there. I had conversations 

with Prime Minister Abe’s—one of his senior advisers. He got very 

emotional and said, ‘‘If we were ever hit with a nuclear attack by 

North Korea, do not tell me you are going to use precision weapons 

against the North.’’ He said, ‘‘You better use nuclear weapons.’’ 

Okay, if that is the case and if he really means it, I would rather 

have the President have the option of using weapons that—perhaps 

if they are nuclear but have, you know, very focused, very limited 

effects, you know, that were necessary to do the job. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Tellis, I see you nodding on that. You got 

a brief— 

Dr. TELLIS. Well, imagine a world where you have an ideal U.S. 

nuclear deterrent. To my mind that ideal world would be one 

where every U.S. nuclear weapon essentially has a selectable yield, 

and that selectable yield can essentially be— 

Senator SESSIONS. A selected yield? 

Dr. TELLIS. A selectable yield, where you can actually dial the 

yield. Where that selectable yield can be organized or orchestrated 

essentially electronically without someone having to actually go to 

the weapon and jimmy it up. 

58 

I think if you could do that, you give the President, even within 

the constraints of the current delivery architecture, a whole range 

of options. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, this is kind of important to us, I think, 

because we are in a stratified, a calcified process here. 

So what you are suggesting is it might be better that if we cannot do as you said, altering it in that fashion but actually could create a multiplicity of weapons with different capabilities that would 

give the President more option, you think we would do well to consider that in our budgetary and defense posture? 

Could all of you all give a quick—I see that Dr. Perkovich—— 

Dr. TELLIS. Yes. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. There are going to be big consequences that, of 

course, you would want to weigh beyond the budget. I mean, because Matt was talking about lack of capability in Europe, but we 

are spending—you tell me—I think it is $8 billion to $10 billion to 

modernize the B61. So if that is irrelevant, why are we going to 

spend $8 billion to $10 billion to modernize the—so you could save 

money from that and put it into something else. 

But to do that kind of development and procurement, beyond the 

budgetary issues, will have reverberations within NATO. You want 

to reassure the alliance. You will split NATO in many ways. So 

most of the Western European states will—in likelihood would protest that. Their parliaments would be mobilized. The Germans 

would be mobilized. So you would have a political— 

Senator SESSIONS. Their theory is it would be more likely to be 

used, and so you should not have that option? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. Exactly. Exactly. So you get a political fissure 

within NATO. I am not saying not to do it. I am saying you would 

want to calculate that. 

For every Japanese official who is worried—and I have talked 

with them, too—like Andrew posits about a threat, you have also 

got a big constituency in Japan that is anti-nuclear, pro-disarmament, and so on. So you would have to deal with the implication 

of that. 

You would have to deal with how the Chinese would react. How 

this is a new capability, so they are going to have to counter it. So 

how do they counter it? How does their counter affect what India 

does? How does that play back into Pakistan? So all of that kind 

of assessment would have to go into a decision to change course. 

Now, you may still want to do it, but it is not risk free is what 

I would say. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I thank you. I have heard a little bit of 

that. 

Senator Donnelly? 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kroenig, I want to be careful here because I do not want to 

go into classified areas. But we have low-yield weapons as well, 

don’t we? 

Dr. KROENIG. We do, yes. We have the B61 gravity bombs in Europe, as George pointed out. My concern there is that if Russia 

used a single nuclear weapon, there are some problems with using 

the B61 to retaliate. 

Senator DONNELLY. There are other missiles, too, though, right? 

59 

Dr. KROENIG. There are some air-launched cruise missiles that 

are based in the United States. But given that they are based in 

the United States, I think that causes some limits in terms of their 

ability to function as a deterrent and an assurant in Europe. 

I should point out that in my testimony, I do not recommend any 

specific changes, but I think that we should consider these changes. 

You know, we are essentially in a third phase in our relations with 

Russia. 

Senator DONNELLY. Well, at what point when you look at Putin, 

what he is doing, is he trying to change the discussion? 

They have lost a lot of their territory. They want to be viewed 

in a different way. When you look at him—and you know, a lot of 

people could make a lot of money trying to figure this guy out. But 

when you look at him, do you think he reasonably thinks that he 

can use manageable nuclear weapons and not wind up in a total 

conflagration of his country? 

Mr. KOENIG. Based on the way they plan and exercise, I think 

there is a belief that they could get away with a tailored use of nuclear weapons in the event of a major confrontation with NATO. 

So, again, it is not a likely scenario, but nuclear deterrence is 

really about, you know, dealing with these unlikely, but dangerous 

situations. 

Senator DONNELLY. My expectation is that if Mr. Putin thought 

that, he would be quickly corrected, and that it would cause one 

of the most dangerous situations ever seen in this world, and I 

would think that reasonable Russian leadership would remove him 

if he tried to move forward with that kind of thing. 

Mr. KOENIG. We could hope for that. I think it would be better 

to have the capabilities in place to deter that kind of response in 

the first place rather than have them tempted to go down that 

route and get into a larger confrontation. 

Senator DONNELLY. So you mentioned suicide. Do you think we 

are in a suicide or surrender situation in this country? 

Dr. KROENIG. I think if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons, we 

do not have a very good response, and so— 

Senator DONNELLY. With all of the materials we have, with the 

nuclear submarines we have, with the triad that we have, you really believe that? 

Dr. KROENIG. Well, as I pointed out, I think the problem with the 

triad is these are large-yield weapons, and so I think that would 

not have the maybe kind of tailored effect that we might want. In 

addition, it raises the possibility that Russia would then retaliate 

with its own strategic weapons. 

So, again, I think having—I think we have this gap in our capabilities, and closing that gap would provide a better deterrent. 

Dr. PERKOVICH. Can you use cyber? I mean, why does it have to 

be nuclear? We have all sorts of other capabilities. 

What is it that you want to take down, and there are all sorts 

of ways that you could take it down that do not even necessarily 

have to be a nuclear weapon. 

So is there something that from a deterrent point of view—and 

there may be—requires it to be a mushroom cloud, or is it to actually incapacitate targets? 

60 

Dr. KROENIG. Well, I think these are exactly the kind of questions and discussions we should be having, and I have an ongoing 

study on this, looking at what the best responses might be. 

But, you know, our current capabilities were put in place at the 

end of the Cold War. All of our assumptions about the strategic environment at the end of the Cold War were that nuclear weapons— 

the threat of nuclear use between major powers was low. The 

threat of conflict with Russia was remote, I think was the language 

we often used. Most people agreed that the strategic environment 

has fundamentally changed in the past year. 

So I think we need to think seriously about what that means for 

our capabilities. It is possible that we will say that everything we 

had been doing is exactly right and we should continue to do it, 

even though the strategic environment has fundamentally shifted. 

My hunch is that, given that the strategic environment has fundamentally shifted, we will have to change the way we do business. 

Senator DONNELLY. Let me ask you about follow-up on Senator 

King’s question about providing defensive weapons to Ukraine. 

What do you think the effect—and this would be for all of you— 

what do you think the, you know—I would like to get your ideas. 

What do you think Russia’s response to that would be? 

Dr. KROENIG. Would you like me to begin? 

Senator DONNELLY. Sure. 

Dr. KROENIG. Well, I do think that we should provide defensive 

weapons to the Ukrainians. I think we should give them the ability 

to defend themselves. It is difficult to know what Russia’s response 

would be exactly, but the purpose would be to raise the cost to Russia. 

I think the worst thing for NATO would be if all of Ukraine fell 

to Russia. I do not think that is likely in the short term. But if all 

of Ukraine were to fall to Russia, you can just look at the geography. The rest of NATO would be very much in danger. 

So I think doing little things to raise the cost to Russia are in 

the United States’ interests. 

Senator DONNELLY. I am out of time, but if we could? 

Dr. Perkovich? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. In principle, nothing would make me feel better 

than to colossally humiliate and emasculate President Putin. So, 

like, I think about ways to do it all the time. 

My worry is it would have the reverse effect, and this goes to 

something Senator King said. Given the geography, given the way 

that he can operate free of a lot of the political, legal, and other 

constraints that we have, if one does something that provokes him 

to feel like he is going to feel even taller as he responds to providing defensive arms to Ukraine—so he comes back harder and 

says, ‘‘We’ve never been in Ukraine, but now that NATO has come 

into Ukraine, we can actually put Russian forces into Ukraine,’’ 

then you have lost that round. It is chess. 

So then you come back—at some point, we have to confront the 

possibility of needing to put air power in as a way to deal with it. 

But then you run into air defenses and losing pilots. 

So unless you have got it figured out, how you do all the escalation so that you kick his—at every step of the way, then why 

gratify him by going another move that allows him to humiliate the 

61 

West further, seems to me very counterproductive to an objective, 

which I would totally, totally share, which would be to humiliate 

him. 

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, let us finish up. 

Dr. Tellis, do you want to have a brief comment on that? 

Dr. TELLIS. I share Mr. Perkovich’s view, which is if there was 

a cheap and easy way to put Mr. Putin back in a box, I am all for 

it. 

The problem we have is this. Whatever assistance we contemplate giving the Ukrainians, do we really believe that that assistance by itself will raise the costs to Russia sufficiently to cause 

Mr. Putin to cease and desist? If we believe that to be the case, 

there is a compelling argument for providing the aid. 

If we believe, on the other hand, that this is only going to be a 

provocation that will cause Putin to double down on what he is already doing, then you do not do this unless you are prepared to 

take the fatal next step, which is to introduce NATO or other Western forces to protect the Ukrainians, because they are going to be 

at the business end of a very severe Russian counter response. 

So my view is we should aid them, but if we aid them, we should 

do it with full malice aforethought. We need to know what we are 

getting into, and we need to be prepared to pay the price of what 

will be required to actually stop them. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Dr. Krepinevich, I think you also wanted to comment on a previous point. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think a key issue with respect to Ukraine is 

just—and I think Ashley was kind of alluding to this—how serious 

are the Ukrainians? 

If they are serious as a heart attack, we have seen recently what 

even modest amounts of decent military equipment can do to an invading force attempting to occupy another country, whether Iraq or 

Afghanistan or the Israelis moving into Lebanon in 2006 in the 

Second Lebanon War. So if they are serious, we have the kinds of 

equipment that can be very useful for resistance forces, that can 

buy us a lot of time to get our house in better order and among 

our Eastern European NATO allies, that can impose dramatically 

disproportionate costs on the Russians. 

So, again, it depends in my mind on just how serious the Ukrainians are. But we can equip them. We do not have to—you know, 

we can train them outside of Ukraine. There are a number of 

things we can do and, quite frankly, we have done it before with 

some success. But I do think, as Ashley said, it requires some serious thinking up front. 

As far as the issue of whether new or different kinds of nuclear 

weapons would help us in the competition with the Russians, I 

guess my feeling is, bottom line, do you want to buy yourself some 

more options or don’t you? You know, can you make the case—as 

George was pointing out, you create a bit of dilemma. Can you 

make the case to your allies that by buying more options, that increases the odds we will not have to use these weapons? Or that 

we will be put in a position, as Matt was saying, of either go places 

you do not want to go or surrender, to paraphrase Henry Kissinger. 

62 

The other point I would make is there have been a lot of advances in both the social and the cognitive sciences over the last 

20–25 years. Two individuals, Kahneman and another, won a 

Nobel Prize in 2002 for pointing out the fact that there is no such 

thing as ‘‘rational economic man,’’ that human beings are in many 

ways irrational. 

There has also been done—accomplished recently in the social 

sciences—some work looking across cultures at how people from 

different cultures calculate cost, benefit, and risk. Obviously, each 

person within a culture is an individual, but by and large how different cultures tend to view things. In some respects, they can be 

very different from the way we view things. 

So the notion that somehow strategies of deterrence and signaling and so on are going to prove effective over time, certainly 

Chamberlain thought he was signaling Hitler, I am sure, and 

thought he had the measure of him. Franklin Roosevelt thought he 

understood Stalin. We still do not understand why Saddam did the 

things he did. We think some of them are wholly irrational, I would 

think. 

So to sit here and say that somehow Putin thinks like us, and 

of course, he would never do these things. History is replete with 

despots and dictators doing things we never thought they would do, 

and yes, Khrushchev was removed by his Soviet colleagues in 1964. 

Unfortunately, 2 years earlier, he precipitated the Cuban Missile 

Crisis that almost blew the world up. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, thank you. 

Now, I will go to you next. You can have my time next. 

I would just think that that is wise advice. We had a hundred 

years ago a shooting of an archduke, and we ended up with the 

most incredible war that anybody had ever imagined at the time. 

On the arming in Ukraine, it is interesting. Brzezinski, Albright, 

Flournoy have all testified in recent weeks before our committee 

that we should—Democrats. Secretary Kissinger is cautious. The 

Germans, Dr. Perkovich, share your view entirely because I was at 

their embassy not long ago, and they were asked and the ambassador explained their position. So it is a complex world we are in. 

Senator King, do you want to— 

Senator KING. Well, Dr. Krepinevich, I would like to follow up on 

your comment. 

I think often the fault of American foreign policy is thinking that 

other people think like us and not understanding what cultural 

and historic differences, and that is why I am so cautious about 

Putin. There is, I don’t know, 500, 600 years of Russian paranoia 

going back to Peter the Great about the West. Putin’s approval rating in Russia today is 80 percent. 

I would venture to say if we came into the Ukraine in a visible 

way, it would go to 90 percent because it is a nationalistic thing 

that is just part of our history. I share the chairman’s concern 

about mistakes and accidents. 

We heard in our caucus lunch yesterday about Pleiku, a little 

town in Vietnam, where there was an attack in 1965. Six Americans were killed. As a result of that attack, President Johnson believed that this was directed from North Vietnam, and it justified 

63 

the bombing campaign and then the introduction of American 

troops. 

It turned out 40 years later, it was a randomly generated local 

conflict. The whole premise of the escalation was incorrect. That is 

what really concerns me about the Ukraine, particularly when you 

are dealing with a place where they have the upper hand in terms 

of the assets available and readiness—readily available. 

I think I want to, though, just come to some consensus. Is it fair 

to say that all of you agree that we must modernize our nuclear 

capacity, and second, we must look to greater flexibility in terms 

of the nuclear deterrent? Is that a fair summary? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. Modernization, yes. Flexibility, would depend 

profoundly on how—and these other effects that I am talking 

about, because—but modernization, yes. 

Senator KING. Dr. Kroenig, that is certainly your position, is it 

not? 

Dr. KROENIG. Yes. Modernization and flexibility. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Yes. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Well, just to proceed a little further, Dr. Kroenig and Dr. Tellis. 

Dr. Tellis hypothesized—raises the hypothetical that there is an 

attack on Japan, and we are obligated to respond forcefully on 

North Korea. If we have a less devastating, more technical weapon, 

we can honor our requirements, maybe do the necessary job without doing as much destruction as a strategic nuclear weapon might 

do. 

Dr. Kroenig came up with another one I had not thought about, 

which is what if the Russians use a tactical nuclear weapon in the 

Ukraine, and do we have a tactical nuclear weapon response, short 

of a massive strategic response? 

I had not thought of either one of those examples before, but I 

think it is something for us to think about. 

As I understand where we are today, the administration favors 

modernization, but it takes Dr. Perkovich’s view that specialization 

or new weapons, even if they are less dangerous and safer and all 

that, represent some sort of alteration of our strategy that would 

cause dominoes around the world to be moved. But I am not sure 

I agree with that, but that is where we are. 

So the budget that has come over, and we have not energized 

any plan to challenge the President or push him harder, but maybe 

we should in the months to come and really insist that we discuss 

this, and is it smarter to have more options or not have more options? So that is— 

Dr. Tellis? 

Dr. TELLIS. I would just like to respond to that because I accept 

the basic argument that Senator Donnelly is making, that the U.S. 

arsenal certainly has weapons of varying yield, including low 

yields. 

What I do not have an answer to, at unclassified levels certainly 

that I can think of, is whether these weapons meet the tests of responsiveness and penetrability. I think that is really what you need 

64 

to think about in a different forum. If you conclude that the lowyield weapons or the weapons that have selectable yields meet the 

requirements of responsiveness and penetrability, then I think we 

are home free, and we do not have to worry about this. 

But in general, I think the point that Dr. Krepinevich made is 

really the central point, which is, do you want to be in a position 

where you have more options rather than less, particularly as you 

enter a nuclear world where most of the emerging nuclear powers 

are going to have weapons that are relatively small in yield and, 

you know, in small numbers? 

So as you think of this new world that is emerging out there, the 

questions that Dr. Kroenig is asking is whether the legacy force 

can actually deal with these contingencies without modification. 

Now I do not know whether this requires us to actually go back 

and develop new warheads or whether we can simply tinker with 

what we have in the back rooms. But these are questions that I 

think need to be addressed in classified settings with folks in 

STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]. 

Senator DONNELLY. Yes, there are a lot of classified settings to 

address these in. I guess, you know, we talk about people, in effect, 

almost riding by each other without understanding that they just 

stopped on the same street. 

I would think, and maybe it is for publication, if President Putin 

would ever think that he could use a low-yield nuclear weapon on 

another country without catastrophic events then beginning from 

that, I think he would be sadly mistaken, that every other leader 

in our network of friends would take action. 

I think—I would hope, you know, as you talk about this, it is a 

different culture. It is a different way of thinking. It is in many 

ways sometimes ships passing in the night, but one ship needs to 

tell the other ship, ‘‘If you do this, all bets are off.’’ 

Dr. Perkovich? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. Just to reinforce—and I agree with Ashley, you 

would want to do these studies. You would also want to ask all the 

different commands, like, given $10 billion for this or for that, how 

would you spend the money? 

But beyond that, in my travels—and I have been to all the countries that we are talking about—Iran, not North Korea, but all of 

the targets. I do not think their leaders are going to discriminate 

between whether it was 100 kilotons or 12 kilotons, and so on. I 

do not think if a device goes off, you know, over at the Pentagon 

and we are sitting here, somebody is going to say, ‘‘Don’t worry, it 

was only 30 kilotons, you know, it wasn’t a big one.’’ 

So I think it is a game theoretic calculation in a lot of ways, and 

that this is something the Chinese and others understood all along. 

They have got their 250 weapons, we have got our 2,200—that you 

do not need to have—that they are political weapons, and the distinctions about yields and all of that are something that people like 

us get paid to think about, but political decision-makers in an actual event when they are going off probably are not going to be 

making those distinctions in the way that they then react. So I 

would factor that into the discussion, too. 

65 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, Dr. Krepinevich, what about the triad? 

Some think we could get by without the full triad. Maybe the nuclear subs and/or something in addition. 

Do you four have an opinion as to that? It is not as expensive 

as you—as some people imagine, but it is an expensive proposition. 

What are your thoughts about the triad? 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. My thought is that until we identify a range 

of contingencies, realistic contingencies that reflect the circumstances that myself and my colleagues have been describing 

here, and test the arsenal against those contingencies or scenarios, 

I would be loathe to abandon any of the legs of the triad. 

I think the bomber leg gives us an enormous amount of flexibility. The submarine leg certainly, perhaps, allows us to sleep 

most securely at night. The land-based missile force, to a certain 

extent, acts as kind of a missile sump because if you look historically at the studies of nuclear attack and so on, that it gives us the 

ability to absorb a lot of an adversary’s nuclear capability if they 

want to undertake a first strike against us. 

So, again, I think we are putting the cart before the horse if we 

are talking about abandoning a particular leg of the triad without 

looking at the new circumstances in which we find ourselves, and 

how we would deal with those circumstances across a range of 

plausible contingencies. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, and I will go to you, but do any 

of the other three want to share briefly? 

Senator DONNELLY. I apologize. I have to go to another meeting 

right now. 

But I want to thank all of you. We are in your debt for your service, for your efforts to inform us in the best possible decisions we 

can make. I want to thank you so much for taking the time to be 

here. 

Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Kroenig? 

Dr. KROENIG. Yes, on the triad, I would agree that each leg of 

the triad has special attributes and characteristics and that our nuclear force would be weaker if we got rid of any of the legs. I do 

think we need all three. 

You mentioned the cost issue as well, and I think according to 

most estimates, we spend something like 4 percent of the defense 

budget on the strategic forces. Given, as Dr. Tellis said, that it is 

really the backstop of the rest of our defensive capabilities, I think 

that is well worth it. 

Even Secretary of Defense Carter has been on the record to say 

that I think the quote is, ‘‘Nuclear weapons don’t actually cost that 

much.’’ So I think these arguments that they are too expensive 

miss the mark. 

Senator SESSIONS. He shared that with me recently, and I share 

that view. 

Are there any of you like to comment on that? 

Dr. PERKOVICH. My only thing would be, I agree with you, one 

would study it. It would be progress if we could make it, and you 

could help make it, not a holy trinity. In other words, that it is— 

the triad is something that should be scrutinized, analyzed, and 

you come up with strong justification, you keep doing it. But for a 

66 

long time it has been something you could not question, and I 

think that would be progress to say we ought to analyze it and not 

prejudge one way or the other. That would be progress. 

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I just would like to say, Mr. Chairman, my colleague Todd Harrison and Evan Montgomery are working on a cost 

estimate of the nuclear enterprise, and we are looking to release 

that estimate in April. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that was going to be my final question 

to ask all of you, knowing what you know about the budget, the 

President’s budget is public, to give us any thoughts about what 

the priorities should be and if it is sufficient. 

Dr. Tellis, do you want to—— 

Dr. TELLIS. Senator, I cannot speak to the issues of cost. So I will 

defer to Dr. Krepinevich on that. 

But I wanted to just make the point that when one looks at the 

nuclear trend lines 10–20 years out, there is nothing that compels 

me to conclude that you can move away from the triad anytime 

soon. So I hope that is something that we will continue to invest 

in. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

I am, frankly, of the view that there is uncertainty about the 

United States’ will around the world. I do not think it is correct, 

but there is a growing uncertainty out there. I think that any significant reduction in our nuclear capabilities could be misread at 

this point in history in a way it might not be misread previously, 

like Nixon going to China kind of insight. 

I also have been—Dr. Krepinevich, I have been watching the defense budget, trying to be hard on them, but likewise, I am a little 

bit of the view that things are getting dicey around the world. People think we are on a pell-mell collapse of will, and even the defense budget, if it is cut—if it is perceived as being reduced too significantly could be improperly perceived as weakness. 

Because I think we can maintain a lean-type budget. With this 

fabulous military, this battle-hardened, fully equipped military that 

we have, and highly trained, I do not think we are heading pellmell to weakness. But I am worried we got people in the United 

States that think so, and we got people around the world that 

share that concern. 

Thank you for this fascinating and fabulous comments you 

shared with us. Again, if you have any thoughts that you would 

like to share, I would appreciate receiving them. 

I would also say that we have a good subcommittee and a good 

committee that I do think wants to do the right thing, and politics 

has not been a big factor in recent years on nuclear issues, and I 

hope we can keep it that way. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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