No. 01 -14-00 772

- CR In the Court of Appeals For the First Judicial District of Texas

At Houston  No. 1384675 In the 209th District Court of Harris County, Texas
 

### T HANH 

### K

IM 

### H OANG Appellant
v. 

### T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS Appellee
 STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF
 D EVON A NDERSON District Attorney Harris County, Texas C ARLY D ESSAUER Assistant District Attorney N ATHAN M OSS Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 770 02 Tel.: 713/755-5826 Fax No.: 713/755-5809 ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED ACCEPTED 01-14-00722-CR FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS 6/25/2015 12:22:22 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERKii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(g) and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 9.1 , the State does not requests oral argument as the issue involved in this appeal can adequately be determined from the record and established
law but wishes preserve its right to present oral argument if th is Court desires to submit this case through oral argument

.

IDENTIFICATION OF TH E PARTIES Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2( a)(1)(A) , a complete list of
the names of all int erested parties is provided below.
Counsel for the State: Devon Anderson

 District Attorney of Harris County Carly Dessauer

 Assistant District Attorney on appeal Nathan L. Moss

 Assistant District Attorney at trial David Bernard

 Assistant Dist rict Attorney at trial 1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600, Houston, Texas 77002 Appellant or criminal defendant: Thanh Kim Hoang Counsel for Appellant: Charles Hinton

 Attorney on appeal P.O. Box 53719, Houston, Texas 77052 Kurt B. Wentz

 Attorney at trial 5629 FM 1960, Suite 115, Houston, Texas 77069 Trial Judge: Hon. Wayne Malliaiii TABLE OF CONTENTS STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

................................ .................... ii IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

................................ ................................ ......... ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

................................ ................................ ............................. iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE

................................ ................................ .......................... 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS

................................ ................................ ................................ .. 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

................................ ................................ ................. 3 REPLY TO APPELLANT’S POINT OF ERROR

................................ ......................... 3 I. The jury charge did not erroneously instruct the jury on the intent appellant needed to be a party to capital murder.

................................ ................................ .......... 3

a. The jury charge correctly required that the jury only convict appellant as a party to capital murder if it found that he had the intent to promote or assist B ui in killing Tu.

................................ ................................ ................................ 6 b. Assuming for the sake of argument that the jury charge was erroneous, appellant was not egregiously harmed by the instruction.

................................ ... 10 CONCLUSION

................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 13 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

................................ ................................ .............. 14 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

................................ ................................ ......................... 15 APPENDIX

................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 16iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Almanza v. State , 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)

................................ ................................ ... 4, 10 Holford v. State , 177 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d)

...................... 9, 10 Nelms v. State , No. 01

- 13

- 00689

- CR, 2014 WL 3738065 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

................................ ................................ . 7, 8 Ngo v. State , 175 S.W.3d 7 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

................................ ................................ ......... 4 Vasquez v. State , 389 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

................................ ...................... 4, 5, 7, 8, 12
STATUTES T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN . art. 36.14 (West 2007)

................................ ...................... 5 T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §7.01(a) (West 2011)

................................ ................................ .. 5 T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §7.02(a)(2) (West 2011)

................................ .............................. 5 T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2014)

................................ ................. 5 T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §29.02(a) (West 2011)

................................ ................................ 5
RULES T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 9.4(g)

................................ ................................ ................................ ............. ii T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 9.4(i).

................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 14 T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.2( a)(1)(A)

................................ ................................ ................................ . ii T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 39.1

................................ ................................ ................................ ................ ii1

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

STATEMENT OF THE CAS E Appellant was charged with capital murder ( CR at 11 ). Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and request a jury trial to determine guilt ( CR at 96; 3 RR at 16 ).
T he jury found appellant guilty , and since the State did not seek the death penalty, the court assessed punishment at confinement for life without parole ( CR at 112, 114; 5 RR at 37, 40 ). The court certified appellant’s right to appeal, and appellant filed a timely notice of appeal ( CR at 117

- 18 ).

STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant and his co

- defendant, Vu Bui, went to Tuan Tu’s game room and café, Café Chieu Tim ( 3 RR at 24; 4 RR at 29 ). The two other patrons present, brothers Nghiep and Johnny Le, were playi ng pool when they arrived ( 3 RR at 123, 125; 4 RR at 13 , 14 ; State’s Ex. 43 ). Both brothers noticed the men as they were
strangers , and the brothers were used to seeing only regulars at the café ( 3 RR at 125;
4 RR at 15

- 16 ). Indeed, Johnny was uncomfortab le with them because , in addition to not knowing the men, they did not remove their jackets or sunglasses despite being inside and the weather being hot (3 RR at 126 ; State’s Ex. 43 ). Appellant and Bui sat down at a table and ordered iced coffee ( 3 RR at 126, 142; 4 RR at 16 ; State’s Ex. 43 ). 1 After about thirty minutes of sitting, smoking, and occasionally talking with Tu,

1 Appellant’s DNA could not be excluded from DNA found at the scene on a pair of glasses, a glass, and a cigarette butt ( 3 RR at 39, 50; 4 RR at 66, 70 ; State’s 29, 58, 59 ).2

appellant and Bui walked up to the three men, and Bui pulled out a gun ( 3 RR at 127 , 148 ; 4 RR at 17, 18 ; State’s Ex. 43 ). Bui tapp ed the gun on Johnny’s shoulder as he was facing the pool table and was unaware of the unfolding robbery ( 3 RR at 129

- 30, 143 ). Appellant was at his side, ready to assist Bui in controlling the men ( 3 RR at 131 ). Bui instructed them to
kneel , and appella nt then told Johnny “to lay down” ( 3 RR at 130 , 131, 149 ; 4 RR at 17, 18 ). However, Tu, who had a concealed handgun, drew his weapon to defend himself and his business from appellant and Bui ( 3 RR at 69, 135 ). Tu and Bui

e xchanged gun fire ( 3 RR at 135, 136; State’s Ex. 43 ). B ui shot at Tu until his gun was empty, hitting Tu twice in the chest and killing him ( 4 RR at 52; State’s Ex. 43 ). Both Bui and appellant fled the scene ( 3 RR at 138 ). Appellant was later
app rehended by police, but at the time of trial, Bui had not yet been apprehended ( 3 RR at 79, 85 ). The evidence presented at trial established that Bui, not appellant, had fired the fatal shots that hit Tu during their robbery, so the trial court instructed the jury that it could find appellant guilty of capital murder as a principle, party , or co

- conspirator to the offense ( CR at 97

- 103 ). APPENDIX . The court also instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of felony m urder and aggravated robbery (CR at 103

- 106)

. Appellant did not object to the charge at trial ( 4 RR at 101 ).3 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUM ENT The trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on appellant’s requisite
mental state to be guilty as a party to capital murder as the charge required the jury to find that appellant had the intent to promote or assist Bui with the robbery in addition
to the intent to solicit, encourage, direct, aid, or attempt to aid Bui in shooting and killing Tu . Appellant’s argu ment focuses on one portion of the jury charge and ignores that the charge as a whole correctly stated the law regarding party intent. Analyzed as a whole, the court did not err in its charge, and appellant’s sole point of
error should be overruled.

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S POINT OF ERROR I. The jury charge did not erroneously instruct the jury o n the intent appellant needed to be a party to capital murder
. In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the law of parties when it instructed that before the jury could find appellant guilty of capital murder as a party, it “must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] with intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense of robbery, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted
to aid Vu B ui in shooting Tuan Tu, if he did, with the intention of thereby killing Tuan Tu” (CR at 10 1). Appellant alleges that the instruction allowed the jury to find him guilty as a party if it only found that he had intent to promote or assist the
robber y without also having the intent to promote or assist Tu’s murder. Appellant’s4

argument focuses on the phrase that instructed the jury that it must find that appellant had the “intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense of robbery” to

su pport his claim (CR at 101). However, as the language of the whole charge shows, the court did not misinform the jury on appellant’s requisite intent as a party to capital
murder . The instruction , as a whole, correctly required that the jury had to find that appellant had the intent to assist or promote Bui both in the robbery and in killing Tu. As such, the court ’ s instruction was not erroneous

. Standard of Review A reviewing court’s first duty in analyzing a jury

- charge issue is to decide
whether error exists. Ngo v. Sta te , 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (T ex. Crim. App. 2005)

. When examining the charge for possible error, reviewing courts “examine the charge as a
whole instead of a series of isolated and unrelated statements.” Va squez v. State , 389
S.W.3d 3 61, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Dinkins v. State , 894 S.W.2d 330, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Only if the court finds error, it must then conduct a harm analysis depending on whether the appellant objected to the error. Ngo , 175 S.W.3d at 743 . When a defendant does not object to the court’s charge, the reviewing court can only reverse if the defendant suffered egregious harm. Almanza v. State , 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)

.5 Applicable Law A trial court must instruct the jury on the “law applicable to the case” when charging the jury. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN . art. 36.14 (West 2007)

. “Because the charge is the instrument by which the jury convicts, [it] must contain an accurate
statement of the law and must set out all the essential elements of the offense.” Vasquez , 389 S.W.3d at 366 (quoting Dinkins , 894 S.W.2d at 339). A person commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2014) . A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, the person i ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes or threatens bodily injury to another. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. §29.02(a) (West 2011)

. “A person is crim inally responsible as a party t o an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §7.01(a) (West 2011)

. To be criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another, the
person must act with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense by soliciting, encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid the other person to
commit the offense. T EX
. P ENAL C O DE A NN . §7.02(a)(2) (West 2011)

.6 Analysis

a. The jury charge correctly required that the jury only convict appellant as a party to capital murder if it found that he had the intent to promote or assist Bui in killing Tu.
In its in struction, the trial court charg ed the jury that it could find appellant guilt y as a principle, as a party, and as a co

- conspirator to the offense of capital
murder (CR at 97

- 103). APPENDIX . Regarding the law of parties, the court first
defined criminal r esponsibility as a party for the jury: A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to a id the other person to commit the offense (CR at 100

- 01). The court then gave the jury an instruction involving the law of parties and appellant’s charged capital murder: Before you would be warranted in finding [appellant] guilty of capital murder, [ ... ] you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant], with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense of robbery, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Vu Bui in shooting Tuan Tu , if he did, with the intention of thereby killing Tuan Tu (CR at 101). Finally, the court gave the jury an application paragraph applying the law of parties to the facts of appellant’s charged capital murder: If you find from the evidence beyond a rea sonable doubt that on or about the 8th day of February, 2013, in Harris County, Texas, Vu Bui, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the robbery of Tuan Tu, intentionally cause the death of Tuan Tu by shoo ting Tuan Tu with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, and [appellant], with the intent to promote or assist the7

commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Vu Bui to commit the offense, if he did[...] then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment (CR at 102

- 03). As is evident from the charge as a whole, the trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury on the law of parties in a way that would have allowed the jury to convict appellant of capital murder if i t only found that he had the intent to promote
or assist the commission of the offense of robbery as appellant allege s on appeal

. See Vasquez , 389 S.W.3d at 366 (requiring reviewing courts to review the jury charge as a whole) . As the charge stated in the paragraph appellant claims to be erroneous, the jury could only find appellant guilty of capital murder if it found that appellant had
both the “ intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense of robbery” and

“ so licited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Vu Bui in shooting Tuan Tu, if he did, with the intention of thereby killing Tuan Tu (CR at 101) (emphasis added)

. The charge did not omit the requisite intent to kill as appellant claims. Indeed, the jury charge in appellant’s case is nearly identical to the charge recently analyzed by this Court in Nelms v. State

. Nelms v. State , No. 01

- 13

- 00689

- CR, 2014 WL 3738065, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) . Nelms, like appellant, was convicted of capital murder; however, the aggravating element of his o ffense was the offense of burglary of a habitation. Nelms , 2014 WL 3738065, at *2 . Nelms, like appellant, complained that the jury charge erroneously allowed the jury to find him guilty as a8

party to capital murder if it found that he had the intent to be a party to the aggravating off

ense when it instructed the jury that “you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [Nelms], with the intent to promote or assist in the offense of burglary of habitation .” Nelms , 2014 WL 3738065, at *3 (italics in original). Nelms, like appellant, argued that the cor rect instruction should have told the jury that
his inten t to promote o r assist should have been directed towards the offense of capital murder instead of his aggravating offense of burglary of a habitation. Nelms , 2014 WL 3738065, at *3 . However, appellant, like Nelms, failed to consi der the charge as a whole when making his argument. Nelms , 2014 WL 3738065, at *3 (noting that jury charge also instructed the jury that it must find that Nelms “ solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid [Jones] in shooting [Nelson], if he did, with the intention of th ereby killing [ Nelson ]”) (italics in original). For the same reason that this Court rejected Nelms’ argument, this Court should likewise reject appellant’s identical argument after analyzing the charge as a
whole. See Vasquez

, 389 S.W.3d at 366

. The court’s e ntire jury charge involving appellant’s guilt on theory of the law of parties correctly informed the jury that appellant needed t he intent to promote or assist Bui with the robbery as well as the intent to promote or assist Bui in killing Tu before it coul d find appellant guilty of capital murder as a party (CR at 101, 102

- 03). See Nelms , 2014 WL 3738065, at *3

. The sentence that appellant focuses on in his argument does mention that appellant intend to promote or assist the offense of robbery, but the court’s instruction goes o n9

to state that appellant also needed the intent to solicit, encourage, direct, aid, or attempt to aid Bui in shooting Tu to be criminally responsible as a party to capital
murder (CR at 101). Additionally, the application paragraph set out similar language
as the sentence appellant focuses on in his brief but does not designate the offen se of robbery to be the offense appellant had to intent to commit (CR at 102

- 03). Instead, the court instructed the jury that it could find appellant guilty only if it found beyond

a reaso nable doubt that appellant intended “to promote or assist the commission of the offense” (CR at 102

- 03).
In Holford v. State , this Court upheld the jury charge over Holford’s claim that
the charge allowed the jury to convict him as a part y to capital murder if he intended to aid only in the robbery when the application paragraph “cautioned the jury” that it
must also find intent to kill. Holford v. State , 177 S.W.3d 454, 460, 461 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that the jury charge read: “Before you would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of capital murder, ... you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen dant, David Charles Holford, with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense of robbery, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Harold Louis Vaughn in cutting or striking Trevor Cook, if he did, with the i ntention of thereby killing Trevor Cook ”) (italics in original).
In Holford

, this Court noted that, when “read logically,” “ the clause “solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Harold Louis Vaughn to commit the
offense” refers to the com plainant’s murder. Holford , 177 S.W.3d at 461 . The same10

logical reading applies to the party instruction in appellant’s charge in which the clause

“ solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Vu Bui in shooting Tuan Tu” refers to Tu’s murder (CR at 101).
B ecause the charge as a whole directed the jury that it needed to find that appellant had the intent to kill Tu before it could find hi m guilty as a party to capital murder, the court’s charge is not erroneous. Therefore, this Court should overrule appella nt’s argument.
b. Assuming for the sake of argument that the jury charge was erroneous, appellant was not egregiously harmed by the instruction
. Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court’s charge erroneously
i ns truct ed the jury regarding the require d intent appellant needed to be guilty of capital murder as a party, appellant’s conviction does not require reversal. Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171 (requiring that the defendant who does not object to the court’s charge at trial to suffer egregious harm to obtain a reversal). Had the trial court’s charge on party intent been erroneous, a ppellant, who did not object to the court’s charge at trial, was not egregiously harmed by the jury instruction ( 4 RR at 101).
Standard of Review
To determine whether a defendant h as sustained egregious harm from a jury instruction, the reviewing court consider s (1) the entire charge; (2) the state of the evidence, including contested issues; (3) arguments of counsel; and (4) any other
relevant information. Holford , 177 S.W.3d at 461

.11 Analysis The jury charge did not egregiously harm appellant because, not only did the charge correctly instruct the jury correctly on the law of parties, the court also instructed the jury that appellant could be guilt as the primary actor or as a conspirator to the offens e . While the evidence would not have supported appellant’s conviction as a primary, the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty as a party as well as a co

- conspirator , and the jury could have found him guilty under either theory. Eyewitness testimony, surveillance video, and DNA evidence put appellant at the scene of the offense ( 3 RR at 39, 50, 125

- 26; 4 RR at 13, 66, 70; State’s 29, 40; 43, 58, 59 ). The evidence showed that appellant and Bui entered the café together and
that t hey did not need to tell each other what they were doing when they initiated the robbery, inferring prior planning (3 RR at 123, 125, 127, 147

- 48; 4 RR at 18). The evidence established that appe llant acted in concert with Bui by following him, ready
to pr ovide assistance when Bui threated Tu and the Le brothers with his loaded gun , and appellant instruct ed the robbery victims to comply with their demands (3 RR at
129

- 31). Indeed, Johnny testified that when Bui placed his gun on his shoulder, appellant instructed him to lay down on the ground (3 RR at 149). Further, both Le Brothers testified that appellant was not surprised or afraid when Bui pulled out his gun (3 RR at 147, 149; 4 RR at 19, 20).12

The arguments of counsel also establish that appellant was not egregiously harmed by the trial court’s instruction as both the State and appellant’s statements to the jury agreed that the evidence only supported appellant’s guilt as a party or co

conspirator and both discussed the requisite intent appellant needed to be a party to capital murder (5 RR at 5, 8, 9, 14, 25). See Vasquez , 389 S.W.3d at 371

- 72 (discussing how both the prosecutor and Vasquez discussed party liability in their clos ing arguments when holding th e jury charge error harmless). Appellant’s argumen t pointed the jury to the lesser included offenses of felony murder and aggravated robbery because appellant claimed that the evidence did not support his intent to kill Tu (5 RR at 8, 9

- 10). B ecause the arguments of counsel reiterated to the jury that appellant needed to intend to kill Tu to be guilty as a party to cap ital murder, he was not egregiously harmed by the error, if any, in the jury charge.
I ndeed, t he record, through the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, and the arguments of counsel, supports that even if the trial court erred in its jury
instruction on the intent needed for the jury to find appellant guilty as a party to capital murder, appellant was not egregiously harmed by the error. However, this Court does not need to depend upon an analysis of harm to uphold appellant’s conviction as the trial court did not err in its charge . Therefore, this Court should overrule appellant’s sole point of error.13 CONCLUSION Based on the arguments stated above, t he State of Texas respectfully urges the Court to overrule appellant’s point of error and affirm h is conviction.
D EVON A

NDERSON District Attorney Harris County, Texas
/s/ 

# Carly Dessauer

________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________ ___ C ARLY D ESSAUER Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 755

- 5826 State Bar No. 24069083 dessauer_carly@dao.hctx.net curry_alan@dao.hctx.net14 CERTIFICATE OF COMPL IANCE The undersigned attorney certifies that this computer

- generated document has
a word count of 3, 2 3 8 words, based upon the representation provided by the word processing prog ram that was used to create the document. T EX
. R. A PP . P . 9.4(i).

/s/ 

# Carly Dessauer

_______________________________________________________________________ _________________ ____________________________________________________________________________________________ C ARLY D ESSAUER Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 755

- 5826 State Bar No. 2406908315 CERTIFICATE OF SERVI CE The State will serve a copy of the foregoing instrument to appellant’s attorney though TexFile:
Charles Hinton Attorney at Law P.O. Box 53719 Houston, Texas 77052

- 3719 chashinton@sbcglobal. net /s/ 

# Carly Dessauer

____________________

___________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ C ARLY D ESSAUER Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 755

- 5826 State Bar No. 24069083

Date: June 25, 201516 APPENDIXCertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page1of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page2of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page3of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page4of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page5of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page6of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page7of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page8of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page9of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page10of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page11of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page12of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page13of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page14of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page15of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page16of17CertifiedDocumentNumber:62067440-Page17of17In accordance with Texas Government Code 406.013 electronically transmitted authenticated documents are valid. If there is a question regarding the validity of this document and or seal please e-mail support@hcdistrictclerk.com HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS Chris Daniel, DISTRICT CLERK I, Chris Daniel, District Clerk of Harris County, Texas certify that this is a true and correct copy of the original record filed and or recorded in my office, electronically or hard copy, as it appears on this date. Witness my official hand and seal of office

62067440 Total Pages: 17 Certified Document Number: June 19, 2015 this