alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Supplementary
Agreement to


The
House Property Transfer Contract


Dated
January 15, 2007




Party A:
Tianjin Mengyang Biotechnology Co., Ltd.


Business
License No.: 120223000009884


Address:
Jinhai Road, Jinghai Economic Development Area,
Tianjin  301600


Tel:
022-27984733





Party B:
Tianjin Yayi Industrial Co., Ltd.


Business
License No.: 120193000003231


Address:
Unit C, 4th floor,
D1 Building, Xinmao Technology Park, Huayuan


Industrial
Park Area, Tianjin  300384


Tel:022-27984058




Since
party A and B had signed the Plant Transfer Contract on January 15, 2007, both
parties have negotiated and achieved the following agreement on the above
mentioned Plant Transfer Contract on the basis of the relevant laws and
regulations of the People’s Republic of China:




A. Time
Limit for Transferring the House Property


Since the
construction of four-stories office building was stopped during the Beijing
Olympic Games under the requirement of the local government of Tianjin, and
considering that the winter season is drawing near right after the end of the
Olympic Games, party A and B have negotiated and agreed that the time limit for
transferring the house property should be extended from September 30, 2008 to
May 31, 2009. The related time limit will be subject to this Supplementary
Agreement.








B. Responsibilities
for Breaching


Both
party A and B regard the forces which had led to the delay of the above
mentioned time limit as irresistible forces. Therefore, neither party would
request the other to undertake the responsibilities for breaching stated in the
House Property Transfer Contract.





C. Other
clauses remain the same as the above mentioned House Property Transfer
Contract.




The
agreement should be in duplicate, with each of party A and B holding one
original copy.




The
agreement is valid after both parties have stamped or signed on it。





Party
      A (stamp): _________________
              Party
      B (stamp): __________________Signature:
      _______________
              Signature:
      ______________Date:
      October 12, 2008
              Date:
      October 12, 2008
#### Thom Express and Storage Company, Appellee, v. Kemper Brothers Company, Appellant.

Gen. No. 15,086.

1. *Contracts—burden of proof to establish.*The burden is upon the plaintiff relying upon a contract as his basis of recovery to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the terms thereof.

2. *Evidence—what does not establish preponderance.*A preponderance is not established by the testimony of one witness directly contradicted by two at least equally credible witnesses, one of whom was called by the plaintiff itself.

Assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.

Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1908.

Reversed.

Opinion filed December 2, 1910.

*86Christian Meier and Paul C. Meier, for appellant.

Defrees, Buckingham, Ritter *&*Campbell, for appellee; Dorrance Dibell Snapp, of counsel.

Mr. Presiding Justice Mack

delivered the opinion of the court.

Defendant company agreed with one C. M. Thom to buy in property at a receiver’s sale under bankruptcy proceedings against Thom and to resell to a company to be formed by Thom. After the receiver’s sale and the subsequent incorporation of plaintiff company, defendant renewed the original offer to plaintiff company which claims that it accepted it by resolution of its directors communicated to defendant. There is however a conflict as to the terms. Thom testifies that plaintiff was not to pay attorney fees and that there were no other conditions. Kemper, whom plaintiff first called as its own witness, and defendant’s attorney who conducted the negotiations, directly contradict Thom’s testimony. There are no circumstances surrounding the transaction which would lend additional weight to either side. The burden was on the plaintiff to establish the terms of the contract and its compliance therewith. This it has failed to do. A preponderance is not established by the testimony of one witness, directly contradicted by two at least equally credible witnesses, one of whom was called by the plaintiff itself.

As there is no suggestion that plaintiff was ever ready and willing or offered to perform its obligations under the terms of the contract established by the preponderance of the evidence, as in fact it refused so to do when demand was made upon it by defendant, it cannot now hold defendant liable for a breach of contract because, subsequently to the demand and refusal, defendant disposed of the goods.

The judgment in favor of plaintiff must therefore be reversed.

*Reversed.*
SAMMY LEE GIBBS 

A/K/A SAMMY L. GIBBS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-5330

_____________________________/

Opinion filed May 16, 2017.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Calhoun County.

Shonna Young Gay, Judge.

Sammy Lee Gibbs a/k/a Sammy L. Gibbs, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Donna A. Gerace, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. This Court retains jurisdiction to address the imposition of 

sanctions.

WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.
§ 31.10 Request for repayment agreement. ( a ) The Secretary does not initiate an offset under this part if the employee agrees in writing to repay the debt under terms acceptable to the Secretary and makes the first payment due under the agreement on or before the latest of— ( 1 ) The seventh day after the date of the decision of the hearing official, if the employee timely requested a hearing under § 31.5 (a) and (d);
( 2 ) The sixty-fifth day after the date of the pre-offset notice under § 31.3 if the employee did not timely request either a hearing in accordance with § 31.5 (a) and (d) or an opportunity to inspect and copy documents related to the debt under § 31.4; or
( 3 ) The fifteenth day after the date on which the Secretary made available documents related to the debt, if the employee filed a timely request for documents under § 31.4.
( b ) In the agreement, the Secretary and the employee may agree to satisfaction of the debt from sources other than an offset under this part, or may modify the amount proposed to be offset in the pre-offset notice or estimated in the decision of the hearing official.
( c ) If the employee does not enter into a repayment agreement acceptable to the Secretary within the deadlines in this section, the Secretary may initiate an offset under this part. The Secretary continues to collect by offset until an employee enters in a satisfactory repayment agreement for the debt. The Secretary suspends an offset already commenced under circumstances described in § 31.5(a)(2).
(Authority: 5 U.S.C. 5514; 31 U.S.C. 3716)
Case 16-36099-KRH Doc 67 Filed 03/25/21 Entered 03/25/21 08:44:53 Desc MainDocument Page 1 of 1
(No. 75-CC-0234

#### Ellard Lee Douglas and Judith Grace Douglas, Claimants, *v.*Department of Conservation of the State of Illinois, , Respondent.

*Order filed October 21, 1977.*

*114Per Curiam.

This matter comes before the Court, by Claimant, on a motion to reconsider, Claimants’ motion in opposition to Respondent’s motion to reconsider, and Respondent’s reply to Claimants’ motion in opposition to Respondent’s motion to reconsider.

In the original opinion in this case, the Court took the position that it was a breach of contract by the Respondent that caused Claimants to incur the expenses for which they now seek recovery. *Douglas and Douglas v. State, 31 Ill.Ct.Cl. 499.*

After reviewing all the motions before the Court, the Court finds that the argument that attorney’s fees are not recoverable is untenable. The attorney’s fees expended by Claimants were incurred in litigation with a third party. The litigation with the third párty was brought on as a consequence of the failure of the Respondent to perform as agreed under its contract with Claimants.

Respondent cites *People v. Redfern, 104 Ill. App. 2d 132, 243 NE2d 252.*In that case, however, the attorney’s fees were incurred in the litigation with the defendant, and the Court held that only when there is statutory authority for assessing attorney’s fees are they to be allowed. See, for example, Sec. 41 of the “Civil Practice Act” Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 110, Sec. 41, where it provides that reasonable attorney’s fees are allowed where untrue allegation and denials are made without reasonable cause.

Respondent also cites *O’Hare v. Moniak 110 Ill. App. 2d 327, 249 NE2d 178,*which is also to the effect *115that a statute must authorize the assessment of attorney’s fees.

However, in the case before this Court, attorney’s fees in the separate litigation with a third party were a result of the Respondent’s breach of contract and, hence, are in the nature of an expense incurred as a result of the breach.

In 15 IL&P, Damages - Sec. 62, p. 397 and 398, it is stated:

> where the natural and proximate consequence of a wrongful act has been to involve the plaintiff in litigation with others, there may be, as a general rule, a recovery in damages against the author of such act of the reasonable expenses incurred in such litigation together with compensation for attorneys fees, and such costs as may have been awarded against the plaintiff.” Citing *Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v.*Daniel, *333 Ill. App. 338, 77 NE2d 526; Freed v. The Travelers, 300 F 2d 395.*

Motion to reconsider heretofore filed by the Respondent is denied and the orgiinal opinion is confirmed.
### §3439. Demurrers and special pleas in bar or abatement abolished; relief on motion—(Rule)

#### See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Motion to dismiss or for appropriate relief substituted for demurrer or dilatory plea or motion to quash, Rule 12.

(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 832.)
#### Sherman GOLDSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of NEW YORK, State of New York Grievance Committee, The Tenth Judicial District, New York State Office of Attorney General, Legal Dept NYC, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 01-9017.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 10, 2002.

Sherman Goldstein, New York, NY, for Appellant.

Constantine A. Speres (On Submission), for Appellees.

Leonard Koerner (On Submission), New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Appellee Legal Dept NYC.

Present McLAUGHLIN, PARKER, and SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the decision of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Sherman Goldstein (“Goldstein”) appeals from the judgment entered by the district court, granting defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss his § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims on the grounds that (1) the claims against New York State were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and (2) Goldstein did not plead any facts supporting a cause of action in his claims against the city. *Goldstein v. State of New York,*slip op., (S.D.N.Y. August 7, 2001).

The district court was correct to conclude that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, *see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n 557*F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); *Dube v. State Univ. Of New York,*900 F.2d 587, 594-95 (2d Cir.1990), and correctly ruled no claim was pled against the City or any responsible individual. Goldstein’s principal argument on appeal is that the state of New York is not immune from suit. He is incorrect. The case law Goldstein cites on appeal pertains to claims brought under the Education of the Handicapped Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act. Goldstein has not raised a claim under either of these acts. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

We have considered Goldstein’s other arguments and find them to be without merit.

We therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court.

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
### §833i. Deposit of receipts; establishment of continuing fund; authorization of appropriations

All receipts from transmission and sale of electric energy generated at the Fort Peck project shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States to the credit of miscellaneous receipts, save and except that the Treasury shall set up and maintain from such receipts a continuing fund of $500,000, to the credit of the Bureau and subject to expenditure by it, to defray the operating expense of generation and transmission of power delivered to the Bureau for disposal under this chapter, to defray emergency expenses and to insure continuous operation. There is authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter, including installation of equipment and machinery for the generation of electric energy, and facilities for its transmission and sale.

(May 18, 1938, ch. 250, §10, 52 Stat. 406.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Transfer of Functions

Power marketing functions of Bureau of Reclamation, including construction, operation, and maintenance of transmission lines and attendant facilities, transferred to Secretary of Energy by section 7152(a)(1)(E), (3) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, and are to be exercised by Secretary through a separate Administration within Department of Energy.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Transfer of Functions

For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of Department of the Interior, with certain exceptions, to Secretary of the Interior, with power to delegate, see Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1950, §§1, 2, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1262, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 16

Office of the Chief Accountant
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20549
March 21, 2002

Dear Sir/Madam:

We have read the first four (4) paragraphs of Item 9 included in the Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2001, of Household Finance Corporation,
to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and are in agreement
with the statements contained therein.

Very truly yours,





                            /s/ Arthur Andersen LLP
                            -----------------------
                            ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP



cc: William F. Aldinger, Chairman and
    CEO, Household International, Inc.
### §2339. Harboring or concealing terrorists

(a) Whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, has committed, or is about to commit, an offense under section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), section 175 (relating to biological weapons), section 229 (relating to chemical weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear materials), paragraph (2) or (3) of section 844(f) (relating to arson and bombing of government property risking or causing injury or death), section 1366(a) (relating to the destruction of an energy facility), section 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), section 2332a (relating to weapons of mass destruction), or section 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries) of this title, section 236(a) (relating to sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284(a)), or section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy) of title 49, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

(b) A violation of this section may be prosecuted in any Federal judicial district in which the underlying offense was committed, or in any other Federal judicial district as provided by law.

(Added Pub. L. 107–56, title VIII, §803(a), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 376; amended Pub. L. 107–273, div. B, title IV, §4005(d)(2), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1813.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2002—Pub. L. 107–273 made technical correction to directory language of Pub. L. 107–56, §803(a), which enacted this section.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2002 Amendment

Pub. L. 107–273, div. B, title IV, §4005(d)(2), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1813, provided that the amendment made by section 4005(d)(2) is effective Oct. 26, 2001.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23


                   CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
                   -----------------------------------------

Household Finance Corporation:

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our
report dated January 14, 2002, included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Household Finance Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2001, into the
Company's previously filed Registration Statements No. 333-47945, No. 333-59453,
No. 333-82119, No. 333-45740, No. 333-56152, No. 333-73746, No. 333-75328, and
No. 333-61964 on Form S-3. It should be noted that we have not audited any
financial statements of the company subsequent to December 31, 2001 or performed
any audit procedures subsequent to the date of our report.


Chicago, Illinois
March 21, 2002
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 19

- 00050

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.E.

, a Child

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018

- PA

- 00436 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding 1

BEFORE JUSTICE MARTINEZ

, JUSTICE ALVAREZ , AND JUSTICE WATKINS

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, we strike the portion of the termination

order finding appellant R.A.’s parental rights should be terminated under section 161.001(b)(1)(Q ) of the Texas Family Code. T he trial court’s termination order is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

We order that appellant R.A. recover his costs of appeal, if any, from appellee The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services.

SIGNED May 15, 2019.

_____________________________ Beth Watkins, Justice

1 The Honorable Norma Gonzales is the presiding judge of the 131st Civil District Court, Bexar County, Texas. The

Honorable Ch arles E. Montemayor, associate judge, signed the termination order.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As
Adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Brent M. Cook, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Quarterly Report of Raser Technologies, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained
in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Raser Technologies, Inc.



|                   |  |  |  |                                                                    
|------------------ |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------
|                   |  | 
|Date: May 15, 2006 |  |  |  | /S/ BRENT M. COOK                                                  
|                   |  |  |  | Brent M. Cook Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer)

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

Pursuant to

18 U.S.C.
Section 1350,

As Adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, William Dwyer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Raser Technologies, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2006, fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Raser
Technologies, Inc.



|                   |  |  |  |                                                                                                      
|------------------ |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                   |  | 
|Date: May 15, 2006 |  |  |  | /S/ WILLIAM DWYER                                                                                    
|                   |  |  |  | William Dwyer Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)

A signed original of each of the written statements above required by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to Raser Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by Raser Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The forgoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q and shall not be considered filed
as part of the Form 10-Q.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit B

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Rica Foods, Inc. (the
"Company") for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gina Sequeira,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350,
as adopted pursuant to (S) 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




/s/ Gina Sequeira

--------------------
Gina Sequeira
Chief Financial Officer
January 13, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

DEBORAH GALLAGHER N/K/A DEBORAH 

A. GATTONE,

Respondent

v.

DOUGLAS GALLAGHER,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 368 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
§ 33.20 Disclosure of documents. ( a ) Upon written request to the reviewing official, the defendant may review any relevant and material documents, transcripts, records, and other materials that relate to the allegations set out in the complaint and upon which the findings and conclusions of the investigating official under § 33.4(b) are based, unless those documents are subject to a privilege under Federal law. Upon payment of fees for duplication, the defendant may obtain copies of the documents.
( b ) Upon written request to the reviewing official, the defendant also may obtain a copy of all exculpatory information in the possession of the reviewing official or investigating official relating to the allegations in the complaint, even if it is contained in a document that would otherwise be privileged. If the document would otherwise be privileged, only that portion containing exculpatory information must be disclosed.
( c ) The notice sent to the Attorney General from the reviewing official as described in § 33.5 is not discoverable under any circumstances.
( d ) The defendant may file a motion to compel disclosure of the documents subject to the provisions of this section. Such a motion may only be filed with the ALJ following the filing of an answer pursuant to § 33.9.
(Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3803(g)(3)(B)(ii), 3803(e))