J-A24009-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CRAIG DORIAN HALL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 389 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001229-2016

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2018

Craig Dorian Hall appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

February 14, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, to serve 

a term of imprisonment of six months to two years less one day of 

incarceration, after he was found guilty by the trial judge of driving under the 

influence (DUI) (highest rate of alcohol), DUI (general impairment), driving 

on roadways laned for traffic, and careless driving.1 Hall contends the 

evidence presented at his stipulated bench trial was insufficient to prove him 

guilty of DUI (highest rate of alcohol), because the Commonwealth did not 

establish his blood alcohol content (BAC) in whole blood. Based upon the 

following, we affirm.

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1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(c), 3802(a)(1), 3309(a), and 3714(a), respectively.
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The non-jury trial in this case consisted of a Stipulation (Exhibit 1), with

four exhibits, numbered one through four, entered into evidence. The 

Stipulation and exhibits set forth the following:

(1) On April 12, 2016, at approximately 7:30 P.M., [Hall], was 

charged with two (2) counts of Driving Under the Influence 

of Alcohol and two summary offenses by Trooper Manuel 

Cabrera-Maldonado of the Pennsylvania State Police.

(2) The charges relate to an incident that occurred on or about 

11:35 A.M. on December 26, 2015 on [R]oute 934, 

approximately four (4) miles south of Jonestown Road in 

East Hanover Township, Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, 

where Trooper Cabrera-Maldonado has jurisdiction.

(3) On December 26, 2015 at 11:35 A.M., Trooper 

[Cabrera-]Maldonado of the Pennsylvania State Police 

responded to the scene of a single vehicle accident at PA9[34] in Lebanon County, PA.

(4) Upon arrival, Tpr. [Cabrera-]Maldonado found [Hall’s]

vehicle, a gold 2000 Chevrolet Malibu with disabling damage 

to the front of the vehicle.

(5) Tpr. [Cabrera-]Maldonado observed an ambulance on scene 

and entered the rear of the ambulance and observed [Hall] 

being treated for injuries.

(6) Tpr. [Cabrera-]Maldonado questioned [Hall] who admitted 

to being the driver of the aforementioned vehicle, and [Hall] 

accurately provided his name and date of birth.

(7) Tpr. [Cabrera-]Maldonado further questioned [Hall] who 

provided a thorough description of the accident.

(8) Tpr. [Cabrera-]Maldonado observed the strong odor of 

alcohol emanating from [Hall’s] breath and that he had

slurred speech and blood shot glassy eyes.

(9) Tpr. [Cabrera-]Maldonado questioned [Hall] if he had

consumed an alcoholic beverage prior to him driving and 
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[Hall] related the day before he had one-half of a case of 

beer, but denied he consumed beer before driving.

(10) [Hall] was transported to the Penn State Hershey Medical 

Center for treatment for his injuries sustained during the 

vehicle crash at the conclusion of Tpr. 

[Cabrera-]Maldonado's questions.

(11) [Hall’s] blood was drawn pursuant to Tpr. 

[Cabrera-]Maldonado's request memorialized in a Law

Enforcement Agency Certification of Request for Blood or 

Urine Testing under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. 

(Attached hereto as Exhibit 1).

(12) Hershey Medical Center staff drew [Hall’s] blood and 

submitted it to the Department of Pathology and Lab 

Medicine for toxicology analysis.

(13) At all times [Hall’s] blood sample was appropriately 

maintained and preserved for chain of custody purposes.

(14) Penn State Hershey Medical Center's Department of

Pathology and Lab Medicine is approved to determine the 

Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of blood serum samples under 

the Vehicle Code.

(15) Tests for BAC of [Hall’s] blood serum sample were certified 

by Monica Straub, a Supervisor in the Automated Testing 

Laboratory in the Chemistry Department at the Hershey 

Medical Center at 12:41 [P.M.] on December 26, 2015.

(16) Ms. Straub has been appropriately educated and trained to 

conduct such work. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 2).

(17) The testing revealed [Hall’s] blood serum to possess a 391 

mg/dL ethanol level. [Hall’s] medical records memorialize 

the results of the test. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 3).

(18) Ms. Straub would testify that BAC is measured in g/dL.

(19) Ms. Straub would testify that dividing a mg/dL unit of 

measurement by 1,000 results in a g/dL measurement, 

therefore dividing a blood serum ethanol level measured in 

mg/dL by 1,000 would give the sample owner's BAC.
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(20) Ms. Straub would testify that Defendant's BAC was .391.

(21) Ms. Straub's testimony would be consistent with the

statements contained within paragraphs fifteen (15)

through nineteen (19).

(22) Defendant admits to the allegations contained in the

Criminal Information filed in the above–captioned matter as 

an accurate description of the events in question. (Attached 

hereto as Exhibit 4).

Stipulation, Commonwealth Exhibit 1, 11/20/2017.

The trial judge found Hall guilty of the above stated crimes, and upon 

the trial court’s finding of guilt, Hall’s counsel made an oral motion for acquittal 

on the DUI – highest rate of alcohol charge, on the basis that Hall’s blood 

alcohol reading was not established in whole blood.2 The trial court denied 

the motion. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Hall. Prior to sentencing, 

Hall’s counsel renewed his oral motion for judgment of acquittal of the DUI –

highest rate of alcohol charge. The trial court again denied the motion, and 

sentenced Hall. This appeal followed.3

The sole issue presented in this appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to sustain the conviction for DUI (highest rate of alcohol). Our 

standard of review of a sufficiency claim is, as follows:

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2 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 606, “A defendant may 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of one or more 

of the offenses in one or more of the following ways: ... a motion for judgment 

of acquittal made orally immediately after the verdict.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

606(A)(4).
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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haight, 50 A.3d 137, 140 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

A conviction of DUI (highest rate of alcohol) requires proof that (1) the 

defendant was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of the 

movement of a vehicle, and (2) the defendant's blood alcohol content was 

0.16% or higher within two hours of driving, operating, or being in control of 

the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). Hall concedes he was operating a vehicle 

within two hours of when his blood was drawn at the Penn State Hershey 

Medical Center. However, Hall contends the evidence stipulated to by the 

parties was insufficient because the Commonwealth only presented blood 

serum testing results and therefore, the trial court could not determine Hall’s 

blood alcohol level, in whole blood, beyond a reasonable doubt. In support, 
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Hall cites Commonwealth v. Karns, 50 A.3d 158, 161 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

for the proposition that “evidence of testing performed on blood serum, 

plasma, or supernatant, ‘without conversion, will not suffice.’” Hall’s Brief at 

11.

Hall claims the Stipulation contains no reference to Hall’s blood serum 

being converted, and the words “convert,” “conversion factor,” and “whole 

blood” are not found in the stipulated facts. Hall argues there is no mention 

that Ms. Straub’s dividing the blood serum reading by 1,000 in order to change 

the unit of measurement from milligrams per deciliter (mg/dL) to grams per 

deciliter (g/dL) was a conversion factor. Hall states that dividing the serum 

results by 1,000 changed the unit of measurement for presenting the blood 

serum results. Hall asserts the division “did not convert his serum results to 

whole blood results; it simply changed the formatting of the presentation.” 

Hall’s Brief at 14. 

The Commonwealth takes the position that the Stipulation and exhibits 

set forth the testimony that would have been provided by Monica Straub. The 

Commonwealth maintains:

The stipulation provided clear evidence of a conversion factor to 

[Hall’s] BAC from serum. As stipulated by the parties, the 

conversion factor that would be testified to by Ms. Straub would 

be to divide the serum alcohol concentration by 1,000 to 

determine the correct BAC. Defense did stipulate that [Hall’s] BAC 

was .391. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.
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The trial court found “[t]he Stipulation sets forth that Ms. Straub would 

testify to the results of testing on [Hall’s] blood serum and explained how that 

result would be converted to indicate [Hall’s] accurate blood alcohol content. 

(See Stipulation, at Paras. 17-20). The toxicology report confirms this result. 

(Exhibit 3).” Trial Court Opinion, 4/30/2018, at 5.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is no basis upon 

which to disturb the judgment of sentence. By entering into the Stipulation, 

Hall agreed with Ms. Straub’s calculations, and he agreed she would testify

“Defendant’s BAC was .391” — without reservation. Stipulation, supra, ¶20. 

Moreover, apart from Hall’s agreement with Ms. Straub’s proposed testimony, 

Hall agreed to the allegations in the Information that he

unlawfully drove operated or was in actual physical control of a 

vehicle, after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that 

the alcohol concentration in the individuals blood or breath 

was at least .16% or higher, to wit .391%, within two hours 

after the individual has driven, operated, or been in actual physical 

control of the movement of the vehicle. 

Stipulation, supra, Exhibit 4 (Information) (emphasis added); see also, 

Stipulation, supra, ¶22. Accordingly, the evidence of record was sufficient to 

convict Hall of DUI – highest rate of alcohol.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2018