Department of Health and Human Servces 

OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

THE REFUGEE MATCHING GRANT PROGRAM: 

BALANCING FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

. SERVlq' 

Ya3a 

JU GffBS BROWN 

Inspector General 

AUGUST 1994 

OEI-Q9-92-
OFFICE OF INSPECfOR GENERA 

The mission of the Offce of Inspector General (OIG), as mandated by Public Law 95-452, as 

amended, is to protect the integrity of the Department of Health and Human Servces ' (HHS) programs as well as the health and welfare of beneficiaries served by those programs. This 

statutory mission is carred out through a nationwide network of audits, investigations, and 

inspections conducted by three OIG operating components: the Offce of Audit Servces, the 

Offce of Investigations, and the Offce of Evaluation and Inspections. The OIG also inform 

the Secretary of HHS of program and management problems and recommends courses to 

correct them. 

OFFICE OF AUDIT SERVICE 

The OIG's Offce of Audit Servces (OAS) provides all auditing servces for HHS, either by conducting audits with its own audit resources or by overseeing audit work done by others. 

Audits examine the performance of HHS programs and/or its grantees and contractors in 

carrng out their respective responsibilties and are intended to provide independent 

asesments of HHS programs and operations in order to reduce. waste, abuse, and mismanagement and to promote economy and effciency throughout the Department. 

OFFICE OF INTIGATIONS 

The OIG's Offce of Investigations (OI) conducts criminal, civil, and administrative. 

investigations of allegations of wrongdoing in HHS programs or to HHS beneficiaries and of 

unjust enrichment by providers. The investigative efforts of OI lead to criminal convictions 

administrative sanctions, or civil money penalties. The OI also oversees State Medicaid fraud 

control units which investigate and prosecute fraud and patient abuse in the Medicaid program. 

OFFICE OF EVALUATION AN INSPECTONS 

The OIG's Offce of Evaluation and Inspections (OEI) conducts short-term management and program evaluations (called inspections) that focus on issues of concern to the Department 

the Congres, and the public. The findings and recommendations contained in these inspection 

report generate rapid, accurate, and up-to-date information on the effciency, vulnerabilty, 

and effectivenes of departmental programs. This report was prepared in the San Francisco 

regional offce under the direction of Kaye D. Kidwell, Regional Inspector General, and Paul A Gottlober, Deputy Regional Inspector General. Project staff included: 

REGION IX 

Elizabeth Celniker 

Robert Gibbons


Catherine King 

Ellen Kotler 

Donald Loeb 

Brian Pattison 

Thomas Purvs 

Brad Rollin 

HEQUARTES 

Alan Levine


For additional copies of this report, please contact the San Francisco offce at (415) 556-6830. 
Departent of Health and Human Servces 

OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERA 

THE REFUGEE MATCHING GRANT PROGRAM: 

BALANCING FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 

t'SERYlCES. 

(4- d3a 

JU GffBS BROWN 

Inspector General 

AUGUST 1994 

OEI-09-92-00060 
EXECUTIVE SUMMAR Y


PUROSE 

Ths inspection assessed (1) how voluntary agencies -and their affates deliver and 

(2) how the Offce of Refugee Resettlement monitors servces to refugees 

parcipating in the Voluntary Agency Matchig Grant Program. 

BACKGROUN 

The Voluntary Agency Matchig Grant Program was established in 1979 as an 

alternative to State-admistered refugee resettlement programs. The program s goal is to help refugees attain economic self-sufciency without accessing welfare. The Offce of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), within the Administration for Children and 

Famies, fuds the program through matching grants to priate, national voluntary 

agencies (volags). Volags tyicaly subcontract with community-based social servce 

agencies (afates) to provide direct servces. In 1992, Federal fudig was 

approxiately $39.2 milion. Volags and affates provide servces for refugees durig their second though fourh months in United States. In 1992, the matching grant program served about one-third of all refugees arrving in the United States. 

The ORR requies that affates place employable refugees in "appropriate" jobs as soon as possible. It has established a gudelie-but does not requie-that at least 

60 percent of cases (a single individual or famly) be economically self-sufcient at the 

end of 4 months. 

For background puroses, we reviewed program gudelies, performance report, and volag self-sufciency outcome data for the last 3 program years. From September 

though November 1993, we conducted on-site visits or telephone intervews with the 

6 parcipatig and 6 nonparcipating volags and 159 of the 165 parcipatig affiates. 

We asked volags and afates to descnbe their history, the refugees that they serve 

the servces they provide, and how the program is monitored. We obtained their 

opinons about the program s gudelines, performance goals, and how the program could be improved. We also intervewed ORR offcials. 

FIINGS 

Prgr flil alws ajtes to tailr seres to a diere refgee popultin 

Afates serve refugees (1) from many different countries, (2) with a range of skils needs, and characteristics, and (3) whose needs have changed since the program 

inception. Flexibility has allowed affates to taior specific servces, such as case 

management, Englsh-language training, maintenance assistance, and acculturation to 

the refugees they serve. 
Refgees and ajte 11t overome muple bar to att self-su 

When asked about the barrers that afect refugees' self-suffciency, volags and 

affiates noted multiple problems including (1) refugees' Englsh and job skils 

(2) poor local economies, (3) lack of adequate medical coverage, and (4) disincentives 

caused by high welfare payments and easy access in some States. Some affates have 

developed unque methods to overcome these barrers. 

Apprly haf of th afte bele th ORR overempha ea emplo 

Approxiately hal of the afates believe that at least some refugees would be better 

served by an extended traig and resettlement approach. In general, these afates 

believe that the decision to emphasize extended trainng instead of early employment 

should be made on a cae-by-cae basis.

Pr efecten meases are inte 

Alost half of the affates believe that job placement at 4 months is not, by itself, an 

appropriate measure of the program s success. Furthermore, ORR has no long-term 

effectiveness measures. 

Gentig an dog machig fu li th nuer an type of refgees sered 

Afiates are requied to match Federal grants with cash and/or donated goods and 

servces. Generatig and documenting the match takes away from affates' abilty to provide servces and has had some unforeseen consequences. These include afliates 

(1) litig the number of refugees they serve, (2) refusing to serve certain tyes 

refugees, (3) delayig the donations of goods and servces, and (4) refusing to 

partcipate in the program.


RECOMMATIONS 

me Th ORR slwuJ deelp peorme inatrs by reg an exg it cuenan data collctn tehn 

Whe 4-month self-sufciency could contiue to be one performance measurement 

ORR should routiely collect longer-term refugee self-sufciency data. Many affiates 

aleady collect longer-term data or would experience miimal dicuty collectig it. 

Both long-term and 4-month self-suffciency measures should take into account (1) the 

health of the local economy, (2) servces available in the community, (3) tyes of 

refugees served, and (4) affliate enrollment policies. 
Th ORR shoul cons optins to rede th bur of th match req 

The ORR should conduct a study to determe how the match requiement could be 

revised to reduce the paperwork burden on grantees without compromising Federal 

grant admistration audit requirements. 

AGENCY COMM 

The ORR provided co=ents on the draf report. In response, we added and modied tex in the body of the report and revied our reco=endations. The fu 

text of ORR's co=ents appears in the appendi. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXCU SUY 

INODUCI0N . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1€

FIINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6€

. Program flexibilty .............................................. 6€

. Refugees and affates face barers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8€

. Overemphasis on early employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. Effectiveness measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. Match requiements pose problems. . . . . . . . 

FUCX i\TIONS ..... . .. 15€

APPENIX 
INTRODUCTION


PUROSE 

Ths inspection assessed (1) how voluntary agencies and their affates deliver and 

(2) how the Offce of Refugee Resettement monitors servces to refugees 

parcipatig in the Voluntary Agency Matchig Grant Program. 

BACKGROUN 

The Volunta Agency Matching Grant Program (MGP) was establihed in 1979 as an 

alternative to State-admstered refugee resettement programs. The program s goal is to help refugees attai economic self-suffciency without accessing welfare. The 

Offce of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), with the Admstration for Chdren and 

Fames, fuds the program though matchig grants to private, national voluntary 

agencies (volags). Volags tyicay subcontract with co=unty-based social servce 

agencies (afates) to provide diect servces. In 1992, Federal MGP fudig was 

approxiately $39.2 mion. 

Though contracts with the State Deparent and ORR, volags provide servces to 

refugees durig their fist 4 months in the United States. The State Deparent provides overseas orientation and fuds 12 volags to provide reception and placement 

servces for al refugees durg their fit 30 days in ths countr. These servces 

include sponsorship assignent, co=unty orientation, and intial food, clothg, and shelter. Afer providig reception and placement servces-and if refugees are not 

employed and are in need of support-volags may either refer refugees to State 

welfare agencies or enroll them in the MGP. Of the 12 volags that provide reception 

and placement servces, 6 participate in the MGP. The following chart lists the volags and the number of refugees they served in the MGP in 1992: 

Refugees Served MGP Fun 

Volag 

Number Percntage Millons Percentage 

Council of Jewb Federations 852 86. $33. 865 

Unite States Calbnlic Conference 754 3.8 

Lutberan Immigrtinn and Refugee Servce 670 1.8 

International Rese Committee 0.3 

American Council for Nationalities Servce 458 1.2 

TOTAL 336 100. $39. 100. 

A six volag, Ibe Epispal Ministries pacipates as a subgrtee of the Council of Jewh Federatinns 

.. The total percentage is grter than 100.0 percent because nf rounding 
Reee eligiil an selectin€

The volags select refugees to participate in the MGP from those who participated in€

the State Department's reception and placement program. Refugees generally are eligIole to participate as long as one famiy member is employable. Aged and disabled 

refugees, who are eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income shorty after their 

arval, are automaticay excluded from the program. In 1992, the MGP served about 

one-thd of all refugees arg in the United States. The Council of Jewish 

Federations serves more than 85 percent of the MGP refugees. Its New York City

afate alone serves approxiately half of al Counci of Jewish Federation refugees€ and more than one-third of al refugees in the MGP.€

Aurig lelan€

Although Congress never specifcally established the MGP, authorition for the MGP€

is found in subpart (c) of 8 U. C. 1522. Subpart (c) authories ORR to make grants 

and contracts with public or private non-profit agencies "priarly for the purose of faciltating refugee employment and achievement of self-suffciency." The law states€

that these grants essentially are designed to 

assist refugees in obtaining the skis which are necessary for economic€

self-sufciency, includig projects for job training, employment servces€

day care, professional refresher traing, and other recertcation 

servces....to provide traig in Englsh where necessar...(and) to 

provide where specifc needs have been shown...health (includig mental health) servces, social servces, educational and other servces. 

Pr guli 

The ORR has not promulgated reguations to implement the law authorig the 

MGP. Instead, ORR developed and distributed gudelies that set fort the MGP' 

goals, requiements, and reco=endations concerng how volags and affates should 

provide MGP servces. Volags and afates have great fleXibilty to design programs€ that best meet the needs of their refugees as long as they meet ORR's mium€

requiements.€

The gudelies requie volags and their affates to provide refugees with case 

management, job counselig and placement, and cah or other maitenance assistance 

from their second through at least their fourth month in the countr. In addition 

ORR requies that volags and affates continua11y work to develop new job 

opportunities. They must fo11ow up with employers or refugees within 2 weeks after a 

refugee has been hired in order to identify any adjustment problems. Volags and 

afates must be able to provide other servces as necessary including job traig,€ Englsh language training, and acculturation servces, either diectly or through€

referral.€
The guidelines refer to other social servces that are available to refugees. Refugees

may receive food stamps and either Medicaid or refugee medical assistance for up to 

8 months. Federal regulations state that if a refugee becomes ineligible for Medicaid 

or refugee medical assistance solely because of increased earnings from employment 

the refugee s eligibilty should be extended for an additional 4 months or until the 

refugee has been receivig assistance for 8 months, whichever comes first. The volags must ensure that refugees do not accept public cash assistance while enrolled in the 

MGP. . 

Volags may contiue to provide MGP servces to refugees beyond the 4-month period. They must ensure, however, that overall costs for Federal reimbursement do not 

exceed the total alowable lit of $1 000 per refugee. 

Ea emp/o objecties an th 4-mont 60 en selfsu guli 

According to Federal regulations and the MGP gudelies, afates should place

employable refugees in "appropriate" jobs as soon as possible, and refugees must accept entry-level jobs. In general, ORR believes that an appropriate job is one that 

matches a refugee s physica skis and abilties. Refugees are supposed to maintain a good-faith" effort to attain employment whie acquig enough competency in Englsh to secure and retain employment. The early employment approach is intended to minimi"e the chance that a refugee wi require welfare assistance after the MGP. 

Afates may provide additional job traing, Englsh classes, and acculturation 

servces to help the employed refugee rise above the entry level. 

The ORR has established a guideline-but does not requie-that at least 60 percent of

caes (a single individual or family) be economically self-suffcient at the end of 

4 months. Accordig to the gudelines, refugees are deemed self-sufcient when they 

no longer need public, matching grant or other fiancial assistance because they are employed." The ORR does not attempt to measure "social adjustment," although it is a priar goal of the MGP. Overall, volags and afliates are not meeting the 

60 percent self-sufciency goal, primariy because the Counci of Jewish Federations 

the largest volag, is far below the goal. 

Math Reqem 

The MGP gudelines state that volags and affiates are required to match Federal 

fuds dollar-for-doIJar. The Federal government matches affate contributions up to 000 per refugee resettled. As much as 80 percent of the match may be obtained 

through in-kind donations, but at least 20 percent of the affliates' contribution must 

be cash. Because the first 30 days that refugees spend in this country are covered by the State Departent s reception and placement program, goods and servces donated durig this period cannot be counted towards the MGP's match requirement. 
Reportg an Monirig€

Volags have the priary responsibility of ensurg that their affiates provide quality MGP servces. The ORR does not routinely conduct on-site monitorig of afiates. Volags submit quarterly statistical reports to ORR showing the number of refugees 

served and their self-suffciency status at the end of 4 months. At 7 months, volags€ report on the employment status of refugees who were self-sufcient at 4 months in 

order to assess their job retention. V olags are supposed to veri the accuracy of afates' reports, the quality of their servces, and their compliance with Federal€

gudelines. The ORR does not have requirements for how frequently volags must€

monitor their affates and does not routinely receive copies of the volags ' site visit 

report. 

Sta refgee astae progrms 

Refugees who do not partcipate in the MGP, plus some refugees who complete the€

MGP, receive servces through State-admistered refugee resettlement programs that€ ORR fuds. In contrast to the MGP, extensive reguations govern the admnistration€

of the State programs. The regulations require States to enroH all refugees and€

provide servces that are simlar to those received by MGP refugees. The ORR does€ not requie States to provide case management, however. The MGP refugees who are€

not self-suffcient at the end of 4 months may receive support from Aid to Famies€

with Dependent Chdren, if eligible, or they may apply to State welfare agencies for€

an additional 4 months of cash assistance in States where such assistance is available.€

Recen Poli Deelopm 

In early 1992, the Bush Adminstration proposed replacing the State-admstered€

refugee cash and medical assistance programs with a "Private Resettlement Program 

that would have used volags to deliver servces to al refugees. In Februar 1993, a U.S. District Court blocked implementation of the proposal because ORR had not 

alowed sufcient public notice and comment. In the next 2 years, Congress€ consider reauthorig the MGP and other ORR programs. The ORR is currently€

holding a series of town-hal forums throughout the country to obtai views concerng€ futue directions of refugee resettlement programs, including the MGP.€

Rete Stu€

The Inspector General's Offce of Audit Servces is currently reviewing the adequacy€ of eligibility controls and the appropriateness of job training in the State-administered€

programs. The Offce of Audit Servces also recently completed an audit that€

examines ORR' s oversight of the entire refugee resettlement program, includig the€ MGP. In a November 1993 draft report on refugee resettlement, the United States€

General Accounting Offce found that the MGP had substantial fiancial surpluses in€

1991 and 1992. The surluses primariy resulted from fewer refugees arrving from the€
former Soviet Union. Ths caused the Council of Jewish Federations to settle fewer€

refugees than it had anticipated.€

MEODOLOY€

For background purposes, we reviewed MGP program gudelines, performance€ report, and volag self-sufciency outcome data for the last 3 program years. From€

September through November 1993, we conducted on-site visits or telephone€

intervews with the 6 parcipatig and 6 nonparcipatig volags and 159 of the€

165 parcipatig afates. We asked volags and afates to descnbe their history, the€

refugees that they serve, the servces they provide, and how the program is monitored.€

We obtaed their opinions about the program s gudelies, performance goal, and€ how the program could be improved. We did not attempt to veri the inormation


and data that they provided to us. We also intervewed ORR offcials.€

We conducted ths inspecton in accordance with the 
 Qu Sll for Insctns€

issued by the President's Counci on Integrty and Effciency.€
FINDINGS


The Voluntary Agency Matching Grant Program allows volags and affliates to provide a€

valuable range of integrated services to refugees who have recently entered the United 

States. Program monitoring is largely the responsibility of the volags; the Federal€

government's oversight is minimaL The ke to success may be the program s abilty to 

respond timely to changing conditions and fluctutions in the number and natue of€

refgees it serves. 

Volags and affliates have taken advantage of the MGP's inate flexbility by altering and€

adpting their services to assit a diverse popultion of refg es whose needs have changed 

and intensifed over tie. As evidenced by the following specific findings and 

recommendations (which incate the need for some ''fne- tuning' ), this flexbility, in 

tandem with appropriate accountabilty measures, needs to be supported and strengthened to assure the success of the MGP. 

PROGRA FLIL ALWS AFTE TO TAIR SERVICE TO A

DIVE REGEE POPULTION 

Both as wrtten and in their implementation, the MGP gudelines neither mandate nor 

advocate a single model for achievig refugee self-sufciency. While the gudelies focu on the goal of assistig refugees to attain self-sufciency, they specify few 

program requiements or means to achieve ths goal. These decisions are left up to 

the individual affliates. 

Afates believe that flexibilty is necessar because of the refugees' diversity. Afates serve refugees from countries rangig from the former Soviet Union to 

Somala and Vietnam, and almost all must tr to find jobs for refugees with a wide 

range of skis, from farers and laborers to doctors and scientists. 

Afates have needed the MGP's flexibilty to alter their servces over tie. 

Accordig to at least one-thd of the afates, refugees parcipatig in the MGP 

when it was initiated were signcantly easier to serve than today s refugees. They 

believe that today s refugees are older, less healthy, less employable, and not as 

motivated, although this contradicts irormation that ORR has co1Jected on refugees 

enterig the United States. Some afates are fidig that fames are becoming "top heavy as older refugees between the ages of 50 and 65 join their relatives. These 

refugees were already retired in their former countres and often are less motivated to 

lear new customs and skills. The followig char ilustrates some of the changes that 

afates have experienced in trng to adapt. 
Changes in the refuge population prent challenges acrding to MGP affiltes 

In the eay refu fam 

ll-educaed 

high-skied heiy

generll Englhproficient 

In compan, a number of affilte re th rent 

regee fames tend to be 

older 

les educ 

les higbkiled 

les heathy€

lackig Englh

proficincy 

The MGP's fleXIbilty has al10wed afates to address these refugee changes. 

Afates have been able to refocus from providing fewer and less intensive servces 

such as simple job placement, to providig a wider range of more intensive servces, 

such as Englsh-language training, health servces, job traig, and case management. 

Because of the flexible gudelies, afates can tailor various servces such as case 

management, Englsh-language traig, and maitenance assistance to the refugees 

they serve. For example, whie some refugees might requie intensive case 

management, others might requie very little assistance. Because the MGP gudelies do not requie cae managers to meet with refugees a specifc number of ties 

afates have the flexibilty to devote cae management resources to the refugees who 

need them most. Similarly, afates var the amount and extent of English-language 

traig and maintenance assistance based on individual refugees' needs as well as the 

resources available in the co=unty. 

The MGP gudelines specifcally encourage affates to use their resources to provide 

servces beyond those specified in the MGP gudelines. The gudelies state that agencies are encouraged to develop special programs which take into account client 

characteristics and the agency s experience." More than two-thds of afates provide 

additional servces such as job trainig, medical servces, chid care, and, after 

4 months, food and rent assistance and interest-free loans. Some of these affliates go 

beyond these servces in offerig semiars on various subjects includig: American 

holidays and customs, automated teller machines and the bankig system, health 
insurance, hygiene, and American work ethics. Some affliates noted that they provide 

mental health counseling and social servces to help refugees manage the trauma of 

relocation. By providing additional servces, affates believe that refugees have a€

better chance of attaining self-suffciency rather than entering the welfare system. 

REGEE AN AFTE MUST OVECOME MiTILE BAR ATTAI SEL-SUFCICY 

When asked about the barers that affect refugees' self-sufciency, volags and 

afates noted multiple problems includig (1) refugees' Englsh and job skis 

(2) poor local economies, (3) lack of adequate medica coverage, and (4) disincentives 

caused by high welfare payments and easy access in some States. Approxiately 60 percent of affliates and 5 of the 6 volags said that they face thee or more barrers. 

Despite encounterig multiple barers, some afates descnbed unque methods 

overcome these obstacles. 

. Lack of English and appropriate job skis are the top two barers to refugee selfsufciency, accordig to affiates. More than two-thirds of all affates indicated that€

refugees ' lack of English skis is a major problem, makig it the most frequently 

mentioned barrer to self-sufciency. Afates also have problems fidig employment for refugees because some refugees lack the basic skills required by 

American employers. Others are well-educated but lack appropriate skils. Afates 

cited examples of engieers sti using draftg equipment rather than Computer-Aided 

Design and computer programmers unskil1ed in the use of English computer 

languages. 

Five of the six volags and many affates believe that the downtu in the American 

economy has led to fewer job opportties for refugees. In many communties, jobs 

traditionally fied by refugees have become scace, and refugees now must compete 

with Americans for these jobs. In areas with large layoffs and plant closures, afates 

mentioned that competition with skied America workers is overwhelmng for 

refugees who have few transferable job skis, cannot speak Englsh, and have no job history. Alost hal of all affates mentioned the economy as a major barer, and 

82 percent of the afates that reported recent declines in self-sufciency indicated 

that the economy is the major reason. 

Alost one-third of the afates described diculties obtainig Medicaid or other 

medical assistance for refugees. In some cases, State agencies do not understand 

refugees' eligibilty for medical programs. For example , affliates described instances 

where States confused refugees with immigrants and did not give them the medical 

servces to which they were entitled. In addition, more than half of all affiates 

reported that some refugees who have famy members that may need medical 

attention do not take jobs because they fear losing Medicaid or other medical 

assistance, a fear that is sometimes unfounded. Ths problem is compounded by some 

States that do not provide extended medical coverage although Federal governent reguations indicate that eligibilty should continue for a short time after employment.€
 .

By workig directly with the State agencies or with ORR' s assistance, some affliates 

noted that they have been able to resolve this issue. 

The availability and amount of State welfare and social servces can have a diect 

impact on refugees' abilty and wiingness to become self-sufcient. More than one- thd of afiates, includig many in Caliornia, New York, Ilois, and Michigan

experience diculty with refugees who appear less motivated because welfare benefits 

in their State are generous. In fact, networks of refugees exist in some of these States 

that educate refugees about the welfare system before they enter the countr.€

Conversely, other afates mentioned that because their States offered litte or no 

general assistance, nearly al refugees are self-sufcient at the end of 4 months. For exaple, one affate hypothesized that the lack of welfare in their State explais why their self-sufciency rate was 98 percent compared to New York's 5 percent. 

Afates volunteered unique methods to overcome these barers. These include 

developing new traing and job opportties for refugees, fiding unque solutions to 

lack of health coverage, workig to change some refugees' atttudes about welfare, and 

fidig ways to provide more intensive servces than other affliates. Some examples include: 

one afiate that links professional1y-trained refugees to local unversity 

professors who act as mentors 

one affate that has agreements with local companes to employ and provide 

Englsh classes for refugees with very poor English 

one affiliate that has developed on-going referral relationships with more than 

120 local companes and corporations, and 

a few afates that have devoted tremendous tie and resources to develop 

relationships with local hospitals and health care providers to provide free or 

low-cost medical servces. 

APPROXITEY HA OF TI AFTE BELVE TIT ORR OVEHAIZ EAY EMLOYM 

Although ORR, most volags, and many affiates believe that early employment is the 

most effective approach to refugee resettlement, approxiately hal of the afates 

believe that an extended training and resettlement approach would better serve al 

some of their refugees. Alost al1 affliates attempt to obtai early employment for 

refugees; however, more than half of the affliates indicated that they would prepare 

refugees for other tyes of employment if ORR did not emphasize early employment. 

The ORR, however, believes that this approach confcts with Section 412 of the 

Imgration and Nationalty Act, which states that Congress intended refugee 

resettement funds to be used to place employable refugees "on jobs as soon as possible after their arrval in the United States. 
Afiates agree that the overall goal of the MGP is to help refugees obtain economic€

self-sufciency, but they disagree on the defiition of "economic self-sufciency" and€

how to achieve it. Some affliates believe that refugees are best served if they find€

employment quicldy and learn English and acculturate through workig. Other€ afates believe that early employment is not synonymous with "economic selfsufciency." They believe that the emphasis on early employment frequently results in 

inappropriate job placements. For example, affates felt pressured to place refugees 

in such poor matches as mathematicians takng piza delivery jobs and electrcal 

engieers workig as janitors. Accordig to these afiates, when refugees are placed 

in inappropriate jobs, they do not retain them and, because they are no longer eligible 

for refugee assistance, they enter the welfare system. Afates assert that, in these 

caes, refugees become more entrenched in the welfare system because they no longer have access to the servces, training, and support that the affates provide. 

Approximately half of the affates believe that at least some refugees would be better 

served if they could concentrate on learng English, overcomig cuture shock, undergoing intensive job training, and havig their social servce needs met while 

enrolled in the MGP. Ths approach would result in a more appropriate, higher-level 

job placement and long-term economic self-suffciency, accordig to its advocates. 

They contend that long-term economic self-sufciency is better achieved by takg tie-up to a year, according to some--to fuJly acculturate and train refugees rather 

than placing them in inappropriate entry-level jobs. For example, one affliate 

believes that ths extended approach would allow many of their refugees who become mancursts to forego these entr-level jobs and instead concentrate on adapting their 

computer or medical skils to United States' standards. 

In general, afliates that would like the flexibilty to provide extended traing believe€

that the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis. Ths would allow them to€

design effective resettlement plans for each refugee based on that refugee s skils€

needs, and desires. The foJlowig chart ilustrates how dierences among refugees warrant diferent strategies to serve them. 
PROGRA EFCI MEUR AR INADEQUATE 

Man 

me ajte belie tJ job placem at moll is not, by itelf an appropri of th MGP's suce 

Although volags report the employment status of all refugees at 4 months, these data 

alone do not effectively measure volag performance. Alost half of al affates 

disagree with or have reservations about the 4-month, 60 percent employment goal. Accordig to affiates, the 4-month data do not reflect their different enronment€

policies, variations in their local economies, or the diversity of the refugees they serve.€

Diferent affate enrollment policies affect volags' 4-month employment rates. Some afates, especially those workig with the Council of Jewish Federations, make it a policy to place an eligible refugees into the MGP while others select refugees they€

believe make the best candidates for achievig early employment. When asked about€

its afates' enrollment policies , the Council of Jewish Federations stated that its 

national policy is to enroll aU eligible refugees. In contrast, less than 14 percent of the 

other volags ' affliates enroll all eligible refugees. These affates select only refugees whose motivation, health, and famiy size and composition make them more easily€

employable.€
Of those affliates that disagree with the 4-month, 60 percent employment goal

38 percent believe it is not appropriate because it does not take into account the local 

economy. Downturns in the American economy have reduced job opportties in 

many communities. For example, one volag had an agreement with a major hotel to 

place its refugees as soon as they arrved in the United States. When the hotel was 

forced to eliminate jobs, the first jobs to go were the ones refugees had filled. 

Because of this, the volag has had to search for new job opportities for its MGP 

refugees. Therefore, even if refugees are willing to accept any employment 

opportty, they may be forced to wait unti jobs become available or they must 

relocate. 

Another factor that the 4-month, 60 percent employment goal does not address is the fact that some affiates serve refugees who have greater needs, fewer skis, and are more chalenging to serve in general than refugees served by other affiates. Refugees from the former Soviet Union tend to be more skilled than refugees from other part of the world, but they may be more diffcult to serve because they prefer, and perform 

better, in jobs that utilize their ski1ls. Other refugees may come from an agraran 

society where many people are pre-literate farmers, shepherds, and fisherman who have received mimal health servces. These refugees require more intensive servces 

and often are less attractive to potential employers. 

Afates offered suggestions to improve how ORR measures their performance. 

Some afliates reco=ended that ORR be more flexible and adjust the goal based on 

such factors as local economies and refugee characteristics. Whle they do not 

necessarily advocate a scorig system for individual refugees, they would like to see ORR adjust the goal to take into consideration special circumstances that are obvious 

and ca be documented. Other afates contend that 4 months is not long enough to 

accately measure self-sufciency. These afliates would lie ORR to lengthen the

program or measure self-sufciency at a later date. 

Th ORR ha no long-te efectiene mees 

The ORR cannot measure and compare the success of the afliates' dierent 

resettement approaches because it lacks long-term effectiveness measures. Afates 

that lit enrollment and focus on early employment tyica1ly have high 4-month selfsufciency rates. Afiates that do not limit enrollment and emphasize longer-term 

intensive training and resettlement servces tyically have lower self-suffciency rates at 

4 months. Many of these afates assert that if ORR measured self-suffciency afer a 

year or more, it would find that they have higher self-suffciency rates and that 

refugees have found higher-level employment. The ORR does not believe that longterm effectiveness measures can be developed or would be appropriate for a 4-month 

program. 

Although ORR co1lects 7-month refugee data, these data are problematic. At 7 months, ORR requires affliates to report the employment status of refugees who . were employed at 4 months. While these data may be usefu to assess the refugees 
job retention, some affliates clearly do not understand the purpose of the 7-month 

report and submit incorrect data. These affliates simply report the percentage of a1

refugees who are self-sufcient at 7 months. The ORR does not validate these data. 

Most affIliates could track refugees for a longer period of tie if required. Approxiately 83 percent of affiates indicated that they already track refugees afer 

7 months or that they would have minor or no diculties trackig them for at least 

another year. The remaining 17 percent of afates indicated that they would have 

major diculties trackig refugees after 7 months, maiy because they serve large 

numbers of refugees or their refugees move frequently and do not stay in contact. 

Compg th MOP to State refgee pro ha bee imle becaue th hae dier efectiene meases 

Although ORR has attempted to compare the effectiveness of the MGP and Stateadmstered refugee programs, no successfu comparison has been completed. In 

1991 , ORR co=issioned a study that would have compared the self-sufciency 

outcomes of comparable refugees enrolled in the MGP and State programs. The 

ORR cancelled the study because of problems with the contractor. 

Furhermore, according to ORR, any comparison between the programs would be 

dicult for two reasons. First, affliates ca choose which refugees to enroll in the 

MGP. States, on the other hand, must enroll and serve an or some of the remaing refugees. Second, not al volags partcipate in the MGP, and those that do may only allow afliates in good job opportunity areas to partcipate. Therefore, their selfsufciency rates would be signficantly higher than State agencies 

GENTIG AN DOCUG MATCHG FUS LI TI NUER AN TYES OF REGEE SERVE 

Generatig and documenting the match takes away from afates' abilty to provide servces and has had some unoreseen consequences on the operation of the MGP. 

These include affliates (1) limiting the number of refugees they serve, (2) refusing to 

serve certain tyes of refugees, (3) delayig the donations of goods and servces, and (4) refusing to participate in the MGP. 

The match policy causes some affiates to limt the number of refugees that they

serve. When asked what factors limt the number of refugees that they could serve 

approxiately 40 percent of afliates mentioned concerns about the match 

requiement. Concerns included generating the match, documenting in-kid servces 

and unwillngness of volunteers to complete burdensome paperwork. For example 

one afliate noted that volunteers refused to help when told of the accountabilty and 

paperwork involved. 

Approximately 16 percent of affliates have restricted the tyes of refugee they will 

serve mainly because of the match. In most instances, these affiates refuse "free 
cases " or restrict enro11ment to refugees who are being reunited with their famies. 

By requiring the families to pay for their relatives' entr into this country, these 

affates have a much easier time generating and documenting the match. In addition 

many of these refugees need fewer servces, and affliates can more easily generate the 

match as frends and family assist refugees with English tutoring, transportation to job 

sites and health servces, and informal acculturation. 

More than one-third of the afiates have had problems with ORR' s requiement that

goods and servces donated durig the refugees' fist 30 days in the country not count 

towards the MGP match. Afliates utie many donated resources durg refugees 

fist month in the country. They may not count these resources as par of the MGP 

match, because these goods and servces techncally are provided to refugees under 

the State Departent s reception and placement program. To get around ths 

approxiately 22 percent of al afates have delayed the donation of nonessential 

items or have "loaned" items for the first 30 days. For example, one afate 

acknowledged that, in certain circumstances, it has asked refugees to sleep in sleeping 

bags unti it could count donated beds towards the MGP match. Other afates have 

avoided delaying the donation of items, but still believe that ORR should count some 

or al of these items toward the match. 

The ORR states that loaning goods is not appropriate and stresses that employmentrelated servces donated during the fist 30 days may be counted towards the match.

Afates clearly are more concerned with durable items such as future not countig towards the matCh. The ORR also states that it has asked volags to determe what 

mimum requirements" refugees should receive durg the first 30 days so that it can 

count any extra servces towards the MGP match, but ORR asserts that volags have 

rejected this idea. 

Six volags provide reception and placement servces but do not partcipate in the MGP. Thee of these volags indicated that the match and burdensome paperwork 

requiements are the major reasons that they do not partcipate. As a result, refugees who enter the country under their auspices do not have access to MGP servces and 

must partcipate in State-admstered resettlement programs if they requie servces€

afer intial reception and placement. 
, 




RECOMMENDATIONS€

TI ORR SHOUI DEVEP PERORMCE INICATORS BY REVIING

AN EXANING IT CU MEUR AN. DATA COlLCTON TECHQUE 

The ORR should col1ect appropriate data in order to establish comprehensive 

performance indicators for all volags and affates partcipatig in the MGP. Whe 

4-month self-sufciency could continue to be one performance measurement, ORR should routinely collect longer-term refugee self-sufciency data. Many afates 

aleady collect longer-term data or would experience minimal difculty collectig it. 

Both long-term and 4-month self-sufciency measures should take into account (1) the 

health of the local economy, (2) servces available in the community, (3) tyes of refugees served, and (4) affate enrollment policies. Besides economic selfsufciency, other performance indicators could include the quality and integration of 

servces provided by volags, the extent to which the entire family receives servces, and socia! adjustment measures such as refugees' English improvement and partcipation in accutuation activities. 

The ORR should examine the performance indicators for other Federal and State jobtraing programs and consider coordinatig with these programs in developing these 

standards. The HHS' Job Opportnities and Basic Skills Traing program and the 

Deparent of Labor s adult trainirg program under the Job Traing Partership Act have established performance indicators to measure their programs' success. 

TI ORR SHOUI CONSIDER OPTONS TO REUCE TI BUREN OF 

TI MATCH REQUJ 

Most afates make extensive use of in-kind servces, but many do not count some or al of it towards the match due to the burdensome nature of the paperwork. Ths has 

a negative impact on the numbers and tyes of refugees that they serve and the qualty of the servces that they provide. We recommend that ORR conduct a study to determine how the match requirement could be revised to reduce the paperwork 

burden on grantees without compromising Federal grant administration audit requiements. 

AGENCY COMM 

The ORR concurred with the recommendation on the match requiement. It did not 

state if it concurred with the recommendation on developing performance indicators. 

The ORR stated that "the data currently col1ected measures employment, the 

cornerstone of the Refugee Act" and that, beyond 4 months it would be diffcult to 

discern outcomes that would be attnbutable to the Matching Grant Program. 
Given the flexibilty that ORR allows for volags and afates to provide longer-term servces to meet refugees needs to attain self-sufciency, the curent measures are not 

adequate to determe the program s success or to provide inormation on ways the 

program could be improved. The mandate for Federal agencies to develop 

comprehensive and appropriate performance indicators is found thoughout effort to 

reform and improve governent. The Report of the Administration for Childen and 

Families Monitorig Team and the National Performance Review both contai strong

endorsements of appropriate and adequate effectiveness measures, includig long-term performance indicators. The General Performance and Results Act of 1993 requies 

that al Federal agencies develop comprehensive performance indicators and review 

their performance based on these indicators starg no later than 1999. 

A fu copy of ORR's co=ents appear in the appendi. 
APPENDIX€

ORR COMM ON TI DRA REORT


The ORR provided co=ents on a draf of ths report. In response, we revised the 

report to address most of its concerns. The draf report contaied thee 

reco=endations. Based on ORR's co=ents, we eliated the fist


reco=endation which suggested that ORR revise its program gudelies to clari the goal of the MGP and address affates' concern that ORR overemphasizes early 

employment. The fu text of ORR's co=ents begis on. the next page. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.. HUMAN SERVICES 

II" 

.a 2 /994	 ADMINISTRATION FOA cHlffliEN ANlIU Ofles 0' the Asalata"1 SecRNSult8-

370 L'Enfant Promenade, SfrG-EI 

TO: June Gibbs Brown Washington. C.C. 2047 DIG-I 

Inspector General AIGCAA 

FRON:	 Nary Jo Bane ,- AlGM Assistant Secretary oeclle 

for Children and Families
 EXC "' 

SUBCT: Reaponse to OIG Draft Report: "Tbe Rafugee NatJT1 

Grant pragraia: Balancinq Flexibility and

Accountability, OEI-09-9Z-00060 

This respond. to the draft report resulting from a recent review 

of the rafuqee Voluntary Aqency Progam (Katch!nq Grant). 

General Comments


Th- report reflect responses ot local affiliates at the national 

agencies that receive fYndng for the Hatching Grant Progam 

(KGP) to question" posed bY the OIG. Th.. r..port' recoendations are based largely on the8e responses. 

Information which is impressionistic i. often presented as fact

e..9., 1:1i -changes in retugQII population" char on page 7 that 

compares demogaphic characteristics of refugees who arrived in 

the early 1980' S with .ore recent arrivals. The report would be 

strenqtened if it included hard data. 


Tbe Matching Grant program is a discretionary proqram. opeates within basic paraJeter8 and specified reqired services 

and assistance to retugee5 that have ben developed based on 

extensive consultations with the participating agencies in the
 contex of the Refuge. Act and available appropriations. wi thin 

the Matching Grant guidelines, grant888 exercise considerable 

discretion in developinq moals to serve refugees accordinq to 

the needs of the refugees in the c01unities in which they 

reside, and which conform to the capacities ot the different 

agencies nationally and locally. Grantlili8 apply for funding and participate in that contex. They are not required to participata or to enroll all of their clients i. e., they are free 

to chao.. which refugees are best served by thia proqa1l.


aespD.. o Recoma8ndation8 

OYS Recommendation


While the KGP' s guidelines stat. that three goals of the progam 

are to help refuge.. (1) achieve econoaic self-sufficiency, (2) 

obtain early employment, and (3) achieve social adjustment, many 

affiliates believa that the.. goals conflict. For this reason 

a guidelines should be revised to more clearly define and


encourage program flexibility. a I :S \.:.: 7.. 


-;"i 

OlJ3dS I:l0 :i:f:: 

031\13::30 

A - 2

...

Paqe Two - June Gibbs Brown€

ACF RO&DOnSg€

These are indeed t.e goals ot the program. The Refuq.. Act requiras that all - resourc.. appropriated to the progaa be 

expended N ... in order to achieve economic selt-sufficiency among rafugees aa quickly a8 possible... " and that " employable 

refugees should be placed on jOb8 a. 800n as possible after their 

arrival in the United State8. N The Hatchinq Grant proqam'€

goal. are broad , but consistent with the Retuges- Act.€

As the report notes, wa have been flexible in how the goals are€

to be achieved in the program. Grantees are able to tailor€

.erlc.8 to a diverse refugee population.€

G Recomendation 

The ORR should develop performnca indicators by revising and€

exanding its cuent l1i!sUre and data collection techiques...€

Both long-ter and 4-month self-sut iciBncy measures should tae€

into account (1) the health of the locl economy, (2) services€

available in the community, (3) typ. of refugees se ed, and (4) 

affiliate enrollment policies. Besides economic seltsufficiency, other performnce indicatora could include the€

quality and inteqation ot services provided by volags, the€

extent to which the entire family receives serices, and social€

adjustment measure. such as refuqeea' English improvement and paricipation in acculturation activities. 

ACF ReSDonSB€

The data cuently beinq collected aeasure8 employaent, the€

cornerstone of the Refuqee Act. W. have revise measures to€

perit the aqencies to report as successful outcomes refugees€

employed or ..If-sufficient two months beyond the end ot the€

Beyond that, it would be difficult to discern outco.es€

tht would be attributable to the Matching Grant program.€ proqaa. €

OTG R eommend8tion€

The ORa should consider options to reduce the burden ot the match€ reqirement. . -. We reco end that ORR conduct a study to€

determine how the match requirement could be revised to reduce€

the paperwork burden on grantees without compromisinq Federal€

grant administration audit requirements.€

ACF Comment€

w. agree and have been working with the agencies in this regard.€

A - 3€
Page Three - June Gibbs Brown 

.ahDioa1 COma.D 

aTG S emBnt (p. 3) 

Acording to the guidelines, sffiliates should place amp lay able refugees in -appropriate" jobs as 800n aa po..1ble , and retugees 

must accept entry-level jobs. The ORR believes t an 

appropriate job is one that match.. a refuqe.l s physical .kill. an abiH ties. 

ACP Comment 

The guidelines actually state. "Federal policy requires that 

rather than resorting to public cash assistance. refugees must 

accept entry level employment. tI The intent ot the policy is to 

indicate that work at any level i8 preterable to welfare. 

ORR statee ite understandinq of appropriats employ.ent at 45 CFR

400. . "criteria tor appropriate employability serica. and 

employment. " These criteria .nco.pa.. broader parameters than 

physical skills and limitations and apply to all recipients of

refugee cash assistance. not just the Hatching Grant Progam. 

OIG S atement (c. 21 

Authorization for the HGP ie found in subpart (c) of 8 O. 

1522. .. The law states that the MGP es..ntially is designed to... 

ACF Comment 

The law does not specifically refer to the MGP in the referenced

subart. The law qivee general authority to the Director, ORR. 

to .aka grants and contracts with public or private nonprofit agencies. 

G statement tD. 31 

Refuqe8s who tind employment are eligible tor Medicaid or refug.. 

lIecical assistance for an additional 4 months even it their 

income exceeds a prograa s eligibility guidelines. 

ACP C mmf!nt 

45 CFR 400. 104 state. N If a refugee vbo is receiving refugee 88leal assistance becomes ineligible 80lely by reason of 

increased earnings tro. employment. the refug..' s medical 

aeeistance eliqibility shall be extended by a period of four 

months or until the refugee reaches the and 

irs . R ot his or her time 

eligibility period for refuqee .adical assistance... whichever 

comes 

A - 4€