22-659

U.S. v. Starling

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

____________________

August Term, 2022

Argued: May 3, 2023

Decided: August 4, 2023

No. 22-659

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CRISTAL STARLING,

Claimant-Appellant,

$8,040.00 UNITED STATES CURRENCY,

Defendant.

____________________

Before: KEARSE, JACOBS, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

Police officers seized just over $8,000 in a search of Cristal Starling’s home 

carried out as part of a drug trafficking investigation into her then-boyfriend, 

K.B. The local police turned over the funds to the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

Administration, which initiated an administrative forfeiture procedure to claim 
2

the funds as proceeds from drug sales. Acting pro se, Starling filed a claim to 

the assets, forcing the government to terminate its administrative seizure and 

open a judicial forfeiture proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the Western 

District of New York. She failed to timely oppose the ensuing judicial 

proceeding, and the clerk of court entered default against the funds.

Starling, still acting pro se, then sent several letters to the district court and 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking leave to file a belated claim to the seized 

assets. The district court (Siragusa, J.) held that Starling had not shown 

excusable neglect, denied her an extension of time to file a claim, and entered 

final default judgment against the seized assets.

We hold that the district court erred in granting default judgment to the 

government. Starling’s letters are properly viewed as seeking both to lift the 

entry of default and to be granted leave to file an untimely claim to the assets. 

So understood, Starling’s motion should have been assessed under the more 

permissive good cause standard, as is any other motion to lift entry of default in 

a civil suit.
3

We therefore VACATE the grant of the motion to strike and the entry of 

default judgment, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

____________________

ROBERT E. JOHNSON (Seth M. Young, on the brief), 

Institute for Justice, Shaker Heights, OH, for ClaimantAppellant.

MICHAEL A. ROTKER (Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant 

Attorney General, and Lisa H. Miller, Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, on the brief), United States 

Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Washington, 

DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Grace M. Carducci, Assistant United States Attorney, for 

Trini E. Ross, United States Attorney for the Western 

District of New York, Buffalo, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

Police officers seized just over $8,000 in a search of Cristal Starling’s home 

carried out as part of a drug trafficking investigation into her then-boyfriend, 

K.B.1 The local police turned over the funds to the U.S. Drug Enforcement 

1 Because he was apparently acquitted of all charges and his state court 

records are sealed, see N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 160.50, his name is omitted from 

this opinion.
4

Administration, which initiated an administrative forfeiture procedure to claim 

the funds as proceeds from drug sales. Acting pro se, Starling filed a claim to 

the assets, forcing the government to terminate its administrative seizure and 

open a judicial forfeiture proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the Western 

District of New York.

As required, the government provided notice of the forfeiture proceeding 

on its website and by mail sent directly to Starling. She claims to have missed

the notice, and after months went by without response to the judicial forfeiture 

action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of New York moved for 

entry of default against the seized currency. The clerk of court entered default.

Starling, still acting pro se, then sent several letters to the district court and 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking leave to file a belated claim to the seized 

assets. The district court (Siragusa, J.) held that Starling had not shown 

excusable neglect, denied her an extension of time to file a claim, and entered

default judgment against the seized assets.

On appeal, Starling argues principally that the district court erred by 

assessing her letters under the strict “excusable neglect” standard set out under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, rather than the more permissive “good cause” 
5

standard that typically applies when a party seeks to lift entry of default before 

default judgment has been granted.

We vacate the default judgment. The district court read Starling’s pro se

letters too narrowly as a motion to file an untimely claim, ignoring Starling’s 

request to lift the entry of default. Viewed properly as a motion seeking both 

forms of relief, we hold that the good cause standard applies and is satisfied.

I

After K.B. allegedly sold drugs to undercover officers as part of a state 

investigation into cocaine and fentanyl trafficking, police executed a warrant to 

search Starling’s apartment on West Main Street in Rochester, New York. There 

they seized “$7,500 United States Currency from the top dresser drawer of the 

master bedroom, [and] $540 United States Currency from the pants pocket of a 

pair of women’s jeans that were laying on the floor in the hallway adjacent to the 

master bedroom.” J.A. 7. Also found with the cash were two digital scales, ten 

strips of Suboxone (a prescription agonist/antagonist drug used to treat opioid 

addiction), and mail addressed to K.B. Substantial quantities of drugs were 

allegedly found at a different residence the government believed was connected 

to K.B., but not in Starling’s West Main Street residence. K.B. was arrested and
6

charged with state drug possession offenses, and local authorities turned over 

the seized funds to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to begin an 

administrative forfeiture proceeding.

Starling, acting pro se, filed a remission petition and an administrative 

claim against the seized funds pursuant to the DEA’s internal procedures. By 

operation of law, see 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(A), (3)(A), Starling’s claim terminated 

the DEA’s administrative forfeiture proceedings and required the government to 

initiate a judicial forfeiture action in the appropriate federal district court—in this 

case, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of New York filed a 

complaint against the seized funds in April 2021, alleging that they were 

proceeds of K.B.’s drug trafficking. The complaint acknowledged that Starling 

was interested in the seizure and had earlier filed a claim with the DEA. 

Consistent with its obligations under Supplemental Rule G to the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, which governs civil forfeiture actions, the government 

provided notice of the action by posting on the government’s forfeiture website 

for 30 days. It also sent, by Federal Express, a notice and copy of the complaint 
7

to Starling in June 2021.2 The notice required Starling to file a claim to the assets 

by July 16, 2021 (32 days after the notice was sent). Starling later explained that 

she did not receive the FedEx mailing because she “was vacationing in Las 

Vegas” at the time, J.A. 58, although it is uncontested that the documents were

successfully delivered to the West Main Street apartment.

In August, having heard nothing from Starling and no challenge to the 

forfeiture proceeding, the government moved for, and was granted, an entry of 

default. It moved for default judgment ten days later.

Roughly three months later, and before the government’s motion for 

default judgment had been granted, Starling sent the first of four undated letters 

to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the district court. Still acting pro se, Starling 

stated that the West Main Street apartment was her residence and that she was 

seeking return of the seized funds because K.B. had been acquitted. Id. at 40. 

At this point, the government apparently contacted Starling and offered to settle 

2 The government need not provide formal service of process in a civil 

forfeiture proceeding; it must only give notice “to any person who reasonably 

appears to be a potential claimant on the facts known to the government,” and it 

may do so by any “means reasonably calculated to reach the potential claimant.” 

Supp. R. G(4)(b)(i), (iii)(A).
8

the forfeiture action by splitting the funds, half to Starling and half for itself. 

Starling rejected the offer in a second letter, received by the district court a few 

days later, which declared that she “would like to move forward with court 

proceedings to have all of the funds returned to [her] promptly.” Id. at 41.

The government moved to strike her letters as an untimely claim to the 

assets, arguing that because she was “given direct notice of this action on June 

14, 2021, Starling’s claim was due on July 16, 2021.” Id. at 44 (emphasis 

omitted). Starling responded that her untimely claim should be allowed by the 

district court because she (i) had challenged the prior administrative proceeding, 

and (ii) “contacted and followed the advice of the district attorney presiding over 

the case that resulted in these monies being confiscated.” Id. at 48. The 

government responded with affidavits from the two assistant district attorneys 

who handled K.B.’s prosecution; one asserted that he had never communicated 

with Starling, but the other, Eleanor Biggers, made the (non-disprovable) 

assertion that she “d[id] not recall ever communicating with” Starling. Id. at 49–

56. Starling replied by offering a description and documents evidencing two 

conversations she allegedly had with Biggers concerning cars that were also 

seized in the search (but ultimately returned to Starling).
9

The district court interpreted Starling’s first and second letters as a claim to 

the defendant assets in the judicial forfeiture proceedings, and the third and 

fourth letters as an opposition and surreply to the government’s motion to strike. 

It took note of this Court’s holding in United States v. Cambio Exacto, S.A., that 

“[i]n order to contest a governmental forfeiture action, claimants must have both 

standing under the statute or statutes governing their claims and standing under 

Article III of the Constitution.” Id. at 71 (quoting 166 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 

1999)). Reasoning that this “[s]tatutory standing relates to a claimant’s ability to 

demonstrate compliance with the statutory and procedural requirements 

imposed by Congress,” the court held that Starling lacked statutory standing to 

oppose the forfeiture because she had failed to file a timely claim as required by 

Supplemental Rule G to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 71–74, 76.

The district court also considered whether Starling should be permitted to 

file a claim against the funds nunc pro tunc. It considered this question in terms

of “excusable neglect” and, applying this standard, it rejected the excuses 

Starling offered for her untimely claim, including that she (i) did not receive the 

FedEx notice, (ii) did not understand that she needed to separately challenge the 

judicial proceeding after challenging the administrative one, and (iii) had been 
10

informed by ADA Biggers that she could not challenge the forfeiture until the 

criminal case completed. The advice that Starling attributes to Biggers is a 

generally accurate statement of the law in New York state proceedings, where a 

forfeiture connected to a drug prosecution is stayed until the associated criminal 

case is completed. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1311(1)(b) (“An action under this 

paragraph shall be stayed during the pendency of a criminal action which is 

related to it.”). Assuming the conversation Starling alleges indeed took place, 

and given the fact that state—not federal—law enforcement officers initially 

seized the funds, the apparent confusion is understandable.

Having rejected as untimely the only claim filed against the defendant 

assets, the district court entered default judgment in favor of the United States. 

Starling now appeals. She argues principally that the district court erred by 

assessing her letters under the excusable neglect standard, rather than under the 

more permissive good cause standard.

II

Under Rule 55, default judgment begins with a motion by a party 

demonstrating that the non-movant has “failed to plead or otherwise defend.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Once that motion is granted, the clerk of court enters a 
11

default. Id. After default has been entered, the movant must apply for the 

entry of default judgment—a final adjudication of the claims—which process may 

entail factfinding or hearings by the district court to establish remedies or 

quantum. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); see also, e.g., Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 

(2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

Rule 55 sets out alternative standards that a defaulting party must satisfy 

in order to resist this process. If the missing party appears when the clerk of 

court has entered default but before final judgment has been entered, the district 

court “may set aside” the entry of default “for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). 

But if final judgment has already been entered, the delinquent party must attack 

the judgment under the exacting standards of Rule 60(b) by showing, among 

other things, excusable neglect. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Entry of 

default therefore operates as a final warning before the absent party suffers the 

hard consequences of a judgment.

Because Starling submitted her letters to the court before final judgment 

was entered, she asks that her challenge be construed, like any other to an entry 

of default, under the permissive “good cause” standard.
12

The government reads the Rules differently. Under Supplemental Rule 

G(5)(a), a party given direct notice of a forfeiture complaint must contest the 

complaint by filing a claim to the assets before the deadline specified in the direct 

notice. Supp. R. G(5)(a). Because Starling failed to file a claim within the 32 

days specified in the notice, the government argues, she is subject to Federal Rule 

6’s general principle that “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified 

time,” and “the time has expired,” the court may extend the deadline only “if the 

party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). (It 

does not appear that the government holds itself to the scrupulous punctuality 

that it demands of a pro se litigant.3)

3 Supplemental Rule G requires that the government fix the deadline for 

filing a responsive claim “at least 35 days after the notice is sent.” Supp. R. 

G(4)(b)(ii)(B) (emphasis added). The government’s notice of the forfeiture 

action was signed on June 11, 2021, J.A. 34, but by its own contention was not sent

until three days later, on June 14, 2021, id. at 37. If the government’s dates are 

accurate, then it was wrong to set any deadline for a responsive filing earlier 

than July 19, 2021, and the notice sent to Starling failed to comply with 

Supplemental Rule G by setting a deadline of July 16, 2021. This innocuous 

mistake merits indulgence, especially when it appears to have had no impact on 

Starling’s default. Still, it raises an eyebrow that the government demands that 

Starling’s claim be stricken for lack of “[s]trict compliance with [the rules].” Br.

of United States at 19–20 (quoting United States v. Amiel, 995 F.2d 367, 371 (2d 

Cir. 1993)) (second alteration in original).
13

III

The question in this appeal is whether the district court was required to 

use the “good cause” standard generally applicable to default under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), or to enforce, under Federal Rule 6’s “excusable 

neglect” standard, the strict requirements of the forfeiture-specific Supplemental 

Rule G.

A

Ascertaining the appropriate standard by which to assess Starling’s letters 

depends first on identifying the relief her letters sought. At the time Starling 

wrote to the district court and the U.S. Attorney’s Office, she was acting pro se. 

Parties have a right to self-representation, and “[i]mplicit” in this right “is an 

obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro 

se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of 

legal training.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). “While the 

right ‘does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural 

and substantive law,’ it should not be impaired by harsh application of technical 

rules.” Id. (quoting Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981)). District 

courts are therefore “directed to read pro se papers liberally.” Id. Because a 
14

default judgment may lead a pro se party’s entire case to founder on mistake or 

ignorance, a court’s discretion to grant default judgment is “circumscribed” as “a 

reflection of our oft-stated preference for resolving disputes on the merits.” 

Enron Oil Corp. v. Daikuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1993). To protect a pro se

litigant’s rights, therefore, we may be called upon to reverse a district court’s 

entry of default judgment, a decision ordinarily “left to the sound discretion of a 

district court,” even in cases where the abuse of discretion “was not glaring.” 

Id.

Starling initially challenged the civil forfeiture proceeding by two letters 

she submitted to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the district court. The first

stated that she was “writing to notify the courts that the defendant of the case 

stemming from the warrant execution, [K.B.], was recently acquitted of all 

charges,” and that she had “been advised to contact this office to have a motion 

filed on the docket to have [her] money be released and returned to [her].” J.A.

40. Her second letter stated that, rather than accept a settlement, she “would 

like to move forward with court proceedings to have all of the funds returned to 

[her] promptly,” that “this money being taken” had “caused a hardship for 

[her]” as “a single woman raising a medically fragile child with no outside 
15

support,” and that she believed that “due to all charges being thrown out and 

legal proceedings ceased, any property confiscated during the legal process 

should be returned to its rightful owner.” Id. at 41.

The district court deemed these letters to be an untimely motion to file “a 

claim on the defendant currency.” Id. at 67. This was true enough—the letters 

plainly communicate a claim to the seized funds. But they also communicate a 

desire to “move forward with court proceedings to have all of the funds 

returned.” Id. at 41. This is the plea of any tardy litigant trying to lift entry of 

default: She was ready to litigate and wanted to win. The district court was 

required to heed that message. See Traguth, 710 F.2d at 94–95. Even if Starling 

had not clearly expressed a desire to press on with the litigation, the letters 

cannot be read as limited to a motion for leave to file an untimely claim. Once

the entry of default was on the docket, final default judgment could be granted 

no matter what claims she sought to file. Construing the letter solely as a 

motion for late filing of her claim—without also viewing it as a motion to lift the 

default—means reading it as a motion for which no relief could be granted. 

This was error. See Meehan, 652 F.2d at 276.
16

B

Starling’s letters are therefore properly viewed as a dual motion, seeking 

both to lift the entry of default—ordinarily governed by the “good cause” 

standard of Rule 55(c)—and to file a claim against the seized funds—ordinarily 

governed by the “excusable neglect” standard of Rule 6. Supplemental Rule G 

does not specify which standard should prevail, and it is a question of first 

impression for this Court.

As the Sixth Circuit recognized when faced with the same question, there 

are “materially different standards in determining whether to excuse 

noncompliance or to adhere strictly to the rules.” United States v. $22,050.00 

U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 2010). On one hand, courts addressing 

“motions to set aside default under Rule 55(c) are extremely forgiving to the 

defaulting party and favor a policy of resolving cases on the merits instead of on 

the basis of procedural missteps.” Id.; see also, e.g., Meehan, 652 F.2d at 277 

(“While courts are entitled to enforce compliance with the time limits of the 

Rules by various means, the extreme sanction of a default judgment must remain 

a weapon of last, rather than first, resort.”). In contrast, “cases discussing 

motions to strike claims under Supplemental Rule G favor strict adherence to the 
17

rules and generally do not excuse even technical non-compliance with the rules.” 

$22,050.00 U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d at 322; see also, e.g., United States v. VazquezAlvarez, 760 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (requiring strict adherence 

to the procedural order dictated by Rule G).

The government asserts that Rule 6’s excusable neglect standard must 

apply because the rule “sets out procedural prerequisites and substantive 

standards for granting an extension of time depending on when the request [for 

an extension] was made.” Br. of the United States at 32. To consider untimely 

claims under the permissive good cause standard would, in its view, “attach no 

consequence to a litigant’s failure to request additional time in a timely manner.” 

Id. at 34. This is mistaken.

The text of Supplemental Rule G suggests that good cause is the 

appropriate standard. The rule sets deadlines for when a claim to the defendant 

assets “must be filed . . . [u]nless the court for good cause sets a different time.” 

Supp. R. G(5)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). It gives no indication that a harsher

standard should govern a later motion. And applying the standard to 

defaulting claimants would mirror the government’s burden when it seeks an 

extension of time to convert an administrative forfeiture proceeding into a 
18

judicial one. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A) (“[A] court . . . may extend the period 

for filing a complaint for good cause shown or upon agreement of the parties.”).

The government’s argument misapprehends how Rule 6 and Rule 55 

operate in the case of default. By definition, default may be entered only when 

a defendant has “failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Of 

course, a party cannot have failed to plead or defend when the deadline for 

pleading or defending has not yet passed. It cannot be that a single missed 

deadline is enough to displace the good cause standard of Rule 55 with the 

excusable neglect standard of Rule 6; if it were, there would never be a party able

to lift default under the lenient standard. This is not what the Rules, or our 

cases, contemplate. See, e.g., Meehan, 652 F.2d at 275–77 (district court erred by 

failing to apply Rule 55(c) standard when defendant had missed the deadline to 

file an answer by ten days). The government’s argument to the contrary is 

defective.4

4 The government understands a denial of Starling’s motion to flow 

naturally from this Court’s rule, set out in Cambio Exacto, that “[t]o establish 

statutory standing, a claimant asserting rights in property that has been seized 

and that is the subject of a forfeiture action in rem must file a verified claim 

within [the required number of] days after process has been executed, unless the 
19

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not supplanted unless they are in 

conflict with a provision of the supplemental rules. Amiel, 995 F.2d at 371. 

Nothing about Supplemental Rule G conflicts with the typical rule—set out in 

Rule 55—that good cause applies when a party seeks to lift an entry of default. 

And for the reasons explained above, the timeliness vel non of a claim cannot be 

sufficient, standing alone, to displace Rule 55.

Like the Sixth Circuit, we do not perceive “anything functionally different 

about civil forfeiture cases that compels us to treat untimely response in these 

court grants an extension.” 166 F.3d at 526 (citing Supplemental Rules for 

Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rule C(6)). But this was no obstacle to 

Starling’s motion. Even in Cambio Exacto we recognized that an untimely 

plaintiff lacks statutory standing “unless the court grants an extension,” and our 

cases have made clear that a nunc pro tunc filing is possible. Id. (emphasis 

added); see also, e.g., United States v. $417,143.48 U.S. Currency, 682 F. App’x 17, 

19 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (illustrating that claimants who lack statutory 

standing could be granted leave to file claims nunc pro tunc). What we have 

described as “statutory standing” operates as an obstacle only to dispositive 

motions which follow from establishing the initial claim. For example, a party 

must first establish that he is a claimant to the seized assets before he can move 

to dismiss the forfeiture action. See Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d at 197. We note 

that “statutory standing” does not implicate our jurisdiction, but the term is a 

“misleading” shorthand for asking “whether [a litigant] has a cause of action 

under the [relevant] statute.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 

Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 & n.4 (2014)
20

cases differently than untimely responses in all other civil cases.” $22,050.00 

U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d at 323. To the contrary, civil forfeiture procedure 

magnifies the importance of deciding such cases on the merits rather than by 

default. Civil forfeiture can “enable the government to seize . . . property 

without any predeprivation judicial process and to obtain forfeiture of the 

property even when the owner is personally innocent.” Leonard v. Texas, 580 

U.S. 1178, 1179 (2017) (statement of Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 

As was made clear in this case, the lax notice requirements allow the government 

to start the clock toward default judgment with perfunctory measures, such as 

ordinary mail, and by posting on a government forfeiture website that the 

citizenry has no reason to know of. See Supp. R. G(4). And because the typical 

forfeiture case concerns cash and goods with consequence to the deprived party 

but which rarely justify hiring a lawyer, a huge number of civil forfeiture cases

are fought by claimants acting pro se. See Louis S. Rulli, Prosecuting Civil Asset 

Forfeiture on Contingency Fees: Looking for Profit in All the Wrong Places, 72 

Ala. L. Rev. 531, 535 (2021) (observing that “civil forfeiture laws do not provide a 

right to counsel for the poor” and that “the government’s seizure of modest 

amounts of cash and vehicles often make it economically infeasible to hire a 
21

lawyer”). All this is driven by incentive: The authorities can pocket what they 

can seize by forfeit.5 Id. at 534, 546–48 (“Between 2001 and 2014, deposits in the 

U.S. Department of Justice and Treasury forfeiture accounts totaled almost $29 

billion.”).

Each of these reasons alone would be enough to compel trial courts to 

consider untimely claims with particular indulgence. We therefore hold that 

when, as in this case, a claimant with Article III standing seeks to file an untimely 

claim against seized assets after default has been entered but before default 

judgment has been granted, district courts should apply the “good cause” 

standard.

5 In eighteenth-century France, many imposts—the most hated being the 

gabelle and the octroi—were collected by tax farmers who kept a share of what 

they could take, to fantastic personal benefit. Eugene N. White, From Privatized 

to Government-Administered Tax Collection: Tax Farming in EighteenthCentury France, 57 Econ. Hist. Rev. 636, 645–48 (2004); Yves Durand, Finance et 

mécénat: Les Fermiers généraux au XVIIIe siècle 14–16, 61–65, 190–91 (1976). 

The abuse of the fermiers généraux was a spark that lit the French Revolution.

See Jean Clinquart, Les services extérieurs de la Ferme générale à la fin de 

l’Ancien Régime 239–44 (1995) (describing the ventilation of popular anger 

toward the Ferme in the summer of 1789); Durand, supra, 195–99 (“[L]es cahiers 

de doléances pour les Etats [généraux] de 1789 contiennent de très nombreuses 

allusions aux financiers et à la Ferme. . . . On enregistre partout la condamnation 

du système d’impôts, de la Ferme et des fermiers généraux.”).
22

IV

Applying the good cause standard, we conclude that the district court 

should have lifted the entry of default and permitted Starling to file her claim to 

the assets. The district court assessed Starling’s motion under the excusable 

neglect standard, which considers “the danger of prejudice to the nonmovant, 

the length of the delay and its impact on proceedings, the reason for the delay 

including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and 

whether the movant acted in good faith.” J.A. 73 (quoting United States v. 

$541,395.06 U.S. Currency, No. 10-CV-6555, 2012 WL 3614294, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 

Aug. 21, 2012)). In contrast, the good cause standard considers three factors: (i) 

the willfulness of the defaulting party, (ii) prejudice to the non-movant, and (iii) 

whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense. Meehan, 652 F.2d at 

277. While excusable neglect penalizes negligent parties for failing to prosecute 

their cases, the good cause standard attaches consequences only to bad faith or

tactical violations of court orders. See, e.g., Action S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 

951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (default would not be vacated where movant 

“admit[ted] he deliberately chose not to appear in the action”).
23

The good cause factors overwhelmingly favor Starling. Willfulness in the 

default judgment context looks to “egregious or deliberate conduct,” and even 

“grossly negligent” actions do not necessarily qualify. Am. All. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. 

Eagle Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We see no reason to expand this 

Court’s willfulness standard to include careless or negligent errors in the default 

judgment context.”). The government does not suggest Starling was acting in 

bad faith; at worst, she was negligent in prosecuting her claim, having relied on 

advice from a state prosecutor—sound as to New York forfeiture law—that she 

could not make a claim until K.B. was acquitted. As to prejudice, the 

government has made no effort to show its interests would be harmed by having

to defend a forfeiture suit against a claimant it knew of from the beginning. See

Meehan, 652 F.2d at 277 (good cause satisfied where, among other things, “[t]he 

appellees neither claimed nor proved prejudice”); United States v. $103,387.27 

U.S. Currency, 863 F.2d 555, 562 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[W]here the putative claimants 

have placed the court and the government on notice of their interest in the 

property and their intent to contest the forfeiture, courts will grant extensions of 

time, recognizing both the good-faith effort put forth and the lack of prejudice to 

the government under such circumstances.”).
24

As to the existence of a meritorious defense, Starling was never charged 

with a crime, let alone convicted. She should have the opportunity to show that 

she was an innocent owner. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (“An innocent owner’s 

interest in property shall not be forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute.”); see 

also United States v. $185,336.07 U.S. Currency, 731 F.3d 189, 197–98 (2d Cir. 

2013) (reversing forfeiture judgment because of “the weakness of the 

government’s case” to establish that all of the defendant funds were connected to 

drug sales).

Because each factor weighs in Starling’s favor, we hold that she has 

demonstrated the good cause necessary to lift entry of default and file a belated 

claim to the defendant assets.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons we VACATE the grant of the motion to strike and the 

entry of default judgment, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.