UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4287

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARLON DANILLO VIERA, a/k/a Marlon Caranza-Dera,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (5:15-cr-00377-F-1)

Submitted: December 28, 2016 Decided: January 6, 2017

Before TRAXLER, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine 

L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM

Based on Marlon Danillo Viera’s guilty plea to illegal 

reentry, the district court revoked his supervised release for a 

prior offense and sentenced him to 10 months’ imprisonment. The 

court ordered Viera to serve his revocation sentence consecutive 

to his 30-month sentence for illegal reentry. Viera appeals, 

arguing that the district court erred when it ordered the 

revocation sentence to run consecutively. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

We will affirm a revocation sentence if it falls within the 

applicable statutory maximum and is not “plainly unreasonable.” 

United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). Under this standard, we first 

determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th 

Cir. 2013). In doing so, “we strike a more deferential 

appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences.” 

Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Only if we find the sentence unreasonable must we decide 

whether it is plainly so.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 640 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court considered the policy statements in Chapter Seven 

of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the policy-statement range,
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and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. Padgett, 

788 F.3d at 373; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). A revocation 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court 

identified a proper basis for its sentence. United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). We presume 

reasonable a sentence within the applicable range. Padgett, 788 

F.3d at 373.

Here, the district court imposed a reasonable revocation 

sentence. Upon revoking Viera’s supervised release, the 

district court considered the appropriate factors under Chapter 

7 and § 3553(a) and sentenced Viera to a sentence within the 

policy-statement range. The court also identified a proper 

basis for the sentence based on Viera’s pattern of illegal 

conduct while under supervised release. Moreover, contrary to 

Viera’s contention, the court did not err by imposing a 

consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation merely 

because the same conduct provided the basis for a separate 

criminal conviction. See United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 

115, 118 (4th Cir. 1998). Because the district court imposed a 

reasonable revocation sentence, we decline to overturn it on 

appeal.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED