NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT V. WARD; CHRISTA WARD, Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

AAA PHOTO SAFETY, INC, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0158 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CV2013-011464 

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

APPEARANCES 

Robert V. Ward, Plaintiff/Appellant, Chandler 

And 

Robert V. Ward, Attorney at Law, Chandler 

By Robert V. Ward 

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants 

The Law Office of JD Dobbins PLLC, Mesa 

By Joe D. Dobbins, Jr. 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
WARD v. AAA PHOTO 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined. 

G E M M I L L, Judge: 

¶1 Robert and Christa Ward (“the Wards”), father and daughter, 

appeal the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of AAA Photo Safety, 

Inc. (“AAA”).

BACKGROUND1

¶2 The Wards filed a complaint in superior court against AAA 

alleging that AAA negligently provided its employee, David Dixon, with 

the wrong address to serve legal process on Christa, and that Dixon served 

legal process on Christa at Robert’s residence even though Robert advised 

Dixon that Christa did not live at that address. The complaint further 

alleged that because of Dixon’s improper service,

2 a default judgment was 

 

1 “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, ‘viewing the evidence 

and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

the motion.’” Felipe v. Theme Tech Corp., 235 Ariz. 520, 528, ¶ 31 (App. 2014) 

(quoting Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12 (2003)). 

2 The declaration of service filed by AAA and signed by Dixon said: 

On Thu, Mar 10 2011 at 05:53 PM I personally served true 

copies of these documents [summons and complaint] upon 

the Defendant CHRISTA WARD by leaving true copies at the 

Defendant’s place of Residence with the Defendant(s) coresident who is of suitable age and discretion and resides 

therein. The defendant’s vehicle, a TOYT, Arizona license 

499YXS, was observed at the service address at the time of 

service. The described male claimed the defendant did not live at 

the residence. I pointed out that the vehicle named in the citation 

was in the driveway, and notified him I would leave the documents. 

He closed the door and I left the documents at the door. (emphasis 

and bracketed material added).
WARD v. AAA PHOTO 

Decision of the Court 

3

entered against Christa and she was forced to retain counsel to set aside the 

judgment for lack of service. The complaint finally alleged that Christa and 

Robert had suffered mental, emotional, and financial injuries as a result. 

¶3 AAA filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming first 

that no duty existed for AAA or Dixon to investigate the address provided 

them by the Tempe Police Department; second, that AAA and Dixon acted 

reasonably; and finally, Dixon was an independent contractor and therefore 

his actions could not be imputed to AAA. The trial court granted AAA’s 

motion for summary judgment but did not specify under which theory or 

theories it was ruling. The Wards timely appeal, and we have jurisdiction 

in accordance with Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-

120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1). 

ANALYSIS

¶4 Summary judgment is appropriate if the there are no genuine 

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We will affirm a grant of summary 

judgment if “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so 

little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that 

reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the 

proponent.” Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990). 

¶5 The Wards present several arguments. First, they allege the 

trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there was evidence 

showing a genuine issue of fact regarding AAA’s negligence. The Wards 

also claim the trial court erred because there was a genuine issue of fact and 

law regarding whether Dixon was an employee or independent contractor. 

Next, the Wards contend that the trial court erroneously implicitly granted 

summary judgment based on collateral estoppel. Finally, the Wards assert 

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their request for oral 

argument. 

I. AAA’s Alleged Negligence 

¶6 An action for negligence requires a recognized duty, a breach 

of that duty, and a causal connection between that breach and actual injury 

or damage. Shaw v. Petersen, 169 Ariz. 559, 561 (App. 1991). This court has 

previously held that a “process server should be held to a degree of liability 

commensurate with his responsibility and he is liable for negligence in 

making a false return as well as for the willful making of such return.” 
WARD v. AAA PHOTO 

Decision of the Court 

4

Marsh v. Hawkins, 7 Ariz. App. 226, 229 (1968). A process server is not, 

however, “an absolute insurer of the truth of the return.” Id. (rejecting strict 

liability for the filing of a false or incorrect affidavit of service).

¶7 The Wards alleged in their complaint that AAA breached its 

duty by providing Dixon with the wrong address for Christa when a basic 

investigation would have shown that she did not live there. The Wards also 

alleged that when Dixon was informed that Christa did not reside at that 

address, he owed her a duty to investigate further to identify her address, 

and that Dixon’s actions and omissions are imputed to AAA. 

¶8 Collateral estoppel bars the Wards’ claim that Dixon was 

negligent. “Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies when an issue 

was actually litigated in a previous proceeding, there was a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issue, resolution of the issue was essential to the 

decision, a valid and final decision on the merits was entered, and there is 

common identity of parties.” Hullett v. Cousin, 204 Ariz. 292, 297–98, ¶ 27 

(2003). 

¶9 Before this action was filed against AAA, the Wards filed a 

complaint in superior court against Dixon alleging a violation of the 

Arizona Code of Judicial Administration’s provisions governing licensed 

process servers. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding 

that complaint. On the issue of whether Dixon knew or should have known 

the falsity of the declaration, the trial court found that Dixon “acted 

reasonably to make the Municipal Court and Prosecutor aware that Ms. 

Ward might not reside at the address in question.”3 That proceeding was 

between the Wards and Dixon (AAA’s purported employee), the Wards 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate Dixon’s actions, the issue of 

whether Dixon acted reasonably was essential to the decision, and the court 

made a final decision in Dixon’s favor on the merits. The Wards’ claim 

against AAA based on vicarious liability for Dixon’s alleged negligence is 

therefore precluded. See DeGraff v. Smith, 62 Ariz. 261, 265–66 (1945) (an 

employer cannot be held liable for the actions of his employee under 

respondeat superior if such actions were exonerated); Law v. Verde Valley Med. 

 

3 The trial court also found that the interchange between Robert and Dixon 

“was sufficient to alert [Dixon] that the information he had been given 

might not be correct, but that [Dixon] acted properly by providing 

cautionary information in his Declaration for the consideration of the 

Tempe Prosecutor and Court.”
WARD v. AAA PHOTO 

Decision of the Court 

5

Ctr., 217 Ariz. 92, 94–96, ¶¶ 8–13 (App. 2007) (discussing and applying 

principles from DeGraff).

¶10 The Wards also contend that AAA was independently 

negligent for providing Dixon with the wrong address. When the law 

imposes a duty upon a party because of his specialized profession or 

occupation, the standard of care and breach thereof must be established by 

the evidence. See Powder Horn Nursery, Inc. v. Soil & Plant Laboratory, Inc., 

119 Ariz. 78, 83 (App. 1978). 

¶11 The Wards presented such minimal evidence of the standard 

of care, or AAA’s breach thereof, that a reasonable jury could not have 

found liability. See Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143 n.1, ¶ 9 (2007) 

(“summary judgment may be appropriate if no reasonable juror could 

conclude that the standard of care was breached”). The record shows that 

AAA received the address from Redflex, a company that contracted with 

the City of Tempe to detect and report speeding and red light violations. 

Redflex received the citation and information from the Tempe Police 

Department and passed it on to AAA for service of process with the address 

and picture pre-populated on the citation. Redflex is not a party to this 

appeal and AAA was not contractually responsible for investigating or 

obtaining the name or address of the individual to be served. The Wards

did not therefore produce evidence of the standard of care nor a breach 

thereof on the part of AAA to obtain or research the address of the 

individual to be served. 

¶12 The Wards submitted an affidavit from Ronald Ezell,4 a 

service of process expert, in which Ezell said the declaration filed by AAA 

without Dixon’s review was technically from AAA, not Dixon, and that 

Dixon failed to make an independent confirmation of Christa’s residence.5

 

4 AAA argues in its reply that the affidavit from Ezell was produced after 

the close of discovery and should not be considered. Whether or not it was 

properly considered, however, does not affect our analysis. 

5 Ezell’s affidavit states:

[T]he Declaration of Service is invalid and should not have 

been filed with the Tempe Municipal Court for two principal 

reasons, a) the Declaration was prepared by AAA Photo 

Safety, Inc, and submitted to the Court without the process 
WARD v. AAA PHOTO 

Decision of the Court 

6

The ruling dismissing the administrative complaint against Dixon, 

however, makes it clear that Dixon was reasonable in assuming the address 

he was given was Christa’s because the vehicle she had been driving at the 

time of the violation was parked in Robert’s driveway, and AAA had no 

reason to believe otherwise based on Dixon’s report.

¶13 Finally, the Marsh opinion imposes a duty on a process server 

to avoid negligently or willfully filing a false return. 7 Ariz. App. at 229. 

The return authored by Dixon and filed by AAA explained the encounter 

with Mr. Ward and was neither negligently nor willfully false. 

¶14 On this record and for these reasons, the trial court did not err 

in granting summary judgment in favor of AAA on the Wards’ claims of 

negligence. 

II. Oral Argument 

¶15 The Wards also assert that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it declined to grant their request for oral argument. They allege that 

“failure of the court to grant oral argument was prejudicial because it 

prevented [the Wards] from providing additional argument, clarification 

and persuasion.” The Wards do not provide any detail as to what such 

“argument, clarification and persuasion” would have been.

¶16 There is no automatic right to oral argument on motions for 

summary judgment. Furthermore, Rule 7.1(c)(2) of the Arizona Rules of 

Civil Procedure gives a trial court discretion to “expedite its business” by 

making determinations on motions without holding oral argument. The 

Wards were therefore not entitled to oral argument on AAA’s motion. 

 

server’s review as pursuant to the transcript prepared by 

AVTRANZ, and therefore, not a Declaration of Service from 

the process server but from the company, and b) the process 

server failed to make any independent confirmation of “the 

Defendant’s place of Residence”, by contacting a neighbor or 

otherwise, after the “described (adult) male claimed the 

defendant did not live at the residence”.

Undisputed evidence shows that Dixon did not merely leave the 

papers at the home but had independently verified that the vehicle 

Christa was driving when photographed by the traffic camera was 

parked in the driveway. 
WARD v. AAA PHOTO 

Decision of the Court 

7

ATTORNEY FEES 

¶17 AAA requests attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(3), 

asserting the Wards unreasonably expanded the scope of litigation by 

appealing. Under § 12-349(A)(3) a court may award reasonable attorney 

fees if a party “[u]nreasonably expands or delays the proceeding.” 

Although we have not found the Wards’ claims to be persuasive, neither do 

we conclude that the Wards have unreasonably expanded or delayed the 

proceeding by asserting this appeal. We therefore decline to award 

attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(3). AAA is entitled to an award of 

its taxable costs on appeal, upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil 

Appellate Procedure 21. 

CONCLUSION 

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court in favor of AAA.