No. 82-212 

IN THE SUPREI~IE COURT OF THE S.TATE OF FIONTANA 

1982 

CHARLES SHANNON, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

DONALD E. HULETT, EAST VALLEY TRUCI<ING, 

and STEVEN LUKSHA, 

Defendants and Apsellants. 

Ap2eal from: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Jefferson, The IIonorable 

Frank Blair, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellants: 

Corette, Smith, Pohlrnan & Allen; Robert Carlson, 

Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

John L. Peterson, Butte, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: September 9, 1982 

Decided: January 19, 1983 
. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Defendants appeal an order of the Jefferson County District 

Court granting pla.intiff a new trial after a jury returned a defense 

verdict in a personal injury case. Although defendants raise 

several issues concerning a claim that the trial court abused its 

discretion, we decline to decide the case on the merits at this time 

because the trial court, in granting a new trial, failed to canply 

with Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ.P., which requires that: 

"Any ord-er of the court granting a new trial, shall 

specify the grounds therefor with sufficient 

particularity as to aprise the parties and the 

appellate court of the rationale underlying the ruling, 

and this may be done in the body of the order, or in an 

attached mrandum. " 

In granting a new trial the court entered an order me1e.1-y 

stating that "on good cause shown the motion by plaintiff for a new 

trial is hereby granted. " The defendants then apaled, and three 

and a half months after the notice of appeal was filed, the trial 

court filed a document with +this Court entitled "Certification of 

Issues on Apal in Granting Motion for a New Trial." This 

document, prepared by plaintiff's counsel, sets forth +the reasons 

the trial court granted a new trial. For policy reasons, we decline 

to consider that order which attempts to relate back to the originalorder grantina a new trial. 

In Churchhill v. Holly Sugar Corp. (19811, Mont . I 

629 P.2d 758, 38 St.Rep. 860, we held that amended findings of fact 

filed after a notice of appeal has been filed cannot be considered. 

The policy reasons underlying this holding also apply here. 

In addition, in Ballantyne ~7. Anaconda Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 

406, 574 P.2d 582, because the trial court had fa.iled to comply with 

Rule 59(f) in granting a new trial, we remanded to the trial court 

to enter reasons for granting a new trial. After this was done the 

case wzs not again appealed to this Court. Rule 59 (f) assures that 
+his Court will not have to guess at a trial court's reasons for 

granting a new trial, that we will not have to search for the 

~roverbial needle in the haystack. Further, where reasons are 

absent it is difficult to determine whether the trial court properly 

exercised its discretion in granting a new trial. The rule provides 

an imprtant safeguard to the trial court's use of discretion. 

Requiring reasons means that the trial court must discipline its 

thinking in the process of considerinq the claimed reasons a new 

trial should be granted. This process should result in a higher 

probability that a proper decision will he reached. The costs of a 

new trial in many cases are significant; the tria.1 court owes a duty 

to the litigants, to the public, and to this Court, to follow these 

safeguards in determining whether a new trial should be granted. 

We are aware that \re accepted a so-called later certificati-on 

of reasons for granting a new trial in Giles v. Flint Valley Forest 

Products (1979), 179 Mont. 382, 588 P.2d 535, and held that the late 

certification nonetheless fulfilled the policy behind Rule 59(f). 

To the extent Giles is inconsistent with our holding here, it is 

0~7errul.ed. An order, whether prepared by an attorney for the trial 

court's signature, or an order prepared bv the trial court itself, 

entered after the decision granting a new trial, fails to disclose 

the reasoning process used in reaching the decision to grant a new 

trial. To he of value, that reasoning process must precede the 

order granting a new trial and it must be set forth in writing at 

least simul~taneously with the orcler granting the new trial. 

We dismiss the appeal without prejudice and remand the case to 

the trial court for reconsideration and entry of an order in 

compliance with Rule 59 ( f) . 
We Concur: 

Chief Justice 
fir. Chief Justice FranK I. Haswell, dissenting: 

The majority hold that a subsequent certification of 

the reasons why the District Court granted a new trial is 

ineffective and remand the case back to the District Court 

for reconslderatlon. 

In my view thls rullng exalts form over substance, 

technicality over purpose, and is quite unrealistic. The 

result is delay in final disposition of cases, an unnecessary burden on Montana's District Courts, many of which are 

alreaay staggering under unmanageable caseloads, and promotes only an academic and theoretical objective. 

We already have before us for review the Distrlct 

Court's order granting a new trial and the District Court's 

reasons for that order. If the majority feel the order 

granting a new trial is erroneous, this Court can so rule on 

appeal. What is accomplished by remanding the case back to 

the District Court for entry of another order with contemporaneous reasons therefor? 1s it realistic to think that 

anything of substance will be changed in this process? The 

Dlstrlct Court has already ruled and given its reasons. 

I would follow our prior decision in Giles v. Flint 

Valley Forest Products (1953), 179 Mont. 382, 588 P.2d 535, 

holding that later certification of the reasons for an order 

yrantlng a new trial satisfies the purpose and policy behind 

Rule 59(b), M.R.Civ.P. The District Court's order is either 

correct or incorrect. It is our duty to determine this on 

appeal. 

%.AOUe.p, & 

Chief usl lice