IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0094

Filed October 15, 2014

Upon the Petition of

KYLE L. DRYSDALE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning

CANDICE ABBOTT,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert Hutchison, 

Judge. 

Father appeals the court’s award of physical care to the mother. He also 

claims the court erred in its disposition of the child’s uninsured medical 

expenses. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED. 

Eric Borseth of Borseth Law Office, Altoona, for appellant.

Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, J.

Kyle Drysdale appeals from a district court ruling granting physical care to 

Candice Abbott. He also appeals the order requiring him to pay the first $500 of 

uninsured medical expenses. Candice requests appellate attorney fees. We find 

the amount of uninsured medical expenses ordered is incorrect and remand for 

entry of an appropriate order consistent with this opinion. We affirm the decision 

of the district court concerning physical care and deny Candice’s request for

appellate attorney fees. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Kyle Drysdale and Candice Abbott are the parents of one child, N.D., born 

in 2006. Kyle and Candice were never married. Their romantic relationship 

began in 2006 and ended in 2012. Frequent breakups marked the couples’ 

tumultuous relationship. After the final breakup in 2012, the couple has been 

unwilling to effectively communicate. 

We incorporate the district court’s background of the parties:

Kyle is 27 years of age, and has never been married; N.D. is 

his only child. Candice is 26 years of age, and has also never been 

married; N.D. is her only child as well. . . . the parties agreed that 

paternity had never been established in Kyle for the child before the 

filing of this action. Kyle was not listed as the father on N.D.’s birth 

certificate, nor was there ever an affidavit of paternity prepared. 

However, the parties agree that Kyle should be established as

N.D.’s father.

The history of the parties to this case is an important factor 

for the Court in determining the proper resolution of the dispute 

presented here. Kyle was born and raised in Winterset, Iowa, 

graduating from high school there in 2004. Kyle testified that he 

moved out of his parents' home when he was 17, prior to 

graduating from high school, simply because he was ready to be on 

his own. He met Candice in the spring of 2005. At that point, she 

was still in high school and was 17. They moved in together in 
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September 2005. At this point, Candice was 18, but was still in 

high school. It was not long before Candice became pregnant; as 

stated above, N.D. was born in June 2006.

At the time Kyle and Candice began living together, they 

were residing in Winterset. Kyle was working as a welder in 

Winterset. In 2006 Kyle purchased a small home in St. Charles, 

Iowa (which is near Winterset), and the parties moved there 

together. Kyle continued to work in Winterset until April 2008 when 

he took a better paying job as a welder in Des Moines, where he

continues to work at present. He currently earns $21.15 per hour. 

Although he has earned overtime pay in the past, Kyle testified that 

he currently receives little overtime. Kyle's basic work hours are 

8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., although he stated his employer is very 

flexible with work hours to accommodate family needs. He further 

testified that although health insurance is offered through his 

employment, he is not covered by that insurance. Rather he stated 

that he had obtained a separate health insurance plan through

Farm Bureau with Wellmark at a cost of $125 per month.

In August 2012 Kyle purchased the home where he currently

resides, located in Des Moines, Iowa. At that point, Kyle, Candice 

and N.D. were living together, and they all moved from St. Charles 

to Des Moines. Kyle testified that the primary reasons for the move 

were that he wanted to be closer to his employment and wanted to 

live in a bigger city. The move cut Kyle’s commute from 

approximately 40 minutes to approximately 10 minutes. Kyle’s 

home is located in the Saydel School District. N.D. attended school 

in Saydel during the fall semester of 2012. The remainder of his 

schooling has been in Winterset. No one resides at the Des 

Moines address except Kyle and N.D., during the time he is with 

Kyle.

Candice currently resides in Winterset, Iowa. She lives in

the apartment with N.D., and has no other roommates. She is 

currently employed as a bartender in Winterset; she has worked 

there since February 14, 2013. Candice works Monday and 

Tuesday from 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., alternate Wednesdays from 

12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. and Saturday and Sunday from 10:00 a.m. 

to 6:00 p.m. She earns $7.50 per hour plus tips, and estimates her 

earnings to be $10 to $12 per hour. Candice states that she gets 

home at approximately 6:15 p.m. on the days she works, and that

N.D.’s bedtime at her home is 8:30 p.m.

An order on temporary matters was entered February 25,

2013. According to the terms of that order, N.D. was to be with 

Candice from Monday morning at 7:00 a.m. to Friday at 6:00 p.m. 

The child was to be with Kyle from Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. to

Monday morning at 7:00 a.m. Because N.D. has been attending 

school in Winterset, Kyle has elected to spend every Sunday 
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evening with his parents in Winterset. This has allowed the child to 

have weekly contact with his paternal grandparents, with whom the

Court finds N.D. has a close relationship. In addition, it has allowed 

the child to return to his mother’s care on Monday morning at 7:00 

a.m. without having to arise at a very early hour.

On November 25, 2013 the court entered a decree granting the parties 

joint legal custody of N.D., with physical care given to Candice. The court 

created a visitation schedule substantially similar to the arrangement set out in

the February order. However, the court allowed Kyle a midweek visit from 5:30

p.m. to 7:30 p.m., and granted Candice visitation every third weekend. The court 

also created a plan for summer and holiday visitation. Kyle was ordered to pay 

$587.33 in monthly child support, to provide for N.D.’s health insurance at a cost 

of $125 per month and pay the first $500 of any uninsured medical expense. 

The court allowed Kyle to claim N.D. as a dependent for tax purposes if he 

remained current on his other obligations. The court ordered Kyle to pay $3500 

in attorney fees to Candice, and taxed two-thirds of the court costs to Kyle and 

one-third to Candice. 

Kyle appeals the district court’s order granting physical care to Candice. 

He claims the court erred in failing to consider various defects in Candice’s ability 

to provide a stable environment for N.D. He believes he is in a better position to 

support N.D. Additionally, Kyle claims the court erred in ordering him to pay the 

first $500 in uninsured medical expenses. He seeks to lower his payment to 

$250 and require Candice to contribute $250. Candice asks us to affirm the 

district court and award her appellate attorney fees. 
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II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

We review decisions on child custody de novo. In re Marriage of Hynick,

727 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Iowa 2007). We have a duty to examine the entire record 

and adjudicate anew the rights on the issues properly presented. In re Marriage 

of Williams, 589 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). Generally, we give 

considerable deference to the district court's credibility determinations because 

the court has a firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence and view the 

witnesses. In re Marriage of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1992).

III. ANALYSIS.

A. Physical Care

Kyle claims the court erred in granting physical care to Candice. In 

matters of child custody, the first and foremost consideration “is the best interest 

of the child involved.” In re Marriage of Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 

1983); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o). The Iowa Code provides a 

nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in determining a custodial 

arrangement that is in the best interest of a child. Iowa Code § 598.41(3) (2013); 

In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa 2007). We also look to the 

non-exclusive considerations in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–

67 (Iowa 1974) (including the needs of the child, the characteristics of the 

parents, the relationship between the child and each parent, and the stability and 

wholesomeness of the proposed environment). The goal is to assure the child 

“the opportunity for the maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with 

both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved the marriage.” Iowa 
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Code § 598.41(1)(a). We seek to place the child in the environment “most likely 

to bring [the child] to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” 

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695.

In seeking to overturn the court’s grant of physical care to Candice, Kyle 

raises multiple assertions, most of which amount to personal attacks on 

Candice’s character, and are irrelevant in assessing N.D.’s best interests. In 

drawing our own conclusions, we evaluate the decision de novo while giving 

appropriate deference to the court. 

The trial court partially relied on the findings of a court-appointed custody 

evaluator in determining N.D.’s best interests. The evaluator assessed Kyle, 

Candice, and N.D. In her conclusions, the evaluator found Candice more

suitable as the primary physical custodian of N.D. due to her strong emotional 

connection with N.D. While the evaluator praised Kyle’s stable housing and 

employment record, the evaluator noted a parent’s ability to attend to the 

emotional and physical needs of the child carries more significance. The district 

court agreed with the evaluator’s assessment. Moreover, the court noted its 

“reservations about joint legal care.” The court stated its disapproval of the 

couples’ inability to communicate, and their tendency to speak ill of each other in 

the presence of N.D. The court also expressed concern about the instances of 

Kyle’s emotional and financial control over Candice. The court found Kyle used 

his superior income status to control Candice’s activities and stated: “These are 

classic symptoms of domestic abuse and controlling behaviors, and constitute a 
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major warning flag.” The custody evaluator echoed this sentiment in her report. 

The court did note no evidence of actual physical abuse had been alleged.

Based on our de novo review of the record, we affirm the court’s award of

primary physical care to Candice. 

B. Uninsured Medical Expenses

Based on the income figures the district court ordered Kyle to pay the first 

$500 of N.D.’s uninsured medical expenses. Once the $500 is satisfied, the 

parents will pay based on their respective incomes. Kyle takes issue with this 

portion of the decree and claims the district court did not properly follow the child 

support guidelines. 

The guidelines provide: 

Uncovered medical expenses means all medical expenses for the 

child(ren) not paid by insurance. . . . [T]he custodial parent shall 

pay the first $250 per year per child of uncovered medical 

expenses up to a maximum of $800 per year for all children. 

Uncovered medical expenses in excess of $250 per child or a 

maximum of $800 per year for all children shall be paid by the 

parents in proportion to their respective net incomes.

Iowa Ct. R. 9.12(5). Rule 9.12 provides the custodial parent “shall pay.” The 

word “shall” imposes a duty. Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a). The word “shall” does not 

mean “may.” State v. Luckett, 387 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Iowa 1986). The district 

court improperly ordered Kyle to pay the first $500 in uncovered medical 

expenses. As the custodial parent, Candice is responsible for the first $250 in 

uncovered medical expenses. Once the $250 is reached, the parents will pay “in 

proportion to their respective net incomes.” 
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C. Appellate Attorney Fees

Candice asks for appellate attorney fees. The right to recover attorney 

fees does not exist at common law, and fees are not to be allowed absent “a 

statute or agreement expressly authorizing it.” Van Sloun v. Agans Bros., Inc.,

778 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Iowa 2010). Iowa Code section 600B.26 gives this court 

the discretion to award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees. The 

decision to award appellate attorney fees rest in our discretion, and we will 

consider “the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party 

to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the 

trial court’s decision on appeal.” In re Fiscus, 819 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Iowa 2012). 

We decline to award appellate attorney fees to Candice in this matter. The costs 

of this action are assessed equally to the parties.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.

Vogel, J., concurs; Danilson, C.J., concurs specially.
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DANILSON, C.J. (concurring specially)

I concur specially because, unlike the majority and the district court, I do 

not believe Kyle’s evidence or arguments were overly critical of or an unfair 

attack upon Candice’s character. Kyle attempted to distinguish himself from 

Candice as a better caretaker for their minor child by showing his stability and 

Candice’s instability. 

Stability of each parent remains a factor in determining which parent can 

provide the “long range best interest of the [child].” See Winter, 223 N.W. 2d at

166-167. Our supreme court cited Winter in stating, “Although Iowa Code 

section 598.41(3) does not directly apply to physical care decisions, we have 

held that the factors listed here as well as other facts and circumstances are 

relevant in determining whether joint physical care is in the best interest of the 

child.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 697. Our case law is also inundated with 

references to a parent’s stability as it relates to stability of residence, 

employment, support systems, relationships, caretaking, financial health, and 

mental health.1

Here, Candice had a history of poor stability of residence and 

employment. Kyle contended Candice had fifteen residences and thirteen jobs 

since 2005, and his contentions appear reasonably supported. Because a 

parent’s stability is a factor in making a physical care decision, Candice’s many 

residences and jobs were fair game for Kyle to address. He should not be 

criticized for the extended discussion or presentation of such evidence. Rather 

 

1 Citations to all such case law would be so extensive as to be prohibitive.
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than describing Kyle as being highly critical of Candice, the district court and the 

majority should have acknowledged Candice’s significant instability of residence 

and employment and determined whether other factors outweighed her 

instability. 

I concur with the majority’s ruling, but find the decision close. I conclude 

that the factors weighing against Candice—including her suspect support 

system—are outweighed by other factors, such as Kyle’s somewhat controlling 

demeanor and Candice’s ability to provide better emotional support for the child. 

I also note that a custody evaluator and the district court had the opportunity to 

view the demeanor of the parents. See In re Marriage of Engler, 503 N.W.2d 

623, 625 (Iowa 1993). (“The trial court had the parties before it and was able to 

observe their demeanor and was in a better position than we are to evaluate 

them as custodians.”).