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NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL 

JAMES CLAPPER, JR., USAF, RET., TO BE 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

JULY 20, 2010 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 3 

Mikulski, Hon. Barbara A., a U.S. Senator from Maryland ................................ 6 

WITNESS 

Lieutenant General James R. Clapper,Jr., USAF, Ret., Director of National 

Intelligence-Designate ......................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Prepared statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold ............................................. 33 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 52 

Article titled ‘‘The Role of Defense in Shaping U.S. Intelligence Reform’’ 

by James R. Clapper, Jr. ..................................................................................... 67 

Prehearing Questions and Responses .................................................................... 79 

Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of Government Ethics, Dated June 15, 

2010, to Senator Dianne Feinstein, Transmitting Public Financial Disclosure Report ........................................................................................................... 168 

Letter from Susan S. Gibson, Dated June 7, 2010, to Robert I. Cusik ............... 177 

Letter from James R. Clapper, Jr., Dated June 7, 2010, to Susan S. Gibson .... 178 

Posthearing Questions and Responses ................................................................... 179 

Article titled ‘‘Reorganiztion of DIA and Defense Intelligence Activities’’ by 

James R. Clapper, Jr. .......................................................................................... 202 

Article titled ‘‘The Newly Revived National Imagery and Mapping Agency: 

Geospatial Imagery & Intelligence in 2002 and Beyond’’ by James R. Clapper, Jr. ................................................................................................................... 210

Article titled ‘‘Desert War Was Crucible for Intelligence Systems’’ by James 

R. Clapper, Jr. ...................................................................................................... 215 

Article titled ‘‘Defense Intelligence Reorganization and Challenges’’ by James 

R. Clapper, Jr. ...................................................................................................... 219 

Article titled ‘‘Challenging Joint Military Intelligence’’ by James R. Clapper, 

Jr. .......................................................................................................................... 227 

Article titled ‘‘Critical Security Dominates Information Warfare Moves’’ by 

James R. Clapper, Jr. and Eben H. Trevino, Jr. ............................................... 235 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL 

JAMES CLAPPER, JR., USAF, RET., TO BE 

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 p.m, in Room 

SDG–50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne 

Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, Levin, Bond, Hatch, 

Snowe, Chambliss, Burr, Coburn, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. This room 

is on the cool side, probably the coolest place in Washington today. 

But I’d like to welcome everyone to this hearing. We meet today 

in open session to consider President Obama’s nominee to be the 

nation’s fourth Director of National Intelligence, General James 

Clapper. So welcome, General Clapper. 

The position of the DNI, as we call him, the Director of National 

Intelligence, is the senior most intelligence position in the government. The DNI is by statute, the head of the 16 different intelligence offices and agencies that make up the intelligence community, the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters, 

and the official in charge of developing the intelligence budget. 

As has been made clear over the first five years of the existence 

of the position, the true extent of the director’s authority and the 

exact nature of the job he is supposed to do are still a matter of 

some debate. As the articles yesterday and today in The Washington Post have made clear, the DNI faces major management 

challenges caused by the enormous growth throughout those intelligence agencies and other parts of the government’s national security complex since 9/11. 

The articles raised several issues such as the high infrastructure 

expansion of buildings and data systems. Yesterday’s article specifically names—and I won’t read them out, but one, two, three, 

four, five, six—seven, huge new buildings, all of which, as was 

pointed out, will obviously have to accommodate individuals and all 

kinds of support services and positions. 

2 

The article also describes a contractor number that now reaches 

approximately 28 percent to 30 percent of the entire intelligence 

workforce and carries out inherently governmental functions, contrary to policies of the Office of Management and Budget. The authors count 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies that work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence. 

Under the past two DNIs and CIA directors, the number of contractors has been coming down slightly. And I’m pleased that they 

are no longer being used to conduct interrogation. Nonetheless, the 

use of contractors needs to continue to decrease substantially, and 

I intend to keep pushing on this point until contractors are not 

used for any inherently governmental purpose. 

Our original fiscal year 2010 intelligence authorization bill contained a requirement that would have reduced the number of contractors across the community by 10 percent from 2009 to 2010. 

But because of the delay in passing the bill, this cut has not gone 

into effect. 

Like the Post’s articles, this committee has found, as evidenced 

by our report on the Christmas Day plot, that intelligence growth 

has not always led to improved performance. Growth in the size 

and number of agencies, offices, task forces and centers has also 

challenged the ability of former Directors of National Intelligence 

to truly manage the community. 

As a sponsor of the first legislation calling for the creation of the 

position, I have long believed that the DNI needs to be a strong 

leader and have real authority. Clearly there is need for a strong, 

central figure or the balkanization of these 16 agencies will continue. 

However, this cannot be just another layer of bureaucracy. The 

DNI must be both a leader as well as a coordinator of this increasingly sprawling intelligence community. But the DNI must also be, 

at times, more than that. He must be able to carry out Presidential 

direction and shift priorities based on national security concerns 

and emerging needs. 

In actual practice, the DNI is constrained from directing 15 of 

the 16 elements of the community because they reside in various 

federal departments. And the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 states that, in carrying out his responsibilities—and this is the rub—the DNI may not abrogate the statutory 

responsibilities of the Secretaries. This is often interpreted in real 

life to prevent centralized direction. The 16th agency, the CIA, is 

not housed within a department, but it, too, has demonstrated its 

ability to thwart the DNI’s directives it dislikes by importuning the 

White House. 

We understand from former officials in the DNI’s office that both 

problems have greatly frustrated past DNIs’ ability to lead. Every 

day of every week, month by month, the DNI must assure coordination between intelligence agencies to eliminate duplication and 

improve information sharing. And, when necessary, he must put an 

end to programs that are not working and avoid redundancy and 

overlap. I increasingly believe that this is becoming a major issue. 

The 2010 Intelligence authorization bill reported out, again 

unanimously, in revised form last week, which the White House 

3 

has approved and the House intelligence committee supports, contains 10 provisions that would strengthen or add management 

flexibilities for the DNI. Eight of those 10 were requested by this 

or prior administrations. I urge the House to pass this bill. 

The primary mission of the DNI is to make sure that the intelligence community produces information that enables policymakers 

to make informed decisions. This mission includes ensuring that 

the Department of Defense and military commanders have the information they need to carry out military operations and force protection. Yet it also covers the full range of national security, foreign 

policy and homeland security information needs. 

I want to make sure that General Clapper, if confirmed, will 

wear the mantle of the Director of National Intelligence, not just 

the hat he wears today as Director of Defense intelligence, and that 

he will have the necessary broad, strategic focus and support that 

this position requires. 

So I will be interested in continuing to discuss with our nominee 

the proper role of the DNI, what the mission should be and how 

strong the authority should be to carry out that mission. 

Not in question is General Clapper’s vast experience or dedication to public service. He has served his country for more than 40 

years in a variety of capacities, 32 of those 40 years in active duty 

in the United States Air Force, retiring in 1995 as a lieutenant 

general. He has led two of the larger intelligence agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency, since renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or NGA. And he is currently the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, a position he has held since 2007, meaning that he is 

one of the few national security officials to serve under both the 

Bush and Obama administrations. 

In short, this nominee has as much experience in intelligence as 

any serving or retired official. So, General Clapper, I want to be 

clear that we do not question your service, your knowledge or your 

capability. We only ask that you clearly indicate your vision and 

commitment to head the intelligence community this afternoon and 

work to give it direction and prevent sprawl, overlap and duplication. 

Before I turn to our distinguished Vice Chairman, I understand, 

General, that you have family and friends with you today. If you’d 

like to introduce them at this time—well, I think I’ll change this 

and ask the ranking member to go ahead, if that’s agreeable, then 

ask you to introduce your family, and then I know Senator Mikulski would like to say a few words, I suspect, on your behalf. I call 

on the Vice Chairman. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair, and as usual, 

I agree with your opening statements, and I join you in welcoming 

General Clapper to the committee for consideration of his nomination to serve as the Director of National Intelligence. 

The outgoing Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Dennis 

Blair, deserves our thanks for his many years of service to the naVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Feb 14, 2011 Jkt 063996 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\63996.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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tion, including his work as the previous DNI. Admiral Blair faced 

a number of unfortunate challenges during his tenure, as other administration officials increasingly assumed greater control over intelligence community activities. The next DNI must have the political clout, the willpower to ensure that our intelligence agencies are 

able to get their vital work done without being micromanaged by 

the Department of Justice or the National Security Council. 

It is my hope that the next DNI will assert this needed leadership over the intelligence community. Something the George W. 

Bush administration got right in this area was placing key people 

in the jobs who were responsible to the Congress. For example, 

there was no question that John Negroponte, and then, most notably, Admiral Mike McConnell, were the President’s principal intelligence advisors, as they should be under United States law. At 

that time, the public did not even know the names of intelligence 

staffers on the National Security Council. Today, the paradigm has 

been reversed. We have a staffer on the National Security Council, 

who most people in the intelligence community believe acts as the 

DNI. 

He calls the shots and even goes on national television to pitch 

the administration’s viewpoint. A June 6 Washington Post article 

was spot on in describing his role in today’s intelligence. This is not 

good for the country and is contrary to Congress’ intent for the IC. 

If the President would like him to act as his principal intelligence 

advisor and head of the intelligence community, then I’ll be happy 

to co-host his confirmation hearing with the Chair. But if not, then 

this template needs to change. 

Turning to you, General Clapper, as the Chair has already mentioned, you’ve served our nation well. You have a long background 

in very demanding leadership roles in the military and the intelligence community, and I think we all thank you for an impressive 

46 years of service to our nation in the field of, primarily, intelligence. But you know that I have concerns about whether you will 

be able to do what Director Blair could not. 

You’ve talked about leaving federal service for some time, yet you 

are now seeking one of the hardest jobs in Washington, one fraught 

with maximum tensions. Frankly, today I ask you to tell us why? 

Our nation is at a critical point. We’re six years into this experience of intelligence reform, and I’m afraid we have a long way to 

go. The recent Washington Post top secret series highlights what 

I and others on the committee have been saying for a long time. 

The intelligence community is lacking effective oversight. And 

today, I hope we can focus on whether you, General Clapper, will 

have the horsepower needed in the White House to use the DNI 

as the position for reform and management it needs to be. 

The DNI, in the next round, will need to be a fire in the gut guy 

who is willing to break paradigms and trends against business as 

usual. He needs to be someone who is not reluctantly accepting the 

job, but is willing to take on the old guard and change broken ways 

of going about intelligence. We don’t need our top spy chief to be 

a figurehead who cedes authority to the Justice Department. Instead, we need a DNI who can oversee our nation’s terror-fighting 

policy. 

5 

We need a DNI who will push the envelope on his authorities 

and advance the institution’s ability to lead our intelligence agencies. Just as important, we need someone who can throw some elbows and take back control of our intelligence agency from DOJ, 

White House bureaucrats and even the DOD. Also, he must establish a clear chain of command between the CIA and the DNI. 

While the 2004 intelligence reform bill was certainly a step forward in our efforts to reform the intelligence community, it fell 

well short of what I hoped Congress would achieve—namely, as I’ve 

said many times and said to you, the DNI was given a load of responsibility without the authority or all the tools needed truly to 

lead our intelligence agencies. 

The arm wrestling that took place between DNI Blair and the 

CIA director over who would appoint the DNI’s representatives 

overseas was a clear sign to me that we do not yet have the right 

balance, but we have to get it right if we hope to meet the national 

security challenges ahead. 

Now, previously you’ve been inconsistent in whether the DNI 

should be granted additional authorities to lead our intelligence 

agencies. While some have rationalized this wavering as an example of the old adage, ‘‘Where you sit is where you stand’’—in other 

words, you protect the turf of whatever institution you lead—I 

don’t take much comfort in that explanation. That’s not the hallmark of the sort of leader that we need at the head of the intelligence community. 

You reference in your prepared opening statement that a number 

of Members have raised concerns about your affiliation with the 

Department of Defense. Well, I think that is a valid concern. When 

the President called the Chair and me to inform us of your nomination, his first selling point was that you were strongly supported 

by the Defense Secretary and the Senate Armed Services Committee. 

I have to tell you, General, that’s not the best way to put you 

forward to this committee as the next leader of the intelligence 

community. We’re happy that the Defense Department and Armed 

Services Committee love you, but frankly, that’s not what we’re 

looking for. 

Now, I am a big supporter of the Defense Department. And as 

I said, my son was in Iraq and three of my staff on the committee 

voluntarily took leaves of absence over the past two years to serve 

in harm’s way in uniform in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we appreciate their service like all of the members of the armed services. 

But at the strategic level, an overemphasis on DOD within the 

intelligence community can be counterproductive. We’ve seen this 

problem with the State Department, and it’s struggled to regain 

the lead from the Pentagon in smart power activities. 

This is one reason the memo from your office to the Senate 

Armed Services Committee a few weeks ago, which criticized 13 

specific provisions in this committee’s authorization bill, was not 

well received here. You said you felt obligated to afford the Armed 

Services Committee the opportunity to hear your criticisms of the 

bill. We would have appreciated that same courtesy being extended 

to this committee, first and foremost, since you are dual-hatted as 

under our structure. 

6 

It is our bill; you are the DNI, Director of National Intelligence. 

The memo is something that I believe you should have addressed 

to us upfront, and on the record at the end of your opening statement today I would hope you might reference it. 

We have to get the relationship between the IC and its overseers 

right. Congressional oversight is instrumental in advancing the 

DNI’s leadership of the intelligence community. Through such oversight Congress can ensure that not only the DNI understands the 

expectations of his position but that other agencies recognize the 

DNI’s leadership. 

General, too much of your previous contact with this committee 

has been too reluctant and reactive. We have to have a DNI who 

works proactively to meet his obligations under the law, to keep 

the Senate Intelligence Committee fully and currently informed. 

And that requires a good and open working relationship. 

Today is your opportunity to instill in this committee the confidence that you’re up to the task of leading the intelligence community while complying with your statutory obligations to work 

with this committee. And I wish you the very best, sir. 

Madam Chair, we’ve had far too many DNI confirmation hearings in our time together on the SSCI. I believe this high turnover 

rate is a symptom of the inadequate authorities that the IRTPA invested in the DNI. If we are unable to address those legislative 

shortcomings in the remaining time in this Congress, then I hope 

this is something you and the next ranking Republican will begin 

to address next year in the new Congress. 

And I thank you, Madam Chair and General. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Mikulski, it’s my understanding you have a few comments you’d like to offer. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you, Madam Chair. I’m going to be 

very brief, because I know we want to get quickly to the hearing. 

I’m one of the people that’s worked hands-on with Mr. Clapper. 

And I would like to just say to the committee, first of all, like you, 

I know we’ve been through four DNI confirmations, four DNIs. And 

if there is a failure in or questions about the authority and the 

functionality of the DNI, then it’s incumbent on Congress to look 

at the legislation, but not necessarily fault the DNI nominee for the 

failures of the legislative framework. 

But let me just say this about Mr. Clapper: One of the things— 

look, you all know me as straight-talking, plain-talking, kind of nononsense. And one of the things in working with Mr. Clapper as 

head of the NGA was, again, his candor, his straightforwardness, 

his willingness to tell it like it is—not the way the top brass wanted to hear it—I thought was refreshing and enabled us to work 

very well. 

I think that in his job he will be able to speak truth to power— 

which God knows we need it—and he will speak truth about power, 

which we also need. And I would hope that as we say, oh, gee, we 

don’t know if we want a military guy chairing or heading the DNI, 

Mr. Clapper left the military service in 1995. He’s been a civilian. 

7 

He doesn’t come with the whole extensive, often military staff that 

people bring with them when they take a civilian job. And I think 

in my mind he’s probably the best qualified to do this job, because 

he’s not only been a night hawk standing sentry over the United 

States of America, but he’s actually run an intelligence agency and 

he’s actually had to run a big bureaucracy. And he’s had to run 

with sometimes very inadequate leadership at the top. 

So we ought to give him a chance and I think we ought to hear 

what he has to say today. I acknowledge the validity of the questions the Chair and the ranking member have raised, but I think 

we would do well to approve General Clapper. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, if I may thank my friend 

from Maryland for helping me get my voice back and wish her a 

very happy birthday. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Happy birthday, Senator. We did this in 

caucus and gave her a rousing verse. 

Senator MIKULSKI. I thank you for your gallantry, but sometimes 

state secrets ought to be kept state secrets. 

[Laughter.] 

Vice Chairman BOND. I didn’t mention any years or anything. 

Just the date. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well done. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Clapper, if you would like to introduce 

your family, please, we’d like to welcome them and then proceed 

with your comments. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES CLAPPER, JR., 

USAF, RET., DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE– 

DESIGNATE 

General CLAPPER. I’d like to introduce my family and friends who 

are with me today. First, my wife of 45 years, Sue, who herself is 

a former NSA employee, my daughter Jennifer and her husband 

Jay. She is a principal of an elementary school in Fairfax County 

and Jay is a high school teacher; my brother Mike from Illinois, 

and my sister, Chris, who just moved to North Carolina; and a 

close friend of ours who is with us today. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We welcome you all. 

General CLAPPER. Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond and 

distinguished members of the committee, it is indeed a privilege 

and an honor for me to appear before you today as President 

Obama’s nominee to serve as the fourth Director of National Intelligence. Additionally, I want to thank Senator Mikulski for your introduction. It was very thoughtful and touching to me personally. 

Being nominated for this position for me was an unexpected turn 

of events. I’m in my third tour back in the government. My plan 

was to walk out of the Pentagon about a millisecond after Secretary Gates. I had no plan or inkling to take on another position. 

But as in the past, I’ve always been a duty guy at heart, and so 

when approached by Secretary Gates, followed by the President of 

the United States of America, both of whom I have the highest respect for, I could not say no. I’m honored that President Obama has 

expressed confidence in my abilities and experience by this nomination. 

8 

I’ve submitted a longer statement for the record, subject to your 

concurrence. If I can deliver one message to you here today, it is 

this: I’ve served over 46 years in the intelligence profession in 

many capacities—in peace, in crisis, in combat, in uniform, as a civilian, in and out of government and in academe. I’ve tried hard 

to serve in each such capacity with the best interests of our great 

nation first and foremost. Should I be confirmed as Director of National Intelligence, I can assure you that will continue to be my 

central motivation. 

We have the largest, most capable intelligence enterprise on the 

planet. It is a solemn sacred trust to the DNI to make that enterprise work for the sake of this nation and its people. Intelligence 

is a team endeavor and the DNI is in the unique and distinctive 

position to harness and synchronize the diverse capabilities of the 

entire community and make it run as a coherent enterprise. 

I want to repeat something here today publicly that I’ve said to 

many of you privately. I do believe strongly in the need for congressional oversight, and if confirmed, I would continue to forge an 

even closer partnership with the oversight committee. 

It’s the highest distinction in my professional career to have been 

nominated for this extremely critical position, particularly in this 

difficult time throughout the world. 

This concludes my formal statement. I’d be prepared to respond 

to your questions, or Madam Chairman, if you’d like, I can respond 

now to your commentary as well as that of the Ranking Member. 

[The prepared statement of General Clapper follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., DIRECTOR

OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE

Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a privilege to appear before you today as the President’s nominee for 

Director of National Intelligence: I am truly honored that the President has confidence in my ability to lead our Intelligence Community. My deepest appreciation 

goes out to him for the nomination, and. my sincere thanks to all of you, the overseers of our nation’s intelligence services, for the opportunity to address you and answer your questions here today. 

When President Obama asked me to lead this organization he said he wanted 

someone who could build the Intelligence Community into an integrated team that 

produces quality, timely, and accurate intelligence; be his principal intelligence advisor; be the leader of our Intelligence Community; and be someone who would tell 

policymakers what they needed to know, even if it wasn’t what they wanted to hear. 

Lastly, he needed someone who knew how to get things done in a bipartisan, professional manner. 

While humbled by the nomination, I reflect upon my 46 years of experience in the 

intelligence business and find confidence in my ability to serve diligently and competently in the position of Director of National Intelligence, should I be confirmed. 

I have heard expressions of concern about my independence; as a long-time denizen of the Department of Defense, and whether I might be too beholden to it, and, 

thus, skew things in favor of the military. I have been out of uniform for almost 

15 years, over six of which were completely out of the government. The former Secretary of Defense ended my tenure as Director of NGA three months earlier than 

originally planned, because I was regarded as too ‘‘independent.’’ I am a ‘‘truth to 

power’’ guy, and try always to be straight up about anything I’m asked. 

Having said that, I feel my experience in the military—starting with my two tours 

of duty during the Southeast Asia conflict—provided a wealth of experience in intelligence which has been expanded and honed by the things I’ve done since retiring 

from military service in 1995. Thus, I have been a practitioner in virtually every 

aspect of intelligence. 

Over the course of my career, I served as a Commander in combat, as well as a 

Wing Commander and Commander of a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center. 

I have also served as a Director of Intelligence (J-2) for three war-fighting comVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Feb 14, 2011 Jkt 063996 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\63996.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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mands and led two intelligence agencies. I learned every aspect of intelligence collection, analysis, operations, planning and programming, and application and in all 

other disciplines—HUMINT, GEOINT, MASINT, Foreign Material, Counter-intelligence, and other more arcane forms of technical intelligence. I have been widely 

exposed to the workings of the entire U.S. Intelligence Community around the globe. 

I have also worked as a contractor for four companies, with intelligence as my primary focus. This gave me great insight into the roles as well as the strengths and 

limits of contractors, how the government looks from the outside, and what drives 

a commercial entity as it competes for, wins, and fulfills contracts. 

I served on many government boards, commissions and panels over my career. 

Specifically, I served as Vice Chairman of a Congressionally mandated Commission 

chaired by former Governor of Virginia, Jim Gilmore, for almost three years. Based 

on this experience I learned a great deal on how issues are perceived at the State 

and local levels, and helped formulate recommendations, which, in part, presaged 

the subsequent formation of the Department of Homeland Security. 

As the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, I helped exercise civilian control over the military, served as Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and developed and promulgated standards and policy across the entire range 

of the intelligence, counter-intelligence, and security dimensions of the Department 

of Defense. 

Apart from all this functional experience, I have lived the history of the Intelligence Community for that same time span. I think the amalgam of this experience—the breadth, depth, and scope—equips me to deal with the demands of the 

DNI—a position which demands extensive knowledge of the entirety of the US intelligence enterprise. 

I think, too often, people assume that the Intelligence Community is equally adept 

at divining both secrets (which are theoretically knowable) and mysteries (which are 

generally unknowable) . . . but we are not. Normally, the best that Intelligence can 

do is to reduce uncertainty for decision-makers—whether in the White House, the 

Congress, the Embassy, or the fox hole—but rarely can intelligence eliminate such 

uncertainty. 

But in order to provide the best intelligence support to our nation, our leaders 

and decision-makers, the DNI can and must foster the collaboration and cooperation 

of the Intelligence Community. Intelligence is a team effort. Given the complexity 

and diversity of the Intelligence Community—we must view it as an enterprise of 

complementary capabilities that must be synchronized. To be specific, the DNI will 

need to serve the President and work with all members of the community and the 

Congress as well as with many others, to be successful in fulfilling the President’s 

vision. 

Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, if confirmed, I pledge not only to follow 

the law, but to go a step further and endeavor, as best as I am able, to build upon 

and increase the trust between Congress and DNI. That’s not to say we’ll always 

see things the same way. And that’s not to say you won’t question us and hold us 

accountable where appropriate—I expect nothing less. But our objective ought to be 

the same: to give the Intelligence Community all that it needs to succeed, consistent 

with our laws and values. If confirmed, I believe I can do that. I have had very positive discussions with CIA, FBI, and other leaders across the Intelligence Community, and I am quite encouraged by their commitment to making this team work 

should I be confirmed. 

Additionally, keeping this Committee ‘‘fully and currently’’ informed is not an option. It is the law, and it is our solemn obligation. I was a young Air Force officer 

at NSA in the seventies, and watched the Church-Pike hearings, which led to, 

among other things, the establishment of the intelligence oversight committees in 

both Houses of Congress. I am a strong believer in the need for an informed Congress. I say this not only as an intelligence-career professional, but as a citizen. I 

have interacted with the intelligence oversight committees since the mid-eighties in 

several capacities. If confirmed, I would seek to forge a close partnership with the 

oversight committees. 

Moreover, I would observe that the Congress will be hugely influential in ensuring 

the DNI succeeds. The Congressional DNI partnership is crucial in all respects, and 

this is one of the most important—keeping Congress fully and currently informed 

of intelligence activities and receiving your feedback, support, and oversight. Indeed, 

it is my conviction that, partly through the Congress, the DNI has a great deal of 

authority already; the challenge is how that authority is asserted. I believe my experience in the community would serve me, and the position, well. 

Finally, the men and women of the Intelligence Community are courageous, smart 

and patriotic; if confirmed, it would be my honor to lead them in support of our nation’s security. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

10 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, that is up to you, General. If you 

would like to, proceed; otherwise we can take that up in questions. 

It’s up to you. 

General CLAPPER. Well, we have Members here waiting to ask 

questions, so I would suggest we go ahead with that, and then perhaps I’ll get to these points, or if not later, I will get to them subsequently. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right. We will begin with 10-minute 

rounds, and we will proceed in order of seniority and we will alternate sides. I hope that’s acceptable. 

General Clapper, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I believe that the DNI must be able to be a strong leader as well as 

a coordinator. In the Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence from February 2010, you wrote, ‘‘I no longer believe as 

strongly as I once did in greater centralization of intelligence activity or authority, and I realize that the individual needs of each department for tailored intelligence outweighs the benefits of more 

centralized management and control.’’ 

Secondly, in answer to the committee’s initial questionnaire, you 

wrote that the responsibilities of the DNI entail ‘‘supervision and 

oversight,’’ which to me seems weaker than ‘‘direction and control.’’ 

Here’s the question: If you were confirmed as DNI, in what way 

specifically will you be the leader of the IC as opposed to simply 

a coordinator of the 16 agencies that make up its parts? And can 

you give specific examples of where you see more forceful leadership is necessary? 

General CLAPPER. Well, Madam Chairman, I think first that 

with all of the discussion about the lack of authority or the perceived weaknesses of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I believe it already does have considerable authority, either 

explicit in the law, the IRTPA, or implicit, that can be exerted. It’s 

my belief that the issue, perhaps, in the past has been the art form 

by which that authority has been asserted. 

And it would be my intent to push the envelope, to use your 

phrase, on where those authorities can be broadened. And I refer 

specifically to programming and financial management, since that’s 

the common denominator in this town, as one area where, having 

been a program manager twice in the national intelligence program 

as well as the program executive for the military intelligence program, I think I know how those systems work and how that can 

be leveraged. 

When I speak of centralization, I don’t think that everything has 

to be managed and run from the immediate confines of the office 

of the Director of National Intelligence. I think Director of National 

Intelligence authorities can be extended by deputizing or delegating, if you will, to various parts of the community things that 

can be done on the DNI’s behalf but which do not have to be done 

within the confines of the DNI staff. So I would want to clarify 

that. 

I would not have agreed to take this position on if I were going 

to be a titular figurehead or a hood ornament. I believe that the 

position of Director of National Intelligence is necessary, and, 

whether it’s the construct we have now or the Director of Central 

Intelligence in the old construct, there needs to be a clear, defined, 

11 

identifiable leader of the intelligence community to exert direction 

and control over the entirety of that community, given its diversity 

and its heterogeneity, if you will, the 16 components that you mentioned. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Given our present budget problems, this 

growth of the entire community, which has doubled in budget size 

since 9/11, is unlikely to continue. We’ve all had occasion to discuss 

this with recent heads of individual departments. It’s my belief 

that everybody is well aware of that. In fact, the budget may actually end up being decreased in coming years. 

So here’s the question: Has this growth, in your view, as you’ve 

participated at least at DIA and other areas, been managed correctly? Are there areas where you believe work remains to be done 

to consolidate and better manage prior growth? 

General CLAPPER. Madam Chairman, I think, with particularly 

the publication of the two articles in the Dana Priest series, that 

it would seem to me that some history might be a useful perspective. And I go back to when I served as Director of DIA in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War where we were under a congressional mandate to—the entire intelligence community was— 

under a mandate to reduce the community by on the order of 20 

percent. And put another way, that meant that one out of every 

five employees that we then had on the rolls had to be removed 

from those rolls. 

The process started before I left active duty in 1995 and continued through the 1990s. I left the government, was away for six 

years, came back to then NIMA, later NGA, took over there two 

days after 9/11. And that downward profile was then in progress. 

And we were constricting facilities, fewer people, then 9/11 occurred. We put the brakes on, screech, and then we had to rejuvenate and re-expand the intelligence community. 

And of course, the obvious way to do that, to do it quickly, was 

through contractors. That certainly happened in my case when I 

was director of NGA for five years in the immediate aftermath of 

9/11. 

And so I think the questions that are raised in the article that 

you point out about the profligate growth of contractors and attendant facilities and all this sort of thing is, in my view, part of a historical pattern here, a pendulum that is going to swing back and 

we are going to be faced, I think, with a somewhat analogous situation as we faced after the fall of the Wall when the charge was to 

reap the peace dividend and reduce the size of the intelligence community. 

With the gusher, to use Secretary Gates’s very apt term, of funding that has accrued particularly from supplemental or overseas 

contingency operations funding, which, of course, is one year at a 

time, it is very difficult to hire government employees one year at 

a time. So the obvious outlet for that has been the growth of contractors. 

Now, if you go back even further in history, at least in my mind, 

you think back to World War II where we had the arsenal of democracy, which turned out ships and planes and trucks and jeeps 

in unending numbers and that’s actually how we won the war. In 

a sense, we’re doing somewhat the same thing analogously today; 

12 

it’s just a different war. It’s much more of an information-driven 

war, where intelligence, instead of being as it was in my day, my 

first tour in Vietnam in 1965, where intelligence was a historical 

irritant, it now drives everything. 

So it’s not surprising, in my view, that intelligence is so prominent and that we have so many contractors doing so many things. 

I think the article today is in some ways testimony to the ingenuity, innovation and capability of our contractor base. That’s not 

to say that it’s all efficient; it isn’t. There’s more work that needs 

to be done there. I think this is a great area to work with the oversight committees. 

What is lacking here are some standards. Should there be limits 

on the amount of revenue that would accrue to contractors? Should 

there be limits on the number of full-time equivalent contractors 

who are embedded in the intelligence community? And I think 

those are issues that I would propose we work together on if I’m 

confirmed as the DNI. And I would start, frankly, with the Office 

of the DNI, which in my sensing, at least, I think has got a lot of 

contractors and we ought to look hard at whether that’s appropriate or not. 

With respect to the buildings that have accrued, most of the 

buildings that—and NGA is a case in point, a $2.1 billion facility 

that will go in at Springfield, Virginia, at the former engineering 

proving ground at Fort Belvoir. I was very instrumental in that 

and that, of course, came about because of the BRAC, the base relocation and consolidation round that occurred in 2005. 

So the NGA facility, the consolidation of the central adjudication 

facilities at Fort Meade, the consolidation and then the co-location 

of the counterintelligence facilities at Quantico, at DISA, going to 

the Defense Information Support Agency at Fort Meade, all came 

about because of the BRAC rounds. 

In the case of NGA, what the business case was, we got out of 

leased facilities which over time cost more than a governmentowned facility, not to mention the quality of life working conditions 

that will demonstrably improve for NGA. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. One last quick question. It’s my understanding that a contractor costs virtually double what a government employee does and has cost that. We have set as a mark 10 

percent reduction a year. I don’t know that that’s quite achievable. 

I know the CIA has tried to do 5 percent. 

What is your view on this as to what would be a practical and 

achievable number to aim for the reduction of contractors, assuming they’re 28 percent to 30 percent of the entire workforce today? 

General CLAPPER. Well, ma’am, I think that we need to try to 

come up with some organizing principles about where the contractors are appropriate and where they are not, since there are wide 

variances in terms of the percentages and prevalence of contractors 

in various parts of the community. In the case of the military services, with the exception of perhaps right now of the Army, which 

I think is understandable, it’s a fairly low percentage of contractors 

that are working in intelligence. In the case of the intelligence 

agencies, the percentage is higher and, of course, one agency in 

particular, the NRO, which has classically, traditionally been heavVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Feb 14, 2011 Jkt 063996 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\63996.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
13 

ily reliant on contractors, not only for acquisition, but for operations. 

So I think I’d want to try to come up with some organizing principles, some standards that would determine—some formulas, if 

you will, that would determine where contractors are appropriate 

and where they are not rather than just keying on a fixed percentage, which could, in some cases, be damaging or not. 

So I certainly agree with, again, it’s time for that pendulum to 

swing back as it has historically. I’m just reluctant to commit to 

a fixed percentage because I’d want to see what the impact was in 

individual cases. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, we will ask you for that assessment 

as soon as you’re confirmed. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General, let me pose a hypothetical that has some base in reality. 

Let’s pretend you are the DNI and you worked for years with the 

oversight committees to produce an intelligence authorization text. 

It’s safe to say the administration’s OMB director writes to the 

committees saying the President will sign the text, and let’s pretend that an Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence—in a sense, 

it would be your successor—sends a discussion draft to the majority 

staff of the Armed Services Committee alerting them to provisions 

in the text that need modification because they conflict with longstanding authorities of the Secretary of Defense. 

Let’s also pretend that you did not clear this, the Under Secretary did not clear it with you, the DNI, or the intelligence oversight committees. 

How would you view this action of your dual-hatted Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence? And how would you view his meddling in this operation? And how do you think you as the DNI 

would react to the USD/I doing this? 

General CLAPPER. Well, I probably would have chastised him for 

not having provided a copy of the staff paper that was exchanged 

in response to requests from the House Armed Services Committee 

staff. And in retrospect, it would have been better had I seen to it 

that a copy of that went to the two respective intelligence committees. That happened anyway at the speed of light without my taking any action, but that would probably have been the more appropriate course. 

I have been for the last three years the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and I considered it my responsibility and my 

obligation to defend and protect the Secretary’s authorities and 

prerogatives to the maximum extent I could. If I were confirmed 

as the DNI, I will be equally assiduous in ensuring that the DNI’s 

prerogatives and authorities are protected and advanced. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, we would hope so. Now, in our discussion—we had a good discussion last week—I believe you said 

that the Senate Intelligence Committee should have jurisdiction 

over the Military Intelligence Program budget, which is currently 

under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. 

Would could you clarify that for me? Do I understand that correctly? 

14 

General CLAPPER. Well, I’m probably risking getting in trouble 

with the Senate Armed Services Committee, who apparently likes 

me now, so—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. You used up a chit or two there. 

Senator LEVIN. I’d continue to worry if I were you, General Clapper. 

[Laughter.] 

General CLAPPER. It would be better, frankly, and I guess I don’t 

want to get into jurisdictional gun battles here between and among 

committees, but from my viewpoint, having done this in several incumbencies, it would be better if the oversight were symmetrical. 

In the House, the House Intelligence Committee does have jurisdiction over the Military Intelligence Program, and it’s a different situation here in the Senate. And I will leave that—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. That’s very clear and I appreciate that, 

and you have, as anyone around here knows, entered into the most 

deadly minefield in Washington, D.C. 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman BOND. So step carefully, but we appreciate you 

taking that step. 

A very important question about habeas. A number of habeas decisions have resulted in release of Guantanamo Bay detainees, government-conceded in some cases; in others, the government argued 

against the release and recently the government won a case on appeal. 

We know the recidivism rate for Gitmo detainees is now above 

20 percent. Do you agree with the public statement of the national 

security staffer who said that a 20 percent recidivism rate with terrorists isn’t that bad? 

General CLAPPER. He was comparing it, I believe, to what the recidivism rate is here in the United States. I think in this case a 

recidivism rate of zero would be a lot better. That would be a great 

concern. I think it is incumbent on the intelligence community institutionally to make the soundest, most persuasive, authoritative 

and accurate case possible when these cases are addressed, when 

decisions are being made to send people back to host countries. 

A particular case in point in Yemen, as we discussed in February 

at a closed hearing when Steve Kappes and I appeared before you, 

that’s something you have to watch very carefully in Yemen because their ability to monitor and then rehabilitate anyone is problematic at best. And these decisions were made, as we also discussed, sir, this is an interagency thing, a process in which intelligence is an important but not the only input to that decision. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Would you agree that the committee 

should be given the intelligence assessments on Guantanamo Bay 

detainees which we have not fully received yet? 

General CLAPPER. As far as I’m concerned, yes, sir, you should 

have that information. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I have some concerns, and I would like 

your views on having the DNI sit in a policymaking role for the 

purposes of voting on the disposition of Guantanamo detainees. Is 

that over the line of intelligence gathering and getting into a policy 

area? 

15 

General CLAPPER. I don’t know the exact mechanics of how those 

meetings work, but I would say as a general rule I don’t believe 

intelligence should be in a ‘‘policymaking’’ role. I think intelligence 

should support policy. It should provide the range of options for 

policymakers, but I do not believe intelligence—other than for intelligence policy, but not broader policy—should be involved. 

Vice Chairman BOND. But I assume you would not hesitate if the 

intelligence agencies’ conclusions point to a different direction than 

the ultimate policy decision, that you would share your honest assessments with the oversight committee in our confidential deliberations. 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I would. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. One of the questions we have is 

whether there should be a statutory framework for handling terrorists’ habeas corpus challenges, a redefinition under the new circumstances of the law of the war, because we are in a different 

kind of battle than we have been. Do you think we need a new law 

on habeas with terrorists who don’t belong to any nation’s army? 

General CLAPPER. Sir, that’s one I think I would need to take 

under advisement. It’s kind of a legal issue, a little out of my domain. Off the top of my head, I’m not sure I can answer that. 

Vice Chairman BOND. If you’re confirmed, we would ask that you 

work with your legal counsel and with us to see if something is appropriate, if you would have any recommendations. 

In your meeting with me last week you said that the Department 

of Justice, in my words, meddling in our intelligence agencies was 

not an acute problem. I respectfully disagree. 

The DOJ prevented IC agencies from complying with their statutory responsibility to share intelligence with the committee on the 

Times Square attack, and the DOJ did not defer to the IC in decisions about whether to Mirandize terrorists. I think those are 

acute. 

If you are confirmed, what input do you expect to have over the 

decision whether or not to Mirandize a terror suspect? 

General CLAPPER. Well, we hope to be consulted and in the decisionmaking process if such a situation arose. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Have you ever had an opportunity to discuss these issues with the Attorney General? 

General CLAPPER. I have not. 

Vice Chairman BOND. What do you think ought to take precedence—making sure defendants’ statements can be used in court, 

or obtaining needed intelligence to thwart future attacks? 

General CLAPPER. Well, obviously my interest, or the interests of 

intelligence institutionally, is in gaining information. How the detainee is treated legally, that’s another decision that I don’t make, 

but my interest is in procuring the information. 

There is some commonality here between a straight intelligence 

interrogation, say done by the military or agency, versus interrogations done by the FBI, in that in both cases the interrogator is trying to achieve or develop rapport with the detainee or the person 

being interrogated. That is a major factor for the FBI, for example, 

when they are interrogating, even in preparation for Mirandizing 

somebody. So again, I think the interest of intelligence is in gaining the information. 

16 

Vice Chairman BOND. Do you believe there are legitimate reasons for Department of Justice instructing entities within the DOJ 

or elsewhere in the intelligence community not to share intelligence 

information otherwise under the jurisdiction of this oversight committee? 

General CLAPPER. Sir, I’m not sure I understand the question. 

I’m sorry. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Are there situations, do you see any situations in which the Department of Justice can or should say to an 

intelligence entity, or even to the FBI, don’t share that intelligence 

with the intelligence committee? 

General CLAPPER. I can’t think of a situation like that, or something I wouldn’t be very supportive if that were the case. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I can’t either. Thank you very much. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Clapper, it is well known that the world of counterterrorism 

and homeland security is a sprawling enterprise. Yet yesterday the 

Washington Post made what I believe is a jaw-dropping assertion, 

and I would like to get your comment on it. It is a really extraordinary assertion of fact, and they said here, ‘‘No one knows how 

much money it costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist within it, or exactly how many agencies do the same 

work.’’ 

Now they made this as an assertion of fact. Do you agree with 

that? 

General CLAPPER. Well, no, sir, I really don’t. The statement implies that this is completely out of control, and I believe that it is 

under control because in the end the common denominator for all 

this is the money that is appropriated, whether it’s intelligence or 

for other purposes. The money is appropriated with fairly specific 

strings attached. There are allocations on a program-by-program 

basis. I know I’ve been the recipient of that. 

And in the end the intelligence community can do many things, 

but printing more money is not one of those things we can do. So 

that does serve, I think, as a means of control over the allegedly 

profligate intelligence activities. 

Senator WYDEN. Let’s take the various judgments made in that 

assertion. Is it clear how many people are employed? 

General CLAPPER. We can certainly count up the number of government employees that we have, absolutely. Counting contractors 

is a little bit more difficult. 

I was a contractor for six years, after I left, in the interval after 

I left active duty. 

And when you have—I would sign off, depending on which company I was working for, I might charge to four or five different contracts. So you have different parts of people, if you will, so it gets 

to be a little more difficult to actually count up, on a head count, 

on a day-by-day basis, exactly how many contractors may be doing 

work, all or in part, for a contract in intelligence. 

Senator WYDEN. I have to cover a lot of ground here. So the answer to that is, it’s not clear how many people are employed. 

Is it clear how many agencies do the same work? 

17 

General CLAPPER. Well, again, this is a determination that Dana 

Priest made, that agencies—— 

Senator WYDEN. I’m asking for your—— 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. I don’t believe that, sir. I don’t believe, as a general commentary. There are cases, as there have 

been in the history of intelligence, where there has been a conscious decision to have some duplication. One man’s duplication is 

another man’s competitive analysis. So there is a certain amount 

of that that does go on, which I do think is a healthy check and 

balance. 

That’s not to say, sir, and I would not assert that this is completely efficient and that there isn’t waste. There is. And, you 

know, the community does work to try to eliminate that. 

Senator WYDEN [continuing]. Let me ask you about another important area to me, and that’s the relationship between the director 

and the Central Intelligence Agency. 

And let me use a hypothetical—a short one—to get your assessment of how you’d deal with it. Supposing a particular foreign government has solid intelligence on al Qaeda but has refused to share 

it with the United States. You’ve dealt with the government before, 

and in your professional judgment, the best way to get the cooperation is to fly there, confront them directly, insist that they share 

the information. 

And let’s suppose, just for purposes of this hypothetical, the CIA 

disagrees with your judgment: They would say, ‘‘No, Clapper, that’s 

not the way to do it. The best way to get the foreign government’s 

cooperation is to be patient and wait six months before asking for 

the information.’’ What would you do, so that we can get some 

sense of how you would see your job interacting with the CIA? 

General CLAPPER. If I felt, for whatever reason, that the only 

way to secure that information would be for me personally to engage with that foreign government, I would do so. I would certainly, though, consult and discuss that with the director of the 

CIA. 

Senator WYDEN. But ultimately do you believe that you would 

have the authority to overrule the CIA director? 

General CLAPPER. I do. 

Senator WYDEN. The third area I want to ask you about, Mr. 

Clapper, involves the contractor issue. We’ve talked about it in a 

variety of ways. 

One of the areas that I have been most concerned about is that 

I think that this is a real magnet for conflicts of interest. Often 

you’ve got a situation where one of the biggest potential sources of 

conflicts is when you have expertise on a particular topic residing 

mostly in the contractor base rather than the government workforce, and you get into a situation where the contractors are being 

asked to evaluate the merits of programs that they’re getting paid 

to run. 

I’d like your judgment as to whether you think this is a serious 

problem, and if so, what would you do about it? 

General CLAPPER. It is a problem, sir, that you have to be on 

guard for. 

When I served as director of NGA for almost five years, half the 

labor force at the time, of NGA, was contractors. And you do have 

18 

to safeguard against—you have to have a mechanism for watchdogging that to prevent this conflict of interest, where you have 

contractors who can gain an unfair advantage, in terms of competing for more work and this sort of thing. So you must be on the 

look-out for it. I don’t think it is a widespread thing, but it does 

happen and you must have the management mechanisms in place 

to ensure that doesn’t happen. 

And to me, that’s the crux here on contractors and their management, is the maintenance of a cadre of government employees who 

do have the expertise to assess and evaluate the performance of the 

contractor. And when you’re in a situation where the contractor 

has a monopoly of knowledge and you don’t have a check and balance in your own government workforce, you’ve got a problem. 

Senator WYDEN. I think you’re going to find that it is a more 

widespread problem than you see today. But I appreciate the fact 

that you’ve indicated that you understand that there are conflicts 

there, and you want to be watchful for it. 

The last area I want to get into is the question of declassification 

abuse. And it just seems to me that so often the classification process, which is supposed to protect national security, really ends up 

being designed to protect political security, and you and I have 

talked about this on the phone. 

And I would just like to get your assessment about how you 

would weigh the protection of sources and methods with the 

public’s right to know. Because as far as I can tell, there really isn’t 

a well-understood process for dealing with this. And in the absence 

of well-understood process the political security chromosome kicks 

in—and everything is just classified as out of reach of the public 

and the public’s right to know is flouted. 

So how would you go about trying to strike that balance? 

General CLAPPER. Well, first, I agree with you, sir, that we do 

overclassify. My observations are that this is more due to just the 

default—it’s the easy thing to do—rather than some nefarious motivation to, you know, hide or protect things for political reasons. 

That does happen too, but I think it’s more of an administrative 

default or automaticity to it. 

And in the end it is the protection of sources and methods that 

always underlie the ostensible debate about whether to declassify 

or not. Having been involved in this, I will tell you my general philosophy is that we can be a lot more liberal, I think, about declassifying, and we should be. 

There is an executive order that we are in the process—we, the 

community—are in the process of gearing up on how to respond to 

this, because this is going to be a more systematized process, and 

a lot more discipline to it, which is going to also require some resources to pay attention to to attend to the responsibilities we have 

for declassification. 

Senator WYDEN. Would you be the person—and this is what I’m 

driving at—who we can hold accountable? Because I think in the 

past there has been this sense, on classification issues, it’s the 

President’s responsibility. Then you try to run down who at the 

White House is in charge. 

I want to know that there is somebody who’s going to actually 

be responsible. I appreciate your assessment that—— 

19 

General CLAPPER. If it is for intelligence. Now, classification—— 

Senator WYDEN [continuing]. On intelligence issues. 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. Yeah, exactly, because it’s broader 

than just intelligence. But certainly if it’s intelligence, yes, I believe 

ultimately the DNI, if I’m confirmed, is the guy in charge. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General Clapper, I want to thank you for your long years of service to this country. You have really an impressive experience in the 

intelligence world, experience that I think you can draw on to help 

you in this job, and I think there’s no question that we’re grateful 

that you’re willing to serve again. 

Now, I appreciated your courtesy call last week. When I asked 

my first question, why you could possibly want this job, you responded, two points: First, you said I was not the first to ask that; 

and second, you said you were taking the job out of a sense of duty. 

So I personally appreciate it. 

Another thing I believe you told me in our meeting was that you 

had no intention of shaking up the DNI structure, that you intended to make it work as it is. Recognizing the weak authorities 

and large responsibility of your office, you told me that the DNI 

can enhance its authority if it has the support of the oversight committee, and you’re certainly right about that. 

And to have our support, you’re going to have to spend a lot of 

time here sharing with us your problems and propose solutions. 

Chairman Feinstein initiated a series of meetings with your predecessor, and I was always grateful for that participation. I know 

Vice Chairman Bond would agree with me that one of the reasons 

we managed to pass the FISA Amendments Act—a politically 

prickly piece of legislation—was because of the long hours that 

then-DNI McConnell had dedicated to the passage of it. Now, 

you’re only the fourth DNI, but there are lessons that I know that 

you have learned from your predecessors, and I appreciate it. 

Now, reform and transformation has as much to do with new 

ways of thinking as it does with new boxes in an organization 

chart. Congress is good at legislating new boxes, but it’s much 

harder to legislate cultural change within organizations. 

We’ve seen that new ways of thinking about threats, capabilities, 

doctrine and training are hard to adapt in well-established bureaucratic cultures. You need leadership at the IC to do this, and that 

of course means you. Do you believe that organizational culture is 

important in the IC? And how do you define intelligence culture? 

And along with that, do you believe that cultural change is important? And how would you address that? 

General CLAPPER. Great question, sir. If I may sir, clarify something that I may not have made myself clear on before—— 

[Pause.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. There we go. 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. First of all, Senator Hatch, I probably should clarify, if I didn’t make clear when I said that no intent 

to shake up the DNI, that actually I do have that intent. 

20 

What I meant to say or to clarify that remark is that I don’t— 

I am in the mode of making the model we have work rather than 

going through the trauma of yet another reorganization, whether 

it’s to some other structure. And I believe that the model that we 

have, with all its flaws and the legal ambiguities in the IRTPA can 

be made to work. And that’s certainly my intent, and I wouldn’t 

have taken this on at my age and station in life if I didn’t think 

that were the case. 

Senator HATCH. Well, that’s the way I took it, anyway. 

General CLAPPER. A very important point—and Senator Bond alluded to this in his opening remarks; I’d like to get back to that— 

is that—and I have said this to the President, and we spoke again 

about it this morning—is the fact that the manner in which the 

DNI relates to the oversight committees, the manner in which the 

DNI relates to the President are very important. And both the optic 

and the substance of those relationships can do a great deal to 

compensate for the ambiguities of the law and the perceived weaknesses of the position. 

That’s why I’m so intent on forging a partnership relationship 

with the oversight committees, because you play a huge role. You 

play a huge role in compensating for those ambiguities. And so it 

would be incumbent upon me as the DNI, if I’m confirmed, or anyone else who serves in that capacity to ensure there is that constructive partnership relationship with the oversight committees. 

So I do want to make that point clear. 

The President again assured me—and I asked him specifically— 

about his support for the position as the leader of the intelligence 

community. And he affirmed that when we spoke this morning on 

the phone. 

Cultural change, I have some experience with that, particularly 

at NGA. I was brought on specifically to implement the mandates 

that the NIMA commission, a commission which did great work, 

mandated by the Congress, on reorienting and refocusing and 

bringing the vision to life of what the original founding fathers and 

mothers of NIMA had in mind. 

And so I learned a great deal the hard way about how to forge 

cultural change in a large bureaucratic institution in intelligence, 

which is the case with NGA. And I’m very proud of the way NGA 

has evolved and how it has turned out as an agency. And I think 

it’s moving to the new campus here in another year or so will further bring that cultural change about. 

There is, indeed, a unique culture in the intelligence community, 

and there are in fact subcultures very much built around the 

tradecraft that each of the so-called ‘‘stovepipes’’ foster. 

And that term is often used pejoratively, whether it’s the SIGINT 

stovepipe or the GEOINT stovepipe or the HUMIN stovepipe. Well, 

that’s also the source of the tradecraft which allows us to conduct 

those very important endeavors. The trick, of course, is to bring 

them together and to synchronize them, mesh them, and to bring 

together the complementary attributes that each one of those skill 

sets bring to bear. 

So there is an important dimension. And you’re quite right. It’s 

one thing to enact laws, draw wiring diagrams, but the cultural asVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Feb 14, 2011 Jkt 063996 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\63996.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
21 

pects, I think, are quite important. And that’s where I think leadership is huge, and that’s something that you cannot legislate. 

Senator HATCH. Well, that’s great. Have you read the July 2004 

report by this committee cataloging and analyzing the Iraq WMD 

intelligence prior to 2002? Did you have a chance to read that? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir. I’m very familiar with that, and I’m 

also very familiar with the WMD National Intelligence Estimate. 

My fingerprints were on it. I was then a member of the National 

Intelligence Board, so I’m very familiar with what were the flaws 

in that NIE. I believe there have been substantial process improvements to preclude, hopefully, such an event from occurring again. 

But I will tell you that was an indelible experience for me in how 

we did the country a great disservice with that National Intelligence Estimate. 

Senator HATCH. What do you believe explains the failure of the 

intelligence community in assessing the presence of WMD in Iraq 

in 2002? And do you believe the lessons from these failures have 

been learned inside the intelligence community? And if you do, why 

do you believe that? 

General CLAPPER. Well, sir, I think that had a profound impact 

on the intelligence community at large. I think we have learned 

from that. The whole process used with the NIEs today is quite different. These were actually improvements that started under 

George Tenet’s time when he was still the DCI, and they’ve continued to this day. 

And so I think one of the first things we do, which we didn’t do 

with that NIE, was that the standard practice when you meet to 

approve an NIE is to first assess the sources that were used in the 

NIE, which was not done in the case of the infamous 2002 WMD 

report. 

The use of red-teaming; the use of outside readers, with their 

input included in the NIE; the use of other options; what if we’re 

wrong; confidence levels; the degree of collection capability gaps or 

not—all of those features are now a standard part of national intelligence estimates drawn primarily from the egregious experience 

that we had with that particular NIE. 

And I thought the report you did laid out exactly what went 

wrong. I can attest, since I was there, it was not because of 

politicization or any political pressure. It was because of ineptness. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. 

And now, General Clapper, the administration and the previous 

one made great efforts to explicitly state that our response to global 

terrorism was not against Islam. In my opinion, the fact that the 

vast majority of adherents to Islam are nonviolent would certainly 

underscore that point. 

Now, do you believe that ideas and ideology have a role in motivating violent extremist terrorism? And, if so, do you believe that 

we have adequately analyzed the ideological component? And one 

last thought, do you believe that closing down Guantanamo would 

undermine terrorist ideology in any way. And if so, why? 

General CLAPPER. Well—— 

Senator HATCH. That’s a lot of questions, I know. 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. On the first issue of the ideological dimension here, I think that’s a very important one. My experiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Feb 14, 2011 Jkt 063996 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\63996.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
22 

ence there most recently was my involvement in the aftermath of 

the Fort Hood shootings. And the question that has certainly been 

a challenge, a huge challenge, for the Department of Defense is the 

discernment of self-radicalization, when people take on an ideology, 

internalize it and use that for radical purposes. 

And I will tell you, sir, in my view, we have a challenge there 

in how to discern that, how to explain that to others, particularly 

a 19- or 20-year-old soldier, sailor, airman or Marine. How do you 

discern if before your very eyes someone is self-radicalizing, and 

then what do you do about it. 

I think with respect to the second question on a closure of Gitmo, 

I think that will—when we get to that point, I think that probably 

would help the image of the United States, if in fact we’re able to 

close it. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. I think my time is up. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

Senator Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Madam Chairwoman, first of all, I want you 

to know, I’ve really enjoyed listening to the questions raised by you 

and the Ranking and the other members. Once again, we’re learning from each other. 

Senator Feinstein, I would just like to suggest to you, with the 

presence of Senator Levin—presuming you’re in charge in November, but whoever is—that the first area of reform has to be with 

Congress. My concern is that DNI, whoever he is—and I hope it’s 

General Clapper—appears before so many committees and so many 

subcommittees—I think by my count, it’s over 88 different committees and subcommittees between the House and the Senate—that 

the oversight—that’s one thing. 

And the other, that we really press for the reform of the 9/11 

Commission that we establish the Intelligence Appropriations Subcommittee. I think Mr. Clapper makes a great point, that it does 

come in appropriations. I have it in the FBI; Inouye has DOD. It’s 

not the subject of this conversation here, but I think we need to 

just get together among ourselves and discuss how reform starts 

with us, meaning the Senate and the House. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I might respond, with respect to the Appropriations Committee, the three of us that serve on it—yourself, 

Senator, Senator Bond and myself—we have all supported that. 

The problem is, we’re only three out of a couple dozen members, 

and it’s those couple dozen members that need to be convinced. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I think they will be. 

But, picking up, General Clapper, Dana Priest has done her series, and I believe that once again she’s done a great service to the 

nation. It was Ms. Priest who brought to the public’s attention the 

terrible stuff going on at Walter Reed. Secretary Gates and the 

President responded, and we dealt with it. I’m not saying there is 

a scandal within the intelligence community, but it has grown. 

And my question to you, if confirmed, will you look at the series 

in the Post and others that have raised similar ones, for a review 

of the allegations, flashing yellow lights, about the growth and duplication, et cetera, and make recommendations to the executive 

and legislative branch for reform? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, ma’am. 

23 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, and thank you, because I think it would 

give us an important guidepost. 

The second is, I’d like to go to the issue of cybersecurity. As you 

know, you and I have worked on signals intelligence, but cybersecurity is a—we’re part of a task force chaired by Senator Whitehouse, Senator Snowe, and myself. And we’ve looked at four 

issues—governance, technology, technology development, maintaining our qualitative edge in that area, workforce, and the beginning 

of civil liberties and privacy. 

Governance has befuddled us. Governance has befuddled us. We 

know how to maintain our technological qualitative edge. We’re 

making progress on how to have an adequate workforce. But what 

we see is overlapped turf warfare, turf confusion. And I wonder, as 

DNI, what role do you have, and what role will you assume in really straightening out this governance issue? 

Congress has the propensity to create czars. We’ve got czars and 

we’ve got czars by proxy. You know, a czar—we have a White 

House now on cyber, a very talented and dedicated man. We have 

you as the DNI; you’re a czar by proxy. But we don’t give those 

czars or czars by proxy any power or authority. Now, we get into 

cybersecurity, and I think the governance structure is mush. 

There’s no way for clarity, there’s no answer to who’s in charge, 

and there’s no method for deconflicting disagreements or turf warfare. Do you have a comment on what I just said. 

General CLAPPER. Well, first, I think I’ll start with, the commentary about NSA—I know an organization near and dear to your 

heart. NSA must serve, I believe, as the nation’s center of excellence from a technical standpoint on cyber matters. I think the 

challenge has been how to parlay that capability, the tremendous 

technical competence that exists at NSA, in serving the broader 

issue here of support, particularly to supporting the civilian infrastructure. 

The Department of Defense’s response has been to establish 

Cyber Command by dual-hatting the Director of NSA, General 

Keith Alexander, as the commander. So in a warfighting context in 

the Department of Defense, that’s how we organize to do that. 

I think we need something to fill that void on the civilian—if you 

will—the civil side. Now, there’s some 35 pieces of—there are legislative proposals, as I understand it, throughout the Congress right 

now. I think the administration is trying to figure out what would 

be the best order of march or combination. 

I think, though, the bill that Senator Bond and Senator Hatch 

have sponsored, without speaking specifically, but it certainly gets 

to what I would consider some sound organizing principles and 

having somebody in charge, having a budget aggregation that—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. But what will your role be in this, as DNI? 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. Well, I think the role of the DNI 

is to ensure that the intelligence support for cyber protection is 

provided and that it is visible to the governance structure, whatever that turns out to be. I do not believe it is the DNI’s province 

to decide what that governance structure should be, but rather to 

ensure that it gets sufficient and adequate and timely intelligence 

support. 

24 

Senator MIKULSKI. But what advisory role do you play to the 

President? There’s Howard Schmidt, a great guy. We’ve met with 

him and so on, but he has no power. So we have what has been 

stood up with the United States military—excellent. I think we all 

recognize that. But when it gets to the Department of Homeland 

Security, when it gets to the FBI, when it gets to the civilian agencies, and also it gets—what gateways do the private sector have to 

go to who to solve their problems or to protect them, it really gets 

foggy. 

General CLAPPER. Well, one solution, I believe, is in the legislation that has been proposed by Senators Bond and Hatch on this 

committee. 

Senator MIKULSKI. I’m not asking for your comment on legislative recommendations. I’m asking what is the role of the DNI to 

help formulate, finally, within the next couple of months, the answer to the question, who is in charge? What is your role? Who do 

you think makes that decision? I presume you’re going to say the 

President. 

General CLAPPER. Well, I guess—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. How is the President going to get to that? Is 

he going to be having, you know, coffee with Brennan? Is it going 

to be you? Is it Howard Schmidt? Is it what? 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. I do not believe it is the DNI who 

would make the ultimate decision on the defense for cyber—and 

particularly in the civil sector. I don’t believe that is a determination or decision that should be made by the DNI. I think I should 

play a role there. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Again, what role do you think you should 

play, with whom? 

General CLAPPER. For the provision of adequate intelligence support, what is the threat posed in the cyber domain, to this nation. 

And I think that is the oversight responsibility of the DNI, to ensure that that is adequate. 

Senator MIKULSKI. I think maybe we’ve got a little—well, then 

let’s go to the role of the DNI with the civilian agencies, the FBI 

and the Department of Homeland Security. What authority do you 

have in those domains? 

General CLAPPER. Well—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. And bringing them in more, now, particularly 

the FBI, which has, I think, done a great job. In fact, I think it’s 

all been great, because here it is 2010, July 20th, and there’s not 

been an attack on the homeland. 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. I think the FBI has done great 

work, and I spent some time with them in the last week or two. 

And I think the transformation that they are effecting to become 

an effective part of the intelligence community has been actually 

very—is very impressive. I think they have a rigorous management 

process to ensure that this takes place at the field. 

They too have a cultural challenge that we spoke of earlier in the 

preeminence of the law enforcement culture in the FBI, which is 

still important, and how they bring along their intelligence arm 

and their intelligence capabilities to match that in terms of its 

prestige and stature within the FBI; that is a work in progress, 

25 

and they acknowledge that. But I think they’ve made great headway. 

And I think the conversations that I’ve had with Director 

Mueller, who’s been marvelous and very supportive of making the 

DNI function work. The FBI is one of the elephants in the intelligence living room, if I can use that metaphor. It has a huge responsibility and a huge contribution to make, and I intend to work 

with the FBI closely if I’m confirmed. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Very good. 

Madam Chair, I think my time is up. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Mikulski. 

Senator Snowe. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome, General Clapper. 

You certainly bring an illustrious career and qualifications to 

bear on this particular position, and it certainly comes at a critical 

juncture, once again, for this position and for this office that we 

continue to struggle with in terms of its definition and the type of 

leadership that should be brought to oversee the intelligence community. 

And that’s what I’d like to explore with you this afternoon first 

and foremost on an issue that I have been advocating, actually, 

even since before we passed the legislation that created the position for which you have been nominated and even before the 9/11 

commission report, and that was to have a community-wide Inspector General. Because I think that one of the issues that has evolved 

from all of this in creating this vast department is being able to 

look across the spectrum 

And one of the things that’s developed in all this and the number 

of reports that have been issued by this committee, and of course 

most recently, which was the scathing review of what happened on 

the Christmas Day attempted attack and the systemic breakdown 

both in terms of policy, follow-through, information-sharing, technology, to name a few, across the agencies. And clearly, it is something that I think underscores the serious and fundamental problems that we continue to have, and obviously we’ve got an unwieldy 

bureaucracy before us with this department. 

In addition, of course, with The Washington Post series that was 

written by Dana Priest this week, I think it’s also a manifestation 

of many of the problems that continue to exist. And certainly we’ve 

had many definitions of the type of leadership that has been 

brought to bear in this position, whether it’s an integrator, a coordinator, a facilitator, and whether or not we should have a strong 

acknowledged leader that oversees all of these agencies who’s going 

to exert that leadership. 

And so I would like to explore with you today in terms of whether or not you would support a community-wide Inspector General. 

That is pending in the current legislation between the House and 

Senate. It’s in conference at this point. I have fought tooth and nail 

for it in the past because I happen to think that it could initiate, 

conduct investigations and, frankly, could produce the types of reports that were put forward by The Washington Post this week in 

illustrating the redundancies, the inefficiencies, and also producing, 

I think, the type of information that is sorely lacking because you 

26 

cannot reach across the spectrum across all agencies in terms of 

ascertaining what types of problems have emerged and how you 

solve them. And that’s where this Inspector General could come in 

and play a critical role. 

That’s what I argued from the outset because I do believe it will 

break down the barriers and stovepipes and the parochial concerns 

and the turf wars that have evolved and emerged. I mean, I think 

that that’s indisputable. And so I believe that you would find this 

as a tremendous asset in having someone that can conduct an overview and examine those issues independently and to give you I 

think the vantage point of seeing the forest through the trees, and 

many of the issues that arose in this Washington Post series and 

other problems that have emerged and certainly in the problems 

that have been identified in the Christmas Day terror bomb plot 

that was identified by this committee in its very extensive analysis 

certainly could have been averted if we had somebody at hand who 

was looking across the spectrum. 

So I would like to have you respond to that, because I noticed 

in your pre-hearing questions you said that you support a strong 

and independent Inspector General and will ensure the Inspector 

General has access to appropriate information and cooperation 

from the Office of DNI personnel. But you limit it by virtue of the 

wording of your statement to imply that the access only would be 

accorded to the 1,500 or so personnel that reside within that office, 

as opposed to all the other agencies and most notably the Department of Defense that obviously has the preponderance of the personnel and certainly the overwhelming majority of the budget. 

General CLAPPER. Well, Senator Snowe, first of all, I guess at 

some risk, but I would refer to my military background in having 

served as a commander and used IGs. I think they are a crucial 

management tool for a commander or a director. The two times I’ve 

served, almost nine years as director of two of the agencies, DIA 

and NGA, I considered an IG crucial. So I feel similarly about a 

community-wide IG. 

My only caveat would be to ensure that I use the IG who—they 

have limited resources as well—would do systemic issues that 

apply across more than one agency, and using the agency IGs or 

the department IGs, in the case of those that don’t have large 

agencies, to focus on agency- or component-specific issues. But I 

think there’s great merit in having a communitywide Inspector 

General. 

Senator SNOWE. So, in the responses that you submitted to the 

House Armed Services Committee in which you said that a community-wide IG would overlay the authority for the IG for the entire 

community over all matters within the DNI’s responsibility and 

with similar authority of the DOD and the IG of the Armed Services and certain DOD combat support agencies, that, obviously, you 

were suggesting that it would duplicate those efforts. 

General CLAPPER. No. What I’m saying now is that I do think 

there is merit in having an ODNI IG, a community-wide IG, who 

can look across intelligence as an institution for systemic weaknesses and problems and identify those. 

All I would try to foster, though, is a complementary relationship 

rather than a competitive one with either agency IGs, particularly 

27 

in the case of DOD, or the DOD IG, which also has an intelligence 

component. 

So I would just try to use—marshal—manage those resources judiciously so they’re not stepping on one another, but I think there 

is great value in having a community-wide Inspector General to address community-wide issues. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, I appreciate that because I think that that 

would be critical and a useful tool to ferret out a lot of the inefficiencies, anticipate the problems before they actually occur, and, 

obviously, redundancies and the waste. 

Was there anything that surprised you in The Washington Post 

series this week? 

General CLAPPER. No, ma’am. 

Senator SNOWE. No? I mean, they saw the redundancy in functions and so on. Do you think—— 

General CLAPPER. I didn’t agree with some of that. I think there 

was some breathlessness and shrillness to it that I don’t subscribe 

to. I think she’s extrapolated from her anecdotal experience in 

interviews with people. 

I must say I’m very concerned about the security implications of 

having—you know, it’s great research, but just making it easy for 

adversaries to point out specifically the locations of contractors who 

are working for the government, and I wouldn’t be surprised, 

frankly, if that engenders more security on the part of the contractors which, of course, the cost will be passed on to the government. 

Senator SNOWE [continuing]. Well, are you going to evaluate this, 

though, on that basis? I just think it is disturbing to think in terms 

of the number of agencies and organizations of more than 1,200, for 

example. I mean, nothing disturbs you in that article from that 

standpoint? 

General CLAPPER. Well, it depends on what does she mean by an 

agency. It’s like in the Army. You know, an organization can be a 

squad or a division. So, you know, I think she’s striven for some 

bit of sensationalism here. That’s not to say that there aren’t inefficiencies and there aren’t things we can improve. 

Threat finance is a case in point. She cites, I think, some 51 different organizations that are involved in threat finance. That is a 

very important tool these days in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction because it is, in the end, the 

common denominator of how money works and how money supports these endeavors. If I’m confirmed, that’s one I would want to 

take on with Leslie Ireland, the new Director of Intelligence for the 

Department of Treasury, because it’s my view that Treasury should 

be the lead element for threat finance. So that’s one area I will 

take to heart. 

But I think the earlier discussion is germane to the number of 

contractors and what contractors are used for, and this article certainly brings that to bear. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, I just hope that you won’t dismiss it out 

of hand. 

General CLAPPER. No. 

Senator SNOWE. Because I always think that it’s worthy when, 

having other people who are doing this kind of work at least to examine it very carefully, very thoroughly, obviously. I mean, I think 

28 

just given the mega bureaucracy that has been developed, we certainly ought to be looking at it, and certainly, this committee as 

well. So I hope that you are going to give it that kind of consideration it deserves. 

One other question. On the April paper, the response that you 

gave to House Armed Services Committee and the information 

paper, you mentioned these grants of unilateral authority, referring 

to the Intelligence Authorization Bill, that it was expanding the authority to the DNI are inappropriate, especially for personnel and 

acquisition functions. You said that some intelligence community 

efforts could be decentralized and delegated to the component. 

I’m just concerned, on one hand, that you would subscribe to sort 

of embracing some of the cultural and territorial battles that we’re 

trying to overcome. When you’re using words such as ‘‘infringe’’ or 

‘‘decentralize’’ to all of the other agencies, to have them execute 

many of those functions, it concerns me at a time in which I think 

that your position should be doing more of the centralizing with respect to the authorities. 

So I’m just concerned about what type of culture that you will 

inculcate as a leader, if you’re suggesting decentralizing, infringing 

upon other agencies’ authority at a time when, clearly, you should 

be moving in a different direction to break down those territorial 

barriers. 

General CLAPPER. I agree with that, but I do not think that everything in the entire intelligence community has to be run within 

the confines of the office of the Director of National Intelligence. I 

do think there are many thing that can be delegated to components 

in the intelligence community that can be done on behalf of the 

DNI and with the visibility of the DNI, but does not have to be directly executed by the DNI at its headquarters staff, which I believe is too large. 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. 

Senator Whitehouse, you’re next. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I yield to Chairman Levin. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please go ahead. 

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, first, we thank Senator 

Whitehouse for that courtesy, as always. 

General, let me ask you first about information sharing. In your 

answers to the committee’s prehearing questionnaire, you state 

that you believe obstacles remain to adequate information sharing. 

You said that the obstacle was cultural. Our congressional investigations by a number of committees of recent terrorist attacks reveal, for instance, the CIA will not share its database of operational cables with the DOD’s Joint Intelligence Task Force for 

Counterterrorism or with the NSA’s counterterrorism analysts and 

watch center. 

NSA itself feels it cannot allow non-NSA personnel to access the 

main NSA signals intelligence databases on the grounds that these 

personnel cannot be trusted to properly handle U.S. persons’ information. Can you comment on that question, on information sharing 

among agencies? 

General CLAPPER. Well, sir, it continues to be a problem. I think 

we’ve got a challenge, I guess. It’s better than it was. It’s better 

29 

than it was before 9/11, but it needs improvement. I think NSA is, 

understandably, very conscientious about the protection of potential data on U.S. persons. They’re very, very sensitive to compliance 

with the FISA, as they should be. So that does, that is one inhibitor to full and open and collaborative sharing that we might like. 

That’s an area that I intend to work, if I’m confirmed. 

Senator LEVIN. You also said that you’ll achieve progress in information sharing by the ‘‘disciplined application of incentives, both 

rewards and consequences.’’ Why do we need incentives? Why don’t 

we just need a directive from the President by executive order, for 

instance, or otherwise? Why do we need incentives, rewards and 

consequences? 

General CLAPPER. Well, that’s one way of inducing change in culture, is to provide rewards for those who collaborate and, I suppose, penalties for those that don’t. 

Senator LEVIN. Should they be needed? 

General CLAPPER. And obviously, directives are effective, too. 

Senator LEVIN. Should they be needed? In this kind of setting, 

where this has been going on so long, should—— 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir. That’s an area, if I’m confirmed, I’ll 

certainly look at to see if there is a need for further direction, or 

what other remedy there might be. 

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. Now, you also indicated, relative to 

a related subject which has been very much on our minds here in 

the Congress, the need for a single repository of terrorism data. 

Your statement in the prehearing questions is the following. ‘‘An 

integrated repository of terrorism data capable of ingesting terrorism-related information from outside sources remains necessary 

to establish a foundation from which a variety of sophisticated 

technology tools can be applied.’’ I gather that does not exist now? 

General CLAPPER. I think, sir, and I, at least, this is my own observation watching from somewhat afar, the Christmas bomber 

evolution. And I believe what is needed, and this is from a technology standpoint, is a very robust search engine that can range 

across a variety of data and data constructs in order to help connect the dots. I think we still are spending too much manpower to 

do manual things that can be done easily by machines. And if confirmed, that’s an area I would intend to pursue. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know if it’s true that NCTC analysts have 

to search dozens of different intelligence databases separately, that 

they cannot now submit one question that goes out to all of them 

simultaneously? Is that true, do you know? 

General CLAPPER. I don’t know the specifics, but that’s certainly 

my impression, and that’s why I made the statement in response 

to your previous question. I think what’s needed here is a very robust, wide-ranging search engine or search engines that can do 

that on behalf of analysts so they don’t have to do that manually. 

Senator LEVIN. I want to go to some structural issues now. The 

Intelligence Report and Terrorism Prevention Act says that the director of the CIA reports to the DNI. Is that your understanding? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Is that clear enough? Is that the reason for some 

complications in this area? 

30 

General CLAPPER. Well, I think it’s—yes. That language is clear, 

but there’s also language in there about, for example, the governance of foreign relationships, which are the province of the director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency, and they are to be ‘‘overseen’’ 

by the DNI, and so that is an area of ambiguity, I think. 

Senator LEVIN. Is section 1018 of the Act, which says that the 

President shall issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities 

granted to the Director of National Intelligence, and these are the 

key words, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the 

statutory responsibilities of the heads of departments, have those 

guidelines now been—were they issued by President Bush? 

General CLAPPER. Well, yes, sir, they were essentially promulgated in the revision to Executive Order 12333. And in that, Secretary Gates and I and Admiral McConnell, at the time, worked to 

attenuate some of the ambiguities created by the famous section 

1018. The specific case in point is the involvement of the DNI in 

the hire and fire processes involved with intelligence leaders who 

are embedded in the Department of Defense. 

Senator LEVIN. And are you satisfied with those guidelines? 

General CLAPPER. I am at this point. Yes, sir. My view may 

change, if I’m confirmed. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know in advance that your view is going 

to change? 

General CLAPPER. No, I don’t. 

Senator LEVIN. But as of this time, you’re satisfied with those 

guidelines? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I am. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, in answer to our committee’s prehearing 

questionnaire regarding the DNI’s role with respect to the DIA, 

NGA, NSA and NRO, you said that the DNI supervises their performance, sets standards and formulates policies governing these 

agencies and ensures that they fulfill their missions. You noted 

multiple times that three of those agencies are combat support 

agencies, which means that they provide critical wartime support 

to the combatant commands. 

And my question is the following: Do you believe that that authority which you mention is a shared authority with those agencies or is this exclusive in the DNI? 

General CLAPPER. You mean the combat support agency? 

Senator LEVIN. Those agencies, yes. Do you believe, for instance, 

that they must ensure that they fulfill their missions, that they supervise their performance? Is this a shared responsibility or are 

you, if you’re confirmed, exclusively responsible for those functions 

of supervision and ensuring that they—— 

General CLAPPER. I believe that is a shared responsibility. I 

think obviously the Secretary of Defense has obligations and responsibilities both in law and executive order to ensure that the 

warfighting forces are provided adequate support, particularly by 

the three agencies who are designated as combat support agencies. 

Obviously the DNI has at least a paternal responsibility to ensure 

that works as well. 

Senator LEVIN. Was that word ‘‘fraternal’’? 

General CLAPPER. ‘‘Paternal.’’ 

31 

Senator LEVIN. Paternal, not fraternal. 

General CLAPPER. Institutional obligation. I’ll amend what I said. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, in your current position have you 

taken a look at the Haqqani network? Have you determined whether or not they have engaged in terrorist activities that threaten 

U.S. security interests and, if so, do you support them being added 

to the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations? 

General CLAPPER. Sir, I’d rather not answer that off the top of 

my head. I’ll take that under advisement and provide an answer 

for the record. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, during the previous administration, we got conflicting prewar intelligence assessments from the 

intelligence community and the administration said in public and 

what the intelligence community was willing to assert in private. 

Do you believe that the importance of Congress as a consumer of 

intelligence products and advice is no less than that of senior officials of the administration? Do you owe us? Do you owe us, if 

you’re confirmed, all of the unvarnished facts surrounding an issue, 

not just the facts that tend to support a particular policy decision, 

and do you believe that Congress, as a consumer of intelligence 

products, is entitled, again, to no less than that of senior officials 

of an administration? 

General CLAPPER. I believe that and not only that, but it’s required in the law. The IRTPA stipulates that the DNI is to attend 

to the proper intelligence support to the Congress. 

Senator LEVIN. On an equal basis. 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. Senator Chambliss. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chairman. And welcome, 

General. As I told you in our telephone conversation after the 

President nominated you, I’m not sure why you want to come back 

before this committee again for this job because, as you stated in 

your article you wrote recently, this is probably the toughest job in 

the intelligence community, and your willingness to serve, particularly with your background in the intel community, says an awful 

lot about you, and we’re fortunate to have you. 

Obviously, though, General, there’s some problems out there 

within the office of the DNI, within the community itself that are 

going to have to be addressed. And these issues are very serious. 

They’re not just matters of the size of the bureaucracy and I’m not 

sure what all they are. But again, as you and I talked, there are 

going to have to be some major changes. We just can’t afford for 

another Christmas Day situation or a New York Times bomber situation to occur because we were fortunate there and it was not 

necessarily the great work of the intelligence community that prevented a very serious situation occurring within the United States. 

You do bring a wealth of intelligence background to this job, but 

so did the three predecessors to this job. You probably have more 

experience than all of them. But still, you have been involved. And 

these are friends of yours. They’re individuals you have worked 

with, you’ve associated with and somewhere along the line there 

32 

have been some apparently systemic failures that are going to have 

to be addressed to individuals that you have worked with. So it’s 

not going to be any easier for you than for any of your predecessors. 

My question is, knowing that we can’t afford for another situation like Christmas Day or the New York Times Square situation 

or the Fort Hood situation to occur where we had an awful lot of 

signs and where nobody connected the dots in spite of the statute 

being very clear as to who is to connect those dots, and that’s going 

to be under your jurisdiction, what specific changes do you know 

now that you think need to be made as we go forward to make the 

community better, to make the office of the DNI stronger and to 

make the colleagues that you’re going to be working with on a dayto-day basis more responsive to you as the chief intelligence officer 

of the United States? 

General CLAPPER. Sir, first of all, thanks for your introductory 

comment. I appreciate that. I think that I—or at least I would hope 

I can bring to bear this experience I’ve had over the last 46 years 

of having run a couple of the agencies, having been a service intelligence chief, having spent two years in combat getting shot at, 

what the value of intelligence is, that understanding of the intelligence community institutionally and culturally, that I can bring 

about a better working arrangement. 

I think, in my book at least, to be very candid, I think our most 

successful DNI to this point was Admiral Mike McConnell precisely 

for the same reason, because he had some experience in the business. He had run an agency, NSA, and had done other things in 

intelligence. And I think that does give one an advantage, an understanding where the problems are, where the skeletons are, if 

you will, and where the seams are and how to work those issues. 

I think that is in fact the value added, potentially, of the DNI, 

is to get at those seams and to work those issues where I perhaps 

don’t require a lot of time learning the ABCs of intelligence. So I 

can’t at this point list you chapter and verse. I certainly will want 

to get back—if I’m confirmed—get back to the committee on specific 

things. I do have some things in mind but some of the people affected don’t know what those are and I certainly didn’t want to presume confirmation by announcing those ahead of time. But certainly, if confirmed, I’d want to consult with the committee on what 

I would have in mind. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. And have you, as a part of your communication and conversation with the President, prior to your nomination 

and maybe subsequent there to, engaged him in the fact that there 

are some changes that are going to need to be made and you’re 

going to have to have the administration’s support. 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, and I had done that in writing before 

I was nominated. Whether it was me or someone else as DNI, at 

Secretary Gates’ suggestion, I wrote a letter to the President and 

made that point clear. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. And you mentioned that letter to me and 

that you had hoped that the White House would at least share that 

with the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Do you know whether 

that’s been done? 

33 

General CLAPPER. I don’t know, sir. I don’t know that actually 

the request has been made to the White House. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Well, General, I’ve known you for a 

long time, seen you operate, and you are certainly well-qualified for 

this job. It is going to be a tough job, but I hope you know and understand that this committee’s here to help you and we want to 

make sure from an oversight standpoint that you’ve got the right 

kind of policy support and political support from this side of Pennsylvania Avenue. And we know soon that it will be there from the 

other side. So we look forward to working closely with you. 

General CLAPPER. Sir, I appreciate that. And that is absolutely 

crucial. I don’t believe oversight necessarily has to be or implies an 

adversarial relationship. And I would need—if I’m confirmed, I 

would need the support of this committee to bring about those 

changes that you just talked about. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, thanks for your willingness to continue 

to serve. Madam Chairman, I don’t know whether we’ve formally 

requested that, but I think certainly we should. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I would join with Senator Chambliss if we 

can make that request. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Fine. Certainly can. Thank you. Thank 

you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam Chair. Congratulations 

again, General Clapper, on your nomination to this critically important position. I agree you are clearly well qualified for this. 

Madam Chair, I’d like to put a statement in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL FEINGOLD

General Clapper’s nomination comes at a critical moment for the Intelligence 

Community and for our national security. Reform—of the IC and of congressional 

oversight—is long overdue. To save taxpayer dollars, I have supported in this committee, and incorporated into my own Control Spending Now bill, provisions requiring reporting on long-range budget projections for the IC, the costs of acquisition 

systems, cost overruns, and the risks and vulnerabilities of intelligence systems. We 

must also ensure that the GAO has access to the IC and that there is accountability 

for impediments to auditing. 

At the same time, we cannot afford so much overlap and redundancy when there 

are still parts of the world, as well as emerging threats, about which we know very 

little. This is why the Senate has approved, as part of the intelligence authorization 

bill, legislation I proposed to establish an independent commission that will address 

these gaps by recommending how to integrate and make best use of the clandestine 

activities of the IC and the open collection and reporting of the State Department. 

Intelligence reform also requires reform of the oversight process. That is why I 

have introduced a bipartisan resolution to implement the recommendation of the 9/ 

11 Commission to grant appropriations authority to the Intelligence Committee, as 

well as a bipartisan effort to declassify the top-line intelligence budget request, a 

requirement if there is to be a separate intelligence appropriations bill as called for 

by the 9/11 Commission. Finally, we must eliminate once and for all the ‘‘Gang of 

Eight’’ briefings that leave the full committee in the dark. 

Since our meeting last week I hope you had a chance to review 

the congressional notification requirements in the National Security Act. Have you had a chance to do that? 

General CLAPPER. I have, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And do you agree that the so-called Gang of 

Eight notification provision applies only to covert action and not to 

other intelligence activities? 

34 

General CLAPPER. Sir, you’re quite right. Section 502 and 503 of 

the National Security Act of 1947 do only call out covert action as 

requiring more limited notification. In the opening statement, however, of Section 502, it does allude to the protection of sources and 

methods, which I think in the past has been used to expand the 

subject matter beyond covert action, which would require a limited 

notification. 

That all said, I will be a zealous advocate for full notification and 

timely notification to the Congress. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate the statement and the spirit of 

it. I just want to point out that when you refer to that preliminary 

language, that language is in both sections, but the additional language about the Gang of Eight notifications in the section on covert 

action means, in my view, that limited notifications were not intended for other intelligence activities. 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, but as I say that, that opening verbiage has been interpreted to expand that and I’ll tell you what my 

personal attitude is, but at the same time I don’t feel it’s appropriate to preempt what the President might want to decide. So I’ll 

tell you my attitude again is I will be a zealous advocate for timely 

and complete notification. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And I appreciate that. I just want to say for 

the record, I think that is an incorrect interpretation, but obviously 

you’re not alone in your view that that can be done. But I really 

feel strongly that’s incorrect. 

Senator FEINGOLD. While many of the operational details of intelligence activities are justifiably classified, I believe the American 

people are entitled to know how the intelligence community, the 

Department of Justice and the FISA Court are interpreting the 

law. Do you agree with that general principle? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, in general, I do. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And I have identified a number of areas in 

which I think the American people would be surprised to learn how 

the law has been interpreted in secret. As you consider these types 

of requests for declassification, will you keep this principle that you 

and I just agreed upon in mind? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I will. 

Senator FEINGOLD. One of the issues that has arisen in the context of your nomination is the Department of Defense’s perception 

that provisions of the intelligence authorization bill may be in tension with the secretary’s authorities, but I want to focus for the moment on the reason these are in there in the first place and why 

I’ve incorporated them into my own bill, which I call my control 

spending now legislation. They would improve accountability and 

help save taxpayer dollars. 

General, at our meeting last week, you told me that not all problems require statutory solutions. So how as DNI would you go 

about fixing the cost overruns and other problems that this legislation is designed to address? 

General CLAPPER. Well, I would continue to support the management mechanisms that have been established, specifically an agreement on acquisition oversight signed by, I think, then-Director 

McConnell and Secretary Gates. That said, of course, acquisition is, 

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35 

where. And so I don’t have any magic silver bullets here to offer 

up because if I did, I wouldn’t be here to solve these significant acquisition problems. 

It does require systematic program reviews. It requires, I think, 

integrity on the part of program managers to ensure that they are 

honestly reporting out their problems and identifying issues early 

enough so that remedies can be afforded. 

Senator FEINGOLD. The intelligence authorization bill would also 

establish an independent commission that would recommend ways 

to integrate the intelligence community with the U.S. government 

personnel, particularly State Department personnel who openly collect information around the world. This reform was first proposed 

by Senator Hagel and myself and I think it’s critical if we’re going 

to anticipate threats and crises as they emerge around the world. 

Would you be open to a fresh look and a set of recommendations 

on this issue from this commission? 

General CLAPPER. I would. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In responding to yesterday’s Washington Post 

story, Acting Director Gompert defended overlap and redundancies 

in the intelligence community. But given finite resources and budget constraints, to what extent should we be prioritizing efforts to 

understand parts of the world and emerging threats that no one is 

covering? 

General CLAPPER. Well, you raise a good point, sir, and we did 

discuss earlier that in some cases one man’s duplication is another 

man’s competitive analysis. So in certain cases, I think, as it was 

during the Cold War, when you have an enemy that can really 

damage or mortally wound you, that’s merited. 

I think in many cases what was labeled as duplication, a deeper 

look may not turn out to be duplication; it just has the appearance 

of that, but when you really look into what is being done particularly on a command-by-command basis or intelligence analytic element on a case-by-case basis, it’s not really duplication. 

I think the important point you raise, though, sir, has to do with 

what about the areas that are not covered, and that has been a 

classic plague for us. I know what the state of our geospatial databases were on 9/11 in Afghanistan, and they were awful, and it’s 

because at the time the priority that Afghanistan enjoyed in terms 

of intelligence requirements. 

So we can’t take our eyes off the incipient threats that exist in 

places, an area that I know you’re very interested in, for example, 

Africa, which is growing in concern to me, personally. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, General. What is your view of 

GAO access to the intelligence community? 

General CLAPPER. Well, sir, the GAO—in several incumbencies 

over my time the GAO has produced very useful studies. I would 

cite as a specific recent case in point the ISR road map that we’re 

required to maintain and the GAO has critiqued us on that. I’ve 

been very deeply involved in personnel security clearance reform. 

The GAO has held our feet to the fire on ensuring compliance with 

IRTPA guidelines on timeliness of clearances and of late has also 

insisted on the quality metrics for ensuring appropriate clearances. 

So I think the GAO serves a useful purpose for us. 

36 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate your attitude on that as well. 

Meaningful intelligence reform is also going to require some reform 

of the oversight process. Is it time for the Senate to grant appropriations authority to this committee, as the 9/11 commission recommended? For that to work, however, there has to be an unclassified topline intelligence budget request that would allow for a separate appropriations bill. 

Would you support the declassification of the President’s topline 

intelligence budget request? 

General CLAPPER. I do support that. It has been done. In fact, 

I also pushed through, and got Secretary Gates to approve, revelation of the Military Intelligence Program budget. I thought, frankly, we were being a bit disingenuous by only releasing or revealing 

the National Intelligence Program, which is only part of the story. 

And so Secretary Gates has agreed that we could also publicize 

that, and I think the American people are entitled to know the totality of the investment we make each year in intelligence. 

And sir, I was cautioned earlier by members about delving into 

congressional jurisdiction issues. I prefer not to touch that with a 

10-foot pole other than to observe that it would be nice if the oversight responsibilities were symmetrical in both houses. 

I’ve also been working and have had dialogue with actually taking the National Intelligence Program out of the DOD budget since 

the reason, the original reason for having it embedded in the department’s budget was for classification purposes. Well, if it’s going 

to be publicly revealed, that purpose goes away. And it also serves 

the added advantage of reducing the topline of the DOD budget, 

which is quite large, as you know, and that’s a large amount of 

money that the department really has no real jurisdiction over. 

So we have been working and studying and socializing the notion 

of pulling the MIP out of the department’s budget, which I would 

think also would serve to strengthen the DNI’s hand in managing 

the money in the intelligence community. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for all your answers, and good 

luck. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General, welcome. We’re delighted to have you here, and I think 

you’ll be the next DNI, hopefully sooner versus later—and I say 

that for the Chair and the ranking member. I hope we’ll move this 

as expeditiously as we can. And, as I’ve publicly said, I think that 

you bring to this position a rich experience that many have covered, as well as yourself, that benefits one’s ability to be successful, 

and our intelligence community needs that desperately right now. 

I’ve got to say, as it relates to the members’ references to The 

Washington Post article—or articles, plural—it pains me, because 

I don’t believe that what happens within the intelligence community is something that needs to be as public as it sometimes is. It 

disturbs me as we promote Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on TV, and 

we do it with the full knowledge of knowing that we give away 

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37 

stand that if you have sufficient oversight in place, you trust the 

individuals that you’ve chosen to put in those roles. 

So I see this explosion of publicity about what happens within 

our intelligence community really as a blow to us, the oversight 

committee, and the inability for us to work effectively with those 

within the community. So I hope you understand, at least from myself, that I believe the committee has to be robust in our oversight. 

It’s not a reflection of the leadership of our committee, I might 

say to the Chair and ranking member. I think it’s an overall level 

of cooperation between the intelligence community and the committee, and I hope that we will work as partners to make sure that 

the trust of the public, but also the trust of our colleagues, is entrusted in this committee, that we’re doing our job and that we’ve 

got our eye on the right thing. 

Now, you said earlier that the DNI needs to be a leader of the 

intelligence community and provide direction and control. Can you 

define direction and control for me in this context? 

General CLAPPER. I think what’s intended in the term ‘‘direction 

and control’’ is that the DNI, I think, is ultimately responsible for 

the performance of the intelligence community writ large, both the 

producers of intelligence and the users of intelligence which are 

represented in those 16 components. 

And I believe that under the, obviously, the auspices of the President, who I believe intends to hold the DNI—whether it’s me or 

somebody else—responsible for that performance, and that that 

therefore empowers the DNI to direct the intelligence chiefs as to 

what to do; what the focus should be; what the emphasis should 

be, or, if that should change; if there needs to be—if we need to 

establish ad hoc organizations to perform a specific task; if we need 

to have studies done, whatever it takes. 

I believe that inherent in the DNI—at least the spirit and intent 

of the IRTPA legislation—was that he would, he or she would direct that and be responsible for it. 

Senator BURR. Do you believe there will be times where the DNI 

has to be a referee? 

General CLAPPER. I think there could be times when—yes, I do. 

Senator BURR. This has already been covered, General, but I’ve 

got to cover it just one more time. I believe that this committee is 

to be notified quickly on any significant attempt to attack, once an 

attack’s carried out, or there is a significant threat that we have 

credible evidence of. 

Do I have your commitment today that you will, in a timely fashion, or a designee by you, brief this committee on that information? 

General CLAPPER. Absolutely, sir. Of course, it carries with it the 

potential of it not being exactly accurate, because my experience 

has been most critics are wrong. But I believe that what you ask 

is entirely appropriate and reasonable. 

Senator BURR. And General, do you have any problem if this 

committee asks for a level of raw data to look at on pertinent 

threats or attempts—at sharing that raw data with us? 

General CLAPPER. I don’t have a problem with it philosophically, 

sir. Just that I would want, as the DNI, if I’m confirmed for that 

position, would want to ensure that at a given time, to give you the 

most complete picture I can, which is as accurate as possible. And 

38 

oftentimes with raw—so-called raw material, it’s erroneous or incomplete or misleading. So, with that caveat, I don’t have a problem with it, but I just want you to understand what you’re getting 

when you get that. 

Senator BURR. I accept that caveat, and I think most members 

would. I think that the raw data is absolutely essential for us to 

do the oversight role that we’re charged with. It’s certainly not 

needed on every occasion, but on those that it might play a role, 

I hope you will, in fact, provide it. 

Now, you covered the history of the intelligence community, especially as it related to the 1990s, and how that affected our capabilities post-9/11. Would we have been able to meet the intelligence 

community needs had we not had contractors we could turn to, 

post-9/11? 

General CLAPPER. No, sir. 

Senator BURR. Do you believe that we’ll always use some number 

of contractors within the intelligence community? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator BURR. And I know this has been a focus of a lot of members about downsizing the contractor footprint, and I’m fine with 

that. But there’s a big difference between downsizing and eliminating. And there’s a tremendous talent out there that, thankfully, 

we were able to tap into. 

I would hate to see us become so adverse to the use of contractors that we would sacrifice potential. And I applaud the effort to 

try to downsize the footprint of them, but hope that we leave the 

flexibility to use them where it’s appropriate. 

General CLAPPER. Absolutely sir. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

And I worked as a contractor for six years myself, so I think I 

have a good understanding of the contribution that they have made 

and will continue to make. I think the issue is, what’s the magnitude? And most importantly, regardless of the numbers of companies, the number of contractor employees, is how the government, 

and specifically the intelligence community, how do we manage 

them; how do we ensure that we’re getting our money’s worth? 

Senator BURR. Lastly—and it’s covering ground already discussed—you indicated that not all of the intelligence community efforts need to be exclusively managed out of the ODNI, that they 

can be decentralized and delegated where appropriate. 

Do you have any concerns that that might undercut the authority of the DNI? 

General CLAPPER. No, sir, I don’t. And I’ll give you a specific case 

in point: 

When I came into this job, early on—in fact, in May of 2007— 

and I prevailed upon both Secretary Gates and then-DNI McConnell to dual-hat me as the Director of Defense Intelligence, a position on the DNI staff, as a way of facilitating communication and 

bridging dialogue between the two staffs. And I think the record 

will show that we’ve worked very well together. 

I would propose to—Director Blair, to his great credit, I thought, 

breathed life, great life into that concept—and I would propose, if 

I’m confirmed, to do the same, and have the same relationship with 

my successor, if I’m confirmed for this—as USD/I, if I’m confirmed 

for DNI. And I think that same approach can be used in other relaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Feb 14, 2011 Jkt 063996 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\63996.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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tionships, perhaps with the Department of Homeland Security, just 

to cite an example off the top of my head. 

All I’m saying is, I don’t think that everything has to be executed 

from within the confines of the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, that there are things that can be delegated and done 

on behalf of the DNI, as long as they are visible to, and with the 

approval of, the DNI. 

Senator BURR. General, I thank you for your candid answers. 

In our telephone conversation, I said to you that your tenure as 

DNI would determine whether the structure we set up actually can 

work, will work, or whether we need to rethink this. I believe that 

we’ve got the best chance of success with your nomination, and I 

look forward to working with you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General CLAPPER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Burr. 

And finally, Senator Whitehouse. Thank you for your courtesy to 

your colleague, too. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Welcome, General Clapper. Near the bitter end. 

I’d like to go back to cybersecurity and ask you about five topic 

areas within it. 

The first is the information that the public has about cybersecurity. Are you comfortable that the public is adequately aware of the 

scope and severity of the cybersecurity threat that the country 

faces? 

General CLAPPER. Candidly, no, sir. I don’t think there is a general appreciation for the potential threat there. 

I think there is widespread knowledge in the cyber community, 

meaning the cyber industry, if you will. I think there’s a less acute 

awareness, perhaps, out there in what I’ll call the civil infrastructure. But I think the general public is not aware of the potential 

threat, no. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The reason that I ask that is that it’s difficult in a democracy to legislate in an area where the public is not 

adequately aware of the threat. 

So I hope that, as we go forward through the 35, 40, 45 pieces 

of legislation that are out there, that you will help us bring to the 

attention, in a—you said we do over-classify, I think we particularly over-classify here—that in areas where it really doesn’t adversely affect national security, there’s a real advantage to getting 

this information out to the public. And I hope you’ll cooperate with 

us in trying to do so, so that we’re dealing with a knowledgeable 

public as we face these legislative questions. 

General CLAPPER. I will, sir. And I believe that it is, in fact, incumbent on the intelligence community to help provide that education to the maximum extent possible without the undue revelation of sources and methods. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The basic sort of protective hardware that 

is out there right now could protect the vast majority of cyber intrusions that take place. Do you agree that trying to establish and 

monitor basically what I would call rules of the road for participation in our information superhighway is an area that could stand 

improvement? 

40 

General CLAPPER. If you mean, if I understand your question, sir, 

sort of conventions or rules that, in order to participate, this is 

what was required, and at sort of minimum levels of security. Is 

that—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes. For ordinary folks who are getting on, 

to be aware that their laptop, for instance, is compromised, and 

willing to do something about it, and that we put a structure in 

place so that you can’t do the cyber equivalent of driving down the 

road with your headlights out, your tail lights out, your muffler 

hanging, at 90 miles an hour. 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. Well, I personally agree with that. 

I think there’ll be a sales job, a marketing job required to get people to buy into that. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And in terms of if you sort of step it up 

to America’s business community, do you feel that the private sector or the business community is adequately situated with respect 

to their own independent self-defense against cyber attack? Or does 

the networking of private business, say by industrial sector, and 

the relationship with government need to be improved so that our 

major businesses can protect their critical infrastructure better? 

General CLAPPER. Sir, I’m not technically fluent here, but my 

general sensing is that, given the sophistication of some of our 

major adversaries, nation-state adversaries, I’m not sure that, 

given the rapidity with which new ways of accessing computers, 

I’m not sure that they’re as current on that—those sectors to which 

you refer are as current as they could or should be. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And if we’re to the point where a private 

business which provides critical American infrastructure—a major 

bank, a major communications entity, an electric utility, some 

other form of infrastructure upon which American lives and property depend—were to be the subject of a sustained and damaging 

cyber attack, are you confident that, at the moment, we have adequate authorities for the government to be able to step in and do 

what it needs to do in a clear way to protect American lives and 

property? 

General CLAPPER. Again, I’m not expert on this, but my general 

sensing is, no, we’re not. I think the whole law on this subject is 

a work in progress. It’s still an issue, frankly, even in a warfighting 

context. 

Should we have a declaratory policy or not on what we would do? 

I would be concerned about the rapidity of response and—which I 

think is the key, and I think if you speak with General Alexander 

about that, who I do consider an authority, that he would raise 

that same concern. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And lastly on this subject, are you confident that the rules of engagement for our covert agencies in addressing attacks and intrusions that take place on our cyber infrastructure are adequate and fully robust for the challenge that we 

face, or is that another area of work in progress? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir. It’s a work in progress, and I think 

perhaps best left for detailed discussion in a closed session. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I won’t go any further than that in this 

session, but I did want to get your general perspective on that. 

41 

I’ve only been in the Senate for three years. You are my fourth 

Director of National Intelligence already. You gonna stick around? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir. I will. I wouldn’t take this on without 

thinking about that. 

And I do think my experience has been that it does take time to 

bring these changes about. When I was asked to take NIMA in the 

summer of 2001, I was specifically asked would I be willing to stay 

for five years, and I agreed to do that. Didn’t quite last that long; 

ran afoul of the previous Secretary of Defense. But I believe that 

kind of commitment is required. 

I also would be less than forthright if I said that I’m going to sit 

here and guarantee that the intelligence community is going to bat 

a thousand every time, because we’re not. And I think I am reasonably confident I can make this better. I don’t think I’m going to be 

able to cure world hunger for intelligence, just to be realistic. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And I’m not going to hold you to this. It’s 

not intended to be a question of that variety, to pin you down; it’s 

intended to be a question to sort of illuminate the areas that you’re 

most focused on. 

Going into this job now, and knowing what you know now, when 

it comes time for you to go—and let’s hope it’s five years from 

now—what now would you think would be the most important 

things that, at that later date, you would like to look back on as 

having accomplished? 

General CLAPPER. I think, for starters, that I kept the nation 

safe. I think, obviously, this is somewhat a high-wire act with no 

safety net. And I think that’s probably the thing that will keep me 

up at night, is worrying about that. So, for whatever my tenure is, 

if the intelligence community has at least contributed to preserving 

the safety of the nation and its people, then I think that would be 

the main thing I’d worry about. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Well, I wish you well. You’ve got a hell of 

a tough job in front of you, if you’re confirmed. And any support 

that we can give you, obviously we’d like to do. 

There are significant questions about what the role of the DNI 

should be, what its authorities should be to complement that role. 

Some of that is a chicken and egg question, that you have to settle 

on one to resolve the other. And we really look forward to working 

together with you to try to get this settled for once and for all. 

General CLAPPER. Thanks, Senator. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Good afternoon, and thank you, General, for your public service. 

The Congress created this position in order to try to exert some 

control over the multiple intelligence units that were at times going 

off in their own directions. And in the compromises that we had to 

make in enacting this legislation that creates the post that you 

seek, a great deal of control was still left within the Department 

of Defense at the insistence of then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. 

How can you bring the Department of Defense intelligence operations in under your orbit so that you can function effectively? 

General CLAPPER. Well, sir, I don’t anticipate a problem there. 

42 

I think I know the Department of Defense pretty well, and that 

is where roughly two-thirds of the manpower and the money for 

the National Intelligence Program is embedded. And I would argue 

or suggest, respectfully, that having run two of the agencies in the 

Department of Defense and having served as a service intel chief 

actually will help empower me to, you know, sustain having I’ll call 

it a positive relationship with the Department of Defense components. I’ve been there, and done that, got the t-shirt, so I think I 

know how to take advantage of that. 

Senator NELSON. Well, the old adage, he who pays the piper calls 

the tune, and a lot of that Defense intel activity does not have to 

report directly to you on the appropriations. How do you get into 

that when somebody wants to go off on their own? 

General CLAPPER. Well, I would intend to further crystallize the 

relationship that Secretary Gates, and then-DNI McConnell established in May of 2007 designating the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence as the Director of Defense Intelligence. 

I have fostered, with the two DNIs I’ve served with in this job, 

a close working relationship on synchronizing the two programs— 

the National Intelligence Program and the MIP. In fact, Director 

Blair and I, you know, twice, two rounds, testified together on 

those two programs. 

We’ve had an aggressive program effort, which has been going on 

for a couple of cycles now, to further synchronize and deconflict the 

two programs, and to coordinate between the NIP and the MIP. 

And I would certainly want to continue that with my successor in 

the USD/I job, if I am confirmed to be the Director of National Intelligence. 

I don’t think, frankly, although there’s much made of it sometimes, I think it’s somewhat hyperbole about the strained relationship between the DNI and the Department of Defense. I just don’t 

think that that’s—I haven’t seen that. And I have certainly endeavored, working with Secretary Gates, to actually enhance and 

strengthen the role of the DNI. The DDI is one such approach. And 

certainly Secretary Gates and I worked during the revisions to the 

Executive Order 12333 to actually strengthen the position of the 

DNI. 

Senator NELSON. Why don’t you share, for the record, what you 

shared with me privately about your forthcoming relationship with 

the Director of the CIA? 

General CLAPPER. I’ll provide that for the record. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I mean, share it now. 

General CLAPPER. Well—— 

Senator NELSON. Basically, you saw the relationship was 

strained. There was a little dust-up between the two in the immediate past DNI. How do you intend to smooth that out? 

General CLAPPER [continuing]. Well, just to continue, sir, with 

my comments earlier, as you know, the intelligence community is, 

as you know, composed of 16 components, 15 of which are in someone else’s Cabinet department. And actually the most strained relationship has been with the one component that isn’t in someone’s 

Cabinet department, and that is the Central Intelligence Agency. 

That has been true regardless of who the incumbents were. It 

has nothing to do, really, with the people involved. All of them are 

43 

good people. I have had some excellent discussions with Director 

Panetta about this, and I think I’m very, very encouraged and 

pleased by his support. He’s been extremely gracious and supportive, and I think he wants to make this arrangement work as 

much as you do. 

Senator NELSON. Will you participate in the President’s daily 

morning brief? 

General CLAPPER. I will participate—I plan to participate, yes, 

sir. I don’t plan to give it, necessarily, but I plan to participate in 

it. 

Senator NELSON. Will the Director of the CIA participate as well? 

General CLAPPER. He could, depending on the subject matter, I 

suppose. But I wouldn’t—I certainly wouldn’t object to that. 

Senator NELSON. Do you get the sense that that was a little bit 

of contention since suddenly what had been historically the role of 

the CIA Director was suddenly not the role once the DNI was established? 

General CLAPPER. That obviously has been a challenging transition. It’s my belief and my observation from somewhat an outside 

perspective that that is an arrangement that has evolved for the 

better, since increasingly more input finds its way into the PDB 

from other than the CIA. 

The CIA will continue to provide the lion’s share of the finished 

intelligence analysis that goes into the PDB. But under the new 

structure and the new set-up, under the auspices of the DNI, it is 

much more—it’s much broader and involves more of the community. I recently reviewed some statistics that bear that out. 

Senator NELSON. Recently we’ve had some cases of homegrown 

terrorists—the Colorado folks, the Times Square folks, the Fort 

Hood person. Do you want to comment for the committee about 

what you think ought to be done? 

General CLAPPER. Well, I think, sir, this is a very—we did speak 

about this earlier—a very serious problem. And I was pretty deeply 

involved and intensely involved in the Fort Hood aftermath, particularly with respect to the e-mails exchanged between the radical 

cleric Aulaqi and Major Hasan. 

And what it points out, in my view, is a serious challenge that 

I don’t have the answer for, and that is the identification of selfradicalization, which may or may not lend itself to intelligence detection, if you will. And this requires, you know, in the case of the 

Department of Defense, some education on how to tell people, or 

instruct people, or suggest to people how they discern or identify 

self-radicalization that’s going on right in front of them with an associate. 

And to me it’s almost like detecting a tendency for suicide ahead 

of time. It’s a very daunting challenge and we cannot necessarily 

depend on intelligence mechanisms to detect that selfradicalization. 

Senator NELSON. On page 23 of your testimony, you consider 

counterintelligence to be under-resourced. You want to share with 

us why and also where you would increase the resources? 

General CLAPPER. I think, given the profound threats posed to 

this country both by nation-states and others who are trying to collect information against us, and we have some very aggressive forVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:51 Feb 14, 2011 Jkt 063996 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\63996.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
44 

eign countries that are doing this, I’m not convinced that—and this 

is more intuitive or judgmental or impressionistic—that we have 

devoted sufficient resources to counterintelligence in the Department of Defense, certainly, which is a major player in counterintelligence, or with the FBI or CIA which are the three poles, if you 

will, involved in counterintelligence. 

And this is something I intend to explore to see what we can do 

to expand resource investment in counterintelligence. This is particularly crucial in the case of cyber. We have the same challenge 

in cyber for counterintelligence as we do more conventionally. 

Senator NELSON. Madam Chairman, are we going to do a classified session at any point? 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We can if there is a request. We will not 

do it today, however. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You’re very welcome. Thank you, Senator. 

General Clapper, let me just say I think you’ve done very well. 

I think what comes through very clearly is your expertise in the 

specifics of intelligence. I think that’s appreciated and I think it’ll 

make your job a lot easier. I do have a couple of questions, and I 

know the Vice Chairman has a couple of questions. So I’d like to 

just continue this a little bit longer, if I might. 

Have you had a chance to take a look at the 13 recommendations 

we made on the Abdulmutallab situation? 

General CLAPPER. Yes ma’am, I have, and I had an excellent session with Mike Leiter last week on this very topic, so he kind of 

went over that with me. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay, then the problem clearly is for me, 

still, connecting the dots. Huge expenditures in computer programs, often bought separately by various departments, organizations, et cetera, can’t connect in certain critical but very simple 

areas. I would like to suggest that that be high in your portfolio 

and that you take a very careful look at it, because I would think 

we are spending billions of dollars on high technology which, candidly, doesn’t work nearly as well as it should, particularly in this 

area, where an identification can be really critical and one letter 

or one number should not make a difference. Do you have a comment? 

General CLAPPER. No, I agree with you. As I alluded to earlier, 

I think, despite all the huge investments in IT that we’ve made, 

that we still depend too much on the minds of analysts to do things 

that we ought to be able to harness with our IT to connect those 

dots. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay, the second is PREDATOR–REAPER 

oversight. I think this is an area that we have been very concerned 

about, and this committee is taking that oversight very seriously 

and has been very active in seeing that this is carefully done, that 

the intelligence is excellent. And I’m one that believes that the CIA 

in particular has had a remarkable record, with very good intelligence, and in some ways really the best of what can be. I just 

hope that you will have this at a high level for your own oversight. 

General CLAPPER. Absolutely. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

45 

The third is Afghanistan. I read a quote by Major General Michael Flynn earlier in the year that said—and I’m paraphrasing— 

that eight years into the war, the intelligence community is only 

marginally relevant to the overall strategy. U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high-level 

decisionmakers seeking knowledge. Would you take a look at that 

and perhaps talk with him and see where we are, if we are in fact 

lacking? 

General CLAPPER. Well, I already have had extensive dialogue 

with Mike Flynn when the article first came out. And a careful 

read of it I think is—I think it’s a Pogo article. We weighed the 

enemy, and it’s ourselves, because what the article really talks to 

is the situation in Afghanistan, much of which is, I think, under 

his control. 

I think what occasioned the article was the change in our strategy from a classic CT or counterterrorist mission to a much, much 

broader counterinsurgency mission. And it’s true. We did not have 

the intelligence mechanism there to make that shift that quickly. 

I think what he’s really getting to is the cultural, the human terrain—if I can use that phrase—perspective and insight that’s required to understand the village dynamics down to the very nittygritty level. And so that’s what his complaint was about. 

As I told him, if he felt that they had too many intelligence analysts at the brigade combat, at the BCT level and he needed more 

down at the battalion or company level, it’s up to him to move 

them. We’re certainly not going to sit back here in the confines of 

the beltway and orchestrate intelligence in Afghanistan. He’s the 

senior intelligence officer; that’s his responsibility, and we back 

here will certainly support him. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay, and finally, contractor analysis. 

Could you put that high on your agenda? I very much appreciate 

what you said. And that was that it all depends on what, where, 

the necessity, the type of thing. And I think we need to get that 

under control, and we do not currently have it under control. We 

need to know where, from an intelligence perspective, contractors 

should serve a vital use, and where they do not. 

As you know, the cost is about 70 percent more than a government employee, so it is a very expensive enterprise as well. 

General CLAPPER. Yes, it is. And of course, per our earlier discussion, you know, the reason why we got to where we are and the 

sudden re-expansion of the intelligence committee after 9/11 and 

intelligence being an inherently manpower-intensive activity, so 

the natural outlet for that was contractors, whom we can hire one 

year at a time, which you can’t do with government employees. And 

you can also get rid of them more quickly, so the expansion or contraction. 

So, for example, the Army right now has about 6,000 contractor 

Pashtu linguists. Well, I’m not sure we want to keep them on as 

government employees when the need for Pashtu linguists hopefully goes down in the future. So I think rather than rote numbers 

or percentages, I think what we need to—and I do intend to get 

into this, if I’m confirmed—what are the ground rules, the organizing principles that govern where it’s proper to use contractors 

and where it’s not. 

46 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, we will schedule a meeting in your 

ascendancy to come in and brief us on that, so be prepared. But 

I’d like just quickly to tell you what my intention is. 

I’m going to request that all members submit questions by noon 

tomorrow and ask you to answer them as quickly as you can. And 

as soon as we receive the answers, Members have a brief opportunity to digest them, we will schedule a markup. If we can do it 

in a week or ten days, that’s fine; hopefully we can. Is that agreeable with you? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, ma’am. I would hope that whatever action 

is taken would be taken before the Senate adjourns in August. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, we will certainly strive to do that, 

and the questions become a vital part, first of all, of us getting 

them, and secondly, your responding. But you’ve been very prompt 

in your responses, and I’ve no reason to believe it would be otherwise, so we will try to do our best to accommodate that. 

Let me just end by saying I think you’ve performed really very 

well. And once again, your expertise in this area is very much appreciated and I think will be very well used. 

General CLAPPER. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, thank you for making it 

clear that we will have more questions for the record. I frankly 

have some questions for the record. I’d like to have your fuller explanation because they seem to be inconsistent with previous positions and some are not clear. I do want to have those. 

Madam Chair, if it’s possible, Senator Nelson said that he would 

like to have a closed hearing. 

I think there are some things that you are interested in that 

might be best covered in a classified hearing, and I have a couple 

of areas of overlap between military and civilian that I prefer not 

to discuss in an open session. So we will do that, and I would join 

you saying that the nominee has certainly stayed with it for a long 

time. We appreciate that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. He says he does not need one. But if you 

do—— 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, we might be able to have some classified questions at least then that we can submit for response, because there’s just a couple of things that probably I’d prefer not to 

discuss in an open session. 

But let me go back. A general question you’ll be asked in writing—and I think it’s good to have on record—will you cooperate 

with both the Chair and the Vice Chair, as well as with our staffs, 

by promptly responding to written and phone inquiries, sharing information, being proactive in sharing it with us? 

General CLAPPER. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman BOND. That’s something we talked about, and I 

wanted to—we mentioned that. I wanted to make sure that the 

staff knows that on both sides. And we will look forward to your 

full answers, but I want to go back—I was going down a road talking when I ran out of time on the first round. 

Talking about Guantanamo detainees and their release, when I 

communicated to the national security advisor that members of 

this committee had been told that the CIA and the DIA did not 

47 

concur in sending a particular detainee back to Yemen, the national security advisor told me that those agencies would be reminded of the administration’s decision. 

Now, as I think we discussed once before, the administration’s 

decision is their decision, but if there is an implication that the intelligence committee should not be told honestly and frankly of advice that you give to the policymakers—whether it’s accepted or 

not—that troubles me. So will you commit to providing the committee the honest and forthright recommendations and assessments that you make, regardless of whether they are accepted ultimately by policymakers? 

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I would. Again, as we discussed before, this is an interagency process. Intelligence is a very important, but not the exclusive, determinant. And it would be my view 

that intelligence should be as thorough and accurate as possible on 

making such assessments. And I don’t see any problem with, once 

we’ve spoken our piece and if that was ignored, that’s the process. 

And I certainly have no trouble—I wouldn’t have any trouble conveying that to the committee. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Good, because in case you’re advised of the 

position, we want the intelligence regardless of what the position 

may come up with. 

Let me go into another interesting area. You gave a conference 

speech in 2008 to GEOINT, which my staff managed to track down. 

And you said that at that point, ‘‘I hope the next administration 

will give some thought, I mean the Congress as well, to maybe another look at the National Security Act of 1947, maybe a Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency.’’ 

But in the answers to the committee’s questionnaire you said you 

had no plan to recommend to the President any dramatic change, 

but rather look to improve it. There are some of us that think the 

Goldwater-Nichols recommendation was similar to what came out 

of the Project on National Security Reform that General Jones, 

Susan Rice, Jim Steinberg participated in before they joined the 

administration. The administration apparently has not gone along 

with that. As your recommendation—did your recommendation 

change as a result of the administration’s position, or do you think 

we need to take another look at the National Security Act of 1947? 

General CLAPPER. I think—what has been discussed about it, 

and I don’t exactly remember the GEOINT discussion. I think it 

had to do with the discussion that was at the time. I remember 

specifically former chairman of the JCS, Pete Pace, who was a proponent for a Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency, which could— 

you know, that might have merit. 

I do think it’s a different proposition, as Secretary Gates, I think 

correctly, points out, that Goldwater-Nichols in its original form, of 

course, only applied to one department. So perhaps the principles 

of Goldwater-Nichols could be applied perhaps in an interagency 

context. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well basically, that’s what the DNI is; it’s 

an interagency agency. And that’s maybe—well, we will discuss 

that further. But are there any particular aspects of GoldwaterNichols you believe should apply to the interagency? 

48 

General CLAPPER. Well, one of the benefits of Goldwater-Nichols—and I was around and was probably part of the legion of people that wrote papers in the Pentagon against it at the time in the 

early 1980s, but now of course it is the accepted norm. And what 

it meant in the department was placing a very high premium on 

jointness and on joint duty. And so that is one of the principles 

that was taken on, particularly by Director McConnell, which I certainly agree with. 

And we are experiencing a lot of mobility in the intelligence community so that people get out of their home stovepipe and move to 

other parts of the community. So that’s a principle of GoldwaterNichols that I think applies in the intelligence community and, for 

that matter, could apply in the interagency. 

Vice Chairman BOND. You suggest in answers to the committee 

questionnaire that the area of greatest ambiguity in IRTPA is the 

relationship with and authority of the DNI over the CIA. What do 

you think is ambiguous in the law? 

General CLAPPER. As I cited earlier, the IRTPA does stipulate 

that the Director of CIA—Director of the Central Intelligence Agency—is in charge of foreign intelligence relationships. And of course, 

that’s what gave rise to the dispute between DNI Blair and the Director of CIA. And I think the law says that the DNI oversees those 

foreign relationships, whatever that means. So I think that is an 

area of ambiguity. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. Three changes that I think 

might go a long way—I think you’ve addressed at least one of 

them—would be giving the DNI milestone decision authority for all 

intelligence programs funded 50 percent or more by NIP; two 

would be changing the non-abrogation language in section 1018; 

and the third is appropriating NIP funds directly to the DNI, rather than through DOD and other departments. 

What are your feelings on those three measures—1018, milestone 

authority over—— 

General CLAPPER. Well, I think there is an agreement now, 

which took the form of a memorandum agreement that was signed 

by Secretary Gates and Director McConnell that governs milestone 

decision authority. And of course it is a shared arrangement, depending on the predominance of the funding, whether it’s in the department or in the NIP. 

Non-abrogation, section 1018, was addressed in the revision to 

Executive Order 12333. And there was some language appended to 

that that basically amplified the process for potential resolution of 

disputes, if in fact they had to go to the White House. 

So at this point, I’m not prepared—as a nominee, certainly—to 

make any recommendations about amending section 1018. 

On DOD funding, I have been a proponent for taking the NIP out 

of the DOD. Now, that carries with it some baggage, if you will, 

in terms of the staffing mechanisms and processing, but I think the 

long-term impact of that would be to actually strengthen the DNI’s 

authorities over the National Intelligence Program. 

Given the revelation of the top line appropriated number of the 

National Intelligence Program, the original reason for burying that 

number in the Department of Defense budget kind of goes away. 

And I have similarly argued—and the Secretary has approved— 

49 

publicizing the Military Intelligence Program for the sake of completeness, both for the Congress and the public to know the totality 

of the investment in intelligence in this country. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Finally, you mentioned that you had 

looked over the bill that Senator Hatch and I had on setting up a 

national cyber center and a cyber defense alliance. Are there any 

further thoughts that you have to share about that bill or where 

we should be going on cyber? 

General CLAPPER. Well, sir, there are, as you know, many—I 

think there’s 34, 35 legislative proposals now in play which address 

a whole range of cyber, cyber-related issues. So I don’t want to preempt the administration on picking and choosing which bill they 

like. 

I do think, though, there are some appealing features in the bill 

that you and Senator Hatch are sponsoring, which is putting someone clearly in charge, having an identifiable budget aggregation, colocation either physically or virtually, I think. So those features— 

I have not read the bill itself but I’ve read about it—I think are 

appealing. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And the other thing, the importance 

that—I think the thing that was different, the cyber defense alliance would be a means for the private sector to come together with 

government agencies and each other, protected from FOIA and 

antitrust or other challenges, to discuss and share information on 

the threats that were coming in. And if you have any further information on that, I would appreciate hearing it, either now or later. 

General CLAPPER. Sir, I would recommend—if you haven’t already—some dialogue with the Deputy Secretary Bill Lynne, who 

has been very much in the lead for engaging with the civilian sector, particularly the defense intelligence base, on doing exactly this. 

And he’s done a lot of work, given this a lot of thought. So I would 

commend a dialogue with him. 

Vice Chairman BOND. All right. Well, thank you. And we’ve 

talked with many, many different private sector elements who are 

concerned that they don’t feel comfortable, don’t know where to go, 

or how to get information and share it. And I think they can be 

very, very perhaps helpful to each other and to the government in 

identifying the threats that are coming in. 

Well, thank you very much, General. As I said, we’ll have some 

questions for the record. And I think there may be some classified 

questions for that, and we’ll wait to hear a response. And thank 

you for the time that you’ve given us. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman 

and General Clapper. I think we’ve come to the end of the afternoon. 

Again, for all staff, if you can let your Members know, please get 

the questions in by noon tomorrow. General Clapper will address 

them as quickly as possible. We will then make a decision whether 

we need a closed hearing. Perhaps these questions can be asked in 

a classified fashion in writing. If not, we will have a closed hearing, 

and we will try and move this just as quickly as possible. 

So, well done, General, and thank you everybody, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:43 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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Æ 


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