J-A29034-14 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee 

v. 

ARTHUR HILLIKER, 

 Appellant 

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 339 WDA 2014 

 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001290-2012 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., ALLEN and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 9, 2014 

 This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence entered after the trial 

court convicted Appellant of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol or 

controlled substance - general impairment (2nd offense) and DUI - high rate 

of alcohol (2nd offense).1 We affirm. 

 On February 7, 2012, Appellant was arrested and charged with 

obedience to traffic control devices, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a),2 as well as the 

 

1

 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a) and 3802(b), respectively. 

2

 Subsection 3111(a) provides, 

Unless otherwise directed by a uniformed police officer or any 

appropriately attired person authorized to direct, control or 

regulate traffic, the driver of any vehicle shall obey the 

instructions of any applicable official traffic-control device placed 

or held in accordance with the provisions of this title, subject to 

the privileges granted the driver of an emergency vehicle in this 

title. 
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aforementioned DUI offenses. Appellant filed a motion to suppress. After 

holding a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied it. 

At Appellant’s non-jury trial, he and the Commonwealth agreed to a 

stipulation of facts. The stipulation of facts established that, after Patrolman 

Mark Hamilton pulled over Appellant’s vehicle on February 7, 2012, 

Appellant failed a series of field sobriety tests. The stipulation of facts 

further established that Appellant subsequently had his blood drawn and that 

his blood alcohol content was .155%. The Commonwealth dismissed the 

obedience-to-traffic-control-devices charge, and the trial court found 

Appellant guilty of the DUI offenses. 

After he was sentenced, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The 

trial court directed Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and 

Appellant then filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In his brief to this 

Court, Appellant asks us to consider one question, namely, “Whether the 

stop, search and seizure of Appellant and his vehicle based upon the officer’s 

incorrect and mistaken belief that the road on which [Appellant] was 

traveling was one way violates the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States[’] Constitution and/or Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?” 

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a). The Legislature has defined “official traffic-control 

devices” as “[s]igns, signals, markings and devices not inconsistent with this 

title placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having 

jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.” 75 

Pa.C.S. § 102. 
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In a case such as this where the trial court denied a 

suppression motion, [an appellate court’s] standard of review is 

well-established. 

We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and 

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of 

the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are 

in error. An appellate court, of course, is not bound by the 

suppression court's conclusions of law. 

Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

The trial court’s opinion, which we quote verbatim, summarizes the 

testimony received at the suppression hearing as follows. 

At approximately 9:22 p.m. on February 7, 2012, Officer 

Mark Hamilton with the North Huntingdon Township Police 

Department testified that he observed a Ford Windstar traveling 

eastbound on the right travel lane on Route 30 where the vehicle 

braked suddenly, made a wide turn and turned down onto an 

one-lane Route 30 eastbound on-ramp from Norwin Towne 

Square. He indicated that at the Norwin Towne Square there is 

an entrance and exit ramp to this Square with a “Do Not Enter” 

sign facing westbound traffic. 

Officer Hamilton further testified that after making the turn 

onto the on-ramp versus the off-ramp, the vehicle proceeded to 

the Norwin Towne [S]quare McDonald’s drive-thru lane. The 

Officer pulled up next to the [Appellant and] advised him to pull 

over upon receipt of his food. He testified that he initiated the 

stop due to the belief that the [Appellant] came down the wrong 

way on a one-way road in violation of Obedience to Traffic 

Control Devices, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3111(a). 

Officer Hamilton indicated that [Appellant] did not commit 

any other Motor Vehicle violations besides failing to obey the “Do 

Not Enter” sign by coming down the on-ramp. He further 

indicated that he believed the property in the Norwin Towne 

Square to be a privately owned parcel; however, [he] was 

unaware if the roadways had been adopted or accepted by the 
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Township of North Huntingdon. He testified that he had no idea 

whether the township or the Towne Square placed the “Do Not 

Enter” sign. 

Mr. Ryan Fonzi, the Associate Planning Director of the 

Planning and Zoning Department, testified that the two ramps 

were not maintained by the township, nor were they accepted by 

ordinance. He further indicated that he did not know who placed 

the sign, but assumed the sign belonged to PennDOT. Mr. Fonzi 

further stated that he did not know if the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, PennDOT, had designated these two roads as 

ingresses and egresses. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/2014, at 2-3 (citations omitted). Based upon this 

evidence, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, concluding 

that “Officer Hamilton established through his testimony that he had 

reasonable suspicion that section 3111(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code was 

being violated.” Id. at 6. 

 We begin by agreeing with the parties that the trial court erroneously 

applied the reasonable suspicion standard in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress. As this Court has explained, 

[a] police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he or 

she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the vehicle 

code has taken place, for the purpose of obtaining necessary 

information to enforce the provisions of the code. However, if 

the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation, 

the officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop. 

Put another way, if the officer has a legitimate expectation 

of investigatory results, the existence of reasonable 

suspicion will allow the stop—if the officer has no such 

expectations of learning additional relevant information 

concerning the suspected criminal activity, the stop cannot 

be constitutionally permitted on the basis of mere 

suspicion. 
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted; emphasis in original). 

 Officer Hamilton testified that he stopped Appellant’s vehicle because 

he observed Appellant enter the Norwin Towne Square by driving down the 

exit ramp, which was marked by a “Do Not Enter” sign. Because further 

investigation would not have helped establish whether Appellant failed to 

obey the “Do Not Enter” sign, Officer Hamilton was required to have 

probable cause to initiate a stop due to his belief that Appellant violated 

subsection 3111(a). We, however, observe that we still may affirm the 

judgment of sentence despite the trial court’s erroneous application of the 

reasonable suspicion standard, as long as the record supports the result 

reached by the court. Brown, 64 A.3d 1105 n.3. 

 Appellant argues that Officer Hamilton lacked probable cause to stop 

his vehicle. According to Appellant, because he was traveling eastbound on 

Route 30 and the “Do Not Enter” sign was facing vehicles traveling 

westbound on Route 30, he could not have violated subsection 3111(a). 

Appellant insists that he legally turned into the Norwin Towne Square 

Shopping Center and that Officer Hamilton illegally stopped him. He further 

maintains that the illegality of the stop is not excused by any “good faith” 

belief or mistake of Officer Hamilton, as this Commonwealth does not 

recognize any such “good faith” exception in the context of a probable cause 

analysis. 
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 In reviewing the trial court’s determination, we observe the following 

well-settled principles of law. 

The police have probable cause where the facts and 

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to 

warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an 

offense has been or is being committed. We evaluate probable 

cause by considering all relevant facts under a totality of 

circumstances analysis. 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007) 

(quotation and citations omitted). 

In short, Officer Hamilton’s testimony reveals that he knew that the 

ramp Appellant utilized to access the shopping center was an exit ramp for 

the center. He also was aware that the ramp was posted with a “Do Not 

Enter” sign facing westbound traffic. When we consider the totality of the 

circumstances, we conclude that Officer Hamilton’s knowledge was sufficient 

to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that Appellant 

violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a) by disobeying the “Do Not Enter” sign. 

Appellant’s claim that he did not have to obey the “Do Not Enter” sign 

because it was facing westbound may have provided him with a defense to 

the charge that he violated 75 Pa.C.S. § 3111(a). However, such a claim 

does not undermine the conclusion that Officer Hamilton had probable cause 

to stop Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Vincett, 806 A.2d 31 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (disagreeing with the suppression court’s conclusion that a 

police officer lacked probable cause to stop Vincett for driving the wrong way 

down a one-way street and holding that the court should have denied 
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Vincett’s suppression motion because, although there may have been 

inadequate posting of traffic signs to convict Vincett of driving the wrong 

way on a one-way street, the officer knew the street was one-way and, 

therefore, reasonably believed Vincett was violating the Motor Vehicle Code). 

We discern no error in the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s 

motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 12/9/2014