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OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION: FIRST HAND AND 

GOVERNMENT WATCHDOG ACCOUNTS OF 

AGENCY CHALLENGES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 9, 2015 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Staff Director 

MICHAEL LUEPTOW, Investigative Counsel 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN. Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

BRIAN TURBYFILL, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Ernst .................................................................................................... 18 

Senator Sasse .................................................................................................... 20 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 22 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 24 

Senator Baldwin ............................................................................................... 27 

Senator Lankford .............................................................................................. 29 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 37 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 39 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 2015 

Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ... 4 

Rebecca Roering, Assistant Federal Security Director-Inspections, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ....... 6 

Robert J. MacLean, Federal Air Marshal, Office of Law Enforcement, Federal 

Air Marshal Service, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................. 9 

Jennifer Grover, Director, Transportation Security and Coast Guard Issues, 

Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office ......................................................................................................................... 11 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Grover, Jennifer: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 93 

MacLean, Robert J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 68 

Roering, Rebecca: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59 

Roth, Hon. John: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statement for the Record from Jason Harrington ................................ 41 

Response to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record 

Mr. Roth ............................................................................................................ 108 

Ms. Grover ......................................................................................................... 113 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: FIRSTHAND 

AND GOVERNMENT WATCHDOG ACCOUNTS 

OF AGENCY CHALLENGES 

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 2015 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:34 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Baldwin, Booker, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. The Committee will come to order. 

I want to first welcome our witnesses. Thank you for your very 

thoughtful testimony that you have provided in written form, and 

I am looking forward to your oral testimony and your answers to 

our questions. 

I do want to point out that this hearing is necessary. I think it 

is unfortunate that some information was leaked prior to our ability to really completely analyze it. We want to make sure, as we 

are asking questions, as you are answering questions, that we do 

not reveal classified or sensitive information to give our enemies information to harm us. But the fact of the matter is if we ever are 

going to solve any problem—and I have said this repeatedly from 

this chair—we have to recognize and acknowledge reality. We have 

to describe it. 

The purpose of any hearing under my chairmanship is that in 

the end, following the hearing, every Member on the dais, hopefully 

every member of the audience, takes the first step in solving any 

problem, which is admit we have one. 

And certainly as I have been reading the briefings, I have been 

thinking about the struggles with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) since it was first established, understanding 

how it has two missions, and they are, by and large, almost completely contradictory. 

On the one hand, we are looking for 100 percent security to keep 

not only just airline but all public transportation 100 percent safe 

and secure. 
2 

1The prepared statement of Chairman Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

2The prepared statement of Mr. Harrington appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

On the other hand, we are looking for complete efficiency so that 

lines do not back up. We are looking for efficient throughput 

through the system. It is an enormously complex and difficult task, 

and because of the leaked information—and, Inspector General 

John Roth, I have to commend you for your independence, for taking a hard look at this, doing the inspections, the investigations 

that I think are appropriate. We are finding out that that contradictory goal, we are not meeting both of those, not by a long 

shot. 

So certainly with Secretary Johnson, with the Inspector General 

(IG), with the Acting TSA Administrator now, and the TSA nominee, I have had some pretty serious discussions, and I have asked 

them to completely analyze the problem, start thinking outside the 

box. We need to look at more effective solutions, and we have to 

start prioritizing what we can do that is going to improve security 

in the most effective way. 

An example I will use is, after September 11, 2001 a pretty simple solution has probably provided us the greatest security so that 

at least airlines cannot be used as the most efficient weapon, most 

effective weapon, being able to fly into things like the World Trade 

Center, and that was just locking the doors and securing the cockpit door. But we found out with Germanwings that is not a complete and total solution either. It creates some unintended consequences. 

So, again, the point I am making is this is an enormously complex and difficult issue. We need to approach the solution soberly 

and honestly and lay the problem out. 

I would like to, first of all, ask unanimous consent to have my 

written opening statement entered in the record.1

I would also point out that we had another witness, Mr. Jason 

Harrington, who is unable to make it due to illness. He was a 

transportation security officer (TSO) at the Chicago O’Hare International Airport from 2007 to 2013. He submitted written testimony in preparation for this hearing, and so I ask unanimous consent to enter his testimony in the record2 as well. 

But I would like to just read a couple stats that kind of describe 

the difficult mission of the TSA. TSA is compromised of 46,000 

transportation security officers. Twenty percent of the TSA employees are veterans. That is a good thing. I would almost like to see 

that increased. 

TSA screens 2 million passengers each day—nearly 160 million 

every year. That is an enormous challenge and task. TSA screens 

1.1 million checked bags and 3 million carry-on bags for explosives 

and other dangerous items on a daily basis. TSA used more than 

700 advanced imaging technology (AIT) machines at airports nationwide. 

TSA is responsible for the security of 25,000 domestic flights per 

day, 2,500 outbound international flights per day. It also secures 

4 million miles of roadways, 140,000 miles of railroad track, 

600,000 bridges and tunnels, 350 maritime ports, 2.6 million miles 

of pipeline. 
3 

Again, it is an enormous challenge, so we need to recognize that 

reality and, again, take a look at this problem as one that is a significant challenge and talk about it as honestly as possible if we 

are going to really find solutions. 

With that, I will turn it over to our Ranking Member, Senator 

Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for bringing us 

all together today. Our thanks to our witnesses. Good to see you 

all. And thank you for your attendance, your preparation, and your 

willingness to respond to our questions. 

Few Federal agencies interact with the American people more on 

a daily basis than does TSA. The men and women who work there 

have, as the Chairman has said, a very difficult but extremely important job. 

Last month, I spoke on the Senate floor about two women who 

have dedicated their lives to keeping our aviation system and its 

users secure by working for TSA. In fact, one of these two women 

was shot in the line of duty and showed up for work the very next 

day. Every day, these women and their colleagues, thousands of 

them around the country, work in a very challenging environment 

to keep our aviation system safe and those of us who use it safe 

and secure. We do not do enough to acknowledge that and to thank 

them when they do their jobs well, which is almost all the time. 

While I believe it is important for us to recognize exemplary performance when it is done at TSA or throughout other parts of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) more often than we do, 

this Committee also has an obligation to exercise our oversight responsibilities when performance falls well short of that standard. 

Thanks to our witnesses before us today, we have been alerted 

to a number of instances where performance by TSA and its employees appears to have been disappointing and even troubling. 

Just yesterday, for example, we learned from the DHS Inspector 

General that 73 individuals with possible links to terrorism have 

been granted credentials to access secure areas of airports across 

our Nation. 

And last week, of course, we learned about significant 

vulnerabilities at passenger screening checkpoints uncovered by 

the Inspector General. The reported failure rates for detecting prohibited items at checkpoints are more than troubling. They are unacceptable. And I look forward to reviewing the Department of 

Homeland Security Inspector General’s full report and recommendations later this summer. That said, I am encouraged by 

the swift action taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security to address the Inspector General’s findings. 

Since 2011, the Transportation Security Administration has 

transitioned from a one-size-fits-all screening philosophy to one 

that is more risk-based. That approach is designed to allow TSA to 

deploy its limited resources to the areas where we face the greatest 

threat. 

However, as the Inspector General and the General Accountability Office (GAO) have identified, such a swift transition may 

have created vulnerabilities in the system. Given recent reports, it 
4 

1The prepared statement of Hon. Roth appears in the Appendix on page 45. 

is more important than ever for the Transportation Security Administration to have a permanent, Senate-confirmed leader in 

place. I thank the Chairman and his staff for working so quickly 

and cooperatively with my staff so that we can move the nomination of Vice Admiral Peter V. Neffenger, which we will examine in 

a hearing tomorrow. 

With that, we look forward to the testimony, and we thank the 

witnesses for appearing here today. I am grateful that the current 

front-line employees have joined us today to discuss their perspectives on how to improve TSA. 

I will close with one last personal thought. My father used to 

drive my sister and me crazy when we were kids growing up by 

saying some of the same things over and over and over again. And 

one of these things he said over and over again is that if the job 

is worth doing, it is worth doing well. He said that hundreds of 

times, maybe thousands of times. And out of that I took this lesson: 

We should be focused on perfection. We will never get there, but 

that should be our goal. And if it is not perfect, we need to make 

it better. 

Clearly, there are some things going on at TSA that fall well 

short of perfection. Our job is to help you get closer, help them help 

TSA to get closer to that goal to better protect the people who use 

the airlines, including all of us. 

Thank you so much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. I would only 

add that in our quest for perfection, the way you achieve it is 

through continuous improvement. I think that is the right kind of 

attitude here. 

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will all stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the 

testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. ROTH. I do. 

Ms. GROVER. I do. 

Mr. MACLEAN. I do. 

Ms. ROERING. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is John Roth. Mr. Roth is the Inspector General 

for the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to serving as 

DHS’s Inspector General, Mr. Roth was Director of the Office of 

Criminal Investigations at the Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA) and also had a decorated career as a Federal prosecutor with 

the Department of Justice (DOJ). 

Inspector General Roth. 

TESTIMONY OF HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,1 INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here to testify today to discuss our work examining TSA’s programs and operations. 
5 

Before discussing TSA’s challenges, I would like to acknowledge 

the TSA whistleblowers that I join on this panel today. We are 

grateful when TSA employees—as well as employees from other 

parts of the Department of Homeland Security—are willing to step 

forward to identify problems within the agency. Whistleblower disclosures have saved lives as well as taxpayer dollars, and whistleblowers play a crucial role in keeping our Department efficient and 

accountable. 

We review over 16,000 complaints per year, more than 300 per 

week, to better understand and respond to potential waste, fraud, 

and abuse in the Department’s programs and operations. 

With regard to TSA, we face a classic asymmetric threat in attempting to secure our transportation systems: TSA cannot afford 

to miss a single, genuine threat without potentially catastrophic 

consequences, yet a terrorist only needs to get it right once. TSA’s 

thousands of transportation security officers conduct tedious tasks 

that require constant vigilance. Complacency can be a huge detriment to TSA’s ability to carry out its mission. Ensuring consistency across DHS’s largest workforce would challenge even the best 

of organizations. 

Unfortunately, although nearly 14 years have passed since TSA’s 

inception, we remain deeply concerned about its ability to execute 

its important mission. Since 2004, we have published more than 

115 audit and inspection reports about TSA’s programs and operations. We have issued hundreds of recommendations to attempt to 

improve TSA’s efficiency and effectiveness. 

We have conducted a series of covert penetration tests—essentially testing TSA’s ability to stop us from bringing in simulated 

explosives and weapons through checkpoints, as well as testing 

whether we could enter secured areas through other means. We 

identified vulnerabilities caused by human and technology-based 

failures. 

I am aware of the media reports regarding our most recent testing. Although the details of those tests are classified, and I will not 

be able to speak to the specifics of them in the hearing today, I welcome the opportunity to brief Members of this Committee and their 

staff regarding our findings in an appropriate and closed setting. 

We have also audited and reported on TSA’s acquisitions. Our 

audit results show that TSA faces significant challenges in contracting for goods and services. Despite spending billions on aviation security technology, our testing of certain systems has revealed no resulting improvement. 

We have examined TSA’s approach to risk-based screening. 

While we applaud the concept of a risk-based approach in transportation security, our audits and inspections have uncovered significant vulnerabilities, and we have deep concerns regarding the manner in which TSA manages this risk. This includes TSA’s use of 

managed inclusion, its risk assessment rule in granting expedited 

screening to those who are not part of PreCheck, and the administration of the PreCheck program itself. 

We have also examined the performance of TSA’s workforce, 

which is largely a function of who is hired and how they are 

trained and managed. Our audits have repeatedly found that 
6 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Roering appears in the Appendix on page 59. 

human error—often a simple failure to follow protocol every time— 

poses significant vulnerabilities. 

We have also looked at how TSA plans for, buys, deploys, and 

maintains its equipment and have found challenges at every step 

in the process. These weaknesses have a real and negative impact 

on transportation security as well. 

TSA has taken some steps to implement our recommendations 

and address security vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, some problems 

appear to persist. While TSA cannot control all risks to transportation security, many issues are well within its control. Sound 

planning and strategies for efficiently acquiring, using, and maintaining screening equipment, for example, would go a long way toward improving overall operations. TSA needs to have a better understanding of the limitations of its technology and develop strategies to counter those limitations. Better training and better management of TSOs would help mitigate the effects of human error 

that, although never eliminated, could be reduced. 

Taken together, TSA’s focus on management practices and oversight of its technical assets and workforce would help enhance security as well as customer service for air passengers. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I am 

happy to take any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Inspector General. 

Our next witness is Rebecca Roering. Ms. Roering is the Assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections at the Minneapolis-St. 

Paul International Airport. During her 25 years of government 

service, Ms. Roering has also served the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a Federal Air Marshal (FAM) and Civil Aviation 

Security Inspector. Ms. Roering. 

TESTIMONY OF REBECCA ROERING,1 ASSISTANT FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR—INSPECTIONS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Ms. ROERING. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and 

Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today 

to discuss important security concerns related to the TSA and security at our Nation’s airports. 

The mission of TSA is to ensure the freedom of movement for 

people and commerce, which is undeniably a difficult challenge. It 

is also the mission of TSA to protect the traveling public against 

terrorist attacks. The ability of TSA to execute its mission has been 

called into question by many oversight groups. 

My testimony today will focus on a number of the security concerns and agency policies that result in vulnerabilities and morale 

issues across our workforce. 

Over recent years, TSA has hired into leadership positions a 

number of former airline executives and others who place more emphasis on customer service and passenger wait times than on security and detection rates. Any wait time that is deemed by the agency as excessive requires immediate reporting, a thorough analysis, 
7 

and corrective action. Conversely, the local monthly testing of our 

officers to determine their ability to detect weapons and explosives 

is not associated with any performance metric. When this testing 

results in a failure to detect the item, there is basic remedial training required before the officer may return to duty. A TSA officer 

may never be subjected to a covert test based on the current volume of assigned tests each month, limited resources to conduct the 

tests, and the sheer volume of our officers. This lack of realistic 

testing on a regular basis leads to complacency in our workforce. 

It is not until recently, actually within the last few weeks, that 

detection rates of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has become 

a topic of discussion at TSA. This is the direct result of covert testing at numerous airports identifying detection rates that caused 

great concern. Leadership recognized that poor detection rates are, 

in part, related to the poor morale that exists across our workforce. 

The 2014 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey resulted in the 

DHS receiving among the lowest ratings of any Federal Government agency, and TSA receiving more than their fair share of low 

marks. The survey demonstrated that while our frontline employees feel strongly that the work they do is important, they are not 

valued by our leadership. The job of a TSA officer is a challenging 

one, with a great deal of pressure and scrutiny. A culture of fear 

and distrust has been created in the agency, also impacting the morale and performance of our employees. This is clearly documented 

in the results of the survey. 

Equally as troubling are the security gaps associated with the 

TSA PreCheck program. While a risk-based approach to security 

screening is essential, TSA has expanded PreCheck to large populations of passengers who have not enrolled in or paid for the program. In the fall of 2013, I expressed my concerns with the expansion of PreCheck to my leadership as well as the TSA Office of Inspections (OOI). I later reported the concerns to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) for investigation. My allegations were substantiated by the DHS Inspector General in a report titled ‘‘Security 

Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck Initiative.’’ 

TSA is handing out PreCheck status like Halloween candy in an 

effort to expedite passengers as quickly as possible, despite self-admitted security gaps that are being created by the process. The 

TSA PreCheck enrollment program did not meet the expectations 

in terms of volume; therefore, PreCheck rules keep expanding as 

a matter of efficiency even though the agency is well aware of the 

associated risks. 

As documented in recent reports, the insider threat continues to 

present a security concern at our Nation’s airports. Although some 

form of screening is conducted on cargo that is transported on passenger aircraft, catering supplies, checked baggage, and, of course, 

passengers, there are other airport employees who have access to 

sterile areas of the airport who are subjected to only criminal history record checks and security threat assessments. This group has 

unimpeded access to aircraft, and it was discovered that some of 

these security identification display area (SIDA) badged employees 

who had worked at the Minneapolis-St.Paul (MSP) Airport later 

traveled to Syria to fight for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Le-
8 

vant (ISIL). TSA has increased the use of Playbook teams recently 

with a focus on insider threat. 

At many locations, and in my experience, the Federal Security 

Director (FSD) is reluctant to initiate enforcement action against 

the airport or air carriers. A conflict of interest exists when the 

FSD relies upon the airport and air carrier to provide certain services and, on the other hand, has overall responsibility for the execution of the regulatory program. 

Additionally, transportation security inspectors are being used by 

FSDs to perform a wide range of duties not related to their core 

functions. Such duties include moving bins at the checkpoints and 

conducting audits of Universal Enrollment Facilities to determine 

such items as whether or not there is hand soap in the restrooms 

or if the staff is friendly. These audits should be done by a contracting officer rather than regulatory inspectors. DHS should reconsider the reporting structure for our inspectors to eliminate any 

potential conflicts, misuse of their time, and pressure to avoid enforcement actions. 

TSA uses prohibited personnel practices to pressure employees to 

resign when management wants them removed from the agency. 

When allegations of misconduct occur by employees in certain positions, the FSD must refer the allegations to the TSA Office of Inspection. If the Office of Inspection does investigate, they send 

criminal investigators to conduct investigations of even minor administrative matters. It is a waste of taxpayer dollars to use criminal investigators to conduct routine administrative investigations 

and also destroys the morale and trust of our workforce. 

In conclusion, the culture that exists at TSA is one of fear and 

distrust. While TSA cannot control all the risks associated with 

aviation security, leadership of the agency is certainly in a position 

to impact change. Better training and management of the workforce would result in an improvement to morale as well as detection rates. If a TSA employee feels valued and respected, the 

metrics will reflect this in a positive way. TSA should eliminate security gaps created by risk assessment rules in PreCheck, and DHS 

should reconsider the reporting structure for Inspectors to avoid 

any conflicts. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome 

any questions from you or any Members of the Committee. Thank 

you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Roering. 

Our next witness is Robert MacLean. Mr. MacLean is a Federal 

Air Marshal who blew the whistle about potential safety concerns 

regarding a TSA plan to alter mission schedules. Mr. MacLean was 

fired by TSA for disclosing this information, but he was eventually 

reinstated after successfully appealing his improper termination 

before the U.S. Supreme Court. He is currently a Federal Air Marshal based out of Los Angeles Field Office. Mr. MacLean. 
9 

1The prepared statement of Mr. MacLean appears in the Appendix on page 68. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. MACLEAN,1 FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL, OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SERVICE, TRANSPORTATION ATTORNEY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MACLEAN. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member 

Carper, and other Members of the Committee. It is a great honor 

to be here as an active-duty TSA Federal Air Marshal. 

Due to my 12-year case that finished before the Supreme Court 

4 years ago and my role as a national whistleblower liaison for the 

Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA), which is 

not a union, dozens of TSA Federal Air Marshals come to me with 

their concerns about aviation security threats. This is a huge responsibility, being a voice for those who are tasked with stopping 

terrorism. 

The public wants to continue enjoying the great privilege and 

miracle of flying on jetliners. They are tired of the complaints and 

want their tax money spent wisely on realistic measures. The 9/11 

attacks should have proved how volatile it is inside a crowded, 

pressurized thin tube traveling 500 miles per hour 40,000 feet up 

in the sky. 

Air Marshals’ most common concern: improved explosive devices, 

bombs. If a terrorist group puts thought into it, it is relatively easy 

to sneak small bombs into jets in order to blow up at high altitude. 

Bombs just will not pass through checkpoints, but purposely or not 

wittingly by airport workers or delivery drivers bringing in daily 

mega tons of items consumed by passengers in the boarding areas. 

That cargo includes food, drink, condiments, cooking oil, cleaning 

products, and then all of the packaging that goes with it. Then you 

have all of the dense stacks of newspapers, magazines, and books. 

This mountain is nowhere near getting the screening that passengers are getting at the checkpoints. A bomb smuggler will hide 

a needle in a hay wagon before sneaking a steak past a pack of 

wolves. 

One remedy: take more TSOs off checkpoints and get exhausted 

Air Marshals out of airline chairs and deploy them deep inside the 

bowels of the train stations and airports to do traditional foot patrol, such as the uniformed Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams (VIPR) and the undercover Red Teams. 

When I flew missions, I desperately tried to find that terrorist. 

But instead I disrupted three illegal alien-smuggling operations 

purely because of my experience learning the mundane routines of 

the traveling public, building rapport with the airport workers and 

local authorities, knowing the area real well, and just simply reading faces. 

TSA PreCheck, with the improvements Ms. Roering obviously 

pointed out, should be greatly expanded, and it should be free of 

charge. More people in PreCheck frees up resources to focus on 

attackers. I would like to see TSOs roaming airports with mobile 

PreCheck application kits and soliciting passengers during their 

delays. 

We need to have more faith in human intelligence gathering and 

the intuition of bold officers. But in order to get more Air Marshals 
10 

on the ground, you need to completely secure the flight deck or the 

cockpit where the pilots are in control of the jet. Every flight deck 

should have a modified shotgun with an emergency lock switch. 

Shotgun pellets are ideal since the primary concern is to stop an 

attacker trying to force the door open. In a highly unlikely miss, 

shotgun pellets will not harm passengers or the aircraft. The group 

of pilots who use their own funds to travel to Artesia, New Mexico, 

spending a week being trained and issued a TSA .40-caliber semiautomatic pistol can miss and kill an innocent passenger in the 

very back of the cabin with a jacketed bullet. Once again, this is 

highly unlikely, but it is possible. 

Armed pilots are not allowed to carry their pistols on international flights due to very restrictive handgun laws in foreign 

countries. But a shotgun modified to stop one or two hijackers trying to break into the cockpit from 1 foot away would be inane for 

a host country to deny and risk another 9/11-style attack. It is an 

extreme hazard whenever a pilot opens the flight deck door to use 

the lavatory or to get food and drink. An amped-up attacker can 

dive inside and destroy the jet. 

There is a cheap and perfect solution to this: secondary barriers. 

Ten horizontal cables attached to a vertical pole, a flight attendant 

can simply stretch across the front of the forward galley and lock 

in place. This barrier buys the flight crew plenty of time to quickly 

get the pilot back into the flight deck and lock the door. 

In order to control unruly passengers who could be suicidal 

attackers setting up a ruse for the law enforcement officers on 

board, every cabin should be equipped with restraint systems and 

nonlethal tools to restrain unruly passengers or stop murderous 

attackers. Flight crews and law enforcement officers need the legal 

authority to deputize and indemnify vetted, able-bodied passengers 

to protect themselves and the jet from destruction. We could do 

this process during our PreCheck. There is no reason why an athlete or a military member cannot walk deep into the cabin to restrain somebody. During PreCheck enrollment, we can ask passengers to volunteer to be these Deputy Air Marshals during critical events and qualify them at training centers. 

Passengers may do nothing because of the potential civil liability 

and because they are expecting Air Marshals to respond. An Air 

Marshal taken away from protecting the flight deck endangers the 

entire jet. The pilots may not be able to safely land a jet for hours 

over an ocean while attackers are going on a murder spree. 

In the case of absolute chaos in the cabin, the pilots need the 

ability to disorient attackers by shutting off all lighting or flashing 

blinding strobe lights or high-pitched sound alarms. And when that 

does not stop the mayhem, pilots can actually don oxygen masks 

and depressurize the cabin, knocking out the attackers due to the 

rapid breathing and heart rate. Do all of this and give the flight 

attendants and regular passengers the right to save their lives or 

the lives of others on the ground. 

You can assign Air Marshals in airports to find terrorists and 

bombs before they go up in the sky. Hiring thousands of flying Air 

Marshals after 9/11 was a natural reaction, but it should have only 

been a temporary detail and not a career. Not very many young 

and ambitious people yearn for a career mostly in an airline seat. 
11 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Grover appears in the Appendix on page 93. 

When I was recruited, the experienced Air Marshals told me half 

the job would be flying, and the rest would be time to recover, 

train, and investigate. They stress that no one can sustain 5 years 

of flying 4 to 5 days a week. Fourteen years later, Air Marshals tell 

me there are still not ground opportunities. We should train Federal and local law enforcement officers to quickly deploy as reserve 

Air Marshals in order to respond to specific threats. 

Finally, all Federal employees are reluctant to report money 

wasted and dangerous security lapses because they do not want to 

gamble with their careers before the Merit Systems Protection 

Board (MSPB), the tiny underfunded agency that rules on whistleblower reprisal claims. For instance, FAA Aircraft Cabin Safety Inspector Kimberly Farrington blew the whistle on FAA 12 years ago. 

Her case was remanded several times to administrative judge, and 

in the last remand, she had a hearing 18 months ago and still the 

judge has not made a decision. 

If I had a jury, I would have won 6 years ago. Federal employees 

are the only workers in the United States who do not have access 

to jury trials. A restaurant cook reporting spoiled food being served 

has more due process than an Air Marshal reporting security 

lapses that can kill hundreds of passengers and cripple the aviation 

industry. 

The list goes on of about what Air Marshals echo to me, so I have 

availed myself all week to meet with Members of Congress and my 

fellow TSA force. Many may think my proposals here are risky or 

even crazy, but I am limited in my opening statement to go into 

detail about how the benefits can greatly outweigh the risks. Other 

Air Marshals and I are just doing our best to think like a suicidal 

attacker. I hope we do not need another 9/11 to prove we were accurate. 

I am excited to serve with the new leader of the TSA, Admiral 

Peter Neffenger. I really hope that he is soon confirmed. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. I apologize for going 

over time. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I appreciate your testimony and your willingness to blow the whistle, the courage to blow the whistle. 

Our next witness is Jennifer Grover. Ms. Grover is the Director 

of Transportation Security and Coast Guard Issues for the Government Accountability Office. Ms. Grover’s work with the GAO includes assessing the vulnerabilities throughout the TSA’s screening 

process. Ms. Grover. 

TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER GROVER,1 DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND COAST GUARD ISSUES, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. GROVER. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, 

Ranking Member Carper, other Members, and staff. Last week, renewed concerns arose about TSA’s screening systems and whether 

they are sufficient to identify prohibited items. 

TSA has developed a layered security approach that is sound in 

principle, and GAO supports TSA’s move toward risk-based screen-
12 

ing. But to fully deliver the promised security protections under 

both traditional and expedited screening, TSA must do two things: 

first, take more rigorous steps to ensure that each layer of security 

works as intended; and, second, put systems in place to continuously monitor their effectiveness. 

Over many years, GAO has reported weaknesses in TSA’s oversight of its screening systems, raising questions about whether TSA 

is falling short in its ability to ensure aviation security. TSA has 

taken steps to improve oversight of these systems, but additional 

actions are needed. 

Today we will focus on four areas: first, the Secure Flight Program, which matches passenger information against Federal Government watchlists to identify those who should not fly or should 

receive enhanced screening; second, the AIT systems, which are the 

full-body scanners used to screen passengers for prohibited items 

at the checkpoint; third, the managed inclusion screening process, 

which TSA uses to provide expedited screening to passengers not 

previously identified as low risk; and, fourth, criminal history 

checks done to vet airport workers. 

First of all, regarding Secure Flight, we found in September 2014 

that TSA did not have timely or reliable information about the extent or causes of system matching errors, which occur when Secure 

Flight fails to identify passengers who were actual matches to the 

watchlist. In response to our recommendations, TSA has developed 

a mechanism to keep track of known matching errors and is considering methods to evaluate overall Secure Flight matching accuracy 

rates on an ongoing basis. 

Second, regarding the AIT body scanners, we found in March 

2014 that TSA did not include information about screener performance when they were evaluating AIT effectiveness; rather, TSA’s 

assessment was limited to the accuracy of the AIT systems in the 

laboratory. However, after an AIT machine identifies a potential 

threat, a screening officer has to do a targeted patdown to resolve 

the alarm. Thus, the consistency with which the screeners conduct 

the patdowns properly and identify all threat items is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the AIT systems in the airport operating 

environment. Consequently, we recommended that TSA assess AIT 

effectiveness as a function of both the technology and the screening 

officers who operate it. TSA concurred with the recommendation 

and recently sent updated information about their efforts to address it, which are under review within GAO. 

Third, in December 2014, we found that TSA had not tested the 

security effectiveness of the managed inclusion process as it functions as a whole. As part of managed inclusion, TSA uses multiple 

layers of security, such as explosives detection devices and canines, 

to mitigate the inherent risk that is associated with screening randomly selected passengers in a system that was designed for lowrisk passengers. However, if these security layers are not working 

as intended, then TSA may not be sufficiently screening passengers. TSA has tested the individual layers of security used in 

managed inclusion and reported them to be effective, but GAO has 

raised concerns about the effectiveness of some of those layers, 

such as the behavior detection officers (BDO). TSA is planning to 

complete testing of the managed inclusion system by mid-2016. 
13 

Finally, regarding TSA’s involvement in airport worker vetting, 

we found in December 2011 that TSA and airports were conducting 

background checks based on limited criminal history information. 

Specifically, TSA’s level of access to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) criminal history records was excluding many State 

records. In response to our recommendation, TSA and the FBI confirmed that there was a risk of incomplete information, and the 

FBI has since reported expanding the criminal history records it 

provides to TSA for these security threat assessments. 

In conclusion, TSA has made progress improving its screening 

oversight, such as taking steps to assess the vulnerabilities in the 

Secure Flight Program and by working with the FBI to obtain access to more complete criminal background information. Yet more 

work remains to ensure that Secure Flight, AIT, and managed inclusion are working as TSA intends. 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, this concludes my 

statement, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Grover. 

Inspector General Roth, I want to start with you, and I want to 

be careful in the way I ask the question, but can you speak to the 

level of preparation, the level of sophistication of the people on the 

Red Team in trying to assess the effectiveness of the system? 

Mr. ROTH. That is going to be a very difficult question to answer 

in this environment. I will say that the testers we used are auditors. These are members of the OIG workforce. They do not have 

any specialized background or training in this kind of work. But, 

again, to go into more detail about this I think would be problematic. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. There are a bunch of accountants, 

which, I am an accountant as well, so—— 

Mr. ROTH. No insult to accountants. [Laughter.] 

Chairman JOHNSON. Can you speak to differences between airports? Did we see some airports perform a whole lot better than 

others so we could maybe see what works and what does not work? 

Mr. ROTH. Again, I cannot get into the specifics of the actual results of the testing, and you should know that we have done field 

work in this area, but we have not written a report yet. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. ROTH. The chronology is we do field work, and then we analyze the results, sort of do the kinds of comparisons that you are 

talking about, and then report them out. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. ROTH. I will say, though, that the results were consistent 

across airports. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I understand, so I will not go any further than that. 

I would like to talk about just the number of standard operating 

procedures (SOP), the number of protocols. Maybe Ms. Roering or 

whoever else wants to speak to that, how many are there? I mean, 

I will see a briefing. I have seen all the acronyms, and the point 

I am trying to make is how overwhelming these detailed standard 

operating procedures are for individual TSOs. 

Ms. ROERING. Thank you for the question. Yes, sir, our number 

of standard operating procedures, offhand I do not know the spe-
14 

cific number, but I can say there is a checkpoint SOP, a checked 

baggage SOP, an SOP for the ticket documenter/checker position, 

known crew member SOP, a BDO SOP, a passenger screening canine SOP, and those are just the ones I can think of off the top 

of my head. 

Chairman JOHNSON. There are a lot more. How detailed are all 

those SOPs? 

Ms. ROERING. They are very detailed. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, again, we are just humans, and it is 

kind of hard to have at your fingertips and the training involved 

of having somebody be able to follow every one of those SOPs with, 

again, the volume, the throughput that we are trying to achieve, 

is a real problem, isn’t it? 

Ms. ROERING. There are a number of very specific procedures in 

the SOP. During the training process, the SOPs are separated out 

so when you are being trained in that function, you would be referring to the SOP that applies. 

Some of the SOPs do not apply to all our officers across the workforce. For example, the BDO SOP would not need to be—a normal 

TSO would not need to know those SOPs as well as the managed 

inclusion and passenger screening canine SOP. So while there are 

a number of them, you do not have to be proficient in every single 

one of the SOPs. 

Chairman JOHNSON. In the first round of questioning, I do want 

to get into the PreCheck Program and my concern that what I 

think is a really good idea—and I think most people would agree 

it is a really good idea, but only if completely followed and only if 

we do complete background checks. So whoever is best able to answer the question in terms of how many people have been cleared 

for PreCheck—I have information here that it is about 100,000, but 

I am not sure that is accurate. And of the number that have been 

cleared, how many actually went through a thorough vetting that 

we would expect versus under pressure to, again, accomplish the 

throughput objective, how many have been approved in a very watered-down process? Ms. Grover, you seem to be ready to answer 

the question. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. I believe that there are about a million 

people now who have applied for PreCheck, but there are about 7.2 

million people who have a Known Traveler Number (KTN) who 

would routinely get PreCheck on their boarding pass because of 

their affiliation with certain groups, such as people who are in the 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Trusted Traveler Programs 

or DOD active-duty military. And then, of course, in addition to 

that, as was discussed earlier, there are people who can get 

PreCheck on a one-time basis through TSA’s automated risk assessments or at the airport through random selection for managed 

inclusion. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Talk to me a little bit about automated 

risk assessment. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, automated risk assessment. So the first 

thing that TSA does is they check to see if a passenger is on one 

of the terrorist watchlists. If they are not, then TSA checks to see 

if the person is already a known traveler, so signed up with 

PreCheck and has a Known Traveler Number. 
15 

If not, then all of the rest of the passengers are screened against 

a set of risk rules that TSA has designed based on intelligence and 

based on certain characteristics of the traveling passenger, including information about that specific flight that they are looking at. 

Then the individual can receive PreCheck on their boarding pass 

on a one-time basis. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Would anybody else like to comment on, 

again, kind of the watering down of the vetting process? Mr. Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. And just so you understand, TSA has increased dramatically the use of PreCheck over the last several years. It has 

gone from really a test kind of a case to a situation where between 

40 and 50 percent of all the traveling public gets an expedited 

screening, whether it is through managed inclusion, whether it is 

part of a Government Trusted Traveler Program, or whether it is 

through, as Ms. Grover talked about, these risk rules that 

apply—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, again, as PreCheck was originally conceived with a full vetting process, how many people received the 

full vetting process to now 40 to 50 percent of the traveling public 

qualifying for PreCheck? 

Mr. ROTH. TSA recently celebrated a million people who have applied for PreCheck through that vetting program. As Ms. Grover 

says, there are other Trusted Traveler Programs. For example, 

CBP has a Trusted Traveler Program that is very similar to 

PreCheck, actually more extensive than PreCheck. So those folks 

get grandfathered in. Obviously, Members of Congress and other 

trusted populations get grandfathered in. But, again, you are talking about 1.8 million people per day traveling, so you are talking 

about a significant portion of the flying public that is truly unknown to TSA, and yet goes through expedited screening. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And waving them through. OK. Well, I am 

out of time. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Again, thanks so much for joining us today and 

for your testimony and for your work. 

Before we talk about some things that TSA needs to do better, 

let us talk about—each of you just maybe give us one thing that 

they are doing well. Give us just one thing that they are doing well, 

and, John, would you just lead us off there, please? 

Mr. ROTH. I mean, certainly, and that is the hazard that I have 

in this occupation. I only focus on the negative as opposed to the 

positive. 

Senator CARPER. We never do that in our jobs. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROTH. Certainly, the two people sitting to my left are people 

with courage to sort of see something that has gone wrong and try 

to fix it, and I suspect within the TSA population there are people 

every day, thousands of people who get up and put on that uniform 

and go to work and try to do their best every single day. Again, 

when you only focus on the negatives, you forget about the overwhelming majority of that population that really wants to do the 

right thing and cares about their job. 

Senator CARPER. Let me just interrupt you for a second, and I 

want the others to speak. I fly a fair amount, not as much as some 

of my colleagues. Most of my next flights are on trains. But I have 

taken over the years to—when someone from TSA is actually doing 
16 

a good job, they are polite, they are courteous, they are thorough, 

I thank them for what they do. They have no idea who I am. They 

think I am Ron Johnson. [Laughter.] 

Chairman JOHNSON. Is that a good thing or a bad thing? 

Senator CARPER. Day to day, it is probably mixed. 

But that is something we might want to think of. One of the 

things that makes people like their job is they know what they are 

doing is important and they feel like they are making progress. We 

just had an interesting study about a month or two ago that said— 

it was very senior-level positions in the Federal Government, why 

people are leaving, and it is because—one of the things is that, as 

hard as they work, they never get thanked. And it is a little thing, 

but it is something that we might want to keep in mind. 

On the other hand, when somebody is out of order, doing things 

inappropriate, I will tell them and tell them who I am. 

But, anyway, let me jump to Rebecca. Ms. Roering, give us one 

thing that they are doing well. 

Ms. ROERING. I think risk-based security is a good procedure, 

and as long as there is not risks associated with it—99.999 percent 

of the traveling public simply wants to get from Point A to Point 

B safely and securely, and we need to focus on a way to quickly 

expedite those passengers and focus on that very small percentage 

of people that actually pose a threat to aviation security. The only 

way that we can do that is using a risk-based security approach. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Mr. MacLean, just very briefly. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Once again, I really like the PreCheck Program. 

It just blows away hay from that haystack so that we can get down 

to that one needle. 

Senator CARPER. That is a good point. 

Mr. MACLEAN. And then the other program I really love is the 

VIPR Teams. I really want officers down deep in those airports establishing relationships with the guy whose job is to mop up hydraulic fluid. He probably is—— 

Senator CARPER. OK. Hold it right there. I am going to run out 

of time. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Sure. 

Senator CARPER. Those are good points. Thank you. 

Ms. Grover, at least one good thing. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. I would like to echo what you have previously heard and say that risk-based security at TSA has the opportunity to offer tremendous efficiencies. So I would encourage 

them to go ahead and continue to work on that. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Good. 

The most important element of any organization I have ever been 

a part of or seen is leadership. If you have great leadership, you 

have a fighting chance to be successful. If you do not, you are probably doomed. And I think we have an—John Pistole was a good 

leader, had a lot of respect here, certainly by me and I think on 

a bipartisan basis. The President has seen fit to nominate Admiral 

Neffenger. I think he is an excellent choice, and we will have a 

hearing, and we are doing our vetting for him right now. 
17 

Again, if Admiral Neffenger were here and you had the opportunity to say this would be a top priority for you, Admiral, what 

would a top priority be? Ms. Grover, what would you say? 

Ms. GROVER. I would go back and echo the remarks that Chairman Johnson made at the beginning and just point out that TSA’s 

primary mission is to ensure aviation security. And another important competing mission is to ensure the free flow of commerce and 

passengers. Those goals are in tension. And so at this time, when 

questions have been raised about whether or not the fundamentals 

are working properly, it is important to have a strong leader in 

place to be able to guide the organization to figure out how to balance those two elements. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. 

Mr. MacLean, one piece of advice for Admiral Neffenger if he is 

confirmed. 

Mr. MACLEAN. More emphasis on protecting the flight deck or 

the cockpit. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thank you. Ms. Roering. 

Ms. ROERING. I think that the leadership of the agency is one 

that really focuses on wait times, and we need to focus less on wait 

times and be more concerned about detection rates and giving our 

officers the time they need to process the passengers and bags in 

a manner that they feel that is comfortable the bag does not contain a weapon or a prohibited item. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. General Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. I had the good fortune of meeting with the Admiral 

prior to one of his hearings, and I think the biggest thing that he 

needs to understand—and I think he does understand this—is an 

acknowledgment that there is a significant challenge here. I am not 

sure that that has been embraced TSA-wide. So in order to fix a 

problem, you have to fully understand it, and I think he is committed to doing that. 

Senator CARPER. All right. My last question is similar to my first 

two: Give us some good advice. Just come back and pick up one 

point that you mentioned for us, a to-do list for us. GAO gives us 

its great high-risk list every 2 years. That is our to-do list in terms 

of ferreting out waste, fraud, and abuse. General Roth, I will ask 

you to give us one great ‘‘to-do’’ for our list, besides maybe confirming a good leader, but give us one really good one. 

Mr. ROTH. Understand the risks that you are attempting to manage. In other words, understand the risks behind the technology, 

understand the risks behind your management processes and manage against those risks. But if you do not understand those risks, 

you are not going to be able to manage against it. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Ms. Roering. 

Ms. ROERING. I will take one out of my statement, and that has 

to do with the fact that we have nobody in the field overseeing the 

numerous contracts that TSA has engaged in. We have no way to 

measure if the performance of the contracts is acceptable. Having 

contracting officer technical representatives (COTR) in the field 

would let us manage those contracts better so we are not wasting 

taxpayer dollars. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Mr. MacLean, one quick one. 
18 

Mr. MACLEAN. I would pass a law that gives flight attendants 

more training and authority to have passengers save their lives. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Ms. Grover. 

Ms. GROVER. GAO is a data-driven organization, so I would like 

to see you hold TSA’s top leaders accountable by asking for data 

on the effectiveness of their operations. 

Senator CARPER. Good. What you cannot measure you cannot 

manage. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

I do have to give a shout out to my TSA TSOs in my gate area 

C in Milwaukee airport. I travel pretty light, but I did attend a Boy 

Scout event, and I was rushing to the airport. They gave me this 

little package I put in my briefcase, and it was a little Boy Scout 

knife, and they caught it. So, I mean, again, there are, I think, the 

vast majority of TSO and TSA employees that are trying to, in a 

very difficult task, stay alert and protect the public. That was my 

own little experience. I got caught. Senator Ernst. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Carper, for calling this very timely hearing today, and 

I do want to thank all of our witnesses with us today. We appreciate your testimony very much. 

Senator Carper I think touched on a lot of the questions that I 

really had. I do believe that there has been an issue with a lack 

of consistency, and I think it is something that TSA has been suffering for from across the various aspects of the organization and 

its mission for a while now. 

But referenced in all of your testimonies really across the board 

is varying degrees of lack of certainty and consistency with people, 

processes, and operations. And these problems, whether it is the 

morale of the organization, the personnel, or the day-to-day operations, they are just so systemic. So you have mentioned some 

ideas on where you would like to see leadership go, a couple of suggestions for Congress. But bottom line, do you think it is really 

more of a management issue for the Admiral? Hopefully he will be 

confirmed shortly, but are these the issues that the Admiral can influence through his management style? Or is it something that 

needs to be addressed through legislation? I would like to hear the 

perspective that you have on that, one or the other or a combination of both. Ms. Grover, if you would start, please. 

Ms. GROVER. I think it is really several issues. I do think that 

there is a concern about morale at TSA. As was mentioned earlier, 

morale at DHS as a Department is very low, and morale at TSA 

is even lower, and that does affect people’s engagement to their 

work. But there are weaknesses in the equipment that TSA uses 

in terms of its effectiveness, and there are challenges in encouraging a workforce of 45,000 people to do the job properly every day. 

That is just a lot of people to manage. So it is morale, it is management, it is attention to the technical specifications of the equipment. And I would like to see TSA spending less time on standing 

up new programs and more time on making sure that the programs 

that they have stood up are working properly. 
19 

Senator ERNST. That is good advice. Thank you. I appreciate 

that. Mr. MacLean. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Well, a big problem with the Air Marshal mission 

is there is nothing going on, which is a good thing. There are no 

arrests happening; there is no casework happening. As you would 

get in a CBP or a Border Patrol station, you have hundreds of 

thousands of arrests, hundreds of drug cases happening. So the 

managers are busy. They have things to do. But when an Air Marshal commits an infraction, it causes a huge ripple in the water, 

and a lot of the local managers do not want to make a decision on 

something, so they wait on headquarters to make it for them. 

So I think a possible solution is to put the Air Marshals underneath the purview of a pure law enforcement agency. There is a 

huge amount of former Border Patrol agents and CBPO officers in 

the Air Marshal Service, and they feel like it was when they were 

under the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It was an 

agency that had conflicting missions. One was to naturalize people 

and then at the same time to catch and deport them. So they feel 

that is a problem. And because there is so little casework, so little 

to do—which is great because there is nobody dying, but bored 

managers are looking for something to do, or they are afraid to 

proactively take care of a situation until they get a phone call from 

D.C. 

Senator ERNST. So you would say to separate the two programs 

and empower, really empower those officers to do more? 

Mr. MACLEAN. Well, many Air Marshals say, ‘‘Why don’t we go 

under the purview of Customs and Border Protection?’’ The facilities are already in all of the airports, and the management is already there. It could be a good transition. 

It happened once before. The original Air Marshal Director had 

put the Air Marshal Service underneath Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), and he did that because he saw the Air Marshals burning out. They were bored. You hire these high-speed, 

‘‘eager beaver’’ guys and gals, and they get out there, and they are 

strapped down. So you have—it is like pressure cookers. Things 

happen. And he saw it. He saw it was going to be a quick burnout. 

So he put them into ICE in order for them to have a better career path and go into making arrests and starting investigations. 

Senator ERNST. Very interesting. I appreciate that. 

And then I do want to address some of what Senator Johnson alluded to in his statements about the recent media reports that indicated the Inspector General discovered that TSA failed to identify 

at least 73 people employed in the industry that were flagged 

under terrorism-related activity codes. And according to the TSA, 

part of the reason for this is that the agency is not authorized to 

receive all of the information under current interagency 

watchlisting policy. I have huge concerns with that as well as I am 

sure most of our public does as well. 

Employees are often granted special access without having gone 

through a thorough background check, and, Inspector General, if 

you could speak to that just very briefly. 

Mr. ROTH. Sure. We share your concern, and your summary of 

what it is that we found is accurate. There is the Terrorist Identity 

Datamart Environment (TIDE) database. TSA by law did not have 
20 

access to some of the codes. In 2014, the Administrator asked for 

access but, again, it is a process that apparently is taking some 

time, so it is not quite there yet. But I think they are moving 

quickly on it. 

Senator ERNST. OK. I thank you all very much for your testimony today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Sasse. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SASSE 

Senator SASSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for all of 

your testimony. And, Mr. Roth, thank you for the work that you 

and your team do. 

I wonder if you could unpack for us a little bit the structure of 

your organization. I think you have the largest IG office in the Executive Branch. Is that correct? 

Mr. ROTH. No. I think we are No. 3. 

Senator SASSE. OK. How many—— 

Mr. ROTH. DOD and Social Security Administration (SSA), I 

think. 

Senator SASSE. How many employees do you have? And can you 

talk a little bit about the structure? 

Mr. ROTH. Sure. We have approximately 700, about 670 employees all together, and it is broken functionally into an audit function 

as well as an investigative function. So we have about 220 criminal 

investigators who do sort of internal affairs work. We are the internal affairs agency for Customs and Border Protection, ICE, really 

the largest standing law enforcement agency in the government. 

And then we have a separate section that does both inspections 

and audits, so we do the traditional sort of financial audits, but we 

do program audits, we do information technology (IT) audits. We 

do sort of inspections of various things, and write reports. 

Senator SASSE. And can you talk about the background of your 

investors and auditors, how diverse their experiences are? 

Mr. ROTH. They are quite diverse. Certainly our criminal investigators are individuals that either grew up in sort of the IG world 

or came from different other law enforcement agencies. They are 

trained criminal investigators—they are armed and have arrest 

power like any other criminal investigator, Federal criminal investigator would have. 

Our auditors come from a variety of places, some within the Inspector General community, some from agencies, some from private 

businesses and private enterprise, all of whom are governed by sort 

of the GAO standards for auditing, the so-called Yellow Book. 

Senator SASSE. Do you have a Red Team that reports to you? 

Mr. ROTH. We do not, no. ‘‘Red Team’’ I think is a term of art 

that TSA uses to do internal testing, but we do not identify ourselves as ‘‘Red Teams.’’ 

Senator SASSE. So in my understanding, the leaked report of last 

week that showed that there have been 70 attempts by your investigators to smuggle weapons or improvised explosive devices or 

fake explosive devices onto planes, the failure rate was 67 out of 

70 times, a 96-percent failure rate. The public is taking some comfort in the idea that this investigation was supposedly done by 
21 

‘‘super terrorists,’’ is the term that is reported in the media, from 

the Red Teams. So the Red Teams are not yours, and this leaked 

report is yours. 

Mr. ROTH. Again, I cannot confirm or deny any of the specific results or the specific methodology by which we did our testing. As 

I said, we do not identify ourselves as Red Teams. They are auditors that we use who are members of the Inspector General’s office. 

Senator SASSE. I appreciate this, and I appreciate the classified 

briefings that you have given a number of us. I think what we hear 

you doing is clarifying that in your employ there are no Red 

Teams. 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Senator SASSE. Do you understand how the stories are out there 

that says that these were Red Team Investigations? 

Mr. ROTH. We do not. I was as disturbed as anyone by the fact 

that this information got into the media. We have done a number 

of classified penetration testings with absolutely no incident of 

leakage. We have started an investigation, a preliminary investigation of this to try to determine exactly where the source of the leak 

was. 

Senator SASSE. Do you have any discomfort with the communication strategy of the Department that appears to be echoing these 

media testimonies? I will quote one from Secretary Johnson last 

week: ‘‘Red Team testing of the aviation security network has been 

part of the TSA mission for 13 years.’’ There are indeed Red Teams 

at DHS. You are not going to in a non-classified setting clarify the 

nature of your investigation that was leaked, but I think we have 

heard you clearly say your employees are mostly auditors. 

Mr. ROTH. That is correct. 

Senator SASSE. Thank you. Last week’s report was just one. Can 

you tell us a little bit more about the number, both classified and 

unclassified, of TSA DHS IG reports that you have issued since 

2004? 

Mr. ROTH. I cannot give you an exact number. It is approximately a dozen, is my sort of best estimate of what we have done 

since 2004. We did a series of penetration testings in 2011, both 

penetration testing to determine the security of the so-called sterile 

area—being able to just move into the sterile area without any sort 

of examination—covert testing of, carry-on luggage through the 

screening process. We had done penetration testing of the AIT machine, the sort of first-generation AIT machine, which is different 

than the ones we have done most recently, as well as penetration 

testing of the checked baggage process, and that report was earlier 

this year. 

Senator SASSE. And are all of your investigations ultimately 

briefed to the leadership of DHS? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Senator SASSE. You said in testimony last month that TSA disagreed with most of your recommendations to a classified report on 

PreCheck, and you concluded, and I quote, ‘‘We believe this represents TSA’s failure to understand the gravity of the situation.’’ 

Can you explain what that means? 

Mr. ROTH. Well, certainly. And, again, this is involving the 

PreCheck Program, that there are a number of different ways that 
22 

you can get expedited screening without actually having an application and your fee and your biometrics taken and your background sort of investigated to become a known traveler. 

We found some security vulnerabilities. In fact, as a result of a 

number of whistleblowers, including the ones sitting to my left, 

some security vulnerabilities. We investigated those. We wrote reports making recommendations that would eliminate those 

vulnerabilities. TSA declined to take our recommendations, so we 

are sort of sitting at loggerheads as we speak. 

Senator SASSE. Do you think it is possible that TSA could really 

have not understood how grave their problem was before last 

week’s leaked report? 

Mr. ROTH. It is something that we think about all the time. I 

mean, do they truly understand the nature of the risks that they 

face? Candidly, I worry about that. 

Senator SASSE. I am basically out of time, but I would like to 

ask, Director Roering, one question for you as well. From your 

statement, are you saying that regular passenger screeners have no 

metrics that have to do with their success or failure rate at interdicting weapons? 

Ms. ROERING. That is correct. 

Senator SASSE. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Sasse. Senator Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the Chairman, and I want to 

thank all of you for being here. 

I wanted to follow-up on a couple of questions. First of all, to understand that we have not been vetting the workers, the workforce 

against the FBI database. And then as I understood you, Mr. Roth, 

saying that, in fact, we still are not able to fully do that because 

of actually an access code issue. Could you let us know more about 

this? Because I have to say, I think all of us are quite shocked by 

this in terms of just basic common sense of we use the FBI background checks on people who deal with the public in a variety of 

contexts, and to not in this context just seems kind of mind-boggling that that step would not have been in place already. 

Mr. ROTH. To do this, a little context on what lists we are discussing. There is sort of the large list, the Terrorist Identities 

Datamart Environment, which has information of individuals that 

is both verified and unverified. So it is the broader list from which 

gets called sort of the so-called terrorist watchlist. 

So what TSA did not have access to is certain codes within that 

larger environment. Again, some of this information is non-substantiated. Once TSA realized, I think around 2014, that they did 

not have this information, Director Pistole or Administrator Pistole 

signed a letter asking for that, and it is now sort of in that interagency environment in order to do it. 

We were able to, in the course of our audit, run 900,000 names 

against the TIDE database. So as we sit now, I think we have some 

comfort and understanding what that environment looks like; in 

other words, the 73 individuals we believe is the sort of sum entirety of what was missed. We gave those names to TSA as soon 
23 

as we discovered them, and I think they are following up on each 

of those. 

So, I mean, to the extent that there was a vulnerability, I believe 

it has been closed, but it certainly gives you pause that this situation was allowed to continue. 

Senator AYOTTE. It does give you pause because it really only 

takes one versus 73 in this context, and as we sit here, even the 

fact that there is still a bureaucratic step that is not being expedited with this request being made by Director Pistole already in 

2014, I just cannot imagine that the FBI would not have moved on 

this with the most haste that they could possibly move, given especially your recent undercover findings. So I think that is something 

we should follow-up on just as a matter of bureaucracy cannot hold 

this up when it comes to basic vetting that needs to be done. 

I also wanted to follow-up on the managed inclusion, what is 

being done with that, and I was interested also to see Director 

Roering refer to it as that PreCheck is being given out like Halloween candy in your written testimony. I think all of us think that 

PreCheck is a very important program for the public and access, 

but to the extent we do have a category of individuals that has 

grown exponentially, that is being used that may not go through 

the entire vetting process, if you could share with us what you are 

able to share here what you think would be better in terms of some 

reforms to focus the PreCheck process properly so that we really 

are allowing the members of the public to use it that should and 

still maintaining a thorough vetting of the individuals we should. 

Mr. ROTH. The basic principle behind PreCheck is great because 

it is sort of this idea that if you are a known traveler, we have to 

spend less time on you than your unknown traveler, so really 

bringing PreCheck back to its basic form, which is we know who 

you are. 

We wrote this report. We have briefed Members of Congress. 

There is proposed legislation in the House of Representatives called 

the ‘‘Secure and Expedited Screening Act,’’ H.R. 2127, which basically directs TSA to bring it back to what it used to be, which is 

somebody looks at you and knows that you are a trusted traveler 

as opposed to some of these risk rules that they now apply. 

Senator AYOTTE. I also wanted to follow-up—we heard a lot of 

discussion today about the vetting process, but one thing—because 

I also serve as the Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee that has 

been an issue—is the SIDA badges and wanting to fully understand from all of you your perspective on TSA’s role in issuing 

SIDA badges. Many of them are not being kept track of, and that 

responsibility is left to the local airports. 

What would you assess in terms of this issue? Is that a potential 

vulnerability? And what recommendations do you have on that 

front? That is to whoever would like to answer it. 

Ms. GROVER. Sure. Well, so let me just start by saying that it is 

the airport’s responsibility, and there are mechanisms that they 

have in place at the airport level to do regular checks with each 

of their contractors to make sure that the badges can be accounted 

for, and I believe that there is a trigger, like a 5-percent trigger, 

if a certain number of the badges have been lost, then they would 
24 

all be reissued. So there are some controls in place, but I think that 

it is an issue that warrants additional attention. 

Mr. ROTH. We are doing some work on that, given sort of the 

news that has been recently out there—— 

Senator AYOTTE. We have had some other incidences with the 

SIDA badges of deep concern. 

Mr. ROTH. We are doing field work right now with regard to that, 

sort of being able to actually go to the sites and figure out whether 

or not the airport authorities are appropriately and properly accounting for the SIDA badges, whether or not TSA is doing their 

oversight responsibility in a prudent way, and, frankly, doing some 

testing to see whether or not we can piggyback into secure areas 

and those kinds of things. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. 

Ms. ROERING. We also conduct tests where we will call the airport and report that an employee has been terminated to determine 

how quickly they turn off the access according to the badges. That 

was a special emphasis inspection activity that we did recently. 

While we found a couple of challenges, in most cases when the 

badge was reported as lost or missing, the airport did turn off the 

access associated with the badge. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. I thank all of you for being here. This is 

an important topic. And let me just say to Chairman Johnson’s 

point, certainly the TSA agents that I interact with in Manchester 

on a regular basis, I think they are very hard working, and so putting together the right process for the people who are trying to do 

this job effectively every day and making sure that they have our 

support I think is important, and then also ensuring that those 

agents that are doing well are empowered to do their job, I think 

that is part of our function here as well. So thank you all. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. Senator 

McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

You have no evidence right now that shows that contracted TSA 

is either cheaper or better, correct? 

Mr. ROTH. I do not, no. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And you are not aware of any that 

exist? 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The magnetometer versus AIT, do we have 

numbers, good numbers, on the cost to operate and speed of use on 

those two different devices? 

Mr. ROTH. We have not done any work in that area. I know that 

TSA itself has some metrics with regard to that, but I do not have 

that available. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I feel like I am handcuffed because we 

do not have TSA here. I will request it from TSA if it is available. 

It is very obvious to me, because I am always looking for AIT, because I have a knee. So I either get somebody to touch me a lot, 

or I do AIT. I am TSA Pre. So even though you do not know this 

unless you start asking, I go through the TSA Pre line, and then 

I ask them to go over to the AIT machine. 
25 

Now, it is catch-as-catch-can at airports. Some airports immediately accommodate you. Others say, ‘‘No, you cannot do that.’’ 

And then when you get there—every airport is a little different. It 

is like snowflakes. Some of them say that you get to leave your 

shoes on and everything in when you go through the other line, if 

you have your TSA preboarding pass with you. Others are no. So, 

it is kind of a mess. But I do not really care as long as I get to 

go through this instead of this. 

And about 50 percent of the time, they have the AIT shut down, 

and I have to ask for them to open it. And so they may have one 

sitting there. Now, some airports do not even have one sitting 

there. It was not until very recently they even had one at the 

Southwest terminal at Reagan. 

So I am curious if your work has focused on this, and maybe the 

Marshal can speak to this, too. Why are we not keeping those AIT 

machines going all the time at every facility? Because we spend a 

lot of money on them, and I know this is the whole thing of time 

versus safety and how quickly can we move people through, right? 

Is that what it is? 

Ms. ROERING. Yes, you have hit the essence of the problem. It is 

much faster to expedite people through a metal detector than an 

AIT, but this is better security than going through a metal detector. A metal detector will not detect a nonmetallic IED, which is 

one of the biggest threats to aviation security. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Think of all the first-time travelers with 

knees and hips that are going through that magnetometer that do 

not know how much time they are going to save and how much 

time TSA is going to save if they go through the AIT instead, if 

they were to ask like I ask. I am worried that they are letting me 

use it because in some of the airports I am in, especially at home, 

they know who I am. And, that is really wrong. Anybody with a 

hip or knee ought to be told they should go through the AIT to save 

time and money—and, of course, be more safe. So I want to keep 

following up on this magnetometer. 

Now, why can’t we have more AIT machines? Well, because we 

are cutting the budget. So we have to remember, as we all sit and 

pound the desk about how bad TSA is, we keep cutting the amount 

of money they have. And we ask them to do more and do it better. 

Clearly, one of the issues is, in fact, resources and how many people are working. The times I have gotten into difficult conversations with people at the airports about why the AIT is not open, 

they just say, ‘‘We do not have the staff. It takes more staff to run 

it, and we just do not have the staff to run it.’’ So I think that is 

also an issue. 

The Marshals. Are you saying now, Mr. MacLean, that they are 

not preboarding, the Marshals? Have they changed that? 

Mr. MACLEAN. It is hit or miss. It depends on where they are flying from. One thing they all tell me is that when they fly from 

international origins, they are paraded by the foreign agents. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I still see them preboarding. I mean, it is 

pretty obvious who they are. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Well, the way it should be done is they should be 

boarding with the passengers, and—— 
26 

Senator MCCASKILL. By the way, isn’t that better security also, 

because aren’t they commingling with the passengers, with more 

opportunities, with eyes and ears—— 

Mr. MACLEAN. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. To figure out who there might 

be on that plane that might be a problem? 

Mr. MACLEAN. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. When they roll up at the beginning of 

boarding and they go on, clearly they are not physically impaired, 

clearly they are not traveling with small children. Now, they are 

not in uniform, but usually they are in jeans, and then they are 

sitting in strategic places on the airplane when you get on. 

So I do not understand why—is this something that anybody can 

speak to? Why do they think it is a good idea to put these people 

on ahead of time? 

Mr. MACLEAN. We cannot dictate what the foreign countries can 

do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, but this is here in the United States. 

Mr. MACLEAN. I am not aware of that. I understand that that 

problem has been—that the Air Marshals have the option, 100 percent option to board with the passengers. But most of the Air Marshals now are flying long routes to places where they are mandating preboarding. So the janitors see them. The workers on the 

front line—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. I see them on my plane, and typically the 

planes I am going on are not longer than a 2-hour flight, and they 

are getting on ahead of time. 

Mr. MACLEAN. That is a problem. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is that their option? 

Mr. MACLEAN. Yes, it is. As far as I am concerned—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why can it be their option? Should they not 

be required to stand in line with everybody else and commingle? 

Mr. MACLEAN. I would like that, absolutely. And also at the 

same time they could be gauging suspicious activity. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. If you want them walking around the 

airport, a perfect place to walk around the airport and be among 

the airport is waiting in line with all the passengers. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there a reason that they are being given 

the option? Do you know, Ms. Roering, since TSA is not here? Ms. 

Grover or Mr. Roth? 

Ms. ROERING. I do not have an answer to that, but we could ask 

to find out and get back to you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I mean, it is more convenient for them to 

get on first. It is nice not to have to wait. You do not have to get— 

especially if you are doing Southwest—— 

Mr. MACLEAN. I can only speculate, but it is possible that the Air 

Marshals may not want to lose their overhead bin space. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Exactly. Just like all of us. 

Mr. MACLEAN. I am just speculating. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes, especially when you are traveling an 

airline like Southwest, which I fly frequently. Being at the front of 

the line—— 
27 

Mr. MACLEAN. Well, Southwest Airlines, it is a free-for-all, for 

the most part. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Correct. But I bet we could figure out with 

Southwest how they could make sure that they have some seats at 

the front. 

Mr. MACLEAN. That all depends on how smart the flight attendants are going to run that operation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, I want to stay on the contractor 

versus employee. I need to talk to Mr. Dodaro about this, but it 

seems to me that you all ought to start putting in the audit from 

GAO, the budget for the year of which you are doing the work compared to the previous years. I think everyone needs to understand 

that there is a price to be paid for us continuing to cut and cut and 

cut the domestic side of Homeland Security, the domestic side of 

our national protection. It is a problem that we are seeing this year 

again that we are going to create a $40 billion slush fund in the 

Department of Defense, but yet we are going to shortchange port 

security, airport security, cybersecurity, the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), FBI, all in the name of holding on to an ill-conceived 

sequestration number. So I think you guys should think about 

doing that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. When we 

are talking about resourcing, I do have to throw out the word 

‘‘prioritization,’’ so we need to look at priority of spending. You can 

also rest assured this will just be the first in a series of hearings 

on TSA. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So I will get a chance at TSA? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Yes, and we can talk about Boarding Group 

B on Southwest Airlines for folks. Senator Baldwin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BALDWIN 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your holding this very valuable hearing. 

I also want to thank the witnesses and especially our whistleblower witnesses for being here to share your stories and your experience. And a special thanks to Ms. Roering. You raised the 

alarm on inadequate PreCheck background checks, and as you are 

stationed at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport where, 

as the Chairman and I know, many of our constituents fly in and 

out of on their way to other destinations, we appreciate your leadership. 

I wanted to follow-up on a line of questioning that some of the 

previous Senators went down with Mr. Roth just so I understand 

it very specifically. 

With regard to TSA access to the terrorism-related information 

in these databases and, in particular, the lack of access to certain 

codes, I thought I heard you say earlier that there was a statutory 

impediment. And then you indicated that it is in the process of 

being worked out bureaucratically between agencies. And I want 

some clarity for our Committee as to whether we need to see legislation on this pushed through in an expedited fashion or whether 

this is on the verge of being resolved between agencies. 
28 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you for that question, and my apologies for the 

confusion. As I understand the process, it is sort of an administrative process that is done within the government itself. There is not 

a need for legislation. 

Senator BALDWIN. OK. 

Mr. ROTH. I think the access to that information is generally governed by statute, but it does not require a statutory fix for TSA to 

apply to have access to those codes, only, for example, if the Committee that decides whether or not TSA has access to the codes, for 

some reason refuses that access, then there may be a statutory fix 

that would be needed. But until that process goes all the way 

through, I think that is what needs to occur. 

Senator BALDWIN. While I am on the topic of legislative or policy 

changes that we should be aware of, I think most of the testimony 

that I have heard points to leadership, points to management, 

points to following the rules that are already in place or examining 

that, all of which the agency would have the authority to do as it 

currently stands. Please highlight for me, each of you, if there is 

anything in your testimony that we should pay attention to that requires a statutory change. Anybody? 

[No response.] 

OK. Thank you. 

I wanted to have you, Ms. Roering, speak a little bit further 

about this issue of performance metrics that are skewed toward 

timeliness rather than accuracy. I know you touched on this briefly 

in response to Senator Carper. But can you elaborate more on performance measures that track wait times and those that track the 

ability to detect weapons or explosives and how that affects both 

safety and TSO performance? 

Ms. ROERING. Thank you for the question, Senator Baldwin. 

When there is an excessive wait time, which by definition for TSA 

is currently over 20 minutes in a regular lane and 5 minutes in a 

PreCheck lane, there is immediate reporting required through our 

coordination centers to the regional offices and ultimately to headquarters. That report requires a thorough analysis of the individual 

number of TSOs that were out for training or called off sick and 

scheduled absences. There is just a lot of focus and a lot of information that is needed to be gathered when we have excessive wait 

times. 

In terms of our monthly testing, which is conducted by my inspectors, we brief the FSD basically once a month on the results 

of the tests. There is no metric associated with it. The test results 

are shared among screening management, but, quite honestly, 

there is just no metric to focus on the detection rates and whether 

or not that would reflect badly on the FSD’s scorecard. 

Senator BALDWIN. Mr. MacLean, you have brought to our attention a lot of information about the threat of IEDs, and certainly 

given the failed bombing attack of the Shoe Bomber and the Underwear Bomber and these sort of things, the evolving ability of 

terrorists to assemble miniature IEDs and remotely detonate them 

or, as you described, the increased threat of larger IEDs in the airport perimeter are huge concerns. 

You have already commented a little bit further in the questioning, but how do you believe resources should be reprioritize to 
29 

better protect against these threats? And if you could elaborate a 

little bit more about the VIPR Teams that you were talking about 

earlier in that capacity to help address this threat. 

Mr. MACLEAN. I am glad you asked that because I really want 

to talk about it. 

Once again, if the PreCheck is done well, it reduces the time that 

the screeners need to focus on non-threatening passengers. So I 

would like to see those TSOs participate more on VIPR Teams, and 

then the four points that I mentioned on the physical security implementation on the aircraft so that you can get more Air Marshals 

on the ground into those VIPR Teams. 

I love that thought of—and these are not teams that I want down 

there ripping and arresting anybody that they see. This is purely 

trying to build rapport from the local authorities all the way down 

to janitors and cooks. For instance, you might have a cook that sees 

something every day, the same thing, but one time he reported it 

to his boss, who might be some knucklehead who just says, ‘‘I do 

not have time for this. You are not a cop. Quit playing cop. I have 

better things to do.’’ So he is frustrated. So, he does not go—he 

barely speaks English. He does not want to go forward with it. But 

if there is that uniform VIPR guy who has built a rapport with 

him, asks him about his family, is very interested in what he sees 

every day, he might come to him for something that is out of the 

ordinary, and that little thing just may be that IED that Air Marshals are scared to death to be stuck flying with. 

Senator BALDWIN. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Baldwin. Senator 

Lankford. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD 

Senator LANKFORD. I thank all of you for your work on this. Millions of Americans fly every day, and they are very dependent on 

what is happening with TSA and the security and what you all are 

also bringing to the table both from whistleblowing and from doing 

basic inspections. So I appreciate what you are doing to be able to 

help out the American people in this. It is extremely important. 

Let me run through just a couple different questions here. 

Mr. Roth, you have in your testimony that you ‘‘have repeatedly 

found that human error—often a simple failure to follow protocol— 

poses significant vulnerabilities.’’ What do you attribute that to? Is 

that systemic? Is that training? Is that management? Is that morale? Where is that coming from? 

Mr. ROTH. I would say it is all of the above, Senator. I think it 

does involve training, it does involve morale, it does involve management. You have an enormously large distributed workforce. But 

you are right; it is one of these things that you have to follow the 

SOP every time. If you do not, that is where we find the 

vulnerabilities. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. So there are all kinds of accountability 

built into the system for time and efficiency. You were talking 

about that before. So if you go past 5 minutes in PreCheck or past 

20 minutes in the regular line, there are all kinds of accountability. 

But is there the same kind of accountability structure built in for 

someone that is not following protocol? 
30 

Mr. ROTH. I am not aware of that. I will leave it to the other witnesses. 

Senator LANKFORD. Have other folks seen that? Or has the 

standard really become a time-based standard at this point? 

Ms. ROERING. It is a time-based standard, but if our TSOs do not 

follow SOP, the agency treats that as a conduct issue versus a performance issue, which, again, impacts the morale. 

Senator LANKFORD. Sure. And TSA agents and what is happening in the Department of Homeland Security on the whole has 

just been terrible morale on the whole. These are great folks, and 

the people that I have traveled back and forth with in Oklahoma 

City, where I catch a flight every single week, are terrific folks and 

extremely friendly, very engaged. They understand the value of 

what is going on. They are great folks. But the morale seems to 

continue to come in time and time again bad. That does not help 

us as the traveling public. 

Let me go through a couple things here as well. Mr. Roth, also, 

there have been ongoing issues with procurement with TSA, both 

getting equipment that is outdated, getting the wrong equipment, 

getting too much equipment that is stored in a warehouse, and this 

has been an ongoing problem. Is it getting better? 

Mr. ROTH. It is hard to determine that at this point. Certainly, 

the kinds of work that we have been doing shows that this is a continual problem. We just did a report, for example, with regard to 

TSA maintenance contracts where it is about a $1.2 billion set of 

contracts over the course of 4 years in which TSA does not have 

the ability to understand whether or not routine maintenance is, 

in fact, being performed, or whether they are being billed for things 

that actually occurred. 

Senator LANKFORD. So basic sustainment. 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. So what is happening on the procurement side? Because there are lots of folks that are vendors that are 

rushing into this space now because they know there is a very 

large market when something is purchased. Is there a good standard of improvement there to say this piece of equipment is 2 percent better? Is that enough to be a multi-million to multi-billiondollar contract? How are the standards for procurement coming out 

to try to increase our effectiveness? 

Mr. ROTH. Certainly DHS-wide this is one of the emphasis areas 

of the Secretary. He is trying to professionalize the acquisition 

process within DHS. TSA is obviously part of that. I cannot speak 

to sort of how it is working on current acquisition projects, but it 

is something that, frankly remains a challenge. 

I will say, for example, the AIT machines, that is a single vendor, 

so there is no real competition in the market for what is a very significant capital purchase. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. We have had a lot of conversation this 

morning about PreCheck and about how in PreCheck you have a 

million people that have gone through that process of PreCheck, 

what was the number? 7 million people that are now basically authorized to go through it at some point through other different variations. 
31 

Do we need to change the name from ‘‘PreCheck’’ to something 

else? Because we have a large number of people that are really not 

being prechecked. They are just being expedited through this process. Am I getting that correct? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. That is correct, and particularly for people 

who are selected at the airport, these are not individuals who were 

previously identified as low risk. And so TSA’s premise is that they 

are providing real-time threat assessment through the use of Behavior Detection Officers and explosives detection. But we have 

raised concerns about the lack of effectiveness data on the BDOs, 

and during the time of our review, we found that TSA was not consistently using the explosive trace detection as their protocols 

called for. So there is a need for more attention to that. 

Senator LANKFORD. If I remember the report correctly from reading through it—and you can correct me on this if I get it wrong— 

basically when they were evaluated for behavioral detection, it did 

not come out any different than just random chance did. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, that is right. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. Well, that is not really PreCheck at that 

point. It is difficult to call the line a PreCheck line when there is 

really a no-check portion of it where part of it has gone through— 

they have done a thorough vetting process and part of it is just 

random chance that they are going through it. So my understanding is this is a faster process because they have done a more 

thorough background than this one. 

Mr. MacLean, I understand what you were saying before. There 

is great benefit to be able to help separate, as you said before, to 

be able to blow some of the hay off the stack so it is easier to find 

the needle. I get that completely. But we cannot call it ‘‘PreCheck’’ 

if it is really no-check and PreCheck combined. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Well, I will tell you, you are familiar with Secure 

Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI)? 

Senator LANKFORD. Yes. 

Mr. MACLEAN. I know a Border Patrol agent, active duty, who 

applied for SENTRI. He got denied because when he was a juvenile, he got into a fight, and he cannot have a SENTRI pass. So 

it may be some things are just not being put together and implemented right. 

Senator LANKFORD. Right. 

Mr. MACLEAN. But I love the program just because—— 

Senator LANKFORD. Well, no, I am good with the program on it 

because it is a reasonable thing, because there are a lot of Americans that are regular fliers, they want to go through that, they 

want to go through the vetting, and to be able to go through the 

line that is a faster line in a PreCheck-type line. My statement is: 

If it is PreCheck, let us really have it prechecked. If they are a 

Trusted Traveler, I have no problem with that, because there are 

high standards for that. If they are active-duty military, I have no 

problem with that. But if we have folks that are just randomly 

coming to the airport and they say, ‘‘You do not look like a terrorist, so I am going to put you over there,’’ that is not really 

PreCheck at that point. We have another line for that. And we 

need to be able to evaluate that as well. 
32 

There are 73 people—and I know others have already talked 

about this as well—73 folks that the IG reported were—that their 

code was related to terrorism. I would assume that means they are 

on the no-fly list. These were individuals that TSA had allowed to 

go through the system as employees kind of behind the perimeter 

there. 

Mr. ROTH. They would not necessarily be on the no-fly list. The 

TIDE list is a very sort of broad list of terrorist identities, some of 

which is verified and some of which is not verified. The no-fly list 

is a subsection of that TIDE list. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK, of that larger list. 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. 

Senator LANKFORD. That is going to be corrected where there is 

access now, and how quickly can that be corrected where that 

record can be tied into TSA and so they can have access to be able 

to look at both? 

Mr. ROTH. I do not have that information with me. I know that 

the specific 73 names we did report back to TSA, and they are taking action on those folks. 

Senator LANKFORD. But we do not have an idea at this point how 

fast they could take action on that, just to be able to do it as a follow-up? 

Mr. ROTH. I am sorry. I do not. 

Senator LANKFORD. OK. We will follow-up on that in the days 

ahead and find out the speed of that and so we can be able to sync 

all those lists together. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Lankford. 

Just a quick follow-up on that. Inspector General Roth, you are 

saying we do not need legislation, that the authority already exists, 

that it is just a matter of will to do it? 

Mr. ROTH. That is my understanding. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I want, to a certain extent, to summarize some of the things we have heard. We are really basically trying to detect two things: either explosives or weapons. The failure 

with the AITs, obviously we put those in place to try and detect 

explosives because metal detectors do not. And so we use the AITs, 

and now weapons are getting through. 

Wouldn’t a pretty simple solution be either two views through 

the AIT—I do not want to discuss exactly where the failure is, but, 

a frontal and a side view, as well as put a metal detector on the 

other side. That would be a relatively simple solution that would 

certainly increase our rate of detection. Is that not true? 

Mr. ROTH. I would assume it would be for weapons. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. That leaves us with explosives. What 

work has been done in terms of bomb-sniffing dogs? I have read 

some things. I do not have it right now that I can cite. Bomb-sniffing dogs are extremely effective. Can anybody speak to that? Mr. 

MacLean, you are shaking your head. 

Mr. MACLEAN. I worked at a Border Patrol checkpoint. I was 

blown away with what a dog can sense. I have seen heroin 

wrapped in coffee, duct tape, Saran Wrap, hermetically sealed, and 

then dunked in a tank of gasoline, and the tank sealed and secured, and the dog still hits on it. 
33 

So if they can do that with drugs, if they can do that with bombs, 

they are amazing. They are amazing creatures. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. Roering. 

Ms. ROERING. Currently, the regulatory program has oversight 

for the passenger screening canine program, and I have witnessed 

at various locations the use of a decoy where an individual would 

be carrying an explosive in a backpack or on their person, and in 

every case the dog was able to detect the explosive and also very 

favorable results with that program. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. Grover. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir, TSA has about 800 canine teams total 

now, and they have been found to be effective. They are expensive. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Well, so is the $7.2 billion we are expending 

on, again, security theater. 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Again, let me be clear: I think security theater to a great extent does deter. I think we need, as Mr. MacLean 

was talking about, layered defense. We need to think outside the 

box. We have to think smarter. And so from my standpoint, if you 

have a very high percentage in terms of effectiveness of a bombsniffing dog, I think that solution is pretty obvious, isn’t it? 

Inspector General Roth, can you speak to that? 

Mr. ROTH. I think it is important for TSA to look at all options 

and to figure out exactly what is going to work, but try different 

things. This reliance on cutting-edge technology clearly has its 

challenges to it, so I would agree with you that they need to start 

to look at other things as well. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I mean, isn’t part of the problem as Americans we watch movies and we always have a silver bullet technological solution, and we are finding out that these technological solutions are failing at a very high rate. And so maybe we need to 

step back a little bit and go, well, what actually works. Again, I 

would argue a bomb-sniffing dog, they may be expensive, but if we 

are not 100 percent effective, think of how expensive that will be. 

Ms. Grover, do you know exactly how expensive are these units? 

Have you done a study on that? Can you illuminate the Committee 

on that? 

Ms. GROVER. So I believe that the startup costs are about 

$100,000 for the conventional canines and in the neighborhood of 

$220,000 for the passenger screening canines (PSC), and then an 

annual cost thereafter of about $60,000 a year for the conventional 

canines and about $160,000 a year for the PSC canine teams. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So I would really love to have the GAO provide us a report that takes those costs, multiplies those times the 

number of teams we actually have to have pretty full coverage in 

U.S. airports. 

Mr. MacLean, you look like you are chomping at the bit here. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Well, remember, every canine comes with an officer—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Precisely. 

Mr. MACLEAN [continuing]. Who has a keen sense of feeling people out, reading faces, building rapport. Sometimes having a dog 

with you, people approach you or you become more approachable. 
34 

Chairman JOHNSON. Again, my point is what we are doing clearly is not working, and so we have to think outside the box and look 

for a different solution. 

Mr. MacLean, I do want to give you the opportunity, because you 

were not able to tell your story of whistleblowing, and I really do 

want you to tell your story and how you were retaliated against, 

because that has been a problem that I have seen repeatedly now 

in my 4 years of people that have the courage in the Federal Government, coming forward, telling a story that has to be told, and 

then they are retaliated against, which has a very chilling effect on 

those individuals that we do need to come forward. So, please, take 

this opportunity to tell your story. 

Mr. MACLEAN. Well, in July 2003, it kind of accidentally fell into 

my lap. After a lot of problems with us preboarding before the passengers, having to wear somewhat of a uniform to get on every 

flight, we were brought in for an unprecedented emergency suicidal 

al-Qaeda terrorist hijack emergency briefing, and we were all told 

that in any moment we were going to be under attack, and the 

flight deck was going to be breached, and those aircraft were going 

to be flown into east coast United States targets and European capitals. 

Just 2 days afterwards, all Air Marshals got an unsecured text 

message sent to their unsecured phone instead of their encrypted 

smartphones, a message that we want everyone to avoid late cancellation fees, therefore, we need to have everyone cancel their 

hotel rooms indefinitely. 

Later on, the GAO and the Inspector General discovered that 

that was going to be the plan until the new fiscal year. So for 60 

days or longer, any aircraft that was going to fly 4 hours or longer 

was not going to have an Air Marshal team on them. 

First of all, we thought it was sort of a test. We get this text 

message that made no sense to us 2 days after this emergency 

briefing, so I just wanted to confirm it with the supervisor, and the 

supervisor told me, he goes, ‘‘We have run out of money, and we 

are going to have to fly puddle jumpers until something happens.’’ 

Chairman JOHNSON. This occurred when? When did this briefing—— 

Mr. MACLEAN. Late July 2008. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. MACLEAN. So afterwards I called the Inspector General hotline, and I got routed to two other offices—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. We need to stand in recess for this Committee hearing. Apparently, the Capitol Police is clearing this so— 

we should be locked down and stay in place? 

OK. We are clearing the floors. So if you could in an orderly fashion please exit as quickly as possible. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

I would like to gavel this hearing back in. 

It is unfortunate what happened here as we were concluding this 

hearing. A threat was called in. In today’s world, we have to take 

those threats very seriously. 

I want to commend the Capitol Police for acting responsibly and 

swiftly. We cleared the hearing room. We cleared the floor. Fortunately, the threat was determined to be false. 
35 

But, again, that is the world we live in today. It is very unfortunate. 

Suffice it to say that this is going to be the first in a series of 

hearings in terms of the challenge that the TSA has in trying to 

really succeed in its dual mission of keeping this Nation safe, identifying every possible threat, preventing those things from harming 

any American, and at the same time allowing efficient throughput 

so that Americans do not wait excessively in lines and do not miss 

flights or any form of transportation. 

So we will continue to explore this. I will continue to work with 

Secretary Jeh Johnson. I will continue to work with the new TSA 

Administrator, Vice Admiral Neffenger, and ask those gentlemen to 

think outside the box, take a look at the priorities that we need to 

establish in terms of being most effective and most efficient at providing the kind of security and traveling convenience that we possibly can within the TSA. 

So with that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days, 

until June 24 at 5 p.m., for the submission of statements and questions for the record. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(37) 

A P P E N D I X 
38 

TSA is charged with the vital duty of securing this country's transportation systems. As the 

committee considers the nomination for the next administrator ofTSA, these issues are 

critical to understanding what actions need to be taken at the agency. I thank the witnesses 

for their willingness to provide their knowledge and expertise on these important issues, 

and !look forward to their testimony. 

### 
39 

Statement of Ranking Member Thomas R. Carper 

"Oversight of the Transportation Security Administration: First-Hand and 

Government Watchdog Accounts of Agency Challenges" 

June 9, 2015 

As prepared for delivery: 

I thank the Chairman for holding this important and timely hearing. 

Few federal agencies interact with the American people more on a daily basis than the 

Transportation Security Administration. The men and women who work for TSA have a very 

difficult, but extremely important job. 

Last month, I spoke on the Senate floor about two women who have dedicated their careers to 

keeping our aviation system secure by working for TSA. In fact, one of these women was shot in 

the line of duty and showed up to work, the very next day. Every day, these women and their 

colleagues around the country work in a very challenging environment to keep our aviation 

system and those of us who use it safe and secure. We don't do enough to acknowledge that 

and to thank them when they do their jobs well. 

While I believe it is important for us to recognize exemplary performance when it is done at TSA 

or throughout other parts of the Department of Homeland Security more often than we do, this 

committee also has an obligation to exercise our oversight responsibilities when performance 

falls well short of that standard. 

Thanks to our witnesses before us today, we have been alerted to a number of instances where 

performance by TSA and its employees appears to have been disappointing and, even, troubling. 

Just yesterday, for example, we learned from the DHS Inspector General that seventy-three 

individuals with possible links to terrorism have been granted credentials to access secure areas 

of airports across our country. 

And last week, of course, we learned about significant vulnerabilities at passenger screening 

checkpoints uncovered by the Inspector General. The reported failure rates for detecting 

prohibited items at checkpoints are more than troubling. They are unacceptable. I look forward to 

reviewing the DHS Inspector General's full report and recommendations later this summer. That 

said, I am encouraged by the swift action taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security to address 

the Inspector General's findings. 

Since 2011, the Transportation Security Administration has transitioned from a 'one-size-fits-all' 

screening philosophy to one that is more risk-based. This approach is designed to allow TSA to 

deploy its limited resources to the areas where we face the greatest threat. 

However, as the Inspector General and GAO have identified, such a swift transition may have 

created vulnerabilities in the system. Given recent reports, it is more important than ever for the 

Transportation Security Administration to have a permanent, Senate-confirmed leader in place. I 

thank the Chairman and his staff for working so quickly and cooperatively with my staff to move 

Vice Admiral Neffengcr's nomination, which we'll examine in a hearing tomorrow. 
40 

With that, I look forward to the testimony and thank the witnesses for appearing here today. I am 

especially grateful that current front line employees have joined us today to discuss their 

perspective on how to improve TSA. 

### 
41 

Statement of Jason Harrington 

June 9, 2015 

I worked for the Transportation Security Administration as a TSO from 2007-2013, and as the 

senior writer for O'Hare airport's TSA newsletter in 2011. Although the agency's knee-jerk 

response to criticism from any given former employee is that said employee's concerns are 

outdated, the fact of the matter is there are perennial problems within the organization that have 

existed from the beginning, and which still plague the agency to this day. As a writer and 

blogger, many current TSA agents regularly contact me to discuss their concerns with the 

organization. The most commonly cited concerns among floor-level employees are as follows: I) 

A lack of a consistent, agency-wide strategy in addressing the inherent dilemma of security 

needs versus the need to process passengers as quickly as possible so as to avoid flight delays 2) 

Poor management culture 3) A questionable promotion system and 4) An unwieldy and 

inefficient SOP and recertification system. 

The recent failure of agents to detect 95% of covert Red Team tests is the most prominent issue 

facing the agency right now, and several current agents have agreed with me that the greatest 

challenge when it comes to such failures stems from the fundamental catch-22 of the TSA's 

mission: if agents properly perform SOP down to the last detail, then internal testing results will 

improve and flyers will be safer. But meticulous adherence to the TSA's SOPs, such as they are, 

will mean that lines will back up to the ticketing counters, and people won't be able to fly. 

Flights will be missed due to the enormous security delays, and the distended passenger lines 

themselves will become choice terrorist targets. It's a classic quantity versus quality dilemma. 

This push-pull between security needs and commercial pressure is one of the many reasons 

agents are likely to fail covert testing. An effective solution for reconciling these two conflicting 

demands will be crucial in any effort to improve the organization. I have heard hundreds of 

speeches from TSA managers ordering agents to follow SOP in the name of national security or 

else face termination, and then, just hours later, heard the very same managers shouting at agents 

to disregard the SOP in the name of reducing passenger wait-times. 

Managers who play this duplicitous game are common. Poor management has for years been one 

of the most widespread complaints among front-line TSA workers, and remains so today. To be 

fair, there are many good managers at TSA. One of the qualities of a good manager is that he or 

she acknowledges the aforementioned quantity versus quality dilemma, and makes best efforts to 

operate with an even-handed, transparent, Realpolitik approach. But the bad managers, as any 

front-line TSA agent will tell you, far outnumber the good. In talking recently to several current 

TSOs, the same time-honored complaints regarding TSA management came up. 

There are far too many TSA managers who reign with a tyrannical hand, and whose promotion 

to a managerial position remains a mystery to the workforce. Many managers have high school 

diplomas and no real security or leadership experience prior to TSA, while their subordinates 

have advanced degrees, security and managerial experience, and yet are somehow overlooked for 

promotion time after time. There's a lot of talent on the screening floor, but the vast majority of 

that talent goes un-utilizcd. The promotion system is rife with cronyism, and fraternization 
42 

between managers and floor-level employees is extremely common. In my time I saw a manager 

who did not know what the word "nocturnal" meant when reading through a fellow officer's 

doctor's note involving work restrictions; another had to ask his subordinates how to spell the 

word "entry." Still another manager was arrested after attempting to evade Chicago-area police. 

The incident was well-publicized, and an account of the story appeared in a local newspaper. 

Drugs were found on the manager's acquaintance. Yet the manager was back on the floor within 

a few days, and received little more than a routine write-up. Managers are consistently more 

concerned about whether or not officers are chewing gum or have an acceptable hair color than 

whether or not the officers are treating the traveling public with respect or operating in a way 

conducive to real security. TSOs are so on guard from toxic management that it is hard for them 

to focus on their jobs. 

The most extreme example of macro-level mismanagement, as well as misuse of funds, that I 

ever witnessed occurred in March of 2012. It still nicely encapsulates the ethos of TSA culture 

today, as confirmed by my private discussions with agents currently on the floor. In 2012 a 

blogger named Jonathan Corbett released a video proving that anyone could bypass the full-body 

radiation scanners in place at the time. Corbett filmed himself repeatedly passing through the 

scanners with a medium-sized metal object- the equivalent, for all intents and purposes, of a 

gun. He provided proof to the public that the machines could easily be rendered useless by 

exploiting a laughable weakness in the technology: metal items on passengers' bodies showed up 

as black on TSA officers' screens, but the background of the image was also black, rendering 

guns, knives, and other metallic weapons indistinguishable from the image background to TSA 

scanner operators. The TSA had paid millions of dollars for full-body scanners that couldn't 

detect a passenger attempting to bring a gun aboard a plane. The Corbett video went viral, and 

the TSA downplayed the video's significance, while floor-level TSA employees knew that 

Corbett's assertions and demonstrations involving the scanners were correct. The TSA clumsily 

attempted to cover up the scanners' critical flaw with a panicked internal directive to us front-line 

TSA officers within a week of the release of the Corbett video, instructing all officers to begin 

patting down the sides of every fifth passenger, essentially making the machines no more than 

million dollar random pat-down generators, a procedural redundancy, since random pat-downs 

were and are already performed on passengers. Compounding this comedy of errors was the fact 

that the radiation scanner technology was not only ineffective, but slow, as well. Wait-times 

began to increase due to the radiation scanners, and so management began pressuring TSOs to 

speed up the floor rotation, thus violating the agency's own official privacy-safeguard procedure 

that was supposed to ensure that officers would never come face-to-face with the passenger 

whose nude image they viewed. Management often pressured agents to speed up the floor 

rotation under threat of disciplinary measures. It thus became simple, in many cases, for officers 

to match a passenger with the nude image just viewed, completely validating just one of EPIC's 

privacy concerns. FOIA requests for the checkpoint footage of the average large, highly 

trafficked airport where the backscatter machines were installed could substantiate this. 

Any current TSA agent will tell you that there are also serious organizational problems involving 

the SOP and annual re-certification tests. There are currently 13 different SOPs related to 

checkpoint screening alone, including the PreCheck SOP, Mil, Ml2, TDC SOP, KCM SOP, the 

regular checkpoint SOP, the Special Screening SOP, and the Wounded Warrior SOP. Officers 
43 

are expected to have memorized all the information from these disparate, disorganized sources, 

and a failure to follow any of the hundreds of pedantic points in those SOPs can lead to 

discipline. TSA agents are so worried about procedural trivialities that they lose sight of the big 

picture: securing the traveling public. 

Officers should be focusing more attention on passengers, and less attention on objects. John 

Pistole initiated the idea of screener discretion, and TSA agents were elated. However, it didn't 

take long before the idea of screener discretion became hollow. Agents were able to use 

discretion, as long their discretion didn't fall on the wrong side of a local rule instituted by a 

capricious manager or supervisor. One of the things that would make the TSO position a more 

fulfilling job would be the ability to utilize a brand of common sense- for instance, to have the 

discretion to loosen special screening procedures on what is clearly a harmless passenger (say, a 

50-year-old cancer patient flying with her family), so as to focus attention elsewhere. 

The redundant and poorly executed recertification tests are another organizational flaw that 

plagues agents, both past and current. Officers are often told after taking one of the theoretical 

annual recertification tests that they have failed a particular portion of the test, yet there are 

widespread claims that the testers at times mistakenly fail officers, and at other times mistakenly 

pass them. I personally experienced this. There was at least one occasion when I was sure that I 

failed a portion of a recertification practical test, confessed to my test proctor, who was a TSA 

supervisor and friend of mine, that I believed I failed a portion of the test, but was then told by 

the test proctor not to worry about my self-confessed failure, even though I did in fact fail a 

portion of the pat-down procedure. Thus, I was unjustly passed. Conversely, there were other 

times when I, along with thousands ofTSA agents, was unjustly failed during a recertification 

test. A more organic, holistic approach to re-certification testing would be better; one where 

officers were measured by their actual, CCTV -recorded, day-to-day performance on the floor, 

and not by a single private performance in a small room with two fellow TSA officers observing. 

While an inordinate amount of time at the agency is spent fussing over pedantic procedural 

points, major security gaps remain open. Random, I 00% officer screening is supposed to be in 

place at the TSA as a counterbalance to insider threats, but at O'Hare there was a period of 

approximately one year where I neither observed nor heard of any random employee screening, 

at all. At several points during my 6 years of employment, I witnessed managers warning 

screeners in advance when the surprise random employee screening would take place, thus 

defeating the entire purpose of I 00% employee screening. Random drug testing was another 

poorly executed procedure: the supposedly random testing occurred like clockwork between the 

months of October and March, so that the common wisdom on the floor for all 6 years of my 

employment was that you only had to show up to work with clean urine for those 6 months. 

I end with a quote from a current screener working at a category X airport. When I asked him 

what he would tell this committee if he were here right now, he asked that 1 simply tell you this: 

"When 1 first started after September II, they were advertising federalization of airport security 

so as to put in place 'professional screeners who want to make TSA a career.' That vision never 

manifested. No one wants to make TSA a career." 
44 

In all my time as a TSA screener, I only ever met two people who claimed to like working for 

the TSA, and who expressed a desire to make it a lifetime career. I am sad to report that my 

friend's comment is reflective of a larger truth among the TSA workforce: the thing the average 

TSA agent wants most is to get out of the TSA. This contributes to a vicious circle: the TSA is 

always desperate to hire anyone, and thus, a lot of unqualified people end up in decision-making 

positions, making the TSA work environment even more toxic and less attractive as a career 

path. Perhaps the greatest security vulnerability at the nation's airports stems from the cold truth 

that the easiest way for a potential terrorist to bypass TSA security would be to put in an 

application to be a TSA officer. 
45 

STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH 

INSPECTOR GENERAL 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL 

AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

CONCERNING 

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION: FIRST-HAND AND GOVERNMENT WATCHDOG 

ACCOUNTS OF AGENCY CHALLENGES 

June 9, 2015 
46 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the 

Committee: thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the 

challenges at the Transportation Security Administration that the Office 

of Inspector General has uncovered in our numerous audits and 

evaluations of TSA. 

Whistle blowers 

Before discussing TSA's challenges, I would like to acknowledge the TSA 

whistle blowers that I join on this panel today. Being a whistle blower is 

seen to be hazardous in the Federal Government, and we are gratified 

when TSA employees as well as employees from other DHS components 

- are willing to step forward to identify problems within the agency. 

Whistleblower disclosures can save lives as well as taxpayer dollars, and 

whistleblowers play a crucial role in keeping our Department efficient 

and accountable. 

Our office can only investigate that which we know about, and 

whistleblowers serve as the IG's eyes and ears. We have been able to 

successfully complete a number of audits, inspections and investigations 

as a result of information we have received from whistle blowers. We 

review over 16,000 complaints- more than 300 per week- to better 

understand and respond to potential waste, fraud, and abuse in the 

Department's programs and operations. 

Whistleblowers perform an important public service by reporting 

evidence of wrongdoing, and they should never be retaliated against for 

doing so. Pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 

2012, the DHS OIG has established a Whistleblower Ombudsman to 

educate Department employees about prohibitions on retaliation for 

whistleblowing, as well as employees' rights and remedies if anyone 

retaliates against them for making a protected disclosure. 

Whistleblowers' identities are protected by the Inspector General Act, 

which prevents the OIG from disclosing the identity of an employee who 

provides information or a complaint without the employee's consent. 

Whistleblowers may anonymously or confidentially provide information to 

the DHS OIG through the toll-free Hotline or the public facing website or 

the Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman. 

The TSA Mission 

TSA's mission-to protect the Nation's transportation systems to ensure 

freedom of movement for people and commerce-is incredibly difficult. 

First, it is a massive operation, with a budget of more than $7.2 billion in 

2 
47 

fiscal year (FY) 2015. Each day, TSA screens about 1.8 million 

passengers and about 3 million carry-on bags at 450 airports 

nationwide. Second, we face a classic asymmetric threat in attempting to 

secure our transportation security: TSA cannot afford to miss a single, 

genuine threat without potentially catastrophic consequences, yet a 

terrorist only needs to get it right once. TSA's 50,000 transportation 

security officers (TSO) spend long hours performing tedious tasks that 

require constant vigilance. Complacency can be a huge detriment to 

TSA's ability to carry out its mission. Ensuring consistency across DHS' 

largest workforce would challenge even the best organization. 

Unfortunately, although nearly 14 years have passed since TSA's 

inception, we remain deeply concerned about its ability to execute its 

important mission. Since 2004, we have published more than 115 audit 

and inspection reports about TSA's programs and operations. We have 

issued hundreds of recommendations to attempt to improve TSA's 

efficiency and effectiveness. 

• We have conducted a series of covert penetration tests-essentially 

testing TSA's ability to stop us from bringing simulated explosives 

and weapons through checkpoints, as well as testing whether we 

could enter secured areas through other means. We identified 

vulnerabilities caused by human and technology-based failures. 

Although the results of those tests are classified, I welcome the 

opportunity to brief the Members of this Committee regarding our 

findings in the appropriate closed setting. 

• We have audited and reported on TSA's acquisitions. Our audit 

results show that TSA faces significant challenges in contracting 

for goods and services. Despite spending billions on aviation 

security technology, our testing of certain systems has revealed no 

resulting improvement. 

• We have examined the performance of TSA's workforce, which is 

largely a function of who is hired and how they are trained and 

managed. Our audits have repeatedly found that human erroroften a simple failure to follow protocol-poses significant 

vulnerabilities. 

• We have looked at how TSA plans for, buys, deploys, and 

maintains its equipment and have found challenges at every step 

in the process. These weaknesses have a real and negative impact 

on transportation security as well. 

3 
48 

My testimony today will focus on the vulnerabilities and challenges 

identified by our more recent work on passenger and baggage screening, 

access controls to secured areas, workforce integrity, and TSA's 

operations. 

Passenger and Baggage Screening 

Risk Assessment Rules 

We applaud TSA's efforts to use risk-based passenger screening because 

it allows TSA to focus on high-risk or unknown passengers instead of 

known, vetted passengers who pose less risk to aviation security. 

However, we have deep concerns about some of TSA's decisions about 

this risk. For example, we recently assessed the PreCheck initiative, 

which is used at about 125 airports to identify low-risk passengers for 

expedited airport checkpoint screening. 

Since 2012, TSA has massively increased the use of PreCheck, allowing 

expedited screening for nearly half of the flying public. TSA did so in 

four ways: 

• Granted PreCheck eligibility to other Federal Government-vetted or 

known flying populations, such as those in the CBP Trusted 

Traveler Program. 

• Established and increased the PreCheck application program, 

which requires individualized security threat assessment vetting. 

• Implemented risk assessment rules. 

• Used "managed inclusion" for the general public, allowing random 

passengers access to PreCheck lanes without having assessed their 

risk. 

As a result of our inspection, we concluded that the first two methods are 

sound approaches to increasing the PreCheck population, but the latter 

two create security vulnerabilities. Based on our review, we believe TSA 

needs to modify the initiative's vetting and screening processes. We also 

determined that PreCheck communication and coordination need 

improvement. TSA did not concur with the majority of our 17 

recommendations; we believe this represents TSA's failure to understand 

the gravity of the situation. (Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA 

PreCheck Initiative, (Unclassified Summary) OIG-15-29) 

4 
49 

As an example of PreCheck's vulnerabilities, we recently reported that, 

through risk assessment rules, a felon was granted expedited screening 

through PreCheck. The traveler was a former member of a domestic 

terrorist group and, while a member, was involved in numerous felonious 

criminal activities that led to arrest and conviction. After serving a 

multiple-year sentence, the traveler was released from prison. 

The traveler was sufficiently notorious that a TSO recognized the traveler, 

based on media coverage. In scanning the traveler's boarding pass, the 

TSO received notification that the traveler was PreCheck eligible. The 

TSO, aware of the traveler's disqualifying criminal convictions, notified 

his supervisor who directed him to take no further action and allow the 

traveler to proceed through the PreCheck lane. 

TSA agreed to modify its standard operating procedures to clarify TSOs' 

and supervisory TSOs' authority in referring passengers with PreCheck 

boarding passes to standard screening lanes when they believe it is 

warranted. However, TSA disagreed with our recommendation regarding 

the Secure Flight program. The failure to implement this 

recommendation perpetuates a security vulnerability. (Allegation of 

Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly 

(Redacted/ OIG-15-45) 

We are pleased that bipartisan legislation has been introduced in the 

House of Representatives to address this issue. The legislation, known 

as the Securing Expedited Screening Act (H.R. 2127), would direct the 

TSA to make expedited screening available only to individuals who are 

vetted PreCheck participants and to people TSA identifies as known-risk 

and low-risk, such as those enrolled in CBP's Global Entry program or 

other DHS trusted traveler programs. We support this legislation and 

believe it represents an important step forward in transportation 

security. 

Passenger and Baggage Screening 

Detection of dangerous items on people and in baggage requires reliable 

equipment with effective technology, as well as well-trained and alert 

TSOs who understand and consistently follow established procedures 

and exercise good judgment. We believe there are vulnerabilities in TSA's 

screening operations, caused by a combination of technology failures and 

human error. Since 2004, we have conducted eight covert penetration 

testing audits on passenger and baggage screening operations. Because 

these audits involved covert testing and contain classified or Sensitive 

Security Information, we can only discuss the results in general terms at 

this hearing. However, we have recently briefed Committee staff about 

5 
50 

our testing in the appropriate closed setting, and we are available to brief 

Committee Members at your convenience. 

One penetration testing audit identified vulnerabilities in TSA's use of 

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) equipmentl at domestic airports. 

TSA acknowledged that it could improve operation of new passenger 

screening technologies to prevent individuals with threat objects from 

entering airport secure areas undetected and agreed to take the 

necessary steps to increase AIT's effectiveness. (TSA Penetration Testing 

o[Advanced Imaging Technology (Unclassified Summary}, OIG 12-0Q) 

In September 2014, we reported the classified results of our tests of 

checked baggage screening. We also reported that TSA did not have a 

process to assess the causes of equipment-based test failures or the 

capability to independently evaluate whether deployed explosive 

detection systems were operating at the correct detection standards. 

According to TSA, since 2009, it had spent $540 million for checked 

baggage screening equipment and $11 million for training. Despite that 

investment, TSA had not improved checked baggage screening since our 

2009 report on the same issue. (Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked 

Baggage Screening Operations (Unclassified Summary}, OIG-14-142} 

We have recently completed the fieldwork regarding covert penetration 

testing to evaluate the effectiveness of TSA's Automated Target 

Recognition software2 and checkpoint screener performance in 

identifying and resolving potential security threats at airport 

checkpoints. The specific result of our covert testing, like the testing we 

have done in the past, is classified at the Secret level. We will be issuing 

our final report to the Secretary and Congress in late summer or early 

fall. 

TSA uses layers of security to prevent dangerous items or individuals 

from entering aircraft. In one layer, TSA uses behavior detection officers 

to identify passenger behaviors that may indicate stress, fear, or 

deception. This program, Screening Passengers by Observation 

Techniques (SPOT), includes more than 2,800 employees and has cost 

taxpayers about $878 million from FYs 2007 through 2012. 

1 AIT equipment screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats, including 

weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing, without 

physical contact. 2 Automated Target Recognition software is designed to enhance passenger privacy by 

eliminating passenger-specific images and instead auto-detecting potential threats and 

highlighting their location on a generic outline that is identical for all passengers. 

6 
51 

In 2013, we audited the SPOT program and found that TSA could not 

ensure that passengers were screened objectively. Nor could it show that 

the program was cost effective or merited expansion. Further, in a 

November 2013 report on the program, the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) reported that TSA risked funding activities that had not 

been determined to be effective. Specifically, according to its analysis of 

more than 400 studies, GAO concluded that SPOT program behavioral 

indicators might not be effective in identifying people who might pose a 

risk to aviation security. TSA has taken steps to implement our 

recommendations and improve the program. However, the program 

remains an example of a questionable investment in security. 

(Transportation Security Administration's Screening o[Passengers by 

Observation Techniques (Redacted), OIG-13-91) 

Access Controls to Secure Areas and Workforce Integrity 

Airport employees, as well as unauthorized individuals, entering the 

secure areas of airports, pose a serious potential risk to security. 

Controlling access to secured airport areas is critical to the safety of 

passengers and aircraft. Despite TSA's efforts to ensure only cleared 

individuals enter secure areas, we have identified numerous 

vulnerabilities. 

Airport Badges and Access to Secure Areas 

We recently reported on TSA's controls over the vetting of aviation 

workers who apply for credentials allowing unescorted access to secured 

airport areas. We reviewed TSA's process for vetting workers for terrorist 

links, criminal history, and lawful status. We also sought to determine 

the accuracy and reliability of data TSA uses for vetting. 

We concluded: 

• TSA has multiple, layered controls for vetting workers for 

terrorism, and its process is generally effective. However, TSA 

could not identify all individuals on the Consolidated Terrorist 

Watchlist because current interagency watchlisting policy does not 

authorize TSA to receive all terrorism-related categories of 

information. We identified 73 individuals with possible terrorismrelated information that was not reported to TSA. TSA 

acknowledged that these individuals were cleared for access to 

secure airport areas despite representing a potential security 

threat. 

7 
52 

• TSA lacks effective controls for vetting applicant's criminal history 

and work authorization. TSA relies on individual airports for 

criminal history and work authorization checks. Presently, TSA 

does not have an adequate monitoring process in place to ensure 

that airport operators properly adjudicated credential applicants' 

criminal histories. 

• Moreover, law and FBI policy generally prohibit TSA and the 

airports to conduct recurrent criminal history vetting and rely on 

individuals to self-report disqualifying crimes. TSA is planning a 

pilot program for late 2015 whereby the FBI will begin providing 

automated updated from the FBI for new criminal history matches 

associated with individuals who have undergone prior criminal 

history records checks. 

• With respect to work authorization vetting, TSA data indicates that 

airports may not be consistently verifying that credential 

applicants possess the immigration status necessary to work in the 

u.s. 

• Finally, we identified thousands of aviation worker records that 

appeared to have incomplete or inaccurate biographic information, 

including incomplete names, passport numbers, alien registration 

numbers, Social Security Numbers, and aliases. TSA has taken 

steps to address some of these weaknesses, and enhancements 

should become effective within 2 years. 

(TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting, OIG-15-98) 

The issues that we identified are consistent with prior reports. In 

February 2013, we identified problems with TSA's Aviation Channeling 

Services Provider project, which uses vendors to relay airport badge 

applicants' biographical information and fingerprints to TSA for vetting. 

Because TSA did not properly plan, manage, or implement the project, 

airports nationwide experienced a backlog of background checks. To 

address the backlog, TSA temporarily allowed airports to issue badges 

without the required background checks. Consequently, at least five 

airports granted badges to individuals with criminal records, giving them 

access to secure airport areas. In response to our findings, TSA agreed 

to develop a lessons learned report, establish a policy requiring all 

projects to include a comprehensive plan, communicate customer service 

expectations to vendors and monitor their performance for 

accountability, and require inspectors to review badges issued without 

8 
53 

the required background checks. (Transportation Security 

Administration's Aviation Channeling Services Provider Project, OIG-13-42) 

We also used covert testing to determine whether unauthorized and 

potentially dangerous individuals could gain access to secured airport 

areas. In addition, during this audit, we identified the extent to which 

TSOs, airport employees, aircraft operators, and contractors were 

complying with related Federal aviation security requirements. Our test 

results are classified and cannot be discussed here today, but we can say 

that we identified significant access control vulnerabilities and 

recommended improvements. (Covert Testing o[Access Controls to 

Secured Airport Areas, OIG-12-2§) 

In response to congressional concerns and media reports about missing 

badges, which could allow unauthorized people access to secure airport 

areas, we very recently began a review of TSA's controls over access 

badges. We intend to identify and test TSA's efforts to mitigate the risks 

of unaccounted for, lost, stolen, or terminated airport-issued badges. 

Workforce Integrity 

The integrity of TSA's workforce is also an important factor in the safety 

of our airports, as well as the public's trust in TSA's handling of their 

personal belongings. Although only a small percentage of TSA employees 

have committed crimes or engaged in other egregious misconduct, even a 

few publicized cases of wrongdoing can affect the public's confidence and 

potentially undermine deterrence. 

Some of these crimes are serious. For example, we investigated a TSO 

who conspired with members of the public in a scheme to smuggle 

Brazilian nationals through an international airport. For his role in the 

crime, the TSO was sentenced to 10 months' incarceration, followed by 

36 months of supervised release. 

In another case, a supervisory TSO was convicted for assisting a drug 

trafficking organization responsible for smuggling large quantities of 

narcotics through an airport. With the supervisory TSO's assistance, the 

organization bypassed security with the narcotics and passed them to 

couriers on the secure side of the airport for transport to the United 

States. The TSO was sentenced to 87 months of imprisonment and 2 

years supervised release. 

9 
54 

TSA Operations and Management Oversight 

We have continuing concerns with TSA's stewardship of taxpayer dollars 

spent on aviation security. 

Acquiring and Maintaining Equipment 

Over the years, TSA has made significant investments in acquiring and 

maintaining passenger and baggage screening equipment, including 

Explosives Detection System machines, Explosives Trace Detection 

machines, AIT machines, Bottled Liquid Scanners, x-ray machines, and 

walkthrough metal detectors, yet a series of our audits found issues with 

TSA's acquisition management. 

We conducted an audit of TSA's methods for planning, deploying, and 

using AIT machines at airports. We found that the component did not 

develop a comprehensive deployment strategy for this equipment. TSA 

also did not require program offices to prepare strategic acquisition or 

deployment plans for new technology that aligned with the overall needs 

and goals of its passenger screening program. As a result, despite 

spending approximately $150 million on AIT units, TSA continued to 

screen the majority of passengers with walkthrough metal detectors. 

Without documented, approved, comprehensive plans and accurate data 

on the use of AIT, TSA was unable to effectively deploy this new 

technology where it was needed and, instead, relied on walkthrough 

metal detectors to screen the majority of passengers. By doing so, TSA 

potentially reduced the technology's security benefits and may have 

inefficiently used resources to purchase and deploy the units. 

(Transportation Security Administration's Deployment and Use of 

Advanced Imaging Technology, OIG-13-120) 

Another recent audit revealed that the safety of airline passengers and 

aircraft could be compromised by TSA's inadequate oversight of its 

equipment maintenance contracts. TSA has four maintenance contracts 

valued at about $1.2 billion, which cover both preventive and corrective 

maintenance for airport screening equipment. Because TSA does not 

adequately oversee equipment maintenance, it cannot be assured that 

routine preventive maintenance is performed on thousands of screening 

units or that this equipment is repaired as needed, ready for operational 

use, and operating at its full capacity. In response to our 

recommendations, TSA agreed to develop, implement, and enforce 

policies and procedures to ensure its screening equipment is maintained 

as required and is fully operational while in service. (The Transportation 

Security Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its Airport Screening 

Equipment Maintenance Program, OIG-15-86) 

10 
55 

Use of Criminal Investigators 

Our report on TSA's Office of Inspection provides another example of 

TSA's lack of stewardship of taxpayer dollars. In September 2013, we 

reported that the Office of Inspection did not use its staff and resources 

efficiently to conduct cost-effective inspections, internal reviews, and 

covert testing. The office employed personnel classified as "criminal 

investigators," who received premium pay and other costly benefits, even 

though other employees were able to perform the same work at a 

substantially lower cost. Additionally, the office's quality controls were 

not sufficient to ensure that its work complied with accepted standards, 

that staff members were properly trained, and that its work was 

adequately reviewed. Finally, the office could not always ensure that 

other TSA components took action on its recommendations to improve 

TSA's operations. We estimated that TSA could save as much as $17.5 

million in premium pay over 5 years by reclassifying criminal investigator 

positions to noncriminal investigator positions. 

As a result of our efforts, in February of this year, the House passed the 

TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act (H.R. 719). Among other 

things, this legislation requires TSA to reclassify criminal investigator 

positions in the Office of Inspection as noncriminal investigator positions 

if the individuals in those positions do not, or are not expected to, spend 

an average of at least 50 percent of their time performing criminal 

investigative duties. This legislation is now with the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation. (Transportation Security 

Administration Office o[lnspection's Efforts To Enhance Transportation 

Security, OIG-13-123) 

Cy bersecurity 

We have conducted a number of audits that highlight our concerns about 

TSA's management of its information technology (IT). During onsite 

inspections of IT systems, we found significant, repeated deficiencies in 

IT systems that support TSA's operations. These include insufficient 

physical security and access controls for numerous TSA server rooms 

and communication closets, failure to implement known software 

patches to servers, and other deviations from DHS IT policies and 

procedures. Collectively, these deficiencies place the confidentiality, 

integrity, and availability of TSA's data at risk. We are especially 

concerned that repeated deficiencies mean lessons learned at one airport 

are not being shared with other airports. (Audit of Security Controls [or 

DHS Information Systems at John F. Kennedy International Airport 

(Redacted) (Revised), OIG-15-18; Audit o[Security Controls for DHS 

II 
56 

Information Technology Systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International 

Airport, OIG-14-132; Technical Security Evaluation o[DHS Activities at 

Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport. OIG-13-1 04) 

This month, we will begin an audit to determine whether TSA has 

incorporated adequate IT security controls to ensure that its Security 

Technology Integrated Program (STIP) equipment performs effectively and 

efficiently. STIP combines various technologies to perform passenger and 

baggage screening. Transportation security equipment includes the 

servers, databases, storage devices, and systems used for explosives 

detection, explosive trace detection, advanced X-ray and imaging, and 

credential authentication. We expect to publish our final report on STIP 

security around the end of this year. 

Conclusion 

TSA has taken some steps to implement our recommendations and 

address security vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, some problems appear to 

persist. TSA cannot control all risks to transportation security and 

unexpected threats will arise that will require TSA to improvise, but other 

issues are well within TSA's control. Sound planning and strategies for 

efficiently acquiring, using, and maintaining screening equipment that 

operates at full capacity to detect dangerous items, for example, would go 

a long way toward improving overall operations. Better training and 

better management of TSOs would help mitigate the effects of human 

error that, although never eliminated, can be reduced. Taken together, 

TSA's focus on its management practices and oversight of its technical 

assets and its workforce would help enhance security, as well as 

customer service, for air passengers. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any 

questions you or other Members of the Committee may have. 

12 
57 

Appendix - OIG Reports Referenced in This Testimony 

Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative 

(Redacted/. OIG-15-29, January 2015 

Allegation of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck 

Improperly fOSC File NO. DI-14-3679/, OIG-15-45, March 2015 

TSA Penetration Testing ofAdvanced Imaging Technology (Unclassified 

Summary), OIG 12-06, November 2011 

Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA 's Checked Baggage Screening Operations 

(Unclassified Summary/, OIG-14-142, September 2014 

Transportation Security Administration's Screening of Passengers by 

Observation Techniques (Redacted/, OIG-13-91, May 2013 

TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting, OIG-15-98, June 2015 

Transportation Security Administration's Aviation Channeling Services 

Provider Project,_OIG-13-42, February 2013 

Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas (Unclassified 

Summary), OIG-12-26, January 2012 

Transportation Security Administration's Deployment and Use ofAdvanced 

Imaging Technology,_OIG-13-120, March 2014 

The Transportation Security Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its 

Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program, OIG-15-86, May 2015 

Transportation Security Administration Office o[lnspection's Efforts To 

Enhance Transportation Security. OIG-13-123, September 2013 

Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information at John F. Kennedy 

International Airport (Redacted/ (Revisedi._OIG-15-18, January 16, 2015 

Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at 

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, OIG-14-132, September 2014 

13 
58 

Technical Security Evaluation o[DHS Activities at Hartsfield Jackson 

Atlanta International Airport, OIG-13-104, July 2013 

14 
59 

STATEMENT OF BECKY ROERING 

ASSISTANT FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR- INSPECTIONS 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL 

AFFAIRS 

U.S. SENATE 

CONCERNING 

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION: 

FIRST-HAND AND GOVERNMENT WATCHDOG ACCOUNTS OF AGENCY 

CHALLENGES 

JUNE 9, 2015 
60 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for inviting me here today to discuss important concerns related to the 

Transportation Security Administration and security at our Nation's airports. 

The mission of the Transportation Security Administration is to ensure the freedom 

of movement for people and commerce, which is undeniably a difficult challenge. 

It is also the mission of the TSA to protect the traveling public against terrorist 

attacks. Balancing these two priorities is critical to the success of the Agency. The 

ability ofTSA to execute its mission has been called into question by many 

oversight and watchdog groups. 

My testimony today will focus on a number of the security concerns and agency 

policies that result in vulnerabilities and morale issues across our workforce. 

Leadership 

Over recent years, TSA has hired into leadership positions a number of former 

Airline Executives and others who place more emphasis on Customer Service and 

passenger wait times than on security and detection rates. This is demonstrated by 

the amount of scrutiny that is placed upon wait times by both the Regional Offices 

as well as TSA headquarters. Any wait time that is deemed by the agency as 

excessive requires immediate reporting, a thorough analysis, and corrective action. 

Wait times are tracked daily on a local level and are the first item listed on our 

daily dashboard. Conversely, the local monthly testing of our Transportation 

Security Officers to determine their ability to detect weapons and explosives is not 

associated with any performance metric. When this testing, referred to as the 

Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP), results in a failure to detect the 

item, there is basic remedial training required before the Officer may return to 

duty. A Transportation Security Officer may never be subjected to a covert test, 

either by TSA, OIG, GAO, or other entity, based on the current volume of assigned 

tests each month, limited resources to conduct tests, and the sheer number of 

Security Officers. The lack of realistic testing on a regular basis leads to 

complacency in our workforce. 
61 

It is not until recently, actually within the past few weeks, that detection of 

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) has become a topic of discussion in TSA. 

This is the direct result of covert testing at numerous airports identifYing detection 

rates that caused great concern. I was briefed on the failure rates of a pilot 

program testing effort during in a classified briefing; therefore, I cannot discuss the 

specifics. In the briefing, TSA Leadership recognized that poor detection rates are, 

in part, related to the poor morale that exists across our workforce. 

In addition to the pressure our Transportation Security Officers experience 

regarding wait times, there is also a hesitancy by some officers to resolve alarms 

on passengers which impacts detection rates. From my experience as a TSA 

Training Coordinator as well as the Acting AFSD-Screening for over 6 months, I 

recognize that while the Standard Operating Procedures may instruct TSOs to 

resolve alarms in a certain manner, they may be intimidated or fearful of physical 

contact with sensitive body areas. Again, with negative reports and encounters 

with uncooperative passengers, TSOs may understandably experience a level of 

discomfort when resolving certain alarms. It is important to have active oversight 

by STSOs and Screening Managers to ensure that the SOPs are followed 

consistently. In my limited experience as a role player for these types of ASAP 

tests, I have placed weapon parts in sensitive areas and taped simulated explosives 

in my upper thigh area, and, in each instance, the female TSO did detect the test 

items. Given time, training, and proper oversight, our TSOs will be able to detect 

prohibited items to include IEDs and weapon parts regardless of their location on a 

person or in their property. 

Just last week, after pressure from the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security and subsequent media reports related to the recent covert testing efforts 

and poor detection rates, TSA began a new initiative for Federal Security Directors 

to become actively engaged with our workforce with an emphasis on improving 

morale and increasing detection rates. It is critical to the success of the 

organization and the safety of the traveling public to continue down the path of 

dedicating resources to improve detection rates, and changing the culture so our 

TSOs do not feel pressure to sacrifice security in order to reduce wait times. 
62 

Morale 

The 2014 Federal Viewpoint Survey resulted in the Department of Homeland 

Security receiving among the lowest ratings of any Federal Government agency, 

and the TSA receiving more than their fair share of low marks. The survey 

demonstrated that while our frontline employees feel strongly that the work they 

do is important, they are not valued by leadership. The job of a Transportation 

Security Officer is a challenging one, with a great deal of pressure and scrutiny. 

For example, the expectation is that a TSO working at the Ticket Document Check 

(TDC) position should average 12 13 seconds to process a passenger. That 

involves comparing the photograph on the identification to the passenger, 

scrutinizing the identification for signs of tampering, ensuring the name on the 

boarding pass matches the name on the identification, and finally reviewing the 

boarding pass for several other data points. If a TSO misses a data point, it 

typically results in a disciplinary action, regardless of the circumstances. A culture 

of fear and distrust has been created in the agency, also impacting morale and 

performance of employees. This is clearly documented in the results of the survey. 

Morale has also suffered from the continuous realignment efforts of various 

departments within TSA. Our Behavior Detection Officers, FSD Staff, 

Transportation Security Managers, Federal Air Marshals, and now Transportation 

Security Inspectors have all gone through a realignment process where many 

positions were eliminated and pay bands downgraded. While it is important to 

improve efficiencies, TSA should also review the number of employees at TSA 

Headquarters for potential realignment opportunities, since the important work of 

day to day operations exists in the field rather than the Headquarters buildings. 

PreCheck Risk Assessment Rules 

Equally as troubling are the security gaps associated with the TSA Pre.l®program. 

While a risk based approach to passenger screening is essential, TSA has expanded 

PreCheck to large populations of passengers who have not enrolled in or paid for 

the program. In the fall of2013, I expressed my concerns with the expansion of 

the PreCheck program to my leadership as well as the TSA Office oflnspections. 

I was informed that "I better watch what I said, and that my comments would be 

shared with the Administrator." I later reported the concerns to the Office of 
63 

Special Counsel for investigation. The allegations were substantiated by the 

Department of Homeland Security Inspector General in a report titled Security 

Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck Initiative. 

According to the report, the OIG "determined that providing TSA Pre.!®screening 

to certain passengers using risked-based analysis by TSA's Secure Flight Program 

creates a known aviation security vulnerability," as alleged in my complaint. Even 

after the DHS OIG asked that TSA discontinue the practice, TSA did not comply. 

TSA is handing out PreCheck status like Halloween candy in an effort to expedite 

passengers as quickly as possible, despite the self-admitted security gaps that are 

being created by the process. The TSA Pre.!® enrollment program did not meet 

expectations in terms of volume; therefore, PreCheck rules keep expanding as a 

matter of efficiency even though the agency is well aware of the associated 

security risks. Also acknowledged in the DHS OIG report is that "internal testing 

results reveal that TSA Pre.!® lane threat detection rates need improvement," 

which is further documented in a classified report titled Comparison through 

Testing Detection Rates of TSA Pre ~and Standard Screening Lanes. 

In addition to the passengers who enrolled and paid to participate in the TSA 

Pre.! ®program, TSA has now extended the privilege to wide populations of 

passengers, some based on their affinity to an organization (for example, TSA 

employees with Known Traveler Numbers (KTN)) and others based on a risk 

assessment performed during the Secure Flight system vetting process. From 

personal experience and documented incidents, I know that there are security gaps 

in the Secure Flight system that could be exploited by terrorists. This includes 

processes used to identifY No Fly and Selectee designations in addition to the 

PreCheck passengers. 

Based on the concerns I voiced regarding PreCheck and the associated DHS OIG 

reports, on April30, 2015 The U.S. House ofRepresentatives introduced H.R.2127 

-Securing Expedited Screening Act. The intent of the bill is "To direct the 

Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration to limit access to 

expedited airport security screening at an airport security checkpoint to participants 

of the PreCheck program and other known low-risk passengers." This legislation 

that would prevent TSA from continuing the practice of risk assessment rules to 

assign PreCheck status to passengers. I respectfully encourage your support of the 

bill as it progresses. 
64 

A second method to increase the volume of passengers through the PreCheck lanes 

is Managed Inclusion. There are two forms of Managed Inclusion, which are MI I 

involving the use of Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) teams, and MI 2 involving 

randomly selecting passengers at airport screening checkpoints to use the 

PreCheck lane. By randomly selecting passengers, felons or others with ill intent 

may be permitted to use the PreCheck lane. MI 2 includes some additional 

security procedures for those randomly selected to receive PreCheck privileges, to 

include interaction with the TSA Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) and checks 

for explosives. I have no data to evaluate the effectiveness of detection rates using 

the MI 2 procedure, as there are currently no ASAP protocols designed for that 

specific process, nor are there any methods to validate the effectiveness of the 

techniques used by the BDOs. 

MI 1 includes the PSC teams conducting Real Time Threat Assessments (RTT As) 

and using vapor wake techniques to detect explosives. On several occasions, I 

have monitored the testing of the PSC teams by using decoys with real explosives 

on their person or accessible property to determine the effectiveness of the process. 

In each occasion, the K-9 alerted to the explosive and the item was discovered. 

Also, during a recent discussion with Officers from the Minneapolis Airport Police 

Department, I learned that after the failed attack by the "Underwear Bomber," the 

aircraft involved in the attack was in Minneapolis for maintenance. The Officers 

took this as an opportunity to test the effectiveness of the K-9 teams by walking 

through the aircraft with no knowledge of where the TED had been located. In 

each instance, the K-9 alerted to the exact location or a row adjacent to where the 

Underwear Bomber had been seated. Although even dogs can have a bad day, 

these personal observations as well as feedback from my peers who currently 

manage the PSC program at their airports suggest a higher level of confidence with 

the MI 1 risk based procedures. 

Insider Threat 

As documented in recent reports, the Insider Threat continues to present a security 

concern at our nation's airports. Although some form of screening is conducted on 

cargo that is transported on passenger aircraft, catering supplies, checked baggage, 

and, of course, passengers, there are other airport employees and contractors who 

have access to sterile areas of the airport as well as the aircraft who are subjected 

to only Criminal History Record Checks and Security Threat Assessments. A 

specific group of employees who are typically contractors of the air carriers 

present a known and greater risk, based on my experience. This group has 

unimpeded access to aircraft, and it was discovered that some of these SIDA 
65 

badged employees who had worked at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport later 

traveled to Syria to fight for ISIL. TSA has increased the use of the Playbook team 

with a focus on the Insider Threat, and needs to continue to use a risk based 

approach when determining the best locations to deploy the Playbook teams. 

Recent reports also reveal that airports have exceeded the acceptable percentage of 

unaccounted SIDA identification, and failed to initiate renewal processes for the 

badge holders. TSA is in the process of collecting data to determine the number of 

unaccounted SIDA badges at each of our nation's airports. This data has not been 

provided to the field locations, so I have no information on the unaccountable 

percentages or measures to address this concern. 

As an Assistant Federal Security Director for Inspections, it is my responsibility to 

ensure airports and air carriers are in compliance with the Transportation Security 

Regulations, and if incidents of non-compliance occur, ensure that they are 

documented and corrected. If the issue continues, it is my responsibility to initiate 

progressive enforcement action. I am fortunate that the airports in Minnesota are 

generally very proactive in terms of security; however, based on conversations 

with my peers, many airports and air carriers are not as proactive and consider 

security a "cost of doing business." 

At many locations, and in my experience in the past, the Federal Security Director 

is reluctant to initiate enforcement action against the airport or the air carriers. 

Last week, at a summit with my peers, I learned of several accounts were AFSDs 

were instructed by their FSD not to move forward with enforcement action in fear 

of the impact it may have on the relationship between the TSA and the airport or 

air carrier. A conflict of interest exists when the FSD relies upon the airport and 

air carrier to provide space for passenger and baggage screening, common use 

baggage conveyor systems, queue line space, etc. and on the other hand has overall 

responsibility for execution of the regulatory program. 

Additionally, Transportation Security Inspectors are being used by FSDs to 

perform a wide range of duties not related to their core functions. Such duties 

include conducting Administrative Inquiries of other TSA employees, being 

members of Safety Action Teams, moving bins at the checkpoints, and, perhaps 

most egregiously, conducting quarterly audits of Universal Enrollment Facilities to 

determine such items as whether or not there is hand soap in the restrooms and if 

the staff is friendly. These audits should be done by a Contracting Officer rather 

than Regulatory Inspectors. This would allow TSTs more time to focus on 

ensuring the safety of the traveling public. DHS should reconsider the reporting 
66 

structure for our Transportation Security Inspectors to eliminate any potential 

conflicts, misuse of their time, and potential pressure to use verbal counseling or 

administrative action in lieu of Civil Penalty enforcement actions against the 

airport or air carrier. TSA should consider training our Finance Officers in the 

field as Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs) to oversee the 

numerous contracts that must be monitored. 

Prohibited Personnel Practices 

TSA uses Prohibited Personnel Practices to pressure and even force employees to 

resign when management wants them removed from the agency. When allegations 

of misconduct occur by employees in certain positions, the Federal Security 

Director or other leader must refer the allegations to the TSA Office oflnspection 

(OOI). I have personally experienced and heard of multiple instances when the 

Federal Security Director is selective in terms of which items will be referred to 

OOI, based on their relationship with the individual. If the Office oflnspection 

does investigate, they send Criminal Investigators to conduct investigations of even 

minor administrative matters. The FSD can influence the scope and direction of 

the investigation. During the actual investigation, the OOI teams use heavy 

handed tactics to intimidate the subject as well as witnesses. In my experience, I 

was threatened with Criminal Prosecution, and I was later informed that the OOI 

Investigators told at least one person that they were simply using that tactic in an 

attempt to get me to resign, when they had no evidence to support the allegations. 

They interrogate witnesses, threaten them with polygraph testing, and design 

questions to obtain certain predetermined answers. Witnesses are instructed to say 

whatever they want against the subject, and they will not be held accountable, even 

if they are untruthful in sworn statements. It is a waste of taxpayer dollars to use 

Criminal Investigators to conduct routine administrative investigations and also 

destroys the morale and trust of the workforce. 

Another technique used by TSA Leadership to "get rid" of employees is directed 

reassignments. A number of employees in leadership positions who are 

performing at levels that Achieve Excellence or Exceed Expectations have been 

given a notice of directed reassignment, with no reason or explanation. They are 

informed that if they do not report to the new location, they will no longer be 

employed. This includes employees who have not signed a mobility agreement as 

a condition of employment. Additionally, by TSA Management using disciplinary 

action to correct alleged performance issues, employees are disadvantaged 

financially and it causes distrust in the workplace. 
67 

The practice of using Criminal Investigators to conduct routine administrative 

inquires is a huge waste of taxpayer dollars and causes morale issues in the agency. 

TSA should reduce the Criminal Investigator workforce, re-evaluate the Table of 

Penalties used by the Office of Professional Responsibility, and immediately 

discontinue the use of interrogations during routine inquiries. 

Summary 

I have over 25 years of Federal Government service, starting as a Federal Air 

Marshal with the Federal Aviation Administration Security Division, and later 

serving 2 years in Singapore under the umbrella of the US Embassy. I conducted 

Foreign Airport Assessments in Manila as Ramzi Yousefwas actively plotting to 

blow up several U.S. aircraft departing from Southeast Asia. On the Thursday 

before the tragic events of9/11, two Special Agents from the local Joint Terrorism 

Task Force shared with me a classified document regarding Zacarias Moussaoui, 

who was in custody in Minneapolis. According to the report, jihad was near, and 

Moussaoui was a member of a group planning to fly commercial aircraft into 

buildings, killing thousands. The following Tuesday, that exact thing happened, 

and I vowed to do what I could to ensure it never happens again. This is why I 

voiced my concerns regarding Secure Flight and PreCheck, initially through my 

chain of command and TSA Headquarters, and ultimately the Office of Special 

Counsel. Although the process is time consuming and extremely stressful, I refuse 

to give up until someone forces TSA to address these and other security concerns. 

That is why I agreed to testify today, despite the retaliatory actions that I may face 

by the Agency. 

In conclusion, the culture that exists at TSA is one of fear and distrust. While TSA 

cannot control all the risks associated with aviation security, the Leadership of the 

Agency is certainly in a position to impact change. Better training and 

management of the workforce would result in an improvement to morale as well as 

detection rates. If employees feel valued and respected, the metrics will reflect this 

in a positive way. TSA should eliminate security gaps created by risk assessment 

rules in the Pre .I® program, and DHS should reconsider the reporting structure for 

Inspectors to avoid any conflicts. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any questions 

from you or other Members of the Committee. 
68 

TESTIMONY OF 

ROBERT J. MACLEAN 

Federal Air Marshal 

Office of Law Enforcement 

Federal Air Marshal Service 

U.S. Transportation Security Administration 

Department of Homeland Security 

BEFORE 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Ai1airs 

ON 

"Oversight of the Transportation Security Administration: First-Hand and Government 

Watchdog Accounts of Agency Challenges" 

June 9, 2015 

Washington, DC 
69 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee. It is a pleasure and an honor to appear before you today to speak about the 

serious concerns of dozens of fonner and current Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) who 

cannot risk their privacy or careers by bringing unwanted attention to themselves, and 

trusted me in private with concerns they believe need to be brought to the attention of 

their executive leadership, Congress, and the general public. I relay F AMs' concerns to 

you with great responsibility because I have not flown a single mission in 10 years. 

The Federal Air Marshal Service promotes confidence in the nation's civil 

aviation system through the effective deployment ofF AMs to detect, deter, and defeat 

hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews. 

Federal Air Marshals must operate independently without backup, and rank 

among those federal law enforcement officers that hold the highest standard for handgun 

accuracy. They blend in with passengers and rely on their training, including 

investigative techniques, criminal terrorist behavior recognition, firearms proficiency, 

aircraft specific tactics, and close quarters self-defense measures to protect the flying 

public. 

Federal Air Marshals have an ever expanding role in homeland security and work 

closely with other law enforcement agencies to accomplish their mission. Federal Air 

Marshals are assigned as Assistant Federal Security Directors for Law Enforcement at 

many airports nationwide to provide law enforcement coordination with airport 

stakeholders and other TSA components. Currently, air marshals are also staff several 

positions at different organizations such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the 

National Targeting Center, and on the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation's Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces. In addition, they are distributed among other law enforcement and 

homeland security liaison assignments during times of heightened alert or special 

national events. 

Successful accomplishment of the F AM's mission is critical to civil aviation and 

homeland security. 

Background on my whistleblower case that was decided on by the Supreme Court of the 

United States 

On October 14, 2001, I was appointed into the first Department of Transportation 

I Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Federal Air Marshal (FAM) class of 35 Federal 

Air Marshals (F AMs) to graduate after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Now the air 

marshal program is under the purview of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) I 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) I Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air 

Marshal Service (F AMS). Prior to joining I was a Border Patrol Agent and a Missile and 

Space Systems Specialist in the Air Force. 

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70 

I was removed on April ll, 2006, for the single charge of"Unauthorizcd Release 

of Sensitive Security Information (SSI)." My oral disclosure stemmed from a July 2003 

unsecured, unmarked, unclassified text message sent to all F AMs government issued 

Nokia 3360-instead of to their encrypted $22 million Datamaxx Group Palm Tungsten 

W smartphones - informing all FAMs to immediately cancel hotel reservations and call 

their respective field offices for new schedules. After exhausting "proper channels," I 

chose to make my disclosure to the most reliable, credible, and responsible journalist 

covering TSA and air marshal issues, former MSNBC Chief Washington Correspondent, 

Brock M. Meeks. Mr. Meeks told me he was in touch with bipartisan members of 

Congress such as Representative Hal Rogers (KY), Senator Chuck Schumer (NY), 

then-Senators Hillary Clinton (NY) and John Kerry (MA), and eight others who appeared 

on the public record to protest plans for removal ofF AM protection for all flight missions 

that required a hotel room. All F AMs in the country received the order just two days after 

an emergency training in response to a confirm an Al-Qaeda terrorist group suicidal 

hijacking plan to crash jets into U.S. east coast and European capitals. My disclosure was 

retroactively marked as SSI on August 31, 2006- three years after the fact and four 

months after my removal. Several weeks after my disclosure I co-founded the first 

Federal Air Marshal unit of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association 

(FLEOA). FLEOA is not a bargaining unit nor a union. 

Part of my work with FLEOA was working with the House Committee on the 

Judiciary regarding the unnecessary danger placed on flying F AMs by TSA senior 

executives. Hazards such as mandating F AMs to wear suits and ties on all flights, 

exposing them boarding before the general public, and grouping them into hotels that 

would later advertise on their electronic marque that they had them staying. In 2005, the 

Committee confronted TSA with its findings and the F AMS director later went back into 

retirement. The final report was released to the public in May 2006 and titled, "In Plane 

{sic] Sight: Lack Of Anonymity At The Federal Air Marshal Service Compromises 

Aviation and National Security": 

https://goo.gl/t60Czk 

Affirming two unanimous decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit (Docket No. 2011-3231), on January 21, 2015, the Supreme Court (Docket No. 

13-894) ruled that my disclosure was lawful under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 

1989. Six associate justices joined Chief Justice John Roberts' decision. My case is still 

pending before the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) (Docket No. 

SF-0752-06-0611-M-1) Western Regional Office Administrative Judge. On April 14, 

2015, administrative judge Franklin M. Kang issued an order informing DHS that he may 

not sustain "the sole charge and specification" in his court, and "a continuation of the 

hearing does not appear to be necessary." Afterwards, DHS later unconditionally 

rescinded my removal and retroactively reinstated me. I'm currently in settlement 

negotiations with DHS. 

Introduction 

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It was a sensible reaction to September 11, 2001 attacks to hire thousands of 

Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) and arm pilots to avert more hijackings immediately after 

the 9/11 attacks. Now trying to sustain a permanent tempo of armed F AMs, armed 

transiting non-F AM law enforcement officers, and armed Federal Flight Deck Officers 

(FFDOs) pilots, needs to be reevaluated. Some of the new threats we face may come 

from lone-wolf attackers with suicidal motives, such as the German wings pilot who 

purposely crashed a jet into a mountain. 

It's now time to implement inexpensive, yet highly effective physical security 

measures, then take more Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) out of the screening 

checkpoints and deploy more F AMs on the ground to area familiarize themselves and 

gather human intelligence deep inside the bowels of train stations and airports. 

When a thin-lined aluminum jetliner is 40,000 feet in the sky, zooming 500 miles 

per hour, and crowded with fuel and passengers, flight crews and their passengers are on 

a potential life or death battlefield. Jetliners can become weapons of mass destruction. 

Flying in a commercial jetliner is a very special privilege, not a right, flight crews and 

passengers have a right to use all means necessary to protect their lives. 

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PART I: LATEST EMERGING THREATS TO AVIATION SECURITY 

5 
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1. THREAT: Miniature Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) smuggled 

onto and hidden on aircraft 

REMEDY: Reprioritize Hying-Federal Air Marshal corps resources to for 

more of the following: Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response 

(VIPR) teams with local police to gather more human intelligence, Canine 

IED-sniffteams, and U.S. and overseas RED TEAMS 

Implement and advertise cash and immigration incentives for airport 

workers to report suspicious activity that may save innocent lives 

TSA Pre-Check expansion and implementation of biometric identification systems with it 

TSA Pre-Check program is great program that allows TSA Transportation 

Security Officers (TSOs) to spend more time and resources searching higher threat 

passengers and their luggage. The program should continue to be vastly expanded, and 

improved by incorporating biometric identification systems so that attackers cannot 

circumvent the process. 

TSA must stop charging fees for such an effective program in order to encourage 

more applicants. I would even go so far as to have a mobile application kits for TSA 

officials to roam the airports in order to solicit passengers to apply for free during long 

layovers or delays. 

More participants means less money time wasted searching low-threat passengers. 

Too much focus on firearms- a distraction from looking for IEDs 

Terrorist organizations, plotting mass destruction, are highly unlikely to take the 

risk of smuggling firearms. A terrorist organization with any common sense should have 

very little ambition to sneak fireanns into the cabin. Reasons why: 

Let's say for instance an attacker lucky enough to smuggle a semiautomatic with 

a 13-round magazine with a chambered round for 14 shots: an exceptionally unlikely 

perfect and unhindered shooter will murder 14 passengers. Once that magazine is 

exhausted, the weapon is useless. In comparison, an attacker armed with two 3.99-inch 

no-slip grip-handle blades made from a pair ofTSA-approved scissors can murder a 

significant more amount of passengers as they never become expended like a firearm: 

Sdssors metal with pointed tips and blades shorterrhan 4 inches 

are allowed, but blades longer than 4 inches are prohibited NO 

[ http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/prohibited-items 

6 

OK 
74 

http://www.shopscissors.com/chef-shear-detachable-p-294.html 

Given all of the orifices in a lireann and its ammunition, it is too risky to have the 

gunpowder- [rom the ammunition- being traced by TSA officers and their machines 

in security. A specially made lED will most likely be hermetically scaled, more easily 

undetectable, and much more deadly. 

A terrorist may be able to kill a handful of passengers until either he runs out of 

ammunition or is tackled by passengers who finally realized there were no law 

enforcement officers on the flight, another reason why we need a '·hero passenger 

depulization and indemnification" law (SEE THREAT #8). 

Suicide mission not necessary with current smartphone technology 

With a smuggled IED and a smartphone, the need for a suicidal mission with a 

firearm is almost nonexistent To give you an idea of how easy it is to use solid state 

digital devices to detonate an in-flight JED, the 20-year old Bojinka cross-Pacific Ocean 

commercial airliners plot was going to have IEDs detonated with common light-emitting 

diode alarm wrist watches. 

Today, an attacker can smuggle on an lED and its state-of-the-art 

delay-programed smartphone detonator, hide it, disembark, and have it explode during 

another flight where the attacker is safe and far away. 

Uniformed VIPR teams with local police as members 

Like very traditional yet very effective police foot-patrols, more FAMs arc needed 

on the ground, TSOs should spend less time searching every single passenger, and 

together roam individually or in teams around airport and train station properties getting 

familiarized with the routine operations and workers. This is where I believe uniformed 

VIPR teams can be very effective in area familiarization deep inside airports and train 

7 
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stations, and developing rapport with transportation private sector and government 

workers. 

Having local police officers on these teams will great increase their effectiveness 

because they act as ambassadors for their own departments. A concern relayed to me is 

VIPR teams run into chest-thumping turf wars with local authorities. Such a harmonious 

federal/local police team-relationship further helps with that essential need to build 

rapport with the local everyday workers and authorities. 

It's extremely important that VIPR members have very congenial and easygoing 

personalities to build trusting and long relationships with workers and authorities. 

Overseas RED TEAMS with canine TED-sniffers 

More RED TEAM operations both in the U.S. and abroad are needed for advance 

searches ofU.S.-flagged aircraft that overnight in foreign countries. These undercover 

Top Secret operatives are experienced f1ying F AMs who are highly trained in TED 

detection and disposal, and know how to test the efficiency and integrity of airport 

security. These teams should only report to the highest authorities. 

RED TEAMS are needed in foreign countries where U.S.-flagged aircraft fly in 

and out of. The Christmas "Shoe Bomber" (200 l) and "Underwear Bomber" (2009) came 

from Europe. RED TEAMS can spot and secondary suspicious passengers for more 

thorough searches. They also can search and snift'U.S. aircraft. 

We cannot totally rely on foreign countries, especially third world, to conduct 

security for our aircraft due to corruption. I had foreign agent ask me to smuggle 

handguns into his country where they are strictly forbidden. 

F AMs tell me that the foreign authorities routinely love to parade them in front of 

the general public and it makes their missions unbearable. Ambassador-like overseas 

RED TEAMS may be able to smooth over such a situation. 

Vendors terminal passenger-boarding areas 

Megatons of cargo not screened goes into the passenger boarding areas, i.e., 

magazine and newspaper stack-bundles, neck-pillows, food, beverage, condiments, 

cooking oil, cleaning products, etc. 

Cash and immigration incentives for airport workers to report suspicious activity 

Most of the people who work deep in the bowels of airports are immigrants. For 

many, money is not much of a motivator for them, but family unity and love is. The "If 

You See Something, Say SomethingTM" campaign ( 

http://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something 

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76 

] should clearly tell them the U.S. Government will immigrate their loved ones to the 

U.S. for stopping a commercial jet from becoming a weapon of mass destruction. 

Cash motivates some people more than ethics or patriotism. The "If You See 

Something, Say SomethingTM" campaign should clearly tell people that million-dollar 

awards are available to you for not causing the aviation security domain to collapse again 

like it did on 9/11/2001. 

Suicide v. non-suicidal lED missions 

In most of the F AMs' -who speak with me -opinions, a non-suicidal IED 

smuggler is more likely than a suicidal one, as many potential attackers may not want to 

end up in solitary confinement for the rest of their natural life like failed suicidal lED 

smuggler-terrorists Richard Reid, AKA: "The Shoe Bomber" of the 2001 Christmas 

Day-minus 3 U.S.-flagged American Airlines Flight 63, and Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab, AKA: "The Underwear Bomber" of the 2009 Christmas Day 

U.S.-flagged Northwest Airlines Flight 253. Another motivator to smuggle, hide, and 

escape from in-flight IEDs is because the vast majority may not want to die a horrible 

death. 

This probability is good news as lED-sniff canine teams, VIPR teams, and 

U.S./overseas RED TEAMS may be able to search, discover, and successfully neutralize 

hidden IEDs with delay-switches to be detonated by terrorists who wish to live and kill 

again. 

2. THREAT: Large IEDs in carry-on luggage detonated in crowded 

checkpoint waiting lines. 

REMEDY: Vehicle checkpoints located at airport entrances; reprioritize 

resources to search for IEDs; human intelligence; Canine lED-sniff teams; 

Cash and immigration award incentives 

It's extremely easy to pack a large carry-on luggage, wait in a crowded 

checkpoint line, walk away the luggage, and safely detonate it seconds later. 

This is a very enlightening article about exploding an lED in a crowd of 

passengers waiting to be screened at Denver International Airport's single-central 

security screening area-- much like Washington-Dulles (lAD). Former FAM, former 

U.S. Army commission officer Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran, and former police 

Special Weapons & Tactics (SWAT) operator, Jeffrey Denning, wrote this. Mr. Denning 

discusses how TSA's policies arc a danger to aviation security on the ground: 

http:l/jeffreydenning.blogspot.com/2009/09/terrorist-plot-prediction-airports-are.ht 

ml 

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F AMs would be more of a deterrent and effective by proactively stopping 

vehicles and handling canine lED-sniffers than seated for thousands of hours in an airline 

chair waiting for the attacker with a firearm or knife. 

3. THREAT: Suicidal or homicidal lone-wolf attackers or organizational 

terrorists infiltrating government or private sector transportation 

companies through employment. 

REMEDY: Human and technological intelligence gathered by law 

enforcement. Flight deck controls and door override from ground-control. 

This is obviously a potential problem given the rogue employees willing use their 

position for personal gain. An example was the group of former Houston F AMs who 

were arrested smuggling cocaine during missions. [ 

http: 1/www. ch ron. com/news/houston-texas/a rticle/2-ex -air-marshals-sent -to-priso 

n-for-cocaine-1863569.php ] 

Flight deck controls and door override from ground-control 

We will never know what truly was happening in the mind of the suicidal pilot 

who murdered 149 passengers by crashing Germanwings Flight 9525 Airbus A320-200 

into the side of a mountain. It's impossible to read a mind, but a pattern of email, cellular, 

and/or social media communications may early detect an attacker's intentions. This is an 

argument for the Intelligence Community to responsibly analyze such digital chatter. 

Another approach is to use a remote system override in which ground-control can 

lock or unlock a flight deck door, and also to take control of the aircraft until the threat 

from a pilot or flight attendant is over. F AMs tell me they are concerned that an attacker 

can force a flight attendant to unlock a flight deck door. 

4. THREAT: Attacker dives into flight deck after unlocked to serve pilots or 

when pilots need to use the lavatory 

REMEDY: Secondary barrier gates installed in front galleys to protect the 

flight decks of all commercial aircraft. 

These lightweight and inexpensive secondary barrier systems should be installed 

on all aircraft to prevent an intruder from entering the front galley when the flight deck 

door is opened during flight. I initially saw these ingenious devices in operation on 

United Airlines Premium Service Boeing 757 aircraft providing service between Los 

Angeles International (LAX) and San Francisco International (SFO), and New York JFK. 

The device consists of a set of approximately a dozen 1/4'' thick horizontal cables 

that quickly stretch across the entry point into the front galley. The device allows the 

pilots and/or flight crew enough time to secure the flight deck before a possible breach. 

10 
78 

Every time a pilot has to open the flight deck door for food, drink, or use the 

lavatory, he/she risks a hijacker diving inside and recklessly taking control of the aircraft. 

Sometimes a flight attendant will take a drink-cart and set up a blockade of the forward 

area. but amped-up suicidal hijackers will just dive over unafraid of injury or death. It is 

worth noting that Southwest Airlines does not equip its aircraft with drink-carts. 

My sources tell me that they hardly ever see these very effective cable devices on 

aircraft they f1y on. 

Here is a link to a "white paper" drafted by the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) 

describing the cable secondary barrier system and recommending every aircraft be 

installed with one of them: 

http://www.alpa.org/-/media/ALPA/Files/pdfs/news-events/white-papers/seconda 

ry-barriers.pdf 

5. THREAT: In-flight knife attacker 

REMEDY: Equip every cabin with electric Taser devices, beanbag guns, 

and other non-lethal tools and assign FAMs to train flight crew members 

with in order to subdue attackers and defend the flight deck; equip cabin 

with loud high-pitched alarms; give flight deck the ability to turn off all 

lights; give flight deck the availability to depressurize the cabin 

If I am a lone-wolf suicidal terrorist and wanted to create chaos on a plane or 

force it down into the ground, I would take steroids, pump iron nonstop, book a seat in 

first class, and board a flight with a pair ofTSA-approved scissors (SEE THREAT #1) 

Electrical Taser projectile weapons, rubber-bullet, and/or beanbag guns- such as 

the equipment used in prisons can be secured in the front galley area in the case the 

super-strength knife-wielding attacker tries slashing his way into the flight deck. The 

non-lethal weapons can be used by the flight crew or deputized passengers (SEE 

THREAT #7), and can be unlocked with a combination code for subsequent use. In the 

rare case of having a F AM team, it is dangerous have F AMs leave the "Place of 

Dominance" near the flight deck and walk toward the back of the aircraft, subjecting 

themselves to an ambush, and having their fireanns and ammunition taken away from 

them. 

The flight deck should have the capability to completely shut otT all lights in the 

cabin to make it more difficult for attackers to cause more chaos. 

Install very loud and high-pitched alarms and blinding strobe-lights in the cabin 

that can be turned on in order to disorient attackers or make it more difficult to 

communicate with other attackers. 

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The Captain and his First Officer can don oxygen masks and depressurize the 

aircraft by engaging circuit breakers located inside the flight deck. The lack of oxygen 

will most likely cause the terrorists to lose consciousness first as their adrenaline, 

breathing, and heart rates will be maximized as they carry out a suicide mission. There is 

the possibility that sick, elderly, or infant passengers may be left with long-term problems 

or death, but it is better than a gunfight between terrorists and law enforcement officers 

mid-flight, and/or an entire aircraft being used as another dangerous September II, 200 I 

attacks missile. 

6. THREAT: The flight deck can be penetrated, pilots attacked, and aircraft 

commandeered. 

REMEDY: Equip every flight deck with specially modified firearms 

Every flight deck should be equipped with a pre-loaded shotgun and 12-guage 

small-diameter pellet ammunition. The shotgun should be a modified pistol-gripped 

12-guage shotgun with a shortened barrel. The 12-guage shotgun rounds should be 

comprised of small-diameter pellets. At close-contact range, birds hot can quickly 

neutralize someone trying to penetrate the flight deck. A close-contact shot can 

neutralize an intruder's head, heart, and/or remove a limb; a miss or partial miss will only 

send birdshot pellets harmlessly down the aircraft as opposed to the .40 caliber or Sig 

Sauer .357 ballistic rounds used by FFDOs and FAMs respectively. The shotgun should 

be secured with an electrical quick-release solenoid mechanism similar to the ones used 

in standard police patrol vehicles. A remote button or switch for the shotgun rack lock 

bracket can be located in a position only accessible to the Captain or First Officer. 

Armed pilots are not allowed to can')' their pistols on international flights due to 

very restrictive handgun laws, but a shotgun modified to stop one or two attackers from 

one foot away would be inane for a host country to deny, and risk another 9/11-style 

attack. 

During my tenure as a U.S. Air Force Missiles & Space Systems specialist for 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, shotgun and pellet ammunition systems were stored 

inside the missile silos to counter a possible attack. The shotguns would be used to 

defend the missiles from the attack because their pellets would not penetrate the skin of 

the missile and possibly ignite the rocket propellant and cause a disaster. 

F AMs can provide an eight-hour or shorter course for pilots on how to 

ammunition-check, chamber, disengage safety, and fire the pump-action shotguns. 

Russia-flagged commercial airliners have a firearm in every flight deck. 

7. THREAT: Highly trained F AMs sitting in chairs waiting for a gun or 

knife attacker is a waste of valuable resources. 

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REMEDY: Air Marshal program should spend the vast majority of 

resources on training flight crews to neutralize critical incidents and local 

and federal law enforcement officers to be reserve/augmentee F AMs; 

Consideration for the Air Marshal program to be placed under the purview 

ofDHS Customs & Border Protection which already has infrastructure 

and management in every international airport 

Streamline the F AMS into a rapid response force; and a training program for 

flight crewmembers and a reserve/augmentee air marshal program available to all federal 

AND LOCAL law enforcement officers. 

Very few sharp, ambitious, and aggressive young adults aspire to sit in a chair for 

25 years as an anti-terrorist law enforcement officer. I knew I would not want to do that, 

and the weeks after the 9111 attacks FAA senior executives told me and other F AM 

applicants there's no way it would expect us to be flying FAMs 90% of our law 

enforcement careers. Prior to the attacks FAA F AMs spent more time training, and 

investigating potential aviation safety security problems than flying. 

Flying air marshal duties should have been a temporary detail, not a law 

enforcement career: I) The job is extremely boring and uneventful thus making F AMs 

lose motivation and becoming too complacent 2) The duty requiring F AMs to constantly 

sit idle is hard on a F AM's health 3) The constant change in time zones causes jet-lag 

which makes F AMs less effective. 

A federal or local law enforcement officer should be able to apply for a one-year 

or longer temporary detail, attend a training course, finish the detail, and return to his/her 

prior position. The F AM overseen by the TSA should be a smaller more mobile force 

that only flies missions on genuine high threat flights, similar to the local police SWAT 

teams: F AMs should be tactically deployed on specifically threatened flights, not 

strategically scheduled on a large category of routes and cities threatened. 

Suicidal hijackers train everyday for their single moment to simply disarm one 

armed passenger mid-flight; it is only a matter of time before a hijacker rushes a flight 

deck when its door opens mid-flight; or before a jet-lagged and unbeknownst seated 

F AM -experiencing inevitable complacency in his mundane profession is 

ambushed, disarmed, and his/her weapon is used cause deadly chaos. F AMs experienced 

tremendous boredom and jet-lag, a dangerous combination. Many other dangers exists 

associated with traveling non-FAM armed law enforcement officers, such as not being in 

communication with FA Ms. 

Unruly passengers who do not endanger the flight deck 

In a potential terrorist ruse, the routine of responding to unruly passengers 

encourages eager F AMs to impulsively engage a covert terrorist in a remote portion of an 

aircraft, come under attack, become disarmed, and a victim. The TSA SV Pay Band 

system encourages such impulsiveness because a young and eager F AM may fly 

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81 

hundreds of missions without incident and is overly committed to finally getting a within 

SV Pay Band increase. If everyone expects the F AMs- not the passengers- to subdue 

unruly passengers with non-lethal force, the attacker may make his way to the flight deck. 

If a group of would-be attackers want to create a ruse to compel a F AM toward the back 

of the plane, they just need to act like unruly passengers to compel a FAM to walk into 

their trap and take his/her handgun away. FAMs do not lock-up their handguns 

someplace in the front of the plane before proceeding to subdue an unruly passenger. 

Despite risking punishment, poor evaluations, and/or getting black-balled from ground 

assignments, it is certain that some FAMs have the common sense to not follow this 

ridiculous expectation; but given the fact that F AMs are under a "Pay for Performance" 

(PFP) compensation plan, in a job they almost never effect arrests or conduct 

investigations, and they are trained to use these non-lethal force tools-- the temptation to 

finally get that increase in pay may override any common sense for an officer waiting 

months or years to finally make an arrest. 

SV Pay Banding system is counterproductive to the F AM team thwarting threats to 

aviation 

F AMs have a very single-dimensional job. F AMs cannot compete for PFP when 

they very rarely generate investigations or effect arrests. PFP has turned F AMs against 

each other by them filing complaints on each other for frivolous violations such as 

showing up the airport late, accidentally nodding off during the flight, flirting with a 

flight attendant, or getting into a disagreement with an airline employee, etc. F AMs are 

supposed to rely on each other in a team environment, but given their uneventful duties, 

they arc only able to out-shine someone else who has petty complaints on file- this 

effectively disrupts the "warrior team spirit" and endangers public and national security. 

F AMs tell me that "F AM on FAM backstabbing" is pervasive given the fact that many of 

the new recruits being hired have no military or law enforcement experience. 

New F AM recruits need more real-world experience 

New FAM hires should have at least five years or more of combat military or law 

enforcement experience given they will rarely make arrests. A FAM recruit cannot have 

field training unit experience in this position like a municipal police officer trainee does. 

A municipal local police trainee rides with a highly experienced senior police officer 

effecting arrests all day and night long. 99% of senior FAMs have never made an arrest 

asaFAM. 

Consideration of placing air marshal program under DHS Customs & Border Protection 

The most common suggestion from F AMs is to get them out from under the 

purview of a regulatory and screening agency, TSA, and place them in a pure law 

enforcement agency that gathers intelligence and enforces the law, DHS Customs & 

Border Protection (CBP). CBP already has management and infrastructure in every 

international airport. This would also give F AMs more motivation with new diverse 

duties, instead of just sitting in a chair waiting for something to finally happen after 

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hundreds of uneventful flights. F AMs can train federal and local law enforcement 

officers to be surge-augmentee reserve air marshals in order to respond to specific threats, 

and then they go back to their departments to resume their primary duties. Other F AMs 

can resume high-threat international routes, be aviation security liaisons stationed 

overseas, become FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, or be on VIPR and RED 

teams. Such a change would not only involve F AMs in proactive intelligence and law 

enforcement programs, but would save taxpayers millions. 

8. THREAT: Passengers do not attempt to restrain unruly or deadly 

passenger inflight incidents as they are conditioned to believe flight crews 

or F AMs have to respond or they're concerned about civil and criminal 

liability 

REMEDY: Congress and the President should pass and well publicize a 

Jaw that gives flight crews and law enforcement officers the authority to 

deputize general passengers as Federal Air Marshals; equip every aircraft 

with non-lethal restraining devices; no one in the aircraft should know 

F AMs or any other law enforcement officers are on board, with the 

exception of the Captain or ground control. 

Hero passenger deputization indemnification law 

An unarmed 100 lbs t1ight attendant will not restrain a 250 lbs angry drunk or 

amped-up suicidal attacker. Due to a potential attacker's ruse, FAMs should no longer 

risk an ambush and endanger the public by walking deep into a cabin -away from the 

flight deck- to subdue unruly passengers. The routine of responding to unruly 

passengers encourages F AMs to become distracted away from the flight deck. The law 

needs to specifically declare that deputized passenger will be exempt from prosecution 

and civil liability. The flight crew can arm a deputized passenger or a group of deputized 

passengers with a Taser device, a non-lethal firearm, duct-tape, and/or restraints that 

should be standard equipment on every aircraft. 

TSA Pre-Check should be used to select and screen able-bodied passengers who 

are willing to volunteer restraining unruly passengers. When a situation begins, 

ground-control can tell the flight deck if any Pre-Check-vetted passengers are on board 

and willing to restrain unruly passengers. 

Such a law needs to be well publicized so that terrorists know F AMs will never 

leave the flight deck unprotected. The flying public also needs to know they may not be 

brought on criminal charges or held civilly liable for seriously injuring or killing a 

passenger. 

When I participated in F AM training, we routinely had training scenarios with 

role-players. In scenarios in which the flight crew asked me to respond to an unruly 

passenger near the back of the plane: I did not want to endanger myself and the rest of the 

passengers and subject myself or my team to an ambush during a potential terrorists' 

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ruse, I would then deputize several passengers, and give them my hand-cuffs to subdue 

the unruly passenger themselves while I remain close to the flight deck. I never failed 

these training scenarios using this technique. It would be deemed illegal for me to 

deputize passengers although it was the safest action to take. 

This incident involved a delusional person who concerned passengers accidentally 

killed as he tried to break down the t1ight deck door. The deceased's family sued the 

passengers, but the lawsuits were dismissed in light after the September 11, 2001 attacks: 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan Burton 

Articles about U.S. FAMs exposing themselves mid-t1ight to unruly passengers as recent 

as last year: 

http://www.csnphilly.com/article/unruly-passenger-threatens-air-marshal-flight-offi 

cials 

http://www. fbi. gov /boston/press-releases/20 15/haitian-national-sentenced-for -dis r 

upting-transatlantic-flight 

http://www. komonews. com/news/12934217. html 

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0.2933.45298.00.html 

http://www. cnn. com/2006/U S/ 12/28/u n ruly. passenger /index. html 

http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/06/19/tsa.drunk.passenger/index.html 

http://www .wtvynews4 .com/news/headlines/561 017. html 

No one in the aircraft should know FAMs or any other law enforcement officers are on 

board, with the exception of the Captain or U.S. 2round control 

F AMs and law enforcement officers need to stop being required to informing 

non-essential personnel who they are, only the Captain or U.S. ground control should 

know. 

An attacker can either view the identification procedure and ambush the F AMs or 

other law enforcement officers, or the attacker can threaten the life of a flight crew 

member to identifY them. 

F AMs and law enforcement officers should always be allowed to remain 

unidentified and board along with the passengers. F AMs in the waiting/boarding area 

may be able to spot suspicious activity before boarding and or take-off. 

9. THREAT: Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge impostors 

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REMEDY: Implement biometric systems to positively identify holders; 

notify all employees of problem or former employees denied access to 

sensitive areas 

When I managed the Border Patrol San Clemente, CA station northbound 

Interstate 5 Pre-enrolled Access Lane program Gust like the Custom and Border 

Protection's SENTRI program at land-port entries). we not only issued applicants lD 

cards, but we registered applicants into an electronic fingerprint-reader and palm-reader 

machine databases. We were using this technology over 15 years ago, so I'm cet1ain it 

has vastly improved since the 9/11 attacks. When someone quits or gets tired, all you do 

is click a button to deny access. 

TSOs and F AMs need to be quickly informed about TSA employees being denied 

access to the field oftice or airport sterile areas. It is a problem when a distraught. 

disgruntled. and rogue TSA employee goes unnoticed in a sensitive area. 

10. THREAT: "Passenger 57" movie scenario with multiple armed hijackers 

REMEDY: The pilots in the flight deck can depressurize the cabin until 

the flight crew and passengers can take control again 

In the exceptional odds of this fictional movie scenario in which a terrorist team 

enters the aircraft with a large cache of weapons, see THREAT #5. 

Conclusion with regards to aviation security threats 

In light of the December 22. 2001 Richard Reid IED attack on American Airlines 

63, the Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attack on Northwest t1ight 253, and terrorists' 

evolving ability to assemble miniature IEDs remotely detonated with existing handheld 

mobile technology, it is dangerous to not implement these relatively inexpensive but 

highly effective physical security measures, and put more F AMs on the ground to prevent 

hijackers and IEDs from boarding aircraft, instead of deploying jet-lagged F AMs to 

dangerously sit and wait for hijackers to attack and/or discover an in-flight lED 

mid-flight- when it's too late. A team of bored and sleepy FAMs sitting on one plane 

waiting for something to happen is a waste of great resources, and dangerous with current 

policies. More VIPR teams need to be deployed deep inside airports familiarizing 

themselves with the daily activity and gathering human intelligence. FAMs need to be on 

the ground in VIPR and U.S./overseas RED TEAMS proactively gathering and analyzing 

intelligence, conducting behavior detection, investigating leads, interviewing informants, 

and building casework that could save us from another 9/11. 

Flight crews and passengers are mostly all alone high in the sky. They need to 

protect themselves and their flights, and the airlines and our government should seriously 

consider giving them indemnity laws, equipment, and training to stay alive. Flying 

commercial jetliners is not a right, but an EXCEPTIONALLY SPECIAL privilege: 

17 
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https :1/youtu. be/uEY 58fiS K8E 

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PART II: PERSONNEL ISSUES THAT EFFECT AVIATION SECURITY 

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A. PROBLEM: Potential whistleblowers lack of confidence in the overburdened 

U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and its administrative judges. 

REMEDY: One option: Pass a law that allows non-Intelligence Community 

whistleblo\vers to try their cases before aU .S. District Court jury. 

Right now only the MSPB can review and rule on a federal whistle blower reprisal 

claim. This mean that only three to four administrative judges and full Board Members 

review a claim. One of these administrative judges is an executive agency middle 

manager, and the other two or three of the full Board Members are political appointees 

with term limits. 

A U.S. District judge's salary is significantly more than an MSPB administrative 

judge or full Board Member, and is nominated by the U.S. President and confirmed by 

the U.S. Senate for life. Removing a U.S. District judge is the same process for removing 

the U.S. President: impeachment by the U.S. House of Representatives, and removal by 

the U.S. Senate. 

The benefits derived by the federal government from whistleblower disclosures 

are measured in the billions of dollars and in other unmeasured benefits such as public 

safety. If a case goes to trial, there is the potential for a jury of taxpayers to determine that 

someone is a whistleblower or not. The MSPB does not have the resources or political 

independence to provide timely justice in cases where the Whistleblower Protection Act 

is needed most. In my own case, I would have won in 2009 instead of2015 ifl had the 

right to seek justice from a jury of taxpaying citizens who enjoy the privilege of flying on 

commercial jetliners. I risked my professional life to protect a common juror. This would 

have saved me some five and a half years of unnecessary emotional pain and financial 

desperation. As long as remedies are restricted to the administrative law system, the 

Whistleblower Protection Act will not be a factor when the country needs it most. 

Federal Aviation Administration whistleblower Kimberly Farrington is has been 

waiting 18 months for her MSPB administrative judge to issue a decision after two 

remands from the full MSPB panel in it's Washington DC. Ms. Farrington made her 

whistleblower disclosures over 12 years ago. [ 

http//www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber-736583&version-73 

9180&application=ACROBAT] 

Federal whistleblower and retired U.S. Park Police Chief Teresa Chambers made 

two trips to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and three trips to the full 

MSPB Board in Washington DC in order to prevail after eight years. [ 

http://www. mspb .gov/netsearch/viewdocs .aspx?docnumber-566514&version-56 

8178&applic:;ation=ACROBAT] 

20 
88 

I can be a W-2 employee in a restaurant and report the owner for endangering 

public safety using spoiled meat to save on costs. If I'm terminated, laws would allow me 

access to a jury. 

Federal laws and the U.S. Constitution allow jury access all corporate, and local 

and state civil services workers except the federal workforce both inside and outside of 

The Intelligence Community. A front-line non-Intelligence Community U.S. Customs & 

Border Protection Officer, who inspects cargo ships for nuclear devices, to a CIA 

Clandestine Services Operations Officer has no access to a jury. 

Civil servant jury trials in cases involving classified information 

If the unauthorized disclosure of SECRET or TOP SECRET classified 

information is a concern, a military-type courts-marshal should be established with jury 

members existing of agency peers who have security clearances. A presiding judge can 

be a senior executive, also with a security clearance, from an agency outside of the 

whistleblower' s. 

B. PROBLEM: The career senior executives rely too much on the TSA Chief 

Counsel and the political appointees for decisions on whistleblower reprisal. 

REMEDY: Career senior executives would act with more independence if 

whistleblowcrs had access to jury trials; career senior executives need to be 

somewhat more independent of the TSA Office of Chief Counsel and political 

appointees. 

After I told internal affairs agents and my deciding official that I was the source 

of the July 2003 disclosure, had no remorse, and would do it again, my deciding official, 

the Office of Professional Responsibility, nor TSA headquarters took any action against 

me for almost five months. Years later, the TSA Chief Counsel's office would argue that 

my disclosure was reckless, and I endangered countless lives and national security. 

For almost five months, my deciding official chose not limit or suspend my access 

to classified information or my duties. He made no attempt to revoke my badge, 

credentials, or firearm. He would later testify that he suspected I was a protected 

whistleblower, but he needed the TSA Chief Counsel to make such a decision for him. 

If your children's babysitter admitted to you that he molested children in the past, 

had no remorse, and would do it over and over again, would you let him continue to 

babysit for another five months while you consulted with your attorneys? No, you 

wouldn't. 

My deciding official knew in fact I was a protected whistleblower who acted 

lawfully, even going so far to declare I was an "exemplary" Federal Air MarshaL 

Unfortunately, he was under extreme pressure by the embarrassed political appointees not 

to ignore their orders. After he testified in his deposition that I "didn't cause any 

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89 

problems," "continued on doing the good work that [I] had been doing," "didn't cause 

any trouble," and suspected I should be protected, he got demoted twice into a 

non-supervisory position outside of the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

The former Federal Air Marshal Service Director in office when I won my two 

unanimous U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decisions- recently contacted 

me to say he was not consulted about whether or not to file the TSA's subsequent losing 

appeals. In 20 l 0, this director made a sincere effort to have me reinstated, but was 

overruled by the TSA Office of Chief Counsel. 

C. PROBLEM: The vast majority of Federal Air Marshals do not need expensive 

and time-consuming TOP SECRET security clearances. 

REMEDY: Require only U.S. Office of Personnel Management suitability 

certifications like Customs & Border Protection Of1icers and Border Patrol 

Agents have. 

The entire time I was a FAM, I never saw a SECRET or TOP SECRET document 

or eoversheet, nor did any F AMs tell me that they saw one except for some very rare 

occasions. I'm told by current F AMs that this is still the case, but that a few office-based 

Supervisory F AMs or acting Supervisory F AMs have access to classified material. 

A Border Patrol Agent has access to land border sensor maps to give easy passage 

for drug smugglers, terrorists, and nuclear devices. A Customs & Border Protection 

Officer or can turn a blind-eye to a large shipment of illegal narcotics or a container with 

a nuclear device, yet neither are not required to even possess a SECRET security 

clearance. 

The consensus is that the TOP SECRET security clearance is an easy way to fire 

whistle blowers. A security clearance determination has no judicial review [ 

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/484/518/case. html ] 

Former Los Angeles Federal Air Marshal Manuel "Manny" V. Alcaraz had an 

honorable and unblemished law enforcement record, and was beloved by his fellow 

coworkers. Unfortunately F AM Alcaraz angered his managers by requesting a written 

policy regarding a mandate to cover his visible, uncontroversial tattoos while he was 

detailed to conduct recurring training for other F AMs. Before being hired, F AM Alcaraz 

already had visible tattoos in which he disclosed during his application process and his 

medical entrance exam. F AM Alcaraz subsequently resigned as a trainer, causing other 

trainers to resign in protest. F AM Alcaraz was later accused by his managers of lying to 

local police. TSA investigators, and a TSA polygraph examiner about an incident in 

which a woman reported to police he "hit" her arm after "stealing [her) mall parking 

space" on the Saturday afternoon before Christmas Day 2007. In the local police and 

TSA reports of investigation, the woman changed her story to F AM Alcaraz "slapping" 

her arm to "pushing" on her arm. Local police did not obtain a warrant or arrest FAM 

Alcaraz, but TSA assigned two Office of Inspection Criminal Investigators to investigate. 

22 
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The TSA investigators interviewed the woman's son and only one of the two third party 

witnesses present who stated that F AM Alcaraz "pushed" on her arm. I later interviewed 

that third party witness and he stated that he no longer believed F AM Alcaraz touched the 

woman. TSA revoked F AM Alcaraz' security clearance due to "lack of candor," and 

subsequently fired him for no longer having a clearance. The MSPB refused to consider 

the merits of the case due to Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 

In an attempt to cross-examine the accuser to present new evidence for TSA to 

reconsider, Mr. Alcaraz for years successfully fought his case and prevailed in a Fourth 

District Court of Appeal of California as his accuser attempted to avoid 

cross-examination by invoking state Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation 

(Anti-SLAPP) laws. But after becoming indigent, unable to find work, and spending tens 

of thousands in attorney fees, Mr. Alcaraz lost hope and could not afford a state jury trial 

to simply cross examine the woman who ended his perfect 14-year law enforcement 

career. 

This case broke my heart, being one of the worst injustices done to an honorable 

law enforcement officer. This was a clear case of the security clearance revocation 

process being abused to settle a petty score: 

"The victim told police she was waiting for a spot in the JC Penney parking 

structure when a man driving a Toyota pickup truck swooped in and stole her 

spot, police said. " 

http: 1/www. ocreg ister. com/articles/police-95586-woman-s uspect. html 

A report of investigation of Mr. Alcaraz' case by Nick Schwellenbach, formerly of the 

non-govemment organization, Project On Government Oversight, and now a manager in 

the U.S. Office of Special Counsel: 

http://pogoblog. type pad. com/pogo/201 0/11/why-is-the-tsa-keeping-air -marshal-e 

!IJQlQyment-disputes-under-a-veil-of-secrecy.html 

D. PROBLEM: The Federal Air Marshal Service has too many supervisors and 

managers either doing too much mundane administrative tasks or are scrounging 

for ways to discipline flying Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) for tl'ivolous 

infractions in order to desperately justify an within SV Pay Band increase. 

REMEDY: Give more administrative responsibilities to Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMs) and go to the General Schedule system of automatic pay increases. 

F AMs are already exhausted from flying between multiple time zones. Select 

F AMs can be provided a secure desktop computer installed in their home and tasked with 

reviewing and approving travel vouchers, time and attendance sheets, special missions 

scheduling, and other tasks Supervisory F AMS spend much time on. Give these F AMs 

one or more administrative leave days a pay period to perform these duties. 

23 
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Once again, there are almost no casework or arrests by F AMs, so there is very 

little hard positive evidence to justify within SV Pay Band increases. This motivates 

Supervisory F AMs to find issues to discipline jet-lagged FAMs. Place all FAMs and 

Supervisory FAMs on the General Schedule where they get schedules within grade 

mcreases. 

This would also greatly benefit F AMs who live in high-cost of living areas as I 

recall a FAM who lived in Apply Valley, California and would commute up to 220 miles 

a day to Los Angeles International Airport. To avoid traffic, he would drive to the airport 

very early and sleep in his vehicle until he had to check in. This could not have been 

healthy for the F AM and effected his ability to thwart an attack. 

Putting this solution into action and you can significantly reduce the F AMS 

supervisory and managerial corps. 

E. PROBLEM: Field office managers have the discretion to make FAMs surrender 

their badge/credential and firearms if they are on offlce or airport light-duty status 

due to medical issues. Unarmed FAMs not only cannot defend themselves, but 

they cannot defend their fellow employees. family members. and the general 

public. 

REMEDY: A FAM's suitability to use a firearm to defend himself or others 

outside of an airborne aircraft should be dctem1ined by the doctor who placed him 

on a medical light-duty and a TSA firearms range onlccr. 

A F AM with a broken foot may not be able to fight a suicidal attacker inside a 

crowded airliner up in the sky, but he may be able to draw his fireann inside a field office 

or elsewhere on Earth while seated, kneeling. or in a prone position to defend himself or 

others. 

If the manager is that concerned about the F AM's condition, the manager should 

allow the F AM to stay home on paid administrative leave and report to the office only 

when absolutely needed. We should have more confidence in a winged F AM to defend us 

from further soft-target attacks such as those at the New Orleans International Airport on 

March 20. 2015 with a knife-attacker, and the fatal fircanns-attacks on the Charlie Hebdo 

office in Paris, France on January 7, 2015, and at the Los Angeles International Airport 

on both July 4, 2002 and November 1, 2013. 

Conclusion with regards to personnel issues 

Once again, many believe that the flying-Federal Air Marshal mission should 

have only been a temporary detail and not become its own agency. This leads to boredom 

and inevitable friction between the front-line F AMs and their managers. Things go very 

wrong when a F AM comes back from an overseas mission in which he may have endured 

a parade by his foreign escorts, tolerated a curious or belligerent passenger for most of his 

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92 

flight, fought through insomnia and absorbed the stress from his spouse and children 

about reading about another salacious news story;only later to get a voicemail to 

immediately see his seated and ambitious supervisor about making a mistake on a travel 

voucher- this is counterproductive to what the taxpayers expected in response to the 

9111 attacks. 

Again, the flying-FAM mission should be temporary duty, not a career or an 

agency. 

I'm exceptionally committed to improving aviation security so that the public has 

the utmost confidence, and enjoys the miracle and wonderful privilege of commercial 

flying. The public has a right to protect themselves when Hight crew member or law 

enforcement officer cannot. I'm very excited and look forward to serving with the 

incoming TSA Administrator, Admiral Peter V. Neffenger, U.S. Coast Guard. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have. 

Respectfully Submitted. 

25 
93 

GltO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30a.m. ET 

Tuesday, June 9, 2015 

GA0-15-678T 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate 

AVIATION SECURITY 

TSA Has Taken Steps 

to Improve Oversight 

of Key Programs, but 

Additional Actions Are 

Needed 

Statement of Jennifer Grover, Director, Homeland 

Security and Justice 
94 

GAO 

Highlights 

Highlights of GA0·15--678T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Since the attacks of September 11, 

2001 exposed vulnerabilities in the 

nation's aviation system, billions of, 

dollars have been spent on a wide 

range of programs designed to 

enhance aviation security. Securing 

commercial aviation remains a 

daunting task, and continuing fiscal 

pressure highlights the need for TSA to 

determine how to allocate its finite 

resources for the greatest impact. GAO 

previously reported on TSA's oversight 

of its aviation security programs, 

including the extent to which TSA has 

the information needed to assess the 

programs. 

This testimony focuses on TSA's 

oversight of aviation security measures 

including, among other things (1) 

Secure Flight, (2) Advanced Imaging 

Technology, and (3) Managed 

Inclusion. This statement is based on 

reports and testimonies issued from 

December 2011 through May 2015. 

For prior work, GAO analyzed TSA 

documents and interviewed TSA 

officials, among other things. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO has previously made 

recommendations to DHS to 

strengthen TSA's oversight of aviation 

security programs. DHS generally 

agreed and has actions undeiWay to 

address them. Consequently, GAO is 

not making any new recommendations 

in this testimony. 

View GA0-1~678T. For more information, 

contact Jennifer Grover at (202) 512-7141 or 

groverj@gao.gov. 

AVIATION SECURITY 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of Key 

Programs, but Additional Actions Are Needed 

What GAO Found 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps to improve 

oversight of Secure Flight-a passenger prescreening program that matches 

passenger information against watch lists and assigns each passenger a risk 

category-but could take further action to address screening errors. In 

September 2014, GAO reported that TSA lacked timely and reliable information 

on system matching errors-instances where Secure Flight did not identify 

passengers who were actual matches to watch lists. GAO recommended that 

TSA systematically document such errors to help TSA determine if actions can 

be taken to prevent similar errors from occurring. The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) concurred and has developed a mechanism to do so, but has not 

yet shown how it will use this information to improve system perfonmance. In 

September 2014, GAO also found that screening personnel made errors in 

screening passengers at the checkpoint at a level consistent with their Secure 

Flight risk detenminations and that TSA did not have a systematic process for 

evaluating the root causes of these errors across airports. GAO recommended 

that TSA develop a process for evaluating the root causes and implement 

corrective measures to address them. DHS concurred and has developed such a 

process but has not yet demonstrated implementation of corrective measures. 

In March 2014, GAO found that TSA performance assessments of certain fullbody scanners used to screen passengers at airports did not account for all 

factors affecting the systems. GAO reported that the effectiveness of Advanced 

Imaging Technology (AIT) systems equipped with automated target recognition 

software (AIT -ATR)-which displays anomalies on a generic passenger outline 

instead of actual passenger bodies-relied on both the technology's capability to 

identify potential threat items and its operators' ability to resolve them. However, 

GAO found that TSA did not include these factors in determining overall AIT-ATR 

system performance. GAO also found that TSA evaluated the technology's 

performance in the laboratory-a practice that does not reflect how we!! the 

technology will perform with actual human operators. In considering procurement 

of the next generation of AIT systems (AIT -2), GAO recommended that TSA 

measure system effectiveness based on the performance of both the technology 

and the screening personnel. DHS concurred and in January 2015 reported that 

it has evaluated the AIT-2 technology and screening personnel as a system but 

has not yet provided sufficient documentation of this effort. 

In December 2014, GAO found that TSA had not tested the effectiveness of its 

overall Managed Inclusion process-a process to assess passenger risk in real 

time at the airport and provide expedited screening to certain passengers-but 

had plans to do so. Specifically, GAO found that TSA had tested the 

effectiveness of individual components of the Managed Inclusion process, such 

as canine teams, but had not yet tested the effectiveness of the overall process. 

TSA officials stated that they had plans to conduct such testing. Given that GAO 

has previously reported on TSA challenges testing the effectiveness of its 

security programs, GAO recommended that TSA ensure its planned testing of 

the Managed Inclusion process adhere to established evaluation design 

practices. DHS concurred and has plans to use a test and evaluation process for 

its planned testing of Managed Inclusion. 

-------------United States Government Accountability Office 
95 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the 

Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the 

Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) oversight of its passenger 

and airport worker screening programs. It has been nearly 14 years since 

the attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed vulnerabilities in the nation's 

aviation system. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent on a wide 

range of programs designed to enhance aviation security. However, 

securing commercial aviation operations remains a daunting task-with 

hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily 

carrying millions of passengers and pieces of carry-on and checked 

baggage. According to TSA, the threat to civil aviation has not 

diminished-underscoring the need for effective passenger and airport 

worker screening programs. As the fiscal pressures facing the 

government continue, so too does the need for TSA to determine how to 

allocate its finite resources to have the greatest impact on addressing 

threats and strengthening the effectiveness of its programs and activities. 

GAO previously reported on TSA's oversight of its aviation security 

programs, including the extent to which TSA has the information needed 

to assess the programs. 

As requested, my testimony today focuses on TSA's oversight of four key 

aviation security measures: 

Secure Flight: a passenger prescreening program that matches 

passenger information against federal government watch lists and 

other information to assign each passenger to a risk category; 

Advanced Imaging Technology fAIT): a full body scanner used to 

screen passengers in the nation's airports; 

Managed Inclusion: a process that TSA uses to determine 

passengers' eligibility for expedited screening at some passenger 

screening checkpoints, via Pre.rTM lanes;' and 

is the program through which TSA designates passengers as low risk for 

expedited screening in advance of their arrival at the passenger screening checkpoint. 

Expedi~ed screening typically includes walk-through metal detector screening and X-ray 

screenmg of the passenger's accessible property, but unlike in standard screening, 

travelers do not have to, among other things, remove their belts, shoes, or light outerwear. 

Managed Inclusion operates only at checkpoints with TSA Pre./ TM lanes. 

Page 1 GA0-15-678T 
96 

Background 

Aviation Workers: a program by which TSA and airports, in 

collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), vet 

applicants against the FBI's criminal history records, among other 

databases, and issue credentials to qualifying airport facility workers, 

retail employees, and airline employees, among others. 

This statement is based on our reports and testimonies issued from 

December 2011 through May 2015 related to TSA's efforts to oversee its 

aviation security measures. 2 For our past work, we reviewed applicable 

laws, regulations, and policies as well as TSA program documents; 

results from AIT testing and screener performance reviews; decision 

memorandums; and other documents. We also visited airports-six for 

our Managed Inclusion work and nine for our Secure Flight work-which 

we selected based on a variety of factors, such as volume of passengers 

screened and geographic dispersion, and interviewed Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), TSA, FBI officials, among other things. Further 

details on the scope and methodology for the previously issued reports 

and testimonies are available within each of the published products. We 

conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) established TSA as 

the primary federal agency with responsibility for securing the nation's 

civil aviation system. 3 This responsibility includes the screening of all 

2

See GAO, Transportation Security: Actions Needed to Address Umitations in TSA's 

Transportation Worker Security Threat Assessments and Growing Workload, GA0-12-60 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2011), Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for 

Behavior Detection Activities, GA0-14-159 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2013); Advanced 

Imaging Technology: TSA Needs Additional Information before Procuring Next-Generation 

Systems, GA0-14-357 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2014); Secure Flight: TSA Should 

Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness, GA0-14-531 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept 9, 2014); Aviation Security: Rapid Growth in Expedited Passenger Screening 

Highlights Need to Plan Effective Security Assessments, GA0-15-150 (Washington, D.C .. 

Dec. 12, 2014); and Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of Key 

Programs, but Additional Actions Are Needed, GA0-15-559T (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 

2015). 

3

Pub. L No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

Page 2 GA0-15·678T 
97 

Secure Flight 

passengers and property transported from and within the United States 

by commercial passenger aircraft.'ln accordance with ATSA, all 

passengers, their accessible property, and their checked baggage are 

screened pursuant to TSA-established procedures at the more than 450 

airports at which TSA performs, or oversees the performance of, security 

screening operations. These procedures generally provide, among other 

things, that passengers pass through security checkpoints where their 

person, identification documents, and accessible property, are checked 

by screening personnel. 5 

Since its implementation, in 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a 

program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them 

against federal government watch lists-primarily the No Fly List, 

comprised of individuals who should be precluded from boarding an 

aircraft, and the Selectee List, composed of individuals who should 

receive enhanced screening at the passenger security checkpoint-to 

one that uses additional lists and risk-based criteria to assign passengers 

to a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. 6 1n 2010, following 

the December 2009 attempted attack on a U.S.-bound flight, which 

exposed gaps in how agencies used watch lists to screen individuals, 

TSA began using risk-based criteria to create additional lists for Secure 

Flight screening. These lists are composed of high-risk passengers who 

may not be in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), but who TSA 

49 U.S. C. § 44901. For purposes of this testimony, "commercial passenger aircratr 

U.S.~ or foreign-flagged air carriers operating under TSA-approved security 

programs with regularly scheduled passenger operations to or from a U.S. airport. 

"Commercia! aviation," as the term is used in this testimony, encompasses the transport of 

passengers and their property by commercial passenger aircraft as wen as the airports that service such aircraft 

5

Screening personnel include transportation security officers, and at airports participating 

in TSA's Screening Partnership Program, screeners employed by private companies 

perform this function under contract with and overseen by TSA. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44901, 44920. 

6

The No Fly and Selectee Lists are subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database-the U.S 

government's consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists 

Page 3 GA0-15-678T 
98 

AIT Systems 

TSA:s Managed Inclusion 

Process 

has determined should be subject to enhanced screening procedures. 7 

Further, in 2011, TSA began screening passengers against additional 

identities in the TSDB that are not included on the No Fly or Selectee 

Lists. In addition, as part of TSA Pre .f "', a 2011 program through which 

TSA designates passengers as low risk for expedited screening, TSA 

began screening against several new lists of preapproved low-risk 

travelers. TSA also began conducting TSA Pre.f"' risk assessments, an 

activity distinct from matching against lists that uses the Secure Flight 

system to assign passengers scores based upon their travel-related data, 

for the purpose of identifying them as low risk for a specific ftight. 

According to TSA officials, AIT systems, also referred to as full-body 

scanners, provide enhanced security benefits compared with those of 

walk-through metal detectors by identifying nonmetallic objects and 

liquids. Following the deployment of AIT, the public and others raised 

privacy concerns because AIT systems produced images of passengers' 

bodies that image operators analyzed to identify objects or anomalies that 

could pose a threat to an aircraft or to the traveling public. To mitigate 

those concerns, TSA began installing automated target recognition (ATR) 

software on deployed AIT systems in July 2011. 8 AIT systems equipped 

with ATR (AIT-ATR) automatically interpret the image and display 

anomalies on a generic outline of a passenger instead of displaying 

images of actual passenger bodies. Screening officers use the generic 

image of a passenger to identify and resolve anomalies on-site in the 

presence of the passenger. 

TSA Pre./ TM is intended to allow TSA to devote more time and resources 

at the airport to screening the passengers TSA determined to be higher or 

unknown risk, while providing expedited screening to those passengers 

7

Standard screening typically includes passing through a walk-through metal detector or 

Advanced Imaging Technology system, which identifies objects or anomalies on the 

outside of the body, and X~ray screening for the passenger's accessible property. In 

general, enhanced screening includes, in addition to the procedures applied during a 

typical standard screening experience, a pat-down and an explosives trace detection or 

physical search of the interior of the passenger's accessible property, electronics, and 

footwear. 

8

See Pub. L No. 112-95, § 826,126 Stat.11, 132-33 (2012) (codified at49 U.S.C. 

§ 44901(1)} {requiring, in general, that TSA ensure that all A!T systems used to screen passengers are equipped with ATR software). 

Page4 GA0·15-678T 
99 

determined to pose a lower risk to the aviation system. To assess 

whether a passenger is eligible for expedited screening, TSA considers, 

in general, (1) inclusion on an approved TSA Pre.rrM list of known 

travelers;' (2) results from the automated TSA Pre.rTM risk assessments 

of all passengers; 10 and (3) real-time threat assessments of passengers, 

known as Managed Inclusion, conducted at airport checkpoints. Managed 

Inclusion uses several layers of security, including procedures that 

randomly select passengers for expedited screening and a combination of 

behavior detection officers (BOO), who observe passengers to identify 

high-risk behaviors at TSA-regulated airports; passenger-screening 

canine teams; and explosives trace detection (ETD) devices to help 

ensure that passengers selected for expedited screening have not 

handled explosive materiaL 

Aviation Workers Program TSA also shares responsibility with airports to vet airport workers to 

ensure they do not pose a security threat Pursuant to TSA's Aviation 

Workers program, TSA, in collaboration with airport operators and FBI, is 

to complete applicant background checks-known as security threat 

assessments-for airport facility workers, retail employees, and airline 

employees who apply for or are issued a credential for unescorted access 

to secure areas in U.S. airports. 11 

9

These lists are composed of individuals whom TSA has determined to be low risk by 

virtue of their membership in a specific group, such as active duty mmtary members, or 

based on group vetting requirements, 

10Using these assessments, an activity distinct from watch list matching that uses the 

Secure Flight system to assign passengers scores based upon their travel-related data, 

TSA assigns passengers scores based upon information available to TSA to identify lowrisk passengers eligible for expedited screening for a specific flight pnor to the 

passengers' arrival at the airport. 

11TSA security threat assessments include a background check to determine whether an 

applicant is a security risk to the United States. In genera!, security threat assessments 

include checks for criminal history records and immigration status, checks against 

terrorism databases and watch Usts, and checks for records indicating an adjudication of 

lack of mental capacity, among other things. For airport workers, TSA is responsible for 

both vetting and adjudicating an applicant's terrorist and immigration history while 

providing the results of criminal history checks to airport operators. The airport operator is 

responsible for adjudicating the criminal history which includes a determination of whether 

an appllcant has committed a disqualifying criminal offense, before determining whether to 

issue an applicant a credential for unescorted access to secure areas of the airport. See, 

e.g., 49 C.F.R §§ 1542.209, 1544.229, & 1544.230 (lis1ing or referencing disqualifying 

criminal offenses) 

Page 5 GA0-15-678T 
100 

TSA Has Taken Steps 

to Improve Oversight 

of Secure Flight, but 

Could Take Further 

Action to Measure 

Program 

Performance and 

Address Screening 

Errors 

In September 2014, we reported on three issues affecting the 

effectiveness of TSA's Secure Flight program-(1) the need for additional 

performance measures to capture progress toward Secure Flight program 

goals, (2) Secure Flight system matching errors, and (3) mistakes 

screening personnel have made in implementing Secure Flight at the 

screening checkpoint. 12 TSA has taken steps to address these issues but 

additional action would improve the agency's oversight of the Secure 

Flight program. 

Need for additional performance measures: In September 2014, we 

found that Secure Flight had established program goals that reflect new 

program functions since 2009 to identify additional types of high-risk and 

also low-risk passengers; however, the program performance measures 

in place at that time did not allow TSA to fully assess its progress toward 

achieving all of its goals. For example, one program goal was to 

accurately identify passengers on various watch lists. To assess 

performance toward this goal, Secure Flight collected various types of 

data, including the number of passengers TSA identifies as matches to 

high- and low-risk lists, but did not have measures to assess the extent of 

system matching errors-for example, the extent to which Secure Flight is 

missing passengers who are actual matches to these lists. We concluded 

that additional measures that address key performance aspects related to 

program goals, and that clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve 

goals, in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act, 

would allow TSA to more fully assess progress toward its goals. 

Therefore, we recommended that TSA develop such measures, and 

ensure these measures clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve 

progress toward the goal. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, 

according to TSA officials, as of April 2015, TSA's Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis was evaluating its current Secure Flight performance goals 

and measures and determining what new performance measures should 

be established to fully measure progress against program goals. 

Secure Flight system matching errors: In September 2014, we found 

that TSA lacked timely and reliable information on all known cases of 

Secure Flight system matching errors, meaning instances where Secure 

Flight did not identify passengers who were actual matches to these lists. 

TSA officials told us at the time of our review that when TSA receives 

information related to matching errors of the Secure Flight system, the 

Page 6 GA0·15-678T 
101 

Secure Flight Match Review Board reviews this information to determine 

if any actions could be taken to prevent similar errors from happening 

again. 13 We identified instances in which the Match Review Board 

discussed system matching errors, investigated possible actions to 

address these errors, and implemented changes to strengthen system 

performance. However, we also found that TSA did not have readily 

available or complete information on the extent and causes of system 

matching errors. We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to 

systematically document the number and causes of the Secure Flight 

system's matching errors, in accordance with federal internal control 

standards. DHS concurred with our recommendation, and as of April 

2015, TSA had developed such a mechanism. However, TSA has not yet 

demonstrated how it will use the information to improve the performance 

of the Secure Flight system. 

Mistakes at screening checkpoint: We also found in September 2014 

that TSA had processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening 

determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance 

these processes. Screening personnel at passenger screening 

checkpoints are primarily responsible for ensuring that passengers 

receive a level of screening that corresponds to the level of risk 

determined by Secure Flight by verifying passengers' identities and 

identifying passengers' screening designations. To carry out this 

responsibility, among other steps, screening personnel are to confirm that 

the data included on the passenger's boarding pass and in his or her 

identity document (such as a driver's license) match one another, and 

review the passenger's boarding pass to identify his or her Secure Flight 

passenger screening determination. TSA information from May 2012 

through February 2014 that we assessed indicates that screening 

personnel made errors at the checkpoint in screening passengers 

consistent with their Secure Flight determinations. TSA officials at five of 

the nine airports where we conducted interviews stated they conducted 

after-action reviews of such screening errors and used these reviews to 

take action to address the root causes of those errors. However, we 

found that TSA did not have a systematic process for evaluating the root 

causes of these screening errors across airports, which could allow TSA 

13Secure Flight's Match Review Board-a multidepartmenta! entity-and associated 

Match Review Working Group review performance measurement results and recommend 

changes to improve system performance, among other things. 

Page7 GA0·15-678T 
102 

TSA Performance 

Assessments of AITATR Did NotAccount 

for All Factors 

Affecting the System 

to identify trends across airports and target nationwide efforts to address 

these issues. 

Officials with TSA's Office of Security Operations told us in the course of 

our September 2014 review that evaluating the root causes of screening 

errors would be helpful and staled they were in the early stages of 

forming a group to discuss these errors. However, TSA was not able to 

provide documentation of the group's membership, purpose, goals, time 

frames, or methodology. Therefore, we recommended in September 2014 

that TSA develop a process for evaluating the root causes of screening 

errors at the checkpoint and then implement corrective measures to 

address those causes. DHS concurred with our recommendations and 

has developed a process for collecting and evaluating data on the root 

causes of screening errors. However, as of April 2015, TSA had not yet 

shown that the agency has implemented corrective measures to address 

the root causes. 

In March 2014, we reported that, according to TSA officials, checkpoint 

security is a function of technology, people, and the processes that 

govern them, however we found that TSA did not include each of those 

factors in determining overall AIT -A TR system performance. 14 

Specifically, we found that TSA evaluated the technology's performance 

in the laboratory to determine system effectiveness. However, laboratory 

test results provide important insights but do not accurately reflect how 

well the technology will perform in the field with actual human operators. 

Additionally, we found that TSA did not assess how alarms are resolved 

by considering how the technology, people, and processes function 

collectively as an entire system when determining AIT -ATR system 

performance. AIT -ATR system effectiveness relies on both the 

technology's capability to identify threat items and its operators to resolve 

those threat items. 

At the time of our review, TSA officials agreed that it is important to 

analyze performance by including an evaluation of the technology, 

operators, and processes, and stated that TSA was planning to assess 

the performance of all layers of security. According to TSA, the agency 

conducted operational tests on the AIT-ATR system, as well as follow-on 

operational tests as requested by DHS's Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation, but those tests were not ultimately used to assess 

14GA0-14-357. 

Page 8 GA0·15-678T 
103 

effectiveness of the operators' ability to resolve alarms, as stated in 

DHS's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's letter of assessment 

on the technology. Transportation Security Laboratory officials also 

agreed that qualification testing conducted in a laboratory setting is not 

always predictive of actual performance at detecting threat items. Further, 

laboratory testing does not evaluate the performance of screening officers 

in resolving anomalies identified by the AIT-ATR system or TSA's current 

processes or deployment strategies. 

Given that TSA was seeking to procure the second generation of AIT 

systems, known as AIT-2, we reported that DHS and TSA would be 

hampered in their ability to ensure that future AIT systems meet mission 

needs and perform as intended at airports unless TSA evaluated system 

effectiveness based on both the performance of the AIT -2 technology and 

screening officers who operate the technology. We recommended that 

TSA measure system effectiveness based on the performance of the AIT2 technology and screening officers who operate the technology while 

taking into account current processes and deployment strategies. TSA 

concurred and reported taking steps to address this recommendation. 

Specifically, in January 2015, DHS stated that TSA's Office of Security 

Capabilities evaluated the AIT -2 technology and screening officer as a 

system during an operational evaluation. However, TSA has not yet 

provided sufficient documentation showing that this recommendation has 

been fully addressed. 

Page9 GA0·15·678T 
104 

TSA Has Not Tested 

the Overall 

Effectiveness of Its 

Managed Inclusion 

Process, But Plans to 

Conduct Such Testing 

In December 2014, we reported that, according to TSA officials, TSA 

tested the security effectiveness of the individual components of the 

Managed Inclusion process-such as BOOs and ETD devices-before 

implementing Managed Inclusion, and TSA determined that each layer 

alone provides an effective level of security. 15 However, in our prior body 

of work, we identified challenges in several of the layers used in the 

Managed Inclusion process, raising questions regarding their 

effectiveness. 16 For example, in our November 2013 report on TSA's 

behavior detection and analysis program, we found that although TSA 

had taken several positive steps to validate the scientific basis and 

strengthen program management of its behavior detection and analysis 

program, TSA had not demonstrated that behavioral indicators can be 

used to reliably and effectively identify passengers who may pose a threat 

to aviation security. 17 

Further, TSA officials stated that they had not yet tested the security 

effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as it functions as a 

whole, as TSA had been planning for such testing over the course of the 

last year. TSA documentation showed that the Office of Security 

Capabilities recommended in January 2013 that TSA test the security 

effectiveness of Managed Inclusion as a system. We reported in 

December 2014 that according to officials, TSA anticipated that testing 

would begin in October 2014 and estimated that testing could take 12 to 

18 months to complete. 

We have also previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in 

designing studies and protocols to test the effectiveness of security 

systems and programs in accordance with established methodological 

practices, such as in the case of the AIT systems discussed previously 

16See GA0-14~159; Explosives Detection Canmes: TSA Has Taken Steps to Analyze 

Canine Team Data and Assess the Effectiveness of Passenger Screening Canines, 

GA0-14-695T (Washington, D.C .. June 24, 2014); and Aviation Security: TSA Has 

Enhan~ed Its ~xplosives Detection Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional 

Screenmg Acltons Are Needed, GA0-11-740 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011). 

17GA0-14-159. 

Page 10 GA0-15-678T 
105 

and in our evaluation of BDO effectiveness. 18 In our December 2014 

report, we concluded that ensuring the planned effectiveness testing of 

the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design 

practices would help TSA provide reasonable assurance that the 

effectiveness testing will yield reliable results. 19 In general, evaluations 

are most likely to be successful when key steps are addressed during 

design, including defining research questions appropriate to the scope of 

the evaluation, and selecting appropriate measures and study 

approaches that will permit valid conclusions. As a result, we 

recommended that to ensure TSA's planned testing yields reliable results, 

the TSA Administrator take steps to ensure that TSA's planned 

effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to 

established evaluation design practices. DHS concurred with our 

recommendation and began taking steps toward this goal. Specifically, 

DHS stated that TSA plans to use a test and evaluation process-which 

calls for the preparation of test and evaluation framework documents 

including plans, analyses, and a final report describing the test resultsfor its planned effectiveness testing of Managed Inclusion. 

November 2013, we reported on methodological weaknesses in the avera!! design 

and data colfection of TSA's April 2011 validation comparison study to determine the 

effectiveness of the behavior detection and analysis program. For example, we found that 

TSA ha? not randomly selected airports to participate in the study, so the results were not 

generalizable across ~irports. We. recommended that future funding for the program be 

limited until TSA provJded scientifically validated evidence that demonstrates that 

be.havioral ind.icators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to 

aviation secunty. See GA0~14~159 

19GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GA0-12-208G (Washington, D.C: January 

2012). 

Page 11 
106 

TSA and the FBI 

Have Addressed a 

Weakness in TSA's 

Oversight of 

Credentials for Airport 

Workers 

In December 2011, we found that, according to TSA, limitations in its 

criminal history checks increased the risk that the agency was not 

detecting potentially disqualifying criminal offenses as part of its Aviation 

Workers security threat assessments for airport workers. 20 Specifically, 

we reported that TSA's level of access to criminal history record 

information in the FBI's Interstate Identification Index excluded access to 

many state records such as information regarding sentencing, release 

dates, and probation or parole violations, among others. 2' As a result, 

TSA reported that its ability to look into applicant criminal history records 

was often incomplete. 

We recommended that the TSA and the FBI jointly assess the extent to 

which this limitation may pose a security risk, identify alternatives to 

address any risks, and assess the costs and benefits of pursuing each 

alternative. TSA and the FBI have since taken steps to address this 

recommendation. For example, in 2014, the agencies evaluated the 

extent of any risk and, according to TSA and FBI officials, concluded that 

the risk of incomplete information did exist and could be mitigated through 

expanded access to state-supplied records. TSA officials reported that 

the FBI has since taken steps to expand the criminal history record 

information available to TSA when conducting its security threat 

assessments for airport workers and others. 

21The FBI's criminal history records contain information from a national fingerprint and 

criminal history system that responds to requests from local, state, and federal agencies. 

The system provides automated fingerprint search capabilities, latent search capability, 

electronic image storage, and electronic exchange of fingerprints and responses. A 

segment of this system is the FBI-maintained criminal history record repository, known as 

the Interstate Identification Index (Ill, or Triple I) system that contains records from a!! 

states and territories, as well as from federal and international criminal justice agencies. 

The state records in the Ill are submitted to the FBI by central criminal record repositories 

that aggregate criminal records submitted by most or all of the local criminal justice 

~gencies ~n their jurisdictions. The FBI's criminal history records check is a negative 

tdentificat!on check, whereby the fingerprints are used to confirm that the associated 

individual is not identified as having a criminal record in the database. If an individual has 

a criminal record in the database, the FBI provides criminal history record check results to 

TSA. TSA, in turn transmits the results to the airport operator that, consistent with TSA 

regulations, is responsible for adjudicating the criminal history to identify potentially 

disqua!i~ing crimina! offenses and making a final determination of eligibility for a 

credentiaL See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.209 

Page 12 GA0-15-S78T 
107 

(441297) 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and members of the 

committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you may have at this time. 

For questions about this statement, please contact Jennifer Grover at 

(202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

include Maria Strudwick (Assistant Director), Claudia Becker, Michele 

Fejfar, and Tom Lombardi. Key contributors for the previous work that this 

testimony is based on are listed in each product. 

Page 13 GA0·15-678T 
108 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to the Honorable .John Roth 

From Senator Rob Portman 

"Oversight of the Transportation Security Administration: First-Hand and Government 

Watchdog Accounts of Agency Challenges" 

June 9, 2015 

1. I am concerned for the safety of airline passengers given recent media reports that in an 

undercover investigation conducted by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of 

Inspector General, security screeners failed to detect weapons, mock explosives, and 

other prohibited items 95 percent of the time at airports across the country. How can TSA 

leadership work with the Office of Inspector General to address findings of the ongoing 

investigation and report while the report continues to be finalized? 

Response: Since the conclusion of testing on May 14,2015, our office has had multiple 

briefings with TSA leadership. On June 25, 2015, our testing team met with senior 

officials from the Secretary's office and with TSA Assistant Administrators responsible 

for checkpoint screening security to discuss our testing scope, methodology, and the 

results of individual tests. The Secretary has assembled a working group to address the 

vulnerabilities identified during our testing and has invited our office to attend and 

observe how the Department is implementing solutions to improve checkpoint screening 

security. 

Additionally, on June 1, 2015, TSA shared with us its "Proposed Action Plan to Address 

Preliminary Results of Inspector General Aviation Security Testing" (Action Plan) to 

address the vulnerabilities we identified during testing. When we reviewed the plan, it did 

not include enough specificity in the actions, did not provide supporting documentation, 

and did not include follow-up and recurring actions to ensure the action plan will be 

successfully implemented and followed. However, we have been in briefings with TSA 

and are aware that it is developing the necessary details that may provide answers to how 

it intends to implement improvements. For example, on June 25, the Secretary's working 

group shared with us its planned presentation to the White House regarding actions TSA 

is taking to implement TSA's Action Plan. We look forward to reviewing TSA's future 

plans to address the passenger screening vulnerabilities identified during our audit. 

2. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General released a report on 

May 6, 2015, that found TSA does not properly manage its airport screening equipment 

maintenance program. TSA was found to not have issued adequate policies and 

procedures to airports for carrying out equipment maintenance, which can result in longer 

wait times, delays in passenger and baggage screening, and ultimately jeopardize 

passenger and aircraft safety. While TSA has concurred with the report's findings and is 

implementing the Office of Inspector General's recommendations, it appears that TSA 

regularly addresses issues only after they are identified by external Office of Inspector 
109 

General or Government Accountability Office audits. How can TSA leadership 

encourage a culture within TSA that is based on continuous evaluation and improvement? 

Response: TSA must change from a reactive to proactive position to address emerging 

threats against transportation security and fulfill its mission. Although TSA made 

significant investments in technology and equipment to protect the Nation's 

transportation system, additional efforts are needed to improve its transparency and 

accountability. For example, in 2013 we reported that TSA's Office oflnspection's 

recommendations from its inspections, covert testing, and internal reviews were not 

always implemented. As a result, TSA may have missed opportunities to address 

transportation security vulnerabilities. (OIG-13-123, Transportation Security 

Administration Office o(Jnspeclion 's Efforts to Enhance Transportation Security.) It is 

incumbent upon TSA to ensure strong management controls are in place to identify and 

correct vulnerabilities. TSA must also strongly encourage its personnel at all levels to 

identify problems and develop solutions to strengthen our aviation security system on a 

continuous basis. 
110 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to The Honorable John Roth 

From Senator Thomas R. Carper 

"Oversight of the Transportation Security Administration: First-Hand and Government 

Watchdog Accounts of Agency Challenges" 

June 9, 2015 

1. We recently learned of potentially systemic failings at our Transportation Security 

Administration passenger screening checkpoints thanks to covert testing performed by your 

office. The reported rate of failure for the covert testing is simply unacceptable but, as we 

also learned, Secretary Johnson has already taken action to address the vulnerabilities your 

covert testing team exposed. Can you please provide your thoughts on Secretary Johnson's 

response to your office's findings regarding passenger screening as a result of covert testing? 

Response: On June 1, our covert testing team was provided with TSA's "Proposed Action 

Plan to Address Preliminary Results of Inspector General Aviation Security Testing" (Action 

Plan). The Action Plan encompasses a number of immediate, medium-, and long-term action 

items for three categories of action -- people, processes, and technology. On its face, the 

Action Plan represents an ambitious effort by TSA to address an array of passenger screening 

issues identified during both recent and prior OIG testing. This is a welcome and long 

overdue development. 

However, we are concerned the Action Plan (as presented) is short on details. Specifically, it 

lacks supporting documentation (e.g., a list of accountable parties, interim 

milestones/reporting requirements, and follow-up and recurring actions, etc.) needed to 

ensure the plan is fully-executed. The Action Plan also employs aggressive timelines which 

may not turn out to be realistic. 

Because the Action Plan is pre-decisional and contains classified or Sensitive Security 

Information, we cannot discuss or comment on the specific actions being contemplated by 

TSA in the public record. We would be happy to arrange a meeting with you or your staff to 

discuss the specific information in a closed setting. 
111 

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record 

Submitted to The Honorable John Roth 

From Senator Jon Tester 

"Oversight of the Transportation Security Administration: First-Hand and Government 

Watchdog Accounts of Agency Challenges" 

June 9, 2015 

I. Your testimony mentions that TSA continues to fail to effectively manage its equipment 

and still depends too heavily on walk-through metal detectors. Did the lack of effectively 

deployed equipment play a role in the failures identified in the recent Red Team tests? 

Response: The audit objective ofDHS OIG's covert testing team was to determine the 

effectiveness ofTSA's Advanced Imaging Technology, Automated Target Recognition 

software, and checkpoint screener performance in identifying and resolving potential 

security threats at airport security checkpoints. The scope of this audit did not include 

assessing how effectively TSA has deployed equipment- including walk-thru metal 

detectors. As a result, we do not know the extent to which deployed equipment 

contributed to the passenger screening vulnerabilities identified during our current audit. 

Our audit involved covert testing and contains classified or Sensitive Security 

Information; we cannot discuss the specific results of our OJG covert testing in the public 

record. We would be happy to arrange a meeting with you or your staff to discuss the 

specific information in a closed setting. (Note: Although recent media reports widely 

reported on the OIG's "Red Team" results, DHS OIG's covert testing team does use this 

name for itself. "Red Team" is a term used by TSA's Office oflnspections for its covert 

testing team.) 

In fiscal year 2013, we conducted a separate audit looking at the deployment and use of 

Advanced Imaging Technology. (OIG-13-120 (Revised), Transportation Security 

Administration's Deployment and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology.) The objective 

of the audit was to determine whether TSA is effectively deploying advanced imaging 

technology and is fully utilizing the equipment at airports. The audit determined TSA did 

not develop a comprehensive deployment strategy to ensure all advanced imaging 

technology units were effectively deployed and fully used for screening passengers. 

Without a documented, approved, comprehensive plan and accurate data on the use of 

advanced imaging technology, TSA continued to use walkthrough metal detectors, which 

are unable to identify non-metallic objects. Additionally, TSA may have used resources 

inefficiently to purchase and deploy underused advanced imaging technology units. We 

issued two recommendations to TSA. TSA implemented corrective actions and both 

recommendations are closed. 

2. Congress passed legislation last year to improve TSA's equipment management over the 

next five years, but do you have any thoughts on what Congress should he doing in the 

short-term to fix this important issue? 
112 

Response: Congress may want to consider requesting more information from TSA on its 

strategy for continuing to develop, implement, and maintain a robust aviation security 

system that is able to adapt to emerging vulnerabilities and threats based on law 

enforcement and intelligence data. This system should encompass not only advanced 

screening technologies but also employee training, internal controls, quality assurance 

measures and continuous monitoring to ensure TSA meets its established mission goals. 

To successfully strengthen and protect the Nation's transportation systems, TSA must 

work closely with transportation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities. 

3. I remain concerned that the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) makes TSA screeners 

worse off and reduces moral without strong evidence that the program saves money or 

increases security. Can you share if any of the recent failures identified by the Red Team 

happened at SPP airports? 

Response: As in previous covert testing reports, our airport sample comprised airports of 

various sizes - including airports that participated in the Screening Partnership Program 

(SPP). During our most recent audit, we conducted test at two SPP airports. Generally, 

results were consistent across all airports. Our audit involved covert testing and contains 

classified or Sensitive Security Information; we cannot discuss specific results of our 

OJG covert testing in the public record, but would be pleased to discuss this with you or 

your staff in the appropriate closed setting. 

4. Is your office examining TSA's security performance at SPP airports versus federal 

airports, or does it intend to in the near future? 

Response: While we did conduct covert tests at two SPP airports during this audit, we 

have not done a large-scale review ofTSA's security performance at SPP airports versus 

federal airports that would allow us to draw across-the-board conclusions about security 

performance at SPP airports. We will consider adding this type of review to a future year 

work plan. 

5. Do you think the SPP plays a role in TSA's low employee moral issues? 

Response: DHS OIG has not done any audit work in this area to date. 
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GAO u.s. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

441 G St. N.W. 

Washington, DC 20548 

July 24, 2015 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United State Senate 

Aviation Security: Responses to Posthearing Questions for the Record 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

On June 9, 2015, I testified before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Oversight of its 

Passenger and Airport Worker Screening Programs. This letter responds to the questions for 

the record that you posed. The responses are based on work associated with our previously 

issued products.' Your questions and my responses are enclosed. 

If you have any questions about this letter or need additional information, please contact me at 

(202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov 

Sincerely yours, 

Jenny Grover 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team 

Enclosure 

cc: cc list 

1 GAO, Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be 

Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored, GA0-09-243 (Washington D,C: April 21, 2009); Surface 

Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Manage Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure Performance, 

but Additional Actions Would Enhance Its Efforts, GA0-10-650T (Washington D,C: April 21, 2010); Passenger Rail 

Security: Consistent Incident Reporting and Analysis Needed to Achieve Program Objectives, GA0-13-20 

(Washington, D.C: December 19, 2012). 
114 

1. The overwhelming majority of attention given to Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) programs relates to efforts to secure commercial aviation. 

However, TSA is the lead federal agency responsible for the security of all modes of 

transportation, including railways, highways, pipelines, and waterways. Do you 

believe more attention to TSA's responsibilities as it relates to surface transportation 

security is warranted? What specific areas of surface transportation security do you 

believe should receive additional attention from Congress? 

While there have been no successful terrorist attacks against the U.S. surface transportation 

systems to date, prior terrorist attacks on surface transportation systems in Moscow, Mumbai, 

London, and Madrid that caused significant loss of life and disruption have highlighted the 

vulnerability of transportation facilities to terrorist attacks worldwide. 2 ln addition, surface 

transportation systems generally rely on an open architecture that is difficult to monitor and 

secure due to there being multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some 

cases, a lack of access barriers. For example, America's rail network is an open system, with 

expanses of infrastructure spread over vast regions that often traverses densely populated 

urban areas. Securing surface transportation systems is also complicated by the number of 

private and public stakeholders involved in operating and protecting these systems, and the 

need to balance security with the expeditious flow of people and goods. While the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the security of surface 

transportation systems, several other agencies, including DHS's Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), also play a role in helping to 

fund and secure these systems. In addition, unlike commercial aviation, where TSA has 

operational responsibility for security and performs or oversees the performance of passenger 

and baggage screening at most U.S. airports, TSA does not have similar responsibilities for 

securing surface transportation systems, but rather public and private sector transportation 

operators are responsible for implementing security measures for their systems. TSA's 

responsibilities for securing surface transportation systems have primarily included developing 

national strategies, establishing security standards, and conducting assessments and 

inspections of surface transportation modes. TSA's annual budget further highlights the 

difference between TSA's role in securing commercial aviation and surface transportation 

modes. For example, the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015, enacted March 4, 2015, appropriated 

$123,749,000 for surface transportation security compared to $5,639,095,000 for aviation 

security. 3 

Since it is not practical or feasible to protect all surface transportation assets and systems 

against every possible terrorist threat, DHS has called for using risk-informed approaches to 

prioritize its security-related investments and for developing plans and allocating resources in a 

way that balances security and commerce. While DHS has taken actions to implement a risk 

management approach to securing surface transportation systems we have previously reported 

2 Subway attacks occurred in Moscow on March 29, 2010, Mumbai on July 11, 2006, London on July 7, 2005, and 

Madrid on March 11, 2004. Each attack caused dozens of deaths and injuries. 

3 Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39, 44-46 (2015). The approximately $124 million and $5.6 billion appropriated to 

TSA's "Surface Transportation Security" and "Aviation Security" accounts, respectively, does not reflect amounts 

appropriated to TSA's "Intelligence and Vetting" and "Transportation Security Support" accounts, which also support 

TSA's surface and aviation security missions, as well as the $250 million in fee collections available to TSA through 

the Aviation Security Capital Fund to support security-related airport improvement projects and the procurement and 

installation of explosives detection systems for use at airports. 

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that it could do more to inform resource allocation based on risk across the surface 

transportation sector-including the mass transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway, and 

pipeline modes. Moreover, our prior work in this area highlights the importance of (1) 

comprehensive risk assessment to guide investment decisions, (2) coordination with 

stakeholders and across federal agencies, and (3) coordinated oversight of security 

requirements and reporting of incidents to allow identification of trends. These are issues of 

enduring importance that continue to be worthy of Congressional attention. We have provided 

additional information below on each of these areas. 

In March 2009, GAO reported that TSA had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments to 

compare risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could use to guide 

investment decisions, and recommended that TSA do so. In June 2010, TSA produced the 

Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA), which assessed risk within and 

across the aviation, mass transit, highway, freight rail, and pipeline modes, and incorporated 

threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 

In addition, we reported in April 2009 that while TSA has generally improved coordination with 

key surface transportation stakeholders, additional actions could enhance its efforts, such as 

sharing relevant freight rail threat assessment information to avoid duplication of effort, among 

other things. TSA has since taken several steps to better ensure federal agencies coordinate as 

effectively as possible, including ensuring relevant freight rail assessments and information are 

shared and that TSA and FRA field inspector resources are better leveraged. Specifically, TSA, 

prior to assessing a railroad bridge, now obtains any prior DHS Infrastructure Protection (IP) 

assessments of the same bridge in order to fully leverage relevant information and analysis 

before conducting their own assessment In addition, in 2012, TSA and DHS IP signed an 

Information Sharing and Access Agreement (ISAA) to define the roles and responsibilities of IP 

and TSA in collaboratively sharing specific transportation sector-related risk information. 

More recently, in December 2012, GAO reported that TSA was not consistently providing 

consistent oversight for its rail security incident reporting requirement because of, among other 

things, a lack of guidance leading to considerable variation in the types and number of incidents 

reported. For example, local TSA officials instructed one rail agency to report all incidents 

related to individuals struck by trains, while local TSA officials for another rail agency said these 

incidents would not need to be reported as they are most often suicides with no nexus to 

terrorism. GAO also found inconsistency in TSA compliance inspections and enforcement 

actions because, among other things, TSA's rail security inspection policies did not specify 

inspection frequency, but rather called for performing a "reasonable number" of inspections. For 

example, 3 of the 19 rail agencies GAO contacted were not inspected from January 2011 

through June 2012, including a large metropolitan rail agency. In addition, TSA took 

enforcement action against an agency for not reporting an incident involving a knife, but did not 

take action against another agency for not reporting similar incidents, though the agency had 

been inspected. As a result, GAO recommended that TSA develop guidance on the types of 

incidents that should be reported, and enhance existing oversight mechanisms for compliance 

inspections and enforcement actions. TSA concurred with our recommendations and has since 

taken action to address these deficiencies. Specifically, in September 2013, TSA disseminated 

written guidance to local TSA inspection officials and rail agencies that provided clarification 

about the requirements of the rail security incident reporting process, and included examples 

and descriptions of the types of incidents that should be reported under the regulatory criteria, 

as well as details about the type of information that should be included in the incident report 

provided to the Transportation Security Operations Center. In addition, TSA provided Surface 

Regional Security Inspectors (RSI) with the ability to review both passenger and freight rail 

Paae 3 
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Æ 

inspections in the Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) before the inspections 

are finalized and any enforcement actions are taken. TSA also established an RSI-dashboard 

report that provides weekly, monthly, and quarterly information about the number of inspections 

that have been reviewed. accepted, and rejected, and developed a mechanism for tracking the 

recommendations RSis make to local TSA inspection officials regarding changes to local 

compliance inspections, as well as any actions that are taken in response. This mechanism 

allows the RSis to provide management oversight of passenger and freight rail regulatory 

inspections and enforcement actions, which helps ensure that these regulations are consistently 

implemented and enforced. 

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