J-A18002-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAWN CRAWFORD

Appellant No. 1221 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 20, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-SA-0000075-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS, AND OTT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 17, 2017

Shawn Crawford appeals from judgment of sentence of fines and costs 

imposed after he was convicted of various summary violations under the 

Dog Law.1 We affirm.

On August 26, 2015, Appellant’s German Shepard dog named 

“Roscoe” seriously injured a dog owned by James Record. The incident 

occurred off Appellant’s property and Roscoe was unrestrained. The day 

after the incident, Appellant relinquished ownership of Roscoe to the 

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1 The charges are: (1) harboring a dangerous dog (3 Pa.C.S. § 459-502-A 

(a)(1)(ii)); (2) unlawful confinement and control (3 Pa.C.S. § 459-

305(a)(3)); (3) failure to properly license dog (3 Pa.C.S. § 549-201(a)); (4) 

failure to vaccinate against rabies (3 Pa.C.S. § 455.8(a)(1)).
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Washington Area Humane Society (“the Humane Society”). The Humane 

Society evaluated Roscoe and found that he was a good candidate for 

adoption. Within a few weeks, a family that lived outside Fayette County 

(“New Owners”) adopted Roscoe.

In October 2015, Mr. Record sent a certified letter to Appellant asking 

him to pay $5,000 in veterinarian bills. Appellant did not respond. On 

March 17, 2016, Fayette County Animal Control Officer Gary L. Hoffman filed 

a criminal complaint against Appellant alleging numerous summary offenses 

under the Dog Law. All charges were based on contemporaneous reports 

from the police and animal control authorities. After one postponement, the 

hearing took place on May 4, 2016, but Appellant did not appear. Based on 

Mr. Record’s uncontested testimony, Appellant was found guilty, and the 

magisterial district justice awarded restitution in the amount of $5,700, plus 

costs and fines. 

Appellant filed a timely appeal to the Court of Common Pleas on May 

31, 2016. A motion to vacate the charges was filed by Attorney Molly 

Maguire Gaussa on behalf of New Owners. On June 7, 2016, the trial court 

held a hearing on the motion. Appellant attended but was unrepresented. 

New Owners maintained that they were interested parties as they did not 

want the dangerous dog label to follow Roscoe. The trial court denied the 

motion. 
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At that hearing, Attorney Gaussa made an oral motion for continuance 

of the trial because she was unavailable on the scheduled trial date. The 

trial court initially indicated that it would entertain a continuance to 

accommodate Attorney Gaussa. However, after realizing that Attorney 

Gaussa was representing New Owners, not Appellant, the trial court denied 

the motion, finding that New Owners lacked standing to seek a continuance. 

At the conclusion of that hearing, Attorney Gaussa expressed a willingness 

to represent Appellant at trial, pro bono.

On July 8, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se “routine” motion for 

continuance of the July 20, 2016 trial without obtaining the Commonwealth’s 

consent. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice on July 11, 

2016, because local rules require parties to file a “priority” motion for 

continuance, which requires a hearing, when they do not have the opposing 

party’s consent. Appellant did not seek the consent of the Commonwealth 

or file a priority motion and, consequently, the case proceeded to trial as 

scheduled on July 20, 2016.

As trial commenced, Attorney Gaussa had not entered her appearance 

as Appellant’s attorney of record. Appellant appeared pro se at trial and did 

not contest his guilt. The trial court asked Appellant if he had reached any 

agreement with the Commonwealth, to which Appellant replied that they had 

discussed the fines. Appellant represented to the court that he wanted to 

contest the $5,700 restitution award lodged against him. At this point in the 
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proceedings, the trial court asked Officer Hoffman to explain why the 

magisterial district court had ordered restitution. Following his explanation, 

the trial court asked Appellant if his challenge was limited to the amount of 

the restitution fees, to which Appellant replied in the affirmative. The trial 

court found Appellant guilty and reinstated the sentence imposed by the 

magisterial district justice with regard to fines and costs, but vacated the 

restitution award. No post-sentence motion was filed. 

On August 16, 2016, Attorney Gaussa entered her appearance on 

behalf of Appellant and filed this timely appeal. That same day, the trial

court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal within twenty-one days. When Appellant 

failed to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement, the trial court filed a 

Statement in Lieu of Opinion on September 16, 2016, urging this Court to 

dismiss the appeal since all issues were waived due to Appellant’s failure to 

file the Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) concise 

statement the same day, prompting the trial court to issue a supplemental 

opinion on October 20, 2016, addressing the issues identified therein “[i]n 

the event that the Superior Court addresses Appellant’s claims.” Trial Court 

Supplemental Opinion, 10/20/16, at 1.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion 

when it denied [Appellant] due process under the 
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Pennsylvania Constitution and the Constitution of the United 

States?

2. Whether the trial court was without jurisdiction over this case 

as the subject of the criminal charges, the dog, was not 

owned by [Appellant] at the time charges were filed nor had 

the dog been kept in Fayette County for over seven months 

when the charges were filed against [Appellant]?

3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abuse[d] its discretion in 

admitting irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence without 

defense counsel present, [when] by prior appearances on the 

issue at hand the court was aware of the defense counsel on 

this case and the circumstances for the defense counsel's 

unavailability the date of the scheduled summary appeal 

trial?

4. Whether the Court erred and/or abused its discretion in 

denying Appellant[’s] pro se request[] for a continuance prior 

to the trial date and by not affording Appellant the 

opportunity for a continuance at the time of the trial to allow 

his counsel to be present as the circumstances surrounding 

counsel's unavailability were known to the court?

5. Whether the court erred and/or abused its discretion in 

granting counsel's request for a continuance dated June 7, 

2016 in motions court then proceeded to deny Appellant's 

direct request for a continuance?

6. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in 

allowing the Appellant to proceed without counsel and enter 

into a guilty plea without counsel present or discussing with 

counsel, as this action waived his Constitutional right to be 

confronted by his accuser and the accuser was not present on 

the date of the trial?

Appellant’s brief at 8-10 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Preliminarily, we must address the effect of Appellant’s failure to 

timely comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which is a prerequisite to appellate 

merits review. Attorney Gaussa entered her appearance and filed the appeal 
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on Appellant’s behalf. Thus, Appellant was represented by counsel when the 

Rule 1925(b) statement was ordered. Counsel’s failure to file a Rule 

1925(b) statement has been held to constitute per se ineffective assistance 

of counsel, and the remedy is to remand to permit the nunc pro tunc filing of 

such a statement and to give the trial court the opportunity to address the 

issues raised therein. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3). Here, however, as in 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428 (Pa.Super. 2009), counsel did 

not completely fail to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Rather, the statement 

was untimely filed. As we recognized in Burton, the untimely filing of a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on behalf of a defendant seeking to appeal is 

the equivalent of a complete failure to file because it results in waiver of all 

issues on appeal without any reasonable basis. However, where a statement 

has been filed, albeit late, and the trial court has issued an opinion 

addressing the issues raised, remand would not serve any purpose. Thus, 

we held in Burton that, in such circumstances, this Court may decide the 

appeal on the merits. 

That is precisely the situation herein. Counsel was per se ineffective in 

failing to timely file the Rule 1925(b) statement. However, since such a 

statement was filed and the trial court addressed the issues raised therein, 

we will proceed to the merits. 

Appellant alleges first that he was deprived of due process and his 

right to counsel because the court denied his request for continuance and 
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failed to inform him of the charges against him. In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement, Appellant purported to preserve this alleged error as follows: 

“Appellant was denied due process.” The trial court found this statement too 

vague to address, and dismissed it as meritless on that basis. We concur. 

We have explained that a Rule 1925(b) statement “must properly 

specify the error to be addressed on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Hansley, 

24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa.Super. 2011). “The Rule 1925(b) statement must be 

specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issue an 

appellant wishes to raise on appeal.” Id. When a court has to guess what 

issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.” 

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa.Super. 2001). “A 

Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the 

issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement 

at all.” Id. at 686-87. 

In the instant case, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) concise statement 

vaguely levels the accusation that there was some due process violation at 

some point in time. It was not specific enough to allow for a cogent analysis 

by the trial court. We find Appellant’s first issue waived for lack of specificity 

in Appellant’s 1925(b) concise statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4). 

However, to the extent that Appellant’s due process claim overlaps other 

issues specifically articulated in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement and 

raised herein, we will address his concerns. 
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Second, Appellant challenges the Fayette County Court of Common 

Pleas’ jurisdiction to hear this case.2 He alleges that since Roscoe was 

owned by persons who did not reside in Fayette County at the time charges 

were filed, Fayette County lacked jurisdiction. This challenge is without 

merit.

All courts of common pleas have statewide jurisdiction over any case 

arising under the Crimes Code. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 

1066, 1074 (Pa. 2003). Appellant’s complaint actually resembles a 

challenge to venue, the procedural protection designed so that a party is 

tried in the court closest to where the crime occurred because the evidence 

and witnesses are most likely to be located there. Id. Venue is generally 

appropriate in the court with the closest geographical connection to the 

events at issue. Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251, 1258-59 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (citing Bethea, supra at 1075). 

The facts of the instant case are undisputed. At the time of the 

incident, Appellant owned Roscoe. Roscoe escaped from Appellant’s 

residence and attacked Mr. Record’s dog, all within Fayette County. Further, 

a Fayette County animal control officer filed the private complaint. Thus, the 

____________________________________________

2 As part of his challenge to jurisdiction, Appellant challenges his conviction 

as a dog owner under the definition of owner in the Pennsylvania Dog Law, 3 

P.S. § 459-502(a)(3), which he maintains is unconstitutionally vague. This 

challenge, asserted for the first time on appeal, is waived. 
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court with the closest geographical connection to the events at issue was the 

Fayette County Court of Common Pleas and the venue herein was proper.

In this third issue, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in 

permitting Officer Hoffman to offer hearsay testimony without the 

administration of an oath. Appellant’s brief at 28-29; Pa.R.E. 603. He 

contends that this violated the Confrontation Clause and the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Evidence’s prohibition against hearsay testimony. Since Appellant 

did not object at the time, he failed to preserve the issue for appellate 

review. However, Appellant attributes his failure to object to the fact that he 

was wrongfully denied his right to counsel and “vulnerable.” Appellant’s 

brief at 29. This contention, together with Appellant’s fourth issue, that the 

court abused its discretion in denying a continuance to permit counsel to be 

present at the summary trial, relate to Appellant’s final issue: that he was 

denied the right to counsel. For ease of disposition, we address Appellant’s 

sixth issue first: the right to counsel. 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to proceed 

without counsel. Appellant’s claim, at its essence, is that he should have 

been afforded counsel to advise him to contest the district justice’s guilty 

verdict. He suggests that if he had counsel at the summary trial, counsel 

might have brought a motion to dismiss or advised Appellant to proceed 

differently. See Appellant’s brief at 40. He avers that the trial court erred 

by failing to advise him of his right to counsel or appointing counsel on his 
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behalf or continuing the case until counsel could be present. Furthermore, 

he contends that his lack of counsel resulted in the Commonwealth’s 

introduction of hearsay evidence, depriving him of his right to confront his 

accuser. For the following reasons, Appellant’s claims lack merit.

It is well-settled that, “[g]enerally, there is ‘no requirement, either 

under the United States Constitution or under the Pennsylvania Constitution, 

that defendants in all summary cases be provided with counsel.’” 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 868 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Long, 688 A.2d 198, 201 (Pa.Super. 1996)). An 

indigent defendant charged with a summary offense is entitled to appointed 

counsel where there is a reasonable likelihood of imprisonment. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 122, 454(A)(2)(b). Further, for a summary trial, a defendant is 

only entitled to be advised of a right to counsel if there is “a reasonable 

likelihood of a sentence of imprisonment or probation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

454(A)(2). A reasonable likelihood of imprisonment or probation requires 

more than the mere possibility under the statute. See Commonwealth v. 

Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa.Super 2006) (citing Argersinger v. 

Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)). 

The statute under which Appellant was charged allows for a sentence 

of no more than ninety days imprisonment. 3 Pa.C.S. § 459-903(b)(1). 

However, the Commonwealth did not seek imprisonment or probation, the 

magisterial district justice did not sentence Appellant to imprisonment, and 
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the trial court clearly had no interest in sentencing Appellant to a term of 

imprisonment. In fact, as noted supra, the Commonwealth and Appellant 

indicated to the trial court that the concern was the restitution, not the 

underlying charges. N.T., 7/20/16, at 3, 5, 8. The trial court vacated the 

restitution award. Id. at 8.

Appellant does not offer any support for his contention that he was 

constitutionally entitled to counsel at his summary trial. He argues only that 

he had the right to present his own defense and the right to confront the 

witnesses against him, which no one contests. In this case, there was no 

reasonable likelihood of a sentence of imprisonment or probation and 

Appellant did not receive a sentence of imprisonment or probation.3 Thus, 

he was not entitled to counsel or to be advised by the trial court of any right 

to counsel, and the trial court did not err by proceeding without counsel 

present.

Nor did the absence of counsel result in any violation of the 

Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to an opportunity 

to challenge the evidence and witnesses presented against him. 

____________________________________________

3

 While not dispositive, the fact that Appellant was not sentenced to a term 

of imprisonment or probation is probative. See Commonwealth v. 

Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa.Super. 2006) (listing the fact that the 

appellant was not sentenced to imprisonment and only received fines as a 

factor in its Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 analysis). 
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U.S.Const.Amend. VI; see Commonwealth v. Brown, 139 A.3d 208, 212 

(Pa.Super. 2016). The Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses providing 

testimony for the purposes of establishing or proving a fact in the case 

against the accused. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 562 U.S. 36, 51 

(2004)). Thus, in this case, Appellant had the right to challenge any 

evidence or testimony adduced at trial for the purpose of proving his guilt, 

although he chose not to do so. He only sought relief from the restitution 

award. 

As trial commenced, the Commonwealth represented to the court that 

it had worked out a resolution with Appellant. Id. at 3. The court then 

inquired of Appellant whether he was represented by Ms. Gaussa. Appellant 

informed the court that Ms. Gaussa “ended up taking my case pro bono, but 

. . . she ended up leaving to get married and she’s out.” Id. Upon 

confirming that Attorney Gaussa never entered an appearance of Appellant’s 

behalf, the court asked Appellant whether he had negotiated an agreement 

with the Commonwealth. Appellant acknowledged that they had discussed 

the fines but told the court that, “the fines ain’t really the problem. It’s 

mainly the $5,700 vet bill.” Id. The court told Appellant that was a civil 

matter and that he was not going to order Appellant to pay the veterinary 

bills. Id. Appellant questioned the effect of the district justice’s order to 

pay the $5,700 bill. 
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At that point, the court turned to Officer Hoffman and asked him if he 

understood what Appellant was saying about restitution. The officer advised 

the court that the owner of the dog that was attacked testified that he 

incurred $5,700 in damages to his dog. Id. at 6. The district justice 

imposed fines, costs, and the entire amount of the veterinary bill as 

restitution. The trial court and the Commonwealth agreed that the 

veterinary bills were a civil matter. 

The trial court specifically asked Appellant whether he was challenging 

the underlying charges:

The Court: All right, so Mr. Crawford, you’re not disputing the 

allegations that, what happened with the dog, you just don’t 

want to pay the vet bill basically? That’s your issue?

The Defendant: Basically, yes.

Id. at 8. 

The record reveals that Officer Hoffman did not “testify” or offer 

evidence regarding the charges. The officer was not sworn in as a witness 

because there was no need for his testimony. Furthermore, his response to 

the trial court was not “hearsay” as it was not elicited to establish 

Appellant’s guilt or innocence. Since Appellant did not contest the charges, 

the Commonwealth did not present a case against Appellant and no evidence 

was adduced at trial to prove Appellant’s guilt. There were no witnesses to 

confront as no evidence or testimony was presented to prove facts tending 

to establish his guilt. See Crawford, supra, at 51 (the Confrontation 
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Clause applies to witnesses who bear testimony for the purpose of 

establishing some fact establishing the guilt of the accused). Thus, 

Appellant’s Confrontation Clause rights were neither implicated nor violated. 

The trial court granted Appellant’s request for relief from restitution, but 

upheld the district justice’s finding of guilt. Id. 

Since Appellant was not legally entitled to counsel, the denial of the 

continuances that would have allowed counsel to attend the summary trial 

did not implicate that right. To the extent that Appellant simply alleges that 

the trial court erred in denying both Attorney Gaussa’s oral request for a 

continuance and Appellant’s subsequent pro se request for a continuance, 

we address it on that basis. 

"The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon 

a showing of an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. 

Boxley, 948 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. 2008). "An abuse of discretion 

is not merely an error of judgment; rather discretion is abused 

when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment 

exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the 

record[.]" Id. Moreover, "[a] bald allegation of an insufficient 

amount of time to prepare will not provide a basis for reversal of 

the denial of a continuance motion." Commonwealth v. Ross, 

57 A.3d 85, 91 (Pa.Super. 2012). "An appellant must be able to 

show specifically in what manner he was unable to prepare for 

his defense or how he would have prepared differently had he 

been given more time. We will not reverse a denial of a motion 

for continuance in the absence of prejudice.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 745-46 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(internal parentheticals omitted).
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Attorney Gaussa, appearing as counsel for New Owners, orally 

requested a continuance of the summary trial at the June 7, 2016 motions 

court hearing. Attorney Gaussa was not Appellant’s counsel, and had no 

standing to seek a continuance. Appellant maintains, however, that because 

the trial court initially intimated a willingness to change the trial date to 

accommodate Attorney Gaussa’s schedule, it abused its discretion when it 

later denied the request. 

The trial court explained the reasons why it changed its mind 

regarding Attorney Gaussa’s requested continuance: 

[T]his court only entertained Attorney Gaussa’s oral motion for 

continuance during motions court on June 7, 2016 because this 

court was under the impression that she would represent 

Appellant. However, since Attorney Gaussa only represented the 

subsequent dog owners and not Appellant, then the subsequent 

dog owners lacked standing to request a continuance in this 

matter.

Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 10/20/16, at 6 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). Thus, the court likely would have granted the continuance if the 

moving party had standing and if Attorney Gaussa was Appellant’s counsel of 

record. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its denial of this 

request for continuance.4

____________________________________________

4 Arguably Appellant does not make the requisite showing of prejudice due 

to the denial. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 745-46 

(Pa.Super. 2014). He sought relief from the restitution that had been 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant maintains further that the denial of his pro se request for a 

continuance constituted an abuse of discretion because it was based on a 

local policy. In support of his position, Appellant cites our sister court’s 

decision in Gillespie v. Department of Transportation, 886 A.2d 317 

(Pa.Cmwlth. 2005), which while not binding, may be cited as persuasive 

authority. See Little Mt. Cmty. Ass’n v. S. Columbia Corp, 92 A.3d 

1191, 1198 n.14 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting In re Barnes Foundation, 74 

A.3d 129, 134 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2013)). In Gillespie, the trial court blindly 

adhered to a policy of only allowing continuances where both parties agreed. 

The Commonwealth Court held that the trial court abused its discretion 

because it did not exercise any discretion at all. 

The Fayette County policy herein is inapposite. As the trial court 

explained, there are two types of continuance motions, “routine” and 

“priority.” See Trial Court Supplemental Opinion at 5. When both parties 

agree to a continuance, a routine motion so stating is filed and ruled upon 

without a hearing. Id. In the event one or more parties do not consent to 

the continuance, a priority motion must be filed and presented to the court 

for a ruling on the motion. Id. In this case, Appellant filed a routine motion 

but without the Commonwealth’s consent. Id. Unlike the trial court in 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

imposed by the magisterial district judge. The trial court granted him the 

relief he sought. 
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Gillespie, the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas does not have a 

“standing policy that all parties must agree to a continuance.” Gillespie, 

supra at 319. Rather, when all parties do not consent, the trial court must 

exercise its discretion and determine whether to grant a motion for 

continuance. Appellant’s failure to follow the proper procedure deprived the 

trial court of the opportunity to exercise its discretion. This claim fails. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, no relief is due. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/17/2017