NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MARCOS G., BRANDON B., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, B.G., M.G., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0133

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD40133

The Honorable Todd F. Lang, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant Marcos G.

Czop Law Firm PLLC, Higley

By Steven Czop

Counsel for Appellant Brandon B.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 11-10-2022
MARCOS G. et al. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Marcos G. and Brandon B., biological fathers, appeal from an 

order terminating their parental rights to minor children M.G. and B.G., 

respectively.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 After receiving an emergency custody order on October 28, 

2020, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took B.G. into custody on 

November 2, 2020, filed a dependency petition on November 4, 2020, took 

M.G. into custody on December 11, 2020, and moved to terminate both 

fathers’ parental rights on December 7, 2021.2 The juvenile court held a 

termination hearing on May 2, 2022.

I. Marcos G.

¶3 Marcos G., father of M.G., has a long history of substance 

abuse, beginning when he was 15 and continuing through the day of the 

termination trial, as he admitted to using Fentanyl that morning. He has 

conceded that his substance abuse impedes his ability to care for M.G. and 

that it has caused him to “leav[e] stuff around that shouldn’t be around.”

At times during the dependency proceedings, he also struggled with

homelessness, mental health issues, and he once attempted suicide.

1 Both Children share the same mother, who is not a party to this 

appeal. 

2 The juvenile court relied on an erroneous entry in Garcia’s Exhibit 2 

saying M.G. was taken into DCS custody on February 11, 2020, but the rest 

of the record indicates he was taken into DCS custody on December 11, 

2020. See Garcia’s Exhibit 2 at 4; 3 at 2, 4; 4 at 2, 5; 5 at 2, 5; 6 at 2, 5. Either 

date satisfies the nine-months’ time-in-care grounds that form part of the 

basis of this appeal. 
MARCOS G. et al. v. DCS et al.

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¶4 Marcos G. was referred for drug testing, substance-abuse 

assessment and treatment through TERROS, supervised visitation, and 

mental health assessment and services, provided he first demonstrated 30 

days of sobriety. However, he never demonstrated the requisite period of 

sobriety, failed to participate in TERROS services beyond initial screenings, 

only took two drug tests, and tested positive for cocaine in July of 2021. He 

was also unable to conduct many visits with M.G., partly due to his work 

schedule and homelessness. 

¶5 At the termination hearing, an assigned DCS caseworker 

testified that Marcos G. could not reunify with M.G. because he was not 

sober, had not addressed his mental health issues, and had only recently 

obtained housing through family members. The court found this testimony 

credible.

II. Brandon B.

¶6 Brandon B., father of B.G., testified at the termination hearing 

that he was on Seriously Mentally Ill (“SMI”) probation and has “anger 

issues and . . . ADHD,” and “emotional regulation issues” regarding 

parenting of B.G. His probation began in 2019 after a domestic violence 

incident involving Marcos G. and M.G.’s and B.G.’s mother, and he 

demonstrated anger and behavioral issues throughout the proceedings. He 

refused to provide a urinalysis sample in front of another person,

threatened to assault testing staff and kill the DCS case worker, and has 

made other violent threats. He was also convicted of solicitation to commit 

abduction from a state agency after abducting B.G. from her grandfather’s 

home. The grandfather later reported B.G. had nightmares about the 

kidnapping and Brandon B.’s subsequent arrest.

¶7 Brandon B. was referred to TERROS for assessment and 

treatment, PSI testing, psychological consult and evaluation, supervised 

visitation, Family Connections services, parent aide services, case 

management services, domestic violence counseling at SAGE, and 

transportation services. He tested positive for methamphetamine and 

amphetamine in early 2021, did not participate in TERROS assessment or 

treatment, did not test at PSI after July of 2021, missed four psychological 

evaluations because they were in the morning, missed SAGE domestic 

violence sessions, and had conflicts with the SAGE staff. He has also 

admitted grabbing B.G. and leaving bruises on her arms.

¶8 At trial, the assigned DCS caseworker testified that Brandon

B. could not reunify with B.G. because of ongoing substance abuse, lack of 
MARCOS G. et al. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

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stable housing, and untreated “significant” mental health issues. The court 

found this testimony credible and noted Brandon B. had not provided 

credible evidence of financial support for B.G.

III. Grounds for Termination and Jurisdiction.

¶9 On May 13, 2022, the court terminated both fathers’ parental 

rights based on the nine-months’ time-in-care ground and finding

termination was in the children’s best interests. The court also terminated 

Marcos G.’s parental rights on an alternative ground of abandonment.

¶10 Both fathers timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A), and 12-2101(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review.

¶11 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find clear 

and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground articulated in 

A.R.S. § 8–533(B) has been proven and must find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. Kent K. v. Bobby 

M., 210 Ariz. 279, 280 ¶ 1, 288 ¶ 41 (2005). Because the court “is in the best 

position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of 

witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” we will affirm an order terminating 

parental rights as long as it is supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan C. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation omitted);

see Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151 ¶ 18 (2018).

II. Nine-Months’ Time-in-Care.

¶12 The court may terminate parental rights if—despite DCS’ 

diligent reunification efforts—the child has spent at least nine cumulative 

months in a court-ordered out-of-home placement and “the parent has 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances 

that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement.”3 A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(a). Parental rights may be terminated despite “sporadic . . . 

attempts to remedy” such circumstances. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. 

3 Neither father challenges the court’s finding that the children were 

in an out-of-home placement for nine months or longer, and they have 

therefore conceded its accuracy. See Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 388 

(1960). 
MARCOS G. et al. v. DCS et al.

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JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994). Moreover, DCS need not “provide 

every conceivable service or . . . ensure that a parent participates in each 

service it offers.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 

(App. 1994). 

¶13 Marcos G. argues that the record does not support the court’s

findings that DCS made diligent and reasonable efforts to provide 

appropriate reunification services and that he failed to remedy the 

circumstances causing M.G.’s placement. However, DCS offered him 

numerous services, including services intended to help him with his 

substance abuse and mental health issues. Despite this, he tested positive 

for cocaine in July of 2021, was never able to participate in mental health 

services because he did not demonstrate sufficient sobriety, and missed 

visits with M.G. Marcos G. essentially asks that we reweigh the evidence

because DCS did not provide him with a parent support partner, inpatient 

treatment, housing, or mental health treatment; because for certain periods 

DCS and TERROS had inaccurate contact information for him; and because 

the court focused on his lack of success in remedying the placement 

circumstances instead of his efforts. But we will not disturb the court’s 

findings where, as here, the court relied on reasonable evidence to find DCS 

offered sufficient services and Marcos G.’s efforts were sporadic, thwarted 

in large part by his disengagement or inattention, and inadequate. See Alma 

S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18.

¶14 Marcos G. also appeals the court’s alternative ground for 

termination of his parental rights based on the abandonment ground. 

However, we need not address this argument because we conclude that 

sufficient evidence supports the court’s termination on nine-months’ timein-care ground. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 3 

(App. 2002). 

¶15 Brandon B. contends the court erred by considering whether 

he successfully remedied the circumstances causing B.G.’s placement 

instead of focusing solely on his efforts to remedy the circumstances. 

However, reasonable evidence supports the court’s findings that he failed 

to put forth enough effort to remedy his mental health, anger, and sobriety 

issues. He failed to show up for mental health services, missed his 

psychological evaluations, missed several domestic violence counseling 

sessions and classes, tested positive for illegal substances, missed most of 

his urinalyses and oral swabs, and consistently demonstrated anger and 

threatened violence throughout the proceedings. Brandon B.’s critique 

invites us to reevaluate the evidence in light of his condition and efforts. 
MARCOS G. et al. v. DCS et al.

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But reasonable evidence supports the court’s findings, and we must decline 

to reweigh that evidence. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18.

¶16 Brandon B. further argues his efforts to remedy the 

circumstances causing B.G.’s placement were satisfactory, given his SMI 

diagnosis, and that he was doing “the best he could.” However, since 

Brandon B. was not found incompetent and the court was aware of his SMI 

status, it is the province of the juvenile court to determine whether his 

efforts were sufficient. See id. Because reasonable evidence supports the 

court’s findings that his efforts were unsatisfactory, we must again decline 

to reweigh the evidence. See id.

III. Best Interests.

¶17 After finding statutory grounds support termination of 

parental rights, the court must consider whether termination is in the 

child’s best interests under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 149–50 

¶¶ 8–9, 13; A.R.S. § 8-533. “The child’s interest in stability and security must 

be the court’s primary concern.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 12. The court 

must find either that the child would benefit from termination of the 

parent’s rights or that the child would be harmed by continuing a 

relationship with the parent. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 

Ariz. 1, 5 (1990); see also Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13.

¶18 Here, Marcos G. contends the court abused its discretion by 

failing to make findings concerning the totality of the circumstances 

regarding him and M.G., and by finding termination was in M.G.’s best 

interests when he had housing and employment by the date of the 

termination hearing. However, the court did consider the totality of the 

circumstances. And it relied on reasonable evidence to find adoption was 

in both children’s best interests. The court found that both children were 

bonded with their grandfather, he was meeting their needs, they were 

thriving and enjoying the stability and security from living with him, and 

they could have a sibling relationship with each other. The court also found 

maintaining a parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the 

children because of Marcos G.’s substance abuse and Brandon B.’s mental 

health and anger issues. We will not disturb the court’s findings because 

the evidence supports them. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 18.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

¶19 Brandon B. further seeks reversal of the termination of his 

parental rights due to ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail under 

such an argument, he must prove his counsel was deficient in a specific 
MARCOS G. et al. v. DCS et al.

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manner that caused “fundamental unfairness” or that “shocks the 

conscience.” See Royce C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 129, 137–38 ¶¶ 24–

25 (App. 2021). Because the right to counsel in termination proceedings is 

not constitutional but rather provided by A.R.S. § 8-221, it is not 

synonymous with the constitutional right to counsel in criminal 

proceedings. As such, relief because of ineffective assistance of counsel in 

parental rights cases is “an extraordinary remedy, unavailable in all but the 

most egregious cases.” Id. ¶¶ 24–26. 

¶20 Here, Brandon B. argues his counsel was ineffective by failing

to: “speak on his . . . behalf at the review hearings [and] request . . . 

accommodations for a client diagnosed as SMI”; “object to reasonable 

efforts under a nine month time-in-care ground”; inform the court he

engaged in services; and “assert [his] bond with B.G.” However, Brandon

B. failed to specify what additional accommodations his counsel should 

have requested. Further, the court listed numerous efforts DCS undertook 

to accommodate Brandon B., in which he failed to engage fully. Our review 

of the record does not substantiate any egregious deficiencies on the part of 

Brandon B.’s counsel, that his counsel caused fundamental unfairness, or 

that his counsel acted in a way that shocks the conscience. Accordingly, 

Brandon B.’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.