INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

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ACCOUNTING

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Paul D. Mather !
M.I.A.

ACCOUNTING FOR

THE MISSING

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1
19960716 081

M.I.A.

ACCOUNTING FOR

THE MISSING

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

PAUL D. MATHER

1994

National Defense University Press

Washington, DC
National Defense University Press

To increase general knowledge and inform discussion, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, through its publication arm the NDU Press, publishes McNair Papers; proceedings of University- and Institute-sponsored

symposia; books relating to U.S. national security, especially to issues of

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publishes out-of-print defense classics, historical works and other especially

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Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this volume are

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Cleared for public release, distribution unlimited.

Photographs are by the author, except for the Associated Press photograph on p. 119.

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call(202) 783-3238, or write to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S.

Government Printing Office

Library of Congress, Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mather, Paul D., 1938-

M.I.A. : accounting in Southeast Asia / Paul D. Mather,

p. cm.

Includes index.

1. Vietnamese Conflicts, 1961-1975—Missing in action—United States. 2.

Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975—Prisoners and prisons. 3. Prisoners of war—United

States. 4. United States—Foreign relations—Indochina. 5. Indochina—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. II. Title: MIA.

—DS559.8.M5M37 1994

_959.704'31-dc20 94-28928

CIP

First printing, December 1994

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail StopiSSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-036391 -8

VI
CONTENTS

FOREWORD xi

PREFACE xiii

THE UNACCOUNTED FOR xix

CHAPTER 1: THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS 1

MIAs and Ending the Conflict 1

An Uneasy Cease-fire 4

The Four-Party Joint Military Team 6

Joint Casualty Resolution Center 10

JCRC Operations Begin 13

Sea Salvage Operations 15

"Public Communications" and the Rewards

Program 16

More Casualties and a Changed Concept 20

A Reduced JCRC 26

CHAPTER 2: A WINDING DOWN 35

A Period of Malaise 35

The Role of Congress 40

The Woodcock Commission 51

The Move Toward US-Vietnam Normalization 61

CHAPTER 3: HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY 69

Refugees Stream From Indochina 69

MIA Reports Flow In 74

vii
The Information Proves Useful 79

Progress Slows 84

The Reagan Inheritance 87

Reorganizing for More Effective Action 89

CHAPTER 4: PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT 95

The National League of Families 95

Other MIA Interest Groups 100

Rise of the "Rambos" 103

Efforts of Untrained Amateurs 109

Attempts by the "Con Artists" 112

CHAPTER 5: RENEWED EFFORTS 123

Establishing and Maintaining Contact 123

Technical Meetings 130

Field Work 133

Uneven Progress 142

CHAPTER 6: TOWARD CASUALTY

RESOLUTION 151

"Creating a Favorable Atmosphere" 151

Special Presidential Emissary 155

The Vessey-Thach Agreements 158

Parallel Progress in Laos 166

1988, Turning the Corner 168

More Recent Progress in Vietnam 170

Movement in Laos and Cambodia 175

Looking Back 177

EPILOGUE 183

GLOSSARY 189

INDEX 193

THE AUTHOR 207
PHOTOGRAPHS

A poster on a tree in Con Tho City solicits

casualty information 19

JCRC members load the flag-covered body of

Captain Richard Rees onto an aircraft in Saigon .... 24

Members of the House Select Committee on

Missing Persons met with Vietnamese officials in

Hanoi in late 1975 41

This bas-relief on a factory wall in Hanoi reports

the shootdown of an American aircraft 77

Vietnamese citizen Tran Huu Hai (also known as

"Tony" Hai) . 105

Peace Corps worker Greg Kamm, who was

misrepresented as an American POW by

unscrupulous individuals in Thailand 113

Mr. Charles Strait, who posed as an American

POW 116

A display of one million dollars in cash,

representing a reward offered for the safe return

of an American POW from Southeast Asia 119

American and Vietnamese workers excavate the

site of a 1972bomber crash near Hanoi 139

A joint American-Vietnamese team is poled

across a reservoir near Thanh Hoa 144

IX
The SRV repatriated a number of American

remains to US custody at Hanoi's Noi Bai

Airport in April 1986 154

MAP

Mainland Southeast Asia xviii
FOREWORD

Among the numerous analyses of those missing in

action in Southeast Asia, this study is the first to concentrate on the process whereby the US military tried to resolve each case. Much of the continuing controversy

ignores or refuses to accept the fact that the US Government, through the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and

other mechanisms, has made a thorough, sustained, good

faith effort to determine the fate of every serviceman declared missing in action in that conflict. The author, who

spent more than 15 years in Southeast Asia taking part

in those endeavors, tells the story of this unique effort

from the point of view of an informed insider.

A member of the MIA search team from the early

1970s through the late 1980s, Paul Mather is well qualified to relate the history of this effort. He covers a wide

range oftopics, from field work at crash sites and personal

interchanges with Vietnamese, Cambodian, Lao, and

Thai officials, through the various international accords

that governed the activities of the US investigatory teams.

Although political changes in the United States alternately facilitated or hampered search efforts, the attempt

to resolve every case never ceased. Colonel Mather faithfully records the efforts of individuals and organizations

XI
that played major roles in this drama: congressional committees; the National League of Families; private citizens

who made sincere efforts to help; senior government officials like General John Vessey,who headed a special fullaccounting commission; military agencies such as the

Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Army's Central Identification Laboratory; scoundrels and swindlers

who exploited the tragedy for personal gain; and selfstyled Rambos who acted on their own.

This account should help to wrap up an especially

emotional chapter of the Vietnam war. By telling how the

process worked for almost two decades, it contributes to

the full accounting desired by all.

SLQy

PAUL G. CERJAN

Lieutenant General, US Army

President, National Defense University
PREFACE

As a member of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) from its formation in Saigon in early 1973

until my reassignment back to the continental United

States from Bangkok in the fall of 1988, I have had the

unique opportunity to occupy a front row seat to events

in Southeast Asia. More importantly, I have had the extreme good fortune to have spent over fifteen years as

either a participant or a close observer of the US government's efforts to resolve the issue of American servicemen

still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as a consequence

of the Vietnam war. For those most directly involved,

these efforts always carried with them a sense of urgency,

and we were surrounded by co-workers who shared in

the dedication and enthuiasm for the task. It was a period

of extreme frustration and constant challenge, of numerous disappointments, and only a small measure of progress and success. But by far the most satisfying feature

was the knowledge that ours was simply a mission of great

humanitarian importance, that of helping determine the

fate of our comrades-in-arms. No one who has served

in the military could possibly wish for a more fulfilling

assignment.

Though since 1975 the United States has had comparatively narrow dealings with the former Indochinese

states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the issue of the

xiii
missing in action (MIAs) and the prisoners of war

(POWs) has loomed large in our limited intercourse.

From the US point of view, this was the main issue left

unresolved when direct United States involvement in the

Vietnam conflict ended.

Having devoted such a large percentage of my military career to this issue, I find it disturbing to hear the

occasional allegations that nothing has been done by the

United States to resolve the POW/MIA problem, or that

our government has approached this problem with ill intent. Milder criticism, perhaps correct, has implied that

there have been periods when opportunities were missed,

or when we might have done better, or when we could

have gone faster. More severe criticism has alleged that

our government was guilty of cover-up and duplicity.

But, behind what at times may have seemed to be an

unfeeling bureaucracy, in fact there have been very many

highly skilled military and civilian officials who have pursued this difficult mission with great dedication, sincerely

hoping for ultimate success. My hope is that this simple

monograph will shed some light on these efforts, both

successful and unsuccessful.

I make no claim that this is an unbiased account.

Nor is it, by any stretch of the imagination, in any way

a complete account; the US government's POW/MIA

activity is much too broad to cover in detail within the

scope of this limited study. In addition, my view was

limited to that of a member of the JCRC, stationed first

in Saigon and later in Bangkok half a world away from

the flagpole in Washington DC where many of the decisions were made. There is no doubt that someone working this issue from the Washington DC end would see

things differently.

Though the reader may detect a bias toward the role

of the JCRC, there is no intent to downplay the role of

others. The many elements of the Departments of Defense and State, the Army's Central Identification Laboratory, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National

Security Council, the CIA, the National Security

Agency, and even less directly related organizations such

xiv
as the Drug Enforcement Agency and the FBI, among

many others, have contributed in their own way to this

task. It is a tribute to our form of government that "the

bureaucracy" can unite and generate such a concerted

effort to determine the fate of those warriors who did not

return to their families following a conflict. The citizenry

of most other countries on this planet are not as fortunate.

Readers may also detect greater emphasis on discussion of our interactions with Vietnam, and might question the author's lesser emphasis on Laos and Cambodia.

There are several reasons for this. An argument can be

made that Vietnam is the "first among equals" of the

former Indochinese states, and that any activity on the

POW/MIA issue with Vietnam will have a corresponding

effect on activity in the other two countries. I happen

to subscribe to this argument, and fully expect that as

cooperation on this issue improves between the United

States and Vietnam, we will see a corresponding increase

in cooperation with both Laos and Cambodia. More importantly, however, since the United States had no diplomatic relations with Vietnam—and therefore no embassy

or ambassador in Hanoi—those of us in the JCRC often

found ourselves acting as intermediaries between our two

countries, dealing directly with Vietnamese officials.

Thus we had more firsthand and direct knowledge of

events relating to the issue. This situation is contrasted

with that in Laos where the United States did not break

diplomatic relations and has maintained an embassy in

Vientiane over the intervening years since the communist

takeover of the Lao government. There, the JCRC has

played a supporting role, always subordinate to the

United States embassy.

In the case of Cambodia, the tragic events there precluded all but the most minimal contact—by any element

of the United States government—during the years following the 1975 communist takeover. These factors notwithstanding, the reader should not interpret the author's

emphasis on Vietnam as indicative of a lack of governmental concern for those hundreds of servicemen yet unaccounted for in Laos and Cambodia; certainly no slight

is intended.

xv
I would like to express my appreciation to the staff

of the National Defense University for affording me the

opportunity and the environment in which to reflect and

write. Particular thanks go to Dr. John Endicott, Dr.

Fred Kiley, Dr. Joe Goldberg, and Dr. Dora Alves for

their encouragement and assistance. The unsung staff of

the NDU Library also deserve my praise for the research

assistance so necessary for filling in the many voids in my

fading memory. Invaluable assistance was also provided

by the staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),

and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). Both

gave me unrestricted access to their files. A special thanks

must also go to one who shares my interest in Southeast

Asia and who played a special role in advocating this

project, Dr. Lewis Stern from the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Though I have received encouragement and assistance from many friends, the responsibility for all errors,

faults, misinterpretations, or shortcomings in this manuscript, is entirely mine.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to a group

of special people who still suffer, mostly in silence, from

the lingering effects of the Vietnam conflict: the families

of those still unaccounted for. May their burden be eased

someday soon.

PAUL D. MATHER

Washington, DC

xvi
M.I.A.

ACCOUNTING FOR

THE MISSING

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
503413 7-77
THE UNACCOUNTED FOR

Lt is early morning in South Vietnam, Tuesday, the 17th of

June, 1969. As the rising sun burns ofj the haze and chases away

the dew and dampness, Private First Class Donald Lee Sparks

and the others in his platoon proceed cautiously through the abandoned rice field to the west of Tarn Ky. Private Sparks reflects

briefly on the contrast between this war-torn and hostile countryside

and the peaceful fields of Iowa where he grew'up.

Sparks' attention is suddenly attracted to movements off to his

right. A Vietnamese man, apparently a woodcutter, briefly appears

at the edge of the clearing, then quickly darts away through the

underbrush and up toward the top of a nearby rise. Sensing the

unusual nature of this behavior, Sparks' platoon warily pursues,

and soon comes upon a small thatched hut about halfway up the

rise. As PFC Sparks and his teammates reconnoiter the hut, the

morning quiet isterrifyingly shattered bythe sudden crack of automatic armsfirefrom a nearby concealed bunker. Sparks and another

man are cut down immediately, both seemingly critically wounded.

Under the pressure of intense enemy fire, Sparks' unit isforced to

withdraw, unable to either help or retrieve the two wounded men.

Sparks is last glimpsed by his retreating teammates as enemy soldiers move into the area and strip his wounded body of his clothing

and weapon.

The follwing day, another United States patrol is dispatched

to the area to search for the two wounded men left behind. The

body of one man is recovered, but there remains absolutely no trace

of Private First Class Donald Lee Sparks.i
And thus begins another human tragedy. Another

American soldier is unaccounted for, a casualty whose

fate is uncertain, his exact whereabouts unknown. His

loved ones at home will be shocked by that ominous visit

to their door by a chaplain and a casualty representative

whose unhappy duty it is to provide notification, and the

familys' terrible agony will begin. They suffer and grieve,

and their hopes may be buoyed—or dashed—as additional information is learned.

Time passes . . . weeks, months, and years . . . and

additional information may not be forthcoming. For some

families there may eventually come a realization that the

loss in permanent, that the soldier will not return, that

in time of war these terrible things happen. For other

families there can be no time of acceptance. The thought

of loss is too great, and the hope remains that somehow,

someday, they will know, and the uncertainty of it all will

finally come to an end.

During the roughly one decade of direct United

States military involvement in the conflict in Southeast

Asia, nearly 3 million US servicemen served in our armed

forces in that theater. The war took a toll of over 58

thousand killed, and 300 thousand wounded.2 A small

number of prisoners were released while the hostilities

were still going on, and 591 US prisoners were eventually

released and repatriated back to United States control

during the emotional Operation Homecoming in early

1973. But there remained over 2,500 servicemen whose

fate was yet to be determined: those believed to have

been captured but who were not returned with the other

prisoners, those known to have been killed but whose

remains had not yet been recovered, and those who were

missing, with little known about the circumstances. The

resolution of these cases, the unaccounted for, was to

become—and still remains—the subject of great US concern and continuing intensive governmental effort.

Like the Vietnam war itself, the issue of the missingin-action is fraught with emotion.3

It is an issue which

has the attention of not only the Executive branch of our

government and the families directly concerned, but also
of the general public, the media, the congress, and certainly the ultimately victorious communist governments

of Indochina. Perhaps at no time in the history of American wars has such an organized effort been mounted to

resolve the fate of US servicemen as has occurred in the

case of the Vietnam War.4The effort has drawn praise

and even admiration from some quarters, while at the

same time prompting accusations of cover-up, duplicity,

and inaction on the part of the US government. Much

has been written and much has been said about the

MIAs, but there still exists considerable misinformation

and no small amount of disinformation. The issue of

American servicemen still unaccounted for as a result of

our longest war has brought out the emotional best in

many Americans and—unfortunately—the worst ina few.

The emotionalism of the issue is exemplified by such

charged headlines as "EX-CONGRESSMAN LEBOUTILLIER CALLS U.S. EFFORTS ON MIAS 'PATHETIC "

5

or "MIA ISSUE: PEROT BLAMES

GOVT FOR SLOW PROGRESS,6or such catchy

quotes as the following, attributed to would-be POW rescuer and former Green Beret officer James "Bo" Gritz:

"... But I'm afraid that only God, the mothers, the

wives who remained true, and the Special Forces want

the prisoners back."7

Despite the controversy implied by such headlines,

agreement is unanimous that the effort to resolve the fate

of our missing is unquestionably a proper obligation of

the US government. This is so, not only for very pragmatic military reasons, but also because it accords with

the American values and traditions for which these servicemen fought and sacrificed. In recent years efforts to

resolve the MIA issue have enjoyed consistent bipartisan

support in Congress, and have become a matter of high

national priority within the Executive branch and its associated agencies and departments. On innumerable occasions the President and other government officials have

reaffirmed to the American public and, more importantly, to the families themselves, a continuing commitment
to achieve the fullest possible accounting for those still

unaccounted for as a result ofthe hostilities in Indochina.

NOTES

1. The details of the incident involving PFC Sparks were extracted

from unclassified DIA and JCRC summary files.

2. These casualty figures, obtained from Department of Defense documents, like many of the statistics associated with the Vietnam conflict, lack precision and are therefore subject to further refinement or

qualification.

3. Strictly speaking, the term "missing-in-action" or "MIA" carries

a legal connotation implying that the service member still lives. As

used herein, the author accepts the more common use of the term

which implies that the member is still unaccounted for.

4. Indeed, there is still an on-going government effort to resolve the

fate of casualties from previous wars, particularly those from World

War II and the Korean War. The mechanism for this effort, however, is by comparison very straightforward and routine. This effort

does not involve such a complexity of organizations, and does not

bear the weight of emotion as US effort to resolve Vietnam War

casualties.

5. Headline for an article which appeared in the New York City Tribune, 3 April 1986, written by staff members Evans Johnson and Patrick J. Martin. The article describes criticism leveled against United

States POW/MIA resolution efforts by John Leboutillier, former Republican Congressman from New York.

6. Headline of a UPI article which appeared in the English-language

Bangkok newspaper, The Nation Review, dated 26 April 1987. The

article reports comments made by Texas billionaire businessman H.

Ross Perot who has maintained a continuing interest in the POW/

MIA issue.
7. Quoted from an interview ofJames Gritz (LTC, Ret), which was

published in the March 1982 issue of Penthouse. Gritz, a former Special Forces officer, has gained a great deal of notoriety because of

his claimed knowledge of American captives held in Indochina, and

because of his alleged forays into Laos to rescue these Americans.

XXlll
1

THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

MIAs AND ENDING THE CONFLICT

President Nixon began his first term of office with

a clear mandate to disengage from the Vietnam conflict.

US efforts in this regard proved to be extremely slow

and agonizing. At the time of the transition between the

Johnson and Nixon administrations in January 1969, the

so-called plenary peace talks which had recently convened

in Paris between the parties to the conflict had achieved

little except an agreement on the shape of the negotiating

table. Nevertheless, these talks proceeded, generally with

precious few tangible results except to provide the North

Vietnamese delegates with a forum in which to tutor the

US negotiators in the nuances of Vietnamese communist

negotiation "logic."1Such logic included stalling tactics,

disagreements about agenda, portraying a position of

flexibility to visitors and the media while maintaining a

rigid stance against the United States negotiators, and

other "psychological" ploys.

As with any negotiation effort, each of the parties

brought to Paris their own ideas of what was to be

achieved. The American side was seeking, among other
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

things, a cessation of the hostilities in Vietnam, guarantees of peaceful reconciliation, withdrawal of US combat

forces from the conflict, and the return of American prisoners of war. Some of these items would be opposed by

the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese participants; others

would be welcomed. A key element of the US negotiation

strategy was to maintain the legitimacy of the non-communist government of South Vietnam, our ally. It was

judged that to seek anything less would be to jeopardize

US honor and prestige and, ultimately, US credibility as

a reliable ally and effective leader in the free world. This

issue became the big sticking point of the negotiations

that delayed agreement on ending the war.

The plenary talks in Paris plodded onward ineffectually at a glacial pace. Meanwhile, behind these overt sessions a series of secret meetings beginning in August 1969

between North Vietnamese officials and then National

Security Adviser Henry Kissinger took place.2These secret negotiations, finally made public by Nixon in January 1972 in an attempt to quell the outcries of anti-war

activists, eventually became the vehicle by which the final

terms of agreement on settling the conflict were hammered out between the United States and the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

The issue of missing American servicemen figured

prominently (usually as it applied to the prisoners of war)

in the conduct of these laborious negotiations. North

Vietnamese officials had taken an extremely tough negotiating stance on this particular matter, knowing full well

the emotionalism of the issue. Initially, they had called

for complete withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam as

a precondition for the release of the prisoners. Meanwhile, the negotiators in Paris, both American and North

Vietnamese, were besieged by groups of visiting family

members of servicemen held prisoner or listed as missing.

The activities of these groups served to remind the US

negotiators of the families' expectation that this issue

would be an integral part of the peace settlement. Unfortunately, these activities also reinforced the North Vietnamese perception that the issue of missing Americans
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

was a bargaining chip that could extract further concessions from the US side.

Not until after their 1972 Easter offensive ground to

a halt did the North Vietnamese show indications of a

willingness to seriously negotiate an end to the conflict.

Discussions began again in July 1972 in Paris between

Dr. Kissinger and North Vietnamese negotiator Le Due

Tho, and thereafter proceeded haltingly toward a final

conclusion and written agreement in January 1973. Only

during this final fitful thrust toward a negotiated end to

the conflict did the North Vietnamese back away from

their earlier precondition and agree that the release of

American prisoners would take place simultaneously with

the United States troop withdrawal.

Ultimately, the agreements called for, among other

things, the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of US

troops, the dismantling of bases and the clearing of

mines, the return of captured and detained military and

civilian personnel, a reconciliation among the Vietnamese parties, and the establishment of a mechanism of commissions and teams to carry out, control, and supervise

the implementation of the accords and their various protocols.

In addition to the question of prisoners of war, the

final negotiations also addressed the issue of Americans

still missing and unaccounted for. The negotiators on

both sides were aware that the return of those servicemen

held prisoner would not clear up the issue of missing

service members. Our knowledge of exactly what had

happened to each missing individual varied over the entire spectrum, from precise knowledge at one extreme to

absolutely no knowledge at the other. At the same time,

there was abundant proof that the communist side had to

know, at some level within their government, the fate

of many of these missing individuals. During the course

of the conflict, the DRV had published, on a number of

occasions, photos of identifiable personal effects of Americans—ID cards, Geneva Convention cards, and so on—

as well as other equally convincing indications that they

had knowledge of missing Americans. Therefore, some

3
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

provision needed to be made for resolution of these unanswered questions upon cessation of the hostilities. The

visits of family members to Paris during the negotiations,

as noted earlier, served to keep the pressure on the authors of the final accords and to ensure that these interests

were considered and dealt with.

In Paris on 27 January 1973, representatives of the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, the North Vietnamese government), the Provisional Revolutionary

Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG,

the "Viet Cong" shadow government in South Vietnam), the government of the Republic of Vietnam

(RVN, the government of our ally in South Vietnam),

and the United States of America signed a document

officially titled "The Agreement on Ending the War and

Restoring Peace in Vietnam." This document, more

commonly referred to as the Paris Accords, included as

a specific provision an article dealing with the resolution

of the fate of those Americans (and others) still unaccounted for at the conclusion of the hostilities. Article

8(b), states:

The parties shall help each other to get information

about those military personnel and foreign civilians

of the parties missing in action, to determine the

location and take care of the graves of the dead so

as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of

the remains, and to take any such other measures

as may be required to get information about those

still considered missing in action.

Thus, at 2400 hours GMT on 27 January 1973 the

stage was unknowingly set for what was to become a most

difficult, frustrating, trying, and exceedingly lengthy effort to carry out the provisions of Article 8(b) of the Paris

Accords and to determine the fate of our missing men.

AN UNEASY CEASE-FIRE

The morning of 28 January 1973 in Saigon was

warm and sunny, and in the streets was the usual Sunday
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

bustle of traffic. There appeared to be little outward indication, however, that this was an auspicious day—the

beginning of an official cease-fire after so many long years

of war. Strangely, the populace seemed to take little note,

and there was no particular air of euphoria or celebration.

A Vietnamese Air Force C-47 droned in slow circles

overhead, spewing leaflets which fluttered slowly down to

the city's inhabitants. These leaflets announced the ceasefire but, prophetically, also exhorted the citizenry to

maintain their vigilance against expected deceptions by a

devious enemy. Quite obviously the government of Vietnam, our ally, had no illusions about the character of the

two communist signatories, the DRV and the PRG, nor

did they put much stock in the assurances written into

the Paris Accords, or in the serpentine conglomerate of

commissions and teams specified to implement and police

the provisions of the agreement.

A Two-Party Joint Military Commission (TPJMC)

and a Four-Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC)

set forth in the accords and the protocols were immediately established as the entities to carry out the specific

tasks which were to lead toward ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam. The FPJMC included representatives from the United States, the Republic of

Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North

Vietnam), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the Viet Cong), and was to exist for only 60 days.

The TPJMC was to have a more enduring tenure, however. The TPJMC, that included only the two South

Vietnamese factions, the RVN and the PRG, was

charged to carry out the implementation of those articles

of the Paris agreements which were viewed as strictly

within the South Vietnamese purview, and which would

supposedly lead toward national reconciliation. Examination of the history of the 60-day period following the signing of the Paris Accords reveals the frustrations,

disappointments, failures, and successes achieved by

those who toiled to implement these agreements.3

One of the most critical failures of the FPJMC was

its inability to achieve a meaningful cease-fire, a failure

5
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

which later would have a telling effect on US efforts to

resolve the fate of still missing servicemen. This failure

seemed to be pre-ordained because of the inherent RVN

suspicion of the motives of the other two Vietnamese

(communist) parties, and even more so because of the

lack of resolve of any of the Vietnamese parties to make

the accords work. The RVN signed the Paris Accords

reluctantly in the first place, saw the agreement as having

given the communists political and military advantage.

Certainly the communist side saw the Paris Accords as

but another means toward their goal of eventual reunification of North and South Vietnam under a communist

government. The record of their delegations to these respective teams and commissions clearly bears out this perception of their goal. One telling example of the

communists' attitude was the constant refusal by their

delegates to participate in joint investigations of ceasefire violations as their troops continued to expand their

control in the countryside.

On the plus side, however, was the successful disengagement of the remaining US forces from Vietnam and,

equally important, the return of captured US military

and civilian prisoners during Operation Homecoming—

both events implemented during the 60-day life of the

FPJMC. The depiction of these joyful events on television, after so many years of TV coverage of death and

destruction, signified to much of the American populace

the end of the war. In actuality, however, the fighting

quickly began anew, this time without the participation

of American forces, and with only a brief respite immediately following the signing of the Paris Accords.

THE FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM

One of the protocols to the Paris Peace Accords made

provision for a residual Four-Party Joint Military Team

(FPJMT) to carry on the search and accounting for missing individuals following the 60-day termination of the
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

FPJMC activities. This team, with representation from

the same four parties making up the Four-Party Joint

Military Commission, came into existence in early 1973

and remained in place in Saigon until the eventual fall of

the Government of the Republic of Vietnam on 30 April

1975. The US delegation to this FPJMT became, in essence, the US negotiating entity to deal with the DRV

and the PRG in carrying out Article 8(b) of the Paris

Accords.

The US delegation of the FPJMT was a group of less

than twenty military personnel from all services, many

with knowledge of unique value to the effort at hand.

These included specialists in international law and history, individuals familiar with negotiation techniques,

plus an array of interpreters, translators, and support

personnel. The chief of the US delegation, (initially Colonel B. H. Russell, USA) represented the US position

in matters pertaining to implementing Article 8(b). He

received guidance from a number of sources, including

both the Department of State, via Ambassador Ellsworth

Bunker in Saigon, and the Department of Defense.

The FPJMT negotiations tested the patience of the

US personnel, just as had the earlier negotiations in

Paris. The two communist parties, the DRV and the

PRG, continued to stall, using any pretext to avoid substantive discussion. Plenary meetings, scheduled twice

weekly at Camp Davis on Tan Son Nhut Air Base in

Saigon, were viewed by the DRV and PRG delegates as

simply another forum in which to carry on the political

battle to achieve what they had earlier been unable to

attain at the conference table in Paris. DRV promises of

assistance in resolving the fate of missing US personnel

were usually made conditional on US willingness to urge

our ally, the RVN, to make various, unacceptable concessions. At other times, the DRV and PRG would refuse

to engage in discussion, alleging that the United States

and the RVN were colluding to prolong the hostilities

and violate the cease-fire, meanwhile ignoring the ongoing actions of their own troops who were busily engaged in nibbling away at what remained of RVN-held

territory.
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

In this environment, efforts by the United States and

RVN delegates to achieve substantive progress generally

proved futile. Requests for information about specific

cases of missing individuals remained totally unanswered. Information passed was received by the communist delegations without comment or response. US efforts

to negotiate field investigation efforts in areas controlled

by either the DRV or the PRG were met with delaying

tactics, polemics, and inaction on the part of the communist delegations.

Attempts to get the communist DRV and PRG delegations to focus on implementation of Article 8(b) often

resulted in introduction of various "red herring" issues

designed to divert attention away from the task at hand.

For example, the DRV at one point threatened to shoot

down the USAF weekly C-130 liaison flight between Saigon and Hanoi after one such flight, on 21 December

1973, had allegedly "exceeded maneuvering limits" during a foul weather approach into Gia Lam Airport in

Hanoi. This threat was taken seriously, even though

DRV and PRG representatives were always aboard these

liaison flights. The communists had already provided

ample proof of their capability and willingness to carry

out such threats, undeterred even by concern for their

own personnel. On 7 April 1973 near Khe Sanh, the

communists had shot down an official helicopter of the

International Commission for Control and Supervision

(ICCS) killing all eleven men aboard, including two PRG

liaison officers.

At other points during the FPJMT talks the DRV

and PRG representatives would make various demands

concerning what they termed their "privileges and immunities," dwelling on their perceived poor treatment at

the hands of their southern non-communist hosts in Saigon. In sum, the good intentions of the United States

and RVN delegations to the FPJMT during the team's

two year existence were generally thwarted by the intransigence and inaction of the DRV and PRG delegates.

Consequently, little progress was achieved in carrying out
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

the casualty resolution tasks specified in Article 8(b) of

the Paris Accords.

The one notable positive event which transpired during the existence of the FPJMT was the repatriation from

Hanoi of the remains of 23 American servicemen who

had died while in captivity in the north.4Even this, however, was not accomplished without torment. Though the

DRV had earlier provided a list during the final negotiations in Paris of those who had died while held in captivity, and had even permitted a visit to the grave sites near

Hanoi by US delegates in May of 1973, the subsequent

negotiations by the FPJMT for the return of these remains took nearly a year to accomplish.5

These 23 remains were finally repatriated from Hanoi to United

States custody in two increments on 6 and 13 March

1974. Indicative of the tenor of these negotiations was the

refusal by the DRV to repatriate the remains of a twentyfourth serviceman whose body had been buried alongside

those of the other 23. The excuse was the technicality that

he had died, not while in captivity, but as a consequence

of being shot down.

Some have speculated, however, regarding a possible

alternate rationale for the DRV refusal to return these

remains. With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, it became

known that the "twenty-fourth remains" were those of

B-52 aircrewman 1/Lt Bennie L. Fryer who had been

shot down on 28 December 1972, just a few weeks prior

to the cease-fire. Thus, at the time that the FPJMT discussions were taking place regarding the return of those

others who had died while in captivity, it is perhaps understandable that the DRV may have been reluctant to

disinter remains which had so recently been buried. To

do so would be contrary to North Vietnamese health and

sanitary concerns, as well as contrary to the usual Vietnamese practice in dealing with human remains which

would normally call for the remains to be interred a minimum of two years prior to disinterment. Regardless of

the rationale, the remains of 1/Lt Fryer were belatedly

repatriated, more than four years later, on 30 September

1977.
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

It should be noted that the PRG also had provided

a list in Paris of those they said had died while in captivity

in South Vietnam. This list proved to be strange in several respects. It was alleged to include the names of all

those who had died while in the custody of the communist

PRG, and carried the names of 40 Americans and 7 foreign nationals. The list contained several explainable

anomalies (misspelled names, wrong nationality, wrong

military status, etc.), but also included three more significant errors which prompted considerable amount of discussion and speculation on the part of US negotiators.

PFC JamesJ. Scuitier and Sgt Billy Knight, whose names

were on the list, had indeed been killed in Vietnam. However, their remains were immediately recovered by US

forces at the time of their respective incidents, were positively identified, and promptly returned to the United

States for burial. At no time were their remains ever in

the hands of Viet Cong (PRG) troops. Even more curious

was the presence on the list of the name Carl Nicotera.

Nicotera had served in Vietnam, but was discharged from

the US Army in October 1968 and at last word was living

in Hartford, Connecticut. How Nicotera's name found

its way onto the PRG died-in-captivity list remains an

unsolved mystery. The discrepancies of the PRG list notwithstanding, US attempts through the auspices of the

FPJMT to gain the release of any of these remains, or to

obtain any additional information regarding these individuals, were totally without result.

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

While the FPJMT constituted the negotiating element of the US effort, another entity, the Joint Casualty

Resolution Center (JCRC), was created as the operational element. The JCRC was a unique organization in

the annals of military history. Activated in Saigon on 23

January 1973, its first Commander was Brigadier General Robert C. Kingston, a hard-driving infantry officer

10
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

with considerable background experience in special operations.6

The JCRC mission was solely to assist the Secretaries of the Armed Services to resolve the fate of those

servicemen still missing and unaccounted for as a result

of the hostilities throughout Indochina. The unit was to

have a predominantly operational role—the carrying out

of field search, excavation, recovery, and repatriation activities negotiated through the FPJMT.7

General Kingston gathered the initialJCRC cadre in

Saigon, calling for volunteers and drawing heavily from

among military personnel still remaining in-country at

that time (January 1973). He personally interviewed each

volunteer, accepting those whose talents matched a menu

of personnel skills previously drawn up by the military

planners at CINCPAC in Hawaii as the Paris negotiations were wending their way toward conclusion.8

The

personnel roster, with an initial authorization for approximately 140 persons, was heavily loaded on the side of

field search teams. These teams were almost entirely

composed of Army Special Forces personnel; however, in

keeping with the joint nature of the organization, members of all four military services were represented within

the unit. In addition to the search teams, the JCRC also

included a sizeable staff element to refine, analyze, update, and store the records pertaining to each of the casualty cases. While the personnel authorization for the

JCRC underwent several revisions and peaked out at

nearly 200 positions, the assigned strength of the unit

grew to a maximum of only 160 persons by mid-1973.

The JCRC case records were inherited from another

little-known military unit in Vietnam which was named

the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC).9The

JPRC, which had already been operational in Vietnam

for over six years, had the mission of attempting to rescue

American prisoners-of-war and, consequently, had collected considerable information and had generated numerous files on those individuals who had disappeared.

Therefore, with the establishment of the Joint Casualty

Resolution Center, the old JPRC files constituted a logical starting point for the entire casualty resolution effort

11
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

that was to follow. Efforts were soon launched by the

JCRC to expand and update these files, beginning immediately with the debriefing of all POWs released during

Operation Homecoming in February and March of

1973.

Though the JCRC was activated in Vietnam, because of the US interpretation of the restrictions imposed

by the Paris Accords on the number of US military personnel who could be left in Vietnam, the unit was immediately moved to Nakhon Phanom Air Base in northeast

Thailand. Here the JCRC Headquarters was established,

the personnel and files were assembled, and training programs were begun in anticipation of the start of search,

exhumation, and repatriation activities back in Vietnam.

Close liaison was established back in Saigon with the FPJMT which was to negotiate the access to various aircraft

crash sites and ground loss sites. In addition, a formal

relationship was established between the JCRC and the

US Army Central Identification Laboratory which had

recently moved from Saigon to Camp Samae San, also

in Thailand. This laboratory, staffed with both military

and civilian experts, was to examine and identify any

remains which might be recovered as a result of either

JCRC search efforts, or any unilateral repatriations of

remains by Vietnamese members of the FPJMT.

To further enhance the effectiveness of the JCRC

organization US plans called for the establishment of several small JCRC liaison offices to be located in each of

the countries of interest. Consequently, in early 1973 a

small contingent of military personnel were relocated in

Saigon to constitute what was to be called the Saigon

Liaison Office of the JCRC. At the same time another

small office, to be known as the Hanoi Liaison Office,

was also placed in Saigon in hopeful anticipation of its

movement from Saigon to Hanoi whenever the FPJMT

could negotiate such a transfer. As previously mentioned,

a spirit of cooperation was lacking in our relations with

the North Vietnamese delegation to the FPJMT. As a

result, the Hanoi Liaison Office was never repositioned

to Hanoi and it was subsequently folded into the Saigon

12
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

Liaison Office a few months before the collapse of South

Vietnam in early 1975.

In Vientiane, Laos, one man was sent to work in the

American Embassy as the JCRC Liaison Officer, though

his effectiveness was extremely limited by the political

turmoil and the American embassy's inability to deal seriously with the communist Pathet Lao regarding missing

Americans. This office, too, was closed when the communists took over the government of Laos in mid-1975. In

Cambodia, also, the chaotic situation prevented the

JCRC Commander from obtaining agreement to place

any JCRC liaison personnel in Phnom Penh to deal with

American losses in Khmer territory.

JCRC OPERATIONS BEGIN

The men and women of the newly-formed JCRC,

sensing the 'uniqueness' of their mission and filled with

a sense of high endeavor, were eager to begin the task of

attempting to recover the remains of their fallen comrades-in-arms. Based on a review of loss records and the

examination of numerous other factors, several candidate

sites were selected for possible JCRC exploration in early

1973. One of the prime selection criterian was security of

the area. Since the communist FPJMT delegates refused

to grant approval for search activities within territory

which they claimed was under their control, sites were

selected which were believed to be well within the control

area of our ally, the RVN. After coordination and approval by the American embassy in Saigon, the United

States delegate tabled the planned JCRC activities before

the FPJMT, and invitations to witness the activity were

extended to all delegations. In every instance, however,

the DRV and PRG delegates refused to discuss these

operations, noting only that the FPJMT had not approved the investigations. Nevertheless, the US delegate

continued to notify all FPJMT members whenever any

JCRC activities were planned.

13
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

Once the proposed search and recovery activities

were coordinated with the American embassy in Saigon

and approved by the RVN, the JCRC teams were flown

from Thailand to Saigon, and thence to a staging area

near the search locale. These teams customarily included

such specialists as crashsite investigators, graves registration experts, medics, explosive ordnance disposal technicians, and interpreters. Teams and their equipment were

commonly moved to the vicinity of the search area via

trucks. However, various means of transport were used,

including backpacking. In one instance, because of the

remoteness and ruggedness of the area, they were forced

to rappel into a Khanh Hoa Province crashsite from CH53 helicopters hovering above the dense jungle canopy.

The JCRC acknowledged that assistance from the

local populace could be helpful, not only as laborers during excavations, but also in determining the exact location of aircraft crashsites and suspected US grave sites.

In several instances the information provided by local

inhabitants was key to locating American remains. One

such effort occurred in May of 1973 when a JCRC team

attempted to locate the grave site of an American aviator

who was shot by the Viet Cong after successfully crashlanding his observation aircraft on a beach near Tuy

Hoa. A.three-day digging effort resulted in the movement

of an estimated 100 tons of sand, but proved fruitless

until a local fisherman came forward to pinpoint the exact

grave location based on his personal recollection of the

burial years earlier.

During its first ten months of activity, JCRC teams

participated in over a dozen search and recovery activities

throughout South Vietnam. The result of this effort was

the recovery of the remains of 21 individuals, eleven of

which were identified as those of Americans. Of the remainder, five were indeterminate and five were proven

to be those of "Southeast Asian Mongoloids" (Vietnamese); these latter were to be eventually repatriated by the

Central Identification Laboratory back to Vietnamese

authorities.10

14
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

SEA SALVAGE OPERATIONS

Of the approximately 2,500 individuals unaccounted

for at the end of active US involvement in the fighting in

early 1973, over 400 had been categorized as "over-water" losses. This meant that these individuals were believed to have been lost at sea, either as a result of having

crashed into the water, or as a result of drowning after

an untoward incident—being washed overboard from a

ship, for example. No one had any illusions regarding

the ultimate fate of those listed in this category; however,

because of the number involved the JCRC Commander

ordered that an attempt should be made to determine the

likelihood of recovering any identifiable remains.

To answer this question, the US Navy Supervisor of

Salvage was asked to design and conduct an off-shore

search and recovery program under JCRC direction.

After a data analysis was completed, a search locale was

selected off the Vietnam coast in the region between the

cities of Danang and Hue. This coastal sea area was the

scene of a relatively high number of aircraft crashsites,

and was thought to afford the maximum opportunity to

test the concept of underwater location and recovery of

remains. The actual search effort (nicknamed SEASAL)

began on 10 July 1973, with the US Navy bringing to this

task the latest undersea technology. The search concept

included location of aircraft wreckage on the sea bottom

by a sophisticated side-looking sonar scanner operated

from an instrumented barge. From this barge, which

could be precisely placed and anchored, divers would descend to the bottom to physically investigate any aircraft

wreckage which was located. As one search area was completely surveyed, the barge was moved to the next area.

By 15 August a stretch of coastal waters covering 48

square miles of ocean bottom had been systematically

searched, and numerous wrecks of crashed aircraft were

individually investigated.

The results of this effort were disappointing but not

unexpected. The often-imagined scene of the World War

II aircraft sitting relatively intact on the ocean floor had

15
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

no parallel in the case of the average modern jet fighter.

The divers' inspections confirmed that these aircraft, due

primarily to their speed, had disintegrated to nearly the

same extent as if they had crashed on land. Wings and

control surfaces were ripped off, engines were broken

from fuselages, and—worst of all—cockpits were shattered and torn asunder. This initial crash trauma, the

time lapse since the event, and the effect of seawater immersion combined to preclude the successful recovery of

identifiable remains. By the time the SEASAL effort was

officially halted on 29 September 1973, 82 days had

elapsed, the activity had cost $830,000, and only a few

bone fragments, unidentifiable, had been recovered from

one crash site.11 Based on these results, the JCRC Commander made the strong recommendation that no further

at-sea casualty resolution operations be conducted.

Over the past decade the remains of several aviators

who were classified as "over-water" losses have been returned by Vietnamese officials. Later analysis has shown,

however, that these were the remains of fliers whose bodies were recovered from the water by fishermen, taken

ashore, and interred. One other additional hope, relatively remote, for recovery of the remains of individuals

classed as "over-water" losses, are cases where the "over-water" classification was made in error. (In a number

of cases the loss location is not precisely known, being

based on such indefinite information as planned flight

track or radio contacts and may be at best an educated

guess.12) These exceptions aside, and in view of the empirical evidence gathered from the JCRC sponsored SEASAL recovery effort, it seems the lesson to be learned is

that it is unrealistic to expect that more than a few of the

"over-water" cases will ever be resolved by the recovery

of identifiable remains.

"PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS" AND THE

REWARDS PROGRAM

The original planning for the JCRC envisioned an

effort to solicit casualty related information from the

16
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

indigenous population. In many instances US case records were lacking in vital details regarding what occurred during the loss incident. It was the JCRC view that

knowledgeable individuals could be enticed to come forward and assist, either by providing firsthand knowledge

or by referring investigators to others who had such information. An offer of rewards for information and/or assistance was planned to aid in this "enticement".

Consequently, a program was formulated whereby various media would be used to inform the general populace

of the US casualty resolution effort, and solicit their assistance in providing pertinent information.

Implementation of this "public communication"

(PUBCOM) program proved to be a slow process. Expertise and personnel were quickly obtained through the

Army's 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa to formulate the

specific media messages to be used. These personnel, including 5 native Vietnamese specialists, joined the JCRC

headquarters in Thailand and became known as the Media Development Element (MDE). Within a short period

of time, information pamphlets were prepared, in Vietnamese, to advise key communicators—governmental officials, clergy, military officials—of the American

casualty resolution effort. In addition, work began on

radio scripts, posters, and other handout materials to disseminate on a much wider basis details about the JCRC,

its activities, and its desire for information about US casualties.

Problems arose when the JCRC attempted to obtain

permission, through the American embassy in Saigon,

for release and distribution of these items. The embassy

had assumed an extremely cautious position regarding

the entire JCRC effort. On the one hand was the requirement to get on with the casualty resolution effort as an

important humanitarian matter; on the other hand was

the need to refrain from doing anything which might scuttle the discussions going on among the members of the

FPJMT and which, hopefully, would lead to the greater

gain. Consequently, the American embassy in Saigon

voiced strong reservations when the controversial topic of

17
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

rewards came up for intensive review in mid-1973. Rewards for indigenous assistance had been an integral part

of the information-collection effort of the Joint Personnel

Recovery Center, and CINCPAC had dictated that a

reward program would also be a part of the JCRC effort.

The ambassador in Saigon, however, doubted the advisability of publicizing such a program. The embassy view

was that the communist parties to the Paris Accords

would take offense at such a program, and the embassy

did not wish to provide the communists with any excuse

to escape their obligation to properly implement these

agreements.

Before this issue could be properly resolved, however, the topic of rewards surfaced in early June 1973 in

the Saigon press when three different local newspapers

announced that the United States was offering "money,

bicycles, and agricultural tools" as incentives for the local

populace to come forward with information regarding the

remains of American soldiers. In a masterful bit of bad

timing, the next day a Stars and Stripes story quoted the

CINCPAC, Admiral Noel Gayler, saying in a San Diego

speech that the United States would provide "considerable rewards to people in remote areas" for their assistance to the casualty resolution effort.13

In a damage

limitation effort, CINCPAC quickly clarified that no rewards would be paid unless JCRC personnel were onsite to confirm the information provided, that no rewards

for remains would be paid unless and until the remains

were positively identified as those of missing American

personnel, and that a schedule of rewards would be promulgated by the JCRC. This schedule, released within several days, offered the following:

• $50-$75 for directing a team to another individual who

has casualty resolution information.

• $75-$100 for information leading to the recovery of the

remains of a missing American.

• $100-$150 for guiding JCRC personnel to a crashsite

or gravesite.

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THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

• The above rewards may be paid in material goods

rather than US currency.

On 14 June 1973, responding to the publicity surrounding the announcement of payment of rewards, the

DRV delegate to the FPJMT expressed his indignation

over the rewards program, saying that it "distorted the

humanitarian policy of the DRV" regarding compliance

with Article 8(b) of the Paris Accords. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon, while not taking issue with the

existence of a rewards program, again reiterating his request that the program not be further publicized.

The strain resulting from the controversial reward

issue seemed to carry over into the implementation of the

overall public communications program. Consequently,

when presented with the idea of displaying posters country-wide, broadcasting radio "spots," or of distributing

free wall and pocket calendars among the populace (the

calendars also carried a message soliciting casualty resolution information), the embassy balked. JCRC persistence

in promoting the PUBCOM program, though it heightened the perception of strains between it and the American embassy, was belatedly successful. After undertaking

a lengthy review of the program, soliciting comments

from the US Information Service and the four regional

consuls general, and assessing the extent of progress in

the FPJMT talks, the ambassador finally agreed on 12

March 1974 to permit a country-wide public communication program on a phased basis. This program began on

18 March 1974, and was fully implemented country-wide

by mid-June. Thereafter, adding new media elements

came easier, but this did not allay the belief on the part

of some that the year's delay in actively soliciting information from the general Vietnamese populace had resulted in casualty resolution opportunities lost.

MORE CASUALTIES AND A CHANGED CONCEPT

The US delegation to the FPJMT had, on a number of

occasions, attempted to gain approval for field operations

20
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

aimed at searching crashsites or gravesites in areas which

were acknowledged to be under the control of the PRG.

These attempts were met, first with delaying replies from

the communists, and later with outright rejection of requests. Consequently, as mentioned earlier, the JCRC

teams had to be content with working in areas which were

deemed to be under the control of the RVN, our ally.

Even in these instances, the PRG and DRV had voiced

their objections over the JCRC activities, usually by contending that the area to be searched was, in fact, within

an area which was under their control. Since there was no

clear delineation of these areas, such claims were always a

matter of concern when planning any search and recovery

operations.

Because of the communist delegates' attitude, coupled with the resurgence in the fighting following the brief

lull of the January 1973 cease-fire, everyone perceived

the inherent danger associated with field operations. Concerted attempts were made to minimize this danger by

means of careful planning and preparation. Intelligence

estimates were made in coordination with our RVN ally,

the American embassy, and other available intelligence

assets. Only if everyone agreed that the degree of risk

was minimal would the American Embassy approve the

initiation of any search or recovery activity. It was acknowledged that the field teams were essentially defenseless in the event of attack since they were, by agreement,

unarmed. Thus, to assure recognition as part of the organizational apparatus set up by the Paris Accords, teams

travelled in helicopters marked with four wide orange

stripes which surrounded the fuselage, and team members wore uniforms which were prominently marked with

bright orange pockets. One last mark of identity was the

bright orange armband worn by each team member signifying his association with the FPJMT.

By the end of 1973 a number ofJCRC field operations

had been conducted with no security problems. The US

delegation to the FPJMT had routinely notified all other

delegates of the on-going US casualty resolution operations,

and even invited each delegation, including the PRG and

21
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

the DRV, to send representatives to witness these activities.

The two communist delegations made note of these field

activities but consistently declined the opportunity to send

any observers.

In early December 1973, another JCRC field activity

began. The site of interest, a helicopter crashsite, was located approximately 20 kilometers southwest of Saigon in

an area of rice and pineapple fields, low trees, and brush.

The rice fields, abandoned for a number of years, had

grown up with tall grass and weeds but were still flooded

with knee-deep water and mud. Captain Richard Rees, the

JCRC field team leader on this operation, flew with his

team and equipment to the crash site aboard FPJMTmarked helicopters on the morning of 13 December. Work

was immediately begun to construct a mud dike which

would surround the crash impact point and the minimal

amount of helicopter wreckage which still remained at the

site. Rees' plan was to construct the circular dike, then

pump the water from inside the dike to the outside, thereby

drying the area to permit a thorough search for the remains

of the long-lost crewman who disappeared when the helicopter had crashed over seven years earlier.14

By the end

of the second day, the circular dike was nearly completed.

On the morning of the third day, 15 December, Rees

and his team again boarded the FPJMT helicopters at Tan

Son Nhut airport in Saigon for the short 15-minute flight

back to the crashsite. This time they had with them portable

water pumps with which they hoped to pump dry the area

surrounding the wreckage. The three helicopters circled to

land, intending to rest their skids gently on the paddy dikes

so that the heavy pumps could then be unloaded from the

helicopters. The first of the three helicopters hovered down

to a landing. Touching down gently, Rees and his men

hopped out as the Vietnamese pilot held the craft stable on

the dike. The other two helicopters commenced their landing adjacent to the first. Suddenly a communist B-40 rocket-propelled grenade exploded against the first helicopter,

setting it afire and fatally wounding one of the Vietnamese crewmen. Though hit by shrapnel, the other two helicopters immediately took to the air to escape a similar

22
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

fate. With their means of escape gone, Captain Rees and

his unarmed team were at the mercy of the automatic

weapons fire which the Viet Cong ambushers now raked

across the paddy field.

Rees and his men threw themselves down into the

knee-deep water, hoping that the weeds and old paddy

dikes would provide some degree of cover from the ambushers' fire. Captain Rees quickly realized that they

were totally at the mercy of their attackers, and that no

help could be expected from either of the unarmed helicopters which were now circling overhead. In a final courageous gamble to save his team, Rees stood up with his

hands raised, and shouted in Vietnamese to the attackers

to stop their firing because his men were unarmed. His

shout was immediately answered by a volley of fire from

the brush at the edge of the paddy, and Captain Rees fell

dead into the water.

One can only speculate why the ambushers did not

pursue the attack to completion. Perhaps it was their uncertainty of whether or not the circling helicopters, which

made zooming passes overhead, were armed or not. Perhaps they expected a relief force to arrive shortly to assist

the pinned-down Americans lying helpless in the rice

paddy. Or perhaps they had made their point and had

sufficiently carried out the orders of their PRG superiors.

Whatever the reason, the Viet Cong quickly withdrew

from the scene leaving behind one American killed and

four team members wounded, one Vietnamese killed and

three wounded, and one helicopter destroyed.

The events that followed were totally predictable. At

the next plenary session of the FPJMT, Colonel William

Tombaugh, then chief of the US delegation, delivered a

blistering attack on the PRG and their DRV ally. He

accused them of treachery in using information provided

by the United States during the FPJMT talks to deliberately engineer the coordinated ambush of an unarmed

team clearly marked with the Four-Party markings and

carrying out the humanitarian work of the FPJMT. The

PRG representative denied any complicity in the event,

protested the "hostile attitude" of Colonel Tombaugh

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THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

(who, in the course of his attack on the PRG, had thrown

Rees' blood-soaked shirt onto the table in front of the

startled PRG delegate), and demanded that the United

States desist from "falsely accusing" them of perpetrating the fatal ambush. Meanwhile, in the United States

there was only brief press mention of the incident. Captain Rees' killers had correctly judged the shift in media

attention, and along with it the degree of public apathy

regarding events in Vietnam once the American forces

had been withdrawn.

The significance of the PRG ambush of an unarmed

JCRC field team went well beyond the tragedy of the loss

of life and wounding of the Americans and Vietnamese

directly involved. Here was clear evidence of the intransigence of the communist parties to the Paris Accords, clear

indications of the lengths to which they would go to sabotage these agreements, and a vivid preview of their unwillingness to cooperate in what should have been viewed

as a solely humanitarian endeavor—the recovery of the

remains of soldiers—from all sides—and the return of

these remains to their families. It was now all too obvious

that the DRV and PRG did not share these high-minded

goals.

The JCRC Commander, now BG Joseph Ulatoski,

was faced with either giving up the effort, or creating

a new concept which might permit continuation of the

mission. It was obvious that inserting unarmed American

search and recovery teams into the field was no longer

feasible. Thus, after a number of consultations among

the JCRC, the American embassy, and our South Vietnamese allies, a scheme was devised whereby the JCRC

would train and equip South Vietnamese Army troops to

carry on the search and recovery activity. US guidance,

planning, and technical assistance would be provided

from a safe location, away from the actual field search

and recovery site.

The necessary actions were undertaken to immediately implement this new concept, and casualty resolution

activity once again resumed in early 1974, with the actual

location and exhumation of remains being carried out by

25
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

South Vietnamese soldiers. Under the new guidelines

from the American embassy, only in those rare instances

where complete safety could be assured were JCRC

members permitted to take part in the search and recovery activity.15

In all other instances, JCRC personnel

were obliged to participate only from a distance, and to

assume nothing more than an advisory role in their relations with the indigenous team in the field. In this manner, and under increasingly difficult circumstances, the

JCRC continued their casualty resolution efforts during

1974. By August, the US-trained indigenous teams had

participated in 15 investigation and remains recovery activities, with 36 remains recovered, of which 5 had been

identified as those of United States personnel.

A REDUCED JCRC

Meanwhile, due to the disappointing results, the declining military situation throughout the countryside,

poor access to sites of interest, and the lack of progress

in the FPJMT sessions, CINCPAC directed a review, in

mid-1974, of the JCRC mission and organization. Recommendations included continued emphasis on the use

of indigenous teams to carry out field investigations and

remains recoveries. At the same time, any US teams

brought into Vietnam were to be smaller in size to reduce

the physical risk and to lower their political profile. Emphasis was placed on refining the JCRC data files to increase their accuracy, and to continue the exchange of

data with the US delegation of the FPJMT in support of

their on-going negotiations with the DRV and PRG. The

JCRC was also to continue its analysis of case files in

order to make recommendations regarding status changes

(from MIA to KIA) to the various military services. Additionally, CINCPAC made other recommendations regarding the staffing of the JCRC, to include reduction

of the number of JCRC field teams from 11 to four, a

26
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

corresponding reduction in JCRC staff members, reduction of the rank of the JCRC Commander's billet from

Brigadier General to Colonel, and physical movement of

the JCRC organization from Nakhon Phanom Air Base

to Camp Samae San in southeast Thailand.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington DC

received these recommendations but, aware of the political sensitivities involved, concluded that making any

sweeping organizational changes at this time would be

premature. The JCS did not wish to take any action

which might be interpreted as decreasing the emphasis of

the casualty resolution effort, or of abandoning the JCRC

mission. They did, however, approve the movement of

the JCRC to Samae San, since military activities at Nakhon Phanom Air Base were gradually being closed down.

This move eventually took place in January 1975.

Meanwhile, the military situation throughout Indochina continued to deteriorate. The FPJMT talks were

essentially stalemated, and the DRV and PRG representatives no longer made any pretense of pursuing efforts

to carry out either the terms of Article 8(b), or of any

other portion of the Paris Accords, including those dealing with the cessation of hostilities. Like a big deadly

chess game, the North Vietnamese relentlessly pushed

their men into place for the final checkmate. By the end

of 1974, an estimated 300,000 North Vietnamese Army

troops were in South Vietnam, an increase of over 90,000

since the date of the cease-fire. In addition, these troops

were supported by an increasing number of tanks, heavy

artillery, and Surface-to-Air (SAM) missiles. The North

Vietnamese had constructed and improved over 1,000

miles of roadways to facilitate their infiltration of men

and supplies into the south, and had turned the city of

Dong Ha into a major port and stockpile site.16 Hope

for the successful conclusion of any meaningful effort to

resolve the American casualties lost in South Vietnam

was rapidly fading.

As this deterioration continued into the first months

of 1975, the JCRC effort in Vietnam ground to a halt.

The public communication program ceased, as did other

27
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

attempts to solicit assistance from officials and community leaders. Planning for site investigations was put on

hold, and the JCRC headquarters in Thailand devoted

itself more and more to analytical efforts. Our South

Vietnamese allies, preoccupied as they were with their

own survival, could no longer devote any energy or resources to assisting the United States in resolving the fate

of American casualties.

By March 1975, all offensive momentum had turned

in favor of the communist forces. Much of the Central

Highlands had fallen or was under siege, and the northern provinces of South Vietnam were falling in turn. The

North Vietnamese war machine ground its way southward, pushing ahead of it a wave of panic designed to

break the resistance of Saigon. All United States efforts

at casualty resolution in South Vietnam had necessarily

ceased, and the JCRC liaison personnel were co-opted

by the American Defense Attache in Saigon to assist in

responding to the approaching debacle. Several personnel

were detailed to assist with the humanitarian aspects of

the flood of Vietnamese refugees who were pouring into

the Saigon area from up-country areas which the communist forces had already overrun. Other JCRC personnel

were assigned to assist in preparing for the evacuation of

both American and Vietnamese personnel.

In the midst of this frantic activity, in early April a

USAF C-5 aircraft crashed at Tan Son Nhut Air Base

near Saigon killing many of the passengers and crew

aboard, including over 100 Vietnamese orphans who

were being evacuated to the United States. The Defense

Attache, taking advantage of the availability and expertise of the JCRC and the Army's Central Identification

Laboratory, directed that they assume responsibility for

the recovery and disposition of the bodies of those killed

in the crash. Thus the JCRC and Central Identification

Laboratory personnel conducted their last and saddest

casualty operation in South Vietnam prior to the final

evacuation.

On 21 April, the JCRC Commander Colonel John

P. Vollmer, directed that the remaining JCRC personnel

28
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

still in Vietnam be evacuated. Colonel Vollmer had several overriding concerns, the first being the immediate

safety of his personnel. Second, however, was his concern

that should JCRC personnel remain in Vietnam to the

last, they would ultimately become involved in the renewed conflict, thus distorting the image of the JCRC

which he and previous commanders had sought to maintain: that the JCRC was strictly a humanitarian organization, overt in all its activities, and not to be involved in

combat of any form. An Army U-21 aircraft was dispatched from Thailand, and the last of the JCRC liaison

office personnel were loaded aboard. The plane returned

across Cambodia to Thailand where the liaison office

members rejoined the JCRC headquarters at Camp Samae San.17

The complete collapse of our South Vietnamese ally

came nine days later as the North Vietnamese Army

tanks rolled into Saigon on the morning of April 30. Earlier that same morning the last of the official American

presence in Saigon had departed from the American embassy rooftop helicopter pad, including the ambassador

and the remaining members of the US delegation to the

FPJMT. At the same time, the American consul general

in Can Tho had led the only other remaining official

American contingent in an escape by boat down the Mekong River and out into the South China Sea where they

were later picked up by US Navy ships.

Only a few hours before, the last two American casualties in Vietnam were incurred when an in-coming

rocket killed two young Marines who were assisting with

the Saigon evacuation. In a twist of regrettable irony,

during the chaos of those final hours their remains were

left behind in a Saigon hospital, not to be recovered and

returned to their homeland until nearly a year later.1°

18

29
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

NOTES

1. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown

&Co., 1979), chaps.8, 12, 23, 25, 27, 31-34 passim. Kissinger

provides a most interesting and detailed account of the negotiations in Paris. The Paris plenary sessions, according to Kissinger, as contrasted with the direct talks between himself and

North Vietnamese officials, "achieved a great distinction in

the annals of diplomacy. In four years of negotiation and more

than 140 meetings not even the most minor issue had been

settled; it was the only regular conference of such length that

could not point to a single accomplishment, however trivial."

p. 1106.

2. Ibid., pp. 441-2, 975. Kissinger describes at some length

the Vietnamese negotiation style, a style which he several times

refers to as an extreme test of his sanity. US personnel later

involved in attempts to resolve the issue of unaccounted for

Americans were to encounter the same maddening techniques

in the course of their dealings with Hanoi counterparts.

3. Walter Scott Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace (Washington, DC:

National Defense University Press, 1982). Colonel Dillard, a

historian by academic training and profession, provides a welldocumented and very interesting account of the 60-day life of

the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, of which he was a

member.

4. It is a known fact that more than 23 men died while in

captivity in North Vietnam. The semantic ruse which the

DRV later used to justify listing only 23, however, was to

claim that the others "weren't in captivity when they died".

The DRV apparently defined "captivity" as including only

those incarcerated in the "formal" POW prison system at the

national level, therefore excluding those who died while in the

hands of the local populace or the militia, while in local prisons,

or while en route to detention in this so-called "formal" prison

system.

5. Among the sticking points during the negotiations for the

return of these remains was the DRV insistence on linking this

repatriation to their demand that all parties agree and sign a

document outlining the "modalities and general principles"

for implementing Article 8(b). Later, in another delaying tactic, the DRV linked their cooperation to the return of civilian

30
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

(communist) detainees still allegedly being held by the government of the RVN, a linkage which the United States had steadfastly rejected. Other similar tactics were also later used to

delay the return of the died-in-captivity (DIC) remains.

6. Before his eventual retirement from the Army in 1985, General Kingston attained four-star rank as the Commander in

Chief of the United States Central Command in Tampa, Florida. He was later to reenter the arena of the MIA issue, when

he became a member of General Vessey's delegation to Hanoi

in August 1987, and again in later Vessey trips to Vietnam.

7. The mission of the JCRC, as described in JCS message

241751Z JAN 73, was to "resolve the status of United States

missing/body not recovered personnel through the conduct of

operations to locate and investigate crash/grave sites and recover remains, as appropriate, throughout southeast Asia as

directed by COMUSSAG/7AF". (COMUSSAG/7AF was the

Commander, United States Support Activities Group/7th Air

Force, whose headquarters was located at Nakhon Phanom Air

Base, Thailand.)

8. The formation of the JCRC was set forth in a conceptual

plan drafted by the CINCPAC staff. This plan, CINCPAC

CONPLAN 5119, was originally complemented by another

plan, CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100, which dealt with the topic

of the recovery of live personnel. By 1974, DOD realized that

the return of live personnel, if any existed, would more likely

take place via diplomatic effort rather than by military action,

and in any event would be planned and coordinated at the

Washington DC level instead of by CINCPAC. So, realizing

that CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100 was unrealistic, JCS authorized, on 27 November 1974, the cancellation of this plan.

9. "Joint Personnel Recovery in SEA (U)", Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO) Report

CHECOD 75-0028, 5 February 1975, 7th Air Force. The Joint

Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was activated on 17 September 1966 as an integral part of the MACV Studies and

Observations Group (SOG) in Vietnam. Its mission was to

pursue the long-term task of recovering US personnel after

search and rescue (SAR) operations had been suspended. The

JPRC served as the coordinating agency for the recovery of

personnel who managed to evade capture, to escape, or those

31
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

who were occasionally released from captivity by the enemy.

The JPRC was subsumed into the newly activated JCRC on

23 January 1973.

10. CINCPAC Command History, 1973 (TS), vol. I, 30 August

1974, p. 224.

11. Ibid., p. 222.

12. One such case of erroneous classification as an "overwater" loss was that of US Army Major George Quamo. He

was a passenger aboard a Vietnamese aircraft which disappeared from radar view during inclement weather many miles

off the coast of Danang on 14 April 1968. Though presumed

to have been lost at sea, the wreckage of his aircraft was discovered in 1974 on a coastal ridge, in heavy jungle, and Major

Quamo's remains were recovered.

13. CINCPAC Command History, 1973 (TS), vol. I, 30 August

1974, p. 175.

14. The unlocated crewman was Cpl David A. Dillon, who was

aboard a UH-1B helicopter which crashed on 20 July 1966.

However, Cpl Dillons' remains have never been recovered.

15. A search and recovery activity was undertaken in a school

yard within the limits of the city of Hue in northern South

Vietnam in August of 1974. In this instance the locale was

deemed by the American embassy to be safe enough to permit

US participation in the recovery effort. Coincidentally, the

effort resulted in the successful recovery of the remains of a

US government civilian official who had been killed during the

1968 Tet offensive in Hue city.

16. CINCPAC Command History, 1974 (TS), vol. I, p. 172, and

vol. II, p. 544.

17. Two JCRC personnel, Captain George Petrie and Captain

Tony Wood, remained in Saigon to the last. During the weeks

before the collapse, they had been given vital roles in the planning and implementing of the final ground and helicopter evacuation from selected sites throughout Saigon. Consequently,

in a paperwork ruse to maintain JCRC's non-combat image,

Petrie and Wood were administratively separated from the

JCRC and assigned to the Defense Attache Office. Their heroic activities during this period would make a book in itself.

So also would the activity of another JCRC member, Captain

Roger Urbaniak, who was evacuated from Saigon to Thailand

32
THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

on 21 April, signed out on leave, then, unbeknownst to the

JCRC Commander, returned aboard an aircraft back to Saigon two days later to assist in the evacuation of the JCRC

Liaison Office Vietnamese staff members.

18. The two Marines killed on 29 April 1975 during the US

evacuation from Saigon were Lance Corporal Darwin L.

Judge from Iowa and Corporal Charles McMahon, Jr. from

Massachusetts. Immediately following their deaths, their remains were moved to the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital in

Saigon. Upon completion of the final evacuation of official

Americans the following morning, it was discovered that these

two bodies had been overlooked in the chaos and had been left

behind. The North Vietnamese victors discovered the remains

in the hospital mortuary, and interred them in the Chi Hoa

cemetery in Saigon. Finally, at the behest of Senator Edward

Kennedy, on 22 February 1976 the DRV repatriated the remains ofJudge and McMahon to the custody of two of Kennedy's staff members, Mr. Tinker and Mr. Dehaan, who then

escorted the remains from Saigon to the Central Identification

Laboratory in Thailand.

33
2

A WINDING DOWN

A PERIOD OF MALAISE

A he fall of Saigon, preceded immediately by the fall

of Phnom Penh and followed shortly by the takeover of

Laos by the communist Pathet Lao, left the future of

the American casualty resolution issue in great doubt. It

almost seemed that the American public, in spite of the

implications of these events, breathed a collective sigh of

relief, and was prepared to put the whole Vietnam affair

completely out of mind. Though there were high level

administration statements in support of the casualty resolution mission and a show of congressional interest, the

government also appeared to be entering a period of paralysis on the issue, and there was little indication of

strong advocacy to continue the effort.

As expected, the exception was to be found among

the families of those still unaccounted for. Their expectations were undiminished, their hopes unsatisfied, and

their criticism of the US government over sparse concrete

results to date was not muted.1 No one in government,

of course, dared speak out in open opposition to a continuation of effort; to do so would be political suicide. But

35
A WINDING DOWN

within the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), an

organization whose sole reason for existence was the casualty resolution task, a sense of frustration arose from the

realization that this issue now had—at best—only the divided attention of all other US governmental entities.

Indeed, at times it seemed that the casualty resolution

mission was fated to be damned by faint enthusiasm.

Even within the JCRC there were problems. Many

dedicated individuals who had been working diligently

on the casualty resolution mission were eager for a resumption of the effort, despite the dramatically changed

circumstances. Some even went so far as to advocate early

renewal of contact with the victorious DRV and PRG to

get the effort back on track, a suggestion which was met

with horror by a few less imaginative members of the

unit. Understandably, for a very few individuals, residual

bitterness over the outcome of the recent conflict held

sway over the necessity to get on with the assigned mission.

The suggestion for early renewed contact with the

DRV had not been made lightly, however. The DRV

had asked quite emphatically in April 1975 that the

United States delegation to the FPJMT stay on in Vietnam to continue discussions, even as North Vietnamese

troops were pressing at the Saigon city limits. Further,

by August 1975, the DRV and PRG were publicly stating

their desire to reestablish contact with the United States,

to include discussions on the fate of American MIAs.

Another problem for the JCRC was the reluctance

to acknowledge that success in resolving the issue of

American casualties would not be immediate, and only a

long-term effort could yield any positive results. It was

difficult, however, to instill such a long-term viewpoint

when the military system dictated that unit assignments

were to be only one year in length. The natural tendency

was for assigned personnel to aim for the maximum shortterm progress, or "results," during their one-year tour,

then to move on to a new and hopefully more productive

assignment. Thus, lack of personnel continuity had sometimes had negative results in the way the JCRC went

about its business.

36
A WINDING DOWN

In some quarters there was even a decided lack of

enthusiasm for retaining the JCRC as a unit. Within a

few weeks of the collapse of South Vietnam, the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces (CINCPAC) forwarded

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington DC a

recommendation that the JCRC be deactivated. In its

stead CINCPAC suggested that the Department of State

assume the responsibilities for contact and negotiation

with the Indochinese governments on the casualty resolution topic, that the Defense Intelligence Agency be responsible for updating and maintaining the casualty files

and for the analysis of the information contained therein,

and that the Army be tasked to maintain a capability to

identify any recovered remains. JCS chose not to respond

directly to these suggestions, and their reply of 27 June

1975 indicated only that the JCRC was to remain in its

current location at Samae San, Thailand, for the time

being.

Meanwhile, in response to a perceived need for a

more long-range plan of action, the JCRC created a new

division, the Negotiations. Assistance Division, whose

task was to prepare for eventual resumption of casualty

resolution activity. A key factor in the JCRC preparation

was the underlying assumption that nothing would, or

could, take place until there was renewed contact between

the US and Indochinese governments. JCRC's advocacy

of such renewed contact was based on a number of factors. First, concern that the Vietnamese might take independent recovery actions without benefit of the required

expertise and thus jeopardize the eventual identification

of any recovered remains; second, the belief that the

United States should take an active, rather than a reactive, stance regarding renewed talks to ensure that these

discussions would avoid the adversarial environment

which characterized the FPJMT meetings; and third, the

fact that there were immediate casualty resolution tasks

which needed to be addressed, such as the return of the

remains of the two Marines killed at the time of the US

evacuation from Saigon, and the return of the remains of

37
A WINDING DOWN

those who had died while held captive in the south by the

PRG.

The JCRC's advocacy efforts were not warmly welcomed. Nevertheless, largely in response to JCRC urging, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

convened a planning conference in August 1975 in Washington DC. This conference was attended by representatives from the offices of the Secretary of Defense,

Secretary of State, JCS, CINCPAC, and the JCRC. Out

of the conference deliberations came the decision that the

JCRC (soon to shed its field teams, and reduced to

slightly over 80 personnel) should prepare to assume the

negotiation responsibilities previously held by the nowdisestablished US delegation to the FPJMT; further,

should negotiations begin (and it is debatable whether

many of the attendees anticipated such a beginning) these

negotiations would initially be conducted on the basis of

Article 8(b) of the Paris Accords.

With a renewed lease on life and an expanded role,

the JCRC began its planning efforts afresh in preparation

for the time when the State Department could negotiate

the reestablishment of discussions with the Indochinese

governments on the issue of casualty resolution. Among

the first tasks undertaken was the preparation of specialized dossiers on each missing individual carried in the

JCRC files. These dossiers, which included a case summary written in narrative form, plus appropriate maps

and photos, were intended to be passed to the Indochinese governments. The narratives contained all pertinent information about the circumstances of the loss

incident available from the JCRC case records. It was

hoped this would be later supplemented by additional

information which the Indochinese governments might

have gleaned from their own records. The total document

package was intended to provide a "hot trail" or a starting point from which a Vietnamese or American investigator, for instance, could proceed to a particular village

and interview witnesses and begin his own investigation

into the particular loss incident. By mobilizing the JCRC

38
A WINDING DOWN

staff (now augmented by those remaining JCRC members who had been evacuated from Saigon), and making

a concerted effort, the majority of the case narratives were

completed and translated by early 1976. Upon completion of the project, a total of 1,554 folders had been prepared, covering the loss circumstances of 2,613

individuals.

Assuredly, some within the Departments of Defense

and State viewed with amazement the JCRC's frantic

stirrings in anticipation of renewed casualty resolution

effort. It was a time of skepticism, and many within the

government doubted that the requisite steps leading to

resumption of the effort would ever be taken. The JCRC

activity, however, had an advocate in the person of Dr.

Roger Shields, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security and POW/MIA Affairs in

Washington DC, whose duties included overseeing and

providing guidance on casualty resolution matters. As a

consequence, the JCRC found itself in frequent direct

communication with this office, a situation which led to

heightened strains between JCRC and its immediate

headquarters, CINCPAC.2

Meanwhile, other factors were at work. Because of

the changing political situation in Southeast Asia, the

government of Thailand was moving to close former USoccupied bases, and negotiations were underway to implement the departure of the residual US force from Thailand. As units were withdrawn and bases were closed,

the question again arose as to the fate of the JCRC and

the Army's Central Identification Laboratory (CIL).

CINCPAC suggested both should move back to the continental United States; JCRC made the recommendation

to move to the Philippines; and the American embassy

in Thailand recommended movement from Samae San

to Bangkok. The Department of State made the call: retain both the JCRC and the CIL in Thailand for at least

one more year with the preferred location at U-Tapao

Air Base. The stated rationale for the decision was that

the casualty resolution issue had caught the attention of

39
A WINDING DOWN

Congress, that a one-year congressional review was underway, and that Congress was taking a serious interest

in the JCRC work.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

On 11 September 1975, the House of Representatives directed the formation of a Congressional Select

Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. The

House, both as an institution and as individual members,

had previously maintained an interest in the topic of the

missing in action. Beginning in the late 1960s, a number

of relevant hearings had been conducted to investigate

the topic and to keep House members apprised of the

current state of affairs as attempts were being made to

disengage from the Vietnam conflict. These hearings

were ordinarily conducted by subcommittees of either the

House Armed Services Committee or the House Foreign

Affairs Committee. However, the newly established Select Committee cut across committee lines and was composed of 10 members of Congress complemented by a

small investigative and administrative staff, with Congressman G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS) designated as Committee Chairman. The Select Committee

was initially given a life span of 12 months. It was tasked

to "conduct a full and complete investigation and study

of (1) the problem of US servicemen still identified as

missing in action, as well as those known dead whose

bodies have not been recovered, as a result of military

operations in (Indochina) . . . and (2) the need for additional international inspection teams to determine

whether there are servicemen still held as prisoners of war

or civilians held captive or unwillingly detained . . . "

3

(The Select Committee charter was later paraphrased:

"To study, investigate, and report on the problems of

Americans still unaccounted for as a result of hostilities

in Indochina."4The Committee final report did not

40

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A WINDING DOWN

address the subject of the need for "additional international inspection teams.")

The committee immediately set to work, holding the

first of many hearings on 23 September. In the following

months, the committee and its small staff compiled an

impressive record. Twenty-four open hearings and 17

private sessions were held with over 50 individuals called

to testify. Committee and staff members also interviewed

an additional 150 persons to gather data related to issues

under study. Committee members met with a number

of high-level officials, including both President Ford and

Secretary of State Kissinger, to clarify specific areas.

Views were solicited from family members of those still

missing, from former prisoners of war, from administration officials, and from a wide range of individuals with

particular interest and/or technical expertise on the question of persons still unaccounted for.

Committee staffers reviewed and examined in detail

the case files of a large number of casualties in order to

understand the circumstances surrounding the losses, as

well as other factors bearing on their current legal status.

The efforts by both the Departments of Defense and State

were reviewed and analyzed. Visits were made and briefings received at the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and

the Central Identification Laboratory in Thailand, as well

as the pertinent offices of the Defense Intelligence Agency

in Washington. Discussions were carried out with diplomatic officials from Bangkok, Beijing, Paris, and Geneva, among others.

Potentially the most significant of the Committee's

efforts, however, were its discussions with government

officials from Indochina. A visit to Hanoi and Vientiane

by Congressman Montgomery and three other committee

members in December 1975 served not so much to shed

fresh light on the questions related to missing Americans,

but rather to overcome bureaucratic inertia on the US

side and to open the way for future and more meaningful

discussions between United States and Indochinese officials. This visit was the first significant contact between

US and Vietnamese officials following the communist

42
A WINDING DOWN

takeover of South Vietnam and the evacuation of the

Americans from Saigon earlier in the year.5

In many ways, the Hanoi visit also served as a vivid

lesson regarding the manner in which the Vietnamese

intended to handle the MIA issue, though no negotiations

as such took place during the visit. When the Congressmen asked about the possibility of Americans being held

anywhere in Vietnam, both Prime Minister Pham Van

Dong and Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien stated

emphatically that all American prisoners had been returned to United States custody in 1973. This answer,

while arguably correct, considering the context in which

the question was posed, was less than candid or adequate.

At the time of their visit to Hanoi, committee members

were unknowingly standing within 30 miles of American

citizen Arlo Gay who was being held in a rural area

prison west of Hanoi. United States Marine Robert Garwood was also residing in North Vietnam at that time,

though probably not in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi.

Mr. Arlo Gay, who had worked in a private fishing

venture in South Vietnam, was among those Americans

arrested as the communist forces took over the country

in May 1975. Suspicious of his background and activity,

communist authorities transferred him to North Vietnam

for further questioning and scrutiny. Mr. Gay was eventually released from incarceration in September 1976 and

returned to the United States. PFC Robert Garwood, on

the other hand, was well-known to Vietnamese authorities. He had been captured near Danang by the Viet

Cong on 28 September 1965. After being held in various

camps in South Vietnam, he was eventually moved to the

north. Garwood, viewed by many as a collaborator with

the Viet Cong, was not repatriated with other American

prisoners in 1973, and subsequently became a part of the

cadre that worked with the Vietnamese camp staff within

the communist "re-education" camps established in

northern Vietnam after 1975. In March 1979, at his own

request, he was returned to US custody and was eventually court-martialed and discharged from military service

by the US Marine Corps.

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Congressman Montgomery's Select Committee visit

also provided the Vietnamese officials an opportunity to

press for economic assistance from the United States. The

Vietnamese sought to link progress on the MIA issue

(Article 8b of the Paris Accords) to US willingness to

"heal the wounds of war" through contributions toward

rebuilding the Vietnamese economy (as set forth in Article 21 of the Paris Accords). To the surprise of the visiting

Congressmen, DRV officials also divulged the existence

of a letter from President Nixon to Premier Pham Van

Dong, and alleged that this letter represented a promise

from the United States for 3.25 billion dollars' worth of

reconstruction assistance.6Both Vietnamese officials

urged the normalization of relations between the United

States and the DRV, but Vice Minister Phan Hien specifically vetoed the idea of American involvement in the

investigation of crash and grave sites, citing Vietnamese

"public opinion" as a possible impediment to achieving

progress.

DRV officials also used the congressional visit as an

opportunity to hand over the remains of three US pilots

who had been shot down while on missions over North

Vietnam. The DRV had first made public their possession of these remains in a 22 April 1975 Hanoi radio

broadcast and a subsequent letter to Senator Edward

Kennedy (D-MA). In August, two days prior to a Security Council vote on UN membership for North and

South Vietnam, the DRV notified the US government of

their willingness to repatriate these three remains. When,

on 11 August, the United States cast a vote which vetoed

Vietnamese UN membership, the DRV immediately retracted their three-day-old offer to return the remains,

citing the US lack of '' goodwill."7Secretary of State Kissinger, in a speech to the Southern Governors Conference

in Orlando on 16 September 1975, summed up the US

reaction to this turn of events:

I feel that they (the North Vietnamese) will use the

missing in action for their political purposes, and we

do not believe that American foreign policy should

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be shaped by the holding of hostages—and even less

by the remains of Americans who died in action.8

Finally, on 6 December at their Embassy in Paris, the

DRV notified visiting Select Committee members oftheir

willingness to repatriate the three remains to their families through the Select Committee. Thus, in Hanoi on

21 December, nearly eight months to the day after their

announcement of possession of the remains, the DRV

released custody of these three remains to the visiting

Congressmen. The remains were duly escorted to the

Central Identification Lab in Thailand for positive identification and eventual return to their families for proper

burial.

The results of the Select Committee's investigative

efforts were documented in five sub-reports which detailed the conduct of the hearings and other committee

activity as it progressed. Upon expiration of the Select

Committee's charter (which had been extended from one

year to 15 months), a final report was submitted to the

House of Representatives on 13 December 1976. Among

the significant conclusions set forth in the report, perhaps

the most controversial, was that:

the results of the investigations and information

gathered during its 15-month tenure have led this

committee to the belief that no Americans are still

being held alive as prisoners in Indochina, or elsewhere, as a result of the war in Indochina.9

The committee also concluded that in many instances the

initial status classification (missing, killed, or captured)

was improper or questionable in light of the actual circumstances of loss. These findings, along with the Committee's belief that the current DOD procedures were

adequate and in conformance with the law, led to a committee recommendation that the Service Secretaries immediately resume case status reviews (previously

suspended by the DOD). Such a process would inevitably

result in recategorization of servicemen from a prisoner

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or missing status to the status of KIA/BNR—killed in

action, body not recovered.

The Select Committee reached another significant

and controversial conclusion: "because of the nature and

circumstances in which many Americans were lost in

combat in Indochina, a total accounting by the Indochinese Governments is not possible and should not be expected."10

The committee also concluded, however, that

the Indochinese governments were capable of providing

at least a partial accounting, based both upon information

which they had or could obtain, and upon the recovery

and repatriation of remains. In this regard, the committee report cited the expectation that "more than 150"

remains could be returned. In order to implement this

effort, the committee recommended that the State Department "promptly engage the governments of Indochina in direct discussions aimed at gaining the fullest

possible accounting for missing Americans."11

As would be expected, the publication of the Committee's final report was met with varying, but spirited,

reaction. Strangely, within the Select Committee itself

there quickly appeared a number of "defectors." At the

end of the final report, in its published form, were appended the "additional views" of committee member

Congressman John Moakley (D-MA), as well as the

"separate views" of members Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)

and Tennyson Guyer (R-OH). Moakley, in his "additional views," contradicted the committee belief "that

no Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in

Indochina," stating that he believed the committee had

gathered no evidence to either prove or disprove that all

the missing were, in fact, dead. He also took issue with

the committee's delving into the subject of status changes

since, in his opinion, the committee had no jurisdiction

in this area and therefore no right to make recommendations on this particular subject. Gilman and Guyer, in

their "separate views," basically echoed these same concerns and reservations, but added their disagreement

with the notion of the committee assigning a numerical

value ("more than 150") to the amount of information

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or remains which the Indochinese governments might

produce. They also made a strong plea for administration

action, both to maintain the new momentum on the issue,

and to make the necessary moves toward Vietnam to

expedite eventual achievement of an accounting.12

Immediately following the printing of the report,

Congressmen Richard Ottinger (D-NY) and Jim Lloyd

(D-CA) made it known that they both associated themselves with the remarks of Congressman Moakley. Fully

half of the ten Select Committee members had now made

known their strong reservations or disagreements with

the most important conclusions and recommendations

put forth in the final committee report.

Family members were also extremely disturbed by

the report; they perceived it to be a harbinger of a break

in faith between the government and themselves. They

found the recommendation to resume case status reviews,

joined with the committee's "belief" that none of the

missing were still alive, to be particularly onerous. First,

it seemed that their own government was about to "write

off" the casualties and put an end to all efforts to seek a

final resolution of the cases. Second, many families were

greatly offended by the report's emphasis on the topic of

continued pay and allowances for the missing servicemen.13

In their view, this impugned their motives and

made the families appear as "money-grubbers" who

were only interested in continuing the "missing" status

of their loved ones for purposes of greed. In short, the

families were unanimously disdainful of the report, and

in their eyes Chairman Montgomery became the report

personified. As a result, he was targeted for severe personal criticism by the relatives of the missing. Unfortunately, this feeling of ill will still persists today, and

mention of Congressman Montgomery's name will draw

derogatory remarks in any group of the next-of-kin.

The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, acting on behalf of

the family members, issued on 18 February 1977 their

own analysis of the Select Committee's work.14This analysis was also highly critical of the committee's investigative effort and the final report. The committee was

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accused of parroting administration positions and criticized for a lack of independent or exhaustive investigation. Several committee members were accused of

tailoring the findings to fit their own preconceived notions

about the issue of servicemen still unaccounted for. In

light of the dissent expressed by half of the committee

members, the League also questioned the basic validity

of the committee's work. In addition, the League cited

Secretary Kissinger's lack of candor during discussions

with committee members regarding the letter sent earlier

by President Nixon to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham

Van Dong as a basis for distrust of the motives and longrange intentions of the US government on the casualty

resolution issue.15Finally, the League expressed its

amazement at what it termed "the wildly speculative beliefs and conclusions" contained in the final report. With

few exceptions the League found little to comfort the families or provide assurance of a future good faith effort on

the part of the government to resolve the fate of those still

unaccounted for.

In spite of the bad reviews received from family

members and their League, the Select Committee's work

was generally viewed by other elements of the US government in a more neutral or favorable light, depending

primarily on how the committee recommendations impacted on each organization. Both the Departments of

State and Defense escaped any serious criticism in the

committee report; hence, their reaction was generally

subdued. The State Department, in a message transmitted on 16 December 1976, summarized the final report

conclusions and recommendations for the benefit of interested American embassies and missions. This summary

stressed, inter alia, that no Americans were still being

held alive as prisoners in Indochina. The summary also

took note of and described the views of dissenting committee members but, curiously, failed to report the specific disagreements of Congressmen Moakley and

Ottinger with the committee belief that there were no

live Americans still being held. In specific reaction to the

report, the State message went on to say that, "for our

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part, we will continue our efforts to obtain an accounting

for MIAs. We will also take into account the views of the

Committee on negotiations (with the Indochinese governments)."16

The difference between institutional and personal

views regarding the committee conclusions, and the eagerness with which some within government hoped the

POW/MIA issue would subside or disappear was revealed in a letter written to Congressman Montgomery

by a State Department official in January 1977. The

writer stated, in part, that the Committee's final report

was more than satisfactory:

You and the Committee did a wonderful thing for

our country when you made your findings so definitive. As you know, I agree with them totally. I hope

now that the MIA mission is accomplished, the Congress will find another important project which will

(bring us into contact) from time to time."17

The Select Committee report was received favorably

by the JCRC, though for other reasons. The JCRC headquarters, by the time the final committee report was published, had once again undergone the turmoil of

relocation and further reduction of personnel. As the USoccupied bases in Thailand were shut down one by one,

the unit was forced to move, first to U-Tapao Air Base,

and then, in May 1976, to Barbers Point, Hawaii. Unit

personnel strength was also reduced from approximately

80 down to 19. (Two of these personnel were permitted

to remain behind in Thailand as the nucleus of a JCRC

liaison office.) Included in the personnel reduction was

the loss of the Negotiations Assistance Division and the

downgrading of the unit commander's position from

Brigadier General to Colonel, a move which CINCPAC

had been unable to earlier implement.

The remaining JCRC personnel, all of whom had

been eagerly awaiting any development which might spur

new forward movement on the casualty resolution issue,

took comfort from the Select Committee recommendations regarding resumption of contact between the US

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and Indochinese governments. Such contacts were

viewed as a possible forerunner of on-site investigations

which would hopefully lead to a final determination regarding the fate of those still missing. JCRC morale was

further boosted by the recommendation that the State

Department take advantage of JCRC expertise in their

talks with the Indochinese governments. This was viewed

as an opportunity to influence the State Department negotiators who did not fully appreciate what was needed

physically or legally to assure resolution of a case, and so

would not know exactly what to negotiate for.

Any executive branch action taken as a result of the

Select Committee work, coinciding as it did with the conclusion of the Ford administration, would now be the

responsibility of President Jimmy Carter. As a final parting act, indicative of the desire to put the Vietnam experience behind us, President Ford on 19 January 1977

ordered honorable discharges for approximately 700 deserters who had served in Vietnam and had either been

wounded or decorated for valor. Two days later, and in

keeping with his campaign promise, newly inaugurated

President Carter ordered a "full, complete, and unconditional" blanket pardon for Vietnam draft evaders. And

on 11 February 1977, three weeks after taking office,

President Carter met with a delegation of six officers from

the National League of Families, assuring them of his

commitment to open talks between the United States and

Vietnam in an effort to obtain an accounting for those

servicemen and civilians still missing. In a move much

favored by the League, the President also ordered the

Defense Department to refrain from making unsolicited

status changes until the United States had exhausted all

avenues to obtain factual information regarding the fate

of these individuals. In another move indicating a desire

to quickly address unresolved issues between the Indochinese states and the United States, Carter shortly announced the pending dispatch of a Presidential

Commission to Hanoi and Vientiane. The specific purpose of this commission was to seek further information

on those still missing.

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THE WOODCOCK COMMISSION

The Presidential Commission, publicly announced

by the State Department on 25 February 1977, was given

the following mandate:

The Commission's primary purpose should be to

obtain the best possible accounting for MIAs and

the return of the remains of our dead. In addition,

it should be authorized to obtain Vietnamese and

Lao views on other issues and to report these views

back to the President. But its mandate does not include authorization to engage in negotiations on the

substance of these issues.18

President Carter selected Mr. Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers, to head the five-member commission. Other commission members included

former Senator Mike Mansfield, former Ambassador

Charles Yost, Congressman Sonny Montgomery, and

Mrs. Marian Wright Edelman, Director of the Children's Defense Fund (a Washington DC based child advocacy organization).

Even before its departure from Washington DC to

Asia, the commission was the target of controversy. In

an 18 February 1977 letter to National Security Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Executive Director of the National League of Families, Carol Bates, strongly appealed

that Congressman Montgomery not be designated a commission member, basing her appeal on the League's view

that Montgomery, in his earlier capacity as Chairman of

the Congressional Select Committee, had misrepresented

the conclusions and recommendations ofthat committee.

In his 3 March reply to the League, Brzezinski noted the

League's concern about Montgomery, but pointed to the

need for a balanced group of commission members, a

group "which must respond to a wide range of constituencies."

In their letter to Brzezinski, and later during a 7

March meeting with the commission members, League

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officials made a plea that a League member be included,

at least as an observer, on the commission staff. This

request was supported by many sympathetic congressmen, 45 of whom signed a letter to President Carter appealing that he include a POW/MIA family member in

the group. The lack of administration response to this

request, the inclusion of Congressman Montgomery as a

commission member in spite of the families' objections,

and the growing perception that the commission's real

purpose was to set the stage for normalizing of relations

with Vietnam at the expense of the MIA issue—all led to

League suspicion that they were about to receive, once

again, what they termed the "cosmetic treatment" by

their own government.

On 13 March 1977 the five-member commission departed Washington DC for Southeast Asia, accompanied

by eight staff members and a five-man press party. The

group made a stop en route in Hawaii for briefings by

DOD, the JCRC, and the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL); and to add three more members to the accompanying staff, all JCRC personnel. Following another

overnight stop at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, the

Commission landed at Gia Lam Airport near Hanoi on

the afternoon of 16 March. The arriving commission was

met by Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien and a fleet of

a dozen black state-owned cars. The group was immediately whisked off in formation across the Paul Doumer

bridge—well known to American attack pilots—and into

Hanoi to the government guest house to be greeted by

Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. As evidenced by

the protocol, it was obvious that the now reunified Vietnam—the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)—was

treating the commission visit as a serious matter.

During most of the discussions that took place in

Hanoi on the ensuing three days, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien was the primary SRV interlocutor. The

commission and staff also met with Prime Minister Pham

Van Dong, and a separate session was held between technical experts from both sides to specifically address the

development and exchange of MIA information. In their

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presentations the SRV addressed three separate areas of

concern between the United States and Vietnam: MIAs,

normalization of diplomatic relations, and reconstruction

aid. Phan Hien stressed that none of these three areas

should be considered a precondition to the other two, but

that all three were clearly interrelated.

Regarding MIAs, the SRV once again affirmed that

"all American military personnel who had been taken

prisoner during the Vietnam war and were still living,

have been returned to the United States side" (proven to

be erroneous when PFC Robert Garwood surfaced to be

repatriated back to the United States two years later),

and that "all Americans who remained in South Vietnam

after 30 April 1975 and registered themselves with the

Foreign Service of Vietnam, have been allowed to leave

for their country."19In addition to affirming these previously stated positions, Phan Hien made the alreadyexpected announcement that the SRV was prepared to

repatriate the remains of 12 individuals which they had

revealed some seven months earlier were in their possession. Later, during a somewhat ineffectual side-meeting

of "experts," the SRV described in vague terms their

unnamed specialized office to seek information on missing Americans and recover remains. General agreement

was also reached on procedures to be used for exchanging

data and information on Americans still missing. Though

Vietnamese officials pledged to return to the United

States any remains and all available information as soon

as possible after they were discovered, the commission

in its final report acknowledged that the SRV "almost

certainly" had additional MIA information already available, but that it was not provided during the visit.

While an obligatory portion of the SRV presentation

to the commission was devoted to the MIA topic, the

subjects of US aid toward "healing the wounds of war"

in Vietnam and normalizing of relations with the United

States were obviously of greater interest to the hosts. As

regards healing the wounds of war, Vietnamese officials

referred to the "undeniable responsibility" of the United

States for the destruction of Vietnam's economic base,

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cultural establishments, natural resources, and the ecological environment. Because of its singular responsibility

for this "atrocious war," said the SRV officials, the

United States had a legal and humanitarian obligation to

contribute to the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam.

Once again the Paris Accords were cited (Article 21, dealing with reconstruction), as well as the Nixon letter to

Pham Van Dong, as evidence of the US obligation to

provide the requested assistance. Magnanimously, SRV

officials agreed not only to welcome the US contribution

toward reconstruction, but also to "create favorable conditions for the United States to carry out this contribution."

Pham Van Dong, Foreign Minister Trinh, and Phan

Hien all spoke at some length on the topic of normalized

relations between the United States and Vietnam. In fact,

Phan Hien, in his remarks during the opening meeting

session, revealed how his government viewed the basic

purpose of the Presidential Commission visit when he

stated, "first of all I would like to say that we have this

opportunity to begin the process leading to the normalization of relations." Though the SRV officials noted that

obstacles still existed on the path to better relations, each

expressed the hope that the process of normalization

would move forward. Ultimately, during the final session

with the commission, Phan Hien proposed that normalization negotiations begin soon, either in Paris or Hanoi.

Despite the commission's full work schedule, there

were opportunities for lighter moments. The Vietnamese

hosts were exceedingly gracious and congenial, hosting a

grand banquet in honor of their visitors one evening, and

providing a first-rate musical show on a second night.

These events were duly recorded on film by the accompanying US media representatives, as were views of Congressman Montgomery and others during an earlymorning jogging session around the picturesque Hoan

Khiem Lake in the center of Hanoi. Unfortunately, when

these scenes were later played for US TV audiences, critics accused the commission of a lack of seriousness in

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their mission, and of joining in a "love fest" with our

former Vietnamese adversaries.

On the morning of 19 March 1977, just before the

departure of the commission from Vietnam, a dignified

repatriation ceremony was conducted on the hot tarmac

at Gia Lam airport at which time the commission accepted custody of the remains of the 12 individuals believed by the SRV to be those of American servicemen.20

The remains were loaded aboard the commission's C141 aircraft, which then departed immediately for Vientiane, Laos, the next stop on the commission agenda.

Commission members, during their overnight stay

in Vientiane, heard once again—this time from the Lao

point of view—about the US obligation to assist in "healing the wounds of war" by helping reconstruct the country. Lao officials described in detail the difficulties

encountered and their efforts to seek information and remains of American servicemen lost in Laos, but regretted

they had no results to report to the commission. The Lao

also denied the existence of any live captives still held as

a consequence of the war.

Late on 20 March, the commission departed from

Vientiane to begin the long journey back to Washington

DC and to report the results of their visit to President

Carter. In his oral report to the President, and as noted

in the final written commission report, Chairman Woodcock expressed the view that a new and favorable climate

had been created by the tommission visit, and that the

best hope for resolution of the MIA issue would be in the

context of improved relations between the United States

and the Indochinese states. Woodcock cited the creation

of a "new spirit" as the most significant contribution

toward the mission assigned to the commission by the

President, mentioning the commission's belief that it had

impressed upon Vietnam and Laos that the United States

had a "realistic attitude" toward resolution of the MIA

issue, and that it was the US intent to remove this issue as

a barrier to normalization of relations. The commission

expressed the view that a non-confrontational approach

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toward Vietnam and Laos would be more likely to elicit

further cooperation on the MIA issue.

In addition to these general views, the commission

report specifically concluded that, based upon the talks

with Indochinese officials and on other information made

available, "there is no evidence to indicate that any

American POWs from the Indochina conflict remain

alive." The commission agreed with the Vietnamese that

those Americans who had stayed in Vietnam after 30

April 1975 had now departed and found no evidence to

support the occasional rumors of deserters still living in

Indochina. The commission did concede, however, that

the Vietnamese probably had other information on missing Americans which it did not reveal, but took seriously

the Vietnamese assurance that they would search for further information and remains and would provide it

promptly to the United States. The commission report

also noted the "new procedure" which was established

for the continuing exchange of MIA information between

Vietnam and the United States. (Establishing this "new

procedure," in fact, amounted to no more than the exchange of mailing addresses between two points of contact

in the US Department of State and the SRV Ministry of

Foreign Affairs.)

Furthermore, the commission made a strong recommendation that the normalization process be vigorously

pursued by a resumption of talks in Paris between US

and Vietnamese representatives. The commission also

recommended continued technical exchanges on accounting for MIAs, suggesting that US personnel deliver pertinent information to Hanoi and that Vietnamese

representatives visit the US identification laboratory facilities in Hawaii. The US government was urged to

promptly consider providing material assistance to aid

Vietnamese search and recovery activity, and to encourage private American groups to increase humanitarian

aid programs for Indochina in such areas as food, medical

supplies, and prosthetic equipment.21

As with the work of the Congressional Select Committee which preceded it, the work of President Carter's

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Commission met with immediate criticism. A White

House news conference was held following Chairman

Woodcock's report to the President. Press interest had

been heightened by the President's earlier announcement

of imminent resumption of negotiations in Paris between

the United States and Vietnam for the purpose of establishing normalized relations with Hanoi. At the news conference, President Carter was questioned by reporters

regarding his statements indicating complete satisfaction

with the results of the commission's trip. In response to

a reporter's suggestion that he had changed his position

regarding the necessity for the Vietnamese to account

for MIAs before normalization would be considered, the

President expressed his belief that by returning the remains of American servicemen to the visiting commission, and by their agreement to investigate cases and

exchange technical information relating to the losses, the

Vietnamese had acted in a positive manner which would

justify the opening of normalization talks. Referring to

the Vietnamese, the President stated:

"I think this is about all they can do. I don't have

any way to prove that they have accounted for all of

those about whom they have information. But I

think, so far as I can discern, they have acted in

good faith."22

Later, Chairman Woodcock was questioned closely

by a phalanx of doubting congressmen when he reported

the results of the commission efforts to the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs on 31 March 1977. The congressmen's questions

and comments clearly implied both their distrust of Vietnamese intentions and motives, and their belief that the

commission members had been "taken in" by their Vietnamese hosts. Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)

took the commission to task, saying he did not share the

sense of accomplishment or forward movement portrayed

in the commission's written report. Congressman Herb

Burke (R-FL), expressing suspicion of Vietnamese motives, thought that rather than acting in a purely humane

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manner, the Vietnamese government was presenting the

United States with a "blackjack proposition" wherein

Vietnamese cooperation on the MIA issue would be exchanged for US acquiescence on SRV membership in the

United Nations. Congressman Frank Gooding (R-ID)

was critical that no family members had been included

on the commission. Congressman Robert Lagomarsino

(R-CA) considered that the commission should have

brought up the subject of Vietnamese human rights violations in the course of the discussions in Hanoi. Finally,

several congressmen expressed their revulsion at associating the accounting of missing American servicemen with

the provision of aid to Vietnam, and the lifting of the

trade embargo.

As an aside, in a gesture which many family members would have expected, at this same hearing commission member Congressman Sonny Montgomery once

again advocated that the President should proceed with

case reviews and should declare all MIAs as killed in

action. With what some would view as almost callous

indifference, Montgomery argued that this would relieve

the servicemen's families of the anguish associated with

their uncertain status.

Columnist John P. Roche, in an article published in

the Washington Star on 1 April 1977, took Woodcock to

task for his apparent naivete, likening the commission's

Hanoi trip to "a visitation by the Salvation Army to the

Mafia." The League of Families, in a "position paper"

commenting on the commission efforts, drew similar parallels, but in less colorful language and with less cynicism.23

The League paper expressed disappointment over

the commission's failure to return with substantive information about those still unaccounted for. While the

League of Families agreed that the repatriation of remains brought about by the commission's visit was a step

forward, they also viewed this activity as far less than

what the Vietnamese were capable of doing had they exhibited a truly cooperative attitude. The League was encouraged by the announcement that the United States

intended to enter into bilateral talks with the Vietnamese

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on the MIA issue, but expressed skepticism regarding

Vietnam's willingness to work within the bounds of the

"technical mechanism" established by the commission.

Even among the participating staff members of the

commission there was a feeling that the results fell far

short of what was being indicated by the optimistic statements of Chairman Woodcock, echoed by the President.

Dr. Roger Shields, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who had represented the Secretary of Defense on the commission staff,

filed a critical report of the commission's efforts. He

pointed out that the turnover of remains to the commission represented "the minimal response which we could

have expected from the Vietnamese."24 He argued that

in spite of Vietnamese assurances to the commission that

they had no further remains or knowledge about any US

missing persons, abundant and unambiguous information possessed by the United States, much of it already

made public, proved the contrary. From this, Dr. Shields

concluded that the Vietnamese were continuing to link

progress on accounting for US casualties to resolution of

economic and political issues. Dr. Shields also made clear

that he viewed the upcoming discussions in Paris as a test

of Vietnamese good faith. Regarding resumption of case

reviews, he recommended that any status changes (from

MIA to KIA, for example) be held in abeyance pending

the outcome of the Paris talks, with a review of this recommendation once Vietnamese intentions become more

clear. A State Department official, also a staff member

on the commission, wrote of his doubts about the commission results in a 6 April 1977 letter to another officer:

"We have been appearing repeatedly on the Hill with

Woodcock et al. Mostly sweetness and light . . . which

worries me. What will they say six months from now

when nothing has happened?"

In retrospect, it is difficult to assess the impact of

the Woodcock Commission. On the plus side, the effort

seemed, once again, to momentarily stir the Vietnamese

to renewed activity on the MIA issue. The remains repatriation on the occasion of the commission's visit to Hanoi

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was followed six months later by another repatriation,

when the remains of 22 Americans who had died in Vietnam were returned. (This repatriation followed by ten

days the admission of Vietnam into the United Nations

on 20 September 1977. Rather than veto Vietnam's

membership in the UN as in the past, the United States

abstained during the vote.)

Unfortunately, the so-called mechanism which was

established by the Woodcock Commission to enhance the

technical exchange of casualty resolution information,

based as it was on communications via the State Department in Washington DC, never proved to be a viable

conduit for exchange of data at the technical level. File

information was passed to the SRV, along with requests

for verification or supplemental information, but there

were no substantive responses received.

The Woodcock Commission, because it laid heavy

emphasis on avoidance of controversy or confrontation

and had refrained from any aggressive push for MIA

answers, probably deluded SRV officials into believing

that the United States was prepared to normalize relations at any cost. This belief by SRV officialdom, in the

long run, may have delayed more meaningful cooperation on resolving the MIA issue. In addition, some might

argue that by not taking a "hard-line" approach in its

discussions with the SRV, the commission may also have

overly emboldened the Vietnamese who then pursued a

less cautious approach in dealings with their Asian neighbors. Regardless of what may or may not have been the

true legacy of the Woodcock Commission, the families of

those still missing perceived the commission as evidence

of a Carter policy of "normalization first, casualty resolution later," a policy which the families felt would forfeit

US leverage on the MIA issue. Thus, in the eyes of these

families, the Carter administration suffered an early blow

to its reputation and its credibility in dealing with the

issue of the MIAs—a blow from which it never fully recovered.

60
A WINDING DOWN

THE MOVE TOWARD US-VIETNAM

NORMALIZATION

Immediately on the heels of the Woodcock Commission visit, direct talks began between US and Vietnamese

officials. The first round of discussions, intended to lead

ultimately to normalization of diplomatic relations, took

place in Paris on 3 and 4 May 1977. While the US side

was only prepared to normalize relations without preconditions, the Vietnamese side, led by Mr. Phan Hien, once

again brought up the topic of reconstruction assistance

and cited the 1973 Nixon letter as a commitment for aid.

SRV officials apparently underestimated US officials' repugnance toward the idea of "reparations," and American reaction to SRV use of this emotionally charged word

during the discussions. Even those Americans who might

have been favorably disposed toward better relations with

Vietnam found it politically unpalatable to move forward

as long as Vietnamese demands were couched in such

terms. This Vietnamese insistence on "reparations" as a

part of the normalization process, reiterated during a second round of talks begun on 2 June, effectively precluded

any forward movement toward a mutual agreement.

Only during the third round of talks, begun on 19 December 1977, did Vietnamese officials finally back away

from their demand for aid as a precondition to normalization; however, Phan Hien again urgently sought an informal commitment from US negotiator Richard Holbrooke

that aid would follow as a consequence of normalization.

Holbrooke's inability to provide such a commitment led

to adjournment of the talks.

Though President Carter had hoped to put the Vietnam War era behind, as clearly evidenced by his early

unconditional pardon of the draft dodgers and by his implied assent to SRV United Nations membership, subsequent events led to a further chilling of the climate

between the United States and Vietnam. In February

1978, just before the start of a planned fourth round of

normalization talks, an American official of the US Information Agency and an American-Vietnamese associate

61
A WINDING DOWN

were arrested by the FBI on charges of spying for the

SRV. Implicated in the case was the Vietnamese UN

Ambassador in New York, Dinh Ba Thi, who was quickly

declared persona non grata and expelled from the United

States.25 As a consequence of the ensuing ill feelings, the

fourth series of negotiations were indefinitely postponed.

By the summer of 1978, however, emotions had

calmed and the SRV once again moved to establish a

relationship with the United States. In mid-July, in response to an earlier US invitation, the SRV dispatched

a team of officials for a four-day trip to the facilities of

the JCRC and Central Identification Laboratory (CIL)

in Hawaii. The group was briefed on US methods of

crash site and gravesite excavation, was shown the extent

of US casualty files, and participated in discussions on

analysis techniques. They also witnessed the anthropological capabilities and methods used in the laboratory to

identify repatriated remains.

This visit to Hawaii by the SRV delegation was followed shortly by a Vietnamese announcement of the discovery and pending repatriation of the remains of another

11 American servicemembers. This time, Vietnamese officials used the occasion of another congressional delegation's visit to Hanoi to return the remains to US

custody.26This delegation, led by Congressman Sonny

Montgomery, received the remains on 26 August at Gia

Lam airport, just across the river east of Hanoi.

Meanwhile, plans were being quietly made to meet

once again with Vietnamese negotiators, this time in the

UN offices in New York. On 22 September, and again on

27 September, Mr. Holbrooke met with Deputy Foreign

Minister Nguyen Co Thach. During the latter session

Thach finally clearly agreed that normalization could

proceed without a prior commitment on the part of the

United States for reconstruction assistance and aid. Of

this sudden reversal on the part of Vietnamese officials

following years of protracted discussions, Holbrooke is

alleged to have commented, "Bang! In one go Thach laid

it all out. Then he wanted the agreement, which could not

be signed for two years, to be settled in ten minutes."27

62
A WINDING DOWN

In spite of the concession by the SRV on the contentious point of a US promise of assistance, other events

were to overtake the move toward normalization. In late

June 1978, at Russia's strong urging, Vietnam had

joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(COMECON), the Soviet dominated Socialist economic

group. This, plus indications of significantly heightened

tensions between Vietnam and neighboring Cambodia,

gave reason for suspicion as to Vietnam's future intentions. Moreover, ethnic Chinese were by this time fleeing

persecution in Vietnam by the boatload, prompting public and official US indignation toward Vietnam and drawing unfavorable congressional attention. Perhaps most

significant of all, however, was the fact that negotiations

were proceeding secretly but rapidly toward establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United

States and China. President Carter had become convinced that normalization with China was of more lasting

significance to US interests, and that normalization could

not be simultaneously concluded with China and Vietnam. Thus, in October 1978, Carter decided to delay

any normalization with Vietnam until after the establishment of full relations with China.

The events which followed are a matter of record.

On 3 November 1978 Vietnam and the Soviet Union

tightened their embrace by concluding a Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation. On Christmas Day the sporadic fighting between Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge

forces on the Vietnam-Cambodia border areas finally

erupted into all-out conflict between these communist

neighbors as the Vietnamese launched a full-scale invasion into Cambodia. The Vietnamese forces swept westward across Cambodia, hardly hesitating at the capital of

Phnom Penh and pushing ahead of them the retreating

Khmer Rouge forces of Pol Pot. Within less than two

months China, the backer of the Khmer Rouge, retaliated by attacking Vietnam at numerous points along the

Vietnamese northern frontier. The United States, neither

wanting to give the impression of condoning Vietnam's

63
A WINDING DOWN

invasion of Cambodia, nor wanting to jeopardize the impending normalization with China, put an indefinite hold

on any further moves toward normalization of relations

with Hanoi.

For the Carter administration, the key to resolution

of the issue of those missing in action was the normalization of relations with Hanoi. Administration officials believed that only with the normalization process would

come the Vietnamese cooperation needed to learn the fate

of those still unaccounted for. While this view was disputed by many of the family members speaking through

the League of Families, it was the view that prevailed.

President Carter had begun his administration with a

plan to speedily normalize relations, and seemingly expected that the issue of missing American servicemen

would just as speedily be resolved and would fade from

view as an issue to be dealt with. Protracted Vietnamese

insistence on "reparations", combined with the Carter

decision to push forward first on the normalization with

China, however, delayed administration efforts to

achieve normalized relations until too late. A multitude

of events had coincided to halt the momentum toward

achievement of a reconciliation with Hanoi. This failure

to achieve normalization marked the beginning of a

lengthy period of further diminished progress toward a

full accounting for the fate of those still missing.

NOTES

1. At the time of the fall of South Vietnam, approximately

100 remains had been recovered and identified as those of

Americans. This number included the 23 remains of those who

had died while in captivity in North Vietnam, repatriated from

Hanoi in March 1974.

2. In January 1976, CINCPAC felt obliged to address the

topic ofJCRC's direct contacts with Washington DC and, in a

message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked that in the future

all communications to JCRC from Washington DC be directed

64
A WINDING DOWN

through CINCPAC. In a reply two days later, JCS advised

that they had discussed the matter with OSD/ISA, and future

communication would be in accordance with the wishes of

CINCPAC. While this appeared to be a relatively minor matter, it was symptomatic of a greater problem underlying the

entire relationship between the JCRC and its headquarters.

This relationship, unfortunately, was not to be smoothed over

merely by a single message to the JCS.

3. US House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Select

Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, Part 1 (94th

Congress, 1st Session), p. ii.

4. US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Missing

Persons in Southeast Asia, Final Report, dated 13 December

1976 (94th Congress, 2d Session, House Report no. 94-1764),

P-5.

5. In addition to Select Committee Chairman Congressman

Sonny Montgomery (D-MS), others who participated in this

trip to Hanoi included Congressmen Richard Ottinger (DNY), Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), and Paul McCloskey (RCA); and several staff personnel.

6. The letter from President Nixon to Prime Minister Pham

Van Dong became a subject of considerable controversy. This

letter, dated 1 February 1973, was alleged by the DRV to

promise that (a) the US government would contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political

conditions, (b) US preliminary studies indicated that the appropriate programs would fall in the range of 3.25 billion dollars of grant aid over a period of 5 years, and (c) other forms

of aid would be agreed upon between the two parties. While

DRV officials portrayed this letter as a firm and unconditional

US commitment, both President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger took a different view. They contended that the letter

did not contain any pledges or promises of aid, but rather

represented US willingness to participate in postwar reconstruction as specified in Article 21 of the Paris Accords, and

advised the DRV of the preliminary financial estimates of the

composition of the reconstruction program. They also contended that there was a definite US-DRV understanding that

congressional authorization and appropriation would be a prerequisite to any implementation of such a reconstruction program.

65
A WINDING DOWN

Executive branch refusal to provide a copy of the letter to

the Select Committee for its examination led to committee

suspicion that there was some form of "secret agreement" or

quid pro quo which might impact on Vietnamese cooperation

on the MIA issue. This suspicion was eventually shared by

the families of the missing, and reinforced their distrust of

administration efforts to resolve the MIA issue.

With the agreement of the NSC, the complete text of the

letter was finally released by the State Department on 19 May

1977. Examination of the letter indicates that it was indeed

what it was represented to be by Nixon and Kissinger—not the

unqualified "promise" which Vietnamese officials led visiting

congressmen to believe. In fairness to the Vietnamese, however, it is not difficult to imagine that the letter, written as it

was in rather stilted "bureaucratese", could be either wrongly

or wishfully interpreted as a written commitment for a specific

amount of postwar reconstruction assistance.'Considering the

probable reason that the letter was written in the first place, it

should have come as no great surprise to US officials that the

Vietnamese interpreted it as a promise.

7. According to Secretary of State Kissinger, the US veto of

UN membership for the DRV and the PRG was not directed

as a hostile act toward Vietnam. The action, he said, was

taken to uphold the right of UN membership for worthy noncommunist states, a right which had been denied to South

Korea several days earlier when on 6 August 1975 their application for UN membership had been refused Security Council

consideration.

8. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 73, no. 1893, 6 October

1975, p. 520.

9. US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Missing

Persons in Southeast Asia, Final Report, dated 13 December

1976 (94th Congress, 2d Session, House Report no. 94-1764),

p. vii. In addition to the quoted conclusions, the committee

arrived at a number of other lesser conclusions, most of which

have been proved valid during the intervening 16 years since

the committee report was issued.

10. Ibid., p. vii.

11. Ibid., p. vii.

66
A WINDING DOWN

12. Ibid. For Congressman Moakley's views, see pp. 255-256.

For the views of Congressmen Gilman and Guyer, see pp. 257-

259.

13. Individuals carried in the status of "missing" are deemed,

in a legal sense, to be still on active duty. Thus they, or their

designated next-of-kin, are entitled to receive their full pay and

allowances. Once this status is changed from "missing" to a

presumptive finding of death, the pay and allowances cease

and the legally stipulated survivor benefits begin, normally at

a significantly reduced monetary value.

14. The National League of Families of American Prisoners

and Missing in Southeast Asia, Analysis ofthe Final Report ofthe

House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, 18

February 1977.

15. For elaboration on the Nixon letter to Prime Minister

Pham Van Dong, refer to note 6 above.

16. State Department message 305388, DTG 162258Z Dec

76.

17. The author of the 18 January 1977 letter to Congressman

Montgomery will remain unnamed, lest he share with the congressman the same slings and arrows delivered by the family

members and by the National League of Families. .

18. The specific mandate of the Presidential Commission was

quoted in a 16 March 1977 letter from National Security Advisor Brzezinski to the Executive Director of the National League

of Families.

19. Quoted from an 18 March 1977 SRV Aide-Memoire provided to the commission upon their departure from Vietnam.

Meeting notes indicate that Phan Hien, under questioning,

added another caveat when he stated that "all those who registered themselves and who have asked to leave have been allowed

to leave."

20. Of the 12 remains repatriated, 11 were positively identified

as those of American servicemen. In the twelfth case, the remains were determined to be those of a Vietnamese individual,

and arrangements were made to return these remains back to

Hanoi during another repatriation visit six months later.

21. Report of the Presidential Commission's Trip to Vietnam

and Laos, March 16-20, 1977.

67
A WINDING DOWN

22. President Carter's comments are quoted from a UPI account of his news conference held at the White House on 24

March 1977.

23. Position Paper of the National League of Families of American

Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, April 1977.

24. Undated memo for the Secretary of Defense, Reference

number 1-5135/77, Subject: Presidential Commission on the

Missing in Action, signed by Roger E. Shields.

25. For an interesting account of the spying incident which led

to the expulsion of the SRV Ambassador to the UN, see Nayan

Chanda's book, Brother Enemy (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1986), pp. 154-156 and pp. 267-269.

26. Congressman Montgomery's delegation spent several days

visiting both Hanoi and Vientiane to discuss the MIA issue.

On 26 August 1978, the delegation flew to both cities in an

Air Force C-141 and picked up the 11 remains in Hanoi, plus

another four remains in Vientiane.

27. Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy, p. 266.

68
3

HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

REFUGEES STREAM FROM INDOCHINA

With the helicopter evacuation from the roofs of

Saigon in the early morning hours of 30 April 1975 came

the end of the official American presence in Vietnam.

The unofficial presence included an assortment of journalists, humanitarian workers, and a few others who remained in Vietnam of their own free will, together with

a number of other American citizens who wanted to leave

but, for various reasons, were unfortunate enough to miss

the final evacuation. All these people, with several notable exceptions, were gradually rounded up by the new

communist regime and expelled from Vietnam, with the

bulk of them leaving from Saigon in the summer of 1976.

The departure of the official American community

from Vietnam had a decided impact on the efforts being

made to resolve the fate of those servicemen still not accounted for. Most immediately affected were on-going

activities which were directed toward searching the South

Vietnamese countryside for aircraft crashsites and possible gravesites. Such activity, however, had already been

69
HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

considerably curtailed as a result of the heightened insecurity throughout the countryside, particularly as hostilities had built toward the final communist push for

takeover of the south. An even more significant and lasting result of the American departure was the loss of access

to the Vietnamese populace, the only real source of potentially useful information needed to determine the fate of

the missing, barring cooperation of the Indochinese governments.

The residual Americans were not the only ones who

were apprehensive as the North Vietnamese army made

its final thrust toward Saigon. Fearing stern reprisals at

the very least, thousands of Vietnamese citizens were desperate to flee and escape life under the communist yoke.

While many were evacuated by the Americans in the days

just before the final takeover and some escaped aboard

commandeered aircraft, a larger number eventually took

to any available boat and fled by sea to the neighboring

southeast Asian countries.

This stream of refugees, initially a trickle of people,

gradually increased in reaction to the new government's

repressive economic and political measures. A blanket of

despair began to settle over the country. When, in March

1978, the Vietnamese government suddenly imposed severe sanctions against ethnic Chinese throughout the

country, and particularly in Chinese enclaves such as the

Cho Lon section of Saigon, the trickle of refugees quickly

turned into a flood. To cope with this influx of refugees,

temporary camps sprang up almost overnight in the

neighboring countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,

Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as the colonies

of Hong Kong and Macau. The effort to relocate these

refugees to new homes on a permanent basis began in

earnest, prompting the creation of what was soon to become a new and bustling industry in Southeast Asia: that

of refugee processing and resettlement.

To those working on the issue of missing Americans,

these refugees, newly departed from their former homeland, constituted a potentially useful source of information about what was transpiring back in their native

70
HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

country. Military personnel in the JCRC Liaison Office

in Bangkok were eager to begin searching among the

refugees for scraps of information which might bear on

the fate of missing Americans. It soon became obvious,

however, that using the refugees as information sources

would not be easy, and US government efforts to exploit

this opportunity got off to a sputtering start as the everincreasing stream of refugees began to take on a political

dimension.

The Indochinese were not particularly welcome in

any of the neighboring countries, and were viewed as a

disrupting influence in the existing society. In the case of

Thailand, for instance, there was no love lost between

the Thais and the Vietnamese. Thailand was not eager

to have these refugees on its soil, and was anxious that

they either return to their homeland, or be immediately

taken out of Thailand by the international community

and settled elsewhere. Moreover, the host countries generally resented the added financial burden of maintaining

the camps, in spite of the assistance which was being

provided under the auspices of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). With few exceptions the host countries made sure that conditions within

the camps were exceedingly spartan to discourage other

potential refugees from following. These conditions, as

well as other factors, all had a bearing on whether or not

access could be gained to interview refugees of interest.

Because the camps were not on US territory, American

personnel who desired to interview the refugees were dependent on the goodwill of the host country to gain entry

to the refugee camps, and the host country was not always

eager to have Americans wandering in the camps to view

the harsh and sometimes even severe conditions imposed

on the camp residents.

Given the limited staff of the JCRC and other organizations charged with gathering and analyzing MIA information, it was clearly impossible to conduct a detailed

interview of each and every refugee throughout Asia regarding his knowledge of missing Americans. Consequently, a plan was devised and implemented to pinpoint

71
HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

those who had specific information of interest, then to

interview them in detail to acquire whatever information

they possessed. This plan began with an effort to heighten

all refugees' awareness of the US government's desire

for MIA-related information. Multi-language posters, in

Vietnamese, Lao, Khmer, Hmong, Chinese, Thai, and

English, were placed in prominent locations around the

refugee camps. The word was also passed by making periodic loudspeaker broadcasts to the camp populace, and

through word of mouth using the refugee leadership

within each camp. The message to the refugee community was simple: following a brief explanation of the US

effort to locate Americans yet unaccounted for as a result

of the war in Indochina, the refugee was urged that

if you have any information about (a) Americans

living freely or in captivity in your home country,

(b) burial sites which may contain the remains of

Americans, or (c) aircraft crashsites which may contain the remains of Americans, please notify. . .

The designated point of contact was ordinarily the US

refugee resettlement officials and workers who were present in the camps on a daily basis. In this way, officials

quickly identified a number of leads and interviewed

them in detail during regular periodic visits to all the

refugee camps.

Expanding the refugee interview program throughout the Asian area was not without its problems. In addition to coordination problems with gaining host

government approval for camp access, other significant

problems arose, many of our own making. One of the

first debates came about over the question of active solicitation of POW/MIA information. Most US officials

found no fault with making refugees aware of the US

desire for any information which might assist in resolving

the uncertainty regarding those Americans still missing,

and of affording these refugees the opportunity to voluntarily report this information to an American representative. A few officials, however, expressed grave concern

72
HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

over the concept of actively going among the refugees,

interviewing them individually, and specifically asking

whether or not they had such information of interest.

These officials feared that refugees would seize upon the

idea that the key to attaining resettlement in the United

States would be to claim knowledge of missing Americans. This situation, they suggested, would lead to a rash

of fabricated stories. In several countries, other problems

delayed implementation of an aggressive refugee interview program. In one instance, for example, the responsible refugee officer was initially unwilling to agree to camp

interviews, suggesting rather that the Department of Defense conduct detailed interviews only after the refugees

had been resettled to the United States. Again, his concern seemed to center on the possibility of creating an

incentive to generate false information. "I also am not

keen on DOD types going into (the camps) to interview

refugees. I propose that we let DOD have a crack at them

upon arrival in CONUS," he wrote.1

Another problem initially encountered in two countries involved the young US-contracted refugee workers

(usually referred to as members of the JVA—Joint Voluntary Agencies), many of whom were a part of the antiwar generation and were openly antagonistic toward US

government efforts to seek information about missing servicemen. Some felt that they, along with the whole refugee resettlement program, were being politicized by the

MIA issue, and strongly vocalized their unwillingness to

address any questions to the refugees. Only very slowly

was this initial uncooperativeness overcome as a result of

a considerable "public relations" effort by JCRC interviewers. To the JVA workers' credit, once they became

convinced of the worth of the effort, they became some

of the most aggressive and effective supporters of the information gathering program.

Despite such problems, active solicitation was begun,

with the full understanding that there indeed would be a

certain number of false leads. The JCRC interviewers

and others working to gather information simply adopted

73
HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

the attitude that they would accept the story of the refugee, although not without the benefit of as detailed an

interview as possible. The interview results would be reported, and would then become a matter for trained analysts to verify or disprove. Essentially, this was an

acknowledgement that we must accept some chaff in order to obtain the wheat—the burden of sorting out which

was which fell to the analysts.

MIA REPORTS FLOW IN

From its beginning in Thailand, the refugee interview program expanded throughout the various camp areas in Southeast Asia, trying to keep pace with the everincreasing numbers of refugees fleeing from Vietnam,

Laos, and Cambodia. As the Vietnamese government

increased the pressure and intimidation against ethnic

Chinese residing in Vietnam in mid-1978, and as uncertainty increased as a result of the Vietnamese invasion of

Cambodia, the flight of people to neighboring countries

markedly increased. At its peak, the outflow reached the

phenomenal number of approximately 64,000 Vietnamese who fled their homeland during the month of May

1979—nearly all by boat.2

Personnel of the smallJCRC Liaison Office in Bangkok had become involved in the detailed interviewing of

refugees almost from the time of the establishment of this

office in 1976. At that time the refugees were predominantly Lao and Hmong who had crossed the Mekong

River into Thailand from Laos, along with a relatively

small number of Vietnamese who had trickled out of

Vietnam and reached the Thai coast by boat. As the

refugee flow increased, however, particularly with the

flood of "boat people" from Vietnam in 1979, the tempo

of interview activity increased. Though screening and interviewing of refugees by others began earlier, the JCRC

did not become heavily involved in this task in Malaysia,

Singapore, and Indonesia until 1979. Thereafter, JCRC

74
HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

interview activity expanded to the camps of Hong Kong,

Macau, and the Philippines, as well as occasionally to

Japan and China.

As the refugee camp population grew, and as more

personnel became involved, the number of information

reports forwarded for analysis and possible correlation to

missing Americans steadily increased. From approximately 400 reports in 1979, the JCRC wrote nearly 1,000

information reports in 1985 and in the years that have

followed. It must also be pointed out that, in addition to

the JCRC, others were similarly involved in collecting

relevant information about Americans still unaccounted

for. The entire official American community was activated to seek out and report any and all information

which might pertain to those still missing. In Asia, information was gathered and reported not only by the JCRC,

but also by elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State

Department, and the Justice Department.

In those cases where it was not possible to conduct

a detailed interview before the refugee's departure for

resettlement, appropriate arrangements were made to

conduct the interview at a later date. This was not an

uncommon event in those instances where the refugee

was unexpectedly resettled rapidly, or where he did not

make known his knowledge about missing Americans until after he had already moved to his new homeland. In

such cases, the detailed interviews were ordinarily conducted by employees of DIA, or by members of the various investigation offices of the military services. In the

event refugees had resettled to countries other than the

United States, interviews were commonly conducted by

personnel from the Defense Attache Office of the corresponding American Embassy. Consequently, over the

years former Indochinese residents have been interviewed

in such diverse places as Paris, Bahrain, Stockholm,

Osaka, and Perth.

While refugees have constituted the primary and perhaps most useful source of new information about the fate

of missing Americans, they are by no means the sole

75
HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY

source of such information. Foreign diplomats posted to

the countries of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have often been willing to volunteer information which they have

gleaned, either from personal observation, or from conversations with host country officials or civilians. One

such instance occurred when a western ambassador to

Hanoi while passing through Bangkok, reported to the

JCRC Liaison Officer that he had spotted a black man

attired in native dress and riding a bicycle in the town

of Gia Lam directly across the river from Hanoi. The

ambassador speculated that the man may have been an

American, perhaps a former serviceman, who had opted

to remain in Vietnam. (For lack of any additional clarifying details or evidence, no definitive conclusion was ever

drawn regarding this report.) Similar cooperation in sharing information has also been obtained from businessmen, tourists, newspersons, and other travelers to these

countries, all of whom have been sympathetic toward efforts to resolve the MIA issue.

As one would expect, the collected reports have varied widely in specificity, content, and degree of detail.

The information has ranged from firsthand knowledge of

burial locations or sightings of Americans, to the vaguest

of rumors of aircraft crashsites or grave sites. Some reports have included amazing amounts of detail, while

others are so nebulous as to be nearly useless. Nevertheless, the analysts of both the JCRC and the DIA have

undertaken the task of attempting correlation of the reports, trying to piece together the over 2,000 picture puzzles which represent the complete story of the fate of

missing Americans. In some instances, most of the puzzle

pieces are in place and a clear picture has already

emerged. In many other instances, though, only a few

pieces are in place and much more needs to be done

before we can gain an understanding of what happened

to a particular individual.

In any event, nothing is discarded by the analysts.

Information which does not immediately fit into the picture may at some later date become explainable as more

76
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and more information is gathered and analyzed. For example, there was a flurry of reports from diplomats

posted in Hanoi in mid-1976 regarding vague rumors of

the escape from prison of an alleged bearded American

pilot POW. These reports made little sense until later

when more was learned of the experiences of American

citizen Arlo Gay (mentioned earlier) who had been held

captive near Hanoi. Gay had indeed escaped into the

North Vietnamese foothills for nearly four weeks, and

was the subject of an intense manhunt before being again

taken into custody. Gay was eventually released in September 1976.

Unquestionably the quality of the information gathered has varied widely. Firsthand accounts have generally

been more detailed than hearsay information, particularly as the hearsay is passed through more and more

"tellers". Some informants have proven to possess excellent memories, while others can recollect very few details.

The interviewers have been faced with the task of eliciting

as much information as possible, in as much detail as

possible, without leading the informant or suggesting answers to questions posed during the interview; and then

faithfully reporting the interview results without bias or

preconception.

The question of "motive" has often entered the public discussion when the validity of refugee reports is debated. Some would ask whether the refugee might not

have some ulterior purpose in providing POW/MIA information. Certainly, most refugees are under stressful

conditions, having recently departed their homeland,

perhaps never to return or never to see loved ones again.

They are desperate to be accepted for resettlement but

threatened with possible rejection. It is quite conceivable

that such persons, in their eagerness to please or to call

their plight to the attention of American authorities,

might fabricate stories they think will interest the Americans. Indeed, there is no negative incentive or penalty

incurred, even if it could be without doubt proven that

the refugee is lying. Interviewers have always taken the

position that there can be no linkage between providing

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POW/MIA information, whether truthful or not, and the

refugee's opportunity for resettlement. If ever the refugees were to perceive a connection and their resettlement

was at risk, surely the flow of possibly vital information

would stop. Consequently, interviewers have duly noted

the information provided, while accepting that there will

be a certain percentage of fabrication, and have relied on

the talent of the trained and experienced JCRC and DIA

analysts to sort out fact from fiction.

THE INFORMATION PROVES USEFUL

Has the still on-going refugee interview activity

proved worthwhile after well over a decade of effort?

What conclusions can be drawn? Has anything of value

been learned? Has the information analysis apparatus

simply been clogged up by thousands and thousands of

conjured-up stories?

Certainly no knowledgeable person would claim that

everything reported as a result of refugee interviews is

true, or even useful for that matter. There has been no

spectacular breakthrough in the number of casualties resolved as a result of information acquired during the interview process. Much of what has been reported is still

open to further analysis, since many of the reports can

neither be proved nor disproved. The analysts at this

point can only say that in many instances the information

cannot be correlated to any known case of missing

Americans.

Over the years, however, the information gleaned

from refugees in this way has added immeasurably to US

government knowledge of what took place during the

war, and what fate befell a number of those individuals

who were unaccounted for. One such example is the case

of Navy Lieutenant Commander John Graf who ejected

from his reconnaissance aircraft on 15 November 1969

over former Vinh Binh province, 80 miles south of Saigon. Numerous reports were received that related his capture by the Viet Cong and subsequent drowning during

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an attempt to escape by swimming a nearby river. His

body was later recovered by the VC and buried along the

river bank. More recent reports reveal that the gravesite

has been eroded away by the annual river floods. We

have learned of specific grave site locations from people

who lived in the war zones and who have recounted their

experiences in finding and burying the remains of Americans left behind after battles. From those who have witnessed the shootdown of American aircraft, we have

sometimes learned the true fate of the crewmen.

Others who have reported their personal observations of persons in Vietnam whom they believe to be

Americans living freely or held in varying degrees of captivity, have contributed to our knowledge of a number of

known cases of Americans who were in Vietnam.

Through refugee reports, for example. We learned of the

incarceration and eventual death in Saigon's Chi Hoa

Prison of Mr. Tucker Gougelmann, an American civilian

trapped in Saigon at the time of the 1975 evacuation.

Unfortunately, many gaps still exist in our knowledge;

many of the reports that still remain uncorrelated, unexplained, unconfirmed, or undenied serve only to further

frustrate the efforts to resolve the issue.

Perhaps among the most useful information gathered

from the refugee interview program is that which contributes to our understanding of events previously reported

but not understood at the time. The example of rumors of

an escaped American pilot near Hanoi was cited earlier.

Another example demonstrates how the acquisition of one

small piece of new information can quickly lead to the

resolution of numerous previously uncorrelated reports:

Puzzling refugee reports had alleged the sighting of an

individual, either held captive or being moved from place

to place, at various locations in the southern Vietnam

delta region following the communist takeover of Saigon

in 1975. The refugees variously described the man as a

Frenchman, a Belgian, or an American. Other intriguing

reports alleged that this individual may have died and

been interred near a prison at Can Tho.

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Fortuitously, in mid-1981, a Vietnamese lady wrote

from Saigon to the American embassy in Bangkok that

she had heard the American government was interested

in information about missing Americans. She related a

story about her husband, an American civilian of ethnic

French background born in Great Britain. Her husband

had secretly returned to Vietnam from the United States

following the 1975 collapse of South Vietnam, she wrote,

with the intention of gaining the release of his wife and

their two small children. Subsequently, he had been arrested, she said, by Vietnamese authorities of the new

communist government and detained at a prison facility

at Can Tho. Thereafter she heard reports, which she was

unable to confirm, that her husband had died. The letter

contained sufficient information to positively identify her

husband and to permit a follow-up investigation with her

husband's relatives in the United States. Further investigation and the attendant analysis confirmed the wife's

information and her husband's unfortunate death while

in captivity at Can Tho.

Though this did not turn out to be a prisoner-ofwar case, the investigation had nevertheless led to the

resolution of a large number of previously uncorrelated

and inexplicable refugee reports. (The remains of Mr.

Jean Lecornec, the American in this case, were repatriated to US custody by Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi

on 14 August 1985, almost precisely ten years after Lecornec's death, most likely from the effects of dysentery

contracted while incarcerated in a camp near Can Tho.)

In summary, a number of general conclusions can

be drawn from the information-gathering effort. First,

sufficient interviews have been conducted with Vietnamese government workers to confirm what plain logic and

previously acquired information also tells us: There is

overwhelming evidence that the Indochinese governments, at some location within their bureaucracies, have

considerable knowledge of the fate of missing Americans.

This information has not been readily made available.

This is due partly to deliberate design on the part of the

Vietnamese government, but to a lesser degree may also

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be a reflection of the difficulty associated with retrieving

this information from written records or personal memories after the lengthy passage of time.

Second, a number of provable, true, and extremely

useful reports have surfaced during refugee interviews,

some of which would never have been uncovered by any

other means, even with complete cooperation and disclosure of information by Indochinese officials. This situation is understandable and logical, given the tendency of

people in the countryside to harbor a basic distrust of

their own government officials, and their reluctance to

report to these officials specific casualty-related information which they have discovered on their own.

Third, refugee interviews have helped the US authorities to amass a base of background information and

data against which to evaluate the accuracy or truth of

any new reports. This information may not necessarily

pertain directly to the MIA topic, but can be very useful,

say, in identifing specific places or time periods. For example, a concerted effort was made to piece together an

extremely detailed and complete history of the evolution

of the "re-education" camp system in northern Vietnam.

Then, by having a former camp inmate sketch the layout

of the camp in which he had been incarcerated, analysts

were able to not only confirm which camp he was held

in, but also determine the period of time he was there.

This knowledge, in turn, could then be used to pinpoint

the time and place of sightings of alleged Americans that

he reported.

A great deal of information has been gathered about

the presence in Vietnam, at various times after 1975, of

a number of American personnel. It must be understood

however, that so far there is not yet any confirming information regarding individuals who could be termed prisoners of war. Unbeknown to much of the American

public there was no shortage of individuals, many of them

Americans, who were candidates for having been sighted

in Vietnam following the supposed complete US departure at the end of April 1975. Individuals known to have

been present at one time or other include a handful of

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Americans captured by North Vietnamese forces during

their final push toward conquest of the South. This group

included missionaries, civilian workers, and several

United States government employees. A number of other

Americans willingly or inadvertently got left behind during the evacuation from Saigon. In addition, information

has been gathered on several Americans who lived in

the Vietnamese countryside, and some who ended up in

Vietnamese jails for various infractions. Indeed, there

remains to be written an interesting collection of true

tales, both humorous and tragic, of assorted American

adventurers, do-gooders, criminals, and a few just plain

folks, who for various periods of time and under mixed

circumstances, resided (or still reside) within the Vietnamese borders.

Another significant benefit of the information gathering effort has been better knowledge of the policies pursued by Vietnam during and since the war in their

handling of American casualties and remains. Such

knowledge has helped United States officials fill voids in

our understanding of exactly what took place on the battlefields in and over Southeast Asia. Refugee information

became particularly useful with the advent of regular

meetings between representatives of the United States

and the Indochinese states, providing much-needed ammunition for these discussions on the subject of missing

Americans.

When evaluating the results of the effort to acquire

MIA-related information from refugees, one final factor

must be considered. As information was gathered, analyzed, and correlated, it was inevitable that family members, congressmen, and the media would take note.

Equally inevitable was the fact that, as more attention

was focussed on the issue of the missing-in-action, pressure increased on all elements of the US government to

do something toward resolving the issue. Ironically, as

this public pressure increased within the United States,

other factors were coming into play that prevented any

accelerated progress.

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PROGRESS SLOWS

As noted earlier, after the visit by a Vietnamese delegation to the JCRC and CIL in Hawaii in July 1978 the

SRV repatriated the remains of 11 American servicemen

to a visiting group of congressmen the following month.

While the pace of progress was painfully slow, both the

visit and the repatriation signalled Vietnam's willingness

to at least keep the door open to continued casualty resolution activity. A number of US officials expressed optimism that with the passage of time, cooperation could be

enhanced and the pace could be speeded up.

Any such optimism proved to be premature, however, when the SRV invasion of Cambodia in late 1978

and early 1979 put a freeze on the already cool relations

between Vietnam and the United States. As the Vietnamese army forces sped westward across Cambodia in pursuit of the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge forces of Pol

Pot, the Deputy Prime Minister of China, Deng Xiaoping, was on an official visit to Washington, DC and

threatening to "teach Vietnam a lesson."

Within days of Deng's return to China, a force of

nearly 300,000 Chinese troops invaded and sacked the

northern provinces of Vietnam. Then, during the one

month that the Chinese forces were on Vietnamese soil,

the United States and China exchanged ambassadors for

the first time and officially opened embassies in each others' country. The timing of these events, whether deliberate or not, was viewed by the Socialist Republic of

Vietnam as an indication of continued US hostility toward Vietnam. At a time when the Vietnamese felt world

opinion should favor their attacks against Pol Pot's genocidal Khmer Rouge regime, the United States had sided

with Vietnam's historic enemy, China.

At the same time, another event took place that further cooled the atmosphere. Among the stream of boat

refugees fleeing from northern Vietnam, one of particular

interest was discovered in a refugee camp in Hong Kong.

This refugee, an ethnic Chinese from Hanoi, had previously worked for the Hanoi City Directorate of Cemeteries until he and his family were expelled from the

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country during the continuing purge of Chinese residents

in 1979. Interestingly, this man, referred to as a "mortician", revealed that in the conduct of his duties he had

personally prepared or observed the remains of over 400

American servicemen. This was not a mortician in the

same sense of the word that Americans would expect.

Vietnamese burial customs do not normally include embalming of the bodies of the deceased. Consequently, remains which are buried in the traditional wooden coffin

normally decompose within a relatively short time. It is

customary, after a period of three to five years after the

interment, to disinter the remains of the deceased (skeletonized by that time), to clean the bones, and to place

them in a clay urn or box for reinterment in a family

grave. This process of disinterring the skeletal remains,

cleaning and treating them with chemicals to retard the

growth of mold in the damp climate, and reinterring the

remains was carried out by the Vietnamese mortician.

Following his discovery, the mortician was extensively debriefed, both in Hong Kong and later after his

resettlement in the United States. By checking his technical expertise, and by comparing events and details of his

activities and his participation in remains repatriations

which he related to interviewers, his identity and credentials were confirmed. Any lingering doubt, if any had

existed, was dispelled when the mortician was positively

identified by the French liaison officer with whom he had

previously worked years earlier in the course of repatriation of French remains from Vietnam, and when the mortician's face was identified in US photos taken during

the March 1974 repatriation of American remains from

Hanoi.

The question of the mortician's claim of having processed or seen over 400 United States remains in Hanoi

was also addressed by DIA interviewers and analysts.

This claim (except, perhaps, for the number) was also

verified both by means of polygraph exams and by comparing technical details revealed by the mortician with

actual remains already repatriated from Vietnam and

identified by the Central Identification Laboratory. (In

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addition to his knowledge about American remains, the

mortician also made claim to having sighted on several

occasions after Operation Homecoming several Caucasians whom he was told were American prisoners of war.

These reports are still open and under investigation.)

In January 1980 a Congressional Delegation, led by

Congressman Lester Wolff (D-NY) traveled to Hanoi.

The delegation confronted officials there with the fact that

the United States was aware that the SRV was, in effect,

storing the remains of US servicemen. The delegation

pressed the Vietnamese officials for an investigation and

the speedy repatriation of these remains. The Vietnamese

officials' reaction to this open confrontation was to emphatically and indignantly deny they had stockpiled any

remains. The Vietnamese reiterated their position that

any remains found by their citizenry would be promptly

repatriated to the United States.

In July 1980, in the presence of a group of family

members and media representatives, Congressman Wolff

chaired hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs at which time

the Vietnamese mortician testified publicly regarding his

knowledge of American remains held in SRV custody.

As before, the Vietnamese again denied the charges, contending that they were fabrications maliciously spread by

disgruntled ethnic Chinese refugees.

During 1979-1980, sporadic communication had

continued between Vietnam and the United States. In

addition to several congressional trips to Hanoi during

this period, the return of Marine PFC Robert Garwood

to US custody in March 1979 prompted a month of flurried exchanges. Also, though SRV officials had earlier

agreed in principle to the idea of holding technical talks—

discussion of individual cases—with US officials on specific matters relating to missing Americans, they did not

permit such a meeting until late 1980 when two members

of the JCRC Liaison Office in Bangkok were allowed to

go to Hanoi. These talks, though polite, were generally

unproductive and served only to establish a precedent for

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other technical talks which were to come later. Consequently, despite sporadic contacts during 1979 and 1980,

little real progress was achieved. Relations between Vietnam and the United States were primarily influenced by

US unhappiness with Vietnam's invasion and occupation

of Cambodia, by Vietnam's equal unhappiness over the

US "tilt" toward China at the same time, and the spate

of negative media coverage prompted by US accusations

of SRV "stockpiling" of American servicemen's remains. Not until early 1981 could slight progress resume

on the issue of missing Americans.

THE REAGAN INHERITANCE

The abbreviated presidency of Gerald Ford, followed

by the four years of Jimmy Carter's presidency were

years of frustration and disappointment, both for the families of missing Americans, and for those who were

charged with the responsibility to assist in resolving the

issue. Both Presidents had expressed sincere sympathy,

and lent moral support to the cause of determining the

fate of those still lost. However, by their actions, both

Presidents attempted to put the Vietnam era behind.

They sought to bring this period of American history to

an end, hoping to somehow tie up the messy loose ends

into a neat package and smooth over the emotional scars

which had resulted from the war.

This movement back toward "business as usual" left

the family members unfulfilled. In their eyes, the same

government which had sent their sons and husbands off

to war was now reluctant to aggressively pursue the cause

of determining what had happened to those who did not

return. During the Ford years, the final report of a major

Congressional Committee effort had recommended, in

effect, that those still unaccounted for be declared killed

in action. This same committee had also expressed very

limited expectations of the possibility of recovering many

remains. Carter, in turn, had moved strongly, though

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unsuccessfully, toward normalization of relations with

Vietnam, without posing any preconditions of Vietnamese cooperation to resolve this sensitive issue.

Casualty resolution activity during the Carter era

was marked in its later years by organizational difficulties. US government action on the MIA issue over the

preceding years had generally been carried out through

a loose cooperative effort between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. Defense understandably had the predominant interest simply because it was

mainly personnel from DOD whose fate was under investigation. The key Defense Department action organizations (as opposed to policy organizations) were the

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and its elements

throughout the world, plus the Joint Casualty Resolution

Center (JCRC), and the Army's Central Identification

Laboratory (CIL).

The Department of State also had an essential role

to play primarily because the accounting effort, by its

very nature, involved contacts with foreign governments

and officials, the guiding of these contacts clearly being

within the purview of the State Department. To a lesser

extent, State was involved because of its responsibility to

account for those other US citizens missing—rather more

than 40 civilians—who were not members of the US military forces.

Theoretically, on the military side, policy guidance

and direction came from the office of the Secretary of

Defense, specifically from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. This guidance

was then passed to the action elements within DOD via

the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and thence

downward through the chain of command. Similarly, requests for support, or reports and recommendations,

would travel back up the chain of command. In the case

of the JCRC, for example, the communication path

would be from the Secretary of Defense through the JCS

and downward to CINCPAC in Hawaii, and then to the

JCRC. While this arrangement is the normal military

way of doing things, it created considerable problems.

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The JCRC and the Central Identification Laboratory, the two elements working on the "cutting edge" of

all casualty resolution activity, both had absolutely no

other purpose for existence, and no other collateral mission or responsibilities competed for their attention. This

was not the case for each and every other organizational

layer or element above the JCRC and the CIL in their

respective chains of command. For these higher-level organizations, dealing with the topic of casualty resolution

was, at best, a part-time job, something to be carried out

along with the multitude of other competing tasks that

faced the headquarters staffer or action officer each day.

This situation hindered not only the acquisition and allocation of resources, but also the free flow of ideas and

suggestions between the "doers" in the field and the policymakers in Washington, DC.

As the Carter administration came to a close, there

was no staunch organizational "advocate" in Washington, DC for the continuation of the casualty resolution

task. Increasingly, the question being asked was, "How

soon can we shut down this effort?" Within an environment characterized by such a question, one might understand how requests from JCRC for increases in travel

funds, or for additional personnel with specialized talent,

for example, were not always looked on kindly by those

who themselves were being asked to trim both funds and

manpower in their own activities. Similarly, ideas and

suggestions from the field for getting on with the casualty

resolution effort, which often involved a closer and cooperative arrangement with counterpart personnel from the

communist-dominated Indochinese governments, were

not always passed upward with great enthusiasm.

REORGANIZING FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION

President Reagan came into office predisposed to

take more aggressive action on the resolution of American

casualties. He had long held a personal interest in this
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issue and he often recalled in speeches his earlier days as

Governor of California when he and Mrs. Reagan had

first met with members of the League of Families and

had later hosted a party for a large number of the returned POWs in 1973.

Early in the Reagan presidency action was taken to

formulate a specific strategy to deal with the MIA issue

in a more systematic and realistic manner. Among the

elements of this strategy was a major effort to increase

public knowledge of the MIA issue. As a consequence of

several years of relative inactivity and little publicity, the

American people generally had little knowledge that a

problem still existed. More important still was the need

to change the apparent perception of Vietnamese and Lao

government officials whose actions seemed to indicate a

belief that the issue was of little importance to America

and would likely fade away given enough time.

Consequently, media contacts were increased to provide press representatives with factual information and

the opportunity to address questions to government officials involved in the issue. The topic of missing Americans found its way into policy statements and major

speeches delivered by the newly-elected President, his

Secretaries of Defense and State, and numerous other

government officials. The proclamation by the President

of a National POW/MIA Recognition Day became an

annual event, and the day was marked by special ceremonies, speeches, and other appropriate events sponsored in

cooperation with the National League of Families.

Closer cooperation with the National League of Families became another element of the government's strategy. Whereas an adversarial relationship had previously

existed between'the government and the League, effort

was now being made to consider more carefully the ideas

and positions of the family members as expressed through

the League. In a major policy change, individual case

files were declassified and made available to family members for their inspection. In a further effort to draw closer

to the families, new emphasis was given to the individual

Service casualty offices, whose responsibility it was to

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maintain contact with the next-of-kin of those missing

and to advise them individually of any activity on their

particular case. The Department of Defense began publishing a "Next-of Kin Newsletter" for the purpose of

keeping family members informed of current governmental activity and any other events which impacted on efforts to resolve the issue. At the same time, security access

was granted by the DIA to the Executive Director of the

League of Families in order that the Director could be

briefed and kept abreast of any classified matters which

could not be disseminated in a general manner throughout the entire League membership. In an unusual step,

the Executive Director of the League was accepted as a

full and regularly participating member of the government decision-making apparatus involving MIA matters.

Though the MIA issue had always enjoyed considerable attention from the intelligence community, action

was initiated to once again heighten the priority and effectiveness of the intelligence effort devoted to this issue.

The need for both overt and covert collection of information was stressed to intelligence entities throughout the

world. Additional assets in the form of manpower and

technical expertise were added, particularly in the Defense Intelligence Agency which had the key responsibility for collection and analysis of information on this issue.

Other military and civilian intelligence organizations

were also directed to increase their emphasis and attention to the matter.

The renewal and heightening of diplomatic activity

and bilateral contacts also became another element of the

Reagan strategy for attacking the MIA problem. After a

shaky start, high-level policy contact was established with

the Vietnamese government in early 1982 when then

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage

led a small delegation to Hanoi to once again point out

the mutual benefits which could accrue with renewed cooperation. While the discussions were termed "candid

but cordial," Vietnamese officials used the opportunity to

make clear their view that there was a definite connection

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between their cooperation on the MIA issue and the US

attitude and posture toward Vietnam.3SRV officials also

accepted an earlier-tendered invitation to again send a

delegation of experts for consultations in Hawaii with

JCRC and CIL officials. (This visit later took place during the month of August.) At the same time, efforts to

reemphasize the MIA issue with the Lao government

through the American Embassy in Vientiane met with

only minimal success.

In addition to these direct contacts with the Indochinese governments, diplomatic approaches were made to

others who might be in a position to influence or encourage movement by the Indochinese states. Soon after assuming the duties of Secretary of State in mid-1982,

George Shultz made personal approaches to the heads of

the ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, at that time) requesting

their support for US efforts and suggesting they use their

influence to encourage added cooperation. Close allies

and friends of the Indochinese states were also approached in a similar vein.

Back on the domestic front, the Reagan administration sought, and immediately received, bipartisan support for its efforts to bring added attention and emphasis

to the MIA issue. Within the Congress, a special House

POW/MIA Task Force was created to oversee the government effort. From the time of its inception the appointed Task Force Chairman has been a member of the

minority party of the House of Representatives, indicative of the bipartisan support directed toward the MIA

issue.

While formulation of an interlocking strategy for addressing the complexities of the MIA issue constituted a

major forward step in the casualty resolution process,

several organizational steps needed to be taken to overcome the previous drift in guidance of the overall US

effort. Though the Defense Department was the executive

agent for the Administration regarding the MIA issue,

many other governmental entities also had an important

part to play.

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To bring order and to assure that each "player" was

working in harmony with the overall strategy, a POW/

MIA Interagency Group (IAG) was created. Membership included representatives from both the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council staff,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency,

the National League of Families, and from relevant committees of the House and Senate.4 While the IAG was

chaired by the State Department representative, the representative from the National Security Council staff monitored the diverse aspects of all governmental MIArelated activity on a daily basis to assure a coherent effort.

With the creation of the IAG in 1982, the US government

had for the first time a single unified group which could

formulate policy, assess on-going efforts, evaluate and

discuss new initiatives, and generally assure that the impact on the MIA issue was considered when various government actions were contemplated.

The impact of the formulation of a unified strategy

for addressing the MIA issue, the establishment of the

IAG, and the resultant focusing of attention on this issue,

cannot be overstated. It was these actions which brought

order to what had previously been a piecemeal effort and,

even more significant for the families and for those who

were daily involved in the issue, there finally existed in

Washington, DC, a sense of advocacy for proceeding

with the mission of resolving the fate ofthose still missing.

President Reagan himself signalled this renewed government emphasis during a speech delivered to a gathering

sponsored by the National League of Families on 28 January 1983. Stressing the goals of gaining release for any

prisoners, achieving the fullest possible accounting of the

missing, and seeking repatriation of the remains of those

killed, he assured the family members that after many

years of malaise, the government's attention and assets

were now fully focussed on this issue. "The government

bureaucracy now understands that these goals are the

highest national priority," he said.5

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NOTES

1. This comment was written in a note sent between Bangkokbased refugee officers on 9 November 1978 at a time when

concerted efforts were being made by JCRC to take a more

active stance and to emphasize and streamline the program to

interview refugees for any POW/MIA information which they

might possess. In defense of the note-writer, the feelings expressed were generally in accord with State Department policy

which at that time also opposed the active solicitation of information from the refugees in the camps. State Department message 78 STATE 112448, DTG 031600Z MAY 78, made

reference to this position when it stated, "We have in the past

assured MIA relatives that US officials follow up PW/MIA

reports from Indochina refugees whenever they come to our

attention, but that we have refrained from aggressive de-briefings on this subject to avoid stimulating possibly false or exaggerated responses." This message announced no new policy

in this regard, but went on only to ask field elements to ensure

that a program existed to receive and report POW/MIA information brought to US officials' attention by the refugees.

2. Refugee departure statistics are quoted from an article published in the December 1979 issue of the Department of State

Bulletin entitled "Refugees: An International Obligation," by

Harry F. Young.

3. CINCPAC Command History, 1982 (TS), vol. II, 16 September 1983, p. 376.

4. POW-MIA Fact Book, Department of Defense, July 1989,

p. 3.

5. Quoted from the text, released by the White House Press

Secretary, of an address delivered by President Reagan to the

National League of Families at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in

Crystal City, Virginia, on 28 January 1983.

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4

PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT

THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES

As one might expect, the US government is not the

only entity involved in the efforts to determine the fate

of those still missing and unaccounted for. Family members, out of their great personal concern for their loved

ones, have involved themselves in various ways from the

day of initial notification of the casualty incident. As

noted earlier, family members traveled to Paris during

the time of the US-Vietnamese negotiations in an effort

to press for answers to their many questions. The commonality of interest among family members, coupled with

their increased activism in the late 1960s, led to the eventual formalization of the group and their incorporation in

May 1970 as the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, generally

abbreviated to the National League of Families.1

The early history of the League of Families was often

characterized by a widely held adversarial position toward the US government. This position had developed

from resentment toward the government's earlier desire

that the families refrain from publicly discussing the MIA

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PR I VA TE IN VOL VEMENT

problem, along with the government's policy of keeping

a low profile on the issue—a policy which the families

equated with government inaction. Following the repatriation of prisoners during Operation Homecoming in

early 1973, much resentment continued over the manner

in which the government handled the status changes of

the missing. Meanwhile, the League continued to press

for additional attention to the plight of those still unaccounted for. Largely as a result of League pressure, Congressman Montgomery's House Select Committee on

Missing Persons in Southeast Asia (see Chapter 2) was

formed; however, the committee's conclusions and final

report led only to additional controversy and alienation

between the family members and the government.

League hopes were once again buoyed by President Carter's early appointment of the Woodcock Commission to

travel to Hanoi and Vientiane "to obtain the best possible

accounting for the missing." The Commission's failure

to achieve this lofty goal once again led to disillusionment

on the part of the League members.

As the Carter administration continued to distance

itself from the League during the administration's later

years, the families became more and more vocal in their

criticism of government actions. The League rightly

claimed that the United States was slow in organizing to

conduct interviews with the flood of refugees from Indochina in 1978 and 1979. Largely out of frustration, the

League began to take initiatives on its own which, in the

long run, were counterproductive to the overall effort.

The League encouraged placement of advertisements

in various publications which found their way to the refugee camps in Southeast Asia. These solicited information

about missing Americans, offering rewards and implying

resettlement assistance for any such information. At a

time when personnel from both the Defense Intelligence

Agency and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center were

attempting to expand the refugee interview program, the

effect of these ads was to deter refugees from confiding

their information to government interviewers. In a number of instances, for example, leads were generated as a

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result of the ads and were then passed by the League to

the DIA for follow-up contact and interview in the refugee camps. When a US official later made contact in the

camp to conduct a detailed interview, the refugee would

first inquire about his promised reward.

League activity also included subsidizing several private individuals to search for MIA information in Asia.

There was even a brief flirtation by the League with the

idea of privately inspired POW rescue attempts. One of

the most counterproductive efforts was instigated by a

League-sponsored individual who encouraged the direct

involvement of Laotian resistance fighters in the recovery

of American remains from crashsites in Laos. Unfortunately, this involvement led to a spate of false reports, a

rise in attempts by Lao resistance personnel to barter for

remains, and the destruction of possibly useful evidence

at crashsites as well as the dispersal of potentially identifiable human remains.

Fortunately, the frustration which had driven the

League to involve itself in these activities eventually eased

as the US government once again focussed its attention

on the MIA issue in 1981 and 1982. In September 1982,

with the US government's blessing and encouragement,

a four-person delegation from the National League of

Families traveled to Vientiane and Hanoi to meet directly

with Lao and Vietnamese officials to make known the

views of the families which they represented. This journey, the first by a League delegation to Hanoi, also included side-trips in Laos to visit two aircraft crashsites.

Undoubtedly there were educational benefits for both

sides as a result of this trip: the League delegation learned

firsthand about some of the difficulties encountered when

dealing with Indochinese officials and of the complexities

of crashsite investigations, while the Indochinese officials

learned about the depth of feeling of the families and their

desire to resolve the MIA issue.

Tensions between the US government and the

League of Families continued to ease with the passage of

time as communication between the two entities improved. After the decision was made by the DIA in November 1979 to grant the Executive Director of the

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League access to classified information, there was marked

improvement in this relationship. Later on, with the creation of the Interagency Group (IAG) and the inclusion

of the League Executive Director as a full member of this

body, the relationship completed its evolution from one

of hostility toward one of cooperation. It must be pointed

out that "cooperation" implied only that the League and

the government would work together toward a common

goal. It did not, and does not, imply complete agreement.

It is to be expected that the League, representing the

special interests of the family members of the missing,

would not always be in one hundred percent agreement

with the US government whose actions must at times be

dictated by larger national interests. Further, though

there is agreement on the ultimate goal of achieving the

fullest possible accounting of those still missing, differences still arise on how to attain that goal.

Nevertheless, as the League drew closer to the government, its influence widened. The League's views were

increasingly sought, not only by the administration, but

also by the legislative committees and subcommittees

which deliberated on matters of US interest in Asia. In

recent years the Executive Director of the League of Families has been called upon innumerable times to present

testimony to Congress and to elaborate on League positions. The Director has also been included as a fullfledged member of government delegations which have

dealt with Indochinese officials, both in Asia and at the

United Nations Headquarters in New York, whenever

matters of League interest were to be discussed.

There is no question that the increased cooperation

between the League of Families and the government has

been beneficial. The League's views are now heard, and

are taken into consideration when plans are made and

actions are contemplated. Equally important, this cooperation, openly advertised, has sent a significant signal to

the Indochinese governments that both the US government and the families share common views and goals.

This, in turn, has negated any attempts by the Indochinese governments to drive a wedge between the families

and their government.

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The US government's unusual quasi-official relationship with the League has also proved useful in strategic matters. There are times, for example, when it is

useful for the Executive Director of the League to say

things to Vietnamese officials, with whom we have no

diplomatic relations, which cannot be said directly by

American officials. This arrangement is a two-way street;

it permits the Vietnamese to pass subtle messages through

the League Director when it would be awkward or diplomatically inappropriate to pass them directly to the US

government. In this way, unofficial communication with

the Vietnamese government via the League has opened

an additional and useful channel for the exchange of

views between the two countries.

Critics of the League of Families, of which there indeed is no shortage, contend that the League has been

co-opted by the US government and, therefore, has compromised its own independence and lost its credibility.

Other critics have expressed concern about the precedent

of government allying itself so closely with what is, essentially, a private non-governmental lobbying organization.

What would be the result, they ask, if other such organizations were formed which also claimed to represent a

substantial number of the family members of the missing?

Would the US government draw equally close to them?

And would the government also take into account any

other organization's views and suggestions, and incorporate them into the decision-making process to plot the

course of future efforts? Whether or not there is any reason for concern over this possible precedent, or any validity in the contention that the League has lost its

effectiveness because of this association, all indications

are that the symbiotic relationship between the League

and the US government has been beneficial, on balance,

both to the family members and to those in the government charged with carrying out the mission of accounting

for those still missing.

The real value of the League, however, can be realized when one contemplates what would have been the

ultimate course of events had the League never existed.

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One could pose a convincing argument that the US government would not have devoted the effort and resources

to resolving the resolution of the MIA issue had it not

been pushed so aggressively by the League. This is not

to imply that the government lacked concern for the issue,

and for the family members who still await an answer to

their uncertainty. This is only an acknowledgement that,

following a war, the military has generally attempted to

"wrap things up" and get on with business as usual.

Indeed, this theme was often heard during the late 1970s

from government officials who would have eliminated the

JCRC and let the casualty resolution mission revert to

the State Department for negotiation purposes, and to

the Army's Graves Registration units for recovery and

repatriation of remains. One can perhaps envision how

the Department of Defense, as a bureaucracy, could

adopt the pragmatic attitude that in time of war soldiers

get killed, incinerated, blown to bits, and lost, and in

many cases we will never know what happened to the

individual. To the League of Families must go the credit

for inspiring the bureaucracy to try harder.

OTHER MIA INTEREST GROUPS

A number of other groups also share an interest in

the MIA issue. Among these groups are the traditional

veterans organizations such as the Veterans of Foreign

Wars, the American Legion, the Disabled American Veterans and, of more recent vintage, the Vietnam Veterans

of America. The interest of these and other such groups

is fueled by their patriotism and their traditional support

for issues related to the welfare of military personnel.

Many other groups and associations have also picked up

the POW/MIA banner and have been supportive, not

only of the family members but also of the US government's efforts to resolve the issue. These cover the entire

spectrum from the Medal of Honor Society and the Noncommissioned Officers Association, for example, down

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to the local Boy Scout troops and the local high school

current events class, with perhaps hundreds of groups in

between.

While everyone is seemingly unanimous in their support to resolve the issue of missing Americans, not all

groups share the belief that the US government is pursuing the task with sufficient enthusiasm. In more recent

years, a number of other organizations have sprung up

which have as a common denominator their strong belief

that the government is not only insufficiently active on

the issue, but also duplicitous in its relations with the

family members. The membership of some of these

groups includes, in addition to interested citizens, a number of family members, many of whom are former members of the League of Families who believe that the

League has been co-opted by the government and no

longer represents their best interests. Unfortunately, the

relationship between a few ofthese "splinter groups" and

the League of Families has at times taken on an extremely

adversarial character. This has been manifested, for example, in hostile diatribes published in their respective

newsletters, and by assorted disruptive activities. In one

instance, a disgruntled group attempted the forceful takeover of the national offices of the League of Families in

Washington, DC, in March 1987.

Nor have these groups reserved their hostility for the

League alone. Character attacks and other forms of harassment have been directed against a number of government officials who have been associated with resolving

the MIA issue over the years. While much of this hostility

could be attributed to understandable frustration over the

slow pace of progress, some also must be attributed to

outright mean-spiritedness and a self-serving desire for

publicity.

Even more reprehensible, however, are the activities

of a few groups who have seized upon the MIA issue as

a'means to make money. Characteristically, these groups

have wrapped themselves in the cloak of humanitarianism, claiming their goal in life is to seek information

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about missing Americans, or to rescue American servicemen they "know" with absolute certainty are still held

in captivity. When confronted with a request for funds to

support such activity, what donor could object to such a

high-minded endeavor? These fund-raising groups, some

using the most modern and sophisticated techniques developed by the mail solicitation industry, have managed

to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars yearly for questionable activity and equally questionable results, and all

without the burden of financial accountability. Unfortunately, the ones hit hardest by this combination of emotional appeal and implied promise of favorable outcome

are often those who can least afford to contribute, either

emotionally or financially: the relatives and friends of

those who are still missing.

Many of the fund raising letters imply that their organization is on the brink of rescuing an American prisoner of war, and that the prisoner will die unless the

recipient of the letter sends money immediately. Typical

of these appeals are the following, quoted from the solicitation letters of three different groups:

We're close to making contact with an American

POW who has been alone since his fellow prisoner

died of natural causes less than a year ago. That

effort could fail for lack of funds. Please be as generous as you can as soon as you can. Thank you.2

I'm exhausted. I'm broke. And, I'm reaching the end of

my rope. But, I believe we are very, very close to getting

our first POW out. I can't give you any more details.

But you may wake up tomorrow morning and hear that

the first American POW has been rescued. We are that

close!

But whatever you can send today in the enclosed envelope

to help, you may rest assured that you have done your

part to restore America's honor. I promise to tell all of

our hostages, when they are finally freed, of the vital role

you played in their release. I wish you would write a

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brief note on the enclosed donation card, which I will

personally hand to the first man to regain his freedom.4

The Defense Intelligence Agency has expended considerable time and effort investigating claims made by

various groups which are soliciting funds on the POW/

MIA issue. According to a 1987 study conducted by DIA

at the request of Congressman Stephen Solarz of the

House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, DIA found that

many of the fund-raising letters included "little or no

substantive data which would lend itself to serious intelligence analysis, but instead are rambling discourses filled

with inflammatory rhetoric." Based on a detailed analysis of the statements and the accompanying "facts" cited

in support of these statements, DIA concluded that these

organizations were basing their fund appeals on claims

which were, at best, highly suspicious, and in many instances, demonstrably false. DIA also observed that "it

is noteworthy that for all their 'proof and the untold

millions of dollars raised, none of these groups or individuals have yet to furnish even the slightest shred of evidence of POWs, much less secure the return of a living

American captive."5

In addition to DIA, the League of Families also went

on record as opposing the activities of these groups. The

League noted that in some instances family members had

been contacted directly by individuals claiming to have

proof that particular Americans were still alive in captivity, yet offering no supporting evidence. Unfortunately,

in spite of League condemnation and these groups' lack

of success in making a contribution toward resolving the

MIA issue, their fund-raising activities continue.

RISE OF THE "RAMBOS"

The Reagan administration's emphasis on wider

publicty for the MIA issue brought a new awareness of

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this topic to the American public. With this new awareness came another disruptive phenomena, the private rescue efforts. Regrettably, added emphasis and an element

of public sympathy for such activity was inspired by movies such as Rambo and others of the same genre. As with

many aspects of the MIA issue, emotionalism occasionally prevails over logic, and there is ample sympathy for

the idea of "overcoming the hated enemy" to rescue anyone who may still be held captive. The premises apparently shared by those who would contemplate such

activity are first, that conclusive proof of the existence of

Americans still held captive is available, second, the US

government is either unwilling or unable to rescue them,

and third, an unofficial private foray would be successful

in locating and freeing the captives. Indeed, there has

been no shortage of reports of Americans still held in

captivity. Seldom did the interviewers in JCRC visit a

refugee camp without receiving several reports of alleged

Americans in varying degrees of captivity. Public knowledge of such reports has become widespread, and these

reports undoubtedly inspire much of the private rescue

talk and activity.

Not widely known, however, are the analyses of these

reports. Of the thousands of sighting reports received

over the past decade, nearly all have been resolved. Many

have been correlated to known cases of individuals who

were at one time in Indochina but who later departed,

such as released POWs, foreign yachtsmen captured offshore, missionaries, persons who remained in Vietnam

following the April 1975 evacuation, and so on. Some of

the sightings of alleged Americans have been correlated to

individuals with distinctly Caucasian features, who were

known to work or reside in Vietnam. For example, a man

nicknamed "Tony Hai" lives in Ho Chi Minh City; his

full-bearded face easily passes for that of an American.

Other segments of the live sighting reports, after detailed

analysis, have been judged to be untrue.

Because of the remaining relatively small number of

reports which have not yet been resolved—and which are

still undergoing extensive investigation and analysis—the

104
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Vietnamese citizen Tran Huu Hai (also known as

"Tony" Hai) is often mistaken for an American still living in Vietnam.
PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT

US government has taken the prudent position that it

does not rule out the possibility that American POWs

may still be held against their will. The unhappy truth,

however, is that there still exists no conclusive proof of

American POWs still held captive in Indochina. (For the

sake of clarity, though, it must be noted that there is very

strong evidence of American law-breakers presently held

in Indochinese jails as a consequence of their illicit drug

activity.)

Therefore, the claims of sure knowledge of the existence of American captives by the so-called "Rambos",

intent on charging into the Southeast Asian jungles to

conduct a rescue, have yet to be proved. While these

individuals have often publicly declared that they possess

sure proof of American captives, no one has yet produced

this evidence. Even retired Army Lieutenant Colonel

"Bo" Gritz, perhaps the most charismatic and famous of

those who have either participated in or advocated private

rescue forays, admitted he had no hard evidence of American captives after his abortive rescue treks into Laos in

1983.6

Based on some of the amazing antics of those individuals and groups advocating private forays in search of

American prisoners, it is sometimes difficult to believe

they are truly serious. Though espousing the goal of freeing alleged captives, an effort which one would ordinarily

expect to be shrouded in secrecy, in actuality these socalled rescue forays usually have been accompanied with

much self-generated media hype.

"Bo" Gritz, during an earlier period of team training in Florida in preparation for a "clandestine" journey

into Laos, invited at least one reporter as a member of

the group. Later, following his arrest in Thailand at the

conclusion of an abortive rescue foray, Gritz enthusiastically granted interviews to the TV and print media in a

circus-like atmosphere at the Nakhon Phanom Provincial

jail. Perhaps Admiral A. G. Paulson of DIA said it best

during testimony on 22 March 1983 before the Asian

and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign

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Affairs Committee when he stated regarding Gritz' activities:

These efforts have seemed like a parody, a caricature

of the clandestine operation, the 'surgical penetration' he purports to be capable of mounting. Concerning his reputation as a soldier, his activities have

been inexplicable from an intelligence point of view.

At the onset, he is confronted with an apparently

unsolvable dilemma, a requirement to solicit funds

publicly and still keep his intentions private. Beyond

this, he has been incapable of surrounding himself

with associates who remain loyal to him or the purpose of keeping his intended operations undisclosed.

As a final contradiction in clandestine operations, it

seems he always keeps certain members of the media

informed of his activity and intentions. . . . This

exposure obviously is incongruent with his stated

purpose to conduct undetected operations. ... If

Mr. Gritz truly believes that live Americans are being held, it must have occurred to him, as it does to

us or any sensible person, that the publicity associated with his activity cannot but have a deleterious

effect on any prisoner who may be still held in

Southeast Asia.7

Gritz, however, is not the only one to involve himself

in alleged forays into Indochina, or to claim a monopoly

on patriotism and fervor over the issue of missing Americans. Other individuals and groups have periodically surfaced and made claims, either to having gone into Laos

personally to search for missing Americans, or to be sponsoring such a foray by others—usually indigenous Lao

resistance fighters. Most assuredly some of these claims

are false, and are made for purposes of personal bravado

or garnering credibility for fund-raising activities. One

American citizen activist who has been heavily involved

in fund solicitation, for example, made the unlikely claim

to the JCRC Liaison Officer in Bangkok that he personally had trekked undetected across the entire breadth of

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the panhandle of southern Laos from the Mekong River

to the border with Vietnam, allegedly in search of MIAs.

As proof of this feat, he showed a photograph which he

claimed to have taken himself, and which supposedly depicted the Highway 9 boundary marker at the border

between the countries of Laos and Vietnam. Significantly, however, even more than the fact that his age

and portliness pointed toward the unlikelihood he could

withstand the physical rigors of such an undertaking,

when questioned he was totally unable to elaborate in a

consistent manner regarding any aspect of the trip details.

Though the motives of many individuals actively involved in private escapades are suspect, the emotional

appeal of such activity is understandable. Nevertheless,

the end result has been extremely counterproductive and

has hindered overall US efforts to address the MIA problem. Experience has shown that invariably those who embark on these activities are operating on bad or nonexistent intelligence and have virtually no chance for success, "Rambo" movies notwithstanding. As a further consideration, if there should happen to be prisoners held,

word of possible rescue efforts would certainly promote

additional caution on the part of the captors, and could

ultimately prompt the elimination of any prisoners.

On the diplomatic front, the communist governments of the Indochinese states, always paranoid and particularly willing to believe the United States is intent on

overthrowing their regimes, have seized upon these private forays, whether actually carried out or only threatened, as evidence of US ill will toward them. In their

society, where governmental control over the individual

citizen is so complete, they find it difficult to comprehend

that a US citizen could conduct a foray on his own volition without the US government both condoning and

sponsoring it. Further, to them it is unimaginable that

the US government is relatively powerless to halt this

activity. Consequently, when private forays by American

citizens have resulted in accusations that the United

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States is sponsoring raids into their sovereign territory,

US denials have generally fallen on deaf ears.

One such example occurred in mid-February 1983.

After years of effort by the American embassy in Vientiane, the Lao government for the first time had finally

agreed to allow personnel from the JCRC and the Central

Identification Laboratory to come to Vientiane and discuss some of the technical aspects of casualty resolution

activities which were contemplated in Laos. As the talks

began in Vientiane, the front page of The Bangkok Post

carried a story of an on-going raid into Laos by American

citizens allegedly intent on finding prisoners of war. The

Lao officials, red with anger, heatedly accused the visiting

delegation of complicity in violating the territory of Laos,

and abruptly broke off the talks. The delegation was

forced to depart without having achieved any positive

results, essentially squandering the hard-won agreement

to meet.

EFFORTS OF UNTRAINED AMATEURS

Another form of unhelpful private activity involves

the attempted recovery of the remains of American servicemen. In a few instances, American citizens have

themselves participated in this activity; however, more

often they have promoted involvement on the part of others such as indigenous "resistance fighters" or refugees.

Indeed it may be possible to resolve a very small number

of cases by covertly dispatching someone into remote areas to recover skeletal remains. The US government has

taken the position, however, that in order to address the

larger number of cases, government-to-government cooperation is essential. The rationale for this position is more

than simply political; it is based on very pragmatic factors.

Experience has shown that more harm than good can

result from the efforts of untrained amateurs. The proper

recovery of skeletal remains is not unlike the science of

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archeology. Care must be taken so that evidence and essential portions such as teeth or bone fragments, are not

overlooked. These are vitally important to the physical

anthropologists when making their identification. Further, the entire effort must be carefully documented and

other secondary evidence noted, such as aircraft or engine

serial numbers, weapons or personal effects, and the exact site location. Each final identification made by the

laboratory must withstand legal scrutiny, and this requirement imposes strict conditions on how the remains

and evidence are handled and accounted for. None of

these sensitivities are taken into consideration when untrained individuals rummage through a grave site or

crashsite in an attempt to recover identifiable remains.

Not only is identification of any recovered remains put

in jeopardy, amateur efforts will quite likely render the

site useless to the trained lab experts who might later

have the opportunity to properly excavate the same site.

Private non-governmental activity has also led to the

problem, increasingly evident with time, of buying and

selling remains. As American citizens have solicited (and

paid) indigenous personnel to assist in covert remainsrecovery efforts, they have implicitly placed a monetary

value on these remains. As word spread, a whole new

class of entrepreneurs sprang up in Southeast Asia among

the refugees and "resistance fighters." As unseemly as

this may appear, JCRC interviewers in Thailand and

other refugee camps throughout Asia have been bombarded with offers of alleged remains of American servicemen, usually in exchange for money, material

assistance for resistance efforts, or for priority treatment

in refugee resettlement. The ultimate result of this phenomenon is the destruction and loss of evidence and remains as they are divided and subdivided as a form of

"trading stock." The obliteration of grave and crashsites

will likely render these cases unresolvable.

A secondary phenomenon is the glut of reports, nicknamed "dog tag" reports, which have been received,

usually from fleeing Vietnamese refugees or from travelers to Vietnam. Typically, a refugee will present an interviewer with a bone fragment with the explanation that

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this is a portion of the remains of an American who was

killed, and that the rest of the remains are being held by

someone still in Vietnam. As further "proof," the refugee will provide either a rubbing of a serviceman's embossed metal "dog tag," or will provide this same

information copied in a "dog tag" format, i.e., name,

service number, blood type, and religion, with slight variations depending on the particular branch of service. Often this information and the remains have been received

second or third-hand by the refugee, who therefore becomes an unwitting accomplice in the passing of information which is most often fallacious.

By 10 December 1991, the DIA had recorded 6,591

"dog tag" reports which included the names of 5,191

individual servicemen. Analysis of these reports showed

that 91 percent of the "dog tag" names were those, not

of casualties, but of Americans who returned home alive

following their tours of duty in Vietnam. Another 6 percent of those named were killed in Vietnam, but their

remains were recovered at the time of their deaths and

were immediately repatriated back to the United States.

Only 3 percent of the names were those of persons who

are still unaccounted for. As can be seen from the number

of reports and names, identical "dog tag" information is

often provided by multiple sources, each of whom mistakenly believes he or she has provided unique information.

Most often, the small fragments of remains which accompany these reports are insufficient for the Central Identification Laboratory to make any sort of conclusion, other

than perhaps to determine that the remains are in fact of

human origin, though this is not always the case.

The pervasiveness of this "dog tag" report phenomenon, coupled with analysis of its origin, has led the DIA

to conclude that this is a managed disinformation effort,

sponsored either by the Vietnamese government, by corrupt officials, or by other opportunists, and directed toward influencing the MIA resolution effort. Certainly this

phenomena has caused much unproductive analytical effort. Additionally, as word has spread within Vietnam of

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the US government's interest in the recovery of the remains of missing Americans, fleeing refugees have more

readily believed the false rumors of the necessity to provide "dog tag" information to American officials to gain

acceptance for resettlement to the United States. As a

consequence, many unsuspecting refugees have lost untold amounts of treasure buying remains fragments or

other bogus information just before leaving Vietnam.

ATTEMPTS BY THE "CON ARTISTS"

The majority of people who have provided POW7

MIA related information to the US government over the

years have done so willingly, believing that most of what

they are relating is true. It is not unusual, of course, for

a bit of exaggeration to creep into a story, or for the

storyteller to "embroider" his report with a few nonexistent details to enhance the interest, or for him to assume a firsthand role when, in fact, he is reporting second

or third-hand information. While such antics can be very

troublesome to the analyst charged with attempting to

substantiate or correlate the story, investigators have generally learned to recognize and cope with such tricks.

Of greater concern, however, are those instances

where individuals have purposefully set out to deceive

investigators by concocting totally false information. No

discussion of private non-governmental activity would be

complete without describing several of the more blatant

efforts in this regard. The reasons for attempted fraud

are not always obvious. In some of the more notable

attempts, though, the motive appears to have been either

to solicit material assistance for so-called resistance fighters, or to obtain money. In the examples described, the

enticement or "commodity" used to get the US government's attention was either supposed proof of American

prisoners or other "certain" information about the

same.

In September 1985, American officials obtained an

interesting photograph from a Lao resistance supporter

112
Peace Corps worker Greg Kamm, who was misrepresented as an American POW by unscrupulous individuals

in Thailand. Kamm's Lao friend was alleged to be his

guard.
PRI VA TE IN VOL VEMENT

residing in Thailand. This photo showed a tall Caucasian

young man, well-dressed and well-groomed, standing in

a wooded and rustic setting which included a thatched

house. Next to this young man was a shorter Asian male,

also well-dressed and pleasant looking. According to the

Lao resistance member, this photo, recently taken at a

camp in Laos, depicted an American prisoner of war

along with his guard, a communist Lao lieutenant colonel.

Though photo analysis strongly suggested that the

subject was not likely to be an American prisoner, officials were duly obliged to investigate on the premise that

the story could be true. By December 1985, the person

in the photo was positively identified as Mr. Greg Kamm,

a Peace Corps volunteer working in Thailand as an instructor in an up-country teachers' school. When contacted, the astonished Kamm explained that the photo

had been taken during one of his many visits to Lao

friends who lived in Thailand, and he identified the other

man in the photograph as one of these friends. Kamm

later was able to also confirm that the negative of the

photo had been taken by another Lao who was closely

associated with the Lao resistance. Meanwhile, as investigation into the identity of those in the photo was proceeding, other US officials were being contacted, occasionally

through intermediaries, in attempts to solicit money for

the alleged purpose of assisting the Lao resistance forces.

The photo of Kamm, still being touted as a POW, was

often displayed as "bait" to prompt US interest.

In one memorable instance, an American official was

enticed to meet at a Bangkok hotel with a Thai businessman intermediary plus two accompanying Lao resistance

supporters who had concocted a revised story of American prisoners. With all seriousness, the Lao resistance

supporters presented a written proposal for their forces

to rescue American prisoners which they "knew with absolute certainty" were being held captive in several locations in Laos. This proposal included the very carefully

calculated cost of the rescue operation, including anticipated duration, manpower required, and expected level

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of casualties. The cost was to be slightly over 1.25 million

dollars, with 10 percent to be paid in advance.

When proof of the existence of the captives was requested, once again the infamous "Greg Kamm" photo

was brought out for inspection. This time, however, the

photo had the face of the Asian "guard" cut out "since

he was really a Lao resistance agent and needed to have

his true identity protected." After hearing the complete

story, and after questioning these gentlemen to "clarify"

some of the details, the American official withdrew from

his briefcase an exact copy of the photo, face intact, explained the realities of the photo, and suggested to the

gentlemen that they had apparently been misled by their

own informant, who had obviously tried to give them bad

information. In the uneasy and embarrassing silence that

followed, the official excused himself and left the redfaced "businessmen" to reflect among themselves.

Not all scams are as straightforward and obviously

false as those described above; some are more serpentine

and elaborate. In mid-November 1987, officials from the

DIA were contacted by an Israeli businessman residing

in London. This businessman stated that he had a contact

in Thailand who was in a position to negotiate the release

of American prisoners from Vietnam through Cambodia.

In this instance, the Thai contact had provided photos of

two alleged American POWs. Among the photos were

several views of a disheveled Caucasian male standing

amidst tall elephant grass while holding the front page of

an English language Bangkok newspaper. Identification

of the specific newspaper proved that the photo was taken

on or after 7 November 1987. According to the Israeli

businessman, the POWs could be safely and quickly released for the sum of $1.2 million.

Alerted by DIA, investigators in Thailand began to

track the case, while DIA maintained communication

over the following weeks with the businessman in London

who steadfastly refused to name his Thai point of contact.

The businessman continued to press for the money, at

the same time reporting to DIA regarding alleged ongoing rescue efforts in Asia which were always depicted

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as being on the brink of success. A confusing series of

events followed, none of which were entirely clear, which

included at least one supposed attempt to bring a prisoner

out of Cambodia, which was allegedly turned back at the

Thai border. Thereafter, though contact was maintained

with the London informant, no prisoner was ever delivered.

Meanwhile, unbeknown to the man in London, the

alleged POW in the photo was identified as an American

who had been discharged from the US Air Force in Thailand in 1970 and had resided in a small village there with

his Thai family since that time. This man, Mr. Charles

Strait, freely admitted to officers at the American embassy in Bangkok that he had been recruited by a Thai

friend on behalf of Thai Chinese "entrepreneurs," to

pose in a photo as an American POW. It was Strait's

understanding that the Chinese men had concocted the

scheme to defraud some "Australians" who would supposedly pay a large sum of money for an American prisoner.

Though there were still many questions left unanswered regarding this scam, in retrospect it seems likely

that the prospect of considerable reward money was the

lure which drew a number of people into this particular

activity. Most likely only the Chinese perpetrators had a

complete grasp on the details of the fraud, while the Israeli businessman, Charles Strait, and others were only

pawns (though knowingly) in the game to defraud the US

government. It is ironic that, as far as can be determined,

the only one who made any money on this scam was

Strait, who claimed he collected $1,500 from the perpetrators of the scam for his modeling services.

It is hard not to draw a correlation between the offer

of reward money and the occurrence of these various

fraudulent schemes to produce an American prisoner.

Seemingly, rewards have been a continuing facet of the

MIA issue since shortly after the Operation Homecoming

prisoner return in early 1973; indeed, as noted, the US

government had used a reward program during the early

117
PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT

days of the JCRC. Over the years, a number of individual families have advertised for information and assistance regarding lost family members. Unfortunately, an

ample supply of opportunists, with the strong scent of

money in their nostrils, then set out to take advantage of

the misfortune of others. As a consequence, several families have been tragically cheated out of large sums of

money.

Though at least one MIA activist group has had a

long-standing offer of a large reward for the return of a

live prisoner from southeast Asia, no group ever achieved

the notoriety of a more recent offer made in the spring

of 1987 by a group of eight congressmen, one former

congressman, and one former prisoner of war. With

much fanfare, this group announced before a gathering

of press cameras that they were each pledging personal

funds to a grand total of one million dollars which would

be awarded to the first Asian to bring forth an American

prisoner. Photos of this group, lined up behind a table

piled high with stacks of money supposedly totaling the

one million, were flashed worldwide and picked up for

publication in newspapers, including those in Thailand.8

In the intervening years, additional private pledges have

increased this reward offer to 2.4 million dollars. More

recent publicity for this fund has included such attentiongetting stunts as floating notices of the reward in sealed

plastic bags on the Mekong River separating Thailand

and Laos, and the launching of message-carrying balloons from a boat in the South China Sea to be propelled

westward by the winds into Vietnam.

The US government, for reasons earlier described,

has deemed such use of rewards as a counterproductive

means to bring about the release of any prisoners who

may still be held. Officials maintain that rewards only

complicate the resolution task and point out that thus far

no POW has surfaced in spite of these well-publicized

offers.

Commenting editorially on this large reward offered

by the group of congressmen in early 1987, a small midwest newspaper took a different critical look at the motivation, terming it "a safe way of playing Rambo," but

one which raised serious questions:

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. . . These men, after all, are in seats of power with

broad access to information. Does their reward offer

mean they have some new evidence that American

POWs from the Vietnam conflict are still alive and

accessible to rescue?

If they have such information, they should

make it known. If they don't have such evidence,

it's cruel to raise new hopes among families of those

who are missing in action.

Sadly, the course these men have taken argues

against their reward offer being anything other than

a bid for political acclaim. These congressmen not

only are in a position to gain information, but they

are also in a position to take action for all of us.

As Republicans they have the ear of a Republican

administration which carries out American foreign

policy. They sit in a Congress which helps shape

that policy and which can allocate money and resources far beyond a million dollars, up to the point

even of declaring war.

Instead of taking any official action, they had

their picture taken with a pile of money. Thus we

can only assume that they either have no information on which the government can act or that they

believe the government of which they are so vital a

part is really powerless. Either way, they've put on

a pretty sad show. Their reward money, unfortunately, is probably safe—and they undoubtedly

know it.9

NOTES

1. Information on the early beginnings of the National League

of Families is extracted from an October 1987 information

sheet entitled Background Information, published by the League.

2. Undated letter from Skyhook II Project, Old Westbury,

NY, soliciting funds to "help continue vital efforts to rescue

our men from their ruthless Southeast Asian captors."

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PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT

3. Undated letter (probably May 1985) from Operation Rescue, Inc., Washington DC, soliciting contributions to "keep

the Akuna (an alleged refugee rescue ship) and Operation Rescue afloat."

4. Letter of 3 October 1986 from the American Defense Institute, Washington DC, soliciting funds to broadcast on national

television several BBC films which "dramatically tell of evidence of live POWs."

5. DIA letter U-1520/VO-PW, dated 23 November 1987, addressed to Congressman Solarz and signed by BGen James W.

Shufelt.

6. Interview of LTC (Ret) James Gritz by the JCRC Liaison

Officer in the provincial jail at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, on

2 and 3 March 1983, reported in JCRC LNO message, USDAO BANGKOK DTG 031815Z MAR 83.

7. US House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign

Affairs, 22 March 1983 (98th Congress, 1st Session), p. 76.

8. See, for example, the 29 April 87 issue of the English language Bangkok newspaper, The Nation, which carried both a

photograph of the group offering the $1,000,000 reward, plus

an accompanying story headlined, "Congressmen Offer $1M

Reward for Freed POWs."

9. The Mason City {Iowa} Globe-Gazette, editorial entitled,

"POW Reward Offer Makes Sad Show," 30 April 1987.

121
5

RENEWED EFFORTS

ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING CONTACT

From its inception, one of the JCRC's continuing

priorities was to sit down with the former adversaries and

engage them in a discussion of the casualty resolution

task. This was deemed a necessary prelude to the ultimate

goal: to conduct an investigation into each and every case

of men missing and unaccounted for.

The path to agreement for regular meetings with

Vietnamese officials has never been an easy one. As previously described, the history of US/Vietnam contacts on

the POW/MIA issue until the early 1980s was characterized by only occasional and sporadic meetings. In the

immediate aftermath of the Paris Peace Accords, there

were the non-productive Four-Party meetings in Saigon

and the delayed repatriation of the remains of those

Americans who had died while in captivity in the North.

In succeeding years contacts were made during the

aborted attempt to normalize relations, plus a few contacts on the occasion of remains repatriations, often inspired by visits to Vietnam by congressional or other US

governmental delegations. Though the goal of all these

123
RENEWED EFFORTS

exchanges was discussion of the topic of Americans still

unaccounted for, only one contact during this entire period (the SRV delegation visit to the JCRC and CIL in

Hawaii in July 1978) had as its focus of attention the basic

"mechanics" and techniques of the casualty resolution

business.

It was not until the summer of 1979, during a 3-

day visit to Hanoi by a congressional delegation, that the

government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam gave

indications of seriously focusing its attention on the problem of missing Americans as a continuing divisive issue

which must be dealt with. At one point during discussions

between delegation leader Congressman Lester Wolff (DNY) and (then) Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Co

Thach, the latter exclaimed in English, "This is crazy!

It is crazy that this issue keeps us apart for so long!"1

During the course of these same talks and at Congressman Wolff's strong urging, Thach gave his government's

"agreement in principle" to the notion of US/SRV meetings specifically held at the technical level during which

casualty resolution would be the sole topic for discussion.

US officials were to learn once again, however, that

there was a wide gap between "agreement in principle"

and agreement implementation. In spite of US urging,

the first meeting of technical personnel did not take place

until over a year later.2This meeting, held in October

1980 in Hanoi, marked the first time that personnel from

both sides, none of whom represented the policy-making

level, sat down at a meeting table to discuss the "nuts

and bolts" of resolving the fate of still missing American

servicemen. The two US participants, both from the

JCRC, were introduced to officials from the Vietnamese

counterpart organization which went by the title of the

"Viet-Nam Office for Seeking Missing Persons," thereafter referred to by the Americans as the VNOSMP. The

membership of this VNOSMP group included a mixture

of civilian and military officials from the Ministries of

Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Interior.

Though it was a step in the right direction, this first

meeting fell far short of what had been hoped for. The

124
RENEWED EFFORTS

Americans came to the meeting prepared to lay the

groundwork for a continued program ofjoint effort. The

US participants made a special plea for the joint examination and matching of military records, explaining that the

US side had only partial knowledge of what had happened to each casualty. By examining Vietnamese wartime records, they argued, the two sides had a much

better chance of clarifying what had actually taken place

in each loss incident.

For their part, the Vietnamese seemed more interested in explaining, in great polemical detail, why any

imminent increase in cooperation was impossible. The

Vietnamese spokesman, an official from the Foreign

Ministry, explained their view of the United States

"playing the China card" against Vietnam, and how the

populace in the countryside, on whose support any further progress would depend, were well aware of the hostile United States attitude and would therefore withhold

their cooperation despite the central government's sincere

desire to resolve the POW/MIA issue. Consequently, little was achieved as a result of this first meeting, other

than to set the precedent for later technical-level meetings

which (hopefully) would be considerably more productive.

The next technical meeting, held in Hanoi nearly

eight months later in May 1981, was indeed somewhat

more productive. The three JCRC participants were

alerted to possible progress when they learned that Vietnamese officials had granted permission for representatives from both AP and UPI wire services to travel to

Hanoi, indicating a possible disclosure of "good news."

At the conclusion of nearly two days of stressful talks the

Vietnamese side finally made their announcement: they

had been able to locate the remains of three American

flyers who had perished in northern Vietnam, and would

repatriate these remains in the near future.

Although Vietnamese officials provided tentative

identities of the three airmen, the names were not publicly announced until later.3

Interestingly, the remains

proved to be those of three individuals from a list of four

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RENEWED EFFORTS

which had been previously delivered by American officials to the SRV UN Mission in New York over one year

earlier. The list had been presented to the SRV delegates

because these four were representative of a larger group

of cases on which the United States possessed irrefutable

evidence of SRV knowledge of the cases.

One of the four cases on the list was that of PFC

Donald Sparks, mentioned earlier, who disappeared in

the south following a skirmish with Viet Cong forces on

17 June 1969. At the time, Sparks was believed to have

been killed. But in a shocking twist of fate, in May 1970,

nearly a year after his disappearance, two handwritten

letters authored by PFC Sparks in April 1970 were recovered by American forces from the body of a Viet Cong

soldier. According to these letters to his parents in Iowa,

Sparks was being held in captivity, was being reasonably

well cared for, and was recovering from the wound received at the time of his capture.

In another of the four cases, the SRV had previously

published (or allowed to be published) a photograph

clearly depicting the identifiable body of a young aviator.

The third case on the list was that of another aviator who

was known to have died while in captivity. In both of

these instances, the United States possessed clear evidence regarding their fate. But more importantly, it was

obvious that the SRV had knowledge of their deaths, and

should have known the whereabouts of their remains.

The fourth name on the list was that of Navy Lieutenant Ronald Dodge, who had become a "cause celebre"

among those familiar with the POW/MIA issue. Dodge

had been taken into custody following the shootdown of

his F-8E Crusader over northern Vietnam on 17 May

1967. He became one of the most celebrated cases when

a photograph depicting Dodge accompanied by Vietnamese cadre appeared on the cover of the French magazine,

Paris Match. Later, movie pictures were also obtained

which showed Dodge wounded but alive and being escorted through a Vietnamese village following his capture. But to everyone's surprise, Lieutenant Dodge was

not among the prisoners returned during Operation

126
RENEWED EFFORTS

Homecoming, and his name did not appear on the list

provided by the Vietnamese naming those who had died

while in captivity. The cry soon went up among the families, "WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO RON

DODGE?", and billboards and bumper stickers featuring this question appeared nationwide.

Past US overtures regarding the Dodge case, as well

as others which the Vietnamese government could obviously help to resolve, had generally been met with silence.

That is, until the technical meeting on 29 May 1981,

when the VNOSMP representative divulged the discovery of the remains of the three aviators, including Lieutenant Dodge, from the list of four names provided to

them in New York.4

After the three remains were repatriated in July 1981

and the names became public knowledge, an outcry arose

over the fact that Vietnam had withheld these remains

for such a long period, when they supposedly could have

returned them years earlier. Understandably, there was

particular antagonism toward Vietnam regarding the

case of Ron Dodge, who was last known to be very much

alive in Vietnamese custody. The League of Families angrily termed the remains repatriation a token effort on

the part of the Vietnamese government, and the US government passed a message to Hanoi demanding an explanation of exactly what had happened to Lieutenant

Dodge.5The Vietnamese responded indignantly that it

was a "hostile act" to pose such a question and, once

again, progress ground to a standstill.

This incident was typical of the problems encountered in establishing and maintaining a continuing dialogue with Vietnam at the technical level. Forward

progress was agonizingly slow, seemingly always with one

step backward after every two steps forward. To renew

contact, get the stalled technical discussions back on

track, and impress upon the SRV the high priority which

the US government placed on resolution of the MIA issue, a visit to Hanoi by a high level administration official

was proposed. Consequently, in February 1982, Mr.

Richard Armitage, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of

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RENEWED EFFORTS

Defense for International Security Affairs, led a delegation to Hanoi for discussions on matters of policy. The

discussions achieved only moderate success, but resulted

in the SRV accepting a long-standing US invitation for

a Vietnamese delegation to once again travel to Hawaii

to visit both the JCRC and CIL facilities. The Hawaii

visit took place approximately six months later, with the

SRV delegation receiving briefings on the US approach

to the casualty resolution problem.

Once again, a slight warming of the relationship followed with a corresponding increase in progress. The

SRV moved to regularize the technical discussions when

they agreed to hold such meetings four times per year.

In October 1982 and June 1983 Hanoi repatriated the

remains of additional US servicemen (four and eight respectively), and technical discussions between the JCRC

and the VNOSMP took place in December 1982, March

1983, and early June 1983. Even such limited progress

was not destined to last long. On 28 June 1983 Secretary

of State George Shultz, while in Bangkok to attend a

foreign ministers' conference of the ASEAN group of nations, commented publicly on the "cruel and heartless

action" by the Vietnamese government in withholding

the remains of American servicemen. The technical meetings and remains repatriations once again ground to a

halt.

This pattern of "on again, off again" was to continue, with flurries of progress interrupted by periods of

inaction. The Vietnamese, always sensitive to any move

or action from the US side which they perceived as "hostile," were primed and cocked to withhold their cooperation at the first drop of a critical word. In some instances,

the exact source of Vietnamese pique was obvious, such

as when the Vietnamese sent word via the American ambassador in Bangkok that the time was "not propitious"

to resume technical meetings following Secretary Shultz's

remarks, or when they temporarily postponed cooperation following the 15 April 1986 retaliatory raid by the

United States against Libya. At other times the reasons

for cessation of activity were less obvious, such as when

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RENEWED EFFORTS

the Vietnamese postponed, at the very last minute, a

meeting and remains repatriation scheduled for 18-21

April 1984, saying only that it was being done for "technical reasons."

During those periods when progress at the technical

level came to a halt for any great length of time, the

United States customarily reacted by initiating another

policy-level meeting to engage high-level SRV officials in

discussions. These meetings served as an essential complement to the technical discussions, often paving the way

and arriving at the policy decisions needed to advance

the technical activity.

In February 1984, for instance, Assistant Secretary

of Defense Armitage again led a delegation to Hanoi in

an attempt to increase the pace of cooperation. As a result

of the discussions the Vietnamese side agreed to reopen

the stalled technical talks, and to focus their investigative

efforts first on the Hanoi-Haiphong area where a concentration of US losses in the north had occurred, and on

attempting to recover of the remains of American servicemen who died while in captivity in the south. Later Assistant Secretary Armitage, this time accompanied by

Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz, made a third

visit to Hanoi in January 1986 to meet with SRV Foreign

Minister Nguyen Co Thach. The agreements were once

again expanded to include a commitment from the SRV

that they would conduct investigations of specific reports

alleging Americans possibly still held captive. Foreign

Minister Thach also pledged to attempt resolution of the

POW/MIA issue within a two-year period, a commitment which the SRV later shelved.

Interspersed with these high-level discussions were a

number of other meetings, some held in Hanoi, and others held at the SRV Mission to the United Nations in

New York. Ordinarily the US side was represented by

an official from the National Security Council, often accompanied by representatives from the Departments of

State and Defense, but always accompanied by the Executive Director of the National League of Families in order

129
RENEWED EFFORTS

to emphasize the unity of purpose between the US government and the family members of those still missing.

Through these series of contacts, discussion of policy matters was emphasized while the technical experts from the

JCRC and CIL concentrated on implementing the agreements reached and achieving progress on the individual

cases.

TECHNICAL MEETINGS

To achieve the goal of the fullest possible accounting

of missing servicemen, talk of generalities and policy matters had to come to a halt. The specifics of each individual

case had to be addressed at some point. This latter task

was the whole reason for the technical meetings. Typically, the US side for these meetings was composed of

members of the JCRC, plus members from the Army's

Central Identification Laboratory to address specifics related to the identification of remains and the techniques

of proper recovery. Customarily, the JCRC Commander

was the US team leader. The counterpart group from the

Vietnamese side, the VNOSMP, included representatives from the SRV Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of

Defense, and the Interior Ministry, with the leader being

from the Foreign Ministry. A military medical doctor

represented the SRV on technical questions relating to

the identification of remains.

The schedules for commercial flights between Bangkok and Hanoi, resulted in the US team ordinarily traveling to Hanoi on a Wednesday, participating in meetings

on Thursday and Friday, then departing Hanoi to return

to Bangkok on Saturday. This schedule usually permitted

ample time for presentations by both sides, plus any

added special activity such as occasional trips into the

countryside to view crashsites, or visits to the military

museum to examine war relics which were on display.

Early attempts to establish an agenda in advance or to

determine if the Vietnamese hosts had any additional special activities planned generally proved futile; therefore,

130
RENEWED EFFORTS

the US participants found it necessary to plan for any

number of possible contingencies prior to each trip to

Hanoi.

Planning for each meeting was extensive and de-

, tailed. Each item of discussion was cleared by the Interagency Group (IAG) in Washington, DC. Since, by

definition, these meetings were to be "technical" in nature, emphasis was placed on discussion of specific loss

incidents, what the United States knew of the case based

on available records, gaps in US understanding of what

had occurred, and specific suggestions as to how the

VNOSMP might be able to assist in resolving the case.

To aid the presentations by the US side, each case was

prepared with a folder which contained, as a minimum,

a narrative account (also translated into Vietnamese) describing the loss incident in detail, a photo and physiological information for each individual associated with the

incident, a detailed map of the area of the incident or the

area where the individual was last believed to be, plus

any other material which might bear on the case such as

clippings from Vietnamese publications or photos published by the Vietnamese during the war which were correlated to this particular case. In other words, the US

side prepared and presented to the VNOSMP a package

on each case which could be given to a VNOSMP investigator to enable him to go to a specific area or village,

begin an investigation, and interview possible witnesses.

The subject of possible live Americans still in Vietnam was (and still is) always a topic of discussion. The

JCRC spokesman became quite adept at rephrasing the

question at each meeting, in an effort to foreclose on

any possible loophole: "Are there any American military

personnel whom you consider as criminals still being held

in your jails?" "Are there any individuals from America

whom you now consider as Vietnamese citizens still living

anywhere in Vietnam?" The VNOSMP reply was unfailingly negative. Sometimes the reply was given resignedly

with a sigh; at other times the reply was testy and exasperated. But always it was emphatically negative.

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RENEWED EFFORTS

As a consequence of interviewing Vietnamese refugees throughout Asia, the JCRC had gathered and reported a number of sightings of alleged Americans in

Vietnam. While many of these reports were satisfactorily

resolved by the intelligence analysts, there were always a

smaller number of intriguing reports which could not be

clarified. During the earlier technical meetings, US suggestions that the VNOSMP assist in checking out some

of these reports had gone unanswered. Following the January 1986 meeting in Hanoi between Assistant Secretary

of Defense Armitage and Foreign Minister Thach, however, agreement had been reached that the SRV would

cooperate in such investigations.

Subsequently, during the next technical meeting in

late February 1986, the VNOSMP accepted several cases

of alleged sighting of Americans for investigation. Regrettably, when investigation results were disclosed at a

later meeting, the VNOSMP was able to shed very little

light on any of the reports. In several instances, they

reported their inability to confirm the information provided them by the US side; in one instance their investigation revealed the presence of a man who could have

been reported as an American, but who proved to be of

another nationality.

The idea behind the "technical meetings" was to

keep them focused on case specifics, and to avoid talking

of wider policy matters or topics other than the MIA

issue, since these were for others at a higher level of government to discuss. Therefore, from the first meeting in

1980, the US side took great pains to make clear that

the JCRC and CIL participants were not empowered to

exchange views on other, unrelated topics. Such caveats,

however, did not prevent the Vietnamese side from engaging in polemics or in using the US participants to

deliver messages to the US government, since they knew

that everything said at the meetings would be duly reported back to the Departments of Defense and State.

Consequently, whenever the Vietnamese officials

wanted to make a political point, or to express their government's unhappiness over some perceived US slight or

132
RENEWED EFFORTS

"hostile act", the VNOSMP leader would deliver the

appropriate diatribe for the US side to note and forward

to Washington, DC. With the passage of time, however,

and as the same individuals met across the table time

after time and became personally more familiar with one

another, it was natural that the intensity of these polemical blasts would diminish. The VNOSMP members, who

were obviously working from their own prearranged

script, also began to treat these unproductive interludes

to the technical talks as a matter of routine. Usually,

at a certain point during the meetings the head of the

VNOSMP would reach for his paper and read its typed

script. He would then casually set it aside and resume

the technical discussions. The Vietnamese had seemingly

become as bored at making their polemical presentations

as the US side was at listening to them.

FIELD WORK

While the technical meetings were an absolutely essential ingredient in the task of resolving the fate of those

still missing, the real payoff would ultimately come only

as a result of specific investigative activity. This activity

might be excavation of graves or crashsites, visits to

places of detention, interviews of villagers or witnesses,

or even plowing through Vietnamese wartime government files or other sources of evidence. A part of the

purpose of the technical meetings was to provide the

VNOSMP with the necessary background information to

begin such investigative activity, and to direct them toward what appeared, at least to the US side, the most

productive path. But another important point continually

made during the technical meetings was the US strong

desire that Americans take part and cooperate in any

investigative activity.

The desire for US on-site participation in any Vietnamese (or Lao) investigations into the fate of missing

service members was not simply a frivolous desire to be

133
RENEWED EFFORTS

involved. The very practical concerns, earlier noted, regarding the technical expertise needed to make a proper

recovery of remains, plus the legal concerns relating to

the "chain of evidence" and accurate documentation of

the effort were paramount.

In addition, there was the factor of "credibility" to

consider. It was commonly accepted, though generally

unspoken, that in a great many cases an investigationeven the most honest and meticulous—would yield neither evidence that the individual under investigation was

still alive, nor recoverable remains. In these instances,

the best that could be offered would be a detailed report

of the investigation, including statements made by witnesses, steps taken to uncover facts, places visited or

searched, and so on. Given the feelings of the next-ofkin of those still missing, US officials surmised that few

families would readily accept a final report rendered

solely by Vietnamese or Lao authorities. Thus, American

on-site presence was deemed imperative to overcome

what might be bluntly termed a lack of trust in the content of a solely communist-produced report.

Early efforts to convince Vietnamese interlocutors

that the United States should be included in their investigations were met with negative responses. At first reactions were to the effect that "we can do it ourselves."

Later, the VNOSMP relented only to the point of occasionally permitting a visit to a site, ordinarily an aircraft

crashsite, though on one occasion a visit was also arranged to a former place of detention of United States

prisoners. In this way, JCRC and CIL representatives

took several trips from Hanoi to the countryside to view

aircraft crashsites near Haiphong, Ninh Binh, and towards Hoa Binh to the southwest. Even so, as late as

August 1984 Vietnamese officials were still maintaining

a rigid stance, and told visiting JCRC and CIL officers

with apparent finality that they would not agree to joint

conduct of investigative efforts "now or in the future."6

Only two months later, however, at the technical

meeting held on October 1984, there were the first signs

of a slight shift in the Vietnamese position regarding joint

134
RENEWED EFFORTS

activity. The head of the VNOSMP discussed at great

length the difficulties and expense involved during their

unilateral search activities which had resulted in the return of remains of American servicemen. He continued

to rule out joint activity, citing as the primary reason the

lack of mutual diplomatic relations, but left the door open

to "visits" to excavation sites by JCRC and CIL officials.

This position was reiterated during the next technical

meeting in February 1985, with the head of the

VNOSMP making a strong bid for US assistance in the

form of funds and special equipment needed to carry out

SRV unilateral excavation efforts.

In early March 1985, Mr. Richard Childress of the

National Security Council staff, who had either led or

participated in many previous high level meetings with

Vietnamese policy makers, traveled once again to Hanoi

to discuss with them their cooperation on the MIA effort.

At this time Vietnamese officials not only agreed to increase the tempo of technical meetings (six a year rather

than four a year), but also favorably entertained the idea

of carrying out joint activities with US participation.

These "agreements in principle" were confirmed to

JCRC and CIL personnel during the following technical

meeting held in April 1985.

In mid-1985, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry made

known its desire to resolve the POW/MIA issue within a

period of two years. The United States, extremely pleased

with this announcement, drew up and offered for Hanoi's

consideration a plan which included considerable US participation in terms of manpower, expertise, and specialized equipment support. During a policy-level meeting

held in Hanoi in late August 1985, however, SRV officials ignored the US plan and instead presented their own

unilateral plan of action. This plan was divided into three

phases. It included an initial nationwide public information and education program for the benefit of local officials, followed by a program of collection and verification

of information from throughout the country. The final

phase involved excavation and recovery of any remains

135
RENEWED EFFORTS

which were discovered as a result of the second phase

activity.

This Vietnamese plan was primarily unilateral in nature, envisioning that any excavation and remains recovery activity would normally be carried out by Vietnamese

officials and workers. The plan did, however, allow that

US help might be requested if needed. When the plan

was presented, SRV officials made clear that Vietnam

would not ask for any compensation, though the United

States would be permitted to contribute to the cost of the

activity on a voluntary basis.

Several other factors may have contributed to this

gradual shift in SRV position toward allowing US participation in a joint activity. For one, Indonesia's Foreign

Minister had also visited Hanoi in March, and had discussed with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach the need

to be more cooperative and to more seriously address

the American MIA issue. Perhaps even more influential,

however, was the effect of a joint excavation activity at a

crash site in Laos, carried out by American and Lao

personnel and completed in February. There is no doubt

that Vietnamese officials, after consulting with their Lao

allies, learned of the potential benefit—in bilateral good

will, in international public relations, and in monetary

terms—which could be gained by working together with

the Americans.

Regardless of the rationale, during the April 1985

technical meeting, the VNOSMP announced that they

would agree to US participation in a joint excavation of

an aircraft crashsite, and suggested it take place at the

village of Yen Thuong, approximately 15 kilometers

northeast of Hanoi, where a B-52 had crashed in December 1972. A preliminary visit to the site by JCRC and

CIL officers and a review of B-52 crash records gave

cause for US initial hesitation. During the preliminary

look at the site, local villagers brought forward a piece of

wreckage which they stated had come from the crashed

aircraft. Close examination of this piece revealed the

presence of Cyrillic letters stamped into the metal, indicating the likelihood of Russian manufacture, such as

136
RENEWED EFFORTS

might be expected from a MiG aircraft or a SAM missile.

During the next technical meeting in July 1985, the US

side emphasized to the VNOSMP the importance to both

sides of selecting a site for this first precedent-setting excavation which would provide the maximum chance of

successful outcome—the recovery of identifiable remains.

Though the US officials offered for consideration another

site which seemed to afford a better opportunity for success, the VNOSMP officials remained adamant that the

excavation would take place at the Yen Thuong site.

On 5 July 1985, JCRC, CIL, and VNOSMP officials conducted a detailed on-site survey in preparation

for the eventual excavation. In this particular incident,

according to local villagers the flaming aircraft had

crashed into the midst of the hamlet during the nighttime,

gouging a large crater in the earth, destroying a number

of structures, and killing several of the local inhabitants

including the husband of the old woman who currently

resided at that location. Following the cessation of hostilities, the villagers had hauled away or buried any residual

wreckage from the crashed aircraft, had filled in the crater

formed and had then returned the area to production, in

this case, a vegetable garden. Neighboring houses had

been rebuilt or repaired; consequently, after the passage

of over twelve years there was little visible evidence of an

aircraft crash. Nevertheless, one of the important elements of this survey was to pinpoint the most logical

location to begin the excavation in order to locate any

possible recoverable remains of the B-52 crew.

The JCRC and CIL officers spent several hours interviewing local inhabitants, photographing and mapping

the area and nearby structures, and determining the accessibility of the area from existing roads and pathways.

These were all important factors to consider when deciding how many people would be needed to carry out the

excavation, what particular skills would be necessary, and

what specialized or unique equipment might be required.

Following several exchanges of planning data between the US and SRV groups during the ensuing

months, the American team arrived at Noi Bai airport

137
RENEWED EFFORTS

near Hanoi on 18 November 1985 aboard a USAF C141 cargo aircraft. The excavation team, in addition to

JCRC and CIL personnel, included a medic, specialists

in handling and disposal of unexploded ordnance (in the

event of discovery of bombs or other dangerous explosives), and military engineers to operate a large tractormounted digger which was also aboard the C-141 aircraft. The VNOSMP officials, in addition to coordinating the effort, arranged for the necessary guards,

laborers, trucks, and other equipment needed to carry

out the excavation task.

Digging began immediately, with team members

commuting daily to the site from their quarters in a Hanoi hotel. As earth was excavated from the impact site,

it was hauled to a nearby location for spreading and examination for possible human skeletal remains. Because

of its clay-like consistency, dry screening of the soil was

impossible, and clods of earth had to be carefully and

laboriously broken up and examined by hand. This condition was further aggravated by rain and seeping ground

water as the hole was continuously deepened. After four

days without locating any remains, at Vietnamese insistence two dwellings were razed and the excavation was

widened. Hopes were buoyed by the occasional discovery

of aircraft wreckage such as landing gear, engine parts,

fuel bladders, survival rafts, and other assorted pieces

which confirmed that indeed a B-52 had impacted at this

location (and not a vehicle of Russian origin as earlier

thought possible). However, after over 2 weeks of digging

which left a hole measuring 50 by 100 feet and nearly 40

feet deep, no identifiable remains or personal effects of

the crew could be located. A few scant, skeletal fragments

which were initially believed to be human, later proved

to be of animal origin upon detailed examination by CIL

anthropologists in Hawaii.

When this excavation effort was finally terminated

on 3 December 1985, there was disappointment on both

sides. The VNOSMP officials and their Vietnamese

workers had proven willing and helpful associates, and

had done their utmost to assure that the work proceeded

138
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American and Vietnamese workers excavate the site of a

1972 B-52 bomber crash near Hanoi in an effort to recover any identifiable remains of the crewmen.
RENEWED EFFORTS

smoothly despite the adverse weather, numerous equipment problems, and hazardous conditions.7

In spite of

the diligent work from both sides, and though the specific

B-52 involved in this incident was identified with reasonable certainty, the final results were inconclusive. The

JCRC Commander, LTC Joe Harvey, who led the US

team's portion of the effort, rightfully surmised that it

was unlikely the results would resolve the cases of the

crew members aboard this aircraft.

This first joint excavation activity with the Vietnamese, though unsuccessful in terms of results, had a much

wider significance in terms of precedent. Even in the absence of diplomatic relations, and despite the many previous SRV refusals, here was an instance where US and

SRV officials demonstrated the ability to work together

in a coordinated manner in a cooperative spirit to carry

out a mutually agreed upon task. It marked one more

milestone in the agonizingly slow decade-long process of

instituting a reliable procedure to arrive at the fullest possible accounting of all missing personnel.

This same precedent had been set with the Lao government earlier and, as previously noted, probably had

a favorable impact on the Vietnamese decision to cooperate. But in the case of the Lao as well, gaining agreement

for the first excavation had been an excruciatingly slow

process. Lao officials had exhibited extreme suspicion in

their dealings with the United States, even though diplomatic relations existed between the two countries. Much

of this was due, no doubt, to their mistaken belief that

the US government was in some way supporting the ongoing noncommunist resistance effort against the Lao

Peoples' Democratic Republic (LPDR).

Indeed, numerous Lao refugees in Thailand opposed

the communist regime, and were actively involved in

cross-border probes trying to make trouble for the Lao

government. Their efforts were occasionally abetted by

private US anti-communist groups and Lao refugees who

had resettled to the United States. The Lao government

had been particularly vocal in denouncing alleged US

encouragement of the resistance activities of General

140
RENEWED EFFORTS

Vang Pao, the former leader of the Hmong forces in the

fight against the communist Pathet Lao in the 1960s and

early 1970s. After fleeing Laos in 1975, Vang Pao had

resettled in the United States where he eventually acquired US citizenship, and travelled occasionally to Thailand to visit among the Hmong refugees still in the

camps. Without fail, Vang Pao's visits to Thailand would

prompt immediate Lao accusations of official US complicity in Lao resistance activity. Lao government officials seemed unable or unwilling to comprehend the

travel freedom afforded to American citizens, or to understand the lack of official US government control over

the private activities of American citizens.

In February 1983, reacting to extensive persuasive

efforts by American embassy personnel in Vientiane, the

Lao government finally agreed to meet with technical

personnel from the JCRC and CIL to discuss casualty

resolution in Laos. However, as described earlier, Lao

insecurity once again immediately came to the fore as the

news broke that a group led by an American citizen had

crossed from Thailand into Laos in an alleged attempt to

rescue American POWs. This meeting, dearly sought for

the purpose of encouraging joint investigative activities,

came to an abrupt and unproductive end.

Following another concerted campaign by American

embassy officials in Vientiane, the Lao finally agreed to

a joint US/LPDR investigative effort at the site of a C130 crash in the southern panhandle of Laos, about 40

kilometers northeast of the town of Pakse. An American

team was flown to the jungle crashsite by MI-8 helicopter

in December 1983 to conduct the preliminary survey

needed to plan the actual excavation of the site.

Having completed the survey and the attendant planning, the JCRC/CIL team eagerly awaited Lao approval

to begin the actual excavation. But as the dry season drew

to a close and rains began to threaten, inevitable delays

and resistance to proceed on the part of the Lao occurred.

With the onset of the monsoon rains, Lao officials insisted

that further consideration had to be postponed. In February 1985, well over a year after the initial survey, the

LPDR finally agreed to begin the excavation work.

141
RENEWED EFFORTS

From 10 to 22 February 1985, a joint team of 11

Americans and 15 Lao dug and sifted the rocky soil at

the point where the C-130 aircraft had impacted almost

vertically after exploding in mid-air on a dark night in

December 1972. This painstaking effort yielded a sizeable quantity of highly fragmented skeletal and dental

remains, plus other identifying effects from the aircraft

crew. The on-site work turned out to be a model of cooperation, and the Lao government received favorable publicity for their effort as a consequence of permitting a

large press group to visit the excavation site while work

was still in progress. Later, Secretary of State George

Shultz sent a letter to the Lao Foreign Minister thanking

him for the Lao cooperation on this highly successful joint

effort.

UNEVEN PROGRESS

All precedents for joint field work notwithstanding,

progress in both Vietnam and Laos continued at an unsatisfactorily slow pace. US officials in Vientiane strongly

encouraged the Lao government to build on the very successful joint excavation effort of early 1985, and to continue the progress throughout the year. The Lao,

however, demanded some form of reciprocal US gesture

before once again moving forward. Several high-level US

delegations traveled to Vientiane during the year to further encourage cooperation, but little substantive progress was made. The sole exception was that the Lao

government finally responded to a long-standing offer

and in late summer dispatched a delegation to Hawaii for

technical briefings on casualty resolution from both the

JCRC and the CIL.

Finally, on 19 December 1985, after considerable

controversy Congress passed a bill which deleted Laos

from the list of countries prohibited from receiving US

bilateral development assistance. In a "tit for tat" move,

on 27 December the Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the American embassy in Vientiane of Lao approval of an early January 1986 joint survey and

142
RENEWED EFFORTS

excavation of a second aircraft crash site, another C-130

crashsite—located in a jungled area to the southwest of

Tchepone near the town of Muong Phine. A survey of

this site was conducted on 3 January, and another highly

successful excavation was conducted by a joint US/Lao

team during the period from 17 February to 1 March

1986. But, as Lao officials once again refused to institute

a continuing cooperative program of casualty resolution,

another monsoon season came and went without any further progress being achieved. At year's end, the JCRC

Commander issued his bleak assessment that there was

"scant hope for meaningful progress when Laos allows

only one excavation per year."8

Meanwhile, in Vietnam sustained progress was also

slow in coming. Following the B-52 crashsite excavation

in late 1985, SRV officials who met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage in Hanoi in early

1986 had agreed to multiple joint activities in the future.

Problems were encountered in implementing this agreement, however. US technical personnel had insisted that

the next excavation site should have a very good chance

of yielding positive results, particularly after the disappointment of the earlier effort at the B-52 crashsite. Minister Thach himself had acknowledged to Mr. Armitage

a need for better cooperation between the two sides regarding future site selection. Despite these agreements

and the goodwill which Vietnam could expect to accrue

following a successful effort such as those already conducted in Laos, it was somewhat puzzling that the SRV

continued to propose excavation sites which seemed to

have little potential for success.

One such site was the alleged burial location of a pilot

who supposedly died following ejection from his disabled

aircraft some 120 kilometers south of Hanoi. A JCRC/

CIL team taken to visit this site learned that the grave

was believed to be several hundred feet out into a manmade reservoir, at a point which was under 3 or 4 feet

of water. Though it would be possible to overcome the

technical difficulties to exhume the pilot's remains, it became obvious during the visit that neither government

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officials nor local inhabitants were certain exactly where

the burial location really was. Further, other information

reported by the local inhabitants indicated that a considerable amount of investigation would be needed before a

decision to dig could be made.

In spite of reservations about the sites being proposed

by the VNOSMP representatives during the technical

meetings, the US side had by now adopted the attitude

that, to keep up the momentum of joint activity, at this

point any excavation was better than no activity at all.

Therefore, on the next trip by a JCRC/CIL team to Hanoi (a repatriation of US remains on 10 April 1986), the

US side came prepared to leave team members and their

equipment behind to participate in an excavation activity. Fortunately, by this time, the VNOSMP had given

more careful thought to US reservations, and had themselves acknowledged that added research was needed before embarking on this particular effort. In addition to

difficulties associated with site selection, other impediments to steady progress continued to arise. Some were

significant; others were petty and resulted only in making

the bilateral working environment more strained.

In mid-February 1986, a sizeable congressional delegation traveled to Hanoi to discuss a number of issues of

bilateral importance, including the topic of Americans

still unaccounted for. At a press conference held upon

their return to the United States, several congressmen

stated that Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Hoang

Bich Son had conceded that American servicemen could

still be alive at remote locations within Vietnam. On 17

February, in response to what were termed "false media

reports," the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on this subject. In this statement, the Foreign Ministry acknowledged that Son did speak with the

congressional delegation about the question of prisoners

of war still alive, but pointed out that Vietnam "has

many times affirmed that there has not been a single US

prisoner more {sic} still detained in Vietnam. In case

there are live Americans hiding themselves out of the

control of the Vietnamese government, they can belong

145
RENEWED EFFORTS

to two categories: they are either planted behind for the

'post-war plan' or they have illegally infiltrated into Vietnam since the complete liberation of South Vietnam."

Nearly two months later, during a meeting with visiting

US journalists on 13 April 1986, Vice Foreign Minister

Son was again asked about statements attributed to him

by the visiting US congressmen. Son was quoted as insisting there was "no, absolutely no" possibility that Americans were living in remote areas of Vietnam.

Regardless of what was actually said to the visiting

Congressional delegation by Vice Foreign Minister Son,

all members of the delegation allegedly came away from

the 14-15 February 1986 visit to Hanoi firmly convinced

that Son had admitted the possibility of American POWs

being held in some remote area unknown to the central

Vietnamese government. At the next Hanoi technical

meeting which occurred less than two weeks after the

congressional visit to Hanoi, JCRC and CIL representatives were treated to another diatribe about the issue of

live Americans. VNOSMP officials, obviously miffed by

the congressmen's version of the discussions in Hanoi,

emphatically stated that their Vice Foreign Minister had

said no such thing, and that the congressional visitors

had apparently misinterpreted some of the discussions.9

Another contentious issue revolved around the SRVproposed two-year plan for resolving the MIA issue, initially unveiled in Hanoi in August 1985. The United

States had enthusiastically embraced the SRV plan, and

at another policy meeting, this time at the SRV UN Mission in New York, had presented a list of actions which

the United States agreed to carry out to complement and

support the Vietnamese plan. The plan was further discussed in Hanoi in January 1986 during the talks, noted

above, between Foreign Minister Thach and Assistant

Secretary of Defense Armitage. At that time, with one

joint excavation activity completed with the Vietnamese

and having received a commitment of more to follow in

the future, Mr. Armitage assured Minister Thach of the

US willingness to support their plan to resolve the POW/

MIA issue. Within several months, however, Vietnamese

146
RENEWED EFFORTS

officials began to complain of a US "lack of commitment" to their plan. This message was first passed to the

Executive Director of the League of Families in April

1986 during a meeting in New York, then later repeated

by the VNOSMP to the JCRC/CIL team during a technical meeting in Hanoi in June.

In an effort to keep things on track, and head off

what appeared to be an SRV reduction of effort, Mr.

Childress of the National Security Council staff met in

New York with the Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister

to once again provide assurances of US support for the

SRV plan. In early July, Mr. Childress delivered this

same message to Foreign Minister Thach in Hanoi, along

with a letter from Mr. Armitage outlining the US understanding of the agreements reached during the earlier

January discussions in Hanoi. While Minister Thach

took no issue with the US understanding of the previous

agreements, he registered his complaint that no mention

had been made of US responsibility for "creating a favorable atmosphere."10

Vietnamese grumbling about the US lack of commitment continued sporadically; however, within a few

months the relationship between the two countries began

yet another transition to a new phase. As the issue of the

SRV two-year plan began to fade from importance and

the SRV essentially shelved the plan, the issue of "creating a favorable atmosphere" began to take on a new,

significant meaning.

NOTES

1. From the author's notes taken during the 11 August 1979

meeting between Congressman Lester Wolff and Vice Foreign

Minister Nguyen Go Thach.

2. Between the time when Vietnamese officials agreed to the

idea of technical-level meetings between the two sides (August

1979), and when the first meeting actually took place (October

1980), several significant events had occurred. In mid-January

147
RENEWED EFFORTS

1980 Congressman Wolff confronted Hanoi officials with the

US belief that Vietnam had "stockpiled" an estimated 400

remains of US servicemen, a charge which Hanoi quickly and

emphatically denied. Later, in June 1980 before TV cameras,

Wolff chaired congressional hearings in Washington, DC, at

which time the Vietnamese "mortician" publicly testified regarding Vietnam's withholding of these remains. Neither of

these events was conducive to gaining prompt agreement from

Vietnam to meet with US technical personnel.

3. The topic of public announcement of names associated with

returned remains was of considerable concern. During earlier

remains repatriations, Vietnamese authorities had made no

attempt to withhold any name associations. US officials were

concerned with the possibility of Vietnamese misidentifications, of which there had previously been several, and the

potential emotional impact which the abrupt announcement

of names would have on the next-of-kin. These factors were

explained to Vietnamese officials and, to their credit, they soon

agreed to withhold any public mention of individual names.

Though this did not completely curtail the premature leaking

of name associations to the media, invariably the leaks that did

occur originated from American sources.

4. The remains of Lieutenant Ronald Dodge, Ltjg Stephen

Musselman, and 1/Lt Richard Van Dyke were repatriated to

US custody on 7 July 1981. Sadly, no word was forthcoming

on the fate of PFC Donald Sparks, the fourth name on the list

given to the SRV Mission in New York.

5. Any theories on the demise of Lieutenant Dodge are purely

speculative, and a number have been proposed. He was never

seen in the established prison "system" by other prisoners;

thus it is likely that something untoward occurred before he

could be transported from his point of capture to Hanoi. A

number of scenarios have been postulated. He could have died

from the shock of his wounds or the trauma of capture, for

example. He may have made an unsuccessful and fatal escape

attempt, or could have conceivably been wrested from his militia escorts and beaten to death by hostile villagers. As one of

the realities of war, the tragic circumstances of his death may

never be explained.

148
RENE WED EFFOR TS

6. USCINCPAC Command History, 1984 (TS), vol. II, 27 September 1985, p. 494.

7. On the second day of the excavation work, an unfortunate

accident occurred when one of the American team members

was struck in the head and seriously injured by the shovel of

the tractor-mounted digger. Vietnamese officials admitted the

man to a Hanoi hospital for emergency treatment, immediately passed word of the accident to the American embassy in

Bangkok, and expedited the clearance for an American medical

evacuation flight into Hanoi from Clark Air Base in the Philippines early the following morning. Vietnamese reaction to this

emergency can only be termed extremely responsive and compassionate.

8. USCINCPAC message, DTG 050329Z DEC 86.

9. In an interesting sidelight to this whole interchange regarding the possibility of Americans being held captive in Vietnam,

it was later learned that an American "adventurer," Mr. Robert Schwab, was being detained in a Vietnamese jail during

this period. Schwab had been arrested in April 1985 by Vietnamese authorities after he deliberately sailed into Vietnamese

coastal waters in an alleged attempt to rescue a former girlfriend. Schwab was eventually released on 14 August 1986

after being held captive for nearly a year and a half.

10. STATE message 211486, DTG 040956Z JUL 86.

149
6

TOWARD CASUALTY

RESOLUTION

"CREATING A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE"

Vietnam's attitude toward normalization of relations with the United States has been generally positive

over the years. The SRV welcomed the idea of normalization during the period following their consolidation of

the north and the south into a unified country in 1976.

However, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 halted any further inclination by the United

States to pursue the course of normalization. As the two

countries again began their discourse on the POW/MIA

issue and other bilateral matters during the early 1980s,

the topic of normalization occasionally arose, but in a

somewhat ambivalent manner. Vietnamese officials took

the position that diplomatic exchanges should be considered as the natural state of affairs between countries. At

the same time they often stated, even during the JCRC/

VNOSMP technical meetings, that they were not about

to beg for US diplomatic recognition, saying in effect,

"We have gotten along without normalized relations with

151
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

the Americans for many years; we can continue to get

along without them in the future."

Despite this stated position, there could be no doubt

in the minds of those who had frequent contact with Vietnamese officials that normalization of relations with the

United States was an eagerly sought goal. Private conversations revealed an element of uneasiness by Vietnamese

officials over their closeness with their Soviet allies. This

did not mean they had a preference for relations with the

United States; it seemed more a reflection of discomfort

over a degree of isolation and a lack of options in their

external affairs.1 Consequently, denials to the contrary,

there seemed to be a constant desire on the part of Vietnamese officials for the United States to normalize relations with the SRV.

At technical meetings in Hanoi, VNOSMP comments were often the precursor of new Vietnamese initiatives to draw closer to the United States. Occasionally, a

veritable offensive was directed at each US team member,

as they were individually and informally engaged in conversation by their VNOSMP hosts on the subject of normalization of relations between the two countries. During

the technical meetings of 6-9 February 1985, for example,

Vietnamese team members initiated open and frequent

informal conversation on US/SRV normalization of relations. During a later meeting, in July of the same year,

the VNOSMP chief several times mentioned that the

SRV government was very anxious to resolve quickly the

MIA issue, and desired to meet with a "high level" US

official to discuss ways to accelerate progress.

The high-level policy meetings between SRV and US

officials were undoubtedly attractive to the Vietnamese

government. Though it was oftentimes difficult to schedule a technical meeting between JCRC/CIL officials and

the VNOSMP, it seldom was difficult to gain Vietnamese

agreement to meet at a higher level. (It was seldom difficult to gain Vietnamese approval for the visit to Hanoi

of US congressional delegations, either.) Indeed, during

a meeting with National Security Council staff member

152
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

Richard Childress in Hanoi in July 1986, Foreign Minister Thach suggested that policy level meetings should be

held between the two countries every six months.

Another subject which surfaced in discussions, and

which gave rise to the possibility of drawing the two countries closer together, was the topic of a so-called American

"technical presence" in Hanoi. There had been occasional speculation over the possible placement in Hanoi

of a small technical group whose sole purpose would be

to work with the VNOSMP on casualty resolution matters. Such a group would comprise primarily military

experts from JCRC and CIL, and would in no way connote a diplomatic presence or recognition. In early June

1985, in response to the appearance of speculation in the

press about the permanent stationing of a team of experts

in Hanoi, the State Department prepared a response

which said, inter alia:

There appears at the present time to be no necessity

to have our technical experts present on a continuous basis in Hanoi. Were circumstances to change,

and Vietnam's cooperation to increase significantly

in such a way as to require the more frequent or

even continuous deployment of technical personnel,

we will give it serious consideration. This would, of

course, have no relation to the issue of diplomatic

relations.2

This position was reiterated to the press when the topic

arose once again in December 1985. In addition, during

the Armitage/Thach discussions in Hanoi in January

1986 Minister Thach brought up the topic of a possible

American presence, though both sides eventually agreed

that the extent of on-going joint activity at that time did

not warrant a permanent presence.3 Another item discussed, and perhaps one of the key elements of agreement, was the position that the issue of missing

Americans was indeed a strictly humanitarian matter on

which progress could be made irrespective of other bilateral issues which separated the two countries, including

the issue of normalization of relations.

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But in spite of the Armitage/Thach agreements in

Hanoi in January 1986, and the later Childress reiteration of US support (including qualified financial support)

for the SRV casualty resolution plan, tangible progress

once again began to wane. Technical meetings were held

between the JCRC/CIL and the VNOSMP during the

months of August and October 1986, and there were also

two remains repatriations during the latter half of 1986.

VNOSMP officials at these technical meetings increasingly mentioned the need for the US side to "have a

really cooperative attitude" and to "create a favorable

atmosphere so that the search for information about

Americans missing in action would be fruitful."4 At the

same time, the number of remains repatriated dwindled

to one on 17 September, and three on 26 November.

Attempts by the United States to maintain the agreedupon pace of six meetings per year and to schedule a

technical meeting during January 1987 were rejected by

the VNOSMP. A similar request for a meeting in February was also rejected. It became very obvious that once

again, the level of progress was winding down.

SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY

Meanwhile, during the latter half of 1986, considerable discussion took place behind the scenes in Washington DC about how to increase the tempo on the MIA

issue and maintain it at a higher level. A number of ideas

had been proposed, discussed, and rejected, including

creation of a special presidential commission similar to

that headed by Leonard Woodcock in 1977. By October

1986, President Reagan had determined to appoint a special POW/MIA emissary to Hanoi, and in February 1987

selected General John W. Vessey, Jr. for this position.

The President could not have made a wiser choice.

General Vessey had retired as Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in 1985. He was intimately familiar with

southeast Asia and the Vietnam conflict, having served

155
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

in that theater in various positions of responsibility, including as Commander of the United States Support Activities Group (parent to the Joint Casualty Resolution

Center) following the signing of the Paris Accords. But

most important, General Vessey had an impeccable reputation for absolute integrity and forthrightness in dealings

with others.

In mid-April 1987, US officials from Washington visited the SRV Ambassador to the United Nations to elaborate on the President's initiative, and in May further

discussions were conducted in Hanoi as a prelude to a

possible later visit to Hanoi by General Vessey. Vietnam's Foreign Ministry spokesman, again echoing their

familiar theme, publicly warned that US/SRV relations

would not improve unless General Vessey was fully empowered by the US government "to create a favorable

atmosphere to a solution of the MIA problem."5Finally,

an exchange of positive letters between National Security

Advisor Carlucci and SRV Foreign Minister Thach

served to confirm the Vietnamese acceptance of a trip by

General Vessey to Hanoi, and established the humanitarian framework for the discussions to follow.

After stops en route for briefings at Honolulu and

Bangkok, Presidential Emissary General Vessey and his

party arrived at Hanoi's Noi Bai Airport aboard an Air

Force special mission aircraft on 1 August 1987 for three

days of talks. In addition to a staff composed of members

from the National Security Council and the Departments

of State and Defense, General Vessey's party included

as special advisors General Robert Kingston, the first

Commander of the JCRC, and Mrs. Ann Griffiths, the

Executive Director of the National League of Families.

Vietnamese interlocutors during the nearly three days of

meetings were primarily from the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, and their delegation was led by Foreign Minister

Nguyen Co Thach.

In the course of the discussions, a number of positive

agreements were reached. Minister Thach committed the

SRV to resuming joint efforts toward resolving the MIA

issue. He agreed that their activity would initially address

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those most urgent cases wherein the missing individual

was last known by the United States to be alive, but who

did not return during Operation Homecoming. General

Vessey presented some 220 such cases to Minister Thach

for examination and review. Seventy of these cases were

singled out for priority attention because of their particularly compelling nature, reflecting the US belief that these

would be the ones most likely resolvable at some level of

the Vietnamese government bureaucracy. General Vessey once again stressed to Vietnamese officials the need

to also address the recovery of the remains of those whom

Vietnam had previously listed as having died while in

captivity in the southern regions of the country.

To facilitate Vietnamese casualty resolution activity,

General Vessey reaffirmed the US commitment to assist

this effort in a material sense. He specifically alluded to

US willingness to conduct technical training for search

teams, including visits to the JCRC and CIL in Hawaii,

and to provide specialized equipment for excavation or

remains recovery activity. In an effort to streamline the

flow of information and to assure that both sides were

working from a common information base, General Vessey also expressed a US desire to help automate the

SRV's casualty data, thereby promoting compatibility

between the VNOSMP and the JCRC and CIL.

In keeping with the humanitarian framework of the

talks, Minister Thach brought up for discussion some of

Vietnam's more urgent humanitarian problems, with a

request that the United States help address these as a

priority matter. General Vessey agreed that the United

States would do so, within the legal constraints presently

imposed on US-SRV relations, and with the further understanding that the focus of effort would first be directed

toward the problems of the disabled. He and Minister

Thach also agreed that cooperation would be pursued

apart from any political matters dividing the two countries; and though each would assist with the other's humanitarian concerns, this work would proceed along

parallel courses and not on a quid pro quo basis. To once

again move the process forward, General Vessey and

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Minister Thach agreed that technical talks would be resumed shortly, with one meeting of experts "to discuss

next steps to resolve the POW/MIA issue, and another

to discuss urgent Vietnamese humanitarian concerns."6

By the time they left Hanoi late on the afternoon of 3

August, General Vessey's party had participated in three

plenary sessions with Foreign Minister Thach, plus four

working-level meetings where the details of their agreements had been hammered out. General Vessey and

Minister Thach had also met privately four times and

established a mutual rapport which was to serve them

well in the months ahead.

THE VESSEY-THACH AGREEMENTS

The impetus provided by the Vessey-Thach agreements set in motion a renewed series of technical meetings, two of which were immediately scheduled to address

the implementation of these agreements. On 25 August

1987 two American groups flew to Hanoi, one a combined JCRC/CIL team to meet with the VNOSMP and

work on the issue of casualty resolution, and the second

composed of orthopedic and prosthetics experts to decide

with Vietnamese public health officers and social affairs

officials what could be done to provide relief for the many

disabled amputees throughout Vietnam.

In keeping with the course agreed upon between

General Vessey and Minister Thach, the JCRC/CIL

team concentrated on presentation of additional details

relating to the 70 "compelling cases" to receive initial

priority. The VNOSMP, for their part, reported on the

results of their on-going unilateral efforts to track down

leads in the countryside, and to locate the remains of

missing Americans. Meanwhile, in another nearby meeting room, the prosthetics experts were discussing with

Vietnamese officials the extent and nature of the problems of amputees and others with crippled limbs throughout Vietnam, and preparing for a field trip to a facility

for the manufacture of prosthetic devices.

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Both sides felt the pressure to achieve positive results.

The Vessey-Thach discussions had generated high expectations, and both the POW/MIA group and the prosthetics group were keenly aware of the need to achieve visible

and substantive progress without delay. Nearly a decade

and a half had elapsed since the cessation of hostilities

between the two sides, yet there had been such relatively

meager progress—no definitive answer to the possibility

of Americans still held captive, and fewer than 150 remains of missing Americans returned from Vietnam.

For their part, Vietnamese officials surely felt that

added cooperation would improve the atmosphere between their country and the United States, and would

move them closer to normalized relations. Indeed, the US

position, enunciated many times to Vietnamese officials,

included the caveat that while resolution of the MIA issue

was not a precondition for normalization of relations, the

pace of normalization would be affected by the perception

of the American people regarding Vietnamese cooperation on this issue.

Thus began a double series of technical discussions

in Hanoi following the initial meetings by both the POW/

MIA groups and the prosthetics groups. In November

1987 the prosthetics experts returned to Hanoi to discuss

the report which they had published as a result of their

earlier fact-finding visit in August.7This report, which

detailed the extent of the amputee and crippled limb

problem faced by Vietnam, suggested a number of remedial actions which US non-governmental organizations

(NGO's) might take to help Vietnam to alleviate the situation. The US State Department rallied a number of

these organizations with potential interest in assisting

Vietnam to address this humanitarian problem, In December Vietnam hosted a representative group of these

NGO's who traveled to Hanoi for a firsthand look at

what projects might be undertaken.

By early 1988, NGO efforts were underway to procure and ship to Vietnam a number of commodities

needed in the manufacture of prosthetic devices. By midyear, some $100,000 worth of supplies had already been

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sent, and another 39,000 pounds of additional supplies

were en route to Vietnam by ship.8In addition, an exchange of letters between Minister Thach and General

Vessey in May 1988 led to further agreement to broaden

the on-going humanitarian cooperation to include the

problem of child disabilities. This agreement was immediately followed by a visit to Hanoi in early June by a

four-man US medical team to explore steps to be taken.

Meanwhile, on the POW/MIA side of the Vessey/

Thach agenda, the renewed technical discussions were

also beginning to show positive results. The VNOSMP,

in a more forthcoming manner and in more detail than

ever before, began reporting the results of their unilateral

activities. Their field teams were spending more and

more time in the countryside investigating possible leads

and talking to villagers. The repatriation of American

remains began anew, with three remains turned over to

a US team in Hanoi on 27 September 1987, and another

five remains repatriated on 25 November.

A new level of openness was achieved as the effort

moved into 1988. Technical meetings were characterized

by more give-and-take as specific information was exchanged, and discussions became more frank and detailed. The VNOSMP presented the results of their own

investigative efforts, including additional reports which

they alleged had come from the populace. However, a

continuing source of difficulty was the "remains trading"

which was taking place. The VNOSMP had obtained

many such remains from the populace, particularly from

the southern parts of Vietnam, and had subsequently included a sizeable number of these remains, usually later

proven not to be those of Americans, among the 17 remains repatriated on 2 March, the 27 repatriated on 6

April, and the 25 repatriated on 13 July 1988.

In addition, a list of equipment to be turned over for

specific use by the VNOSMP to enhance the efficiency

of their casualty resolution efforts was drawn up. As the

equipment items were procured, another visit to Hawaii

by a VNOSMP delegation was planned. One of the primary reasons for this visit, which occurred in late June

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1988, was to provide the opportunity for special training

for Vietnamese operators on some of the equipment to

be turned over. Such training was considered essential,

particularly on such technical equipment as the computer, and to a lesser degree with the photographic gear,

metal detectors, and other specialized laboratory equipment.

On 8 June 1988, General Vessey traveled to New

York to meet again with Foreign Minister Thach who was

there to attend a meeting of the United Nations General

Assembly. This meeting provided the opportunity for

mutual review of progress since their initial meeting in

Hanoi ten months earlier. While the review led to a reemphasis of the importance of resolving the so-called "compelling" cases, there was an even more significant

outcome to this meeting. During their discussions, Minister Thach revealed to General Vessey that the Vietnamese government was preparing for additional joint

activity, and that they were ready to discuss the conduct

ofjoint investigations and the possible joint excavation of

suitable crashsites.

As in the past, the road to this new plateau of progress and commitment was not an entirely smooth one.

Minister Thach had, on a number of occasions since their

first meeting, communicated with General Vessey regarding a variety of topics not related to the humanitarian

issues which had dominated their face-to-face talks. For

example, in December 1987 Minister Thach had written

to General Vessey to express his government's displeasure over a potential submission to the US Congress of a

bill which would permit the United States to satisfy private American claims against Vietnam by liquidating

Vietnamese-owned assets in the United States. In April

1988, Minister Thach wrote again, responding to a statement by a DOD spokesman who had said that Vietnam

had more information about missing Americans than

they had thus far divulged. On 31 July 1988, Minister

Thach again wrote to General Vessey, this time expressing his views regarding a statement made by an Assistant

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Secretary of State indicating that the United States should

continue its policy of diplomatically isolating Vietnam.

In each of these instances, Minister Thach included

the suggestion, either implicitly or explicitly stated, that

the offensive US behavior jeopardized future Vietnamese

cooperation on resolution of the US humanitarian problems. Fortunately, however, and indicative of the mutual

rapport and respect which arose between these two men,

the messages between General Vessey and Minister

Thach were invariably polite, moderate in tone, and always couched in non-inflammatory terms. The various

opposing positions did not become so hardened as to defy

resolution, and could be reviewed unemotionally as the

obstacles were removed one at a time in an effort to continue toward resolving both countries' humanitarian

concerns.

Nowhere was this more evident than in the instance

cited earlier where Vietnam had taken offense regarding

the comments of an Assistant Secretary of State. These

comments had been made in open testimony before a

subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

which was holding hearings on a proposed bill calling for

the President to normalize diplomatic relations with the

Socialist Republic of Vietnam. When, on 31 July, Minister Thach wrote specifically that cooperation with the

United States would be "temporarily suspended" as a

consequence of the negative testimony of the Assistant

Secretary of State, the sponsors of the normalizing bill

immediately withdrew their support and all further consideration of the proposed legislation ceased. In earlier

years, such a confrontation undoubtedly would have led

to an extended cessation of all cooperation. Throughout

this episode, however, the tenor of the communication

between Minister Thach and General Vessey was kept

low-key, the result being that cooperation soon afterward

was not only resumed, but resumed at a level not previously achieved.

The specifics of this new level of cooperation were

worked out at the next technical meetings held in Hanoi

in mid-September 1988 between the VNOSMP and

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JCRC/CIL officials. The plan called for the initial fielding of two joint teams, composed of both US and Vietnamese members. Each of these teams would attempt to

locate and investigate several casualty-related sites during

a period of approximately 10 days.

The US team members arrived at Hanoi's Noi Bai

airport aboard a USAF C-141 on 25 September 1988.

Also aboard the aircraft were fourJeep Cherokee 4-wheel

drive vehicles to serve the transportation needs of the

investigation teams, plus another 13,000 pounds of specialized equipment earlier agreed upon. After some additional logistical planning and joint consultation in Hanoi,

the respective Vietnamese and American members divided into two investigation teams and departed for several specific preplanned areas in the Vietnamese

countryside. On each joint team, the US contingent included a Vietnamese-speaking chief and an analyst familiar with the casualty cases under investigation, both from

the JCRC, plus a CIL representative knowledgeable in

the techniques of search and recovery of remains. The

following week was spent travelling about, investigating

leads earlier gathered by the VNOSMP, and conducting

detailed interviews with local inhabitants and officials

who might be able to shed additional light on the fate

of those crewmen associated with the crashsites under

investigation. In this way, by the time the American team

members departed Vietnam on 5 October to finalize the

reports of their findings, the two teams had investigated,

in extensive detail, a total of six sites.

The complexity of this effort cannot be overstated.

The conditions under which such work must be carried

out are difficult to comprehend unless one has spent considerable time travelling about remote areas of Southeast

Asia. What appear on maps as major highways are often

unpaved and narrow trails, made even more difficult by

the adverse weather conditions. Crashsites, when they

can be located at all, are often accessible only by foot

through difficult terrain and dense vegetation. Investigation team members also contend with some of the same

hardships and dangers as those encountered by American

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infantrymen over two decades ago—from jungle leeches

to unexploded anti-personnel bomblets.

The effects of time and local inhabitants' scavenging

of metal debris, added to the initial effects of impact and

fire, make location and identification of specific aircraft

crashsites extremely difficult. One must understand that

specific aircraft identification is important for several reasons. Identification of the aircraft provides the initial

clues as to the possible identity of any remains which

might be located at the crashsite. In addition, the Indochinese countryside is cluttered with the wreckage of several

hundreds of aircraft which are of no interest from the

standpoint of casualty resolution. These are the sites from

which the aircrew members were known to have escaped

from their aircraft prior to the crash. There is no reason

to expend the effort to excavate such sites in a fruitless

endeavor to locate remains which are not there. American

investigators were also to encounter other difficulties in

addition to those of a physical nature. Problems resulted

from the multi-layered bureaucratic system which historically exists throughout the country.

The Vietnamese contingent on the joint teams normally included a representative from the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Interior.

After leaving Hanoi and arriving at the province in which

the investigation site is located, comparable provincial

officials had to be contacted for purposes of coordination.

Team members are invariably obliged to call upon officials of the province foreign office, the province military

office, and the province security office. This procedure is

then repeated at the district level, and at the village and

hamlet level where the people's committees hold forth in

any dealings with the local populace. As a consequence,

a considerable amount of time can be spent satisfying the

bureaucratic requirements, explaining at each level what

is planned and for what purpose, gaining agreement for

any needed support such as guides and workers, or canvassing for possible eyewitnesses to interview. To comprehend the need for this time-consuming process, one

needs to recall that communication systems, such as the

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sophisticated telephone or radio networks common in

many other countries, do not exist in many of the remote

areas where these investigation activities take place.

Another significant difficulty encountered relates to

the interviewing of witnesses. Because of the elapsed time

and wartime movement of the population, it is sometimes

difficult to find people with firsthand knowledge of the

event under investigation. Even if witnesses can be

found, memories are often dimmed by time, and it is not

unusual to obtain conflicting reports from several individuals, all of whom claim to be reporting the same event.

The question of candor on the part of witnesses has

been raised when evaluating the results to date. No doubt

there have been instances where the alleged witness has

been coached to modify his testimony regarding the

events which took place. However, with the passage of

time and the increase of familiarity and trust among

members of the joint teams, US investigators have reported increasing success in selecting people at random

to talk to, with a corresponding increase in apparent validity of the information collected.

As noted earlier, during the first ten-day joint effort

in September and early-October 1988, the two teams

were able to investigate six aircraft crashsites located to

the north and northwest of Hanoi. This effort was shortly

followed by a second iteration beginning in late October,

again with two joint teams. This time another eight cases

were investigated, all to the west and southwest of Hanoi.

Meanwhile, another exchange of letters took place between General Vessey and Foreign Minister Thach

wherein both expressed their mutual satisfaction with the

direction that the joint effort was taking, and with the

results to date. Both men also agreed to further expand

the on-going efforts with the fielding of additional teams.

As a result, a third joint investigative activity took

place from 5 to 15 December 1988, this time in the narrow central regions of Vietnam in the area southward

from Vinh toward the city of Hue. For this particular

effort, three investigative teams were fielded, and they

conducted investigations of 12 separate sites. In addition,

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a special team composed of forensic anthropologists from

the CIL plus Vietnamese counterparts were in Hanoi

examining, screening, and analyzing skeletal remains

which had been recovered earlier from various locations

throughout Vietnam. This was a special effort to address

the problem, noted earlier, of copious remains obtained

from "remains traders". Most of such remains had

proven not to be those of American servicemen.

As the joint investigation activity picked up momentum, so also did the repatriation of remains believed to

be those of Americans. On 1 November 1988, the SRV

turned over 23 containers of remains, and on 15 December another 38 were repatriated. Some of these remains

resulted from the efforts of the joint teams; others were

obtained unilaterally by the SRV government from the

populace or as a result of their own recovery activity.

Among these remains were those previously reviewed by

the joint forensic team and deemed to require additional

scientific analysis back at the CIL in Hawaii to conclusively determine if they were those of American servicemen.

PARALLEL PROGRESS IN LAOS

The year of 1988 also saw an increase in cooperation

with the Lao government on the MIA issue. Relatively

little progress had been made on the casualty resolution

issue in Laos since the successful excavation of the C130 crashsite near Muong Phine in early 1986. Lao officials, in their contacts with American embassy personnel,

had continued to insist on reciprocal humanitarian gestures by the United States before they would cooperate

any further. During August 1987 another US policy level

delegation traveled to Vientiane and elicited Lao agreement to resume cooperation. The United States agreed

to work with Lao officials to resolve their humanitarian

problems within the various constraints imposed by Congress. Despite these agreements, when a round of "consultative meetings" (which included representatives from

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the JCRC and CIL) was convened in Vientiane on 10-

14 November 1987, the Lao representatives backed away

from their earlier commitments to take specific actions

relating to the resolution of American casualties in Laos,

and once again sought specific US assistance as a precondition to any further cooperation.

The year 1988, however, began with the Lao government in a more conciliatory mood. In January, Vientiane

officials agreed to receive the Commander of the CIL

to discuss a number of technical concerns related to the

recovery and identification of remains. On 17 February,

Laos repatriated to US custody two containers of remains

which resulted from Lao unilateral recovery efforts at two

crashsites in the southern provinces of Saravane and Savannakhet, the first such unilateral Lao action in nearly

a decade.

In addition, after a hiatus of over two years, the Lao

government agreed to a survey of an aircraft crashsite,

located in the old "Ho Chi Minh trail" area northwest

of the town of Tchepone, followed in early May by a

week-long joint excavation effort. This site was conclusively determined to be that of an Army OV-1A Mohawk

aircraft, lost on 15 March 1966. Though only sparse personal effects were located, and no identifiable remains,

the cooperation among the Lao and American team

members, as on previous occasions, was again outstanding.

Very significant to future casualty resolution efforts,

however, was the outcome of a second round of "consultative talks" held in Vientiane on 22-23 August 1988.

Lao officials agreed, for the first time, to give serious

consideration to a year-around program of activity,

breaking away from the previous mode of permitting field

work only during the relatively few dry months in the

early part of each year. This was a concession the US

side had long considered as vitally necessary if meaningful results were ever to be achieved on the MIA issue in

Laos. In her report on the results of this meeting, the

American Charge d'Affaires, Harriet Isom, characterized

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the talks as the "most cordial, easy, open, and productive" sessions that US participants could recall with the

Lao.9 Only two months later, Lao officials made good on

their commitment to improve cooperation. In September

a JCRC/CIL team spent several days conducting preliminary surveys of aircraft crashsites in eastern Savannakhet

province in preparation for future excavation activity.

In late October Laos once again sent a team of officials to Hawaii for DOD-hosted consultations with JCRC

and CIL personnel, the first such visit in more than three

years. In December another joint excavation effort took

place at one of the crash sites surveyed in September.

This site, located in eastern Laos near the Vietnam border, was that of a RF-8G Navy fighter-reconnaissance

aircraft which had been lost on 28 March 1968. The joint

teams were successful in recovering identifiable remains

of the sole crewman.

1988, TURNING THE CORNER

The year closed as one of the most productive yet

from the standpoint of cooperative efforts with both Laos

and Vietnam. Unquestionably, the willingness of the

United States to assist these countries in addressing their

own humanitarian problems had a great deal to do with

this cooperation. In Laos, for example, the United States

had facilitated the shipment of a prefabricated medical

clinic donated by the humanitarian non-governmental organization, Americares. All materials for the construction

of this clinic, for a village in southern Laos, were transported to Laos in September 1988, and the construction

work was completed by early November. Also indicative

of improving US-Lao relations was the announcement,

in December, that the United States and Laos would undertake expanded bilateral discussions early in 1989 in

Vientiane. Significantly, the Lao expressed their willingness to include in these discussions, for the first time since

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1975, the subject of narcotics control. This particular

topic had prompted mutual animosity and was the source

of many of the legislative restrictions that limited the US

ability to assist in other Lao humanitarian concerns.

Lao cooperation may also have benefited from and

been stimulated by the improved atmosphere which characterized the casualty resolution effort with Vietnam,

particularly the Vessey initiatives. US humanitarian assistance in Vietnam had gone forward, and the earlier

prosthetics effort was expanded to include the problems

of disabled children. In July 1988 the State Department

had published the results of the investigative visit to Hanoi conducted by a small group of medical specialists in

early June.10 American and Vietnamese officials continued to meet, both in Hanoi and New York, to refine and

expand on ways of dealing with Vietnam's humanitarian

problems. Materially, Vietnam was assisted by the shipment, in November, of substantial donations of pharmaceutical supplies to help in some of the problems of child

survival. Additionally, in response to other problems set

forth in the State Department report, a private group,

Operation Smile, visited Vietnam in August to set the

stage for a later visit by volunteer surgeons who would

conduct numerous operations to repair cleft lips and

palates, and other disfiguring disorders among children.

Compared with previous years, the tally of activity

indicated that 1988 had been a most successful year in

matters of casualty resolution. A total of six technical

meetings had been held in Hanoi between the JCRC/

CILHI and their VNOSMP counterparts, with the exchange of information becoming more detailed and frank.

Two similar meetings had been held with Lao officials in

Vientiane. American teams had participated, for the first

time ever, in joint in-country investigation activity in

Vietnam, with a fair amount of progress made toward

addressing the 70 "compelling" cases stressed by General

Vessey and Minister Thach. The SRV had unilaterally

provided information—but no remains—on 11 of these

70 cases, had repatriated the remains associated with another 14, and US-SRV teams had jointly conducted field

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investigations on another 18 with the results yet pending.11

Teams surveyed a number of crashsites in Laos,

and two were excavated. Both Laos and Vietnam had

sent delegations to Hawaii during the year for special

orientation and familiarization on casualty resolution

procedures. Three remains had been repatriated from

Laos, and 130 from Vietnam; the CIL had been able to

make positive identifications on the remains of 26 American servicemen and return these remains to their nextof-kin, while additional identification work continued on

other repatriated remains.12

After so many years of halting progress, finally it

seemed there was cause for optimism regarding the direction being taken toward resolving the fate of those still

missing and unaccounted for. No one familiar with this

effort would be so bold as to predict smooth sailing for

all future endeavors; however, new levels of cooperation

had definitely been achieved, and new precedents had

been set. Nearly sixteen years of governmental attention

and diligent work had finally brought the effort to this

point where one might optimistically suggest that the rudimentary procedures for eventual resolution of the cases

were in place. Seemingly, from the field standpoint, the

task now being faced was to focus on speeding and expanding the effort, and making the activity more efficient. For those in Washington, DC, the challenge was

to provide the necessary personnel and material assets to

maintain and build on the momentum already attained.

Anticipating and heading off potential policy problems

likely to hinder the overall cooperation was another important activity.

MORE RECENT PROGRESS IN VIETNAM

The year of 1988 was clearly a year of change, not

only in the tempo of casualty resolution activity, but also

in the attitude of the Indochinese states. It seemed they

had at last begrudgingly acknowledged that the MIA issue was indeed important to the American people, an

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issue which wasn't going to disappear with time. There

appeared to be a realization that the casualty resolution

problem must be addressed once and for all if favorable

relations were ever to be restored between the Indochinese countries and the United States, their former adversary.

A review of more recent activity bears out the observation that a conscious decision has now been made to

remove the issue of Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia as a divisive obstacle to better relations. If the

amount of activity can be used as a measure of progress, a

great deal has been accomplished in the past three years.

Furthermore, as activity has increased, the immense difficulties of the task have become more and more obvious

to all concerned.

In Vietnam, American and Vietnamese personnel

have been blended together into joint teams which travel

the back roads of the countryside in flashy Jeep vehicles

attracting curious crowds as they investigate cases, interview villagers, and follow leads. Such activity, not long

ago believed to be almost impossible, has now become so

commonplace that it is seldom noted by the newspapers.

Physical anthropologists from the Army CIL have routinely joined with medical counterparts in Hanoi and Ho

Chi Minh City to pore over quantities of skeletal remains,

measuring, comparing, and deliberating on their origin

and identity. This investigative effort has led, in turn, to

the repatriation of additional remains to the CIL for final

identification and eventual return to their next-of-kin.

The complexity of remains recovery and identification after such a prolonged period of time, underscored

by the recent investigations, have, at the same time, suggested the likelihood of non-recovery of many remains.

There have been instances of bodies buried in unmarked

jungle graves or fallow rice paddies, with their exact location lost from memory, even from the memories of those

who were personally involved in the original interment of

the remains. In other cases, the ravages of time, natural

elements, erosion, and predators have made the recovery

of identifiable remains highly unlikely.

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At the policy level, Presidential Emissary General

John Vessey made a second trip to Hanoi, meeting with

Foreign Minister Thach in late October 1989. Commitments to speed the casualty resolution work were reaffirmed and expanded. So also were commitments for the

United States to assist in addressing Vietnam's humanitarian concerns. US non-governmental assistance was expanded, and the government has expedited the transfer

to Vietnam of medical equipment which is serviceable but

no longer needed or used by US Government hospitals.

Meanwhile, moves have also been made to further

ease tensions between the United States and Vietnam.

The SRV set the stage when they finally withdrew their

troops from Cambodia in the latter part of 1989, a move

urged by the United States for many years. On 18 July

1990 Secretary of State James Baker publicly announced

the US withdrawal of recognition from the Khmer Rouge

faction, and signalled a possible accommodation with

Vietnam when he added that talks would soon begin with

the SRV. On 6 August 1990, US and Vietnamese officials met at the United Nations offices in New York to

discuss a settlement of the Cambodian conflict, the role

of the UN in this effort, and the need for international

guarantees of neutrality for Cambodia.

Finally, on 29 September 1990, Secretary Baker and

SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach met in New

York. A Washington Post article the following day termed

this "the first high-level meeting between officials of their

two countries since 1973, two years before the end of the

Vietnam War." Minister Thach later hinted in a press

interview that he and Secretary Baker had discussed a

schedule for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It wasn't until 9 April 1991,

however, that US and SRV officials met once again to

discuss the steps to be taken which would lead to normalized relations. These steps, referred to in the media as a

"road map," would begin with mutual agreement on a

solution to the Cambodian problem, and would end at

some future date with the establishment of full diplomatic

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relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. At intermediate points along this

"road," both sides would take certain specified actions;

for example, the United States would lift restrictions previously imposed on American business and veterans

groups wanting to travel to Vietnam. During later steps

the US trade embargo would be lifted and US opposition

to international lending to Vietnam would be halted.

Vietnam, in turn, was expected, among other things, to

speed their work on accounting for missing US personnel.

Significantly, General Vessey made yet another trip

to Hanoi later the same month. His discussions with Minister Thach resulted in a landmark agreement that a temporary office would be opened in Hanoi, manned by US

casualty resolution personnel, and intended to improve

the coordination between US and SRV casualty resolution personnel, as well as speed the on-going joint field

investigation efforts. The establishment of this office—

a suggestion discussed on and off for years but never

implemented—represented a large step forward in the

overall progression of relations between the United States

and Vietnam. Not since the closing of the US Consulate

in Hanoi in the mid-1950s had US officials been based

for any extended length of time in northern Vietnam.

Opened in May, the office was first manned by two officials, one from the JCRC and one from the Defense Intelligence Agency, though additional personnel were added

later.

The JCRC official, because of the increased tempo

of activity by visiting US investigative teams, was responsible for liaison with the VNOSMP, and for the preplanning and logistical support which were so vital to the

success of the joint team activities. The primary task of

the DIA member was to research with various SRV offices records and archival materials which might shed

added light on the fate and disposition of Americans still

missing. Such an effort, urgently sought from the time of

the first US/SRV meeting in 1980, was needed to fill the

voids in the incomplete US knowledge of the missing.

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The United States was anxious to discover the precise

fate of many whose circumstances of loss were still unknown, and to provide corroboration of any information

that had surfaced during the on-going field investigation

activity.

Extensive DIA research of wartime intelligence reports had led to the conviction that such archival records

existed within several Vietnamese organizations. Foreign

Minister Thach, interviewed while in New York in October 1990, implicitly acknowledged that such documents

had been created, but at the same time hinted at the

problems of locating these records.13"I try my best," he

was quoted as saying, "but some of the archives have

been bombed by the United States." In addition, records

had deteriorated because "we are a tropical country and

have no air conditioning," Thach continued. "It is

amazing that you think other (countries) will be just like

the United States" (regarding preservation of historical

records), "but it is not the same."

Nevertheless, with a limited degree of cooperation

from Vietnamese officials, the DIA member of the Hanoi

office has been able to gain access to a number of very

useful documents, including records of wartime artifacts

stored or on display at the Hanoi military museum.

Among the items displayed are various identity cards—

such as military ID cards and Geneva Convention

cards—pilots' helmets and other flight gear (many with

names still affixed), weapons and aircraft wreckage (with

traceable serial numbers), and other assorted detritus of

war. The real value, however, is not in these items themselves, but in the documentation which accompanies

them or which describes their origin. Generally, each displayed item has on file an accession document which describes the provenance of the item, and the circumstances

leading to its acquisition by the museum.

While museum documentation has added to our

knowledge of the circumstances of disappearance of a

number of servicemen, other archival collections hold

promise of even more useful information. Consequently,

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TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

the DIA member of the Hanoi office has devoted considerable effort toward gaining access to the archives of various military units such as anti-aircraft units, the PAVN

units which had jurisdiction over the Ho Chi Minh trail

areas, and the headquarters of the forces which operated

in the southern part of Vietnam. This task has produced

mixed results. Varying degrees of access to military archives have been granted, but some Vietnamese officials

have yet to overcome their penchant for secrecy, even

when they must know their national interests are better

served by openness with American officials.

The archival and records research activity in Hanoi

is but one indication of DIA's expanded operational role

in recent years. During the latter part of the Reagan

administration, more and more emphasis was placed on

acquisition of casualty resolution information, particularly as it applied to the investigation of reports of sightings of alleged live American POWs. In 1987 DIA made

the decision to supplement the efforts of the JCRC personnel located in Bangkok, and assigned a small group

of language qualified personnel to the task of gathering

any information which might relate to possible live

Americans still in Indochina. This new DIA group, codenamed Stony Beach, immediately began to conduct interviews of refugees and other potential information sources

throughout Asia. More recently, as joint investigative activities in Vietnam and Laos have placed increasing demands on the small JCRC liaison office staff, the Stony

Beach group has assumed an even greater portion of the

information gathering workload.

MOVEMENT IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Vietnam has not held the monopoly on increased

casualty resolution activity during the past several years.

Progress has also been made in Laos. The start of the

rainy season no longer signals the absolute cutoff for any

175
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

possible field activity. Parties of American and Lao officials, flying aboard Russian-built Lao Air Force helicopters, have jointly visited and surveyed a number of

aircraft crashsites located among the remote mountainous

outcroppings and jungle valleys. A number of these sites

have now been successfully excavated with the resultant

recovery of identifiable remains of the crews. Additional

investigation and excavation activity is continuing.

Bilateral cooperation in addressing the humanitarian

concerns of Laos have paralleled the increase in Lao cooperation on resolution of the MIA issue. US funds and

military expertise have been used since early 1991 to

carry out a number of construction projects in more remote areas. Army engineers were responsible for the construction of a badly needed school in Savannakhet

Province which was formally turned over to the Lao government in March 1991. Additional construction projects

have been undertaken since that time. US medics or doctors, always included as members of joint investigation

or excavation teams, have routinely donated their time

to provide medical assistance to rural Laotians and villagers in the vicinity of the team's casualty resolution activities. At the national level, official US aid to Laos has

assisted with Lao developmental needs, including education, health care, crop substitution and, narcotic suppression programs.

Even in Cambodia, with its slightly over eighty

Americans yet unaccounted for, there is now evidence of

a quickening activity on the MIA issue. Previously, because the US did not want to lend legitimacy to the Phnom Penh government, contact was minimal and carried

out through intermediaries. Though the communications

problem may have hampered progress, there were serious

questions as to whether Phnom Penh officials could assist

in the casualty resolution effort, even if they were inclined

to do so.

Finally, a thaw in relations began when Phnom Penh

announced a willingness to repatriate a group of remains

which they believed to be those of American servicemen.

176
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A JCRC/CILHI delegation was dispatched to Cambodia, and on 26 July 1990 at Phnom Penh the US delegation took custody of six remains and flew them to the

CILHI for further analysis.14 When—also in July 1990—

Secretary of State Baker announced a switch in US policy

toward Cambodia, the stage was set for a further warming of relations between the United States and the Phnom

Penh faction that was competing with other groups to

control Cambodia. By the closing months of 1991, with

the 23 October signing in Paris of a UN-sponsored peace

agreement, the United States finally reestablished a diplomatic presence to Cambodia. The arrival in Phnom Penh

of Ambassador Charles Twining brought an end to the

period of non-recognition that began when Ambassador

John Günther Dean lowered the American flag there

nearly 17 years earlier.

LOOKING BACK

It is sad that it has taken so long to arrive at the point

where one might prudently believe that a glimmer of light

can be seen at the end of the tunnel. Only now, after

nearly two decades, is the US Government at the point

it had earlier hoped to reach during the tenure of the

Four Party Joint Military Commission in early 1973.

One cannot help but wonder, "Could we have done

better?"

In retrospect, it seems inevitable that the resolution

of the POW/MIA issue would be held hostage to whatever concessions the Indochinese states could wrest from

the United States. In simple terms, they have something

which the United States wants, and it has been a seller's

market. They own the territory on which most investigations would have to take place, they control the individuals who might be able to shed light on the fate of missing

American servicemen, and the military and government

records which might reveal what happened to our missing

comrades are also in their sole charge. To paraphrase the

177
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

words of an often-seen bumper sticker, "Only Hanoi can

help us find out!"

The task of gaining Vietnam's cooperation (as well

as that of Laos and Cambodia) has been hampered in a

number of ways. Progress has been slowed by the fact

that, for better or worse, the MIA issue has become intertwined with a number of other bilateral concerns. These

include the problems of refugees, re-education camp detainees, and Amerasian children; the tragic and confused

situation in Cambodia; the degree of cooperation on narcotics interdiction and control—and a host of other bilateral or international issues. One small example of this

intertwining from earlier years was the obvious connection between Hanoi's repatriation of American remains

and US actions regarding Vietnam's application for

membership to the United Nations. Even in today's relatively less adversarial relationship between the United

States and Vietnam, efforts to treat the MIA topic as a

humanitarian issue "separate from other political problems which divide our countries" are obscured by other

issues.

Another factor which has slowed progress is the extremely limited US ability to influence Vietnam. The

United States, since 1973, has foregone the use of any

"stick", leaving only the "carrot" as an enticement to

action. This "carrot" has been commonly understood to

mean a closer and more benevolent relationship with the

United States, with all the attendant benefits this implies.

One might conclude that the poor record during earlier

years indicates that perhaps either the carrot wasn't

tempting enough, or that Vietnam was not yet that

hungry.

The idea that the United States should postpone any

progress on the MIA issue while awaiting a change of

heart by the Vietnamese has held a certain appeal for

some people. For example, during a private conversation

at a cocktail party in Bangkok some years ago, a Thai

diplomat who had closely followed American attempts

to deal with Vietnam on the POW/MIA issue drew an

interesting analogy. "The American government," he

178
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

said, "is like a man in the market, unaccustomed to the

techniques of bargaining, trying to buy a vase which has

caught his eye. The man tells the merchant, 'I really like

that vase! The color is absolutely perfect, and it has the

most unusual shape. It would fit beautifully in our livingroom, my wife would love it, and I must have it. Now,

how much do you want for it?'

The implications of this analogy notwithstanding,

adopting a policy of "benign neglect" in our dealings

with Vietnam on the POW/MIA issue has never been

considered a viable alternative. Not only does it run contrary to Americans' impatience to achieve results as

quickly as possible, such a course of action would never

have been tolerated by the family members. Even more

to the point, such a ploy likely would have achieved little

anyway.

Another factor in the limited amount of progress

achieved, perhaps the dominant one, has been the barrier

of mutual distrust existing between the United States and

Vietnam. The Paris Accords left no clear victors or losers,

and led not to reconciliation, but to continuing suspicion

and prolonged adversarial relations. The relentless continuation of military pressure by DRV and PRG forces

that resulted in the eventual collapse of the Saigon government left a legacy of bitterness over the outcome of

the conflict. Some elements of the American public—and

some American officials—still show signs of wanting to

fight the war anew. As regards the MIA issue specifically,

numerous instances of obvious SRV deception and lack

of candor have strengthened American distrust of the

"humanitarian spirit" touted by the Vietnamese.

Though occasions of duplicity and deception still occur in Vietnam's dealings on the MIA issue, happily, in

recent years Vietnamese officials have exhibited a marked

increase in candor—possibly perhaps their own form of

glasnost—which has contributed to a reduction of hostility

toward Vietnam. A vivid example of this change was

Hanoi's response to an unusual incident that occurred in

July 1988. A US Navy T-39 jet executive aircraft suffered navigation equipment failure while on a flight over

179
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

the South China Sea, became lost, ran out of fuel, and

was forced to ditch in waters near the Spratly Island

group. The three crew members were picked up uninjured by a Vietnamese fishing craft and transported to

Nha Trang on the Vietnamese mainland. Within several

days, American authorities were notified by the SRV

Embassy in Bangkok of the safe rescue of the crew, along

with plans for their release several days hence. Such candor and cooperation was a radical departure from previous incidents when Vietnam had arrested Americans and

held them incommunicado for extended periods while denying any knowledge of their whereabouts.

One final factor to consider is simply that of elapsed

time: the time needed by both sides to dull past pains,

ease old animosities, adjust to new ideas, and adopt different attitudes. Indicative of how attitudes have changed

with time is the fact that in 1977 most people were put

off by Vietnam's request to President Carter's emissary,

Leonard Woodcock, for humanitarian assistance from the

United States. Many people found the same request

much more acceptable when it was made to President

Reagan's emissary, General Vessey, ten years later.

Would progress toward resolving the MIA issue be

further ahead today had normalization of diplomatic relations been achieved as contemplated in 1978? Or would

we instead still be arguing with SRV officials from our

little American Embassy compound on Hai Ba Trung

Street in Hanoi, trying to negotiate an opportunity to

search the countryside, interview villagers, and gather

other information about those individuals who are still

missing? No one can know.

Could we have done better? In a few small ways,

perhaps yes; but considering the political climate and the

many factors which have worked against timely resolution of the MIA issue, probably not in any meaningful

way. Considering all the time that has elapsed, and comparing what has been accomplished with what is yet to

be done, neither the family members nor those who have

worked at this effort so diligently can derive much satisfaction from the number of cases so far resolved. The

180
TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

stage is now set for better things, however, and both

groups can be justifiably proud of their unwavering stewardship over these many years. They have kept the faith.

NOTES

1. At the personal level, a visitor to Hanoi or Haiphong cannot

help but detect a degree of antagonism on the part of the

populace toward the Soviets. The origin of this hostility, often

manifested by taunts or rock-throwing from Vietnamese children on the streets, is difficult to understand. Since it can be

reasonably assumed that Soviet visitors to Vietnam are not

routinely mean to children, it seems most likely that the children's behavior must be prompted by attitudes picked up from

their parents, elders, teachers, or other adult influences.

2. Department of State message, 85 STATE 176045, DTG

081700ZJUN 85.

3. Vietnamese officials, apparently thinking that a permanent

presence in Hanoi was something which the American side

wanted, had insisted that it could be permitted only if Vietnam

were allowed to have an equal presence in Washington, DC.

Once further discussion revealed that American officials were

not enthusiastic about placing personnel in Hanoi, both sides

jointly acknowledged that the present level of work did not

necessitate any immediate consideration of this idea.

4. Reported in a Washington Post article on 18 August 1986, as

quoted from a release by the Vietnamese News Agency.

5. SRV Foreign Ministry spokesman Trinh Xuan Lang was

quoted in a news release filed from Hanoi by the AFP French

news service on 29 April 1987.

6. Extracted from the US/SRV statement released jointly by

General Vessey and Minister Thach on 3 August 1987 following the conclusion of their discussions in Hanoi.

7. The Problem of the Disabled in Vietnam, US Department of

State, 13 October 1987.

8. USCINCPAC Command History, 1988 (TS), vol. II, 29 September 1989, p. 403.

9. American Embassy Vientiane message 2138, DTG 231215Z

AUG 88.

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TOWARD CASUALTY RESOLUTION

10. Children's Disabilities in Vietnam, US Department of State,

27 July 1988.

11. USCINCPAC Command History, 1988 (TS), vol. II, 29 September 1989, p. 406.

12. Ibid., p. 400.

13. The Washington Post, 13 October 1990, feature article by

Post staff writer, Al Kamen.

14. Unfortunately, none of the six remains repatriated from

Phnom Penh have yet been positively identified as those of any

missing Americans.

182
EPILOGUE

A he US effort to resolve the fate of servicemen missing throughout Indochina continues. A relatively small,

but very dedicated group still quietly toils away at this

task. Most directly this includes the personnel of the former JCRC which, in early 1992, was absorbed into a

newly established organization called the Joint Task

Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA). Also working diligently

are the personnel of the CIL, the Stony Beach team, and

those—farther removed but still directly supportive of the

on-going field activity—in DIA and in the policy-making

apparatus in Washington, DC.

The creation of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting

under the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces is indicative of the heightened emphasis now being directed toward the casualty resolution task. In its first six months

of existence the JTF-FA has already grown to nearly 150

personnel from the approximately 40 personnel of the

final JCRC days. Small JTF-FA detachments have been

established in Bangkok, Hanoi, Vientiane, and Phnom

Penh. The organization, now commanded by a Major

General, enjoys the very active support of the CINCPAC

183
EPILOGUE

staff and can draw upon additional resources throughout

the DOD as deemed necessary to accomplish its mission.

Organizational changes have also occurred in Washington, DC, with the creation of the office of the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW-MIA Affairs.

Not only does this office give added visibility to the casualty resolution issue, it serves as a central point for direction of all policy matters on the issue within the DOD.

While the tempo of casualty resolution activity has

increased markedly in Indochina, a corresponding increase in misinformation has attracted the attention of

the media and added to the public perception that the

US government has done little except cover up its sure

knowledge that American servicemen continue to be held

as prisoners of war. Most notable in 1991 has been the

veritable flood of bogus photographs that are alleged to

depict specific servicemen still in captivity. MIA activist

groups were quick to seize on these photos and began to

incorporate them into their fund-raising appeals. One

such group included two of these photos in its literature

and appealed to its readers as follows:1

Somebody's trying to make it seem as if the men in

these pictures never even existed! Let me assure you

they not only did, they still do! They're alive today—each one a prisoner of war in Southeast Asia.

With hundreds of others, they're victims of the biggest and most disgraceful cover-up in American history!

After four pages of misinformation on this theme, the

author then makes his plea:

... I desperately need your financial support. Skyhook II is the only American group working fulltime to get our POWs out of Vietnam and Laos

while Washington continues to cover up their existence. And it's an expensive struggle . . Our recovery efforts, our face-to-face negotiations with

Vietnamese and Laotian government officials, and

184
EPILOGUE

all our other efforts on behalf of those POWs and

their families, have exhausted our already meager

funds.

Other critics of the US government have also jumped

into the fray with equal fervor. Under a newspaper headline which states, "Forensics expert identifies MIA photos from Laos," a Washington Times writer explains that

a noted anthropologist, forensics expert, and critic of

DOD's identification methods, has identified a man in

two snapshots recently taken in Laos as an Army captain

listed as missing in action from the Vietnam War.2

Unfortunately, all of the cited photos have proven to

be fakes. Of necessity, uncounted manhours were diverted from more productive tasks to track down the origin and ascertain the true identity of the individuals

depicted in the bogus photos. Equally unfortunately, the

media has taken little note of this fact, leaving the public

with the lasting impression of more government duplicity

and adding to the public beliefthat hundreds of American

servicemen are known to have been abandoned by our

government in Asian prisons. The purveyors of these

hoaxes have not only played into the hands of those who

are using the MIA issue as a means of garnering funds,

they have once again cruelly played upon the emotions

and hopes of the family members of the missing.

Shortly after the surfacing of the bogus photographs

and the ensuing media attention, a move was begun in

the Senate to investigate once again the possibility of unaccounted-for American servicemen being still alive in

captivity. On 2 August 1991, the Senate passed a resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee on POW/

MIA Affairs, with Senator John F. Kerry (D-Mass) as

chairman. This committee held a number of hearings

and stirred further controversy because of both its public

pronouncements and its internal squabbles.3It remains

to be seen whether, in the long run, this committee will

contribute to clarifying the issue for the American public,

or whether it will only add to the confused public perception and play into the hands of the conspiracy theorists

185
EPILOGUE

who are intent on rewriting the history of US efforts to

resolve the issue.

As the Vietnam era casualty resolution effort approaches the end of its second decade, all indications

point toward serious progress being made. Recent experience leads us to expect that any "backing away" on the

part of the Vietnamese, Lao, or Khmer would be but

temporary in nature. As noted earlier, the important

mechanisms for resolution seem to be in place. The biggest tasks now facing the US side are those of refinement.

We need to speed the process and make it more efficient.

We must be ready to deal promptly with the inevitable,

but not insurmountable, problems which will arise.

This is not to imply that the POW/MIA problem has

been solved. The statistics provide ample evidence that

resolution still remains far short of the "fullest possible

accounting" which the US government has set as its goal.

And obstacles will arise, particularly those in maneuvering through the political minefield of relations with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. There will undoubtedly be

delays prompted by the tentative relationship with Vietnam, and by a perceived US failure to "create a more

favorable atmosphere".

As this relationship builds, however, it is essential

that there be a parallel enhancement of trust between the

two countries. The work of Presidential Emissary Vessey,

a man of abiding decency and honesty, has gone a long

way toward dispelling what has hitherto been considerable mutual distrust. The great challenge for the United

States now is to continue this movement, to deal forthrightly with former adversaries, and to abandon bitterness and recrimination. Only in this way can we promote

the healing process which is still so obviously needed.

And only in this way will we give meaning to the sacrifice

made by those whose fates we still work to determine.

186
EPILOGUE

NOTES

1. Skyhook II Project, headed by former US Representative

from New York, Mr. John LeBoutillier, in an undated mailing

sent to potential financial contributors in early 1992.

2. The Washington Times, 23 July 1991, page A3. Writer Carleton R. Bryant, citing the photo identification work done by

Colorado State University professor of anthropology Dr. Michael Charney, says these photos "are the first clear snapshots

to be verified by a reputable authority as showing an MIA."

3. Indicative of the confusion which has accompanied the coverage of this issue, following Senate Select Committee hearings

on 24 June 92, a 25 June Washington Post headline stated "Possibly 80 Vietnam POWs Left Behind, Kerry Says," while USA

Today published an article the same day carrying a heading

which read, "Operation Homecoming in 1973 left 133 soldiers

unaccounted for, says Kerry." Chairman Kerry has also had

to deal with criticism that his staff, which has included MIA

activists holding controversial views, has used the committee

to further their own agenda.

187
GLOSSARY

AP: Associated Press.

ASEAN: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

comprised of the countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and, more recently,

Brunei.

Bangkok: Capital city of the Kingdom of Thailand.

BNR: Body not recoverd.

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.

CIL: The US Army's Central Identification Laboratory.

CINCPAC: Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces, located in Hawaii.

CONPLAN: Conceptual Plan.

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency.

DOD: Department of Defense.

DRV: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North

Vietnam).

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation.

FPJMC: Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

FPJMT: Four-Party Joint Military Team.

Hanoi: Formerly the capital city of North Vietnam, now

the capital of the unified Socialist Republic of

Vietnam.

IAG: Interagency Group.

189
JCRC: Joint Casualty Resolution Center.

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff, located in Washington, DC.

JPRC: Joint Personnel Recovery Center.

JTF-FA: Joint Task Force- Full Accounting, the military

organization which replaced the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in early 1992.

Khmer Rouge: The Cambodian communist forces which

took over Cambodia in 1975.

KIA: Killed in Action.

League of Families: Common name for the National

League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing

in Southeast Asia.

LPDR: Lao People's Democratic Republic.

MDE: Media Development Element.

MIA: Missing in Action.

NSA: National Security Agency.

NSC: National Security Council.

Operation Homecoming: Nickname for the military effort associated with the return of the Vietnam era

POWs.

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Paris Accords: The unofficial name for "The Agreement

on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,"

the agreement which ended the US combat involvement in Vietnam.

PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam.

Phnom Penh: Capital city of Cambodia.

POW or PW: Prisoner of War.

PRG: Provisional Revolutionary Government, the communist "shadow" government of South Vietnam.

PSYOP: Psychological Operations.

PUBCOM: The acronym denoting the Public Communications program to solicit casualty-related information

from the local populace in Southeast Asia.

RVN: Republic of Vietnam, the non-communist South

Vietnam.

Saigon: Former capital city of South Vietnam, now renamed Ho Chi Minh City.

SEASAL: Nickname for the US Navy's JCRC-directed

effort to recover remains of those individuals lost at

sea.

190
SRV: Socialist Republic ofVietnam, created in July 1976

with the unification of North and South Vietnam.

TPJMC: Two-Party Joint Military Commission.

UN: United Nations.

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

UPI: United Press International.

VNOSMP: Viet-Nam Office for Seeking Missing Persons.

Vientiane: Capital city of Laos.

191
INDEX

Aircraft shot down. See also

Crashsites

clues to, 77

F-8F Crusader, 126

International

Commission for Control and

Supervision helicopter, 8

observation planes, 14

threats, 8

UH-1B helicopter, 32

USAF C-5 evacuation,

28

North Vietnam missions,

44

Amerasian children, 178

American Legion, 100

Ameri cares, 168

Amputees, Vietnamese, 159-

60, 169

Anti-war activism, 2, 73

Armitage, Richard, 91-92,

127-28, 129, 132,

143, 146-47, 153,

154

ASEAN countries, 92, 128

Baker, James, 172, 177

Bangkok Post, 109

Bangkok, Thailand, 74, 86-

87, 107-08, 128

Bates, Carol, 51

Barber's Point, Hawaii, 49

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 51-52

Bunker, Ellsworth, 7, 20

Burke, Herb, 57-58

C-130 liaison flights, 8

Cambodia,

JCRC in, 13, 176-77

repatriation of remains

from, 176-77

SRV invasion of, 62-63,

74, 84, 87, 151

SRC withdrawal from,

172

US diplomatic relations

with, 177

Camp Davis, 7

Can Tho City, 19,29,80-81

Carlucci, Frank, 156

Carter administration, 50,

51-60, 61, 63-64, 87-

89

Casualties, xx

last Americans, 29

overwater losses, 15-16,

32

Vietnamese handling of,

83

Casualty resolution efforts.

See also Joint

Casualty Resolution

Center

accident during, 149

continuing efforts, 183-

86

criticisms of, xxi-xxii,

54-55

field work, 133-42, 149

managed disinformation

efforts, 111-12

normalization of

relations and, 60, 64

193
INDEX

post-war support for, 35-

36

priority cases, 158, 169-

70

progress of, 142-47, 166-

76

public support for, 83

refugee interviews, 71-

73

retrospective view of,

177-80

reward money, 117-20

SRV Plan, 146-47, 155

Cease-fire, 5-6, 8, 21, 27

Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA), 75

Child disabilities,

Vietnamese, 160,

169

Children's Defense Fund,

51, 147

Childress, Richard, 135, 153

China

normalization of US

relations with,

63-64

refugees from Vietnam,

74

CINCPAC

CONPLAN5119, 31

JCRC and, 26-27, 37,

64-65, 88-89

JTF-FA and, 183

rewards program, 18

Congress. See US Congress

Costs

rewards for information,

18-20

SEASAL effort, 16

Crashsites. See also specific

locations

aircraft identification

problems, 164

ambush of field search

team, 22-26

Army OV-IA Mohawk,

167

B-52, 136-40

C-130, 141-42, 143, 166

joint investigation, 134-

35, 136-40, 158, 161-

64, 169-71

Laos, 166-68, 170, 176

National League visits

to, 97

post-war visits to, 134

RF-8G Navy fighterreconnaissance

aircraft, 168

selection of, 13, 15, 143

witness interviews, 165

Council for Mutual

Economic

Assistance

(COMECON), 63

Danang, 43

Dean, John Günther, 177

Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA), 42, 75, 76,

77,79, 85, 88, 91, 96-

97, 98, 103, 173-74,

175

Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (DRV), 2,

5

economic assistance

demands from US,

43-44

evidence of MIAs, 3-4

delaying tactics, 7-8, 13-

14, 26, 30-31

post-war contact with,

36

and rewards program, 20

US accusations of

194
INDEX

treachery,23, 25

Department of Defense

Assistant Secretary for

POW/MIA Affairs,

184

Assistant Secretary for

International

Security and

POW/MIA Affairs,

39, 59, 88, 128

Nexl-of-Kin Newsletter,

91

Department of State, 75, 88

Deserters, 50, 56

Died in captivity

DRV definition, 30

list, 10

repatriation of remains,

9, 64, 126, 157

Dillon, David A., 32

Disinterment, Vietnamese

customs, 9-10, 85

Dinh Ba Thi, 62Disabled

American Veterans, 100

Dodge, Ronald, 125-26, 148

Dong Ha, 27

Draft dodgers, 50, 61

Easter (Tet) Offensive, 2, 32

Edelman, Marian Wright, 51

Families of MIAs

advocacy, see National

League

distrust of Garter

administration, 64,

66, 87

notification of, xx

pressure on Paris Peace

negotiations, 2-3, 4,

95

Select Committe report

and, 47-48, 52

support for casualty

resolution mission,

35-36

testimony before

Congress, 42

FBI, 62

Ford administration, 42, 50,

87

Foreign Service of Vietnam,

53

Four-Party Joint Military

Commission

(FPJMC) ambush

accusations, 23, 25

effectiveness of, 6, 177

evacuation, 29

JCRC coordination with,

12, 13-14, 18, 21-22,

26

mission, 6-7, 12

representatives, 5, 7

stalling by DRV and

PRC, 7-9, 12-13,

26, 123

US delegation, 7, 30

Fraudulent fund-raising

schemes, 101-03,

107-08, 184

Fryer, Bennie L., 9-10

Garwood, Robert, 43, 53, 86

Gay, Arlo, 43, 78

Gayler, Noel, 18

Gia Lam (town), 76

Gia Lam Airport, 8, 52, 55,

62

Gilman, Benjamin, 41, 46,

57, 65

Gooding, Frank, 58

Gougelmann, Tucker, 80

Graf, John, 79-80

Gravesites

Chi Hoa cemetery, 33

195
INDEX

location of, 14, 33, 143,

145

Griffiths, Ann, 156

Gritz, James "Bo," xxi, xxiii,

106-07

Guyer, Tennyson, 46

Haiphong, 134

Hanoi

Armitage delegations,

91-92, 127-28,

129, 132, 143,

153, 155

C-130 liaison flights, 8

Childress visit to, 135,

153

City Directorate of

Cemeteries, 84-85

JCRC Liaison Office,

12-13, 173

Montgomery's

delegations, 42-43,

62, 65, 68, 84

National League visits

to, 97

Paul Doumer bridge, 52

Presidential Commission

to, 50; see also

Woodcock

Commission

records research in, 174-

75

special presidential

emissary to, 155-58,

172

Wolff delegation to, 86,

124

Harvey, Joe, 140

Hawaii

Laotian delegates, 170

SRV delegation's visits,

62, 92, 124, 127-28,

160-61

Hmong, 74, 141

Ho Chi Minh City, 104

Ho Chi Minh trail, 167, 175

Hoa Binh, 134

Hoang Bich Son, 145-46

Holbrooke, Richard, 61, 62

Hong Kong, 74, 84, 85

House of Representatives

POW/MIA Task Force,

92

Subcommittee on Asian

and Pacific Affairs

(Committee on

Foreign Affairs), 57,

86, 103, 107

Hue, 32, 165

Human rights violations, 58

Humanitarian relief, 158-60,

166-67, 168, 176,

180

Indonesia, 74, 92

International Commission

for Control and

Supervision (ICCS),

8

Isom, Harriet, 168

Japan, 74

Johnson administration, 1

Joint Casualty Resolution

Center (JCRC)

activation, 10-11

American embassy and,

17-18

chain of command, 88-

89

CINCPAC and, 26-27,

37, 64-65, 88-89

commander, 11, 15, 25,

27, 49, 130, 143, 156

conceptual plan, 31

congressional review, 40-

196
INDEX

41,42

crashsite visits, 134, 135,

136-38

evacuation of, 29, 32-33

field work, 133-42

FPJMT liaison with, 12,

13-14, 18, 21-22, 26

headquarters, 12, 27, 28,

37-38, 39, 49, 49

Joint Chiefs'

recommendations,

27

joint field work with

VNOSMP, 134-35,

136-40, 158,161-62,

169-71, 173

last operation, 28-29

Laotian delegation to

Hawaii, 142

Liaison Offices, 12-13,

49, 74, 86-87, 107-

08, 173-74

Media Development

Element, 17

meetings with

Vietnamese officials,

123-30

mission, 11, 31, 38, 173

morale, 49-50

Negotiations Assistance

Division, 37, 49

OSD planning

conference, 38

parent group, 156

personnel and

organizational

structure, 11-12, 28-

29, 32-33, 36-37, 38

post-war problems, 35-

36, 88-89

private POW rescue

operations and, 108-

09

public communications

(PUBCOM)

program, 17-20, 28

reduced operations, 26-

29, 36-37, 38

refugee interview

program, 71-83, 96-

97, 104

remains recovered by,

26, 125-26

rewards program, 18-20

search and recovery

operations, 11, 13-

15, 21-26, 28-29,

137-39

sea salvage operations,

15-16

South Vietnamese Army

efforts, 25-26, 28

SRV delegations' visits,

62, 92, 124, 127-28

technical meetings with

SRV, 124, 130-33,

136-37, 146, 147,

151-52, 155, 157-58,

169

Vietnamese counterpart

organization, 124

and Woodcock

Commission, 52

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman of, 155

JCRC and, 27, 88

Joint Personnel Recovery

Center (JPRC), 11-

12,31

Joint Voluntary Agencies

(JVA), 73

Joint Task Force-Full

Accounting (JTF-FA), 183

Judge, Darwin L., 33

Justice Department, 75

197
INDEX

Kamm, Greg, 113, 114, 115

Kennedy, Edward, 33, 44

Kerryjohn F., 185

Khanh Hoa Province, 14

Khe Sanh, 8

Khmer Rouge, 13, 63-64, 84,

172

Killed in action, body not

recovered, 45

Kingston, Robert C, 11, 31,

156

Kissinger, Henry, 2, 3, 42,

44,48

Knight, Billy, 10

Korean War, xxii

Lagomarsino, Robert, 58

Lao Peoples' Democratic

Republic (LPDR), 140-42;

see also Laos

Laos

casualty resolution

efforts, 92, 166-68,

170, 175-76

consultative talks, 167-

68

crashsites, 141-42, 166-

67, 170, 176

delegation to Hawaii,

142

humanitarian assistance,

166-67, 168-69, 176

JGRG Liaison Office, 13

joint excavation

activities, 135, 140-

42, 168, 176

narcotics control

discussions, 168-69

reconstruction aid, 55,

142-43

refugee interviews, 140-

41

remains repatriated

from, 170, 176

resistance fighters, 97,

107, 109, 112, 114,

115, 140

Leboutillier, John, xxi, xxii

Lecornec, Jean, 80-81

Le Due Tho, 3

Letters, fund-raising, 102-03,

120-21

Libya, US retaliatory raid

on, 128-29

Lloyd, Jim, 47

Malaysia, 74, 92

Mansfield, Mike, 51

McCloskey, Paul, 41, 65

McMahon, Charles, Jr., 33

Medal of Honor Society, 101

Missing in action. See also

Casualty resolution efforts

civilians, 88

defined, xxii

dossiers on, 38

evidence from DRV, 3-4

information exchange

with SRV, 53, 56

information sources, 71-

79

interest groups, 100-03

knowledge of

Indochinese

governments, 81-82

number of servicemen,

xx-xxi

pay and allowances, 47,

67

reelassification issue, 45,

50, 58, 59, 67, 87-88

Moakley, John, 46, 47, 48

Montgomery, G. V.

"Sonny," 40, 41, 47,

49, 51-52, 54, 58, 62,

65, 68, 96

198
INDEX

Muong Phine, Laos, 143,

166

Musselman, Stephen, 148

Nakhon Phanom

Air Base, 12, 27

Provincial jail, 106-07

Narcotics control issue, 168-

69, 178

National League of Families

of American

Prisoners and

Missing in

Southeast Asia, 47-

48

adversarial position, 95-

97, 127

advertisement and

rewards initiative,

96-97

Carter administration

and, 50, 58-59, 64,

67,96

cooperation with

government, 98-99

criticisms of, 99

delegation to Hanoi and

Vientiane, 97

diplomatic role, 99, 129-

30, 147, 156

and fund-raising groups,

103

and Laotian resistance

fighters, 97

POW rescue attempts,

97

private search initiatives,

97

Reagan administration

and, 90, 98

Reagan speech to, 93

records declassification

for, 90-91, 98

splinter groups, 101

testimony before

Congress, 98

value of, 100

National POW/MIA

Recognition Day, 90

Next of Kin Newsletter, 91

Nguyen Co Thach, 62-63,

124, 129, 132, 136,

146-47, 153, 155,

156-66

Nguyen Duy Trinh, 52, 54

Nicotera, Carl, 10

Ninh Binh, 134

Nixon administration, 1, 2

Nixon, Richard, 44, 48, 61,

65-66

Noi Bai airport, 137-38, 156,

163

Non-Commissioned Officers

Association, 101

Non-governmental

organizations, 159,

166, 172

Normalization of US-China

relations, 63-64, 87,

125

Normalization of USVietnamese

relations,

American "technical

presence" in Hanoi,

153, 157

Armitage delegation, 91-

92

Cambodian-SRV conflict

and, 63-64

high-level policy

meetings, 152-53,

172-73

House testimony on,

162

199
INDEX

internations lending to,

173

MIA issue and, 52, 55-

56, 64, 88, 91-92,

159

normalization of USChina relations and,

63-64, 87, 125

Paris talks, 56, 57, 61-62

reconstruction

assistance/

reparations issue, 61,

62

spying incident, 61-62,

68

SRV position on, 151-52

technical meetings and,

151-52, 155, 162-63

trade embargo, 173

travel restrictions lifted,

173

UN (New York) talks,

62-63

Woodcock Commission

and, 55-56, 57-58,

60

Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD), 38

Operation Homecoming, xx,

6, 12,86,96, 117,

126-27, 157

Operation Smile, 169

Ottinger, Richard, 41, 47,

48, 65

Pakse, Laos, 141

Paris Match, 126

Paris Peace Accords, 11

Article 8(b), 4, 7, 8, 9,

20, 27, 30, 38

Article 21, 43-44, 54, 65

Cambodia, 177

cease-fire and, 5-6

communist attitudes, 6,

21, 25, 27

effectiveness of, 179

Kissinger-Le Due Tho

negotiations, 2, 30

MIA families and, 2-3,

4,95

MIA issue, 2-3

military commissions,

see Four-Party Joint

Military

Commission; TwoParty Joint Military

Commission

North Vietnamese

negotiating style, 1-,

30

restrictions on US

personnel in Vietnam,

12

rewards program and, 18

secret negotiations, 2

signatories, 4

terms of, 3

title, 4

US goals, 1-2

Paris talks

normalization of

relations, 56, 57, 61-

62

reconstruction aid, 54,

58,61

spying incident and, 61-

62,68

Pathet Lao, 13, 35, 141

Paulson, A.G., 107

PAVN units, 175

Peace Corps volunteers, 114

Perot, H. Ross, xxi, xxiii

Petrie, George, 32

Pham Van Dong, 41, 43, 44,

48, 52, 54, 65

200
INDEX

PhanHien, 41,43, 44, 52,

53, 61, 67

Philippines, 74, 92

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 13,

35, 176, 177

Pol Pot, 84

POW/MIA Interagency

Group, 93, 98, 130

Prisoners of war

debriefing of, 12

denial of existence of,

55, 56, 145-46

escapees, 76, 79

fraudulent reports of,

112-20, 184

imprisoned lawbreakers,

106, 149

JCRC discussions with

SRV, 131-32

misinformation on, 184

National League rescue

attempts, 97

non-military, 83

post-war, 43, 45, 86

private rescue

operations, 11-12,

103-09, 114, 141

released and repatriated,

xx

reward offers, 117-20

sighting reports, 76, 78,

82-83, 86, 104-06,

132, 175

Provisional Revolutionary

Government of the

Republic of South

Vietnam (PRG), 4,

5,7

delaying tactics, 7-8, 13-

14, 21, 26

US accusations of

treachery, 23, 25

Quamo, George, 32

"Rambos," 103-09, 118

Reagan, Ronald, 89-90

Reagan administration, 90-

93, 103-04, 155, -175

Reconstruction aid

Laos, 142-43

Nixon letter, 44, 48, 61,

65-66

and site excavation

efforts, 142-43

SRV demands, 53-54,

61,62

Records and recordkeeping,

11

archival, 174-75

declassification of, 90-91,

98

dossiers on MIAs, 38

information exchange

with SRV, 53, 60

quality of information,

78

museum documentation,

174

refugee interview

reports, 75-79

wartime artifacts, 174

Re-education camps, 82, 178

Refugees

bilateral concerns, 178

boat people, 74, 84-85

camps, 70, 72, 74, 75

"dog tag" reports, 110-

11

ethnic Chinese, 63, 70

Hmong, 74, 141

interview program, 71-

83, 96-97, 104, 132,

175

Lao, 74

motives for providing

201
INDEX

information, 78-79,

110-12

National League

initiatives, %

POW sightings, 132

processing and

resettlement, 70-71,

78-79,96, 112

reports generated from,

75

volume of, 69-70, 74

volunteer workers, 73

usefulness of

information from,

79-83

Repatriation of remains, 154

amateur efforts, 109-12

buying and selling of

remains, 110-11,

160, 166

from Cambodia, 176-77

civilians, 81

delays by DRV, 30-31,

44-45, 125-26, 127-

28

died in captivity, 9, 64,

126, 157

"dog tag" reports, 110-

11

at fall of South Vietnam,

64

French, 85

identification

considerations, 110,

148, 157, 171-72

joint US-VSNOP

operations, 135-42

from Laos, 167

last casualties, 33, 37-38

Montgomery

delegations' visits

and, 62, 68, 84

number of remains, 155,

159, 166, 170

positively identified, 67,

170

priority cases, 169-70

refusal by Hanoi, 9

stockpiling of remains,

148

UN membership vote

and, 44, 60

Woodcock Commission

and, 53, 59-60

Rees, Richard, 22-25

Republic of Vietnam (RVN),

4, 6, 7, 13

Roche, John P., 58

Russell, B. H., 7

Russia, 62

Saigon

American Defense

Attache, 28

American embassy and,

17-18

Americans trapped in,

80,82

cease-fire, 5

Chi Hoa Prison, 80

Cho Lon section, 70

crashsite, 22-26

evacuation, 29, 32-33,

37-38, 69, 80, 82

fall of, 35

FPJMT negotiations, 7

JCRC Liaison Office,

12-13

Seventh Day Adventist

Hospital, 33

Samae San, 27, 29, 37-38, 39

Saravane, Laos, 167

Savannakhet, Laos, 167, 168,

176

Schwab, Robert, 149

Scuitier, James J., 10

202
INDEX

Sea salvage operations

(SEASAL), 15-16

Select Committee on

Missing Persons in

Southeast Asia

conclusions, 66, 96

final report, 45-47, 49,

96

formation, 40

hearings, 40-42

Hanoi visit, 42-44

information gathering,

42

members, 41, 42, 51

National League's

analysis, 47-48

repatriation of remains

to, 44-45

task, 40

Senate Select Committee on

POW/MIA Affairs,

185

Shields, Roger, 39, 59

Shultz, George, 92, 128, 142

Singapore, 74, 92

Skyhook II Project, 120, 184

Solarz, Stephen, 103

Socialist Republic of

Vietnam (SRV)

archival records, 174-75

Cambodian invasion by,

63-64, 74, 84, 87,

151

Foreign Ministry, 135

humanitarian assistance,

157, 158-60, 169

knowledge of MIAs, 53,

56, 87, 125-26, 179

normalization talks, 52,

56, 57, 60, 61-62, 88,

151-52

persecution of ethnic

Chinese, 63, 70, 74,

84-85

private American claims

against, 161

technical meetings with

JCRC, 124, 130-33,

136-37, 146-47, 1-51-

52, 155, 157-58, 162-

63, 169

Treaty of Friendship

and Cooperation

with Russia, 63

UN membership, 44, 58,

60, 61, 66, 178

US influence, 178

visits to Hawaii, 62, 92,

124, 127-28

withdrawal from

Cambodia, 172

Southern Governors

Conference, 44

South Vietnam

died-in-capivity list, 10

evacuation, 28-29

fall of, 7, 13, 28, 29, 37,

64,81

North Vietnamese push

into, 27

search and recovery

operations, 14-15

South Vietnamese Army

search and recovery

activities, 25-26,

28

soldiers' remains, 14-15,

67

Sparks, Donald Lee, xix-xx,

126, 148

Spratley Island group, 179

Stars and Stripes, 18

Stoney Beach group, 175,

183

Strait, Charles, 116-17

203
INDEX

Tarn Ky, xix

Tan Son Nhut Air Base, 7,

22,28

Tchepone, Laos, 143, 167

Thach. See Nguyen Go

Thach

Thailand, 92

base closures, 39, 49-

Gritz arrest, 106

JCRC Headquarters, 12,

27, 28, 29, 37-38

Lao refugees, 140-41

Nakhon Phanom

Provincial jail, 106-

07

Vietnamese refugee c

camps in, 70, 71

Thanh Hoa, 144

Tombaugh, William, 23, 25

Tran Huu Hai ("Tony

Hai"), 104-06

Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation, 63

Two-Party Joint Military

Commission

(TPJMC), 5

Tuy Hoa, 14

Twining, Charles, 177

Ulatoski, Joseph, 25

United Auto Workers, 51

United Nations

High Commissioner for

Refugees, 71

membership of Vietnam,

44, 58, 60, 61, 66,

178

SRV Mission meetings,

129-30

United States Support

Activities Group, 156

Urbaniak, Roger, 32-33

US Army

7th PSYOP Group, 17

Central Identification

Laboratory, 12, 15,

28-29, 33, 39, 42, 45,

62, 86, 88, 89, 109,

111, 130, 167, 183

Corps of Engineers, 176

Graves Registration

units, 100

US Congress. See House of

Representatives;

Select Committee

on Missing Persons

in Southeast Asia;

Senate

US Information Agency, 61-

62

US Information Service, 20

US Marines

casualties, 29, 33, 37-38

Viet Cong collaborator,

43

US Navy

salvage operations, 15-16

U-Tapao Air Base, 39, 49

Van Dyke, Richard, 148

Vang Pao, 141

Vessey, John W., Jr., 31,

155-66, 172, 173,

180, 186

Vessey-Thach agreements,

158-66, 172, 173

Veterans of Foreign Wars,

100

Vientiane, Laos, 13, 42, 50,

55,68, 97, 141,

167,168-69

Viet Cong, 4

ambush of JCRC search

team, 22-26

collaborators, 43

Viet-Nam Office for Seeking

204
INDEX

Missing Persons criticisms of, 54-55, 56-

(VNOSMP) 58

Hawaii visit, 160-61 impact of, 59-60

investigation of POW and information

sightings, 132 exchange on MIAs, 53,

joint field work with 60

JCRG, 134-35, 136- members, 51-52

40, 158, 161-66, 173 mission, 51

membership, 124, 130 National League's

polemic presentations, reaction to, 51-52,

132-33 58-59, 96

POW issue, 131 normalization of

remains repatriated by, relations, 55-56, 57-

127, 160 58,60

site selection, 145 reconstruction aid, 53-54

technical meetings with repatriation of remains

JCRC, 128, 130-33, to, 53, 55, 59-60

146, 151-52, 155, report, 55, 57, 59

158, 160, 162-63 SRV's areas of concern,

training and equipment 53-54, 58

for, 157, 160 treatment in Hanoi, 52-

53, 54-55

Vietnam Veterans of US public opinion on,

America, 100 54-55

Vietnamese people. See also Woodcock, Leonard, 51, 55,

South Vietnamese 57, 59, 155, 180

Army World War II, xxii, 16

assistance in gravesite

location, 14

rewards for assistance,

18-20

Vinh, 165

Vinh Binh Province, 79

Vollmer, John P., 29

Washington Post, 172

Washington Star, 58

Washington Times, 185

Wolff, Lester, 86, 124, 148

Wolfowitz, Paul, 129

Wood, Tony, 32

Woodcock Commission

controversy, 51-52

Yen Thuong, 136-40

Yost, Charles, 51

205
THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mather holds a Bachelor's

Degree in Aeronautical Engineering from Iowa State

University, and a Master's Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Wyoming. During the

early years of his military career, he served in engineering

assignments related to intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Following specialized training with the Army and several

tours of duty in Vietnam, he served in Southeast Asia

with the Joint Casualty Resolution Center from the time

of the unit's creation in early 1973 until his return to the

United States in the fall of 1988. He wrote this book,

much of it based on his personal experiences, while a

Research Fellow at the National Defense University from

September 1988 to January 1990. Lieutenant Colonel

Mather retired in January 1990 after over 30 years' active

duty with the United States Air Force.

207

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1994-282-306/40012
. Long afte

in Southeast Asia as members of, U.S.-military teams se

resolve the fates of Americans missing in action. >

mm

the part of the United States to conceal anything o

iffiieeiia':".' issue

House National S<

responding to allegations that the Pentagon has tried to cov

facts of some MIA cases.

"I've learned a great deal on this trip about how th<

process of resolving MIA cases ^operates. I've real

impressed with how-much good work theMJS MIA spi

do-work that you almost never hear about. The Americ

lie needs to know about this to realize we're seriou

resolving these cases."

Senator John F. Kerry (D-Mass), Chairman of the

Selects Committee on I"""

m