* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 T H

C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-20491

Summary Calendar

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

versus

CENTRAL CARTAGE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(H-95-CV-4331)

June 10, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Chief Judge: *

Central Cartage Company appeals an adver se jury verdict in a lawsuit

br ought by Michael R. Williams under the Employment Retirement Income1 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.

2

Security Act (ERISA). 1 Williams cross-appeals from the partial denial of his

attorney’s fe es motion. For the reasons assigned, we modify and, as modified,

affirm the judgment appealed.

BACKGROUND

Williams was a part icipant in the Central Cartage Company Employee

Benefit Plan, a self-funded hea lth care plan. The Plan was sponsored and

administered by Central Cartage Company. In June 1993 Williams underwent

surgery to remove impacted wisdom tee th. The surgery was performed in a

hospital on the recommendation of Williams’ oral surgeon, Dr. Oscar Maldonado.

As a result of the extraction of his wisdom teeth, Williams incurred medical bills

totaling approximately $6,000.

Williams requested benefits from the Plan under both the dental and major

medical provisions. Determining that hospitalization for the extraction of wisdom

teeth was not “re asonably necessary”, Central Cartage denied coverage of all

charges relating to Williams’ hospitalization and, instead, paid an amount it

d eemed “usual and customary” for the extraction of wisdom teeth in a dent ist’s

office. Williams requested a reevaluation of his claim; the request was denied.

Thereafter, Williams filed the instant acti o n, alleging that his claim for benefits was2 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1109(a) (providing cause of action against fiduciary, such

as plan administrator, for breach of fiduciary duties).

3 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2). S ee also Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co.

, 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir.

1995).

3 wrongfully denied.

The case was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict for Williams. The parties

stipulated to the amount, and the district court awarded Williams attorney fees, but

less than that requested. The court entered judgment against Central Cartage

Company. Central Cartage timely appealed and Williams cross-appealed.

ANALYSIS

Cen tral Cartage contends that: (1) as the plan administrator it is not the

proper defendant in a suit to recover benefits; (2) Williams does not have standing

to bring this action because he assigned his rights; (3) the evidence does not support

the jury’s verdict; (4) Williams’ failure to disclose x-rays during pre-trial discovery

mandates a new trial; and (5) the court erred in awarding attorney’ s fees. In his

cross-appeal Williams contends that the attorney’s fees award is inadequate.

In the absence of evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty, 2 a judgment for the

amount of benefits denied is against an employee benefit plan and “shall be

enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be enforceable against

a ny other person....” 3 Because Williams did not seek damages greater than the4 See Hall v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. , 105 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The Federal Rules

reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be

decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of a pleading is to facilitate

a proper decision on the merits.”).

5 Hall , 105 F.3d 225.

6 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).

4 amount of benefits denied, we must agree with Central Cartage’s contention that

the district court erred in entering judgment against it, as the plan administrator.

We cannot agree, however, with its suggesti on that this bars Williams from

receiving the relief obtained in this action. Rather, we accept the district court’s

findings and conclusion that Williams’ complaint was against the Plan. 4 In light

of the substance of the complaint and Central Cartage’s participation in this action

as the Plan’s agent for service of process, sponsor and administrator, Williams’

action actually was against the Plan and he is therefore entitled to recover from the

assets of the Plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d). Accordingly, we modify the district

court’s judgment against Central Cartage Company as the plan administrator to

reflect judgment against the Central Cartage Company Employee Benefit Plan. 5

We find Central Cartage’s contention that Williams does not have standing

to bring this action to be without merit. Williams’ claim implicates the relationship

between himself as beneficiary and the ERISA plan. Standing is manifest. 6

Notwithstanding Williams’ initial assignment o f his claim for benefits to the7 Rideau v. Parkem Indus. Services, Inc. , 917 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1990).

8 Id.

5 hospital, the record reflects that he was responsible for the health care expenses at

the time suit was filed.

Central Cartage also contends that the dist rict court erred in denying its

motion for judgment as a matter of law challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

In reviewing the denia l of this motion, we view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination. 7 A verdict must

be upheld unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury

to find as it did. 8 Our review of the record persuades that Williams established a

sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find that hospitalization for the

extraction of his wisdom teeth was “reasonably ne c essary.” Specifically, Dr.

Maldonado’s uncontroverted medical testimony was that in circumstances such as

Williams’, where the surgery is risky because the teeth are impacte d below the

nerve a n d intravenous sedation is required for more than thirty minutes,

hospitalization is required. Dr. Maldonado further testified that general anesthesia

is not done in the office and approximately 9 0 percent of his practice is hospital

oriented. The district court did not err by denying Central Cartage’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law and deferring the matter to the jury.9 Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc.

, 95 F.3d 1320, 1329 (5th Cir. 1996) (“the

district court is given wide discretion regarding evidentiary rulings”, and such a ruling will

not be disturbed “unless it affects a substantial right of the complaining party.”).

10 Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen , 624 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1980).

6 Central Cartage contends that the district court erred in denying his motion

for new trial on the gr ound that Williams violated the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure by failing to disclose x-rays relating to Williams’ surgery. We do not

agree. When Dr. Maldonado was asked to testify using the x-rays, Central Cartage

objected on the ground that the x-rays had not been disclos ed prior to trial. The

objection was sustained and the x-rays were not admit t ed into evidence. Dr.

Maldonado was not permitted to testify about same and the jury was instructed to

disregard any statements he made about them. Dr. Maldonado’s testimony was

limited to his operative report and diagnosis notes which had been made available

to Central Cartage prior to trial. Accordingly, we conclude and hold that Central

Cartage has failed to show that its rights were substantially affected, and we find

no reversible error with respect thereto. 9

Finally, both parties appeal the award of attorney’s fees. Central Cartage

contends that no fees are warranted, while Williams responds that the district court

abused its discretion by reducing counsel’s proposed hourly rate. The district court

applie d both the B owen 10 factors and the loadstar calculation in determining the11 Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co. , 47 F.3d 1448 (5th Cir. 1995).

7 amount to be awarded. 11 Reviewing the same, we find and conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees.

Judgment appealed is MODIFIED and as so modified is AFFIRMED.