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NEW ORLEANS: TEN YEARS 

AFTER THE STORM 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

HOUSING AND INSURANCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 6, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 114–60 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Chairman 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina, 

Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

FRANK GUINTA, New Hampshire 

SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

BRUCE POLIQUIN, Maine 

MIA LOVE, Utah 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

JOHN K. DELANEY, Maryland 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DENNY HECK, Washington 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

SHANNON MCGAHN, Staff Director 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri, Chairman 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia, Vice 

Chairman 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

KEITH J. ROTHFUS, Pennsylvania 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri, Ranking 

Member 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

DANIEL T. KILDEE, Michigan 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

November 6, 2015 ............................................................................................. 1 

Appendix: 

November 6, 2015 ............................................................................................. 47 

WITNESSES 

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2015 

Barnes, Nicole, Executive Director, Jericho Road Episcopal Housing Initiative 7 

Fortner, Gregg, Executive Director, Housing Authority of New Orleans ........... 14 

Hill, Cashauna, Executive Director, Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center ............................................................................................................ 10 

McConduit-Diggs, Erika, President and Chief Executive Officer, Urban 

League of Greater New Orleans ......................................................................... 18 

Randall, Earl III, New Orleans Field Office Director, U.S. Department of 

Housing and Urban Development ....................................................................... 5 

Uddo, Connie, Director, St. Paul’s Homecoming/Senior Center .......................... 16 

Washington, Tracie, Managing Director, Louisiana Justice Institute ................ 12 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Barnes, Nicole ................................................................................................... 48 

Fortner, Gregg .................................................................................................. 52 

Hill, Cashauna .................................................................................................. 56 

McConduit-Diggs, Erika ................................................................................... 64 

Randall, Earl III ............................................................................................... 72 

Uddo, Connie ..................................................................................................... 77 

(1) 

NEW ORLEANS: TEN YEARS 

AFTER THE STORM 

Friday, November 6, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING

AND INSURANCE, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:20 p.m., in the 

boardroom of the Port of New Orleans Administration Building, 

1350 Port of New Orleans Place, New Orleans, LA, Hon. Blaine 

Luetkemeyer [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Luetkemeyer; Cleaver and 

Green. 

Ex officio present: Representative Waters. 

Also present: Representative Richmond. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. The Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of 

the subcommittee at any time. 

Today’s hearing is entitled, ‘‘New Orleans: Ten Years After the 

Storm.’’ We are excited to have with us today your Congressman 

who represents this area, Mr. Richmond. Technically, he is not on 

the committee, so we have just a little housekeeping to take care 

of to make sure he can participate. 

So, without objection, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, may participate in today’s hearing by making a statement 

and asking questions of the witnesses. Since there is no objection, 

your voice is now going to be heard. 

Before we go on, I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today, and the Port Authority of New 

Orleans for hosting us. We look forward to the testimony of our distinguished panel. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to give an opening statement, and before I do I just want to start out by explaining for 

those in the audience how this all works, if you are not familiar 

with how we do things in Congress. We don’t do things well, but 

we do have some order sometimes. 

I have a statement of a few minutes, and then Ms. Waters and 

Mr. Cleaver, and then we will have statements from the witnesses 

in the 5-minute range, and then we will begin questions, and we 

will try to keep our questions to about 5 minutes apiece and see 

if we can get through 2 rounds of questions. We have a hard stop 

at 3:00 because of some flight connections. 

2 

The audience is asked to remain quiet. This is a hearing for us 

to learn from the witnesses whom we have asked to be here. They 

are very knowledgeable in each of their fields, and we are excited 

to have them. 

The gentleman over here on my left has a little timer. So whenever you see the lights over there, green means it is time to start, 

yellow means you have about a minute to go—when you see us 

with a minute left, you know we are going to have to wind up our 

questions shortly—and red means we have to figure out how to 

wind things up and move on to the next person. So, just a little 

housekeeping. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to give an opening statement. 

Ten years ago, much of this City was underwater. The aftermath 

of Hurricane Katrina destroyed communities and displaced thousands upon thousands of individuals. The lives that were not 

claimed were severely disrupted, and housing of any kind went 

from being a necessity to a luxury. 

The Federal Government stepped in and partnered with the 

State in an attempt to deliver services and fill immediate needs, 

with the ultimate goal of rebuilding a stronger New Orleans. 

The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita totaled more than $120 billion in aid. In some cases, that funding was seemingly put 

to good use. Earlier today, my colleagues and I toured a postKatrina housing development that has become a cornerstone of a 

revitalized community. We also saw areas of New Orleans that 

don’t seem to have been touched yet at all. 

So here we are more than 10 years later, looking at communities 

that haven’t been redeveloped, aware that there are still people 

who are unable to return home. It is clear that government at all 

levels had some failings. Government didn’t serve those in need to 

the best of its ability. 

This hearing today is to allow history to guide us by examining 

what worked and what didn’t work, and have an honest discussion 

about the appropriate roles of the Federal, State, and local governments, the private sector, and the non-profit community and disaster assistance. 

Today, we will hear from a diverse set of witnesses who had diverse experiences and played different roles in the days and years 

after Katrina. We have representatives on today’s panel who led 

groups that were some of the first responders in the post-Katrina 

housing crisis. In places where the State or Federal Government 

was slow to help, they were there, working to physically and emotionally rebuild their communities. That they continue their work 

10 years later is both a testament to their strength and an indication of the need to examine the process for delivering housing assistance in the wake of disasters. 

This subcommittee was the first to have a field hearing in postKatrina New Orleans. We welcome the opportunity to study the 

progress or lack thereof made in the last decade and thank the people of this City for having us back. 

As someone who has also seen a devastating situation, I 

empathize with the citizens of New Orleans for what you have gone 

through. A devastating tornado ripped through Joplin, which is a 

3 

town not too far from where I am. I saw the governor call out the 

National Guard and work with all the different emergency people 

there and address that issue. I have stood in the middle of the devastation, a swath 7 miles long and a mile wide, with literally nothing left but a few stumps of the trees, and all that was left was 

the rubble of the homes and the buildings that were there. 

As you stand there, your feelings range from awe to sadness, 

from disbelief to grief at the lives lost. I have also witnessed what 

it did to the community and how the community responded and got 

back on its feet. 

So I look forward to an affirmative discussion today, and I commend the panel and the people of the Gulf Coast for their strength 

and determination. 

With that, I yield 3 minutes to the ranking member of the full 

Financial Services Committee, Ms. Waters from California. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you, Chairman Luetkemeyer and Ranking 

Member Cleaver, and thanks to all of our witnesses who are here 

today. 

I am reminded that this August was a wonderful time here in 

New Orleans. I joined the people of New Orleans to mark the 10- 

year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. Ten years ago, I saw the 

devastation of Hurricane Katrina firsthand as then-Chairwoman of 

the Housing Subcommittee when I, along with members of the subcommittee including Mr. Cleaver and Mr. Green, visited public 

housing units that were damaged by the storm and witnessed the 

difficult conditions victims of the storm faced. In the following 

years, we continued to work with public housing tenants and the 

Housing Authority to ensure that tenants had the resources they 

needed to survive. We worked together with housing advocates to 

shine a bright light on problems with recovery efforts, and to hold 

officials accountable for improving conditions in the City and getting its residents back to life as it was before the storm. 

We held 16 hearings, 6 of which were held in the Gulf. We understand that stabilizing the housing infrastructure was a critical 

part of ensuring that New Orleans reached full recovery. So in 

order to ensure that we were meeting the immediate and long-term 

housing needs of vulnerable populations, I introduced legislation, 

H.R. 1227, the Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery Act of 2007, to help 

reestablish housing options for Gulf Coast families. 

Although this bill was never signed into law in its entirety, I am 

proud to say that several pieces of the bill were successfully enacted, including provisions to authorize vouchers to house the 

homeless, as well as disaster vouchers for displaced families to help 

smooth the transition into permanent housing after the storm. 

The work in the aftermath of Katrina also included identifying 

and re-housing victims of the storm, as well as identifying and 

seeking to end housing discrimination such as the anti-housing ordinance in St. Bernard Parish, and the discriminatory allocation of 

grant dollars through the HOME Program, which I am sure will 

come up today. Additionally, I stood with several local officials and 

advocates to call for the one-for-one replacement of every unit demolished in the City’s public housing developments. 

I am proud to see that after 10 years, the City has truly turned 

the corner and New Orleans has shown the world what resilience 

4 

and true grit looks like. Notably, population levels continue to rise, 

homelessness has fallen by nearly 90 percent, and the City has effectively ended veterans’ homelessness. 

Nevertheless, our work is not done. First, we must work to expand affordable housing options for low-income New Orleanians. 

HUD-assisted housing in New Orleans now exceeds pre-storm levels, yet the public housing stock stands at just 26 percent of its 

pre-Katrina inventory. 

Second, I am also concerned about recent studies regarding the 

impact of Katrina on New Orleans’ black middle class. As we confront the wealth gap nationally, we must also confront the policies 

that have led to the erosion of New Orleans’ once-vibrant black 

middle class. 

Third, far too many residents are paying more than their share 

to rent a home. Prior to the storm, the majority of households in 

New Orleans spent less than 30 percent of their income on rent. 

Recent data released by the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that the 

trend is now moving in the wrong direction, with 58 percent of 

renters spending more than 30 percent of their income to pay the 

rent today. 

So I hope to explore each of these issues in-depth today, and I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their work to improve housing opportunities here in New Orleans. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. With that, we go to the gentleman 

from Missouri, the ranking member of our Housing and Insurance 

Subcommittee, Mr. Cleaver. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Ten years after the storm. Thank you, Chairman 

Luetkemeyer and Ranking Member Waters, and other members of 

the committee. 

I would like to begin by thanking the Chair of this subcommittee 

to my immediate right, Chairman Luetkemeyer, for his interest in 

and willingness to bring forth this hearing. I would like to thank 

Ms. Waters for agreeing to help facilitate the request for this hearing. She and Congressman Green to my left and I were here in the 

aftermath of Katrina and saw firsthand what it had done in terms 

of devastation. 

I would like to thank Congressman Cedric Richmond of Louisiana’s 2nd Congressional District for the leadership he has provided 

and the direction that he has given on this issue as well. 

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck this area. This 

Category 3 hurricane brought with it winds up to 140 miles an 

hour, stretching 400 miles across the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. When the levees protecting the City of New 

Orleans broke, 80 percent of the City was flooded with up to 15 feet 

of water. I doubt that there is anyone in this room or across the 

country who does not remember the images of the City underwater. 

All told, 1,500 people in the State of Louisiana lost their lives, 

more than a million people in the Gulf were displaced, and over a 

million homes were damaged. There are many who consider 

Katrina to have been the single most catastrophic natural disaster 

in U.S. history. 

Sadly, though perhaps not surprisingly, the road to recovery for 

the City of New Orleans has been bumpy. To assist with the recovVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:41 Nov 04, 2016 Jkt 099779 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\99779.TXT TERI
5 

ery, Congress appropriated $120 billion, and the National Flood Insurance Program paid out $16.3 billion in claims. The Financial 

Services Committee, which is the oversight committee of this subcommittee, held 16 hearings on Katrina and the Gulf Coast recovery. And in the aftermath of the Katrina event, as I mentioned earlier, we had a field hearing here so we could see firsthand the 

struggles faced by the community. 

Eight years later, there have been impressive signs of recovery, 

and we saw them today. I appreciate all of the work that has gone 

on, and we will get into details on that later. 

I would like to yield back the balance of my time, and I look forward to becoming dialogical with the panel. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. 

With that, today we welcome the testimony of Mr. Earl Randall, 

Field Office Director, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; Ms. Nicole Barnes, Executive Director, Jericho Road 

Episcopal Housing Initiative; Ms. Cashauna Hill, Executive Director, Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center; Ms. Tracie 

Washington, President and CEO, Louisiana Justice Institute; Mr. 

Gregg Fortner, Executive Director, Housing Authority of New Orleans, who did a fantastic job of getting us around today and getting 

us around on time, so, well done; Ms. Connie Uddo, Executive Director, St. Paul’s Homecoming Center; and Ms. Erika McConduit, 

President and CEO, Urban League of Greater New Orleans. 

Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Everybody has submitted written testimony so you can give us an overview of that. And without objection, your written statements will be made a part of the record. 

Mr. Randall, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF EARL RANDALL III, NEW ORLEANS FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND 

URBAN DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. RANDALL. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member Cleaver, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Earl Randall III, and I have been Director 

of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s field office 

here in New Orleans for the past 2 years. We are grateful for the 

chairman and ranking member’s leadership in calling for this hearing, and especially your interest today on the tour as we viewed 

some of our recovery projects. 

I would also like to give a special acknowledgement to Ranking 

Member Waters for her presence here today, and the interest she 

has shown over the past decade for the citizens of New Orleans and 

the recovery of this area. Thank you for inviting me here today. 

Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath created unprecedented destruction along the Gulf Coast and inflicted a human toll of more 

than 1,800 lives. Over the past 10 years, investments made 

through HUD programs have had a major impact on the recovery 

in the Gulf Coast region. The Department has worked closely with 

State and local leaders and effectively managed nearly $20 billion 

delivered through the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program to help the region recover from Hurricanes 

Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. 

6 

Hurricane Katrina has forever changed New Orleans and the 

Gulf Coast. The post-recovery chapter of HUD’s relationship with 

New Orleans builds off the substantial recovery of the past 10 

years and now focuses on how to make New Orleans and the Gulf 

Coast communities, and the residents of every neighborhood, successful in the 21st Century. 

At the time of Hurricane Katrina, I was HUD’s Community Planning and Development representative for Shreveport and Bossier 

City. Immediately after landfall, I was asked by the field office director to coordinate HUD’s on-the-ground responses to the devastation caused by Katrina. One of my first official duties was to coordinate a congressional field hearing that was held here in New Orleans, and I have come full circle to sit on the panel as a witness 

here today. 

In my role with HUD over the past decade, I have had a firsthand opportunity to watch how CDBG-DR funds were the driving 

force in the recovery that were used to fill funding gaps and provide flexibility that caused communities to carefully think through 

recovery plans and how best to meet the specific recovery needs. In 

Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, CDBG-DR dollars were used 

by States to ensure that they were able to develop holistic recovery 

plans to ensure recovery across the spectrum of housing, infrastructure, and economic development needs. The $19.7 billion that was allocated to the Gulf Coast region for Katrina was broken down as such: $11.6 billion for homeowner 

compensation; $2.7 billion for housing rehab; $1.7 billion for infrastructure and public improvements; $1.3 billion for economic development and tourism; and $2.4 billion for other activities. 

To this point, I have discussed HUD’s post-Katrina investment in 

terms of CDBG-DR. The second major aspect of HUD’s recovery 

work in New Orleans has been the redevelopment of the four big 

public housing developments: C.J. Peete; B.W. Cooper; Lafitte; and 

St. Bernard. Hurricane Katrina displaced 3,000 families who lived 

in those buildings. Public housing in New Orleans pre-Katrina was 

a dense development that was isolated from the community. There 

was high poverty, high crime, lack of services and amenities, vulnerability to flooding, low education, and lack of opportunity. The 

Housing Authority of New Orleans, after consulting with and obtaining approval from HUD, decided to demolish and rebuild these 

developments to be more resilient to future floods, and to create 

communities of opportunity. 

The funding sources for these endeavors included HUD and 

HANO contributing $200 million for capital investment, Go Zone 

tax credits of $250 million, and FEMA’s $20 million investment. 

And I am proud to note that CDBG-DR added an additional $115 

million at a critical time, when other funding sources became less 

stable during our financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. 

Two of the transactions, Columbia Park and Harmony Oaks, 

went to final closing in December of 2008. Many of the remaining 

projects were closed in phases in 2011 and 2013, while others are 

scheduled to close. Today, 4 new mixed-income developments are a 

vital part of community life in New Orleans. These are mixed-income developments with both public housing and non-public housing units, and market-rate units, and especially units dedicated to 

7 

permanent supportive housing. HUD’s investment is having a 

broader impact on neighborhood revitalization, greater resilience, 

improved amenities, and offering housing to working families. 

HUD is going beyond public housing with the transformation at 

Iberville. We are not just focused on a building. In fact, we are redeveloping the neighborhood with a $30 million HUD Neighborhood Grant. This will be an historic restoration that will meet the 

needs of the local population, such as expanding access to fresh 

foods, job opportunities, and quality early childhood education. 

HUD’s investment spurred an additional $53 million in private investment to date, and well over $1 billion in planned neighborhood 

investment. 

I want to reiterate that despite the success stories, our job is not 

over. There are still miles left on the road to recovery. As a native 

of New Orleans, I am proud of the work that has been done and 

the lessons that we have learned about providing quality housing 

for all, developing mixed-income communities, leveraging private 

investment, and building resilient communities of opportunity. The 

remainder of our journey will continue to bolster the City of New 

Orleans’ recovery and can serve as an example of redevelopment 

across the country in the wake of major disasters. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Randall can be found on page 72 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. 

Ms. Barnes, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF NICOLE BARNES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

JERICHO ROAD EPISCOPAL HOUSING INITIATIVE 

Ms. BARNES. Good afternoon, Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking 

Member Cleaver, and members of the subcommittee. My name is 

Nicole Barnes, and I am the executive director of Jericho Road 

Episcopal Housing Initiative. Jericho Road is a non-profit community development organization established in 2006 in response to 

the pressing need for affordable housing in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. As a lifelong citizen of New Orleans, with a 20-year 

career as a housing professional, I have witnessed and been a part 

of the post-Katrina revitalization efforts as a homeowner, a former 

government employee, and a non-profit executive. I look forward to 

addressing the current conditions in the market, progress made 

over the 10 years, and the challenges that still remain regarding 

housing in post-Katrina New Orleans. 

A current snapshot of the housing market conditions in New Orleans is as follows: fair market rent in New Orleans for a one bedroom apartment is $767 per month, or $9,204 per year; the median 

income in New Orleans is $37,000 per year; the median rent is 

$765, and the average home value is $183,000 per unit; homeownership rates in New Orleans are at 45 percent, well below the national average of over 60 percent; African American households disproportionately pay more of their income towards housing costs; 

more than 60 percent pay over one-third of their monthly income 

toward housing costs; both rent and home values have increased 

close to 50 percent since 2000; and approximately 58 percent of all 

8 

households pay over one-third or more of their income towards 

housing, as Congresswoman Waters alluded to earlier. 

Housing is typically the highest cost for any household. However, 

housing is only one of a household’s many expenditures. New Orleans saw a substantial increase in housing costs from 2000 to 2013, 

far outpacing the increase in median incomes. Rents have increased by 102 percent or 50 percent when adjusted for inflation, 

while home values have increased 109 percent or 54 percent when 

adjusted for inflation. As with income, the most drastic increases 

in home value have been seen at the high and low ends of the cost 

spectrum. The percentage of homes valued below $100,000 has 

been reduced by more than two-thirds, while the percentage of 

homes valued over $300,000 has more than tripled. While rents 

and home prices continue to increase, household income has not 

significantly changed since the year 2000. In fact, when adjusted 

for inflation, median income in New Orleans has dropped by 15 

percent since 2000. Thus, the decrease in income has severely impacted current housing market conditions in the City. 

Homeownership: In New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina, for 

many low- to moderate-income working families, the ultimate 

dream of homeownership was an attainable goal. The average cost 

of the typical three-bedroom/two-bath home before Hurricane 

Katrina ranged from between $80,000 to $100,000. In the wake of 

Hurricane Katrina, the real estate market has changed tremendously, and the average price for that same three-bedroom/twobath home is now starting at $159,000. 

This increase is precipitated and compounded by several factors 

which serve as very challenging impediments to affordable homeownership in the City of New Orleans. These impediments include 

a decreased supply of undamaged homes in the market, increased 

construction costs for both labor and materials, increased insurance 

premiums and property tax costs, and a lack of resources for increased gap financing needs for families. There were various programs funded by the Federal Government and administered by 

both the State and the City to mitigate some of these impediments. 

Two of the most successful programs were soft second programs 

that provided gap financing for families who were attempting to 

purchase homes post-Katrina. The first program was sponsored by 

the Finance Authority of New Orleans. This program was funded 

with $27 million of Disaster Community Development Block Grant 

funds and served 1,140 families from the period of 2005 to 2014. 

However, this program has exhausted its resources and is no 

longer accepting applications. 

The second program was managed by the City of New Orleans, 

and the program began in 2012 and has closed 891 homes across 

the City and was also funded by CDBG funds. The average program participant qualified for a $91,000 first mortgage. They received a second mortgage in the amount of $51,000, and they also 

needed about $5,000 in closing cost assistance. 

The third major program sponsored by the government for homeowners was the Road Home Program, and this was for existing 

homeowners. The Road Home Program represents the largest single housing recovery program in history. Eligible homeowners received up to $150,000 in compensation for losses and had 3 comVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:41 Nov 04, 2016 Jkt 099779 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\99779.TXT TERI
9 

pensation options. The program has been closed to new recipients 

since 2007. 

As of mid-2013, the Road Home Program has successfully assisted more than 130,000 Louisiana citizens affected by Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. The program has disbursed more than $8.9 billion to residents of Louisiana to rebuild their homes. With regard 

to New Orleans, 46,884 households received $4.2 billion in grants 

from the Road Home Program. Of the homeowners who chose Option 1, 94 percent have rebuilt their homes. 

Increased insurance premiums and property taxes are now taking a toll on residents of Gulf communities. Annual homeowners’ 

insurance premiums have tripled, and in some cases, for the newly 

insured, quadrupled in post-Katrina New Orleans. This is compounded by the fact that many large insurers no longer write policies in the City of New Orleans. New homeowners have had to rely 

solely on the insurance of last resort, the Louisiana Citizens FAIR 

Plan. 

Homeowners have also seen significant increases in flood insurance premiums. Although homeowners have access to the generally 

affordable, federally managed National Flood Insurance Program, 

market conditions reflect an increase in these premiums as well, by 

as much as 4 times in some areas of the City. Additionally, the new 

administrative fees that have been added to the National Flood Insurance Program have also impacted affordability to homeowners. 

In addition to the increased insurance — 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Ms. Barnes, we are getting well over 

5 minutes. Can you wrap it up in just a few comments? 

Ms. BARNES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. I noticed that you have 2 pages to go 

there. 

[laughter] 

Ms. BARNES. I know. We have a lot going on. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. That is great. We will ask a lot of 

questions and get into that information. 

Ms. BARNES. I do want to emphasize that moving forward, we 

recognize all of the practitioners and persons who are working in 

housing in the City, the need to work together and to come up with 

a plan to, if you will, remove the second half of recovery, because 

I think right now we are probably at half of where we need to be 

in terms of the City and the housing issues and citizens returning 

to New Orleans. 

So with that being said, we have been working—all of the practitioners, government officials, and stakeholders have been working 

on a plan called HousingNOLA, and it is a new 10-year plan for 

the City of New Orleans to look at housing, to figure out the best 

way to invest the little funding or the shrinking funding that we 

are seeing coming down with regard to housing and investment 

projects for rental and homeownership. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Barnes can be found on page 48 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Very good. Thank you. 

Ms. Hill, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

10 

STATEMENT OF CASHAUNA HILL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Luetkemeyer, 

Ranking Member Waters, Ranking Member Cleaver, and members 

of the subcommittee. My name is Cashauna Hill, and I am executive director of the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center (GNOFHAC). GNOFHAC is a non-profit civil rights organization established in 1995 to eradicate housing discrimination in the 

greater New Orleans area. Through education, investigation, and 

enforcement activities, we promote equal opportunity in all housing 

transactions, including rental, sales, lending, and insurance. We 

are funded in part by the Fair Housing Initiatives funds from 

HUD. Our work since Hurricane Katrina has focused on ensuring 

that all former residents of the City can return to their homes with 

the guarantee of fair housing choice. 

Thank you for hosting this important hearing today, and thank 

you for inviting me to participate. 

August of this year marked a decade since Hurricane Katrina 

made landfall, and many of you are well aware of the great accomplishments and many persistent challenges that this City and region have faced. I would like to provide you with just a quick 

sketch of some overall indicators of recovery, both at the City and 

regional levels. 

Of New Orleans’ more than 70 neighborhoods, more than half of 

those neighborhoods have recovered over 90 percent of their population, according to the New Orleans Data Center. In the last 4 

years alone, New Orleans has grown an additional 12 percent. 

However, despite rapid growth and ongoing recovery, approximately 100,000 African Americans have not yet returned to New 

Orleans. 

Regionally, surrounding parishes have also shifted demographically in the decade since Hurricane Katrina. These shifts are consistent with trends nationwide and the suburbanization of poverty 

as low- and moderate-income people are pushed out of City centers. 

However, the ‘‘Katrina Effect’’ certainly accelerated trends seen at 

more gradual rates in other cities nationwide. 

In Jefferson Parish, for example, just west of Orleans Parish, the 

population rebounded far faster than New Orleans, with 95 percent 

of its pre-storm population back by 2010, while New Orleans had 

only 71 percent of its pre-storm population back at that time. 

To the south of Orleans Parish lies St. Bernard Parish. In 2006, 

the Fair Housing Center filed suit against St. Bernard for enforcing 

a ‘‘blood relative only’’ ordinance that prevented St. Bernard homeowners from renting to any person who wasn’t a blood relative. As 

we know, because 90 percent of homeowners in the Parish were 

white at that time, most single-family homes would have only been 

available to white tenants. 

The ordinance was passed at a time when New Orleanians forced 

out of their homes by natural disaster were desperately seeking 

housing options with reduced housing stock and limited options 

available. As New Orleanians, who are majority African American, 

sought stable housing options, surrounding communities unfortunately erected barriers to entry. 

11 

Since the 2006 litigation and widespread press coverage, St. Bernard Parish has integrated considerably. 

By far, the largest congressionally funded housing recovery program in U.S. history has been the Road Home Program. The program was designed, as we heard, to provide direct cash rebuilding 

grants at a maximum of $150,000 for storm-impacted homeowners. 

In 2008, GNOFHAC filed a lawsuit against the State of Louisiana and HUD because of the design of the Road Home Program. 

The housing counseling staff at GNOFHAC, working directly with 

homeowners seeking Road Home funds, noticed that many African 

American clients received smaller grants than white clients, even 

when the homes had similar square footage, had sustained comparable damage, and were estimated to cost the same amount to 

repair. The grant formula was based on the pre-storm value of the 

home rather than on the actual cost to rebuild. As a result of this 

formula, homeowners from white neighborhoods received more 

than homeowners from African American neighborhoods, even 

when the costs to rebuild were the same. I know that in 2008 and 

again in 2009, this committee heard extensive testimony from the 

Fair Housing Center about this program, so I won’t go into any 

more details about that. 

The plight of renters in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, as 

Ranking Member Waters stated, is particularly striking, as New 

Orleans is a City where more than half of the residents are renters, 

rather than homeowners. Yet, there was never a comprehensive 

plan to rebuild or repair this largest slice of the housing market. 

In fact, 50 percent of private market rentals were destroyed or 

damaged in the aftermath of the storm. 

The results of this lack of a comprehensive rental rebuilding program are twofold: first, much of our rental stock is low quality as 

a result of deferred maintenance, with families living in substandard housing that creates a significant public health concern; 

and second, there is tremendous pressure and competition in our 

rental market. 

The Citywide average rent in New Orleans is up 40 percent since 

before the storm, yet household income has only gone up 2 percent. 

As we heard, close to 60 percent of renters in the City are rentburdened, and they pay more than 30 percent of their income toward rent and utilities. Shockingly, more than one-third of New 

Orleans renters are severely rent-burdened, which means that they 

pay more than 50 percent of their income towards rent and utilities. Increased competition for limited remaining rental stock has 

pushed middle- and lower-income people to the margins of the 

housing market here in New Orleans. Further, we have not been 

immune to the effects of gentrification, which is common to other 

cities. 

I do want to briefly wrap up with a note about HUD-assisted clients. As this committee is very well aware, after Hurricane Katrina 

many thousands of units of public housing were demolished. The 

vast majority of those former public housing residents received 

Housing Choice Program vouchers. As portable subsidies, the 

vouchers are often referred to as a way to provide better housing 

choice for HUD tenants and increase housing mobility. 

12 

However, this transition hit New Orleans at precisely the moment when approximately 50 percent of the rental housing stock 

had been lost, increasing the demand but reducing the supply, and 

putting program participants in competition for remaining limited 

housing stock. 

As a result, the voucher program has helped to increase residential segregation in the City in the decade since Katrina. The program includes nearly a quarter of our City’s renters. In 2010, there 

were about 18,000 families using vouchers to subsidize their rent, 

up from about 8,400 in 2005, and this reflects the replacement of 

unit-based assistance with tenant-based vouchers. 

We know that in the 10 years post-Katrina, housing options have 

become limited for HUD-assisted clients, deepening racial segregation and living patterns in neighborhoods of extreme poverty. 

With that said, I would like to thank you all for your commitment and interest in our hometown. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hill can be found on page 56 of 

the appendix.] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Ms. Hill. 

Ms. Washington, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

And for the remaining witnesses, we have your written testimony. So if you can summarize what you want to talk about, if you 

have something you want to highlight, we want to give you plenty 

of time here, but by the same token, be respectful of everybody 

else’s time. So if you could stay close to 5 minutes on this, that 

would be great. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF TRACIE WASHINGTON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

LOUISIANA JUSTICE INSTITUTE 

Ms. WASHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Staying close to 

within 5 minutes for a trial attorney is a challenge. 

[laughter] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. You understand you are talking to 

politicians, too, right? 

[laughter] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. We know all about how to take up the 

time. 

Ms. WASHINGTON. I will try to summarize, and not go over my 

time, because you have heard some of the testimony that I was prepared to give. 

So, Chairman Luetkemeyer and Ranking Members Cleaver and 

Waters, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony today about the fundamental importance of rebuilding communities after disasters, and as related to 

the mission of the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, your 

committee has been crucial to this work, and certainly you must 

know that the City of New Orleans could not have been rebuilt and 

redeveloped without the work of Congress and your understanding 

of the needs of displaced residents. 

My name is Tracie Washington, and I serve as President and 

CEO of the Louisiana Justice Institute, a non-profit civil rights 

legal advocacy organization and law firm. 

13 

Immediately following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, I located to 

Beaumont, Texas, and then Austin, Texas, where I began my practice early in my career, in 1989. I returned to New Orleans first 

in October 2005 to evaluate the state of my home and my father’s 

home and rental properties, and to begin assessing whether I could 

return home. 

In December 2005, after my son had completed his fall semester 

of 7th grade, we returned to New Orleans solely to celebrate 

Christmas and to hire contractors. It was not my intent to stay. In 

fact, I accepted employment in San Antonio, Texas. But my son 

convinced me otherwise. Even at age 10, he understood the value 

of home and family, and he convinced me, his jobless mother with 

a home badly in need of repair, that New Orleans should be our 

home. So I want to focus there and not go off script with some others. 

It is that 12-year-old statement and his plea to remain home that 

was the plea of so many people in the City of New Orleans, and 

I want to talk to you today about some of those left behind, particularly individuals who live in public housing. 

Now, many individuals accuse advocates like me of providing 

only bad news, what hasn’t occurred in 10 years since Hurricane 

Katrina in terms of housing recovery. So let me begin there and 

state unequivocally that the state of housing has improved in New 

Orleans post-Katrina. That is an undeniable fact. 

Look around you. The City has rebuilt in many places, and rebuilt very, very well. But there are troubling facts still remaining, 

and I will take up where Cashuana left off. I want to talk about 

who we left behind in public housing, and think about this fact: 

There were 8,000 families receiving Housing Choice vouchers in 

2005, and 18,000 by 2015 receiving those same vouchers in a community that just could not sustain the extra 10,000 people. 

The other side of the housing redevelopment story is important 

for your committee here because it is the story of individuals left 

out of recovery and for whom the promise of return to rebuild New 

Orleans, a recovered New Orleans, a New Orleans with streets that 

had been formerly pockmarked with despair but would be paved 

with prosperity, has been broken. 

We are a nation of values. We are a nation that keeps its promises. I want to tell you there remains a debt to those individuals 

left behind. The mistrust you heard often during the 10-year commemoration had its impetus from two events: that Dallas meeting 

of the fab four of business leaders convened to say how the City 

would be rebuilt and who would be invited back; and that horrible 

discoloring of our City with these obscene green dots to be designated as green space, never to be rebuilt. Those areas were the 

predominantly African American communities in the City containing the generational wealth of homes that had been passed 

from within families that could never be reclaimed. 

But it is also the story of the fight, because while African American citizens were displaced and often homeless, they returned en 

masse in February of 2006 to tell City officials they would rebuild, 

and they demanded the moratorium on rebuilding permits in their 

neighborhoods. 

14 

But the residents of public housing weren’t as lucky. Even with 

the Herculean efforts of Professor Bill Quigley and his outstanding 

attorneys at the Loyola University School of Law Property Law 

Center, attorney Judith Browne-Dianis, Co-Director of the Advancement Project, and myself, the Louisiana Justice Institute and 

scores of attorneys led by Ross Bricker from the Chicago law firm 

of Jenner and Block, who filed a landmark Anderson v. Jackson 

public housing litigation for the B.W. Cooper, St. Bernard, C.J. 

Peete, and Lafitte communities. 

And I want to tell you, these were communities of residents who 

were not saying we don’t want our areas to be rebuilt. They were 

communities that said we want to return to those rebuilt communities. 

I said I was a trial attorney, and I guess I am. It didn’t seem 

like 5 minutes. I want to close by just letting you know that we 

serve just 9 percent of those public housing residents now. The 

same promise we owe to the individuals who own their homes, who 

rented homes, that same promise to return should have been fulfilled by and for those public housing residents. 

We still fight. We still fight because we know they have the right 

to be back, and we have not fulfilled that promise. 

So I thank you for allowing me to testify, and I am available for 

questions. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you very much. 

Do we have a copy of her testimony? I don’t have it in my—do 

we have a copy of it? If you have a copy— 

Ms. WASHINGTON. I have been crossing it out, but I can give it— 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. All right, very good. We need to have 

that before we leave today. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. 

Washington. 

Mr. Fortner, thank you very much again for the tour you gave 

us today. It was very informational and you did a good job of keeping us on track. 

You are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GREGG FORTNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS 

Mr. FORTNER. Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member 

Cleaver, Congresswoman Waters, Congressman Green, and our 

own New Orleanian, Congressman Cedric Richmond, I am Gregg 

Fortner, executive director of the Housing Authority of New Orleans, or HANO, and it is my privilege to appear before you today 

on behalf of HANO, the HANO Board of Commissioners, the City 

of New Orleans, and most importantly, the nearly 50,000 New 

Orleanians directly served by the housing programs administered 

through HANO. 

On July 7, 2014, HANO was returned to local control after various forms of HUD receivership since 1996. In partnership with 

HUD and the City, today’s HANO has continued and improved 

upon the reform and progress experienced during the 18 years of 

HUD receivership. Today, HANO administers almost 18,000 Section 8 Housing Choice vouchers and manages over 4,000 housing 

units on HANO-owned sites throughout the City of New Orleans 

through direct service or contracts with third-party property manVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:41 Nov 04, 2016 Jkt 099779 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\99779.TXT TERI
15 

agers. As a result, today’s HANO provides affordable housing assistance to more than 25 percent of all renter households in the 

City of New Orleans. 

HANO is crystal clear in its mission to provide affordable housing opportunities for low-income residents of the City of New Orleans. Yet, we realize that HANO has a vital role in the future affordable housing strategies for the entire City of New Orleans. 

This year, on August 29th, the entire country remembered the 

10-year anniversary and the devastating impact of Hurricane 

Katrina on the City of New Orleans. As we move forward in a City 

continuing to rebuild while preserving the rich culture that defines 

the unique flavor of New Orleans, we must also acknowledge that 

the affordable housing environment has experienced a dramatic 

change over the past 10 years since Katrina. 

Recent studies report that prior to Katrina, the average renter 

in New Orleans spent about 19 percent of household income for 

rent. Today, studies report that almost 40 percent of renters in 

New Orleans pay more than 50 percent of income towards rent. 

These numbers further illustrate the need for the comprehensive 

approach currently being undertaken by the City of New Orleans 

to ensure that the affordable housing needs of the current and future citizens of New Orleans are met through leveraging of existing 

and future resources, and partnerships involving the entire New 

Orleans housing and business communities. 

On August 21, 2009, Congresswoman Waters held a congressional field hearing here in New Orleans, through the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, to discuss the 

progress of HANO’s recovery efforts 4 years after Katrina. Today, 

I have given you written testimony that updates you on the 

progress of those recovery efforts now 10 years after the storm, including the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative in Iberville and the socalled Big Four, which formerly were known as Calliope, Magnolia/ 

CJ Peete, St. Bernard, and Lafitte. My update contains the original 

construction date of these properties, the original number of units, 

the funding sources used for the redevelopment, the current number of units, and the cost of the full redevelopment program. 

These are the major projects that make up the majority of the 

over $1.2 billion in Federal investment to rebuild public housing in 

New Orleans after Katrina through Federal funding sources. Even 

with that tremendous commitment from the United States Government, the 2,000 replacement units of pure public housing fall well 

short of the pre-Katrina numbers of over 5,000 occupied public 

housing units. 

Over the past 2 decades, the reduction in public housing operating subsidies and capital funds have dictated a new dynamic in 

redevelopment of this Nation’s 1.2 million public housing units. 

Communities with 100 percent public housing cannot be sustained. 

As a result, mixed-income communities have become the mandate 

to produce revenue-generating units that can support the funding 

challenges faced by the traditional public housing inventory. 

Although the public housing inventory for the City of New Orleans has decreased by over 3,000 units since Katrina, the Section 

8 Housing Choice Voucher Program has increased by almost 9,000 

vouchers allocated to the City of New Orleans. As a result, HANO 

16 

is serving over 30 percent more households now than before Hurricane Katrina. HANO operates the 15th largest HCV program in 

the country, paying out almost $150 million annually to Section 8 

property owners on behalf of the nearly 18,000 HCV participant 

households in the City of New Orleans. 

As I conclude, I again want to thank the subcommittee for the 

continued commitment and interest in the ongoing revitalization efforts by HANO and the City of New Orleans. HANO will continue 

to effectively and creatively utilize all its assets and resources in 

the furtherance of providing affordable housing opportunities to the 

citizens of New Orleans. We further pledge that we will be exemplary stewards of public funds and justify the public trust that 

HANO is committed to sustain. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fortner can be found on page 52 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Fortner. You came in 

right at 5 minutes. Congratulations. Thank you. 

Ms. Uddo, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF CONNIE UDDO, DIRECTOR, ST. PAUL’S 

HOMECOMING/SENIOR CENTER 

Ms. UDDO. Thank you. Thank you so much for having me today. 

My name is Connie Uddo, and I am the director of the St. Paul’s 

Homecoming Center, which operated as a Hurricane Katrina Recovery Center from 2006 to 2014 in the Lakeview and Gentilly 

neighborhoods of New Orleans, and we would still be operating 

today had we not lost our funding in 2014. 

In preparation for this testimony, I found previous testimony 

that I presented in Washington, D.C., on May 24, 2007, to the ad 

hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, chaired by Senator Mary 

Landrieu. As I read through my testimony in preparation for this, 

I realized that not much has changed in regards to how government addresses disasters in our country. 

Thank you for inviting someone like me who is not with a government agency or a private contractor, but someone who has been 

on the front lines of this recovery for 10 years in New Orleans. 

Being an everyday citizen was an asset in many ways, as I used 

commonsense approaches to rebuilding the community, gained the 

trust of the residents quickly, and knew the geography and demographics of the neighborhood. I will do my best in this testimony 

to point out what worked and really what didn’t work from a bootson-the-ground, everyday-citizen perspective. 

I appreciate that you all recognize a need to become more expedient, efficient, and humanitarian in your approach to disaster recovery. It is very important that this process changes and that we 

get this right as disasters are becoming an everyday occurrence in 

our country. 

In January 2006, my family was the first of 10 families to move 

back to our devastated Lakeview neighborhood of 8,000 flooded 

homes. While living very much alone and seeing there was very little help coming our way, I realized that the recovery was going to 

be up to us, and the quicker we got going, the better off we would 

be. I started a recovery center out of my home, and our mantra in 

Lakeview became, don’t wait for the government, they will slow 

17 

you down and hold you up. If we do, we will wallow in bureaucracy 

and false promises. 

As a result, Lakeview became the model in the City of New Orleans for do-it-yourself recovery. Using organizational skills, volunteers, and connections to the private sector—we were wiped out 

just like everybody else, we didn’t have a lot of money like people 

thought we did—the residents united and raised funding for the rebuilding of schools, churches, a firehouse, and our public green 

spaces, all while waiting for FEMA to get their act together. 

People of New Orleans were both physically and emotionally devastated by Katrina. Depression shifted from the storm to the recovery, where hopelessness and stress continued for years due to the 

failures of government programs such as the Louisiana Road Home 

Program, the Hazard Mitigation Program, and the Nonprofit Rebuild Pilot Program, NRPP, to name a few. ICF was awarded a $756 million contract to run two Louisiana 

Road Home Programs, the Homeowner Effort and the Small Rental 

Repair Program. Both programs failed so miserably that ICF International is reviled by most Louisianans and is essentially banned 

from doing new business with the State, but walked away $900 

million richer, holding lucrative contracts with governments across 

the country. The employee who landed the contract for ICF was 

awarded a $1 million bonus while thousands of people were struggling to rebuild their homes and to return home. 

I am going to skip a lot of the failures of the Road Home Program because that is in my testimony, and I think most people 

know about the cumbersome verification procedures, the pre-storm 

appraisal. The paperwork was constantly lost, the case managers 

constantly changed, the lack of caring really for the suffering and 

unwillingness to find ways to help desperate homeowners is what 

I really saw. We even gave Road Home free office space at my center for a solid year to meet with residents. When we were running 

out of funding, I actually reached out to ICF and said would you 

consider maybe even making a donation to help us keep going, and 

they said they didn’t do that kind of thing. Yet they put $900 million in their pockets and took free office space from us, and we did 

this just to try to keep the process going. 

Which leads me to when a for-profit company is administering 

the program, their priority is to make money for their company, 

and therefore they avoid spending any extra money to assist homeowners in the manner they need. 

The Hazard Mitigation Program is another one. This is a Staterun program that contracted much of the work out to the for-profit 

private contractor Shaw. My whole testimony, what I am really 

pointing out here is that as long as we keep giving the for-profit 

private contractors these contracts, we will be in these situations 

today. 

At one time, one of our clients was told that this was the reimbursement program, the Hazard Mitigation. This money was given 

to raze your house. Many homeowners borrowed. Once they were 

approved, given the green light, they borrowed from family members, took seconds out, whatever, and then razed their houses, and 

in many cases after they did it, they were told that a mistake had 

been made, the rules had changed, and they no longer qualified. 

18 

One of our cases was—one of our homeowners was middle-class, 

a white male with three young children. After being turned down, 

he borrowed $80,000 from his family, his parents’ retirement fund 

money. After they turned him down, he literally took his life, committing suicide, shooting himself under his carport. 

So my point is—and then I will go into the Nonprofit Rebuild 

Program. It was a program that was given to the non-profits like 

myself. Now, this was also reimbursement from the State. That 

failed so miserably that Catholic Charities, and the Episcopal Diocese, to name a few, closed their doors because we waited for years 

and years to be reimbursed hundreds of thousands of dollars. 

I want to close by saying this: My point is that the non-profits 

are much more well-prepared in this country, and the first people 

who show up in a disaster, as you probably saw in Joplin, were the 

faith-based and non-profits. They are there for the long haul. I call 

them the second responders, but we are there for the long haul. We 

are never invited to be a part of these contracts, to bid on them 

or whatever. I would love to see something change that the nonprofits and the faith-based are included more in being able to administer these programs, versus the private, for-profit contractors. 

So I just would like to say in closing that I have experienced 

firsthand what happens when government and the non-profit and 

faith-based can come together and meet in the middle. I have 

worked very closely with the mayor’s office here and many other 

City agencies, and I can tell you that when we can meet in the 

middle and we can come together and the funding could be given 

to us rather than the for-profit, private contractor, we could be an 

unstoppable force. You would see much more impact made and 

communities restored much more quickly and efficiently. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Uddo can be found on page 77 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Ms. Uddo. 

Ms. McConduit-Diggs, thank you for being here. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ERIKA MCCONDUIT-DIGGS, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, URBAN LEAGUE OF GREATER 

NEW ORLEANS 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. Thank you again for inviting me to appear before you. My name is Erika McConduit-Diggs. I am the 

president and CEO of the Urban League of Greater New Orleans. 

We are one of 94 affiliates of the National Urban League, an historic civil rights organization whose mission is to enable communities of color to secure economic parity, power, civil rights, and 

self-reliance. 

The housing empowerment goal for the National Urban League 

is to ensure that every American has access to decent, safe, and affordable housing on fair terms. I am here today to discuss the current and historic practices and policies that contribute to housing 

inequities and the broad disparities that exist between African 

American and white communities; and finally, the efforts the government can make to address and eradicate the problem. 

For greater context, I urge you to read the Urban League of 

Greater New Orleans’ publication released at the 10th anniversary 

19 

and entitled, ‘‘The State of Black New Orleans: Ten Years PostKatrina.’’ 

As the 10th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina has come and 

gone, many people have been amazed at the level of progress New 

Orleans has made. However, the road to recovery has been paved 

with many inequities. The post-Katrina New Orleans recovery is 

really a tale of two cities. African Americans and communities of 

color in New Orleans have had a markedly different experience 

with the recovery than white residents. This is clear from the varying responses from a recent survey conducted by the Public Policy 

Lab at the LSU Reilly Center, where nearly 80 percent of white 

New Orleanians feel the City has mostly recovered, but less than 

60 percent of African Americans feel this way, and over 60 percent 

of white residents feel the economy is better now than pre-Katrina, 

but only 10 percent of African Americans feel this way. 

As a native New Orleanian, I am intimately aware of the inequities that have contributed to the disparate perspectives of African 

American and white residents regarding post-Katrina New Orleans 

recovery. Historically, African Americans have encountered discriminatory practices that pushed them into low-lying neighborhoods of the City, practices such as redlining and, later, green dots. 

The residual effect is that some of these issues remain a barrier to 

housing equity in New Orleans. 

Additionally, accessing insurance enough to fully insure a home 

was and continues to be out of reach for many African American 

families in New Orleans because the cost to do so is beyond the financial means of the working class. This has made it significantly 

more difficult for many families to return to the City, resulting in 

a sharp decline in the number of African Americans post-Katrina. 

Before Katrina, more than two-thirds of the City’s residents were 

African American, and now only approximately 60 percent of the 

population is; that is more than 100,000 African Americans who 

have not returned since the storm, compared to a loss of only about 

11,000 whites. 

Approximately 70 percent of white residents were able to access 

their homes within a year, compared to only 42 percent of African 

Americans. And only 54 percent of African American residents returned to their pre-Katrina communities, compared to over 80 percent of whites. 

Additionally, policies and practices in post-Katrina New Orleans 

have resulted in a slower recovery in African American neighborhoods, particularly New Orleans East and the Lower Ninth Ward. 

Increased insurance costs, low-wage jobs and poor economic prospects, flawed Road Home policies and other related challenges have 

worked against the goal to thoughtfully de-concentrate poverty instead of having limited options available for African Americans to 

repopulate and re-resource neighborhoods. In many instances, the 

recovery process has been implemented unfairly on its face and in 

application, and has exacerbated many of the inequities that existed prior to Katrina. 

According to the National Urban League’s 2015 State of Black 

America Equality Index, African Americans have only 6 cents of 

wealth for every dollar of wealth that whites have nationwide. Unfortunately, most of this wealth, approximately 90 percent, is tied 

20 

up in African Americans’ homes. Locally, the wealth gap between 

African American and white New Orleanians can be explained by 

highlighting several key economic inequities. 

At approximately 27 percent, New Orleans’ poverty rate is more 

than double that of the national rate. More than half of African 

American children in New Orleans live in poverty. More than half 

of African American men in New Orleans are not connected to the 

workforce. Only 14 percent of African American men and 21 percent of African American women had Bachelor’s degrees or higher 

in 2014, compared to 63 percent of white men and 64 percent of 

white women in New Orleans. Minority businesses represent nearly 27 percent of businesses in New Orleans, but only account for 

2 percent of gross receipts. The median income for African American residents is just over $25,000, compared to whites who earn 

nearly $61,000. 

When directly compared to the current average cost of homeownership and insurance rates, African American New Orleanians are 

at a severe disadvantage compared to their white counterparts. 

And I would be remiss if I did not mention the high rates of incarceration of African Americans in this City and its economic impact 

on the African American community. One in seven African American males in New Orleans is under the supervision of the criminal 

justice system, and African Americans represent only 60 percent of 

the population but make up more than 90 percent of the local prison population. High rates of incarceration in New Orleans are almost exclusively impacting African American communities. 

Individuals with criminal convictions have greater difficulty accessing economic opportunities and even more challenges acquiring 

housing for themselves and their families. The impact of the criminal justice system on economic and housing security for African 

Americans in New Orleans must be underscored. The wealth gap, 

which has been exacerbated by issues of the criminal justice system 

and educational attainment, must be considered when developing 

policies aimed at improving housing equity in New Orleans and nationwide. 

And I know my time is up, so I will stop there. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McConduit-Diggs can be found 

on page 64 of the appendix.] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. 

McConduit-Diggs. 

Let me begin by recognizing myself for 5 minutes and start the 

questions with Mr. Fortner. 

In going through our tour today, it was obvious to me that the 

activities that you are engaged in to try to build basically a new 

community here are such that you are not necessarily trying to 

build a place where people live, you are trying to build a place 

where people can have a life. I think that it was very encouraging 

to see what you have done. 

I guess my question would be, what can we do as a legislative 

body representing the Federal Government to enhance your ability 

to be able to do more with what you have the opportunity to qualify 

for here? 

Mr. FORTNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, everything comes down to the almighty dollar—$1.2 billion was invested 

21 

in New Orleans to rebuild public housing. It can be used as a 

model across the country as what the proper investment in public 

housing and in these communities are filled with comprehensive 

services, not just living facilities but, as you saw today, child care 

facilities, pre-school, after-school. All this is a comprehensive life, 

because it is not just about decent, safe, and sanitary. Decent, safe, 

and sanitary now talks about not just bricks and mortar but uplifting the human condition, empowering our residents, and giving 

them a better future as they move along. 

Easing of regulations can always help us toward flexibility. But 

when it comes down to building communities, there needs to be the 

proper investment from not only the Federal Government but from 

the State and local, and our business community also. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. I was talking to the gentleman this 

morning whenever we were walking along, and I asked him, I said, 

you have done a good job of coordinating all the different State, 

Federal, local funds, non-profit and profit, and getting everybody 

together to try to help in this. I said, what is the one thing that 

could really help to make this work, and he said flexibility, if we 

can find ways to make the rules and regulations more flexible. 

Obviously, we are accountable for the taxpayer dollars. We have 

to make sure they are used wisely and that they are accounted for. 

But at the same time, if there are ways that you see—I know right 

now we have a bill in Congress we are working on to try to do that 

very thing with HUD, to enable them to be more flexible to be able 

to address problems without going through a laundry list of boxes 

to check to make sure they do things. 

Is that something that you can point to a particular situation 

where if we had this flexibility, we could move these things around, 

we could respond more quickly or be able to do more things? Do 

you have anything like that in mind off the top of your head? 

Mr. FORTNER. I have been in public housing since 1986. That is 

almost 30 years. And during that whole time, the word ‘‘deregulation’’ has popped up every other year. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. And they take one rule off and add 

two, right? 

Mr. FORTNER. Exactly. The more flexibility we have with the dollars, because you can’t take a cookie-cutter approach from D.C. and 

design programs that are going to fit every community across the 

country. So the flexibility that we can have—the New Orleans environment is that dynamic after Katrina and moving forward is going 

to be different from a Los Angeles or a St. Louis, or even another 

city or the country. 

The flexibility to have local programs, designed for local needs, 

will be of vital importance and will facilitate housing programs 

being more successful. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Very good. 

Ms. Barnes, you mentioned something about some soft grants, 

soft second mortgage grants, and the program is no longer there. 

Was it successful, or was it a failure? Was it just so-so? Can you 

give me an opinion on that? 

Ms. BARNES. The programs were extremely successful. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Extremely successful. 

22 

Ms. BARNES. And they provided the only opportunities for working families in New Orleans to be able to cover the gap between 

what they make in income and what they can qualify for first mortgages and what housing prices are post-Katrina. These programs 

are funded through various funding sources that come to the City 

through the HOME program, through the National Housing Trust 

Fund, which have been decimated, if you will, in the years subsequent to the disaster recovery funds that we have received. Without that, the people who work in the backbone of our economy, 

which is tourism in the City of New Orleans, will not be able to 

afford to live here. 

The persons working in that industry make, on average, about $23,000 a year. If they are lucky, they make up to $37,000 a year. 

Without those gap financing resources to help them to be able to 

become homeowners, to be able to pass on wealth to their children, 

to be able to live in the City that they maintain the entire economy 

for, we will see a City that has pushed out the people who are responsible for all of the income that comes into the City. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Very good. Thank you. 

Mr. Randall, you talked a while ago about mixed-income neighborhoods, how important it was. Can you expand on that just a little bit, why it is important? And I think it is important to get on 

the record the reason that—and Mr. Fortner was talking about this 

on our trip today, why it is important to sort of shift in that direction and, quite frankly, why it helps build more of a community 

rather than just a place where people live? 

Mr. RANDALL. Definitely. Thank you very much for that question, 

and it is a good question, really a great question. 

When you look at the fact that we have mixed-income communities, it moves to the discussion of quality of life. A lot of the 

issues that we face, whether it be NIMBYism, whether it be affordable housing, it all hinges on the source of having a better quality 

of life. 

For individuals who live in public housing, they should have the 

same quality of life as individuals who pay rent. So when you see 

a community like a Columbia Park and you go through it and you 

see it is a mixed-income community that supports our homeless individuals and market rent, you see the same standards, the same 

quality of life being really engaged with that community. 

We saw early childhood education. We saw McDonald 35. We 

saw a community that could actually raise a child from cradle to 

college. So that promotes the same quality of life across-the-board. 

And if we can do that across this City, that would speak volumes 

about rebuilding a community or recovering a community. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. 

My time has expired. We will go to the ranking member of the 

subcommittee, my fellow colleague from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank all of you for your testimony. 

I would like to start with you, Ms. Hill. You mentioned 100,000 

African Americans have not returned to New Orleans. I think we 

all know the reason for the exodus, but I am concerned about the 

right of return and what you think is needed for New Orleans to 

serve as a magnet to bring back those individuals who are now, a 

23 

large number of them are in Congressman Green’s district and that 

City. So what do you think we need to do? 

Ms. HILL. Thank you. That is an excellent question. We know 

that the data show that there are many contributing factors to the 

reason why African American residents in particular were unable 

to return to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Certainly, the 

implementation of the Road Home Program and the way in which 

the rebuilding grants were calculated played some role in the inability of African American homeowners to be able to rebuild their 

homes and return. 

Also, with voucher holders and low-income folks, the very difficult process in terms of importing vouchers from State to State 

has caused some lack of ability to return. 

The lack of a right to return for former public housing residents, 

as we heard from Ms. Washington, the folks who were living in 

public housing didn’t necessarily have a right to return to public 

housing units. So we know that of the 5,000 or so units that we 

lost with the demolition of the Big Four, only about 600 of those 

units have actually been replaced. So if folks didn’t have a unit to 

return to, then they weren’t able to return home. 

Also, there are ongoing issues of affordability that contribute to 

people’s inability to come home. As we heard, over 50 percent of 

the housing stock, the private rental housing stock, was destroyed 

in Hurricane Katrina, or severely damaged. So folks were really 

competing for fewer units. Maybe some of those people who were 

displaced didn’t have the ability to come in and compete in a highly 

competitive and very tight market. 

Also, displacement has become a very big problem in New Orleans with neighborhoods rapidly gentrifying. African American 

neighborhoods, particularly those that are along the river, known 

as the ‘‘sliver by the river,’’ many of those neighborhoods are higher 

and less prone to flooding and damage as a result of storms, and 

some of those communities had been traditionally African American, but they have become porous, which means that white folks 

have moved into those neighborhoods and gentrified them, but African Americans haven’t had the ability to move into traditionally 

white, higher-opportunity neighborhoods. 

So there are many contributing factors that are at play when we 

talk about the lack of ability to return for African American residents. 

Mr. CLEAVER. In 1950, the Israeli Knesset passed a law called 

the Right of Return for Jewish residents anywhere in the world. 

They could come, and the right to return was based on some very 

real-life requirements, if you were born there, and they expanded 

a few of them. I can’t remember the date, but they wrote it to 

grandparents. If your grandparents were Jewish and left Israel, 

they have a right to return if they meet these qualifications. Maybe 

you want to think about that. 

Your testimony was a little chilling. The Road Home Program 

you were saying was blocked with people who were ripping off and 

taking pieces of the road. Is that a mild characterization of what 

you — 

Ms. UDDO. What I am really trying to say is that I just think— 

and I would love to give you all this book. This is what really 

24 

opened my eyes. In the midst of rebuilding and running the St. 

Paul’s Homecoming Recovery Center in Gentilly, I met those anthropologists who wrote the book from Cal State San Francisco, 

and I was part of the interview process. Many of our homeowners’ 

stories are in this book. 

She shed light on the private, for-profit contractor. When those 

Federal dollars are given to the State and the State has to administer them, they hire the for-profit, private contractor. What we experienced and saw was that the money did not get down to the people, and that is why the faith-based and the non-profit had to step 

up to fill the void. 

Our City is socially and economically where it is today not because these programs worked. It is really because the non-profit 

and the faith-based really rebuilt most of the homeowners’ houses 

in the City—many, many, many, thousands and thousands—because these programs so failed the people. As they said, the people 

who couldn’t get enough money because their houses weren’t appraised. It should have been like an insurance claim. It should 

have been based on loss and how much it costs to build a 1,200- 

square-foot house, no matter where you lived. 

That didn’t happen. As I said, in many neighborhoods—and this 

wasn’t just poor African American neighborhoods but in Gentilly, 

very mixed. This happened everywhere, that this disparity in the 

appraisal process was just horrible. There were 43 steps homeowners had to go through before they got an award letter with ICF. 

It was so handcuffed and cumbersome. 

I talked about one suicide. Our center has dealt with three suicides because of the failures and injustices of the programs run by 

private contractors. That is the bottom line. That may be chilling, 

but it is really the truth, and that is why I am so adamant about 

advocating that the non-profit and faith-based become more a partner with government and included and not just think, oh, they 

raise their money, and they do this and they do that. Meanwhile, 

ICF pockets $900 million, and we have people dying in the process 

and taking New Orleans. That is what I meant. I hope that answered your question. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes. Thank you, Ms. Uddo. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

With that, we go to the ranking member of the full Financial 

Services Committee, Ms. Waters from California, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much to all of the witnesses. 

Let me just say about the Road Home Program that it is a prime 

example of what should not happen when we have a disaster like 

this. It is not so much private contractors; it was your governor, it 

was your State that did not trust the citizens and the administrators of these cities to be able to implement a program that was 

being paid for. 

Anyhow, I guess that is kind of behind us. 

I want to talk about the chronic under-funding of public and assisted housing. Mr. Fortner, Federal funding for public housing and 

tenant-based Section 8 Housing Choice voucher program has been 

constrained in recent years, leaving many housing authorities to 

adopt policies to reduce costs. How has HANO responded to recent 

Federal funding constraints, particularly following sequestration? 

25 

What have been the impacts and the public policy changes HANO 

has adopted? 

I hear a lot about flexibility, and I hear a lot about flexibility in 

the Move to Work Program. And what I am saying about the Move 

to Work Program now is demonstrate to me exactly what you have 

been able to accomplish. Tell me about all public housing programs, 

because I am not so sure that it is simply flexibility. 

We cannot get around the fact that we need dollars, we need 

money in public housing. All of this wonderful housing that you are 

building, if you can’t maintain it, it is going to fall into disrepair, 

just like so much public housing is around the country. So, what 

have been the impacts of the policy changes HANO has adopted? 

By the way, I was out at Magnolia earlier today, and the housing 

was wonderful, but there are no programs there. There is no support there. The citizens don’t have anything, the children don’t 

have anything. So how much flexibility can you have in order to 

replace the dollars that are needed? Is that possible? 

Mr. FORTNER. That is a very complex question. Thank you for 

asking it, Congresswoman Waters. 

As you know, New Orleans is not a moving to work agency, because I have been affiliated with a few in my career. The success 

is based on the individual contract that is written with HUD that 

usually says that you have to serve as many people before as after 

you get this flexibility with the individual contracts, and the MTW 

program, as you know, basically waives the housing—the original 

1937 Housing Act. 

As far as HANO, because we are not an MTW, we can only opt 

and do reform within the context of the Federal regulations that 

they have. 

Ms. WATERS. How much of that can replace actual dollars? 

Mr. FORTNER. Not much. You can have local programs designed 

and have better use of dollars. But New Orleans is a primary example of the fact that other public housing jurisdictions across the 

country look at New Orleans and say, if I had $1.2 billion, I could 

replace all my units. 

There are 1.2 million public housing units across the country. 

Just to give you an example of the funding challenges that we 

have, as far as the operating subsidy we receive for our public 

housing units, we get less than $400 per month regardless of the 

size of the unit. Compare that to the Section 8 subsidy that we pay 

in New Orleans that is based on bedroom size. The average payment that we pay to Section 8 owners is over $700 per month. So 

public housing is expected to do the programs that you are talking 

about, enhance supplement security on half the money that the private sector gets to serve the same population. 

Ms. WATERS. The question was, do we need more money? 

Mr. FORTNER. Absolutely. 

[laughter] 

Mr. FORTNER. If you have your checkbook on you, we will take $100 million right now. 

[laughter] 

Ms. WATERS. Let me move on, Mr. Fortner. 

I have spoken with some of the residents who currently live in 

revitalized public housing in New Orleans who are happy with 

26 

their new homes. While this is certainly a positive outcome, I do 

have concerns that only 26 percent of the public housing units have 

been replaced with public housing, which is where HANO’s initial 

plans were. In replacing the units, this means that there are families who have been, in effect, permanently displaced from the communities where they once lived, and testimony from the Fair Housing Action Center and others shows that many of these families are 

worse off than before Katrina. Over 3,000 households were displaced from public housing, and maybe more, and only a lucky few 

have been able to benefit from the revitalization efforts thus far. 

We are a long way from replacing public housing in New Orleans, which is what I so staunchly advocated for post-Katrina. I understand that HANO has a strategy for rehabilitating some of its 

scattered site public housing units that have remained undeveloped 

since Katrina. Does this plan include one-for-one replacement? 

Please outline for us any remaining plans you have to bring back 

some of the public housing demolished, and do you need money to 

do it? 

Mr. FORTNER. Okay. I will just make a blanket statement: We 

need money. 

[laughter] 

Mr. FORTNER. Just a back-of-the-envelope formula says that you 

need two revenue-generating units to support one unit of public 

housing. So a strategy that moves forward says that we have to develop communities that provide two units for every unit of public 

housing. Of course, all of our plans are driven by whatever funding 

environment we are in at the time. 

As I go back, the $1.2 billion was a lot of money that was invested in New Orleans, and you see what was done with that. The 

fact is that if the proper investment is put in for public housing, 

then yes, you can do a one-for-one replacement. But because of the 

funding situation with operating subsidies, one-to-one replacement 

on pure, 100 percent public housing units cannot be sustained. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time, and I would 

like to thank Cedric Richmond for all of the information that he 

continues to bring to us about HANO and what is going on in the 

City. That information coming to us on the Housing Subcommittee 

where these members serve and I sit in has been very helpful to 

us. I yield back. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. 

With that, we recognize the distinguished gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, we all have, if we live long enough, a ‘‘but for the 

grace of God go I’’ moment. Hurricane Katrina was my ‘‘but for the 

grace of God go I.’’ I was right down the road in Houston, Texas. 

And had Katrina moved a little bit more to the west, I could easily 

have been one of the many people who found their way into my 

congressional district. 

It has an impact on you, and the impact continues when you 

hear people talk about blood covenants, you have to be in the 

bloodline before you can live here. 

27 

It has an impact when you hear people talk about, as Congressman Richmond has called to my attention, replacement value 

versus repair value versus the value that the home actually had at 

the time it was built. 

All of these things have an impact on you, and I am still being 

impacted to this day by Katrina, notwithstanding where I lived. 

One brief vignette. A family got into contact with my office. They 

were out on the causeway, among the multitudes that were on the 

causeway, by the way, and they had an appeal for help. Fortunately, they were able to get help, and came to Houston. They have 

had to start a new life. 

These were not poor people. If you assume that it only happened 

to the poor, you are sadly mistaken. Many people of means found 

themselves relocated with only the clothing on their backs. That 

was it. 

So I feel a sense of duty and obligation to do what I can to be 

of assistance. And I believe in this approach of being holistic because we sleep in houses and live in neighborhoods. We live in 

communities. You need schools. You need all of the support systems to help the whole person recover and move forward in life. 

I also understand the need for more actual facilities and the need 

to make sure you accommodate people who are without homes. So 

you have to kind of balance it, and I want to do that balancing test 

accurately. 

To this end, I will look forward to working with Congressman 

Richmond through his good offices to do what I can to be of assistance to you. 

I will pose just a question or two. The first has to do with the 

CRA. Have we had any banks move forward because of CRA, getting some assistance so that they can get those credits under CRA? 

Any banks? Anybody know of anything related to CRA? 

Mr. Randall? 

Mr. RANDALL. Thank you, Congressman. We do have an active 

partnership with Treasury and the FDIC that we are promoting locally here at HUD that we are actually bringing banks to the table 

to really take part in a lot of our initiatives that we have on the 

ground here, namely our homeless initiative. They have stepped up 

to help us tremendously in the homeless initiative. 

As you know, New Orleans was the first major city to eradicate 

veteran homelessness. They played a part in that regard. But we 

definitely need our banks to step up more as it relates to the recovery aspect. 

As I mentioned before in talking about promoting that quality of 

life, everyone plays a part in promoting that quality of life. I have 

been involved in the recovery for the past 10 years. I have seen the 

best, and I have seen the worst. So that is one of the things that 

we need to bring all of those active partners, and CRA is one of 

those that we definitely need to really hit the crux of revitalizing 

our community, and that is something that we are committed to 

doing as the Federal agency on the ground. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. I mentioned that because, as you know, 

financial institutions come under the jurisdiction of the Financial 

Services Committee. 

28 

One final question, and this one has to do with those who are 

arrested, those who are convicted and can’t come home and live 

with the parents, the children. They are evicted. Or if they are arrested and the family is living in public accommodations, they can’t 

come in. 

How do you propose, or have you proposed, or have you done any 

studies, do you have any empirical evidence to show the extent of 

this problem as it relates to some of what you are trying to accomplish here? Because I would dearly like to see us change the law. 

I don’t want to see families separated because someone made a 

mistake. I really do not. But for the grace of God, I have not always 

been in Congress, and I could have been a lot of other places. I just 

got lucky. Nobody was there to see me. 

So what can we do to try to alleviate this concern? 

Mr. Fortner? 

Mr. FORTNER. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. Mr. 

Randall wasn’t asked this question, but HUD recently, following 

the President’s lead, has actually talked about making more regulations, giving housing authorities the local control to develop policies that can give opportunities to those people who are reentering 

from whatever is going on. The housing authority in New Orleans 

right now is having working groups and stakeholder meetings with 

our stakeholders to talk about what we can do to get Section 8 

owners and property managers to embrace this more liberal admission and adding members to the households as we move forward. 

We have had very successful engagement and sometimes very 

controversial meetings, but we are moving towards initiating a policy that will give opportunity to those people reentering, from 

whatever facilities, back to their families and back into apartments 

to qualify for our programs, and we hope to have probably the most 

liberal admissions policy in public housing across the country, and 

hopefully we will do that by the end of the year. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you very much. 

I am going to yield back, because the Honorable Cedric Richmond has his share of time. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. 

With that, we go to Mr. Richmond from Louisiana, who is the 

resident Congressman. 

Welcome, and you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will just tell you that although Joplin was after Katrina, it certainly helps when Members have a perspective of a natural disaster and how the government responds. It makes it easier to understand what other communities are doing. 

Let me just publicly thank the ranking member of the full committee, Maxine Waters, for her assistance. 

Maxine, we talked at the field hearing, but if you remember the 

first time after Katrina, you and I and your husband Sidney were 

on a bus from Baton Rouge to pick up people out of New Orleans 

when the Red Cross and the National Guard were on the side of 

the interstate because it was too dangerous. Then you had the field 

committee hearing, and then just this past year we worked together to reform Biggert-Waters to make sure that our flood insurVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:41 Nov 04, 2016 Jkt 099779 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\99779.TXT TERI
29 

ance remained reasonable and that people could stay in their 

homes, although we still have work to do. And then now with the 

subcommittee today. 

And thank you, Al, for Houston’s hospitality after the storm. 

When people were looking for shelter, you all provided it. 

I do have questions. Mr. Fortner, I will just pick up from Mr. 

Green’s last question about stable housing for people reentering. I 

am sure you got our letter that my office sent you, talking about 

how important it is. One of the factors in recidivism is the ability 

to find stable housing afterwards, and we support you in your efforts to reform those rules and make them a little bit more liberal 

so that people can have housing. 

But, Mr. Randall, Ms. Barnes, or Mr. Fortner, you all mentioned 

the median rent, which was somewhere around $767, and then you 

mentioned the median income of residents. I think in order to look 

at it fairly, you have to take the median rent, but then you have 

to take the median income of renters, not everybody. So does anybody have that number, the median income of people who rent? 

And if we don’t, then it would be helpful to provide it, because I 

believe that the median income of people who rent puts us far 

above that 40 percent to 50 percent of their income in terms of 

rent. 

Let me just comment on what Ms. Uddo said in terms of having 

the community have input in non-profits. After the storm, one of 

the big frustrations, and it is still a frustration, is that people coming in, they want to help you in spite of yourself, as opposed to including you in terms of how to help build it. If we would have included the people in the community as we developed policies, we 

would have used replacement value or rebuilding cost instead of 

appraised value, which we fought for—I was Chair of the Legislative Black Caucus at the time—in the legislature, but we were 

overruled. We would have said that clear title in the Lower Ninth 

Ward would be a significant challenge in terms of them being able 

to come back, and we would have said the first thing you do to 

homeowners, the most responsible people in society, when they lose 

their home due to a manmade/natural disaster, is you don’t fingerprint them. In the Road Home Program, the first order of business 

was to fingerprint homeowners in the process. 

So when you put that in total context, I think that you see that 

the cultural sensitivity and cultural experience makes a big, big 

difference. 

Mr. Fortner and Ms. Washington, I will ask you a question in 

terms of where we are moving as a City. Is it sustainable? If you 

look at the rising real estate values, and then you look at the rising 

rents, and then you look at the lack of rising wages, and then factor in the shortage of affordable housing, and now I would say that 

Airbnb is going to play a role because you are taking out units that 

otherwise could be rented and they are not in that rental market, 

how do we make sure that working families, ordinary people, still 

have the ability to live in this great City? Because we want to be 

an elite City, we just don’t want to be a City of the elite. I think 

that is a big difference. 

30 

So, what is your vision? Tell me how we make sure that regular 

working families in New Orleans can continue to live in New Orleans? 

Mr. FORTNER. Thank you, Congressman Richmond. I don’t have 

numbers for the average income of renters. I have numbers for the 

average income of people in public housing and Section 8. 

On the public housing side, the average annual income of a pub- lic housing resident is $14,500. The average income—and this is 

annual income—for people on the Section 8 program is $11,400. 

That puts the population that we serve at around 20 percent of 

area median income. 

If not for the subsidies provided by the Section 8 program and 

the services provided by public housing, you are absolutely right. 

With the income rate at 2 percent, and rents raised to about 50 

percent over the past 10 years, those persons at that income level 

could not possibly have afforded rental housing—decent, safe, and 

sanitary rental housing, affordable housing in New Orleans today. 

As we move forward, there must be some sort of serious discussion as far as how we increase our inventory for those affordable 

units. The housing authority can do what we can. Congresswoman 

Waters mentioned our scattered sites program. We had an opportunity with vacant land that we can put not only public housing 

but help alleviate that public housing crisis that is in New Orleans 

right now. But we have to get together and have confidence, like 

we are doing with the City of New Orleans. We have to engage the 

public and private entities in New Orleans, business here, to make 

sure that we can look out for the affordable housing needs well into 

the future, because we are losing ground. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, and I see that my time has expired. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Richmond. 

We will go to round 2 here. 

A quick question for—let me follow up with Mr. Richmond’s point 

here. He was getting to the heart of a real question that I think 

is important from the standpoint of affordability. In order for people to be able to afford the house, to me, what I would like to see— 

and I asked Mr. Fortner this question this afternoon, as to what 

percentage of your public housing is elderly and disabled, and then 

the rest is—and I think you said 50 percent. So 50 percent of the 

folks have the opportunity at some point to work or be able to afford in some way, to be able down the road, hopefully, I think the 

goal would be to own their own home. 

We had a very passionate, very effervescent lady this morning 

we talked to who had that dream. She had the American Dream 

like everybody has. They want to own their home. I think that if 

we can design a program at some point where we could allow that 

to happen, I think that would be—recently, I had the opportunity 

to talk to some folks from Great Britain. They have 17 percent public housing over there, and they want to try to get people off the 

public housing rolls and own their own home or condo or whatever, 

and they are trying to come up with a program to be able to do 

that. I was hopeful that we could work together on something 

among ourselves here that we could do that, and with your help to 

be able to design something that would allow people to do that. 

31 

But in order to do that, they are going to have to have the ability 

to make a payment, to have a job. So my concern is, are you working with the local economic development people to see if you can 

bring industry in, bring jobs in, to have opportunities? It is pretty 

hard to bring people in and plop them down with no hope of being 

able to own that home if they don’t have a job to be able to, at 

some point, have that dream fulfilled and being able to afford that 

home. 

It was interesting this morning that Mrs. McMillan made a comment that her son makes a house payment that is less than what 

her rent payment is. If he can do that, she should be able to own 

a home as well, I think. 

So I guess my question is, where are we from the standpoint of 

economic—I know that you guys here in New Orleans have taken 

quite a hit. But where are we with regards to economic redevelopment of the communities to be able to allow people to be able to 

afford to own a home again? 

Mr. FORTNER. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. As 

you all witnessed, our mayor jumped on the bus this morning, and 

you could tell by his presentation that he has a comprehensive approach to government working together to utilize resources to get 

the best result to serve the people. 

As you articulated, it is not just housing. It has to be economic 

opportunities so that people have jobs, have access to the empowerment and being able to better their quality of life. Here in New Orleans, the housing authority is engaged with the economic development, the affordable housing community, and all aspects of City 

government as we try to move forward to build, as the mayor 

would say, the City how it should be, as opposed to how it was. 

So you are absolutely correct and on point in that the housing 

authority doesn’t work in silence. The housing authority is a part 

of the City’s affordable housing plan and economic prosperity plan. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Ms. Diggs, would you like to comment? 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. Thank you. Of course, that is certainly 

something that the Urban League focuses heavily on. 

I will start by saying that we do provide job assistance training 

to residents in Columbia Park. So that is one example where we 

are working to provide additional job training — 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Let me interrupt. Job training is important. But when they are trained, they have to have a job to go 

to. 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. Absolutely. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. And my question is, is the economic 

development there to produce and track the jobs in the community 

to be able to have people have that opportunity? 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. So, we have a long way to go, is the 

short answer to that question. Certainly, the business sector has 

been engaged and been brought to the table. But when you think 

about policies relative to criminal justice, that still excludes a lot 

of people from being able to access particularly high-paying, demand-sector job opportunities. 

The City has done its part with Ban the Box, but certainly we 

need to push on the private sector to do its part. 

32 

The other thing I will say in terms of what certainly HANO and 

others who have contracting opportunities can do is make sure that 

opportunities are available for small and minority business contractors because they often employ the individuals that we are talking 

about, and making sure that if there are any non-compliance issues 

with the DBE policies and maintaining a setting and adhering to 

the DBE goals that are set, if there are any problems with that, 

they need to hold them accountable, and we know that is happening in this City. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Quickly, though, I want to follow up on 

Mr. Green’s comment also about CRA. 

Do you work with the financial institutions — 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. Absolutely. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. —to help them look for opportunities 

to develop businesses so that they can fulfill their CRA? 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. Absolutely. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. And produce the opportunities for people to have a job and be able to afford those homes? 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. Absolutely. Several of the financial institutions here have leveraged their CRA credits to support the assistance, technical assistance being provided to small and minorityowned businesses. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Very good. Thank you. 

My time is up. 

With that, Mr. Cleaver is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you. I would like to follow up with where 

you left off, I guess with Ms. McConduit-Diggs, although any of you 

can respond. 

I think one of the things that we quite often fail to connect is 

the fact that Katrina hit just before the beginning of the Great Recession, where we lost 8.7 million jobs. The GDP contracted by 5.1 

percent, and our committee is the Financial Services Committee. It 

used to be the Banking Committee. They call it the Banking Committee over on the less significant Senate side. 

[laughter] 

Mr. CLEAVER. But my great concern is given the fact that New 

Orleans has somewhat of a service-based economy, how are we 

going to create the jobs that would be available to folks who need 

those jobs to purchase the homes? 

I associate myself with comments from the chairman of our subcommittee. Everything is okay, except we have to figure out how 

to get jobs. What can we do? What is going to be done? We can’t 

alter the economy—I don’t think we can—of this community. 

Ms. Washington? Or Ms. Diggs? 

Ms. MCCONDUIT-DIGGS. Sure, and I will be brief. We have to certainly do our part with looking at how we better integrate career 

opportunities in high schools. We have a significant number, and 

that is where we see the fall-off start to occur, that when we don’t 

properly connect to college opportunities or career opportunities, 

then we see this huge number contributing to our opportunity and 

beyond for joblessness. So certainly building greater and stronger, 

and funding stronger career programs within high schools. We 

have moved away from that nationally. We really need to consider 

that as a viable opportunity. 

33 

And I know that Tracie wants to respond. 

Ms. WASHINGTON. Thank you, Congressman Cleaver. You have 

hit at the heart of the matter. New Orleans pre-Katrina was a New 

Orleans that was subsidized in our private sector by poor workers. 

We worked people poor, but we subsidized their lives by having 

public transportation even though they couldn’t afford cars, by having public housing even if it was bad public housing, because they 

couldn’t afford housing otherwise. They were still working. 

We subsidized the private sector with bad public schools, and 

they sent their kids to those schools because we were subsidizing 

the private sector and not paying these individuals—who are all 

working—living wages and wages where they could afford a car, a 

house, better education. 

Now, when we came back post-Hurricane Katrina, while we had 

to sue and I had to sue, unfortunately, to get a lot of that stuff 

moving, to get people back into their houses, to get public housing 

moving so even the minor advances we had in public housing we 

have gotten, to get people back in schools and to get schools open, 

we have rebuilt a private sector off of those same poor people, we 

have just not enriched them. If we could pay that hotel worker not $9 an hour, because we are 

still going to need hotel workers in this service community, but if 

we could pay that person a living wage — 

Mr. CLEAVER. Does New Orleans have a different minimum 

wage? Is it $7.25? 

Ms. WASHINGTON. Yes, and that is why we are still having the 

public housing issues. It is not that the folks aren’t working. We 

are not paying them enough. We have an economy growing here, 

but you have to pay people to be involved in that economy. 

I don’t want us to leave today without acknowledging that our 

economy—look around. We are growing. But we are leaving a lot 

of people behind. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Mr. Fortner said earlier that the median income 

for the residents of public housing is $14,000, which is about the 

same as what you would earn in a year working every day for minimum wage. We have a problem. 

Ms. WASHINGTON. And they work. You don’t live in public housing and not work. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Yes, I used to live there. My father got up every 

morning and went to work. 

Ms. WASHINGTON. Thank you. 

Mr. RANDALL. Congressman, just to add that the number that 

Mr. Richmond asked for about the median income of renters is 

$24,399. That is the median income of renters in the City. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Very good. Thank you. 

Next, we will go back to Ms. Waters, the ranking member of the 

full committee, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You asked a lot about economic development, and I was looking 

at Mr. Fortner because I know what he was thinking, that I have 

enough trouble trying to manage public housing and provide all the 

services that are needed, and economic development is not necessarily part of my mission. But certainly, that is the mission of 

the mayor and the City council members. 

34 

They have land use authority, and that is extremely important 

in economic development, what you are able to do with that land 

and how you are able to make it available. 

On the other kind of development opportunities, if you remember, I asked about Iberville. I wanted to know who the contractors 

were, who the developers were, because I want to close the wealth 

gap, and I have come to understand very clearly that it is not simply through wages. You can’t close the wealth gap there. 

We have to increase minimum wage. Everybody is talking about getting to $15, et cetera. But to close this wealth gap, what we 

have to do is make sure that contracting opportunities are available to contractors who happen to be people of color, that joint ventures are available to our community, and that government, first 

the Federal Government, has to do its job to get rid of discrimination in contracting, respond to Requests for Proposals. 

We are looking at everything now from what is known as our 

TSP plan. That is who has all of our investments that we put all 

of our money into for retirement. We have none of our minorities 

who are asset managers and people in that community who are 

really involved, and these are some of the smartest people we have 

in our communities. If given an opportunity, not only will they provide those services but they will create jobs, and many jobs. 

The other thing is we have been fighting really hard about this 

transportation bill. Don’t you know if we would fund transportation 

by the Federal Government in a reasonable way, we could rebuild 

our roads and our streets and our highways and our water system, 

create contracts that create jobs, et cetera, et cetera. 

So I don’t want you to start thinking about what can I do about 

economic development. We all have a responsibility to be about the 

business of economic development, opening up contracting opportunities and making sure that people have the possibility to enjoy the 

wealth of this country. 

Even though this is a little bit different than the conversation we 

had before, flexibility—as I understand it, the HUD Secretary has 

talked about flexibility in this policy of allowing those who have 

been kicked out of public housing to return based on a criminal offense. That is so important, that if there is real flexibility—and I 

told someone earlier I have started to put together a piece of legislation called Second Chance, for public housing tenants who have 

been kicked out. But if you have the flexibility, we have to stop 

putting these grandmothers out of these units, and these mothers 

who just happen to have children or grandchildren who just visit 

them, who get in trouble, et cetera, because many of these people 

have nowhere else to go. 

That 50 percent that you told me about, Mr. Chairman, that is 

disabled or senior or what-have-you, these are some of the people 

who are being harmed with these policies. 

So if you have some flexibility, please use it. I am going to be 

looking with Mr. Richmond to see what we can do to make sure 

that in addition to the Secretary sending that message out, that 

maybe we have to try to get something in law that will help to 

undo that no-tolerance policy. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Ms. Waters, you have time left. 

35 

Ms. WATERS. Oh, excuse me. 

[laughter] 

Ms. WATERS. I never have time left. 

[laughter] 

Ms. WATERS. In the final analysis, let me just ask this. What do 

you think the Members of Congress can do to help with policies 

that would create more opportunities right here in New Orleans? 

What would you talk to your Congressman about that he will talk 

to us about that we need to be doing yesterday? 

Mr. FORTNER. Is that for me? 

Ms. WATERS. Yes. 

Mr. FORTNER. Thank you, Congresswoman. We have a blueprint. 

We have had successes, and we have had failures. Let’s build on 

those successes and gear our legislation and funding towards building on those successes. We know what the problems are, and we 

have a lot of smart people in Congress who can build solutions to 

get to where we need to be. 

Ms. WATERS. Okay. Do I still have any more time? No, the red 

light is flashing. 

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. I would be more than happy to give 

you another minute or two, Ms. Waters, if you have another question. 

Ms. WATERS. Please don’t do that. 

[laughter] 

Ms. WATERS. You know I will take that and go over time, too. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. We are here to find the facts. But, 

okay. 

Mr. Richmond, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. I’m sorry. Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. No, continue. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. My apologies. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Let me just start off where Maxine left off. We 

talk about economic development and all those things, and they 

can’t be in a vacuum. Let me just give you some of the things that 

we find that we are working on. 

Transportation is a big problem. If you look between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, Lafayette, we are very special 

in terms of we have between $80 billion and $150 billion worth of 

new development going on. But if you look at how industry or government responds in terms of TWIC cards to work on the river and 

to do those things you need a TWIC card, but you can’t get a TWIC 

card if you have had a conviction in certain areas. So we have to 

look at how everything runs together. 

Our government turned down the money for high-speed rail from 

the stimulus, which would have given us the chance to connect 

New Orleans to Baton Rouge almost like one city, up and down the 

river, where you have billions and billions of dollars of new construction. They would be able to participate, and that would go a 

long way towards full employment, livable wages, and all of those 

things. So those are things that we are working on. 

Mr. Fortner, let’s take a trip down some HANO stuff in terms 

of what we are talking about in terms of community benefit. I 

36 

know that you have a whole bunch of land which was subject to 

controversy that people wanted you to sell so that people could develop it. You made the decision not to sell it because you wanted 

to keep it, and I agree with your decision. As articulated to me, you 

said you didn’t want to sell it because you could see HANO finding 

developers to develop that land that would be future income, consistent income for HANO to fulfill its mission of providing housing, 

affordable housing, and also develop unused land, and I love that 

idea. 

Now, when we talk about employment, I want to take it as you 

develop the RFPs for those developments of all the vacant land and 

scatter sites, some of them in very affluent neighborhoods, some of 

them in other areas, but when you develop that RFP, can you put 

in the RFP grading for community benefit? 

For example, if you are using a company out of the community 

or a local Louisiana or New Orleans company, then that money is 

going to have a bigger multiplier than if you use somebody else. 

So the question is, as you go and start to develop these and find 

developers whom you are going to partner with so that you have 

recurring revenue to fulfill your mission, they will provide the 

housing and they will provide the benefit, do you have the ability 

to modify an RFP so that you could select a company that you feel 

brings the best benefit to the community as a whole? 

Mr. FORTNER. Thank you for the question, Congressman. Absolutely. The good thing about our scattered sites inventory is that 

it is not going to be restricted by the rules of sale or CNI, because 

this is a program that we developed ourselves and as much local 

opportunity as we can—because we can’t say in New Orleans that 

you can’t find minorities to work on projects. You can’t say that you 

don’t have disadvantaged business enterprises in New Orleans. 

We are going to make a focus to make sure that the people 

who—especially those who are represented by the public housing 

community, the Section 8 community, also that is an untapped resource that we have failed to fully exploit. We want to make sure 

that opportunities are afforded to people who benefit from public 

housing, who live in public housing, who moved on from public 

housing, who actually make a contribution to successful—absolutely. 

The short answer to your question is ‘‘yes.’’ 

Mr. RICHMOND. Well, I just want a commitment from you that 

if you run into some roadblock that prevents you from being able 

to factor those in as you award the development contract in partnership, that you would let our office know it so we make sure that 

they don’t exist. 

Part of the thing we talk about in keeping economic development 

and all those things is part of it is not giving $900 million to a company that leaves right after the storm. 

I am looking at the light because I don’t want to go over, and 

the chairman has been gracious enough to allow me to participate 

today. 

Ms. Washington, as we talk about factors and other things, 52 

percent unemployment among African American males is not sustainable for any community in the country, probably in the world. 

37 

So what do you see at your organization, and how are you all trying to address that targeted unemployment? 

Ms. WASHINGTON. Thank you, Congressman Richmond. It is not 

only not sustainable in any other place in the world, but because 

of our large population of African American males, and because I 

don’t know what it is about biology but that would make a New 

Orleanian percentage-wise, this community won’t be able to be sustained much longer because we are unemployed. 

All the things that we talked about today as far as banning the 

box, as far as ensuring that individuals who are coming out of our 

jails are able to find housing, as far as ensuring that there is education and training for them are important. But the most important thing we have to do is ensure that they are either employed 

and employed at a wage where they can support and sustain themselves and their families, or that we allow them to contribute to 

this economy with their own businesses. 

What I hear a lot of, particularly at LGI or in my other job when 

I am wearing my hat at the Sheriff’s Office, is I want to start a 

business, I want to get out there and be a part of bidding on these 

projects, but I have stuff in my past. 

Congressman Richmond, you have worked so hard in Louisiana, 

and I know Ms. Waters has worked so hard to ensure that these 

individuals don’t carry that burden with them forever. They work 

hard at reentry. I work with these guys at reentry. Just give them 

that opportunity. 

I can assure you, I was here right after Hurricane Katrina, and 

if I may just for a moment tell you—right after Hurricane Katrina, 

the one thing I loved here was from these brothers who were saying, man, I am making $25 an hour cleaning up, $30 an hour, and 

they were proud of being able to support their families and send 

money out of this community. Those jobs left, or at least those 

wages left. 

But what we saw was a resurgence in that community in that 

amount of time. I am telling you, I am sitting here telling you it 

can work. I have seen it work. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Very good. 

My apologies to the gentleman from Texas. I skipped over him 

a moment ago. 

The distinguished gentleman, who is always very insightful, is 

recognized for 5 minutes, Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you 

for not being sick such that we couldn’t have this hearing. There 

were many things that could have occurred in your life such that 

I won’t be able to be there on that Friday, but you chose to come, 

and I am grateful, and I thank you, I thank you for coming. 

I thank Congressman Cleaver as well for working so well with 

you. The two of you don’t always agree. I know that you don’t know 

this and that I am letting a secret out now, but — 

[laughter] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. It is no secret. 

[laughter] 

Mr. GREEN. But you found a way to allow your disagreements to 

develop positive legislation. I think you are doing that with H.R. 

3700. 

38 

Of course, the Honorable Maxine Waters, I just thank her for allowing me to serve on the committee with her. I am there because 

she brought me to Congress. It is a long story, but I didn’t get 

there by myself. 

And to my good friend, Mr. Richmond, you and I will continue 

to work together. I appreciate you so much for all that you do. 

And I thank all of the witnesses for appearing today as well. 

On the question of jobs, let me make this statement as a sort of 

a predicate. It does one little good to have a Ph.D. if you cannot 

acquire a j-o-b so that you can e-a-t. 

[laughter] 

Mr. GREEN. Jobs are pretty important for everybody, not just 

those who happen to be born in the sweets of life. Those who live 

in the streets of life need work, too. 

And I concur with the Honorable Maxine Waters that a good 

transportation bill would help this whole country. But I was just 

in the Lower Ninth Ward. A good transportation bill would help us 

with a lot of streets over there and put a lot of people to work who 

live in the Lower Ninth Ward. It would just be a great thing. 

And because I don’t want you to think we do nothing in Congress, I want to mention the Honorable Jim Clyburn, who has legislation that would target areas that have been left behind, very 

well-thought-out and very well done. It targets—I don’t like the 

term ‘‘pockets of poverty.’’ I like ‘‘areas that are emerging.’’ So 

areas that are emerging, that are trying to help themselves. It is 

a great piece of legislation, and hopefully we will be successful with 

that. I think all of the members of the CBC have signed on to it. 

And my final comment, with the time that I have left, has to do 

with something that is a little bit off script but important. The 

mayor said something today that left an indelible impression. He 

said that around 2008, for some reason, there was an uptick in 

young black males killing each other. Does anybody remember him 

saying that other than me? He said that around 2008, he said it 

was inexplicable as to why. I don’t know why, either. But I do 

know this: We have a duty, those of us who look like me, we have 

a duty to do a little bit more in this area. 

Now, there are all kinds of external forces, exigent circumstances, but this has to be dealt with. Jobs are a component 

of it, but it is not the end of it. There is something that we have 

to do in our own communities among ourselves to stop this killing 

of each other, and I am just curious as to what happened in 2008. 

I don’t know. I know about the Great Recession. We have been in 

a recession since I was born, so that was nothing new for black folk 

to be in a recession. Our unemployment has always been twice that 

of white unemployment. 

This is empirical evidence. It is there. So what happened? What 

happened in 2008? 

Ms. Washington, or Attorney Washington who works at the Sheriff’s Department — 

Ms. WASHINGTON. Works everywhere. I don’t know that there is 

any one particular thing, Congressman, that we could say happened in 2005 or 2006 or 2007 or 2008, or all the way up to 2015, 

but I know a couple of facts that may help people along the way. 

39 

We never, Congressman Richmond, fully dealt with some of the 

lingering mental health issues for so many of our young African 

American males who were affected by Hurricane Katrina. I will tell 

you personally I am a single mom of an African American male. I 

am one of the strong moms who was able to say ‘‘no way,’’ and my 

son got through college this year. 

Mr. GREEN. Is this the same son who brought you back? 

Ms. WASHINGTON. It’s the same son who brought me back. 

Mr. GREEN. Good job. 

Ms. WASHINGTON. But I represent some school districts here, and 

just this morning I will share with you the story of a young man 

who had gangs following him yesterday to a school. The police got 

there and he said, look, I am going to leave this school. He and his 

mom made a decision, I am not going to come back here because 

I know none of the other students will be safe in my high school 

if I am here. 

But we also know that child had lingering mental health issues 

that weren’t dealt with post-Hurricane Katrina. And I don’t know 

where that money will come from, but I don’t think it is sustainable to keep putting them at my other place of employment, the 

Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office and knowing that they still have 

those mental health issues. It is just perpetuating — 

Mr. GREEN. If I may just intercede and say this. I think you hit 

upon something. I talk to people now who were displaced, and they 

start to—many of them will have tears well in their eyes when 

they talk about Katrina. There are people who are still having 

issues, internal issues. We have dealt with the external forces and 

factors to a certain extent, not completely, totally and absolutely, 

but housing, better schools. But the mental side of this is something that we have neglected, and I thank you for calling it to my 

attention. 

My time has expired and the chairman has been more than generous. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. 

We have some time left, and we could go to a round 3, although 

I don’t have any questions. 

Mr. Cleaver, you don’t have any? 

Ms. Waters, do you have any questions you would like to ask? 

I know I opened the door, so — 

[laughter] 

Ms. WATERS. You did. You opened the door. 

Mr. Green just talked about, and Ms. Washington talked about 

Katrina and the impact that it had on children and families. I am 

still shaken by what I saw on television that brought me here a 

day or two after, the people standing outside that dome with signs 

saying somebody help us, please. I will never forget that picture. 

So if I am in California watching TV and feeling absolutely 

stunned and upset, what must it have felt like to be in the middle 

of it, not only as a family, as adults, but as children, not knowing 

what to do, and families and children who have friends who died 

in it all? 

So, you talk about the mental health problems that are not attended to, which we don’t pay for services for folks with mental 

40 

health problems. When we take a look at the homeless, a large percentage of them have problems that need to be dealt with. 

But the thing that I think is most misunderstood as we talk 

about violence in our communities is this. Somehow, people don’t 

understand or refuse to accept what poverty does to children and 

families. What happens when a child ends up with parents who 

may be on drugs, one parent may have gone to prison? I know from 

experience, having worked in communities, many of them in public 

housing in South Los Angeles, that gangs were formed where they 

said this is our family. 

When you pull the safety net out from young people and boys 

who are capable of doing things that even they didn’t know they 

were capable of, this kind of stuff is not really dealt with, not really 

understood. It is simply, ‘‘There is a bad boy.’’ 

It is not really, ‘‘There is a bad boy,’’ but ‘‘Who is this child? 

What has happened to him? Where did he come from?’’ 

So I think that we need a lot more resources to begin to staff 

families and to provide support services and to understand the role 

that we can play in healing people, making people whole and, of 

course, basically providing assistance in ways that some people 

don’t think is very important. 

People say you are either good or you are bad. No, you are not. 

You are both good and bad. It all depends on what experiences you 

have that will take you in one direction or the other. 

So, I guess I would be considered a tax-and-spend liberal. But I 

do know this, because I serve on the Financial Services Committee, 

and I understand the tax breaks that we give to some of the richest 

people in this country. I understand the strong lobbying efforts of 

special interests who get a lot. 

But what I understand and what upsets people is the lack of opportunity and the utility for the average citizen to be able to have 

access to the resources of this country and the representation that 

they need in order to break up some of the traditions that lock people out. So that motivates me to be on the side of the least of these. 

When we talk about the violence and we talk about the disruption 

and we talk about what can we do, it is not simply by saying, ‘‘Be 

like me, I am your role model, you don’t know what I have been 

through.’’ But it is up to us to find out what can we do and what 

are we willing to support, and what are we willing to ask our government to do to help the least of these. 

But I think we are going to have to get out in front of it, and 

this is some hard political stuff. But I think that is what we all 

need to do in order to get—it is not simply lock them up and throw 

the key away. It is not simply just pointing your finger and talking 

at them. It is about understanding, a deep understanding and support, and in the final analysis a lot of love. 

So I won’t preach anymore, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to have that opportunity. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. I was wondering if you had a question 

in there somewhere. 

[laughter] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Ms. Waters. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green. 

41 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. I promise to be pithy and concise, terse 

and laconic. 

Thirty million dollars remaining in Road Home funds, unobligated. Who knows how we plan to utilize it? 

You were waiting on that question. 

Ms. UDDO. Yes, I was. I have been waiting on a couple of things. 

I was just at a homeowner’s house yesterday in New Orleans 

East. I had invited them to come because I wanted you to meet 

them. They are still living with no floor, no kitchen, a bathroom 

that the shower is still—garbage bags to keep the water off the 

walls, a wrench to turn on the shower, no sink. This is a middleclass African American couple who did great before the storm. 

And I said they came to my center. Now, my center, as I said, 

closed down. We transitioned in 2014 as a senior social services 

center, and this was a strategy for me just to try to stay alive so 

that I could continue to help people, and we are serving now 300 

senior citizens a month and struggle to stay open, keep our doors 

open, all African American, low-income senior citizens in the 

Gentilly neighborhood. 

But what that strategy allowed me to do is people still show up 

on my doorstep all the time trying to get their houses back, trying 

to still come home. I feel so—you have no idea the pain and the 

sleep I lose at night. I can’t help them. There is nothing out there. 

And the other programs, the lists are so long, and there are so few 

of us now who are doing it. We can’t help them. So I said, did you go back to Road Home? There is still $30 million in Road Home. Did you go back? Oh, yes, we did. Well, what 

happened? The case manager—and she got her on the phone with 

me, because I wanted to talk to this case manager, and I believe 

Franklin now has the contract for this, the Road Home Program. 

There are two private contractors. 

Anyway, she said she couldn’t give her the money, and the case 

manager even went to her house, could not give her the money because some of the money she had lost was to a fraudulent contractor. Because this homeowner didn’t report and didn’t file suit 

because she had no money to do that, the fraudulent contractor, 

that disqualified her from getting more funds. 

So again, there is $30 million, but these roadblocks, these ridiculous roadblocks, it is just a deep dark hole that continues and continues, and this proves my point. If I had that money to distribute 

and administer, our case managers would go out, we would say we 

clearly see you have the need, we are going to make sure this 

money is spent properly, you are going to get the right contractor 

and you are going to get the money. 

So, that is my case. There will always be money because people 

cannot qualify because they just keep putting up ridiculous rules 

and policies. That is why I am so mad about this program. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Let me yield now to Mr. Randall. 

Mr. RANDALL. Thank you, Mr. Green. The $30 million that was 

mentioned that is left over, the State has committed to a rehab 

program to help the 6,000 applicants who have not yet returned to 

their homes. The State just admitted APA Amendment 65. That is 

Amendment 65 to the Road Home Program, which will allow for inVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:41 Nov 04, 2016 Jkt 099779 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\99779.TXT TERI
42 

terim housing to be taken into consideration, fraudulent contractors to be taken into consideration, and the use of inspections to 

go out and inspect homes that are subsequently rehabbed to make 

sure those individuals’ work is done and they can obtain a Certificate of Occupancy to return home. 

So there is a significant amount of money that is remaining, but 

the State has committed that funding to get those 6,000 people, 

those Option 1 applicants who have not met compliance to comply. 

Mr. GREEN. Ms. Barnes? 

Ms. BARNES. Additionally, the State is working with an advocacy 

group called the Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance to provide 

case management to those persons who have unmet needs resulting 

from Hurricane Katrina, and that was done by a great deal of lobbying by the advocates. We have been working with boots on the 

ground, with families who have not been able to return. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

My time is up, but thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, may I add one more thing? 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Sure. 

Mr. RANDALL. As we work with Mr. Fortner and HANO, I just 

wanted to let the committee know that HUD recently joined with 

the Department of Justice in the Juvenile Reentry Assistance Program (JRAP) which works with Justice to expunge records of youth 

that have served their time. So we are going to work closely with 

the Housing Authority, and I believe to date that the President announced $1.7 million to help in that effort with the Public Housing 

Authority. So we will continue to work closely with the Housing 

Authority as we work on reentry policies and procedures to help 

eradicate some of those problems here in the New Orleans area. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. 

Mr. Randall, we want to work with you on that situation with 

HUD there. If they are sitting there fiddling around with the rules 

and regulations and they haven’t done anything, and now in the 

11th hour they are starting to do something, we want to help you 

cut through that nonsense. We will be in contact, okay? 

Mr. RANDALL. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Mr. Richmond? 

Mr. RICHMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just start off with criminal justice reform, which is good. 

I just left a conference this morning, speaking at the Charles Koch 

Foundation and the Charles Koch Institute, who are in New Orleans having a criminal justice conference. I think there is tremendous synergy in Congress and across the country to get something 

done, because we have reached the point of the law of diminishing 

returns. Every dollar we spend on incarceration makes the country 

less safe, so we need to figure it out. 

Let me just say, because we touched on it right at the end, contractor fraud in this entire process was a tremendous problem. If 

you look at the demand when you are talking about thousands and 

thousands of homes being almost completely destroyed, and you 

look at the demand for contractors, you get contractors who came 

in from all over the country, all over the world who had shiny business cards and could talk real good and showed you a whole bunch 

of stuff, and when the homeowners gave them an initial deposit or 

43 

something else, they would start work, shabby work, and never 

come back. 

If you look at the magnitude of the construction that had to happen, it was understandable that people took chances because they 

were the only contractors available, and we did not adequately figure out a way to compensate people who were victims of contract 

fraud. We held some contractors accountable. We did that. But to 

make the homeowners whole, we fell short, especially elderly homeowners and other people who were not as sophisticated in terms of 

navigating this Road Home process and managing contractors. It 

was just that bad. 

People who weren’t victims of contractor fraud were lucky. Some 

of us were unlucky, like myself. We decided to play our own contractor, and that was just a disaster in its own right. 

[laughter] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. No multi-tasking. 

[laughter] 

Mr. RICHMOND. Now, I am on my third house, and I have learned 

from the error of my ways and I can do just about anything at 

home. 

Mr. Fortner, let me just go back to one thing that is critically important, and Ms. McConduit-Diggs touched on the DBE part of it. 

Watching my parents who had a small business and the fact that 

they employed everyone and they didn’t do background checks, 

they just looked at you and if they thought you were a good person 

after they talked to you, they gave you a chance, and it made a difference in a bunch of lives. And the fact that my parents’ small 

electrical business did a lot of work at the Hilton, it was what put 

my brother and I through Morehouse. It was what changed our life 

forever, because the Hilton took a chance on this little bitty company, and we did most of the outside electrical work. And because 

of that, not only myself and my brother but a bunch of other people 

were able to go to college. 

So as you do your developments, do you do a post-development 

report of the DBE participation? Was it meaningful? Was it real? 

And I say that because now it has come to our office through complaints about Iberville that the subcontractor was subbing to DBEs 

that the subcontractor had a substantial ownership in, and it fulfills the DBE goals. 

And I am not saying it is true, but it would be great if we had 

post-development reports that outlined every company that participated, what they did, and the ownership make-up. We just ought 

not have a prime-time subcontractor owning 49 percent of a disadvantaged DBE that is subbing to himself. 

So we just have to make sure that the spirit of the law and the 

goals are what we reach, because they could be employing or contracting with that small business that allowed at least my brother 

and I to get to Morehouse, and that, I think, would have a domino 

effect in urban areas, and rural areas, in terms of spreading out 

economic development and giving young men and young women a 

chance to really achieve their dreams just because of the nature of 

their circumstances, and you have the power to do that. 

So, I will turn it over to you. 

44 

Mr. FORTNER. That is an excellent point you make, Congressman 

Richmond. New Orleans just received—HANO was just returned to 

local control just over a year ago, July 7th of 2014. A very dynamic 

board was appointed by the mayor, which actually consists of a few 

DBE ownership. We are still in the growing stages of getting back 

local control because now we are going to commission this, engage, 

and this is a passionate issue for that board. 

As they move forward and grow, they are holding us accountable 

because we have not only reports, we have reports during the ongoing contract, and they are making sure now that staff in the Housing Authority are looking at those reports, looking for compliance 

issues and, as you stated so eloquently, making sure that not only 

contractors honor the letter of the law but the spirit of the policies 

that were put in place to make sure that we have the opportunities, the DBE, MBE, and WBE in our contracts. 

Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Chairman, let me just thank you for taking 

the time to come down to New Orleans and have a subcommittee 

hearing. I know that many of the people in the audience probably 

know this, but for those who don’t know, usually on Thursday 

when we have a week of voting, Members really take the time to 

get back to their districts so they can see their constituents and be 

with their family whom they didn’t see all week, and for these 

Members to forego going home yesterday and to come to New Orleans and have a hearing today on issues that are very important to 

us, Katrina didn’t hit in their area but their commitment is very, 

very special. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for that commitment and 

working with the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. 

Cleaver, in making sure that this issue of housing, and especially 

post-Katrina housing, is not one that we forget. 

And to the witnesses who have really been on the front lines of 

our recovery, thank you. Mr. Fortner, I know you have been here 

for a year, but what you are doing at HANO is a breath of fresh 

air, and continue the good work. 

[applause] 

Ms. WATERS. We trained you in California. 

[laughter] 

Chairman LUETKEMEYER. Thank you. 

I would like to sincerely thank all the witnesses today for participating and for your testimony, and also for your passion for the 

people of New Orleans and their housing needs. 

And I thank Congressman Richmond for inviting us here. I appreciate the opportunity with he and his fellow New Orleans citizens. 

For my colleagues who made the trip and continue to be with us, 

and for our staffs, it is a little bit of a job to put this event together, and I know our staffs and the different Members on the 

dais here as well were able to help us out, and I sincerely thank 

them. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. Also, without obVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:41 Nov 04, 2016 Jkt 099779 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\99779.TXT TERI
45 

jection, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous 

materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:48 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(47) 

A P P E N D I X 

November 6, 2015 

48 


99779.001

Introduction 

Good afternoon Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member Cleaver and members of the Committee. My name is Nicole 

Barnes and I am the Executive Director of Jericho Road Episcopal Housing Initiative. Jericho Road is a nonprofit, 

community development organization established in 2006 in response to the pressing need for affordable housing in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. As a lifelong citizen of New Orleans, with a twenty year career as a housing professional, 

I have witnessed and been a part ofthe Post·Katrina revitalization efforts as a homeowner, a former government employee 

and non-profit executive. I look forward to addressing the current conditions, progress made over the past ten years and 

the challenges that remain regarding housing in Post-Katrina New Orleans. 

Current Housing Market Conditions 

)> Fair market rent" in New Orleans for a one bedroom apartment is $767 monthly, or $9,204 yearly on rent. 

l> Median income in New Orleans is $37,146. 

)> Median Rent is $765; average Home Value is $183,700. 

~ Homeownership rates in New Orleans are 45%, weB below the national average of over 60%. 

>- African American households disproportionately pay more of their income towards housing costs~~ more than 

60% pay over one-third or more of their income towards housing costs. 

)> Both rent and home values have increased close to 50% since 2000. 

)> Approximately, 58% of all households pay over one-third or more of their income towards housing costs. 

Housing is typically the highest cost for any household. However, housing is only one of a household's expenditures. New 

Orleans saw a substantial increase in housing costs from 2000 to 2013, far outpacing the increase in median incomes. 

Rents have increased by 102% (50% when adjusted for inflation), while home values have increased 109% (54% when 

adjusted for inflation). As with income, the most drastic increases in home value have been seen at the high and low ends 

of the cost spectrum. The percentage of homes valued below $100,000 has been reduced by more than two-thirds, while 

the percentage of homes valued over $300~000 has more than tripled. While rents and home prices continue to increase, 

household income has not significantly changed since 2000. In fact, when adjusted for inflation, median income in New 

Orleans has dropped by 15% since 2000, thus the decrease in income has severely impacted current housing market 

conditions 

Homeownership 

In New Orleans, prior to Hurricane Katrina, for many low-to-moderate income working families, the ultimate American 

dream of homeownership was an attainable goal. The average cost of the typical three bedroom/two bath home, before 

Hurricane Katrina, ranged between $80,000 and $100,000. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the real estate market has 

changed trel!lendously with the average price for that same three bedroom/ two bath home, now starting at 

$l59,000.00.'This increase is precipitated and compounded by several factors which serve as very challenging 

impediments to a!lordable homeownership in post-Katrina New Orleans. These impediments include: decrea,ed supply of 

undamaged homes in the market; increa()ed construction costs for both labor and materials; increased insurance premiums 

and property tax costs and a lack of resources for increased gap financing needs. There were various programs funded by 

the federal government and administered by both the State and City to mitigate some of these impediments. 

Soft Second Mortgage Programs 

In an effort to help spur homeownership and meet the post-Katrina market demands for higher home prices, two programs 

were launched to assist first-time homebuyers. Both programs featured an increase in the AMI (Area Median Income) 

limits for homebuyers from 80% to 120%. 

l> Finance Authority of New Orleans (FANO) - This program was funded with $27 million of Disaster 

Community Development Block Grant funds through FANO and served I, 140 families from 2005 to 2014. 

The program has exhausted its resources and is no longer accepting applications. 

l> City of New Orleans Soft Second Mortgage Program- The program began in 2012, and has closed 891 

homes across the city and was funded by Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery funds. 

Program participants, on average qualified for approximately $91,000 in first mortgage loans, $51,000 in soft 
49 


99779.002

second mortgages and $5,000 in closing costs assistance. The program has exhausted its resources and is no 

longer in existence. 

Road Home (Homeowners Assistance Program) 

The Road Home program represents the largest single housing recovery program in U.S. history. Eligible homeowners 

received up to $150,000 in compensation for losses and had three compensation options. The program has been closed to 

new recipients since 2007. As of mid-2013, the Road Home program had successfully assisted more than 130,000 

Louisiana citizens affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The program has disbursed more than $8.9 billion to the 

residents of Louisiana to rebuild their homes. The Road Home program provided funding for 46,884 households in New 

Orleans, a total of $4.2 billion. Of those homeowners who chose Option l(Rebuilding Option), 94% have rebuilt their 

homes. 

In August 2015, HUD and the State of Louisiana have announced an Action Plan Amendment to the current Road Home 

Program--creating a category ofunmet needs for interim housing costs and the proposed shared equity plan will both 

provide much needed relief for Road Home grantees who are still struggling to recover from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

Increased Construction Costs 

New construction in the post-Katrina environment of New Orleans has seen a 20% increase in costs, preKatrina. The increased costs in both materials and labor have pushed the prices of new construction and 

rehabilitated homes even higher. 

Increased Insurance Premiums and Property Taxes 

Annual homeowner's insurance premiums have tripled and, in some cases for the newly insured, quadrupled in 

post-Katrina New Orleans. This is compounded by the fact that many large insurers are no longer writing new 

policies in New Orleans. New homeowners have had to rely solely on the "insurance of last resort", the 

Louisiana Citizens FAIR Plan. Homeowners have also seen significant increases in flood insurance premiums. 

Although homeowners have access to the generally affordable, federally managed flood insurance program, 

market conditions reflect an increase in these premiums as well, by as much as four times, in some areas of the 

city. Additionally, the new administrative fees that have been added to the National Flood Insurance Program 

have also impacted affordability for homeowners. 

In addition to increased insurance premiums, since 2005 New Orleans homeowners have experienced increased property 

tax assessments in areas of the city that were not flooded. Homeowners in these neighborhoods have seen an average 42% 

increase in their assessed home values. The aforementioned increases have resulted in many homeowners paying 

almost the equivalent amount to their escrow accounts as they pay toward principal and interest for their 

mortgages. This poses a serious impediment in real affordability for families, and in some instances can determine if they 

qualify for a mortgage. 

Rental Housing 

Housing is typically the highest cost for any household. However, housing is only one of a household's 

expenditures. New Orleans renters disproportionately pay more of their income on housing. The city ranks 

second in the nation for the percentage of renters paying over half of their income on housing. 

~ As of2013, 46,433 households (58%) in New Orleans paid more than one-third of their income towards 

housing costs, 29,271 (37%) households paid over half of their income towards housing costs. 

~ Nationally, 20.2 million households (52%) pay more than one-third of their household income towards 

housing costs, and I 0.3 million (36%) of those households spend over half of their income on housing 

costs. 

While it is clear that New Orleanians are paying too much for rent across the city, the percentage that renters 

pay toward housing costs is a relationship between household income and the cost of housing. A limited supply 

of rental housing and an increase in lower-income households both impact the percentage of cost-burdened 
50 


99779.003

households (paying more than 30% of their income). Additionally, the increased Post -Katrina rental rates by 

landlords have also been due largely to the significant increases in both property insurance rates and tax 

assessments that are in turn, passed on to renters. Reducing the percentage of household income paid for 

housing costs requires either cheaper housing costs or more income. Low-income renters who are cost burdened 

are extremely limited in where they are able to live, which impacts safety and access to essential services such 

as transportation options, healthcare, green space, grocery stores and jobs. 

Current Economic Conditions: Occupations and Wages 

The city's poverty rate remains incredibly high at 28% (100,605 residents living in poverty), an overall increase of 2% 

since 2000. The median household income remains unchanged since 2000, at approximately $37,000. Examining what 

New Orleans workers earn in relation to their housing costs shows that many key industries pay wages that make housing 

unaffordable to their employees. Many workers in New Orleans earn far less than the median annual income. As of2014: 

l> Extremely low-income households earoed under $23,549, per year. 

l> Very low-income households earoed between $23,000 and $37,000, per year. 

l> Low-income households earoed $37,000 to $58,000, per year. 

l> Moderate income households earned over $58,000, per year. 

New Orleans' primary economic industry is service and tourism. This industry employs the majority of low-to-moderate 

income workers. For example, 33,801 employees work in the Accommodation and Food Services industry, and these 

housekeepers, bartenders, fast food employees and hotel desk clerks all earo under $23,000 a year. With so many 

residents working in these industries, it is critical that we create housing that is affordable for the workers who support the 

backbone of the New Orleans economy. 

Displacement 

Housing displacement occurs when residents are unable to continue living in their homes and must move to another 

location. Displacement can happen for a variety of reasons. but housing cost is a major contributor to the displacement of 

residents. The following factors play a role in the displacement of residents in New Orleans: 

:> Increasing real estate values due to major public or private investments may cause rents and property taxes in a 

particular area to rise, thus increasing homeowners' and renters' monthly costs. 

);:>- Other monthly costs of housing, such as utility bills (water, electric and gas) or flood insurance costs, cause 

increases. 

Since 2005, an estimate based upon census tract data, reflects the demographic and economic transition where all but 

seven of the City's 72 neighborhoods saw ao increase in their average contract rent from 2000 - 2013. In 42 

neighborhoods, that increase was at least over 35% --the cumulative rate of inflation for that same time period. 

HousingNOLA -A 10 Year Plan 

For the past 10 years, passionate residents have been working with non-profit, community-based organizations to rebuild 

their homes and create a more equitable and resilient New Orleans. In early 2014, the Foundation fiw Louisiana's 

TOGETHER Initiative convened a group of residents and non-profits to develop strategies for improving housing policies 

and increasing equity in New Orleans. The Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance (GNOHA) was chosen by the group to 

manage the HousingNOLA process, assisted by fair housing advocates, deve1opers, and City and State officials - in 

partnership with civic, neighborhood, business, and philanthropic leaders. 

As a 10-year plan~ HousingNOLA is designed to provide a road map for future housing development in the city, and a 

process to benchmark this progress. The housing demand model follows a standard approach to measuring housing 

demand: considering existing data sets, and using assumptions about how New Orleans will grow to project housing 

demand for the future. The demaod model has clear limitations, but uses current data sources including growth trends, 

income levels, household types, vacancy rates, household tenure and anticipated new construction for the City of New 

Orleans. Based on these assumptions, over the next five years, the projected demand for homes in New Orleans over the 

next 10 years will be 33,593 homes by 2025 (rental and homeownership). This includes 10,952 rental units for low- and 

moderate-income households; 5, 720 market rate rental units; 5,628 low- and moderate-income homeownership units; and 

II ,293 market rate homeownership units, Housing demand is essentially what the growth of households will be minus the 

housing JikeJy to become available, and the demand that can be met through new construction, rehabilitation of existing 

homes, and conversion of non-residential building to housing units. 
51 


99779.004

Conclusion and Next Steps 

The Hou.singNOLA process has continued to engage New Orleans residents and key stakeholders in a community-led 

planning process that will create a road map for addressing housing needs over the next ten years. The Plan is divided into 

two distinct reports: the release of the preliminary report in August 2015, and the final HousingNOLA Plan scheduled for 

release in November 2015. 

Since 2005, 2!,622 subsidized units have been created in New Orleans of the overall 148,398 housing units in the city. 

These opportunities have been created largely through the use of public funds that were leveraged by private sector and 

philanthropic capitaL Public sector agencies have received billions in recovery funds to address the damage wrought 

following the series of disasters beginning in 2005. This influx of federal funds continues to play a critical role in the state 

and New Orleans economies, but the funding pool continues to shrink while the housing needs remain pressing. Housing 

supply in the city occurs in the context of long-term abandonment and vacancy issues. The damage caused by Hurricane 

Katrina and the subsequent levee breaches damaged 70% of households in the City of New Orleans, and half of all rental 

units. This large-scale displacement, the challenges faced by homeowners who did not have adequate assistance to rebuild 

and the choice made by many landlords not to rebuild rental units, exacerbated vacancy and affordability issues across the 

city. It is crucially important, that Congress continue to fund programs like HOME and the National Housing Trust Fund, 

which provide the greatest opportunity for affordable housing options. 

While much progress has been made with regard to recovery in the region, there is still significant work to be done to 

ensure that all residents who want to return horne have both the resources and opportunity to do so. 

I would like to thank the members of the committee for your time and consideration of this testimony. 

'All statistical data included was compiled and published in the HousingNOLA Preliminary Report, August 21,2015. 
52 


99779.005

Gregg Fortner, Executive Director 

Housing Authority of New Orleans 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services 

Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance 

"New Orleans: Ten Years After the Storm" 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

November 6, 2015 

Chairman Blaine Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member Emanuel Cleaver, Congresswoman Maxine 

Waters, Congressman AI Green, Congressman Garret Graves and New Orleans own Member of 

Congress, the Honorable Cedric Richmond. I am Gregg Fortner, Executive Director of tbe 

Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) and it is my privilege to appear before you today on 

behalf of HANO, the HANO Board of Commissioners, the City of New Orleans and, most 

importantly, the nearly 50,000 New Orleanians directly served by the housing programs 

administered through HANO. 

On July 7, 2014, HANO was returned to local control after various forms of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD) receivership since 1996. In partnership with HUD and the City, today's 

HANO has continued and improved upon the reform and progress experienced during the 18 

years of HUD receivership. Today's HANO administers almost 18,000 Section 8 Housing 

Choice Vouchers and manages over 4,000 housing units on HANO owned sites throughout the 

City of New Orleans through direct service or contracts with 3'd party property managers from 

the private sector. As a result, today's HANO provides affordable housing assistance to more 

than 10% of the total population of the City and 25% of all renter households in the City of New 

Orleans. 

HANO is crystal clear in its mission to provide affordable housing opportunities for low-income 

residents of the City of New Orleans. Yet we realize that HANO has a vital role in the future 

affordable housing strategies for the entire City of New Orleans. This year on August 29'\ the 

entire country remembered the 10 year anniversary and the devastating impact of Hurricane 

Katrina on the City of New Orleans. As we move forward in a City continuing to rebuild while 

preserving the rich culture that defines the unique f1avor of New Orleans, we must also 

acknowledge that the affordable housing environment has experienced a dramatic change over 

the past 10 years since Katrina. 

Recent studies report that, prior to Katrina, the average renter in New Orleans spent about 19% 

of household income for rent. Today, studies report that almost 40% of renters in New Orleans 

pay more than 50% of income towards rent. This is an especially tough burden for those 

households at 50% or below the area median income who live and work in our City, particularly 

those on fixed incomes. These numbers further illustrate the need for the comprehensive 

approach currently being undertaken by the City of New Orleans to ensure that the affordable 

housing needs of the current and future citizens of New Orleans are met through leveraging of 

existing and future resources, and partnerships involving the entire New Orleans housing and 

business communities. 
53 


99779.006

On August 21, 2009, Congresswoman Waters held a Congressional Field Hearing here in New 

Orleans, through the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, to discuss the 

progress of HANO's recovery efforts four years after Katrina. Today, I will share with you the 

on-going progress of those recovery efforts now I 0 years after the storm. 

Iberville Choice Neighborhoods Initiative (CNI) 

In August 2011, HANO and the City of New Orleans as co-applicant were awarded a Choice 

Neighborhoods Initiatives (CNI) Implementation Grant of $30.5 million for the redevelopment 

of the Iberville Public Housing Development. The initiative includes both an on-site and off-site 

component that expands well beyond the property's original footprint. The Iberville Plan is the 

most aggressive Public Housing redevelopment initiative in the history of the City with a total 

project cost estimated at over $225 million for the on-site component alone. The initiative 

includes 821 replacement Public Housing/project-based voucher units integrated into hundreds 

of additional affordable and market rate units. The many funding sources involved in this 

aggressive endeavor include: City of New Orleans HOME Investment Funds; City of New 

Orleans Community Development Block Grant (CDBG); State of Louisiana CDBG; I·lANO 

Capital Fund Program (including Replacement Housing Factor [RHF] Funds); CNI; HANO 

program income; private bank loans; low income housing tax credit equity; tax exempt bonds; 

state historic tax credit equity; and federal historic tax credit equity. 

The CNI on-site housing component consists of several phases. Phase l and II included 227 

mixed-income units completed this fall 2015. 212 units are currently occupied as of November 

2015. Phase III construction began in December 2014. Construction is almost 50% complete as 

of November 2015. Estimated completion date is April2016. This phase includes 105 mixedincome units. Phase IV construction is scheduled to start by the end of 2015 and will include 

164 mixed-income units. 

The off-site housing component has several projects completed or in development, including the 

Marais Apartments with 112 replacement project-based voucher units completed last summer 

2014 and an additional 64 replacement project-based voucher units completed throughout the 

CNI boundaries. An additional 164 units are in development and scheduled to be completed 

over the next 12 months. 

Marrero Commons 

Formerly Calliope/BW Cooper was originally constructed in 1942. The original number of units 

was 1,546. Redevelopment began in 2008. Funding included HANO RHF, CFP, l-lANO 

program income, HOPE VI, low income housing tax credit equity, State of Louisiana CDBG 

Piggyback and City of New Orleans CDBG. Phase !A and IB was completed in 2014 and 

included 410 units of which 143 are Public Housing. Cost of full redevelopment was $158 

million. 

Harmony Oaks 

Formerly Magnolia /CJ Peete was originally constructed in 1941. The original number of units 

was 1,403. Major redevelopment began in 2007 with a $20 million HOPE VI revitalization 
54 


99779.007

grant. Construction was completed in 2011. The current number of units is 460 of which 193 are 

Public Housing. Cost of full redevelopment was $177 million. 

Columbia Pare 

Formerly St. Bernard was originally constructed in 1942. The original number of units was 

1,464. Redevelopment began in 2007. Funding sources included HANO RHF, CFP, Section 8 

program income, State of Louisiana CDBG Piggyback, low income housing tax credit equity, 

FEMA, New Market Tax Credits, and private bank mortgage. Phases I and II were completed in 

2012 and Phase III Heritage Senior Residences was completed in 2013. The current number of 

units is 683 of which 228 are Public Housing. Cost of full redevelopment program was $190 

million. 

Faubourg Lafitte 

Formerly Lafitte was originally constructed in 1941. The original number of units was 896. 

Redevelopment began in 2008. Funding sources included HANO RHF, CFP, HANO program 

income, State of Louisiana CDBG Piggyback, low income housing tax credit equity and FEMA. 

Phases I and II were completed in 2011 and Phases III and IV began in 2014/2015. The current 

number of units is 365 of which 141 are Public Housing. Cost of full redevelopment program 

was $162 million. 

Florida 

Initial redevelopment began in 2002, however, Katrina destroyed construction that was in 

progress at the time in 2005. The original number of units was 734. Redevelopment re-start 

began in 2013 through Capital Funds and FEMA totaling $14 million. 52 units are about 90% 

complete and scheduled for occupancy within the next few months. 

Guste 

The original number of units was 993 including a 385 unit high-rise complex housing the elderly 

and disabled. Modernization of the high-rise complex totaling $7 million was completed in 2012 

through the Capital Fund Program. Redevelopment of Guste I and II was completed in 2007 and 

2012 respectively. Guste III began construction in 2013 with delivery of completed units 

scheduled within the next several months. Funding includes HANO RHF, CFP, FEMA, low 

income housing tax credit equity and tax-exempt bond financing. Upon completion, the current 

number of units will be 638 of which 577 are Public Housing. Cost of redevelopment is $81 

million. 

These are the major projects that make up the majority of the over $I .2 billion in federal 

investment to rebuild Public Housing in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina through BUD 

funding, FEMA, CDBG and other federal funding sources. Even with that tremendous 

commitment from the United States government, the 2,000 replacement units of pure Public 

Housing fall well short of the pre-Katrina numbers of over 5,000 occupied Public Housing units. 

Over the past 2 decades, the reduction in Public Housing operating subsidies and capital funds 

have dictated a new dynamic in redevelopment of this nation's 1.2 million Public Housing units. 

Communities with 1 00% Public Housing cannot be sustained. As a result, mixed income 

communities have become the mandate to produce revenue generating units that can support the 

funding challenges faced by the traditional Public Housing inventory. 
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Although the Public Housing inventory for the City of New Orleans has decreased by over 3,000 

units since Katrina, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) Program has increased by 

almost 9,000 vouchers allocated to the City of New Orleans. As a result, HANO is serving over 

30% more households than before Hurricane Katrina. HANO operates the 15'h largest HCV 

program in the country paying out almost $150 million annually to Section 8 property owners on 

behalf of the nearly 18,000 HCV participant households in the City of New Orleans. 

I would like to leave you with two innovative initiatives that HANO is undertaking to further its 

overarching mission to expand affordable housing opportunities for the people of New Orleans. 

In the past year, HANO has developed and launched its Scattered Site Redevelopment Plan. 

Over the years, HANO acquired and developed properties on over 200 sites across the City of 

New Orleans. Katrina destroyed the structures on practically all of these properties. These lots 

ranged in size from 1,300 to over 400,000 square feet. Using the best practices learned from 

Public Housing redevelopment across the country and expanding the housing footprint across 

several properties in designated neighborhoods, HANO's implementation of this robust strategy 

will augment the City's affordable housing stock through a mix of Public Housing, other 

affordable and market rate rental and homeownership units. It will also build sustainable revenue 

streams for affordable housing reinvestment, promote economic opportunity, facilitate resident 

self-sufficiency, and serve as a platform for continued neighborhood stabilization. 

Also, HANO is developing a plan to bring homeownership opportunities to one of the I" Public 

Housing developments to receive HOPE VI funding in the early 1990s. The Desire Public 

Housing Development (currently called the Estates) originally consisted of 1,860 units in the 

upper 9'h ward of the City. Through a series of misfortunes before and after Katrina, including 

inadequate funding, the community now consists of 425 units of which 283 are Public Housing. 

During the infrastructure construction phases over the years, I 00 lots were planned for 

homeownership but those lots remain vacant today. HANO will seek out public and private 

partners to design a plan that will help this neighborhood realize the promise of homeownership 

from the original HOPE VI grant while adding a key revitalization component to the rebirth of 

one of the City's most historic communities. This initiative will add to the successful 

homeownership programs operated by HANO that has produced 363 homeowners since 200 l. 

As I conclude, I again want to thank the subcommittee for the continued commitment and 

interest in the on-going revitalization efforts by HANO and the City of New Orleans. HANO 

will continue to effectively and creatively utilize all its assets and resources in the furtherance of 

providing affordable housing opportunities to the citizens of New Orleans. We further pledge 

that we will be exemplary stewards of public funds and justify the public trust that HANO is 

committed to sustain. 
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99779.009

Testimony of Cashauna Hill, Executive Director 

Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center 

Presented to the 

United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services 

Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance 

November 61

h, 2015 

Good afternoon, Chairman Hensarling, Ranking Member Waters and Members of the 

Committee. My name is Cashauna Hill, and I am Executive Director of the Greater New 

Orleans Fair Housing Action Center. GNOFHAC is a private, non-profit civil rights 

organization established in 1995 to eradicate housing discrimination in the greater New 

Orleans area. Through education, investigation, and enforcement activities, GNOFHAC 

promotes equal opportunity in all housing transactions, including rental, sales, lending, 

and insurance. We are funded in part by federal Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) 

funds from HUD. Our work since Hurricane Katrina first made landfall in August of 

2005 has focused on ensuring members of classes protected under the Fair Housing Act 

have been able to return to the City they call home, and with guarantees to fair housing 

choice. I wanted to thank you for hosting this important hearing today. 

I. Indicators of Recovery 

August of this year marked a decade since the storm made landfall, and many of you are 

well aware of the great accomplishments and many persistent challenges that this city and 

region have faced. I would like to provide you with just a quick sketch of some overall 

indicators of recovery, both at the city and regional levels. 

Of New Orleans 72 neighborhoods, more than half (40) of those neighborhoods have 

recovered over 90 percent of their population, according to the New Orleans Data Center. 

In the last four years, New Orleans has grown an additional 12 percent, ranking 28th in 

population growth out of U.S cities with populations of 50,000 or more. However, as 

you probably heard during the August media coverage of Hurricane Katrina, despite 

rapid growth and ongoing recovery, approximately I 00,000 African Americans have not 

returned to New Orleans. 

Regionally, surrounding parishes have also shifted demographically in the decade since 

Hurricane Katrina. These shifts are consistent with trends nationwide and the 

suburbanization of poverty as low and moderate-income people are pushed out of city 

centers. However, the "Katrina Effect" certainly accelerated trends seen at more gradual 

rates in other cities nationwide. 
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For example, in Jefferson Parish, the county just to the west of Orleans, the population 

rebounded far faster than New Orleans -with 95 percent of its pre-storm population back 

by 2010, while New Orleans only had 71 percent. The African American population 

grew in Jefferson Parish after the storm, but at a rate far slower (8 percent) than previous 

decades. Consistent with national trends, however, between 1999 and 2010, the share of 

the region's poor living in suburbs increased from 56 percent to 67 percent, with roughly 

61,500 people living below the poverty line in Jefferson Parish. 

To the south of Orleans Parish lies St. Bernard Parish. In 2006, the Fair Housing Center 

filed suit against St. Bernard for enforcing a "blood relative only ordinance" that 

prevented St. Bernard homeowners from renting to any person that wasn't a blood 

relative. Because 90 percent of homeowners in the Parish were white at the time the 

ordinance was passed, most single-family homes would have only been available to white 

tenants. 

The ordinance was passed at a moment when New Orleanians, forced out of their homes, 

were desperately seeking housing with reduced housing stock and limited options 

available. As New Orleanians, who are majority African American, sought stable 

housing options, surrounding communities quickly erected barriers to entry. 

Since the 2006 litigation and widespread press coverage, St. Bernard Parish has 

integrated considerably. With a pre-storm percentage of 7.5% African American 

residents, St. Bernard is now close to a quarter (22%) African American. Notably, the 

Hispanic population has also doubled since the days before Hurricane Katrina as well. 

II. The Road Home 

By far the largest Congressionally funded housing recovery program in U.S. history has 

been the Road Home, the disaster Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funded 

rebuilding program for Louisiana homeowners. The program was intended to provide 

direct cash rebuilding grants at a maximum of$150,000 for storm-impacted homeowners, 

with awards calculated to exclude insurance proceeds or other existing benefits. 

In 2008, GNOFHAC filed a lawsuit against the State of Louisiana and HUD because of 

the design of the Road Home program. Our housing counseling staff had noticed that 

many African American clients received smaller grants than white clients --even when 

the homes had similar square footage, had sustained comparable damage, and were 

estimated to cost the same amount to repair. That's because the grant formula was based 

on the pre-storm value, rather than the cost to rebuild. As result of this formula, 

homeowners from neighborhoods where homes were appraised at a higher value received 

more- even if the costs to rebuild were the same. The formula benefited white 

homeowners over African Americans due to high home values in white neighborhoods, 

and played a major role in displacing black residents. In 2008 and again in 2009 this 

committee heard extensive testimony from the fair housing center about this program, so 

I won't go into any more details. 
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In 2011, the case settled and made additional funds available to eligible homeowners. 

The settlement was a step in the right direction toward getting more hurricane-affected 

homeowners back into their homes and making good on the promise to rebuild a better 

New Orleans, but the truth is that the settlement in 2011 was a tremendously late 

recovery start for primarily African American households that had been left behind. 

While the formula was ruled discriminatory by a federal judge, in the meantime many 

people had made homes elsewhere or were overwhelmed by the costs of prolonged 

displacement. To date, the settlement has resulted in $16 million to hundreds of 

homeowners. 

1 to 100 

0 to -99 

-100 to-199 

- -200 to -299 

-300 to ~533 

Loss of A f. A mer. homeowners ot higher rate 

than the the City lost 

homeowners of all. races 

The map shows areas with the greatest losses of African American homeowners in dark orange. While the 

City lost homeowners of all races after Katrina, the hatched areas show where the loss of African American 

homeowners out-paced the loss of homeowners in the City as a whole. Source: Greater New Orleans fair 

Housing Action Center. 

III. Renting in New Orleans 

The plight of renters in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina is particularly striking, as New 

Orleans is a city where more than half of the residents are renters, rather than 

homeowners. Yet, there was never a comprehensive plan to rebuild or repair this largest 

slice of the housing market. The results of this lack of a comprehensive rental-rebuilding 

program are twofold: For one, much of our rental stock is low quality and suffers 

deferred maintenance, with families living in substandard housing that creates a 

significant public health concern. Second, there is tremendous pressure and competition 

on our rental housing market. 
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As a result, citywide average rent in New Orleans is up 40 percent since before Katrina, 

yet household income is only up 2 percent. Close to 60 percent of renters are rentburdened and pay 30 percent or more of their income toward rent and utilities. 

Shockingly, more than a third of New Orleans renters are severely rent-burdened and pay 

50 percent of their income towards rent and utilities, leaving little else for education, 

transportation, groceries or other necessities. Increased competition for limited 

remaining rental stock has pushed middle and lower income people to the margins of the 

market. 

No data available 

Further, New Orleans has not been immune to the effects of gentrification common to 

other cities. These trends have most severely impacted service industry workers, culture 

bearers, musicians and others in the cash tourist economy. It has also more severely 

impacted African Americans over whites, as the borders of historically African American 

neighborhoods became porous to whites moving into the city center. We do not see the 

same trends in historically white neighborhoods. 

At the same time that the city is facing a massive affordability crisis that pushes low and 

moderate income renters to the periphery of the market, both geographically and into 

substandard units, discrimination also has worked to keep people of color out of New 

Orleans' highest opportunity neighborhoods. 

In 2014, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center investigated fifty 

properties to determine whether landlords and housing providers discriminate on the 
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99779.013

basis of race in neighborhoods that social science research would indicate offer 

significant opportunity for healthier and more successful life outcomes. The sites tested 

included apartment complexes, single-family homes, and apartments located in multifamily buildings that advertised availability in local publications and online. 

Paired sets of testers, or persons trained to pose as apartment-seekers, contacted the rental 

agent for each of the fifty properties investigated to express interest, elicit 

information about the terms and conditions, arrange a viewing, and ask for an 

application. The testers in each paired set had substantially similar profiles and were 

equally qualified to rent the advertised apartments. 

All testers received standardized training from the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing 

Action Center. The training included both classroom and field training. Testers are taught 

to be objective fact- finders and to report, but not interpret, the results of their test. 

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the use of the testing process as a legal and 

effective tool to investigate claims of housing discrimination. Both the U.S. Department 

of Justice (USDOJ) and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) use 

testing to conduct investigations. 

The tests revealed that equal access to housing opportunity does not exist in the highest 

opportunity neighborhoods of the city. Of the fifty tests conducted, African-Americans 

who were otherwise fully qualified, were either outright denied the opportunity to rent or 

received less favorable treatment 44% of the time. 

Similarly situated white testers, on the other hand, were given the opportunity to rent or 

otherwise experienced favorable treatment in a stark demonstration of racial preference 

and discrimination. Unfortunately in New Orleans, not only does the place where a 

person lives contribute to one's life outcomes, but race plays a significant part in 

determining whether one can find a home in neighborhoods that offer the greatest 

opportunity for positive life outcomes. 

It can therefore be seen that New Orleans' affordability crisis, coupled with ongoing 

racial discrimination, continues to skew the rental housing market and push African 

American renters to the margins. A number of citywide interventions may help to 

increase supply in high opportunity neighborhoods, including enhanced neighborhood 

zoning and small local dedicated funding sources. However, it will take a number of 

local interventions and leveraging of local and federal assets in order to adequately 

address this crisis. 

IV. HUD Assisted Clients 

As this committee is aware, after Hurricane Katrina the Housing Authority of New 

Orleans (HANO) demolished over 5,000 units of public housing. While Congress funded 

the Gulf Opportunity Zone (Go Zone) for low-income housing tax credits to rebuild or 

replace affordable and deeply affordable housing, only 13 percent (or 670 units) in the 
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99779.014

original Big Four housing developments have been replaced more than a decade since the 

stonn. The demolition of public housing developments began even before the storm. At 

the time, the demolitions were justified based on high poverty concentrations and local 

trends, consistent with national ones, to move from project-based (supply-side) rental 

assistance to tenant-based (demand-side) assistance. 

The vast majority of former public housing residents received Housing Choice Program 

vouchers. As portable subsidies, the vouchers arc often referred to as a way to provide 

better housing choice for HUD tenants and increase housing mobility. 

However, this transition hit New Orleans at precisely the moment when approximately 50 

percent of the rental housing stock had been lost, increasing the demand but reducing the 

supply, and putting program participants in competition for remaining limited housing 

stock. 

As a result, the voucher program has increased residential segregation in even further 

flung and isolated areas of the city in the decade since Katrina. The program includes 

nearly a quarter of our city's renters: In 2010, there were 17,347 families using vouchers 

to subsidize their rent, up from about 8,400 in 2005-reflecting the replacement of unitbased assistance with tenant-based vouchers. 

Water 

Orleans Parish Census 2000 Tracts 

CJ with HCVs per Tract 

II 

~ 

IOrleans Parish Census 2010 Tracts 

Sources: HUD Picture ofSubsidired Hm,s€'hoids, 2010 Hou$lng Choke Voudler Data by Census 2000 Tracts; Amertcan CammJJnity S.urwy XKlS-2013 5-yt!ar tsr_1

mates 

by censusl!llO Tracts, Taliie 603002. 
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99779.015

From: The Data Center. 

Even before the storm, a 2003 HUD study found that twice as many metro New Orleans 

voucher households (21 percent) lived in neighborhoods of extreme poverty compared 

with a national average of 10 percent. 

The 2000 dissimilarity index for New Orleans was .68 (68% of African Americans or 

whites would have to move to in order to create neighborhood distributions that look like 

the city as a whole), in 2015 the dissimilarity index had gone even further up to .71. 

According to HUD, dissimilarity indices below .40 are considered indicative of low 

levels of segregation. Indices between .40 and .55 indicate moderate levels of 

segregation; above .55 indicate high levels of segregation. 

Yet housing options since the storm have only become more limited for HUD clients, 

deepening racial segregation and living patterns in neighborhoods of extreme poverty. 

According to a report issued by the New Orleans Data Center, 

"An examination of voucher households reported by HUD in 2010 reveals that 25 

percent of the vouchers were used in 5 percent of the census tracts (4,279 total 

vouchers used in nine tracts). In each of these nine tracts, more than 300 vouchers 

were used, which is triple the amount that would be present if vouchers were evenly 

distributed across all tracts. The number of vouchers appearing in these tracts 

ranged from 318 to 843. Seven of the nine census tracts are located in New 

Orleans East; six of the nine tracts in this group are in high-poverty areas; and all of 

them are in neighborhoods with fewer than 25 percent white residents." 

With the exception of a lucky few, evidence suggests that people who were displaced 

from public housing after Katrina and subsequent demolitions arc worse, not better, 

off, potentially condemning a Katrina generation to poverty. 

Yet, the benefits of living in a high opportunity, low poverty neighborhood arc well 

documented. More than a decade after HUD's Moving to Opportunity pilot program, 

where voucher holders were randomly selected to move to lower poverty 

neighborhoods, the children of parents who participated in the program were found to: 

• Have an annual income 30 percent higher than their non-moving counterparts 

• Have increased rates of college attendance 

• Be more likely to live in high opportunity neighborhoods themselves 

• Be less likely to be single parents 

Programs like Moving to Opportunity have been found to remove the generational 

persistence of poverty and ultimately generate better returns for taxpayers and 

decreased future reliance on HUD programs, yet program design heavily influenced 

outcomes. Successful demand side programs all included mobility counseling and 

supports for tenants, as well as landlord recruitment. 
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If the next generation of New Orleanians is to succeed, we must do more to expand 

housing choice and opportunity. This includes efficient administration of the voucher 

program and an effective counseling program with landlord recruitment and retention, 

pre-move counseling, search assistance, and post-move counseling. HUD should also set 

fair market rents (FMRs) at the neighborhood or zip code level, rather than metrowide. 

HUD could also incentivize administration of vouchers at the metro or regional level, 

which could improve access to a wider range of neighborhoods. Finally, as mentioned 

during the overall market discussion, New Orleans must do more to increase the supply 

of affordable and deeply affordable housing in high opportunity neighborhoods and use 

every asset to do so, including redevelopment of HUD scatter sites and even better use of 

adjudicated or other city owned properties. 

The last thing I'll mention related to barriers to housing opportunity for HUD clients is 

criminal background policies, again which I believe mirrors nationwide trends and 

research that demonstrates reduced recidivism with family reunification and housing 

stability. While Secretary Donovan issued guidance to public housing authorities (PHAs) 

explicitly allowing them to adopt more flexible admissions and continued occupancy 

criteria, Secretary Castro should take the next step and direct PHAs to increase housing 

choice for individuals that have paid their debt to society, or who may have faced 

possible arrest but without conviction. In New Orleans, where 60 percent of African 

American males have faced arrest, the impact on families is considerable. 

V. Conclusion 

Swift and thoughtful policy interventions are needed to ensure that the next generation of 

New Orleanians-the Katrina generation-is not permanently set back. With over 39 

percent of children living in poverty in New Orleans in 2013 and over half of voucher 

households including children, it is time we reset long term recovery patterns and 

promote equity for those who have been left out of the recovery. 

Thank you for all of your time and the opportunity to present, and I'm happy to answer 

any questions you might have. 
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99779.017

"New Orleans: Ten Years After the Storm" 

Congressional Testimony 

U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee 

Housing and Insurance Subcommittee 

By: Erika McConduit-Diggs 

President & CEO 

Urban League of Greater New Orleans 

November 6, 2015 

First, I would like to thank the Chair and the Ranking Member of the Housing and Insurance 

Subcommittee for inviting me to appear before you to discuss the important issue of the state of 

housing in New Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina. 

1 am Erika McConduit Diggs, President & CEO of the Urban League of Greater New Orleans. We are 

one of the 94 affiliates that make up the National Urban League, a historic civil rights organization, 

whose mission is to enable communities of color to secure economic parity, power, self-reliance 

and civil rights. The Urban League embraces advocacy, research, community organization, 

collaboration and direct service to advance our mission. 

The Urban League of Greater New Orleans strives toward its mission through work in three Centers 

of Excellence: the Center for Education and Youth Development; the Center for Economic and 

Community Development and the Center for Policy and Social justice. The housing empowerment 

goal for the National Urban League is to ensure that every American has access to decent, safe and 

affordable housing on fair terms. 

I am here today is to discuss: (1) the problem of the lack of affordable housing and rentals in New 

Orleans, 10 years post-Katrina; (2) how the problem came about, including a discussion of the Road 

Home program, and of the current and historic practices and policies that contribute to housing 

inequities and the broad disparities that exist between African American and White communities; 

and (3) efforts the government can make to address and eradicate the problem -for the greater 

good. 

I urge you to read the Urban League of Greater New Orleans' publication the State of Black New 

Orleans: Ten Years Post Katrina: http:/fwww.urban/eagueneworleans.or{l,lul/wpcontent/up/oads/2015/08/StateotB/ackNewOrleans TenYearsPostKatrina.pdt released this summer, 

for more information and a broader discussion of the topic. 

BACKGROUND 

As the lOth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina has come and gone, many people have been amazed 

at the level of progress New Orleans has made. We have come back from the brink and proven our 

resilience. However, in my view, the road to recovery has been paved with inequities. The postKatrina New Orleans recovery is really a "tale of two cities"; African Americans and communities of 
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color in New Orleans are having a markedly different experience with the recovery than White 

residents. 

This is clear from the varying responses from a recent survey conducted by the Public Policy Lab at 

the LSU Reilly Center for Media and Public Affairs, where: 

Nearly 80 percent of White New Orleanians feel the city has mostly recovered, but less than 

60 percent of African Americans feel this way; 

• Over 60 percent of White residents feel the economy is better now, than pre-Katrina, but 

only 10 percent of African Americans feel this way. 

As a Native New Orleanian, I am intimately aware of the inequities that have contributed to the 

disparate perspectives of African American and White residents regarding post-Katrina New 

Orleans recovery. For instance, most poor and working class families lived at or below sea level in 

New Orleans- one of the primary reasons they were so heavily impacted by the floods resulting 

from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Historically, African Americans have encountered discriminatory practices that pushed them into 

low-lying neighborhoods of the city. Practices such as Redlining prevented African Americans from 

securing mortgages for homes in desirable neighborhoods, while veterans returning after World 

War II found their VA Housing Loans and GI Bills delayed or denied. Many families that were able to 

access these benefits did so after properties in the safest neighborhoods in the city were full. 

African American families also encountered blatant racial discrimination in the sale of homes. Some 

of these issues remain a barrier to housing equity in New Orleans, such as housing discrimination in 

the rental market in high opportunity neighborhoods in the city. 

Additionally, accessing insurance enough to fully insure a home was and continues to be out of 

reach for many African American families in New Orleans because the cost to do so is beyond the 

financial means of working class families. This has made it significantly more difficult for many 

families to return to the city resulting in a sharp decline in the number of African Americans in 

post-Katrina New Orleans. Similarly, policies and practices in post-Katrina New Orleans have also 

resulted in slower recovery in African American neighborhoods, particularly New Orleans East and 

the Lower Ninth Ward. Increased insurance costs, low wage jobs and poor economic prospects, 

flawed Road Home policies, and other related challenges have worked against the goal to 

deconcentrate poverty and instead have limited options for African Americans to repopulate in 

well-resourced neighborhoods. 

In general: 

Ten percent of New Orleans Metro residents have not returned to their pre-Katrina homes; 

Approximately 70 percent of White residents were able to access their homes within a year, 

compared to only 42 percent of African American residents; 
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On(y 54 percent of African American residents returned to their pre-Katrina communities, 

compared to over 80 percent of White residents; 

Before Katrina, more than two-thirds of the city's residents were African American, 

however African Americans currently make up approximately 60 percent of the population; 

• Near(y 100,000 African Americans have not returned since the storm compared to a loss of 

roughly 11,000 whites; 

Now, over 30 percent of New Orleans' residents are White; 

More than 10 percent of the city's residents arrived after Katrina- most of whom are White 

-totaling between 25,000 and 30,000 people; 

Approximately 90 percent of the pre-Katrina New Orleans' population-count is back and 88 

percent of the housing inventory is restored; 

It is estimated there are 28,000 blighted properties in New Orleans, down from 

approximately 150,000, immediately following Katrina; 

By all estimates, the city is reducing blight, recovering its housing inventory and regaining strength 

in numbers within its population. But the city's African American population has experienced major 

losses including lower rates of return, significant population decline, and slower recovery overall. 

In most cases, the successes and failures of the recovery can be directly attributed to government 

policies that were implemented in the immediate aftermath of Katrina. We acknowledge the 

progress made through the Community Development Block Grant, Low Income Housing Tax Credits 

and the City's BlightStat program. We congratulate the Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance and 

its partners on the HousingNOLA plan and their work to improve housing policies and to increase 

equity in New Orleans. We also commend the efforts oflocal and national organizations, 

corporations, developers, families, friends, neighbors, volunteers and colleagues who used private 

and government funding, sweat equity and sheer determination to affect positive change for the 

city and its residents. We have come a long way from discussions about "shrinking the footprint" 

and starting off with a "blank slate," and we have pressed forward. But there is a lot more work to 

do. 

Many people agree the recovery process has been implemented unfairly, on its face and inapplication, and that it has exacerbated many of the inequities that existed before Katrina. Only 

approximately 25 percent of New Orleanians believe the government did all it could to ensure an 

equitable recovery. Failures such as: (1) inadequate housing code enforcement to prevent poor 

rental conditions and crime and blight in vulnerable neighborhoods; (2) the razing of public 

housing structures when affordable housing was needed the most; (3) the dearth of necessary 

Housing Choice Vouchers to address the overwhelming number of people in need of affordable 

housing; and ( 4) myriad fair housing concerns including housing discrimination against African 

Americans in "high opportunity neighborhoods" and exclusionary housing policies that prevent 

individuals with criminal convictions and their families from accessing public housing, all help to 
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confirm this view. In my opinion, however, none of the failures were more egregious than the 

failures associated with the Road Home program. 

ROAD HOME 

Road Home was designed to "help Louisiana residents get back into their homes or apartments as 

quickly and fairly as possible." The program provided grants to help homeowners cover uninsured 

losses after the storm -mainly due to the refusal of insurance companies to cover damages deemed 

to have been caused by flooding; rather than wind- to help them repair their homes or relocate. 

While the overwhelming majority of residents who applied for the program received funding, 

several glitches limited its effectiveness, and according to many experts, helped to encourage 

displaced and dislocated African Americans from returning back to the city. For example, the 

program was delayed. It did not officially launch until one year after Katrina. 

Approximately 130,000 homeowners received funding through the program, averaging $64,000 per 

recipient. However, many homeowners faced major funding gaps- making it nearly impossible to 

make the requisite repairs to their homes. 

According to the State of Black New Orleans, Ten Years Post Katrina Report, "The shortfall of funding 

was a direct result of Road Home's policy in determining how much funding homeowners could 

receive. The formula was based on the pre-Katrina assessed value of the home or the actual cost to 

repair the home- whichever amount was less. For example, a home valued at $70,000 with $90,000 

of home rebuilding costs would only receive $70,000 thus creating a $20,000 shortage. This policy 

created an even more deleterious effect for African American communities dealing with the 

nationwide trend of depressed market value attributed to homes located in predominantly Black 

neighborhoods. 

Policy Link (2007) found that African American households had an almost 35 [percent] higher 

shortfall than White households. A neighborhood-by-neighborhood analysis showed that in 

predominantly Black areas such as New Orleans East and the Lower 9th ward, 60 [percent] of 

homeowners ended up with average gaps of $65,000 and $68,000 respectively." 

As a result, a class action lawsuit was filed against HUD and the Louisiana Recovery Authority, the 

federal and state agencies operating the program, for the disparate treatment of African American 

homeowners. The suit was settled in 2011. 

In addition to Road Home's funding shortfalls, inadequate oversight and policy changes to the 

program helped lead to contractor fraud. According to a recent study, approximately 9,000 

households were affected. "In 40 percent of the cases, the homeowner was unable to finish 

rebuilding. More than half of the incidents were reported, but in 41 percent of the cases no action 

was taken by the authorities. Only 1 percent of victimized homeowners [were made whole]." 

WEALTH/ INCOME AND POVERTY GAPS 

According to the National Urban League's 2015 State of Black America Equalit;y Index, African 

Americans have only six cents of wealth for every dollar of wealth that Whites have, nationwide. 
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Unfortunately, most of this wealth, approximately 90 percent, is tied up in African Americans' 

homes. The wealth gap between African American and White New Orleanians can be explained by 

highlighting several key economic inequities. 

African American New Orleanians have: (1) higher unemployment; (2) lower educational 

attainment; (3) earn less income; (4) face skyrocketing rents; (5) suffer high levels of 

discrimination; and (6) have a higher poverty rate. Add to that: (7) the uneven housing policies 

implemented after Katrina; (8) the slow appreciation of homes in African American neighborhoods; 

and (9) the financial crisis, resulting in a disproportionate number of foreclosures and homes with 

negative equity in the community. 

Taken together, economic conditions of African Americans must be considered in any retrospective 

and current analysis of the housing conditions in New Orleans. 

In particular: 

The current homeownership rate in New Orleans is approximately 46%, 17% lower than 

the national homeownership rate; 

Nearly 60 percent of the city's tenants are "cost-burdened" by their rent- meaning they 

spend at least 30 percent or more of their income on housing and housing related expenses; 

At approximately 27 percent, New Orleans' poverty rate is more than double that of the 

national rate; 

More than half of African American children in New Orleans live in poverty; 

More than half of African American men in New Orleans were jobless in 2011; 

Only 14 percent of African American men and 21 percent of African American women had 

bachelor's degrees or higher in 2014 as compared to 63 percent of White men and 64 

percent of White women in New Orleans; 

Minority businesses represent nearly 27 percent of the businesses in New Orleans, but only 

account for 2 percent of gross receipts; 

The median income for African American residents is just over $25,000, compared to 

Whites who earn nearly $61,000 (more than 2.4 times higher than African Americans); 

Nearly 45 percent of African American families in New Orleans earn less than $20,900, 

annually; and 

Only 7 percent of African Americans in New Orleans earn $105,000 or more. 

When directly compared to the current average costs of home ownership and insurance rates, 

African American New Orleanians are at a severe disadvantage compared to their White 

counterparts. 
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In 2010,90 percent of the families that received HUD Housing Choice Voucher were African 

American; 

While the number of families that received HUD Housing Choice Voucher tripled between 

2000 and 2010, there are still currently 20,000 families on the waiting list. 

And I would be remiss if I did not mention the high rates of incarceration of African Americans in 

this city and state and its economic impact on the African American community. 

• One in seven African American males in New Orleans are under the supervision of the 

criminal justice system; 

African Americans represent approximately 60 percent of the population in New Orleans 

yet make up 90 percent of the local prison population; and 

African Americans make up 32 percent of the state population yet represent 67 percent of 

the prison population. 

High rates of incarceration in New Orleans are almost exclusively impacting the African American 

community. Individuals with criminal convictions have greater difficulty accessing economic 

opportunities and even more challenges acquiring housing for themselves and their families. The 

impact of the criminal justice system on economic and housing security for African Americans in 

New Orleans must be underscored. The wealth gap, which is exacerbated by issues with the 

criminal justice system and educational attainment, must be considered when developing policies 

aimed at improving housing equity in New Orleans and nationwide. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

We can add to the progress that we have made over the last 10 years, hy committing to several key 

improvements, including the following: 

The U.S. Congress should increase funding levels for the CDBG and HOME Investment 

Partnerships Programs to help with home purchases and rental assistance, and to build 

additional affordable housing units, especially in high opportunity areas; 

The U.S. Congress should permanently extend the Low Income Housing Tax Credit to help 

build additional affordable housing units, especially in high opportunity areas; 

The U.S. Congress and/ or the City of New Orleans should increase small business 

contracting procurement goals and accountability measures to keep up with the demand of 

qualified disadvantaged business enterprises; 

Relevant stakeholders should continue to support Mayor Landrieu's PropserityNOLA fiveyear development plan and the BuildNOLA program to ensure African American small 

businesses have the opportunity to compete for City contracts; 

The U.S. Congress and/ or the City of New Orleans should provide additional job training 

programs to decrease the unemployment rate and help increase the average income; 
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The U.S. Congress, the State of Louisiana, and/ or the City of New Orleans should pass an 

increase in the minimum wage to address residents' below average income; 

The City of New Orleans' Office of Code Enforcement should be held accountable to 

investigate and enforce claims against "slum" landlords of both occupied and unoccupied 

units to ensure tenants live in safe and decent housing; 

The City of New Orleans should seek to deepen the inclusionary zoning incentives in its 

2014 New Orleans Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance to ensure more affordable housing 

units are built; 

The City of New Orleans should improve the quality of its rental stock to ensure all New 

Orleanians have access to safe, decent and affordable rentals; 

• The City of New Orleans should use its Neighborhood Housing Improvement Fund to help 

expand housing choices to low and moderate income families; 

• The City of New Orleans, HUD and other appropriate parties should provide incentives for 

investments in poverty-stricken neighborhoods; 

• New Orleans City Council should strengthen the New Orleans Human Relations Commission 

to effectively combat housing discrimination; 

New Orleans City Council should seek to strengthen its fair housing laws to ensure people of 

color are not discriminated against when seeking to rent or buy a home; 

HUD should increase the availability of its Housing Choice Vouchers to meet the demand of 

the resident~ who need more affordable housing options; 

HUD should help incentivize landlords to accept housing vouchers in high opportunity 

neighborhoods to ensure voucher holders are not forced to live in low income and very-low 

income neighborhoods; 

HUD and LRA should continue to advertise the Road Home program to encourage native 

New Orleanians to move back to the city, in addition to creating more innovative ways to 

incentivize them to move back; 

HUD and LRA should identify strategies to expedite claims of contractor fraud to help get 

homeowners who qualified for Road Home back into their homes; 

Relevant stakeholders should continue to zealously pursue fair housing violations to ensure 

people of color are not unfairly discriminated against; 

Relevant stakeholders should continue to support the HousingNOLA plan that improves 

housing policies and forwards the goat of eliminating inequities in New Orleans. 
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The Housing Authority of New Orleans should accelerate their development of a housing 

policy that eliminates the exclusion of individuals with criminal convictions and their 

families from accessing public housing. 

In closing, I believe that New Orleans still has the opportunity to actualize its promise to fully 

recover, allowing all of its former and new residents access to quality, fair and affordable housing 

options. Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee today. 
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U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Washington. DC 20410 

Written Testimony of Earl Randall, Ill 

New Orleans Fidd Office Director 

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Hearing before the Committee on f~inancial Services, Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance 

on 

~' New Orleans; Ten Years After the Storm" 

Friday. November 6, 2015 
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Good morning, Chairman Luetkemeyer, Ranking Member Cleaver, and Members of the 

Committee. My name is Earl Randall, Ill, and I have been Director of the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Field Office here in New Orleans for the past two 

years. We are grateful for the Chairman and Ranking Member's leadership in calling for this 

hearing and your interest in seeing our recovery progress this morning during the tour. If I may, 

I would also like to give a special acknowledgement to Ranking Member Waters for her 

presence here as she maintained her interest in New Orleans' recovery effort over the past 

decade. Thank you for inviting me to be here today. 

Community Development Block Grant- Disaster Recovery 

Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath created unprecedented destruction along the Gulf 

Coast and inflicted a human toll of more than l ,800 lives. Over the last I 0 years, investments 

made through HUD's programs have had a major impact on the recovery in the Gulf region. The 

Department has worked closely with state and local leaders, and effectively managed nearly $20 

billion delivered through the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBGDR) Program to help the region recover from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma. Hurricane 

Katrina has forever changed New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. The post-recovery chapter of 

HUD's relationship with New Orleans builds off the substantial recovery of the past 10 years, 

and now focuses on how to make New Orleans and the Gulf Coast communities- and the 

residents of every neighborhood- successful in the 2! st Century. 

At the time of Hurricane Katrina, I was HUD's Community Planning and Development 

(CPD) representative for Shreveport and Bossier City. Immediately after Katrina made landfall, 

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I was asked by the Field Office Director to coordinate HUD's on-the-ground responses to the 

devastation caused by Katrina. One of my first official duties was to coordinate a Congressional 

field hearing here in New Orleans, so I have come full circle to be on the witness panel today to 

discuss HUD's role in the recovery. 

In my role with HUD over the past decade, I have had a first-hand opportunity to watch 

how CDBG-DR funds were the driving force in the recovery, filling funding gaps and providing 

flexibility that caused the community to carefully think through recovery plans and how best to 

meet its specific recovery needs. In Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, CDBG-DR dollars 

were used by states to ensure that they were able to develop holistic recovery plans to ensure 

recovery across the spectrum of housing, infrastructure, and economic development needs. 

The $19.7 billion CDBG-DR contribution to the recovery in the Gulf from Katrina, Rita, 

and Wilma included: 

• $11.6 billion in compensation to homeowners; 

• $2.7 billion for other housing rehabilitation; 

• $1.7 billion for infrastructure and public improvements; 

$1.3 billion for economic development and tourism; and 

• $2.4 billion for other activities. 

Public Housing 

To this point I have discussed HUD's post-Katrina investment in terms of CDBG-DR 

funding. The second major aspect ofHUD's recovery work in New Orleans has been the 

redevelopment of the four big public housing developments: C.J. Peete, B.W. Cooper, Lafitte, 

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and St. Bernard. Hurricane Katrina displaced 3,000 families who lived in those buildings. 

Public housing in New Orleans pre-Katrina was a dense development that was isolated from the 

community. There was high poverty, high crime, lack of services and amenities, vulnerability to 

flooding, low education and lack of opportunity. The Housing Authority of New Orleans 

(HANO), after consulting with and obtaining approval from HUD, decided to demolish and 

rebuild these developments to be more resilient to future floods, and to create communities of 

opportunity. 

The funding sources for this endeavor included HUD's and HANO's $200 million 

investment, Go Zone tax credits of$250 million and FEMA's investment of$20 million. I am 

also proud to note that CDBG-DR provided an additional $115 million at a critical time, when 

other funding sources became less stable as the financial crisis unfolded in 2008 and 2009. Two 

of the transactions, Columbia Pare and Harmony Oaks, went to final closing in December of 

2008. Many of the remaining projects were closed in phases in 2011 and 2013 while others are 

scheduled to close. Today, four new mixed-income developments are a vital part of community 

life in New Orleans. These are mixed-income developments with both public housing and nonpublic housing units that include market-rate units and units dedicated to permanent supportive 

housing. They are an example of public-private partnerships, and include a mix of uses, 

including retail recreation, education, and technology. The new buildings are safer from floods 

and attractively designed; they are built with green building requirements, and are built with 

accessible units for all. HUD's investment is having a broader impact on neighborhood 

revitalization, greater resilience, improved amenities and housing for working families. 

HUD is going beyond public housing with the lberville/Treme Transformation. We are 

not just focused on buildings in fact, we are redeveloping the neighborhood with a $30 million 

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HUD Choice Neighborhoods Grant. This will be a historic restoration that will meet the needs 

of the local population, such as expanding access to fresh foods, job opportunities, and quality 

early childhood education. HUD's investment spurred an additional $53 million in private 

investment to date, and there is over $1 billion in private neighborhood investment planned. 

I want to reiterate that, despite the success stories, the job is not over. There are still 

miles left on the road to recovery. As a New Orleans native, I am proud of the work that has 

been done and the lessons that we have learned about providing quality housing for all, 

developing mixed income communities, leveraging private investment, and building resilient 

communities of opportunity. The remainder of this journey will continue to bolster the City of 

New Orleans' recovery, and can serve an example of redevelopment across the country in the 

wake of major disasters. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testifY at this hearing today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

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TESTIMONY OF CONNIE UDDO 

DIRECTOR OF THE ST. PAUL'S HOMECOMING/SENIOR CENTER 

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 

Before 

The COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE 

"New Orleans: Ten Years after the Storm" 

NOVEMBER 6, 2015 
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My name is Connie Uddo, Director of the St. Paul's Homecoming Center, 

which operated as a Hurricane Katrina Recovery Center from 2006-2014 in the 

lakeview and Gentilly Neighborhoods of New Orleans and would still be operating 

today had we not lost funding in 2014. In preparation for this testimony, I found 

previous testimony that 1 presented in Washington D.C. on May 24, 2007 to the 

AD Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs- U.S. Senate- chaired by Senator Mary landrieu. As I 

read through my testimony, I realized that not much has changed in regards to 

how government addresses disasters in our country. 

I thank you for inviting someone like me that is not with a government 

agency nor a private contractor, but someone that has been on the front lines of 

this recovery for ten years in New Orleans. Being an everyday citizen was an 

asset in many ways as I used common sense approaches to rebuilding the 

community, gained trust of the residents quickly, and knew the geography and 

demographics of the neighborhood. I will do my best in this testimony to point 

out what worked and what didn't work from a "boots from the ground" 

perspective. 

I appreciate that you all recognize a need to become more expedient, 

efficient, and humanitarian in your approach to disaster recovery. It's very 

important that this process changes and that we get this right as disasters are 

becoming an everyday occurrence in our country. 

In January 2006, my family was the first of ten families to move back to our 

devastated Lakeview neighborhood of eight thousand flooded homes. While living 

very much alone and seeing there was very little help coming our way, 1 realized 

that the recovery was going to be up to us and the quicker we got going the 

better off we would be. I started a recovery center out of my home and our 

mantra in Lakeview became- "Don't wait for the government"- they will slow 

you down and hold you up. If we do, we will in wallow in bureaucracy and false 

promises. As a result, lakeview became the model in the City of New Orleans for 

"Do It Yourself Recovery." Using organizational skills, volunteers and connections 
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to the private sector, the residents united and raised funding for the rebuilding of 

schools, churches, a firehouse and our public green spaces all while waiting for 

FEMA to get their act together. 

People of New Orleans were devastated both physically and emotionally by 

Hurricane Katrina. Depression shifted from the storm to the recovery where 

hopelessness and stress continued for years due to the failures of government 

programs such as the Louisiana Road Home Program, the Hazard Mitigation 

Program, and the Non-profit Rebuild Pilot Program (NRPP), to name a few. 

LA Road Home- ICF International was awarded a $756 million contract to run 2 

louisiana Road Home Programs: The Homeowner Effort and the Small Rental 

Repair Program. Both programs failed so miserably, that ICF International is 

reviled by most Louisianans and is essentially banned from doing new business 

with the state, but walked away $900 million richer, holding lucrative contracts 

with governments across the country. The employee that landed the contract for 

ICF was awarded a $1 million bonus while thousands of people were struggling to 

rebuild their homes and to return home. 

Failures: 

• The program's cumbersome verification procedures and constantly 

changing rules dragged out the process for years. 

• Appraisal process total failure- appraisers were from out of state and 

didn't know the market. The awards should have been based on loss and 

bricks and mortar cost to rebuild. 

• Paperwork was constantly lost. 

• Case managers constantly changed along with the rules. 

• lack of caring for the suffering and unwillingness to find ways to help 

desperate homeowners. 
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• When a for-profit company is administering the program, their priority is to 

make money for their company, therefore they avoid spending extra 

money to assist homeowners in the manner they need. 

Hazard Mitigation Program- a State Run Program that contracted with the Shaw 

Group, a private, for-profit company. 

• Reimbursement program- homeowners had to come up with the money 

to raise their homes first and then would be reimbursed. 

• Many homeowners borrowed money to elevate their home after being 

approved, only to be told that a mistake had been made or the rules had 

changed and they wouldn't be reimbursed the $30,000-$80,000 or more 

that they had already spent. One of our homeowners, a middle class, white 

male with three young children shot himself by committing suicide after he 

was told he wasn't going to be reimbursed the $80,000 he had borrowed 

from his parents retirement account to raise his home. 

• Much of the work for this program was administered by the Shaw Groupa Baton Rouge based company that had very little understanding about the 

issues and demographics that made up New Orleans. 

• The Shaw Group did a very poor job in regards to recommending credible 

shoring companies. Many contractors were fraudulent in their practices 

and faced legal consequences- these contractors were on the Shaw 

Group's list of recommended contractors. 

• The Shaw Group was also hired to oversee the case management part of 

this program which failed homeowners miserably. 

If for-profit contractors such as ICF International, Shaw, etc. continue to 

receive the multi-million dollar contracts to run the humanitarian and public 

safety piece of recovery, disaster-hit areas will look much like New Orleans does 

today with areas not rebuilt and over 30,000 blighted homes in the city. 
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For-profit contractors may not have the experience, or the desire to spend the 

money to address the humanitarian and public safety issues because they are out 

to make profits. Had it not been for the non-profits and faith-based organizations, 

New Orleans clearly would not be economically and socially where it is today. 

The Non-profit Rebuild Pilot Program- A State run program that was supposed 

to fund local Non-profit and Faith-based groups, allowing them to rebuild homes 

for low income families. They were on the right track with this, but failed because 

they made it a reimbursement grant, constantly changed the rules, and made the 

application and verification process so cumbersome that it took years to get 

approval. These were some of the problems with the NRPP Program: 

• This was a reimbursement grant which made it extremely difficult for nonprofit and faith-based organizations to utilize it. 

• Rebuilding programs such as Catholic Charities and the Episcopal Rebuilding 

Program were forced to close as it took over two years to get reimbursed 

for hundreds of thousands of dollars. They had no funds to continue the 

work and the churches totally lost faith and were exhausted from fighting 

the system to continue their much needed work in the community. 

• Many non-profits "staffed up" to deliver this grant, only to sit for years with 

no funds. 

• The application and verification process was so restrictive and 

cumbersome it could take years to get a homeowner approved. One to two 

years after non-profits had been told that were approved for this grant, not 

a single homeowner had been approved. 

• Paperwork was lost 

• The rules of the grant changed over and over. They were constantly 

moving the goal posts, with desperate homeowner's hopes dashed time 

and time again. 

In response to the failures of all of these programs, both non-profit and faithbased organizations stepped up to fill the void. Non-profit and faith-based 

organizations recognized that the recovery money was not going to make it to the 
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people who really needed it the most. Despite all of the roadblocks and 

difficulties, non-profit and faith-based organizations rebuilt thousands of homes, 

advocated for thousands of homeowners, and played a critical role in the social 

and economic recovery of the city. This is why I advocate for the non-profit and 

faith-based organizations to be included in disaster relief and recovery funding. 

Non-Profits & Faith-based Organization: 

• Non-profits are well prepared to expedite with great efficiency the 

distribution of federal funding while not losing their main focus which is to 

love and care for people who have lost everything. 

• Non-profits have gained and become more experienced, more fiscally 

responsible and organized in the past ten years due to the many disasters 

that have hit our country. 

• A critical part of the non-profit and faith-based model is utilizing 

volunteers. Literally millions of volunteers came from all over the world to 

help with our recovery. This greatly increased the impact that non-profits 

and faith-based organizations were able to have on the recovery. The dollar 

value of these volunteer hours is well over $100 million. 

• Had the non-profits and faith-based organizations been given a small 

portion of the $900 million that ICF International profited, a much larger 

portion of the city including the gth Ward could have been rebuilt by now, 

with lives and homes restored. You would not see the over 30,000 blighted 

properties in our city today. 

• Government needs to understand that non-profits stretch dollars every 

day. Better progress would be made in recovery work if they weren't 

having to fund raise constantly to keep their doors open. Funds need to be 

given to non-profits upfront absolutely no reimbursement programs. 

• Government also needs to understand that any money that non-profits 

receive goes back into the communities and the sustainability of the 

organization, rather than the stock portfolios or pockets of CEO's making 

multi-million dollar salaries. 
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• If Government could identify non-profit and faith-based organizations with 

proven track records and strong ties in the community to partner with 

immediately after a disaster to administer humanitarian assistance, many 

more people could be helped in a timely manner. The longer it takes for 

assistance to be received, the greater the damage both physically and 

emotionally. We had many houses that were salvageable directly after the 

storm, but were a complete loss by the time funding was made available 

years later. 

For-profit contractors do play a vital role in recovery, but their role should be 

more in the heavy lifting work such as debris clean-up and infrastructure repairs, 

not humanitarian, housing, and case management administration. 

In the aftermath of a devastating event, victims need hope and energy, yet 

these two things are quickly depleted. Hope and energy are restored when the 

non-profit and faith-based organizations are involved because of the personal, 

on-the-ground presence, trust, and relationships that they build. 

Contrarily, the for-profit contractor does exactly the opposite. The 

dysfunctions, bureaucracy, prolonged time lapses and lack of personal caring 

increases the stress of victims, and robs them of the hope and energy they need 

to recover. 

The money that was received from the government was greatly appreciated 

and needed, but it could have been spent more efficiently and effectively had it 

had been given to the local stakeholders who are invested in the community. 

I cannot emphasize enough the importance of having a strong partnership 

between local non-profit and faith-based organizations (boots on the ground) and 

the government to address humanitarian and public safety issues. Recovery 

cannot be a profit-driven enterprise. It has to be focused on getting the money to 

the people who need it most, ensuring that the resources are available to rebuild 

destroyed lives and homes, and that this is done in a timely manner. People 
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cannot be expected to wait years for assistance. We had homeowners dying or 

even committing suicide while waiting for assistance that never came. 

In closing, I have experienced first-hand what happens when government 

which works top down and non-profits which work from the bottom up can meet 

in the middle and work together. Government needs the non-profit to do what 

they can't do and that is to be the boots on-the-ground everyday doing the work 

with disaster victims. On the other hand, non-profits need government to 

enforce laws and policies and to get the money to the devastated communities as 

quickly as possible. When government and non-profits come together visible 

progress is made, and communities are restored. Together we can be an 

unstoppable force! 

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