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U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA:

MINIMIZING RISKS AND IMPROVING OVERSIGHT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 14, 2016

Serial No. 114–195

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Thomas Melito, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 6

The Honorable Ann Calvaresi Barr, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector 

General, United States Agency for International Development ....................... 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Thomas Melito: Prepared statement ............................................................... 8

The Honorable Ann Calvaresi Barr: Prepared statement .................................... 22

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

(1)

U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA: 

MINIMIZING RISKS AND IMPROVING 

OVERSIGHT 

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:19 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I know that Mr. Deutch is right in the side room, so he will be 

right out. And my apologies for starting late. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from our 

witnesses. 

And without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will 

be made a part of the record. Apologies for keeping you waiting. 

And members may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

I would first like to thank all of the individuals and organizations involved in providing humanitarian assistance for the Syrian 

crisis. Working in an active conflict zone is incredibly dangerous 

but also desperately needed. So we thank you and we support you. 

Today’s hearing is the subcommittee’s fourth hearing that focuses specifically on the Syrian humanitarian crisis. It has been an 

issue we have been following closely since the fighting in Syria 

began over 5 years ago. And until the administration gets serious 

about developing a comprehensive plan to end the conflict, it will, 

unfortunately, be an issue we will continue to revisit. 

The numbers are truly staggering. By most estimates, there have 

been at least 1⁄4 million Syrians killed and possibly as much as 

nearly 1⁄2 million. Nearly 5 million Syrians have fled to neighboring 

countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. There are nearly 7 

million internally displaced Syrians and more than 131⁄2 million 

people are in need of assistance, with about 51⁄2 million people in 

besieged and hard-to-reach areas. 

We have convened this hearing today to see how we can maximize our efforts and limit risks when providing humanitarian assistance. 

2

In addition to the $5 billion already provided, Secretary Kerry 

announced, earlier this week, $439 million in additional humanitarian assistance, and the President’s budget request for Fiscal 

Year 2017 seeks nearly $2.1 billion through accounts that addresses the humanitarian impact of this crisis. 

This is a lot to ask of the U.S. taxpayers, especially when we 

know that there is no end in sight to this terrible crisis. And that 

is why Congress must conduct oversight, to ensure that this assistance is being used as effectively and efficiently as possible. And 

that is why I was pleased to be joined by Ranking Member Deutch, 

Gerry Connolly, and Ron DeSantis in requesting a GAO review of 

our Syrian humanitarian assistance program. 

This report focuses solely on our programs inside Syria. With the 

U.S. no longer having a presence in the country, we have to rely 

on remote programs and coordinating with implementing partners. 

We recognize this brings challenges, but these challenges also 

make it more important for our agencies to mitigate all risks, because situations like these make our effort more vulnerable to 

waste, fraud, abuse, and diversion. And that is precisely what GAO 

and USAID’s Inspector General have found, that we have weaknesses in our humanitarian aid programs in Syria and both State 

and USAID could improve their fraud oversight. 

GAO’s review found that most of the implementing partners that 

we work with to provide humanitarian assistance into Syria do not 

assess the risk of fraud. Why is this important? Well, we will hear 

from the Inspector General that her office has opened 25 cases to 

investigate allegations of abuse of USAID funds with three common 

fraud schemes. This, obviously, raises concerns, not only with how 

USAID and State oversee our assistance programs, but it raises 

concerns regarding the checks and balances our implementing partners have in place as well. 

We rely heavily on our partners, as does the U.N., where 75 percent of all our assistance is funneled through. And if they are lax 

in their oversight, we run the risk of wider loss due to waste, 

fraud, and abuse, and diversion. 

What GAO also found is that not only do most implementing 

partners not assess the risk of fraud, but their controls for mitigating the risk of fraud and loss were not informed by a risk assessment. So it is likely that they either don’t know what they are 

looking for or are looking in the wrong place. And that is why GAO 

has recommended that USAID and State strengthen their fraud 

oversight themselves, but they must also require implementing 

partners to conduct fraud risk assessment and to ensure monitors 

are properly trained. These are common sense recommendations for 

our efforts in Syria, but they are also common sense for State and 

USAID across the board. 

We provide large sums of money and assistance every year and 

administer very large programs. We need to be doing everything 

we can to minimize the risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and diversion. 

It is also important because we do send most of our assistance 

through the U.N., and from there we have less oversight, less 

transparency. If we can work with our implementing partners to 

strengthen how they assess the risk of fraud and how they improve 

3

their oversight, we have a better chance of maximizing the humanitarian assistance response across the board. 

State and USAID are doing a good job with their humanitarian 

response, but we can always seek to do better. We all want to ensure that we are being proper stewards of American taxpayer dollars, but we are also promoting our core ideals and values as Americans by doing what we can to help those suffering from the ongoing crisis in Syria. So I am eager to hear from our witnesses on 

how we can accomplish both of these objectives without sacrificing 

our ability to assist those in dire need. 

And with that, I apologize to our ranking member for my lateness, and he is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It was an honor to 

arrive before you——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DEUTCH [continuing]. Once. First time ever. 

Thanks so much for holding today’s hearing, and thanks for your 

continued commitment to making sure that this committee keeps 

the humanitarian response to this herein crisis at the forefront of 

our work. 

And thank you to Congressman Connolly and Congressman 

DeSantis for joining us in requesting the GAO report to review our 

humanitarian assistance to Syria. Because of the extent of U.S. 

commitment to responding to this humanitarian crisis, this report 

is not only very timely, but it is extremely important for the safety 

and for the accountability of our aid programs. 

I also thank our witnesses for appearing here today and for the 

work that you do to ensure proper oversight of aid to the Syrian 

people who are in critical need. 

The humanitarian crisis in Syria has reached staggering heights. 

I repeat these figures at every hearing because we have to take a 

moment to just try to grasp the magnitude of the crisis. There are 

now more than 131⁄2 million people inside Syria in need of immediate humanitarian assistance. 131⁄2 million people of which 61⁄2

million are internally displaced. These people require health care, 

water and sanitation, shelter, food, and all of them desperately 

need protection. Since the crisis began in 2011, Syria’s development 

situation has regressed almost by four decades, and the life expectancy among Syrians has dropped more than 20 years. 

This humanitarian catastrophe is exacerbated further by the 

Assad regime, which has intentionally obstructed access to the Syrian people. The regime leverages food and water as a weapon of 

war. The regime’s systematic denial of medical assistance, food 

supplies, and other humanitarian aid to people living in besieged 

areas is unacceptable. It is illegal under international law. 

There are over 5 million people in hard-to-reach areas, including 

close to 600,000 people in 18 besieged areas who are dying from 

starvation. This flagrant violation of international humanitarian 

norms must end. The number of deaths surpasses 400,000 Syrians, 

and this number increases every day. These are not just numbers; 

they are human lives, and we must continue to think of that. 

I commend the hundreds of aid workers, NGOs, and implementing partners that are on the ground risking their lives to provide food and medical care to the Syrian people. They, you, are 

4

doing an exceptional job in extraordinarily difficult circumstances, 

and I don’t think that you get the credit that you deserve. 

I am proud that the United States has stepped up to lead the 

worldwide humanitarian response effort. The U.S. has consistently 

led global funding efforts since 2013, and our total funding has 

passed $5 billion at the end of this year. Other donor countries 

must now fulfill their pledges, something that we say at every one 

of these hearings, and it continues to be true and urgent. Yet the 

scale of the need continues to grow. 

I understand that the humanitarian response of this size is not 

easy, especially in an operating environment that is particularly 

dangerous and hostile. Delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance inside Syria is further complicated by a reliance on partners who can 

deliver cross-border aid. This means USAID and other international NGOs have been forced to oversee assistance remotely 

from neighboring countries, including Turkey and Jordan. 

USAID has relied on implementing partners to cross the border 

into Syria to deliver assistance into both government and opposition controlled areas. These cross-border operations only increase 

the opportunity for risks and fraud and for other entities and individuals to take advantage of our resources. This is troubling. 

When I hear about organized criminal networks infiltrating aid 

organizations or instances of bribery, bid rigging, delivery of products of lower quality, or even the failure of delivery altogether, I 

am concerned about where the gaps exist within our humanitarian 

assistance programs. I am concerned whether these programs have 

adequately assessed the risks and provided the necessary oversight 

of the programs and their partners. Our aid agency and partners 

need to be prepared for potential risk and fraud, especially in a 

context like this. They need to consistently review and verify that 

they are meeting financial obligations and holding the highest 

standards for aid products and partners. 

The GAO found that although USAID had guidelines for 

verifying the progress of activities in Syria, they did not include 

clear instructions to identify and recognize potential fraud risks. 

Moreover, field monitors did not receive fraud awareness training. 

When internal controls monitoring and financial oversight plans 

fail, it puts taxpayer dollars at risk. But more importantly, it 

delays the critical and crucial assistance to those who are depending on this aid. It diverts resources from those who need it most. 

We need to keep our agencies and partners accountable. The Syrian people deserve that, and I am pleased to see that USAID has 

concurred and is in the process of implementing all of the GAO recommendations. I am also pleased that USAID has increased its 

own third-party monitoring of programs. 

It is a war zone out there. We understand there will be unforeseen circumstances and challenges. There will, unfortunately, always be situations where individuals will attempt to take advantage of the chaos. Despite all these challenges, we need to have 

that confidence that the agencies are doing all they possibly can to 

mitigate fraud and mismanagement of our resources. We need to 

have the confidence that the agencies have made all the necessary 

risk assessments and are continually monitoring and updating procedures to close the gaps and vulnerabilities. 

5

I applaud USAID for working so quickly to address these gaps, 

and I am hopeful that the measures that the USAID has put in 

place as a result of both the GAO and OIG’s work will give us that 

confidence. All of that is to say, while there are many obstacles to 

assisting Syrians, we are helping millions and we are saving many, 

many lives. Americans can be proud that we are the largest donor 

country to the Syrian crisis, that we have the largest donor worldwide to humanitarian assistance. We are committed to living up to 

our values and to meeting the needs of the millions in crisis. 

I look to our witnesses today to help us better understand the 

situation on the ground and to their recommendations. 

And, Madam Chairman, before I yield back, I would take just a 

moment of personal privilege, if I may. Julie Ahn, who is sitting 

behind me, is a Rangel Fellow from the State Department, who is 

completing her internship with us before she heads off to the Kennedy School in the fall. She will then be entering the foreign service to pursue the good work that our foreign service officers do all 

around the world. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yeah. Two lovely years in Kurdistan. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So I thank you very much and I appreciate your 

giving me that opportunity. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

So safe speed and may all go well. 

And now, I would like to turn for any opening statements that 

they would like to make to Randy Weber of Texas and then to be 

followed by Ron DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. WEBER. I am good and I am ready to go. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Texans are always ready. 

Ron? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Let’s get this show on the road. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Let’s do it. 

Well, thank you. And I know Lee Zeldin is there on the side, and 

if he comes back, we will recognize him. 

But the subcommittee is delighted to welcome back Dr. Thomas 

Melito, who serves as the director of the International Affairs and 

Trade team at the Government Accountability Office, GAO. In this 

capacity, Dr. Melito is primarily responsible for GAO’s multilateral 

assistance portfolio as well as other areas of important oversight. 

So welcome back. 

And next, we would like to welcome to our subcommittee for the 

first time, but we know that it is going to be a repeated engagement, Ms. Ann Calvaresi Barr, who serves as the Inspector General 

for the United States Agency of International Development, 

USAID. In this capacity, she leads the USAID Office of Inspector 

General exercising broad oversight authority over programs and 

operations of USAID, as well as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the U.S. African Development Foundation, the InterAmerican Foundation, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. They sure keep you busy. 

So it is my understanding that the two of you came through GAO 

at the same time, so this is a very public reunion of sorts. We welcome you. Welcome, both of you. 

And we will start with Dr. Melito. 

6

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS MELITO, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MELITO. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, and 

members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to discuss 

the work you requested on delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could bring that microphone a little bit 

closer. 

Mr. MELITO. I am pleased to be here to discuss the work you requested on delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria. The conflict in Syria has created a complex humanitarian challenge. As of May 2016, the U.N. reported that 131⁄2 million people inside Syria have been affected by the conflict and are 

in need of humanitarian assistance such as food, shelter, and medicine. 

Since the start of the conflict in March 2011, the United States, 

through the Department of State and USAID, has provided over $5 

billion in humanitarian assistance, about half of which has been 

provided for assistance to people inside Syria. In 2015, the U.S. 

provided more than a quarter of the total international funding for 

the humanitarian response to Syria. 

My testimony summarizes our report on the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria, which is being released today. I will focus on four topics. First, factors affecting delivery of assistance. Second, the extent to which State, USAID, and 

their partners have assessed risks to their program. Third, implementation of controls to mitigate identifying risks and ensure appropriate financial oversight of humanitarian assistance projects. 

And fourth, GAO’s recommendations and the agency responses. 

Regarding the first topic, several factors complicate the delivery 

of humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria. For example, the 

increasingly violent and widespread Syrian conflict has hindered 

effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. In addition, administrative procedures put in place by the Syrian Government have delayed or limited the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially 

to besieged areas. Further, due to restrictions for traveling to 

Syria, State and USAID staff must manage the delivery of humanitarian assistance remotely from neighboring countries. 

Regarding the second topic on risk assessments, U.S. agencies do 

not require comprehensive risk assessments from implementing 

partners, and most partners have not assessed the risk of fraud. 

Risk assessment involves comprehensively identifying risks associated with achieving program objectives and determining actions to 

mitigate those risks. In the context of Syria, such risks include 

theft, fraud, and safety and security. 

Most of the implementing partners we examined conducted formal risk assessments for at least one type of risk, most commonly 

security risk. In addition, several maintain assessments on a variety of risks that are updated on a regular basis. However, few of 

these implementing partners conducted risk assessments for the 

risk of fraud, despite elevated risks for fraud in assistance projects 

inside Syria. These risks have been highlighted through the ongoing and closed fraud investigations by USAID’s Inspector General. 

7

Absent assessments of fraud risk, implementing partners may 

not have all the information needed to design appropriate controls 

to mitigate such risk. In addition, State and USAID officials may 

not have sufficient awareness of the risk of fraud or loss due to 

theft. 

Regarding the third topic on oversight, partners have implemented controls to mitigate some of the risks of delivering humanitarian assistance inside Syria, but U.S. agencies could improve 

their oversight of these programs. We found that partners we examined had implemented controls to mitigate certain risks of delivering humanitarian assistance inside Syria. For example, many 

partners implemented controls to account for safety and security 

risks to their personnel and beneficiaries receiving assistance. 

However, we found that fraud oversight could be strengthened. 

While USAID has hired a contractor for verifying the progress of 

activities in Syria, they have not clearly instructed field monitors 

on how to identify and collect information on potential fraud risks. 

Further, the contractors have not received fraud awareness training. 

Regarding the fourth topic, GAO made several recommendations 

in our report. To provide more complete information to assist the 

agencies in conducting oversight activities, State and USAID 

should require the implementing partners to conduct fraud risk assessments. In addition, USAID should ensure its field monitors are 

trained to identify potential fraud risks and collect information on 

them. Both agencies agreed with GAO’s recommendations. 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of 

the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I will be 

pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melito follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Calvaresi. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANN CALVARESI BARR, INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me to discuss USAID’s efforts to provide humanitarian assistance 

to the more than 13 million in Syria affected by the crisis there. 

The billions of dollars USAID has invested not only provide relief 

to those impacted, it strengthens our standing in the world. Yet despite our goodwill, bad characters have taken advantage of the 

complex situation for personal gain, ultimately denying Syrian people the food, clothing, health care, and other aid they urgently 

need. 

Today, I will summarize the actions our special agents and investigators have taken to uncover and stop fraud. I will also highlight 

several program management concerns exposed by these investigations. 

When the U.S. designated the response to Syria as a contingency 

operation, we ramped up our oversight in the region. OIG investigators briefed hundreds of USAID and implementer staff on fraud 

indicators and developed a comprehensive handbook for how to 

identify and report fraud. They also stood up the Syria Investigations Working Group to share information with other U.S. and 

international oversight organizations about ongoing investigative 

issues. 

To date, we have received 116 complaints of alleged abuse and 

have opened 25 investigations. Some complaints relate to terrorist 

diversions, but the majority, roughly two-thirds, relate to theft and 

fraud schemes, such as collusion, product substitution, and false 

claims. For example, vendors paid bribes or kickbacks to implementer staff in exchange for competitive bidding data or manipulation of bid evaluations. 

One of our product substitution cases involved a Turkish vendor 

that placed more salt and less lentils in food kits to increase their 

profits. We also found nonfood kits in a warehouse in Syria that 

were missing items or included substandard products, such as poor 

quality frying pans that can easily be bent and folded and tarps 

that were too small to shelter an adult. In one false claims case, 

a Jordanian NGO fabricated documentation that it distributed 

nonfood items to communities in southern Syria when, in fact, the 

goods were distributed by another organization at its own expense. 

To date, we have made seven referrals to USAID regarding nine 

implementers. These referrals prompted USAID actions ranging 

from employee and program suspensions and terminations to now 

placing specific conditions on implementer awards and agreements. 

Our investigative outcomes have resulted in $11.5 million in savings and six programmatic suspensions of awards valued at $305 

million. This represents about a third of the money USAID disbursed in Fiscal Years 2015 and 2016. This demonstrates the imVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:10 Sep 01, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\071416\20748 SHIRL
21

pact our work has had and the proactive measures taken to further 

prevent losses. 

Our investigative cases not only stopped fraud, but also raised a 

number of concerns about implementer procurement practices and 

internal controls for managing projects as well as USAID’s oversight. 

First, we question whether implementers’ procurement policies 

and internal controls are appropriate for the high-risk environment. In an effort to expedite procurements, implementers used an 

emergency waiver to bypass established procurement policies and 

procedures, including full and open competition. While the use of 

these waivers is allowable when the needs are urgent, they were 

used for an extended period of time and were not accompanied by 

enhanced monitoring. Internal control concerns relate to implementers’ quality control procedures such as allowing vendors to ship 

materials across the border without the items being inspected and 

accepting substandard items. In addition, some implementers did 

not pursue allegations, overlooked evidence of wrongdoing, or did 

not notify USAID or OIG of internal investigations. 

Finally, our cases point to potential gaps in USAID oversight of 

implementers. For example, OFDA generally did not require implementers to obtain prior agency approval of large subcontracts or set 

requirements to inspect them. Further, DART teams responsible 

for coordinating and managing response efforts did not include permanent subject-matter experts to evaluate procured items. 

While we are encouraged by the steps USAID has taken and 

plans to take in response to the vulnerabilities we identified, continued vigilance and a better understanding of program deficiencies 

is required. To that end, my office, along with our partners at DOD 

and State, remain committed to aggressively cracking down on 

fraud, waste, and abuse. Concurrently, my office plans to advance 

audit work aimed at identifying systemic weaknesses and additional actions USAID can take to eliminating vulnerabilities before 

they can be further exploited. 

Providing aid in conflict settings presents significant challenges 

and frequently calls for flexible practices. However, as our investigators demonstrate and their work, flexibility cannot eclipse rigor. 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, this concludes my 

prepared statement. I would be happy to take any questions that 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Calvaresi Barr follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Really, thank you both for your testimony. There is certainly a 

lot to think about there, and I want to make sure that we thank 

you both and your teams for all the work they have done on this 

issue, for continuing to seek ways to help our agencies improve our 

oversight and the implementation of our assistance programs. 

And, Dr. Melito, I will start some questions with you, if I might. 

Tell us about why it is important for individuals and organizations operating in Syria to conduct a risk assessment? And if you 

could tell us how the U.N. internal control framework compares to 

ours. What are the—how do the requirements differ? 

Mr. MELITO. Very good. A risk assessment is a jargony phrase 

that is pretty obvious. It is management, basically, trying to understand the challenges that their employees are having in the field. 

In this case, it is generally a procurement and logistics exercise 

where they need to understand which particular place they are 

using for buying things, storing things, moving things. And in the 

environment of Syria, there are a lot of complicating factors and a 

lot of heavy risks. 

So risk assessment would really be a diagnostic on looking at 

what exactly is the situation on the ground, what are they facing, 

and then recognizing that some of this is very risky and then mitigating that by trying to make sure that there are oversight controls 

and just a good situational awareness on the part of management. 

That is why risk assessments are essential. 

In terms of the internal control framework of the U.N., it is very 

similar. They are using international auditing standards which 

mirror, in a lot of ways, the ones that the U.S. Government uses. 

So when we have dialogues with them, we are pretty much on the 

same page. They are required to do risk assessments like the U.S. 

Government is. So there was no mismatch in discussions with 

them. They have the same requirements in that area. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you. And all programs, and just 

about anything we do, are going to have at least some loss as a result of waste, fraud, abuse, diversion. It is sad to say, but it is reality based. Did either State or USAID provide you with a number 

on how much they believe is being lost to waste, fraud, abuse, or 

diversion? And do you get a sense from the agencies that they expect a certain amount to be lost as the cost of doing business in 

that they may have a formal or informal percentage they believe 

is acceptable? 

Mr. MELITO. So GAO’s perspective on this, and this is the auditing community as well, is that you need reasonable assurance. 

Now, reasonable assurance is something which has to be sort of understood at the corporate level, and they need to really think about 

where their particular tolerance is. But we are not talking about 

absolute assurance. I just want to drive that home. Because absolute assurance would be too expensive and it probably would prevent the humanitarian mission from going forward. 

In terms of the magnitude of the losses, I do not think USAID 

or State have really any inkling on that. I don’t think they have 

done the work to address that, nor have they thought about what 

is their risk tolerance. So I think that is a dialogue that they need 

to have moving forward. 

32

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And, Inspector General, I know you can’t really go into details 

about the individuals and the entities, because in a lot of these 

cases, we are discussing ongoing investigations. But I did want to 

ask you a few questions about how that works when USAID says, 

okay, this implementing partner or this program is problematic, we 

need to cut ties. Because the vast majority of our assistance to—

for Syria, for the humanitarian crisis, does go through the U.N., 

and obviously, there will be some overlap on the implementing 

partners and partner organizations. So when USAID suspends 

these individuals, these entities, these programs, they are no 

longer eligible to receive any U.S. Government awards, correct? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Yes, for a period of time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And do we share this information with the 

U.N. or other organizations and implementing partners? And if so, 

what actions do they take or what actions do we expect them to 

take? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Let me make a few comments with regard 

to your question. First of all, I am very proud of the work that our 

office of special agents and investigations have done in this crisis. 

When the overseas contingency operation was activated in 2014, 

proactive efforts went into the region, identified all of the implementers that were in that region, conducted 32 fraud awareness 

briefings with, you know, over 400 individuals, including USAID, 

DART teams, implementers, public international organizations. 

From that, these allegations have come forward, we opened cases 

and we found fraud. 

USAID’s response to that has been very, very promising. And 

what I will say to that is that we have ongoing communications 

with the various bureaus affected by this, whether it be OFDA, 

whether it be Food for Peace, regarding what we found. And they 

have taken actions in terms of suspensions, debarments, special 

conditions put on awards, employee terminations, and they have 

done so oftentimes without having a full record of our investigation. 

And just to make a point of that, it is very difficult to sit down 

with organizations or with employees and say, you are being suspended, or you are being terminated, without the full 

underpinnings of an investigation. So this speaks to what USAID 

proper has done in response to that, and they have taken approximately 35 actions as a result of our work. 

With regard to the U.N.—with regard to the U.N., what happens 

is—and as you noted in your statement, so much of the money 

flows through U.N. organizations, these, you know, PIOs, as we 

refer to them. It is absolutely important, because we do not have 

independent oversight of those operations, that information is 

shared. 

Our office of investigations put together—and I know you asked 

me about this when we met the other day, and I am proud of it, 

so if I may hold it up for all of you—a fraud prevention and compliance handbook just for the region that goes out to everyone. This 

includes our U.N. counterparts. It includes all of the NGOs. It tells 

them what to look for. Our Syria Investigations Work Group, which 

we stood up, is a venue to actually brief the U.N.—our U.N. partVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:10 Sep 01, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\071416\20748 SHIRL
33

ners with its World Food Programme, on the fraud we are seeing. 

We share vendors lists where we have had issues, and we put, I 

would say, not only them on notice but pressure to say, you are 

likely working with the same implementers, now here, have at it. 

So you get the pressure points applied from a number of different 

perspectives, and I just wanted to take that moment because I am 

very, very proud of our——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am glad that you did. Because I can foresee 

an instance where maybe these guys are defrauding the U.N. or 

other implementing partners as well or perhaps even the U.N. continues to work with them after we provide these agencies with our 

information. 

And just to finish up with the U.N., perhaps I will ask this of 

both of you, how does working through the impact, the U.N. impact 

our ability to exercise the kind of oversight that we would require 

if we were working with implementing partners directly in terms 

of things like transparency and accountability? How does that 

change? 

Mr. MELITO. So we do have audit authority over the implementing parties. We do not have audit authority over the U.N. 

That said——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Could you say that again? 

Mr. MELITO. So—here we go. I said we do have audit authority 

over implementing partners, but we do not have audit authority 

over U.N. agencies. That said, I have done, over the last 10 years, 

a series of reports involving U.N. agencies where I have generally 

gotten excellent cooperation. And I think that is in recognition of 

how important the U.S. is as a donor, and I think they would want 

to cooperate with the U.S. Government. So I can’t point out a case 

where I wasn’t ultimately able to get the information that GAO 

needed to do its work. So while it is an indirect process, ultimately, 

I think it’s been a successful process. 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. I would just add to that, again, to underscore our Syrian Investigations Working Group. We also have 

reached out sort of on a one-to-one basis. I just recently met with 

the World Food Programme Inspector General. I know that he was 

in town working with folks in the bureau as well, and the pressure 

is really being applied saying, you are going to be working with 

these same implementers, with these same vendors. We are relying 

on you to provide this aid. 

And I think it is also important to point out the very important 

role that the U.N. plays. They provide these bulk items in terms 

of humanitarian assistance into the region. They can have staff in 

Syria. You know, we need them. They provide a huge role and help 

us achieve this mission. 

We just need to stay on top of them, make sure that the right 

oversight, the monitoring, the internal controls are established, and 

that USAID puts some pressure on them to do it. 

I will tell you, you can be assured, we will be on it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I understand that. 

Congratulations to both of you for the great work that you do. 

It is important to carry that message to the U.S. taxpayer. Thank 

you. 

And with that, my good friend, the ranking member, Mr. Deutch. 

34

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I also want to 

express my personal gratitude and our committee’s—subcommittee’s gratitude for the work you have done here. I think it is really 

important. 

Ms. Barr, I would like to pick up where the chairman left off, on 

what happens when there is a suspension for fraud activities? 

I would tell my friend, if he would like to wait, I will sit in as 

the chair. It is not something that I get to do. I am just kidding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No problem. 

Mr. WEBER. Will the gentleman yield the rest of his time? 

Mr. DEUTCH. If I get to be chairman, I will. 

When there is a program that is suspended, there is a quick—

how quickly can we move to find a partner to pick up whatever 

support that program was providing, and how do we ensure that, 

for all of the really necessary oversight efforts that you both have 

been so deeply engaged in, that we don’t wind up with serious gaps 

in providing the lifesaving services that are so important? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. I can tell you that USAID works very, very 

promptly to try to identify other implementers that we—the aids—

that the aid can resume to get to those in need, and they work very 

heartily and swiftly at that. There sometimes is a delay. I am not 

going to say there isn’t a gap in that aid going out, because it certainly does happen, but these companies needed to be suspended. 

As our results show, you know, we have six suspensions currently 

out in place, and those are six program suspensions that fall under 

some major, major implementers. 

The best thing that we can do, and I think it is in line with 

Tom’s statement and the work of GAO overall. USAID’s role is 

really to establish a baseline set of internal controls, procurement 

practices that they are going to require for any implementer, regardless of who they are. You know how many are out there. The 

range of their—the rigor and their controls is going to be vast. 

There should be a baseline standard set for what those internal 

controls should be, what those good procurement practices should 

be, and those should be monitored from USAID. 

And given that we don’t have the oversight authority with the 

U.N., you know, establishing those expectations, setting them, 

making that a condition of the money flowing to those in need is—

it sounds quite simple, but it hasn’t been uniformly applied. And 

I think it speaks to the recommendations that the GAO report 

made and certainly to the observations that are coming out of the 

outcomes we have found. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. It is a really good suggestion. 

Dr. Melito, I wanted to acknowledge, I think, what we have all 

already been discussing. In the conflict zone like Syria, we can’t 

have U.S. personnel on the ground. So we rely on remote monitoring and management. 

The report discusses many of the challenges of remote management, but if you could just elaborate on these challenges, and in 

this particular environment, why it is different in terms of what 

agencies and implementers have dealt with previously. Why is it 

such a concern for oversight in particular? 

Mr. MELITO. So as you mentioned, U.S. Government officials cannot enter——

35

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes. 

Mr. MELITO [continuing]. Syria. So for a normal humanitarian 

assistance effort, you would expect on-the-ground monitoring by 

U.S. Government officials. They would be looking at the warehouses, they would be watching the beneficiaries receive their assistance, making sure it is up to the quality and quantity that we 

paid for. 

In this case, the information they have to rely on is coming from 

people who are inside the country telling them subsequently what 

has happened. That is indirect. Now, they trust a number of these 

parties correctly, but it is still, though, something which is indirect 

for them. 

So what they do, they end up trying to triangulate, trying to get 

information from multiple sources. They are trying to use some 

new technologies such as geotagging pictures of things, and that is 

all very good, but it will never be as effective as being able to see 

it yourself. So that in itself means the risk of fraud and diversion 

is greater. Because of the indirectness of the monitoring, you are 

in a situation and environment which heightens the risks, and that 

needs to be recognized and addressed. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And can you, just in the remaining time that I 

have, can you try to put a face on this? When—we are obviously 

concerned. We are grateful for the report, and we are concerned 

about instances of bribery and bid rigging and failure to provide 

the material that had been committed to or contracted to provide. 

But what does that actually mean for the people who were to 

have been on the receiving end? And it is—we know what the impact is on our taxpayers, and that is why this is so important, but 

just how awful is it to the people on the ground who are in such 

desperate need? 

Mr. MELITO. So in your statement and in the chairman’s statement, talk about the magnitude of it, 131⁄2 million people inside the 

country. The U.S. Government estimates it is reaching about 4 million. So that is—the U.S. Government is doing great. It is the single largest donor, but it is only reaching a subset. Any diversion 

from that is even lower than that. 

So from our perspective, this is literally taking food out of the 

mouths of babies. I mean, it is taking resources that are in desperate need and not putting it where it needs to be and, instead, 

in hands of people who you are not designating as a target. So it 

has a direct humanitarian impact. It is not just that this is a bad 

deed that we—you don’t have them for criminal reasons. It is hurting the humanitarian mission, and that needs to be kept front and 

center. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I am—I appreciate that. 

And just, Ms. Barr, I would say to you, again, as grateful as we 

are for the focus on the impact, dollars are one thing and they are 

important. And as watchdogs, it is important that you focus on 

that. But the work that you do is so terribly important, because the 

proposals that you made, if they are followed, will mean not only 

that taxpayers can be satisfied that their tax dollars are being used 

the way they are supposed to, but that those tax dollars are actually being used to save lives. And we are grateful for that. 

I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

36

Mr. WEBER [presiding]. Mr. DeSantis, if you are ready, if you are 

in a hurry, I will yield to you for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to the witnesses. 

So, obviously, we appreciate you looking into this. We know there 

is going to be a certain amount of waste, fraud, and abuse, unfortunately, when you have operations going on in this area. But did 

you get the approximate numbers on how much U.S. assistance inside Syria may have been lost due to waste or fraud? 

Mr. MELITO. GAO does not have a number. That would be the 

kind of number that AID would need to produce itself. I would 

defer to my colleague if she has any information. 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. What I can tell you is what we reported 

and what we know, is $1.3 million in losses. And those would be 

losses that are due to fires, bombings, parachutes not opening 

when pilots drop, but they also refer to diversions to other terrorist 

organizations. 

Mr. DESANTIS. What about fraud? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. And with regard to fraud, sometimes 

things, they are stolen, but in terms of fraud, it is hard to quantify 

the total dollar on fraud. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I think you have to view it differently. I mean, 

if you are in a hot zone and you have aid that is intercepted by 

terrorists, that is much different than if the money is just being 

frittered away. And so I think it is important for us to know the 

distinctions on there. 

Let me ask you this, Mr. Melito. There have been a number of 

attacks on medical facilities and humanitarian workers in Syria. 

Did either USAID or State provide a list of all instances in which 

one of the belligerents in Syria attacked any of our partners delivering aid or seized any of our assistance? 

Mr. MELITO. So in our report, we talk about some U.N. information on that. So U.N. reports about 89 humanitarian workers have 

been killed since the conflict has started, and there have been hundreds of attacks on medical facilities and also attacks on food deliveries and such. And then the U.S. in my report, we also talk about 

when the city of Palmyra fell, food that was stored there fell into 

the hands of ISIS. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So do you have an estimate on the numbers and 

the costs in terms of the assistance that has been implicated by 

any of those? I guess State didn’t give you any information? 

Mr. MELITO. We are unaware of either agency doing a comprehensive assessment of that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. There are U.N. Security Council resolutions in place for accessing movement for humanitarian assistance 

inside Syria, but from your report, it seems that Assad’s regime 

may be in violation of these resolutions. So how many requests do 

you know has the regime denied since the beginning of 2015? 

Mr. MELITO. The U.N.’s reporting that they are only receiving 

about—approvals about 20 percent of the time. I think the number 

that we report is 110 requests and 13 approvals. So in—what is 

going on there, it pays to talk a little bit about it. 

So when the U.N. wishes to go outside of these Assad-controlled 

areas, to the areas outside of our control, they need permission for 

37

what the items are; they need permission to travel on the roads; 

they need permission to cross checkpoints; they need visas for employees to come in, and they have not been getting the approvals 

90 percent of the time. And when they do get it, they say that it 

is very slow and uncertain. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So even if they are not actually denying it, they 

are basically undermining it with the process. And so how have 

State and USAID responded to those limitations? 

Mr. MELITO. Well, the U.S. is part of the international community’s effort to broaden the delivery of services. So there was two 

Security Council resolutions that passed in 2014 and 2015, which 

made it legal for delivery of services across the border. And that 

is what most of the international NGOs are doing. They are delivering assistance from Turkey and Jordan mostly, and that is 

against the wishes of the regime. So there, they are saying that the 

humanitarian assistance is more important than the wishes of the 

regime. 

This that we are referring to as denials is areas that are still 

within the control of the regime or at the border of the control of 

the regime. So it is two different ways of delivering services. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The agencies that concurred with your recommendations, how long do they have to implement these and for 

you to close the recommendations? 

Mr. MELITO. GAO tracks its recommendations for 4 years. But 

generally, agencies respond within 1 or 2 years. And given the importance of this issue, I am hopeful they will do it quickly. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I thank you. I thank the witnesses. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from Florida is recognized. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks to the witnesses. 

I want to start by saying that I think most of us agree that what 

is going on in Syria is one of the greatest humanitarian tragedies 

of our lifetime since World War II. And there is no question that 

we have to do whatever is reasonably possible to be part of efforts 

to relieve some of the suffering, the starvation, the homelessness. 

And because we are going to lose a generation of people, of young 

people who are not getting health care or getting education. So I 

want to say that I appreciate your efforts to try to make sure that 

it is done right. 

My first question is, in your review of these—of the programs, 

can you tell us, are any programs doing better than others? And 

what is it that—where things are working, what makes it different? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. I think it goes back to what we said in 

terms of what is missing. And what is missing is when there aren’t 

clear expectations regarding what should be internal control processes and good procurement practices that need to be in place, 

given the fact that you are in these highly unstable and stable environments, the fact that it is remote monitoring and remote oversight. Those kinds of things call for special conditions, and I think 

it is incumbent upon USAID—it all starts with them, setting those 

baselines of standards, holding its implementers, NGOs to that 

38

standard, the U.N. organizations to that standard, and make sure 

that the reporting does come back. There has to be that basic minimum set of circumstances and requirements put in place, and currently, that is missing. 

Ms. FRANKEL. In your review, were you able to determine where 

aid is actually getting through to? Because I know there is—you 

have regime-held areas and you have ISIL-held areas and then you 

have, I guess, other areas. 

Mr. MELITO. So the U.S. agencies, both State and AID, pay very 

close attention to the map, basically. And it divides up, generally, 

to areas that are controlled by the Assad regime and the areas 

right near that, which includes a lot of the seized areas and hardto-reach areas. And the other part is the areas near the borders of 

Turkey and Jordan. 

They have different implementing partners for those two, so the 

U.N. is able to operate within the Assad-controlled areas of the 

country. The international NGOs cannot operate there, but they 

can operate across border. And in all those cases, State and AID 

pay very close attention to groups which are not permitted to receive assistance. And we’ve got very good assurance that there is 

no assistance going currently to ISIS-controlled areas. 

That all said, it is a very fluid situation on the ground and a very 

complicated situation on the ground that has to be constantly monitored, but those are the kinds of things that the agencies are balancing. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So is aid going to the Assad-controlled areas? 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. The U.N. is—there are a number of individuals 

in the Assad-controlled areas which are in desperate need. So the 

U.N. is providing assistance there, but it also is deploying out of 

those areas into the besieged and hard-to-reach areas. That said, 

it is not reaching nearly as many of those people as it wishes to. 

That is the reference to being denied access by the regime. 

Ms. FRANKEL. So Assad is not—which countries are being used, 

which borders, to get the assistance across? 

Mr. MELITO. So it is predominantly Turkey in the north and Jordan in the south. Those are the two main. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And how cooperative have their governments been 

and their military that is on the border? 

Mr. MELITO. That is probably appropriate for both the State and 

AID, but my understanding is they have been getting good cooperation. 

Ms. FRANKEL. That they have been given good cooperation. All 

right. 

I have nothing further. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Thank you. 

I am sorry, Dr. Melito, did you just say that the Turkey and the 

Jordan military have not been very cooperative? 

Mr. MELITO. I said have been cooperative. 

Mr. WEBER. They have been cooperative. 

Mr. MELITO. That is also a question for USAID. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. I don’t think your button is on. 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. Have been. Sorry. 

Mr. WEBER. Have been. Okay. 

39

Mr. MELITO. I want to be clear on that. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Very good. 

A lot of questions. Is it Calvaresi Barr? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Calvaresi Barr. 

Mr. WEBER. Calvaresi Barr? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Calvaresi Barr. 

Mr. WEBER. Calvaresi Barr. Okay. 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Very good. 

Mr. WEBER. I can do this. 

You said earlier, I think, that there were nine partners that had 

been either used or identified as bad players. Refresh my memory 

on that. 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. We have seven referrals that we have 

given to USAID, and they involve nine implementers. 

Mr. WEBER. Implementers. 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Implementers, right. And the program suspensions that we have in place are six. And, again, I just want to 

underscore, this isn’t a wholesale suspension of the implementers 

at large. These are programs within these implementer——

Mr. WEBER. In what period of time? Is that the last year? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. This is data pretty much coming from 2014 

through the present. 

Mr. WEBER. So the last not quite 2——

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Since the overseas contingency operation. 

Mr. WEBER. I got you. And when aid is delivered, do you have 

evidence that it was delivered? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. So I think part of the challenge definitely 

lies in that. And I think we are calling for recommendations along 

the lines of the types of reporting back you might require under 

some of these basic standards that you set. 

Could it be a phone call? Could it be a printed receipt? Are there 

ways to put more branding or tags or labeling on the food, on the 

nonfood items to come back? But because we are in this kind of remote business and we are reliant on others, we have to come up 

with creative mechanisms to determine that, in fact, that aid did 

reach those it was intended for. Currently, again, that is a mixed 

bag, but I think if there are reporting standards and other kind of 

baselines to establish it, it could help. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, they can put chips in animals, right, that can 

be tracked? So if you put one on just every 50th, you know, item 

or so? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Has that been looked at? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. It is something that, I think, is under consideration, talking about a whole range of options. But it all starts 

with even checking at the warehouses before it crosses the border, 

whether it be in Turkey, in Jordan. You know, it starts there, and 

then what happens in transit, because, again, this is remote monitoring. This is remote oversight. 

Mr. WEBER. So if you lose an implementer, do you have a ready 

supply of people lined up on the list that are applying to be implementers? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. I represent the oversight community, so 

not being the USAID proper or others to know exactly what their 

40

full list of contingents are, I know that for the aid going into Syria, 

they are working with approximately 29 implementers now. But oftentimes, when these situations occur, folks go into the region very, 

very quickly in order to deliver the aid, to deliver the assistance, 

and that—you know, that creates some vulnerabilities in and of 

itself. They are new to it. We are relying on them. It creates a perfect storm for what our investigations have found. 

Mr. WEBER. It makes me wonder if there is not a preferred implementer that actually—this is probably not the right term—but 

gets a kickback or is a favorite. They get a pass, they get to come 

on deep into Syria with the least amount of hassle. Has that been 

your findings or no? Are there preferred implementers, one does a 

better job than the other? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. You know, hard to say if there are preferred, but I can tell you that all of the implementers have to show 

themselves as presently responsible. And when that doesn’t occur—

and there are certain criteria for that—that is when program suspensions and other things happen. 

So there are some implementers out there that have very, very 

good, as I said in the beginning, tight controls, good internal—

know what internal controls are brought into play. 

Mr. WEBER. So that they all get treated—I guess I am asking, 

are they bipartisan, is what I am asking? They all get treated the 

same. 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. They all get treated the same. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Good. And has there ever been an instance 

where there is a recovery of any aid? Aid gets lost, gets taken, and 

once that happens, it is done. 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Our work, one of the impacts that we 

talked about is the fact that we brought in $11.5 million in savings 

as a result of our fraud investigations. And what that means is 

when we uncovered the fact, like in the case of a Jordanian NGO 

that was to provide assistance and had another NGO actually do 

the transport and deliver the items but yet charged USAID for it 

when it was incurred by another NGO, shut down that program, 

shut down that operation. That one in and of itself was $10.5 million of the $11.5 million. So——

Mr. WEBER. Were there criminal charges that ensued in that instance? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. In some cases—these are ongoing investigations. There could be criminal implications as a result of it, but 

I can tell you it resulted in a number of employee and implementer 

terminations, suspensions, debarments. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And then, Dr. Melito, I think you said some 

aid workers were killed, and I didn’t quite hear what you said. Did 

you say eight or nine or 89? 

Dr. MELITO. According to the U.N., 89. 

Mr. WEBER. Eighty-nine. Okay. Okay. And then furthermore, 

Turkey and Jordan were the two areas that the aid came out of, 

but did you say that they really didn’t—that the Assad regime really doesn’t prefer that? 

Dr. MELITO. So until these Security Council resolutions were 

passed, it wasn’t clear that they could do that, because it would be 

41

violating the sovereignty of the country. Normally, you have to basically get the permission of the country to provide assistance. 

Yes, the Assad regime is not supporting the cross-border assistance and they are doing it against his wishes, but it is an international—it is legal now because of the Security Council resolutions. 

Mr. WEBER. So is it because Turkey and Jordan signed onto the 

resolution? 

Dr. MELITO. The Security Council resolutions have the force of 

law internationally. So they gave permission for that kind of assistance to occur. 

Mr. WEBER. So would Assad rather they come from Russia, from 

Iran, from Iraq? Where would he rather they come from? 

Dr. MELITO. He would rather it was in his areas of control. 

Mr. WEBER. His areas of control, so he can parlay out the 

goods——

Dr. MELITO. He can determine when and how, yes. 

Mr. WEBER [continuing]. However he wants to. Well, that makes 

sense, I guess, if you are Assad. 

Okay. And then finally, your office hasn’t yet conducted audits of 

USAID programs in Syria. Is that right? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. We, in fact, have done some audits in the 

recent past. There are about three audits that were done in the 

2014 timeframe. With that said, they were very specific audits 

looking like a survey of OFDA activities. There were audits regarding Office of Transition Initiatives work there, Food for Peace work. 

One thing, if I could take a moment, just since I have been sworn 

in into this position as the new IG at USAID, one thing that we 

need to do better—and I am working very quickly to do so—is to 

make sure that our work informs at the policy and the strategic 

level and goes after the highest risk areas. We have done tremendous work on Food for Peace programs over the years. They are 

very, very program transactional specific, but it doesn’t raise oftentimes to the higher level. 

As a result of our investigative work, a number of program concerns and questions have been raised now regarding internal controls, procurement practices. We are now focusing our audit work 

and our audit plans going forward on those very real effects that 

our Office of Investigations have found. 

So we have some work to do in that area. And I don’t want to 

belittle what USAID IG has done before, but we need to link it to 

those policy-level decisions and the bigger picture and the highest 

risk and crosscutting work across the board, and I am committed 

to do that. 

Mr. WEBER. Well, that is encouraging to hear. So you will have 

a plan put together and we will see you back next week? 

Ms. CALVARESI BARR. Can I have an extra week on top of that? 

Mr. WEBER. All right. Well, my time has expired. I am going to 

yield back. 

Ted, any more questions? 

Mr. DEUTCH. No. 

Mr. WEBER. All right. This hearing is concluded. Thank you very 

much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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