COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00474-CR

EX PARTE JUSTIN GREEN

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FROM THE 97TH DISTRICT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Justin Green appeals from a trial court order denying him relief 

on his application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bail reduction. We will 

affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. BACKGROUND

Texas Ranger Marshall Thomas participated in exhuming a heavily

decomposed body buried in a “shallow grave” in Clay County, Texas, in early 

February 2012. Thomas’s investigation into the body led him to obtain an arrest 

warrant for Green, who had previously lived on the land where law enforcement 

found the body. On February 16, 2012, Arizona officials extradited Green to 

Texas by delivering Green to Thomas, who, accompanied by other law

enforcement officers, flew Green from Phoenix, Arizona, back to Texas. Having 

identified the body and determined the date of death, the State charged Green 

with having murdered Jose Ramirez on July 25, 2007.

Prior to trial, the trial court set Green’s bail at $1,000,000. Green moved 

the trial court to reduce the bail, and the trial court denied his motion. At trial, 

Green argued that he shot Ramirez in self-defense.2 The State, however, 

introduced evidence that Green shot Ramirez, his friend and ex-Army mate, in 

the head and chest while Ramirez was unarmed and either sleeping or seated at 

his computer wearing only his boxer shorts. The evidence also indicates that 

from there, Green dragged Ramirez’s body to Green’s truck, which he had 

 

2At the habeas hearing, the State introduced “all of the evidence” from the 

trial. Green stated affirmatively that he did not have any objection. In its oral 

pronouncement to deny Green’s application, the trial court stated that it had 

considered “all of the evidence previously [introduced at trial]” in making its 

determination. Thus, our review of the record is not limited to the hearing 

transcript only. See Ex parte Green, 940 S.W.2d 799, 800–801 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 1997, no writ).
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parked near the garage for the purpose of transporting Ramirez’s body from the 

residence to a pre-dug, shallow grave on the property where Green lived with his 

mother. Green, who at that time had recently been discharged from the Army for 

“patterns of misconduct” involving his repeated use of marijuana and 

methamphetamine, was unemployed.

The State elicited testimony from Green’s sister and her best friend, 

Stephanie Corral. Corral specifically testified that Green had told her and his 

sister on multiple occasions that he had killed Ramirez and buried his body on 

his property. By Corral’s account, Green killed Ramirez for money. Corral also 

stated that Green had threatened his mother, his sister, and Corral that if any one 

of them ever disclosed this information to anyone, he would kill them as well. 

The evidence shows that after he shot Ramirez, Green sent papers to Ramirez’s 

bank and obtained a new PIN for Ramirez’s debit card. From there, the evidence 

indicates that Green withdrew over $9,000 that had belonged to Ramirez. Green 

later moved to Arizona with his mother.

With a jury unable to reach a verdict, the trial court granted Green’s motion 

for a mistrial. Green then filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, seeking a 

reduction in the $1,000,000 bail. After conducting a hearing, the trial court 

denied Green’s application. This appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

Setting bail is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, but the 

exercise of that discretion is governed by law. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. 
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Const. art. I, § 13; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (West 2005). In setting 

bail, the trial court must strike a balance between the defendant’s presumption of 

innocence and the State’s interest in assuring the defendant’s appearance at 

trial. Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). 

Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit excessive bail. See U.S. Const. 

amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. Bail is excessive if it is “set in an amount 

greater than is reasonably necessary to satisfy the government’s legitimate 

interests.” Beard, 92 S.W.3d at 573. In addition to the constitutional prohibition 

against excessive bail, the Texas Legislature has imposed the following statutory 

requirements:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance 

that the undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an 

instrument of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it 

was committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken 

upon this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the 

community shall be considered.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15.

In setting the amount of bail, the trial court may also give consideration to 

such factors as (1) the accused’s work record; (2) the accused’s family and 

community ties; (3) the accused’s length of residency; (4) the accused’s prior 
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criminal record; (5) the accused’s conformity with previous bond conditions; 

(6) the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; and (7) aggravating 

circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense. See 

Maldonado v. State, 999 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, 

pet. ref’d) (citing Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1981)).

We review the trial court’s ruling on a request to reduce bail under an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 850; Clemons v. State, 

220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.). To determine 

whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial 

court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, 

whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 

505 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 

S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). We must not disturb the trial court’s 

ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Clemons, 220 

S.W.3d at 178.

In a habeas case, the writ applicant bears the burden of proving facts that 

would entitle him to relief and ensuring that a sufficient record is presented to 

show error requiring reversal. See Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703–04

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The burden of proof is upon an applicant who claims bail 

is excessive. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 

148 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
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A. Statutory Factors

1. Sufficient Bail to Assure Appearance but Not Oppress

The first two statutory factors are interrelated. The primary purpose of an 

appearance bond is to secure the presence of the accused at trial on the offense 

charged. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1980). Thus, the amount of bail must be high enough to give reasonable 

assurance that the accused will appear as required. Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 

S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Even though bail should 

be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the accused will appear, 

the power to require bail should not be used as an instrument of oppression. Id.;

Ex parte Ivey, 594 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). This 

occurs when the trial court sets bail at an amount “for the express purpose of 

forcing appellant to remain incarcerated” pending trial or appeal. See Ex parte 

Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.).

Here, Green did not present any evidence at the habeas hearing that the 

trial court set bail in his case for the express purpose of forcing him to remain 

incarcerated. And the bail the trial court set is congruent with a number of cases 

involving similarly alleged crimes. See Ex parte Garcia, No. 09-06-00543-CR, 

2007 WL 846571, *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 21, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (upholding trial court order granting habeas relief 

and lowering murder defendant’s bond from $1,000,000 to $950,000); see also 

Ex parte Jackson, 257 S.W.3d 520, 523 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) 
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(declining to reduce $750,000 bail for defendant charged with capital murder);

Ex parte Brown, 959 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) 

(affirming denial of reduction of $500,000 pretrial bail in capital murder case). 

Although $1,000,000 is within the higher range of bails set for similar cases, 

Green presented no evidence that the bail set in his case required reversal, and 

we conclude that the trial court did not act arbitrarily in setting the amount.

2. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

The nature of the offense and the circumstances surrounding the offense 

are primary factors in determining what constitutes reasonable bail. Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(3); see Ex parte Davila, 623 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex. 

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). In considering the nature of the offense, it is 

proper to consider the possible punishment. Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 

479–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). When the nature of the offense is serious and 

involves aggravating factors, a lengthy prison sentence following trial is probable. 

Ex parte Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754, 760 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no 

pet.). Therefore, pretrial bail must be set sufficiently high to secure the presence 

of the accused at trial because the accused’s reaction to the prospect of a 

lengthy sentence might be to not appear. Id. at 761.

The record reflects that the State indicted Green for intentionally or 

knowingly causing the death of Ramirez by shooting him with a gun, a firstdegree felony. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b), (c) (West 2011). As a firstdegree felony, the offense carries a sentence of five to ninety-nine years’ or life
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imprisonment, and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Id. § 12.32(a)–(b) (West 2011). 

At trial, the State introduced evidence that Green killed Ramirez by shooting him 

in the head and then in the chest, and then disposing the body in a shallow grave 

which Green had prepared prior to the shooting for the very purpose of burying 

Ramirez’s body. Further, the evidence suggests a calculated murder motivated 

by money—a mere $9,000. Thus, the record reflects that the nature of the 

offense and the alleged circumstances surrounding its commission are very 

serious.

When reviewing the appropriate bail for a particular offense, appellate 

courts often compare bail amounts in other cases involving offenses of the same 

degree. This is because such offenses carry the same punishment range, which 

is a proper consideration in determining the nature of the offense charged. See 

Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d at 317; Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d at 480; Maldonado, 999 

S.W.2d at 95.

Texas courts have approved bail amounts as low as $1,000 and as high as 

$1,000,000 for first-degree felony offenses. See, e.g., Ex parte Carson, 215 

S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (setting bail at $1,000 in 

case involving first-degree felony offense of possession of controlled substance); 

Gonzalez v. State, 996 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, 

no pet.) (approving bail set at $90,000 in case involving aggravated robbery); see 

also Pharris v. State, No. 14-06-00788-CR, 2006 WL 3313323, at *1–2 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 16, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated 
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for publication) (approving bail set at $500,000 in case involving offense of firstdegree felony theft); Overstreet, 2009 WL 2196133 at *1 (upholding bail of 

$500,000 in murder charge); Garcia, 2007 WL 846571, at *1 (upholding trial court 

order granting habeas relief and lowering defendant’s bond from $1,000,000 to 

$950,000); Tran v. State, No. 01-06-00035-CR, 2006 WL 1771815, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (approving bail set at $800,000 for cocaine possession and $500,000 

for marijuana possession); Ex parte Cuevas, No. 11-03-00402-CR, 2004 WL 

527960, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 18, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for 

publication) (approving bail set at $1,000,000 in case involving offense of 

engaging in organized criminal activity to commit theft). The bail amount set in 

this case, $1,000,000, is within the range of bail amounts approved for other firstdegree felonies.

3. Ability to Make Bail

The ability of an accused to post bail is a factor to be considered, but the 

inability to make the bail set by the trial court does not automatically render the 

bail excessive. See Ex parte Vance, 608 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 

[Panel Op.] 1980); Maldonado, 999 S.W.2d at 96. This is true even if the 

accused is determined to be indigent. Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d at 317. If the 

ability to make bail in a specified amount controlled, the role of the trial court in 

setting bail would be unnecessary and the accused would be able to set his own 

bail. Hunt, 138 S.W.3d at 506.
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Green presented some evidence that he could not afford to post bail. He 

testified that the bond company would expect him to put up $100,000 but that he 

possessed no assets and was unemployed. And the record reflects that the trial 

court appointed Green counsel based on his indigence. This factor supports 

Green’s contention that the bail is excessive, but the accused’s inability to make 

bail, even to the point of indigence, does not control over the other factors. See 

Ex parte Parker, 26 S.W.3d 711, 712 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.).

4. Future Safety of the Community

The final statutory factor examines the safety of the victim and the 

community if the defendant were to be released on bail. See Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(5). In this case, testimony adduced at trial indicates that 

Green threatened to kill his mother, his sister, and his sister’s best friend if they 

revealed to anyone that he had shot and killed Ramirez and buried his body. 

There is also evidence in the record that Green has previously been charged with 

the theft of firearms and body armor, armor that he allegedly stole from the Army. 

There is also evidence that Green has unlawfully brought firearms onto premises 

licensed to sell alcoholic beverages and that he has been convicted of driving 

under the influence. Further, there is record evidence that when officers arrested 

Green for the offense in which he was wearing the body armor, he told the 

arresting officers that he “has angry outbursts and homicidal tendencies.” These 

actions bode ill for the future safety of the community should Green be released 

within it on a lower bond.
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Based on this evidence, the trial court could have found that Green posed 

a threat to the community and that the $1,000,000 bail was necessary to ensure 

safety of the community. This factor supports that the trial court did not act 

arbitrarily by denying Green’s application to reduce bail.

B. Rubac Factors

The remaining non-statutory factors also support that the trial court did not 

act outside the zone of reasonable disagreement by denying Green’s request to 

lower the $1,000,000 bail amount. Although Green presented evidence that he 

has an in-law in Clay County willing to let Green stay at his ranch, the record 

demonstrates that after he killed Ramirez, Green and his mother moved to 

Arizona. In fact, Arizona extradited Green to Texas in order for him to face this 

present charge.

Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Green has an extensive record 

of past infractions involving drugs and firearms. And although there is no 

evidence that Green has violated past conditions of previous bonds, the 

aggravating circumstances of the present offense are considerable. Green is 

alleged to have shot Ramirez, his friend and ex-Army mate, in the head as he 

either sat at his computer or slept. When Green shot him, Ramirez wore only a 

pair of boxer shorts. The evidence also reveals that Green pre-meditated killing 

Ramirez. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Green had already dug the shallow 

grave where he eventually buried Ramirez’s body prior to shooting him and that 

Green had even backed up his truck to the garage in anticipation of removing 
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Ramirez’s body. The consideration of the non-statutory factors supports that the 

trial court did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably by denying Green’s application to 

reduce the $1,000,000 bail amount.

IV. CONCLUSION

Although Green presented some evidence of his inability to make bail at 

the habeas hearing, the nature and aggravating circumstances of the charged 

offense, the future safety of the community, Green’s prior criminal history, and 

the fact that he moved to Arizona after having shot Ramirez and disposed of his 

body in a pre-dug, shallow grave support that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Green’s application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bail 

reduction. See Jackson, 257 S.W.3d at 523 (holding that bail of $750,000 for 

defendant charged with murder as shooter during robbery was within range of 

bail for similar crimes). We affirm the trial court’s order.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: February 13, 2014