Honorable Charles H. Bolton Opinion No. M-119 

County Attorney 

Meridian, Texas Re: Must a writ of possession 

be issued within a period 

of 20 days after the perlod 

of redemption on property 

sold attax sale has expired 

and not thereafter under 

the authority of Art. 73&b, 

Sec. 12, V.C.S., and related 

Dear Mr. Rolton: statutes. 

You have requested the opinion of this Office In regard 

to the following question: 

Must a writ of possession be issued within 

a period of 20 days after the period of 

redemption on property sold at a tax sale 

has expired, and not thereafter, under 

the provisions of Article 7345b, Section 

12, Vernon's Civil Statutes, and the 

related statutes? 

Section 12 of Article 7345b, provides as follows: 

"In all suits heretofore or hereafter 

filed ,to collect delinquent taxes against 

property, judgment in said suit shall provide for the Issuance of writ of possession 

within twenty (20) days after the period of 

redemption shall have expired to the purchaser at foreclosure sale or its or his 

assigns; but whenever land fs sold under 

judgment in such suit for taxes,' the owner 

of such property, or anyone having an lnterest therein, or their heirs, assigns or 

legal representatives, may, within two (2) 

years from the date of the filing for record 

of the purchaser's deed and not thereafter, 

have the right to redeem said property from 

such purchase on the following basis, . . .'I 

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Honorable Charles H. Bolton, Page 2 (M-119) 

The statute under consideration is a part of Chapter 

10, Title 122, Vernon's Civil Statutes, dealing with the 

collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes. In order to 

arrive at a proper meaning of Section 12, It should be considered in connection with the purposes of Chapter 10, and, 

in particular, with all of Article 7345b. In brief, this 

Article deals with suits for delinquent taxes by taxing 

units, the judgments, rights of redemption, and other related 

matters. 

Tht literal meaning of the phrase of Sectfon 12, whfch 

provides . . , judgment In said suit shall provide for the 

issuance of a writ of possession within twenty (20) days after 

the period of redemption shall have expired to tl;fe purchaser 

at foreclosure sale or its or his assigns; . . . would be 

that the "writ of possession" must Issue within 20 days after 

the period of redemption has expired. 

If the legislature had intended this as a limitation 

to be strictly limited to the period state?, It would Gave 

added after the words "shall have expired, the words and 

not thereafter" or other language of similar meaning. 

We find the following language In 53 Tex.Jur.2d 195, 

196, Statutes, Sec. 134: 

"Statutes are frequently given an lnterpretatlon at variance with their llteral terms. 

The court will depart from the exact and 

literal import of a statute, or a particular 

part, provision, or word thereof, if this is 

necessary to effectuate or preserve the leglslative intent. Thus, worasor clauses will 

not be given their literal meaning if such an 

interpretation would thwart the plain purpose 

of the legislature, or would lead 'to palpable 

absurdity, contradiction, injustice, OP uncertainty, and if such a construction can reasonably be avoided. 

"In departing from the literal meaning of a 

statute, its letter is sometimes enlarged, 

sometimes restrained, and sometimes the construction given Is contrary to the letter 

of the law." 

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Honorable Charles H. Bolton, Page 3 (M-119) 

Clearly, it was the intent of the legislature in 

making the detailed provisions of Article 7345b, dealing 

with suits for delinquent ad valorem taxes, sales of the 

property by the purchaser at the sales, and the redemption 

thereof by the owners, to place the purchaser at such sales 

in possession of the property so purchased after the period 

of redemption has expired. To place the literal construction limiting the issuance of the writ of possession to the 

period of "within 20 days after the period of redemption 

shall have expired," would do violence to the purpose and 

intent of all of Article 7345b, when considered as a whole. 

In the case of Dolan v. Walker, Land Commissioner, 

121 Tex. 361, 49 S.W.28 693 (1932) the Court used the foliowing language relating to the co;struction of statutes: 

'In the construction of statutes certain fundamental rules control. The 

paramount rule In construing statutes 

Is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intention of the Legislature. If the 

language or terms used in the statute 

are uncertain or confusing in arriving 

at the Intention, it is proper to consider the general policy towards the 

matter legislated upon, the purpose of 

the legislation, the evils to be remedied, 

and the object to be accomplished. Cannon's 

Adm'r v. Vaughan, 12 Tex. 399; Higgins V. 

Rinker, 47 Tex. 393; City of Austin v. Cahill, 

99 Tex. 172, 88 S.W. 542, 89 S.W. 552; Clary 

v. Hurst, 104 Tex. 423, 138 S.W. 566; article 

10, subd. 6, R. S. 1925." 

It is stated in 37 Tex.Jur.2d 83, Limitations, Sec. 3: 

. . . statutes of limitation should be construed In like manner as other statutes, and 

should receive such Interpretation; consistent 

with their terms, as will defeat the mischief 

intended to be suppressed, and advance the 

policy and remedy they were designed to promote." 

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Honorable Charles H. Bolten, Page 4 (M-119) 

We have been unable to find a case direct1 

on the question involved. However, the case of &%&k?~. 

Owens, 209 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App., 1948, no writ hist.) 

deals with the subject generally. One of the points of error 

relied on by Appellant was to the effect that in one of the 

suits (for delinquent ad valorem taxes) ,the Order of Sale 

was issued'less than twenty days after the judgment was rendered. 

The Court, in disposing of this point, stated: 

rr . . . The fact that the Order of Sale 

was issued less than twenty days after 

judgment was rendered was but an irregularity and it will be respected until 

set aside by a direct proceeding. . , .)l 

Further, it was stated: 

11 . . . The purchase of the property 

at the sheriff's sales, namely, the 

State of Texas, was not bound to examine 

into the regularity of the proceedings 

under which the Orders of Sale were issued 

and, however irregular they might have 

been, the title of the purchaser was not 

affected thereby. . . .' 

Applying the proper rules of construction, as announced 

by many decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas, it is the 

opinion of this Office that the literal wording of Section 12, 

Article 7345b, provides that the writ of possession is available to the purchaser within 20 days after the date of redemption, but that this is not a limitation statute, and such writ 

may issue after the expmtion of 2mays aster the period of 

redemption has expired. 

------- SUMMARY 

Section 12 of Article 7345b, Vernon's 

Civil Statutes, is not a statute of limitation, and the writ of possession provided for therein may issue to the purchaser 

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. . 

. . 

Honorable Charles H. Bolton, Page 5 (M-119) 

after the expiration of 20 days 

after the period of redemption 

shall have expired. 

truly yours, 

Prepared by John R. Grace 

Assistant Attorney General 

JRG/dls 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTED 

A.J. Carubbi, Jr., Chairman 

Staff Legal Assistant 

W.O. Shultz, Co-Chairman 

John Reeves 

Tom Mack 

Tom Thurmond 

Bob Flowers 

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