1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-22-1997

United States v. Bell

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-7654

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Recommended Citation

"United States v. Bell" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 110.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/110
Filed May 22, 1997 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 96-7654 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v. 

ROBERTA RONIQUE BELL, 

Appellant 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

(D.C. Criminal No. 95-163) 

Argued: April 15, 1997 

Before: GREENBERG, ALITO, and SEITZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: May 22, 1997) 

RICHARD K. RENN (Argued) 

SNYDER & RENN 

149 East Market Street 

York, PA 17401 

 Attorney for Appellant

DAVID M. BARASCH 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 

GORDON A.D. ZUBROD (Argued) 

Assistant U.S. Attorney 

P.O. Box 11754 

Harrisburg, PA 17108 

 Attorneys for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT 

ALITO, Circuit Judge: 

Appellant Roberta Ronique Bell was convicted following a 

jury trial of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; 

murder of a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) 

and (C); use of physical force and threats against a witness, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (2), and (3); and use 

of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). She was sentenced to 

life imprisonment. These charges all relate to the killing of 

Doreen Proctor, who had been acting as an informant for 

the Tri-County Drug Task Force. Before Bell was indicted 

on these federal charges in June 1995, she had been

acquitted in the Court of Common Pleas for Adams County 

of murder and witness intimidation charges arising out of 

the same events. 

Bell's principal argument in this appeal is that her 

convictions on the witness tampering charges must be 

reversed because there was insufficient evidence that she 

intended to interfere with a federal proceeding or to prevent 

the communication of information to federal law 

enforcement officers. We hold that the jury was entitled to 

conclude (1) that Bell intended to prevent communications 

by Proctor to law enforcement officers and (2) that under 

United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996), at 

least one of those communications would have been to a 

federal officer. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I. 

Doreen Proctor was an informant for the Tri-County Drug 

Task Force ("the Task Force"), which was comprised of 

local, state, and federal investigators operating in 

Cumberland, Dauphin, and Franklin Counties in 

Pennsylvania. The Task Force had developed federal as well 

as state criminal cases. Based on an investigation by the 

Task Force in which Proctor had provided information, 

David Tyler (who was Bell's boyfriend and colleague in the 

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drug business) was on trial for drug offenses in state court. 

Proctor was scheduled to testify against Tyler on April 21, 

1992, in the Court of Common Pleas for Cumberland 

County. In the early morning of April 21, at the direction of 

David Tyler, Bell and several others kidnapped Proctor, 

took her to an isolated location in Adams County, tortured 

her, and killed her. Bell drove Proctor to the place where 

she was killed, and fired the first shot, into Proctor's chest. 

Willie Tyler, David Tyler's brother, then shot Proctor in the 

head. 

Several of Bell's co-conspirators were convicted in state 

court of murder and/or witness intimidation. Bell, however, 

was acquitted in April 1993. Federal authorities then began 

their own investigation into Proctor's murder, which 

culminated in the convictions that are the subject of this 

appeal.1 

Before trial, Bell moved to dismiss the indictment on 

double jeopardy and related grounds. The district court 

denied this motion in September 1995. Following trial, Bell 

moved for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, renewing 

her double jeopardy argument and contending that there 

was insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions on the 

witness tampering charges because Proctor was not a

federal witness. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence, Bell contended that the court erred in its 

charge to the jury on the issue of her intent to interfere 

with a federal proceeding or investigation. She also 

advanced the related argument that without a connection 

between Proctor and a federal proceeding or a federal 

investigation, the court lacked jurisdiction. The court 

denied this motion in a memorandum opinion filed in June 

1996. At her sentencing hearing, Bell argued that it was 

error to use the first-degree murder guideline in computing 

her sentence on the 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) intimidation count 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. Willie Tyler is the only co-conspirator of Bell's to have been similarly 

prosecuted in federal court after the state prosecution. He was acquitted 

of murder and convicted of witness intimidation in the state trial, and 

served two years in prison. He was then convicted of the same offenses 

as Bell following a trial in the Middle District of Pennsylvania (No. 1:CR96-106). 

 3 
(as the pre-sentence report recommended) because the jury 

never determined that Bell committed first-degree murder. 

The court rejected this argument. (App. 21A-30A) 

On appeal, Bell raises these same contentions. In 

evaluating Bell's sufficiency challenge, we must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government (the 

verdict-winner) and ask "whether any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 

711, 731 (3d Cir. 1994). Since the remainder of Bell's 

contentions pose questions of law, our review as to them is 

plenary. 

II. 

Subsection (a)(1) of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 ("Tampering with a 

witness, victim, or an informant") makes it unlawful to kill 

or attempt to kill another person "with intent to -- (A) 

prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an 

official proceeding; [or] (C) prevent the communication by 

any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the 

United States of information relating to the commission or 

possible commission of a Federal offense . . . ." Subsection 

(b) of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 prohibits the knowing use of 

intimidation, physical force, threats, and corrupt 

persuasion to accomplish these ends. 

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1) defines an "official 

proceeding" as a federal proceeding, whether before a court, 

a grand jury, Congress, or a government agency. Similarly, 

18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4) defines a "law enforcement officer" as 

"an officer or employee of the Federal Government, or a 

person authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal 

Government . . . ." While the statute thus limits its reach 

to tampering that affects a federal proceeding or 

investigation, it expressly does not require that the 

defendant know or intend anything with respect to this 

federal character. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f) provides: "no 

state of mind need be proved with respect to the 

circumstance -- (1) that the official proceeding before a 

judge [or] court . . . is before a judge or court of the United 

States . . . or (2) that the . . . law enforcement officer is an 

 4 
officer or employee of the Federal Government or a person 

authorized to act for or on behalf of the Federal 

Government . . . ." 

A. In the district court's view, the government was

required to prove only that "the Defendant intended to 

interfere with a proceeding (that happened to be a federal 

proceeding) or interfere with communication to a law 

enforcement officer (who happened to be a federal law 

enforcement officer)." Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. If the government 

had presented evidence that it was contemplated that 

Proctor would testify in a federal proceeding, the jury could 

easily have inferred that at least one of the proceedings 

with which Bell intended to interfere would have been 

federal. But there was no federal proceeding contemplated 

at the time of Proctor's murder.2 Similarly, if the

government had presented evidence that at the time of her 

murder Proctor was cooperating in an ongoing federal 

investigation, the jury could easily have inferred that at 

least one of the law-enforcement-officer communications 

that Bell intended to prevent would have been with a 

federal officer. But, while federal officers were involved in 

the Task Force investigation, there is no evidence that 

Proctor had been providing information to a federal officer 

or to an officer authorized to act on behalf of the federal 

government. 

Accordingly, in this case, as in United States v.

Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 1996), we must rely on 

circumstantial evidence to decide whether the jury could 

have concluded that at least one of the law-enforcementofficer communications that Bell intended to prevent would 

have been with a federal officer. In Stansfield, the 

defendant believed that one Hoffman had told the 

authorities that Stansfield had burned down his 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. The government contends that "federal proceedings were, in fact, 

contemplated as the result of the victim's discussions with Special Agent 

Diller. (App. Vol. 2, pp. 45, 46)." Govt. Br. at 23. Diller's testimony does 

not bear this characterization. He did not say anything that can be 

construed to mean that the Task Force had already decided at the time 

of Proctor's murder to make a federal case out of the drug trade in which 

Tyler, Bell, and others were engaged, or that it had even thought about 

doing so. 

 5 
(Stansfield's) house to collect the insurance money. 

Stansfield threatened, beat up, and attempted to kill 

Hoffman and Hoffman's parents. On appeal, Stansfield 

argued that his conviction for witness tampering could not 

stand because there was insufficient evidence that he had 

intended to hinder Hoffman's communications with a 

federal law enforcement officer. Id. at 917. 

Stansfield argued that the government was required to 

prove "an intent to prevent the communication of 

information to some particular law enforcement officer" who 

was, in fact, a federal officer. Id. at 918. The government 

countered that all it had to prove was that "the offense 

about which the defendant wishe[d] to prevent 

communications [was] actually a federal offense." Id. We 

rejected Stansfield's interpretation, but noted as well that 

"the position of the government [was not] without 

problems." Id. We expressed concern that if we demanded 

"only that the government prove that the underlying offense 

is federal and that the defendant intended to prevent the 

witness from communicating with law enforcement officers 

in general . . . we would essentially vitiate an important 

facet of the intent requirement of the statute." Id. We set 

forth the following formulation of the elements of 

§ 1512(a)(1)(C): 

[T]he government must prove: (1) the defendant killed 

or attempted to kill a person; (2) the defendant was 

motivated by a desire to prevent the communication 

between any person and law enforcement authorities 

concerning the commission or possible commission of

an offense; (3) that offense was actually a federal

offense; and (4) the defendant believed that the person

in (2) above might communicate with the federal

authorities. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

In view of the statute's clear command that the 

government need not prove any "state of mind" on the part 

of the defendant with respect to the federal character of the 

proceeding or officer, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f), we do not read 

the italicized passage as requiring proof that the defendant 

believed the victim might communicate with law 

 6 
enforcement officers whom the defendant knew or believed

to be federal officers. Rather, we read this sentence as 

recognizing that what the statute mandates is proof that 

the officers with whom the defendant believed the victim 

might communicate would in fact be federal officers.3 

Our interpretation is buttressed by the Stansfield court's 

explanation that "[t]his last element may be inferred by the 

jury from the fact that the offense was federal in nature, 

plus additional appropriate evidence." Id. If an offense 

constitutes a federal crime, it is more likely that an officer 

investigating it would be a federal officer, but an offense's 

status as a federal crime has no relationship with the 

defendant's subjective belief about the individual 

investigating it. Our reading of Stansfield is further 

confirmed by an examination of the dissent in that case. 

The dissent would have ordered the entry of a judgment of 

acquittal because the evidence revealed "no way to 

conclude that Stansfield either believed that a federal 

investigation was underway or could possibly have been 

aware of the potential for a federal investigation." Id. at 924 

(Lewis, J., dissenting). The dissent thus clearly framed the 

issue as whether the defendant must know or intend that 

the law-enforcement-officer communications which he

seeks to prevent would be with federal officers. Because of 

the majority's conclusion that such federal-specific 

knowledge or intent was not required, the dissent charged 

that the majority had "essentially eviscerate[d] the intent 

element of the statute." Id. at 923 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 

Accordingly, we believe that the law of this circuit after 

Stansfield is that the government must prove that at least 

one of the law-enforcement-officer communications which 

the defendant sought to prevent would have been with a 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. We do not mean to imply that the victim and the witness or informant 

-- the person murdered and the person whom the murderer intended to 

prevent from communicating with the authorities -- must be one and the 

same. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) seems to apply as well to a situation 

where the defendant kills one person at least in part to set an 

intimidating example to dissuade another person or persons from 

communicating to the authorities. See id. ("Whoever kills or attempts to 

kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any

person to a law enforcement officer . . . .") (emphases added). 

 7 
federal officer, but that the government is not obligated to 

prove that the defendant knew or intended anything with 

respect to this federal involvement. As Stansfield explained, 

the government may carry this burden by showing that the 

conduct which the defendant believed would be discussed 

in these communications constitutes a federal offense, so 

long as the government also presents "additional 

appropriate evidence." Id. at 918. 

B. The questions upon which the disposition of this

appeal turns, then, are: (1) whether the jury could have 

concluded that at least part of Bell's motivation in killing 

Proctor was to prevent Proctor from communicating further 

with the Task Force; and (2) if so, whether the jury could 

have concluded that at least one of Proctor's further 

communications with the Task Force would have been with 

a federal officer. 

We have no hesitation in answering the first question in 

the affirmative. In Stansfield, the government's case 

appears to have been based solely on the law-enforcementofficer-communication part of the statute. Here, in contrast, 

the government has emphasized the official-proceeding 

subsection (despite the fact that § 1512 clearly would not 

apply if Bell's sole motivation in killing Proctor was to 

prevent her from testifying at Tyler's trial, because that 

state-court trial does not qualify as an "official proceeding"). 

Nevertheless, the government also alleged in the indictment 

and submitted to the jury the theory that Bell killed Proctor 

to prevent her from communicating with law enforcement 

officers. (App. 62A, 70A, 72A-73A; 561-62, 565-66, 586-87) 

We are satisfied that, while the evidence may lend itself 

more obviously to the theory that Bell killed Proctor in 

order to prevent her from testifying a few hours later at 

Tyler's trial, it also supports the inference that Bell believed 

Proctor was going to continue to communicate with the 

Task Force concerning drug crimes that Bell and others 

had committed. It is undisputed that, as a result of 

Proctor's information and testimony, an individual named 

Mary Jane Hodge had been convicted of drug offenses, and 

that at the time of her murder Proctor was scheduled to 

testify against two other drug defendants besides Tyler. 

(App. 54-57) The Task Force had not at that point begun an 

 8 
investigation of Bell, but it is undisputed that Proctor "was 

still providing information about the drug trade in the 

Carlisle area at the time and also Harrisburg," a drug trade 

in which Bell was personally and heavily involved. (App. 57) 

We hold that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that 

Bell feared that Proctor's continued cooperation with the 

Task Force would have resulted in additional 

communications with law enforcement officers concerning 

drug crimes committed by Bell, among others, and that at 

least part of Bell's motivation in killing Proctor was to 

prevent such communications. The evidence is thus 

sufficient to support a finding that Bell killed Proctor not 

only to protect her boyfriend, Tyler, but also to protect 

herself, because there is evidence that Bell was at least as 

heavily implicated as Tyler in the drug trade for which Tyler 

was on trial. (App. 300, 435-36, 451) 

We also believe that the second question requires an 

affirmative answer. The government clearly presented 

sufficient evidence to entitle the jury to conclude that Bell 

killed Proctor; we have held that the jury could have found 

that Bell was motivated at least in part by a desire to 

prevent Proctor from communicating with the Task Force 

concerning the commission or possible commission of

offenses; and those offenses (drug crimes) are clearly 

federal offenses. See Stansfield, 101 F.3d at 918. Bell, like 

Stansfield, "had knowledge of [Proctor's] past cooperation 

and was aware that some investigation, though not 

necessarily a federal one, was underway." Id. at 919. The 

Stansfield court noted that it was unclear whether 

Stansfield knew that a federal investigation had been 

opened. Id. Similarly, it is unclear whether Bell knew that 

the Task Force was a joint federal-state effort, but it is clear 

that it in fact was. As in Stansfield, the evidence does not 

indicate that Bell intended to prevent Proctor from

communicating with a particular officer or officers, but 

rather with the Task Force generally. 

We hold that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that 

if Proctor had continued to cooperate with a partially 

federal law enforcement body regarding conduct 

constituting federal crimes, at least one of her 

communications would have been to a federal officer or to 

 9 
an officer authorized to act on behalf of the federal 

government.4 The jury thus could reasonably have found 

that Bell killed Proctor "with intent to . . . prevent the 

communication by [Proctor] to a law enforcement officer . . . 

of the United States of information relating to the

commission or possible commission of a Federal offense." 

18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). Contrary to the criticism 

expressed by the dissent in Stansfield, this conclusion does 

not render the defendant's intent "irrelevant." See 101 F.3d 

at 922 (Lewis, J., dissenting). Rather, it respects fully the 

statute's requirement that the defendant intend to prevent 

a communication to a law enforcement officer, as well as its 

requirement that such officer be, in fact, a federal officer. 

What our analysis renders irrelevant is the defendant's 

"mental state" regarding the fact that the officer is a federal 

officer -- a fact which § 1512(f)(2) by its terms declares 

irrelevant.5 

III. 

We next address Bell's challenge to the district court's 

jury charge with respect to the intent requirement of the 

tampering counts. The court gave the jury a supplemental 

instruction stating that the government was required to 

prove that: 

_________________________________________________________________ 

4. Beyond stating our conclusion that the additional evidence presented 

in this case (in particular, that the Task Force was a joint federal-state 

effort that had developed federal cases in the past) constitutes 

"additional appropriate evidence" of the sort mandated by Stansfield, 101 

F.3d at 918, we express no opinion as to what types and what quantum 

of evidence satisfy that standard, which by its nature will require careful, 

case-by-case analysis. 

5. Bell's argument that the federal government lacks jurisdiction to try 

her for these crimes is founded upon her contention that the evidence 

reveals no nexus between her charged conduct and any federal interest. 

In light of our conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Bell's 

convictions for tampering with a federal informant, we reject her 

jurisdictional argument. Similarly, Bell's sufficiency argument as to the 

conspiracy and gun charges depends upon the success of her sufficiency 

challenge to the tampering counts. We therefore find this argument as 

well to be meritless. 

 10 
defendant intended to frustrate a future judicial 

proceeding, and in parentheses that would turn out to 

be a federal proceeding . . . . 

[Y]ou would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant intended to frustrate a future 

judicial proceeding. You would also have to conclude 

that that proceeding would be a federal proceeding, but 

you don't have to find that the defendant knew that it 

would be a federal proceeding. 

(App. 586) Bell argues that this charge "watered down" the 

intent requirement by "shift[ing] the jury's focus to deciding 

whether it was possible that the victim could relay 

information to federal law enforcement, rather than to the 

proper inquiry -- the intent of the Defendant . . . ." Bell Br. 

at 29 (emphasis in original). 

This argument is meritless. The quoted instruction did 

nothing more than explain 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) and (2)'s 

express provision that the government need not prove any 

state of mind on the part of the defendant with respect to 

the federal character of the proceeding or law-enforcementofficer communication that it alleges she intended to 

interfere with or prevent. 

IV. 

In sentencing Bell to life imprisonment, the district court 

followed the pre-sentence report's recommendation and 

applied U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a), the guideline for first-degree 

murder. Bell contends that since the jury did not find that 

her killing of Proctor constituted first-degree murder, it was 

error for the district court to sentence her based on the 

first-degree murder guideline rather than the second-degree 

guideline. 

The provision under which Bell was sentenced, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(a)(2)(A), incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 1111's definition of 

murder, and provides that a conviction for tampering-bykilling shall be punished by death or life imprisonment if 

the killing constitutes murder under § 1111, and shall be 

punished in accordance with § 1112 (the manslaughter 

statute) if it is any other kind of killing. Here the district 

 11 
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Bell's 

conduct fit the definition of first-degree murder set forth in 

18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). (App. 21A-30A) Bell argues that it was 

a violation of due process for the district court, as opposed 

to the jury, to make this determination. 

We are unpersuaded by this argument, but we need not 

resolve it definitively. Even if Bell should have been found 

to have committed second-degree rather than first-degree 

murder, it would not affect her sentence. Title 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1512(a)(2)(A) provides that the punishment shall be death 

or life imprisonment where the "killing" constitutes murder, 

regardless of whether it is first-degree or second-degree 

murder. Bell does not argue that the "killing" here should 

have been found to be manslaughter.6 

V. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

conviction and sentence entered by the district court. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

_________________________________________________________________ 

6. Bell also reiterates the double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, and 

selective prosecution arguments that were rejected by the district court. 

The dual sovereigns doctrine has long foreclosed Bell's argument that the 

federal government may not prosecute her for the same conduct of which 

she was acquitted in state court, and Bell fails in her attempt to fit this 

case into the "Bartkus exception" to that doctrine. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 

359 U.S. 121 (1959). The same defect -- no identity of parties -- dooms 

Bell's collateral estoppel argument. Finally, Bell's selective prosecution 

argument is frivolous. No such claim lies unless Bell can make out a 

difficult prima facie showing that she was selected for prosecution for an 

invidious reason such as her race, her religion, or her exercise of 

constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 

608 (1985). The only motive so much as hinted at here -- that the 

federal government chose to prosecute Bell after her state court acquittal 

because it did not want her to get away with murder -- is far from 

invidious. 

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