The NATO Response Force

Facilitating Coalition Warfare through

Technology Transfer and Information Sharing

Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl 

Report of a study conducted by the 

Center for Transatlantic Relations and 

Funded by the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

September 2005 
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

Jeffrey P. Bialos is the Executive Director of the Transatlantic Security and Industry Program at 

the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Center for 

Transatlantic Relations, and a partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill and Brennan. Mr. 

Bialos previously served in a number of senior positions in the Clinton Administration, including 

most recently as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Affairs. He received the 

Defense Department’s Distinguished Service Medal for his service. He has published numerous 

articles and reports on defense and security issues, and conducted studies of a variety of issues 

concerning the transatlantic armaments market, NATO and related subjects. He was also 

appointed by Governor Mark Warner of Virginia to serve on Secure Virginia, a panel overseeing 

Virginia’s homeland security efforts. Mr. Bialos is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. with 

honors), the University of Chicago Law School (J.D.) and the Kennedy School of Government, 

Harvard University (M.P.P.) 

Stuart L. Koehl is a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, where he focuses his 

research activities on transatlantic security and industrial issues. A graduate of Georgetown 

University, Mr. Koehl has been a defense analyst for twenty-five years and has conducted a wide 

range of analyses for both government and industry on defense technology, strategy, and 

transformation issues. 

Acknowledgements. This study is based on a review of unclassified, open literature and 

interviews with selected U.S. government, NATO, and industry personnel. We acknowledge the 

support and assistance of these individuals, who took time out from busy schedules to talk to us. 

We acknowledge Johns Hopkins University’s Center on Transatlantic Relations (CTR) and 

National Defense University (NDU) for their support of this project. In particular, we appreciate 

the helpful advice and comments of Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler at NDU and Dan 

Hamilton at the CTR. As always, however, the responsibility for content is that of the authors, 

not the institutions with which they are affiliated, nor the sources on which they drew.

Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl 

Washington, D.C. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Fort 

Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

ii
Contents 

Executive Summary v

I. The NATO Response Force: From Conception to Operations 1

A. The NRF Concept 1

B. The Purpose and Roots of the NRF 2 

C. The NRF in Operation 12 

D. Relevant Issues and Uncertainties on the NRF’s Development 15 

II. Identifying Critical Enabling Technologies and Information for the NRF 21

A. A Taxonomy of Technology Transfer Needs 22 

B. The Phased Timeline for Technology Transfer 27 

III. A Taxonomy of Technology Transfer and 

Information Sharing Issues 35

A. The Regulatory, Policy, and Institutional Framework for Technology 

Transfer 35

1. The Legal and Regulatory Basics 35 

2. Entrenched Problems in the Technology Transfer Process 38 

3. Limited Effectiveness of Attempted Solutions 40 

4. Study Assumptions: Continued Release and Process Issues and 

Lack of USG Consensus for Overall System Reform 47 

B. Information Sharing and Network-Centric Warfare 50 

C. Capability Requirements 66 

1. The Range of Capability-Related Technology Transfer Needs 67 

2. Technology Transfer Policy Issues 68 

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 77

A. General Observations 77 

B. NRF Recommendations 79 

C. Steps to Improved Technology Transfer and Information Sharing 81 

Appendix: Critical Enabling Technology and Key U.S. Programs 84

iii
Tables 

1.1 Force Contributions, NRF Rotation No.1 16

2.1 Taxonomy of NRF Capabilities by Implementation Phase 24 

3.1 Key ISR Enabling Systems 51 

3.2 Interoperability Enhancements and Technology Transfer 58 

3.3 U.S. Transformational Programs and Releasability Status 60 

3.4 Capabilities and Technology Transfer Requirements (Non-C4I) 66 

Figures 

2.1 Spectrum of Interoperability 26 

3.1 National Disclosure Policy Review Process 37 

3.2 Process for Review of Signature Control Technology 43 

3.3 Anti-Tamper Executive Authority Decision Process 45 

iv
Executive Summary 

At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO Heads of State announced the creation of the NATO 

Response Force (NRF), a relatively small expeditionary force for spearhead operations in out-ofarea conflicts. The central concept was to create, over time, an advanced, primarily European 

force for high-intensity conflicts that would catalyze force transformation and capability 

acquisition in Europe, promote Transatlantic force interoperability, and provide Europe with outof-area capabilities to match its new strategic direction and reorient NATO toward out-of-area 

expeditionary operations. The hope was and is that this type of operational force would, along 

with other steps, help to revitalize the NATO alliance and improve Transatlantic security 

relations in these times of tensions and drift. 

The NRF is intended to be a transformational force that will not only be able to meet the security 

needs of NATO in the 21st century but also serve as an agent of change whereby all the member 

nations of NATO will be able to bring new technology, capabilities, and concepts of operations 

into their national forces. While the NRF is still a work in progress, the threats and missions that 

the Force is intended to address will undoubtedly require, and encourage the acquisition of, 

strategic mobility and deployability, battlefield agility, and high lethality. Unlike previous joint 

forces, which tended to fight in a segregated fashion (by virtue of either roles or geographical 

boundaries), the NRF is intended to be fully integrated, i.e., units will be able to fight within the 

same battle space without regard to national origins and unconstrained by geographical 

boundaries. Significantly, this coalition warfighting construct implies the need to fully share 

information within the Force at the tactical and operational level, something that can only be 

done if there is a significant level of technical, tactical, and operational inter-operability—to say 

nothing of a common doctrine and concept of operations. 

Undoubtedly, the sharing of U.S. technology and technical information would facilitate, and in 

some cases be essential to, the development and fielding of a highly capable and interoperable 

NRF. Unfortunately, however, the history of recent Transatlantic armaments initiatives suggests 

that the complex problems associated with such technology and information sharing with the 

United States could be a significant limiting factor in standing up the NRF, and that new or 

special approaches should be considered to address these issues. If the NRF is to succeed, both 

in its primary mission as NATO’s fast reaction, cutting-edge force, and as an instrument of 

military transformation within the Alliance, then information-sharing and technology transfer 

issues must be identified, addressed and resolved expeditiously. Hence, this study is primarily 

an examination of the issues associated with transferring U.S. technology and information 

needed for standing up such an advanced force for early entry into high-intensity conflicts. 

In the course of evaluating these issues and making recommendations on ways forward, this 

essay also makes a number of additional, and broader observations about the nature of 21st

century coalition warfighting, the centrality of network-centric warfare to coalition operations, 

and the importance and complexity of improving force interoperability in an increasingly 

network-centric environment. In this regard, the NRF is really a microcosm of broader 

crosscutting issues and challenges inherent in developing an effective coalition warfighting 

capability and cohesive alliance for the 21st century. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a 
basis for solving all of these complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for 

experimentation and testing—the essence of military transformation—and the forging of creative 

solutions. 

Specifically, in organizing this analysis: 

• Section I sets forth an understanding of the purposes, operational realities and 

developmental path of the NRF—which is critical to establishing a conceptual baseline 

for identifying and assessing the technology transfer needs associated with the Force. 

• Section II seeks to identify and prioritize the technology transfer and information sharing 

needs associated with standing up the NRF, including those related to Force operational 

and doctrinal needs, ensuring force interoperability, and incentivizing the acquisition of 

enhanced capabilities. As the NRF is still a work in progress, we have, of necessity, 

made educated guesses about its likely trajectory in order to identify technology and 

informational needs. 

• Section III assesses the specific technology transfer issues, concerns, and impediments 

likely to arise with respect to the releasability of needed technologies and information 

sharing under applicable U.S. laws, rules and policies, and makes recommendations on 

specific and realistic steps needed to address these concerns so that the NRF can achieve 

its stated purposes. 

As discussed in more detail below, this study has found the following: 

1. The NRF: The Tenuous Link Between Its Goals and Operations. Specifically, the 

purposes of the NRF are relatively clear: 

• Provide NATO a capability to act rapidly and lethally in out-of-area conflicts and, in so 

doing, strengthen its raison d’etre as a military alliance that can handle 21st century 

security threats; 

• Operate as a catalyst for focusing and promoting the transformation of the Alliance’s 

military capabilities to meet these threats; and 

• Enhance interoperability between the multinational elements of the NRF in order that it 

can effectively achieve its mission goals. 

Since the Prague Summit, SHAPE has made significant progress in moving the NRF from

concept to operations. A six-month rotational force, the NRF will have three phases of

development, including: the stand up of an initial “spearhead” force in 2004-6; full operational 

capability in 2006 (using European ground elements together with U.S. “enablers” in areas such 

as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), lift, and so forth); and, in 2013 and 

beyond, the integration of European or NATO enablers as Europe and/or NATO acquires 

advanced capabilities in key areas such as airlift, precision munitions, missile defense and 

Command, Control, Communications Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR). 

vi
Despite these promising beginnings, there are several significant realities concerning the NRF 

that warrant serious consideration and make it more difficult to assess the Force’s technology 

transfer needs: 

• Given SHAPE’s operational focus and the necessary priority on standing up the NRF 

soon, there has been little longer-term focus to date in NRF force planning on explictly 

linking the NRF’s long-term development to its underlying capability acquisition goals 

(e.g., lift, precision munitions, and the like). While the NRF undoubtedly will integrate 

new European capabilities as they come on line, there is no specific plan or roadmap as to 

how the NRF will catalyze the acquisition of such capabilities. 

• There also is no clear plan to facilitate NRF interoperability (i.e., to ensure that the forces 

of participants, with different levels of capability for years to come, will be able to 

operate together on the battlefield). 

• Finally, there is no clarity concerning the extent to which the United States will 

contribute its advanced network-centric enablers during NRF Phase II when they are 

critical to the Force’s operation as a cutting edge spearhead force (i.e., when advanced 

European enablers in areas from lift to network-centric warfare are still on the drawing 

board). 

These uncertainties about the NRF—issues of concern in their own right—make it more difficult 

to assess the NRF’s technology transfer and information needs. 

2. Critical NRF Technology Transfer Needs Relate to Interoperability and Long Term 

Capability Acquisition. The reality is that, for the most part, the capability needs of the NRF in 

its early phases can largely be met by existing European capabilities and European industrial 

capabilities—and without significant U.S. technology transfer. The key NRF needs for 

technology and information sharing, and where the significant and complex policy issues 

undoubtedly will arise, are twofold: 

• To ensure force interoperability in NRF Phase I (which will require at least secure 

communications and avoidance of friendly fire), Phase II (i.e., when European ground 

and naval forces link up to and take advantage of outputs from current U.S. enablers of 

network-centric warfare) and Phase III (i.e., when the NRF is linked to significant U.S. 

network-centric capabilities under development and new European capabilities as they 

emerge that will provide full situational awareness and ability for collective engagement). 

Significantly, interoperability is less about transferring enabling technologies than 

sharing classified and unclassified information necessary for full situational awareness 

and friendly fire avoidance, including access to ISR and command and control systems 

(linkages and software), real-time, actionable outputs from such ISR assets, and detailed 

technical information concerning network architectures, interfaces, protocols, and file

structures needed to allow the seamless transfer of information between national systems. 

• To meet the long term goal of European capability acquisition for NRF phase III. While 

some capability areas do not require significant U.S. technology (strategic lift, ground 

vehicles), other areas (sensors, ISR capabilities) would significantly benefit from U.S. 

technology. 

vii
The Need for Heightened Focus on Interoperability: The overwhelming focus by the United 

States and NATO on European capability acquisition, reflected in the Defense Capability 

Initiative and the Prague Capabilities Commitment, has effectively resulted in far less attention 

being paid to improving interoperability between U.S. and allied forces. While Europe may 

acquire some or all of the PCC capabilities, the reality is that numerous of these acquisitions and 

the fielding of these capabilities will occur years hence—if at all. Thus, the United States and its 

partners should, in the context of NRF and otherwise, undertake robust and focused efforts in the 

near- and mid-term on enhancing interoperability of coalition forces likely to operate at very 

different levels of capability for the next decade and beyond. This new shift in focus inevitably 

changes the priorities of potential Transatlantic collaboration. In this regard, wholly distinct 

from the list of capabilities developed at Prague, with its focus on lift, precision guided 

munitions and the like, the spectrum of interoperability runs from secure communications and 

friendly fire avoidance to establishing common levels of situational awareness, and, at the high 

end, having the ability for cooperative logistics, cooperative asset tasking and cooperative 

engagement. Plainly, in this new era, the focus on interoperability must be achieved through the 

development of coordinated and, to some extent, common network-centric capabilities, including 

the establishment of a common architecture into which nations can “plug and play” and thereby 

achieve secure communications, similar levels of situational awareness, and other potentially 

higher order forms of interoperability. 

 

3. Current U.S. Policy and Processes Would Likely Result in A “Dumbed Down NRF.” 

Regrettably, the application of current U.S. armaments cooperation, technology transfer, and 

information sharing processes and standards, including the U.S. National Disclosure Policy for 

release of classified information and the International Traffic in Arms rules governing the export 

of unclassified technical data, would likely result in: 1) lengthy, non-transparent, fragmented, 

and ultimately frustrating review processes; and 2) eventually, a “dumbed down” NRF with 

limited interoperability along the spectrum outlined above, limited connectivity to advanced U.S. 

network-centric warfare enablers, and, hence, less potency as an expeditionary force, greater risk 

of casualties (from friendly and unfriendly fire), and little real opportunity for leveraging U.S. 

technology for capability acquisition. A key question is whether any NATO country will be 

willing to put its forces at risk in 21st century high-intensity encounters with “second best” 

capabilities in these circumstances. 

To highlight the critical problems: 

• The cumulative thrust of current U.S. policies and programs undermines rather than 

facilitates allied force interoperability and the development of true coalition warfighting 

capability. The lack of foreign participation in any significant U.S. C4ISR or networkcentric warfare development programs—even areas like tactical radios—and the U.S. 

refusal to release even to close allies a range of technical information—from daily GPS 

codes to current and future U.S. military communications codes—are contrary to our 

interoperability goals. In effect, there is a significant gap between our stated 

transformational goals, which include interoperability, and our willingness to take needed 

steps, including the sharing of technology, training and other measures, necessary to 

effectuate those goals. In an era when the United States is focusing on its own force 

jointness, true efforts at interoperability have been afforded a lower priority in practice.

viii
• U.S. National Disclosure Policy decision-making, done on an ad hoc, fragmented, 

country-specific basis in response to a specific crisis or operation, is at odds with the 

notion of a rotational, multi-national force designed to handle a host of potential 

missions. Under current U.S. policy, it would be very difficult for the NRF to train 

together using U.S. enablers in advance of an exigency justifying the need for such 

information, and it would prove very difficult to ensure that NRF participants had the 

same level of situational awareness needed for true coalition warfare. 

• Despite U.S. government policy level support for greater technology sharing in order to 

advanced coalition warfighting capabilities, the old paradigm—of maintaining U.S. 

security through our technology leadership, even vis-à-vis close allies—continues to be 

alive and well in some parts of the U.S. defense bureaucracy. Indeed, a variety of 

special committees and modalities outside the traditional technology transfer process,

including the low observable-counter low observable review process and anti-tamper 

regimes, emerged to pose significant hurdles to technology transfer to close allies. Thus, 

the difficulties in technology sharing between the United States and its allies that have 

plagued virtually all of our few Transatlantic programs, from Joint Strike Fighter to 

MEADS, continue unabated and are likely to recur. And the “lessons learned” on major 

programs have not been institutionalized through needed reforms; there is little evidence 

of a changed approach. 

• Indeed, there is a sense of “déjà vu all over again” when approaching the tired but real 

need for reform of U.S. technology transfer rules that has been evident across both the 

Clinton and Bush Administrations in order to reflect a changing security paradigm that 

places more emphasis on coalition warfighting. Regrettably, a minority in Congress has 

stymied major reform efforts and, at this writing, has agreed to an informal stand down 

with the Bush Administration—no major reforms or country-specific export control 

waivers in exchange for no new and more onerous legislation. 

Of course, the United States should not shoulder all the responsibility for this situation. 

European under investment in defense, slow recognition of the revolution in military affairs and 

concepts such as network-centric warfare, and lack of focus on interoperability in their own 

programs and priorities also are partly responsibility for current circumstances. 

Interoperability Initiatives Have Not Been Successful. Moreover, the modest steps taken by the 

United States and its allies to enhance force interoperability, within NATO and otherwise, have 

not borne fruit. As reflected in a range of recent conflicts, from the Balkans to Afghanistan to 

Iraq, the ability of the United States and its allies to meaningfully fight wars together is limited. 

The interoperability initiatives taken to date—including the development of common standards 

and increasing reliance on open systems and commercial interfaces and technology—simply 

have not and will not solve the range of fundamental problems that exist. While NATO has 

undertaken some limited efforts and developed some degree of common or joint architecture, the 

efforts have been piecemeal and not systemic. The inherent complexity and proprietary nature of 

network-centric warfare systems currently fielded and under development, especially in the 

United States, and the lack of compliance with NATO interoperability standards (which are 

voluntary), mean that more focused and substantial efforts will be needed, including, most 

notably, the establishment of a common plug-and-play backbone architecture that nations can 

utilize for coalition operations (presumably in NATO) and a fair degree of information sharing. 

ix
The “Interoperability Gap” Will Worsen, Not Improve, Due to Divergences in Transatlantic 

Spending Patterns. Unfortunately, with the very sizable and accelerated U.S. investment in 

transformational network-centric technologies, the interoperability gap between fielded U.S. 

systems and European systems is likely to increase in years to come. As U.S. forces become

more joint and move to our future architecture for C4ISR and we continue to limit release of or 

access to these new modalities, ad hoc attempts at integration of the NRF will be much more 

difficult and the degree of “dumbness” is likely to increase. Experience in the commercial 

business environment has consistently shown that disparate networks cannot be integrated 

smoothly without extensive prior planning and agreement on the sharing of network and 

database architectural and structural information. Network-centric warfare, which is in essence 

an attempt to superimpose distributed commercial business processes on war, will take place in a 

much more demanding environment. It is therefore unreasonable to expect that multinational 

military forces will be able to do under the exigencies of combat what commercial enterprises 

cannot do in a relaxed, peacetime environment without a concentrated, disciplined effort beyond 

those now underway. 

Moreover, while the “network-centric divide” between Europe and the United States may very 

well be a product of funding rather than technology, 1 the funding differences are meaningful and 

have implications. In other words, absent significant spending changes in Europe or refocused 

priorities, the fact that Europe has the technology will not allow it to magically catch up or hook 

into U.S. advanced capabilities without significant U.S. cooperation. 

Thus, both the United States and Europe face a strategic choice about the nature and degree of 

interoperability of coalition partners in the NRF (and NATO more generally), and the potential 

overall effectiveness of the NRF and the overall alliance as military coalitions. In effect, on both 

sides of the Atlantic, we must decide whether and to what extent we really want to develop truly 

interoperable coalition warfighting. If we do, we need to give higher priority and more focus to 

the interoperability issues highlighted herein in addition to the known problems of capability 

acquisition. 

 While nations can perhaps form “coalitions of the willing” for political purposes on an ad hoc 

basis, they cannot do likewise in true military coalitions. In this regard, 21st century coalition 

warfare is not like a pick up game of basketball at the gym, where we choose sides on a given 

day and fight together—working out the roles and relationships as the “game” progresses. 

Particularly with the emergence of network-centric warfare, it will take years of planning, 

information sharing, cooperative development efforts, the creation of interoperability bridges, 

and shaping plug-and-play architecture to develop true coalition warfare capabilities. 

As discussed below in depth, to facilitate NRF interoperability and capability acquisition, we 

need to: 

 

1

 Gordon Adams, Guy Ben-Ari, John Logsdon and Ray Williamson, “Bridging the Gap: European C4ISR 

Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability,” (Washington, DC: George Washington University, October 2004). 

x
1. Develop overall C4 architecture (whether in NATO or otherwise) for use with potential 

coalition partners (which will help frame the parameters of what we are willing to share 

with our allies); 

2. Adopt a range of other necessary steps to improve interoperability, including training 

together in network-centric warfare techniques; and 

3. Adopt new “top down” approaches to technology transfer and information sharing, with 

significant leadership attention, “one-stop” shopping modalities, and other more flexible 

mechanisms that recognize the necessities of sharing information on a sustained basis 

during the planning, training, and actual operations necessary for successful coalition 

operations. 

Undoubtedly, there will be limits to U.S. information sharing occasioned by a range of security 

considerations. However, we can and should adopt a more flexible approach to information 

sharing that gives more priority to coalition warfare as an element of U.S. national security 

strategy. 

Finally, once and for all, the Bush Administration should tackle the “enabling” issue of 

technology transfer reform early in its second term (and not in year three or four, as in the past), 

exert its leadership, and develop meaningful and comprehensive modalities for facilitating the 

information sharing and technology transfer necessary to advance coalition warfighting 

capabilities and force interoperability, both in the context of the NRF and more generally. Only 

with strong leadership by the Administration and a commitment to advance coalition warfighting 

as an element of national strategy can the NRF and the broader operation of NATO as a military 

alliance be sustained. 

xi
xii
I. The NATO Response Force: From Conception to 

Operations 

As a threshold matter, it is important to have a sound understanding of the concept, 

purposes and operational realities of the NATO Response Force (NRF) as a baseline for 

assessing the technology transfer needs associated with it. 

A. The NRF Concept 

As proposed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and adopted by NATO Heads of 

State at the 2002 Prague Summit, the NRF was conceived to be a multinational spearhead 

expeditionary force that would operate under NATO auspices in the initial phase of highintensity conflicts. Specifically, as stated in the Prague Summit Declaration, NATO 

committed to “[c]reate a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically 

advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, 

and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council.”1

 

As announced at the Prague Summit and evolved at subsequent ministerial meetings, the 

NRF is a combined arms, multi-national, multi-service force consisting of land, air, and 

naval contingents. Ultimately, at full capability, the NRF will consist of a deployable 

headquarters staff, a reinforced brigade combat team (2,500-3,000 troops) with missiontailored elements; a rapidly deployable composite air group (approximately 40 aircraft 

and helicopters) with C4ISR capabilities; and an amphibious support force (6-12 ships, 

including frigates, amphibious assault ships, logistic support ships, and possibly an 

aircraft or helicopter carrier).2

 The ground component of the NRF will eventually 

include up to three light infantry battalions (either motorized or air mobile), plus one or 

more light armored battalions, an artillery battalion, a special operations element, and 

supporting engineer, nuclear, chemical, biological (NBC) defense, and logistic units. 

Intended to provide NATO with a fast reaction force capable of engaging in highintensity combat on a modern battlefield, either independently for up to 30 days, or for 

longer periods as part of a NATO Combined Joint Task Force, the NRF also includes an 

“early entry contingent” consisting of light infantry, special operations forces, and a small 

air contingent; this will be capable of deploying out-of-area within 72 hours to secure a 

lodgement for follow-on forces. In early 2004, this early entry element was activated to 

provide a preliminary NRF capability and to exercise basic command and control 

 

1

 See Prague Summit Declaration, Paragraph 4, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 

in the meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002. Available online at: 

<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>. 

2

 Organizationally and conceptually, the NRF is quite similar to a U.S. Marine Corps “Marine 

Expeditionary Force”, which consists of a reinforced regimental combat team, a Marine Air Wing, and a 

U.S. Navy amphibious task group. 
functions. In addition to its high-end combat capability, the NRF will also be able to 

conduct low-intensity “Petersburg” missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian 

assistance. According to former SACEUR General Joseph Ralston, “the NATO 

Response Force has got to be across the board from high-intensity conflict all the way 

down to lower levels, whatever the political authorities tell us to do.” 3

B. The Purposes and Roots of the NRF 

As articulated at Prague and more recently, the purposes of the NRF were multiple: 

• Strengthen the bonds between the United States and its NATO allies—nations 

that cannot and do not fight together are less likely to work cooperatively in other 

areas. 

• Give NATO a capability to act rapidly and lethally in out-of-area conflicts and, in 

so doing, strengthen its raison d’etre as a military alliance that can handle 21st

century security threats. 

• Be a catalyst for focusing and promoting both the transformation of the 

Alliance’s military capabilities” to meet these threats and improved 

interoperability between the multinational elements of the NRF. 

While these NRF purposes seem simple and clear, they in fact reflect a complex 

underlying history and gradual evolution in thinking about Transatlantic geopolitical 

relationships, the future role of NATO and the need for the acquisition of European 

military capabilities as well as better force interoperability. In effect, the NRF is a 

microcosm of these broader considerations—the tensions in the alliance, the different 

security perspectives and different force doctrines and trajectories—and must be 

understood in this context. 

Geopolitical Underpinnings 

The geopolitical context for the NRF’s creation was increasing and significant 

divergences in U.S relations with its European allies over a range of issues, from defense 

to trade to global warming, and the Bush Administration’s desire to strengthen the 

Transatlantic relationship in the security context, especially in the aftermath of the 

September 11, 2001 attacks, and the desire in Europe to show solidarity with the United 

States on terrorism and other issues. 

These divergences, which have deep roots, began after the end of the Cold War, long 

before the Bush Administration took office. While the United States and its European 

partners have a history of shared values, close security relations, and the largest two-way 

 

3

 “Keeping NATO’s Military Edge Intact”, Luncheon Address by General Joseph Ralston, SACEUR, 

NATO/GMFUS Conference, Brussels, 3 October 2001. Available online at: <www.nato.int/docu/speech/ 

2002/s021003d.htm>. 

 2
trade and investment relationship in the world,4

 recent years nevertheless have witnessed 

the rise of significant countervailing tendencies that have driven a wedge in the 

relationship. Fundamentally, different degrees of concern over security and different 

approaches to ensuring it began to take root on both sides of the Atlantic. With the end 

of the Cold War, Europeans became less concerned over security generally and less apt to 

favor military solutions.

5

 Indeed, the relevance of NATO was questioned on both sides 

of the Atlantic and various efforts have been made for years to address this issue. 

Moreover, serious efforts have gained steam in Europe to move toward a separate 

“European” security identify, defense capability, and supporting industrial structure. The 

centerpiece of these efforts is the European Common European Security and Defense 

Policy (CESDP), which includes, among other things, new European Union institutional 

structures for defense and security policy and the establishment, as part of the so-called 

“Headline Goals,” of a European rapid reaction force capable of handling Petersburg 

missions. More recently, the European Union has decided to create an EU armaments 

agency. 

These European security developments reflect a number of dynamics, including a Europe 

coming of age and integrating successfully in other areas as well as a European reaction 

to its inability to deal with the Balkan crisis in the 1990s and its forced reliance on NATO 

and the United States to address the most significant post-Cold War region crisis.6

 Also 

underlying these European developments are the economics of small defense budgets and 

the need for cooperative efforts to improve affordability, and the industrial policy desire 

to maintain significant defense industrial capabilities away from national autarky in 

defense. However, at the core of these developments, there is no mistaking the political 

impulse in Europe (stronger in some European countries than others) to create a 

counterweight to perceived U.S. hegemony and what some have called its 

“overdependence” on the United States, and assert a more independent European role and 

leadership on foreign policy and defense—in effect, to achieve a “rebalancing” of the 

relationship.7

 In turn, the United States has gradually begun to look at Europe as less of 

an equal partner in security matters. The United States reaction to CESDP has varied 

from outright opposition and concern it will undermine the NATO alliance to 

constructive efforts to link it inextricably to NATO. 

Despite periodic efforts to revitalize NATO and tie it to CESDP and Europe’s invocation 

of Article 5 of the NATO Charter after September 11, the reality is that Europe and the 

 

4 Hamilton, Daniel and Quinlan, Joseph, Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the 

Transatlantic Economy, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations (Washington, 

DC) 2004. Executive summary available online at: 

 <http://www.transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/Publications/books_monographs.htm>. 5

 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review, June 2002. 6

 “The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the role of the European

Commission,” Speech by The Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, CH, Conference on the Development of a Common

European Security and Defence Policy, pgs. 2-3, (Berlin, 16 December 1999). Available online at: 

<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_99_215_en.htm>. 7

 NATO Handbook, Chapter 4, pg. 2, “The European Security and Defence Identity”, “Evolution of the 

ESDI.” Available online at: <http://www.nato.int./docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>. 

 3
United States have continued to drift apart on security matters. The perceived 

unilateralism of the Bush Administration has accelerated these tendencies and fueled 

geopolitical tensions. Indeed, both at the time of the Prague Summit and today, U.S.-

European relations on security matters stand at historic lows, with major divergences 

over Iraq, Iran, China, and many other major security matters. 

 

Moreover, other centrifugal forces have been at work. In armaments, there has been little 

meaningful Transatlantic cooperation in recent years outside the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) program (and even that effort has been plagued by continuing tensions over 

technology transfer and work share). Technology transfer remains a sensitive issue: 

European allies continue to raise serious concerns about U.S. unwillingness to share 

technology, even in support of coalition warfare efforts.8

Indeed, while the United States continues to exhort European nations to spend more on 

defense capabilities, the United States also appears, from a European perspective, 

unwilling to share the technology needed to facilitate this capability acquisition. 

Similar tendencies are also present in the economic arena, where there have been 

contentious and intractable trade and economic disputes between the United States and 

the European Union. The Transatlantic dialogue today, like the U.S.-Japan dialogue of 

years past, increasingly focuses on areas of dispute rather than areas of common cause. 

These issues run the gamut from global warming to the WTO-illegal U.S. foreign sales 

corporation tax exemption to EU treatment of imported bananas, beef hormones, and 

foodstuffs containing genetically modified organisms to U.S. legislation imposing 

extraterritorial sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and Libya and U.S. import restrictions on 

European steel products. While there have been efforts to resolve some of these issues 

and broaden U.S.-EU economic cooperation (for example, in the new WTO round), these 

issues nevertheless reflect serious underlying differences in cultures, institutions, 

economic and industrial policies, and cannot be submerged for long—as witnessed by the 

current escalating dispute over alleged Airbus subsidies. 

Thus, it is in this context of drift in Transatlantic relations that the Administration sought 

to shape a NATO initiative for Prague that would be its own positive contribution to 

reinvigorating the Transatlantic relationship and changing the dynamics away from drift 

toward tangible and useful security cooperation. 

Revitalizing NATO for the 21st Century: The Thrust Toward Out-of-area 

Operations 

Another fundamental underpinning of the NRF is to shift European mindsets from fixed, 

stationary defense—the traditional strategic approach utilized against the threat of a 

Soviet invasion through Central Europe—toward a 21st century approach to security that 

assumes that many of the threats will be out-of-area. The structure, operational doctrine, 

 

8

 Dov Zakheim, “Military Planning and Export Controls”, CSIS Working Paper No.7, 29 September 2000. 

Available online at: <www.csis.org/export/articles/zakheim.pdf>. 

 4
equipment and training of most European force structures, with an emphasis on heavy 

ground forces, have until recently been based on this traditional, Cold War era paradigm. 

In contrast, for reasons of geography and history, the United States has long had a more

established approach to the deployment of its forces beyond American territory. 

The out-of-area issue takes on particular significance in the NATO context, where the 

entire thrust of the alliance has historically been focused on defending members’ 

territories against the Soviet Union. In the post–Cold War era, the out-of-area debate was 

central to NATO’s future—whether and how should NATO be re-invented to address 

new and emerging 21st century threats, from terrorism to conflicts in Third World 

countries that damage NATO’s interests. The idea of expanding NATO’s out-of-area 

operations capabilities gradually emerged in the mid-1990s9

 and was adopted as part of 

NATO’s new Strategic Concept at the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington, DC. 

Specifically, NATO recognized that “alliance security interests can be affected” by “risks 

of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the 

disruption of the flow of vital resources,” and specifically noted the prospect that NATO 

may carry out out-of-area crisis management operations to address such threats.10 This 

new approach, which went beyond NATO’s longstanding defensive doctrine, was also 

reflected in its new force posture approach, which included guidelines that reflected the 

need for operational capabilities such as deployabililty and mobility as well as greater 

force interoperability and the use of mobile headquarters.11

While the Washington Summit resulted in the adoption of a new approach on paper, the 

real challenge was to facilitate the actual transformation of NATO member forces to 

align with the new strategic shift toward possible NATO expeditionary actions. A 

RAND report released in 2000 found that: 

The military forces of NATO’s member states should be structured and postured for 

expeditionary operations. Achieving a more expeditionary posture entails expanding 

and modernizing transportation fleets (principally military airlift, but also sealift),

acquiring more mobile logistics assets, upgrading infrastructure in selected countries, 

and modernizing the forces themselves so that light, more mobile units can be more

effective in a wide range of missions. This will entail, among other things, exploiting 

recent advances in surveillance, information processing, communications, and 

 

9

 Kugler, Richard L., The Future of NATO and U.S. Policy in Europe, RAND Report P-7800 (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1992); Kugler, Richard L., NATO’s Future Conventional Strategy in Central Europe: 

Theater Employment Doctrine for the Post-Cold War Era, RAND Report R-4084-A (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1992); Harris, Scott Allen, and James Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of

Transatlantic Cooperation, RAND Report MR-276-USDP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993); Naslund, 

Willard E., NATO Airpower: Organizing for Uncertainty, RAND Report MR-215-AF (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 1993); Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Security for All of Europe,

in Seven Tricky Steps,” St. Petersburg Times, 29 August 1993, p. 8D; Kugler, Richard L., “Building a New 

NATO,” Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct 1993, pp. 40-41;Kugler, Richard L., U.S.-West European Cooperation 

in Out-of-Area Military Operations: Problems and Prospects, RAND Report MR-349-USDP (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1994); and Gompert, David, and Richard Kugler, “Free-rider Redux: NATO Needs to

Project Power (and Europe Can Help),” Foreign Affairs, January 1995, pp. 7-13. 10 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65m, paragraphs 10, 24, and 31

(April 23 1999). Available online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. 11 Id., at paragraph 52. 

 5
precision weapons so that the military assets of adversaries can be rapidly located, 

identified, and destroyed with minimal collateral damage.12

As the Prague Summit of 2002 approached, the idea began to take shape of a 

highly capable European expeditionary or spearhead force that would be able to 

conduct, on short notice, out-of-area, high-intensity missions together with more 

advanced U.S. forces. Conceptually, the idea for the force, outlined in a series of

articles by Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler of the National Defense 

University,13 was that Europe need not transform all of its forces at once to match 

U.S. capabilities, but should “configure a portion of their forces for swift power 

projection and high-tech strike operations with U.S. forces.”14 The creation of 

such a force was viewed as a catalyst to move European members of NATO 

toward transforming their overall forces in order to provide expeditionary 

capabilities; the changes required are significant in nature and necessitate changes 

in European force structures, doctrines, equipment, and the like. The notion of a 

NATO spearhead force for high-intensity conflicts also is complementary to the 

European plans for a rapid reaction force for low-intensity Petersburg missions. 

The need for such a force was embraced in the White House’s “U.S. National Security 

Strategy,” issued in September 2002: 

NATO’s core mission—collective defense of the transatlantic alliance of democracies—

remains, but NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that mission 

under new circumstances. NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice, highly 

mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any 

member of the alliance....To achieve this, we must:....ensure that the military forces of 

NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare;...take 

advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of scale in our defense spending 

to transform NATO military forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish 

 

12 David Ochmanek, “NATO’s Future: Implications for U.S. Military Capabilities and Posture, RAND 

Report MR-1162-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. viii. 13The National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy originated the 

idea for the NRF in November of 2001. It was designed as a result of NATO’s inability to support U.S. 

operations in Afghanistan after NATO declared that an Article V commitment was in effect. Hans 

Binnendijk first presented the idea formally to the annual meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in

December 200l. It first appeared in print in the International Herald Tribune on February 16-17 in an op-ed

article by Hans Binnendijk entitled “A European spearhead force would bridge the gap.” Binnendijk and 

Richard Kugler presented the concept to the National Security Council Staff and to Pentagon officials at

several meetings in February and March 2002. Kugler provided programmatic details for the NRF in a 

paper called “Toward a NATO Defense Transformation Initiative” in March 2002. Binnendijk and Kugler 

presented the idea publicly to several Washington audiences in the Spring of 2002, including the Atlantic

Council, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS, and the Heritage

Foundation. Binnendijk and Kugler presented the idea in detail in the Autumn 2002 issue of Survival pp. 

117-132. Once formally proposed by the United States, they wrote an oped in support of the concept in the 

October 24 addition of the International Herald Tribune entitled “Europeans should say yes to Rumsfeld”. 

In early 2003, together with Stuart Johnson, Binnendijk and Kugler prepared briefings on “Implementing 

the NATO Response Force” which were presented in Washington and in Europe. 14 Richard L. Kugler, “Preparing NATO to Meet New Threats,” U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda [online], Vol. 

7, No. 1, 27 March 2002. As Rand analysts and later at the National Defense University, Binnendijk and

Kugler were instrumental in formulating the NRF concept and pushing it before senior U.S. policy-makers. 

 6
our vulnerabilities; streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new 

operational demands and the associated requirements of training, integrating, and 

experimenting with new force configurations; and maintain the ability to work and fight 

together as allies even as we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our 

forces.15(Emphasis added.) 

Thus, the creation of the NRF, together with major reforms announced at Prague (i.e., 

improvements in NATO command and control mechanisms needed to facilitate 

deployability), were designed to ensure that NATO actually has the capabilities necessary 

to implement, and put flesh on the bones of, its new out-of-area strategy.16 

Capabilities and Interoperability 

The NRF goal of incentivizing European capability acquisition is the latest in a series of 

initiatives, to date largely unsuccessful, to address the continuing and increasing 

capabilities gap between the United States and its European allies that developed after the 

Cold War and to improve interoperability. 

The capabilities gap that emerged during the 1990s was a function of a number of factors, 

including: overall declines in defense budgets in Europe after the Cold War; the very 

wide resulting gap in spending between U.S. and European armaments development (at 

barely one-fourth of U.S. levels); the fragmented and inefficient nature of European 

defense procurement; continued European reliance on an overly large, aging and largely 

immobile force structure inherited from the Cold War era; and the resulting need to spend 

more and more of European defense budgets on operations and maintenance rather than 

future investment. To address the problem, NATO decided at the Washington Summit in 

1999 to adopt the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which ultimately became a list of 

some fifty-six specific capabilities that European NATO forces needed. 

What Has DCI Achieved? DCI has led to a heightened European focus on the need to 

transform forces for the future and to organized European efforts (under EU auspices) to 

identify and address the gap areas. On balance, however, DCI led to very few results. 

Why? For one thing, the DCI list that emerged was so broad that no priorities were set. 

Also, European nations, facing severe budget constraints, pre-existing commitments to 

 

15 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The 

White House, September 2002), pp. 25-26. 16 A final agreement on “NATO’s new streamlined command arrangements” was reached at the 

 ‘Meeting of the North Atlantic Council of Defence Ministers’ in June of 2003. These will consist of two 

strategic commands: one to control three ‘operational’ commands (two Joint Force Commands and one

Joint Headquarters) as well as a number of “tactical” commands (Joint Force Component Commands and 

Combined Air Operations Centres); the other strategic command to “guide and encourage the 

transformation of forces and other capabilities...” through a Joint Warfare Centre (“with a subordinate 

Joint Force Training Centre and a Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre”), and a number of

nationally- or multi-nationally sponsored Centres of Excellence....”. See “Final communiqué: Meeting of 

the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers session held in Brussels on Thursday, 12 June 2003,” 

Press Release (2003)065, 12 June 2003, and “Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and

the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Thursday, 12 June 2003: Final Communiqué,” Press

Release (2003)64, 12 June 2003. 

 7
defense programs (such as Eurofighter), and increasing operations and maintenance 

expenses, have made few real commitments to take specific actions on new capability 

acquisition, and no real timetables were adopted. Moreover, the United States, over 

several Administrations, has done little more than exhort European nations to acquire 

more capabilities or encourage European firms to buy U.S. developed capabilities, from

missiles to fighter jets. Yet Europe has increasingly shied away from this approach and 

has sought to develop its own capabilities. Moreover, in this arena, the United States has 

not engaged in significant armaments cooperation designed to incentivize capability 

acquisition and has continued to limit technology transfer in ways that have slowed and 

undermined European efforts to develop enhanced capabilities. 

Recognizing the shortcomings of DCI, a major focus of the Prague Summit, in addition to 

creating the NRF, was to identify a shorter set of priority military capabilities and 

establish specific commitments for European nations to meet these goals. Specifically, at 

Prague, NATO Heads of State also committed to the Prague Capabilities Commitment 

(PCC), under which individual allies made “firm and specific political commitments to 

improve their capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; 

command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided 

munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air 

refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.” 

The NRF is in turn designed to incentivize the fulfillment of the Prague Capabilities 

Commitments by establishing a force intended to ultimately have such transformational 

European capabilities in key areas such as lift, C4ISR and the like. The concept is that 

the actual need to field high-level European forces in the NRF will create more focus on, 

and serve as a basis to prioritize and catalyze, capability acquisition. 

The NRF goal of having the force be interoperable also is the latest NATO commitment 

designed to redress growing issues of force compatibility between the United States and 

its allies. While most analysis tends to blur the capability and interoperability concepts, 

the reality is that they are quite distinct. In Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff recognized that “[s]ince our potential international partners will have varying levels 

of technology, a tailored approach to interoperability that accommodates a wide range of 

capabilities is necessary.” Joint Vision 2020 in turn states that “[i]nteroperability is the 

foundation of effective joint, multinational and interagency operations.” Thus, U.S. 

military doctrine recognizes explicitly that there is a distinction between military 

capabilities and military interoperability, and that symmetry of capabilities is not a 

prerequisite for interoperability in a coalition environment—quite the opposite, in fact; 

asymmetrical capabilities among coalition partners are assumed to be the norm, not the 

exception. 

In fact, the preponderant U.S. and NATO focus on European capability acquisition over 

the last decade has tended to blur the concepts and submerge the desire for improved 

interoperability to a second-level priority. Yet, the reality is that interoperability remains 

as significant a concern as the capability gap and a somewhat distinct problem. The 

 8
United States and its allies have undertaken a number of steps to address interoperability, 

including the development of NATO common standards (STANAGs) to facilitate 

interoperability, the development of some NATO rudiments of a C4 architecture, and a 

thrust toward open architecture and commercial standards. Moreover, numerous fora 

have been established to address interoperability concerns, including the Multinational 

Interoperability Council, composed of six leading nations (Australia, Canada, France, 

Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) likely to lead future coalitions. 

Yet, the reality is that these efforts have been largely ineffective to date. NATO 

standards are voluntary in nature and not adhered to in practice in many instances. Many 

network-centric systems have significant proprietary elements (despite a theoretical 

emphasis on open architecture), and military needs have precluded full adoption of

commercial standards and architectures. 

Despite these various efforts, the cold reality is that across a series of recent conflicts, 

from the Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq, the United States and its allies remain unable to 

meaningfully fight wars together. 

• In Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States was unable to share air tasking and 

targeting data with its NATO partners, severely restricting the ability of NATO 

aircraft to fly the same missions or even in the same airspace with U.S. aircraft. 

Airspace management and deconfliction remained a problem throughout the 

conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

• The U.S. was unable to share remote sensor information in a timely manner with 

its NATO partners because of security restrictions and incompatible 

communications and battlefield information systems. This problem remained 

unresolved in Afghanistan, and even in Iraq, where British forces found their 

flexibility and operational tempo constrained by the inability to access U.S. 

targeting systems such as JSTARS and Global Hawk.

• Shortages of precision munitions and aircraft cleared to deliver them limited the 

numbers and types of targets that could be engaged by NATO aircraft; 

suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) remained a major weakness through 

both operations.

• Combat Identification has remained problematic, despite significant effort 

devoted to operational solutions. The loss of Canadian troops in Afghanistan and 

British aircraft in Iraq to U.S. “friendly fire” points out the difficulty of operating 

multinational forces in a common battlespace.

Network-centric Warfare: The Focus of 21st Century Interoperability 

Finally, interoperability takes on important new meanings and dimensions in this era of 

military transformation and the shift toward “network-centric warfare.” While a 

somewhat amorphous term, network-centric warfare is generally defined as the linking of 

distributed sensors, weapons systems, command nodes and maneuver units over several 

interconnected digital networks, so that capabilities are seen as residing “on the network” 

rather than with specific units or platforms. Sharing of sensor information allows (in 

theory) greatly enhanced situational awareness (of both friendly and enemy forces), 

 9
minimizing uncertainty and accelerating the tempo of operations. Commanders sharing a 

common relevant operational picture can also access a wide range of weapons and 

maneuver units to execute their concept of operations, now defined as generating a 

particular desired “effect” on the enemy—hence the advent of what are sometimes called 

“effects-based” operations. In effects-based operations, a commander decides what he 

wants to do to the enemy, then examines the full spectrum of systems and capabilities 

available to him, choosing the ones that best meet his needs. In a network-centric, 

effects-based system, distinctions between platforms, military services, and (in theory) 

national components become transparent. These categories are replaced by 

functionalities: surveillance, target acquisition, precision strike, close combat, etc. 

This new approach to warfare inevitably changes the focus of interoperability of

multinational forces like the NRF. As advocates of the NRF recognized, there must be an 

emphasis on: 

[t]he need for allied information systems and networks that can interoperate with 

U.S. networks ... In the coming era, interoperability will come mostly from

establishing connectivity between U.S. and allied information nets rather than from

equipping troops with identical weapons and munitions.

17 

In a certain sense, interoperability is no longer about having the same missiles or tanks, 

but about having the ability to securely communicate, to have access to the same level of 

situational awareness, and to have the types of command and control capability to allow 

execution based on the real-time sensor inputs. Thus, interoperability is more a matter of

compatible software and codes and information sharing than technology transfer. 

The prospect that the NRF can become interoperable with U.S. forces is threatened by the 

unrivalled and very expensive U.S. transformational efforts to develop and field a broad 

panoply of network-centric warfare capabilities. All of the U.S. services are focusing on 

the development of the necessary enabling systems and system architectures. Early 

elements of network-centric warfare were demonstrated both in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

where the U.S. military has given it the lion’s share of the credit for the rapid end of the 

conventional phases of combat. 

While these concepts are beginning to catch on in Europe, the degree and breadth of 

commitment, level of spending, and number of programs lag far behind the United States. 

The United Kingdom is developing a “Network-Enabled Capability” in which specific 

systems will be designed to plug-and-play on other countries’ networks. Sweden is 

moving toward a full, end-to-end network-centric capability. Most other European 

countries at best intend only to develop specific elements of a network-centric system, 

relying to some degree on other countries (i.e., the United States) to provide other critical 

capabilities. NATO similarly intends to develop a NATO Network-Enabled Architecture 

into which various member nations can plug their own network-centric systems. 

 

17 Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, “Adapting Forces to a New Era: Ten Transforming Concepts,” 

Defense Horizons No. 5 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, November 2001), p. 5.

 10
The widening network-centric warfare gap is not necessarily a matter of different 

spending and technology levels across the Atlantic. For a number of reasons, other 

European nations have been slow to embrace network-centric warfare and a few have 

been somewhat hostile to it (while, paradoxically, embracing selected elements of it). 

Concerns raised in Europe include cost (an “end-to-end” network-centric capability 

would be prohibitively expensive), potentially increased dependence on the United States 

(as cost limitations will drive most to plug-and-play with U.S. architecture rather than

develop their own) and differing national approaches to warfare deeply rooted in 

historical experience. Both the Germans and the French, for instance, have less faith in 

technological solutions to the problem of uncertainty on the battlefield, and prefer instead 

to rely on training to teach officers and men to make effective decisions in the presence 

of uncertainty.18 

Interestingly, the U.S. transformation strategy embraces interoperability as a priority. 

However, the United States has to date taken few steps to translate this goal into reality. 

The reality is that the OSD Office of Interoperability, as well as the Joint Forces 

Command, are both primarily focused on the increasing jointness of the U.S. services, 

and have taken few meaningful steps to ensure allied interoperability in the context of

network-centric warfare. 

In any event, the widening chasm between U.S. and European network-centric 

capabilities make it that much harder to create even rudimentary levels of interoperability 

(compatible secure tactical communications, combat identification, etc.). Thus, the NRF 

commitment to an interoperable force offers the opportunity for focus on these 

increasingly difficult issues in an operational context and to translate U.S. rhetoric of

interoperability into coalition warfighting reality. 

In sum, the NRF highlights both the challenges and opportunities facing the United States 

and its allies as they seek common ground in forging a 21st century security strategy. 

Certainly, the NRF is not a panacea and should not be expected to provide answers to all 

of the longstanding and complex issues of capability, interoperability, and the like. In a 

certain sense, however, the NRF is an incubator or test bed that, if successful, can allow 

us to identify the overall architecture needed for effective coalition warfare and a stronger 

overall Transatlantic security relationship. 

 

18 There also is concern that massively integrated networked systems can be prone to single point failures, 

information saturation, and enemy counter-information operations. In addition, some European military 

officers note that network-centric warfare is inherently designed to deal with conventional modes of war 

against an enemy with large combined armed forces, and that most network-centric capabilities are of little 

value against an asymmetrical adversary employing guerrilla warfare or terrorism—as witnessed in Iraq 

and Afghanistan today. Given that this is perceived to be the dominant form of warfare in the future, 

European critics wonder at the relevance of network-centric warfare, given the cost and complexity of its 

implementation. These critics also point to the risks of creating an operational and tactical monoculture in 

which the unique capabilities of each European military force are subsumed into a single, overarching 

operational method—one that allows potential enemies to exploit the inherent weaknesses of the system

and play upon the margins of its capabilities. 

 11
C. The NRF in Operation 

 

Since the Prague Summit, planning for the NRF has gone forward expeditiously and the 

force has moved from paper to an operational force very quickly. The rapid stand up of 

the NRF was facilitated by NATO’s decision to allow the Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Powers Europe (SHAPE) to develop the force rather than NATO Force Development, 

which would have been more inclined to view the NRF notionally and rely on concept 

planning and establishing national commitments. In contrast, SHAPE approached the 

stand up of the force from an operational perspective, focusing on the steps necessary to 

stand up an actual force, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) and 

on the development of an “expeditionary mindset” within NATO. As one SHAPE 

official put it, “Transformation is a process that takes place between the ears.” Thus,

SHAPE sees the NRF as an integral part of the larger NATO command transformation 

process, and tends to view the development of the NRF through the prism of operational 

doctrine. 

Because of resource constraints and developmental lead time, whether technology or 

operations driven, the NRF will follow an evolutionary course of development, moving 

from basic to more advanced capabilities, and from heavy reliance on U.S. systems to 

increasing independence through the development of indigenous capabilities.

NRF’s Phased Development 

As now planned, the NRF will have three phases of development: 

1. Phase I Prototype Effort (04-06). The idea is to field a very small spearhead of a 

spearhead force with minimal changes to existing composition and equipment of 

national contingents. This would initially be a reinforced light infantry battalion 

supplemented by 6-8 special operations teams, an artillery company, engineer, 

communications, and NBC and other combat service support elements. Intended 

as an early entry force, its main purpose in the near term will be to exercise the 

command and control functions of the Deployable Joint Task Force headquarters 

unit and to iron out problems before fielding a full-scale NRF contingent; 

enhancements to C4I systems would be made as needed to facilitate integration 

within NRF and between the NRF and the NATO Combined Joint Task Force 

Headquarters. Communications systems and battlefield information systems will 

either be standardized or brought up to a common standard of interoperability, 

and first-iteration command and control procedures established. While the naval 

contingent of this early-entry force is sufficient to meet envisaged operational 

requirements, the air component appears to be deficient in the number of 

AWACS, surveillance, transport, and fighter/attack aircraft committed; there are 

not enough of these assets to sustain a 24–hour operational cycle. 

2. Phase II U.S.-Enabled NRF (2006-2012). In phase two, a full NRF would be 

fielded in 2006, with both European ground elements and U.S. enablers, including 

airlift, strategic and tactical C43ISR (such as JSTARS, Global Hawk, satellite 

 12
surveillance and broad band satellite communications) and theatre missile 

defense. Advanced network-centric and other new capabilities of individual 

NATO members, such as the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), 

will be integrated into NRF as they become available. Given the short time 

frames involved, however, it is unlikely that Europe will have most of its planned 

advanced capabilities ready for integration into NRF in this period. While less 

certain, NATO may gradually develop and integrate some elements of its own 

C4ISR architecture as it becomes available based on building blocks now 

underway, such as the Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

(CAESAR) Advanced Capability and Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and 

such cooperative efforts as the Multifunctional Information Distribution System

(MIDS). 

3. Phase III Integration of European or NATO enablers (2013-Onward). As Europe 

and/or NATO acquire advanced capabilities in key areas such as airlift, precision 

munitions, missile defense (possibly a NATO owned and operated Pac III), and 

C4ISR (e.g., the AGS system, EuroHawk, NATO IV Satcomm) by decade’s end, 

these would be integrated into the fielded force as it gradually shifts toward a 

more transformational objective force.

Rotational Structure and Certification Process 

Significantly, the NRF is not a fixed force; its composition and organization will change 

in accordance with a six-month rotation schedule. Also, SHAPE will utilize a 

certification process already employed with the NATO Graduated Readiness 

Headquarters—that is, a set of objective standards and normative capabilities to which 

each rotational national contributor must commit, and on which the readiness and 

deployability of each NRF rotation will be based. 

According to current plans, individual NATO states will bid to contribute force elements 

to an upcoming NRF rotation roughly 18 months before that rotation is scheduled to 

deploy as a combat-ready unit. Twelve months prior to deployment, the various NRF 

components will begin joint training exercises. Six months later (and six months prior to 

deployment), SHAPE will conduct an operational readiness evaluation of the NRF 

rotational force and will decide whether to certify it as combat ready to undertake the 

needed missions (which may change from one rotation to another) and be listed among 

NATO’s deployable assets. After six months of operations, the rotational force will stand 

down and be replaced by the next NRF rotation. Thus, at any given time, there is one 

NRF rotation in the process of formation, one in training, and one ready to deploy. 

Ultimately, a total of six NRFs are planned—one active and five in ready reserve, 

theoretically capable of mobilization at short notice. 

Significantly, SHAPE plans to create escalating certification requirements with each 

rotation. Thus, those countries committing to the first rotation will have to meet a 

baseline standard, while those contributing to each subsequent rotation will have to meet 

ever-higher certification requirements. 

 13
Plainly, the object of the rotational structure and certification process is to maximize the 

effect of the NRF as a “catalyst of transformation.” By passing as many units through the 

NRF as possible, it is hoped that each national military force will develop a nucleus of

modern, high-technology forces suitable for out-of-area operations. This presumes, of 

course, that each participating country will choose to make a new investment in 

equipment for each rotation in which it participates rather than just rotating a single set of 

equipment through each unit it contributes to the NRF.19 Further, by continually 

upgrading the certification requirements, SHAPE intends to promote or incentivize 

capability enhancement. 

Of course, the price the NRF pays for using a rotational and certification structure is a 

high degree of turbulence, with all the associated problems that come with it. More than 

anything else, the rotational structure ensures that each force entering the rotation will 

have a steep learning curve to climb before being certified as deployable. Moreover, the 

NRF will barely have developed cohesion and a sense of unit identity before it must 

disband and the process must begin anew. 

Multinational Composition

Finally, SHAPE has had to wrestle with precisely how multinational the NRF should be 

and whether the NRF’s reinforced land brigade should be drawn from multiple countries, 

which directly raises issues of interoperability. Brigades normally fight as task-oriented 

combat teams, with integration of subunits down to the company and even platoon level. 

This would suggest, for example, that an Italian tank platoon could be attached to a 

French infantry company supported by an Italian mortar platoon. Yet, the reality is that 

issues of language, diverse and often incompatible equipment, and differences in 

operational doctrine and training severely limit the ability to have a truly multinational 

force, with brigade elements from multiple nations fused together. In short, there are

trade-offs between the degree of force integration—designed to promote political goals 

underlying the NRF—and efficiency considerations. Indeed, existing NATO 

multinational forces are generally limited to the divisional or corps echelons to avoid

these problems. The NRF, with its rotational system and limited opportunity for six 

months of common training, would make this approach even more difficult. 

SHAPE resolved this issue by requiring that the primary maneuver component (i.e., the 

armored and infantry battalions) in initial rotations come from a single national 

contingent or from a multinational force with a longstanding “habitual association.” 

Other discrete combat support and specialist units, such as NBC units, could come from 

other countries. In the long term, SHAPE is open to the idea of composite brigades that 

 

19 This approach has been used repeatedly over the years to enable budget-constrained countries to meet

specific materiel commitments. For instance, a NATO initiative to enhance broadband satellite 

communications among naval forces required the acquisition of X-band antennae terminals, but few navies 

purchased a sufficient number to equip all of their combatant ships. Instead, they acquired a number 

sufficient to equip those ships on station at any given moment, moving the terminals from one ship to

another as they rotated through the dockyards. While this created the illusion of capability, in fact it left the 

navies in question incapable of meeting surge requirements or of coping with an unexpected casualty to the 

deployed ships.

 14
integrate maneuver battalions from several countries and operate together— but the 

responsibility for working out the operational issues would rest with the component 

armies, not SHAPE. 

As shown in Table 1 on page 23, the contribution of assets by NATO member states to 

the first NRF rotation reflects this principle of unified maneuver forces. While no fewer 

than fourteen individual countries contributed assets, plus NATO-controlled assets, the 

paratroop battalion contributed by France is the principal maneuver element. Apparently, 

most other countries found it much simpler to earmark ships or aircraft for the force, as 

bringing ground units up to a uniform standard and making them interoperable with other 

ground forces in the rotation is far more difficult than making an individual ship or 

handful of aircraft interoperable (indeed, many already met the existing standards for 

capabilities and interoperability). 

D. Relevant Issues and Uncertainties on the NRF’s Development 

To date, SHAPE has made significant strides in making the NRF operational on schedule. 

Moreover, the commitments made by NATO members and the willingness of countries 

like France—which previously had a very circumscribed role in NATO’s military 

activities—to participate is welcome and suggests that NRF will be a real rather than only 

a paper force. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, the U.S. Operation Iraqi 

Freedom appears to have enhanced interest in NRF among the European allies, including 

France. Several senior Europeans we met with at NATO noted that the performance of 

U.S. forces in Iraq was eye-opening to European military leaderships and has created a 

new impetus on developing European transformational capabilities in “high-end” 

missions. In the past, as reflected in the European Headline Goals, Europe has primarily 

coalesced its collective force development around Petersburg (or, low-intensity) missions 

such as peacekeeping. Hence, France’s interest and its reported intent to field forces in 

an early rotation suggests its calculation that the NRF will get off the ground, and that it 

wants to take a leadership role among European countries in developing this type of 

capability. 

 15
Table 1.1 Force Contributions, NRF Rotation No.1 

Country Troops Assets/Capabilities

Spain 2,200 Ships, aircraft, helicopters 

France 1,700 Paratrooper battalion, ships, aircraft, helicopter, 

vehicles 

United 

Kingdom

1,200 Ships, aircraft

Germany 1,100 Ships, aircraft

Turkey 600 Ships, aircraft, helicopter 

Italy 600 NBC protection troops, military police, ships, 

aircraft 

Greece 300 Airmobile company, two frigates, one C-130H 

United States 300 Ship, aircraft

Belgium 250 Paracommando company, ship, six F-16s, two 

C-130s, A109 helicopters 

Netherlands 200 Ship

Norway 150 Ships, aircraft, JWC (Stavanger) 

Denmark 100 Ships, helicopter

Czech 

Republic 

80 NBC equipment and vehicles 

Poland 20 EOD unit

NATO 700 AWACS (SHAPE, AFNORTH, AIRNORTH 

HQ/E-3A Component) 

Source: Nicholas Fiorenza, “First NATO Response Force Is Larger Than Expected,” DefenseNews, 20. 

At the same time, the current NRF force structure and developmental process raise a host 

of issues and uncertainties, any number of which can be the subject of serious analysis. 

For example: 

• Can the rotation system produce viable combat units, and how will “lessons 

learned” in one rotation be passed on to the next? 

• How will common operational doctrine for performing missions be developed and 

imparted to participating elements? Will there be training and warfighting 

exercises?

• Will European nations make the investments needed in the short and long term to 

meet NRF certification requirements, or will the NRF be another in a growing line 

of efforts to enhance capability acquisition?

• Will NATO ever develop a consensus to actually deploy and then employ the 

NRF? French President Chirac’s recent rebuff of proposals to use the NRF to 

enhance security in Afghanistan during local elections does not bode well in that 

direction. 

Of direct relevance here are several key issues and uncertainties concerning the NRF’s 

structure and development that bear directly on the question of what types of technology 

 16
transfer and information sharing will be needed to facilitate the force’s fulfillment of its 

objectives. 

The NRF’s Limited Nexus to Capability Enhancement 

A critical question is whether and to what degree the NRF, as currently being structured, 

will achieve its goal of catalyzing the European acquisition of transformational 

capabilities and at what rate capabilities will be integrated into the force? In fact, the 

linkage between the NRF and the enhancement of specific capabilities is limited, with no 

future roadmap or plan—leaving it to national participants to shape their own approaches. 

While SHAPE’s leadership on NRF has been beneficial and has led to significant 

attention on making the force operational in the short-term, it has had unintended 

consequences. As discussed above, by virtue of SHAPE’s warfighting focus, it 

necessarily views the NRF as a catalyst for transformation in a very operational sense—

focusing on needed changes in doctrine (encouraging European focus on an 

expeditionary force), organization, training and warfighting methods, and emphasizing 

the importance of jointness by facilitating interoperability in C4I systems. 

At the same time, however, there has been little focus to date in NRF force 

development/planning on explicating linking the NRF’s long-term development and 

evolution to its underlying armaments capability acquisition goals (lift, precision 

munitions, and the like). As noted above, SHAPE plans to rely heavily on its certification 

process to require participating national forces to acquire a gradually escalating level of 

capability and interoperability, and hopes to disseminate these capabilities throughout the 

national forces of the Alliance through the rotation process. SHAPE believes, based on its 

experience with the Graduated Readiness Headquarters (GRHQ) program, that the 

commitment of national prestige to the NRF will be sufficient to ensure compliance with 

certification requirements. Yet, this approach has serious limitations. The process has no 

clear benchmarks and, based on interviews, it appears that SHAPE’s planning, by 

necessity, reflects the notion that the NRF will be comprised of what forces actually exist 

rather than those SHAPE would like to see for the future. Thus, under SHAPE’s 

approach, as more advanced capabilities come on line, they will incorporated into NRF 

certification requirements and integrated into the NRF. In effect, this resembles a type of 

spiral development that is increasingly popular in the U.S. armaments community—

where new capabilities and technologies are phased in as they become available in a kind 

of evolutionary acquisition strategy. Yet, the difference is that there is no long-term

“spiral road map” to follow. In other words, the NRF certification process is likely to 

follow armaments capability development and innovation rather than catalyze it. 

Other NATO elements also have not developed any more explicit linkages between NRF 

and NATO’s capability enhancement goals. Within NATO’s Resource Management, the 

NRF is perceived as a new avenue for the promotion of existing procurement priorities, 

such as AGS and MEADS, which are already planned (whether or not these actually 

support or facilitate transformation), rather than as a tool to catalyze or prioritize 

 17
additional capability enhancements.20 Officials in NATO Force Planning also viewed the 

NRF as just a fire brigade analogous to ACE Mobile Force-Land (AMF-L), ignoring the 

differences in role and mission between the two forces;21 they do not have ambitions to 

utilize the force as a catalyst for capability acquisition and view this as a separate process 

driven by national budgetary and other considerations. 

 

In short, there is at present no apparent NATO planning or other process designed to 

make a more direct or explicit linkage between the future development of the NRF and 

the acquisition of enhanced capabilities. There is little focus on what capabilities are 

needed to forge the NRF into a truly transformational force that can meet projected 

mission needs. 

The NATO planning gap is readily explicable. In most national forces, system

development and procurement is “requirements driven;” i.e., commanders work from 

assigned roles and missions down through doctrine, operational methods, and tactics, to a 

set of operational requirements that in turn fuel the development of new systems. Forces 

of technology push also operate to encourage the use of new developmental efforts. Yet, 

these normal processes of demand pull and technology push are largely lacking in the 

NATO context. There is no rigorous planning to develop a future NRF roadmap that 

focuses on what objective transformational set of capabilities the NRF needs to carry out 

its projected missions and catalyze the acquisition of such capabilities. At present, current 

and future NRF requirements are being developed from a set of abstract propositions

derived from analysis and simulation; in the absence of real field experience, NATO 

requirements developers must rely on projections of future combat operations or 

battlefield simulations whose outputs are only as sound as the fundamental assumptions 

that drive them. Such a process of force development has never been tried in the past and, 

given the weaknesses of combat simulations as a predictive tool, is a path fraught with 

multiple unknown dangers.22 

In reality, therefore, the NRF objective of catalyzing the acquisition of new capabilities 

has been subordinated to the realities of NRF operational necessities. As a result, there is 

a growing disjunction between the operational and technological aspects of the NRF, 

without any firm roadmap for technological insertion or any mechanism to incentivize 

technology investment and military transformation. Thus, these circumstances—the lack 

 

20 Interview with Robert Bell, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment, October 2003. 21 AMF-L, the land component of the ACE Mobile Force, was a brigade-size force composed of UK, U.S. 

and Norwegian troops for the defense of the Norland against a Soviet invasion via North Cape. As such, it

was purely territorial, with a single mission and a single are of operations. Its capacity for out-of-area 

operations was limited at best, and with the evaporation of the Soviet threat, its rationale also disappeared. 

On the other hand, as a standing force, AMF-L did manage to develop a coherent doctrine and operational

method, with considerable interoperability among the national components, something that the rotational 

nature of the NRF makes much more difficult to accomplish. 22 See S. Koehl, T.N. Dupuy and D.A. Cohen, “Modeling Suppressive Effects in Battlefield Simulations: 

SBIR Phase I Technical Report,” JHF & Associates, Inc. (Vienna, VA) 1994; and Blumenthal, D. and

Davis, P.K., “The Base of Sand Problem: A White Paper on the State of Military Combat Modeling

(RAND Note), 1989.”

 18
of a capability driven technology roadmap—make it very difficult to assess what the 

technology transfer needs of the NRF should be. 

Uncertainties Over Plans for NRF Interoperability 

As noted above, one of the NRF’s purposes is to facilitate the development of a highintensity European combat force capable of interoperating with U.S. forces on a modern 

battlefield. However, at this juncture, there seems to be no coherent interoperability plan 

in place to facilitate this requirement; there is little detailed focus on what types of 

interoperability make sense, let alone on what types of enabling technology transfer or 

sharing of technical information is necessary to achieve it. This is not surprising in light 

of the continued focus on capability acquisition by the U.S. and its European allies. 

While the rhetoric often mentions interoperability, there is little focus on these issues.

A starting point for considering the degree of interoperability required for the NRF is two 

baseline conditions. First, as noted above, there are trade-offs between interoperability 

and efficiency, and, as SHAPE has apparently decided, it makes little sense to bring 

interoperability down to the brigade level. Second, in the near to mid term, at least, the 

NRF must depend on U.S. enabling systems for intelligence, reconnaissance and 

surveillance, and other critical functions. Thus, assuming this baseline, three different 

types of interoperability must be achieved: 

• Architectural compatibility between the NRF and existing or developmental U.S. 

C4ISR systems to ensure that NRF elements have access to the best available 

situational awareness produced by U.S. ISR assets. 

• Interoperability with the C4 architecture deployed by other NATO member states 

and the NATO Multinational Regional Headquarters. 

• Interoperability among the NRF elements within a given rotation. 

Uncertainties Over U.S. Commitment to NRF 

Even with this set of baseline interoperability requirements, there remain considerable

uncertainties in this area. First and foremost is the question of what enablers will the 

U.S. provide the NRF; will it offer its latest capabilities and best situational awareness 

and actionable, real-time firepower control, or will it insist on dumbing down its 

offerings? To date, there is no clarity on what enablers the United States will commit to 

NRF. Will it provide JSTARS and Global Hawk, for example, and if so, will it allow 

actionable information from these key capabilities to be provided to NRF war fighters? 

Also, assuming U.S. commitment of advanced capabilities, how will interoperability be

ensured between these U.S. enablers and the NRF so as to make it an advanced, 

transformational force?

NATO’s C4 Architecture 

The successful integration of U.S. C4ISR enablers with the NRF probably requires the 

development of an overall NATO or NRF architecture or backbone structure into which 

 19
new capabilities can be plugged. That, in turn, requires the development of a set of 

explicit standards and specifications for interfaces, none of which are yet in place for the 

NRF, let alone for NATO as a whole. The NATO C4ISR Agency has been tasked to try 

to develop an overall C4ISR architecture for the NRF. However, at this writing, this 

effort has not made significant progress. Thus, at present, there is no vision of whether 

the NRF will have its own (or be part of a broader NATO) C4ISR architecture with 

national plug-and-play capabilities or will simply use existing NATO building blocks and 

national assets as they find them. Key issues of data fusion and ensuring that the NRF 

components see the same integrated battle space picture are recognized at NATO, but 

have not yet been meaningfully addressed. 

Finally, the need for the NRF to be interoperable with U.S. ISR capabilities has 

significant implications for the force’s evolving technology transfer requirements. It 

means that the central issues in the area of interoperability are not so much about what 

enabling technologies will be shared so as to facilitate capability acquisition as about 

what developed software and what outputs from U.S. ISR assets will be shared to ensure 

full situational awareness and prevent fratricide, among other things. 

In sum, the NRF being developed and deployed in the near term is really a microcosm of 

broader cross-cutting issues and challenges inherent in developing an effective coalition 

warfighting capability and cohesive alliance. Undoubtedly, the NRF will not provide a 

basis for solving all of these complex challenges. But it does offer an opportunity for 

experimentation and testing—the essence of military transformation—and the forging of 

creative solutions. 

 20
II. Identifying Critical Enabling Technologies and 

Information for the NRF 

The next question that arises is what specific enabling technologies and technical 

information (software, data output from sensors, and the like) are critical to the success of 

the NRF in light of its goals, structure, and probable evolution, as described above. The 

task of identifying these technical drivers is made more difficult because the NRF’s 

capability trajectory roadmap and planned degree of interoperability are unknown at this 

juncture. It is tempting to assume that the NRF will utilize new capabilities as they 

emerge and will draw on U.S. enabling capabilities as they become available. In this 

scenario, the technology and informational needs of the NRF would be relatively modest. 

For purposes of this analysis, however, we have rejected this minimalist approach and

instead have assumed, for the purposes of analysis, that NATO will try to develop the

NRF in a manner consistent with its stated goals. 

This means that the NRF will require access to the technology and information needed to: 

• Develop the doctrine, operational methods, tactics, and training necessary for outof-area expeditionary warfare (operational needs),

• Catalyze the acquisition of capabilities needed for such high-intensity missions 

(capability needs), and 

• Ensure robust interoperability between the NRF and U.S. forces to allow the NRF 

to exploit the capabilities of leading-edge U.S. ISR assets and other enablers 

(interoperability needs). 

As a threshold matter, it is important to understand that this analysis represents a 

snapshot of presently identifiable technology and technical informational needs, which 

undoubtedly will change over time. As the NRF’s development proceeds in an iterative

and interactive process, a combination operational (demand) pull and technology push, 

will cause the migration of capability requirements, doctrines, operational methods, and 

tactics. Initial high-intensity mission requirements will drive development of a 

preliminary doctrine and operational method, mainly using existing technologies and 

capabilities. As it gains operational experience, the NRF will identify capability and 

interoperability shortfalls that in turn will drive new capability and interoperability 

requirements. Thus, this initial analysis of technologies and technical information needs 

is subject to change over time. 

With these baselines in mind, this essay attempts to identify the specific categories of 

technology and informational requirements of the NRF during the three phases of its 

development: initial capability (Phase I, 2004-06), reliance on U.S. enablers (Phase II, 

2007-12), and phase in of advanced European capabilities (Phase II and Phase III (2013 

and beyond). In the absence of existing roadmaps, we have developed prioritized 

taxonomies of operational, interoperability, and capability needs to use as guideposts. We

then take a series of deeper dives into the key areas of technology and technical data 

access we have identified. 

 21
A. A Taxonomy of Technology Transfer Needs Related to NRF Operational, 

Capability, and Interoperability Goals 

NRF technology transfer requirements are related to the NRF’s three goals: shifting to 

expeditionary warfare, catalyzing capability acquisition, and facilitating coalition 

warfighting interoperability. 

Limited Operational Needs 

In developing the doctrine, tactics, and operational methods for an NRF-type 

expeditionary force, SHAPE probably does not need significant technology transfer or 

sharing of technical data. In attempting to organize and field a high-intensity, 

multinational expeditionary force, SHAPE is operating on something of a level playing 

field and has its own internal capability drawn from different NATO members, including 

the United States. Something of this type has not been tried before.23 Indeed, there is 

today little by way of doctrine, tactics, and operational methodologies for a national 

network-centric force, let alone a multinational force. In the United States, the 

development of doctrine for joint service operations has been ongoing for some time but 

has not yet reached maturity. Thus, the NRF goal of creating operational modalities 

probably can proceed without significant access to sensitive technical information or 

technology. Of course, one aspect of the NRF doctrine will have to relate to the sharing 

of technical information needed for interoperability among NRF participants; this is 

addressed below in the interoperability discussion. 

A Taxonomy of Capability and Interoperability Needs 

The NRF need for access to U.S. technology and technical information flows largely 

from the need to: 1) catalyze capability accession and 2) establish effective

interoperability for coalition warfighting. 

Capability Needs. As a starting point, it must be recognized that the NRF accession of 

new and advanced capabilities will, by its nature, be long term. The transformational 

programs just started or underway from which NRF can benefit, such as Airborne Ground 

Sensor (AGS) and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), are unlikely to 

reach initial operating capability (IOC) for 6–10 years. Paradoxically, however, the 

technology transfer needs related to these programs are immediate and pressing; given 

the developmental lead times, it is important that relevant technology be provided as 

early as possible to facilitate lateral technology insertion and spiral development in order 

to accelerate the acquisition of advanced capabilities. 

The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) is the starting point for understanding 

capability needs; it set forth certain high-priority capabilities needed to provide NATO 

with the wherewithal for implementing an expeditionary strategy. Thus, the PCC called 

for NATO to acquire a fleet of long-range transport aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, 

 

23 At least not recently. The only successful example, already noted, was the U.S.-Canadian 1st Special 

Services Force in World War II, which bore little resemblance to the NRF. 

 22
NBC defensive systems, ballistic missile defenses, an airborne ground sensor system, 

unmanned air vehicles, and so forth. The PCC, however, did not directly relate these 

capability requirements to the mission-oriented operational requirements of the NRF. 

The link between capabilities accession and force development remained implicit rather 

than explicit. Moreover, with SHAPE’s emphasis on the operational aspects of raising, 

training, and deploying the NRF, the link has become more tenuous still. 

Nonetheless, it is possible to develop a taxonomy of capabilities that relates specific PCC 

capabilities to specific phases in NRF evolution. This taxonomy, set forth in Table 2.1 

below, essentially matches the NRF’s development concept for each phase with specific 

enabling PCC capabilities. Thus, in Phase I, where the NRF will put a small spearhead 

force in place that will largely fight “as is,” capability needs relate to rudimentary 

capabilities needed for these missions (force protection, precision strike, and close 

combat). In Phase II, while the NRF will rely primarily on U.S. enablers, the notion of

having a full operational force suggests that European strategic mobility or lift, missile 

defense and additional precision strike capabilities should be phased in; there are 

programs in place to develop these capabilities, and the timetables involved make their 

fielding realistic if appropriate European investments are made. Finally, in Phase III 

where the goal is to phase out U.S. enablers and create an autonomous, high-capability, 

primarily European force, the more advanced capabilities (in C4ISR and other areas) 

would be introduced. 

 23
Table 2.1 Taxonomy of NRF Capabilities by Implementation Phase 

NRF Implementation 

Phase 

Capability Enabling Systems

Phase 1 Tactical Mobility and 

Logistic Sustainability

* High-Mobility Tactical 

 Trucks 

* Utility Helicopters 

Force Protection * NBC Detection and 

 Decontamination Equipment 

* Mine Detection and Clearing 

 Equipment 

* Body Armor 

* Armored Personnel Carriers 

* Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) 

Precision Strike * JDAM 

* Laser-Guided Bombs 

* Tactical Standoff Missiles 

* Guided Artillery Rounds

Close Combat * Light Tanks 

* Anti-Tank Guided Missiles 

* Mortars 

* Night Vision Devices (GEN III/III+) 

Phase II Strategic Mobility * Long-Range Transport Aircraft (A400M) 

* Aerial Refueling Tankers 

* Amphibious Assault Ships 

Force Protection * Tactical Missile Defense (MEADS) 

* Improved NBC Defense 

Precision Strike * Tactical Cruise Missiles

Phase III C4ISR * Airborne Ground Sensor (AGS) 

* HALE Unmanned Air Vehicle (EuroHawk) 

* Airborne ESM Platform 

* High-Resolution Surveillance Satellite 

* Broadband Military Communications 

 Satellite 

Precision Strike * Joint Strike Fighter 

* Unmanned Combat Aircraft 

Force Protection * Theater-Wide Ballistic Missile Defense 

* Robotic Ground Vehicle 

Close Combat * Advanced Combat Vehicles 

 24
The Spectrum of Interoperability. Figure 2.1 depicts the spectrum of NRF 

interoperability needs in terms of the degree of interoperability (the horizontal axis) and 

relative complexity (the vertical axis). Admittedly, there is no theoretical optimal level 

of interoperability. How the NRF will be organized and operate, and the intensity and 

nature of the operations it will undertake, will determine the appropriate scope and level 

of interoperability required. However, it is possible, as set forth in Figure 2.1, to identify 

and prioritize interoperability levels in the context of a network-centric environment. 

At the lower left corner of the spectrum are certain basic interoperability requirements, 

without which any form of coalition (or even joint) warfighting is either impossible or at 

least very difficult. These include: combat identification (necessary for the prevention of 

fratricide) and secure tactical communications (for basic command and control 

functions). Achieving these aspects of interoperability is not particularly complex from a 

technology standpoint.24 Indeed, much of the required capability can be achieved 

through doctrine, training, and standard operating procedures, although some technical 

information sharing will be needed. 

As Figure 2.1 highlights, the present state of interoperability between U.S. and allied 

forces, as demonstrated in Operation Iraqi Freedom, is relatively low on the spectrum. 

Both combat identification and secure tactical communications were achieved, albeit 

imperfectly, between U.S. and British forces operating in Iraq.25 The initial rotations of

the NRF will be at an equal or even slightly lower state, but will advance as it moves up 

the spectrum of interoperability. 

Inevitably, the need to provide the NRF with access to U.S. network-centric enabling 

systems and the services they provide will drive the NRF to a higher degree of

interoperability. Specifically, further along the interoperability spectrum in Figure 2.1 is 

the development of a single integrated air picture (SIAP) and a single integrated ground 

picture (SIGP). The United States is seeking to develop a holistic common relevant 

operational picture (CROP), which would include both SIAP and SIGP. Under CROP, 

information from many different sources, including airborne, ground and space-based 

sensors, electronic intelligence, human intelligence, and situation reports, will be fused 

and displayed as a map showing the location and status of all friendly and enemy forces. 

Every unit in the area of operations will be able to access the CROP, or at least that 

 

24 Even with regard to combat ID, the most technically challenging of the Phase I requirements, needs can

be met with off-the-shelf solutions assuming that a degree of commonality and/or interoperability can be

attained; the emergence of a NATO STANAG for Combat ID systems represents an important step in that 

direction. As shown below, most of the systems under development or in service today support NATO

standards. 25 As far as can be determined, there were no instances of friendly fire losses involving U.S. or British

ground forces. However, at least two aircraft, one U.S., the other British, were lost by accident to Patriot 

air defense missiles. The war in Afghanistan saw a considerable number of friendly fire casualties, most 

attributable to human error. In one notable instance, a U.S. forward observer forgot to reinitialize his 

Global Positioning System receiver after replacing the battery, and inadvertently gave his own position as a 

target location to a U.S. attack aircraft, which then dropped a GPS-guided bomb on the coordinates. After 

the war, four Canadian soldiers engaged in a training operation were accidentally bombed by U.S. aircraft 

that had not been informed of their presence in the vicinity. Both examples demonstrate the role nontechnical factors play in achieving reliable interoperability. 

 25
portion of it that pertains to its own area of interest. If successfully implemented, CROP 

would automatically solve the combat ID problem (since commanders will know where 

all friendly forces are located), as well as facilitate a more rapid operational tempo and 

reduce the chance of enemy surprise.

Figure 2.1 Spectrum of Interoperability

Capability

Low High

Complexity

Low High

Combat ID

Secure

Tactical

Communications

Single

Integrated

Air Picture Single

Integrated

Ground Picture

Cooperative

Logistics

Cooperative

Asset

Tasking

Cooperative

Engagement

Capability

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Finally, moving further along Figure 2.1’s spectrum of interoperability for NRF are the 

following types of more complex forms of coalition warfighting cooperation: 

• Cooperative logistic systems, in which supplies will be delivered to units only as 

required by them (a variation on the just-in-time inventory system used by 

commercial industries). 

• Cooperative asset tasking, in which commanders can allocate resources such as 

sensors, fire units, and ground and air forces as needed to achieve a desired effect, 

without regard to “ownership” of particular systems. 

• Ultimately, a cooperative engagement capability—the ability of a command 

center to engage a target with a fire unit belonging to another service or country, 

based on fire control information provided by yet another service or country. 

Significantly, the development of CROP is a prerequisite for these more advanced 

capabilities; having full situational awareness is critical to managing logistics, allocating 

resources, and having a cooperative engagement capability. At present, CROP itself is 

under development. These other core elements of advanced interoperability are in early 

phases of development, and all of these network-centric capabilities present some

daunting technical challenges. 

 26
These interoperability elements, including the needed enabling technologies to achieve 

these elements, are shown in Table 2 below. 

B. The Phased Timeline for Technology Transfer 

The NRF need for access to technology and technical information for its operational, 

capability, and interoperability development will vary over its phases of operation. The 

technology transfer and information sharing needs each phase of the NRF are separately 

assessed below. 

Near Term: Limited Technical Needs for the “Pickup Team” 

In the near term, the focus is on bringing the NRF together as a force, producing a 

baseline doctrine, and achieving operational readiness. In this phase, with the emphasis 

on operational needs, the NRF has no choice but to employ systems already in service 

with the national contingents, with minimal augmentation to facilitate command, control, 

and communications, and to rely on the United States for enabling capabilities (strategic 

lift, air support, logistics support, and ISR). Thus, for the first several rotations, the NRF 

will effectively resemble a pickup basketball team selected ad hoc at the gym one day: 

each participating nation will contribute one or more units “as is”, with integration of

disparate capabilities left to the training phase of the rotation.

With little prior experience on which to draw, the NRF commander and his staff will 

have to improvise an operational method and tactics that reflect the capabilities and 

tactics of the individual components of the force. In effect, this means that early rotations 

of the NRF will employ variants on conventional combined arms operational methods 

and tactics. Presuming that the NRF will be built around motorized infantry and light 

armored battalions supplemented by special operations teams and combat service support 

units, it will employ some combination of fire-and-movement tactics on the attack, with a 

mobile, elastic defense. Indirect fire and air support will be essential for success on both 

attack and defense, with close air support and battlefield interdiction, either by fixedwing aircraft or attack helicopters providing the bulk of the firepower, especially in the 

early phases of an operation. 

As currently envisaged, the NRF may fight on its own for a period of several days to 

several weeks, but ultimately it must be reinforced and sustained by follow-on forces. 

Thus, at some point, the NRF must be fully integrated into a larger NATO multinational 

expeditionary force. This is accommodated through the NATO Graduated Readiness 

Corps headquarters structure, which consists of several Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTF) headquarters, each with a multinational land, air, and naval contingent. Within 

the CJTF, the NRF is controlled by a Deployable CJTF (D-CJTF) capable of providing 

command and control for an expeditionary force centered on a brigade-size ground 

component, an amphibious assault task group, and a small composite air group. 

 27
Since the NRF Phase I rotations will largely fight as is, the insertion of new European 

capabilities is, by definition, not on the near-term agenda, given the time horizons for 

weapons development. However, consistent with the goal of establishing a small but 

advanced operational force, there are several capability areas where European capabilities 

should and can be modestly augmented to provide the minimum credible level of 

logistical support and tactical mobility so as to sustain itself in the field and move 

throughout the battle area, and a minimum credible level of force protection, precision 

strike, and close combat capability. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the relatively 

small NATO contingent in Afghanistan is absolutely unable to support itself and is 

entirely reliant on the U.S. supply system for fuel, rations, ammunition, and spare parts;

this experience helps suggest the baseline needs of the NRF. Significantly, Europe today 

has the ability to provide these modest capability augmentations, and with little or no 

technology transfer or information sharing; the only requirement is for European funding, 

which also would be relatively modest. 

The most important of the capability upgrades in Phase I is the acquisition of highmobility trucks and utility helicopters to provide the force with tactical mobility and 

logistic sustainability.26 The European automotive and aerospace industries have several 

eminently satisfactory systems in production27; they simply need to buy them in sufficient 

numbers to support the NRF. The same can be said of force protection assets; Europe 

makes excellent NBC defensive systems, body armor, light wheeled armored personnel 

carriers, and short-range air defense systems

28, but needs to field them in numbers 

sufficient to meet the NRF requirement. This is also true for precision strike and close 

combat capabilities. Several European air forces are now pursuing JDAM compatibility 

for their existing fighter-bombers; this initiative should be extended to the entire NATO 

fighter force (except for those aircraft which are physically incapable of carrying the 

weapon, or which will be phased out of service in five years or less). JDAM 

compatibility should be incorporated into the new Eurofighter Tyfun at the earliest

opportunity.29 In the interim, several European countries either co-produce the U.S. 

Paveway family of laser-guided bombs, or, like France, have developed fully-

 26 In contrast to the United States military, which assumes the requirement to operate in “undeveloped”

theaters, most European armies have not procured significant numbers of high-mobility trucks (e.g., the 

2.5- and 5-ton LMTV 6x6 trucks, the HMETT 8x8 10-ton truck, and the HET 60-ton tractor), relying 

instead on militarized commercial trucks. Given that the primary mission of NATO was the defense of

Western Europe, where paved roads were plentiful and lines of communication relatively short, this made 

sense in the Cold War era. However, commercial trucks have proven less than satisfactory when deployed 

to places like Afghanistan and Iraq, because they lack the ruggedness and off-road mobility needed in those 

theaters. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, helicopters have proven invaluable, not only for tactical transport of

troops, but also for aerial resupply of widely-scattered forces in rough terrain. However, few European

nations have invested in sufficient numbers of utility helicopters to support this task, and many helicopters 

in the inventory are aging and difficult to maintain. 27 France, Germany, Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland all produce excellent tactical trucks for their own 

forces and for export (the U.S. 6x6 FMTV is based on a Swiss design), while Westland Augusta and 

Eurocopter have both the EH-101 and NH-90 helicopters in production. 28 As an example, the USMC’s LAV-25 and the Army’s Styker Interim Armored Vehicle are both derived 

from the Swiss MOWAG Pirhana APC. 29 The ability to exploit the full capabilities of JDAM, particularly against relocatable targets, requires 

Europe and the United States to address various issues of C4ISR interoperability, such as access to daily 

GPS encryption codes; see Section III, below. 

 28
interoperable equivalent systems. One of the few success stories of the Defense 

Capabilities Initiative has been the buildup of NATO stockpiles of precision-guided 

munitions. This success should be leveraged into new areas of precision munitions, such 

as guided artillery and mortar shells (France, Sweden, Germany, and the UK all have 

different systems in production or development) and tactical air-launched standoff 

missiles (TASMs). In close combat systems, Europe merely needs to leverage its global 

leadership in light tanks, anti-tank guided missiles, and mortars. 

Finally, night vision devices, particularly Gen III and III+ image intensification and 

thermal imaging systems, have provided U.S. forces with a substantial technical edge and 

force protection capability. Europe has proven quite adept at development of its own 

indigenous night vision systems, often refining older technology to perform at the same

level as current generation systems when precluded from acquiring the latest versions by 

U.S. export control laws. Under the current Figure of Merit (FOM) method for 

determining releasability, European NATO countries can acquire systems approximately 

1-2 technology generations behind the current U.S. systems. Because the newer 

technology works better under marginal operating conditions (fog, precipitation, smoke, 

and dust), European forces will require an equivalent capability to fight alongside U.S. 

forces in those environments. 

In Phase I, the NRF will also require minimal-level interoperability, which will in turn

require some sharing of technical information. Thus, as shown on Figure 2.1 above, even 

at this early phase, the minimum interoperability requirements include secure, tactical 

communications and some form of fratricide avoidance or “blue force tracking” (BFT).

The need for interoperable secure communications is obvious: as each national 

contingent comes to the NRF with its own specific tactical communications equipment, 

this equipment must either, 1) be made compatible and interoperable (through hardware 

or software “patches”), or 2) replaced by a common set of communications equipment. 

Theoretically, having the same equipment is the best insurance of 100 percent 

interoperability; although this solution may initially be more expensive it has greater 

long-term payoff. Some of the participants may balk at this approach, particularly if the 

system adopted by the NRF is not backward compatible with the existing 

communications gear in the rest of their armed forces.30 Yet, the alternative solution, the 

use of patches, tends to be less reliable in the long term and more difficult to maintain 

over time, resulting in higher life-cycle costs. It also should be recognized that the NRF 

must have communications connectivity not just within the force, but between the Force 

and the D-CJTF and with any NATO or other follow-on forces that may be deployed in 

the same battle space. Patches also do not lend themselves to the integration of disparate 

battle command and combat information systems due to the complexity of the interfaces 

and variances in the formatting and definition of data. This problem tends to push not 

only toward the use of a single, integrated tactical communications system, but also to a 

single battle command/combat information system. 

Moreover, since the NRF will be relying very heavily on air support in the initial phases

of its deployment, reliable communications also must be maintained with any supporting 

 30 See Sandra L. Irwin, “Sticker Shock Felt as New Radios are Acquired”, National Defense, July 2004. 

 29
air contingents—the most likely provider of which would be the United States. Thus, 

from its inception, the NRF must plan to be interoperable with American forces, even 

though these are not integrally part of the NRF itself. This requirement extends not only 

to tactical communications, but to command and control systems, particularly those used 

for deconfliction of airspace and the prevention of fratricide by air attack. From an 

American perspective, the ideal solution would be adoption of U.S. communications and 

battle command systems. However, this is not likely to win favor with the various 

European national contingents. The practical solution therefore would lie in developing 

bridges to facilitate interoperability between U.S. and NRF systems (and, again, the 

difficulty of developing and supporting multiple bridges tends to push for homogeneity of 

both communications and battle command systems within the NRF). 

To sum, during NRF Phase I, Europe is capable of filling most capability needs in the 

NRF from its own resources—with only limited technology transfer sharing needs. In a 

certain sense, whether Europe is willing to fund these types of relatively modest needs 

will reflect its level of commitment to the NRF concept and its political will to transform

NATO. Interoperability needs (secure communication and blue force tracking) will 

require some technical information sharing and transfer of technology (either 

software/hardware patches or new systems). 

Mid-Term: Technical Needs Primarily Driven By Increased Interoperability, Not 

Capability 

In the mid-term (2006–12), the development of the NRF, as currently contemplated, will 

have several distinct elements: 

• the evolution to a network-centric operational methodology; 

• primarily reliance on U.S. enabling systems, particularly for critical ISR

capabilities; and 

• addressing interoperability problems arising from operational experience. 

SHAPE plans the evolutionary development of the NRF through what might be termed 

“spiral development” or “lateral technology insertion;” based on the experience of the 

previous rotations, SHAPE will formulate new operational, technical or material 

requirements to be met by future rotations. Consistent with the military transformation 

underway, a key SHAPE goal will be to develop the NRF’s capabilities for networkcentric warfare, which is becoming the central paradigm of modern warfighting. Indeed, 

it is generally assumed in SHAPE and throughout NATO that the NRF will eventually

evolve into a high-technology, network-centric force capable of emulating the emerging 

U.S. style of warfare and interoperating with U.S. forces within a common battle space.

The NRF, in fact, is directed toward this long-term goal, with the recognition that the 

transition itself will take many years. 

A key point in understanding NRF development is that, as noted above, the European 

acquisition of most enablers—from network-centric capabilities to ISR to precision 

strike—is considerably in the future. For a number of reasons, Europe will not field an 

 30
indigenous air-ground sensor (AGS), or strategic unmanned air vehicles, or sophisticated 

surveillance satellite systems, or wide-area tactical ballistic missile defense systems for 

years to come.

31 Thus, in the medium term, these systems or enablers will have to be 

provided by the United States. 

Hence, during NRF Phase II, a critical priority will be on the need to become

interoperable with existing U.S. enabling systems in order to access the data and services 

they can provide. These include: JSTARS, Global Hawk and Predator UAVs, Rivet Joint

ELINT aircraft, satellite reconnaissance and broadband satellite communications. 

Accessing the capabilities of these systems embedded in a network-centric architecture 

requires access to the network itself through a variety of digital communications and 

battle command systems. Thus, for the NRF to actually deploy and operate alongside and 

within the same battle space as U.S. forces and have the benefit of the increased 

situational awareness provided by these U.S. systems, the degree of interoperability 

required between the NRF and supporting U.S. forces inevitably must increase—

especially as compared to the rather basic interoperability needed in Phase I. Specifically, 

in Phase II, the implementation of network-centric warfare concepts while relying on 

U.S. enabling systems for ISR services, would require development of a single integrated 

air picture (SIAP) and a single integrated ground picture (SIGP), eventually merged into 

a single Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP) providing full situational 

awareness. 

 

Accordingly, one significant point from a technology transfer standpoint is that the NRF 

Phase II technology transfer needs are, for the most part, driven by interoperability, and 

not capability, goals. 

Of course, the NRF phases are somewhat artificial and will blur together. Thus, in the 

latter part of Phase II, it certainly is appropriate and realistic to establish some capability 

acquisition goals as part of a robust, forward leaning NRF roadmap. In this regard, 

Europe should be called on to redress shortfalls in strategic mobility, force protection and 

precision strike—for the most part by bringing ongoing programs to production: 

• Europe should make a firm commitment to the production of the A400M to 

provide the NRF with an indigenous strategic airlift capability. Modified A400Ms 

or some other platform also should be acquired to provide sufficient aerial 

refueling capability to offload support of European fighters and transports from

the hard-pressed U.S. tanker fleet (tanker availability often being one of the 

principal constraints on the tempo and scale of aerial operations). 

• Several amphibious assault ships similar to U.S. Navy LHAs or LHDs should be 

built to provide the means for moving heavy equipment and supplies and 

offloading them over a beach or undeveloped port. 

• In the area of force protection, the prospective fielding of MEADS will provide 

the NRF with an effective area defense system to supplement its existing 

SHORAD capability, together with a point-defense system against short-range 

 31 MEADS, which is now scheduled for deployment ca. 2006-08, can provide only a point defense 

capability against ballistic missiles. 

 31
ballistic missiles. Without MEADS, the NRF will remain vulnerable to missile 

attack (both ballistic and cruise missiles), and would have to rely on less 

transportable U.S. systems such as Patriot PAC-3. This capability is important, as 

NATO commanders have repeatedly stressed that they would not deploy forces to 

a theater in which ballistic missiles were a threat unless they could provide an 

effective missile defense. Completion of the MEADS development program and 

rapid transition to production are thus critical to standing up a full NRF capability 

in Phase II, pending acquisition of an area defense system such as the U.S. 

THAADS or a European equivalent. 

• In tactical strike, NATO could enhance its capabilities by fielding the several 

tactical cruise missile systems presently in development, of which the most 

noteworthy is the MBDA Storm Shadow/SCALP; it has a range of some 250 km

and can attack both point and area targets. Acquisition of such weapons would 

enable the NRF air contingent to attack high-value targets without penetrating 

high-risk areas. 

Significantly, these capability acquisition goals do not for the most part (with the 

exception of MEADS) require the transfer of U.S. technology. Ironically, while most of 

the debate over U.S. technology transfer to our NATO partners focuses on capability 

programs (radar technology for the AGS, stealth for UAVs, engine technology for the 

A400M, guidance, propulsion and fusing technology for precision weapons), the reality is 

that interoperability considerations in NRF Phase II will generate a considerable and 

difficult range of release issues with respect to the accessibility of U.S. technical 

information (from software to sensor outputs) needed for better NRF interoperability. 

Long-Term: Indigenous European Capabilities

In the long term, the goal is for the NRF’s so-called objective force to include significant 

European enablers of modern warfare and more robust network-centric warfare supported 

by the development of indigenous European C4ISR systems. 

Thus, over time, Europe would presumably begin to field advanced enabling systems of 

its own design that would be integrated into the NRF, thus allowing the NRF to function 

independently without significant U.S. involvement. From a capability standpoint, AGS 

would replace J-STARS; EuroHawk or some comparable UAV will replace Predator and 

Global Hawk; new satellite surveillance systems will supplement and supersede U.S.

reconnaissance satellites; new precision strike weapons will supplant JDAM and other 

U.S. weapons.32 Specifically: 

• The most noteworthy of the European ISR programs is the NATO AGS, which 

will provide NATO commanders with the ability to track and classify enemy 

 32 At this point, in theory, the NRF could potentially become a completely self-sufficient, network-centric 

force. However, it does not seem likely that Europe will be able to deploy these enabling systems in

numbers sufficient to support sustained operations. Consistent with the “early entry” notion of the NRF, in

any large-scale NATO expeditionary operation, the United States will inevitably continue to provide a 

significant proportion of the forces. 

 32
ground forces at night and in poor visibility. A number of issues pertaining to 

AGS have yet to be resolved, including the mix of platforms on which the system

will be mounted (will they be unmanned or manned) and various technology 

transfer issues. 

• There is also growing interest in Europe in High Altitude, Long Endurance

(HALE) unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), such as the U.S. Global Hawk. 

Negotiations are being conducted at this time for license production or codevelopment of a European derivative to be called EuroHawk; France is also 

developing its own HALE systems.33 

• A manned or UAV-based ELINT platform is needed to supplement the U.S. Rivet 

Joint (and its replacement, the E-10A MC2A). 

• Europe, and particularly France, Italy, and Germany are working to develop highresolution remote imaging and radar satellites to provide military as well as 

commercial reconnaissance and surveillance. 

• To exploit the information collected by these new ISR systems, Europe will also 

need to replace its aging military communications satellites and their terminal 

infrastructure. The UK is already developing Skynet V broadband satellites as a 

privately financed initiative, while France is deploying the Syracuse III military 

communications satellite with Ka-band terminals. Spain and Italy likewise are 

investing in military Ka-band satellite communications. NATO as a whole is also 

subscribing to the U.S. Advanced EHF (AEHF) secure, protected broadband 

satellite program—not by participating in the space segment, but by co-producing 

AEHF-compatible terminals. 

• In precision strike, NATO’s capabilities will be enhanced by the introduction of 

the FA-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which will be able to carry both existing JDAMS 

and the new Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) as well as advanced tactical missiles. 

Precision strike capabilities will be further enhanced if NATO acquires or 

develops an equivalent to the U.S. Unmanned Air Combat Vehicle (UCAV). This 

will serve as a “can-opener” system to attack very heavily defended high value 

targets and provide real-time bomb damage assessment. 

• Force protection capabilities would be enhanced by: deployment of a NATO 

Theater-Wide ballistic missile defense system, providing area defense against 

medium- and intermediate-range missiles; and adoption of robotic Unmanned 

Ground Vehicles (UGVs) for scouting and reconnaissance, NBC reconnaissance, 

and mine detection. 

The acquisition of some of these capabilities raises significant technology transfer issues. 

In some cases, like AGS, these issues have already been raised and to some extent 

addressed. In UAVs, the United States is only beginning to grapple with thorny issues. 

Significantly, while the timelines for introducing these types of capabilities are long, the 

technology transfer and information sharing issues must be addressed soon in order to 

avoid schedule delays. 

 33 Global Hawk has been demonstrated for the German MoD. However, budget shortfalls may derail plans 

for system acquisition. One mission for which Germany, at least, would like to use EuroHawk is electronic 

intelligence (ELINT) gathering.

 33
This Phase II plan also implies an even greater degree of NRF interoperability. In Phase 

II, the NRF accesses a CROP generated mainly from U.S. sources and the NRF 

commander accesses U.S. precision strike systems. In contrast, in Phase III, European

systems as well as U.S. systems would feed data to the sensor network to generate the 

CROP, and the U.S. commander and the NRF commander must be able to access both 

U.S. and European strike systems. Also in Phase III, full interoperability would mean a 

shift toward the acquisition of collaborative logistics, cooperative asset tasking, and 

cooperative engagement capabilities. At this level of integration, there must be a much 

greater sharing of information, not only at the tactical and operational levels, but at the 

technical level as well. All subscribers to the sensor and strike networks must know the 

technical parameters of all the different sensors and weapons. 

Designing seamless interoperability in this manner will require intimate knowledge of 

each other’s network architectures. Proprietary standards probably would need to be 

replaced by open standards, with all the implications that has for maintaining controls 

over access, releasability, and technology transfer. But this is the inevitable and 

unavoidable logic of pursuing a network-centric approach to defense transformation in a 

coalition warfare environment. 

Thus, in sum, NRF Phase III raises serious questions of information sharing and 

technology transfer relevant to meeting interoperability goals and some difficult 

technology transfer issues pertinent to the acquisition of advanced capabilities (although 

some of these issues have already been addressed). 

 34
III. A Taxonomy of Technology Transfer and 

Information Sharing Issues 

In light of the NRF’s purposes, projected roadmap and technology and information needs, 

this section evaluates the specific technology transfer and information sharing issues 

inherent in standing up the force. Within the framework of the current U.S. regulatory 

process (Point I), we separately evaluate the technology transfer and information sharing 

issues that arise in: 1) meeting the NRF’s interoperability and network-centric warfare 

goals (Point II); and 2) acquiring other enhanced European capabilities (Section III). 

A. The U.S. Regulatory, Policy, and Institutional Framework for 

Technology Transfer: The Reality of Continued Impediments to 

Coalition Warfare 

1. The Legal and Regulatory Basics 

The transfer of U.S. technology and sharing of technical information relevant to the NRF 

must be evaluated in the context of the applicable U.S. legal and regulatory framework 

and the current and projected operating policies for technical transfer and information 

sharing under these rules. 

Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations. The Arms

Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 

promulgated thereunder34 establish the process for U.S. government case-by-case 

decision-making on the transfer abroad of U.S. arms and technology (i.e., U.S. technical 

data and services relating to the design, development, and manufacture of weapons). The 

ITAR licensing and review process is inherently complex, involving several different 

government departments (Defense, State, and others, depending on the nature the product 

or technology), and various DOD components (including the Defense Technology 

Security Agency and, in complex cases, the armed services and other DOD components). 

Depending upon the results of the review, the decision may be passed on to an 

interagency committee or special executive committees for additional review. The U.S. 

Conventional Arms Transfer Policy35, last updated in 1995, articulates the criteria for 

U.S. decision-making under the auspices of the AECA and the ITAR. 

 34 22 USC Sec.2751 et seq.;22 c.f.r. Part 120 International Trade in Arms Regulations. 35 A broad outline on “International Trade in Arms Regulations” was revealed in a White House Fact Sheet 

dated February 1995. It states that all arms and technology transfer decisions must be made on a case-bycase basis, in accordance with four broad policy objectives [emphasis added]:

• Assisting allies and friendly nations deter or defend against aggression, while promoting 

interoperability with U.S. forces when combined operations are required; 

• Promoting stability in regions critical to U.S. national interests while preventing the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction;

 35
National Disclosure Policy. National Disclosure Policy (NDP), which is not well 

understood, establishes the framework for transfer of classified information to foreign 

governments (including information incident to sales of arms and arms development, 

intelligence, data related to ongoing operations or otherwise). 36 While the release of

classified information on advanced weapons is closely related to the ITAR review 

process, it is nevertheless distinct and includes its own review mechanisms by separate 

DOD and service offices and components and its own criteria. Under NDP, an initial

request for advanced systems or technology is initially referred to the military service or 

agency responsible for its development, which then coordinates with different 

bureaucratic entities to process the request and arrive at a release decision. Depending 

upon the results of the initial review, the decision may be passed on to an interagency 

committee or special executive committees for additional review. If the requested item is 

not covered by the NDP, or exceeds the NDP classification level authorized for the 

requesting country, then the request is referred to a National Disclosure Policy 

Committee (NDPC) for inter-agency review;37 the NDPC review process for exceptions 

to the NDP is shown in Figure 3.1 below. 

 

• Promoting peaceful conflict resolution, arms control, democratization, human rights and other 

U.S. foreign policy objectives; and

• Enhancing the ability of the U.S. defense industry to meet U.S. defense requirements, maintain

long-term technological superiority, and reduce costs. 36Established by National Security Decision Memorandum 119, “Disclosure of Classified Military 

Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations” (Approved 20 July 1971, amended 6 

June 1978), and implemented through DOD Directive 5230.11, “Disclosure of Classified Military 

Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations” (16 June 1992, supersedes previous

version dated 31 December 1984), the NDP encompasses eight broad categories of classified information, 

including information relevant to arms and arms technology. These include: 1) organization, training and 

employment of military forces, including tactics, techniques, doctrine, intelligence and counterintelligence 

techniques; 2) military materiel and munitions, including specific items already in production or in service, 

and the information needed for operations, maintenance and training; this category includes items on the 

U.S. Munitions List, but not items in research and development; 3) applied research and development 

information and materiel, which includes fundamental theories and designs, experimental investigation into

possible military uses, engineering data, operational requirements and concepts, and military characteristics 

needed to adopt an item for production; 4) production information, including designs, specifications,

manufacturing techniques and related information; 5) combined military operations, planning and 

readiness, including information necessary to plan, ensure readiness for and provide support to the 

achievement of mutual force development goals or participation in combined tactical operations and

training exercises, but excluding strategic plans and information related to homeland security; 6) U.S.

order of battle, including information pertaining to U.S. forces in a specific area; 7) North American

Defense, including plans, operations programs and projects (but excluding data and equipment) related to

North American defense, including U.S. homeland defense; and 8) military intelligence, which includes all 

military information pertaining to foreign nations, but excluding national intelligence and secret 

compartmented information controlled by the Director of Central Intelligence. See DOD Directive 5230.11, 

op.cit., Section E.2, Para E.2.1.2—Definitions. 37 DOD Directive 5230.30, op.cit.

 36
Figure 3.1 National Disclosure Policy Review Process 

he NDP establishes four criteria for the transfer of classified information or materiel 

• Disclosure is consistent with U.S. foreign and national security objectives

• rsuance of military and 

• e served; and 

In practice, the consideration of whether a transfer is consistent with national security 

criteria

e

 

Staff Out for Committee

Member Vote

Unanimity Reached?

Unanimity Reached?

Nonconcur:

Members Add Limitations

And Conditions

Elevated to Chairman

For Proposed Decision

Final Decision

Accepted and Recorded

Elevated to Deputy Sec’y

Of Defense for

Final Decision

Yes

No

No

Appealed

Accepted

Decision Usually

Within Day 1-10

Negotiations

Between

Days 11-30

Appeal Within 10 Days

For a total of 40 Days

Maximum for Process

NDP Committee

Chairman

Dep. Under Sec’y

Of Defense for Policy Support

General Members

Army, Navy,

Air Force, JCS and

Department of State

Special Members

CIA; DIA; OUSD (Policy)

OUSD(AT&L); ASD(C3I)

MDA; ASD(NBC)

Dept. of Energy

Source: GAO-03-694, Better Information Needed to Support Decision Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers, July 2003

T

which are applied on a country-specific and situation-specific basis. These include 

whether: 

concerning the proposed recipient foreign government; 

The recipient government cooperates with the U.S. in pu

policy objectives compatible with those of the United States; 

A specific U.S. national purpose, diplomatic or military, will b

• The information will be used in support of mutual defense and security 

objectives.38

objectives has effectively resulted in a focus on the effect of the transfer on U.S. 

technological advantage and the maintenance of U.S. military superiority. These

are sufficiently broad to allow various DOD and other U.S. government participating 

agencies to interpret them in different ways and emphasize different considerations; th

result is an ad hoc decentralized process with little uniformity. 

38 Ibid. Sec. E.3—NDP-1 Disclosure Criteria, Conditions and Limitations. 

 37
Multi-Lateral Disciplines. Finally, there are a series of multilateral arrangements, 

is a

osed

d

2. Entrenched Problems in the Technology Transfer Process 

nfortunately, since the late 1990s, it has become clear that the labyrinth of applicable 

ad in

tional areas 

he myriad problems in the ITAR export licensing process uncovered by the DOD in the 

l

tion of

s a consequence of these problems, the perception that the system was broken grew on 

lease of 

ctive is

f relevance here, some of the central problems inherent in U.S. arms transfer policy 

ght

U.S. armaments cooperation policy continues to be divorced from technology 

r

including Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR), to which the United States

party, that are applicable to the transfer of certain types of technology abroad. In 

practice, MCTR issues are examined as part of the review under the ITAR of prop

transfers. Generally, the Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation takes the lea

in addressing MTCR and other proliferation issues for the U.S. government, and sensitive

issues are addressed by an inter-agency committee under the auspices of the National 

Security Council. 

U

U.S. rules and technology transfer processes that have developed thereunder is outdated

and based on antiquated Cold War paradigms and has effectively become a major 

stumbling block to sharing of technology with our closest allies. Given the U.S. le

many areas in spending and development, the reality is that U.S. technology sharing is 

vital to ensure Europe acquires enhanced capabilities and also can improve 

interoperability. This is particularly the case in C4ISR and other transforma

(precision munitions) where the U.S. lead is probably growing. 

T

late 1990s were deep-rooted and reflect the fact that the Cold War system had not kept 

pace with changes in the business world, including industrial integration across borders

and the multi-country development and production—even in the defense world. The 

antiquated system was not designed to deal efficiently with multi-country internationa

cooperative armament programs or distributed manufacturing projects involving 

commercial and defense products, components, and technologies and the participa

foreign engineers from numerous countries. 

A

both sides of the Atlantic. From a European perspective, the main shortcomings of the 

U.S. technology transfer process are the complexity of the process, its apparent 

arbitrariness, its lack of transparency and, in the end, the difficulty in securing re

enabling technologies. These considerations have caused Europeans to consider 

designing around U.S. components and technologies where possible. This perspe

also shared by many in the U.S. defense industry who seek expanded participation in the 

European defense market. 

O

directly affect efforts to enhance European capabilities, improve interoperability and fi

coalition operations, for example, they relate directly to situations like the NRF. 

 

a.

transfer policy. Technology transfer issues have continued to plague a series of majo

international cooperative armaments programs in which the United States and various 

 38
European countries participates, including the Joint Strike Fighter Program (JSF), 

MEADS, the U.S. Missile Defense Program, and the NATO Advanced Ground 

Surveillance (AGS) System. While the specific technology transfer issues vary a

the programs (as discussed below), the results have been similar. 

cross

In each case: 

• The United States has made a policy commitment at senior levels of government 

• haring surfaced in the U.S. bureaucracy 

nd

•

ed to address the

• , but not all cases, some compromise (usually uneasy and not satisfactory 

In the case of JSF, for example, the U.S. government actively promoted and solicited 

ology

r,

t

. Adverse Impact on Coalition Operations and Undermining of Interoperability 

n

• A U.S. company license request to sell Air-Sea Rescue Flares to the Italian Coast 

d

• t license to import digitized maps 

e

 

to enter into a cooperative armaments program and share the necessary 

technology to sustain and foster it. 

Enormous resistance to technology s

(either the services or other DOD components that deal with export controls a

acquisition programs) that undermined the overall goals of the program. 

Significant tensions were created in the bilateral relationships. 

• Enormous time and attention of senior policy makers was requir

issue. 

In most

to foreign participants) have been worked out, at least for a period of time, but 

numerous restrictions on technology sharing were also imposed. 

international participation in the program. Yet, nevertheless, the United States

subsequently has made a series of restrictive decisions that effectively bar techn

release and cooperation on key subsystems of the platform, including avionics and rada

even with close allies like the United Kingdom. These decisions were made under a 

variety of U.S. government review processes, including NDP and otherwise. Thus, no

surprisingly, U.S. credibility today in the area of cooperative armaments is extremely low 

and our most significant efforts in this arena are struggling and at risk. 

b

Goals. Export controls interfered with coalition operations during the Kosovo campaig

and other recent campaigns. Examples include: 

 

Guard to use to rescue NATO airmen during the Kosovo crisis was initially 

turned down even though it was eventually approved and is a product that ha

already been approved for sale to 30 countries. 

The Netherlands waited months for a U.S. expor

for the Chinook helicopters. The license was not granted in time, even after 

requests for an emergency exemption, and the pilots had to operate without th

digitized maps.39

39 Colin Clark, “U.S. Export License System Broken, Say Allies,” Defense News (Internet version), April

24, 2000. Available online at: <http//:www.defensenews.com>. 

 39
• Another U.S. company waited seven months for a license to supply technical data 

to a Netherlands contractor that was building components for a U.S. fighter 

engine. 

At their heart, the technology transfer problems can be broken down into: 

• Process issues—problems resulting from the cumbersome licensing processes 

and related requirements; and 

• Release issues—the unwillingness to release technology even to close U.S. 

allies. 

3. Limited Effectiveness of Attempted Solutions 

Across the Clinton and Bush Administrations, there have been well intended reform

efforts made to address these issues, especially concerning process. The reality today is 

that these efforts have had limited effect, been incomplete, and in some ways have proven 

counterproductive. While it may be difficult to imagine the complex process becoming 

more dysfunctional, this is in fact what appears to be happening. One has a sense of 

“déjà vu all over again” when approaching these issues. 

 

Clinton Administration Reform Efforts 

In 2000, the last year of its tenure, the Clinton Administration announced the Defense 

Trade Security Initiative (DTSI), a package of predominantly licensing reforms that 

included: 

• ITAR country waivers or exemptions, along the lines of the Canada exemption, 

for close allies and trusted firms within those countries. The idea was to share 

more technology with countries that agreed to improve their own export control 

systems in various respects. Such governments and firms would be afforded 

access to certain unclassified technology related to armaments without obtaining 

specific licenses in advance of export. 

• Various types of global licensing agreements designed to facilitate significant 

transatlantic projects, programs and joint industrial activities, joint ventures and 

the like. 

• Process reforms to speed up procedures and create some process transparency. 

• Reform of the U.S. Munitions List, so as to eliminate articles and technologies 

that no longer warrant inclusion. 

 

Unfortunately, these reforms, which deal more with process issues than releasability, 

have to date not been implemented fully and have in some ways been counterproductive. 

• The idea of country-specific exemptions for close allies, while promising, has 

been stymied by congressional opposition. While the United States has signed 

such exemptions with the UK and Australia, a minority in Congress—especially 

Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations 

 40
Committee, and his staff—have effectively stopped the waivers from becoming 

effective by refusing to grant relief from legislation that creates very high, some

might say unrealistic, standards for such exemptions. 

• Similarly, while the idea of large, blanket licenses for major programs has 

promise, it too has been ineffective. The only such major license issued to date, 

on the JSF program, was riddled with provisos that undermined the very purpose 

of this type of license and imposed significant and new compliance burdens. 

There are real questions about this model for the future. Indeed, some companies 

have opted out of the Global Project Authorization (GPA) issued for the JSF 

program and instead chose to rely on traditional technical assistance agreements 

in order to avoid the compliance burdens and costs. 

• Moreover, even some U.S. “win efforts,” like reducing approval times, may have 

actually been counterproductive. First, the reduction in processing time appears 

to have resulted in a greater number of restrictive provisos (apparently because 

time pressured reviewers now make more conservative, risk-averse decisions); 

while this issue is being addressed, it continues to be a problem. Second, 

companies are now taking much longer to prepare licenses in anticipation of 

trying to get them through and offering the needed detail required. 

• Finally, the effort at Munitions List Reform, begun under the Clinton 

Administration and continued under the Bush Administration, failed to achieve 

any meaningful reductions in coverage. 

Bush Administration Reform Efforts 

While the Bush Administration has had some change initiatives underway and is 

introducing some needed structural and management reforms into the traditional defense 

trade control bureaucracies (State Department Directorate of Trade Controls (DTC) and 

the DOD’s Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)), the reality is that 

these efforts have also been incomplete, limited in scope and subject to new 

developments in the security environment that have created yet additional constraints on 

technology transfer. 

The Unfulfilled Promise of Export Review

On July 21, 2002, President Bush announced a review of Defense Trade Export Policy 

and National Security, which called for a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness 

of U.S. defense trade policies, to identify changes necessary to ensure that those policies 

continue to support U.S. national security and foreign policy goals. The review, which 

was to be completed in six months, included promising elements designed to promote 

coalition warfighting, including facilitating friends' and allies' efforts to increase 

capability and interoperability. Thus, among other things, the review directed the 

identification of the top U.S. weapons acquisition programs for which increased 

industrial participation or greater access to U.S. technology by allies, and vice versa, 

would improve military effectiveness of U.S. coalitions. 

 41
One idea the Bush Administration explored was to address the problem, inherent in 

cooperative programs, where European firms had engineers of numerous nationalities 

resident in facilities in a particular European country. Thus, the idea of an enterprise 

license was explored to address this issue (i.e., and license many of such nationals). This 

approach to the so-called “deemed export” rule (i.e., the licensing of data disclosures to 

foreign nationals from one country working in another)) had merit and could have been 

potentially useful for the NRF. 

Unfortunately, however, despite the fanfare surrounding the reviews announcement and 

the promise it held out, at this writing, it is two and a half years and counting (and nearly 

two years behind schedule). There are indications, however, that the review rejected 

major changes in the U.S. approach to technology transfer, including approaches to 

address application of the deemed export rule to multinational companies and efforts to 

change release policies on certain technologies. Moreover, there are indications that 

congressional concern over review proposals to raise the threshold for congressional 

notifications became a stumbling block. 

Indeed, prior to the 2004 Presidential election, an informal temporary stand down was put 

in place. Congress (notably Congressman Hyde) apparently agreed not to pursue pending 

legislation to amend the AECA that would tighten restrictions in exchange for an 

Administration decision not to proceed with changes or the ITAR waivers with the UK

and Australia noted above. 

Additionally, since September 11, one has the sense that technology release has actually 

walked back, especially in areas like electro optics, and that more scrutiny is being 

applied to release. While the release policies (for the most part, not written) vary from

one technology area to another, the overwhelming reality is one of continued limited 

releasability and greater scrutiny in the context of the war against terrorism. 

New or Expanded Bureaucratic Hurdles (Special Committees): Stealth and AntiTamper 

Different Special Committees and other bureaucratic mechanisms have gradually 

emerged to pose significant hurdles to technology transfer to close allies. Significantly, 

these decisions are made by different bureaucracies outside of the ODTC/DTSA orbit and 

through different types of standards. 

The releasability of classified and unclassified Low Observable/Counter Low Observable 

(LO/CLO) technology, stealth and counter-stealth, is managed at DOD through an 

elaborate process supervised by the Director of Special Programs (DSP) now situated in 

the Office of International Technology Security (which reports to Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)).40 Under the 

 40 The mandate for the LO/CLO process is found in DOD Directive 5220.22M, “National Industrial 

Security Program Operations Manual”; and “Security Classification Guide for Department of Defense

(DOD) Low/Counter Low Observable (LO/CLO) Programs (U), 2 October 2000. For a review of the 

 42
LO/CLO process, low observable cases are initially reviewed by the Air Force and 

counter low observable cases are referred to the Navy along with ship low observable 

cases and ground vehicle cases to the Army. Decisions are generally made on a 

precedent basis. Sensitive cases are referred to a Tri-Service Committee chaired by the 

DSP, and some complex or extraordinary cases that require exceptions to existing 

LO/CLO policy precedents are elevated to the LO/CLO Executive Committee, which 

includes the USD(AT&L) and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs) for final decision.

41

DOD, which deals with, has become a significant roadblock to technology sharing in a 

broad range of technology areas relating to stealth and counter-stealth technologies. The 

LO-CLO review process is shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 Process for Review of Signature Control Technologies 

ource: GAO-03-694 

ere are a number of issues inherent in the current LO/CLO process: 

 

S

Industry Service LO/CLO OPR

OUSD(AT&L)/DSP 

Tri-Service

LO/CLO EXCOM

DoS

DoC

DOC

DoS

DTSA

OSD LO

Position

Informal Parallel Review Process

Formal, Statutory Review Process

LO

Cases

Th

LO/CLO process, see “Better Information Needed to Support Decisions Affecting Proposed Weapons 

Transfers,” GAO Report GAO-03-694, July 2003. 41 The LO/CLO committee also includes the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Support, the 

military services and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence agencies, the Missile 

Defense Agency, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense, and the 

Department of Energy. 

 43
• Its ambit is very broad in scope; it seems to have expanded to cover anything 

related to LO/CLO in recent years. 

• There are no firm deadlines. ITAR license applications that have not been subject 

to LO/CLO review are typically returned without action and are resubmitted after 

LO/CLO review, which can take lengthy periods of time. 

• The standards, which apparently are entirely informal (or at least not available in 

open sources), appear based on industrial rather than national security 

considerations. 

• Its decision-making is not transparent (which is not surprising given the highly 

classified nature of some of the technologies involved). 

A fundamental dilemma is that the technology experts staffing the LO/CLO process in 

OSD (particularly in DOD/AT&L) have strong views on technology protection, distrust 

the export licensing process and safeguards it establishes (i.e., do not believe in their 

effectiveness to stop improper technology transfers), and believe technology will likely 

be transferred through informal osmosis—talk among engineers notwithstanding rules 

and safeguards. Moreover, it is often difficult for more senior officials, especially 

political appointees without technical backgrounds, to feel comfortable overruling the 

technical judgments of these experts. 

Thus, the LO/CLO process tends to be a black box, and the Executive Committee can 

exercise a veto over release applications without providing a rationale for the decision. 

The LO/CLO process also has had a distinctly different operating approach and apparent 

philosophy in different Administrations. In the Clinton Administration, the LO/CLO 

EXCOM was a forum where senior leadership sought to change the technology transfer 

paradigm and provide more support for coalition warfare. Indeed, senior DOD 

acquisition officials were committed to facilitating greater defense supplier linkages 

among allies in order to promote greater interoperability, and AT&L became a voice of 

reason in LO/CLO decision-making (which a shift in emphasis toward coalition warfare 

as a security mantra and a corresponding shift away from sole reliance on technology 

dominance even vis-à-vis allies). Moreover, AT&L was closely integrated into DOD’s 

overall technology release policy, as DTRA, which then housed the overall DOD export 

licensing function now contained in DTSA, reported to both AT&L and Policy. 

In contrast, in the Bush Administration, coalition warfare goals have become less 

pronounced and there has been far less enthusiastic support for these goals throughout 

DOD, including senior DOD acquisition officials. Thus, in this different context and 

without more affirmative guidance in support of coalition warfare, the DOD LO/CLO 

bureaucracy has been left more to its own, more protectionist instincts (i.e., which tend to 

focus more on technology protection and less on technology sharing as a means of 

ensuring U.S. security). Moreover, the role of the DOD acquisition community in export

licensing has shifted markedly. Early in the Administration, AT&L lost its leadership 

role over DTSA and eventually created its own office to focus on technology security 

issues, now called the International Security Office. This office, which lacks line 

authority over export licensing, is functionally more disconnected from overall Pentagon 

export licensing, including DTSA, then in the past and has developed its own 

 44
independent approach with less emphasis on coalition warfare and more on technology 

protection and dominance. Indeed, its website notes that its mission is to “identify, assess 

and protect U.S. ‘technological dominance’ for the U.S. war fighter, while influencing 

and supporting globalization.” 

 

Anti-Tamper. Similarly, the new focus in DOD decision-making on creating anti-tamper

mechanisms threatens to undermine cooperation. Over recent years, DOD initiated an 

anti-tamper policy for acquisition programs that is becoming a significant factor in 

technology transfer decisions. Initially established by DOD directive in 1999, the idea 

was to require programs to include anti-tamper measures in requirements development 

for new and upgraded programs and to be considered for systems developed with allied 

partners or exported. Yet, this initial guidance has now matured into a firmer policy that 

now requires anti-tamper mechanisms as a condition of export. Specifically, DOD has 

now established the Air Force as the DOD Executive Agent for Anti-Tamper; it is 

charged with overseeing an annual budget of some $8 million to develop anti-tamper 

technology intended to protect sensitive hardware and software from theft or corruption 

by hostile powers. In practice, individual program managers are responsible for 

considering potential anti-tamper measures for any weapons systems with critical 

technologies. Anti-tamper techniques vary depending upon the type of technology to be 

protected and the level of protection required. It could include such measures as software 

encryption, opaque coating of micro electronics, self-destruct devices, auto-erase 

provisions for mass storage devices, etc. Figure 3.3, below, sets forth the current antitamper decision process at DOD.

Figure 3.3 Anti-Tamper Executive Authority Decision Process 

Preliminary

Requirements

Final Requirement

& Solution Set(s)

Program Protection

Plus Annex

Downselect

Recommended

Solution Sets

Identify

Specific

Issues

Select

Potential

Implementations

Identify

Available

Anti-Tamper

Verification

&

Validation

Identify

Critical

Technologies

Identify

Threats

Identify

Vulnerabilities

Identify

Attack

Scenario

Identify

Impacts If

Exploited

Identify New

Exploitation

Timeline

Develop an Exploitation Estimate Without Anti-Tamper Protection

Determine if Project Needs Protection and Amount

•Performance

•Hardware

•Performance

•HW/SW

•Operating

Exploit to

•Defeat

•Improve

•Transfer

•Performance

•Hardware

•Performance

•Hardware

•Cost to Exploit

•Technology

•Hardware

•Software

•Cost

•Schedule

•Performance

•Producibility/RAM/Safety

•Production Lot Phasing

•Systems

•Hardware

Source: DoD Program Manager’s Anti-Tamper Handbook

 45
At first blush, the anti-tamper regime sounds sensible and designed to achieve legitimate 

policy ends. However, this constructive idea in fact has some troubling aspects in 

practice. First, it has evolved from an elective approach used to help provide a basis for 

facilitating exports to a requirement on programs. Second, like LO/CLO, the anti-tamper 

decision-making process is outside the scope of the traditional DTSA and service review

of ITAR licenses as well as the NDP process. Hence, it has, as some officials has 

suggested, become another basis on which U.S. reviewers could effectively say no to 

exports. Moreover, there is no clarity on what technologies are critical—the DOD 

critical technologies list used in anti-tamper reviews is very outdated—and in practice

program managers have broad discretion—with no clear guidelines—for determining 

whether anti-tamper techniques are needed and for which countries. 

Indeed, not surprisingly, a recent GAO report highlights that the anti-tamper policy is 

being inconsistently applied, with different concepts of critical technology applied and

different standards about what level of protection is needed.42 Unfortunately, DOD 

rejected the GAO’s suggestion that a centralized mechanism be established to ensure 

consistent treatment of technologies on programs. Also, there is no clarity, in an export 

context, when such anti-tamper techniques are needed vis-à-vis close allies with strong

export control track records. 

 

Thus, as a practical matter, anti-tamper policy is becoming a new effective barrier to the 

release of advanced technology to allies—and affords DOD acquisition and technology 

communities another and separate methodology by which to oppose or slow technology 

transfer even to close allies. Depending upon how anti-tamper is applied, it could have a 

very significant effect upon the cost of developing new systems. Undoubtedly, antitamper will be a significant issue for many of the types of information sharing and 

technology transfer needs related to the NRF. 

By way of example, it was announced recently that anti-tamper requirements have added 

close to $1 billion to the program costs of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF); these are 

designed to protect the stealth features of the air craft and develop a sanitized and less 

stealthy configuration of the aircraft.43 One can seriously question the need for this 

protection and, hence, whether this enormous expense is justified. Given the millions of

lines of code involved in various JSF subsystems, it remains to be seen whether foreign 

engineers working on the development phase of the program or foreign governments that 

acquire production models could ever backward-engineer these systems or subsystems. 

This precedent thus is a potentially troubling one for other Transatlantic programs. 

 42 “DOD Needs to Better Support Program Managers’ Implementation of Anti-Tamper Protection,” 

General Accounting Office Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (GAO-04-302, March 

2004). 43 See Bill Sweetman, “JSF Security Costing Up to US$1 Bn”, Jane’s International Defense Review. 

Available online at: <www.janes.com/aerospace/military/news/idr/idr040416_1_n.shtml>. 

 46
4. Study Assumptions: Continued Release and Process Issues and Lack of 

USG Consensus for Overall System Reform 

Today, in light of the foregoing, the fundamental realities of technology transfer to U.S. 

allies are as follows: 

a. The Licensing Process. There is some overall sense that the overall licensing process 

is better; licenses are processed more quickly and the system is more disciplined. In 

some program and product areas that are less controversial, there is an overall impression 

that the system functions in a reasonable and predictable manner. Yet, significant 

problems remain. 

Continued Failure of Industry to Use Global Licenses. The new broader licenses have 

essentially remain unused—probably out of industry’s concern that JSF type licenses 

have high costs of compliance and limited benefits in terms of coverage as well as 

liability risks for the prime on the program. 

The Funnel Effect in Export Licensing. There is an increased demand for precision in the 

description of what technical data or services is covered—leading to the preparation of

more, rather than less, limited technical assistance agreements and other licenses. 

Moreover, despite efforts to create uniform provisos, there continue to be many extra 

very limiting provisos on licenses. Thus, the combination of more precise and, therefore, 

narrow license coverage and more provisos has created a funnel effect in export 

licensing—resulting in a patchwork of very carefully conscribed licensing vehicles that 

undoubtedly will raise significant compliance problems in the future for licensees. The 

limited nature of these licenses—with many exceptions—create situations where full and 

sustained compliance is highly unlikely even with the best of intentions; can engineers on 

programs really be fairly expected to abide by these complex, narrowly tailored licenses 

in discussions with foreign engineers—is this workable? Thus, the funnel effect is likely 

to increase compliance costs and risks for U.S. firms. 

Overall Licensing Times May Have Increased. While the USG licensing process times 

have declined, there is a sense that corporate licensing process times have increased; 

firms spend much more time and effort than before meeting the increased need for 

precision in drafting of such licenses. Moreover, licenses are rejected (usually “returned 

without action) because there has been no LO/CLO release decision prior to submission. 

Hence, parties have now recognized the need to seek this review first before submitting a 

license– and no time limits exist. These reviews do not show up in the DTC data on 

licensing times that continue to show very low totals. 

Lack of Progress in Major Acquisition Program Technology Transfer Decision-Making. 

Finally, there is no sense of any effort to develop modalities to quickly and effectively

establish technology transfer rules for major U.S. programs; problems inherent in JSF, 

MEADS, and other programs have continued. Foreign participants, especially close 

allies, are vocal in their continued complaints and highlight that unless the U.S. 

government is made to really care about these issues, the technology transfer issues linger 

 47
for lengthy periods of time. Thus, the continued reality is that for transformational U.S. 

programs that are important to European capability acquisition or interoperability, 

technology transfer issues will continue to be intractable and require a slog through the 

complex bureaucratic process. Simply put, there is no clear process designed to achieve 

an agreed upon solution in a transparent and reasonable manner. 

 

b. Technology Release Policy: Focus On Industrial Policy Rather than Coalition 

Warfare Goals. Ironically, while most of the export control reform initiatives, like

DTSI, dealt with licensing process issues, the reality is that when all of the licensing 

process underbrush is cleared away the harder issues appear to lie in the area of

technology release. Fundamentally, the underlying sense is that protectionism and the 

maintenance of technological and industrial leadership continue to be the fundamental 

drivers of U.S. government technology release decisions. In effect, the old paradigm is 

still in effect—that is, that the fundamental source of U.S. national security, at least in the 

export control community, is perceived to be U.S. technology and industrial leadership—

even vis-à-vis close allies. Working with allies is viewed as a second best way to achieve 

true security. This is especially true in circumstances, where, as in the Bush 

Administration, there is less senior level policy-making focus on encouraging technology 

sharing with allies—which is critical to tackling the problems inherent in an entrenched 

bureaucracy. This problem was hard enough in the Clinton Administration, where senior 

officials labored to fix the process; it is yet harder in the absence of senior leadership 

focus. 

Moreover, what makes changing the paradigm more difficult is that the U.S. decisionmaking process that makes technology transfer and NDP judgments is highly 

decentralized —dispersed among acquisition program executives, representatives from

the operational side of services, the intelligence community and the defense research and 

development community. Thus, the inherent problem is that: 1) release policies in most 

areas are not written in some type of objective guidance statement but are inherently 

subjective and not clearly established; and 2) in the absence of clear written standards, 

these are judgments and decisions being made on a decentralized, program-specific or 

activity-specific basis throughout the Pentagon bureaucracy. 

Part of the problem is the absence of any clear priority consideration for coalition warfare 

in the U.S. technology transfer decision-making process. The AECA does not establish 

interoperability or European capability acquisition as significant factors in export control 

decision-making; they are nowhere mentioned. Indeed, the AECA focuses only on 

whether “the export of an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development 

of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility 

of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or

multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.”44 

Moreover, the 1995 U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy45 provides a basis for 

relying on technological leadership in decision-making. It states that all arms and 

 44 AECA, Section 2778(a)(2). 45 Its broad outline was revealed in a White House Fact Sheet dated February 1995. 

 48
technology transfer decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with 

four broad policy objectives: 

• Assisting allies and friendly nations deter or defend against aggression, while 

promoting interoperability with U.S. forces when combined operations are 

required. 

• Promoting stability in regions critical to U.S. national interests while preventing 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

• Promoting peaceful conflict resolution, arms control, democratization, human 

rights and other U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

• Enhancing the ability of the U.S. defense industry to meet U.S. defense 

requirements, maintain long-term technological superiority, and reduce costs. 

While the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy clearly establishes that promoting 

interoperability with U.S. allies (which requires greater releasability) should be a policy 

objective in release decisions, it also establishes that maintaining long-term U.S. 

technological superiority (which implies withholding technology from foreign 

competitors) and the ability of the defense industry to meet U.S. requirements are 

similarly important factors. Plainly, there is a tension between these considerations. 

And, in practice, interoperability and capability acquisition have definitely taken a back 

seat to the protection of perceived U.S. technology and industrial leadership in critical 

transformation areas, resulting in a widening, rather than a closing of the interoperability 

gap with the NATO allies. Moreover, the CATP provides no basis for affording a 

priority to coalition warfighting and capability acquisition goals over technology 

leadership. Thus, perhaps one reasonable approach is to reformulate the AECA and 

CATP to afford a priority to coalition warfighting where the United States is satisfied that 

sensitive technology would not fall into third party hands and will be sufficiently 

protected (i.e., potential adversaries or their allies). 

However, while changes in laws, regulations and new policy guidance will help, the 

reality is that paper alone has not and will not effectuate change; there have been efforts 

to afford priority to coalition warfare before that have not done the job. The more 

significant challenge is changing the culture within the export licensing community of 

reflexive rejection of applications for technologies in which the U.S. is perceived to have 

a substantial industrial lead—at the expense of interoperability in coalition warfare. 

While achieving cultural change within the license review community has been a priority 

of the leadership of Defense Technology Security Agency (DTSA), which oversees 

licensing and release at the DOD level, this is a slow process when dealing with career

civil servants of entrenched habits. Moreover, reform in DTSA does not address the 

issue of review within the services (where foreign governments often are viewed with 

great suspicion). The fact that the CATP explicitly states that interoperability is one of

the primary objectives of armaments and technology transfer has not resulted in the 

elevation of interoperability to a high priority among the technology transfer review 

community. 

 49
c. Lack of Reform Consensus. Finally, there is no consensus for significant reform of 

the existing U.S. technology transfer system and no apparent willingness of senior 

Administration officials to afford a high priority to such reforms. Plainly, such reform is 

not plausible in the absence of sustained senior leadership focus on the issue. Moreover, 

even if such a consensus was possible, the issues are difficult ones. There are no quick or 

easy fixes here. The problems inherent in releasability cannot be solved through a rule 

change or review of the Munitions List. 

Thus, for the purposes of this essay, we: 1) assume that the overall U.S. technology 

transfer system is unlikely to undergo significant change and continue to have 

dysfunctional elements; 2) explore the specific information sharing and technology 

transfer issues relevant to NRF below within this framework; and 3) propose specific 

recommendations for new modalities, short of total system reform, that could potentially 

be developed for the NRF (some of which have potentially broader application). The 

challenge is to develop realistic modalities that constrain or limit the inherent discretion 

of myriad bureaucrats in the export control system in order to facilitate development of 

the NRF. 

B. Information Sharing and Network-Centric Warfare 

The technology transfer and information sharing issues related to ensuring 

interoperability—which largely focuses on linking the NRF to U.S. and European 

network-centric enablers—breaks down into the three sets of discrete issues discussed

below: 

1. Connecting the NRF, especially during NRF Phase II, to existing U.S. ISR

enabling systems; 

2. Linking the NRF to U.S. network-centric capabilities now in development and 

likely to be fielded in the next 5-10 years; and 

3. Linking the new European network-centric enablers with U.S. enablers as they 

become fielded and available. 

Connecting the NRF to Current U.S. ISR Enablers 

One core set of technology transfer issues arise from the need for the NRF, during Phase 

II, to access the capabilities of U.S. intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

enabling systems prior to the development and fielding of European enablers in order to 

ensure interoperability and provide a high level of support for high-intensity operations. 

The key U.S. enabling systems, and the requirements for interoperability requirements, 

are shown in Table 3.1. 

 50
Table 3.1 Key ISR Enabling Systems 

System Capability Interoperability Requirements

J-STARS Airborne Ground Surveillance 

Moving Target Indicator

Targeting Sensor Cuing 

J-STARS Ground Terminal 

Access to Tactical Internet 

Interoperable Combat Information System

Global Hawk Airborne Ground Surveillance 

Overhead Imagery 

Target Acquisition & Designation 

ELINT 

Communications Relay

Global Hawk Ground Terminal 

Access to Tactical Internet 

Interoperable Combat Information System

Predator Overhead Imagery

Target Acquisition & Designation 

Target Engagement

Predator Ground Terminal

Interoperable Combat Information System

Rivet Joint ELINT 

SIGINT 

Secure Data Link 

Interoperable Intelligence System

Access to Tactical Internet 

Surveillance & 

Recon Satellites 

Visual and IR Imagery 

Synthetic Aperture Radar 

ELINT 

SIGINT 

Missile Early Warning

TENCAP Terminals 

Access to SIPRNet 

Global Positioning

Satellite 

Precision Navigation 

Precision Targeting and Strike 

Access to Encrypted L1 and L2 Bands 

JDAM Precision Strike GPS Daily Code Access for Attacks on

Relocatable/Mobile Targets 

Significantly, the key issues concerning each of these U.S. enablers, such as J-STARS, 

Global Hawk, Rivet Joint, Predator and various national intelligence assets, is whether 

the United States is willing to provide the data outputs of these enablers to NRF 

participant nations on a real-time, actionable basis. To do this, the United States must 

agree to: share the data outputs of these U.S. enabling systems, which often are classified, 

with the particular NRF country involved, on a real-time, actionable basis; and export the 

software or terminals that allows a participating NRF country to access the data and some

type of interoperable command and control system that allows the real-time exploitation 

of the ISR data from the particular enabling system. 

In practice, each of these issues can be complex. Since the data outputs of these U.S. 

systems are in most cases classified, the U.S. sharing of such data outputs requires a 

determination of releasability under NDP for each system. The exportability of the 

software or equipment to access the data as well as information about the system and 

command and control architecture necessary for the data to be utilized in real time also

raises issues with respect to unclassified data under the ITAR. 

These issues, vary to some extent from one capability area to another, and are analyzed 

below on a capability-specific basis: 

Joint Surveillance and Targeting System (J-STARS). The E-8C Joint Surveillance and 

Targeting System (J-STARS), a premier U.S. electronic ISR system, consists of a 

sophisticated ground mapping synthetic aperture radar (SAR) with ground moving target 

 51
indicator (GMTI) capability. Able to look hundreds of kilometers into enemy territory to 

detect tanks, trucks and other moving vehicles, J-STARS can provide commanders with 

early warning of enemy movements and intentions as well as a means of cueing other 

sensors and precision strike weapon systems. Since its introduction in Desert Storm, the 

U.S. military has assiduously integrated J-STARS capability into C4ISR architecture, 

with options for relaying J-STARS data via satellite or to a specified ground terminal; the 

data is then disseminated to subordinate units via broadband networks like SIPRNet or 

the tactical internet. J-STARS data can be stored and displayed on a range of U.S. combat 

information and battle command systems, and overlaid with topographical, tactical, 

logistical and imagery data. 

In Operations Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), data from JSTARS were made available to coalition partners—but only indirectly and not in realtime, executable form. Data were first downloaded from the sensor platforms to 

terminals located at the Coalition Air Operations Center (CAOC), thence to the theater 

commander’s HQ, where the data was processed (and in some cases, filtered or 

degraded), then forwarded via a dedicated bridging link to the headquarters of coalition 

partners. This process was time consuming and prevented the exploitation of ISR data in 

near-real time. Also, by filtering or degrading the quality of the data provided to the 

allies, the U.S. reduced its value to coalition partners and their ability to employ the data 

for planning and targeting purposes. 

To fully exploit J-STARS data in real time in operations, the NRF would need to: 1) have 

some means of access (via its own J-STARS terminals, or access to the U.S. tactical 

internet46); and 2) combat information and battle command systems compatible with JSTARS tracking and targeting data so as to allow the information from the sensor to be

displayed in a way meaningful to NRF commanders and utilized. This in turn will 

require the United States to release significant technical information regarding the 

internal functioning of J-STARS, its system specifications and limitations, 

communications protocols related to J-STARS track file messages, and the means by 

which J-STARS data is displayed on U.S. battle command systems. The U.S. may or 

may not choose to “hide” certain J-STARS capabilities (and limitations) from the NATO

Allies, but in so doing it would undermine the ability of the NRF to exploit the system’s 

full capabilities. 

Other U.S. Enabling Systems (Global Hawk, Predator, and Rivet Joint). The technical 

information sharing issues with respect to the U.S. Global Hawk and Predator unmanned 

air vehicle (UAV) systems and the RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic intelligence (ELINT) 

 46 The Tactical Internet is the term used to describe this integrated battlespace communications network. 

The term is appropriate due to functional similarities to the commercial Internet and because the Tactical

Internet communications infrastructure is based on Internet technology. A key feature is the ability to

exchange VMF messages using the commercially based Internet Protocol (IP), which is mandated in the 

ATA and is common across all segments of the Tactical Internet. At brigade and below, the Tactical 

Internet will extend the Army Battle Command systems to the soldier and weapons platform. The Tactical 

Internet passes battle command and situation awareness data. The Tactical Internet must provide tactical, 

mobile, simultaneous multi-band, multi-mode, voice and data (and possibly video) communications while 

providing routing and network services.

 52
are similar to JSTARS. NRF users must have a means of access (via a compatible 

terminal for each, or a link to a U.S. command and control network) plus a means of 

disseminating the information and displaying it in a useful format through a battle 

command system. While the terminals could be acquired directly from the U.S. with 

little in the way of technology transfer, using the information would require the release of 

substantial technical data on each system as well as the network architectures used to 

support the intelligence they provide. Thus, both the imagery and information on 

network architectures probably require exceptions from current NDP policy or 

establishing new NDP policy for systems not yet released. To date, information on these 

systems has been shared only with a select group of partners, most notably the United 

Kingdom. As noted, above, however, this has so far been done by first routing the data 

through U.S. communications nodes and processing centers so that the data going out to 

foreign users has been reviewed and, if necessary, scrubbed. This has effectively 

eliminated the ability to utilize this data in real time in operations for targeting and other 

purposes. As this scrubbing is now done manually, and would be very difficult to 

automate, the process imposes further time delays, or latency on targeting data, which 

often renders it less valuable for addressing time-sensitive mobile or relocatable targets. 

Intelligence Data. Accessing the data outputs of various U.S. national intelligence assets, 

including NRO imaging and ELINT satellites, Defense Support Program (DSP) missile 

warning satellites, present similar issues but also may involve sensitive intelligence 

sources and methods. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a variety of 

programs intended to integrate the capabilities of these systems with the theater and 

operational levels of conflict; most notable is the TENCAP (Tactical Exploitation of

National Capabilities) program, under which highly secure, protected data links 

(terrestrial and satellite) transmit national intelligence asset data directly to commanders 

in the field, bypassing much if not all intermediate processing. Again, NDP issues are 

raised. It is highly unlikely that the United States will allow the NRF real-time, direct

access to this information, with the possible exception of DSP (which already is shared 

over a theater-wide warning network, but which does not really provide detailed tracking 

and targeting data).47 Establishment of protocols for the exchange of this information 

will be one of the more intractable operational issues to be addressed in NRF Phase II. 

Daily Global Positioning System (GPS) Encryption Keys. Another somewhat different 

information sharing issue concerns the releasability of the daily keys for the encrypted 

military GPS signal (P-Code) that provides greater accuracy and faster initialization. 

This information is compartmentalized communications security (COMSEC) data, the 

access to which is controlled tightly by the National Security Agency (NSA). To date,

the United States has not shared the daily codes with U.S. allies or NATO, presumably

out of concern over the proliferation of its daily encryption keys and the information this 

might provide about its encryption methodology. Yet, access to the encrypted signal is 

 47 Sharing of DSP information, not merely with NATO but also with the former Soviet Union, was 

instituted after Desert Storm as a confidence-building measure in light of the risk of accidental ballistic 

missile launch or attacks from rogue states. DSP data is now routinely directed to the NATO Air 

Operations Center, and both DSP and its future replacement, the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) are 

already incorporated into the notional NATO ballistic missile defense architecture. 

 53
essential for striking mobile or relocatable targets (i.e., Scud launchers). With access to 

the encrypted P(Y)- Code48, it takes one-tenth the time to initialize a GPS-guided weapon

such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). While several European air forces are 

integrating JDAM capability into their F-16 fighter aircraft, without access to the daily 

GPS decryption keys the weapons are useful only to attack fixed targets.49 Ultimately, 

should the U.S. fail to release these codes, it seems likely that Europe will develop its 

own satellite-guided weapons so as to rely on the European Union’s Galileo satellite 

navigation system now in development rather than the U.S.-controlled GPS. 

In a certain sense, the United States now has it both ways on global navigation. On the 

one hand, the United States has fought hard to maintain the integrity of, and freedom

from interference with, its current and future military signals in negotiations over the 

shape of Galileo, a European navigation system under development. Yet, while the 

United States achieved this goal and continually reinforces the reliance on GPS as a 

critical element of NATO strategy, it at the same time denies allies the ability to make 

best use of the precision GPS data needed for precision targeting in coalition operations. 

This choice effectively highlights that the United States has not afforded a high priority to 

coalition warfare in its decisional process concerning the release of such data. 

When viewed in totality, the United States has, would and should share some of the data 

outputs from these enabling systems with our allies during exigencies in order to achieve 

force interoperability and establish the NRF as an effective coalition force for highintensity missions. Indeed, in light of lessons learned from recent conflicts, the United

States has put bilateral memorandums of understanding in place with certain coalition 

partners that would provide a basis for release of some of this data and ensures that

coalition partners will maintain security of such data. Moreover, within Afghanistan and 

Iraq, field commanders have been delegated the authority to release certain types of

actionable data. 

 48 GPS uses two different signal frequencies, L1 and L2. The L1 signal carries a publicly-useable and less 

precise acquisition (C/A) code as well as an encrypted P(Y) Code. The L2 signal normally only carries the 

P(Y) Code. Only the U.S. military and approved civil users can access the encrypted P(Y) Code, using a 

very long sequence of pseudo-random binary bi-phase modulations on the GPS carrier at a chip rate of

10.23 MHz. The keys required to directly use the P(Y) code are tightly controlled by the U.S. government

and are generally provided only for military use. Using the P(Y) Code on both the L1 and L2 signal bands 

effectively doubles the number of positioning sources open to each user, allowing for more rapid and

accurate acquisition. In spite of not having the P(Y) code encryption key, several high-end GPS receiver 

manufacturers have developed techniques for utilizing this signal to increase accuracy and remove error 

caused by the ionosphere. The U.S. appears willing to supply selected European allies with access to the

keys for P(Y) on the L1 band, but not for L2. This would allow those users to achieve a higher degree of

accuracy, but not with the accuracy or speed available through use of L1 and L2 together. 49 Lack of P-Code access also limits the capabilities of other GPS-guided weapons, including BGM-109 

Tactical Tomahawk cruise missile, the AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and the AGM-158 Joint 

Air-to-Surface Strike Missile (JASSM). Of these, both Tactical Tomahawk and JSOW have been offered 

for release to the UK and Australia, among others, while JASSM, a much more capable missile with low 

observable technology, has not been released to date. 

 54
Nevertheless, in the context of creating a standing, rotational force, the release of such

information relating to current U.S. network-centric enablers to NRF participating nations 

raise significant NDP (and, to a lesser degree, ITAR) issues. 

The Tension Between Ad Hoc NDP Decision-Making and A Standing, Multi-National, 

Rotational Force. The ad hoc nature of NDP decision-making—the application of the 

general NDP criteria on a case-by-case basis to requests from individual countries—

raises serious tensions with respect to standing up a multi-national, rotational standing 

force. 

First, the current NDP policy has resulted in separate disclosure policy parameters for 

each NATO country, both general and specific in nature to programs. Thus, as a general 

matter, which level of classified information (Confidential, Secret, Top Secret and 

compartmentalized data) can be released varies for each country. Also, within these 

general levels, whether data specifically related to or produced by certain specific 

systems are releasable to that country can vary materially; decisions are program specific 

and require the involvement of the program “owners” in the judgment. Thus, while some

data outputs from these systems is releasable to some NATO countries (especially the 

United Kingdom), there is no uniform policy and some data outputs may not be 

releasable today to all NATO countries, especially on a real-time, actionable basis. 

Clearly, this current U.S. NDP approach, with different levels of disclosure for different 

NATO allies on different systems, does not mesh well with the rotational structure of the 

NRF and the fact that different NATO countries will be participating at the same time. 

Can we provide some data to one NRF participating country’s NRF contingent but not 

another when they are in the same rotation or the next one? Should we have a separate 

NDP process for these systems for each separate country in each rotation? Needless to 

say, this would not only exhaust the NDP process, but the ultimate prospect of different 

disclosure levels would thoroughly undermine coalition warfare and render some of the 

force “dumber” than other force elements—to the detriment of the NRF’s operational 

capabilities and overall force protection. 

Second, the ad hoc, case-by-case nature of NDP decision making does not mesh with the 

idea of a standing, rotational force that would, on a sustained basis, be ready on rapid 

notice to take on a range of spearhead missions. Rather, NDP decision making tends to 

be tailored to specific situations, allowing for what GAO has called “judgment and 

interpretation of the unique circumstances surrounding each transfer.”50 In other words,

the broad NDP standards noted above are subject to interpretation and the interpretations 

can vary from one case and one official involved to another; State Department officials 

may focus on impacts on regional stability and DOD officials on technology security or 

operational impacts. Thus, traditionally, data might be releasable to a particular

participating coalition partner during a specific exigency such as Operation Iraqi 

Freedom or the Balkan wars. Indeed, DOD has delegated disclosure decisions to U.S. 

 50 “Better Information Needed to Support Decisions Affecting Proposed Weapons Transfers,” General

Accounting Office report to Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives (GAO03-694, July 11, 2003), p. 13. 

 55
commanders in a theatre of operation. However, there is no overall approach by which 

such data could be releasable in advance of such contingencies—on a global basis in 

anticipation of a future need in light of NRF missions. 

The reactive and case-specific nature of NDP decision-making thus poses significant 

problems vis-à-vis the NRF, where, in each rotation, there would be six months of 

training prior to certification and deployment. Thus, under the current approach, such 

U.S. data outputs generally would not be available during the training phase and would 

only be afforded during a specific operation on an as needed basis. Critically, this ad hoc 

quality to national disclosure decision-making preludes NRF participants from using this 

data while training together in advance of operations—a necessity for coalition warfare 

participants that need experience in using such data output and makes sharing with some

countries difficult. It is unrealistic to expect nations that do not train together, and do not 

train in advance in the actionable use of such sophisticated data outputs, to be able to rely 

on these enablers in the context of actual operations. 

The Fractured Nature of NDP Decision-Making. The fact that the NDP decision making 

is shared among a number of DOD and other USG entities, while ultimately subject to 

review by the NDPC, also makes holistic decision-making difficult. The disclosure of

some data (human intelligence, satellite imagery) generally is decided, in the first 

instance, by the U.S. intelligence community and the disclosure of communications 

security data (GPS daily codes, intercept messages, encryption capabilities) would 

generally be decided by the National Security Agency. Thus, it is difficult to obtain an 

overall perspective based on specific policy parameters set for NRF. 

Difficult Disclosure Issues; Exceptions Required. Finally, even assuming a fair and 

reasonable process, there are sensitive issues concerning the release of some of the data 

involved and the United States will probably, and understandably, restrict some types of 

data. For example, the United States does not, to date, allow foreign access to the 

SIPRNet, the Tactical Internet, ground stations for key enabling systems or the U.S. 

command and control systems used to execute this data. Thus, the questions of whether 

and how to allow access to this data will be significant ones. The SIPRNet is employed 

by a range of U.S. Government agencies, including the intelligence community, and 

foreign access to it would pose serious, if not insurmountable, challenges. The U.S. 

willingness to allow access or details about our leading battle command and control 

systems that utilize this data would pose difficult issues; we might perhaps be willing to 

provide sufficient information to allow NRF participants to ensure that their own systems 

could utilize the data. 

 

Indeed, a number of the needed data transfers would involve classified information on 

programs on which the DOD has not yet set a disclosure policy or which exceeds existing 

U.S. disclosure guidelines—necessitating high-level reviews by the NDPC and other 

special committees (i.e., the LO/CLO Executive Committee). Fortunately, in contrast to 

the ITAR system, there is a central database, although far from perfect, that can be used 

to identify the NDP precedents in a particular area.51 In all events, seeking favorable 

 51 See GAO-03-694, op. cit. 

 56
outcomes on these issues would require a significant change in policy that provided a 

significant priority to creating coalition warfighting capabilities such as the NRF (i.e., 

and offset considerations such as maintaining technological advantages over our allies 

and otherwise). It would also undoubtedly require agreements with NATO and its 

members to ensure security of this information. 

In sum, the fragmented NDP process, with ad hoc decisions, different U.S. decision 

makers and different disclosure policies for each NATO member, and the need for senior 

level reviews, would pose significant challenges for the NRF. Significantly, there is 

today no unified integrated effort by DOD to review the disclosure issues relevant to the 

NRF (or NATO interoperability more generally) on any type of global or wholesale basis. 

Thus, DOD needs to consider standing up a group that would make a comprehensive 

disclosure policy for the NRF (and not on an ad hoc or rotation-specific basis). The 

United States should share some of the data outputs from these key enablers and develop 

modalities to provide access, as well as sufficient knowledge for allies (or NATO) to 

develop compatible command and control mechanisms that can utilize these data outputs 

in real time. In the absence of such an effort, we undoubtedly are headed toward a 

dumbed down NRF that only obtains last minute, ad hoc access to data from these 

enablers and is probably therefore unable to execute actions based on this information in 

real time. 

Accessing Developmental U.S. Network-centric Programs 

As discussed above, the interoperability of the NRF with U.S. enablers becomes that 

much more complex given the wide range of cutting-edge U.S. network-centric systems 

now under development to provide enhanced situational awareness and information 

dominance. 

As the U.S. transitions from its present pastiche of disparate, stand-alone combat 

information and battle command systems to a more integrated C4ISR architecture, 

interoperability between U.S. and Allied command, control and communications systems 

will become both more critical and more difficult to accomplish. With the completion of 

the digitization process and the transition from voice to data (machine-to-machine) as the 

principal mode of communications, frequency and even waveform compatibility is no 

longer sufficient. Interoperability demands that forces exchange detailed technical 

information concerning network architectures, interfaces, protocols, file structures and so 

forth, merely to allow the seamless transfer of information between national systems. 

Internal details of combat information and battle command systems will also be needed if

forces are to share the same operational pictures and emulate each other’s tactical 

displays.

 57
Table 3.2 Interoperability Enhancements and Technology Transfer 

Phase Capability Definition Enabling Technologies Minimum Required Capabilities Technology Transfer Requirements

I Secure Tactical Communications The ability of different national Spread-Spectrum Communications Seamless voice and data commun- SDR Technology (JTRS)

forces to communicate seamlessly TDMA/FDMA Techniques ications across national networks Waveforms & frequency-hopping

over common communications Data Encryption algorithms

networks with minimal risk of enemy Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Encryption methods

interception and jamming. Open Data Architecture Data formats and protocols

I Combat Identification The ability to distinguish between Non-Cooperative Target Recognition Ability to distinguish between allied Transponder codes

frienly and enemy forces on the GPS-Based Vehicle Tracking and enemy forces in all weather Blue Force Tracking System 

battlefield so as to avoid fratricide Radio Ferequency Transponders down to the vehicle level.

(Friendly Fire). Cellular Communications

II Single Integrated Air Picture The ability of different national Track Correlation Algorithms Digital Command & Control Network SIAP Algorithm & Software Develop

forces to access and display the Sensor Fusion Algorithms Upgraded Air Defense Systems Sensor Technical Specifications

locations of all friendly and enemy Bandwidth Compression Techniques Upgraded Airspace Management Network architectures

air assets through the merging Network Video Techniques Data Architectures

of track files from multiple sensor Bandwith compression techniques

systems reporting over a single Broadband data links

sensor network.

II Single Integrated Ground Picture The ability of different national Sensor Fusion Digital command & control network SIGP Algorithm & Software Develop

forces to access and display the Track Correlation Digitized Combat Vehicles FBCB2 Architecture and File System

location of all friendly and enemy Bandwith Compression Digitized Soldier Systems Warfighter Information Networkground units through the merging of Network Video Techniques Tactical (WIN-T) Architecture

track and intelligence files from Measurement & Signature Intelligence Warfighter 2000

multiple reporting systems over a Blue Force Tracking System

single reporting network. Data Architectures

Bandwith compression techniques

Broadband data links

III Cooperative Logistics The ability of different national Logistic Management Software Digitized logisitic system Mostly COTS-based logistic 

forces to monitor friendly unit status, Secure Networks Digitized Command & Control Net management and inventory control

draw supplies, and provide Common Network Architecture Smart Card-Based Inventory systems

maintenance support through a Common Data Element Dictionary Management Interfaces between battle command

common logistics management Sensor Fusion and integrated logistic systems

system employing "just-in-time" GPS-Based Asset Tracking Information exchange on unit status

logistic techniques Smart Cards Exchange of logistic data

Common Relevant Operational Picture

III Cooperative Asset Tasking The ability of different national Battle Management Software Digitized command & control network Common Operating Standards

forces to control sensors and other Secure Digital Networks Digitized Sensor Network System Operating Specifications

assets belonging to a different Common Network Architecture Advanced Sensor Capabilities (e.g. Sensor System Specifications

national force. Common Data Element Dicturenary Counter-Low Observables, Low Command System Specifications

Sensor Fusion Porbability of Intercept Transmission) Intelligence-Sharing Protocols

GPS-based Asset Tracking Asset Prioritization Protocols

Common Relevant Operational Picture

III Cooperative Engagement The ability of different national Battle Management Software Digitized command & control network Common Operating Standards

forces to direct weapon systems Secure Digital Networks Digitized Sensor Network System Operating Specifications

belonging to another national force Common Network Architecture Advanced Sensor Capabilities (e.g. Sensor System Specifications

using a wide range of sensors and Common Data Element Dicturenary Counter-Low Observables, Low Command System Specifications

fire control assets belonging to its Sensor Fusion Porbability of Intercept Transmission) Intelligence-Sharing Protocols

own and/or other national forces. GPS-based Asset Tracking Precision Strike Systems Asset Prioritization Protocols

Common Relevant Operational Picture Rules of Engagement

Thus, NRF interoperability with the spectrum of emerging U.S. network-centric 

capabilities, from secure communications to CROP to cooperative engagement, would 

require the transfer of technology and information for the resolution of outstanding 

technical issues, including algorithm development, enhanced broadband communications, 

high speed data processing and fusion, and visualization and decision aids. Table 3.2 

summarizes these technology transfer and information sharing needs. A number of 

operational issues must also be addressed, including the sharing of intelligence from

these new assets, the exchange of salient sensor characteristics, sensor network access,

and the sharing of information about the underlying architecture and methodologies 

inherent in these systems. While some of these issues can be resolved through doctrine 

and training, others will require difficult technology transfer decisions due to the 

sensitive nature of the information exchanged. 

When reviewing the technologies on Table 3.2 and emerging U.S. capabilities, there are 

several important realities that make these technology transfers difficult. 

 58
1. Little Cooperative Engagement 

Significantly, there are few cooperative programs or other substantial joint efforts by the 

U.S. and its coalition partners to develop common network-centric capabilities. 

Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, there is virtually no foreign participation in 

any of the leading U.S. network-centric warfare programs. Table 3.3 sets forth the major 

U.S. network-centric warfare programs. Significantly, there has not been significant 

foreign engagement or participation in any of them. 

Thus, even in program areas where near- term interoperability is important and should be 

a major focus, such as secure communications and blue force tracking, cooperation is 

limited and no easy answers exist. 

• On tactical radios, the United States and its European allies have largely independent 

next generation secure communications programs underway, with little focus on 

interoperability. The United States is moving toward Software Defined Radios 

(SDRs) such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), while most European 

countries are still deploying single-band radios similar to the U.S. SINCGARS 

developed in the 1970s. Attempts to create a multinational Future Multiband, 

Multiwaveform Modular Tactical Radio program foundered over issues of cost and 

the releasability of SDR and encryption technology. Since then, most European 

countries have initiated their own national tactical radio programs. Sweden, Finland 

and France are all developing SDR concepts, but the most important system (from a 

coalition warfare perspective), the British Bowman tactical radio family, uses 

conventional single-channel technology. There has been no coordinated effort to 

ensure interoperability among these next-generation communications systems. The 

most prominent, the U.S./UK JTRS/Bowman Interoperability Initiative, requires the 

British to release to the United States the Bowman waveforms and encryption engine, 

allowing the U.S. to develop software to emulate the Bowman system.

52 Given that 

Bowman is a hardware defined radio, there really was no other viable solution, but it 

did have the virtue (from an export control standpoint) of protecting U.S. SDR 

technology and the JTRS encryption engine. Refusal to release those technologies 

has prevented the development of interoperability standards for European software 

defined radios.53

 52 In the same manner that SoftPC© allows the Windows© operating system and applications to run on a 

Macintosh© computer. 53 See Appendix A for additional details. 

 59
Table 3.3 U.S. Transformational Programs and Releasability Status 

Program Sponsor Type Releasibility LO/CLO

Advanced Broadband Satellite Joint Communications No

Aegis BMD Navy Missile Defense Some Yes

Airborne Common Sensor (ACS) Army ISR (ELINT) No

Airborne Tactical Data Link Joint C3I No

All Source Analysis System (ASAS) Army Intelligence No

Army Airborne Command Post (AACP) Army C3I No

Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) Army Artillery Fire Control No

Blue Force Tracking Army C3I No

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance System Navy C3I No

Combat ID Joint C3I Some

Cooperative Engagement System Navy C3I No

Digital Terrain Simulation System (DTSS) Army Intelligence No

E-10A MC2A USAF C4/ISR No Yes

FAADS C2 Army C3I Some

Future Battle Command Brigade & Below (FBCB2) Army C3I No

Future Combat System (FCS) Army System Architecture No

Gapfiller Communications Satellite Joint Communications No

Global Hawk USAF ISR Some Yes

GPS Encryption Joint C3I Some

Inter/Intra Flight Data Link USAF C3I No

JLENS Army Sensor No Yes

Joint Tactical Radio System Joint Communications Some

Maneuver Control System (MCS) Army C3I Some

MEADS Engagement Radar Army ISR Some Yes

Missile Defense Battle Management Joint C3I Some

Mounted Battle Command on the Move Army C3I No

MP-RTIP USAF ISR No Yes

Rosetta Stone Joint C3I No

Single Integrated Air Picture Joint C3I Some

Single Integrated Ground Picture Joint C3I No

SPY-3 Radar Navy ISR Some Yes

UCAV USAF Precision Strike Some Yes

Warfighters Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Army C3I No

• On Blue Force Tracking, the United States has leased the initial version of the Blue 

Force Tracking System (BFTS) to UK forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has 

worked well, though there were still a number of friendly fire incidents and the 

Coalition Command did not have sufficient faith in the system to deploy U.S. and UK

forces in the same battlespace. While the UK seems content with BFTS, other 

European countries, notably France, are developing their own Blue Force Tracking 

capabilities. These are simple interrogate-and-respond systems like the U.S. 

Battlefield Combat ID System (BCIS)—for which NATO STANAG 4579 provides 

minimum interoperability standards54—but are not compatible with BFTS, which 

provides continuous, real-time reporting of blue force positions (and potentially unit 

status information as well). Thus, without some effort in the direction 

interoperability, European forces will not be able to provide input to BFTS (unless, of 

course, they are willing to accept BFTS on U.S. terms). Moreover, BFTS is a 

significant input to the Single Integrated Ground Picture (SIGP) or the Common 

Relevant Operational Ground Picture (CROP). Without BFTS interoperability, not 

only is the risk of fratricide increased, but the entire situational awareness capability 

on which network-centric warfare rests will be undermined. 

 54 See Appendix A. 

 60
In more advanced areas (CROP, cooperative engagement) there is virtually no foreign 

participation in key U.S. programs and little cooperative activity. Indeed, the areas of 

collaboration have been few and far between: 

• Single Integrated Air Picture. Cooperative development is limited to part of the 

NATO Airspace Management program, and the AEGIS air defense system. Within 

the NATO Airspace Management Program, the emphasis in on European homeland 

defense, through the integration of civil air traffic control radars and NATO and 

national military air surveillance systems, fused to provide a single integrated picture 

of European airspace at several regional airspace management centers. SIAP is being 

developed as part of AEGIS for the purpose of enhancing defense against anti-ship 

cruise missiles (by providing an over-the-horizon detection, tracking and 

classification capability), and to expand the capabilities of AEGIS ballistic missile 

defense (by allowing the fusion of missile track data from several off-board sources 

such as early warning satellites, ground-based radars, and other AEGIS-equipped 

ships). Due to the miniaturization of AEGIS and a concomitant reduction in costs, 

the system is being installed on new European frigates and destroyers, which can thus 

interoperate seamlessly as part of a U.S. naval battle group.

• An affordable Link 16 (JTIDS) terminal intended for NATO forces and other U.S. 

allies, the MIDS program was initiated in 1994 by the U.S. Navy Space and Warfare 

Center (SPAWAR) to enhance interoperability in coalition environments. Because 

the U.S. JTIDS Class 2 terminal was simply too large for many allied ships and 

aircraft, and too costly for most European countries, MIDS was conceived as a 

smaller, lighter version of a Class 2 terminal.55 At present, five countries, the U.S., 

France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Germany, are full participants in the MIDS program, 

with most NATO countries committed to purchasing the terminal; future sales outside 

of NATO are anticipated. Under the MOU that established the MIDS program,

system development responsibility is assigned to MIDSCO, a U.S.-chartered joint 

venture company under contract to SPAWAR. MIDSCO not only designed and 

developed the terminal, but also has responsibility for qualifying other companies 

from participating countries to produce and/or assemble components, subsystems and 

entire terminals.

• CAESAR: The Coalition Airborne Surveillance and Reconnaissance (CAESAR) 

program, initiated as a multinational Advanced Concept Test and Development 

(ACTD) experiment during the latter phases of the war in Kosovo, has developed a 

range of hardware, software and procedural solutions to integrate different data links 

and information management systems, thereby eliminating the so-called “sneaker 

links” that had to be used to transfer information from U.S. to allied command and 

control systems and vice versa. Though not yet fully operational, CAESAR is an 

excellent example of a relatively low-key international initiative that has yielded 

significant benefits for interoperability. 

 55 With production plans for more than 4,000 terminals already in place, the anticipated cost of a MIDS 

terminal is on the order of $250-300 thousand, as compared to more than $1 million for a JTIDS Class 2 

terminal. 

 61
Plainly, if Europe is to narrow the C4I gap sufficiently to make interoperability with 

developing U.S. systems a realistic hope, then there must be an increased degree of 

European involvement in U.S. transformation programs. 

2. Limited or No Release

Significantly, for some of these leading C4 programs, the United States has a policy of 

limited or no release. For others, in early development stages, there is no overall release 

policy yet in place and we do not know whether and to what degree the software or 

architectures associated with them can be released to third countries under the U.S. 

national disclosure policy. Among these critical programs are: 

• Future Combat System (FCS), the U.S. Army’s network-centric system of 

systems for the next generation, including new vehicles, weapon systems, and 

C4ISR capabilities (no release); 

• Future Battle Command—Brigade and Below (FBCB2), the U.S. Army’s nextgeneration tactical command and control system, without access to which the 

NRF will be unable to operate effectively with U.S. forces (no release); 

• Blue Force Tracking (BFT), an element of FBCB2 allowing commanders to keep 

track of all friendly forces down to the individual vehicle level, without which the 

NRF will not be able to avoid fratricide (limited release

56); 

• Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the Army’s new field 

artillery and air support fire control system, without which the NRF will not be 

able to access U.S. fire support assets (limited release57); 

• E-10A Multi-Mission Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A), the USAF’s

replacement for J-STARS, AWACS and Rivet Joint (no release policy); 

• Digital Rosetta Stone, a system for bridging new and legacy C4I systems, an 

essential aid for creating bridges between the NRF and U.S. C4I systems (not 

releasable);58 and 

 56 The Blue Force Tracking System (BFTS) was leased to British forces in Iraq on a “black box” basis 

without any transfer of technical data; the principal purpose was to prevent U.S. forces from attacking

British forces. See Operations in Iraq: Lessons for Future Conflict, UK Ministry of Defense (London)

December 2003. However, the technology, and particularly the encryption engine for the system, are not 

releasable to foreign entities. This makes it difficult for the allies to develop their own compatible BFT 

systems, and encourages them to develop national systems using their own unique protocols and standards,

whch may not be compatible with the BFTS. 57 A less capable export version of AFATDS is being developed by Raytheon, but has not yet been

approved for sale to foreign governments. 58 Digital Rosetta Stone (DRS) Model is a framework for capturing and maintaining methods necessary for 

the retrieval and display of digital information stored on obsolete or incompatible media or using obsolete 

software. While originally developed to facilitate the archiving of government documents, its utility as a 

bridge between new and legacy hardware/software systems makes it an important tool in the development

of a fully-integrated C4ISR network involving new and legacy systems, as well as systems owned by

several different services or countries. See Alan R. Heminger, “A Delphi Assessment of the Rosetta Stone

Model”, Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences-2004. Available 

online at: <http://csdl.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2004/2056/04/205640104b.pdf>. 

 62
• Warfighter’s Information Network—Tactical (WIN-T), the future information 

network over which the U.S. plans to transmit the bulk of its broadband C4ISR 

data59 (not releasable).

3. Limited Foreign Participation in Joint Warfighting Experiments. 

Further, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is conducting a series of Advanced 

Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) that focus, among other things, on joint operations 

between U.S. forces and the utilization of network-centric capabilities. Conducted by the 

U.S. services individually, or more commonly, as joint exercises under the auspices of 

the U.S. Joint Forces Command, AWEs are intended to test new concepts, technology 

and tactics in a simulation environment. The results of AWEs are used to direct research 

and development and to refine acquisition priorities.60

Significantly, there is very limited foreign participation in these experiments. In the 

absence of such training and experimentation together, it will be very difficult to identify

the detailed nature of interoperability requirements regarding these future systems. 

Connecting these future capabilities with those of NRF participants will take considerable 

time and effort, and cannot meaningfully be done on the fly in the context of a particular 

exigency when the force is called to action. 

In short, without any affirmative U.S. actions to address this issue, the capability and 

interoperability gaps that exist today are likely to widen significantly in the future. In 

some of these program areas, the United States may be willing to ultimately sell some of

the new network-centric capabilities to its European allies and share the software, but 

may only want to offer a more limited version for export or may not be willing to share 

source code. In the past, the black box approach was grudgingly accepted by most 

European countries faut de mieux, because their defense industries were not yet 

sufficiently developed to provide the requisite capabilities indigenously at a competitive 

price. Such is not the case today: anything the United States can develop, Europe can 

also develop, albeit somewhat later and probably at somewhat higher cost. Failure to 

allow full access to the technology in cooperative systems creates the impression that the 

U.S. considers its European allies second class partners; and that it wishes to deny them 

access to technology in order to protect the U.S. defense industry and suppress 

competition. It also creates the suspicion among some Europeans that the United States 

 59 WIN-T is Army XXI's tactical telecommunications system consisting of communication infrastructure 

and network components from the maneuver battalion to the theater rear boundary. The WIN-T network 

provides C4ISR support capabilities that are mobile, secure, survivable, seamless, and capable of 

supporting multimedia tactical information systems within the warfighters' battlespace. WIN-T's 

infrastructure provides commanders and other users the ability to communicate via voice, data, and video 

simultaneously at all levels of security up to Top Secret. WIN-T supports the warfighter's requirement for

Command and Control On-the-Move (C2OTM) by integrating the major WIN-T elements into warfighter 

mobile tactical operations center (TOC) platforms while leveraging the Joint Tactical Radio System

(JTRS), wide-band digital radios, and wireless local area network (LAN) technologies. 60 Best known among the AWEs are the Millennium Challenge series of exercises that have run 

periodically since the late 1990s. For a description of Millennium Challenge 2002, see: “Millennium

Challenge 02”, U.S. Joint Forces Command. Available online at: 

<www.jfcom.mil/about/experiments/mc02.htm>. 

 63
might use the black box to deprive them of certain critical capabilities omitted from

export variants. Objections to the black box approach have been seen recently with regard 

to the MEADS engagement radar, with the MP-RTIP radar proposed for AGS, and with 

regard to some elements of the AEGIS air defense system. 

On the other hand, with regard to certain systems, some European countries still appear 

willing to accept a black box approach. The United Kingdom, for instance, is buying the 

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) data link for its new aircraft carrier as a black 

box via FMS. Also, in regard to the JTRS-Bowman Interoperability Initiative, Britain 

has voiced no opposition to an approach that amounts to a black box. In the case of CEC, 

it appears that the UK has determined that co-development would not be economically 

feasible at this time. With regards to JTRS-Bowman interoperability, the operating 

principles of Bowman are so different from those of JTRS as to make a more 

collaborative solution impossible, while the cost of Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) 

such as JTRS remains prohibitive for the fiscally-constrained British MoD. The 

acceptability of black box solutions thus depends entirely on how badly the Europeans 

want a particular capability, and whether they think it is economically feasible to bypass 

the United States to develop it themselves. 

Given the general lack of U.S.-European cooperation on the development of networkcentric solutions, the United States should consider holistic approaches for integrating the 

NRF and our NATO allies more generally into our advanced efforts if it truly seeks to

promote coalition warfighting capabilities. Under the current NDP approach, this would 

require country-specific and program specific decisions, again rendering the matter very 

complex. The better approach would be to identify a set of core programs needed to 

ensure interoperability in the emerging era of network-centric warfare and facilitate 

foreign participation in them. 

Linking New European Network-Centric Capabilities to U.S. Enabling Systems

Finally, in the long term, the introduction of indigenous European capability systems 

such as the Airborne Ground Sensor (AGS), advanced UAVs, high-resolution 

reconnaissance satellites and broadband communications satellites, does not diminish the 

need for interoperability with U.S. forces. Indeed, if fully network-centric concept of 

operations is adopted, interoperability will become a two-way street, with U.S. forces 

drawing information from European systems in addition to European forces tapping U.S. 

systems. With the advent of cooperative logistic support, cooperative asset tasking, and 

ultimately, cooperative engagement capabilities, total interoperability between 

communications networks, combat information systems, and battle command systems 

will be essential. Information will pass automatically from machine-to-machine, with 

commanders acting upon seamlessly fused information for situational awareness, 

maneuver control, and effects-based operations (see Appendix A for detailed 

interoperability requirements in Phase III). 

To achieve this degree of interoperability, the United States and Europe must either 

develop common command and control systems, or must exchange detailed technical 

 64
data on their respective systems in order to develop the proper interfaces and bridges 

between systems. Unfortunately, at this time, there appears to be little cooperation in the 

area of command and control, and little exchange of information on battle command 

systems being developed or implemented on either side of the Atlantic, and little U.S. 

release of technology or other technical information, classified or otherwise, in these 

areas. Thus, while there have been some bright spots such as the acquisition of CEC by 

the Royal Navy, and the U.S.-UK JTRS-Bowman Interoperability Initiative, for the most 

part the European allies have been closed out of critical C4I programs, including the 

Army’s FBCB2 tactical battle command system, the Army Future Combat System (FCS), 

WIN-T, and the USAF’s E-10A MC2A among others. And the military has been loathe 

to release certain critical communications technologies to anyone, such as the encryption 

engine and other SDR applications for JTRS. 

By excluding the Europeans from meaningful participation in these and other 

transformational programs, the U.S. has made it difficult if not impossible for the NRF to 

achieve the required degree of interoperability with U.S. forces to exploit key U.S. ISR 

enablers in Phase II, and to execute effects-based network-centric operations with U.S. 

forces in Phase III. 

 

In sum, the United States faces a strategic choice about the nature and degree of 

interoperability between the United States and its coalition partners on the NRF and the 

potential overall effectiveness of the NRF. 

If the United States approaches this issue on a business-as-usual basis and applies its 

current complex and ad hoc processes and restrictive policies on sharing the technical 

information relevant with other countries (ITAR, NDP and others), we will end up 

adopting an unsatisfactory least-common-denominator approach to sharing these 

capabilities in a coalition environment (NRF or otherwise). This would surely result in a 

dumbed down NRF that lacks the top line enabling capabilities, has very limited 

interoperability with U.S. network-centric enablers and, hence, would not be as potent an 

expeditionary force offensively and will face greater combat risks of casualty. 

The degraded NRF would not be able to receive and process all data passed to it by U.S. 

forces from various ISR and information systems.61 On an absolute level, this will reduce 

the effectiveness of the NRF in high-intensity combat by limiting its access to all 

available ISR data and reducing its ability for real-time use of such data for more 

opportunistic and precise combat operations. In relation to U.S. forces, it will inhibit if 

not prevent the NRF from operating in the same battle space with U.S. forces, thus

forcing coalition commanders to segregate it in a separate area of operations. Clearly, 

this defeats the one of the core purposes of the NRF—to establish an advanced and 

interoperable expeditionary fighting capability for high-intensity warfare. 

Alternatively, the United States could and should make a strategic choice, consciously 

and holistically, and not on an ad hoc basis, to afford more priority to the NRF and 

 61 See, for instance, the previously noted development by Raytheon of a less capable, export version of the 

Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). 

 65
coalition warfighting and take actions to follow through on this policy choice. This 

would mean more advanced training with NRF partners in the use of these enabling 

assets and the creation of mechanisms (through software, hardware, interoperable 

architectures, etc.) to facilitate the real-time use of these capabilities. 

 

C. Capability Requirements

Table 3.4 below sets forth the areas of potential technology transfer relevant to the 

enhancement of NRF capabilities (other than in C4 area discussed above). 

Table 3.4 Capabilities and Technology Transfer Requirements (Non-C4I) 

NRF Implementation

Phase Capability Enabling Systems Technology Transfer Req'ts. 

Phase I Tactical Mobility and 

 Logistic Sustainability

High Mobility Tactical Trucks None 

 Utility Helicopters None 

Force Protection NBC Detection & Decontamination Equip. None 

 Mine Detection and Clearing Equipment None 

 Body Armor None 

 Armored Personnel Carriers None 

 Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) C3I Integration 

Precision Strike JDAM GPS Daily Codes 

 Laser-Guided Bombs None 

 Tactical Standoff Missiles None (GPS Code), MCTR 

 Guided Artillery Rounds None 

Close Combat Light Tanks None 

 Anti-Tank Guided Missiles None 

 Mortars None 

 Night Vision Devices (GEN III/III+) Possible Licensing Req't. 

Phase II Strategic Mobility Long-Range Transport Aircraft (A400M) Minimal 

 Aerial Refueling Tankers None 

 Amphibious Assault Ships None 

Force Protection Tactical Missile Defense (MEADS) Engagement Radar, Missile Tech 

 Improved NBC Defense Minimal 

Precision Strike Tactical Cruise Missiles Possible GPS Code, Low Obser 

Phase III C4ISR Airborne Ground Sensor (AGS) Vestigial Radar Issues 

 HALE Unmanned Air Vehicle (EuroHawk) Airframe, Payload, ECM, MCTR 

 Airborne ESM Platform SIGINT/ELINT 

 High-Resolution Surveillance Satellite Special Access Programs

 

Broadband Military Communications 

Satellite Special Access Programs

 Precision Strike Joint Strike Fighter LO/CLO, Sensors, Avionics 

 Unmanned Combat Aircraft LO/CLO, Commo, Sensors 

 Force Protection Theater-Wide Ballistic Missile Defense Sensor, CLO, Guidance, MCTR

 Robotic Ground Vehicle Autonomous Operation 

 Close Combat Advanced Combat Vehicles Propulsion, Vetronics, Armor 

 66
It should be recognized that in many of these areas Europe has technology, but simply 

has not invested to the degree and at the pace of the United States. Thus, while Europe

could in theory develop these capabilities on its own, U.S. technology transfer and greater 

Transatlantic collaboration could potentially provide significant geopolitical, 

interoperability and security benefits: 

• First, by allowing Europe access to the U.S. technology base, the European 

development time for new systems and costs would be reduced, which in turn 

would allow the procurement of a larger number of systems, thereby increasing 

Europe’s capabilities. 

• Second, employment of U.S. technology in these systems would allow the U.S. to 

retain some control over technology proliferation through end-user certification 

(which, even if imperfect, is better than having no control proliferation of over 

purely European systems). 

• Third, transfer of U.S. technology implies participation by U.S. industry, which 

helps maintain the U.S. defense industrial base, reducing costs for the U.S. 

military. 

• Fourth, collaborative programs can bind the U.S. and its allies closer together, and 

create a feeling of solidarity and commitment to European defense transformation 

as an Alliance issue. 

• Fifth, it is easier to ensure interoperability (in both directions) when systems are 

developed collaboratively, due to better understanding of technology and 

operating principles, as well as the development of common protocols and 

interface standards. 

For the purposes of analysis, this essay assumes that the U.S. government would value 

some of these benefits sufficiently to engage in greater technology sharing. If not, then 

the degree of interoperability in the NRF and NATO more generally will remain 

significantly limited, and European capabilities should not be expected to increase 

materially for a considerable period of years to come. 

1. The Range of Capability-Related Technology Transfer Needs 

The technology transfer needs for enhancing NRF capabilities tend to be grouped in 

certain areas: 

Force Protection. Ensuring adequate force protection systems will require extensive 

technology transfer. 

• NBC defense would be improved through exploiting U.S. advances in remote, 

hyper spectral sensing in order to scan large areas quickly and track weapons of 

mass destruction back to their source. 

• Enhanced air and missile defense would be provided by the access to the far more 

extensive U.S. investments in missile defense technologies. 

• Generation III and IV electro optic capability (night vision equipment, etc.). 

 67
ISR Sensors. Access to U.S. sensors would be beneficial in facilitating European 

acquisition of cutting edge ISR systems similar to JSTARS, Rivet Joint, and Global 

Hawk. European industry has proven quite capable of developing the requisite 

technologies on its own (i.e., Synthetic Aperture Radars, infrared sensors, data links, 

visualization applications, etc.). U.S. refusal to share technology merely delays the 

development of these systems and raises costs to the point where either systems cannot be 

procured in sufficient numbers or are cancelled altogether. Failure to develop sensor 

systems cooperatively with Europe prevents the U.S. from amortizing its development 

and production costs over larger production runs, and undermines the quest for systems 

interoperability. From a proliferation standpoint, the U.S. has no control at all over 

systems without any U.S. technology content. 

UAVs/Cruise Missiles. In some UAV and cruise missiles areas, Europe is as advanced as 

the United States (see, for instance the Matra-BAE Apache/Black Shadow missile), and 

in some areas, such as propulsion, may be ahead. Collaboration with Europe would 

permit the insertion of advanced European capabilities in exchange for U.S. technology 

on guidance, autonomous target recognition, and low observables. 

Advanced Combat Vehicles. The U.S. Army is now developing an entirely new family 

of very lightweight manned and unmanned combat vehicles under the Future Combat 

System program. These vehicles will feature advanced, lightweight armor, highly lethal 

weapon systems, and radical hybrid-electric propulsion systems that will reduce fuel 

consumption and thermal signature. However, the program is running behind schedule 

and is over budget, placing the most technologically advanced elements, including the 

ground vehicle segment, at risk. Europe, for its part, has always relied more on light 

armored vehicles and has more design and development experience than the United 

States (i.e., both the USMC’s LAV-25 and the Army’s Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle 

derive from a Swiss design). This is another example of an area in which greater 

cooperation would benefit the United States while allowing the Europeans to develop 

their own capabilities through cost and risk sharing. 

2. Technology Transfer Policy Issues 

In practice, the following policy issues arise with respect to the types of technology 

transfers set forth in Table 3.4 above. 

a. Short-Term Needs: Mundane and Licensable. As noted above, there are limited 

needs for technology transfer relating to NRF capability acquisition for NRF Phase I as 

Europe has many of the technological and industrial capabilities needed. Thee short term

technology transfer needs that may exist (primarily where European governments chose 

to acquire U.S. existing solutions rather than develop or modify their own) are largely 

mundane and can be readily handled through normal licenses and/or ITAR country 

exemptions if and when they are eventually ratified. The licensing of trucks, utility 

helicopters, body armor and related items should not pose difficult problems. The only 

area of apparent sensitivity is night vision equipment, discussed separately below). 

 68
b. Medium and Long-Term NRF Needs: More Sensitive, Complex and Related to 

Major U.S. Programs. Many of the medium and long term technology transfer needs 

for NRF II and III set forth on Table 3.4 are not mundane and concern technologies and 

information the United States has viewed as sensitive and raise complex export control 

and national disclosure policy questions. There are several important considerations

relating to these technology transfer needs. 

Many involve significant and transformational U.S. defense programs that today have 

little foreign participation and which are either subject to limited release or have not been 

reviewed for releasability. As shown on Table 3.2, the vast majority of transformational 

programs presently are not eligible for foreign release, making meaningful cooperation in 

them impossible. Among the few exceptions have been: 

• The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), in which the U.S. presently has a bilateral interoperability program with the British Bowman system. 

• Aegis BMD, in which some aspects of the system have been released to Japan and 

Australia pending their procurement of Aegis BMD capability for homeland 

defense. 

• The SPY-3 radar associated with the AEGIS BMD system (though the depth of 

technology sharing remains unknown). 

• The Global Hawk long-endurance UAV, now being evaluated by the German 

Luftwaffe, mainly as an ELINT platform. 

• The MEADS engagement radar system (but see above for the disputes over black 

boxing of key technologies. 

• The Unmanned Air Combat Vehicle (UCAV), but limited to the United Kingdom.

More significant, however, are those programs on which there is no foreign release 

allowed or no foreign release policy established:

• Future Combat System (FCS), the U.S. Army’s network-centric system of 

systems for the next generation, including new vehicles, weapon systems, and 

C4ISR capabilities. 

• The E-10A Multi-Mission Command and Control Aircraft (MC2), the USAF’s 

replacement for J-STARS, AWACS and Rivet Joint. 

The lack of foreign participation in or U.S. willingness to disclose technology concerning 

these programs highlights the ongoing disconnects between our overall policies of 

promoting interoperability and capability and our unwillingness to share these 

technologies. We exhort European allies to obtain capabilities but are largely unwilling 

to share the relevant technologies that could facilitate such acquisitions. This is a 

continuing and sustained discontinuity in U.S. policy that bears on the NRF and more 

generally the difficulties inherent in U.S.–European technology sharing. 

The Medium-Long Term Technology Transfer Issues cannot be addressed through 

solutions like the ITAR country exemption but require holistic, program specific 

solutions. 

 69
• The ITAR country waivers do not apply to a wide range of sensitive technologies 

and classified information. These types of data are exempt from the licensing 

waivers. 

• JSF Type Solutions: Solutions will be more along the lines of JSF type program

licenses which address, at one time and in advance, a complex range of 

technology transfer and NDP issues. 

c. Specific Technologies Issues. More specifically, each of the various capabilities 

areas raises discrete, technology based NDP and technology transfer issues. 

Night Vision Systems: Prior to 2001, the U.S. had cleared all NATO countries plus 

Japan, Australia, South Korea, Egypt and Israel for Generation (GEN) III night vision 

systems; all other requests for GEN III required automatic review.

 62 However, beginning 

in 2001, the U.S. implemented a new figure of merit (FOM) system for determining the 

release of night vision technology. FOM is an abstract measure of image tube 

performance, derived from the number of line pairs per millimeter multiplied by the 

tube's signal-to-noise ratio. Under the FOM system, there are different levels of GEN III 

performance, with different countries are allowed to buy image intensifier systems up to a 

particular FOM threshold. To summarize: 

• U.S. Forces are now receiving GEN III and GEN III+ systems with an FOM of 

about 1700-1800. 

• NATO, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Israel and Egypt get GEN III with an FOM 

of 1600—roughly equal to what the U.S. procured circa 1996. 

• Other countries can get GEN III tubes with an FOM of up to 1250, roughly equal 

to U.S. Army GEN II tubes. 

Through reliance on the FOM parameter, the United States effectively ensures that its 

forces will always remain one or even two iterations ahead of even its closest allies in this 

critical tactical capability area, even while ostensibly loosening constraints on the export 

 62 Though no longer used to determine releasability, it is still common to characterize night vision devices 

by their technology "generation" as either GEN I, II, or III (with GEN IV on the horizon). Generations of

imaging tubes can be described as follows:

• GEN I: Vietnam-era technology, with short tube life and considerable distortion, most commonly

found on commercial, imported tubes. 

• GEN II: Late 1960s development with microchannel plate (MCP) amplifier for higher resolutin 

and reduced size. 

• GEN II+: From the 1970s, with increased image tube bias for increased gain (brightness); a glass 

faceplate was added to improve resolution. 

• GEN III: From the 1980s, with substantially improved gain and bandwidth reaching into the nearIR region, plus improvements to the MCP and gallium arsenide photocathode for increased tube

life and performance. 

• GEN III+/GEN IV: From the 1990s, includes improved MCP and photocathode for further

increases in gain and resolution. 

See Michael J. Brower, “Do You See What I See?” Special Operations Technology Online. Available at: 

<www.sotech-hmi.com/print_article.cfm?DocID=314>. 

 70
of GEN III technology. However, this approach is subject to debate since indigenous 

modifications to releasable technology has in the past allowed European, Israeli and 

Japanese companies to develop capabilities equivalent to non-releasable technology (i.e., 

to develop GEN II and GEN II+ systems equal or better to early GEN III systems). There

is no reason to believe that the FOM approach will inhibit future activities of this nature, 

which tend to move night vision technology completely out of U.S. control. 

Radar and IR Sensor Technologies. As shown in Table 3.4, most of the most sensitive 

technological issues arise with respect to sensor technology. Given the U.S. desire to 

maintain information dominance on the battlefield, the United States is highly sensitive 

over the transfer of advanced sensor capabilities in areas like radar, electronic warfare, 

advanced imaging, SIGINT and ELINT and sensors in missile defense programs on UAV 

and manned surveillance platforms. These issues span ITAR release and NDP disclosure 

policy, which are of course interrelated. 

Two cases highlight the problems inherent in these areas: 

1. U.S. Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The United States has been 

consistently resistant to releasing technical data, especially concerning the MEADS 

engagement radar, with respect to this joint U.S., German, and Italian program.

63 The 

United States instead has at various times offered to provide these as a black box. 

Europeans have consistently balked at this approach, viewing it purely as an attempt by 

the United States to protect the industrial lead of Lockheed Martin, the radar system

prime contractor. Elements of the missile guidance system, derived from the U.S. Patriot 

PAC-3 missile, also have been restricted, creating tension within the international 

consortium (MEADS International) established to develop the system. Technology 

transfer issues have repeatedly threatened the survival of MEADS, without which the 

NATO Response Force will have no effective mobile ballistic missile defense. In the 

case of MEADS, tensions over the releasability of the engagement radar data package 

and other elements has, at various times, alienated European governments and industry, 

and placed the future development of the program in jeopardy. Ultimately, after long and 

difficult negotiations and periods when disclosure issues caused the program to creep to a 

near halt, the MEADS partners reached agreement on the technology transfer issues. 

Italy and the United States have already signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the 

Design and Development Phase; German approval is expected next year. The only black 

box item now in the MEADS radar is the U.S. supplied exciter. 

2. AGS. In the case of AGS, there also have been a series of complex technology 

transfer issues. Initially, the USG was reluctant to release many of the technologies 

related to the system. This reluctance was only overcome through high level U.S. 

consideration of these issues linked to building support for an international program that 

 63 Intended to defend deployed forces, MEADS is a strategically deployable, tactically mobile system that 

can be loaded onto a C-130, can transition between march and firing mode in under 15 minutes, and can

provide 360° area defense against air-breathing threats and point defense against short-range ballistic 

missiles. In its initial operating capability, MEADS will employ the same missile as the much less mobile 

Patriot PAC-3 system, though later MEADS production blocks may use an enhanced missile. 

 71
has been virtually a decade in the making. As NATO members considered making real 

commitments to a funded AGS program in the 2001-2004 period, the U.S. came under 

enormous pressure from NATO officials and others to be more flexible on technology 

transfer issues; U.S. technology sharing was viewed as critical to the program’s future as 

it would enable the European industrial participation that was helping to build support for 

the program among reluctant European governments. Eventually, through focused U.S. 

senior leadership attention, the categories of data for which U.S. release were authorized 

expanded sufficiently to allow the program to move forward. This included an agreement 

in principle to cooperative development of the ground tracking radar—essentially an 

effort to bring together the European SOSTAR and U.S. NP-RTIP program development 

efforts. Indeed, in the roll up to the Prague Capabilities Commitments, the United States 

developed a matrix that appeared to show an overall reasonable approach, with release of 

technology in many non-controversial areas. Yet, critics point out that this approach was 

somewhat misleading in that it showed releasability in many mundane areas but 

nonetheless showed continued U.S. resistance to release of key radar technology central 

to the program, including the release of the information package on MP-RTIP. 

Subsequently, an issue arose with respect to the export of monolithic power amplifiers

(MPAs)—a key subsystem of transmit-receive modules used in advanced radar 

applications such as AGS. In this regard, in 2002, TriQuint, a small U.S. firm that 

produced the modules, had sought and obtained State Department export licenses to ship 

nearly 1,400 of the modules to the European Aerospace and Defense Systems 

Corporation (EADS) for use in space satellite applications (i.e., the TerraSar remote 

sensing radar satellite system for commercial and scientific applications). Inadvertently, 

the Triquent license request did not mention that the plan was for EADS to utilize most of

the modules on the SOSTAR radar system under development. EADS realized the error 

when the MPAs arrived in Germany, halted all work on SOSTAR, and in July 2003 

TriQuint sought USG approval to utilize many of the MPAs for the AGS development 

effort. In fact, what seemed a simple and relatively mundane request, one consistent with 

the overall U.S. policy mandate for joint radar development on AGS, rapidly turned into 

a controversial and significant dispute involving the LO/CLO Executive Committee 

described above. Ultimately, this licensing request was denied. 

In fact, the original export license for the modules had not been reviewed by the LO/CLO 

committee (apparently because the space application did not suggest that stealth and 

counter-stealth was involved). When the committee learned of this, its staff was very 

concerned and insisted on reviewing the request. Thereafter, the LO/CLO community 

raised serious concerns, apparently on the grounds that the T/R module would provide 

capability for very sensitive radar that potentially had counter-stealth qualities. In 

particular, the Office of International Technology Security in DOD/AT&L, with its focus 

on protecting the U.S. dominance in radar technology, apparently even vis-à-vis our close 

allies, became an ardent opponent of the licensing request. Other DOD components, 

including DTSA, and the State Department, took a more positive view of this request

(consistent with overall DOD policy guidance on AGS) and a considerable dispute 

ensued. Indeed, at one point, AT&L sent a team to Europe to assess the level of radar 

technology and concluded that Europe has significant capabilities and that there was little 

 72
point to withhold the MPA. Nevertheless, after consideration at senior levels, the 

licensing request was denied. 

In the deliberative process leading up to this decision, a number of options were 

considered by NATO and the United States, including: 1) revoking the USG license 

altogether, thereby denying the use of the MPAs in both space applications and AGS, and 

requiring the return of the modules (already in Germany)—an approach favored by DOD 

AT&L; 2) allowing use of the MPAs for AGS; and 3) allowing use of the U.S. MPAs 

only for the TerraSAR satellites, but not for AGS. In this third option, AGS would be 

developed with European MPAs designed by European industry, with the option of

providing U.S. MPAs later if the European development efforts are not completed on 

schedule. DOD AT&L also wanted U.S. inspectors to have significant access to 

European facilities utilizing the MPAs. When U.S. resistance to use of the MPAs for 

AGS became clear, the European industry determined that it could actually develop its 

own variant of the MPA based on work already underway by EADS, Thales and BAE 

Systems. However, this required additional non-recurring costs (raising the question of

who would pay) as well as program risk (would the development work be complete on 

schedule and provide sufficient technical performance). At NATO, there was 

considerable concern that if the development of the T/R module held up the fielding of

AGS, the NATO military committee would be reluctant to deploy forces—to put them in 

harm’s way. 

Ultimately, after considerable inter-agency and intra-DOD debate, the USG decision was 

made to allow use of the MPAs in the European TerraSAR satellites but not in AGS. 

This decision has a number of noteworthy implications. First, it highlights some difficult 

issues, both process and policy, with respect to the LO/CLO review process. From a 

process standpoint, the LO/CLO review was outside the normal export licensing review 

process—a process unto itself, non-transparent in nature, and without clear procedures 

for appeals of such judgments. Moreover, from a substantive standpoint, the LO/CLO 

community apparently has a strong policy preference in favor of maintaining U.S. 

technological dominance in radar, taking the view that such capabilities should not be 

exported even where close allies are involved, the project is a high profile one that has 

tangible U.S. policy benefits (European capability acquisition, coalition warfighting and 

strengthening of NATO), and a denial could encourage the development of foreign 

capabilities that could, over time, pose more of a proliferation threat than licensed U.S. 

capabilities. The ultimate decision to favor U.S. technology dominance or protection 

rather than coalition warfare again reflects the familiar problem that our overall security 

policies (here, in favor of AGS and collaborative development of radar on the program) 

continue to be disconnected from our technology transfer policies. The prevailing 

LO/CLO view also reflects the somewhat questionable notion that European industry 

could reverse engineer the MPA and an unwillingness to accept any risk in this area or 

trust close allies. Even if European firms had the ability to engage in this conduct, this 

basis for decision-making would essentially require denial in most export cases vis-à-vis 

close allies. 

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The case also has difficult implications for Trans-Atlantic cooperation. The European 

experience on this issue—the time required, the attitudes in the U.S. bureaucracy, and the 

need for repeated high level U.S. policy-makers intervention to resolve it– only serves to 

weaken European resolve for Transatlantic cooperation and reinforce a preference for 

developing autonomous European capabilities and avoiding reliance on U.S. technology. 

Indeed, this is precisely the result of the USG exporting licensing denial decision on 

MPAs. Ultimately, the decision was made in Europe to build the TerraSAR satellite using 

indigenously developed MPAs and T/R modules rather than rely on U.S. products or 

technology. Further, on the military side, Germany has recently conducted sea trials for a 

new class of air defense and command frigates (the F-124 SACHSEN) that have 

advanced multi-function, active phased radar and multi-beam, long range radar (the 

APAR and SMART-L 3d) made of components “wholly developed and produced in 

Europe by European companies.”64 A recent article on the program notes that these radar 

systems “are based on precisely the same components elements that U.S. technology 

transfer regimes have prohibited from sharing with U.S. allies in and through cooperative 

programs such as [MEADS] and whose transfer caused numerous problems associated 

with the European TerraSAR-X radar satellite.”

65 

The increased European reliance on indigenous capabilities that has apparently resulted 

from the U.S. denial decision on the MPAs highlights the dilemma in maintaining tight 

U.S. control in such circumstances. If, as appears to be the case, Europe could and did in 

fact replicate the U.S. capability (or a closely analogous approach), this capability would 

be, and in fact is, outside the scope of U.S. export controls. Hence, this uncontrolled 

European technology actually poses a greater and more sustained proliferation threat than 

if Europe simply acquired U.S. MPAs that were export controlled, dedicated to AGS and 

could not be used for any other purpose or re-exported or backward-engineered without 

prior authorization. 

In sum, these cases illustrate that any European participation in U.S. programs involving 

advanced sensors relating to NRF undoubtedly will face the same types of difficulties, 

including generalized resistance to release and particular concerns arising in the LO/CLO

context. Plainly, these situations need to be addressed as part of program-specific holistic 

solutions where the degree of sharing is established up front and reaffirmed, and overall 

U.S. policy on NRF-related development programs are consistent with our technology

transfer policies on such programs. 

MCTR Issues. A final set of issues relate to the application of the MCTR regime to 

missile defense capabilities, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles for various 

purposes. Under MCTR, which is designed especially to stem the proliferation of

missiles and weapons of mass destruction they might carry, the export of Category I 

articles and any design and production technology directly associated with such articles is 

subject to a strong presumption of denial. Articles covered in Category I include: 

 

 64 Defence Systems Daily (August 27, 2004). 65 Id. 

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complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles and 

sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, 

target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload 

to a range of at least 300 km as well as the specially designed "production facilities" for 

these systems.

Further, under MCTR, the transfers of such articles are only allowed to be authorized

on rare occasions and where the Government (A) obtains binding government-togovernment undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government ... 

and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put 

only to its stated end-use. 

Needless to say, this and other MCTR disciplines make the transfer of technology related 

to cruise missiles, UAVs, and missile defense systems very difficult and complex—and 

often subject to the Category I presumption of denial– even for close allies. This would 

make it very hard to provide technical information on cruise missiles or UAVs, which 

often have longer ranges, to European governments. The problem is equally troublesome 

for missile defense. As noted above, there needs to be some type of theatre missile 

defense system for the NRF and NATO forces more generally; follow-ons to current 

NATO missile studies undoubtedly will run up against this issue. 

Specifically, the MCTR makes no distinction between offensive and defensive missiles 

(focusing only on the kinematic range), which creates problems for technology transfer 

related to the development of a European theater-area missile defense system. The 

velocity that allows a theater ballistic missile interceptor like the U.S. THAADS to 

protect a wide area from medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles also 

potentially gives it a range of several hundreds of kilometers in a surface-to-surface role. 

Hence, such systems fall squarely into MTCR category I and subject to the strong 

presumption of denial, thereby making it very difficult for the United States to supply 

enabling technologies or components. 

Recognizing the complexity of these issues, the Bush Administration announced in 

December 2002 that it would conduct a six-month study of impediments to international 

cooperation on missile defense and specific issues associated with squaring missile 

defense cooperation with the MCTR. To date, however, over two years later, there has 

been no action on this issue. Moreover, while the Administration has approved certain 

technical assistance agreements for industrial cooperation on missile defense on a caseby-case basis, these have come with killer provisos that effectively block in-depth 

cooperation. 

 

In short, facilitating cooperation on missile defense, UAVs and cruise missiles, for NRF 

or to improve coalition warfare generally, will pose considerable challenges.66 In all 

 66 Issues also exist concerning UAVs under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which 

similarly does not distinguish between manned aircraft and UAVS. When UAVs were generally smaller

than manned aircraft, this was not particularly relevant. But with the advent of long-endurance UAVs, such

as Global Hawk and Predator, the case is being made in arms control circles on both sides of the Atlantic

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probability, the United States and other regime participants need to revise the MTCR

guidelines or re-interpret them in order to create more flexibility; this can be done by: 

distinguishing offensive and defensive missiles; creating an exception for force protection 

or surveillance in connection with coalition warfighting; or utilizing existing exceptions 

(i.e., there is a presumption of denial not an absolute prohibition). In any of these 

scenarios, it also would be important to create additional safeguards against proliferation 

or conversion to offensive use. Notwithstanding such safeguards, however, the overall 

risk is that such exceptions undermine the effectiveness of MTCR as an instrument of 

proliferation control and open the door to national exclusions the United States does not 

agree with. Ultimately, this is a policy issue that must be resolved at the highest levels of 

government. 

In sum, it is evident that the application of the current U.S. technology transfer and 

information sharing processes and standards would result in a dumbed down NRF with 

modest connectivity to current and future U.S. enablers and little real opportunity for 

leveraging U.S. technology for capability acquisition. Leaving the matter to normal 

bureaucratic modalities would be counterproductive to the NRF’s key goals. Thus, as

discussed below, some top down approaches, with significant leadership attention, onestop” shopping modalities, and other more flexible approaches, are needed to facilitate 

NRF interoperability and capability acquisition. 

 that such UAVs should be treated as aircraft under the terms of the treaty. Thus, to remain within the treaty 

ceiling for aircraft, the deployment of one UAV would in theory have to be matched by the withdrawal of

one combat aircraft. The weaponization of UAVs like Predator, and the development of specialized 

Unmanned Combat Aircraft (UCAVs) are likely to strengthen this argument.

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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 

As discussed at the outset, the NRF really is a microcosm of the broad range of complex 

issues facing the United States and our alliance partners in shaping a mutual security 

policy and developing and enhancing 21st century coalition warfighting capabilities. 

While this essay primarily has focused on the technology transfer and information 

sharing issues relating to standing up the NRF, the analysis herein has led to a series of

broader observations on coalition warfighting and specific recommendations concerning 

the development of the NRF set forth below.

 

A. General Observations 

1. The Need for a Robust Interoperability Agenda. The overwhelming focus by the 

United States and NATO on European capability acquisition, reflected in the DCI and the 

PCC, has effectively resulted in far less attention being paid to improving interoperability 

between U.S. and allied forces likely to operate at different levels of capability for years 

to come. While Europe may acquire some or all of the PCC capabilities, the reality is

that numerous of these acquisitions and the fielding of these capabilities will occur years 

hence, if at all. Thus, in the near-term and mid-term, the United States and its partners 

should shift focus and undertake robust and focused efforts on enhancing interoperability 

of coalition forces likely to operate at very different levels of capability for the next

decade and beyond. 

In this new era, the focus on interoperability be must be achieved through networkcentric capabilities: establishing a common architecture into which nations can plug-andplay and thereby achieve similar levels of situational awareness and other higher order 

forms of interoperability set forth in Figure 2.1 above. The reality is that, in contrast to 

the large costs associated with acquiring advanced capabilities, facilitating 

interoperability may be more cost effective; relatively small investments have potentially 

high coalition warfighting payoffs. Indeed, such solutions as bridging software to link

disparate command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems and manage 

legacy systems while new C3I systems are developed and the adoption, as appropriate, of 

commercial standards for information technology would be relatively low key and low 

cost. 

2. 21st Century Warfighting Coalitions Require Significant Advanced Planning to 

Address Interoperability Issues. While we can perhaps form “coalitions of the willing” 

for political purposes on an ad hoc basis, the reality of 21st century warfare is that we

cannot do likewise in true military coalitions. If the analysis above shows anything, it is 

that 21st century coalition warfare is not like a pick up game of basketball at the gym, 

where we choose sides on a given day and fight together, working out the roles and 

relationships as the game progresses. Particularly with the emergence of network-centric 

warfare, it will take years of planning, information sharing, developing interoperability

bridges and shaping plug-and-play architecture to develop true coalition war fare 

capabilities. Experience in the commercial business environment has consistently shown 

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that disparate networks cannot be integrated smoothly without extensive prior planning 

and agreement on the sharing of network and database architectural and structural 

information. Network-centric warfare, which is in essence an attempt to superimpose 

distributed commercial business processes on war, will take place in a much more 

demanding environment. 

 

Yet, today, there is a marked disconnect between U.S. and European rhetorical support 

for interoperability and our lack of actions, in NATO or otherwise, to support it. Indeed, 

the cumulative thrust of current U.S. policies and programs, including the lack of foreign 

participation in U.S. C4ISR development programs and the U.S. refusal to share a range 

of key enabling information with even our close allies, undermines, rather than facilitates, 

interoperability.67 Thus, on these current trajectories, we truly are headed toward a 

dumbed down NRF with second best coalition warfighting capabilities where U.S. allies 

will have markedly less capable situational awareness and face greater risks in fielding 

forces. A key question is whether any country would be willing to put its forces at risk in 

these circumstances in 21st century high-intensity encounters. 

Moreover, with U.S. C4ISR capabilities advancing rapidly through accelerated 

investment in transformational technologies, the interoperability gap between fielded 

U.S. systems and European systems is likely to increase, not improve, in the years to 

come. As U.S. forces become more joint and move to our future architecture for C4ISR 

and we continue to limit release of or access to these new modalities, ad hoc attempts at 

integration of the NRF will be much more difficult and the degree of “dumbness” is 

likely to increase. The United States cannot, however, shoulder all the responsibility for 

this situation. European under investment in defense, slow recognition of the revolution 

in military affairs, and lack of focus on interoperability in their own programs and 

priorities also are partly responsible for current circumstances. 

Thus, both the United States and Europe must decide whether and to what extent we 

really want to develop truly interoperable coalition warfighting. If we do want true 

coalition warfighting capabilities, we need to give higher priority and more focus to the 

interoperability issues highlighted herein. 

3. The Critical Technology Transfer Needs for NRF Relate to Interoperability and 

Long Term Capability Acquisition. The reality is that, for the most part, the early 

phases of the NRF (I and II) can be stood up without significant U.S. technology transfer 

(and minimal technology transfer issues) regarding capability acquisition. The capability 

needs can be met by existing European capabilities and from European industry without 

 67 While there is in fact an Office of Interoperability within OSD, its principal mandate is to facilitate 

interoperability between and within the U.S. military services in order to implement the U.S. vision of

network-centric warfare. Interoperability with allied forces in a coalition environment is a decidedly 

secondary consideration to which limited attention has been given to date. The general philosophy of the

Office of Interoperability appears to be a reliance on commercially driven standards to force convergence 

among the various C4ISR systems under development in the U.S. and abroad, with the assumption that any

U.S. network architecture that includes the majority of commercial standard interfaces will facilitate 

“automatic” interoperability—though of course, the experience of the commercial market demonstrates that 

such standards-based interoperability can be illusory. 

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significant U.S. technology transfer. The key needs for technology, and where the 

significant issues arise, are twofold: 

• Information sharing (and release under U.S. NDP and the ITAR licensing process 

for unclassified items) is critical to ensure NRF interoperability in NRF phases II

(using current U.S. enablers) and III (linking the NRF to U.S. network-centric 

capabilities under development). 

• The long-term goal of European capability acquisition for NRF phase III (which 

would enable the NRF to utilize European enablers) would substantially benefit 

from U.S. technology transfer. 

 

 

B. NRF Recommendations 

1. Develop A Long-Term Force NRF Force Planning Roadmap to Explicitly Link 

Force Development to Transformation, Capability Acquisition and Interoperability. 

As a key goal of the NRF is to move toward a transformational force with European 

enablers and incentivize European capability acquisition, it is not enough that the NRF 

simply integrates new capability as it comes on line or iteratively change its certification 

requirements to reflect such new capabilities. Rather, NATO should develop an NRF 

force planning roadmap that makes this linkage between the NRF and 

transformation/capability acquisition explicit: 

a. Mission-Oriented Planning. The roadmap should evaluate potential NRF missions 

and seek to ensure that the NRF evolves into a transformational objective force 

with cutting edge capabilities and inter-operability; it should be updated from

time to time to reflect changing missions, operational lessons learned and the 

evolution of technology and capabilities. 

b. NATO plug-and-play Architecture for C4ISR. The roadmap should include the 

development of a C3ISR architecture for NRF that builds on existing NATO

building blocks like MIDS and CAESAR and develops a NATO infrastructure 

that can be complemented with plug-and-play national sensors and other assets, 

including a NATO-owned and operated AGS. The roadmap should consider but 

not be limited to the Prague capability commitments. A plug-and-play NATO 

architecture will facilitate interoperability and allow more controlled information 

sharing. The United States undoubtedly would be more comfortable sharing data 

outputs from its current and future enablers through a NATO architecture in 

which NATO participants in NRF can plug and play as they participate in 

rotations; this would allow some greater degree of protection of sensitive U.S. 

data and can also establish NATO as a fulcrum for true coalition force 

interoperability (not only the keeper of standards). 

c. NATO Acquisition of Certain Equipment. NATO should consider the merits of 

acquiring the modest types of equipment or capabilities recommended for NRF 

Phase I above, including tactical radios, battle command information systems, 

data link terminals, and combat ID systems. This would facilitate cost sharing 

and the availability of this equipment for all NRF rotations. In some cases (e.g., 

advanced night vision equipment), NATO acquisition and retention, with “loan 

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outs” as needed to national forces, may ease technology transfer issues associated 

with the export of this equipment. 

2. U.S. Steps to Facilitate NRF and Allied Interoperability. If the United States 

decides it is serious about coalition warfare and following through on its rhetorical 

commitment to interoperability, we must consider taking a series of concrete steps 

regarding the NRF and beyond: 

a. Provide Robust Enablers to the NRF; Stand Up DOD-Wide NRF Interoperability 

Planning Effort. The United States must decide on what enablers it will provide 

the NRF. Should the United States deny European partners access to our best 

enablers and not share the outputs of this advanced technology in real time? To 

do so would commit coalition partners to fighting with a second best capability—

the antithesis of what the NRF is supposed to be. Thus, we should seriously 

consider making advanced U.S. assets and their outputs available during NRF 

Phase II. In all events, to address this issue, the United States should stand up a 

DOD-wide effort, possibly centered in the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics68, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, focused on what enablers can be made available and 

how to make such U.S. enablers, both those existing and on the drawing board, 

interoperable so as to ensure NRF force best available situational awareness etc. 

This effort would include a focus on operational interoperability today and future 

issues associated with new U.S. architectures and other C4ISR programs coming 

on line. These efforts coming on languages cover effort would form the baseline 

for the establishment of a holistic, overall NDP approach for NRF (see below) on 

what access to networks to provide, what sensor output to provide, and so on. 

b. European Participation in Advanced Warfighting Experiments. The United States 

should establish advanced experiments with NRF rotations in the six months prior 

to their certification, focusing on identifying interoperability problems and needs. 

For example, these experiments should seek to utilize such U.S. assets as JSTARS 

and Global Hawk with European ground capabilities. Broader European 

participation in other existing U.S. warfighting experiments conducted by JTC 

also should be considered. 

c. Cooperative Programs Focused on Interoperability. The United States should 

consider joint programs or foreign participation in key U.S. enabling programs on 

network-centric warfare in order to facilitate interoperability; all existing U.S. 

programs with respect to secure communications, CROP, etc. should be 

considered from this standpoint as well as any new ones that are stood up. This 

would require a sea change in mindset that places a higher priority on coalition 

warfighting in program development. Such program areas as blue force tracking, 

where no optimal solutions currently exist, and CROP are possible candidates for 

 68 The Office of International Programs within USD (AT&L) technically has the mandate to oversee the 

Coalition Warfare Initiative, which is intended to promote joint development of systems to facilitate 

coalition warfare capabilities. However, the initiative lacks focus and has only been funded to the order of

$6–7 million annually. 

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these types of efforts. Also the U.S. should expand its ACTD program to include 

more emphasis on interoperability solutions. 

C. Steps to Improved Technology Transfer and Information Sharing 

Finally, recognizing the centrality of U.S. export control reform to facilitating the 

development of the NRF as a transformational vanguard expeditionary force, the United

States should consider a number of critical export control steps. As discussed above, the 

issues here run deep and there are no quick “silver bullet” solutions. But a number of 

steps can be taken to effectuate change with coalition warfighting in mind: 

1. One-Stop U.S. Disclosure Decision-Making for NRF Interoperability Needs. 

Once DOD develops a full out interoperability plan (as recommended above), DOD 

should stand up an inter-agency group that would be tasked with establishing a single, 

wholesale disclosure policy for the NRF that allows accessibility to networks and 

release of technical data needed for the NRF to meet its interoperability goals. This 

would replace piecemeal decisions on data for each rotation and each country, and 

allow joint training. These decisions can be for NRF purposes only so that individual 

participating nations cannot utilize such access on a broader basis. As noted above, 

the development of a NATO architecture for NRF and NATO more broadly, into 

which nations can plug and play and gain needed access, would make U.S. decisions 

easier and facilitate limiting recipient nations from access outside of the NRF context. 

The U.S. can also build into appropriate software bridges and access rights inherent 

technical limitations that allow it to deny access in exigencies or limit access for nonNRF purposes. In standing up a NDP inter-agency group to focus on the NRF, the 

group should be given the following senior policy guidance: 

a. Coalition warfare and inter-operability are strong U.S. priorities, and the 

presumption should be in favor of disclosure to promote these goals even if 

release exceeds current standards or if no standards exist. 

b. Disclosure decisions for current and future U.S. release pertaining to current and 

future U.S. enablers of network-centric warfare would be made up front for NRF 

purposes and would not await the development of an exigency or need to commit 

the NRF to conflict. 

c. Disclosure would be made to nations within the NATO framework and for NRF 

purposes only. The United States would negotiate a multi-lateral agreement with 

NATO and its members to facilitate NDP release for NRF purposes which would 

embody appropriate safeguards and commitments to protect the security of

released data. 

d. The distinctions, if any, between release policies for different NRF countries 

would be the minimal required, every effort should be used to release to all NRF 

participants subject to appropriate safeguards (on re-export or security), and 

specific justifications would be required to justify why release would not be 

permitted subject to safeguards; the approach should not result in least-commondenominator disclosure solutions. 

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e. NRF release decisions would be exempt from review through the LO/CLO and 

Anti-Tamper processes except that the findings of such bodies, as needed, would 

be taken into account in shaping appropriate safeguards. 

f. Any decisions not to release would be subject to full review by the NDP

Committee. 

2. Afford Higher Priority to Coalition Warfare Benefits in Technology Transfer 

Decision-Making. While coalition warfighting benefits is a legally permissible 

factor today in arms export and technology transfer decision making under the Arms

Export Control Act relating to unclassified technology, it is in practice afforded a 

lower priority than maintaining national capability leadership. Hence, where the 

release of technology or export of capability would have tangible coalition benefits 

for NRF, the presumption should be in favor of release unless the recipient’s third 

country policies on re-export can be shown to provide undue risk of disclosure to 

third parties.

3. Allow Release of Key Technologies and Information. DOD should seriously 

consider the release of technology and the sharing of technical information (network 

access, software bridges, etc.) with respect to the following set of set of equipment 

and programs for NRF purposes (provided that recipients have sufficiently developed 

export control systems, and controls on third party transfers, to warrant such release):

a. Capabilities Related 

i. Night vision up to current U.S. figure of merit 

ii. Programs for foreign participation 

1. MC2A 

2. MMA/BAMS 

3. Missile Defense 

4. Small Diameter Bomb

5. FCS Manned and Unmanned Ground Vehicles 

b. Interoperability Related: Early emphasis has to be put upon combat 

identification, expanding into enhanced situational awareness systems 

such as SIAP, SGIP and CROP. That in turn will necessitate a higher 

degree of interoperability in tactical communications, combat 

information systems, network architectures, and battle command systems. 

In short, real interoperability requires the United States to accept an 

unprecedented degree of release of command and control technology 

and information sharing. 

 4. One-Stop Technology Transfer Review; Exempt NRF Needs From LO/CLO 

and Anti-Tamper Review. In the long term, the United States should develop a 

more systemic solution that eliminates the current problem of multiple, fragmented 

technology transfer reviews by different entities/agencies. As important as LO/CLO 

technologies are, it makes little sense today to have separate, stand alone technology 

transfer regimes for this and other sensitive areas. The same is true for anti-tamper 

review, which started as a vehicle to facilitate release and has morphed into a reason 

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to deny release. Thus, one-stop shopping should be established for all technology 

transfer (including disclosure, LO/CLO and the like) under the administration of 

DTSA and pursuant to the legal standards set forth in the AECA. Such processes as 

LO/CLO, national disclosure and anti-tamper should come under single leadership 

and one set of parameters (with inputs, of course, from relevant Pentagon 

communities). This ensures uniformity of policy and balanced, reasonable decisionmaking by the Pentagon bureaucracy established for this purpose. 

In the short-term, however, it would be an appropriate solution to exempt NRF 

specific needs from these separate review mechanisms on the ground that coalition 

warfighting benefits should be afforded higher priority than these other 

considerations. 

5. Early Technology Transfer Plans for Armaments Programs that Contribute to 

NRF. Recognizing the problems of past cooperative programs and the divorce 

between technology transfer and armaments cooperation policy, the Administration 

should require that an up-front technology transfer plan be approved before the start 

of any major cooperative armaments development program relating to NRF or NATO 

interoperability more generally and should require the approval of a more detailed 

plan (once requirements are more defined) early in its program life. All major DOD

components with equities should be required to sign up to such a plan and be bound 

by it (even across Administrations). For any new programs linked to or with tangible 

benefits for NRF, the Bush Administration should commit to a time line for expedited 

development of such plans. 

6. Industry Should Come Forward With Proposals for Cooperation on NRF Using 

the Broad Licenses Established Under DTSI. Where the program is consistent with

NRF objectives, the U.S. Government should encourage such proposals and act to 

facilitate them. To facilitate this approach, DTC should offer a modified template for 

the GPA and similar licenses based on the JSF experience which: 

• Addresses outstanding liability issues, 

• Limits the compliance burdens of firms participating in return for an 

agreement to an audit rather than a directive approach to compliance, and

• Promises to avoid the multiple license exclusions and exceptions that limit the 

effectiveness of the JSF license. 

In sum, the heart of the issue concerning the NRF and technology transfer is whether and 

to what extent the United States is committed to coalition warfighting (whether in the

NRF or otherwise) as a real means of ensuring U.S. security in the 21st century. If 

coalition warfighting with close allies is a core element of our national security strategy, 

we should seriously consider the steps set forth herein. 

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Appendix 

Critical Enabling Technologies and Key U.S. Programs 

This appendix provides a detailed analysis of the specific types of technology or technical 

information sharing relevant to the NRF’s development in each specific capability and 

interoperability area, organized by NRF implementation phase. 

I. Phase I: Secure Tactical Communications and Blue Force Tracking

A. Secure Tactical Communications 

The standard U.S. tactical radio, by which all others are presently measured, is the 

Single-Channel Ground-and-Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), a spread-spectrum, 

frequency-hopping voice and data VHF radio which has replaced a wide range of older 

radios for short-range air-ground and ground-ground communications.69 In contrast to 

older radios, which operated on fixed frequency, SINCGARS transmits over a broad 

frequency band, breaking up messages into small packets that are transmitted over 

different frequencies and reassembled at the receiving end. This reduces the ability of the 

enemy to locate the transmitter by triangulation and makes interception of messages 

almost impossible under tactical conditions. 

While some other countries have either purchased SINCGARS for their own forces, or 

developed and deployed SINCGARS-compatible radios, many, even with Western 

Europe, continue to use fixed-frequency single-channel radios, making interoperability 

with U.S. forces a difficult and time-consuming process. As the Army’s FM 100-32 

states: 

(1) Planning for the SOI must include factors such as types of radios available in 

subordinate or allied units, cryptographic equipment, key lists, and frequency 

allocations available from the host nation(s) for the particular area of operation. 

(2) Equipment compatibility is a major issue in network planning for HF and 

VHF systems. The planning must cover FH and single-channel modes of 

operation. All U.S. forces use SINCGARS compatible radios, but allied nations 

 69 SINCGARS is the primary means for short-range (less than 35 kilometers (22 miles)) secure voice C2 

below division level. It is also the secondary means for combat support (CS) and combat service support 

(CSS) units throughout the corps. SINCGARS, like the current VHF-FM radios, is user-owned and –

operated. SINCGARS can provide access to the area common-user (ACU) network through the Net Radio 

Interface (NRI) System, or its range can be increased by retransmission. Data and facsimile transmission 

capabilities are available to tactical commanders through simple connections with various data terminal 

equipment (DTE). Until the ADDS fielding is complete, SINCGARS will, on a limited basis, fulfill the 

data transmission requirements. However, avoid this when possible because voice has priority on the 

system. FM 11-32, Combat Net Radio Operations, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 15

October 1990. 

 84
may not have compatible FH radios. Therefore, plans should address interface 

between single-channel and FH radios or lateral placement of compatible radios 

in allied command posts (CPs). SINCGARS requires special key list variables to 

operate in the FH mode. These variables are developed and distributed from the 

highest level possible (usually the J6), but they may be developed at a lower level 

for special operations within the theater.70

In practice, this has meant the distribution of SINCGARS transceivers to critical allied

C3 nodes and the erection of bridges between the SINCGARS net and equivalent Allied 

fixed-frequency systems.71 In the worst case, messages have had to be manually 

retransmitted, with inherent time delays and errors. Moreover, many Allied fixedfrequency systems are capable of either voice or data transmission, but not both, leading 

to additional duplication of equipment and networks. 

Existing U.S. command and control systems are designed to accept input from

SINCGARS or compatible systems; thus, interfacing directly with U.S. battle command 

networks requires SINCGARS compatibility. At present, few U.S. allies have this 

capability, which limits their interoperability with U.S. forces. This has become a major 

consideration in coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where coalition partners 

have had to resort to ad hoc measures to achieve even minimum interoperability. The 

British Army, for instance, has been ordering Harris PRC-117 Falcon tactical radios for 

its forces, bypassing its normal procurement system.

72 Harris has delivered Falcon II 

radios to Macedonia, Norway and several other European countries as a means of 

providing SINCGARS interoperability. On the other hand, Thales Group has 

successfully marketed its non-SINCGARS-compatible RITA 2000 spread-spectrum radio 

to the French and other European armies, creating a competing installed base73. Patches 

could be devised if necessary, but it would be a costly, time-consuming and suboptimal 

solution.

However, whatever progress has been made to provide interoperable tactical 

communications will soon be rendered moot when the U.S. begins deployment of the 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), a new multi-mode, multifrequency voice/data 

network radio that will replace SINCGARS and several other radio systems in U.S. 

forces.74 The first software-defined radio (SDR), in which waveforms and frequencies 

are generated not by fixed firmware but by programmable software, JTRS is capable of 

 70 FM 11-32, op. cit., Chapter 2, Sec. 2-1. 71 And, conversely, that the U.S. has had to acquire foreign tactical radios to ensure interoperability with

other forces. Thus, the USMC acquired 5000 Bowman tactical radio sets to ensure interoperability with

British army forces operating in southern Iraq. See Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, UK

Ministry of Defense, December 2003. 72 “Harris Corporation Rapidly Deploys Falcon II Digital Radios to UK Ministry of Defense”, Harris

Corporation Press Release, 22 October 2002. 73 “Thales Communications at IDEX 2003”, Thales Group, Paris, 2003. 74 As an interim solution to the need for increased digital bandwith at the tactical level, the U.S. military is

fielding the ITT Mercury Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR) to support the development of the “tactical 

internet”, thus creating a more complex interoperability problem within its own joint operating 

environment.

 85
transmitting not just in VHF, but also UHF, HF and SHF. It can thus be used for shortrange line-of-sight, for long-range non-line-of-sight, and for satellite communications

simply by selecting different programs. Data security is enhanced through built-in 

cryptographic capabilities. New waveforms and data compression software also allow 

JTRS to exceed SINCGAR’s 16 kilobit per second (kpbs) limit for data communications, 

a critical capability given the increasing demand for broadband data transmission in battle 

command applications. JTRS will be able to emulate SINCGARS waveforms, but in so 

doing it is bound by the limits of the SINCGARS system.

75

Recognizing the need for greater throughput and networking flexibility, other countries 

are developing a new generation of tactical network radios, of which the most prominent 

is the British Bowman system. However, Bowman is not a software-defined radio, which 

means it lacks the inherent flexibility of JTRS, and efforts at developing an 

interoperability patch have focused on having JTRS emulate Bowman waveforms and 

data formats.76

Other European countries are working to develop their own software defined radio 

systems, but are beginning far behind the U.S. development curve, despite the fact that 

many of their programs date back to an abortive Future Multiband, Multiwaveform

Modular Tactical Radio initiative in which France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and 

the United States would attempt to leverage the USAF’s experimental Speakeasy SDR77

into a common tactical radio for all four countries. After a promising start, the initiative 

broke down and each country began pursuing its own national programs. 

Despite that failure, several countries now have SDR programs in place, including: 

• Finland, where an SDR demonstrator is being developed for the Finnish MoD 

based on Spectrum Signal Processing’s SDR-3000 system (also being examined 

by Sweden, Korea and Japan). 

• Sweden, where the MoD has issued an RFP for a SDR Tactical Data Radio 

(TDR). 

• France, where the Multi-Band, Multi-Mode Radio Demonstrator has proven the 

feasibility of software defined radio, and a Poste Radio Programmable (PR2) is 

 75 To use a common computer analogy, a USB-2 connection is “backward compatible” with a USB-1 link,

but when a USB-2 device is connected to a USB-1 link, data moves at the much lower USB-1 rate. 76 The BOWMAN project is designed to provide a new tactical, secure voice and data communications 

system with greater functionality and wider interoperability capabilities for the British Army, Navy and 

Royal Air Force from 2005 through 2026. Its target in-service date, when a brigade headquarters and two 

mechanized battalions will be equipped, is March 2004. Earlier, the Personal Role Radio, a short-range 

non-secure section radio, was separated from BOWMAN and formally accepted into service in January 

2002. Under BOWMAN, about 48,000 radios and 26,000 computer terminals will be supplied, in addition

to approximately 45,000 Personal Role Radios. A U.S./UK team is pursuing an interoperability 

demonstration between JTRS and BOWMAN. See: “Will Software Radio Become Real—and When?”

COTS Journal, January 2004. 77 The linear predecessor of JTRS. See “Future Multiband, Multiwaveform Modular Tactical Radio 

(FM3TR).” Available online at: <http://mccoy/ucsf.edu/emondi/Public/FM3TR/FM3TR_Summary.html>. 

 86
being developed to replace legacy systems (Germany will probably become a codeveloper of the latter).78

It should be noted that in the case of all three European programs that commercially 

developed dual-use technologies have been integrated into the respective systems, in 

some cases leapfrogging the U.S. technical advantage. However, merely the 

development of an SDR radio will not ensure interoperability with U.S. forces since each 

SDR would still use unique, proprietary waveforms and encryption methods. While the 

software basis of the new radios would make interoperability updates easier from a 

hardware perspective (there would be no need to replace internal processors, crystals or

modulators), developing a common software set would take considerable time and a 

degree of cooperation not yet demonstrated by the United States.79 Until standards and 

protocols are adopted for waveforms, frequency hopping, data formatting and encryption, 

even the deployment of SDRs by U.S. allies will not ensure real interoperability. 

B. Fratricide Avoidance (Blue Force Tracking) 

Throughout history, fratricide, or friendly fire, has typically accounted for 10 percent or 

more of all battle casualties.80 With the decrease in overall casualties from enemy fire, 

the percentage of friendly fire casualties is certain to increase. In Operation Desert 

Storm, it accounted for some 24 percent of total coalition casualties. The number of 

friendly fire casualties has risen considerably as the power of modern weapons has 

increased.81 In the past, friendly fire casualties were mainly the result of the inaccuracy

of weapons such as bombs and artillery. Today, they are the result of their dramatically 

improved accuracy: what can be seen can be hit and destroyed; ergo, the absolute 

importance of knowing with great precision and confidence the location of all friendly 

forces. In multinational operations, fratricide avoidance has deeper geopolitical

overtones: friendly fire inflicted on one’s own troops can be politically embarrassing on 

a domestic level, but friendly fire affecting allied troops can undermine the foundations 

of a coalition and place strategic war objectives in jeopardy (e.g., the deaths of four 

Canadian troops from a U.S. bomb in Afghanistan). 

Network-centric warfare inherently demands a high level of confidence in blue force 

locations, since the network-centric force is highly dispersed and seeks to control rather 

than occupy territory. Network-centric forces self-synchronize and move rapidly to 

exploit the fleeting opportunities created by the information dominance that the network 

provides to its subscribers. If reliable blue force tracking cannot be provided, then 

 78 “Will Software Radio Become Real—and When?”, COTS Journal, January 2004. 79 The U.S. presently has an MOU in place with Japan for the development of SDR technology, and is in

discussions with Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, and 

Turkey, but these discussions have not yet passed beyond the preliminary phases. See “Will Software 

Radio Become Real”, op. cit. 80 Recent estimates for the Battle of Cassino in Italy in 1944-45 put friendly fire casualties as high as 33% 

of the total, due mainly to misdirected artillery fire. 81 In one noteworthy incident in Normandy in August 1944, some 600 American troops (including LTG 

Lesley J. McNair, Commander of U.S. Army Ground Forces) were killed when an aerial bombardment by

the VIII Air Force fell short of the German lines. 

 87
commanders must fall back upon more traditional means of controlling and locating their 

forces, such as phase lines, fixed unit boundaries and areas of operations, bomb lines, 

forward observer lines, and rigid timetables. But these control measures by their very 

nature defeat the purpose of network-centric warfare. Blue force tracking is therefore a 

necessary precondition for the implementation of network-centric warfare, before any 

other criteria are met. 

The United States and other countries have been trying to solve the fratricide problem

since before the Operation Desert Storm, though the high proportion of friendly fire 

casualties gave added impetus to their efforts. Several different approaches have been 

tried to date, none of which has proven entirely successful to date. Among these are: 

• Transponder-Based Systems 

• RF Triangulation Systems 

• Non-Cooperative Target Recognition

Transponder-based systems employ for ground forces the same principles used in 

airborne Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) systems first developed in World War II: a 

coded radio signal interrogates unidentified vehicles or personnel, triggering a radio 

transponder that transmits a response positively identifying the vehicles or personnel as

friendly. Alternatively, the transponder can be set to ping at predetermined intervals 

without interrogation, to provide constant updates of blue force locations. Additional 

information can also be included in the signal, such as unit designation, location, 

direction of travel, and even unit status; the proliferation of GPS devices makes accurate 

positioning very easy, in theory. Transponder systems have several disadvantages. RF

signals cannot penetrate through certain types of terrain and have propagation problems

in built-up areas. Signals can be intercepted by the enemy forces, and transponders can 

even be spoofed into broadcasting for enemy direction-finding equipment. All of these 

difficulties can be reduced by technology, but not eliminated entirely, to the point where 

one has a very high level of confidence. All of the problems inherent in IFF are also 

present in transponder-based blue-force tracking. 

RF triangulation uses two or more receiving stations to determine the bearing of a blue

force transmitter, using triangulation techniques to pinpoint the location. This system is 

used on instrumented ranges for both air and ground training (i.e., the Army’s National 

Training Center at Ft. Irwin, CA), in which it is possible to position direction finders with 

the best possible lines of sight. This is not possible for ground units moving into 

unsurveyed and hostile terrain. Triangulation therefore combines most of the 

disadvantages of transponder systems with the additional problem of getting a good fix 

on signals. With the advent of GPS, the locational value of triangulation is greatly 

diminished. 

Finally, there is Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR), once seen as the “Great

White Hope” of fratricide avoidance: vehicles, aircraft and other targets would be 

detected and classified by remote sensing systems (optical, passive RF, active RF, etc.) 

and classified by type based upon Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) 

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techniques. This approach has even been applied with some success in fighter and 

AWACS aircraft, but it has never been used for tracking ground forces.82 It had potential 

when the U.S. and its allies faced a discrete adversary whose forces were relatively 

homogeneous and used equipment radically different from that of the U.S. and its allies; 

i.e., the signature of a U.S. M1 Abrams tank is quite different from that of a Russian T-80 

or T-90 tank. However, with the fall of the USSR, the U.S. finds itself involved in 

coalition warfare with allies whose equipment is similar, if not identical to that used by

the enemy. Attempted implementation of NCTR also revealed other practical difficulties, 

such as the need to correlate tracks from multiple sensors, the fusion of diverse signature 

and measurement data from different types of sensors, and the development of reliable 

discrimination algorithms capable of working in near-real time. As a result, expectations 

for NCTR have been greatly reduced, though considerable amounts of research are still 

being performed with other applications in mind (i.e., Red Force Tracking, ISR, target

acquisition).

In response to the friendly fire incidents of Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Army

acquired infrared beacons for its armored vehicles. Intended to provide a distinctive 

visual signature on the FLIR sensors of U.S. combat aircraft and helicopters, as well as

the thermal sights of U.S. tanks and fighting vehicles, it was useful only at night and in 

good visibility. Sandstorms, fog, precipitation and smoke all greatly degraded its 

effectiveness. In its place, the U.S. sought a practical, all-weather, near-term solution. 

The near-term solution was the Battlefield Combat ID System (BCIS), a millimeterwave, interrogation (Q&A)-based millimeter wave (Ka-band) transponder system with a 

range of 150-1500 meters. Fully compliant with NATO STANAG 457983, BCIS is

triggered when the targeting platform (whether airborne or ground) interrogates the 

potential target. An IFF display in the targeting platform then indicates whether the 

target is friendly or hostile. However, BCIS is useful only when forces are within direct 

line of sight of potential adversaries. It does not work for units beyond line of sight, nor 

does it report unit positions and status to the battle command network. Thus, BCIS is of 

limited utility for network-centric operations in which commanders need to know the 

actual positions of all units in near-real time. 

Thus United States is now developing the Blue Force Tracking System (BFTS), which 

has been integrated into the Future Battle Command-Brigade and Below (FBCB2)

command and control system. Essentially a transponder-based system, the BFTS is 

mounted on tanks, personnel carriers and other combat vehicles. Using GPS to derive 

accurate position data, the system reports either on an interrogation or timed response 

basis, using spread-spectrum, low-probability of intercept signals. During Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, some 1200 systems were installed on U.S. Army, Marine Corps and 

British army vehicles. Due to cost, however, the system could generally be installed only 

on one or two vehicles per company. Performance in combat was reasonably good, given 

 82 However, this is of limited value when both friend and enemy fly the same types of aircraft. 83 STANAG 4579 establishes standard frequency bands and waveforms for use in combat identification/IFF 

systems such as BCIS or the French BIFF. This creates the potential for interoperability, but does not 

ensure it, unless the same encryption, data formats and interrogation techniques are employed. 

 89
that terrain conditions in Iraq were ideal for the use of transponders. Despite this, there 

were still friendly fire incidents, and the Coalition command apparently did not have 

sufficient confidence in the system to mix U.S. and British forces in the same battlespace. 

A serious long-term objection to the direction of the BFTS is the size and weight of the 

system, which can only be installed on vehicles. Given that much of future U.S. and 

coalition operations are likely to feature dismounted combat in urban areas (i.e., Najaf 

and Faluja), the United States and its allies will need a smaller, lighter, less costly and 

man-wearable device to show the location of each individual soldier in a dismounted 

squad or platoon. Apparently such a system is under development by U.S. Army Soldier 

Systems Command as part of the Land Warrior XXI program. 

European countries seem to be following suit. Britain, as noted, has leased the BFTS for 

its forces deployed in Iraq. France, for its part, is developing a system called Battlefield 

Identification, Friend or Foe (BIFF), which has been incorporated into France’s LeClerc 

Battlefield Management System (LBMS). STANAG 4579-compliant, BIFF-equipped 

vehicles can interrogate potential targets, while individual vehicles can independently 

declare themselves friendly by transmitting the BIFF code. It is thus much closer in 

concept to BCIS than to BFTS, in that it does not have the capacity to capture 

automatically and display all blue force positions in a combat information system. 

In March 2000, Thales Group received $36.9 million for the development and production 

of the first 1500 BIFF units, toward a total requirement for 5400 units. Assuming it is 

successful, BIFF will likely be adopted by the German Bundeswehr. However, BIFF has 

the same shortcomings as BCIS, and does not meet the requirement for true blue force 

tracking. 

Ultimately, it would appear that the solution to the blue force tracking lies in the synergy 

of several different methods, including GPS-based vehicle tracking (possibly using 

satellite communications to transcend line-of-sight restrictions), interrogator-based 

systems, and non-cooperative identification methods, with data from all sources 

correlated and fused as part of the Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP). Blue 

force tracking cannot therefore be solved until solutions have been reached for the Single 

Integrated Air Picture and the Single Integrated Ground Picture. 

Phase II: Single Integrated Air Picture, Single Integrated Ground Picture, 

and CROP 

A. Single Integrated Air Picture 

Airspace management and integrated air defense are among the most complex tasks 

facing the modern theater commander. With thousands of friendly, hostile and neutral 

aircraft occupying the same airspace, at altitudes from nap-of-the-earth to 70,000 feet, 

and with targets moving as fast as twice the speed of sound, the seemingly simple task of 

keeping track of aircraft, deconflicting them to prevent collisions, directing friendly 

aircraft toward their targets and intercepting hostile aircraft is actually beyond the ability 

 90
of a human being to accomplish manually. Indeed, just maintaining adequate situational 

awareness to make correct operational and tactical decisions is increasingly problematic. 

In civil aviation, automated systems provide air traffic controllers with digitized displays. 

Yet even in this relatively benign environment, with aircraft flying at predictable speeds 

along well-defined corridors, and with transponders providing the air traffic control 

system with the identification, course and speed of all aircraft, air traffic controllers are 

hard-pressed to avoid data overload. The military airspace environment is much more 

complex and hostile. Enemy aircraft do not identify themselves, fly evasive routes, use 

jamming to degrade sensor performance. Low observable technology reduces the 

detection range of radar, and weapons are used to suppress the airspace management 

system by attacking its constituent radars stations. In addition to aircraft, the airspace 

management system must track incoming and outgoing missiles, and also correlate the 

airspace picture to the tactical situation on the ground. 

At present, military airspace management in an expeditionary force such as the NRF 

tends to be centralized: a relative handful of ground-based radars cover specific, 

minimally-overlapping sectors, with air traffic control directed from a central Combined 

Air Operations Center (CAOC)84 in which several controllers are linked directly to a 

specific radar. If an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is available, the 

CAOC can offload some of the airspace management tasks to the onboard controllers, 

while receiving a mirror air picture via data link (generally Link 16 JTIDS/MIDS). The 

CAOC and AWACS coordinate the movements of friendly aircraft, ensure that they stay 

within predesignated safe corridors, do not attack friendly ground forces, and vector them

toward hostile air tracks. 

In addition, the CAOC is responsible for coordinating ground-based air and missile 

defense. In practice, this means that the CAOC will cue individual air defense batteries

to the approach of a threat (aircraft or missile), so that the battery can engage at the 

earliest opportunity. However, at present, each air defense battery is a stand-alone unit, 

with a single sensor feeding tracking and fire control data to a single battery command 

post (BCP), which in turn controls guns and/or missile launchers tied directly to that 

BCP. The CAOC and battalion tactical operations center (TOC) are not directly involved 

in the engagement of targets, except to provide authorization to fire under certain rules of 

engagement. 

This approach worked reasonably well in the 1960s, but is woefully inadequate in the

current threat environment. The four main issues facing conventional airspace 

management and air defense are: 

1. Saturation 

2. Terrain Intervisibility 

3. Active and Passive Countermeasures 

 84 A TAOC is used at the brigade and divisional echelons; corps and echelons above corps (EAC) employ a 

“Combined Air Operations Center” or CAOC, which performs many of the same function plus higher-level

campaign planning and coordination. 

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4. Critical Node Failure 

Saturation is accomplished when the enemy pushes an air attack on a narrow sector so as 

to exceed the capability of the radar, the airspace management system or the air defense 

system to cope with all the potential targets. The number of targets can be artificially 

enhanced with the use of decoy drones and electronic countermeasures, and more 

recently, through the use of tactical standoff missiles (TASMs).85 Some of the incoming 

aircraft and missiles may be engaged and destroyed, but others will be missed in the 

clutter, and more will simply get a free ride because the system lacks the capacity to 

engage them all. 

Terrain intervisibility refers to the blocking effect of hills, trees and other terrain that 

creates “dead ground” in which aircraft are invisible to line-of-sight sensors. Aircraft can 

use this ground to mask their approach to a target area.86 AWACS can eliminate some, 

but not all dead ground; but its performance tends to be degraded when trying to track 

aircraft in clutter close to the ground. In the past, the difficulty of low-level, high-speed 

navigation made exploitation of terrain intervisibility a difficult and risky proposition (the 

proliferation of small-caliber air defense artillery in particular caused the loss of many 

more aircraft than the more glamorous surface-to-air missile). Thus, the United States 

and most of its allies have abandoned this method of attack in favor of using precisionguided munitions delivered from medium-to-high altitude, relying on a combination of 

stealth, electronic warfare, and defense suppression to neutralize enemy air defenses. 

Smaller, less well-endowed air forces cannot afford this costly, high-overhead tactic,87

and so continue to practice low-altitude, terrain masking tactics. More threatening still is 

the proliferation of tactical cruise missiles that can fly preprogrammed, terrain-masking 

flight paths. Conventional air defense systems find these difficult to counter because (a) 

they have very small radar and infrared signatures; and (b) their use of terrain-masking 

flight precludes having an unobstructed line-of-sight for enough time to complete the 

engagement cycle.88

For these various reasons, the U.S. military has been pursuing the goal of creating a

Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) that would display the total air situation within a 

 85 A typical fighter aircraft can carry from 2–4 TASMs, which now have ranges in excess of 25–30 km. 

Thus, a single fighter can spawn as many as four daughter tracks, each a critical target moving at high

speed. The effects on airspace management and air defense systems can be imagined. 86 The famous karst outcropping known as “Thud Ridge” was habitually used by U.S. fighters approaching 

Hanoi from the west during the Vietnam war. 87 In a typical U.S. air strike package, eight fighter-bombers might be supported by as many as two dozen

other aircraft—AWACS, tankers, standoff jammers, escort jammers, fighter escorts, and “Wild Weasel” 

defense suppression aircraft. A high percentage of the strike package is thus devoted to “taking in the 

laundry” rather than to destroying the target. 88 Most air defense systems require a direct line of sight from the weapon to the target throughout the 

engagement cycle. That cycle includes detection, classification, tracking, illumination or lock-on, launch, 

flyout, and post-engagement assessment. For most air defense systems, this cycle time is least 20–30 

seconds; however, the typical unmask period for a low-altitude cruise missile is about 10–15 seconds. As a 

result, except in extraordinary circumstances, conventional air defense systems have a very low probability 

of intercepting a cruise missile. 

 92
theater of operations in near-real time, using all available sensors in a single fused track 

file. Achieving this goal requires the solution to four key problems: 

1. Track Correlation 

2. Sensor Fusion 

3. Latency 

4. Data Distribution 

The track correlation problem is the most fundamental and, in some ways, the most 

intractable. In short, when two sensors observe an object, each reports the location of the 

object in a slightly different position, due to the inherent inaccuracy or “error budget” of 

the sensors. When three sensors look at the same object, they report three slightly 

different positions, leading to the generation of an “error elipse” within which the target 

is located. If multiple sensors look at the same set of multiple targets, it becomes difficult 

to determine which particular targets in the track file of one file match or correlate with 

the targets in the track files of the other sensors. If the tracks cannot be correlated 

successfully, then the merged track file will report false tracks (one object reported as 

two) or dropped tracks (two objects reported as one). The difficulty of solving the 

problem rises exponentially as a factor of the number of sensors and targets. Any terrain 

masking that may occur only adds additional layers of complexity, since correlated tracks 

going into dead ground can de-correlate while masked. A typical theater of operations, 

with several thousand air objects being tracked by a dozen or more sensors at any given 

moment, would require the solutions of hundreds of thousands of track correlation 

hypotheses at any moment. In the past, processor speed made a technical solution 

impossible under field conditions. Given the operation of Moore’s Law, processors are 

now fast enough to perform the correlation problem in reasonable time under ideal 

conditions, but the correlation problem is still far from being solved. 

The sensor fusion problem is similar to, but distinct from track correlation. In this case, 

the issue is the merging of information from dissimilar sensor types (i.e., from a radar and 

an IR sensor) in such a manner that the sensors act synergistically to provide more 

information about the target than either sensor separately. This capability, critical for 

reliable NCTR, requires first the solution of the correlation problem (i.e., relating a 

specific radar track to a specific IR signal), co-registering them in the same coordinate 

frame, and then somehow merging the data from each and presenting it in a 

comprehensible manner to the human operator. 

Doing track correlation and sensor fusion takes time, and time is the critical factor in 

airspace management, air defense and air combat: objects are moving at speeds from 250-

700 meters per second, which means that a delay of only four seconds between the time a 

target is detected and the time the track is displayed on a screen represents a positional 

error of 1.0-2.8 kilometers (and in reality, the elapsed time may be several times greater). 

Positions on a situational awareness display, therefore, are really just approximations, 

representing elipses within which the target is located. Whether this degree of latency is 

operationally acceptable or not depends on the use to which the data is being put. It may 

be acceptable for overall planning and situational awareness, but it is not acceptable for 

 93
targeting and fire control purposes. Thus, if we just want the SIAP in order to see where 

all the air objects are, latency of several seconds is fine, but if we want to use the SIAP to 

cue and guide missiles against incoming targets, the latency is too great. 

Latency has several components. Sensor detection and reporting time is one component; 

correlation and fusion processing time is another. But the largest contributor to latency is 

the data transmission and distribution time. Sensor data files are extremely large, and

moving them across a network, either by datalink or even by fiber-optic cable, takes time. 

Merged and fused multi-sensor track files are even larger. All of these have to be 

continuously transmitted across a sensor network to provide subscribers with the current 

SIAP, but there is a limit to how much bandwidth may be available for this purpose. If 

bandwidth is inadequate, then there will be increased latency between the time the SIAP

update is published and the time it reaches subscribers. 

From this discussion, it should be clear that there are several critical technologies 

required to provide a useful SIAP. To deal with track correlation and sensor fusion 

requires high-speed processors combined with efficient algorithms and software 

implementations. To some extent, that also deals with part of the latency problem. The 

rest of the latency problem requires solutions the bandwidth shortage, including more 

efficient and reliable data and bandwidth compression software, higher-capacity data 

links, and less processor intensive video processing firmware for moving sensor data over 

a network. 

B. Single Integrated Ground Picture 

The single integrated ground picture (SIGP) is analogous to the SIAP, but ground rather 

than air objects. The principal technical differences between the SIAP and the SIGP are 

the tempo of operations and the number and diversity of objects to be tracked. Whereas 

air targets are moving at very high speeds (250-700 mps), ground targets rarely move 

faster than 100 kph. As a result, latency is not as serious a consideration in the SIGP, not 

even in regard to fire control applications. On the other hand, the shear number and 

variety of objects to be tracked dwarfs that of the SIAP. There may be as many as a 

thousand targets in the air picture at one time, but there are more than 1500 discrete 

vehicular targets in a single armored/mechanized division. And whereas air targets can 

be divided into a relative handful of discrete categories, each with four or five specific 

types, there are literally dozens of different classes of ground target, with many more 

individual types in each class. Moreover, whereas airborne sensors are usually quite 

effective in detecting and tracking air targets at long range, ground sensors, both RF and 

optical, find it much more difficult to detect and track targets in the clutter of terrain and 

under camouflage. Only through the fusion of several different sensor types is it possible 

to reliably track and classify vehicular-sized targets, provided such targets are in fact in 

the open (and not hidden in barns or caves, or even under tarps and camouflage netting, 

as was the case in Serbia). 

To detect concealed targets, as well as those enemy units too small or low-contrast to spot 

with remote sensors (i.e., a squad of guerrillas dressed in civilian clothing), SIGP must 

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supplement remote sensor data with human intelligence (HUMINT), including situation 

reports from line units, long-range scouts, and covert intelligence operatives. Human 

intelligence, however, is not amenable to compression into fixed, quantitative data 

formats. Rather, HUMINT is highly variable and must be collated and assessed against 

other sources before being reduced to an input format compatible with SIGP. With 

combat increasingly devolving to squad-sized actions against dismounted irregular 

forces, HUMINT is gaining importance—as is the need to track both friendly and enemy 

forces down to the squad, fire team or even the individual level. Eventually, some form

of GPS-based blue-force tracking system may suffice to locate friendly forces on the 

battlefield (but not if these troops are fighting inside buildings or even built-up areas

where buildings create GPS dead zones and multipath transmission problems). 

Thus, while the track correlation problem may be less critical for SIGP than for SIAP, the 

sensor fusion problem is much more difficult, while the two or three order of magnitude 

increase in the number of targets to be tracked (blue and red) creates an awesome data 

storage and transmission problem. Assuming these can be resolved, SIGP also creates

daunting visualization problems. For example, the amount of information available to 

commanders at all levels is so vast that it creates data overload; the mind cannot 

assimilate everything being presented. Commanders must be able to parse the SIGP, 

focusing only on the level of information and the area of operations appropriate to their 

command responsibilities. This can be accomplished by intelligent, user-defined 

command information systems (such as the U.S. FBCB2) that not only filter out

unwanted information, but also provide the commander with decision aids that suggest 

alternative courses of action. 

Therefore, SIGP not only faces the same technical problems as SIAP, it adds several new 

ones of its own. Again, the potential solutions involve both hardware and software, 

including artificial intelligence systems, mass storage systems and visualization systems. 

C. Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP) 

Recently, the U.S. has been moving toward the merging of SIAP and SIGP into a single 

product or service called the Common Relevant Operational Picture, or CROP. Given 

the increasing integration of air and ground operations, it is logical to combine the two in 

such a way that the commander can access both air and ground data to provide total 

situational awareness of his area of operations. This can be done either by physically 

merging the two track files into a single CROP file, or by maintaining them as separate 

files and combining them through battle command and visualization software. The 

former approach would result in a file too large to be manageable and which would not 

take into consideration the widely divergent reporting and latency requirements of SIAP

and SIGP. It therefore seems likely that the latter approach will prevail eventually, 

however, this in turn puts even greater pressure on the development of high-speed 

processors, data fusion algorithms, visualization systems, and decision aids. 

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Phase III: Cooperative Logistics, Asset Tasking and Engagement 

A. Cooperative Logistics 

In conventional logistics, lines of supply are stovepiped by nationality, by service, and 

ultimately by unit. Thus, in a coalition theater of operations, one would normally find 

one separate line of supply for each country involved (unless a country’s contingent was 

too small, in which case it would piggyback on the supply line of another), then one for 

each service within a national contingent, then one for each unit with each service, down 

to the brigade/wing/task group level. Through adoption of common standards for certain 

commodities such as fuel, lubricants and some classes of munitions, it may be possible to 

share supplies across national or service boundaries, but as a rule, sustained operations 

require distinct logistic trails for each service and component due to the diversity of 

systems, maintenance concepts, and even dietary requirements. 

In the past, logistics normally have followed a supply-push model, in which supplies are 

transported into theater as rapidly as possible, then sent to forward depots as soon as they 

arrive, and then pushed onward to combat units without actually waiting for those units to 

call back for resupply. This is due to three factors: 

1. Excessive Consumption. Though logistics planning usually includes consumption 

models, in practice these models have usually underestimated the rate at which 

supplies are expended. Rather than wait for this to become apparent at the combat 

unit, commanders push supplies forward in the expectation that the supplies will be

needed by the time they arrive. 

2. Operational Fluidity. Except in cases when operations are stalemated and become

static for extended periods (i.e., Korea 1952-53), modern war is characterized by 

rapid and fluid movement of forces. Units that request supplies at one moment are 

likely to be in a different location by the time supplies arrive. The delay between the 

receipt of a request for resupply, the dispatch of a supply convoy, and the arrival of 

the convoy have traditionally made it difficult for logistic support to keep up with the 

forward echelons. Rather than trying to meet immediate demands in real time, 

logisticians have traditionally fed a continuous stream of supplies forward in the wake 

of advancing units. 

3. Lack of Asset Visibility. In the past, it has been extremely difficult for supply 

officers to know the status of units and the location of all supplies in real time. Some

materiel would be in rear depots, others would be in transit, some would be at 

forward depots, and others with units. But because most record keeping was 

performed manually and only at supply nodes, there was only a very approximate 

knowledge of where anything was at a given time. Similarly, the supply requirements 

of combat units would only be known as those units reported back, usually during 

intervals in operations, or when a critical supply shortage emerged. To minimize the 

effects of this lack of visibility in the supply chain, supplies were pushed forward as 

quickly as possible. 

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This supply philosophy had several effects: 

• It required the acquisition and maintenance of excessively large stockpiles, with 

the associated costs of acquisition, maintenance and inventory control. 

• It required excessive amounts of shipping and rolling stock to transport inter and 

intra-theater, which would otherwise be available for the transport of combat 

forces. 

• It required an excessively large logistics footprint in-theater, with large supply 

depots and convoys, all of which are vulnerable to attack, and which therefore 

would require their own security detachments and base defense, imposing a form

of “strategic consumption” on forces as they advance. 

• The excess materiel shipped into theater would have to be shipped back to home 

base, or destroyed, at the end of each operation. 

All of these shortcomings were observed during Operation Desert Storm. Not 

anticipating such a short ground phase to the war, the U.S. brought in far more fuel, 

ammunition and spare parts than was actually required. Most of this materiel never 

reached forward combat units, but rather was left sitting in large desert supply dumps or 

on the docks at Dahran. The inability of the supply services to clear the ports of 

incoming supplies resulted in the back up of supplies in and around the ports, where they 

were vulnerable to missile attack or sabotage.89

In response, the U.S. initiated a Revolution in Logistic Affairs (RLA) to parallel the 

ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). In brief, the RLA called for the adaption 

of the commercial business practice of just-in-time inventory management to military 

logistics; instead of constantly pushing supplies forward according to a preplanned 

schedule, or simply as soon as they arrived, supplies would only be sent forward as 

needed, arriving “just in time”—i.e., when the unit needed to resupply without incurring 

critical shortages. If successfully implemented, the RLA would greatly reduce the size of 

supply stockpiles that the military would have to purchase and maintain in peacetime, 

with concomitant savings in the O&M account. It would reduce the demand for inter and 

intra-theater transport, and reduce the logistic footprint of combat units, thereby making 

them lighter and more agile. U.S. network-centric warfare concepts, with their emphasis 

on units widely dispersed throughout the battle area controlling but not occupying terrain, 

implicitly assume that RLA capabilities will be available to support combat forces. 

Implementation of the RLA required the development of several enabling technologies: 

• Automated Inventory Control 

• Real-Time Asset Tracking 

• Integrated and Automated Logistic Management Systems 

 89 At one point, some 25,000 tons of munitions were sitting on the docks at Dahran, with more munitions 

waiting to be offloaded from ships at dockside and in the harbor. A single Scud missile landing there

would have resulted in a catastrophic explosion which probably would have destroyed the port, sunk

several ships, and killed thousands of U.S. troops and Saudi civilians. 

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Automated inventory control involves the use of bar codes, smart cards and associated 

electronic I/O devices to maintain inventory of stocks in an automated logistics database 

that keeps track of every supply item in inventory, from the main depot down to the 

forward unit. Wireless network devices allow stocks to be inventoried as they arrive, as 

they leave, and in transit.

Real-time asset tracking permits the continued tracking of supplies between nodes, 

whether by air, sea, truck or train. Various forms of vehicle tracking systems—some

based GPS and satellite communications—indicate where a supply vehicle is at any 

moment, and can also keep track of changes in its load as cargo is on- or off-loaded. 

All of this information is fed into an automated logistic management system, the supply 

equivalent of a command and control system, to present graphically to supply officers the 

status of all supplies moving at all points along the supply chain. To get a real-time 

picture of the demand side of the logistic situation, the blue force tracking element of the 

battle command system must feed combat unit logistic status into the logistic 

management system. Thus, each vehicle in each combat unit would be reporting on its 

fuel and ammunition status each time it reports its location. This information would be 

aggregated at the platoon or company level, and included in the platoon’s position report. 

Platoon data would be aggregated at company, company at battalion, and so forth, until it 

reached the level at which supply decisions are made. The logistics officer would 

therefore have total asset visibility from end to end, and in theory, be able to forward

precisely what supplies would be needed to the units that needed them, in real time. 

Whether this is actually achievable in practice remains unproven. The United States 

partly implemented a number of RLA concepts on its dash up to Baghdad, but found that 

security along an extended line of communications remained a problem. Moreover, 

while there were never any serious shortages of fuel or ammunition, it must be 

recognized that some units came close to running out at several times, and that the U.S. 

faced no substantial organized resistance. In the south of Iraq, the British Army tried to 

apply its version of just-in-time logistics, and found its supply system in a state of 

collapse by the end of the war. The main problem seems to be a failure to recognize that 

in many cases, practices that work in the commercial business environment may not be 

applicable in the military environment. There is competition in the commercial 

environment, but it is inhibited by a web of legal and regulatory constraints which do not 

exist in war. Put another way, UPS and FedEx do not try to blow up each other’s trucks; 

While in war, supply lines remain high-value centers of gravity to be destroyed or 

neutralized. Business is also much more predictable than war, which makes operations 

more predictable, whereas war remains characterized by great uncertainty.

The difficulties of implementing the RML are multiplied when extended to a 

multinational coalition. Not only are the number and variety of systems greater, but 

many of them operate to different standards and may even require different types of fuel 

and lubricant.90 Standards regarding these basic issues can greatly reduce, but not 

eliminate the added complexity of cooperative logistics in a coalition environment. 

 90 This is the case with the Polish contingent to the Coalition Forces in Iraq.

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On the positive side, there is relatively little new technology needed to implement most 

of the RML. As noted, the idea was to import commercial logistic practices into the 

military environment, and most of the technology used in the RML is either commercial 

off-the-shelf or derived from commercial systems. This includes bar code and smart tag 

systems, vehicle tracking systems, automated inventory management and tracking, and 

even some forms of logistic management displays and visualization. The main 

technological developments related specifically to military requirements are a higher 

degree of information security, compatibility with military communications systems, and 

integrating the logistic management system with the battle command system in order to 

(a) receive information on unit supply status; and (b) provide the commander with a 

logistic situation overlay for the CROP. All of these appear to be relatively easy to 

accomplish at a purely technical level. The issue is whether this can be accomplished in 

a manner that allows interoperability with U.S. battle command and logistic systems now 

in development. 

B. Cooperative Asset Tracking 

In effects-based, network-centric warfare, commanders and warfighters can access the 

entire panoply of assets in a theater area of operations to implement the concept of 

operations and impose the desired effects on the enemy. Asset ownership and the 

traditional chain of command become less relevant as the military reorganizes around 

functions rather than services. In a radically flattened command system, units and assets 

may be tasked based upon their specific capabilities rather than on the basis of nationality 

or service. For example, a naval surveillance asset such as the P-3C Orion was widely 

used as a ground surveillance and reconnaissance platform, while USAF-controlled 

unmanned air vehicles provided coastal surveillance. In other examples, U.S. ballistic 

missile early warning satellites provided warning of missile attacks to British forces. 

In a network-centric system, this approach is taken to its logical conclusion: any 

commander, anywhere, can in theory access and task the sensors and other assets of any 

other unit, whether it belongs to the same service, or even the same country. This poses 

profound challenges both to technology and to the predominant military culture 

developed over the course of the last 1000 years. If ownership and the chain of command 

become transparent, who decides who has ultimate control over an asset? How does the 

nominal owner schedule and deploy his assets? Since many important assets are high 

demand/low density (i.e., everybody wants them, but few are available), who gets priority 

for what missions? How can priorities be changed dynamically in response to a rapidly 

evolving ground situation? Who resolves conflicts? All of these are doctrinal issues that 

can only be resolved on the basis of operational experience, which will not be available 

until cooperative asset tasking becomes a reality. 

Already some progress is being made in this area, particularly in regard to UAVs, NATO 

STANAG 4586, issued in 2002, sets forth standards for UAV interoperability. Focusing 

on the command data link interface between the UAV and its control terminal, the 

command and control interface between the UAV control system and the overall C4ISR 

system, and human interface controls, the STANAG ensures that all UAVs developed in 

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accordance with this standard will have interoperable, plug-and-play architectures 

allowing differing degrees of cooperative asset control. This Joint Tactical Architecture 

identifies a common set of mandatory information technology (IT) standards and 

provides a common architecture for C4I, sensors, modeling and simulation. STANAG

4586 provides five different levels of interoperability to which UAV systems can be 

designed: 

• Level 1—Direct Receipt of Secondary Data. This applies to UAV tracking and 

status information, allowing UAVs to be included in the SIAP and CROP through 

Blue Force Tracking. 

• Level 2—Direct Receipt of Sensor Payload Data. Data from the sensor payload 

may be accessed by non-owning parties, either directly through a data link

terminal, or over a sensor network. 

• Level 3—Control of UAV Payload. Non-owning users can actually redirect the 

sensor package to look in particular directions or scan in particular modes of 

operation. 

• Level 4—UAV Flight Control. Non-owners can take control of the UAV and fly 

it to areas of their choosing; alternatively, control of the UAV can be handed off 

from one ground station to the next without regard for ownership, allowing the 

UAV to operate beyond line of sight with its original ground station. 

• Level 5—Launch and Recover UAV. Non-owners can either direct the launch of 

the UAV or control its recovery at a sight other than the original takeoff point.

All the capabilities of the lower levels are included at the higher levels. If fully 

implemented, Level 5 interoperability under STANAG 4586 would allow any unit in a 

coalition force to control the UAVs of other members of the coalition. 

Similarly, the USAF is examining what it calls “dynamic sensor retasking” for its E-10A 

Multi-Mission Command and Control Aircraft (MC2A), in order to accommodate the 

conflicting requirements for sensor coverage from the various subscriber communities.91

According to current plans, users in different services (and potentially from different 

countries) could direct the MC2A’s airborne ground sensor or ELINT system to look at 

specific areas of interest or switch from one operating mode to another. How well this 

works in practice depends on the standard operating procedures developed to prioritize 

requests and resolve conflicts. 

From a technological standpoint, cooperative asset tasking requires the implementation of 

hardware and software standards for data communications, data processing and 

information display. Implementing the standards will require considerable exchange of

technical data in order to design the proper interfaces and construct data element 

dictionaries, as well as to understand and interpret the information generated by sensors 

and other assets (i.e., range, resolution, operating limitations, etc.). If sensor data is 

accessed and assets controlled over the command and control network, then all battle 

command systems must be interoperable; i.e., able to access the same subsidiary systems, 

 91 See Adam J. Hebert, “Building Battlefield Awareness”, Air Force Magazine, September 2004. 

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issue command, and receive and display data in a transparent and compatible manner. 

For example, the U.S. Army’s Future Battle Command–Brigade and Below (FBCB2) will 

be the standard Army tactical command and control system in the near future. For other 

countries to access and control U.S. assets over the command and control network, their 

battle command systems must be compatible with FBCB2. Conversely, if the U.S. 

wishes to access foreign assets such as UAVs or the Airborne Ground Sensor, FBCB2 

must be interoperable with foreign command systems. 

C. Cooperative Engagement 

Cooperative engagement is the fulfillment of the network-centric concept: a commander 

from one unit or service, using sensor data from a second unit or service, can task a unit 

of third unit or service to launch a weapon that destroys an enemy target. In essence it 

simply takes cooperative asset tasking to its logical—and lethal—conclusion. What 

distinguishes cooperative engagement from cooperative asset tasking is the need to 

provide timely and precise target acquisition and fire control information. 

This problem was first confronted by the U.S. Navy in the development of the Aegis 

weapon system. Under the original Aegis concept, an Aegis ship would be able to access 

the sensor data of every other ship in the battle group, combine it with its own sensor 

data, and then pass weapon release commands to those ships within the battle group best 

positioned to destroy the incoming threat. However, until recently, the Navy was never 

able to implement this Cooperative Engagement Capability inherent in the Aegis system

due to a lack of adequate communications bandwidth: neither NTDS Link 11 or Link 14, 

or even JTIDS/MIDS Link 16, could pass on the required targeting information fast 

enough to provide a reliable fire control solution. The Navy finally began to solve this 

problem with the development of a new data link system called (logically) the 

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). Providing, in theory, an order of magnitude 

increase in throughput over Link 16, CEC has been used successfully in a variety of air 

and missile defense experiments, and is being deployed throughout the U.S. fleet on CG47 and DDG-51 class Aegis ships. The United Kingdom became the first foreign 

customer for the CEC, buying several units under FMS for its Future Aircraft Carrier and 

Type 45 destroyers. 

CEC, however, will not completely fulfill the requirements of network-centric 

cooperative engagement. In naval applications, the cooperative engagement architecture 

is relatively simple, since there are only a dozen or so ships in a battle group. Moreover, 

command in the battle group is centralized at a designated flag ship, which coordinates 

the actions of all the other ships, whereas in a truly network-centric architecture, 

command authority is dispersed, and the unit best positioned to exploit a fleeting 

opportunity would issue engagement commands. This requires a small, lightweight, and 

affordable communications link, which CEC in its present manifestation certainly is not. 

The USAF, for instance, has steadfastly refused to accept CEC as its standard broadband 

communications specifically because the CEC terminal is too large for airborne 

applications (which means it is certainly too large, heavy and expensive for ground 

systems). Instead, the USAF and U.S. Army have been investigating ways of stacking 

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Link 16 terminals and compressing data to achieve equivalent throughput at lower cost. 

So far results have been mixed. 

Assuming that the bandwidth problem can be resolved, the remaining interoperability 

issues are both technical and operational. On the technical side, there must be full 

compatibility between the battle command systems used by all members of a joint or

coalition force, in order to ensure that the proper intelligence and fire control information 

is transmitted and received in a timely and seamless manner. Operationally, it will 

certainly require a change in military protocols to give the authority to use lethal force to 

a commander from a foreign force. Formulating the new doctrine may be more difficult 

consuming than and time resolving the purely technical issues. 

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