The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia:

Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy

by Thomas F. Lynch III, Michael Bouffard, Kelsey King, and Graham Vickowski

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 21

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, 

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The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the 

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NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and 

the broader national security community. 

Cover: Fighters at Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad training camp in

northern Syria
The Return of Foreign Fighters to

Central Asia

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

Series Editor: Laura J. Junor

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

October 2016

By Thomas F. Lynch III, Michael Bouffard,

Kelsey King, and Graham Vickowski 

The Return of Foreign Fighters to

Central Asia:

Implications for

U.S. Counterrorism Policy
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit inss.ndu.edu/Publications.aspx.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, October 2016
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 2

Balancing Security, Stability and Socioeconomic Factors............................. 2

ISIL and U.S. Global Counterterrorism Concerns......................................... 4

U.S. Policy in Central Asia Pre-2016—A Balancing Act............................... 6

Foreign Fighter Flows: Why, How, and from Where?................................... 9

Whither Blowback? What Is Its True Potential in Central Asia?...............16

Conclusions.......................................................................................................23

Notes ..................................................................................................................24

About the Authors............................................................................................33

1

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

Executive Summary

Central Asia is the third largest point of origin for Salafi jihadist foreign fighters in the 

conflagration in Syria and Iraq, with more than 4,000 total fighters joining the conflict since 

2012 and 2,500 reportedly arriving in the 2014–2015 timeframe alone. As the Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continues to lose territory under duress from U.S.-led anti-ISIL 

coalition activities, some predict that many may return home bent on jihad and generating 

terror and instability across Central Asia. Yet several factors indicate that such an ominous 

foreign fighter return may not materialize. Among these factors are that a majority of Central 

Asians fighting for ISIL and the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq are recruited while working 

abroad in Russia, often from low-wage jobs under poor conditions making the recruits ripe 

for radicalization. In addition, many of those heading for jihad in Syria and the Levant expect 

that they are on a “one way journey,” some to martyrdom but most for a completely new life, 

and do not plan a return.

Most Central Asian states face their greatest risk of domestic instability and violent extremism as a reaction to political repression and counterterrorism (CT) policies that counterproductively conflate political opposition and the open practice of Islam with a domestic 

jihadist threat. If improperly calibrated, greater U.S. CT assistance to address foreign fighter 

returns may strengthen illiberal regime short-term focus on political power consolidation, 

overplay the limited risks of foreign fighter returns, and increase the risks of domestic unrest 

and future instability.

The United States has few means to pressure Central Asian regimes into policies that 

address the main drivers of domestic radicalization, such as political inclusion and religious 

freedom.

Although an imperfect instrument, U.S. security assistance—and the specific subset of 

CT assistance—is a significant lever. U.S. CT assistance for Central Asia should eschew additional general lethal assistance and instead scope security attention toward border security 

intelligence and physical capacity enhancements. This CT aid should be paired with important, complementary socioeconomic programs that help with countering violent extremism, 

including greater religious and political openness along with support for the Central Asian 

diaspora.
2 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

Introduction

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and similar Salafi jihadist organizations, 

such as the al-Nusra Front and other al Qaeda affiliates, have presented the United States with 

serious counterterrorism (CT) challenges since ISIL expanded its reach in Syria and Iraq in 

2014.1

 Among these serious challenges, stemming the flow of foreign fighters to this conflict 

area as well as preparing for the eventual return of these fighters to their home countries have 

become issues of significant concern for U.S. policymakers.2

 The region of Central Asia has 

played an important, if often overlooked, role in supplying fighters to various violent extremist 

organizations (VEOs) in Syria and Iraq. The United States, along with Russia and other adjoining countries, could confront serious threats to CT interests in Central Asia as foreign fighters 

return to this region after having been radicalized and battle-hardened.

This paper assesses the current status and future risk potential for return of the thousands 

of Central Asian foreign fighters who have joined Salafi jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq since 

mid-2011. The analysis and policy recommendations draw upon authors’ findings from a review of primary source publications from the region, field trips there from 2013 to 2015, and 

research into English-language and other secondary sources that culminated in June 2016.

Balancing Security, Stability and Socioeconomic Factors

Central Asia is important to overall U.S. CT efforts, having received increasing levels of 

security assistance since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.3

 With Afghanistan bordering three of the five Central Asian states, U.S. security assistance in the region increased with 

the intensification of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past decade (see map). 

After a steady increase, there has been some reduction in overall security assistance after 2010.4

The United States also has a stated policy interest in seeing that Central Asian governments are 

accountable to their people for basic human rights and liberties, as well as capable of providing 

economic opportunities. Although U.S. economic and governance assistance to these states has 

increased in absolute terms over the past decade, non–security assistance first decreased as a 

proportion of overall U.S. assistance between 2009 and 2013, and then eclipsed security assistance by 2014. U.S. non–security assistance to Central Asian states is projected to remain greater than security-related assistance through 2017. With a general trend toward authoritarianism 

in several of these states in recent years, specifically Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the United States 

faces a policy dilemma. Should, on one hand, greater security assistance in the form of CT support again be prioritized with less attention paid to the development of accountable governance 
3

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

and civil and religious liberties? If, on the other hand, the United States does press Central Asian 

countries for reform in these areas by denying or conditioning security assistance, will Russia 

simply fill the gap, damaging and perhaps removing U.S. influence in the region?

These questions are all the more significant because Central Asians have been recruited 

in great numbers as foreign fighters by Islamic jihadist groups such as ISIL. ISIL recruitment 

from Central Asian countries has benefited from local government policies that have eroded 

the space for the open and peaceful practice of Islam while also removing outlets of legitimate 

political opposition. Central Asians as a group have been disproportionately represented as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, with close to 20 percent of all foreign fighters originating from 

Central Asia while this region accounts for less than 5 percent of global Muslims.5

 According to 

the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), Central 

Asia is the third largest source of foreign fighters for ISIL and other VEOs in Iraq and Syria.6

The Five Central Asian States

Kazakhstan

Mongolia Russia

Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan

China

Pakistan

Afghanistan India

Turkmenistan

Iran

Tajikistan

Astana

Bishkek

Tashkent

Dushanbe

Kabul

Ashgabat

Tehran

Baku

Caspian 

 Sea

Azerbaijan
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

Poor economic conditions in most of Central Asia, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 

contribute to restlessness and wanderlust among many there. An overarching—and in some 

states increasingly—repressive political climate generates disaffection and can make populations vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by VEOs. An absence of capable border 

controls and credible reintegration programs makes most Central Asian governments appear 

at risk for continuing as a supplier of Salafi jihadist foreign fighters for Syria and Iraq, and at 

risk from instability and violence upon their return home.7

 As ISIL steadily loses strength and 

territory in the Levant region, Central Asian governments will need to address the risks of increasing terrorism and instability if thousands of foreign fighters return home. Increasing the 

amount of U.S. security assistance, including CT assistance, is unlikely to help these governments weather the turbulence of returning jihadis if there is not an accompanying adjustment 

in the political-religious climate. The threat of returned fighters moving underground and 

engaging in terrorist attacks is greater if there is no process to reintegrate and absorb them 

into a reasonably open society.

The United States can foster an increase in religious and political opening through nonkinetic forms of assistance and public diplomacy. But the returns of such soft power assistance 

are harder to quantify in the short term than security forces training or weapons transfers. The 

United States will have to find a balance between military and nonmilitary aid to each of the 

Central Asian republics, keeping in mind the local context in each state. Mitigating rather than 

contributing to violence and extremism in Central Asia is the challenge that the United States 

faces at this important time in the region’s history.

ISIL and U.S. Global Counterterrorism Concerns

ISIL changed the terrorist landscape in the Middle East, which had ripple effects around 

the globe. Skillful marketing has given ISIL greater reach than previously established Islamic 

VEOs such as al Qaeda.8

 Manifestations of ISIL’s reach have shown up in places where dramatic 

jihadist terrorism was not an expected threat, such as Brussels and Paris. ISIL has built its ranks 

by recruiting fighters from across the globe.9

 The potential for fighters to return to their home 

states with an objective to practice organized jihad is a major international security concern.

It is also a concern for global U.S. CT efforts. The 2011 U.S. CT strategy calls for coordinating, 

enabling, and improving capabilities of partner nations.10 U.S. CT leaders have consistently named 

places where foreign fighter returns from Syria and Iraq may necessitate additional partnership, 

and Central Asian states—especially Tajikistan—are on that list.11 Among the key questions for 
5

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

U.S. security partnerships worldwide is whether Central Asian states merit a $20–$50 million increase in CT security assistance in 2016–2017 to address legitimate risks they face.12

While the majority of ISIL recruits originate in the Middle East, the Maghreb, and Western Europe, Central Asia is the third largest source of foreign fighters in Syria.13 Central Asians 

also are overrepresented among jihadist VEOs in Iraq and Syria, making up over 17 percent of 

the foreign fighters there, despite constituting just 5 percent of the global ummah.14 More than 

4,000 Central Asian fighters are believed to have joined armed groups fighting in Syria, with an 

estimated 2,500 arriving there in 2014 and early 2015 alone.15 Russian President Vladimir Putin 

has stated that as many as 7,000 fighters from Russia and Central Asia have joined the ranks 

of the Islamic State.16 While many of the Central Asians fighting in Syria and Iraq align with 

ISIL, they also are present in a number of other Salafi jihadist outfits there, some under the al 

Qaeda–affiliated umbrella group known as the al-Nusra Front. Among the prominent groups 

with known Central Asian participation are Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, Jamaat Sabri (a 

mostly Uzbek group), and Imam Bukhari Jamaat (also predominantly Uzbek). Central Asians 

also make up small percentages of primarily Chechen-led Caucasian VEOs.17

Many analysts have written about the “blowback potential” from these foreign fighters, 

speculating about an increase terrorism and instability across Central Asia but with divergent 

and often uncertain conclusions. An early 2015 International Crisis Group report labeled the 

risks of instability from the inevitable return of these Central Asian fighters as great, observing 

that the governments know of the dangers but are not properly preparing, instead using the 

forecast threat to bolster domestic political agendas and curtail more civil liberties.18 Another 

regional observer noted, “Although a threat from jihadist returnees does exist, it has been 

exaggerated by the Central Asian governments . . . playing on the population’s fear . . . to legitimate . . . repressive measures.”19 His sentiments are shared by other regional experts who view 

the risks from foreign fighter blowback as less significant than those from violent opposition 

from within.20 Still others have argued that Central Asia faces great risks from foreign fighter 

repatriation and that this mandates significant scope for policy action and outside security assistance.21 Among those sounding the more worrisome alarm are those who point to reports 

that children of Uzbek and Tajikistani origin are being indoctrinated in radicalism and the 

practice of jihad by ISIL zealots in Syria and in Turkey.22

Policymakers require a more discerning assessment of the actual risks from foreign fighter 

blowback in the Central Asian countries. The number of expatriates from there fighting in Iraq 

and Syria is not the sole indicator or even the best indicator of blowback risk. Many Central Asian 

foreign fighters do not expect to return home; some are there to culminate their martyrdom and 
6 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

most have gone to start a whole new life in an Islamic caliphate. With ISIL currently on the defensive during 2016, its recruiting strategies for Central Asians and others appear to be more centered 

on bolstering ranks within Iraq and Syria than spreading instability elsewhere.23

U.S. Policy in Central Asia Pre-2016—A Balancing Act

In March of 2015, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined U.S. policy in the 

Central Asian region as founded on two distinct ideas: “first that our own security is enhanced 

by a more stable, secure Central Asia that contributes to global efforts to combat terrorism and 

violent extremism, and second that stability can best be achieved if the nations of Central Asia 

are sovereign and independent countries . . . benefiting from governments that are accountable 

to their citizens.”24 Current U.S. policy emphasizes both security assistance and democracy and 

governance programing equally.25 In most of the past decade, U.S. aid to Central Asia has been 

imbalanced toward more security assistance focused on tactical training and equipping than 

on democracy and governance programming.26 The most recent example of this policy was the 

waiver of sanctions on Tajikistan after being designated a country of particular concern regarding religious liberty.27 However, the U.S. policy challenge is more than one of disproportional 

funding between hard and soft power programs. U.S.-sponsored countering violent extremism 

(CVE) workshops and other governance/democratization programming confront limited effectiveness when constrained by wary Central Asian governments and if not buttressed by firm 

but flexible pressure from Washington’s most senior leaders.

The United States walks a challenging path with a dual concentration on CT assistance 

and fostering human rights and democratic governance in Central Asia. The difficulties for 

cohesive U.S. policy in Central Asia are many. Chief among them is the wide disparity in key 

factors found in the individual regional states. Repressive national political and human rights 

policies contribute to radicalization and recruitment to the Syria-Iraq front. A one-size-fits-all 

U.S. policy approach to what are distinct and diverse political and economic national conditions 

across the five Central Asian countries could have counterproductive results.

The United States faces a number of challenges with implementing effective policy in the 

region. First, America is not the only—or the preferred—guarantor of security in Central Asia. 

Historic and contemporary security ties between Russia and the Central Asian states remain 

strong. Additionally, the United States has few levers to pull when trying to influence Central 

Asian republics. The option to cut off security assistance to Central Asia exists. However, an 

end to security assistance would, by extension, cut off the military-to-military relationships 
7

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

that those assistance programs develop. Additional challenges arise in trying to strike a balance 

between maintaining ties and assistance while not tying the United States to autocratic regimes.

Given its historic ties in the region, Russia remains the primary security partner for the 

Central Asian republics.28 Russia provides engagement through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including tactical-level training and equipping, and military professionalization training at the Frunze Academy in Moscow. Within the region, those trained at the Frunze Academy 

are regarded as part of an elite network of officers, upon which career and promotions depend. 

While the United States does provide some military professionalization training,29 it is not currently seen as at the same level as Russian training.30 Despite Russian military attention currently focused on Syria and the recent Russian economic downturn, U.S. influence in the region 

is unlikely to surpass longstanding Russian ties. At the same time, Russia is trying to retain its 

relevance in the region, whether through its leadership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or bilateral joint-level 

security and CT exercises with regional countries.

Central Asian governments will participate in ventures such as the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization’s Partnership for Peace as far as it will benefit them, but there is relatively little 

buy-in for large institutional reform initiatives emanating from the United States or Western 

Europe. Conditioning U.S. security assistance on improved governance and political opening 

is unlikely to work. Rather this will likely drive Central Asia further into Russia’s sphere of influence, severely eroding if not ending military-to-military ties between the United States and 

Central Asia.

Table 1. U.S. Aid to Central Asia, 2014

Country Military and 

Police Aid

Humanitarian and 

Development Aid

Arms Sales 

(Deliveries)

Trainees

Kazakhstan $19,452,079 $6,438,000 $1,084,188 275

Kyrgyzstan $8,902,880 $37,506,150 $307,400 358

Tajikistan $29,214,516 $26,644,000 $4,263,198 119

Turkmenistan $1,054,809 $4,078,000 $38,613 35

Uzbekistan $13,674,055 $9,352,200 $4,004,190 127

Floating 

Regional Funds

$7,000,000 $31,422,000 N/A N/A

Total $79,298,339 $115,440,350 $9,697,589 914
8 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

In 2014, the most recent year with a full set of security assistance data, the United States 

spent $194,738,689 on Central Asian security and economic aid—$79,289,339 of which was 

security oriented aid (≈ 41 percent). The United States trained 914 Central Asian security personnel (see table 1).31

The volume of U.S. security, governance, and economic aid to the states of Central Asia 

grew and then declined over the past decade from a relative low point in 2005 to a high in 

2010 and then to a smaller amount in 2014.32 So too did the proportion of general security 

(military and police aid) in that assistance. In 2005, the United States spent $221,059,971 on 

Central Asian security and economic aid; $88,729,971 (≈ 40 percent) of that was security-oriented aid. It also trained 993 Central Asian security personnel. In 2010, the United States spent 

$385,159,747 on Central Asian security and economic aid; $216,707,698 (≈ 56 percent) was 

security-oriented aid. It also trained 678 Central Asian security personnel.33 From 2010 through 

2014, the proportion of U.S. regional assistance given as security assistance declined from 56 

percent per year back to roughly 41 percent in 2014. Incomplete data for U.S. aid to Central Asia 

in 2015 indicate that the overall amount of aid dropped by almost 50 percent from 2014, falling 

to $111,282,000; $25,702,000 of this amount (23 percent) was general military police and security aid. If all U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Counterterrorism Partnership Funds (CTPF) 

earmarked for Central Asia—up to $20 million in fiscal year 2016 and up to $30 million in fiscal 

year 2017—are applied, then 60 percent of the total planned U.S. $51,870,000 security assistance 

to Central Asia for 2017 will come from CTPF. Projected U.S. economic and development aid 

for Central Asia in 2017 is almost $140,000,000. Thus the percentage of U.S. security assistance 

Table 2. Forecast U.S. Aid to Central Asia, 2017

Country Military and 

Police Aid

Humanitarian and 

Development Aid

Arms Sales 

(Deliveries)

Trainees

Kazakhstan $ 2,600,000 $6,183,000 N/A Unknown

Kyrgyzstan $ 3,060,000 $47,696,000 N/A Unknown

Tajikistan $ 6,515,000 $35,055,000 N/A Unknown

Turkmenistan $715,000 $4,100,000 N/A Unknown

Uzbekistan $1,780,000 $9,828,000 N/A Unknown

Floating 

Regional Funds

$37,200,000 $37,076,000 N/A N/A

Total $51,870,000 $139,938,000 N/A Unknown
9

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

of the overall projected $191,808,000 in total U.S. assistance to Central Asia in 2017 will be 27 

percent (see table 2).34

The forecast remix of overall U.S. aid to Central Asia by 2017 appears calibrated to emphasize economic, development, and governance programs nested around CVE initiatives.35 The 

re-scope of U.S. military and police aid to a less significant proportion of overall U.S. aid and 

a specific focus on CTPF programs seem aimed to provide sustained but targeted assistance to 

selected CT programs in Central Asian states.

Foreign Fighter Flows: Why, How, and from Where?

Before the rise of ISIL, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was the main Central 

Asian VEO of notable consequence in the region.36 Its historic base of operations is in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The case of IMU is informative when assessing the risk of fighters returning 

to Central Asia from Iraq and Syria. Observers report a conspicuous absence of IMU foreign 

fighter return to Uzbekistan as of early 2016. Some analysts suggest that this demonstrates IMU 

members—and other Central Asian jihadists traveling to Syria—view their trip as a one-way 

ticket, some committed to remaining with the Islamic State forever and others understanding 

the untenable repercussions they could face if they try to return home.37

As mentioned earlier, most respected estimates indicate that, as of 2015, Central Asia accounted for the third largest source of Islamist foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.38 These estimates indicate a political environment that contributes to the radicalization and subsequent 

recruitment of a significant number of Central Asian Muslims. Indeed, the governments of 

Central Asia display various deficiencies in the areas of political and religious freedom, some 

to a much more serious degree than others. Although the absolute number of Central Asian 

fighters in the Syrian civil war is high, the per capita foreign fighter flows from Central Asia are 

lower than those from the states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Kazakhstan (1 

in 72,000), Kyrgyzstan (1 in 56,000), Tajikistan (1 in 40,000), and Uzbekistan (1 in 58,000) have 

lower per capita foreign fighter flows into Syria than Turkmenistan (1 in 14,000). Turkmenistan 

alone has reported per capita foreign fighter flows more comparable to MENA states.39 MENA 

state foreign fighter flow rates are those from Jordan (1 in 5,300), Lebanon (1 in 6,500), Tunisia 

(1 in 7,300), Saudi Arabia (1 in 18,200), and Morocco (1 in 22,000). The proximity of MENA 

states to ISIL territory is likely a pertinent contributing factor, but the lower per capita flows 

may indicate other mitigating factors in Central Asia.

Some Central Asian fighters originate via recruitment cells actually found in Central Asia. 

Often these are small, secretive, and sometimes extensions of prayer groups. Not everyone in a 
10 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

prayer group will be aware of 

the activities of other members 

or the connection to Syria.40 A 

significant number of these 

radicalized fighters, however, 

travel directly from Russian 

territory, which demonstrates 

a major radicalization factor 

for Central Asian states—the 

difficult working conditions 

and religious and ethnic persecution faced by the Central 

Asian diaspora within Russian 

territory.41 Separated from 

their home communities, 

families, and local imams, and 

with little or no support from 

their home governments, it is 

easy to imagine how Central Asian migrant workers in Russia might become socially alienated 

and more susceptible to radicalization and VEO recruitment.42 Many working in Russia turn to 

in-person and online social media–based Islamic communities to explore their faith, particularly 

when it previously was not a strong part of their identity. As they interact with online faith communities in their native languages, many are targeted by extremist recruiters. If they are co-opted, 

migrants then travel directly to Syria or Iraq to fight with violent extremist organizations.43

In his 2015 Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Responses, Central Asia expert Noah Tucker demonstrates that economic migration is one of the primary 

factors that leads to Central Asian recruitment by Islamist extremists, with the majority of Central Asians being recruited outside of the area.44 Given often limited economic opportunities, 

many Central Asians migrate to Russia or Germany for work. As Russian economic stagnation 

has increased in the past couple years, Moscow has introduced additional laws and restrictions 

on economic migrants. These laws have further isolated the Central Asian diaspora in Russia.45

While the majority of Central Asian economic migrants go to Russia, more are looking to Germany as an option. In 2000, 546,823 Central Asians lived in Germany, whereas 4,501,585 lived in 

Russia. In 2015, these numbers were 4,950,593 in Russia and 1,178,397 in Germany.46 As Central 

Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov of Tajikistan’s OMON, pictured as an

ISIL leader in Syria
11

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

Asian migrant flows increase, the percent growth from 5 years previously (2010–2015) of those 

going to Germany (3.45 percent growth) outpaces the growth of total migration from Central 

Asia (2.65 percent growth), whereas migration to Russia shows less growth (1.91 percent). Russia 

is the destination for 64.63 percent of Central Asian migrants, whereas Germany is the destination of 15.38 percent. Ukraine is the destination for 6.79 percent, followed by intra–Central Asia 

migration.

Despite the Russian economic downturn from 2014–2016, much of the Central Asian economy still relies on remittances from migrants living in Russia. Remittances from the Russian central bank, comprise a sizeable portion of the Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek gross domestic products in 

order of decreasing magnitude (see table 3).

Whether radicalized in Central Asia and transiting Russia onto Iraq and Syria or radicalized and recruited from the diaspora in Russia, there are a number of “celebrity cases,” demonstrating the leadership role Central Asians play in ISIL’s operations. Most notable is Gulmurod 

Khalimov, who formerly commanded the Tajikistani Special Purpose Mobility Unit (Otryad 

Mobilny Osobogo Naznacheniya or, OMON). Colonel Khalimov participated in five separate 

U.S.-led training programs between 2003 and 2014, three of which were on U.S. soil.47 In early 

September 2016, Khalimov reportedly was elevated to the position of ISIL “Minister of War,” 

succeeding an ethnic Chechen who held the post before being killed in a July 2016 U.S. airstrike.48 In August of 2014, a Tajikistani was appointed as emir of the Raqqa Province, which is 

the location of the Islamic State’s eponymous capital.49 There are a few ethnic Uzbeks, veterans 

of the Afghan jihad, who are leading brigades in ISIL and the al-Nusra Front.50 Central Asian 

foreign fighters linked to ISIL headquarters in Syria also have participated in significant acts of 

terrorism in other countries. Most notably, a Kyrgyzstani and an ethnic Uzbek from Central 

Country Remittances from 

Russia (% of GDP)

Total Remittance from Russia 

(USD)

Tajikistan 41.45 $3,831,000,000

Kyrgyzstan 27.36 $2,026,000,000

Uzbekistan 8.91 $5,581,000,000

Kazakhstan 0.22 $480,000,000

Turkmenistan 0.065 $31,000,000

Table 3. Russian Remittances to Central Asia, 2014

Source: Bank of Russia, “External Sector Statistics,” available at <www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/?PrtId=svs>.
12 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

Asia were among the three suicide terrorist attackers/bombers at Istanbul airport that killed 

over 40 and wounded more than 200 others on June 28, 2016.51

Given the diverse nature of the Central Asian states, we address the key factors and context 

for Islamist radicalization and recruitment in each. This assessment considers ethnic and political aspects, number of fighters recruited, and influence of social media or Russian information 

operations in each Central Asian country.

Kazakhstan

ICSR estimates that a moderate number of 250 foreign fighters had traveled from Kazakhstan to the Levant to “do jihad” as of early 2015.52 Many of these are believed to have been radicalized and recruited while in Russia. ISIL propaganda has tried to exploit the diverse ethnic and 

demographic nature of Kazakhstan through its al-Hayat media wing. Al-Hayat has also played 

up the presence of women and children in ISIL to portray ISIL as both a multinational and 

multigenerational movement. This has provoked harsh backlash against ISIL from many Kazakhstanis, including independent Islamic groups online (both strict reformists and Salafists) 

who reject what they see as exploitation of Kazakhstani society and who reject any relationship 

between ISIS and Islam.53

The Kazakhstani state enforces some restrictions on free speech and religion, but Kazakhstan is perceived to be relatively free compared to other Central Asian republics. Kazakhstan 

has participated in U.S. CVE activities by hosting the regional CVE conference in June 2015 in 

cooperation with the U.S. and other international partners and ensuring ample media coverage 

for the conference.54

The Kazakhstani government does not deny the fact that some Kazakhstanis have gone 

to fight in Iraq and Syria. Kazakhstani leaders and its press report that Russian information 

operations blame the United States for the creation of ISIL and al Qaeda. Russian information 

activities focus on increasing the public perception of a meaningful threat from ISIL and other 

VEOs in Kazakhstan as part of an effort to isolate the United States and pull Kazakhstan further 

into Russia’s sphere of influence.

Kyrgyzstan

After a peaceful electoral transition of government in 2011, Kyrgyzstan touts its credentials as an “Island of Democracy” amid the more repressive authoritarian regimes in Central 

Asia. Recent fears that Islamic extremism is growing in Kyrgyzstan, particularly among the 

ethnic Uzbek minority in southern Kyrgyzstan, should be tempered by the fact that Kyrgyzstan 
13

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

does not border other states where ISIL is active and that its populace is targeted less by online 

recruiters than other Central Asian states.55 However, the Kyrgyzstani government has been using fear of ISIL terrorism to justify cracking down on political opposition.

There is no official number of suspected Kyrgyzstani foreign fighters doing jihad in the 

Levant. In February 2015, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry reported that 22 of its 

citizens had been killed in fighting in Syria and some 200 total citizens, 30 of them women, had 

gone to Syria. He also reported that investigators had uncovered 83 cases of people attempting 

to recruit Kyrgyzstani citizens to go to Syria.56 Details on these radicalization and recruitment 

patterns were not provided.

Among the Kyrgyzstanis who have left to fight in Syria, a common profile emerges: “identifiable Kyrgyzstani participants in the Syrian conflict are primarily politically and economically marginalized ethnic Uzbeks from southern Kyrgyzstan whose messaging, recruiting, and 

social media activity is primarily in the Uzbek language and largely ignored by the Kyrgyzstani 

media.”57 Best available independent data on fighter flows also indicate that an estimated 500 

to 1,000 ethnic Uzbeks were fighting in Syria during 2015, with a majority of them likely from 

southern Kyrgyzstan.58 While many foreign fighters are transiting to Syria and Iraq to fight with 

ISIL, data on foreign fighter flows suggest most Kyrgyzistani/Uzbek fighters are traveling to 

Syria to fight with al-Nusra Front.59

One of the most well-respected voices in the fight against ISIL in Kyrgyzstan has been that 

of Rashot Kamalov, a prominent imam in the southern town of Kara-Suu near the Uzbek border. 

Kamalov took over the mosque after his father was killed in a Kyrgyzstani security services operation in 2006. He gained prominence for his willingness to criticize local and state officials, as 

well as to speak openly against terrorist organizations, including ISIL. In October 2015, a judge 

in southern Kyrgyzstan sentenced the Kamalov to 5 years in jail for “inciting religious hatred” 

and “possessing extremist materials.”60 The prosecution used sections from Kamalov’s sermons 

condemning ISIL to demonstrate the state narrative that he was allegedly supporting ISIL. Although the Kyrgyzstani government advertises its actions as necessary for security, the sequential 

persecution of Kamalov, other religious leaders, and the common ethnic people following them 

not only risks their good will toward the government but also may be increasing the internal risks 

to domestic stability.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan is the poorest country of the former Soviet Republics and its economy continues 

to face major challenges. It has a deep dependence on remittances from Tajikistanis working in 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

Russia, exhibits pervasive government corruption, and struggles with a major narcotrafficking 

role in the country’s informal economy.61 The Tajikistani government estimates that up to 1,000 

citizens have left to fight in Syria and Iraq, while ICSR reports a far more conservative figure of 

190 as of early 2015.62 This reporting discrepancy may indicate a motivated inflation of foreign 

fighter numbers by the Tajikistani government or it may reflect the fact that the government 

reports its diaspora in Russia in its accounting, while ICSR data do not. ISIL recruitment of 

Tajikistanis relies heavily on the glorification of celebrity jihadist commanders, such as Gulmurod Khalimov, who interact with independent journalists and religious leaders in Tajikistan 

via correspondence from the frontlines.63 Despite this, ISIL recruitment in Tajikistan is perhaps 

the least organized of all the Central Asian states as Tajikistanis fighting for ISIL maintain no 

dedicated official media outlet or spokesman.64

The Tajikistani government restricts religious freedom to an exceptional degree. The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was Central Asia’s only legally registered Islamist 

political party until it was banned by the government of President Emomali Rahmon in 2015, 

leaving the political opposition without any venue for peaceful political redress.65 The government continually tries to tie ISIL to Tajikistan’s domestic opposition, specifically the IRPT, and 

to a “Western” plot to “destabilize” the country, effectively amplifying information operations 

coming from Moscow.66 The government has engaged in acts such as forcible beard shavings 

and strict regulation of Friday mosque content, prompting the resignation of some of the more 

influential (and anti-ISIL) clerics in the country, including Kulobi imam Hoji Mirzo.67

Analysts of Tajikistan point out that while no change appears to be forthcoming on these 

repressive policies, “the Tajikistani state has attempted to show a changed approach to returnees, 

granting at least six Tajikistani citizens who had participated in the conflict in Syria amnesty.” In 

two specific cases, two 22-year-old Tajikstanis, Rizvon Akhmadov and Farrukh Sharifov, were 

among at least six currently reported Tajikistani citizens to take advantage of an amnesty offer. 

Sharifov and Akhmedov were migrant laborers in Russia when they chose to join ISIL. They 

have told their story on television and in talks around the country, warning others of the Islamic 

State brutality that motivated them to leave what they thought would be a paradise when they 

joined. In the view of many Tajikistanis on social media, allowing returnees to speak for themselves and granting them amnesty may be the only effective response to the ISIL threat adopted 

by the government so far and one that appears to enjoy broad public support.68

Much of U.S. policy in Tajikistan is predicated on the worry of militant “overflow” from 

bordering Afghanistan. Drug-trafficking has been a consistent concern along the TajikistaniAfghan border, and it remains unclear whether the current upswing in border incidents is due 
15

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

to traffickers or militants. This ambiguity is further obfuscated by the murky relations between 

opium production and the Taliban in Afghanistan.69

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan’s opacity makes it difficult to comprehensively analyze the local government policy regarding the threat from ISIL and other VEOs. Citizens are subject to stringent 

travel restrictions. The government limits independent news media and restricts certain Web 

sites. State-run (and oriented) news sources persistently deny Russian claims that there is an 

“active threat” within Turkmenistan.70 While tight control of travel in and out of the country 

limits the likelihood of attacks inside Turkmenistan, individual experiences with Draconian restrictions may contribute to radicalization. ICSR estimates that the number of Turkmen in Syria 

and Iraq was 360 as of early 2015.71 What remains to be seen is whether estimates of Turkmen in 

Syria and Iraq differentiate between ethnic Turkmen native to the Levant area and Turkey with 

Turkmens coming from Turkmenistan.72 Current Turkmen ISIL activity does not exceed what 

would be expected of an estimated 30–60 person population with origins in Central Asia: “Evidence observed from jihadist media by the Digital Islam project over the past two years would 

not support claims for an estimate larger than perhaps a few dozen Turkmenistan militants. No 

Turkmen language messaging targeting the public in Turkmenistan has been observed.”73

Uzbekistan

As noted already, an estimated 500 to 1,000 ethnic Uzbekistanis were fighting in Syria during 2015, with a majority of them believed to be from southern Kyrgyzstan.74 As many Uzbekistani-national jihadists have been expatriates for many years, we can safely assume that there 

may be as many as 400 to 500 more Islamist fighters with ties to Uzbekistan who have made it 

onto the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. This accounts for widespread reporting of many Uzbekspeaking militants fighting in the conflict across the Levant.

Much of Uzbek language messaging that extols the virtues of jihad in Syria was disrupted 

throughout 2013–2014 due in large part to the short lifecycle of Uzbek fighters in the field there. 

However, ISIL’s language messaging strategy continues to target all Uzbek speakers, those in 

Uzbekistan, throughout Central Asia, and in Russia.75 Uzbek language media, both domestic 

and international (such as BBC), portray ISIL as the primary jihadist threat for Uzbekistan, and 

largely ignores the Uzbekistani-led battalions and groups fighting for al-Nusra Front and the 

Syrian Islamic Front. A majority of Uzbekistani fighters are believed to be aligned with Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Although the IMU declared an official affiliation to ISIL in 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

September 2015, some of its splinter groups retain ties to al Qaeda and reportedly fight with 

al-Nusra Front.76

In February 2015, Uzbekistan’s domestic intelligence agency announced that it had intercepted militant communications claiming that terrorist attacks were planned across the country 

for that spring. These attacks did not materialize, leading outside analysts to believe that reports 

of ISIL activities and risks in Uzbekistan, as across Central Asia, are highly politicized and 

speculative.77

At the same time, changes to Uzbekistani policy since March 2015 demonstrate that religious openness can be effective in countering radicalization propaganda—even in the repressive 

Central Asian context and within a highly authoritarian system such as that of Uzbekistan—if 

the government actually commits to it. Uzbekistan’s movement toward greater tolerance for the 

open expression of Islam’s beliefs has come without any direct U.S. policy intervention. After the 

March 2015 presidential election that again stamped authoritarian strongman former President 

Islam Karimov’s longstanding lock on power, Uzbekistan has changed its tactics and started to 

actively downplay the threat ISIL internally poses to the country and to show that ISIL is subverting true Islam.78

The Uzbekistani government has begun empowering religious leaders to speak out 

against ISIL.79 Former President Karimov took the unprecedented step of releasing Hayrulla 

Hamidov, a highly respected Islamic poet and teacher, from jail to make him the face of the 

anti-ISIL campaign. Hamidov was jailed on dubious terrorism charges in 2010, but since his 

release he is still seen as a legitimate and popular religious figure, despite working in concert 

with the Uzbekistani government. Hamidov’s efforts to counter ISIL messaging have become 

extremely popular among ethnic Uzbekistanis. This tactic achieved immediate resonance, 

attracted significant attention, and prompted an official response from IMU and other dissenting radical Uzbekistani Islamic figures.

Whither Blowback? What Is Its True Potential in Central Asia?

There is significant anxiety regarding the prospect of jihadists returning from the conflict 

zone who are intent on overthrowing governments in Central Asia.80 Regional governments in 

particular fear such a scenario and have used this fear to justify stricter laws on religious practice 

and personal liberties. The risks of returning fighters, however, are not uniform across the region 

and are far from certain as a whole. Central Asian governments do face violent threats, but most 

of the important threats have originated from domestic rather than foreign sources. As of mid2016, there is little evidence of Central Asian fighters returning in significant numbers, and even 
17

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

less that those who have returned are organized for jihad. Many are likely to have been killed in 

Syria. A blanket description of all migrants to ISIL-controlled territory as potential returnees fails 

to recognize the motivations that prompted them to leave in the first place.

Tajikistanis fighting for ISIL have repeatedly threatened to return and wage jihad in Tajikistan, but they have remained in Syria so far. In January 2015, members of an IMU cell planning to attack a police station were arrested in Tajikistan.81 Yet as of mid-2016, instability and 

violence due to extremism has yet to materialize. It may be that ISIL’s current need for fighters 

in Syria (in order to bolster ranks depleted by coalition efforts) outweighs the desire of fighters 

to return home and fight, assuming that desire for return exists in the first place. Ongoing, lowlevel violence along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is generally attributed to narcotrafficking despite contrasting government claims that the violence is terrorism related.82

In Turkmenistan, the threat of instability due to returned fighters is not high. The government is more concerned with issues along its Afghan border than it is with Turkmens leaving to 

fight for ISIL or returning. Formal and informal restrictions prevent many Turkmen from leaving the country in the first place. The security services in Turkmenistan take an active role in 

dominating the narrative against ISIL. The Turkmens fighting in Syria and Iraq are not particularly organized and as such do not present a threat to Turkmenistan.83 However, Turkmenistan 

has requested security assistance from the United States in response to issues along its border 

with Afghanistan.84

Unlike Russia and its Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan has rarely seen attacks by Muslim hardliners. This does not mean that it has no risk of returning fighters because an estimated 

250 fighters of Kazakhstani origin have left the country for Syria and Iraq. In early June 2016, 

17 people, including 11 “extremists,’” were killed in Aktobe, near the site of attacks in 2011. The 

government claimed that the attackers followed radical, nontraditional religious movements.85

However, security services “often imitate counter-terrorism operations by accusing average 

criminals of siding with religious fighters.” It remains unclear if the June 2016 reported attack 

was a case of violent religious extremism or a case of armed gangs robbing commercial shops 

and being accused of terrorist activities.86 Kazakhstan has taken a relatively more constructive approach to addressing ISIL recruitment. In contrast to its post-Soviet neighbors, it has 

refrained from hyping the threat as a means of justifying internal religious repression, and it is 

much less reliant on remittances from migrant workers in Russia. This helps to reduce a major 

recruitment dynamic faced by neighboring countries such as Tajikistan.87

Kyrgyzstan has made significant progress in implementing democratic reforms over the 

past several years. The government, however, has recently begun using a seemingly exaggerated 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

threat of Islamic extremism as justification to crack down on political and religious opposition 

leaders. Rather than discouraging already marginalized people away from extremist organizations and recruiters, government heavy handedness plays into the narratives that extremist recruiters use. By silencing the moderate voices, the Kyrgyzstani government risks pushing 

marginalized communities towards more radical action.

Regional Recommendations

Any overarching U.S. policy addressing fighter flows from Central Asia must acknowledge 

that the region is first and foremost dominated by Russia’s security interests and capacity. Russian policy there will be focused on maintaining security and predominant influence. Some 

Russian interlocutors may acknowledge the long-term importance of addressing drivers of radicalization, but most observe that Russia will prioritize regime stability over human rights in the 

Central Asian countries.88 Russia wishes to see jihadist groups in Afghanistan that are isolated 

there denied access to Central Asia and Russia itself. But this potential point for security cooperation with the United States is presently lost in rhetoric from Moscow accusing Washington of 

intentionally orchestrating the deterioration of security in Afghanistan and the expansion of the 

Islamic State there.89 Combined with the visceral Russian opposition to U.S. influence in Central 

Asia, there seems little room for U.S.-Russian cooperation on Central Asian foreign fighter or 

radicalization issues directly in those countries. Even with a significant downturn in the Russian 

economy and the subsequent drop in remittances from Russia to Tajikistan and other Central 

Asian states, historic ties remain strong. At the same time, Central Asian states do want cooperation with and assistance from America, especially in the area of security. Simultaneously, 

they will remain resistant to U.S. calls for socioeconomic reform when receiving U.S. assistance, 

routinely criticizing the United States for pushing nefarious “Western influence.”

Rather than increasing direct general security assistance, the United States should pursue 

targeted increases in limited CT-focused security assistance and pair this with an increase funding for soft power activities such as CVE and civil society building, as well as its support for 

diaspora labor migrants. Because the U.S. Agency for International Development can no longer 

operate in Russia, the United States should facilitate skills training and information access for 

Central Asian labor migrants while still in Central Asia. These initiatives would not be as immediately visible as security assistance activities, but their long-term dividends are too important to 

ignore. Instead of delivering additional general military aid to governments that likely use it for 

more repressive and counterproductive purposes, selective CT security assistance and enhanced 
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The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

socioeconomic aid could sow the seeds of gradual social and political change—change far more 

meaningful for dampening the incentives for radicalization.

In parallel with the soft power focus, U.S. security assistance given to Central Asian states 

should prioritize greater CT border patrol intelligence cooperation that improves national abilities to track and intercept foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria who might return to their home 

countries, particularly through Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. In this context, the 

current DOD Counterterrorism Partnership Funds proposal for $20–$50 million in fiscal year 

2016–2017 for Central Asia security programs (aimed at assisting regional border security forces to improve border security intelligence, facilities, and mobility) seems prudently targeted for 

best effect—if the proposal remains limited to those specific aims.90

Tajikistan

Issues facing Tajikistan are some of the most nuanced in Central Asia. Thus a nuanced U.S. 

security and socioeconomic assistance policy is required. Hard policy decisions must be made: 

Is the main U.S. assistance priority that of stability? Is it maintaining U.S. influence? Or is it facilitating democratization? To some extent, tenets of these priorities may be mutually exclusive. 

Policymakers should be aware of the possibility that continued security assistance to Tajikistan 

would be seen as an endorsement of the occasional heavy-handed crackdowns on “radical Islamist threats” emanating from Dushanbe.

To the threat perception of radical Islam in Tajikistan, Central Asia experts John Heathershaw and David Montgomery of Exeter University have stated, the Government’s response to 

the conflict may increase the likelihood of outbreaks of Islamic militancy in the longer term.”91

A case in point is the recent forced beard-shaving campaign conducted under the guise of an 

“anti-radicalisation campaign.”92 If the roots of radicalism were in facial hair, this would indeed 

be an astute policy approach. Unfortunately, this potential risk factor has been struck from the 

list of correlates to jihad. The actions taken by the Tajikistani government to counter extremism 

quite predictably will, as a consequence of “being detained in the street and forcibly taken to the 

police department or a barber shop,” create legitimate grievances among the 13,000 Muslims, 

and some may take things further.93

In counteracting ISIL messaging to Tajikistanis, prominent cleric Hoji Mirzo Ibronov has 

been moderately successful, and this should be capitalized on. Having taken such drastic measures against the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan while allowing Hoji Mirzo to remain in 

the public arena takes away from the perception of his independence and as such delegitimizes 

his message, as effective as it may be. A good start for Tajikistan would be to empower other 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

imams across the country to speak out against ISIL, allowing them independence while removing restrictions such as state approval of sermons or forcible shaving of beards. It remains to be 

seen whether the Tajikistani government can reverse course and what amount of political Islam 

it can tolerate, but even a token political group, independent from governmental Islam, would 

have a positive effect, as the IRPT has previously.

Russian information operations have saturated Central Asian Internet forums and social 

media. They state that ISIL is the result of U.S. meddling and conspiracy. The United States 

could be effective in advocacy, however, by pressuring the Tajikistani government to release 

imprisoned political activists (especially those involved with the IRPT). U.S. support for democracy should result in concrete gains for the Tajikistani public. Given Russian control of the 

information sphere, this is one of the few places America could improve its image.

The United States reportedly provided $29 million in security and defense assistance aid to 

Dushanbe in 2014 and about $8 million in 2015, but the amount could jump again because the 

CTFP proposed in February 2016 to allocate $50 million to Central Asia over the next 2 years 

to help counter the Taliban, Islamic State, and other militant groups, with a priority focus on 

assistance for Tajikistan.94

The CTFP proposal for Tajikistan in fiscal year 2016–2017 must exercise discipline 

when making the country a “feature state” for its CT approach, limiting the scope of activities to prudent security increases along critical borders with a focus on intelligence, facilities, 

and mobility there.95 Simultaneously, the United States should resist initiatives to extend or 

expand general Tajikistani military and paramilitary capabilities to prevent more capable 

and repressive activities against ethnic and religious minorities across the country. Concurrently, the United States should tether additional targeted CT assistance to Tajikistan with 

the government’s willing participation in conferences and other activities aimed to improve 

national capabilities to counter violent extremism, building on the CVE seminar hosted by 

the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe in February 2016.96

Turkmenistan

The threat of instability in Turkmenistan is not particularly high. The Turkmens fighting in 

Syria and Iraq are not particularly organized and as such do not present a threat to Turkmenistan.97 The government of Turkmenistan is more concerned with issues along its Afghan border 

than with Turkmen leaving to fight for ISIL or coming back. Since Turkmenistan has requested 

security assistance from the United States in response to issues along its border with Afghanistan, 
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The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

that aid might come with U.S. conditionality targeted at greater openness in stability collaboration and in expanding socioeconomic opportunities across the country.98

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has taken a relatively more constructive approach to addressing ISIL recruitment. That said, degrees of religious persecution are still evident and the government must take 

significant steps in other areas. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is widely praised for turning 

Kazakhstan into one of the most prosperous former Soviet states. But his rule has grown increasingly heavy handed with political opponents jailed and marginalized.99

The United States should continue to solicit Kazakhstan’s support in carrying out CVE 

activities, including by hosting conferences like the one in January 2015.100 Furthermore, 

while Kazakhstan has acknowledged the recruitment of some of its own citizens by ISIL, it has 

often resorted to censorship of online and independent media outlets in order to maintain 

its control over the narrative and convince its citizens that it there is no significant problem 

posed by ISIL that it cannot control. Ultimately, the significant degree of government censorship is counterproductive; it inhibits potentially moderating voices from Muslims who are 

strongly anti-ISIL.

As with all Central Asian states, Russian information operations penetrate the public 

and private discourse in Kazakhstan. While ISIL is not portrayed as an existential threat to 

Kazakhstani territory, which necessitates the repression of Kazakhstani Muslims, ISIL is frequently depicted as a bogus threat created by the United States. In response, the United States 

should seek to demonstrate tangible support for moderate and anti-ISIL voices wherever possible, including bringing pressure to release imprisoned imams and to recognize the efforts 

of moderating voices.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has made significant progress in implementing democratic reforms over the 

past several years. However, the government appears to have begun to use of an exaggerated 

threat of Islamic extremism as a justification a crackdown on political and religious opposition leaders. By silencing moderate voices, the Kyrgyzstani government risks distancing the 

marginalized ethnic Uzbek minority even more. This may lead to greater domestic instability 

and animus toward the Kyrgyzstani government, either from indigenous religious extremism 

or renewed ethnic violence.
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

The United States should advocate for moderate and anti-ISIL voices wherever possible. 

Addressed earlier in this paper, Rashot Kamalov is an imam who gained prominence for his 

willingness to criticize local and state officials as well as speak openly against terrorist organizations, including ISIL. Kamalov was sentenced to 5 years in jail for “inciting religious hatred” and 

“possessing extremist materials” in October 2015.101 However, his arrest and sentencing were 

almost certainly in response to his criticisms of corrupt local and state officials.102

Uzbekistan

Although former President Karimov’s March 2015 release of Islamic Imam Hayrulla Hamidov from jail and Karimov’s tolerance of greater open discussion of Islam and Islamic beliefs 

has been noteworthy, the U.S. State Department continues to assess Uzbekistan’s human rights 

conditions as of “serious concern.”

Despite some press reporting from the state-controlled media, the threat of Islamist-inspired instability in Uzbekistan is not high. State-run security agencies have tight control and 

reportedly resort to exceptional measures of torture and depredation to maintain it.103 In the 

past, the U.S. State Department has issued waivers for direct security assistance to Uzbekistan, 

and this has led to sharp criticism of America from a wide array of international human rights 

agencies, including Amnesty International.

Uzbek-language ISIL radicalization and recruiting propaganda is broad-based in its targeting and tends to have most impact upon Uzbekistani expatriates and migrant workers. 

Thus the direct danger to Uzbekistan stability from that propaganda is less within and more 

outside of the country. Neither the United States nor its allies would generate much advantage 

in trying to support Uzbekistan’s longstanding efforts to tightly control media or social media 

messaging.

As in Kyrgyzstan, the United States should seek to demonstrate support for religious and 

political openness. To the extent that Hayrulla Hamidov represents a figure of moderate Islam, the United States should support his and other similar voices in Uzbekistan. President 

Karimov’s successor will certainly be selective and clever in the assistance he or she seeks from 

Washington. However, the United States should not agree to direct support of Uzbekistan’s repressive security apparatus, and should instead emphasize support for political and economic 

openings that will provide all Uzbekistanis with greater opportunities and more reasons not to 

leave the country and join with jihadist groups.
23

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

Conclusions

From 2012–2015, ISIL has attracted a coalition of Central Asian jihadists and sympathizers with a network of links in the region and in the nearby areas of Xinjiang, China, and the 

Caucasus. Dangerous violent extremist organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have leveraged affiliations in Syria and Iraq to gain traction lost across Central and South 

Asia in years prior to 2012. But the clear operational nexus of Central Asian jihadists in the 

heart of the Middle East does not mean that the repressive governments of Central Asia confront a dire or certain blowback threat from jihadist violence at home. The risks are present, 

but properly assessed in mid-2016, the problem is not dramatic. Many factors mitigate against 

a return to Central Asia of a critical mass of Syria-trained jihadists capable of toppling regional 

governments and establishing an extension of the ISIL-led caliphate.

Many Central Asian governments are using—and often overstating—the risks of foreign 

fighter return to bolster repressive political agendas, curtail civil liberties, and seek additional 

lethal assistance from outside donors. In this manner, they are exploiting rather than realistically addressing the problems of radicalization and instability. These governments must be 

encouraged to create balanced and viable CVE action plans. Such plans must feature programs 

to reduce the risk factors for radicalization and generate credible rehabilitation programs for 

those seeking to return from doing jihad in Syria or elsewhere abroad. This kind of balance can 

only be struck when the leaders of the region move away from repressive-only approaches and 

expand political, economic and educational opportunities while at the same time ending ruthless security services practices that generate widespread distrust and fear.

The United States, as other outside security partners, is best advised to refrain from any 

hasty favorable response for greater, more lethal general security assistance by these governments as the best means to combat returning foreign fighters. Instead, the U.S. should offer the 

Central Asian governments additional and targeted border and intelligence CT security assistance, simultaneously extending to them the more robust socio-economic assistance necessary 

to expand domestic opportunities and establish de-radicalization programs as part of wider 

CVE initiatives for those seduced by ISIL or other jihadist propaganda.
24 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

Notes 1 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaeda, the al-Nusra front, and numerous 

other Salafi jihadist organizations fit under the much broader U.S. category of violent extremist organizations. See Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (Washington, D.C.: 

The White House, February 18, 2015), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/

fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>; Paul Davis, Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations and Their Supporters without Adverse Side Effects, Working Paper WR-909-OSD 

(Washington, DC: RAND, March 2012), 3–8, available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

working_papers/2012/RAND_WR909.pdf>.

2 In early 2016, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Tina Kaidanow observed that, “the international terrorist threat picture has been transformed by ISIL’s territorial expansion, the promulgation of its so-called caliphate, and its campaign aimed at the West. Weak 

or failed governance has allowed ISIL to take territory in Syria and Iraq and continues to provide an 

enabling environment for ISIL and its affiliates, notably in the Sinai, Libya, and Yemen. ISIL’s seizure of 

territory in Iraq and Syria; its continued access to significant numbers of foreign terrorist fighters; its 

increased number of global branches; its unprecedented use of social media to spread its message, radicalize and recruit individuals to violence; and its external plotting through directed and inspired attacks 

has elevated it to our most pressing counterterrorism priority at this moment.” See Tina S. Kaidanow, 

“Countering the Spread of ISIL and Other Threats,” remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Washington, DC, February 3, 2016, available at <www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/252082.htm>.

3 Eugene Rumer, Richard Solilsy, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25, 2016), available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/u.s.-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0/itlr>.

4 Data demonstrating U.S. assistance trajectory is presented later in the paper.

5 Described in more detail later in the paper. See Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia, 

Europe and Central Asia Briefing No. 72 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 20, 2015), 1–3, 

available at <www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/central-asia/b072-syria-calling-radicalisation-incentral-asia.pdf>.

6 Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses 

Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” International Center for the Study of Radicalization, January 26, 

2015, available at <http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s>.

7 Of note, there is a grand debate among experts about the factors that contribute to individual 

radicalization and the propensity to become a terrorist group member, including a Salafi jihadist group 

member. Some experts find an absence of economic opportunity to be a factor, if not a major one. 

Other scholars dispute the role of economic deprivation in the process of radicalization, pointing to the 

number of rich and privileged joining terrorist organizations. Many scholars view repressive political 

climates as a key factor in the alternative expression of needs, wants, and grievances as violence. Others 

minimize the factor of political repression in the individual choice for radicalism and terrorism. Some 

scholars argue that national programs for identification and reintegration of one-time terrorists and 
25

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

jihadists are a critical factor in reducing the risks from radicalization and instability. Others have found 

that these programs produce uncertain results and may not be of much value. For a review of these and 

other academic debates regarding radicalization and the choice to violent action, see Matthew Francis, 

“What Causes Radicalisation? Main Lines of Consensus in Recent Research,” RadicalisationResearch.

org, January 24, 2012, available at <www.radicalisationresearch.org/guides/francis-2012-causes-2/>; 

Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Revie of Conceptual Models and Empirical 

Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 11 (Winter 2011), 37–62, available at <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1140&context=jss>; Saliha Metinsoy, “What Are the Common Factors That Drive Radicalization,” Newsweek.com, June 17, 2016, available at <www.newsweek.

com/what-drives-radicalization-471661>. With these debates noted, this paper develops the important 

role that poor economic conditions, political repression, and an absence of credible means for generating social connections within the Central Asian republic states play in the preconditions for radicalization and the choice to jihad. Each of these factors contributes to what the majority of radicalization 

literature agrees is a common trait in those ripe for radicalization: the feeling of social alienation and 

the desire for positive social relations and solidarity that the cells of a terrorist organization provide. For 

a general review of this consensus on radicalization, see Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: 

Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), 78–

105; Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in 

Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1990), 7–24.

8 For ISIL’s advances in terrorist organization marketing and social media use, see J.M. Berger, 

“How ISIS Games Twitter,” Atlantic.com, June 16, 2014, available at <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/>; Javier Lesaca, “On Social 

Media, ISIS Uses Modern Cultural Images to Spread Anti-modern Values,” Brookings Institution, 

September 24, 2015, available at <www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2015/09/24-isis-socialmedia-engagement>.

9 Estimates of non-Syrian fighters joining jihad there and in Iraq between 2011 and late 2015 

range from a low of 27,000 to a high of 31,000. All points in this range indicate the great importance of 

foreign fighters to the jihad in Syria and the Levant. See Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al Qaeda, 

The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1; Foreign 

Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq (New York: The Soufan Group, December 2015), 4–9, available at <http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/

TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf>.

10National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011), 6, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf>.

11 In part, this is now done through the Department of Defense Counterterrorism Partnership 

Funds (CTPF) established in 2014. Here Central Asia is among the regions for CTPF partnership-fund 

focus. The fund targeted $20 million in CT money toward Central Asia in fiscal year 2016 and proposes an increase to $30 million for fiscal year 2017. The fiscal year 2017 plan proposes assistance to Tajikistan as a feature state and with focus on security programs for countering regional terrorist groups, 

while assisting security forces to improve border security intelligence, construction, and mobility as 
26 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

a priority—but not exclusive—security effort. See Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund: Department of 

Defense Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

[Comptroller)], February 2016), 1, 10–11.

12 See Joshua Kucera, “Pentagon Proposes $50 Million Program to Help Tajikistan Fight Terrorists,” Eurasianet.org, February 16, 2016, available at <www.eurasianet.org/node/77366. 

13 Maciej Falkowski and Józef Lang, Homo Jihadicus: Islam in the former USSR and the Phenomenon of the Post-Soviet Militants in Syria and Iraq (Warsaw: Center for Eastern Studies, September 2015), 

40, available at <www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/homojihadicus.pdf>. Also see Foreign Fighters, 10, 

14–15.

14 Here, ummah denotes the Sunni Islam population worldwide. See Falkowski and Lang, 40.

15 Syria Calling, 1–3; Neumann.

16 See Thomas Grove, “Vladimir Putin Sympathizes with Turkey after Airport Killings,” Wall 

Street Journal, June 29, 2016, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/vladimir-putin-sympathizes-withturkey-after-airport-killings-1467196514>.

17 Ibid., 43.

18 Syria Calling, 13–14.

19 Edward Lemon, “Assessing the Threat of Returning Foreign Fighters from Central Asia,” Geopolitical Monitor.com, September 18, 2014, available at <www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/assessing-threatreturning-foreign-fighters-central-asia/>.

20 For examples, see, Bayram Balci and Didier Chaudet, “Jihadism in Central Asia: A Credible 

Threat After the Western Withdrawal from Afghanistan?” Carnegie Endowment.org, August 13, 2014, 

available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/08/13/jihadism-in-central-asia-credible-threatafter-western-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-pub-56381>; Reid Standish, “Shadow Boxing with the 

Islamic State in Central Asia,” ForeignPolicy.com, February 6, 2015, available at <http://foreignpolicy.

com/2015/02/06/shadow-boxing-with-the-islamic-state-in-central-asia-isis-terrorism/>; Ryskeldi Satke, 

Casey Michel, and Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, “The Islamic State Threat in Central Asia: Reality or Spin?” 

Terrorism Monitor 13, no. 6 (March 2015), available at <www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43680&cHash=0675ecbfd7e509e815ff002b4143e228#.V40YBPnR_mE>.

21 Frank J. Cilluffo, “Wanted: Foreign Fighters—The Escalating Threat of ISIL in Central Asia,” 

testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), June 

10, 2015, available at <https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CentralAsianForeignFighters.pdf>; Mark Kramer, The Return of Islamic State Fighters: The Impact on the Caucasus and Central Asia, PONARS Eurasia Memo 381 (Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, August 

2015), available at <www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/return-islamic-state-fighters-impact-caucasus-andcentral-asia>. For an earlier, similarly worrisome conclusion, see John C.K. Daly, “Islamic Movement 

of Uzbekistan Flirts with ISIS,” SilkRoadReporters.com, October 13, 2014, available at <www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/13/islamic-movement-uzbekistan-flirts-isis/>.

22 “ISIL Child Training Camp Discovered in Istanbul: Report,” Hurriyet Daily News (Turkey), October 19, 2015, available at <www.hurriyetdailynews.com/isil-child-training-camp-discovered-in-istanbulreport-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=90052&NewsCatID=341>; “The Child Soldiers of Islamic State,” RFERL.

org, October 30, 2014, available at <www.rferl.org/content/islamic-state-child-fighters/26666558.html>.
27

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

23 Uran Botobekov, “ISIS and Central Asia: A Shifting Recruiting Strategy,” The Diplomat, May 17, 

2016, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/isis-and-central-asia-a-shifting-recruiting-strategy/>.

24 Antony J. Blinken, “An Enduring Vision for Central Asia,” remarks at the Brookings Institute, 

Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, available at <www.state.gov/s/d/2015/240013.htm>. This U.S. policy 

approach toward Central Asia remained unaltered in 2016.

25 In addition to these two main policy aims, the United States asserts sustained “connectivity” to the region as an official policy objective. See Blinken; Reid Standish, “Watchdogs Say U.S. 

Turned Blind Eye to Uzbek Abuse,” ForeignPolicy.com, April 15, 2015, available at <http://foreignpolicy.

com/2015/04/15/amnesty-international-uzbekistan-central-asia-war-on-terror-torture/>.

26 In 2010, the U.S. security assistance was 56 percent of its overall $385 million in total aid to 

the Central Asia region. But in 2014, direct security assistance it was 41 percent of its ≈ $194 million in 

overall regional aid. Much if not all of this general security assistance decline is scheduled to be offset 

by CTPF funds for targeted security support in 2016 and 2017. See details in text associated with table 

1 of this paper. Also see the Center for International Policy’s Security Assistance Monitor, available at 

<http://securityassistance.org>.

27 Catherine Putz, “Tajikistan Battered with Criticism, but U.S. Waives Sanctions,” The Diplomat, April 2016, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/tajikistan-battered-with-criticism-butus-waives-sanctions/>.

28 For an in-depth exploration of Russian and other external support for Central Asian militaries, see Dmitry Gorenburg, External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces (Stockholm: 

SIPRI, January 2014), available at <www.sipri.org/research/security/afghanistan/central-asia-security/

publications/SIPRI-OSFno1WP.pdf>.

29 Approximately $6 million worth of International Military Education and Training annually, 

which as of 2014 translated to 109 trainees, per SecurityAssistance.org.

30 In 2015, there were approximately 3,000 officers from Uzbekistan alone studying at Russian 

military schools. See Dmitry Gorenburg, “Ever Wondered about the Military Balance in Central Asia?” 

RussiaInsider.com, July 3, 2015, available at <http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/ever-wonderedabout-military-balance-central-asia/ri8488>.

31 See Security Assistance Monitor. Data for total 2015 U.S. aid and security assistance was not 

fully available at the time of this writing. However, incomplete 2015 information did reveal a substantial 

cut to the category of U.S. military and police aid for all regional countries, with much of the past funding in this category evolving to management under the new, targeted CTPF in 2016 and 2017. After a 25 

percent decline from 2014 to 2015, U.S. humanitarian and development aid for 2016 and 2017 forecasts 

a return to a level slightly above 2014 numbers.

32 This rise and decline in U.S. assistance to the states of Central Asia largely paralleled the 

increase in U.S. military and security forces pushed into Afghanistan during the U.S. and North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization troop surge there from 2009 to 2013. Washington’s attention toward 

Central Asia spiked during the Afghanistan surge as Central Asia and Russia provided critical rail and 

air access—through what became known as the Northern Distribution Network—for the additional 

troops and support personnel moving during the surge. See Deirdre Tynan, “Afghanistan: The Pressure Is Now on Central Asian Supply Route,” Eurasianet.org, December 7, 2011, available at <www.
28 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

eurasianet.org/node/64650>; John C.K. Daly, “Russia Shutters Northern Distribution Network,” Eurasia 

Daily Monitor 12, no. 111 (June 15, 2015), available at <www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_

news%5D=44034&no_cache=1#.V4famoTR9aQ>.

33 Security Assistance Monitor.

34 Ibid.

35 Countering violent extremism (CVE) refers to proactive actions to counter efforts by violent 

extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that 

facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence. See Department of State & USAID 

Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (Washington, DC: Department of State, May 2016), 

4, available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/257913.pdf>. Also see Peter Romaniuk, Does 

CVE Work? Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to Counter Violent Extremism (Goshen, IN: Global 

Center on Cooperative Security, September 2015), available at <www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/

uploads/2015/09/Does-CVE-Work_2015.pdf>; Owen Frazer and Christian Nunlist, The Concept of 

Countering Violent Extremism, No. 183 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, December 2015), 1, available at <www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/

CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf>.

36 Here the authors include the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s breakaway offshoot, the 

Islamic Jihad Union, as part of this main group with extraregional consequence. See “Islamic Jihad 

Union,” Terrorism Research Analysis Consortium, available at <www.trackingterrorism.org/group/

islamic-jihad-union-iju>; Daly, “Islamic Movement”; Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Islamic Jihad Union 

Details Its involvement in Taliban’s Azm Offensive,” The Long War Journal, July 25, 2015, available at 

<www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/islamic-jihad-union-details-its-involvement-in-talibansazm-offensive.php>.

37 Falkowski and Lang, 69.

38 Ibid., 40.

39 Anna Dyner, Arkadiusz Legieć, and Kacper Rękawek, Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed 

Expansion into Central Asia, PISM Policy Paper No. 19 (121) (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International 

Affairs, June 2015), available at <www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20020>.

40 Syria Calling, 6.

41 Paul Goble, “80 Percent of Tajiks Fighting for ISIS Recruited While in Russia, Dushanbe Says,” Window on Eurasia, January 19, 2016, available at <http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.

com/2016/01/80-percent-of-tajiks-fighting-for-isis.html>; Catherine Putz, “Central Asia’s Migrants Face 

Suspicion in Russia,” The Diplomat, April 1, 2016, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/centralasias-migrants-face-suspicion-in-russia/>.

42 “From Tajikistan to Russia: Vulnerability and Abuse of Migrant Workers and Their Families,” 

International Federation for Human Rights, October 2014, available at <www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/russie641uk2014hd.pdf>.

43 Ibid., 11.

44 Noah Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Kazakhstan, CERIA Brief No. 13 

(Washington, DC: Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, February 2016), available at 

<https://app.box.com/s/q2deq68fvhjkgn8ijp2ywy7xshpuqzt9>; Goble.
29

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

45 Umida Hashimova, What 2015 Is Promising for Labor Migrants from Central Asia, CERIA 

Brief No. 23 (Washington, DC: Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, March 2015), 

available at <https://app.box.com/s/bwoq8p80wfbn7brg2wyczzusx2p8ljhn>.

46 United Nations (UN), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 

“Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin,” POP/DB/MIG/Stock/

Rev.2015. UN data are calculated mid-year every 5 years and as such does not cover the last year of 

further cutbacks in migrant flows.

47 Dugald McConnell and Brian Todd, “ISIS Fighter Was Trained by State Department,” CNN, 

May 30, 2015, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/29/politics/isis-man-trained-in-us/>.

48 Marnie O’Neill, “U.S.-Trained Police Sniper Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov Made ‘ISIS 

Minster of War,’ News.com, September 8, 2016, available at <www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/

ustrained-police-sniper-colonel-gulmurod-khalimov-made-isis-minister-of-war/news-story/5469ea355

13f9c8a4eba5cf553d5171c>.

49 John C.K. Daly, “Tajikistan Worried by Islamic State’s Threat to Central Asia,” SilkRoadReporters.com, December 04, 2014, available at <www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/12/04/tajikistan-worried-islamic-states-threat-central-asia/>.

50 Falkowski and Lang, 2.

51Ned Levin and Ayla Albayrak, “Istanbul Airport Bombers Were from the Former Soviet 

Union, Turkey Says,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2016, available at <www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-detains-13-in-raids-linked-to-istanbul-airport-terror-attack-1467282081>; Thomas Grove, “Former Soviet 

Republics Are Fertile Ground for ISIS Recruiting,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2016, available at <www.

wsj.com/articles/former-soviet-republics-are-fertile-ground-for-isis-recruiting-1467311228>.

52 Neumann.

53 Tucker.

54 “Senior U.S. Delegation in Astana for the Central and South Asia Regional Conference on 

Countering Violent Extremism,” Media Note, Department of State, Washington, DC, June 26, 2015, 

available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244422.htm>; ibid.

55 Joanna Paraszczuk, “Kyrgyz Official Blames Minority Uzbeks For Syria Presence,” RFERL.

org, March 17, 2015, available at <www.rferl.org/content/isis-kyrgyzstan-kyrgyz-uzbeks-syria-fightersislamic-state/26905648.html>; Tucker.

56 “Twenty-Two Kyrgyz Nationals Killed in Syria,” RFERL.org, February 2, 2015, available at 

<www.rferl.mobi/a/kyrgyzstan-22-killed-syria/26825435.html>.

57 Ibid., 3.

58 Neumann.

59 An August 30, 2016, suicide car bombing against the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 

corroborated analysis that the limited linkages that do exist between Salafi jihadist groups in Syria and 

militant operatives in Kyrgyzstan mainly come from the al-Nusra Front, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. 

Kyrgyzstan’s State National Security Committee reported that the suicide bomber had been identified as 

a Kyrgyzstan citizen (born in Osh), who had joined the anti-China East Turkestan Islamic Movement 

(ETIM) and then trained in Syria in explosive attacks before returning to Kyrgyzstan on a Tajik passport 

under ETIM orders in June 2016. ETIM groups in Syria operate under the al-Nusra front umbrella organi-
30 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 21

zation. See “Jabhat al-Nusra Behind Attack on Chinese Embassy to Kyrgyzstan—Kyrgyz Security Agency,” 

Interfax.com, September 6, 2016, available at <www.interfax.com/news.asp?y=2016&m=9&d=6&pg=3>.

60 Umar Farooq, “Kyrgyzstan and the Islamists,” The Diplomat, November 16, 2015, available at 

<http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/kyrgyzstan-and-the-islamists/>.

61 “Tajikistan,” in The CIA World Factbook, available at <www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ti.html>.

62 “Рахмон: «Более 1000 таджиков воюют в Сирии и Ираке» [Rahmon: “More than 1,000 

Tajiks Fighting in Syria and Iraq”], Radio Azattyk, January 25, 2016, available at <http://rus.azattyk.org/

content/tajikistan-more-than-thousand-fighters-syria-iraq/27508035.html>; Neumann.

63 Noah Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Tajikistan, CERIA Brief No. 11 

(Washington, DC: Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, February 2016), 3, available at 

<https://app.box.com/s/o4q4porur5wg0xu1ngvseukxgwgkjiew>.

64 Ibid.

65 Catherine Putz, “Tajikistan Uses Laws to Crush Islamist Opposition,” The Diplomat, July, 10 

2015, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/tajikistan-uses-laws-to-crush-islamist-opposition/>.

66 Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Tajikistan, 3.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Bruce Pannier, “All Unquiet on the Tajik-Afghan Frontier,” RFERL.org, March 12, 2016, available at <www.rferl.org/content/qishloq-ovozi-unquiet-tajik-afghan-border/27606705.html>.

70 Noah Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Turkmenistan, CERIA Brief No. 

15 (Washington, DC: Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, February 2016), 3, available 

at <https://app.box.com/s/k6qqvl3b2gsr08tyqu45flg211hz7icg>.

71 Neumann.

72 Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Turkmenistan, 33.

73 Ibid.

74Noah Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Uzbekistan, CERIA Brief No. 

12 (Washington, DC: Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, February 2016, available 

at <http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2016/02/16/public-and-state-responses-to-isis-messaginguzbekistan/>.

75 Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Turkmenistan, 2.

76Thomas F. Lynch III, Islamic State as Icarus: A Critical Assessment of an Untenable Threat

(Washington, DC: The Woodrow and Wilson Center for International Scholars, October 2015), 15–16, 

26, available at <www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/theislamicstateasicarus.pdf>; Jacob Zenn, “Al 

Qaeda–Aligned Central Asia Militants in Syria Separate from Islamic State-Aligned IMU in Afghanistan,” 

Terrorism Monitor 13, no. 11 (May 29, 2015), available at <www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_

ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43968&cHash=618bae17a86c2d23c30b7e219c3c731c#.V1hqhITR9aQ>.

77 See John Heathershaw and David W. Montgomery, The Myth of Post-Soviet Muslim Radicalization in the Central Asian Republics (London: Chatham House, November 2014), 6, 10–12, available at 

<www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141111PostSovietRadicaliz

ationHeathershawMontgomery.pdf>; Standish, “Shadow Boxing.”
31

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

78 Noah Tucker, “Uzbek Extremism in Context, Part 2: The Internet, Social Media and Religious 

Speech”, Registan.net, October 14, 2013, available at <http://registan.net/2013/10/14/uzbek-extremismin-context-part-2-the-internet-social-media-and-religious-speech/>. After quarter century as Uzbekistan’s only president, Islam Karimov died of a stroke on September 2, 2016. See “President Islam 

Karimov of Uzbekistan Dies at Age 78,” New York Times, September 2, 2016, available at <www.nytimes.

com/aponline/2016/09/02/world/asia/ap-as-uzbekistan-president-profile.html?_r=0>; Andrew Roth, 

“Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan Strongman Who Exploited Anti-Terror Fight, Dies at 78,” Washington Post, 

September 2, 2016, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/islam-karimov-uzbekistan-strongman-who-exploited-anti-terror-fight-dies-at-78/2016/09/02/3e08f846-7059-11e6-8365-b19e428a975e_

story.html>.

79 Ibid.

80 In addition to earlier citations focused on these fears, see Dylan Morris, “ISIS in Central 

Asia: Threat or Illusion,” ForeignBrief.com, March 21, 2016, available at <www.foreignbrief.com/isiscentral-asia-threat-illusion/>.

81Daniil Turovsky, “‘Congratulations, Your Brother’s Become a Martyr’: How Moscow’s Migrant Workers Became Islamic State Fighters,” Meduza Project, April 2015, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2015/04/27/congratulations-your-brother-s-become-a-martyr. 

82Nazarali Pirnazarov, “Barely Guarded Afghan Border Puts Ex-Soviet Tajikistan in Peril,” 

Reuters, April 21, 2016, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tajikistan-afghanistan-borderidUSKCN0XI107>; Ovozi.

83 Tucker, “Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Tajikistan,” 3.

84 Joshua Kucera, “Turkmenistan Asks U.S. for Military Aid to Address Afghan Border Instability,” Eurasianet.org, March 2015, available at <www.eurasianet.org/node/72761>.

85Olzhas Auyezov, “Exclusive: Suspect in Kazakh Shooting Posted Islamic State-Linked 

Video,” Reuters, June 8, 2016, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-kazakhstan-shooting-exclusiveidUSKCN0YU1TM>.

86Mansur Mirovalev, “Kazakhstan: 17 Killed in Series of ‘Extremist’ Attacks,” Al-Jazeera.com, 

June 6, 2016, available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/kazakhstan-17-killed-series-extremistattacks-160606105755961.html>.

87 Bank of Russia, “External Sector Statistics,” available at <www.cbr.ru/eng/

statistics/?PrtId=svs>.

88Authors’ interview with former U.S. Defense Attaché to Moscow, Washington, DC, February 

15, 2016; National Endowment for Democracy, “Eurasia,” available at <www.ned.org/region/eurasia/>.

89 “ISIS training Militants from Russia in Afghanistan, ‘U.S. and UK Citizens among Instructors,’” RT.com, October 8, 2015, available at <www.rt.com/news/317989-afghanistan-isis-train-russians/>.

90 See Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, 1, 10–11.

91 John Heathershaw and Sophie Roche, Islam and Political Violence in Tajikistan, Ethnopolitics 

Papers No. 8 (Exeter, United Kingdom: Exeter Centre for Ethno-Political Studies, March 2011).

92 Anora Sarokova, “Tajikistan’s Battle Against Beards to ‘Fight Radicalisation,’” BBC.com, January 2016, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35372754>.

93 Ibid.
32 

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94Pirnazarov; Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, 10–11.

95 See Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, 10–11.

96 Embassy of the United States, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, “U.S. Embassy Conducts Countering 

Violent Extremism Seminar,” February 1, 2016, available at <http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/pr020116.html>.

97 Tucker, Public and State Responses to ISIS Messaging: Turkmenistan, 3.

98 Kucera, “Turkmenistan Asks.”

99Mirovalev.

100 See Department of State, “Central and South Asia Regional Conference on Countering 

Violent Extremism (CVE) (Summary Report),” available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/245601.pdf>.

101 Farooq.

102 “Kyrgyzstan Detains Imam for ‘Encouraging Followers to Fight for ISIS,’” The Guardian, 

February 18, 2015, available at <www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/kyrgyzstan-imam-encouraging-followers-fight-for-isis>; ibid.

103 Standish, “Watchdogs Say.”
33

The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia

About the Authors

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III is the Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia, the Near 

East, and Radical Islam in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, at the National Defense University (NDU). He researches, writes, lectures, and organizes workshops and conferences for Department of Defense customers on the topics of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and the Subcontinent; the Gulf Arab states; and the past and future 

trajectory of radical Islam. Dr. Lynch has published widely on the politics and security of South 

Asia, the Near East, and radical Islam including articles in Orbis, The American Interest, The 

Washington Quarterly, and Joint Force Quarterly; book chapters in publications by NDU Press, 

Oxford University Press, and Johns Hopkins University Press; and feature monographs with 

the New America Foundation, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Hudson 

Institute, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and NDU Press. Dr. Lynch joined NDU 

in 2010 after a 28-year career as an Active-duty U.S. Army officer, serving in a variety of command and staff positions as an armor/cavalry officer and as a senior-level politico-military 

analyst. Dr. Lynch holds a BS from the United States Military Academy and an MPA, MA, and 

Ph.D. in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 

Affairs at Princeton University.

Michael Bouffard is a Master of Arts Candidate in Security Policy Studies in the Elliott 

School of International Affairs at The George Washington University.

Kelsey King and Graham Vickowski are 2016 Graduates of the Master of Arts in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington 

University.

Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit inss.ndu.edu.

COL KRIS A. BAUMAN, USAF, PH.D.

Senior Military Fellow

DR. G. ALEXANDER CROWTHER

Senior Research Fellow

DR. T.X. HAMMES

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. FRANK G. HOFFMAN

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. LAURA J. JUNOR

Director

DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. ANDRE LE SAGE

Senior Research Fellow

DR. THOMAS F. LYNCH III

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. DENISE NATALI

Senior Research Fellow

DR. JAMES J. PRZYSTUP

Senior Research Fellow

DR. PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS

Distinguished Research Fellow