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22–307 2016

PROPOSED REFORMS TO RULE XXI AND THE 

MODERN AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

RULES AND ORGANIZATION 

OF THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE ON RULES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

(RCH 114–1) 

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2016 

( 


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COMMITTEE ON RULES 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas, Chairman 

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New 

York, Ranking Member 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

JARED POLIS, Colorado 

HUGH NATHANIAL HALPERN, Staff Director 

MILES M. LACKEY, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio, Chairman 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New 

York, Subcommittee Ranking Member 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

MARK GILBRIDE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ADAM M. BERG, Minority Staff Director 


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C O N T E N T S 

THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2016 

Page 

Speakers Index ......................................................................................................... V 

Hearing on Proposed Reforms to Rule XXI and the Modern Authorization 

and Appropriations Process ................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX 

Prepared Statements: 

Insert 1–1: Statement of the Hon. Tom McClintock, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of California ................................................................ 35 

Insert 1–2: Statement of the Hon. H. Morgan Griffith, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Virginia .............................................................. 39 

Insert 2–1: Statement of the Hon. David E. Price, a Representative in Congress from the State of North Carolina .............................................................. 42 

Insert 2–2: Statement of the Hon. Tom Cole, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Oklahoma ................................................................................ 51 


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SPEAKERS INDEX 

Byrne, Hon. Bradley; a Representative in Congress from the State of Alabama 

Cole, Hon. Tom; a Representative in Congress from the State of Oklahoma 

Collins, Hon. Doug; a Representative in Congress from the State of Georgia 

Griffith, Hon. H. Morgan; a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Virginia 

McClintock, Hon. Tom; a Representative in Congress from the State of California 

McGovern, Hon. James P.; a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Massachusetts 

Price, Hon. David E.; a Representative in Congress from the State of North 

Carolina 

Slaughter, Hon. Louise McIntosh; a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York 

Stivers, Hon. Steve; a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio 


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HEARING ON PROPOSED REFORMS TO RULE 

XXI AND THE MODERN AUTHORIZATION 

AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 

THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

RULES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE HOUSE, 

COMMITTEE ON RULES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., in Room 

H–313, The Capitol, Hon. Steve Stivers (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Stivers, Collins, Byrne, Slaughter, and 

McGovern. 

Mr. STIVERS. The chairman has a really good microphone here. 

Welcome to the subcommittee. It is great to have everybody here, 

and we are having our first hearing in the subcommittee this Congress. It is great to have the gentleman from Massachusetts. We 

are looking forward to the gentlelady from New York joining us 

here in a few moments. 

And while I am not a big fan of opening statements, I would like 

to just give a quick opening statement, talk about the purpose and 

method of this and future hearings. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘Proposed Reforms to Rule XXI and 

the Modern Authorization and Appropriations Process.’’ It is the 

first of several hearings we will have, and the aim of these is to 

explore improvements of how the House of Representatives functions. 

Today, we want to have a constructive discussion among Members about the intersection of the House rules of appropriations 

and authorization and overall Federal spending. 

At the center of this intersection is House rule XXI. Clause 2 of 

this rule prohibits the inclusion of legislative provisions in authorizations bill, while clause 4 restricts authorizing committees from 

reporting legislation that contains appropriations. Rule XXI also 

prohibits appropriations of unauthorized programs and altering 

mandatory programs in appropriations legislation. 

But we all know, in practice, the separation of authorization and 

appropriating can get blurred. It can give rise to disputes between 

authorizing and the Appropriations Committee while also frustrating Members in their attempts to pursue policy goals that are 

important for their constituents and our country. 

So finding potential solutions to address these issues may help 

the House return to regular order and make our institution more 


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effective at addressing the great issues facing our country today. 

But if these issues are addressed poorly, we could end up gumming 

up the process and making it worse. 

For that reason, I am honored to have Representatives McClintock and Griffith before the committee. They put a lot of thought 

into separate proposals that, among other things, would amend 

rule XXI with respect to the current restriction on making changes 

to the funding of mandatory programs in appropriations bills. Both 

Representatives serve on authorizing committees, and Representative McClintock will also add the perspective of being a member of 

the Budget Committee. 

So I am also honored to be joined by Representative David Price 

and our own Tom Cole, who serves on our committee but is also 

an appropriator. And it is great to have the perspective of an appropriator in this process as well. 

Lastly, I am honored that you are here to talk about this. I am 

hopeful that Members will find this subcommittee to be an inclusive place. We want everybody to feel like they can have their robust discussion here and exchange their thoughts in a very respectful way. 

I am encouraged that we have full attendance, and I look forward to having real, thoughtful, conversations on these proposals. 

With that, I—do you know where—she is on the elevator. I 

will—— 

Mr. COLLINS. Keep talking. Filibuster—— 

Mr. STIVERS. We will just take a pause for a moment and wait 

on the gentlelady from New York. 

Mr. MCGOVERN. Do you want me to give my—— 

Mr. STIVERS. Do you want to—I will recognize the gentleman 

from Massachusetts. 

Mr. MCGOVERN. I will associate myself with the comments of Ms. 

Slaughter in a few minutes. 

Look, I would rather deliver my whole statement here. I am kind 

of troubled by the proposals that are being brought before the 

Rules Committee today. You know, authorizations and appropriations do get mixed up with one another, and that is because we 

allow it to happen that way. We are constantly adding waivers— 

we are constantly adding riders to appropriations bills and authorizing language to appropriations bill that this committee, you 

know, provides all the waivers to do. I wish that wasn’t a pattern. 

It is not just unique to when the Republicans have been in control. 

The Democrats have done that on occasion as well. I think it is 

bad, bad practice. 

But when people talk about needing to get at mandatory spending, I think sometimes people forget that we have the ability to do 

that if we so choose. There is nothing that prevents us from doing 

that, other than we don’t want to do it. So you don’t need to have 

all of these little magical fixes, you know, to mess around with the 

appropriations process if you want to get at mandatory spending. 

We can have the committees of jurisdiction do hearings and do 

markups and report out legislation if that is what people want to 

do. And we could have a debate and make amendments in order. 

We could vote up or down on it. That is called regular order. And 

all of these attempts to get around regular order to try to find, you 


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know, backdoor approaches to getting at something that people 

don’t seem to want to do, I think what it does is it could damage 

the entire appropriations process. And we have got to keep this 

government running. And it already is difficult enough. We can’t 

even get a budget. And the problem with the budget is even the 

Republicans are having a battle amongst their own ranks about 

what a budget should be. So, at the end of the day, you want to 

tackle these issues, we have just got to do our jobs. 

And so I don’t like what is being proposed here today. I respect 

the Members who are before the committee, but, you know, it is not 

as if you can’t do it. You know, the party in charge can do whatever 

they want to do and let the House work its will through regular 

order. And I don’t think these are necessary. So, having said 

that—— 

Mr. STIVERS. There she is. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Hi. 

Mr. MCGOVERN. Louise, I just agreed with everything you are 

about to say. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. All right. 

Mr. MCGOVERN. I yield back. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you, all. I am so sorry. 

Mr. STIVERS. I yield time to the gentlelady from New York. 

Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you, Mr. Stivers. 

I got held up, something I am sure most of you are pretty much 

familiar with. 

I do have an opening statement, but it is nice to see all of you. 

All right. The proposed changes to House rule XXI would fundamentally change the way the Chamber has been governed since 

1876 and would further inject partisanship into our already fraught 

appropriations process. 

Let me be clear: the changes to rule XXI, as proposed, would 

alter longstanding House rules to make it easier to sabotage responsible spending bills. One of the rules changes proposed today 

would strictly prohibit appropriating money for programs with 

lapsed authorizations. 

To take one example, we have not reauthorized the State Department since fiscal year 2003, but we are very much unlikely to shut 

down the State Department. The unfortunate reality is there are 

a number of controversial issues to be tackled in every authorization, and in today’s climate, it has been difficult to impossible to 

reach agreement. But we have continued to appropriate money for 

the State Department, because, obviously, we can’t do without it. 

Under one of these proposals today, if a reauthorization of the 

State Department couldn’t get the support of the Republican 

House, 60 votes in the Senate, and the signature of the Democratic 

President, we would be unable to appropriate any more money for 

the State Department, and the Department would have to shut its 

doors. 

Under another of today’s proposals, we would do away with the 

age-old prohibition of legislating on appropriations bills. 

The Republican majority in the House could and would insert 

cuts to Medicare, Social Security, or food stamps into all the appropriations bills, which would lead all House Democrats to vote 

against the bills and cause the bills to fail in the Senate and cause 


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the President to oppose them. We would virtually be guaranteeing 

more full or partial government shutdown. 

These proposals are yet another tactic to slash any spending that 

they choose, even at the risk of turning off the lights at the offices 

of agencies that protect our national security and keep us safe, 

such as the Departments of Defense and State, FEMA, NASA, 

Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service. 

And not only would these changes impact our national security, 

they would erode the bedrock of our social contract. The proposed 

changes are a backdoor way to cut Social Security, Medicare, veterans’ benefits, WIC, Head Start, and the community block grants, 

programs that Americans rely on but the Republicans have been 

trying to slash for years. 

And, what’s more, the proposed changes would make it even 

more difficult to keep the government open and to avoid shutdowns. In our politicized environment, it is already hard enough to 

keep the government running with brinksmanship, political ploys, 

widespread grandstanding. These proposals would make the government shutdowns more likely by weighing down the annual appropriations process with controversial mandatory spending cuts to 

programs that Americans rely on. 

We know the massive and sweeping implications that this seemingly small change would make, and we hope that a change like 

this will not go unnoticed by the media, the advocates, and Americans alike. 

The larger view is this: It isn’t the House’s rules that are keeping 

Republicans from passing bills. The real issue here is the failure 

to run the House. We have no budget. They won’t address the Flint 

water crisis, our crumbling national infrastructure, the looming 

threat of Zika virus, or any critical issues that are challenging us 

and frightening the public. We can’t let this technical change derail 

our appropriations process that is already overburdened with divisive tactics and antics. So we have real problems to address, and 

I fear this change would make it even harder than it already is. 

And I yield back the balance of time. 

Thank you, Mr. Stivers. 

Mr. STIVERS. Well, thank you. 

So you just heard the bells ring. Votes were called. We would like 

to try to get through as much of the testimony as we can before 

we take a short recess to let folks vote. The order that I would like 

to invite folks to testify is almost straight down the row, except I 

would like Mr. Price to go before Mr. Cole in the interest of bipartisanship. So we will go Mr. McClintock, Mr. Griffith, Mr. Price, and 

then Mr. Cole, if that is amenable. 

I would like to go ahead and recognize the Honorable Mr. 

McClintock. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. TOM MCCLINTOCK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very much for holding this hearing today. 

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen 

warned that in his professional military judgment, our greatest national security threat is our national debt. He issued that warning 


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$4 trillion of debt ago. The interest costs on that debt are eating 

us alive: $255 billion this year that will accomplish nothing more 

than to rent the money that we have already spent. 

The Congressional Budget Office warns that, within 6 years, our 

interests costs will exceed what we are currently spending on the 

entire defense budget. 

Last May, Congress adopted a budget that changed this disastrous trajectory and pointed us back to balance by 2024. But having set that course, we then had to stay that course, and we 

haven’t. 

The budget now awaiting House action doesn’t balance until 

2026 and only then if we are able to summon the discipline to stick 

to these new numbers. Now, on very rough figures, we are now 

spending about $4 trillion per year; $2 trillion of that is for trust 

funds, Social Security, and portions of Medicare. When these funds 

run out of money, the benefits automatically plunge. That is a 

major problem, but it is not, strictly speaking, a budget problem. 

Roughly $1 trillion is the discretionary spending that is directly 

under Congress’ annual appropriations control. Now, that spending 

is actually declining. In 2010, our discretionary spending is $1.35 

trillion. The budget now before us spends $1.07 trillion. That is 

down almost $280 billion. The problem is the remaining $1 trillion 

that Congress does not directly control. That is mainly entitlement 

programs, like food stamps, ObamaCare, Medicaid. This spending 

is exploding, and the only way to control it is to change the underlying laws, something that today’s divided government makes virtually impossible. 

But there is an alternative: to control mandatory spending 

through the same appropriations process that controls discretionary spending. 

The problem is our own rules won’t allow it. Rule XXI, clause 

2(b), forbids any changes to mandatory spending in an appropriations bill. So I propose permitting appropriations bills to include 

such statutory adjustments to mandatory spending as are necessary to keep within the enacted budget. Think of it as one-stop 

reconciliation. It is necessary because spending is a pleasant experience. Cutting spending is very painful. 

So spending bills pass, and reforms necessary to control spending 

do not. 

Now, this reform would not give the Appropriations Committee 

carte blanche to assume the prerogatives of authorizing committees. It would be limited to annual and temporary changes necessary to keep spending in line within the budget parameters. It 

could be done upon consultation with the authorizing committees, 

or at least their chairmen, and would be pursuant to the budget 

that Congress has already enacted. 

A second reform I would urge you to consider is to gradually revive enforcement of House rule XXI, clause 2(a), which forbids appropriations, except for purposes authorized by law. 

Ms. Slaughter is incorrect. This is not a new idea. This is in the 

rules. It dates back to 1837, and it is the mechanism that forces 

Congress to review its programs periodically. As the program’s authorization expires, Congress must revisit it to ask obvious questions: Is it effective? Is it meeting its goal? Is it needed? Is it worth 


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the money we are paying? Depending on the answer to these questions, Congress then renews the program, reforms it, or lets it die. 

Well, this process is broken down to the point that, today, nearly 

one-third of our discretionary spending is for programs whose authorization expired years, if not decades, ago. 

And Ms. Slaughter is correct. Some of these programs are vital, 

but others have degenerated into the outrages often cited by taxpayer watchdog groups. But authorizing committees feel no urgency to revive them because we routinely fund them anyway by 

routinely waiving this rule. 

Now, given the backlog of unauthorized programs, such a reform 

can’t be implemented overnight. But the House should express its 

intention to restore this rule over a reasonable period, first, by 

freezing appropriations for unauthorized programs and, ultimately, 

forbidding them. And, of course, case-by-case exceptions can always 

be made by the House. 

Before we can provide for the common defense or promote the 

general welfare, we have to be able to pay for them. And history 

warns us that countries that bankrupt themselves aren’t around 

very long. I believe that these two reforms that we can make by 

ourselves, without action by the Senate or the President, are essential to restoring functional control of the purse strings to the Congress. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. McClintock can be found in the Appendix 

as Insert 1–1.] 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

Next, I would like to recognize the Honorable Morgan Griffith 

from Virginia. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you very much for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing. I am pleased to come before the subcommittee to discuss changes to rule XXI and how best to reform 

the authorization and appropriations process. One proposal I have 

would restore the ability of Members of Congress to offer more limiting language amendments to appropriations bills on the floor. 

As a background, in 1983, when the Democrats were in the majority, the rules were changed at that point. So this is not a longstanding rule that dates back to the 1870s or 1880s. It was 

changed in 1983. It was seen at that time—it made it harder to 

make amendments. It was seen at that time as a response to the 

fact that the Reagan Republicans in the minority were working in 

a bipartisan fashion with some of the Democrats to get some cuts 

or limiting language into appropriations bills. The changes that I 

would propose would largely restore the rule that existed prior to 

1983 and remain substantially unchanged since it began in 1876 

to 1880. This change opens up mandatory spending to so-called 

limitation amendments during the appropriations process, as this 

autopilot spending is currently protected from reductions by rule 

XXI. See the attachment that I gave you previously, No. 1, for the 

rule itself. 


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My proposal would give Members of both parties the ability to 

offer amendments on the floor and in the Appropriations Committee to cut the amount of money an agency could receive, the 

number of employees that the U.S. Government or its agencies 

could have, and the amount of money that could be paid to an employee of the U.S. Government. Prior to 1983, amendments abolishing offices, such as Customs Service, reducing the number of 

naval officers, and imposing an employment ceiling on Federal employees, et cetera, were held to be in order under that rule. 

Now, I am not saying that we should do all of those things. I am 

just saying that we ought to have the opportunity as duly elected 

Members of Congress to do that. 

Now, I keep in my office a core sample of the rules. And so when 

I hear folks say that this is a rule that goes back to certain time, 

I go back to my core sample and look. And in our 1880 rule—and 

I ask you to take a look at the amendment that I have proposed. 

And I am going to read you the section, the pertinent section, 

under the 1880 rule, which was pretty much the same until 1983, 

100 years: ‘‘Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment 

thereto changing existing law be in order, except such as being germane to the subject matter of the bill, shall retrench expenditures 

by the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the 

United States by the reduction of the compensation of any person 

paid out of the Treasury of the United States, or by reduction of 

the amounts of money covered by the bill.’’ 

If you take a look at my changes in 2(b) and 2(c) of rule XXI, 

you will see this language: Except germane provisions that retrench expenditures, one, by reducing amounts of money covered by 

the bill, which may include those recommended by the Committee 

of Appropriations by its direction of a legislative committee having 

jurisdiction over the subject matter; two, by reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; and, three, by 

reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States. 

The order is different; the language is the same. So I think it is 

important that we take a look at this, because we are going back 

to the system. It is not going to make it harder to make our jobs. 

If that were the case, it wouldn’t have survived 100 years. It will 

get us back to a system where Members of Congress actually have 

authority to make proposals. It doesn’t mean they will pass, unless 

they can get a majority on the floor. Generally, that means you 

have to have some bipartisan support. 

As my colleague, Mr. McClintock, said, it is impossible to get serious about cutting spending and setting priorities in Washington 

when our own rules prevent us from doing so. We must modify rule 

XXI to open up mandatory spending to the will of the House and 

eliminate barriers that put mandatory spending outside the reach 

of the amendment process. 

We are $19 trillion in debt. We can’t continue to shield mandatory spending. 

Now, you know, we have heard that you can do that with a separate bill, and that is true. But most of the bills that we have that 

are really the big ones are authorizing for, usually, 5 years. Sometimes we shorten it to 2 years or 3 years, but it is usually for 5 


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years. Once that bill is passed, absent getting the committee to go 

in and say, ‘‘We made a mistake,’’ and reverse itself, you have no 

other way, except through the appropriations process with a 

change in rule XXI, to effect a change. So I don’t think it is exactly 

correct to say you can do it in the authorizing bill. 

The American people expect us to get it done. We can get it done, 

but we have to change our rules of operation in order to make that 

happen. 

So, you know, I think it is important for a legislative branch of 

government to have this authority and this power. I think we have 

given up too much of our power in many ways. This is one step 

that brings it back, not only to the House and to the Senate, but 

to individual Members to at least make the proposals they think 

are important. 

And I have given you an appendix that shows you that while 

Medicaid, Medicare, food stamps, those are the issues that are 

going to get all the attention, we have hundreds of programs—now, 

I will tell you: this is my list. We don’t actually—nobody has ever 

provided us with a list. We asked CRS how to get it. They told us 

how to go try to find some of it. This is a list I have been able to 

come up with on mandatory spending. But when you look at, say, 

we tried to find the Wild Horse and Burro Program, which is mandatory spending, you have got this page here, got a little star there, 

and that might be the program it is in. But you get into subprograms, and then you have got these four or five programs over here 

on this page, which might be the Wild Horse and Burro Program. 

But when I went to try to amend that early in my term here—and 

I have been here for 5-plus years now—I was told: Oh, you can’t 

do that, except by making a change in the farm bill, because of rule 

XXI. 

So it is not something that just happens once in a while. It happens all the time. Members are proposing changes, eliminating programs, reducing the numbers of employees in programs, cutting the 

money, and we are not allowed to do it. That is not the way a legislative body should operate, and I hope that you all would join me 

in supporting this rule, because, whether you are a Democrat or a 

Republican, this gives more power to the legislative branch of government in the long term and to its Members. And that means 

that, in order to be an equal branch of government, we have to 

have this power, whether the Democrats are in control or the Republican are in control. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The statement of Mr. Griffith can be found in the appendix as 

Insert 1–2.] 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you very much. 

The Members are advised that there are about 350 Members who 

still haven’t voted. We have about 6 minutes left on the clock. So 

we might be able to get through both of the next witnesses’ testimony. 

I now recognize and welcome to the subcommittee the gentleman 

from North Carolina, the Honorable David Price. 


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STATEMENT OF THE HON. DAVID E. PRICE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, 

and colleagues. I am glad to be with you today. I appreciate the 

chance to testify in opposition to this proposed change to rule XXI. 

I am here primarily as a representative of the House Appropriations Committee minority, but it is fair to say that the concerns I 

will raise are shared by my many members of the Committee from 

both parties. I want to begin, though, by acknowledging what I 

think is the premise of this discussion today, and we can all agree 

on this: In recent years, the congressional budget and appropriations process has broken down to the point of dysfunction. Budget 

resolutions are adopted late or not at all. Appropriations bills are 

stitched together in omnibuses, usually after a series of continuing 

resolutions that are necessary to avoid a government shutdown. 

And as the authors of these proposals have highlighted, far too 

many Federal agencies and programs languish without proper authorization. 

In this context, it is understandable that the idea of radical reforms to the House appropriations process would hold appeal for 

some Members in search of solutions to our current woes. But I believe this is truly a case where the proposed remedy would be a 

good deal worse than the disease. 

The rules changes before us today would weaken Congress’ 

power of the purse by undermining its authority to enact mandatory spending and by prohibiting appropriations for programs that, 

for whatever reasons, are unauthorized. They would further politicize and immobilize the once bipartisan appropriations process by 

opening the floodgates to mandatory spending changes in the annual appropriations process. And, to top it off, they would punish 

Federal employees for carrying out directives under the law. 

In short, the changes would only exacerbate our current dysfunction, not relieve it. 

Now, longstanding rules don’t automatically have merit. However, in this case, time has proven the 25th Congress correct in 

separating the appropriations process from the authorizing process 

through rule XXI to, quote, ‘‘prevent delay of appropriations bills 

because of contention over propositions of legislation,’’ end quote. 

Now, nothing in rule XXI has prevented us from enacting balanced budgets over the past 179 years. Instead, such failure has resulted from an unwillingness to compromise on revenues and expenditures. Many of us in this room today were here for the 

multiyear budget agreements in 1990, 1993, and 1997. They helped 

produce a roaring economy, and we had 4 years of balanced budgets. 

We have paid off $400 billion of the national debt. Why is that 

so hard to figure out? Why is that such a hard precedent to return 

to? I would contend the consequences of the George W. Bush administration’s fiscal policies plunged us back into deficit financing 

through trillions of dollars in lost tax revenue and two unpaid-for 

wars. Then, of course, we had the necessary but expensive countercyclical responses to the great recession. All of that has contributed 

to the past 5 years of extremely partisan, a largely dysfunctional, 

congressional budgetary politics. 


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The Members offering their proposals before us today are attempting to scapegoat rule XXI for the problems of partisan dysfunction, driven largely by rightwing budgetary ideology. They are 

trying to change House rules in order to enact long-time priorities 

that are too politically unpopular to pass through regular order, 

namely, cuts to America’s safety net. And, meanwhile, they have 

signed a pledge, of course, not to ever touch revenues. 

I want to focus on the major changes proposed by the McClintock-Griffith amendments to rule XXI. Both would affect the authorizing and appropriations processes in significant ways to the 

detriment of both. 

Rule XXI was set up by the 25th Congress to avoid the delay of 

appropriations because of conflicts and debates inherent in the establishment of new policy unrelated to the budget. The proposal before you today, offered by Mr. McClintock, would, among other 

changes, enable a point of order against unauthorized appropriations and allow reductions in mandatory spending to be enacted 

through appropriations bills. 

Let me start with the first. Ostensibly, this provision is aimed at 

unauthorized appropriations. It is put forth as a way to force Congress, under threat of a shutdown, to review unauthorized programs. Now, let me be clear: The solution to the problem of unauthorized appropriations is important. And it is important for the 

authorizing committees to do their job and reauthorize or eliminate 

unauthorized programs. But to hold annual appropriations legislation, must-pass legislation that funds critical authorized and unauthorized governmental functions, to hold that hostage to the inaction of authorizing committees would only serve to create more 

brinksmanship and manufactured crises. 

What are the practical implications? Ms. Slaughter has already 

referred to some of those. Proponents of the change cite CBO estimates that, in fiscal 2016, Congress appropriated approximately 

$310 billion in funding, approximately one-third of the budget, for 

programs operated under expired authorizations. They say that 

shows rule XXI needs reform. 

What the number really highlights is the breakdown of authorizations. But it certainly is not an indictment of the appropriations 

process or evidence that most unauthorized programs lack broad 

bipartisan and bicameral support. 

So this has already been mentioned: Eliminating such funding 

through a point of order would force such entities as the National 

Institutes of Health, National Weather Service, and NASA to shut 

down immediately, pending action of the authorizing committees. A 

number of agencies and programs critical to the national security 

would be forced to put up a ‘‘closed’’ sign: the entire U.S. Coast 

Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Prison 

System, the Secret Service, Customs and Border Protection, along 

with Federal grants to State and local law enforcement agencies. 

We would also have to close a little-known agency known as the 

U.S. State Department. 

Mr. STIVERS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. PRICE. Yes. 


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Mr. STIVERS. Apparently, they are not going to hold the vote 

open downstairs. So if we could—and I hate to cut you in the middle of your testimony. 

Mr. PRICE. No, that is fine. 

Mr. STIVERS. If we could resume there, if we can just go down, 

and as soon as the last vote—how many votes are we talking? 

There is a bunch. So, as soon as the last vote is done of the five 

votes, come right back, if you could. But I don’t want anybody to 

miss a vote. 

Thank you. We stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. STIVERS. I would like to call the meeting back to order and 

recognize the Honorable David Price. 

I am so sorry that we interrupted you. Please continue. 

Mr. PRICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to continue where I 

left off, I—— 

Mr. STIVERS. You can start if you want to—do what you want. 

Mr. PRICE. No, no. I will start right here in the middle, and we 

will wrap as quickly as possible. I know better than to impose any 

further. 

Anyway, I was saying the proposed rule would require us to shut 

down these agencies, these departments. And unless the authorizing committees acted to reauthorize every aspect of these departments or agencies, that is a process that, itself, is difficult. It is 

fraught with longstanding partisan divisions. You know, we would 

be out of business. It is a recipe for chaos. 

It is a threat to national security. We regularly pass the Defense 

Authorization Act after the DOD appropriations bill. The proposal 

before us would jeopardize our national defense by tying critical 

annual funding to the authorizing process. 

Further, if a Member wants to eliminate an authorized program 

or department like the Department of State, for example, they are 

welcome do introduce an amendment on the House floor doing so 

and put it to a vote. Nothing stopping a Member from coming to 

the floor during debate on an appropriations bill to strip out funding for a program or agency in that bill. 

Now, as a senior appropriator, I am naturally sensitive to major 

changes in the appropriations process, but I really believe the annual work of appropriations serves the entire institution. It serves 

our place in the constitutional balance of power, regardless of 

which party is in power and regardless of who is President. 

That is why appropriations has historically been relatively bipartisan. And it is why the Congress’ place in the constitutional order 

is compromised to the extent appropriations is swamped by partisan maneuvers, and by that I mean everything from poison-pill 

riders to ideological budget resolutions or politically divisive cuts to 

unauthorized programs or entitlements that distract from the work 

of crafting workable annual funding bills. 

Now, let me ask just take a final moment to address the proposal 

before us to allow reductions in mandatory spending in appropriations bills. That is the second major proposal. 

It should be clear to all political observers that conservative Republicans are pushing this idea as a means of catering to the most 


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right-wing supporters, unrelenting in their desire to slash entitlements and slash our Nation’s social safety net. 

And it is not like I am making this up. This isn’t a new idea. 

We have seen numerous Ryan budgets. They voucherize Medicare, 

they block-grant Medicaid, they slash nutrition assistance to lowincome Americans. We remember President George W. Bush’s efforts to partially privatize Social Security. This isn’t new. This is 

another effort to placate the most conservative elements of the Republican Party. 

Now, there is nothing wrong with scrutinizing our fiscal situation, reviewing spending and tax expenditures, including appropriated and mandatory spending. In fact, we should be doing that 

systematically, regularly. All elements of the Federal budget should 

be considered as part of a comprehensive budget deal. 

But we should not single out any one item. The majority party 

in recent years has singled out domestic appropriations as though 

that were the entire budget. Now, in this proposal, we are singling 

out entitlements and, moreover, using them to gum up appropriations bills. 

I really believe today’s effort has more to do with conservative 

ideology than with any balanced approach to budgeting. 

The only thing currently preventing Congress from reducing or 

increasing mandatory spending is political will. And any one of 

these authorizing committees that meets down the hall could gavel 

into session today; they could report a bill with changes to entitlement programs. The reason they will not is not because of rule 

XXI. The reason they won’t is because Members of Congress lack 

the courage to compromise on long-term spending priorities. 

So this rules change wouldn’t solve that problem. It would only 

raise the stakes of partisan impasse by attaching such debate to 

must-pass appropriations bills. Very bad idea. 

Mandatory spending programs such as Social Security, Medicare, 

Medicaid, veterans’ benefits, Federal employee retirement and disability, food and income security programs, those are lifelines for 

millions of American families, many of whom have earned their 

benefits through years of paying into these programs through Federal service. When Congress originally created these retirement 

and social safety net programs, it explicitly decided that beneficiaries should not be subject to the vagaries of the annual appropriations process. 

Further, this provision is biased in favor of reducing mandatory 

or entitlement spending, allowing only reductions in such spending, 

never increases, to be included in appropriations legislations. Now, 

why would we want to do that? Why would we want to tie the 

hands of future Congresses to adjust entitlement spending as needed on behalf of the American people? After all, these programs 

exist to provide for the most vulnerable members of society. 

The rule jeopardizes long-term and future assistance for the poor 

or the elderly by favoring cuts over increases or even over minor 

adjustments and tying long-term and sensitive entitlement funding 

like Medicare to annual budgets of agencies like Education and 

Labor. 

So, to put it plainly, Mr. Chairman, if the majority wants to cut 

entitlements, they should put a bill on the floor and have a straight 


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up-or-down vote. They could do that tomorrow. Everyone in this 

room knows such an effort would fail because it would be at odds 

with the will of the overwhelming majority of the American public. 

So instead of honoring the public’s preference in a straightforward manner, we are instead entertaining an effort to end-run 

the House budget process through a rules gimmick. It is as if the 

conservative wing of the majority is admitting they can’t win the 

debate straight up so now they want to change the rules of the 

game. No wonder people are cynical about our politics. 

It is clear the existing budget process has broken down. We have 

passed ideological and unrealistic budget resolutions that make 

passing appropriations bills nearly impossible. The proposed 

changes before us today would fix none of this and only make it 

worse. 

We must muster the political will to make difficult and politically 

costly decisions. And that includes, I must say, whoever the next 

President is, whatever the next Congress looks like, it includes a 

comprehensive budget plan. And it has to address the main drivers 

of our deficit—that is, tax expenditures and entitlement spending— 

as well as the full gamut of appropriated spending. 

We have a precedent in the nineties as to what such budget 

agreements look like. The proof was 4 years of balanced budgets, 

$400 billion of the national debt paid off. Why is that so hard to 

understand? 

I urge my colleagues to reject the proposed changes to rule XXI 

and redouble our efforts to address the underlying causes of our 

long-term fiscal challenges. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Mr. Price can be found in the Appendix as Insert 2–1] 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you very much. 

And now I recognize one of our own on the Rules Committee and 

a subcommittee chair on the Appropriations Committee, Congressman Tom Cole. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. TOM COLE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Mr. COLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 

Chairman Stivers and Ranking Member Slaughter, for the opportunity to testify today regarding the proposed reforms to rule XXI 

and the modern authorization and appropriations process. As a 

member of the Appropriations Committee, the Rules Committee, 

and the Budget Committee, I look forward to discussing whether 

changes are needed in the current House rules to make the appropriations process better. 

I find myself in the unusual position as an appropriator of arguing against nonappropriators who want to enhance the power of 

the Appropriations Committee. I actually joked to my good friend 

Mr. Price earlier, if we are going to become the new Ways and 

Means Committee, maybe we could take over those splendid Ways 

and Means Committee rooms and just swap out where we do our 

humble work. 

But as many of you are aware, the appropriations process is vested in Congress by section 9, Article I of the Constitution. Enacting 


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annual appropriations is something the Congress must do under 

the Constitution. It only follows that House rules providing for consideration of these bills should help, not hinder, the enactment of 

appropriations bills. 

One of the largest challenges the Appropriations Committee faces 

is the decline of the reauthorization process. As we all know and 

several members have stated, CBO reports that $310 billion in 

funding was providing in the fiscal year 2016 budget for programs 

whose authorization had lapsed. 

In response to these challenges, there have been thoughtful suggestions, some by my colleagues testifying here today. One suggestion is amending rule XXI to create an additional point of order on 

appropriations bills that would require unauthorized programs to 

be left unfunded or frozen as a way to incentivize the authorization 

committees to enact authorizations. 

In my opinion, these proposals have serious downsides. First of 

all, I do not see how additional points of order on appropriations 

bills will serve as an incentive to authorizating chairmen to move 

their authorization bills. The target is being put on the wrong back. 

It is also unrealistic to expect that Congress will not fund our national security while awaiting a defense authorization bill, or that 

Congress will shut down funding for the National Institutes of 

Health for lack of an authorization, or that no increase will be provided for veterans’ health when an authorization isn’t moving for 

whatever reason. 

The net result would be more pressure on the Rules Committee 

to provide additional waivers to these new rules. In addition, these 

changes would create obstacles to rapidly responding to emergencies and would disadvantage the House in relationship to the 

Senate, which does not have similar rules. 

If the intent is to incentivize the authorization process, then proposals should address the authorizing committees, not the Appropriations Committee. However, if the intent of the proposed amendments of rule XXI is to ensure that no objectionable unauthorized 

programs are funded, there is already a process to prevent this, the 

so-called Armey protocol. 

Currently, every appropriations bill is sent to the authorizing 

committee before being considered in the Rules Committee. If the 

authorizing committee objects to funding for an unauthorized program, it can already be exposed to a point of order. Rather than 

expanding additional points of order that are not likely to achieve 

their intended purpose and likely to make the appropriations process more arduous, we should focus on making sure the Armey protocol functions as intended. 

Another set of proposals recommends changing rule XXI to make 

it easier to amend mandatory programs on appropriations bills, including a proposal to reinstate the so-called Holman rule, which 

was removed in 1983. This rule would allow changes in existing 

law as part of an amendment to reduce spending in an appropriations bill. 

These proposals would significantly expand what amendments 

could be offered on appropriations bills. They would allow appropriations amendments that are legislative in nature, including how 

agencies and programs are staffed, structured, and compensated, 


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things that are directly under the jurisdiction of the authorization 

committees and involve permanent changes in law. It would diminish the roles of the authorizing committees, make them less central 

to the legislative process, and at the same time make it harder to 

pass appropriations bills. 

It would involve appropriations bills in more controversies and 

increase the number of amendments to appropriations bills, which 

has already exploded in recent years. In 1982, the last year the 

Holman rule was in effect, there were 59 floor amendments offered 

to the 10 appropriations bills brought to the floor. Last year, there 

were 456 amendments proposed to the 7 bills that came to the 

floor, an 800-percent increase. I shudder to think how long it would 

take to consider an appropriations bill with a whole new category 

of made-in-order amendments not necessarily related to discretionary funding. 

In conclusion, I believe that any changes in rule XXI must be 

carefully considered. We should consider proposals to change rule 

XXI to determine if they will help us achieve our shared goal of the 

enactment of annual appropriations bills. From my perspective, I 

am concerned that these proposed changes will not necessarily address the real challenges that their sponsors seek to change. 

At the same time, I am certainly willing to work with my colleagues to identify changes that will make the process work more 

smoothly and will ensure that the authorizing committees do their 

jobs. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions you 

might have. 

[The statement of Mr. Cole can be found in the Appendix as Insert 

2–2.] 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate all of you for being here today and sharing your perspectives on these proposals. 

I have a couple questions for Mr. McClintock. 

You said on the second part, on page 3, where we would gradually revive enforcement of rule XXI, clause (a)(2). How would you 

propose gradual enforcement? Either we are going to enforce it or 

we are not. So I want to understand—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, we don’t enforce it now. 

Mr. STIVERS. We don’t enforce it now. I understand that. Yeah. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. The point is this. This is not some new radical 

idea, as is being portrayed by my colleagues. Quite the contrary. 

This is the existing House rule. And it has been the existing House 

rule since 1837. All we are asking is to restore enforcement of that 

rule. But I agree it does have to be done gradually. 

We do have a huge backlog now of unauthorized programs that 

haven’t been reviewed in years. I believe that Congress, you know, 

ought to make it its intention clear that the authorizing committees have a certain period of time, a year or two, even a session 

or two, to review these programs under their jurisdictions and to 

renew them, alter them, let them die, but to do their jobs. There 

is no incentive for them to do their jobs as long as we continue to 

shovel money at them regardless of whether or not these programs 

are authorized. 


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And I agree, some of them are absolutely vital. And, by the way, 

the House on a case-by-case basis can continue to override that 

rule, but it would be by a vote of the House. The important thing 

is that the committees are reviewing the expenditures as they 

ought to be doing. 

Mr. STIVERS. Great. 

Let me rephrase my question. How much notice do you think the 

authorizing committees should have? You kind of said maybe a session or two. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. I think it would take at least a session. I think 

it would take at least 2 years. 

Mr. STIVERS. A couple years. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Yeah. 

Mr. STIVERS. Okay. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. And, again, phased in gradually. You know, I 

have proposed perhaps the first phase would be freezing increases 

in expenditures and, finally, bringing back the force of that rule. 

Mr. STIVERS. Great. Thank you so much. 

On your other proposal, you kind of referred to one-stop reconciliation with regard to allowing votes on mandatory programs. As far 

as the process goes, reconciliation only takes 50 votes plus one in 

the Senate, but any appropriations bill would be subject to the 60- 

vote threshold. So how can we be sure that any proposals we would 

move would even be able to get through the Senate? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, we can’t be sure of that now. Under the 

current rules, we can’t be sure that appropriation bills are going 

to be taken up in the Senate. And the Senate may decide to work 

its will. We have a conference process that is very good at identifying and reconciling the differences between the two houses. 

The point is this. The Appropriations Committee has been very 

effective at marking to the budget levels for discretionary spending. 

They have often rightly and proudly boasted of that success. And 

as I indicated, we have brought down the discretionary spending 

that is under the direct control of the Congress. 

The problem is they are completely powerless to mark down to 

the mandatory spending levels called for in the budget. And so, despite all the work on the discretionary side, we continue to see the 

budget spinning out of control because we can’t touch the mandatory programs without separate, standalone legislation, which in 

this environment becomes extremely difficult to pass. 

Put it together with the spending bill so that you get the savings 

along with the spending. I think that that is a streamlined process 

that actually allows us to stick to the budget numbers that we have 

set before we bankrupt our country. 

Mr. STIVERS. Sure. 

And to follow up on that, you had said in your testimony that 

the measures would be annual and temporary, I believe was the 

word you used—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. The idea would be—— 

Mr. STIVERS [continuing]. So it would only apply for that Congress, and it could only go down to the numbers approved in the 

budget resolution for that year for that program. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Correct. Correct. 


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Mr. STIVERS. Okay. So I just wanted to understand. So the 

changes would expire at the end of the fiscal year, and then you 

would have to do it again in the next year to mark it down. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. The idea is to give the Congress the full power 

to stick to the budget numbers that it has established. 

Mr. STIVERS. And the way you envision your rule proposal, the 

amendments to the appropriations bill would not have the ability 

to reduce programs below the budget number in the budget resolution that is effective for that year. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Correct. And, by the way, this would only be 

effective if we have already voted to enact a budget setting these 

numbers. 

Mr. STIVERS. So if an amendment under your rule was not just 

limited to that fiscal year, it would be ruled out of order, under the 

way your rule would be proposed. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Correct. 

Mr. STIVERS. So are you envisioning amendments that would cut 

a specific dollar amount or maybe make programmatic changes—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. It would make programmatic changes to the 

underlying statutes to the extent that are necessary to bring the 

spending to the budget numbers already enacted by the Congress. 

Mr. STIVERS. So envision with me, if you will, remember back to 

our appropriations process. Last year and every year since I have 

been here—I know you were here 2 years before me—we have had 

an open rule process on appropriations bills generally, which 

means things move fairly fast. 

How can we ensure through this process, these amendments, 

that we would get the relevant CBO and Budget Committee determinations, you know, on an amendment? Have you thought 

through that and what that might mean, given that it would be a 

fast-moving process? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, it would be a fast-moving process if it 

was brought to amendment. The idea would be that we would incorporate into the appropriations bills the statutory changes necessary to bring spending to the level set by the budget, both on the 

discretionary side as the current process and the mandatory side, 

which is currently forbidden. 

Mr. STIVERS. Great. 

So my next question is for Mr. Griffith. 

How do you propose that your rule would work? Would it work 

just like it worked until 1983? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. I would propose that that would be the case. And 

all the precedents from the rule’s inception, roughly 1876 through 

1982, that precedent would still be standing because we didn’t 

change the language substantially. Like I said, in the earlier rules, 

there is an order difference, but the language is substantially the 

same as what we had for over 100 years. It seemed to work during 

that time period. There is lots of precedent that the parliamentarians can use. And I would submit it would work the same way. 

And I would also submit to you that, while I know there are multiple reasons why we have gone from 59 the last year the Holman 

rule was in effect to 456 amendments, one of those reasons might 

be that there is just a tremendous amount of frustration that you 

can’t get to other things, so people look for all kinds of little 


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changes in the section of the budget we can get to. Because the 

mandatory spending is the lion’s share of our budget. 

And if you had opportunities—now, let me make it clear again, 

there are only three categories, and so it is not like you could 

change an entire program. You could affect a program by reducing 

salaries, reducing the number of employees. That might affect the 

program. But you wouldn’t actually take the program off the books 

unless you went through the regular order of that. 

But this was regular order. It is what they worked out. They 

started, you know, figuring out what they could do. Someone raised 

the question, why just reductions? Well, the concern there was 

that, you know, you only have so much money, and when this rule 

evolved, it was, okay, we can do retrenchments if that is where 

people want to go, but you better have authorization; if we are 

going to spend big chunks of new money, that needs to be studied 

carefully. 

But a retrenchment was considered appropriate, and it served 

our Nation well for many, many years. And as I said, as much as 

we hate to go back and rehash a prior political event, I have spoken to some of the Republicans who were in office at that time, and 

they have indicated that their view was it was an attempt to stop 

some changes that Ronald Reagan was proposing and that House 

Republicans, along with their colleagues, some of their colleagues 

on the Democrat side of aisle—Democrats still had control—where 

it had been very effective in the first couple of years of the Reagan 

administration. And this was a way to put a stop to it, because 

then you couldn’t go in and say, okay, we are going to do this or 

that. All you could do was affect the money. 

And here is where it tilts the power to the administrative branch 

of government. And I don’t care whether it is the Democrat or Republican administrative branch. It tilts the power to them, because 

now all we can do is limit the money going to a particular area, 

sometimes with many programs under that particular item. And 

then the cuts are then decided by—you know, whether or not you 

keep this many employees, what you do, all of that is now decided 

by the administrative branch of government. 

I would submit that under the Holman rule, although I have no 

examples to give you today, but I would submit that power was a 

congressional power that we ceded in 1983, which I don’t think was 

appropriate. But, you know, we talk about this would make things 

more partisan. The failure to have this language started off with 

partisan origins, and today what I am trying to do is to restore it 

to a rule that existed during both a big chunk of Republican hegemony over the votes in the House and then a period of years 

where the Democrats had control and significant majorities in the 

House. 

And so it worked for both Democrats and Republicans before. It 

can work for both Democrats and Republicans again. More importantly, it works for the people of these United States because it is 

a fairer process. It lets the floor and the Appropriations Committee 

have more power. And the gentleman was correct when he said he 

is arguing against more power for the Appropriations Committee. 

That, too, is true. 


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Mr. STIVERS. And I was going to ask you, and you already said, 

you don’t have any examples in front of you of when the Holman 

rule was used and effective? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, I do have some examples of things that were 

proposed to be cut that were in my statement. I would have to go 

back and find them. 

Mr. STIVERS. Yeah, I was wondering if you could give me any examples of when it was actually used to cut things, not just proposals that were then—— 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, and I don’t know—those were held in order, 

and I don’t know whether the votes were successful or not. Parliamentary precedent tells us that there was a challenge to whether or not that was appropriate under the Holman rule. And the 

ones that I mentioned—— 

Mr. STIVERS. Were upheld. 

Mr. GRIFFITH [continuing]. It was appropriate. Whether or not 

the votes were there or not, I don’t know. I would submit that on 

occasion, although rare occasion, it was probably successful. 

The resistance you see to the rule is exactly why you won’t have 

hundreds of amendments that actually pass. The authorizing committee, if it is not something that they have studied or care about, 

they are all going to be against it. You are going to have a group 

that proposes it. The authorizing committee is probably going to be 

against it. In some cases, if it is a floor amendment and not an 

amendment coming out of the Appropriations Committee, the appropriators are going to be against it, whether they are Democrat 

or Republican, in the majority or in the minority. 

So it is going to be difficult to pass the amendment, as it should 

be. But if it is the will of the respective Members of Congress, representing all of the States, to make a retrenchment in those three 

specific areas that are allowed under the Holman rule and under 

my restoration of that Holman rule, than that is good government 

and it should go forward. 

And so, you know, we haven’t studied what kind of cuts were 

made because, contrary to some folks’ opinion that we are trying 

to cut specific types of programs, that is not the case. What we are 

trying to do is to reestablish the authority of Congress to go in and 

not just say we are going to cut the money to program X but that 

we think that you have too many employees and that is where you 

ought to make the cut. And then you may also have a respective 

money cut, or you may cut the number of employees and put that 

money into programs that go directly to the people, as opposed to 

having it being spent by bean counters or others in D.C. 

Mr. STIVERS. Great. 

Mr. McClintock, one last question for you. From your perspective, 

what is wrong with the Army protocol that Mr. Cole brought up 

and the process now for unauthorized expenditures? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. I think the Army protocol is a very good practice. I would like to see it in the House rules. But I don’t think it 

alone is adequate to provide the Congress with the tools that it 

needs to stick to the budget numbers it has adopted. 

Mr. STIVERS. Great. 

Mr. Price, one question for you, and then I will give it to Ms. 

Slaughter. 


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In your testimony, you state that time has proven that the 25th 

Congress was correct in adopting rule XXI and preventing a delay 

in the appropriations process over proposals of legislation. 

The Holman rule, which has a long history—first adopted in 

1876 by Democrats, actually, and then turned off in 1895 to 1910, 

then reinserted in the House rules from 1911 through 1983—is 

very similar to the proposal that Mr. Griffith would restore to the 

pre-1983 rule. 

Do you have any legislative history on why it was changed in 

1983 and why we should not turn it back on? 

Mr. PRICE. My understanding of the changes in 1983, leaving 

aside the political motives that Mr. Griffith has attributed to this, 

I have no evidence one way or the other on that. My interpretation 

of the change that was made in 1983 would be that it was a further 

tightening up of the distinction between authorization and appropriations and that, in that respect, it appears to be consistent and 

appropriate. 

But I think we need to back up a little bit. The Congress made 

a decision, almost at the beginning, to separate the authorizations 

and appropriations process. Now, admittedly, not every parliament 

in the world does that. But we have done it, and I would submit 

that that separation has served us well. 

But, in any event, it would be a radical change. And I am particularly going here by what Mr. McClintock is envisioning. It 

would be a radical change to have the processes once again combined. 

And as I am listening to our two friends here, I don’t believe they 

are talking about the same thing. I mean, the Holman rule is one 

thing. That is a rather narrow provision which might or might not 

be tweaked. But as I hear Mr. McClintock talk, I envision the Appropriations Committee becoming the arena for considering the 

whole gamut of the Social Security program, the Medicare program, the Medicaid program. I mean, the distinctions would come 

down between mandatory and discretionary spending. I stand to be 

corrected on that, but I could imagine the appropriations process 

being totally gummed up by whatever people wanted to bring up 

in committee or on the floor with respect to changing this or that 

entitlement program. 

So I suggest we just back off and look at this historical decision, 

which has been with us for a couple hundred years, to separate appropriations and authorizations and, as the founders of this distinction stated, to not let annual appropriations be held hostage—they 

didn’t quite say it that way, but that is the idea—don’t let annual 

appropriations be held hostage to disagreements on legislation or, 

one might say, to the obstruction of legislation or gridlock on legislation. Because we have to pass a budget each year. The government shuts down if we don’t. And goodness knows we have enough 

trouble with that process already. 

But the notion that you would fix it somehow by importing authorizations into this whole process and adding that whole gamut 

of controversies and difficulties, it is just inconceivable to me that 

this would work in any kind of positive way. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

I now yield to the ranking member. 


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Ms. SLAUGHTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Stivers. 

And I really learned a lot here today, and I thank all of you for 

a good discussion. When I first came, I obviously came down on the 

side of Mr. Cole and Mr. Price. And I think all of you made a good 

case, but I continue to stand with my first statement, that this is 

too draconian for us to do. 

And if I might speak out of order for a moment, I would like to 

acknowledge the presence of Tom Wickham, who is the House Parliamentarian, who is a consummate professional recognized by both 

sides for his expertise and his fairness. And his visits up here are 

rare but very, very welcome. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. STIVERS. Great. 

I would now like to recognize Bradley Byrne, our distinguished 

gentleman from Alabama. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate everybody being here today. 

I was taught in college not to be an ideologue. I was taught to 

think through issues. I sometimes think that we are teaching college students today to be ideologues, but that is a different topic 

for another time. 

So thinking through these issues and not being an ideologue, let 

me ask you a question, Mr. McClintock. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Only if it won’t send me fleeing to the committee safe room. 

Mr. BYRNE. The rule is very clear: We are not supposed to be appropriating to that which has not been authorized. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Correct. 

Mr. BYRNE. We get around that by waiving the procedural point 

of order, correct? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Correct. 

Mr. BYRNE. And what you said earlier was we want to not just, 

you know, slam the door right away but create enough time where 

our authorizers can do their jobs. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Exactly. 

Mr. BYRNE. And I think that we should assume in good faith that 

they are going to do their job. 

So what if we just said, the Rules Committee said today that on 

January 1, 2018, and going forward we are not going to waive the 

point of order anymore? That gives our authorizers a little over a 

year and a half to authorize it or not. And I think after that period 

of time it would be fair to assume if they haven’t authorized it that 

their failure to decide is a decision in and of itself. What do you 

think about that? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. I think that would be a huge step in the right 

direction. You know, again, there are vital programs that are unauthorized. The opponents of this proposal are absolutely correct in 

that respect. But I would have to think that those programs enjoy 

broad bipartisan support; reauthorizing them would be a very simple matter. And if a program after 2 years can’t be reauthorized, 

maybe that is nature’s way of telling us that it is superannuated 

and ought to be let alone for a while. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, that is kind of the way I looked at it. One problem up here—I have only been here 21⁄2 years—is that inertia 


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takes over and we just kind of let things keep on going the way 

they have always gone and think that that is okay. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Right. 

Mr. BYRNE. The American people are screaming at us right now, 

‘‘It is not okay.’’ Democrats are screaming that. Republicans are 

screaming that. The status quo is not okay. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. And if it is not worth the time and fuss and 

bother to reauthorize, maybe it is also not worth the money that 

we are shoveling at it. 

Mr. BYRNE. Right. And I dare say there are some of these programs and departments and agencies, et cetera, that if we took it 

out to the American people and let them vote, they wouldn’t— 

Democrats and Republicans would have broad bipartisan agreement, ‘‘Why are we doing that?’’ Because it doesn’t get to what people need for their everyday lives. 

Let me follow up on something, because I wanted to make sure 

I understood something you said. And this was with regard to what 

you were talking about about mandatory funding in appropriations 

bills. 

When the chairman was asking you about potential complications with availability of the CBO data and House Budget Committee guidance during the amendment consideration on the floor, 

I believe I heard you say that would only be the case if we allow 

amendments on the floor to affect those changes. 

Does that mean that you are only requesting that the Appropriations Committee have the ability to report changes in mandatory 

spending, or are you advocating floor amendments? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Both. But I would be content to limit it to committee action. 

Again, when the budget is adopted, there are CBO scores on all 

of the provisions involving the mandatory spending, the reforms 

necessary to effect those savings. Placing that in the appropriations 

process then allows us to take action, as we currently do on the discretionary side, on the mandatory side as well. 

Mr. BYRNE. Okay. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. And those CBO scores, I believe, are available 

and accompany the budget. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Griffith, let me ask you a question. I know 

where you are trying to go. I want to go there with you, but I am 

having a little problem with how you are trying to get there. 

I think there is a big distinction both in substance but also in 

the practical reality of how things work between mandatory spending where people have paid into a program, like Social Security and 

Medicare, and all those other mandatory spending programs. And 

you have the list that you are trying to compile, which may not be 

complete. I think that is a pretty big substantive distinction and 

a pretty big practical political distinction. 

So I wonder if, in thinking through what you are trying to do, 

if there is some way to make that very important distinction that, 

as you said, would, you know, affect $2 trillion of what we are presently spending. So I would just throw that out there, if there is 

some way for us to practically understand. 

But I don’t think anybody around here wants to, without having 

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mittees and public hearings and everything else, to start making 

anything like a significant change to those two programs. 

Does that make sense to you at all? 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Well, it does. Now, you know, you wouldn’t be able 

to affect the general tenets of the program. You could affect the 

employees who are working on that program, and that could have 

the indirect result of affecting that program; I grant you that. I 

would submit to you that, as I said before, it is going to be very 

difficult on some—particularly on something complicated like 

that—it would be very difficult to get passage on the floor to begin 

with, which is why I don’t think it was a major problem up until 

the rule was changed, because it does take a tremendous amount 

of effort to make a change when you have got the authorizing committee that is most likely going to be opposed to you, et cetera. 

That being said, while I think that going back to the Holman 

rule is the appropriate way to go if you wanted to pick out, you 

know, a program or two and say that that could only be done in 

the committee, because I am changing both 2(b) and 2(c)—2(c) 

deals with the floor, and then there is a clarifying amendment in 

2(d)—2(b) deals with the appropriating committee. You could put 

something in there like that, or you could just say you couldn’t do 

it. That wouldn’t be my preference. But, obviously, if there was 

great concern and we could try it out as an experimental program 

or a test case to see if going back to the Holman rule caused the 

chaos that some of my colleagues have felt that it would. We could 

try it by making some distinction in which programs of those really 

big ones—and Social Security clearly is a different animal. Medicare has different components to it, and I recognize that. Then 

there are all the other programs. And many of them—I mean, I 

have looked at the list that I have got to the best of my ability to 

figure out where things are in there, and there is a lot of them that 

I wouldn’t vote to do anything to. There are some that I would, and 

it is the fact that we don’t have the ability to get to it in what was 

the regular order for many, many decades. I think that we ought 

to be able to do that. 

That being said, if it is the will of the House that we go with this 

as a test case and we set aside a couple of programs and leave the 

other hundreds of programs out there to be examined by the membership, I certainly wouldn’t say that was a bad step. That certainly would be a step in the right direction. 

Mr. BYRNE. I am just speaking to you like a regular old rankand-file Member. I wouldn’t feel comfortable with any process that 

would have any sort of a significant effect on Social Security and 

Medicare if they didn’t go through an extremely thorough hearing, 

deliberative committee process, et cetera. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. I would agree with that. And let me just make it 

clear so there is—and I know you know this, but I don’t want anybody taking out a little sound bite and thinking we have said something different. I wouldn’t vote for one of those amendments. 

Mr. BYRNE. Right. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. But the opportunity to offer an amendment is different than actually approving the amendment. And all I am saying is that, as Members elected by our respective congressional districts, we ought to have more ability to impact this process, as was 


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done for, you know, 100 years, and that didn’t seem to cause chaos 

or the destruction of the Republic. 

Mr. BYRNE. I would like to ask Dr. Price—Professor Price—and 

Professor Cole, what do you all think about the Rules Committee 

saying, ‘‘Look, we have been waiving this point of order, but as of 

January 1, 2018, we are going to stop waiving the point of order’’? 

Doesn’t that give our authorizing committees plenty of time to get 

their job done and tell us what should be authorized and what 

shouldn’t? 

Mr. PRICE. Well, I do think we have a problem with way too 

many unauthorized programs. I am reluctant to paint with too 

broad a brush. I do think, from time to time, there are good reasons for that as well as bad. There are certainly some persistent 

problems that leaders in both parties could testify to as to finalizing some authorizations, you know, like that State Department 

authorization. 

Mr. BYRNE. After a year and a half? 

Mr. PRICE. I think that the historical record is pretty clear that 

some of this is pretty difficult stuff and not probably solved by simplistic remedies. 

Having said that, I am all for exerting pressure, and I would 

hope pressure is from within the authorizing committees themselves. I mean, these people didn’t join these committees just to sit 

there, right? They chose to be there because they presumably 

would be writing legislation. 

So I am not making excuses for those committees, but I think to 

condition the appropriations process on the completion in each and 

every instance of the underlying authorization would be just an invitation to—if you think gridlock is bad now, that would be an invitation to just shutting this place down or certainly shutting the appropriations process down. 

And let me just say: I agree with you, Mr. Byrne, about the way 

the public views a lot of this. So I think our constituents want to 

see—they don’t want to see programs just indefinitely continued. 

But there is nothing that gives any kind of privileged position right 

now to unauthorized programs. On the Appropriations Committee, 

on the House floor, we can cut and cut and cut those programs if 

that is our political desire. So there is no privileged position that 

these programs have by virtue of being unauthorized. There is no 

immunity that they enjoy. So if the point is to get at authorized 

or unauthorized programs, you know, the appropriations process 

provides a perfectly viable way to do that. 

Mr. BYRNE. I want Dr. Cole to speak to this, but it seems to me 

that—I am not proposing changing the rule. I am proposing, after 

a year and a half time, enforcing the rule. So what is wrong with 

that? 

Mr. COLE. Well, I am like my friend Mr. Price. I am loath to tell 

you that I am not in favor of finding ways to get the authorizing 

committees to reauthorize. 

But I do want to pick up on a point he made that I was going 

to make as well. We do cut spending for unauthorized programs all 

the time. You know, we cut—State Department hasn’t been reauthorized. If you go back and look at foreign aid, we cut 24 percent 

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mittees in the areas on—we don’t have to wait around on Appropriations for the authorization guys to do something to act within 

the sphere that we have. I would suggest our Members on Defense 

Approps, with all due respect, are every bit as knowledgeable about 

the defense of the country as the Members on the House Armed 

Services Committee. They actually probably go to at least as many 

hearings, and since they are so much smaller, they interact a lot 

more with the witnesses, having been on both Armed Services and 

now on Defense Approps. And I could say the same thing on Natural Resources, where I served, and now Interior Approps. 

So I am not saying the authorization thing isn’t a problem, but 

it is not a silver bullet either. Going through the authorization, it 

is not as if we haven’t tried to save money in State since the last 

time it was authorized. It is not as if we haven’t cut and changed 

appropriations. So I think we can get too hung up on that point. 

Second, you do empower, you know, an obstructionist minority 

perhaps—and I don’t mean that aimed at our colleagues in the minority—I mean, anybody that just wants to gum up the works in 

an authorization committee. I saw this happen, frankly. Mr. Simpson, when he was chairman of the Interior Committee, tried to 

force the authorizers to reauthorize the Endangered Species Act, to 

just go through it; we think it is a problem area. And he was going 

to withhold funding. And the authorizers, for whatever—it is highly contentious; it is highly partisan; it has been used in political 

campaigns to defeat Members on both sides of the aisle—simply 

couldn’t get it done. Now, I suppose we could have just gotten rid 

of the entire program. But our own leadership said: No, you can’t 

do that; that would become an issue in and of itself. 

So these issues become complex. And I suggest that Appropriations is not a tool to discipline the other committees. That is not 

its function. You need to get the other committees to do their job. 

Now, as Mr. McClintock—and he has been great about this, honestly—pointed out, look, when we get a number from the Budget 

Committee, we live within the number, whether we like the number or not. And we have made substantial reductions and cuts and 

sometimes in things we didn’t want to do. I have been here for 

many years. I voted against ObamaCare in every iteration. I have 

never seen a substitute produced out of the appropriate committees. You know, I have watched these committees do Medicare part 

D or ObamaCare. It is not as if they can’t function legislatively, but 

they don’t want to pick up entitlements and deal with entitlements. 

And that is 70 percent of the spending. 

So I don’t think us withholding appropriations, which might affect the defense of the country or some other important day-to-day 

function—you are also putting the American people at risk here. 

You are not just putting an authorizing committee at risk. They 

didn’t do their job, and we didn’t fund the military. Then who is 

at risk? The American people are at risk. So I don’t think you 

blackmail your own people. 

But there has to be a way—and I would love to work with my 

colleagues on this—to encourage or incentivize authorizing committees to do their work. But, at the end of the day, remember, the 

unauthorized appropriations are certainly a tremendous amount of 

money, $310 billion. That is in a $3.9 trillion budget that is over 


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half a trillion dollars out of balance. So you could reauthorize them 

all and you would still have a substantial deficit. 

The real issue is, hey, when are we going to reform Social Security the way Ronald Reagan, Tip O’Neill, and Howard Baker did 

in 1983? When are we going to sit down and look at Medicaid? 

Now, we do this in the Budget Committee. The Budget Committee 

has, you know, advanced programs in Medicare and Medicaid reform. They are highly controversial, very, very spirited debates. I 

have never seen those things picked up in the appropriate committees of jurisdiction. When the Budget Committee gives us a number, we are living within the number. 

So the other committees have got to figure out a way just to do 

their work. And I would be a lot more impressed if I saw them— 

again, we have seen major legislation—never a problem around 

here to move tax bills. My friend mentioned tax expenditures. 

Okay. If you are going to do that, why can’t you pair that with a 

mandatory spending bill? If you are going to cut taxes, okay; over 

here, you are leaving the expenditure part of this that you control 

totally unaddressed. Now, I am not advocating you have to offset 

tax cuts with additional spending. But there is no linkage whatsoever. So I see bills coming to the floor to cut taxes; I never see bills 

coming to the floor to cut—not cut, but reform Social Security. 

Same thing with Medicare. Same thing with Medicaid. Again, 

Budget Committee wrestles with these things. They vote on them. 

They put their fingerprints up there on them. A lot of Members do. 

Why can’t those committees do it? But, again, I would urge you— 

I know I have gone on a long time—don’t use the Appropriations 

Committee to discipline every other committee because it hasn’t 

done its job. And the only reason why we are doing that is because 

the Appropriations Committee has done its job. It has lived within 

what this body collectively told it to live within. 

The last point I want to make, and this is somewhat unrelated, 

but I think it is important, there are two things I think you need 

to look at when you look at both of these proposals. One is, how 

much do you want us to do? Do you really want us, as an Appropriations Committee, to become experts on Medicare and Medicaid 

and Social Security? Because we already have the range of the entire, you know, discretionary part of government, where we have 

blocks of expertise in each of our committees. So you are going to 

now have to both enlarge the committee and create new areas—we 

have no expertise. I have strong opinions about Social Security, 

Medicare, and Medicaid, but I don’t pretend to know as much as 

the people in the relevant committees. Do you really want to trust 

me to do that job? It is going to take a long time. 

Mr. BYRNE. But under my proposal, that wouldn’t get to that. 

Mr. COLE. No, that is true. As I said, this was unrelated. I 

thought it was an important point to make. And you need to 

think—you would really, under these things, put everything under 

our control, except the raising of revenue and whatever taxes. We 

would control everything out of that single committee. 

Mr. BYRNE. If I followed your line of reasoning, then, if we are 

not going to enforce the rule, why do we keep the rule the way it 

is? Why don’t we change the rule and say it is okay to appropriate 


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things if they haven’t been authorized? Because the rule right now 

says we are not supposed to. 

Mr. COLE. That is true. And, again, you know, I will leave it to 

this committee. I am not coming up here arguing that one way or 

the other. All I am saying is when you do that, if the job doesn’t 

get done by that authorization committee, don’t think you are just 

punishing the authorizers. You are punishing the American people, 

who are supposed to be getting some sort of service or some sort 

of benefit. 

Mr. BYRNE. I am not trying to punish anybody. I think the American people are being punished by our failure to get control over 

our spending. 

Mr. COLE. I would agree with that wholeheartedly. And I would 

put my record on those things up on the line with anybody else’s. 

And I agree with you. But stopping functions of government because something hasn’t been done is essentially a sort of governmental shutdown in miniature in a particular area. Maybe that is 

what you want to do, but you are putting at risk people that have 

no part in that process, that have no mechanism to enforce it or 

to defend themselves from it. And I would think long and hard— 

look, I don’t think the day would come when we would not authorize defense. I have enormous respect for people on the Armed Services Committee. But what if it did? What if it did? 

So you are really shutting down whole functions of government. 

It is not just the legislative process here; it is reality out in the 

field where the rubber meets the road. That is a high risk to take. 

It may be the only way, but I just want to point out that is a high 

risk to take. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I have monopolized my time here, but you 

brought up the Endangered Species Act. I have got people in my 

district whose livelihoods are being challenged by what I consider 

to be the inappropriate use of the Endangered Species Act. And 

they get no fair hearing in front of the people in the relevant agencies who are involved with that before their livelihoods are put at 

risk by what I think is a total misinterpretation of that, because 

we have legislatively delegated to that agency that authority. And 

we have lost the ability to control it, we the Congress, the people 

that are elected by the people to make sure that the people’s will 

is enforced. And perhaps the only way we have of controlling that 

is by using the power of the purse. So I think there are certain programs that if you went to the people in America and said, ‘‘Do you 

want these to continue or not,’’ the people of America would say, 

‘‘No, if that is the way that these agencies are going to use them, 

if they are going to go way beyond what they have ever done before.’’ 

Now I will say this: bad facts make bad law. In the last several 

years, we have had some terrible facts. And part of what is driving 

this is the American people have just had enough of what has been 

happening out there with the over-assertion of Federal authority. 

And if we could pull back, then we may not be having the sort of 

discussion we are having today. I apologize for speaking so long, 

but I think this is critically important. 

Mr. COLE. I think it is too. Let me respond, because I suspect we 

agree 100 percent in terms of the inappropriate exercise of power 


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and bureaucracies. Now, on the appropriations, let’s just take the 

Environmental Protection Agency, probably one of the more controversial agencies. It is operating with 22 percent less money than 

it had in 2010 and at 1989 staffing levels. And that was driven, not 

by anything the authorizing committee did, but through the appropriations process. 

But if we need to do something, why can’t the Natural Resources 

Committee, where there is enormous expertise, simply pass a law? 

Now, it may or may not get through the Senate. We have actually 

cut, in the House, EPA more than 21 percent. I think we have cut 

it in the mid-30s. But those cuts get partially restored in the negotiation process with the Senate and the administration. But, again, 

I don’t see how any of this is an excuse not for the authorizing committees to simply do their job. And if you can’t get it through the 

Senate or—we will still do our part. We tend to philosophically 

agree—when we are in the majority, we philosophically agree with 

what our friends on Natural Resources are trying to do, our friends 

on Armed Services are trying to do. So we will use that. 

But, again, using the funding of day-to-day government to discipline a committee because it either hasn’t authorized something 

or has not achieved a policy objective puts the day-to-day functioning of government at risk and creates enormous problems in 

terms of moving any kind of appropriations bill through. I mean, 

it literally is—and I know my friends mean this in the right way— 

but, again, how powerful do you guys want us to be? Because you 

act like it is going to be the Congress that does it. Believe me, 

these decisions, they will be made largely inside the Appropriations 

Committee, and you will have enormously expanded our power, I 

guess because you trust us because we have been able to bring 

down discretionary stuff. But I think that is too much power that, 

you know, Congress itself, there was a time when all taxing power 

and all appropriations power was in the same—with the old Ways 

and Means, before Appropriations was created. And the sentiment 

in the body then was that was too much power. That was way too 

much power for one small group of people to have. 

So I do think it is worth asking these deeper questions, because 

the frustration is going to lead you to making us stronger than I 

would argue we should be. 

Mr. COLE. Now, again, like anybody else, I guess if you give 

Frodo the ring, he will put it on. But do you want to give him the 

ring? 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I have taken up too much time. I was just saying my proposal would take power away from the Appropriations 

Committee. It wouldn’t allow you to appropriate to things that 

aren’t authorized. 

But I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you very much. That was a great exchange. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. McGovern. 

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am not going to speak for very long here. You 

know, as I am listening to this, I can’t help but think that this is 

not a House rules problem. The dysfunction that exists here, the 

inability to get authorization bills passed, the inability to do a lot 

of what the American people want—I don’t know. We can blame it 


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on the House rules if we want. We can say that there is a magic 

silver bullet, or we can try to concoct a system that essentially 

forces us to do certain things. But this really isn’t a House rules 

problem. I mean, you know, I don’t want to be partisan here, but 

you guys are having trouble with the budget right now. That is not 

a House rules problem. That is a problem of ideology within the 

Republican Conference. The problem with some of these authorization bills is that they have become polarizing debates that extremes 

have kind of taken over, and they go so far one way that it becomes 

impossible to get a majority to support them. 

That has nothing to do with House rules. If you want to cut, you 

know, SNAP, which I know a lot of my colleagues do, you know, 

you had the opportunity to do that in the farm bill, and you did. 

You cut it by $8 billion. You voted—initially, you cut it by $40 billion, but you cut it by $8 billion, which I think was unconscionable, 

but there was the opportunity to do it. 

Now, people, some people, think that we should cut it even more 

deeply. Well, I think you wait for the next farm bill or the next appropriate vehicle to be able to do that. But I don’t think this is a 

House rules problem. If people are frustrated with the way this 

place runs, look in the mirror. Those of us who serve here, need 

to kind of figure out a way where we get back to a time where we 

don’t have to get everything we want. And, you know, even the 

budget agreement that the Speaker, helped negotiate, last year is 

now coming under attack, and we are not quite sure whether we 

can proceed when the election is over with. 

So, you know, I think this is more an issue of the people who are 

getting elected, who are coming here, are—you know, are moving 

more and more ideologically to one side, but so far to one side that 

it is, quite frankly, out of the mainstream of where the American 

people are. We ought to have appropriations bills. The appropriators—I mean, we ought to have authorization bills. The authorizers ought to do their job. But it is—I don’t think you are not getting them because the chair or the ranking member of the authorizing committee don’t want to bring a bill to the floor; it is some 

of the amendments and the nitpicking and the polarizing issues 

that get all attached to these bills that make it very difficult to be 

able to get them passed. 

But I would like to get back to a day where we can, you know, 

figure out how we can work in a bipartisan way to get legislation 

that, again, may not be everything I want, may not be everything 

you want, but reflects genuine compromise. You don’t have to agree 

on everything to agree on something. And we are at the point now 

where the something we agree on is never enough to move it forward on the House floor. 

So, you know, I don’t think—you know, I appreciate my colleagues coming with these ideas. I think it is very interesting to 

talk about them, but to the extent that this place doesn’t function 

right, I think it has more to do with the makeup of the membership than it does with the House rules. And I think we need to figure out a way to kind of get back to the concept where getting legislation done is, actually, you know, a goal that we both share. The 

problem is that the incentives in this place are not to compromise, 

are not to get a deal. It is always to have a fight. And I think that 


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is—when you talk about the American people being frustrated, 

they are really frustrated because we don’t seem to be able to get 

anything done. We do the minimum. We get our appropriations 

bills, and we usually keep the government running at the last 

minute, but I think they are expecting more. And, again, it is not 

a House rules problem. I think it is us. 

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could respond—— 

Mr. MCGOVERN. Sure. 

Mr. PRICE [continuing]. To what my friend is saying. 

I basically agree with him. In fact, I was saying myself in my 

statement that the political dysfunction around here was a function 

of ideology and probably wasn’t going to be solved by a proposal of 

this sort. 

But I would like to suggest that maybe he is going a bit too far, 

because I do think—I think the rules can make a difference. And 

I have an example to suggest. 

Now, these gentlemen, I think, are doing a good job of trying to 

figure out what difference the rules changes they are interested in 

would make. And I, of course, disagree with those particular 

changes. 

But let me remind you of one rules change that I think everybody agrees had a great impact, and that was the—it was part of 

the 1990 bipartisan comprehensive budget deal with President 

George H.W. Bush and the Democratic majorities in the Congress. 

And, you know, that budget deal set numbers, revenue numbers, 

entitlement numbers, spending numbers. It did lots of things with 

numbers, but it also set a rule. And the rule was called Pay-AsYou-Go. And it directly addressed the problem my friends are trying to address here; that is, entitlement spending. It set the rules 

for how the budget—the reconciliation process would work. And it 

said, in short, that if you are going to raise entitlement spending, 

you are not going to be able to do that unless you do one of two 

things: unless you reduce the entitlement spending somewhere else 

or unless you raise revenue. Otherwise, it is not a nonstarter. You 

are not going to cut taxes unless you raise taxes somewhere else 

or you cut entitlement spending. Those are pretty powerful inhibitions against both tax cuts and entitlement spending increases. 

And I suggest to you that was a rules change, and it did work. 

And we lived with that discipline for a long, long time. And you remember when it was lifted, unfortunately, early in the George W. 

Bush administration. 

But I just suggest, Mr. McGovern, that is one area where it is 

productive, I think, to think about how the rules affect what we do. 

Although, I do believe, right now, whatever rules we are working 

with are getting swamped by polarized politics. 

Mr. MCGOVERN. Yeah. And a rule is only as good as whether we 

follow it. And one of the things that we have done on this committee on many occasions is waive rules, PAYGO rules and other 

rules. You know, again, so we have all these rules, and if we don’t 

enforce them and we don’t follow them, you know, then they lose 

their—I agree with the concept, but I am saying—— 

Mr. PRICE. My point was—— 

Mr. MCGOVERN. It goes back to what I was saying before. We are 

waiving these things, I think, more for political reasons and for ideVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:30 Nov 02, 2016 Jkt 022307 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A307.XXX A307

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ological reasons. And I go back to my—I really do think that, you 

know, at some point, we need to figure out a way to regroup in a 

bipartisan way and to approach some of these very difficult debates, whether it is dealing with entitlements, which are very, very 

delicate issues or our tax policies or whatever, in a way where it— 

you know, everything doesn’t have to be like we are in the middle 

of a political campaign. 

So, with that, I appreciate you being here. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you very much to the gentleman. 

I have a couple of followup questions before I wrap up the hearing. 

The first is for Dr. Price, Professor Price. You referred to the 

1990 PAYGO rule, which I think was a big step forward. Do you 

recall what the deficit was in 1990? 

Mr. PRICE. I can’t give you the publicly held—— 

Mr. STIVERS. I will remind you. I just googled it. It was $220 billion that year. 

Mr. PRICE. The annual deficit? 

Mr. STIVERS. The annual deficit. 

Mr. PRICE. I know the deal produced $500 million in 5-year savings. 

Mr. STIVERS. And it is great that we have PAYGO, now CutGo, 

which we have—a rule we have improved. But the problem with 

that is it kind of locked in a deficit of about that amount, unless 

you actually make programmatic changes. It prevented you from 

going above that, other than interest and other waiving of the rule, 

but it essentially made it hard to go below it, too. So that is the 

only concern. 

I agree with you: it was better than what we had before. So I 

just wanted to remind you of that. 

I do have two followup questions for Mr. McClintock. 

You had talked a little bit about, when you changed mandatory 

spending, it couldn’t go below the budget resolution; it would go to 

the budget resolution number. What would happen if we would find 

ourselves in a situation where the House and Senate didn’t agree 

on a budget number? Would that rule be, essentially, unable to be 

enforced because there is no budget number? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, those differences would then be resolved 

by the normal conference process that has evolved over centuries 

and is very good at isolating and working out—— 

Mr. STIVERS. Well, there have been years when we didn’t have 

a budget, I guess. So I am saying, if we don’t have a budget resolution in effect—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, that is exactly right. 

Mr. STIVERS. That is what I am trying to figure out. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. The idea behind this would be the budget resolution has to be in place. So we have already voted to enact spending at certain levels on both the discretionary and the mandatory 

sides. As we have discussed, the House has been very effective at 

marking on the discretionary side. It has been totally ineffective 

marking down to the mandatory side, because the appropriations— 

because of, you know—— 

Mr. STIVERS. Rule XXI. 


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Mr. MCCLINTOCK [continuing]. Clause 2(b) forbids that. And the 

ironic thing is clause 2(a), that prohibits unauthorized spending, 

we waive routinely, but 2(b), that is absolutely essential to getting 

mandatory spending within the parameters set by the budget, we 

never waive. 

Mr. STIVERS. So, for some of our friends—on both sides of the 

aisle—who don’t want to pass a budget this year, it would render 

this change—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, the budget—— 

Mr. STIVERS [continuing]. Worthless? We need a budget. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Yes. Exactly. And we do anyway. 

Mr. STIVERS. We do anyway. I agree with that. But it would help 

increase, I guess—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. And, again, the source of my frustration is we 

had a budget that set numbers. We couldn’t stick to those numbers. 

Why can’t we stick to them? Well, a big part of that is we don’t 

have direct control over the mandatory expenditures. 

And Mr. Price is absolutely right that PAYGO was a very good 

reform, but that only constrained changes—— 

Mr. STIVERS. Future. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK [continuing]. In the entitlement programs. 

The problem is the entitlement programs haven’t changed, but 

they are dramatically expanding. That is what is pulling us so far 

out of balance. 

And I do want to make a distinction between that and, again, the 

trust fund. Social Security and the portions of Medicare funded by 

the payroll tax, that is a separate issue. It is still very important 

to resolve, but it is not a direct budget issue. I am talking about 

the trillion dollars that goes out a year—roughly a trillion dollars 

that goes a year—that we don’t have any direct control over. 

Mr. STIVERS. You are not talking about Social Security, and you 

are not talking about Medicare? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Right. Right. 

Mr. STIVERS. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. And, Mr. Chairman, I would submit that—of 

course, I would prefer a change—but either a change, a waiver of 

2(b), or a return to the Holman rule would put a number of avenues on the table that would allow us, I believe, most fervently, to 

get a budget. I don’t think that would be any problem whatsoever 

if you had that as one of the tools that the House could use. 

And, currently, as my colleague said, there is a waiver of 2(a) on 

a regular basis, but nobody ever wants to waive 2(b), nor do we 

want to—at least up until now—want to change it back to the 

original Holman rule. Either one of those would give us so many 

different avenues that I think we could have a resolution, could 

have had a resolution weeks ago. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

And one last question for Mr. McClintock. So you talked about 

consultation with the authorizing committee. Do you envision that 

the same way the current Armey protocol works or some other 

way? How would the Appropriations Committee, under your rule, 

consult or get consultation with the authorizing chair or committee? 


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Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Well, as I said, I would, obviously, advocate 

the broadest application of this principle but would be quite content if it were simply done through the committee process. 

The budget enacts mandatory spending at a certain level, calls 

for certain reforms to bring that mandatory spending to that level, 

and in the absence of standalone legislation, the Appropriations 

Committee, with the advice and consent of the authorizing committee, would make those changes in that statute necessary to 

bring us within the parameters of the budget. 

Mr. STIVERS. So how does that—what is that advice and consent, 

and how does it work? So what would the Appropriations—and, 

you know, they talked about how powerful this—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Once the budget is enacted, it calls for certain 

reforms in mandatory spending and certain levels of mandatory 

spending. Those reforms would, then, be within the purview of the 

Appropriations Committee to place into the appropriations bill 

to—— 

Mr. STIVERS. So the assumptions under the budget resolution 

would have to be enacted—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Yes. And the Armey protocol—— 

Mr. STIVERS [continuing]. As a way to get it? 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. And the Armey protocol, which facilitates communication between the authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committee, you know, could certainly be harnessed for 

that purpose as well. 

Mr. STIVERS. Okay. Because there would have to be changes to 

reduce the number. You can’t just put a number in. You have to 

say how you are going to get to that number—— 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Which is what—— 

Mr. STIVERS [continuing]. So that is what the consultation would 

be. And it would be with the chairman or the entire committee? 

Would there be some kind of referral or hearing of a committee 

with notice? I am trying to understand what—how this would just 

work. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. Those details would be worked out. 

Mr. STIVERS. Okay. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. I mean, the Armey protocol does serve as a 

template for that. 

Mr. STIVERS. A means. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. And as I understand it, that is the authorizing 

committee chairman, who, presumably, is in communication with 

the majority of the Members. 

Mr. STIVERS. Sure. And I am not trying to be difficult. I am trying to understand how it would work. 

Mr. MCCLINTOCK. No, I understand. 

Mr. STIVERS. I am just trying to ask questions about how all 

these things work, so we can then work out the details and figure 

out what it would mean. And so we can understand how that rule 

might work in the real world. 

We certainly appreciate all four of you being here. I think it was 

a very robust and thoughtful discussion. I appreciate the two proposals and the gentlemen for their hard work in trying to figure 

out how we can make the House work better, how we can navigate 

the intersection of authorizing and appropriating committees in a 


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thoughtful way. And I appreciate the gentlemen from the Appropriations Committee for giving their perspective as well. 

This has been, I think, a great opening hearing on the ideas of 

how we can improve the House rules, and we will definitely continue. We have three more hearings we are going to have, I think. 

So I really appreciate the thoughtful input, and thank you so much 

for all your help. 

With that, we will end the hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 5:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Insert 1–1: Statement of the Hon. Tom McClintock, a Representative in Congress from the State of California 


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Insert 1–2: Statement of the Hon. H. Morgan Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia 


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Insert 2–1: Statement of the Hon. David E. Price, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of North Carolina 


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Insert 2–2: Statement of the Hon. Tom Cole, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Oklahoma 


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