Mark C. Leffler (VSB #40712) Dale W. Pittman (VSB #15673) 

Boleman Law Firm, P.C. THE LAW OFFICE OF DALE W. PITTMAN, P.C.

P.O. Box 11588 The Eliza Spotswood House 

Richmond, VA 23230 112-A West Tabb Street 

Telephone (804) 358-9900 Petersburg, VA 23803 

Counsel for Debtors and Special Telephone (804) 861-6000 

 Counsel for Salina Ann Willis Special Counsel for Salina Ann Willis

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

Eastern District of Virginia 

Richmond Division 

In re: Clarence Milton Staton, Jr. 

 Salina Ann Willis 

 AKA Clarence M. Staton, Jr. 

 

 Debtors 

Case No. 18-32776-KRH

Chapter 13

Address: 1615 Bickerstaff Road 

 Henrico, VA 23231 

Last four digits of Social Security No(s): xxx-xx-2454 (Debtor) 

 xxx-xx-4763 (Joint Debtor) 

______________________________________________________________________________

NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF DEBTOR’S COUNSEL’S 

COMPENSATION, AND NOTICE OF HEARING 

Clarence M. Staton, Jr. and Salina Ann Willis (the “Debtors”), by counsel, have filed 

papers with the Court requesting approval of compensation (the “Application”) for legal services 

rendered (including expenses) in the amount of $6,000.00 to be paid from the settlement of 

Salina Ann Willis’s claim against Symmetry Management Corp., d/b/a BCC Financial 

Management Services, Inc. for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 

A copy of the Application, together with applicable exhibits, may be obtained from the 

Debtors’ counsel or through the Court’s PACER system. 

Your rights may be affected. You should read these papers carefully and discuss 

them with your attorney, if you have one in this bankruptcy case. (If you do not have an 

attorney, you may wish to consult one.)

If you do not want the Court to grant the relief sought in the Application or if you want 

the Court to consider your views on the Application, then on or before seven (7) days prior to 

the days of the scheduled hearing, you or your attorney must: 

 File with the Court, at the address shown below, a written response and 

supporting memorandum pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(H). If you mail your 

response to the court for filing, you must mail it early enough so the court will receive it on or 

before the date stated above. 
Clerk of Court 

United States Bankruptcy Court 

701 East Broad Street, Suite 4000 

Richmond, VA 23219 

 Mail a copy of your response and supporting memorandum to: 

Mark C. Leffler, Esquire 

Boleman Law Firm, P.C. 

P.O. Box 11588 

Richmond, VA 23230 

And also to 

Dale W. Pittman, Esquire 

THE LAW OFFICE OF DALE W. PITTMAN, P.C. 

The Eliza Spotswood House 

112-A West Tabb Street 

Petersburg, VA 23803 

You or your attorney also must: 

 Attend a hearing on the motion scheduled to be held on May 29, 2019, at 12:00 

p.m. at the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond 

Division, 701 East Broad Street, Room 5000, Richmond, Virginia 23219. 

If you or your attorney do not take these steps, including the filing and serving of a written 

response and supporting memorandum within the time period and in the manner set forth 

above pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1, the Court may deem any opposition 

waived, treat the Application as conceded, decide that you do not oppose the Application, 

and issue an order granting the relief requested without further notice or hearing. 

 
Respectfully submitted, 

CLARENCE MILTON STATON, JR. 

SALINA ANN WILLIS 

By Counsel: 

 /s/ Mark C. Leffler 

Mark C. Leffler (VSB #40712) 

Boleman Law Firm, P.C. 

P.O. Box 11588 

Richmond, VA 23230 

Telephone (804) 358-9900 

Counsel for the Debtors and Special Counsel for 

Salina Ann Willis 

 /s/ Dale W. Pittman 

 Dale W. Pittman (VSB #15673) 

 THE LAW OFFICE OF DALE W. PITTMAN, P.C. 

 The Eliza Spotswood House 

 112-A West Tabb Street 

 Petersburg, VA 23803 

 Telephone (804) 861-6000 

Special Counsel for Debtor 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on April 30, 2019, I have transmitted a true copy of the foregoing document 

electronically through the Court’s CM/ECF system or by first-class U.S. mail to the Debtor, 

Chapter 13 trustee, the United States trustee if other than by the electronic means provided for at 

Local Bankruptcy Rule 2002-1, and to all creditors and parties in interest on the mailing 

matrix attached hereto. 

/s/ Mark C. Leffler 

Counsel for the Debtors and 

Special Counsel for Salina Ann Willis 
 Label Matrix for local noticing Exeter Finance LLC, c/o AIS Portfolio Servic VHDA 

 0422-3 4515 N Santa Fe Ave. Dept. APS 601 S Belvidere Street 

 Case 18-32776-KRH Oklahoma City, OK 73118-7901 Richmond, Va 23220-6504 

 Eastern District of Virginia 

 Richmond 

 Tue Apr 30 14:19:18 EDT 2019 

 United States Bankruptcy Court ADT Security American Medical Collection Ag 

 701 East Broad Street RE: Bankruptcy Re: Lab Corp of America 

 Richmond, VA 23219-1888 PO Box 650485 2269 S. Saw Mill River Rd #3 

 Dallas, TX 75265-0485 Elmsford, NY 10523-3848 

 

 Ashley Funding Services, LLC its successors BCC Financial Mgt Svs Inc. Bon Secours 

 assigns as assignee of Laboratory 3230 W. Commercial Blvd PO Box 1123 

 Corporation of America Holdings Suite 2 Minneapolis MN 55440-1123 

 Resurgent Capital Services Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-3400 

 PO Box 10587 

 Greenville, SC 29603-0587 

 Bon Secours Medical Group COUNTY OF HENRICO, VIRGINIA Citi Cards/Citibank 

 7229 A Forest Avenue ANDREW R. NEWBY, ASST. COUNTY ATTORNEY P.O. Box 6241 

 Suite 112 P. O. BOX 90775 Sioux Falls, SD 57117-6241 

 Richmond, VA 23226-0000 HENRICO, VIRGINIA 23273-0775 

 

 Citibank, N.A. (p)COMCAST Commonwealth Radiology 

 Citibank, N.A. 676 ISLAND POND RD Re: Bankruptcy 

 701 East 60th Street North MANCHESTER NH 03109-4840 1508 Willow Lawn Dr, Ste 117 

 Sioux Falls, SD 57104-0493 Richmond, VA 23230-3421 

 Convergent Outsourcing County of Henrico Debt Rehab LLC 

 800 SW 39th Street Treasury Division 5000 Birch Street 

 PO Box 9004 P.O. Box 90775 West Tower, Suite 3000 

 Renton, WA 98057-9004 Henrico, VA 23273-0775 Newport Beach, CA 92660-2140 

 Emergency Medical Associates Exeter Finance Corp Exeter Finance LLC 

 Attn: Bankruptcy Dept. PO Box 166097 AIS Portfolio Services, LP 

 PO Box 5508 Irving, TX 75016-6097 4515 N Santa Fe Ave. Dept. APS 

 Virginia Beach, VA 23471-0508 Oklahoma City, OK 73118-7901 

 Exeter Finance LLC c/o AIS Portfolio Service (p)FOCUSED RECOVERY SOLUTIONS Granite Asset Management 

 4515 N Santa Fe Ave. Dept. APS 9701 METROPOLITAN COURT P.O. Box 10555 

 Oklahoma City, OK 73118-7901 STE B Greenville, SC 29603-0000 

 RICHMOND VA 23236-3690 

 Granite State MGMT-DIR Granite State Management & Resources HSN 

 P.O. Box 3420 P.O. Box 3420 1 HSN Drive 

 Concord, NH 03302-3420 Concord, NH 03302-3420 Saint Petersburg, FL 33729-0001 

 Hill & Rainey LCA Collections LVNV Funding, LLC its successors and assigns 

 Re: Whittle & Roper Inc., Real Re: LabCorp assignee of CONSUMER LOAN UNDERLYING 

 2425 Boulevard, Ste 9 1250 Chapel Hill Road BOND (CLUB) GRANTOR TRUST 

 Colonial Heights, VA 23834-2324 Burlington, NC 27215-7141 Resurgent Capital Services 

 PO Box 10587 

 Greenville, SC 29603-0587 
 Labcorp Langley Federal Credit Union Langley Federal Credit Union 

 Re: Bankruptcy Dept. Attn: Accounts Control Re: Bankruptcy 

 PO Box 2240 P O Box 120128 P.O. 7463 

 Burlington, NC 27216-2240 Newport News VA 23612-0128 Hampton, VA 23666-0463 

 

 Lending Club Corporation Lendmark Financial Services Memorial Regional Medical Cent 

 71 Stevenson 2118 Usher St. RE: Bankruptcy 

 Suite 300 Suite 200 P.O. Box 409601 

 San Francisco, CA 94105-2985 Conyers, GA 30094-0000 Atlanta, GA 30384-9601 

 Midnight Velvet Midnight Velvet Miramed Revenue Group 

 Attn: Bankruptcy Department c/o Creditors Bankruptcy Service Re: Bon Secours 

 1112 7th Avenue, Box 2816 P O Box 800849 991 Oak Creek Drive 

 Monroe, WI 53566-1364 Dallas, TX 75380-0849 Lombard, IL 60148-6408 

 NWFCU Nathaniel A. Scaggs, Esq Neurology Clinic At Memorial 

 P.O. Box 466 2425 Boulevard, Suite 9 Regional 

 Herndon, VA 20172-0466 Colonial Heights, VA 23834-2324 PO Box 14000 

 Belfast, ME 04915-4033 

 NorthWest Credit Union Northwest Federal Credit Union One Hampton Medical Group 

 NWFCU PO Box 1229 13700 St. Francis Blvd. 

 P.O. Box 466 Herndon, VA 20172-1229 Midlothian, VA 23114-3222 

 Herndon, VA 20172-0466 

 Pediatric Center-VCC (p)PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES LLC Quantum3 Group LLC as agent for 

 Re: Bankruptcy PO BOX 41067 CF Medical LLC 

 10571 Telegraph Rd., Ste. 110 NORFOLK VA 23541-1067 PO Box 788 

 Glen Allen, VA 23059-4652 Kirkland, WA 98083-0788 

 Richmond Card Assoc. Richmond Community Hospital SYNCB/JCPennys 

 Attn#18117J Attn: Bankruptcy Department PO Box 965007 

 P.O. Box 14000 P.O. Box 27184 Orlando, FL 32896-5007 

 Belfast, ME 04915-4033 Richmond, VA 23261-7184 

 SYNCB/Marshalls SYNCB/Rooms To Go Safe Home Security 

 P.O. Box 965005 PO Box 965036 1125 Middle St. 

 Orlando, FL 32896-5005 Orlando, FL 32896-5036 #201 

 Middletown, CT 06457-1686 

 Southwest Credit Systems St. Mary’s Hospital Synchrony Bank 

 4120 International Pkwy Attn: Bankruptcy Dept Recovery Management 

 Suite 1100 P.O. Box 100767 25 SE 2nd Ave., Suite 1120 

 Carrollton, TX 75007-1958 Atlanta, GA 30384-0767 Miami, FL 33131-1605 

 The Home Depot/CBNA U.S. Attorney’s Office US Department of Education 

 P.O. Box 6497 919 East Main Street, Suite 1900 Direct Loan Servicing Center 

 Sioux Falls, SD 57117-6497 Richmond, VA 23219-4625 PO Box 105028 

 Atlanta, GA 30348-5028 
 VA Housing Development VHDA Vector Security 

 P.O. Box 4549 PO BOX 4627 Re: Bankruptcy 

 Richmond, VA 23220-8549 RICHMOND, VA 23220-8627 2805 North Parham Road #500 

 Richmond, VA 23294-4453 

 

 Verizon (p)VIRGINIA UROLOGY Clarence Milton Staton Jr. 

 by American InfoSource LP as agent Attn: Bankruptcy Department 1615 Bickerstaff Road 

 4515 N Santa Fe Ave 9101 Stony Point Drive Henrico, VA 23231-4840 

 Oklahoma City, OK 73118-7901 Richmond, VA 23235-1979 

 Dale W. Pittman Emily Connor Kennedy John P. Fitzgerald, III 

 The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C. Boleman Law Firm, P.C. Office of the US Trustee - Region 4 -R 

 112-A W. Tabb Street P.O. Box 11588 701 E. Broad Street, Ste. 4304 

 Petersburg, VA 23803-3212 Richmond, VA 23230-1588 Richmond, VA 23219-1849 

 Laura Taylor Alridge Mark C. Leffler Salina Ann Willis 

 Boleman Law Firm, P.C. Boleman Law Firm, P.C. 1615 Bickerstaff Road 

 P.O. Box 11588 P.O. Box 11588 Henrico, VA 23231-4840 

 Richmond, VA 23230-1588 Richmond, VA 23230-1588 

 Suzanne E. Wade Veronica D. Brown-Moseley 

 P.O. Box 1780 Boleman Law Firm, P.C. 

 Richmond, VA 23218-1780 PO Box 11588 

 Richmond, VA 23230-1588 

 The preferred mailing address (p) above has been substituted for the following entity/entities as so specified 

 by said entity/entities in a Notice of Address filed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 342(f) and Fed.R.Bank.P. 2002 (g)(4). 

 Comcast Focused Recovery Solutions Portfolio Recovery Assoc., LLC 

 Attn: Bankruptcy Dept 9701 Metropolitan Ct, Suite B 120 Corporate Boulevard 

 PO Box 3012 Richmond, VA 23236-3662 Suite 100 

 Southeastern, PA 19398-3012 Norfolk, VA 23502-0000 

 Virginia Urology 

 Re: Bankruptcy 

 P.O. Box 79437 

 Baltimore, MD 21279-0437 

 The following recipients may be/have been bypassed for notice due to an undeliverable (u) or duplicate (d) address. 

 (d)VHDA End of Label Matrix 

 PO BOX 4627 Mailable recipients 73 

 Richmond, VA 23220-8627 Bypassed recipients 1 

 Total 74 
Mark C. Leffler (VSB #40712) Dale W. Pittman (VSB #15673) 

Boleman Law Firm, P.C. THE LAW OFFICE OF DALE W. PITTMAN, P.C.

P.O. Box 11588 The Eliza Spotswood House 

Richmond, VA 23230 112-A West Tabb Street 

Telephone (804) 358-9900 Petersburg, VA 23803 

Counsel for Debtors and Special Telephone (804) 861-6000 

 Counsel for Salina Ann Willis Special Counsel for Salina Ann Willis

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

Richmond Division 

In re: Clarence Milton Staton, Jr. 

 Salina Ann Willis 

 AKA Clarence M. Staton, Jr. 

 

 Debtors 

Case No. 18-32776-KRH

Chapter 13

APPLICATION BY DEBTORS’ COUNSEL FOR APPROVAL OF COMPENSATION 

 Comes now Clarence M. Staton, Jr. and Salina Ann Willis (the “Debtors”), by counsel, 

and state the following in support of this Application for Approval of Attorney Compensation. 

For the reasons given below, the Debtors asks the Court to approve reasonable compensation 

(including expenses) in the amount of $6,000.00 for services rendered in prosecution of Salina 

Ann Willis’s (“Ms. Willis”) claim against under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Action 

(“FDCPA”) against Symmetry Management Corp., d/b/a BCC Financial Management Services, 

Inc. (“BCC”). 

1. On March 29, 2019, this Court entered an Order Granting Debtor’s Application to 

Employ Counsel for Special Purpose and to Use Property of the Estate (the “Employment 

Order”). The Employment Order appointed Boleman Law Firm, P.C. (“Boleman”) and the Law 

Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C. (“Pittman”), as counsel for Ms. Willis for the special purpose of 

pursuing any remedies she possessed arising from her cause of action against BCC. 

2. As set forth in the Debtor’s Motion to Employ Counsel for Special Purpose and to 

Use Property of the Estate, Ms. Willis had a cause of action against BCC, a debt collector, for 

violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 USC § 1692 et seq., and 
specifically 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692g, which arose from a dunning letter BCC mailed Ms. 

Willis on or about April 2, 2018. 

3. On March 12, 2019, Boleman and Pittman, respectively, filed their Disclosures of 

Compensation of Proposed Special Counsel for Debtor (the “Disclosures of Compensation”). 

The Disclosures of Compensation set forth the terms of Boleman’s and Pittman’s compensation 

in exchange for agreeing to represent Ms. Willis in her cause of action against BCC: 

4. The Disclosures of Compensation explained that the source of the proposed 

compensation was not the Debtors but, instead, was the Defendant in her action. Boleman and 

Pittman disclosed that they had agreed to share the compensation for legal services on a pro rata 

basis based upon their respective Lodestar amounts. 

5. At all times since the entry of the Employment Order, Ms. Willis was represented 

by Boleman and Pittman, who are competent to represent her interests against BCC. 

6. BCC’s dunning letter stated that the consumer could notify the debt collector in 

writing or by calling in order to invoke the debt validation rights contained in 15 U.S.C. § 

1692g(a)(4) and g(b). A consumer who does not make a written dispute within the thirty-day 

validation period loses the rights afforded by §§ 1692g(a)(4) and 1692g(b). Adding “or calling” 

to the § 1692g disclosure could cause the least sophisticated consumer to conclude that she can 

invoke her debt validation rights by calling the debt collector. In fact, a consumer may only 

invoke these debt validation rights by requesting in writing that the debt collector provide 

validation of the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) and g(b). 
7. By adding “or calling” to the debt verification rights disclosures required to be 

made by § 1692g(a)(4) and g(b), when each subsection requires that the consumer make a 

dispute in writing in order to trigger the debt validation rights provided by these two subsections, 

BCC sought to discourage or prevent disputes that it would be required to respond to as a thirdparty debt collector, and, with respect to § 1692g(b), BCC sought to discourage or prevent being 

required to “cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector 

obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original 

creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original 

creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” 

8. By adding “or calling” to the § 1692g(a)(4) and g(b) “in writing” requirement 

contained in the disclosures that a debt collector must make through the mandatory § 1692g debt 

validation process, BCC sought to eliminate any debt validation disputes beyond thirty days. A 

consumer who does not make a written dispute within the thirty-day validation period loses the 

rights afforded by §§ 1692g(a)(4) and 1692g(b). 

9. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a), violations of the FDCPA by a debt collector 

subject the debt collector to liability for actual damages and, in individual cases, statutory 

damages of up to $1,000.00. Additionally, pursuant to § 1692k(a)(3), a successful action under 

the FDCPA by the plaintiff requires the defendant to pay “the costs of the action, together with a 

reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 

10. On March 29, 2019, Ms. Willis filed a Complaint against BCC in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Civil Action No. 3:19cv220). 

11. On April 16, 2019, Ms. Willis and BCC reached a settlement in which BCC paid 

Ms. Willis $7,000.00 (inclusive of attorney fees) in exchange for a Release of All Claims. 
Although litigation on the merits would surely have resulted in BCC being liable to Ms. Willis 

for much more in attorney fees, Boleman and Pittman agreed to reduce their fees and expenses to 

no more than $6,000.00 to facilitate settlement and insure that Ms. Willis received at least the 

$1,000.00 to which she would have likely been entitled in statutory damages under the FDCPA. 

12. Counsel for Ms. Willis worked together and with Ms. Willis to evaluate the value 

of the claim she had against BCC, taking into consideration the actions complained of with 

respect to the violation of the FDCPA. 

13. Ms. Willis approved of the terms of the settlement with BCC, including the net 

proceeds after payment of her attorneys’ fees. 

14. The total attorney fees attributable to this case are set forth below: 

Boleman Law Firm, P.C. $ 4,607.50 

Dale W. Pittman, Esq. $ 4,625.00 

15. The total expenses attributable to this case are set forth below: 

 Boleman Law Firm, P.C. $ 63.00 Postage 

Dale W. Pittman, Esq. $ 400.00 Filing Fee 

 $ 3.50 Photocopies 

 $ 1.45 Postage 

 $ 13.00 Process Service 

16. The Declarations of Mark C. Leffler and Dale W. Pittman, along with the 

supporting Exhibits and time and expense records, are attached to this Application and are 

incorporated by this reference. 

17. Because the Lodestar value of the attorneys’ time exceeds 45% of the total 

settlement value, the attorneys request approval of their fees based upon the Lodestar value, less 

voluntary reductions made for the benefit of Ms. Willis. 
18. The attorneys have agreed to reduce their respective fees such that each law firm 

will receive a pro rata share of the $5,519.05 fee (after reimbursement of their respective 

expenses), or the amounts set forth below, which amounts are requested for approval: 

Boleman Law Firm, P.C. $2,754.00 

Dale W. Pittman, Esq. $2,765.05 

18. The undersigned counsel for Ms. Willis has reviewed the time records for the 

above-referenced attorneys and represents that the attorney time records support the respective 

fee requests. 

19. The undersigned counsel for Ms. Willis represents that the time records reflect the 

following amount of time expended on behalf of Ms. Willis and the following current hourly 

rates: 

Name Hours Current Hourly Rate Amount 

Mark C. Leffler 9.7 $475.00 $4,607.50 

Dale W. Pittman 7.5 $550.00 $4,125.00 

Karen Graham, 

Paralegal 

2.5 $200.00 $ 500.00 

20. The undersigned counsel for Ms. Willis represents that the time expended by each 

person set forth above was reasonable and that the time billed is reflective of appropriate billing 

judgment and, further, that the hourly rates are within a range approved by this Court for 

attorneys of similar experience and reputation. 

21. The undersigned counsel for Ms. Willis represents that Boleman and Pittman did 

not duplicate each others’ work. However, the substantial discount of the fees requested more 

than compensates for any inefficiency. 

22. Counsel for Ms. Willis has incurred additional time and expense in assisting in the 

preparation of the instant pleading, which is necessary in order to present the Court with 
information concerning the benefit of the settlement to Ms. Willis as well as information 

concerning the attorneys’ fees. 

CONCLUSION 

The Debtors respectfully request that the Court approve the fees requested above as 

reasonable compensation for Boleman’s and Pittman’s representation of Ms. Willis in her 

FDCPA claim against BCC and that the Court grant such other relief as is proper. 

Respectfully submitted, 

CLARENCE MILTON STATON, JR. 

SALINA ANN WILLIS 

By Counsel: 

 /s/ Mark C. Leffler 

Mark C. Leffler (VSB #40712) 

Boleman Law Firm, P.C. 

P.O. Box 11588 

Richmond, VA 23230 

Telephone (804) 358-9900 

Counsel for the Debtors and Special Counsel for 

Salina Ann Willis 

 /s/ Dale W. Pittman 

Dale W. Pittman (VSB #15673) 

THE LAW OFFICE OF DALE W. PITTMAN, P.C. 

The Eliza Spotswood House 

112-A West Tabb Street 

Petersburg, VA 23803 

Telephone (804) 861-6000 

Special Counsel for Debtor 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on April 30, 2019, I have transmitted a true copy of the foregoing document 

electronically through the Court’s CM/ECF system or by first-class U.S. mail to the Debtor, 

Chapter 13 trustee, and to the United States trustee if other than by the electronic means 

provided for at Local Bankruptcy Rule 2002-1.

/s/ Mark C. Leffler 

Counsel for the Debtors and 

Special Counsel for Salina Ann Willis 
Mark C. Leffler (VSB #40712)

Boleman Law Firm, P.C.

2104 W. Laburnum Ave., Suite 201

Richmond, VA 23227

Telephone (804) 358-9900

Counsel for Debtors and Special Counsel

 for Salina Ann Willis

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

In re: Clarence Milton Staton, Jr.

 Salina Ann Willis

 AKA Clarence M. Staton, Jr.

 

 Debtors

Case No. 18-32776-KRH

Chapter 13

DECLARATION OF MARK C. LEFFLER 

Mark C. Leffler declares under penalty of perjury that the following statements are true:

1. I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.

2. I am a member in good standing of the bars of the following courts:

Supreme Court of the United States

Supreme Court of Virginia

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

3. I am a 1991 graduate of Eastern Mennonite College and a 1996 graduate of the 

Duquesne University School of Law in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. I have been licensed to practice 

law in Virginia since October 1996. I am a member of the Virginia State Bar, the National 

Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees (NACTT) 

(Associate membership), and the Richmond Bankruptcy Bar Association. I am a member of the 

Board of Governors of the Virginia State Bar, Bankruptcy Section. I was the first debtor’s 

attorney to be invited to join the Board of Directors of the NACTT Academy for Consumer 

Bankruptcy Education, of which I am currently the President. I also currently serve on the 

American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, Chapter 7 Committee.

I have previously served on the Virginia Bar Association Bankruptcy Section’s Board of 

Directors, the Local Rules Committee for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of 

Virginia, and the Richmond Bankruptcy Court Liaison Committee.

4. From July 12, 2000, until present, I have been employed by Boleman Law Firm, 

P.C., beginning in Richmond, Virginia, as an attorney. I am currently a shareholder, director, and 

Chief Legal Officer of the Boleman Law Firm, P.C. Since 2000, I have limited my work 

exclusively to the representation of consumers, with particular emphasis on representing

consumer debtors in bankruptcy. 

5. I am AV® rated by Martindale Hubbell, and I have been named a member of 

Virginia’s “Legal Elite” in the bankruptcy practice category published by Virginia Business 

magazine on numerous occasions. In 2017, I was selected for inclusion in The Best Lawyers in 
America in the category of Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights/Insolvency and 

Reorganization Law.

6. I am a contributing author to the Virginia CLE publication, Bankruptcy Practice 

in Virginia. I currently write a recurring column on bankruptcy law for the NACTT Academy 

for Consumer Bankruptcy Education’s website at http://considerchapter13.org/. In July 2016, the 

Norton Bankruptcy Advisor published an article I authored. From 2010 through 2013, I was the 

Editor of the Virginia State Bar Bankruptcy Section’s Bankruptcy Law News, and, from 2007 

through 2009, I was the Case Summaries Editor for the Bankruptcy Law News. I have also 

written articles that have been published by the Virginia Lawyer magazine and the Bankruptcy 

Law News.

7. I have given dozens of lectures to lawyers and professional groups on consumer 

law issues that qualified for continuing legal education credit, including:

Consumer Bankruptcy Cases: 

The Trustee’s Perspective

Richmond Bankruptcy Bar 

Association

February 2002

2004 Caselaw Update: Virginia, 

Fourth Circuit, and U.S. 

Supreme Court

Tidewater Bankruptcy Bar 

Association Annual Seminar

December 2004

Post-Confirmation Issues: 

Property of the Estate, Sales, 

Refinances, and Lien Avoidance

Virginia State Bar Bankruptcy 

Section Advanced Consumer 

Bankruptcy Practice Seminar

May 2005

Oh, Won’t You (362(c)) Stay Just a 

Little Bit Longer: BAPCPA, 

Multiple Filers, and the 

Disappearing Automatic Stay

Virginia State Bar Bankruptcy 

Section Advanced Consumer 

Bankruptcy Practice Seminar

May 2006

Debtor Attorney Roundtable: Do 

I Still Have a Practice? 

Attorney’s Fees, Debt Relief 

Agency Requirements, 

Credit Counseling, and the 

Debtors’ Practice under 

BAPCPA

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2006

Post-Confirmation Issues under 

BAPCPA

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2006

Ethics Panel Virginia State Bar Bankruptcy 

Section Advanced Consumer 

Bankruptcy Practice Seminar

May 2007
Chapter 13 Panel: 8 Things We 

Still Love About Chapter 13 ... 

And 2 Things We Don’t

Virginia Bar Association, 

Bankruptcy Section

May 2008

Chapter 13 Disposable Income: 

Courts Where Form B22C 

Controls

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2009

What Is a Successful Chapter 13 

(Plenary)

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2010

Chapter 13 Success Factors 

(Plenary)

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2010

Post-Confirmation Issues in 

Chapter 13

Virginia State Bar Bankruptcy 

Section

October 2010

What Am I To Do About These 

Mortgage and Proof of Claim 

Issues?

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2011

Mortgage Claims After 

December 1, 2011

Richmond Bar Association, 

Bankruptcy Section

November 2011

Both Sides of the Aisle: An 

Examination of Current Chapter 

11 and 13 Issues that Every 

Practitioner Should Consider

Virginia Bar Association, 

Bankruptcy Section

May 2012

The Means Test Form Under 

Chapter 7 and Chapter 13

Virginia State Bar, Bankruptcy 

Section Annual Seminar

March 2013

Successful Outcomes in 

Consumer Bankruptcy

2013 American Prepaid Legal 

Services Institute

May 2013

"The Dirty Dozen: 12 Hot 

Topics in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 

Practice"

Virginia CLE May 2013

You Talking To Me? 

Depositions and 2004 

Examinations

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2013

Successful Outcomes with a 

Bankruptcy

2013 Annual Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference

October 2013
Model Chapter 13 Plan and 

Amendments to Federal Rules of 

Bankruptcy Procedure

Richmond Bar Association, 

Bankruptcy Section

January 2014

Official Form Chapter 13 Plan 

and Proposed Rule Changes

Virginia Bar Association, 

Bankruptcy Section

May 2014

Disposable income panel: 

Collisions at the intersection of 

disposable income & good faith

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2014

Bankruptcy Panel: What Every 

Creditor’s Lawyer Needs to 

Know

Virginia Creditors’ Bar 

Association Annual Seminar

October 2014

Everything a Bankruptcy Lawyer 

Should Know About Personal 

Injury Claims and Disability 

Law

Virginia State Bar, Bankruptcy 

Section Annual Seminar

March 2015

Ethical Issues Regarding 

Limited-Scope Representation 

and Withdrawal from

Representation in Bankruptcy 

Cases

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2015

Break-Out Session for Consumer 

Practitioners: Post-Confirmation 

Issues in

Chapter 13 Cases

Annual Mid-Atlantic Institute on 

Bankruptcy and Reorganization 

Practice

September 2015

Dismissal and Conversion Issues National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2016

Mortgage Issues Toolbox Southeastern Bankruptcy Law 

Institute

March 2017

Dealing With a Worst-Case 

Scenario: A Discharge 

Roundtable

Southeastern Bankruptcy Law 

Institute

March 2017

Direct Payments by Debtors vs. 

Conduit Payments: Discharge 

and Other Issues Presented by 

Who Payor Is

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2017
Post-Judgment: Best Practices 

and Recent Developments

Richmond Bar Association 

Bench-Bar Conference

October 2017

Consumer Protection Litigation 

and Bankruptcy: Intersections 

and Collisions

Richmond Bar Association October 2017

The Claim Before the Storm: 

Remedies When Proof of Claim 

Compliance Fails

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2018

FDCPA Violations Arising from 

Filing a Proof of Claim in 

Bankruptcy: What does Midland v. 

Johnson Mean?

27th Annual Consumer Rights 

Litigation Conference

October 2018

Pursuing and Defending Class 

Actions in Bankruptcy Court

National Association of Chapter 

Thirteen Trustees (NACTT) 

Annual Seminar

July 2019

8. I have am currently counsel of record in over 1,000 active bankruptcy cases in the 

Richmond, Newport News, and Norfolk Divisions of the Eastern District of Virginia. I have 

handled alone or co-counseled with others the following cases that resulted in opinions: 

Tidewater Finance Co. v. Kenney, 531 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2008); In re Freeman, 297 B.R. 41 

(Bankr.E.D.Va. 2002); In re Schechter, 2012 WL 3555414 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 2012); In re Sheets, 

2014 WL 4831339 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 2014); In re Lavigne, 2007 WL 3469454 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 

2007), affirmed in part and reversed in part sub nomme GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191 (E.D.Va. 

2008); In re Swain, 509 B.R. 22 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 2014); In re Foster, 556 B.R. 233 

(Bankr.E.D.Va. 2016); In re Maddux v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 567 B.R. 489 

(Bankr.E.D.Va. 2016); Charity et al v. NC Financial Solutions of Utah, LLC, d/b/a NetCredit, 

2017 WL 3580173 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 2017); Taylor v. Allied Title Lending, d/b/a Allied Cash 

Advance et al. (In re Taylor), 2019 WL 103775 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 2019); and Derby v. Portfolio 

Recovery Associates, LLC, 2019 WL 1423084 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 2019).

9. My 2017 hourly rate of $435.00 was determined on May 7, 2018 to be a 

reasonable hourly rate by Hon. F. Bradford Stillman (Ret.), who was acting as an arbitrator on 

the subject of determining attorney fees payable in the adversary proceeding in this Court that 

was styled as Burnetta Michelle Jones v. CNU of Kansas, LLC, dba CashNet USA, Adv. No. 16-

03272-KLP. The Award in Arbitration is attached as an Exhibit to the Fee Application in this 

case and incorporated by this reference. On June 15, 2018, this Court approved the Award in 

Arbitration and entered an Order Granting Application by Counsel for Debtors for Approval of 

Compensation in the Chapter 13 case of Burnetta Michelle Jones, Eastern District of Virginia, 

Richmond Division, Case No. 16-33496-KLP, at Dkt. No. 35. 

10. I have thus far devoted 9.7 hours to the representation of Salina Ann Willis in her 

cause of action against Symmetry Management Corp., d/b/a BCC Financial Management 

Services, Inc. (“BCC”). I have applied my 2019 hourly rate in this engagement, which is 

$475.00. At my applicable hourly rates throughout this case, the total lodestar value of my time 

in this case is $4,607.50. 
11. Costs associated with this case incurred by my firm total $63.00. Fees plus costs 

total $4,670.50. An itemization of my firm’s costs is attached to this Declaration.

I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that the foregoing is 

correct.

DATED: April 30, 2019. _/s/ Mark C. Leffler_____________

Mark C. Leffler
 Boleman Law Firm, P.C.

When Who Hrs Rate L/A Fee Description of services Clarence Staton Jr. & Salina Willis

Other Litigation

3/5/2019 MCL 0.1 475 L 47.50 Tc w/DWP re FDCPA claim (0.1)

3/6/2019 MCL 0.9 475 L 427.50 Tc w/client about FDCPA claim against BCC, discuss procedure for bringing claim while in 

bankruptcy, and terms of representation (0.4); draft Representation Agreement (0.2) and email 

to client recapping discussion (0.3).

3/7/2019 MCL 0.2 475 L 95.00 Email to DWP re representation of client in FDCPA matter, likely hearing date in Bk Ct, and 

SOL.

3/11/2019 MCL 1.9 475 L 902.50 Review Fed Bk Rules re notice periods for application to employ and motion to use property of 

the estate (0.2); draft Application to Employ and Motion to Use Estate Property (0.6), Motion to 

Shorten Notice Period (0.5), Motion for Expedited Hearing (0.3), and Statement of Attorney 

Compensation (0.2), email to DWP (0.1).

3/12/2019 MCL 0.2 475 L 95.00 Final review of pleadings, authorize filing.

3/27/2019 MCL 0.2 475 L 95.00 Draft proposed letter and forward to court for entry.

3/27/2019 MCL 1.5 475 L 712.50 Represent client at hearing in Bk Ct on appointment as special counsel for purpose of bringing 

FDCPA case.

3/27/2019 MCL 1.8 475 L 855.00 Review and edit Complaint, including online research to review cases cited in the Complaint 

and insure block quotes are accurate and properly formated.

3/29/2019 MCL 0.1 475 L 47.50 Tc w/Rachel Greenleaf in Judge Huennekens' chambers re entry of order and SOL.

4/11/2019 MCL 0.1 475 L 47.50 Tc w/DWP re settlement demand to counsel for BCC.

4/15/2019 MCL 0.2 475 L 95.00 Review emails re settlement and tc w/DWP (0.1); tc w/client to discuss settlement proposal 

(0.1).

4/26/2019 MCL 1.5 475 L 712.50 Call Court to get hearing date, prepare fee application following successful settlement of 

FDCPA claim.

5/28/2019 MCL 0.5 475 L 237.50 Prepare notes for hearing on fee application (estimated time).

5/29/2019 MCL 0.5 475 L 237.50 Attend hearing on Application for Compensation (estimated time).

9.7 4,607.50 Total Other Litigation

Totals 9.7 $4,607.50

Page 1 of 1
Date Description Count Rate Total

3/12/2019

Postage ‐ 

Motions 63 $0.50 $31.50

4/30/2019

Postage ‐ 

Notice of

Application 63 $0.50 $31.50

Total $63.00

Boleman Law Firm, PC Expenses
Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

In re: Clarence Milton Staton, Jr.

 Salina Ann Willis

 AKA Clarence M. Staton, Jr.

 

 Debtors

Case No. 18-32776-KRH

Chapter 13

DECLARATION OF DALE W. PITTMAN

Dale W. Pittman declares under penalty of perjury that the following statements are true:

1. I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.

2. I am a member in good standing of the bars of the following courts:

Supreme Court of the United States

Washington, DC

February, 1997

Supreme Court of Virginia

Richmond, Virginia

June 8, 1976

U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Richmond, Virginia

September 2, 1980

U. S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia

Roanoke, Virginia 

U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

Richmond, Virginia

December 30, 1976

U. S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

Richmond, Virginia

November, 1997.

3. I am a 1971 graduate of Hampden-Sydney College and a 1976 graduate of the T. 

C. Williams School of Law of the University of Richmond, Virginia. I am a member of the 
Page 2

Virginia State Bar, the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, the Virginia Bar Association, the 

National Association of Consumer Advocates, and the Petersburg Bar Association, of which I 

am a past President. I am a member of the Council of the Virginia State Bar, the State Bar’s 

governing body, currently serving in my sixth term as the elected representative of the Eleventh 

Judicial Circuit. I am a member of the Board of Governors of the Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association, and I chair the VTLA’s Consumer Law Section. I serve on the Board of Directors of 

the Legal Services Corporation of Virginia, which provides funding for programs offering civil 

legal assistance to low-income Virginians. I served as President of the LSCV Board for five 

years. 

4. From February 1, 1977 until September 13, 1996, I was employed by Southside 

Virginia Legal Services, in Petersburg, Virginia, as its General Counsel (Chief Executive 

Officer). My caseload at Southside Virginia Legal Services evolved over the years into a 

primarily consumer law practice. 

5. From September 16, 1996, until the present, I have maintained a private law 

practice with an office located in Petersburg. My work in private practice is limited exclusively 

to the representation of consumers, with particular emphasis on representing consumer debtors 

under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. I have a statewide consumer law practice, and 

have represented consumers from all regions of the Commonwealth and elsewhere.

6. I was a contributing editor to the consumer law sections of Virginia Practice 

Manual, a practice manual for Legal Aid lawyers in Virginia, and for private lawyers handling 

cases under the auspices of pro bono initiatives in Virginia.

7. Pleadings and discovery from many of my consumer law cases appear in the 

National Consumer Law Center’s Consumer Law Pleadings, nationally distributed form books of 
Page 3

consumer law pleadings, beginning in 1994. Pleadings and discovery from my cases appear in 

Books 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11.

8. I have given over eighty lectures to lawyers that qualified for continuing legal 

education credit. 

9. I have made two presentations on consumer protection law and litigation to 

Virginia’s General District Court judges at the Judicial Conference of Virginia for General 

District Court judges, one in 1987 on consumer protection laws generally and one in 2008 on 

arbitration in consumer financial services cases.

10. My consumer protection law continuing legal education lectures include the 

following: 

Phone Cases 2018 Fair Debt 

Collections Conference, 

Chicago

March 19, 

2018

Consumer Protection Litigation and 

Bankruptcy: Intersections and Collisions, 

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act

Richmond Bar 

Association,

Richmond

October 24, 

2017

Class Actions and Multiple Claims: End 

Games Planning

Hampden-Sydney Bar 

Association CLE Event

Hampden-Sydney

October 20, 

2017

Debt Collection in Virginia

(co-presenter with Judge Robert A. 

Pustilnik and Robert P. Quadros, 

Esquire)

Virginia CLE

Charlottesville

September 18, 

2017

Serious Illness, the Law, and Pro Bono 

Services, Part 3: Relief from Creditors

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act

Legal Information 

Network Cancer, in 

conjunction with Virginia 

State Bar Access to Legal 

Services Committee

Webinar

November 17, 

2016
Page 4

Representing the Pro Bono Client: 

Consumer Law Basics 2016

Practicing Law Institute, 

San Francisco

July 22, 2016

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act Old Dominion Bar 

Association Winter 

Meeting,

Williamsburg

January, 30, 

2016

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 

Overview

Virginia State Bar Young 

Lawyers Section 

Professional 

Development Conference

September 24, 

2015

Consumer Law (FDCPA) A Law Day Celebration

Ft. Lee, Virginia

May 1, 2015

FDCPA: Ask the Experts National Association of 

Consumer Advocates 

Fair Debt Collection 

Training Conference, 

Washington, DC

March 11, 

2015

"It May Not Be a Payday Loan...." Virginia Poverty Law 

Center 2014 Annual 

Statewide Legal Aid 

Conference, Portsmouth

October 23, 

2014

Meeting the Legal Needs of Individuals 

Facing Serious Illness Through Pro Bono 

– Relief From Creditors

Virginia State Bar and 

the Legal Information 

Network for Cancer 

Webinar

April 23, 

2014

Ethical Responsibilities of Class Counsel 

to Class Representatives, the Class and 

Objectors

Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act Training 

Conference, San Antonio, 

Texas

March 8, 

2014

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act Working With Military 

Clients, Military Law 

Section of the Virginia 

State Bar, Williamsburg, 

Virginia

October 18, 

2013
Page 5

How the Consumer Bar Views FDCPA 

Compliance by Collection Attorneys

National Association of 

Retail Collection 

Attorneys Fall Collection 

Conference, Washington, 

DC

October 17, 

2013

Making the Bad Guys Pay Virginia Poverty Law 

Center, Richmond

May 9, 2013

FDCPA: Ask the Experts National Association of 

Consumer Advocates 

Fair Debt Collection

Training Conference, 

Baltimore, Maryland

March 8, 

2013

FDCPA Update JAG School, 

Charlottesville, Virginia

December 11, 

2012

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act VA CLE, Charlottesville, 

Virginia

September, 

2012

FDCPA ABA Standing 

Committee on Legal 

Assistance to Military 

Personnel, George Mason 

University Law School

March 15, 

2012

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act Ft. Lee Legal Assistance 

Division JAG Office 

CLE

May 5, 2011

Debt Collection: Protecting Consumers in 

Debt Collection and Arbitration

Federal Trade 

Commission Roundtable, 

Washington, DC

December 4, 

2009

Handling Fair Debt Collections Practices 

Act Cases 

65th Legal Assistance 

Course, The Judge 

Advocate General’s 

Legal Center and School, 

Charlottesville, Virginia 

November 16, 

2009

Handling Fair Debt Collections Practices 

Act Cases 

VPLC Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference, 

Williamsburg, Virginia

November 5, 

2009
Page 6

Challenging Predatory Small Loans National Consumer Law 

Center Consumer Rights 

Litigation Conference, 

Philadelphia

October 23, 

2009

The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act: 

Update 2009 

VA CLE Webinar September, 

2009

Handling Fair Debt Collections Practices 

Act Cases

2009 Mid-Atlantic Joint 

Services Consumer Law 

Symposium, Naval 

Legal Service Office 

Mid-Atlantic Legal 

Assistance Department, 

Norfolk, Virginia

June 12, 2009

Handling Fair Debt Collections Practices 

Act Cases 

64th Legal Assistance 

Course, The Judge 

Advocate General’s 

Legal Center and School, 

Charlottesville, Virginia

April 2, 2009

Defending Consumers in Medical Debt 

Collection Cases

National Consumer Law 

Center’s Consumer 

Rights Litigation 

Conference in Portland, 

Oregon

October, 2008

Combating Consumer Issues Facing the 

Military, FDCPA Cases

Consumer Law Intensive 

for Military Personnel 

Advocates, National 

Consumer Law Center’s 

Consumer Rights 

Litigation Conference in 

Portland, Oregon

October, 2008

Issues in Arbitration Cases Judicial Conference of 

Virginia for District 

Court Judges, Virginia 

Beach

August 13, 

2008

A Perfect Storm – The Intersection of the 

FDCPA and the FCRA in Debt Collection 

Harassment Cases

Virginia CLE Solo and 

Small Firm Institute, 

Williamsburg, Virginia

May 13, 2008
Page 7

Defending Debt Collection Suits National Consumer 

Rights Litigation 

Conference, Washington, 

D.C.

November 11, 

2007

Emerging Issues in Debt Collection 

Abuse & False Credit Reporting

Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association

Solo & Small Firm 

Conference, Richmond

October 19, 

2007

Collecting Consumer Debts: The 

Challenges of Change. Concerns About 

Debt Collection: The Consumer’s 

Perspective

Federal Trade 

Commission, 

Washington, D.C.

October 10, 

2007

The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 

(Including 2006 Amendments)

Virginia CLE September 24, 

2007

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act Naval Legal Service 

Office Mid-Atlantic Joint 

Services Consumer Law 

Symposium, Norfolk

May 11, 2007

How to Win (or Not Lose) an Arbitration National Consumer 

Rights Litigation 

Conference

Miami, Florida

November 11, 

2006

Consumer Debt Collection 59th Legal Assistance 

Course

The Judge Advocate’s 

School

Charlottesville

November 2, 

2006

Consumer Credit: Remedies You Should 

be Aware of

Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association

Solo & Small Firm 

Conference,

Williamsburg

October 20, 

2006

Collection Law From Start to Finish

(Presentation on the FDCPA)

National Business 

Institute

Richmond

October 10, 

2006

Overview of the Fair Debt Collections 

Practices Act

Framme Law Firm, 

Richmond

June 23, 2006
Page 8

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Naval Justice School

Newport, Rhode Island

May 22 , 2006

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act –

Essential Tips for Both Debtors and 

Creditors

Virginia CLE - 4th

Annual Advanced 

Consumer Bankruptcy, 

Richmond

April 28, 

2006

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 3rd Annual Naval Legal 

Service Office, MidAtlantic, Auto Fraud 

Symposium,

Norfolk

April 12, 

2006

What the Virginia Lawyer Must Know 

about Consumer Protection 

Solo and Small Firm 

Conference – Virginia 

Trial Lawyers 

Association,

Charlottesville 

September 30, 

2005

Points to Consider if You are Going to 

Arbitration

National Consumer Law 

Center’s 13th Annual 

Consumer Rights 

Litigation Conference

November 7, 

2004

Protecting Your Client’s Consumer 

Rights – 

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act

Virginia CLE -

Richmond and Tysons 

Corner 

April 21 and 

22, 2004

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 

Training Conference – Practice Issues

National Consumer Law 

Center and National 

Association of Consumer 

Advocates, Kansas City

February 22, 

2004

Fair Debt Collections Practices Act Henrico County Bar 

Association and Virginia 

Creditor’s Bar 

Association, Richmond

February 19, 

2004

Using Experts in Automobile Sale Wreck 

Damage Cases

IVAN Diminished Value 

Conference, Chesapeake

January 31, 

2004
Page 9

Consumer Law: Everything You Need to 

Know to be an Expert in Handling the 

Latest in Consumer Cases

First Annual Solo and 

Small Firm Conference – 

Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association,

Charlottesville 

October 10, 

2003

Points To Consider If You Are Going To 

Arbitration

Virginia Women 

Attorney’s Association, 

Southside Chapter,

Petersburg 

July 31, 2003

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Virginia CLE, First 

Advanced Consumer 

Bankruptcy Conference

May 2, 2003

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

Fair Credit Reporting Act

Naval Justice School

Newport, Rhode Island

April 3, 2003

Overview of the Fair Debt Collections 

Practices Act

Framme Law Firm, 

Richmond 

December 17 

& 18, 2002

Arbitrating: Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad 

Wolf?

National Consumer Law 

Center Consumer Rights 

Litigation Conference, 

Atlanta 

October 26, 

2002

Mobile Home Litigation Issues National Consumer Law 

Center Consumer Rights 

Litigation Conference, 

Atlanta 

October 25, 

2002

Settlement Agreements and 

Confidentiality Issues: Recent Cases in 

the News and the Problems News 

Attention Can Create

Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association Fall Fiesta, 

Richmond

September 28, 

2002

Practice Pointers Roundtable Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association Fall Fiesta, 

Richmond

September 27, 

2002

Arbitration and Beyond: What to Do If 

You Are Forced Into Arbitration and 

What Happens After the Arbitral Award

Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association Fall Fiesta, 

Richmond

September 27, 

2002
Page 10

Fair Debt Collection ABA Standing 

Committee on Legal 

Assistance for Military 

Personnel Legal 

Assistance Symposium, 

Quantico

August 15, 

2002

Practical Applications of Consumer 

Protection Laws for the General 

Practitioner – Part II

Virginia Women 

Attorneys Association, 

Southside Chapter, 

Petersburg

June 27, 2002

Practical Applications of Consumer 

Protection Laws for the General 

Practitioner – Part I

Virginia Women 

Attorneys Association, 

Southside Chapter, 

Petersburg

April 25, 

2002

Federal Court-Fun & Easy Annual Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference, Virginia 

Beach

November 1, 

2001

FDCPA Compliance for the Virginia 

Practitioner

National Business 

Institute CLE for Virginia 

Lawyers, Richmond

October 11, 

2001

Use of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in 

the Recovery of Attorney’s Fees

Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association Fiesta 3, 

Richmond

September 28, 

2001

Credit Reporting Abuse Petersburg Kiwanis 

Breakfast Club, 

Petersburg

September 18, 

2001

A Consumer Lawyer’s Perspective on 

Mobile Home Transactions

Virginia Manufactured 

Housing Association, 

Virginia Beach

August 8, 

2001

Debt Collection Harassment, Credit 

Reporting Abuse, Home Solicitation 

Sales, Fraud.

Elder Law Day May 11, 2001

Truth in Lending Act and Title Issues in 

Car Sales

VA Independent 

Automobile Dealers 

Association, District 1 

Dinner Meeting, Virginia 

Beach, Virginia 

April 11, 

2001
Page 11

What Do These Attorneys Know About 

The Used Car Business That You Don’t?

VA Independent 

Automobile Dealers 

Association, District 2 

Dinner Meeting, 

Richmond, Virginia

January 30, 

2001

Mobile Home Litigation Issues National Consumer Law 

Center Consumer Rights 

Conference

October 28, 

2000

Update on the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act

Virginia CLE® July 12 and 

19, 2000

Consumer Privacy in the Electronic Age The Bar Association of 

the City of Richmond

May 31, 2000

Consumer Law Update for Virginia 

Practitioners, Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act.

Virginia CLE® December 7 

and 8, 1999

Recent Developments in Fair Debt 

Collection, With an Emphasis on the 

Fourth Circuit

Annual Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference

November 3, 

1999

Recent Developments in Fair Debt 

Collection

The Bankruptcy Section 

of the Bar Association of 

the City of Richmond

October 26, 

1999

Consumer Law Seminar Office of the Staff Judge 

Advocate, Ft. Eustis, 

Virginia

August 27, 

1999

Automobile Fraud and Financing Issues Annual Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference

November 

11, 1998

Consumer Law for Support Staff Annual Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference

November 11, 

1998

First Day in Practice (Topic: Consumer 

Law Practice)

Virginia State Bar November 3, 

1998

Complying with the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act in Virginia

National Business 

Institute CLE for Virginia 

Lawyers

September 9, 

1998
Page 12

Basic Overview of Several Consumer 

Protection Laws Available to Assist 

Victims of Consumer Fraud and Abuse

CharlottesvilleAlbemarle Bar 

Association 

Bankruptcy/Creditors’ 

Rights Committee

February 10, 

1998

Overview of Consumer Law for Support 

Staff

Annual Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference

November 6, 

1997

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Annual Statewide Legal 

Aid Conference

November 6, 

1997

Recent Developments under the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act

Virginia Creditor’s Bar 

Association

September 25, 

1997

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 10th Circuit Bar 

Association

April 23, 

1997

Complying With the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act in Virginia

National Business 

Institute CLE for Virginia 

Lawyers 

February 11, 

1997

Handling Repossession Cases (gave 

segment on odometer law)

Virginia Legal Services 

Consumer Law Task 

Force

State and Federal Consumer Protection 

Statutes Frequently Applicable to General 

District Court Cases 

Judicial Conference of 

Virginia General District 

Court Judges

April 29, 

1989

Everything Under the Sun You Ever 

Wanted to Know About Handling Home 

Improvement Cases 

Elderly Law Task Force 

of Virginia Legal 

Services Programs

Consumer Law for Non Consumer 

Lawyers

Virginia Legal Services 

Attorneys

Handling Home Improvement Cases Consumer Law Training 

for Virginia Legal 

Services Attorneys
Page 13

11. The Summer 2006 edition of The Journal of the Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association included “Disputing Home Loan Servicing Abuse Through RESPA,” an article that I 

prepared for that publication.

12. From 2001 through 2010, I prepared annual reports on Virginia law for the 

American Bar Association’s Survey of State Class Action Law.

13. I was Section Chairman and Program Moderator for a Virginia Trial Lawyers 

Association Consumer Law Seminar entitled “Keeping the Big Boys Honest,” that took place on 

April 25, 1997, and covered the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting 

Act, Consumer Class Actions, Motor Vehicle Litigation, and Recovering Attorney’s Fees in 

Consumer Litigation. I was Program Chair for the Consumer Law portion of the VTLA’s 

February Fiesta CLE that took place in Williamsburg in February 2000. I was a presenter on 

Mobile Home Sales, and in a Consumer Law Practice Roundtable. I was Program Chair for the 

Consumer Law portion of the VTLA’s Fall Fiesta that took place in Williamsburg on October 14 

and 15, 2000, and was a presenter on Emerging Issues in Mobile Home Sales Fraud. I was 

Program Chair for the Consumer Law portion of the VTLA’s Fiesta 3 that took place in 

Richmond on September 28 and 29, 2001, and was a presenter on “Use of the Magnuson-Moss 

Warranty Act to Recover Attorney’s Fees.” I was Program Chair for the Consumer Law portion 

of the VTLA’s Fiesta 2002 that took place in Richmond on September 27 and 28, 2002, and was 

a presenter on “Settlement Agreements and Confidentiality Issues: Recent Cases in the News 

and the Problems News Attention Can Create,” “Arbitration and Beyond: What to Do If You 

Are Forced Into Arbitration and What Happens After the Arbitral Award,” and a roundtable 

participant in a “Practice Pointers Roundtable.”
Page 14

14. On November 9, 2007, I received the 2007 Consumer Attorney of the Year 

Award from the National Association of Consumer Advocates at its Annual Meeting in 

Washington, D.C. On October 21, 2010, I received the Virginia Lawyers Weekly “Leader in the 

Law 2010” award. On November 4, 2010, I received the Virginia Poverty Law Center’s John 

Kent Shumate, Jr. Advocate of the Year Award, in recognition of my having made a significant 

impact in advocating for low-income Virginia residents. The Virginia Trial Lawyers Association 

recognized me as the fifth recipient of its Oliver White Hill Courageous Advocate Award at the 

VTLA's 2014 annual convention, an award periodically presented to an advocate who has 

demonstrated courage and commitment to the ideals of justice in representing an individual or 

cause at considerable personal risk. I received the Dr. David E. Marion Award for Legal 

Excellence, presented by the Hampden-Sydney College Bar Association, on October 20, 2017. I 

have been selected to Virginia Super Lawyers every year since 2011. I was recently named to the 

Virginia Lawyers Hall of Fame for 2019 by Virginia Lawyers Media, being honored for my

career accomplishments, contributions to the development of the law in Virginia, contributions to 

the Bar and to the Commonwealth at Large and efforts to improve the quality of justice in 

Virginia.

15. I have been involved in many consumer cases involving a range of consumer 

protection laws, with an emphasis on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act cases that 

I have handled alone or co-counseled with others include Withers v. Eveland, 988 F. Supp. 942 

(E.D. Va. 1997); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Service, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Va. 1997); 

Morgan v. Credit Adjustment Board, 999 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Va. 1998); Talbott v. GC Services 

Limited Partnership, 53 F. Supp. 2d 846 (W.D. Va. 1999); Talbott v. GC Services Limited 
Page 15

Partnership, 191 F.R.D. 99 (W.D. Va. 2000); Woodard v. Online Information Servs., 191 F.R.D. 

502 (E.D.N.C., Jan. 19, 2000); Jones v. Robert Vest, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18413 (E.D. Va. 

2000); Kelly v. Jormandy, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29901 (W.D. Va. 2005); Gansauer v. 

Transworld Systems, Inc., Civil Action No. 7:00cv00931 (W.D. Va. 2007); Croy v. E. Hall & 

Associates, P.L.L.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14830 (W.D. Va. 2007); Turner v. Shenandoah 

Legal Group, P.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39341 (E.D. Va., June 12, 2006); Karnette v. Wolpoff 

& Abramson L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53382 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2006); Karnette v. Wolpoff 

& Abramson, L.L.P., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20794 (E.D. Va. March 23, 2007); Bicking v. Law 

Offices of Rubenstein and Cogan, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 841v (E.D. Va. 2011); James v. Encore 

Capital Corp., No. 3:11cv226 (E.D. Va.), Goodrow v. Friedman & MacFadyen, P.A., 788 F. 

Supp. 2d 464 (E.D. Va. 2011); Goodrow v. Friedman & MacFadyen, P.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 105395 (E.D. Va. July 26, 2013); Kelly v. Nationstar, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 156515 

(E.D. VA 2013); Cross v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC, 986 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. Va. 2013);

Fariasantos v. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC, 2014 WL 928206, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 30898, 

(E.D. Va. 2014); DeCapri v. Law Offices of Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 

131979, 2014 WL 4699591 (E.D. Va. 2014); Lengrand v. WellPoint, No. 3:11-CV-333 (E.D. 

Va.); Henderson v. Verifications, Incorporated, Civil Action No. 3:11cv514 (ED Va.); and 

Thomas v. Wittstadt Title & Escrow Company, LLC, No. 3:12cv450 (E.D. Va.); Soutter v. 

Equifax Information Services, LLC, 307 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Va. 2015); Henderson v. Corelogic, 

Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 3:12cv97 (E.D. Va.); Berry, et al. v. LexisNexis Risk & Information 

Analytics Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:11cv754 (E.D. Va.); Henderson v. First Advantage 

Background Services Corp., Civil Action No. 3:14cv221 (E.D. Va.); Cornell v. Brock & Scott, 

PLLC, Civil Action No. 3:14cv841 (E.D. Va.); and Reese v. Stern & Eisenberg Mid Atlantic, PC, 
Page 16

Civil Action No. 3:16cv496 (E.D. Va.). I was one of several lawyers representing plaintiff 

classes in a Multidistrict FDCPA class action, styled In Re Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. Debt 

Collection Practices Litigation, MDL #1198. The cases, originally transferred by the Judicial

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the Western District of Virginia, Danville Division, for 

consolidated pretrial proceedings, were centralized before the Northern District of Illinois for 

purposes of finalizing settlement. Classes were certified in Talbott, Woodard, Gansauer, 

Karnette, Bicking, Goodrow, Kelly, Fariasantos, DeCapri, Lengrand, Henderson v. 

Verifications, Incorporated, Thomas, Soutter, Henderson v. Corelogic, Inc., Berry, Henderson v. 

First Advantage Background Services Corp., Cornell and Reese. 

16. I served as Special Master in the case styled Silva v. Haynes Furniture Company, 

Inc., Civil Action No. 4:04cv082, E.D. Va., an ECOA/FCRA class action, having been appointed 

by Judge Kelley on January 27, 2006.

17. Less than a handful of Virginia attorneys are willing to accept consumer cases 

because of the special expertise required and the risk of nonpayment. I request attorney’s fees at 

the rate of $550.00 per hour. I believe that the amount requested is reasonable, and that it is less 

than the rates being charged by many attorneys of similar experience and expertise in Virginia’s 

federal and state courts. 

18. My standard hourly billing rate is $550.00. That is the rate I charge clients for 

representation in consumer cases. 

19. An earlier $425 hourly rate was approved in Randle v. H&P Capital, Inc., Civil 

Action No. 3:09cv608, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74994 (E.D. Va. July 21, 2010), adopted in part 

in 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101509 (E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2010); affirmed in part and appeal 
Page 17

dismissed in part by Randle v. H&P Capital, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 4506 (4th Cir. Va., 

Mar. 5, 2013). 

20. My fee at a subsequent $475 hourly rate was approved in Berry v. LexisNexis Risk 

& Information Analytics Group, Inc., et al, 3:14cv754-JRS-MHL, as was the $150 billing rate of 

my paralegal, Karen Graham. In Berry, class counsel, myself and co-counsel, submitted a 

lodestar-based fee request, placing our hours expended and hourly rates before Judge Spencer for 

decision. Judge Spencer approved the requested award, and also added a risk multiplier of 1.99, 

and the Fourth Circuit approved that award in full. Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 617 (4th 

Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Schulman v. LexisNexis Risk & Info. Analytics Grp., Inc., 137 

S. Ct. 77 (2016).

21. I raised my hourly rate to $550 on November 1, 2016.

22. My $550 hourly rate was recently approved in an FDCPA case in the Eastern 

District of Virginia, Richmond Division case, Levy v. Pioneer Credit Corp., Civil Action No. 

3:16cv864. The Court found my $550 hourly rate to be acceptable, noting that “the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions I think is reflected in the hourly rate because, candidly, most lawyers 

in Richmond – and even in larger metropolitan areas, such as Washington or New York, don’t 

really have the knowledge and experience to handle a case like this. But, again, I think that is 

reflected in the hourly rate.” The transcript of the June 12, 2017 hearing on my statutory 

attorney’s fees request is attached as Exhibit A. 

23. My $550 hourly rate and the $200 hourly rate of Karen Graham were approved by 

this Court on March 22, 2018 in Henderson v. Corelogic National Background Data, LLC, Civil 

Action No. 3:12cv97, Document 501, and Witt v. Corelogic Saferent, LLC, Civil Action No. 

3:12cv386, Document 374. It was later approved in Harris v. Redneck Recovery & Towing, 
Page 18

LLC., Civil Action No. 3:17cv00741-REP (ED VA, May 19, 2018), Doc # 16, and Jones v. CNU 

of Kansas, McCammon Group mediation ordered by Judge Philips (Retired Judge Stillman, 

Order entered May 7, 2018, Exhibit B). 

24. My caseload consists almost exclusively of consumer protection matters on behalf 

of consumers, with a heavy emphasis on cases under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. I 

undertake representation in most cases with the expectation of being paid a contingency amount 

from the proceeds of recovery, or being paid based on an award of fees pursuant to a fee shifting 

statute such as the FDCPA. I also represent many consumers on the basis of fees paid to me 

directly by the individual clients. In those cases, the rate of compensation that I require for my 

services is based on the hourly rate of $550.00. 

25. I am able to bill at $550.00 per hour because I have over forty years of experience 

as a consumer protection lawyer. Hardly any other attorneys in Virginia have such extensive 

experience representing consumers, and I know of no other lawyer in Virginia whose practice is 

limited to a consumer law practice aimed heavily at the FDCPA. 

26. I have extensive experience in cases brought under the Fair Debt Collections 

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (the “FDCPA”). I routinely represent plaintiffs in cases 

brought in the Eastern District of Virginia under the FDCPA. I have been involved in many cases 

involving requests for attorneys’ fees under the FDCPA and am familiar with the rates charged 

by both plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys in this region. My knowledge of the prevailing rates in 

this region comes from a variety of sources, including my own personal experience requesting, 

or opposing requests for, attorneys’ fees, discussions with other attorneys, advertised rates, case 

decisions and other publications. I have had an opportunity to survey the current hourly rates 

charged in this District and Division, as well as in the consumer protection field. My current 
Page 19

billing rate is $550 per hour. Given the specific knowledge I have as to hourly rates charged and 

approved in this District and Division, I am comfortable stating that the average hourly rates for 

federal litigation attorneys in this District and Division range between $300 and in excess of 

$900. 

27. Karen A. Graham has been my paralegal for twenty-two years. The hourly billing 

rate for work performed by Ms. Graham is $200.00. Ms. Graham is a seasoned and experienced 

Rocket Docket civil litigation paralegal.

28. Co-counsel and I divided work responsibilities in a manner designed to promote 

efficiency and effectiveness. My roll in this case has generally been that of reviewing and 

analyzing FDCPA liability issues, preparing and tendering a settlement demand to the debt 

collector, and negotiating a settlement, which has now been consummated.

29. To date, I have devoted 7.5 hours in this case. Karen A. Graham, my paralegal, 

has devoted 2.5 hours to this case, for a total of $4,625.00 in fees. Costs associated with this 

case total $417.95. Fees plus costs total $5,042.95. My firm’s itemization of time and costs is

attached as Exhibit C. 

I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States that the foregoing is 

correct.

DATED: April 29, 2019

___/s/ Dale W. Pittman________________ 

Dale W. Pittman (VSB No. 15673)

Counsel for Debtor Salina Ann Willis
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

Sandra E. Levy, 

Plaintiff, 

 versus 3:16 CV 864 

Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 

Defendant 

Before: HONORABLE JOHN A. GIBNEY, JR.

United States District Judge

June 12, 2017

Richmond, Virginia

GILBERT F. HALASZ

Official Court Reporter

U. S. Courthouse

701 East Broad Street

Richmond, VA 23219

EXHIBIT A
APPEARANCES

Dale Pittman, Esq.

for the plaintiff 

Louis Rouleau, Esq.

Pascal Naples, III, Esq.

for the defendant 
 3

THE CLERK: Case number 3:16 CV 864.

Sandra E. Levy versus Pioneer Credit Recovery. 

Mr. Dale Pittman represents the plaintiff. 

Mr. Louis Rouleau and Pascal Naples represent the

defendant.

Are counsel ready to proceed?

MR. PITTMAN: Plaintiff is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. 

We are here today on plaintiff's motion for

attorney's fees. I have read the papers in this case and

I am wondering whether the lawyers from Pioneer have taken

a look at the decision by Judge Davis decided in about the

middle of May.

What is the name of that case, Sarah? 

LAW CLERK: I can look it up.

THE COURT: Have you seen that? The case that

settled for $5,000 and he awarded a $30,000 fee.

Have you reviewed that case?

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, I am not sure if I have. I

don't think I have. It hasn't caught my attention. I

reviewed the cases. I thought I reviewed all the cases

cited by both parties, but I am not familiar --

THE COURT: I don't think it was cited by anybody,

because it was decided after I think you all completed

your submissions in this case.

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Well, let me just ask the defendants this.

Do you disagree with the hourly rate of $550 from

Mr. Pittman in this case?

MR. ROULEAU: We do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. What is wrong with the rate? What

is wrong?

And you are Mr. Rouleau?

MR. ROULEAU: Excuse me, Your Honor, Louis Rouleau.

Your Honor, would you prefer I move to the podium?

THE COURT: That would be good.

So tell me what is wrong with the rate of 550 an

hour. What should it be?

MR. ROULEAU: I apologize. I have been a little

under the weather.

THE COURT: Well, sorry to hear that. It is going

around.

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, we, as we set forth in our

objections, we think it slightly high.

THE COURT: What should it be?

MR. ROULEAU: Somewhere between 400 and probably that

particular rate. And we were --

THE COURT: Between 400 and 550? 

MR. ROULEAU: Yes, because we found a -- 

THE COURT: Do you have an affidavit from a

practitioner saying that is what it should be?

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MR. ROULEAU: No, Your Honor.

What we cite in our brief is, we cited a case Lundie

versus Smith and Cohen, a January 2016 case. And it just

stands for the simple proposition that 400 an hour for

senior counsel --

THE COURT: That's from where?

MR. ROULEAU: Eastern District of Virginia case. It

is on page 12. So that is where we are getting that

figure --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROULEAU: -- to address your question.

THE COURT: You don't have -- Mr. Pittman wasn't the

lawyer in that case?

MR. ROULEAU: No, sir, he was not.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROULEAU: Yes.

THE COURT: And you also think that -- well, okay. 

Let me hear from Pittman with respect to the number

of hours.

Mr. Pittman, I am a little perplexed, because I have

what looks like a bill to Ms Levy here that says, fees

ought to be 33,000 but you are requesting 20-some

thousand. What is the story with that?

You just cut them back to be reasonable?

MR. PITTMAN: Cut them back because whenever I have

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been before this court in, for lack of better a word, a

fee fight, I always wanted to make sure that I am not

asking for anything that I haven't earned.

THE COURT: You earned it either today or sometime in

the distant past when you started doing this.

MR. PITTMAN: I hope so.

It is in the very distant past. I have to say that I

haven't seen anyone this young admitted since I introduced

my son to Judge Brinkema a couple years ago.

The -- in this, one of the cases I cite -- 

THE COURT: Okay. 

So you have cut them back to make sure that your fees

are reasonable. 

MR. PITTMAN: Ten percent across the board to take

into consideration billing discretion, A, and as Judge

Lauck put it in the Randal case, to account for the

vagaries of billing entries. For example, in one of the

entries that I didn't catch until after we heard from

Mr. Rouleau there is another case with Ms Levy against a

different debt collector, suit against a debt collector

for this company that used to be Sallie May, and I billed,

to read a Judge Ellis opinion, I said, I just said, I was

wrong in that, and I have reduced my fee across the board

ten percent hopefully I hope to avoid this.

THE COURT: By more than ten percent, because, I

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mean, as I read this bill that you have got here it says

total hours 65.70 which is 57 for you and 8.7 for your

paralegal, for a total of fee of 33,090. But you are only

asking for 21,388; is that right?

MR. PITTMAN: Twenty-one -- I don't remember seeing

that number.

THE COURT: I am looking at your motion. Are you

asking for 31,388?

MR. PITTMAN: We filed a motion and asked for a

number at that point. We then continued working on the

case through the point of the reply brief.

THE COURT: How much are you asking for?

MR. PITTMAN: We were asking for 29-something in the

reply memo. We spent time yesterday preparing for today.

We are here today. Would like to get paid for that.

THE COURT: Asking for roughly $30,000.

MR. PITTMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

Do you have anything else to say? I think I

understand your position on this pretty well.

MR. PITTMAN: Well, if you think, if The Court thinks

it understands my position, the best thing to do is -- 

THE COURT: You are doing pretty well.

MR. PITTMAN: -- sit down and shut up.

I could speak to the Lundie case, but if I don't need

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to, I am going to sit down.

THE COURT: It is one of these cases that is unique.

Let me hear from Mr. Rouleau. 

Rouleau, is that it?

MR. ROULEAU: You said it correct. Rouleau, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Rouleau.

Mr. Rouleau, I mean, as I sort of went through this

case you guys made it pretty clear from the start that

this was going to be a battle royal. I mean, I looked at

your answer in this case. And, for instance, you pleaded

the affirmative defense of the plaintiff lacks standing.

How does the plaintiff lack standing to bring this law

suit?

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, at the time that we -- 

THE COURT: That is your third affirmative defense.

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, after SPOKEO a lot of these

FCDA cases are attacked initially and successfully on

SPOKEO grounds, and so I don't remember as I sit here

today on exactly what our thinking was, but, of course, we

had to assert an affirmative defense or we waived that.

THE COURT: Okay. 

Then your fourth or fifth affirmative defense is that

it is barred by the statute of limitations. How does that

work in this case?

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MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, we didn't have full --

first of all, we did not have full information at the

time. I would say when we we first got the complaint we

noticed that --

THE COURT: Okay. Well then -- okay.

Well, how about this one?

It says that the plaintiff's contributory negligence

caused damages in this case. How can the plaintiff

possibly be contributorily negligent on how the envelope

was sent by your folks to her?

MR. ROULEAU: Well, without discovery, Your Honor, we

don't know, but we do know --

THE COURT: Whoa. Hang on. The law suit is that you

think that she repackaged it in the envelope? You know

here is the thing.

How about this one?

It is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

How is it possibly barred by the doctrine of unclean

hands?

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, as I sit here today --

THE COURT: You don't know, do you. You didn't know

then. You just wanted him to understand that this was

going to be a hard-fought case. Is that a fair statement?

MR. ROULEAU: It is not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh, you were just -- let me ask you this.

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MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, if I may --

THE COURT: Suppose Mr. Pittman had said that this

conduct by your clients caused caused Ms Levy the

intentional infliction of emotional distress. You would

say, that is not supported by the facts in this case.

Everybody knows that is not supported. This is a case

where the wrong -- the envelope showed that it was from a

loan collector. That is not the intentional infliction of

emotional distress. But, suppose Mr. Pittman then said,

well, if I don't plead it at the beginning I waive it, and

something might come up later on that would support it.

Would you think that would be a good way for him to

practice law?

MR. ROULEAU: I think, Your Honor, we actually had

that discussion prior to our initial conference with you

on damages and experts.

THE COURT: But on that particular tort. That is the

tort I am talking about.

MR. ROULEAU: Not necessarily, no, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh. Okay. Well -- 

MR. ROULEAU: Because we didn't --

THE COURT: -- you take a different view of

intentional infliction of emotional distress than I do

because it is clear it doesn't exist. 

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, if I may address -- 

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THE COURT: I will bet you would have said that to me

and you would have been down here asking for sanctions.

MR. ROULEAU: Well, I don't think that would be the

case.

But, Your Honor, the point is, after the initial

pleading stage both parties worked very quickly, not on

the merits, but to resolve this case quickly. There was

no discovery. No depositions. No rule 12(b)(6) motions.

Nothing.

There were some discussions, a brief call with Your

Honor. So this wasn't, this wasn't -- this was not a

fight, notwithstanding the initial pleading stage, at all.

No discovery. No preliminary motions. No rule 56

motions. Quickly we realized that the stumbling block was

fees, and we made an offer of judgment three times the

amount of the statutory amount. So, respectfully, this

was not about a battle royal at all. What I am saying

is -- 

THE COURT: What do you think he ought to get in

fees?

MR. ROULEAU: That is up to The Court's discretion.

THE COURT: I know, but you --

MR. ROULEAU: I would just note, Your Honor, that the

plaintiff received three times the statutory max, and the

fees, even at -- even at 21,000 or 21,388.50, which is in

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the opening papers, is seven times that amount.

In the case where you are just dealing with an

initial pleading, really quick offer of judgment, I would

just note for The Court, and I leave it to the The Court's

good discretion. And that -- 

THE COURT: You don't -- what did you charge Pioneer

Credit Recovery in this case?

MR. ROULEAU: I do not know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think if you are going to

say that this is an unreasonable fee probably we should

see your billings as well. I am going to enter an order

directing you to submit those to The Court, and we will

then take a look at those and decide what a reasonable fee

is.

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, if I may -- of course I

will listen to The Court's instruction -- but I don't how

that is appropriate vis a vis my opposition regarding his

fee position.

THE COURT: That is what we are going to do, okay?

MR. ROULEAU: Okay, Your Honor. I just note my

objection for the record, but thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

Here is how I tend to view this case.

You can sit down.

MR. ROULEAU: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: I will tell you how I tend to view this

case.

I think the rate of 550 is acceptable. There is an

affidavit that is submitted that says it is a reasonable

fee in this case, and it is submitted by someone who

understands the how these cases operate and the fees that

are charged in it.

Number. The number of hours, I think Pioneer

probably has a point there that Mr. Pittman may have

gilded the lily a little bit in this case. So if it were

up to me I would probably -- well, it is up to me, isn't

it? -- I will reduce reduce the number of hours somewhat.

And as far as the Johnson factors go, as I said a

moment ago, I think the time and labor required is

probably a little high. But the novelty and difficulty of

the questions I think is reflected in the hourly rate

because, candidly, most lawyers in Richmond -- and even in

larger metropolitan areas, such as Washington or New York,

don't really have the knowledge and experience to handle a

case like this. But, again, I think that is reflected in

the hourly rate.

The same thing is true of the skill required in this

case. I think the factor of preclusion of work is pretty

neutral in this case. The customary fee in the community,

I think we have a pretty small specialized bar that

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handles these cases, or at least that handles them well.

And this fee of, or the rate, again, reflects that fact.

Whether it is a fixed or contingent fee, obviously it

is contingent. There is a great deal of risk in any kind

of contingent case, but especially in this one.

Reviewing the time limitations is pretty neutral in

this case.

The amount of time and the results obtained, you

know, on the one hand it is a good result for her because

it takes care of a problem that she had. But it is not

anything she is going to be able to retire on, or really

even go on much of a vacation on. So it's not like she

got a ton of money in this case. But it is also not like

Mr. Pittman is billing an enormous amount of time.

The next factor is the experience and reputation and

ability of the attorney, which in Mr. Pittman's case is

very high. And, I will say, that the lawyers on the other

side are also of the highest reputation and ability.

The desirability of the case or undesirability of the

case. Well, it is not as though he is representing,

Mr. Pittman was representing someone who was a pariah in

the community. I think these cases are not desirable for

average lawyers; but, again, that is because of the nature

of the case, and it is reflected in the hourly rate.

The nature and length of the relationship with the

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client is probably neutral in this case. People come to

Mr. Pittman because Mr. Pittman handles these kinds of

cases. So it is not like, maybe Ms Levy is someone that

he is now representing as she attempts to buy a business

or something, but I kind of doubt it. I don't see any

evidence of that here.

Finally, awards in similar cases are all over the

place. And the one I looked at, as I mentioned earlier,

is Judge Davis' ruling in Norfolk.

So if it were up to me -- and it is up to me -- I

would probably reduce Mr. Pittman's requested fees by

25 percent to reflect all of the efforts in this case,

which would get us to a number that I can't compute off

the top of my head. But, it is probably around $24,000, I

guess.

And if the litigants want to -- well -- those are my

thoughts on the case. You can proceed from here to

whatever is next for you.

How long, Mr. Rouleau, will it take you to get your

billings into The Court?

MR. ROULEAU: Your Honor, to answer the first

question, before that question, if we could stop at 24, I

would rather stop the expenses and billing my client if

The Court enters $24,000 for Mr. Pittman and be done with

it.

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THE COURT: Are you all right with that?

Well, you can appeal it if you don't like it. You

have heard my judgment. And I will -- I am prepared today

to enter an order of $24,000. You are welcome to appeal

if you want. 24,000 plus the costs you requested.

MR. PITTMAN: Sure.

THE COURT: All right.

Now, Mr. Rouleau, I am sorry Ms Israel is not here,

because I noticed that she is active in the Washington,

District of Columbia Lawyers Assistance Committee. And I

really --

MR. ROULEAU: She is.

THE WITNESS: -- commend her for that.

MR. ROULEAU: I will let her know that, Your Honor,

because that is a big deal for her.

THE COURT: That is very, very important. I am

active in the Virginia program, Lawyers Helping Lawyers.

And I commend her for that, and I commend you and your

firm for supporting her in that.

MR. ROULEAU: Thank you, Your Honor. I will let her

know. That is extremely important to her.

THE COURT: You have done a good job today, a

professional job, and I appreciate that.

Did I see something about your firm getting taken

over by a firm from another -- not taken over -- merging

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with a firm from another country?

MR. ROULEAU: We did merge with a London firm Bond

Dickenson, so I think it becomes official October 1. We

will become Womble Bond Dickenson, but we will still drive

on the correct side in this country.

THE COURT: Well, good.

And Ms Israel is driving on the correct side in all

ways that she can. 

We will enter a judgment today. Thank you very much

for a job well done. 

Have a safe trip back up the road.

HEARING ADJOURNED. 

THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT.

GILBERT FRANK HALASZ, RMR 

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 

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TIIE 

MCCJ\i\ll\ION 

GROUP 

May 7, 2018 

Emily Conner Kennedy, Esq. 

Mark C. Leffler, Esq. 

Boleman Law Finn, P.C. 

2104 W. Laburnum Avenue, Suite 201 

Richmond, Virginia 23227 

Dale W. Pittman, Esq. 

The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, O.C. 

The Eliza Spotswood House 

112-A West Tabb Street

Petersburg, Virginia 23803

Thomas D. Domonoske, Esq. 

Consumer Litigation Associates, P. C. 

763 J. Clyde Morris Boulevard, Suite IA 

Newport News, Virginia 23601 

Charles K. Seyfarth, Esq. 

Corey S. Booker, Esq. 

LeClair Ryan, P.C. 

Sun Trust Center - 24th Floor 

919 East Main Street 

Richmond, Virginia 23219 

Re: Award in Arbitration -Burnetta Michelle Jones v. CNU of Kansas, LLC 

Dear Counsel: 

In connection with the settlement of the foregoing matter, you have asked me to 

determine the amount of attorneys' fees to award to plaintiff. 

Background 

This matter arises out of proceedings in the Richmond Division of the U.S. Bankruptcy 

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. PlaintiffBumetta Michelle Jones filed a 

Chapter 13 Petition and the Court entered an automatic stay. A dispute arose over 

whether Defendant CNU of Kansas, LLC, violated the stay. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 

Section 362(a)( I), Plaintiff Jones filed a complaint for violation, and continued violation, 

of the automatic stay. In her complaint, Plaintiff Jones demanded damages, to include 

both actual and punitive damages and attorneys' fees and costs, all pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 

Section 362(k)(l). 

EXHIBIT B
Counsel first contacted me to mediate the broader dispute. However, during the week 

prior to the date set for the mediation conference, counsel agreed to settle their 

differences, and to seek a determination, through arbitration, of the amount of attorneys' 

fees to which plaintiff is entitled. Counsel then asked me to arbitrate the fee dispute. 

From the pleadings filed in this arbitration, it appears that, in addition to the agreement 

between the parties to arbitrate the issue of attorneys' fees, the remaining settlement 

terms are as follows: Defendant has agreed to pay actual damages to plaintiff in the sum 

of $5,000 and to effect a change in its bankruptcy refund process; and in return, plaintiff 

has abandoned any claim she may have had for punitive damages. 

Total Fees At Issue - October 27, 2017 Application And December 5, 2017 

Supplemental Fee Declarations 

Based on pleadings submitted on October 27, 2017, plaintiff asserts that three law firms 

provided legal services to her in connection with this matter. The firms and the fees for 

services rendered are as follows: Boleman Law Firm ($56,691.50); Consumer Litigation 

Associates, P.C. ($40,480.00); and The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman ($9,360.00). 

The total of fees as of October 27, 2017, come to $106,531.50. 

In Supplemental Fee Declarations dated December 5, 2017, plaintiffs attorneys have 

added relatively modest amounts to the total claim for attorneys' fees: Boleman Law 

Firm, including the fee claims of Mark C. Leffler and Emily Connor Kennedy 

($3,520.50); Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C., including the fee claim of Thomas D. 

Domonoske ($2,860.00); and The Law Office of Dale C. Pittman, P.C., including the fee 

claim of Dale C. Pittman ($2,365.00). 

Fees claimed on December 5, 2017, amount to $8,745.00. 

The total amounts claimed by plaintiff, including both the fees demanded in pleadings 

dated October 27, 2017, and supplemented by fee declarations dated December 5, 2017, 

are as follows: Boleman Law Firm: $60,212.00 ($56,691.50 plus $3,520.50); Consumer 

Litigation Associates, P.C.: $43,340.00 ($40,480.00 plus $2,860.00); and The Law Office 

of Dale C. Pittman, P.C.: $11,230.50 ($9,360.00 plus $2,365.00). 

Consequently, the total claim to be considered here is $115,277.00. (Plaintiff has not 

separately identified any costs to be recovered.) 

I note that, in the pleading submitted on October 27, 2017, plaintiff reduced by ten 

percent the amount in attorneys' fees she claimed as of that date, which came to 

106,531.50. Thus, on October 27, 2017, plaintiff made a formal demand of $95,770.35 in 

attorneys' fees. Explaining her reduced demand, plaintiff stated that the proposed 

downward reduction was a concession "in the interest of billing discretion and to account 

for any duplicative efforts that could have been avoided." See Application By Counsel 

For Plaintiff For Award Of Attorneys' Fees, page 13. The plaintiffs offer to reduce her 

2 
total claim to $95,770.35 anticipates the analysis that must be performed in this 

arbitration, and the adjustments that follow use sums that have not been voluntarily 

adjusted downward by plaintiff. 

The Record 

I have read and reviewed the following pleadings, etc. 

(1) Application By Counsel For Plaintiff For Award Of Attorneys' Fees, a pleading

supported by the following documents: 

(a) Declaration of Mark C Leffler In Support Of Request For Attorney's Fees,

together with the following attachments: (i) Declaration of L. Lee Byrd; (ii) 

Exhibit B [Excerpt of Transcript of Hearing on Motion of Midland Credit 

Management To Amend, etc.]; (iii) Objection of NC Financial Solutions of Utah, 

LLE to Consolidated Application By Counsel For Plaintiffs For Award Of

Attorneys Fees And Reimbursement Of Expenses; (iv) Exhibit D [Email from 

Mark Leffler to Corey S. Booker, dated May 1, 2017]; (v) Exhibit E [Email from 

Corey S. Booker to Mark Leffler, dated May 2, 2017]; (vi) Exhibit F [Email from 

Mark Leffler to Corey S. Booker, dated May 11, 2017]; Exhibit G (vii) [Email 

from Mark Leffler to Corey S. Booker, dated May 11, 2017]; (viii) Exhibit H

[Email from Mark Leffler to Corey S. Booker, dated April 13, 2017]; (ix);

Exhibit I [Email from Tom Domonoske to Corey S. Booker and Mark Leffler,

dated April 21, 2017]; (x) Exhibit J [Email from Corey S. Booker to Tom 

Domonoske and Mark Leffler, dated April 21, 2017]; (xi) Exhibit K [Boleman 

Law Firm, P.C., Time Records for Timekeeper MCL]; and (xii) Exhibit L

[Boleman Law Firm, P.C., Time Records for Timekeeper GMC].

(b) Declaration of Emily Connor Kennedy In Support Of Request For Attorney's

Fees, a pleading supported by the following documents: (i) Exhibit A [Boleman 

Law Firm, P.C., Time Records for Timekeeper ECF].

(c} Declaration of Thomas D. Domonoske In Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For 

Attorney's Fees, a pleading supported by the following documents: (i) Exhibit A 

[Domonoske Time Records]; (ii) Exhibit B [Domonoske Professional 

Biography]; (iii) Exhibit C [Domonoske Email Log]; (iv) Exhibit D [Email About 

Rates]. 

(d) Declaration Of Dale W. Pittman In Support Of Debtor's Motion For 

Attorney's Fees, a pleading supported by the following documents: (i) Exhibit A

[Pittman Time Records]; (ii) Exhibit B [Declaration Of Dale W. Pittman In 

Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For Attorneys' Fees And Costs]. 

(2) CNU of Kansas, LLC's Objection To Application By Counsel For Plaintiff For 

Award Of Attorneys' Fees, a pleading supported by the following documents: 

3 
(a) Exhibit A [Complaint For Turnover Of Estate Assets And To Determine 

Violation Of Automatic Stay from U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the E.D. o f

Virginia (Richmond Division) in Charity, Fullerton, and Jones];

(b) Exhibit B [Black lined copy of Amended Complaint of Burnetta Michelle

Jones];

(c) Exhibit C [PACER Records for Burnetta Jones Adversary Proceeding from 

U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the E.D. of Virginia (Richmond)];

(d) Exhibit D [Email from Mark Leffler to Corey S. Booker, dated March 28,

2017];

(e) Exhibit E [Initial Disclosures from U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the E.D. o f

Virginia (Richmond) in Charity and Jones];

(f) Exhibit F [Motions In Limine, including Notices, in Charity and Jones from 

U.S. Bankruptcy Court for E.D. of Virginia (Richmond Division)];

(g) Exhibit G [Summary of Timekeepers in Burnetta Michelle Jones, including

hourly rate, hours, and amount billed, etc.];

(h) Exhibit H [Analysis of Jones Billing Records];

(i) Exhibit I [Exchange of emails from Mark Leffler to Corey S. Booker, dated 

March 20 and March 22, 2017];

G) Exhibit J [Consolidated Applications By Counsel For Plaintiffs For Award Of

Attorney Fee And Reimbursement Of Expenses from the U.S. Bankruptcy

Court for the E.D. of Virginia (Richmond Division) in Charity, Edmonds, and 

Lane].

(3) Response To CashNet's Opposition To Application For Award Of Attorneys' Fees

And Reimbursement Of Expenses.

(4) Supplemental Fee Declaration Of Mark c. Leffler In Support Of Plaintiffs

Application For Attorneys' Fees and Costs a pleading supported by the following

documents: 

(a) Supplemental Fee Declaration Of Emily Conner Kennedy In Support Of

Plaintiffs Application For Attorneys' Fees And Costs;

(b) Supplemental Fee Declaration Of Thomas D. Domonoske In Support Of

Plaintiff's Application For Attorneys' Fees And Costs.

4 
A review of the record reveals the following information regarding the time keepers who 

represented the plaintiff, the time spent by each time keeper, and their hourly rates. 

Holeman Law Firm - Time Keepers, Hourly Rates, and Time Spent 

Application By Counsel For Plaintiff For Award Of Attorneys' Fees- October 27, 2017: 

Time keepers for the Boleman Law Firm include two attorneys, Emily Connor Kennedy, 

whose hourly rate is $350.00, and Mark C. Leffler, whose hourly rate in this matter is 

$435.00. In addition, Boleman has identified another time keeper, its paralegal, Gina M. 

Cross, whose hourly rate is $150.00. (The hourly rates for both Ms. Kennedy and Mr. 

Leffler were increased during their representation of the plaintiff as noted below.) 

Ms. Kennedy's hourly rates in this matter times hours spent ($325.00 X 1.0 hours; 

$350.00 X 29.1) total $10,510.00. Mr. Leffler's hourly rates in this matter times hours 

spent ($425.00 X 10.1 hours; $435.00 X 95.4 hours) total $45,791.50. Ms. Cross' hourly 

rate ($150.00) times her hours spent (2.6) comes to $390.00. The total claim for attorneys' 

fees made on October 27, 2017 is $56,691.50. 

Supplemental Fee Declarations (Boleman Law Firm, Leffler and Kennedy) - December 5, 

2017: 

Mr. Leffler claims the following additional fees: $1,870.50 (4.30 hours times his hourly 

rate of $435.00); and Emily Connor Kennedy claims the following additional fees: 

$1,645.00 (4.7 hours times her hourly rate of$350.00) Thus, an additional sum totaling 

$3520.50 is claimed by the Boleman Law Firm. 

Total fees claimed by the Boleman Law firm under consideration here are $56,691.50 

plus $3520.50, for a total claim of $60,212.00. 

Consumer Litigation Associates - Time Keepers, Hourly Rates, and Time Spent 

Application By Counsel For Plaintiff For Award Of Attorneys' Fees-October 27, 2017 

Thomas D. Domonoske, an attorney, provided services in this matter. His hourly rate 

($550.00) multiplied the hours he devoted to this matter (73.6 hours) total $40,480.00. 

Supplemental Fee Declaration (Consumer Litigation Associates, Domonoske)-

December 5, 2017: 

Mr. Domonoske claims the following additional fees: $2,860.00 (5.2 hours times his 

hourly rate of $550.00). 

Total fees claimed by Consumer Litigation Associates under consideration here are 

$40,480.00 plus $2,860.00, for a total claim of $43,340.00 

5 
The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C.-Time Keepers, Hourly Rates, and Time 

Spent 

Application By Counsel For Plaintiff For Award Of Attorneys' Fees- October 27, 2017 

Dale W. Pittman, an attorney, seeks an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of 

$9,240.00, based on his hourly rate ($550.00) times his hours devoted to this matter 

(16.8). In addition, Mr. Pittman employed a paralegal, Karen A. Graham, who spent 

limited time (.6) on this matter. The value of Ms. Graham's services at her hourly rate 

($200.00) totals $120.00. The Pittman Law firm seeks a total of$9,360.00. 

Supplemental Fee Declarations (The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C., Pittman)-

December 5, 2017: 

Mr. Pittman claims the following additional fees: $2,365.00 (4.3 hours times his hourly 

rate of $550.00). 

Total fees claimed by The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C., are $9.360.00 plus 

$2,365.00, or $11,725.00. 

Total Fees Claimed By Counsel 

The total fees claimed are $60,212.00 (Boleman Law Firm), plus $43,340.00 (Consumer 

Litigation Associates), plus $11,725.00 (Law Office of Dale C. Pittman), for a total of 

$115,277.00. 

The Standard To Be Applied To Determine The Award Of Attorneys' Fees 

Counsel for plaintiffs have identified Perdue v. Kenny, 559 U.S. 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662 

(2010) as controlling precedent. Defendant contends that McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81 

(4th Cir .2014) should guide the analysis of the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees 

claimed by plaintiff. 

In Perdue, the Supreme Court adopted the so called "lodestar method," or "lodestar 

approach" for determining an award oflegal fees in cases involving fee-shifting statutes, 

counseling that it "produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the 

prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client 

who was billed by the hour in a comparable case" Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-552, 130 S.Ct. 

at 1671-72. (italics in original) 

In a fee-shifting context, the lodestar method requires an analysis of both the number of 

hours spent by an attorney in representing a client as well as the hourly rate charged for 

each hour of time. It is determined by multiplying the hourly rate by the number of hours, 

after it has been determined that the hourly rate and the number of hours spent are 

reasonable. Blum v. Stenson, 456 U.S. 886, 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984). 

6 
Until Perdue was decided, many courts applied twelve factors to evaluate the 

reasonableness of awards of attorneys' fees. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 

488 F2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fourth Circuit was among them. See Barber v. 

Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2nd 216 (4th Cir. 1978). 

The Johnson factors included the following: ( 1) the time and labor expended; (2) the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform 

the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant 

litigation: (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset 

of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the 

amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability 

of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which 

the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney 

and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases. Barber, 511 F.2° d at 226, n. 

28. 

In Perdue, the Supreme Court seemed to undermine the use of the so-called Johnson 

factors, as they were applied by the courts to determine the reasonableness of awards of 

legal fees in fee-shifting cases. The Court asserted that the Johnson factors "gave very 

little guidance to district courts" in awarding legal fees, "placed unlimited discretion in 

trial judges," and ''produced disparate results." Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550-52, 130 S.Ct. at 

1671-72. 

The Court went on to state its intention to seek to "cabin" the discretion of the district 

courts that often followed upon the application of the "sometimes subjective" Johnson 

factors, by embracing the "lodestar approach," used by the Third Circuit in Lindy Bros. 

Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 478 F. 

2

nd 161 (1973), appeal after remand, 540 F.2d 102 (1976). The Court noted that the 

"lodestar approach" achieved dominance after it decided Hensley Gisbrecht v. Barnhard, 

535 U.S. 789. 801, 122 S.Ct. 1817 (2002). Id. at 559 U.S. 550-52, 130 S.Ct. at 1671-72 

As the Court put it in Perdue, since Gisbrecht, the lodestar has become "the guiding light 

of our fee-shifting jurisprudence." Id. at 559 U.S. 550-52, 130 S.Ct. at 1671-72. 

When it adopted the lodestar approach, the Court announced a strong presumption that 

the lodestar figure is reasonable in fee shifting jurisprudence, but it went on to state that 

the presumption may be overcome in rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not 

adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a 

reasonable fee. Id. at 559 U.S. 554, 130 S.Ct. at 1673. 

The 4

th Circuit follows the "lodestar approach," while continuing to apply the Johnson 

factors to determinations regarding the reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed and the 

number of hours spent by attorneys in cases involving fee-shifting inquiries. McAfee v. 

Boczar, 738 F.3d 81 (4th Cir.2014). 

7 
The McAfee court has identified the basis for a proper calculation of an attorney's fee as a 

three-step process: 

"First, the court must 'determine the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of 

reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate.' Robinson v. Eguifax Info. Servs., 

LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009). To ascertain what is reasonable in terms of hours 

expended and the rate charged, the court is bound to apply the factors set for the in 

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) Id. at 

243-44. Next, the court must "subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims 

unrelated to successful ones. Id. at 244. Finally, the court should award "some percentage 

of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff." 

McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81 

With the foregoing analysis in mind, I have concluded that the "lodestar approach," 

announced in Perdue v. Kenny. 559 U.S. 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010), must be applied in 

a manner consistent with the three-step process set out in McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81 

(4th Cir 2014). This conclusion necessarily requires consideration of the Johnson factors 

in order to determine the "lodestar." Guided by these precedents, the inquiry that follows 

is calculated to lead to a proper determination of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 

The Lodestar Analysis 

Here are facts that can be gleaned from plaintiffs fee application dated October 27, 2017: 

plaintiff claims entitlement to a total fee of $106,531.50. (For the purposes of the lodestar 

analysis, this sum has not been reduced by ten percent.) In addition, plaintiffs 

supplemental fee applications dated December 5, 2017, contains a demand totaling 

$8,736.50. 

The grand total representing plaintiff's demand for legal fees is $115,277.00. This sum 

represents the lodestar amount to which the plaintiff is entitled absent the consideration 

and application of the various Johnson factors to assure reasonableness with respect to 

hours and hourly rates. 

Defendant argues that this amount must be reduced to $40,053.76, sum which includes a 

reduction based on defendant's assertion that plaintiff enjoyed partial or limited success. 

Step One - The Reasonableness of Hourly Rates 

Pursuant to the first step prescribed by McAfee, a determination must be made as to 

whether the hourly rates claimed by counsel for the plaintiff are reasonable. 

Here are the hourly rates to be considered to determine if they are reasonable: Attorneys 

Emily Connor Kennedy ($350.00), Mark C. Leffler ($435.00), and their paralegal, Gina 

8 
M. Cross ($150.00); Attorney Thomas D. Domonoske ($550.00); and Attorney Dale W. 

Pittman ($550.00), and his paralegal, Karen A. Graham, ($200.00).

The Johnson factors that bear upon the calculation of the reasonable hourly rate are as 

follows: Factor 3 (skill required to properly perform legal services); Factor 4 (attorney's 

opportunity cost); Factor 5 (customary fee); Factor 6 (attorney's expectations at outset of 

litigation) and Factor 9 ( experience reputation, and ability of attorney). In applying these 

factors, I find that the hourly rates charged by counsel are reasonable. 

Defendant does not challenge the hourly rates charged by counsel for plaintiff, including 

the hourly rates of their paralegals. In any event, given the evidence in the record, any 

such a challenge would be unavailing. 

As a general matter, consumer law and bankruptcy, the two areas of law within which 

plaintiff's attorneys practice, are highly specialized. This case arose in a bankruptcy court 

where knowledge of both bankruptcy law and practice as well as consumer protection 

statutes and regulations was necessary and essential. In her Declaration, Emily Connor 

Kennedy asserts that "[f]ew Virginia attorneys are willing to accept consumer cases 

because of the special expertise required and the risk of nonpayment." See Declaration Of 

Emily Connor Kennedy In Support Of Request For Attorney's Fees, page 2. Mark C. 

Leffler makes the same statement in support of his claim for attorney's fees. See 

Declaration Of Mark C. Leffler In Support of Request For Attorney's Fees, paragraph 8. 

Defendant has not challenged these statements, which serve to satisfy, for each of the 

plaintiff's attorneys, the Johnson factors that relate to the required skill to properly 

perform the legal services rendered; the opportunity costs in pressing the litigation; and 

the undesirability of the case within the legal community. Each of plaintiffs lawyers has 

also adequately shown the experience, reputation and ability necessary to satisfy that 

Johnson factor. 

The record adequately justifies Mr. Pittman's hourly rate of$550.00. Mr. Pittman, who 

supports his attorney's fee application with two Declarations, has been a lawyer in 

Virginia since 1976. His first professional position was as a legal aid lawyer. After many 

years of legal aid work, he entered private practice. Mr. Pittman is clearly a highly skilled 

and experienced lawyer who appears to have devoted himself to consumer law and 

consumer advocacy in his legal practice for many years. He has lectured and written 

extensively on this subject. He has been recognized by his peers and the profession, 

having received numerous awards for service to the bar and for legal excellence. It is 

clear from the lengthy list of cases provided by Mr. Pittman that he has extraordinary 

lmowledge and ability in the area of practice he has chosen, which includes this case. He 

states that his hourly rate in the matter is "within the range of the local prevailing market 

rate for services in the narrow area of [his] practice." See Declaration Of Dale W. Pittman 

In Support Of Debtor's Motion For Attorney's Fees (dated October 26, 2017), page 2. 

Similarly, Mr. Domonoske' s Declaration also demonstrates his devotion to consumer law 

and consumer advocacy. Mr. Domonoske has practiced law since 1986. Over the years, 

9 
he has developed extensive experience as a legal aid lawyer and in his private consumer 

law practice. He has served as a lawyer in a wide range of cases, including as an 

appellate advocate. He has been a teacher of law at two well regarded law schools. He 

has delivered lectures too numerous to count in the field of consumer law and consumer 

advocacy and he has frequently written on this area of the law. He has also been 

recognized by his peers and by the legal profession for his pro bono work and for his 

advocacy. In seeking approval for an award of reasonable legal fees, Mr. Domonoske 

makes the following unchallenged statement: "My hourly rate was established and 

adjusted after reviewing the hourly rates charged by federal court lawyers who represent 

clients in consumer protection cases in this part of Virginia, particularly the Richmond 

Division of the Eastern District of Virginia , and the legal skills and experience that 

correspond to those hourly rates." See Declaration Of Thomas D. Domonoske In Support 

Of Plaintiff's Motion For Attorney's Fees, paragraph 6. He goes on to say that "based on 

that information, [h]is current hourly rate is within the range of the local prevailing 

market rate for services in the narrow area in which [h]e works." Id. Mr. Domonoske's 

hourly rate of $550.00 finds sufficient support in the record. 

Mr. Leffler claims an hourly rate of $435.00. Mr. Leffler became a lawyer in 1996. His 

practice has been limited to the representation of consumers and especially consumer 

debtors in bankruptcy. Mr. Leffler declares that "[he] is currently counsel of record in 

over 1,000 active bankruptcy cases in the Richmond, Newport News, and Norfolk 

Divisions of the Eastern District of Virginia." See Declaration Of Mark C. Leffler In 

Support Of Request For Attorney's Fees, paragraph 7. Among the documents provided 

by Mr. Leffler to support his claim for attorney's fees, are the following: (1) the sworn 

( and unchallenged) assertion that his hourly rate was found to be reasonable in a case 

recently decided in the U.S Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by 

Judge Phillips; and (2) the Declaration of L. Lee Byrd, Esq., filed in an unrelated case in 

the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, stating that Mr. Leffler's 

hourly rate is reasonable. Mr. Leffler has been a frequent lecturer to the bar on 

bankruptcy related matters, and he has been recognized for legal excellence. The record 

supports the reasonableness of Mr. Leffler's hourly rate. 

Ms. Kennedy, who entered the practice of law in 2012, claims an hourly rate of $350.00. 

Her hourly rate was challenged in a recent proceeding before Judge Phillips in the U.S. 

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia where he found it to be reasonable. 

Ms. Kennedy claims that her "time was valuable and necessary to this case due to [h ]er 

extensive experience with the Bankruptcy Court and knowledge of bankruptcy law." See 

Declaration Of Emily Connor Kennedy In Support Of Request For Attorney's Fees, 

paragraph 10. While Ms. Kennedy has less practice experience as compared to the other 

attorneys representing the plaintiff, her qualifications are none the less formidable. Ms. 

Kennedy has limited her practice exclusively to the representation of consumers, 

especially consumer debtors in bankruptcy. She has authored several articles on 

bankruptcy law and she has given three continuing legal education lectures on bankruptcy 

topic. She has been involved in the handling of several reported bankruptcy cases. Ms. 

Kennedy's hourly rate is reasonable. 

10 
For the reasons expressed above, I find that the hourly rates identified by plaintiffs 

counsel are reasonable. This finding completes the analysis of the first factor in the 

calculation ofthe "lodestar amount" in this matter. 

Step One - The Reasonableness ofTime Expended 

Pursuant to the first step in the McAfee analysis, a second factor must also be determined: 

whether the total number ofhours claimed by plaintiffs counsel are reasonable. 

Plaintiff seeks approval of the time spent by three law fimls, four attorneys, and two 

paralegals. Plaintiff claims a total of 244.6 hours ofattomey tin1e and 32 hours of 

paralegal time. The breakdown is as follows: Mr. Leffler (109.9 hours); Ms. Kennedy 

(34.8 hours); Mr. Domonoske (78.8 hours); and Mr. Pittman (21.1 hours). 

Among the Johnson factors bearing on the calculation of the number ofhours reasonably 

expended are as follows: Factor 1 (time and labor expended); Factor 2 (novelty and 

difficulty of question raised); and Factor 7 (time limitations imposed by the client or 

circumstances.) 

Plaintiffs case is straightforward matter involving defendant's violation of the 

bankruptcy court's automatic stay as a result of defendant's post-stay debiting of 

plaintiffs bank account. The debited sum was approximately $150.00. This matter does 

not appear to present novel or difficult questions oflaw, which implicates one of the 

Johnson factors. 

Despite the apparent lack ofnovelty and difficulty in plaintiffs case, its significance 

should not be overlooked. Mr. Leffler and Ms. Kennedy and their fmn, The Boleman 

Law Firm, undertook to represent plaintiff in an uncomplicated bankruptcy that 

blossomed into a much larger matter in July, 2017, after defendant withdrew money from 

plaintiffs bank account in violation of the stay in bankruptcy. They found themselves in 

litigation involving seven actions against sister entities to the defendant, and as a 

consequence, they became "increasingly alarmed by the systematic abuse [these entities] 

were demonstrating against debtors represented by the Boleman Law Firm." See 

Response To CashNet's Opposition To Application For Award Of Attorneys' Fees And 

Reimbursement Of Expenses, page 2 When this significance became apparent, Boleman 

brought in specialists, including Mr. Domonsoke and Mr. Pittman, both of whom made 

time entries for the first time in February, 2017. 

Defendant's recalcitrance in refusing to refund the sum debited in violation of the 

automatic stay for nearly six months, from August to December, was egregious and 

remarkably abusive. Defendant's obtuse behavior undoubtedly complicated this matter 

and forced the expenditure ofadditional time on this case. Defendant's stalling tactics 

during settlement discussions related to reaching agreement on changes to defendant's 

business practices also caused costly delays. 

11 
Applying the Johnson factor related to time and labor expended, and based on my review 

of the time sheets in the record, I find substantial evidence of duplication in time and 

effort. Extraordinary amount of attorney time was devoted to the prosecution of the 

interests of the plaintiff in connection with this obvious violation, especially when the 

amount debited from the debtor's bank account after the bankruptcy court entered the 

stay was approximately $150.00. 

Plaintiff offers a justification for the reasonableness of the number ofhours spent in this 

matter by asserting that her attorneys were careful in the coordination as between counsel. 

This justification can best be summed up by the following statement, made by Mr. 

Pittman: "In this case, debtors' counsel divided up tasks between the various counsel to 

capitalize on the strength of the individual team members and to avoid unnecessary 

duplicity [sic] of work, a working arrangement that we have developed over the past two 

years in a number of consumer protection cases litigated by this Court." See Declaration 

ofDale W. Pittman In Support OfDebtor's Motion For Attorneys' Fees, paragraph 7. 

I have reviewed the individual time records provided by counsel, and I have considered 

the various entries contained in them. I have noted significant duplication of effort in the 

way in which the individual attorneys conferred and communicated, as well as in the way 

they contributed through research and drafting, to the prosecution of plaintiffs case. I 

have also considered the roles played by the attorneys whose time is under consideration, 

and whether resort to their skill and expertise was warranted to the degree apparent in 

their time records. 

I find that the Perdue presumption, however strong, has been rebutted on this record, and 

that the total hours ofattorney time is excessive. I find that a reduction in the number of 

hours to be used in calculating the reasonable number ofhours expended is appropriate. 

For the Boleman Law Firm, a lodestar amount for Ms. Kennedy and Mr. Leffler must be 

calculated. 

For Ms. Kennedy, a reduction in attorney's time of50 percent, or to 16.9 hours at 

$350.00 and 5 hours at $325.00 is reasonable. Applying these hours to Ms. Kennedy's 

hourly rates of$325.00 and $350.00, I find that the sum in fees of$5,255.00 is the 

appropriate lodestar amount. 

For Mr. Leffler, a reduction in attorney's time of50 percent, or to 5.05 hours at $425.00 

per hour, and to 49.85 hours at $435.00 per hour, is reasonable. Applying these hours to 

Mr. Leffler's hourly rates of$425.00 and $435.00, respectively, I find that the sum in 

fees of$23,83 l.OO is the appropriate lodestar amount. 

For the Law Office of Dale W Pittman, a reduction of 50 percent, to 10.55 hours, is 

reasonable. Applying these hours to Mr. Pittman's reasonable hourly rate of$550.00, I 

find the sum in fees of$5,802.50 to be the appropriate lodestar amount. 

12 
For Consumer Litigation Associates, a reduction of 50 percent, to 39.4 hours, is 

reasonable. Applying these hours to Mr. Domonoske's hourly rate of$550.00, I find the 

sum in fees_of$21,670.00 to be the appropriate lodestar amount. 

Having calculated the total number o fhours and total hourly rates as above, I find the 

lodestar in this matter to be $50,558.50. 

Step Two 

A deduction based on an assessment of unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones, 

as required by McAfee, is not warranted here. Plaintiff and defendant agreed to settle their 

differences prior to trial and, as a consequence, the bankruptcy court has not made a 

judicial determination with respect to plaintiffs claims. In the absence ofajudicial 

determination of plaintiffs success on individual claims, I will rely on the defendant's 

concession that a step two deduction is not warranted. See CNU Of Kansas. LLC'S 

Objection To Application By Counsel For PlaintiffFor Award Of Attorneys' Fees, page 

9. 

Accordingly, I find that a step two deduction should not be made in the calculation of the 

attorneys' fee award to be made to plaintiffs counsel. 

Step Three 

At step three of the McAfee process, some percentage of the remaining amount should be 

awarded, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff. Additional Johnson 

factors are appropriate for consideration at this point in the necessary analysis: (8) 

amount in controversy; ( 10) undesirability of case within the legal community; ( 11) 

nature and length of professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) 

attorneys fees in similar cases. 

The settlement agreement reached by the parties in this matter weighs heavily in the 

determination as to the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff. The agreement sets out 

a compromise pursuant to which both plaintiff and defendant benefitted by avoiding 

uncertainty ofoutcome at trial, as well as the costs and expenses of preparing for and 

trying this case. 

Additional terms include the following: plaintiff gave up her claim for punitive damages 

in return for a payment of$5,000.00 in compensatory damages by defendant, and 

defendant agreed to change certain ofthe business practices which caused hann to the 

plaintiff. The agreed changes to defendant's business practices make future violations of 

the bankruptcy court's automatic stay less likely, benefitting both future debtors and the 

bankruptcy court. 

Finally, an essential tenn ofthe settlement included the agreement of plaintiff and 

defendant to submit the plaintiffs claim for attorneys' fees to arbitration. In addition to 

the other aspects of the settlement benefiting the plaintiff, this term of the settlement 

13 
agreement necessarily implies that plaintiff was largely successful in prosecuting her case 

against the defendant. 

Defendant points out trial results in substantially similar cases involving a business entity 

related to the defendant. In three companion cases that were tried together in the U.S. 

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District ofVirginia, Charity, Edmonds, and Lane, the 

damages awarded were $60,195.05, $59,426.53, and $58,550.34, respectively. These 

awards included actual damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. In the case at 

hand, the parties agreed to settle their differences before full blown discovery was taken, 

and the parties were spared the expense of trial preparation. 

Defendant also points to other substantially similar cases involving this defendant and 

various plaintiffs, identified as Fudala, Johnson, Munoz, and Smith. Defendant advises 

that these cases were settled prior to trial. The record reveals that the average award of 

attorneys' fees in these four cases amounts to $11,743.90. 

The settlement reached in connection with the plaintiffs claims did far more than provide 

plaintiff with monetary relief in the form of a payment of$5,000. As a result of plaintiffs 

success, she was able to obtain a significant change in certain of the business policies and 

practices ofthe defendant, not only insuring that defendant will be less likely to violate a 

bankruptcy court's automatic stay in future cases, but also protecting future debtors from 

having their bank accounts raided by the defendant in disregard ofbankruptcy law. 

Obviously, the settlement in this case helped put an end to defendant's apparent 

systematic violation of the bankruptcy court's automatic stay and represented a victory of 

significant proportions. 

It is clear from the record that the work ofrepresenting debtors in cases of this kind is 

disfavored. Special skills are required, including specialized knowledge ofbankruptcy 

practice and procedures and federal and state statutes enacted to provide protection to 

debtors. Thus, a team approach, with lawyers representing different areas of practice, was 

necessary to plaintiffs success in this matter. A strong commitment to serving 

individuals in financial distress, despite scant likelihood of payment, is the hallmark of 

debtor's counsel. The step three analysis called for in McA.fee is obviously intended to 

reward this commitment. 

Defendant argues for a downward adjustment of the award ofattorneys' fees in this 

matter, claiming that plaintiff achieved only limited success. However, plaintiffs success 

must be measured not only by her recovery of$5,000.00 in a matter involving a financial 

loss ofapproximately $150.00, but also by her achievement in forcing defendant to 

change its bankiu ptcy refund procedures. 

After considering the terms ofthe settlement agreement reached by the parties, the 

applicable Johnson factors, and the record before me, I find that the defendant is not 

entitled to a downward adjustment of the attorneys' fee award. 

14 
I further find that the plaintiff is entitled to an increase in the amount ofattomeys' fees of 

ten percent based the degree of success she enjoyed in this matter, or $5.658.85. 

Consequently, the final award is in the amount of$62,257.35. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Hon. F. Bradford Stillman (Ret.) 

15 
Salina Willis Apr 29, 2019 

1615 BickerstaffRoad 

Richmond, VA 23231 

File 190007 

Attention: Inv#: Sample 

RE: Salina Willis v. BCC Financial Management Services, Inc. (Boleman case)

DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 

Mar-07-19 Prepare draft complaint. Online research for 0.70 140.00 KGP 

corporate information. 

Mar-12-19 Prepare attorney compensation form and efile 0.20 40.00 KGP 

same with the bankruptcy court. 

Mar-25-19 Begin review of draft Complaint 2.20 1,210.00 DWP 

Proof and edit complaint. 0.50 100.00 KGP 

Mar-26-19 Complete text of draft Complaint for review 2.10 1,155.00 DWP 

by Mark Leffler at this time 

Phone from Mark Leffler to discuss the 0.10 55.00 DWP 

remaining process vis a vis the Bankruptcy 

Court prior to filing the Complaint in the 

District Court 

Proof and edit draft complaint. 0.40 80.00 KGP 

Mar-27-19 Phone from Mark Leffler to discuss his 0.20 110.00 DWP 

appearance before Judge Heunnekins today, 

and filing the Complaint 

Review file, prepare draft settlement demand 0.90 495.00 DWP 

letter an proposed release and settlement 

agreement to Florida lawyer Bruce Goldman 

Review and respond to email from Bruce 0.30 165.00 DWP 

Goldman. PH one to Mark Leffler to discuss 

settlement at this time. 

Review and edit draft Notice of Settlement. 0.20 110.00 DWP 

Phone to Robin Belcher to advise of the 

settlement of this case. 

Mar-29-19 Email exchanges with counsel regarding filing 0.40 80.00 KGP 

of complaint. Efile complaint with the court 

and edit documents to include case no. 

Apr-01-19 Review service papers to go out now to serve 0.10 55.00 DWP 

the defendant. 

Apr-09-19 Phone from Florida attorney Bruce Goldman 0.20 110.00 DWP 

to advise that he represents BCC and to 

request a settlement demand. 

Review Return of Service, diary Defendant's 0.10 55.00 DWP 

Answer due date. 

EXHIBIT C
Invoice #: Sample Page 2 

Apr-11-19 Review Bruce Goldman's emailed counter, 

review same by phone with Mark Leffler, 

revise release, email reply with counter to 

Bruce Goldman 

Apr-16-19 Reply to Bruce Goldman's settlement 

negotiations related email. 

Apr-18-19 Review and send executed release to Bruce 

Goldman. 

Apr-23-19 Prepare draft notice of settlement. 

Apr-29-19 Review and complete draft Declaration in 

support of my fee approval request to the 

Bankruptcy Court 

Format draft of Pittman fee declaration. 

Totals 

FEE SUMMARY: 

Lawyer Hours Effective Rate 

Dale W. Pittman 7.50 

Karen Graham, Paralegal 2.50 

DISBURSEMENTS 

Mar-29-19 filing fee 

Apr-01-19 photocopies 

postage 

Apr-23-19 process service 

Totals 

Total Fees, Disbursements 

Previous Balance 

Previous Payments 

Balance Due Now 

AMOUNT QUOTED: 

$550.00 

$200.00 

April 29, 2019 

0.60 330.00 

0.10 55.00 

0.10 55.00 

0.10 20.00 

0.30 165.00 

0.20 40.00 

10.00 $4,625.00 

Amount 

$4,125.00 

$500.00 

Disbursements 

400.00 

3.50 

1.45 

13.00 

$417.95 

DWP 

DWP 

DWP 

KGP 

DWP 

KGP 

Receipts 

$0.00 

$5,042.95 

$0.00 

$0.00 

$5,042.95 

$0.00