SECOND DIVISION April 5, 2011 No. 1-09- 1131 THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, ) Appe al fro m the ) Cir cu it Co ur t o f Pl ai ntif f -Ap pel l ee, ) Coo k C oun ty ) v. ) No. 05 C 441431 ) JAVI ER LUN A, ) Ho no r ab le ) Car ol A. Kipper man, Def endan ts-A ppel l an ts. ) Judge Presidin g. JUS TI CE CON NOR S d elivered t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Jus t ices Kar nezis and Har ris co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. OPINI ON Defe ndan t Javi er Luna appea

ls fol lowi ng hi s convi ction by a j ury f or second-degree murder. The tri al

court sentence d defen

dant to 20 years' i

ncarcerati on. Defen

dant rais es three issues on appeal : (1) whet her he was entitl ed to a jury instruct ion on the lesser-i ncl uded offense of invo lunt ar y manslaught er ; (2 ) w het her t he t rial co ur t impro per ly conside re d an e lement o f the off ense as an aggravating f

actor in sen

tenci ng def endan t o r, alternativ

el y, wh ether the 20-yea

r sent ence was exce ssive; and (3 ) w het her t he t rial co ur t co rr ect ly admonished t he venire pur sua nt t o I llino is S up r eme Co ur t Ru le 4 31 ( b) ( eff. Ma y 1, 20 07 )
. We affir m. I. BACKG

ROUND On Novem

ber 23, 2005, defen

dant and sev

eral a cquai ntances s pent most of the day drin kin g al cohol an

d usi ng cocai ne. The v

ictim, Jose Alfredo Basi

li o Miran da, joi ned the group at so me po int and bro ught mor e bee r. Lat e in the evening o f No vember 2 3 o r e ar ly i n t he
m orni ng of Novem ber 24, two m

en f rom th e group g ot in

to a hea ted argu men t over a c ard ga

me. One o f the men ret rieved a knife fro m his bedro om and st abbed t he o t her man in the ha nd andNo. 1-09- 1131

2

stomach, al

though apparently

the wounds were nei

ther severe n

or li fe-threateni

ng. The attacker t hen t hre at ened t he o t her men in the r oo m. De fendant ar med himself with a k nife from t he ki tche n, w hi l e se veral other m en broke up the f i ght. The foregoing facts are largely undis puted , but what happened next i s not clear because
m ost of the occupa nts of the ap artm en t were f ocu se d on

br ea ki ng up th e f i gh t an d they di d n ot wit ness t he ac t ual mur der . Ac co rd ing t o o ne ac co unt , d efenda nt dec lared t hat no o ne wo uld be al l owed to l eav

e the apartm en t, and then, unprovoked , stab

be d the vi cti m i n the ch est. Accordin g to defen

dant, he was h

el pin g the ma n wh o had been

stabbed wh

en h e “sen sed”
so meo ne be hind him an d la she d o ut wit h his kn ife. De fen da nt lat er ga ve shift ing r ea so ns f o rhis
ac ti on , ra n gi n g f rom de f en di n g h i m se l f ag ai n st a perc ei v ed v i ol en t atta ck to m erel y atte m pti n g to “s care away ” the pers on by

wav i ng th e kn i f e. Re ga rdl es s, th e s

ub se qu en t f acts a recl ea r: d ef en da n t' s k n i f e pun ctu re d th e v i cti m' s ch est, kil li ng hi m. Def endan t was charged wi

th fi rst-degree murder. Durin g voir dire , the tri

al court in form ed the enti

re veni re of the f oll owing: “[I] t is t he b ur de n o f t heStatewh o has br ou ght t he cha rg es t o p ro ve t he de fendant gui l ty be yond a re as on ab l e doub t. What t his means is t hat t he de fendant has no obl i ga ti on t o t es t ify in h is o wn be ha lf o rt o ca ll an y w itnes ses in hi s def ense. He
ma y sim ply sit here and rely

upon what he and his a ttorn eys pe rc eive t o be t he inabili t y of t he St at e t o p re sent evidenc e t o mee t t heir bu rd en. Sho uld t hat happ en you will have to dec ide t he ca se o n t he bas is of t he evid enc e p re se nt ed by t he p ro se cu t io n. Th e fa ct t he d efe nda nt do es no t t es t ify
m us t n ot b e c on si

dere d b y you i n an y wa y i n ar ri v i n g a t y our v erdi ct.No. 1-09- 1131

3 Ho we ve r , sh o ul d t he de fe nd an t ele ct t o t es t ify o rsh o ul d h is a t t o rne ys pr es en t wit ne ss es in his be ha lf, yo u a r e t o co nsid er t ha t ev ide nc e in t he sa me man ner and by

the same standards as evidence presented by the Stat e's Atto rneys. T he bo t t o m line, ho we ve r , is t he r e is no bu r de n u po n t he de fen da nt t o pr o ve his i nn ocence.” At t rial, d efenda nt asse rt ed s elf-de fense bu t t est ifi ed s omew hat incons iste nt ly. Defend ant t est ifi ed t hat he wa s afra id for his life and, at different po ints in his t est imony, st at ed t hat he i nten tion al l y stab be d the vi cti m i n orde r to sav e hi

m sel f f rom a perce i ve d vi ole nt attack or, al ternativel y, m erely swung the kn

if e i n order to scare the vi

ctim away . However, the jury was al so pres en

ted wi th previ ous statemen

ts by def endan t to t he ef f ect tha t he w as “doi

ng a f avor” f or the m an who had be en stab be d i n the f i ght wh en he stab be d the vi cti m . At the j ury i nstructi ons c onf

eren ce, de f endan t sough t an i nstructi on f

or the l ess eri nc l uded off en se of man slaugh

ter, ba sed on h i s statemen

t that he had onl y be en tryi ng to sc are t he vict im away at t he t ime that t he vict im was st abbed . T he t rial co ur t dec lined t o g ive the in struction. The j ury ul

tim ately convi cted defen

dant of the lesser-i

ncl uded off ense ofseconddegree m urder based on i

mpe rfect sel f-def ense. At se nt en cin g, t he t r ial c o ur t mad e t he fo llo win g s t at eme nt , wh ich is r ep r o du ce d h er e in full: “Allright . I pr eside d o ver t he t rial. I hear d all t he fact s o f the case. I read the Pre sen

tenc e In ve stigation. Wit h r eg ar d t o ag gr av at io n, o ne fac t o rin a gg r av at io n is s er io us bo dily ha rm . In th i s ca se i t was extrem

e se ri ous b odi l

y ha rm i n that the v

i cti m i s de ad.No. 1-09- 1131

4

Oth er f actorswh i ch I w oul d c on si der i n pron oun ci n g a se n ten ce i s a deter re n ce to ot her s so t hat t hey will not co mmi t t he sa me offense , a lso, t he pr ot ect ion o f the pub l i c f rom th i s ty pe of cond uct. You have a case here of

a vi ctim who is in nocent. At the most, he m ay have had som

e alcohol i

n hi s sy stem, but he di

dn't ha ve a gun . He didn

't have a kn i f e. H e w asn'

t doi ng an y thi ng , an d he w assta

bb ed i n th e c he st a nd died f rom th at. Ba se d u

pon th e acti on s of th e def en da n t, p un i sh men t h as to b e ta ken i n to acc ount as

wel l as the protecti

on of the publ i c an d deterr ence a nd th e b odi l y ha rm or death whi ch wascaus ed i

n th i s ca se. The sen tence that the defen

dant's attorney is aski

ng f or is ei ght ye ars but the Cou rt f ee l s is i na de qua te j us t i n te rms of pun i sh men t an d i n te rms of prot ection of the publi

c and i n terms of deterrence and i

n terms of what happe

ned i n th i s ca se. Wh il e the Court is m

in dful of the f act that t he def

endan t has no cri

mi nal ba ck gr o un d, co nsid er ing all t he fac t s in t his c as e, t he Co ur t wo uld se nt en ce him to 20 years

IDOC .” Defe ndan t was accordingl

y s entenced to 20 years ' i

ncarcerati on. This

appeal fol lowed. II. ANA LYSIS Defe ndan t raises three issues: (1) whethe r the trial court should have gi

ven the jury an i nstructi on on th

e less er-i nc l uded off en se of i nv olu ntary man slaugh

ter; (2 ) whethe

r the tri al court i m properl y cons i dered

the v i cti m's death as a n a ggrav ati ng f actor i n s en tenc i ng d ef endan t or,No. 1-09- 1131

5

al terna tiv el y , wh ethe r the 2 0-y ear s en tenc e was ex ces si ve ; a nd ( 3) wh ethe r the tri al court correctl y adm oni shed th e v en

i re purs uan t to Rule 431(b). A. Ju ry Ins t ru ct ions We f irst consi der whether the j ury s

hould h ave recei ved an in volun tary m ansl aughter i n str uc ti on . B oth

pa rties ag re e th at th i s iss ue h as b een f orf ei ted b ec au se de f en da n t f ai l ed to b oth obje ct at t rial

and rai se the i ssue i

n a posttrial

motion, so thi s i ssue can

only be revi ewed under the pla in -error doctr in

e. See People v. Enoch , 122 Ill . 2d 176, 186 (1988). We m ay review unprese rve d error onl

y wh ere e i ther "(1) a clear or obvious error occur red and the evidence is so cl ose l y b al an ce d th at th e error al on e th re ate n ed to ti p th e s ca l es of j us ti ce ag ai n st th e def en da n t,
r eg ar dle ss o f t he se r io us ne ss o f t he er r o r , o r( 2) a c lea ro ro bvio us er r o ro cc ur r ed an d t ha t er r o ris
so ser iou s t hat it affec t ed t he fairne ss o f the defend ant 's t rial and challenge d t he inte gr ity o f the judi ci al process, regardless

of the cl oseness of

the evi dence .” People v. Piatkow ski , 225 Ill . 2d 551, 565 (2007). Defendan t bears the burden

of persuasi

on. See id. The f irst step i n pl ai n-error anal

ys is is determi ni ng whether an error occurred. See id. The supr em e court has s

um mari zed th e proper anal y si s i n the con text of an i nv olu ntary
manslaughter in

struct ion as f

ollows: “ Th e g i

vi ng of j ury i ns tructi ons i s a matter wi

thi n th e s oun d di screti on of the tri al court. [Ci

tation .] An

i nstructi on on a

l ess er of f en se is j ustif

i ed wh en there i s som e cre di bl e ev i den ce to sup port the gi

vi ng of the i nstructi on. [Ci

tation .] Where t her e is evide nt iary sup po rt for an involunt ar y manslaught er instr uct ion, t he f ail ure to gi ve the i nstructi on consti

tutes an abuse of d i scre tion . [Ci tation .] W h eth er an i n v ol un tar y mansl augh ter i n str uc ti on i s war ra n ted de pen dson th e f actsNo. 1-09- 1131

6

and ci rcum stan ces of e ach cas e. [Ci tation .] The off en ses of i nv olu ntary man slaugh

ter an d f i rst deg ree m urder r equi re me ntal s tates, such that inv

oluntary ma nsl aughter requires a

le ss cul pabl e m ental state t han fi rst degree murder. Particularly , in volun tary m ansl aughter requires tha

t a def endan t uni nten tion al l y kil l an i ndi vi dual by reckl ess l y perf ormi ng a cts tha t are li kel y to cause death or great bodil y h arm.” People v. Jones , 219 Ill . 2d 1, 31 (2006 ). Th e p ri mary que sti on h ere i s w he the r th ere i s a ny cre di bl e evi denc e that d ef

en da nt d i d n ot intent ionally sta b t he vict im but inst ead merely swu ng t he knife r eck lessly in the vict im's direction. The sole pi

ece of ev ide nce on this poin

t is def endan t's trial testim ony tha t he in tended only to scare the vi

ctim away at the time

that he swung the kn

if e. St an din g b y it se lf, t his w o uld se em t o qu alify a s s o me e vid en ce o f lac k o f int en t t o kill, wh i ch wou l d a rgua b l y su pp ort a n i n v ol un tar y mansl augh ter i n str uc ti on . H owev er , the S tate
ma in tains that defenda

nt rais ed the af

fi rmati ve def ense of self-def ense i n thi s case, an

d it argues that by asserting sel

f-defen se defendan

t has necessaril

y adm itted t he underly

in g offens e, t hat is, defen dant has conc eded that he intentiona lly st ab be d t he vic t im. T he St at e a r gu es t ha t t his
mea ns t ha t de fen da nt ca nno t inc o nsis t en t ly as se r t invo lun t ar y mans lau gh t er , wh ich wo uld require that he unintentionally stab be d the vi cti m . Wh i l e logi cal l y persuas i ve , the s uprem e court has rej ected this preci

se argum ent. See People

v. Castil lo , 188 Il l . 2d 536 , 545 (1 999) (“

To t he extent that there is i

nconsistency

between def

endan t's contention that the j ury s hould h ave b een in structed on in

volun tary m ansl aughter and h

is al ternate clai

m of self-def ense, the i nconsistency i s n ot fatal to thi s ap peal . Il l i noi s law al

l ows a c ri m i na l def endan t to rais e i nc onsi sten t def en ses .No. 1-09- 1131

7

Indeed, we hav e sp eci

f i cal l y he l d tha t whe re the re i s ev i den tia ry supp ort for an

i nv olu ntary
ma nsl aughter in struction, such an

in struction is

not pro hi bi ted by a cl ai m of self-def ense. ”) (citi ng People v. Whiters , 146 Il l . 2d 437 , 441-4 2 (199 2)). A ddi ti on al l y , the S tate

ci tes ca se l aw th at stan dsf or th e p rop osi ti on th at “a d efe nd an t is
n ot en ti tl ed to re du ce f i rs t de gr ee m urder to [ i

n v ol un tar y mansl augh ter] by a h i dden men tal sta te known only

to hi m an d unsuppor ted by the facts. ” People v. Jackson , 372 Ill . App. 3d 605, 614 (2007); accord People v. Sipp , 378 Il l . Ap p. 3d 15 7, 164 ( 2007)
. Jackson su m marize d th

e state of cas e law as f

oll ows: “ Il l i n oi s c our ts h av e c on siste n tl y h el d th at w h en th e def en da n t i n ten dsto fi re a gun, poin

ts it in the general

direction of his or her in

tended vi ctim, and sh

oot s, such
co nduc t is not merely re ckles s and do es no t war ra nt an involunt ar y-manslaug ht er instr uct ion, regar dless of the def

endan t's asse rtion that he or sh

e di d not i nten d to ki l l an y one. [C i tations.] ” Jackson , 372 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 613-14. Altho ugh Jackson discu sses t his issue in t he co nt ext of firing a g un, t he sa me rea so ning appl i es to th e f acts o f th i s c as e. Here , the ev i den ce demon strate d th

at ( 1) de f en da n t i n ten de d to
sw ing t he k nife, whic h, like a gu n, is a d ea dly we ap o n; ( 2) de fend ant eit her po int ed t he k nife
o ver his s ho uld er in t he d ire ct io n o f t he v ict im or wa lke d u p t o t he v ict im and po int ed t he k nife at his chest; an d (3) defen

dant swung the kn

if e at the vi ctim . Foll

owing Jackson , the evidence
un eq ui v oca l l y demon strate d th

at def en da n t intended t o s wing t he knife in t he vict im's direct ion, whi ch i s al l that i s req

ui red un der Jackson to precl

ude a n i nv olu ntary man slaugh

ter i nstructi on. Whet her defend ant might ha ve had t he ad dit ional su bject ive intent t o e ither kill or s car e t he vi ctim away is irrel evan t. His later clai

m a t t rial that he i ntended onl

y to scare the vi

ctim away ca nno t be us ed in su pp o r t o f an invo lun t ar y mans lau gh t er inst ruc t io n be ca us e it is me r ely hisNo. 1-09- 1131

8

own statement about hi s own “h idde n” i ntent and i s not support ed by any ot her evi dence. As wit h t he gu n in Jackson , d efenda nt 's ac t of int ent ionally swinging t he knife at t he vi ctim ma kes his conduct more than reckl ess, precl udin g an i nvol untary m ansl aughter in struction. No relevan

t evide nce was presented that could support an in volun tary m ansl aughter instr uct ion, and c ons equ ent ly, the t rial co ur t did no t er r by re fusing t o inst ru ct t he jur y on t he l ess er-i nc l uded off en se of i nv olu ntary man slaugh

ter. B. Sent encing We n ext consider whether the trial court im properly considered the vi

ctim 's death as an ag gr ava t ing fa ct o r in s ent enc ing d efe nda nt . T her e is “ a g ene ra l pr o hibit io n ag ains t t he u se o f a si ngle fac to r both as an el

em ent of a def

endan t's cri me and as a n agg ra vat ing fact or just ify ing t he impo sit io n o f a h ar she rse nt en ce t ha n mig ht o t he rwis e h av e b ee n imp o se d. ” ( E mph as is in origi na l .) People v. Gonzalez , 1 51 I ll. 2d 7 9, 83- 84 ( 199 2) . T he fact or her e wa s t he vict im's dea t h, a nd t he disa gr eement bet wee n t he pa rt ies is o ver t he effect of t he t rial co ur t 's st at ement that “[w] ith regard t o aggr avation, one facto r in aggravation i s serious bodil y h arm. In this case it w as e xt re me ser iou s bo dily harm in that t he vict im i s de ad. *** Base d up on t he ac t ions o f the defend ant , p unishment has t o be t ake n into acc ou nt as w ell as t he pr ot ect ion o f the public and deterrence and the b odil

y h arm or death whi

ch was c aused i

n thi s case.” The de fen

se i nsists that this was an i mpe rmissi ble doubl e enh

ancem ent, while the Stat e argues that it was m erely an obse rva tion that the vi cti m di ed. The t rial co ur t mentio ned t he de at h of t he vict im twice, t he first t ime not ing t hat it is “o ne factor in aggravation”

and the sec ond tim

e noting tha

t death is one f

actor t hat “h

as to be taken into acc ou nt .” Altho ugh w e ca nnot say for cer t ain, ba sed on t he t rial co ur t 's st at ement s du ringNo. 1-09- 1131

9

the sentenci

ng he arin g it i s probabl

e that the tr ia

l c ourt considered the death of the v ictim as an aggravating factor, and death is an el emen t o f second-degree murder. S ee 720 ILCS 5/ 9-2 (West 200 8) (c iting 7 20 I LCS 5/ 9- 1 ( West 200 8) ); 7 30 I LCS 5/ 5- 5- 3. 2( a) (Wes t 200 8) (list ing statutory f actors i n a ggrav ati on tha t weigh i n f avor of a term

of i m pri sonm en t). Ho we ve r , “no t ev er y inst an ce in w hic h a n a gg r av at ing fac t o ris imp r o pe r ly co nsid er ed in sent encing c alls for aut omat ic reve rsa l, and t he ca ses mak e it c lear t hat t his rule s hou ld no t be applie d rigi

dly .” People v. Csasz

ar , 375 Il l . Ap p. 3d 92 9, 951 ( 2007) . The appropri ate i nqu i ry in this si tuat ion i s as follows:

“ [R]e l i an ce on an i m pr oper f actor i n ag gr av ati on doe s n ot al wa y s n ec es si tate re mandment for re sent encing. Where t he r eviewing c ou rt is unable t o d et er mine the weight giv

en to an i mproperl y c onsidered facto r, the cause m ust be rem

anded for re sent encing. [Cit at ions. ] H ow ever , w her e it c an be d et er mined fro m the record t hat the weight plac ed on the i mproperl y c onsidered aggravati

ng f actor was so i ns i gn i f i ca nt th at i t did n ot l ead to a

gre ater s en

ten ce , reman dm en t i s n ot requi red.” ( Intern

al quotati on m

arks omi tted.) People v. Gilliam , 172 Ill . 2d 484, 521 (1996) (quot in

g People v. White , 114 Il

l . 2d 61, 6 7 (198 6)). The ul tim ate question that we mus

t resolve on thi s poin

t is wh ether the trial

court 's i mproper consideration of the v

ictim 's death was

harm le ss an d did n ot resul t in a h arsher sen tence than would otherwi se h

av e b een meted out. See , e.g. , People v. Vers er , 200 Ill . App. 3d 613, 621 (1990 ). Here, the consi deration of the v ictim 's death was

only one of sev

eral f actors t hat the trial court me ntioned i n aggrava tion. In sen

tenci ng def endan t t o 20 years'

in carceration, the trialNo. 1-09- 1131

10

court al so conside

red such f actors as the fact that the vi ctim was i nnocen t and unarm

ed, de t er r en ce , pr o t ec t io n o f t he pu blic, an d p un ishme nt . Ho we ve r , t he t r ial c o ur t dis cu ss ed o nly one of these f

actors in detail: the i

nnocen ce of the v

ictim . The trial

court stated, “You have a
ca se he r e o f a v ict im wh o is inn o ce nt . At t he mo st , he may ha ve ha d s o me a lco ho l in his sys t em, but he di dn't ha ve a gun . He didn

't have a kni

fe. He was

n't doin g any thin g, and he was stabbe d in the chest and di

ed from that.” As for the rem

ai ni ng f actors, the trial

court me rely recited them and no t ed t hat t hey sho uld be t ake n into acc ou nt . B ase d o n t he r eco rd befo re us, t he t rial co ur t 's
re fere nce t o t he vict im's deat h was mini mal, and given t he co ur t 's exp licit re liance o n t he i nn ocenc e of the vi cti m i n a ggr avati on, weca nn ot sa y tha t the tri al cou rt' s c ons i derati

on ne ces sari l y l ed i t to im pose a ha rsher se nten ce than would otherwi se h

av e b een i m posed
. Consequen

tly, although the tria

l c ourt ma

y h ave i mpe rmissi bl y c onsidered the vi

ctim 's death as an aggravating f

actor, reman

d for resentenc in

g is not necessary

in this case. Alt er na t ive ly, d efe nd an t ar gu es t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t faile d t o su fficie nt ly co nsid er fac t s in mit iga t io n, mak ing t he se nt en ce o f 20 yea r s e xc es sive
. Se nt en cin g d ec isio ns a r e r ev iew ed o nly for abuse of di scretion, and the

suprem e court has summ

arize d the proper method of review as foll ows:

“ I t is w ell s et t led t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t ha s br o ad dis cr et io na ry po we r s in im posin g a sentenc e [citation], an d the trial court 's se ntenci ng decisi on is

entitled to great deference. [Citations.] The t rial cour t is granted such deference because t he t rial co ur t is gene ra lly in a bet t er po sitio n t han t he r eviewing c ou rt t o d et er mine the a ppropri ate se nten ce. Th e tri al j udge ha s the opportuni

ty to we i gh s

uch f actors as the def endan t's credi bi li ty, dem eanor, general

moral character, men

tali ty, socia lNo. 1-09- 1131

11

envi ronment, habi

ts, and age. [Citations.] Co nsequently , t he reviewin

g cour t must not subs t itu t e its judg ment fo r t hat of t he t rial co ur t merely beca use it w ou ld have wei ghe d the se f

actors di f f eren tly. [Ci tation .] Al though the trial

court is vested wi

th wide dis cretion i

n sen tenci ng, such discr et ion is no t wit hou t lim itat ion. Su pr eme Co ur t Rule 6 15( b)( 4) gr ant s t he
re v i ewi n g c our t th e p owe

r to r ed uc e th e s en ten ce i m pos ed b y th e tr i al cou rt. [Ci tation. ] Th

e ru l e i tse l f , h owe ve r, doesnot s et f

orth the sc opeof thi s p ower or t he cir cu mst an ce s u nd er wh ich it sho uld be ex er cis ed
. Ra t he r , de cis io ns o f t his
co ur t have e st ablished t hat , a bsent an abu se o f discr et ion by t he t rial co ur t , t he sentence ma y n ot be al tered on review. [Ci

tations.] For exam

ple , a sentence wi thi n s tatutor y l i m i ts wi l l be de em ed exce ss i ve an d the re sul

t of an ab us e of discr et ion by t he t rial co ur t wher e t he se nt ence is gre at ly at var iance w ith t he spirit and p ur po se o f the law, or manifestly dispr op or t ionat e t o t he nat ur e o f the off ense. [Ci tation.]” People v. Stacey , 193 Il l . 2d 203 , 209-1 0 (200 0). In thi s case, the 20-y

ear sentence

was wi thin the statut ory range f

or second-degree murder, although it was the maxi mum sentence possibl

e. See 730 ILCS 5/5- 4.5-3 0(a) ( West 200 8) (mand at ing a se nt ence of be t wee n 4 and 20 yea rs fo r se co nd- deg re e mur der ). Defend ant 's
ar gument is pre mised o n t he as ser t ion t hat t he t rial co ur t did no t co nsider fact or s in mi t igat ion, spe ci f i cal l y def endan t's l ack of cri m i na l history , his ag e, an

d hi s reh ab i l i tativ e poten tia l
. The trial court expl

ic itl y s tated t hat it was awa

re that defenda

nt had n o crim in al ba ck gr o un d, an d it wa s no t r eq uir ed by law t o co nsid er t he o t he rfac t o r s t ha t de fen da nt ar gu ed in
m i tig ati on. See

730 IL CS 5/5 -5-3.1 (W

est 200 8) (l

i sti ng s tatutory f actors i n m i tig ati on).No. 1-09- 1131

12

De fen da nt 's a r gu men t is e ss en t ially t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t faile d t o su fficie nt ly bala nc e t he fac t o r s in agg ra vat ion and mitigat ion befo re imposing s ent ence . H ow ever , d efenda nt offer s litt le in the way o f aut hor ity for t his pro po sitio n, a nd de fendant 's ar gument s must be co nsider ed a gainst t he st anda rd of r eview. Altho ugh t he t rial co ur t 's sent ence was seve re , it co nsider ed a ll of the evidenc e pr ese nt ed in mitiga t ion t hat it w as st at ut or ily re quir ed t o c ons ider , t he cr ime was t he murder of s omeone wh

o was unarm

ed and b y a ll accounts blam

el ess, and the ul

tim ate sentence wa s wi th i n th e statu tory ra n ge . B as ed

on th es e f acts, we ca n n ot s ay th at th e tr i al cou rt a b us ed i ts discr et ion by sent encing d efenda nt t o 2 0 year s' incar cer at ion. C. Voir Dire Fi n al l y , w e c on si

der w h eth er th e tr i al cou rt p rop erl y ad moni sh ed th e v en i repu rsua n t to I llino is S up r eme Co ur t Ru le 4 31 ( b) ( eff. Ma y 1, 20 07 )
. T his is su e is co nt r o lled by t he su pr eme co ur t 's re cent dec ision in People v. Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d 5 98 ( 201 0) , w hich was issued dur ing t he p end enc y of t his a pp ea l. T he p ar t ies c o mplet ely dis ag re e o ver t he a pp licat io n o f Thompson t o t he fact s o f this ca se, and bo t h claim that t he o pinion su ppo rt s t heir p os itio n. The p ar ti es ag re e on at l ea st two poi

n ts: (1 ) the tr

i al cou rt di d n ot s tri ctl y com pl y wi th Rul e 431(b), and (2) def

ense couns el

fai le d to obje ct during voir dire . Resoluti on of thi s i ssue th eref orere qui re s a n sweri n g th re e q ue sti on s. Fi rs t, di d def

en da n t f orf ei t thi s iss ue b y f ai l i n g to obje ct during voir dire or by f ai li ng to raise i

t in a posttrial

motion? Second, if

the is sue was forfe ited an

d consequentl

y c an onl y b e reviewed under the pl ai n-error do ctrine, was

the trial
co ur t 's ad monit ion t o t he venire and failur e t o ind ividually quest ion t he jur or s o n t hat po int error? Third, if i

t was error , is i

t reversible

error under t he pl

ai n-error do ctrine? Regardi ng the f irst questi on, defen

dant concedes that he f

ai le d to obje ct during voir dire ,No. 1-09- 1131

13

b ut a ss er ts th at h e w as n ot re qui re d to ob j ect b ec au se

i t i s th e tr i al cou rt' s res ponsi b i l i ty to pr op er ly quest ion jur or s o n Rule 4 31( b). Defend ant cite s litt le aut hor ity for t his pro po sitio n, a nd t he au t hor ity t hat he do es c ite, even if it st ands for suc h a pr op os itio n, d oe s no t sur vive Thompson . T he su pr eme co ur t co nsider ed a simi lar ar gument by the d efenda nt in Thompson , in wh ich t he de fen da nt as se r t ed t ha t he did no t ne ed t o o bje ct t o t he t r ial c o ur t 's e rr o ne o us Ru le 431(b) adm

onis hm ent due to t he Sprinkl

edoctr in e. See Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d a t 612 . T he supr em e court rej ected th

i s posi tion , noti ng th at the d octri ne i s onl y av ail ab l e i

n ra re ci rcum stan ces . Id. More to t he poi

nt f or this case, the court mad

e the f oll owin g observ ation :

“ We h ave stressed the i

mportance of appl

yi ng the f orfei ture rule uni

form ly except in compel li ng si tuations becaus e fai

lure to raise a

cl ai m properl y de nies the trial
co ur t an o ppo rt unit y to co rr ect an er ro r o r g ra nt a new t rial, t hus w ast ing t ime and j udi cial resourc es. [C i

tation .] In thi s case, there i s no i

ndication that the trial

court would ha

ve i gnored an
o bje ct io n t o t he Ru le 4 31 ( b) qu es t io ning
. We pr es ume t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t wo uld have c omp lied wit h t he manda t or y languag e o f Sup re me Co ur t Rule 4 31( b) ha d t he
er ror b een poi n ted out a t tri al . M ore ov er , de f

en da n t doe s n ot ar gu e th at the trial
co ur t o ve r st ep pe d it s a ut ho r it y in t he jur y's p r es en ce . A simp le o bje ct io n w o uld have allowed the trial

court to correct the error dur in g voir dire . Accordin

gly , we concl ude there is

no compel

li ng reason to relax

the forfe iture rul e i

n thi s case.” Id. T he fo r feit ur e p r inc iple sho uld no t be r ela xe d in t his c as e, an d fo rt he sa me r ea so ns a s in Thompson . Th

e s up re me c our

t m ade c l ea r that a de f en da n t sti l l b ea rsth e b urden of ob j ecti n g to
an err one ousRul e 4 31(

b)ad moni sh men t, ev en thou gh the tri al cou rt i s res pon si bl e f orNo. 1-09- 1131

14

ad m oni sh i n g th e v en i recor re ctl y . Th i s iss ue i s c on se qu en

tl y f orf ei t b ec au se de f en da n t f ai l ed to obje ct during voir dire
. Re ga r dle ss , ev en if we fo un d t ha t de fen da nt did no t ha ve t o o bje ct in order to pres erve the

error, def

endan t al so f ail ed to rai se the i ssue i

n h i s posttrial

motion
. Wit ho ut r ais ing t he iss ue in bo t h a co nt emp o r an eo us o bje ct io n a nd aft er t r ial, t he iss ue is fo r feit and can only be revi ewed under the pl

ai n-error do ctrine. See id. at 611-12 (citin g People v. Enoch , 1 22 I ll. 2d 1 76, 186 (1 988 )) . I n or der t o o bt ain reve rsa l and a ne w t rial und er t he plainerror do ctrine, def

endan t bears the burden

of persuasi

on. See Thompson , 238 Il l . 2d at 61 3. A s p rev i ous l y sta ted , th e f i rs t ste p of pl ai n- err or an al y sis is determ

i ni ng whether a

n e rror occurred (see id. ) , an d s o we t ur n t o t he se co nd qu es t io n: wh et he rt he t r ial c o ur t pr o pe r ly adm oni shed th e v en

i re. The onl

y question i n de term i ni ng e rror here i s wh

ethe r the tri al court strictly compl ie d with R

ule 431(b) when

it adm onis hed the veni

re. The suprem

e court described t he co rr ect analysis as fo llows in Thompson :

“The l anguage of Rule 431(b) i s clear and un am bi guous. The rule states that t he trial

court 'sh all ask' potential

jurors whether they

understand an

d accept the enum erated princi

ple s. Wh il e the prospective jurors may be questioned in div idua ll y or i n a group, the method of i nqui ry m ust 'provide

each j uror an opportuni ty to res pond to sp eci

f i c que sti ons c once

rni ng th e [Ru l e 431 (b)] pr inc iple s. ' T he co mmit t ee co mment s e mph as ize t ha t t r ial c o ur t s ma y no t simp ly gi ve 'a br oad sta tem en t of the appl i ca bl e l aw f ol l owe d by

a g en era l que sti on conc ern i ng th e j uror's wil l i ngn ess to foll ow the l

aw.' [Ci tation .] Rul e 431 (b), th

eref ore, m andatesa sp eci

f i c que sti on an

d res pons e proce ss. The t rial co ur t must ask eac h po t ent ial juro r w het her he o r she unde rst ands andNo. 1-09- 1131

15

accepts each of

the prin ci ple s i n the rule. The questioni

ng m ay be per form

ed ei ther i nd i vi dua l l y or i n a grou p, b ut the ru l e re qui res an oppor tun i ty f or a res pon se f rom each prospect iv

e juror o n his or her underst andi ng and acceptance of those prin ci ple s.” Id. at 607. It is undi sputed in this case that the trial

court negl

ected to ask the j urors whether they
un ders tood a

n d acc ep ted

th e f our th pr inc iple , t ha t is, t ha t de fen da nt ne ed no t t es t ify and t ha t his de cis io n no t t o ca nno t be he ld a ga inst him. T he St at e a r gu es t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t su bst an t ially
co mplie d b ec au se it ex pla ine d t he pr inc iple t o t he en t ire ve nir e a nd as ke d if in div idu al p an els
ac ce pte d a nd un de rs tood th

ree of the f our pri nc i ples , but th

i s is i rre l evan t to the que sti on of
err or. Th e tri al cou rt f ai l ed to com pl y wi th R ule 4 31( b) 's cl ea r re qui rem en ts, a nd tha t i s error und er Thompson
. Cf. id. (“ Mo st not ably, t he t rial co ur t did no t que st ion any o f the pr os pec t ive j uror s on the thi rd pri nc i ple, w he the r th ey un ders tood a

nd ac ce pte d that d ef

en da nt wasnot
r eq uir ed t o pr o du ce an y evid en ce o n his o wn be ha lf . Rul e 431 (b) requires trial court s to address each of the enum erated princi

ple s. The f

ai lure to address the thi

rd prin ci ple , by itsel f, consti tut es non com pli ance wi

th the rule.”). The final quest ion is whe t her t he t rial co ur t 's er ro r is r ever sible unde r e ither pr ong of t he pla in -error doctr in

e. See id. at 613. In defen dant's openi

ng bri ef, h e asserted that the erro r was re ver sible unde r t he se co nd pr ong , r elying heavily on People v. Glasper, 234 Il l . 2d 173 (2009 ). Ho weve r, t he su pr eme co ur t add re ssed and r eject ed t his arg ument in Thompson , finding t hat t he
cr itical qu est ion in est ablishing seco nd- pr ong plain er ro r in t his situ at ion is whe t her t he def endan t has shown that the tri

al court's Rul e 431 (b) e

rror resu l ted i n i m pan el i ng a bi ase d j ury . See Thompson , 2 38 I ll. 2d a t 614 . D efenda nt in this ca se ha s o ffered no e vidence of bias, and heNo. 1-09- 1131

16

therefore cann

ot carry h is burden un

der the second prong. Defend ant alte rna t ively assert s t hat t he er ro r is r ever sible unde r t he first pr ong of t he doctri ne be caus e the

evi den ce was cl osel y ba l anced. Thompson did not reach this i ssue because t he de fendant in that cas e as ser t ed o nly seco nd- pr ong er ro r, and it is the re for e po ssible t hat t he fi rst pro ng i s stil

l a vai la ble for Rule 431(b) errors. See id. at 613. Ev en so, def endan t sti l l be ars t he bur den o f per sua sion, and d efenda nt ar gue s o nly that t he evide nce a gainst him on t he que st ion o f self-de fense w as c lose ly balanced. It was undisp ut ed t hat defend ant st abbed t he vic t im, s o t he o nly r ea l qu es t io n a t t r ial w as wh et he rde fen da nt r ea so na bly o run r ea so na bly b el i ev ed (or d i d n ot b el i ev e a t al l) that h e w as i n i m m i n en t da n ger of se v ere b odi l y h ar m or d ea th
and tha t deadl y f orce wa s neede d to prev en t such ha rm . Ho we ver , e ven if we as su med t hat t he e vide nce wa s c lo se ly balan ce d o n t he is su e o f se lfdefen se, defe ndan t fails to expl ai n how the Rul

e 431(b) error co uld h

ave ti pped the scal

es aga inst him. I n t his case defend ant t est ifi ed, and ba sed on t hat fact we c anno t see how defend ant could ha ve be en prej udiced b

y the tri al court's error i n f ail i ng to ensure

that the veni re un de r st o o d a nd ac ce pt ed t he pr inc iple t ha t a d efe nd an t 's d ec isio n no t t o t es t ify ca nno t be he ld ag ai ns t hi m . De f en da nt of f ers no e xp l an ati on, an d he there f

ore c an not c arr y hi s b urden of per sua sion. As a r esu lt, t he t rial co ur t 's Ru le 431 (b) er ro r is no t re ver sible unde r t he first pr ong of the plai n-error do ctrine. III. CONCLUSION As exp lained abo ve, t he t rial co ur t did no t er r by de clining to instr uct t he jur y on t he l es se r-i n cl uded of f ense of i n v ol un tar y mansl augh ter , a n d al th oug h th e tr i al cou rt f ai l ed to pr op er ly admonish t he venire pur sua nt t o R ule 43 1( b), t he er ro r is no t re ver sible unde r t he plain-No. 1-09- 1131

17

error do ctrine. F

urthermore, trial

court did n

ot abuse i ts discretion in

im posin g a sentenc e of 20 ye ars' i ncarcerati on. Defen

dant's conv

iction and s entence are cons equentl y a ff irm ed. Af fi rmed.