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THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL 

CRISIS IN BURUNDI 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 9, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

CHRIS FORD, Majority Chief Counsel

MARGARET TAYLOR, Minority Chief Counsel

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona ......................................................... 1 

Markey, Hon. Edward L., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts .............................. 2 

Nimuraba, Sixte Vigny, Dean’s Assistant and Director of Violence Prevention 

Program, The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason 

University, Arlington, VA .................................................................................... 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Sixte Vigny 

Nimuraba by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ................................................. 48 

Siegle, Dr. Joseph, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University, Washington, DC ................................................. 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18 

Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................ 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary 

Linda Thomas-Greenfield by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ....................... 43 

Vircoulon, Thierry, CentraL Africa Project Director, International Crisis 

Group, Nairobi, Kenya ......................................................................................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY 

CRISIS IN BURUNDI 

Wednesday, December 9, 2015 

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Flake, chairman 

of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Flake [presiding], Markey, Cardin, and Coons. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator FLAKE. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Subcommittee on African and Global Health will come to order. I 

want to take a moment to thank our witnesses for arranging schedules to be here today and for your contribution to this hearing. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the political and security crisis in 

Burundi, where violence is increasing and instability is growing. 

Mass arrests, high-profile assassinations, and the killing of more 

than 200 people have caused at least 220,000 Burundians to flee 

the country. 

President Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term in office 

is widely viewed as a catalyst for this crisis, which has splintered 

his own party and hardened the line between his supporters and 

those who oppose him. But the roots of today’s crisis precede the 

most recent elections in Burundi. 

Today, we will examine Burundi’s history, the Arusha Accords 

that ended its civil war, and how we can go back to the spirit of 

that agreement to end the conflict. 

This particular part of the world has borne witness to many 

mass atrocities. Obviously, Burundi’s 12-year civil war is among 

them. As we look to what has contributed to the breakdown of governance in Burundi today, it is important to pay attention to the 

ethnic underpinnings of this and previous conflicts. 

Understanding the role that other actors in the region are playing is critical to understanding how to stop the violence in Burundi. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the other actors are influencing the conflict there, perhaps for their own benefit, and what options are available to the United States to weigh 

in. 

Unfortunately, President Nkurunziza is not the only leader of an 

African nation with the desire to hang on to his seat longer than 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

2 

is permitted. In the Great Lakes region alone, there are several 

elections coming up next year where the current leaders may well 

seek reelection through various means. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, hear what they 

think about the current crisis here, what it portends for these elections, and if we can expect similar outcomes from those who choose 

to stay in power longer. If so, how will these different crises intertwine? What will be the regional implications? And lastly, again, 

what should the United States be saying about these elections? 

The bottom line is that the violence in Burundi needs to stop. 

The stakes are simply too high for these events to escalate. 

With that, I will turn to recognize the ranking minority member 

on this committee, Senator Markey, for any comments you might 

have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much 

for having this very important and timely hearing. It is a critical 

moment for Burundi, the Great Lakes region of Africa, as well as 

for the wider African and international communities. 

As President Obama said last July when Chairman Flake and I 

traveled with him to Africa, the continent’s progress is impressive. 

It is one of the fastest growing regions in the world with a middle 

class projected to grow to more than 1 billion consumers. Africa is 

moving fast toward a better future, with millions reaching for opportunities that did not exist just a few years ago. 

It is important to keep this larger picture in mind as we focus 

today on Burundi, a country that has experienced deep political division and escalating political violence since last spring. 

Since the Arusha Accords ended Burundi’s civil war in 1993, the 

country has continued to face challenges, but its politics have been 

relatively free of violence. While the international community and 

the United Nations have played a critical role in this process, all 

of the credit for the advances up until last spring rightly go to the 

Burundian people and its leaders in government, opposition, and 

civil society, who consciously worked toward national harmony. 

With the political turmoil that began last spring, it has become 

apparent that the work of over 20 years could come undone unless 

all of the leaders of Burundi take seriously their solemn duty to 

find common ground, to seriously negotiate ways to accommodate 

one another’s legitimate interests, and to guarantee that the security and fundamental rights of all of Burundi’s people are protected. 

The people of Burundi have suffered enough. A grinding poverty 

is accompanied by ongoing turmoil, including mass arrests, several 

high-profile assassinations, and over 200 reported extrajudicial 

killings since April. At least 210,000 Burundians have now fled 

into neighboring countries. An armed conflict in Burundi could 

draw in neighboring countries and non-state actors elsewhere in 

the conflict-torn Great Lakes region. The consequences in terms of 

Burundi and the region could be devastating. 

We are committed to helping Burundi change course, to turn 

away from violence, and for political rivals to sincerely negotiate 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

3 

with each other and make common cause for the good of all of the 

people of Burundi. That is why this hearing is so important. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling for it. We very much 

appreciate the witnesses’ willingness to join us today, and I look 

forward to hearing your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

The only witness in this first panel is Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield. 

Thank you for being here. We know that you are busy. We know 

how much you travel to the region and the time you put in. We appreciate you being here. Obviously, your entire comments will be 

made a part of the record. Please, if you can keep it close to 5 minutes, we will have time and have the next panel as well. We look 

forward to your testimony. 

Assistant Secretary? 

STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA THOMAS–GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much, Chairman 

Flake and Ranking Member Markey, for the opportunity to testify 

before you today on Burundi. 

As you noted, the situation in Burundi is very worrisome, and 

the stakes are very high. The Department of State and the Bureau 

of African Affairs, in particular, greatly appreciate the bipartisan 

support we continue to receive for our work, our Embassies, and 

our people, who spend every day striving to promote U.S. national 

security, foreign policy, and economic interests on the African continent. 

In Central Africa, we have focused on our core values: strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth, advancing 

peace and security, and promoting opportunity and development. 

Occupying significant attention over the past year, however, is 

Burundi. Burundi has sadly become a cautionary tale for the region 

about how a leader who will do anything to stay in power can undermine a decade of peace and post-conflict reconciliation. 

President Nkurunziza’s pursuit of non-inclusive, nonconsensual 

elections, as characterized by the African Union’s October 17 communique, sparked the current crisis. His decision also clearly violated terms of the 2000 Arusha agreement that led to the end of 

the Burundian civil war and became the country’s foundation for 

governance, peace, and security. 

Since the discredited elections last summer, the crisis in Burundi 

has worsened, with Nkurunziza in isolation and his government 

taking an increasingly hard line against any form of perceived opposition or critique, even from within the ruling party ranks. 

A daily pattern of retaliatory attacks between security forces and 

armed elements of the opposition has continued for months. The repression and violence has forced over 220,000 Burundians to flee 

the country over the last 8 months, and the U.N. Office of the High 

Commissioner of Refugees has documented at least 240 killings of 

individuals in Burundi in the same time frame. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

4 

In response to these troubling events, we have pursued an aggressive three-pronged strategy to prevent mass violence. 

First, we are directing pressure at the Government of Burundi 

and armed opposition to step back from increasingly violent actions 

as well as rhetoric. 

Second, we are accelerating the launch of a credible dialogue 

process under African leadership to find a political solution. 

Third, we are reaching out to the region and international community to encourage their support while supporting regional contingency planning by the A.U. in case the violence worsens. 

We believe that our pressure on and direct engagement with the 

Government of Burundi and with opposition leaders, as well as our 

broader outreach to the region and international community, has 

positively impacted the situation. It has done so both by helping to 

stave off what we feared could have been wider spread violence and 

by providing a window to press for regional efforts to support a political solution through internationally mediated dialogue. But that 

window cannot last indefinitely. 

The underlying calculus of those in the government that they 

will use all means necessary to retain power has not changed. In 

addition to our suspension of in-country training support for Burundian military and law enforcement, and the withdrawal of 

AGOA trade benefits effective January 2016, President Obama 

issued an executive order on November 23 imposing economic sanctions and a travel ban on four individuals, two from the government side and two of the May coup plotters. 

The implementation of a sanctions regime underscores the seriousness with which we view the severity of the crisis and demonstrates the President’s commitment to using all the tools available to discourage violence and encourage a political resolution. We 

will not hesitate to add additional individuals to the list. 

We are in daily contact with members of the Burundi Government and opposition, as well as regional leaders. Our senior leaders, including President Obama as well as Secretary Kerry, have 

engaged with stakeholders in Burundi and throughout the region 

with a topline message to refrain from violence and pursue dialogue. 

In November, President Obama delivered a video message directly to the Burundian people, in which he called on all the country leaders to seek a peaceful solution for the country through dialogue. This was very well-received in Burundi. 

Special Envoy Perriello has spent the bulk of the past 3 months 

in the region and in Europe, including an emergency deployment 

to Burundi to deter the launch of the government’s planned security operation in early November, which we feared could have instigated much more widespread violence. 

Ambassador Liberi and our Embassy staff worked around the 

clock under intense circumstances to maintain crucial lines of communication and provide a voice for peace and human rights. 

We cannot afford further delay of the dialogue process without 

risking an escalation in repression and violence. With the process 

currently entrusted to Ugandan President Museveni on behalf of 

the East African Community, we continue to hope to see dialogue 

initiated in the very near future. If it is not, and the crisis deterioFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

5 

rates further, possibly into full-scale war, I fear that President 

Museveni and the EAC could end up being partially blamed, given 

the lengthy delays in getting a process started. 

We have encouraged the EAC leaders, as well as those in the 

broader region, to support peace and dialogue, and to ensure that 

this crisis does not become another protracted regional conflict 

dominating the continent’s time and resources. We strongly support 

the commencement of dialogue, active A.U. leadership, and the 

need for a full-time mediator. 

At the same time, other regional leaders are contemplating efforts to extend their own terms in office beyond constitutional limits. President Obama articulated the U.S. position very clearly in 

Addis Ababa when you both were there in July when he said that 

Africa’s democratic progress is put at risk when leaders refuse to 

step aside at the end of their terms. 

Leaders who try to change the rules to stay in power solely for 

personal gain risk instability and strife in their countries. We are 

seeing this play out in Burundi and the Republic of Congo as well 

as elsewhere. 

Our policy position enjoys overwhelming support across Africa. 

This is in the words of Secretary Kerry a decisive moment for democracy in Africa. The steps that we take now to encourage peaceful transitions of power may encourage other leaders in the region 

from following Burundi’s path and encourage them to make the 

right decision for their countries and their people. 

Senator Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the 

subcommittee, I want to thank you again for holding this hearing 

and giving us the opportunity to brief you on the situation in Burundi. I hope the information is useful to the subcommittee. I have 

submitted a much longer version of my testimony for the record, 

and I am happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Thomas-Greenfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD

Thank you very much Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and other 

Members of the Committee for the opportunity to testify today on the many challenges facing Burundi. 

The Department of State and the Bureau of African Affairs in particular greatly 

appreciate the bipartisan support we continue to receive for our work, our embassies, and our people who spend every day striving to promote U.S. national security, 

foreign policy, and economic interests on the African continent. 

In Central Africa, we have focused on strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth, advancing peace and security, and promoting opportunity and 

development. Occupying significant attention over the past year, Burundi has sadly 

become a cautionary tale for the region about how a leader who will do anything 

to stay in power can undermine a decade of peace and post-conflict reconciliation. 

The current crisis in Burundi began more than a year ago when the Burundian 

government began an increasingly repressive crackdown against journalists, civil society, and all political opponents. In the months leading up to his decision in April 

2015 to stand for a third presidential term in Burundi President Pierre 

Nkurunziza’s government was responsible for increasingly harsh repression, intimidation, and violence towards legitimate political opposition, independent media, and 

anyone within his own party who dissented against this plan. Credible local and 

international human rights groups have documented a harrowing number of cases 

of torture and extra-judicial killings over the past two years. Nkurunziza’s pursuit 

of ‘‘non-inclusive, non-consensual elections’’—as characterized by the African Union’s 

October 17th communique—after a decade of irresponsible governance and failure 

to alleviate poverty in Burundi—sparked the current crisis. His decision to pursue 

a third term also clearly violated terms of the 2000 Arusha Agreement which led 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

6 

to the end of the Burundian Civil War and became the foundation for relative peace 

and security over the past decade. Furthermore, the presidential elections, held in 

late July, were widely viewed as not credible, not fair, not free, and not transparent. 

Since the election, we have seen the crisis in Burundi only worsen—with the 

Nkurunziza government taking an increasingly hard line against any form of perceived opposition or critique, even if it comes from within the ruling party’s ranks. 

The crisis has for months been characterized by a daily pattern of retaliatory attacks between security forces and armed elements of the opposition or those perceived to be opponents of the ruling party. More recently, this has included beheading and disembowelment of victims. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights (OHCHR) has documented at least 240 killings of individuals in Burundi since April. Members of the ruling party, including public security forces, have 

used extreme violence with impunity and targeted the most vulnerable members of 

the country’s population, namely those trying to flee the country as refugees. The 

government has not taken action to seriously investigate credible allegations of 

human rights violations and abuses by members of the ruling party youth wing, 

known as the Imbonerakure, the Burundian National Police, and the National Intelligence Service, nor has the government taken action to hold these same groups accountable. 

The repression and violence have forced over 220,000 Burundians to flee into 

neighboring countries since April, when Nkurunziza announced his decision to pursue a third term. Many of those attempting to flee have reported violent confrontations by party militias and police while en route. Since the crisis began in April 

2015, amorphous groups of armed opposition actors have also carried out violence 

against the security services and key targets in Bujumbura, and in Burundi’s border 

areas, further exacerbating the conflict. 

Inflammatory rhetoric used by President Nkurunziza and the Senate President 

threatening a disarmament operation in November stoked fears of greater violence 

throughout the country. I will discuss this later, but we firmly believe that the consequent outpouring of international messaging and pressure prevented the November 8th ultimatum from being the start of wider-spread violence. 

At the same time, some elements opposed to President Nkurunziza have conducted targeted attacks on government officials, police officers, and civilians. These 

actions also threaten to escalate the situation and spark more widespread violence. 

While Nkurunziza’s cynical attempts to treat all of those opposed to his actions as 

coup plotters must be rejected, it is equally important for those opposition members 

who have taken up arms to renounce violence and fully commit themselves to reaching a political consensus for the way forward. 

As this crisis has unfolded, we have been actively engaged with Burundian and 

regional stakeholders, donor partners, and other allies in preventing Burundi from 

returning to war. We believe that our direct engagement with the Government of 

Burundi and opposition members, as well as our broader outreach to the region and 

international community, has impacted the situation by helping to hold off widerspread violence and giving us a window to support regional efforts to find a political 

solution through internationally-mediated dialogue. But that window of time will 

not last indefinitely. The underlying calculus of the government - that it will use 

all means necessary to retain power—has not changed. 

Since the discredited election and an increase in violence, we have pursued an aggressive three-pronged strategy to prevent mass violence by: 1) directing pressure 

at the Government of Burundi and armed opposition to step back from increasingly 

violent action; 2) accelerating the launch of credible peace talks under African leadership to find a political solution; and 3) supporting regional contingency planning 

by the AU in case violence worsens. 

We are in daily contact with the Burundian government and opposition, and regional leaders. Our senior leaders, including President Obama, Ambassador Rice, 

Secretary Kerry, Ambassador Power, Assistant Secretary Malinowski, and I have 

called or met with stakeholders throughout Burundi and the region with the top line 

message to refrain from violence and to pursue dialogue. For example, earlier in November, President Obama delivered a video message directly to the Burundian people calling on the country’s leaders to seek a peaceful solution for the country 

through dialogue. The video was very well received by the region, specifically the 

appeal to all for non-violence and the recognition of the military’s professionalism 

and restraint thus far. President Obama has also reached out to regional leaders 

such as South African President Zuma to call for calm and press for a dialogue that 

can bring about a long-term solution to the crisis. Special Envoy Perriello has spent 

the bulk of the past three months in the region and Europe, including emergency 

deployment to Burundi to deter the launch of Operation Kora, a governmentplanned public disarmament campaign, in early November. Ambassador Liberi and 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

7 

our Embassy staff have worked around the clock under intense circumstances to 

maintain crucial lines of communication and provide a voice for peace and human 

rights. 

Since the beginning of the electoral cycle, we have called on Burundians and regional actors to play constructive roles and to reject violence before, during, and 

after the presidential elections. Our messaging has targeted the government and its 

supporters for unlawful violence against peaceful protestors, the participants in the 

attempted illegal seizure of power last May, and any others who have sought or are 

seeking to use violence to advance their agenda. 

We have also joined our donor partners in increasing the costs for the regime and 

armed opposition for the use of repression and violence. We suspended in-country 

delivery of the Train and Equip mission of our Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance peacekeeping program as well as provision of assistance under 

the African Military Education Program. We also suspended International Law Enforcement Academy and Anti-Terrorism Assistance training that had been provided 

to Burundian law enforcement agencies. In early November we announced that 

AGOA trade preference benefits will be withdrawn from Burundi effective January 

1, 2016. 

More recently, President Obama announced an Executive Order on November 

23rd, imposing economic sanctions and a travel ban on four individuals, two officials 

within the government and two of the May coup plotters. The establishment of a 

sanctions regime underscores the severity of the crisis and the President’s commitment to using all tools available to pressure Burundian stakeholders to resist violence and seek a political resolution. With the sanctions regime in place, we will not 

hesitate to add additional individuals to the list, including those aiding and abetting 

individuals already sanctioned. We continue to assess whether to designate additional individuals or entities for sanction under the Executive Order. 

It heartens me to see the Burundian people continue to reject attempts to turn 

the ongoing political crisis into an ethnic conflict. This crisis is first and foremost 

a political one, driven by a break within the ruling party over Nkurunziza’s insistence in staying in power. While we remain vigilant about any attempt to turn this 

crisis into an ethnic conflict, it is important to remember that until the advent of 

this crisis, Burundi was considered a success story in overcoming ethnic division. 

The integration of the military and civil society are models of post-conflict reconciliation, and have remained a strong, but fraying bulwark against efforts to divide and 

inflame. The outcome of this crisis will determine whether the youth in Burundi, 

which make up the majority of the population, remain a relatively post-ethnic generation, or whether ethnic and political divides are locked in for more decades. 

The best route for resolving this crisis remains an internationally-mediated dialogue amongst all Burundian stakeholders that is hosted outside of Burundi so all 

stakeholders can safely attend. Members of the East African Community (EAC) entrusted Ugandan President Museveni back in July to facilitate such a dialogue, and 

our top diplomatic priority is accelerating the start of this process, whether in Kampala, Addis, or Arusha. Each day without credible peace talks is read as a permission slip for the government or the opposition to escalate repression and violence. 

We simply cannot afford further delay, and that is our top message to the region. 

If war breaks out before the dialogue starts, the EAC could end up being partially 

blamed for the delay in starting a dialogue. 

The very existence of talks, even if they falter, would release pressure and give 

the international community and the region a focal point for diplomatic pressure on 

all sides. We continue to reach out to President Museveni, the African Union, and 

other EAC leaders to press them to immediately convene a dialogue. We have made 

known that we are ready to support the dialogue, including through the international team of envoys as observers. We strongly support active AU leadership and 

the need for a full-time mediator. 

While we continue to strive for a political solution, we are urging our UN and AU 

partners to undertake contingency planning for the worst case scenario. We believe 

the best and most viable option would be an AU-mandated regional force, possibly 

with the East African Standby Force. We are in regular contact with the AU and 

made clear our readiness to help should the situation call for regional, multi-lateral 

intervention. 

We continue to be seized by this crisis, and are working with the EAC, AU, EU, 

UN and others. Special Envoy Perriello plans to join the EU, AU and UN Envoys 

for the Great Lakes Region of Africa for a visit to Burundi and its neighbors later 

this month, as well as to Addis and Kampala to press the urgency of talks. 

Despite our best efforts, we recognize that more must be done to ensure that Burundi can exit the path of violence and shift toward a peaceful settlement of the 

political crisis. The international community remains engaged, and we have been acFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

8 

tive in New York, Geneva, and bilaterally to keep Burundi on the international 

agenda. The UN Security Council is considering a visit to Burundi early in the new 

year. The Pope appealed for peace in Burundi during his recent visit to Africa. We 

will continue to encourage international pressure and visibility on the Burundi crisis so that all the interlocutors fully understand the stakes. 

The crisis in Burundi has also beset its neighbors with refugees continuing to 

cross into Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC, and at times exacerbated existing regional tensions. We have encouraged all of the EAC’s leaders and the broader region to support peace and dialogue and ensure this crisis does not become another protracted regional conflict that dominates the continent’s time and resources. 

At the same time, other regional leaders themselves are contemplating efforts to 

extend their own terms in office beyond constitutional limits. President Obama articulated the U.S. position on this very clearly in Addis Ababa in July when he said 

that Africa’s democratic progress is put at risk when leaders refuse to step aside 

at the end of their terms. He added that leaders who try to change the rules to stay 

in power solely for personal gain risk instability and strife in their countries, and 

we are seeing this play out in Burundi, in the Republic of the Congo, where a referendum was just held on a new constitution that would allow President Sassou 

N’guesso to run again by doing away with term limits provisions, and elsewhere. 

Our policy position enjoys overwhelming support across Africa, particularly from its 

youth. 

We have engaged directly with the presidents of this region approaching elections 

with that very same message. As Secretary Kerry wrote in an October 6 op-ed, this 

is a decisive moment for democracy in Africa. While each situation and each country 

context is unique, the steps that we take now to encourage peaceful transitions may 

help to prevent similar crises from occurring. The Burundi crisis is a cautionary tale 

for others in the region. No leader wants to be in Nkurunziza’s situation, fearing 

for his life, watching his nation’s economy plummet and his citizens flee the country. 

Others in the region still have an opportunity to avoid Burundi’s path and make 

the right decision for their country and their people. 

Senator Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you again for holding this hearing and giving me the opportunity to brief you 

on the steps we are taking to address the situation in Burundi. I hope this information is helpful to the subcommittee. I am glad to answer any questions you might 

have. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. I really appreciate this. 

As you know, some of the coalition of opposition leaders there 

have made it clear that no peace will be possible as long as 

Nkurunziza remains in power. He is committed and has no intention, it seems, of stepping down. 

What is going to give? First, is this just a ‘‘who blinks’’ here? Or 

is there going to be pressure from the EAC and others to break the 

logjam? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We are trying every way to encourage 

all of the regional partners to put pressure on President 

Nkurunziza as well as the opposition to go to the negotiating table 

to start a dialogue process. 

The EAC’s early attempts did not work. They have turned the 

process over to President Museveni. Right now, our Special Envoy 

Perriello is in Uganda and hoping to encourage the Ugandans to 

step up their efforts in pushing for and starting the dialogue. 

But we are also putting pressure on the A.U. We have had a 

number of conversations with the A.U. In fact, the A.U. deployed 

a special envoy or a representative of the A.U. chairperson. That 

is President Boni Yayi of Benin. He was sent to Burundi yesterday. 

Unfortunately, his plane was not allowed to land. But their efforts 

will continue. We are hopeful that eventually we will get someone 

in. 

It is important that President Nkurunziza meet with the parties 

and start this process so that we can see some solution to what is 

happening there. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

9 

Senator FLAKE. I would assume it is a little difficult for somebody like Museveni, who has been there since 1986 and is planning 

to run again, to speak with much credibility about leaving after the 

two terms that that Arusha Accords spells out. 

You talked about some of the sanctions we imposed on individuals, travel sanctions, other suspensions of other programs that we 

have. What additional leverage do we have, as far as the U.S. goes? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think we can impose additional sanctions to the ones that we have already imposed. We also have additional leverage as it relates to other partners. We are working 

closely with the EU. They have just concluded what they refer to 

as Article 96 negotiations with the government. They were key contributors to budgetary support for the Burundi Government. 

Those discussions with the EU did not go well, which leads to the 

next step, which would be their ending their support for the government. We are working very closely with them as they move forward on those efforts, as well as supporting efforts to impose additional sanctions on additional individuals. 

Senator FLAKE. There are in the region other actors there and 

other influences on this. There have been reports that the Rwandan Government is secretly recruiting an army of Burundian refugees, presumably for the purpose of conducting some kind of armed 

insurgency inside Burundi. 

There was a letter to the editor in the Washington Post in November, written by Jeff Drumtra, a former U.N. official, who outlined what he saw there in those camps. If these reports are true, 

what is the State Department doing to press the Rwandan Government from doing this, from stepping up recruiting efforts like this, 

or to stop these recruiting efforts? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Sir, we have seen these reports, and 

we have had a number of conversations with the Rwandan Government to encourage them to investigate the reports. Any efforts that 

are being made within refugee camps on the borders of Rwanda 

should be stopped. 

We are encouraging the Rwandans as well to be more proactive 

in supporting the peace process. We have also had discussions with 

them to discourage any actions being taken by the Rwandan Government to support additional violence that might take place in the 

region. 

Senator FLAKE. Do you put stock in those reports yourself? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I have seen reports coming from 

UNHCR. We work closely with UNHCR, and I trust that if they 

are reporting this, they have seen the basis for making these reports and allegations. 

Senator FLAKE. Let us talk about the DRC for a minute. What 

pressures are coming from the DRC? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Again, additionally, we have had conversations with President Kabila over the past 2 years and probably even longer to discuss with him his efforts to change the constitution so that he might seek a third term. 

Fortunately, the constitution does not allow that change in DRC. 

I continue to be hopeful that he will make the right decision and 

not run for a third term and keep the country moving in the right 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

direction and not turn back the very meager democratic gains that 

they have made over the past 10 years. 

Our special envoy has as well been to DRC on a number of occasions. Secretary Kerry was there last year as well. We continue to 

have conversations with the President on this issue. 

Senator FLAKE. What kind of border pressures and issues are 

there with the DRC? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I am sorry? 

Senator FLAKE. What kind of border pressures are there? With 

Rwanda, you have refugees going across and allegedly being used 

by the Rwandan Government. What are we seeing in terms of refugees? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We are seeing refugees cross into all 

of Burundi’s neighbors. In addition to Rwanda, Tanzania has more 

than 50,000 refugees. DRC has a large number of refugees, as well 

as Uganda. 

Also, in the case of DRC, there are armed groups that are based 

in DRC. Some fear that those groups might participate in the violence in that country. So it is a very volatile situation along that 

border. 

Senator FLAKE. Some were surprised that Nkurunziza, when he 

was outside the country and there was a coup staged, that he was 

able to maintain or regain control when he returned. 

Is he in a stronger position now? If he is, is it just because the 

opposition is splintered so much? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. You know, we regret that coup taking 

place. We do not support those kinds of actions, and we have made 

that very clear. But I do not believe the president is in a stronger 

position. I think because of the decision to seek a third term, he 

has weakened his position significantly, both within his party as 

well as outside his party. 

The information that we are getting from inside of Burundi is 

that he is in isolation. He is not in the capital. I do not think when 

he made the decision to run for a third term that he thought he 

was going to be president of a country that was imploding. That 

implosion is a result of his decision. 

Senator FLAKE. Senator Markey? 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Thank you for all your good work on this issue. 

So the President of Uganda is the mediator, but he has his own 

tough election next year, so he is going to be distracted in terms 

of his role. That creates a problem, a political distraction, when we 

need something that is real and now, an intervention with some 

passion and immediacy to solve the problem. 

Should the U.N., in your opinion, send in Chapter VII peacekeepers at this time, in order to help keep the peace? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. President Museveni is engaged in his 

election, and I think very much distracted from the process. I think 

when he took on this responsibility from the Tanzanians, he hoped 

that it could be resolved quickly. 

He has assigned his minister of defense to oversee the negotiations. Again, they have not, as of yet, bore any fruit. 

Senator MARKEY. Again, that is a lot different than the president 

of a country. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Yes. He actually traveled there himself. 

Senator MARKEY. I know, but over the next several months 

here—— 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We are hopeful that in this process the 

A.U. will become more actively engaged in the negotiations and 

take this burden away from President Museveni. 

Senator MARKEY. What is Zuma saying to us? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. She is very engaged, as I mentioned 

earlier. She just deployed her own special representative, President 

Boni Yayi, to Burundi. We have not had an opportunity to speak 

to him about what his tasks are, but we saw that as a positive 

sign. 

Senator MARKEY. The Hutu are organizing along ethnic lines and 

militarizing along ethnic lines, and that is always kind of a prelude 

to a failed state. So can you talk a little bit about that and this 

division that is developing more along arms lines between the Hutu 

and the Tutsi and how that ethnic traditional rivalry is now affecting the politics and the difficulty in finding a political resolution? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. You know, Senator, actually we are 

buoyed by the fact that the ethnic part of this conflict has not 

taken root yet. It is a concern, but—— 

Senator MARKEY. Do you see militarization developing along ethnic lines? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. There is some militarization developing, but it is also within the ranks of the Hutu, as well as among 

the Tutsis, but I do not think the divisions are as sharp yet as they 

might become. We are worried about that happening, but at this 

point, that has not happened. I think the military has particularly 

avoided that. 

Again, we are seeing conflict within the Hutu ranks, within the 

president’s party. So this is not yet one that has divided along 

those two fissures, which I think would be a really serious step in 

the wrong direction. 

Senator MARKEY. What is your view about the suitability of the 

East African Community to be able to deal with a problem of this 

magnitude? Is that really within their capacity to respond in a way 

that is going to avoid a civil war? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. It could be in their capacity. They 

have not been able to successfully achieve that because there are 

tensions within the EAC as it relates to Burundi. There are tensions, clearly, between Burundi and Rwanda, but also tensions between Rwanda and Tanzania. 

Those tensions have caused the EAC not to be as effective as 

they might have been. For that reason, we do think having the 

A.U. take on this role would be a good thing. 

Senator MARKEY. Does that point more toward a U.N. Chapter 

VII peacekeeping mission? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I do not think we have reached that 

point yet. We have been in discussion with the A.U. about moving 

forward on contingency planning, so that if there is a need for a 

protection force in Burundi, that the A.U. would be able to pull 

that together very, very quickly. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

12 

We have also been in discussion with the U.N. about the possibilities of using troops out of DRC who are along the border to provide protection. The Chapter VII discussions have not taken place 

yet. 

Senator MARKEY. Tell us a little bit, if you could, about your targeted measures against individuals in the country and who you are 

talking about and what those measures might be. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We have designated four individuals 

thus far for targeted sanctions. It was two from the government 

side and two who were involved in the failed coup plot. We are 

looking at individuals who have been responsible for exacerbating 

the instability in Burundi, who have contributed to the violence, 

and who are standing in the way of peace. 

So, again, there are two right now on the government side and 

two on the opposition side. 

Senator MARKEY. Okay, thank you. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. And we are looking at others as well. 

Senator MARKEY. I think, from my perspective, as I look at this, 

in the absence of actual regional forces stepping up to deal with 

this issue, I think it should telescope the time frame that it takes 

for the U.N. to consider an active peacekeeping intervention. If we 

are waiting for all these countries on the sidelines to finally get 

their act together, it may be too late, and the ethnic divisions become so strong that putting the country back together again becomes very difficult. 

So I would recommend that you look at that and just make a 

clear-eyed judgment as to whether or not they are going to be able 

to resolve their own political differences in the surrounding countries. If not, I think we have to ask the U.N. to act. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. There are discussions and plans for a 

Security Council trip to Burundi early next year, and I think that 

as well as many other issues will be on their plate to consider. 

Senator MARKEY. So I just think it is pretty clear that the President of Uganda is distracted, the other countries have their own 

political considerations, and meanwhile in the middle here is a 

president who is not really as concerned with the overall long-term 

historical well-being of his country. I just think we have a big role 

that we can play in the intervention. 

The sooner we make the intervention, the sooner everyone else 

is going to have to pay attention as well. I think this is a problem 

Africa should be solving. I think the sooner we get in, the sooner 

they will say, ‘‘We are going to solve it for you. We should take this 

role.’’ But I think it has to happen soon. 

Thank you so much for all your great work. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you, sir. 

Senator FLAKE. Senator Coons? 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Flake and Ranking Member Markey, for holding this hearing that I think is so important. 

Thank you and great to see again, Assistant Secretary. Thank 

you for your tireless and dedicated work and your focus on this 

issue. 

The United States and the world are watching what is happening 

in Burundi. Back in August, I had the opportunity to lead a biparFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

13 

tisan codel to Rwanda, where we visited the memorial to the victims of genocide of 1994. 

Members of this Congress are committed to not letting such a 

stain on humanity happen again. So we are eager to work with you 

and the administration to make sure we are deploying all the capabilities and resources of the U.S. Government to meaningfully engage with this. 

The Burundian Government and the opposition must pursue a 

negotiated peace process, as you said in your testimony. Each day 

without credible peace talks is being read as a permission slip for 

the government or the opposition to escalate repression or violence. 

We cannot let that happen. 

There needs to be accountability for those who have been fomenting violence. 

As you discussed, what is happening in Burundi is also important because it can affect the future of other countries in the region, not the least of which is the DRC, as they prepare for their 

elections. It is my hope that President Kabila takes appropriate 

lessons from what is happening in Burundi and that he should not 

aspire to mire his country in even greater conflict by going down 

the ill-conceived path of President Nkurunziza. 

Regional leaders like Ugandan President Museveni have a critical role to play. Regional structures like the East African Community and the A.U. do. 

Our President Barack Obama has spoken of African solutions to 

African problems. When it comes to security and political crises 

like the ones we are seeing in Burundi, regional leaders need to 

partner with the international community and with us to develop 

meaningful solutions. 

So I am grateful for your focus on this, Mr. Chairman, and for 

your leadership. 

Tell me, if you would, just answers to three brief questions. 

What greater role can Congress play in preventing mass atrocities, specifically in Burundi but also elsewhere around the world? 

I know Senator Cardin is working on the mass atrocity board authorization bill. I would be interested in your view on what Congress can do here in Burundi as well as around the world. 

Second, just tell us a little more, if you would, about our efforts 

to support contingency planning by the U.N., by the A.U., by the 

EAC. 

And tell me, if you would, under what conditions you would seek 

additional authorities or funding from Congress for either stabilization assistance or humanitarian assistance relative to Burundi. 

Thank you. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you, Senator, and it is great to 

see you. And again, thank you for everything that that you are 

doing to support our efforts. 

In terms of the role of Congress, there are a number of things 

you can do, particularly these kinds of hearings give a tremendous 

amount of highlight to this issue, both here in Washington but also 

in Africa. It amazes me the extent to which I hear from Africans 

what I say and what you say in these hearings. They need to know 

that our Congress, our Senate, is engaged on this issue. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

14 

So that is the first thing, and you are already doing it, and it 

really does make a huge difference. 

The kinds of trips that you have taken to Rwanda and delivering 

the tough messages so that countries know that there is no light 

between the Congress and the administration on this issue are important. They need to hear from you on a regular basis that you 

support the efforts, you support the policy, and you are demanding 

the change. 

I sometimes use you when I am in meetings with heads of state. 

‘‘If I do not do this, my Congress is going to be on my head. You 

need to make a difference because it is not just me saying this but 

the entire U.S. Government, including our Congress, is a part of 

the process.’’ 

So having a strong, unified message from the Senate to President 

Nkurunziza—he looks for divisions within us. Those divisions are 

used. So having that message delivered to him in no uncertain 

terms, or any of these heads of state in the region, I think again 

gets the message across in a strong way. 

In terms of contingency planning, we were very pleased to hear 

from the A.U. that they have now intensified their contingencyplanning efforts. We have been in conversation with them for probably the last 8 months to push contingency planning forward. We 

have offered some of our planners to support their effort. That offer 

is still on the table. They are moving forward with this, as well as 

having conversations with the East African standby force. 

The important element of putting together a contingency plan is 

what troops will be used and to make sure that we have troops 

that have the support of both sides, and who are not seen to be 

taking sides. 

So it is really important that we encourage some of the countries 

who are outside of the region, the immediate region, to participate 

in any troop deployments that we make in the region. 

The EC has indicated their support for this effort. We are in constant conversation with the EU. 

In fact, the five envoys—the EU envoy, our envoy, A.U., U.N., 

and the Belgium envoy—are traveling together in the region right 

now and are putting together a very strong front to respond to this. 

In terms of funding, of course, the humanitarian side is huge. 

The humanitarian impact of what is happening in Burundi cannot 

go unnoticed. Two-hundred-twenty-thousand refugees is not a 

small number. 

When we start looking at those numbers in Europe, we think 

they are huge. They are huge in Africa as well. 

We need to be able to provide the support to refugees and respond to the humanitarian crisis that is coming out of this with robust funding. And the U.S. Government’s funding has been critical 

to support refugees. 

But we also have to look at what we do on building the capacity 

of civil society, as well as governments, to build strong governance. 

We have worked closely with civil society and even the parties in 

Burundi in the early days. But certainly, we had limited resources 

in that area. We need to do more. We need to do more to support 

good governance and build institutions that are strong and that 

people have confidence in. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

15 

We see when we do that it works. It has worked in Burundi. It 

has worked in Nigeria. It has worked in Cote d’Ivoire. And it can 

work in Central Africa, with the right amount of resources to put 

into play. 

Senator COONS. Terrific, thank you, Madam Assistant Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Senator Markey brought up the prospect of this devolving into 

some kind of ethnic conflict like we have seen in that area, obviously, before. You mentioned that, gratefully, it is not there. 

What are the warning signs that we are looking for? Where is 

the tipping point there when it becomes an ethnic conflict? What 

should we be looking for there? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We have seen some warning signs already. Several weeks ago, the language coming out of the president 

and the president of the senate were very alarmist. They were 

using references that we saw used prior to the start of the genocide 

in Rwanda. 

We pulled out all the stops during a very short period of time to 

highlight what we were hearing, including making calls to the government to say we are hearing what you are saying and it is not 

acceptable. But we also gave that message to leaders around the 

region. 

I think they heard it, and I think we were able to actually stave 

off this turning into that kind of ethnic violence. There was clearly 

an effort to make a call to people to respond in that way. I think 

the Burundian people resisted, and we have to hope that they continue to resist. We have to continue to give them the wherewithal 

to resist these calls. 

So there are some signs. It has not gotten to the point yet where 

we can call it a solid line drawn ethnic conflict, because, once that 

happens, I think it will be hard to turn it back. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. With that and the appreciation of the 

committee, thank you for being here, and we will make time for the 

second panel. 

Thank you, Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield, for being 

here and for all your hard work. Thank you for always keeping us 

informed and working with us on this. We appreciate it. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much. 

Senator FLAKE. We will have a 2-minute break while the second 

panel takes its place. Thank you. [Break.] 

Senator FLAKE. I appreciate the second panel being in place. Senator Markey will be back momentarily, so we will go ahead and get 

started. 

Dr. Joseph Siegle is director of research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where his work focuses on the ongoing and long-term 

security challenges for African nations. Thank you for being here. 

Thierry Vircoulon is the project director for Central Africa at the 

International Crisis Group. He joins us today all the way from 

Nairobi. Thank you for being here. 

Vingy Nimuraba is dean’s assistant and director for violence prevention programs at the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution 

at George Mason University. Thank you for being here. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

16 

We look forward to your testimony, and we will go with Dr. 

Siegle. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH SIEGLE, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Dr. SIEGLE. All right, good afternoon, Chairman Flake. Thank 

you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the crisis in 

Burundi. 

While frequently characterized in ethnic terms, the crisis in Burundi today is actually political in nature. It is an outcome of a political leader and a small cadre of allies gaming to perpetuate their 

hold on power passed through constitutionally mandated term limits. 

This has triggered a breakdown in Burundi’s popular and heretofore effective process of building a multiethnic democratic transition since the conclusion of the country’s 12-year civil war in 2005, 

in which an estimated 300,000 Burundians lost their lives. 

While there are pathways to resolving this crisis, it is important 

that a resolution be found quickly before the human costs worsen 

and the situation deteriorates to a point where any such solution 

becomes much more difficult and costly. 

Finding a solution in Burundi has broader implications for the 

region as well. Already the Burundi crisis has created a burden for 

its neighbors, with 223,000 refugees, mostly in Rwanda and Tanzania. This is exacting a prolonged economic and social burden for 

these countries. 

Africa’s Great Lakes region also has been host to some of the 

most prolonged, vicious, and complicated conflicts on the continent 

over the past 2 decades. Further escalation in Burundi could at any 

time precipitate military intervention by neighboring Rwanda 

where the memories of genocide remain fresh. This in turn may 

spark a military response from other neighbors worried about 

Rwanda’s influence in the region, recalling previous conflicts in the 

Democratic Republic of Congo. 

Likewise, there are reports that Rwandan Hutu rebel groups operating out of the DRC, notably the Interahamwe, have been coming into Burundi in support government-aligned militias there. 

Similarly, the outcome of the term limits battle in Burundi has 

political implications for the rest of Africa. Since 2000, there have 

been a dozen African leaders who have tried to circumvent term 

limits that were instituted to limit the monopolization of power and 

foster a culture of democratic transition in Africa. 

Half of those leaders were successful in extending their time in 

office. The other half, however, facing concerted domestic and international opposition, were not. In fact, the trend since 2010 has 

been to block such attempted circumventions. 

The outcome in Burundi, therefore, will impact the norm on the 

continent, where 19 of the 54 African leaders have been in power 

for more than a decade. 

Furthermore, the tactics used in Burundi in pursuing a third 

term, overriding the constitution, bullying opponents, and then 

holding rump elections, set a particularly destabilizing precedent in 

Africa, if it is allowed to stand. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

17 

Despite the serious challenges involved, the crisis in Burundi is 

amenable to resolution. It is not rooted in deep structural differences within Burundian society. Moreover, a framework resolution already exists in the Arusha Accords that have guided the 

country out of its civil war. These accords are a popular social contract among Burundi’s ethnically diverse population. They have become nothing less than a part of the social fabric and national identity in Burundi as part of its vision for a multiethnic democratic 

society. 

So any diplomatic efforts we pursue should make clear that the 

Arusha Accords are the starting point for this. 

So working in collaboration with regional mediation efforts, the 

United States can reinforce the Arusha political framework in the 

following five ways. 

First, support the creation of a multiparty transitional government in Burundi. For the purpose of a transitional government, 

model experiences of Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, to chart a 

course back to the constitutional framework of a free, fair, 

participatory electoral process. 

These institution mechanisms were in place earlier in the year, 

before the April announcement. Consequently, the objective of this 

transitional phase would be to reestablish this democratic trajectory. 

Second would be to support the deployment of an international 

peacekeeping force. In order for a political resolution and to foster 

a stable transition to Burundian crisis, the United States should 

logistically and financially support an international peacekeeping 

force under the auspices of the African Union and the United Nations. Such a force would serve as a buffer between rival armed 

groups to minimize the risk of escalation, enhance civilian protection, as well as to serve as a deterrent to the provocations that 

could trigger mass atrocities. 

Third would be to sanction spoilers. The White House decision to 

issue targeted sanctions for individuals most responsible for the political violence is an effective way to demonstrate to Burundi’s political elites that there are personal costs for their actions. The European Union and African Union have also imposed sanctions on 

individuals and entities. But the U.S. should be prepared to expand 

the scope and breadth of these sanctions as a way of exerting 

greater pressure on Burundian political actors. 

Fourth, all non-statutory forces should be disbanded and forensic 

accounting should be made to identify those responsible for funding 

them. Given the central and unaccountable role that militias, particularly the Imbonerakure, are playing in intimidating and inflicting violence on the civilian population in Burundi, the United 

States should support the disbanding of these groups as part of any 

peacekeeping mandate. 

Fifth, the free and independent flow of information should be restored. A prerequisite of any genuine domestic dialogue in the 

participatory political process in Burundi is going to be the restoration of an independent media and protections of the freedom of expression. The U.S. should call for the restoration of independent 

media outlets that have been closed by the Burundian Government. 

Until that time, the United States should expand funding to the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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1Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies. All views expressed are those of 

the author and do not reflect an institutional position of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies 

or the Department of Defense. 

Voice of America, as well as networks of exiled from Burundian 

journalists across the region who can help report on events inside 

of Burundi. 

The Government of Burundi should be called upon to immediately release all journalists who have been arrested. And in the 

absence of any domestic means to investigate the harassment and 

violence against journalists, the United States should also sponsor 

independent fact-finding missions by the African Union and the 

United Nations regarding the circumstances and parties responsible for journalists who have been killed or imprisoned in the 

course of trying to do their job of informing the public. 

So in conclusion, the crisis in Burundi today is political. It is 

manufactured by a relatively small number of individuals who do 

not want to play by the democratic rulebook to which they came 

to power. In the process, they are attempting to undermine the 

multiethnic political framework that has been taking hold in Burundi. 

Active international engagement at this point is going to be critical to restoring the Arusha Accords before the cycle of violence and 

fragmentation accelerates to a point that a solution becomes much 

more difficult and costly to Burundi, the region, and the international community. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Siegle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH SIEGLE1

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and fellow members of the Senate 

Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, thank you for the opportunity to 

speak with you today about the crisis in Burundi. 

While frequently characterized in ethnic overtones pitting the majority Hutu population against the minority Tutsi, the crisis in Burundi today is not an ethnic conflict. This is a political crisis—an outcome of a political leader and a small cadre 

of allies aiming to perpetuate their hold on power past constitutionally-mandated 

term limits. This has triggered a breakdown in Burundi’s popular and heretofore effective process of building a multi-ethnic democratic transition since the conclusion 

of the country’s 12-year civil war in 2005 in which an estimated 300,000 Burundians 

lost their lives. 

While there are pathways to resolving this crisis, it is important that a resolution 

be found quickly, before the situation deteriorates to a point of fragmentation and 

self-perpetuating ethnic conflict such that any solution becomes much more difficult 

and costly. 

The current security situation 

The crisis in Burundi was triggered on April 25, when incumbent President Pierre 

Nkurunziza announced he would seek a third term in office, despite a two-term 

limit in the country’s constitution. Popular, peaceful protests organized by a multiethnic coalition of civil society organizations ensued. So too did an orchestrated campaign of intimidation by a youth militia, the Imbonerakure, which was established, 

trained, and armed by the ruling CNDD-FDD party for at least a year in advance. 

The repression escalated following an attempted military coup in May. Opposition 

strongholds, civil society representatives, and media were especially targeted. 

This has led to the deaths of an estimated 500 people and the displacement of 

280,000-350,000. Underscoring the political origins of this crisis-and the repercussions for dissent—many senior government officials from the CNDD-FDD opposed 

to Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term have also fled to exile. 

In the face of this intimidation and exodus, peaceful protests have waned and violent reprisals have emerged. In early August, a well-coordinated rocket attack killed 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

the most feared military figure in the country, General Adolphe Nshimirimana. Reflecting an apparent decapitation strategy, several other senior military figures have 

also been assassinated or targeted. Several dozen police officers have also been attacked. In apparent retaliation, civil society and opposition political leaders or their 

family members have been killed. 

Despite calls from African and international leaders to delay elections until the 

term limit controversy could be resolved through regional mediation efforts and stability restored, the CNDD-FDD held parliamentary and presidential elections in 

July. The elections were boycotted by opposition parties and were deemed to lack 

credibility by the United States, the African Union, the East African Community, 

the European Union, and the United Nations. 

Keeping track of these fluid developments has been all the more difficult because 

Burundi’s independent media outlets have been shuttered by government forces 

since May. Access to independent and corroborated sources of information has become more difficult. 

The fear of genocide 

Raising the stakes further, in an effort to mobilize support among the Hutu majority, the CNDD-FDD has been increasingly employing ethnically polarizing tactics. 

Purges among senior military and government officials have largely been ethnically 

based. In November, CNDD-FDD leaders began invoking ethnically incendiary language, recalling the pattern employed in the Rwandan genocide. Emblematic of this 

was a speech Burundian Senate President Reverien Ndikuriyo gave to supporters 

in Kirundi on November 3: ‘‘on this underlying issue, you have to pulverize, you 

have to exterminate—these people are only good for dying. I give you this order, go!’’ 

Similar statements were made by other senior government leaders including Pierre 

Nkurunziza. These remarks triggered a new surge of refugees toward Burundi’s borders. 

Swift international condemnation of such language, notably by President Obama, 

United States Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power, and an open letter by International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda that any invocation to ethnic violence would be used as evidence in a future ICC investigation, 

have led to the tempering of such inflammatory remarks. Nonetheless, the intimidation and targeted killings continue. 

In short, the foundation for genocide—the mindset, climate of fear, and polarization—has been laid. Some Burundians have said the level of apprehension is now 

worse than during the civil war. Then, most of the killing was between armed combatants. Now civilians are also being targeted, causing a greater sense of vulnerability. 

Various mediation efforts have been underway since April, led primarily by the 

African Union and the United Nations. These have been unsuccessful in dissuading 

Nkurunziza from his determination to hold onto power at all costs, however. 

Nkurunziza’s determined resistance to diplomacy and reason, even at risk of precipitating a new civil war and overturning all of the progress Burundi had made 

over the past decade, has led many Burundians to conclude that the only pressure 

he will respond to is military force. 

Regional implications 

Finding a resolution in Burundi has broader implications than for the country 

itself. Already the Burundi crisis has placed a burden on its neighbors with 240,000 

refugees-mostly in Rwanda and Tanzania. During the 1993-2005 civil war there 

were 870,000 Burundian refugees, exacting a prolonged economic burden on the region. 

Africa’s Great Lakes region has also been host to some of the most prolonged, vicious, and complicated conflicts on the continent over the past two decades-from 

which the region has only recently been moving past. Further escalation against the 

population in Burundi could at any time precipitate a military intervention by 

neighboring Rwanda, where the memories of genocide remain fresh. This, in turn, 

may spark a military response from other neighbors worried about Rwanda’s influence in the region and recalling previous conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo (DRC). Likewise, there have already been reports of Rwandan Hutu rebel 

groups operating out of the DRC, notably the Interahamwe, coming into Burundi 

in support of government-aligned militias. 

The outcome of the term limits battle in Burundi also has political implications 

for the rest of Africa. Since 2000, a dozen African leaders have tried to circumvent 

term limits that were instituted to limit the monopolization of power and foster a 

culture of democratic transitions in Africa. Half of those leaders were successful in 

extending their time in office. The other half, facing concerted domestic and interFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

national opposition, were not. In fact, the trend since 2010 has been to block such 

attempted circumventions. The outcome in Burundi, therefore, will shape the norm 

on the continent where 19 of 54 African leaders have been in power for more than 

a decade (and four for more than 30 years). Furthermore, the tactics used in pursuing a third term in Burundi—overriding the constitution, bullying opponents, and 

then holding rump elections—are a particularly dangerous precedent for Africa if allowed to stand. 

Underlying factors to the Burundi crisis 

Given the devastating social and economic costs to Burundi caused by Pierre 

Nkurunziza’s decision to pursue a third term in office, as well as strong opposition 

from within his own party, it is reasonable to reflect on what some of the underlying 

motivations for this course of action may be. 

In addition to the natural desire of many leaders in positions of authority to extend their time in power, Nkurunziza’s efforts to retain control of the presidency 

likely stem from a Burundian political economy that rewards senior officials financially. Access to political power in Burundi allows for considerable control over public procurement processes, the mining sector, international financial assistance, and 

reimbursements for peacekeeping deployments. Moreover, presidential power affords 

control over state-owned monopolies, land and property sales, privatization procedures, as well as import and export restrictions. Burundi scores 159th out of 175 

countries on Transparency International’s ranking of most corrupt countries in the 

world. Furthermore, the government has forcibly intervened when its own 

anticorruption watchdog has inquired too deeply or publicly. 

Another motivation for attempting to stay in power is the desire by some Hutu 

hardliners in the CNDD-FDD to break out of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 

Agreement for Burundi (referred to as the Arusha Accords). Their position is that 

the Accords are overly restrictive to Hutus, who comprise a strong majority in Burundi. The avoidance of term limits is a violation a key feature of the Accords. If 

this is accepted, it then offers prospects to renegotiate the entire political framework 

in Burundi in a manner that will be more conducive to hardline Hutu interests. 

A framework for stability 

Despite the serious challenges involved, this is a political crisis and is amenable 

to resolution. It is not rooted in deep structural differences within Burundian society. Moreover, a framework for resolution already exists in the Arusha Accords that 

has guided the country out of its civil conflict since 2000. This includes the precedent of political transitions. Burundi has experienced two peaceful transitions in 

power under the Accords, first in 2003 and again in 2005. Indeed, one of the greatest tragedies of the current crisis is the obscuring of the exemplary progress within 

Burundian society that has been made over the past 15 years. By stipulating that 

political power would not be dominated by either Hutus or Tutsis, the Arusha Accords promoted inter-ethnic political coalition building. This was true for nearly all 

of the major Burundian political parties including the CNDD-FDD. 

Similar patterns took hold within civil society with the result being the fostering 

of an inter-ethnic national identity-a dramatic departure from the polarization of 

the past. Revealingly, the protests against Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term were 

organized by these inter-ethnic civil society alliances involving more than 200 nongovernmental organizations who were mutually motivated to upholding Burundi’s 

fledgling democratic processes. 

Perhaps the greatest headway was made within Burundi’s military. Historically 

Tutsi-dominated, the military embarked on a comprehensive reform program in the 

mid-2000s that embodied the multi-ethnic principles of the Accords. Trust-building 

exercises were held at all levels of the military, Hutu and Tutsi recruits were 

trained together, and values of apolitical military professionalism were inculcated. 

While incomplete, the process demonstrated dramatic changes in attitudes about 

ethnicity within the military. Burundian troops also came to play a significant role 

in peacekeeping missions, especially through their contributions to the African 

Union’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Its five rotating battalions equate to more 

than 5,000 troops stationed in Somalia throughout the year. The result has been 

a relatively strong level of pride and military professionalism. 

This professionalism has been on display during the political crisis. Despite extraordinary political pressures, the Burundian military has largely stayed neutral 

during the crisis. During the protests, soldiers regularly acted as a buffer between 

protesters and police and government-affiliated militias. Nkurunziza’s inability to 

depend on the military for domestic political ends has constrained his behavior. 

That said, the ongoing efforts to politicize the military by arresting and purging 

Tutsi or moderate Hutu troops have placed great strains on this institution. DefecFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

tions have ensued with as many as 300 military members having absconded with 

their weapons as a result. 

The enormous value of Burundi’s security sector reforms is underscored by how 

poorly the police, gendarmerie, and intelligence services have behaved in comparison to the military. These groups are made up mostly of former combatants from 

Burundi’s civil war who were ineligible for integration into the military. Burundi’s 

police and intelligence services, therefore, have remained politicized and are collaborating with the CNDD-FDD’s youth league, the Imbonerakure, in cracking down on 

opposition and spearheading the pro-government violence. 

The extent to which the Arusha Accords have become a part of the political fabric 

in Burundi is evidenced by the serious rift within the CNDD-FDD caused by 

Nkurunziza’s pursuit of a third term and mobilization of support on an ethnic basis. 

Some 130 senior CNDD-FDD officials signed a petition in April requesting 

Nkurunziza to respect the Constitution and the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 

Agreement. When this was rejected, over 140 CNDD-FDD members, including two 

senior vice-presidents, left the party (for safety concerns sometimes departing the 

country clandestinely before voicing their opposition). In July a coalition of opposition parties, senior defectors from the ruling party, and civil society leaders met in 

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to form the National Council for the Restoration of the 

Arusha Accords (CNARED). It is leading a broad-based effort to engage in externally facilitated negotiations to establish an Inter-Burundian National Dialogue. 

Role for external actors 

Given the high levels of distrust among political parties and limited space for free 

expression, resolving the conflict in Burundi will require engagement by external actors. Diplomatic efforts in the region should continue to be the focal point for mediation efforts. The United States can support and enhance these initiatives in several 

ways. 

• Support creation of a multi-party transitional government in Burundi 

As part of its commitment to a political settlement in Burundi, the United States 

should support the creation of a transitional government in Burundi whose purpose 

is to oversee a political course back to a constitutional framework and a free, fair, 

and participatory electoral process. As the institutional mechanisms for a political 

transition were already in place earlier this year, the objective of this transitional 

phase would be to reestablish a path for this democratic trajectory. This transitional 

government of technocrats should be comprised of all leading political parties as 

well as representatives of civil society. Members of the transitional government 

would be barred from competing for political office in the succeeding elections. Having fulfilled his constitutionally mandated second term, Pierre Nkurunziza would 

not be eligible to participate in this transitional government or the subsequent presidential elections. 

• All parties in Burundi must renew their commitment to the Arusha Peace and 

Reconciliation Agreement 

Diplomatic efforts should make clear that the starting point for any political arrangement must be founded on the Arusha Accords. The Accords represent a social 

contract among Burundi’s ethnically diverse population to end 12 years of civil war 

and, at times, genocidal massacres that dated back to Burundi’s independence in 

1960. The Arusha Accords were intended specifically to prevent future ethnic conflict and its provisions were included in Burundi’s constitution. The highly popular 

Accords have become no less than a part of the fabric of Burundian national identity 

and its vision of a multiethnic, democratic society. 

Under the Accords no single ethnic group can constitute more than half of the defense and security forces. Similarly, no ethnic group can hold more than two-thirds 

of local, county, and municipal positions. Across cabinet ministries, the diplomatic 

service, and the institutions supporting democracy such as the National Electoral 

Commission, Constitutional Court, National Assembly, and National Commission on 

Human Rights, no party in power can enjoy more than 60 percent representation. 

• Support deployment of international peacekeeping forceIn order to support a political resolution and foster a stable transition to the Burundi crisis, the United 

States should logistically and financially support an international peacekeeping 

force (likely comprising 3,000-5,000 troops) under the auspices of the African 

Union and/or United Nations. As at the end of the civil war, such a force would 

serve as a buffer between rival armed groups to minimize the risk of escalation, 

enhance civilian protection, as well as to serve as a deterrent to provocations 

that could trigger mass atrocities. Deploying a peacekeeping force would also 

serve as a confidence-building measure for all sides, which would help provide 

assurances to those in exile and among all parties to the conflict that their reFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

turn and participation in the political dialogue will be supported by institutional 

safeguards. The African Union has previously called on its members to be prepared to support such a mission. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2248, furthermore, reminds all of the ICC’s jurisdiction and welcomes the deployment of 

African Union monitors and military experts. 

• Sanction spoilers 

The White House’s decision to issue targeted sanctions on four individuals most 

responsible for the political violence-from both the government and opposition-is an 

effective way of demonstrating to Burundi’s political elites the personal costs of their 

actions. The European Union and African Union have also imposed sanctions on a 

list of individuals and entities. 

The United States has also suspended Burundi from eligibility for the preferential 

trade benefits that come from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The 

EU is debating whether to suspend Burundi’s trade privileges. Belgium and other 

European bilateral donors have suspended aid to a number of development projects 

and stopped cooperation with the Burundian police. This is particularly significant 

since aid accounts for 54 percent of Burundian government expenditures. 

The United States should be prepared to expand the scope and breadth of these 

targeted sanctions as a means of exerting greater pressure on Burundi’s political actors to restore the Arusha Accords and demonstrate a sustained United States commitment to a political resolution. With this aim in mind, the United States should 

offer its cooperation in evidence- gathering to any International Criminal Court investigation that is undertaken. 

• All non-statutory forces must be disbanded and forensic accounting should identify those responsible for funding them. 

Given the central (and unaccountable) role that militias, particularly the 

Imbonerakure, are playing in intimidating and inflicting violence on the civilian 

population in the Burundi conflict, the United States should support the disbanding 

of these groups as part of any peacekeeping mandate. The United States should also 

make available any information, including the forensic accounting of financial flows 

to these groups so as to hold responsible those political actors who are sponsoring 

these militias. 

• The free and independent flow of information should be restored 

A prerequisite to a genuine domestic dialogue and a participatory political process 

in Burundi is the restoration of independent media and protections for freedom of 

expression. Independent reporting and access to information are also essential ingredients to maintaining domestic and international accountability. The United 

States should call for the restoration of all independent print, broadcast, and digital 

media outlets that have been closed by the Burundian government. Until that time, 

the United States should expand funding to the Voice of America and exiled Burundian journalists who can tap their networks to report on events inside of Burundi. 

The Government of Burundi should be called on to immediately release all journalists who have been arrested. In the absence of any domestic mechanisms to investigate the harassment and violence against journalists, the United States should 

also sponsor an independent fact-finding mission by the African Union and United 

Nations regarding the circumstances and parties responsible for journalists who 

have been killed or imprisoned in the course of trying to do their jobs of informing 

the general public. 

Conclusion 

The crisis in Burundi today is political-manufactured by a relatively small number of individuals who do not want to play by the democratic rulebook through 

which they came to power. In the process, they are attempting to undermine the 

multi-ethnic political framework that has provided Burundi a pathway away from 

cycles of genocide to peace and stability. Active international engagement at this 

point is critical to restoring the Arusha Accords before the cycle of violence and fragmentation accelerates and finding a political solution becomes much more difficult 

and costly to Burundi, the region, and the international community. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Mr. Vircoulon? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

STATEMENT OF THIERRY VIRCOULON, CENTRAL AFRICA 

PROJECT DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 

NAIROBI, KENYA 

Mr. VIRCOULON. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear this afternoon on behalf of the International Crisis 

Group before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss 

the current political and security crisis in Burundi. We want to 

thank the chairman and members of the committee for calling U.S. 

attention to an already severe humanitarian crisis and one that 

has a potential for mass atrocities and regional destabilization. 

The Crisis Group has been following developments in Burundi 

for almost 2 decades, and we have warned repeatedly about these 

crises building under President Pierre Nkurunziza, one with political origins, as it was said, but with clear ethnic undercurrents. 

The first phase of the present crisis began with the 2010 election. 

Those polls were a logistical success but a political failure, leaving 

political institutions dominated by the ruling party. Immediately 

following those elections, the government launched a post-electoral 

campaign of extrajudicial killings and forced its main opponents 

out of the country. 

As a result, civil society and independent media became the only 

dissenting voices. From 2010 to 2014, there was a steady polarization, socioeconomic discontent, and further closing of political 

space. 

The second phase of the crisis started in 2014 and centered on 

the growing evidence that President Nkurunziza intended to run 

for a third term, violating the Arusha agreement. 

The third phase of the crisis started in April this year with street 

protests against President Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term. 

The present phase of the crisis—armed confrontation—corresponded with President Nkurunziza securing a third-term mandate in July after an election that the African Union and the European Union decided not to observe because of political and security 

conditions in the country. 

Even beyond the humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Burundi, the 

regime now looks more and more like a failed police state. Regional 

spillover no longer is just a threat, as has been said, but a reality. 

The present patterns of violence are a reminder of what happened before the civil war broke out in 1993. For the Burundians, 

the story is repeating itself. This deja vu feeling and the memories 

of the civil war are the reasons why more than 200,000 Burundians 

have fled their country since the start of this year. 

One of the fundamental reasons why this crisis matters for Burundi, Africa, and the international community is that it challenges 

the Arusha peace agreement that was painstakingly negotiated 

during 4 years to bring peace to a country where 300,000 had died. 

One of the most glaring failures of Arusha sponsors was not enforcing respect for the results of international mediation. Mediation 

brokered a deal for the return of the opponents in exile in 2013 

with the view of making the 2015 elections inclusive. 

Special envoys from the U.S., the EU, Belgium, France, the U.K. 

and other countries also enabled a dialogue led by the U.N. special 

envoy between the opposition and the government to try and bring 

peace during the street protests earlier this year. However, the aim 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

of an inclusive electoral process was gutted by President 

Nkurunziza’s insistence on running again. 

The mediation was officially handed over to the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, but there has been no progress. The resumption of an externally mediated dialogue is now the only option. 

The decision of the U.S. Government to support an international 

dialogue is, at this stage, very important. U.S. President Barack 

Obama’s 27 October decision to exclude Burundi from the African 

Growth and Opportunity Act is an important signal, but it is not 

enough. 

The African Union Peace and Security Council has been most 

outspoken in demanding an end to violence, a resumption of a facilitated dialogue, and threatening the use of an African Union 

intervention force. But the African Union members do not want to 

bypass President Museveni and the East African Community. 

Right now, the Westerners are waiting for the African Union. 

The African Union is waiting for President Museveni. And the people of Burundi are waiting for the end of violence. 

If there is no externally mediated dialogue, the likely scenarios 

include a new coup, the emergence of a guerilla force in the countryside, and/or a large-scale repression against the rebellious districts of Bujumbura. 

Therefore, the resumption of a dialogue between the opposition 

and the government is absolutely essential. This implies the formation of an international mediation team supported by the U.S. and 

the European Union with additional sanctions against those responsible for violence. 

The agenda of the internationally mediated dialogue should be 

open, but it should include the Arusha agreement. 

If there is a need to halt atrocity, and if an African Union-led 

peace implementation mission cannot be deployed quickly, the U.N. 

should be planning to bring MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade into action. 

In addition, the African Union should be examining how it could 

replace Burundian troops in AMISOM, if that becomes necessary. 

It also must be stressed to Rwanda and Tanzania that they must 

play a constructive role in the present crisis. 

The wait-and-see attitude of the international community during 

the past 4 years is part of the reason why the crisis has brought 

us to this point. There is now urgency for more coherent and determined international action to halt the country’s further disintegration and prevent more violence within and beyond Burundi’s border. 

Thank you for your attention. 

[The statement of Mr. Vircoulon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THIERRY VIRCOULON

I appreciate the opportunity to appear this afternoon on behalf of the International Crisis Group before the Senate Foreign Relations Africa Subcommittee to 

discuss the current political and security crisis in Burundi. We want to thank the 

chairman and members of the Committee for calling U.S. attention to an already 

severe humanitarian crisis and one that has the potential for mass atrocities and 

regional destabilization. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

The International Crisis Group came into being because our founders believed 

that too often, major powers and international organizations ignored the cables, 

however incomplete they might be, coming from Rwanda, or Srebrenica or the 

Congo. After the Cold War, there seemingly no longer were strategic linkages from 

those countries affecting major powers, other than the sheer horror of the human 

suffering being inflicted. 

We are an independent, non-partisan, non-governmental organization that provides field-based analysis, policy advice and recommendations to governments, the 

United Nations, the European Union and other multilateral organizations on the 

prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. We were founded in 1995 by distinguished diplomats, statesmen and opinion leaders. Our president is Jean-Marie 

Guehenno, former head of U.N. peacekeeping, and our board of national and international leaders includes four former heads of state and eight former foreign or defense ministers and distinguished African leaders including Cheryl Carolus, former 

South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the African 

National Congress; Mo Ibrahim, president of Ibrahim Foundation; and Ayo Obe, Nigerian lawyer and human rights activist. U.S. foreign policy leaders on our board 

include Ambassador and former Undersecretary of Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, former NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark, former Senator Olympia 

Snowe, former career Ambassador Mort Abramowitz and former Secretary of the 

Treasury Lawrence Summers. 

Crisis Group has been following developments in Burundi for almost two decades, 

and we have warned repeatedly about this crisis building under President Pierre 

Nkurunziza, one with political origins but with clear ethnic undercurrents. The first 

phase of the present crisis began with the 2010 elections. Those polls were a 

logistical success but political failure. The opposition only participated in the communal elections and boycotted the national ones, charging the government with unfairly tilting the playing field, but thereby leaving national political institutions 

dominated by the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). 

Immediately following those elections, the government launched a repressive postelectoral campaign of extrajudicial killings and forced its main opponents out of the 

country. As a result, civil society and independent media became the only dissenting 

voices. From 2010 to 2014, there was steady polarization, socio-economic discontent 

and further closing of political space. It included a failed constitutional review, public disputes between civil society watchdogs and the government, and the government arming the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD known as the Imbonerakure to 

maintain a tight grip on the countryside. The Nkurunziza administration established a near monopoly and corrupt control over state resources, bribed and coerced 

opposition party leaders and over time used national police and security forces to 

enforce authoritarian governance. 

The earlier political deterioration exploded finally into the second phase of the crisis in 2014 centered on the growing evidence that Nkurunziza intended to run for 

a third term-violating the Arusha Accord which had ended the country’s 12 year 

civil war. During the electoral preparations, the government and the opposition disagreed on almost everything, from the composition of the local electoral commissions 

to the registration of voters, stripping its legitimacy from the start. At the end of 

2014, all the unsolved problems of the previous four years had resurfaced. With the 

ruling party rejecting any consensual approach, opposition and civil society had no 

faith in the electoral process as a means to achieve political change. 

The third phase of the crisis started in April this year with street protests against 

President Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term. After the president managed to 

obtain the blessing of the constitutional court and to silence those who opposed his 

candidacy within his own party, demonstrations in Bujumbura, the capital city, 

quickly turned violent. Daily confrontations occurred between the security forces/ 

Imbonerakure and a coalition of political opposition/civil society organizations who 

enjoyed the moral support of the Catholic Church. Two key developments happened 

during this phase. First, the army, which had initially played a positive role by 

interposing its forces between demonstrators and police to halt conflict, became increasingly fractured leading finally to high-ranking officers organizing a failed coup 

in May. Second, given increasing rifts within the CNDD-FDD and fearing for their 

lives, many moderate leaders of the ruling party fled the country, leaving the radicals in complete control of the party and the state. Regional and international attempts to mediate the crisis in June and July only managed to delay elections without substantially improving the conditions under which they were held. 

The final phase of the crisis-armed confrontation-corresponded with President 

Nukurnziza securing a third-term mandate in July after fraught elections declared 

unfair by virtually every observer, including the African Union, the European 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

Union, the U.S. and other governments. Nightly police raids and execution-style operations followed in districts of Bujumbura where many regime opponents lived and 

have led now to the militarization of the political conflict, with dead bodies dumped 

in the streets each night and grenade attacks occurring almost daily. A normal day 

in Bujumbura starts with the counting of the night’s death toll. 

Why the Burundi crisis matters 

Even beyond the the humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Burundi, the regime now 

looks more and more like a failed police state. There is violent and open confrontation between armed government forces and a large opposition consortium, also increasingly armed. President Nkurunziza and the leaders of the ruling party are 

bunkering themselves; the economy is barely functioning (according to the IMF, 

GDP will have shrunk by 7.2 per cent this year); many businessmen and women, 

civil society leaders and journalists are out of the country;security institutions are 

politicized and divided. The stability of Burundi is in jeopardy with dangerous regional consequences. 

Regional spillover no longer is just a threat, but a reality. Population flight already has produced a refugee crisis with several hundred thousand Burundians fleeing across the country’s borders in eight months. The formal refugee numbers, undoubtedly understated, of 215,000 include 70,000 in Rwanda, more than 100,000in 

western Tanzania and the rest in DRC and Uganda. Serious tensions with Rwanda 

include the severing of diplomatic ties and Kigali accusing Burundi of tolerating the 

presence of Rwandan Hutu FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, 

an armed militia that may still include former genocidaires) and Bujumbura accusing Kigali of recruiting, training and arming Burundian refugees in refugee camps 

in Rwanda. 

The pattern of violence changed immediately following the reelection of president 

Nkurunziza. Targeted assassinations of key personalities in both camps have taken 

place (General Nishirimana, Colonel Bikomagu, an assassination attempt of Pierre 

Claver Mbonimpa, a well-known human rights activist, and the recent murder of 

one of his sons; and another attack on the army chief of staff) along with mortar 

attacks against the presidential palace. Both sides are radicalizing. Government officials are reviving the rhetoric from the civil war of 1993-2005. The president made 

public an ultimatum giving the ‘‘criminals’’ seven days to lay down arms. Reverien 

Ndikuriyo, the Senate president, cryptically warned on 1 November that the police 

would soon go to ‘‘work’’ and asked district heads to identify ‘‘elements which are 

not in order’’. The language is unambiguous to Burundians and chillingly similar 

to that used in Rwanda in the 1990s before the genocide. The opposition is organizing in exile and a platform was created in Addis Ababa by politicians (including 

the moderates from the ruling party), civil society leaders and former military officers. The present patterns of violence are a reminder of what happened before the 

civil war broke out in 1993. For the Burundians, the story is repeating itself. This 

deja vu feeling and the memories of the civil war are the reasons why so many of 

them have left their country.One of the fundamental reasons why this crisis matters 

for Burundi, Africa and the international communities is that it challenges the 

Arusha peace agreement of August 2000 that was painstakingly negotiated during 

four years to bring peace to a country where 300,000 had died in more than a decade of conflict. That accord, negotiated with the facilitation of two African presidents (President Julius Nyerere and President Nelson Mandela) and endorsed by 

the U.N., AU, US France and the EU, institutionalized political and ethnic powersharing between Hutu and Tutsi. The Arusha agreement explicitly mentions the 

two-term limit for presidents (article 7). While there had been a long list of violations of the Arusha agreement since its signing and a failure in the constitutional 

review attempt of 2014, it was the violation of the no third term provision that was 

the straw that finally broke the camel’s back. 

In its report Bye Bye Arusha, written in 2012, Crisis Group warned that the ruling party was distancing itself from the Arusha agreement and listed all the violations of the peace accord. The CNDD-FDD never genuinely adhered to its principles 

and blocked the implementation of those which were detrimental to its monopoly of 

power. For instance, it discarded the creation of a special tribunal to deal with the 

crimes of the civil war and opted only for the creation of a truth and reconciliation 

commission whose work has not even started. Indeed the issue of post-conflict justice has remained the elephant in the room during the two mandates of president 

Nkurunziza who has been granted provisional amnesty. The present crisis also has 

demonstrated another critical violation of the Arusha agreement: the politicization 

of the security forces. The ruling party gradually distanced itself from the Arusha 

agreement because most Arusha guarantors did not follow up on their commitments 

to long-term political engagement and resorted to a near completely private diploFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

matic approach without firm consequences until very recently, despite clear signs 

of authoritarian actions and violation of the Arusha accord. 

One of the most glaring failures by Arusha sponsors was not enforcing respect for 

the results of international mediation. Mediation brokered a deal for the return of 

the opponents in exile in 2013 with the view of making the 2015 elections inclusive. 

Special envoys from the U.S., the EU, Belgium, France, the UK and other countries 

also enabled a dialogue led by the U.N. special envoy between the opposition coalition and the government to try and bring peace during street protests earlier this 

year. However, the aim of an inclusive electoral process was gutted by Nkurunziza’s 

insistence on running for a third term. The mediation was officially handed over to 

the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni this past summer but, despite informal 

consultations, no meeting has happened yet under his chairmanship. The resumption of the dialogue is the only option at this stage but only informal consultations 

have been held and the most that is hoped is that a meeting may happen before 

the end of the year. 

As Burundi’s civil war was ended by an agreement negotiated by African leaders, 

Western governments have again waited for an African solution, i.e. a regionally 

mediated dialogue. Unfortunately, times have changed. South Africa has disengaged 

from Burundi and its present government seems disinterested in preserving 

Mandela’s legacy. The East African Community (EAC) has been mandated to find 

a solution but is too divided. In addition, its chief mediator, Ugandan President 

Museveni, in power since 1986, is himself busy with the preparation of elections in 

early 2016. 

U.S. President Barack Obama’s 27 October decision to exclude Burundi from the 

‘‘African Growth and Opportunity Act’’ is an important signal of the U.S.’s growing 

concern, but it is not enough. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council 

(PSC) has been most outspoken in demanding an end to violence and a resumption 

of a facilitated dialogue, issuing a strong communique and threatening the use of 

an African Union intervention force, but does not want to bypass president 

Museveni and the EAC.Right now the westerners are waiting for the AU, the AU 

is waiting for president Museveni and the people of Burundi are waiting for the end 

of violence. If there is no regionally mediated dialogue, the likely scenarios include: 

a new coup attempt, the emergence of a guerilla force in the countryside and/or a 

large scale repression against the rebellious districts of Bujumbura.Another reason 

why what happens in Burundi matters is it could set a dangerous precedent among 

its neighbors. While there are substantial differences in each of its neighbors where 

the third term issue also is a matter of dispute, the potential for political unraveling 

appears greatest in the DRC where a third term for its president Joseph Kabila constitutes a similar violation of the peace agreement and the DRC constitution.The 

way forwardThe resumption of the dialogue between the opposition and the government is absolutely essential. This implies the formation of an international mediation team with AU, EAC, International organization of the French speaking countries (IOF), U.N. representatives, supported by the U.S. and the EU with additional 

sanctions against those responsible for egregious violence, like those the U.S. announced last week--to put pressure on the reluctant stakeholders.The agenda of the 

internationally mediated dialogue should be open and it should include the Arusha 

agreement. As the stumbling block of the post-conflict regime, the Arusha agreement is the reference point in every political discussion about Burundi but a frank 

discussion is needed about the future of the Arusha agreement and its values that 

have underpinned the hard-won peace in Burundi. The Arusha agreement is at the 

core of the Burundi crisis and therefore it must not be taboo. Some 15 years after 

its signing it is legitimate to ask whether some changes—but only if adopted consensually—are needed. 

The U.N. should be planning, if an AU led peace implementation mission cannot 

be deployed quickly to bring MONUSCO’s FIB into action if there is a need to halt 

atrocities. In addition, the AU should be examining how it could replace Burundian 

troops in AMISOM if that becomes necessary. In addition, the AU, the U.S., UK and 

other concerned members of the international community should quietly stress to 

the Rwandan and new Tanzanian governments that they must play more constructive roles. 

The wait-and-see attitude of the international community during the past four 

years is part of the reason why the crisis has brought us to this point. There is now 

urgency for more coherent and determined international action to halt the country’s 

further disintegration and expanded violence within and beyond Burundi’s borders. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

We now turn to Vigny Nimuraba. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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STATEMENT OF SIXTE VIGNY NIMURABA, DEAN’S ASSISTANT 

AND DIRECTOR OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAM, THE 

SCHOOL FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION, 

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 

Mr. NIMURABA. Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear 

here today to discuss the political and security crisis in Burundi. 

I thank also the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at 

George Mason University. 

I am Burundian, and I just returned. This testimony reflects the 

discussions I had with key stakeholders, as well as common Burundians, from all sides—different people, different understandings of 

the crisis, different approaches to resolution. 

From the government perspective, a core pillar of Arusha Accords 

is ethnic quotas, and this remains unquestionable by both government and opposition in Burundi. Virtually everyone agrees that it 

is still a good thing to have security forces made up of 50 percent 

Hutu and 50 percent Tutsi troops. Although the population is actually divided into approximately 85 percent Hutu and 15 percent 

Tutsi citizens, the government holds to the principle of 40 percent 

Tutsi and 60 percent Hutu staffers at any administrative leadership posts in the country. 

Burundi’s leadership has called upon all organizations, national 

and international, to check and make sure they respect those ethnic quotas to reflect the makeup of the population. 

One of the major achievements of the past 15 years is the power 

of unity over ethnic divisions. The Burundian people can distinguish ethnic groups from political and personal interests. 

It is widely agreed that Burundian people need peace. People in 

the countryside do not care about presidential terms or nuances of 

constitutional law. While some people want economic support, such 

as chemical fertilizers or seeds, others want jobs and equal opportunities. 

The capital city is the place where the political classes live. That 

may be the reason why there is violence now, and that has a lot 

to do with our own history. 

Current government leaders see Western countries as denying 

the principles of democracy and sovereignty of Burundi. There is 

an underreported cold war competition between the two major powers, China and Russia on one side and the West on the other. Exploited mineral resources like nickel and uranium play a major role 

in that commercial conflict. 

The concept of genocide is being invented to show that the situation is chaotic and, therefore, to call for external military intervention. It is, however, critical that atrocity prevention efforts take seriously the specific context in which violence is unfolding. 

The current government is not opposed to dialogue. Inclusive dialogue has started among all Burundians. This dialogue will continue with members of the diaspora. However, the dialogue will not 

include people who were involved in the failed coup of May 2015. 

In dealing with people involved in the protests, the first group 

made up of underage prisoners has been released and the Red 

Cross was in charge of bringing them back to their families. YesterFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

day, around 100 youth involved in the protests were released, and 

the African Union was present at that release. 

People were released after completing a civic education program. 

This initiative will continue, and it needs to be supported. 

Finally, the government has issued a strong request that all people involved in the process of addressing the current crisis to visit 

the whole country and see how different some suburbs of 

Bujumbura look in comparison to other areas, if they wish to write 

accurate reports on Burundi. 

The opposition’s major motivation to fight is unequal opportunities. There is some kind of collaboration between the youth who 

fighting with some current army forces. The only way peace can be 

restored is if opposition can be involved in the discussion and dialogue, which would be inclusive. That must take place in a safe 

zone. 

Religious leaders, especially the Catholic Church, are calling both 

parties to dialogue without pushing too hard. 

Civil society operates under fear. Civil society requests the government to stop the immediate act of harassment, intimidation, 

and arbitrary detention against members of civil society organizations, journalists, and other human right activists and peace-builders, as well as members of their families. 

Burundian civil society would like to see the establishment of an 

independent and rigorous inquiry in order to establish responsibility for the violence observed in Burundi since April 2015. 

There is a problem is the new education system—bachelor, master’s, doctorate—which was launched with insufficient studies in 

terms of implementation and transition from the previous system. 

Some week-long basic workshops were conducted to equip educators with skills to teach new courses, such as English, Swahili, 

music, and arts. Educators themselves testify, however, that they 

did not learn enough to allow them to teach those courses adequately. 

The deteriorating education system is a real threat to security in 

Burundi. If young people do not have access to good education and 

consequently to good jobs, no matter how hard we work to address 

the current issue, violence will remain and will not cease. 

Rwanda has an active role in the Burundi crisis. Hopefully, the 

international community will request Rwanda to stop such tactics. 

Other counties such as Tanzania, DRC, and Uganda have also a 

major role to play, they can really act and stop violence in Burundi. 

Some of the recommendations include the need to improve the 

economy, job creation, investment, and opportunities for youth and 

other people who are able to work. 

Second, we should improve education programs, both long-term 

and short-term, with regard to peace education. 

Post-traumatic stress disorder is a continuing problem in Burundi. We need to create a substantial program of trauma healing 

that will be implemented nationwide. This would also include nonviolence activities and teaching. 

Some other suggestions: one, help the government disarm all militia, regardless of political affiliation; two, request the government 

to restore the freedom of expression, allowing private media to reopen; three, allow civil society to operate freely and to reopen the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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bank accounts that have been frozen for investigation purposes, 

and this goes along with training of civil society personnel and 

journalists to improve the capacity for reporting and acting responsibly; four, strengthen the African Union human rights observers 

and require them to have toll-free phones to allow every Burundian 

to reach them and to report misconduct; five, urge the Burundian 

Government to have conflict resolution experts working with the 

national commission for dialogue to focus on long-term goals and 

sustainability of peace in Burundi; six, urge the Rwandan Government not to continue its interference in the Burundian crisis and, 

if necessary, put in place some sanctions against Rwanda; seven, 

provide generous humanitarian support to all displaced and support an extensive campaign for refugees to return to Burundi once 

security is restored; finally, pressure and sanctions will not work 

but will radicalize parties to the conflict in Burundi. The U.S. and 

the international community should look for other ways, other collaborative ways, to address the current issue. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nimuraba follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SIXTE VIGNY NIMURABA

Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, members of the subcommittee: 

Thank you for the invitation to appear here today to discuss the political and security crisis in Burundi. 

By way of background, I currently serve as the Dean’s Assistant and Director of 

Violence Prevention for the Genocide Prevention Program / GPP in the School for 

Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) at George Mason University (GMU), 

where I am also pursuing a doctoral degree. I have had extensive experience working with Burundian civil society and non-governmental organizations to promote 

peace, conflict prevention, social cohesion, and integration of returnees in local communities. 

During my four-year tenure with Ligue Iteka, the oldest and largest civil society 

organization in Burundi, I collaborated closely with UNHCR and other national and 

international human rights organizations to foster peaceful coexistence. In my capacity as regional coordinator within Ligue Iteka’s Monitoring of Returnees Project, 

I first coordinated resettlement and social cohesion activities in five northern provinces (Ngozi, Kirundo, Kayanza, Muyinga and Karusi) and was then promoted to 

the position of southern regional coordinator, covering the provinces of Makamba, 

Bururi, and Rutana, which together had a significantly larger population of returnees and a remarkably larger number of land conflicts to mitigate. 

Before joining Ligue Iteka, I held different positions in local and international organizations such as VISPE, Care International, and CNLS. This work inspired my 

passion to dedicate my life to the quest for peaceful coexistence and social cohesion 

in Burundi and the African Great Lakes region, which eventually brought me to this 

hearing room today. 

Mr. Chairman, in your letter of invitation to present this testimony, you posed 

questions in three broad areas of interest. First, what have I learned during my recent trips to Burundi about the perspectives of average citizens toward the current 

political situation and prospects of violence that may disrupt their lives? Second, 

what have I learned in discussions with members of the government and opposition 

parties about how Burundi can prevent further political violence and move toward 

a clearer path of reconciliation? And third, how do I perceive the role of Burundi’s 

neighbors in the region to facilitate the peace process, diffuse tensions, and get the 

country ‘‘back on track’’—plus what role can the United States and other international partners play in improving the situation? 

I would like to address each of these issues separately, although you may see 

some overlap in the discussion. While these are preliminary thoughts, I will be 

happy to answer your questions and provide clarification or additional information 

today or in writing later to supplement the hearing record. 

A core pillar of Arusha Accords is ‘‘ethnic quotas’’ and this remain unquestionable 

by both government and opposition in Burundi. Virtually everyone agrees that it is 

still a good thing to have security forces made up of 50 percent Hutu and 50 percent 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Tutsi troops. Although the population is actually divided into approximately 85 percent Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi citizens, the government holds to the principle of 

40 percent Tutsi and 60 percent Hutu staffers at any administrative leadership post 

in the country, from the presidency to the administration of the smallest entity, 

which is the ‘‘hill’’ (administration collinaire). Burundi’s leadership has called upon 

all organizations, national and international, to check and make sure they respect 

those ethnic quotas, to reflect the make-up of the country’s population. 

One of the major achievements of the past fifteen years is the power of unity over 

ethnic divisions. The Burundian people can distinguish ethnic groups from political 

and personal interests. After decades of artificial segregation, the Arusha Accords 

and subsequent constitutional and legal reforms successfully brought Hutu and 

Tutsi together to work in the same office, to plan and implement projects jointly, 

to govern and to be governed together. At the end of the day, the Burundian people 

discovered that any leader can be good or bad regardless whether he is Hutu or 

Tutsi. Now the majority of Hutu and Tutsi know that they have the same destiny 

and therefore must struggle together and celebrate what they have together. This 

shared struggle that both Hutu and Tutsi now experience is, however, endangered 

by a small number of older people who retain vivid memories of ethnic hate the violence it spewed. These few sadly try to embed their fears among younger generations. Our hope is that newer generations—today’s young people and their children 

and grandchildren—will remain united and refuse to inherit the dangerous ideology 

of the past. 

It is widely agreed that the Burundian people need peace. Yet, as in most countries, many people among the government and among the opposition claim that the 

majority of the populace supports their own cause. Yet the reality is that both Hutu 

and Tutsi have bad memory of the civil war. They still remember human and material losses caused by that war and they would not like to see this happen again. 

People in the countryside do not care about president terms or the nuances of constitutional law. They likely know nothing about what the Arusha Accords say about 

the president’s term limits; what they remember is that there has been a popular 

president who does community service with them and who plays soccer with them. 

The people’s desire for peace is reflected in how many armed people have been 

caught and denounced by other citizens, as was the case in Muyinga, Kayanza, 

Cibitoke, Bujumbura, and elsewhere. The Burundian people do not want any fellow 

citizens to be left behind because he may endanger the sustainability of peace that 

they reached the hard way. What they say when you ask them is, ‘‘Can you please 

tell our leaders to ask what the opposition needs and share some of the parliamentary seats with them? They should give them something of political value so that 

politicians do not lead us into another civil war’’. 

Another question that should be raised is why the violence is mainly occurring 

only in few discrete areas, especially in some suburbs of Bujumbura, the capital city. 

One answer is that the capital city is the place where the political classes live. Since 

independence in 1963, the ruling class and their families have taken advantage of 

the opportunity to move to Bujumbura to seek an even better life than what they 

had in their home towns. It was the best place to live for people doing business, 

military families, and people searching for both government and private-sector jobs. 

This was also related to the how land distribution had been done in the past few 

decades, as well as property leasing requirements, rent-to-buy procedures, and so 

forth. 

The Arusha Accords—The Burundian people’s engagement for unity and forgiveness 

Although the 2005 Arusha Accords did contribute to peace in Burundi, most of 

the work was done by the people themselves. The Arusha Accords were a blessing 

from both the international community and leaders of the then-opposition and President Buyoya’s administration. In effect, the Arusha Accord was more about power 

sharing than peace and reconciliation per se—although all those were components 

of the agreement. 

What outside observers tend to forget is that the Burundian people, no matter 

what side they were on as the civil war approached its end, were exhausted. They 

were tired of war and daily killings and fighting that had been occurring for more 

than 12 years. People started to ask the fighters to engage in dialogue that could 

bring peace back, Hutus, on one side, were pressing rebels to stop violent means 

and start negotiations with the government; on the other side, Tutsi were also demanding the Tutsi-dominated army and government to find ways of talking with the 

rebels in order to stop the violence. 

Even before and during the civil war, there were many communities that had already overcome ethnic divisions. Some Hutus had started to help Tutsis whose 

houses were destroyed to make bricks and help them return to their properties. The 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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only Tutsis who remained in internally displaced person (IDP) camps were those 

who had direct ties with people involved in leadership position, those with business 

activities, and several others who were better off compared to the rest of Burundian 

population. Those wealthy families decided either to rent houses for their IDP families in cities and suburbs, because they had financial means to support them from 

there. Other Tutsi families returned or had already returned to their native towns 

and villages and were interacting productively with Hutu residents on a daily basis. 

For Hutu communities, the majority of them had also left regroupment camps 

(camps de regroupements) which were established by the government in order to 

separate innocent people from those who were then called rebels. 

Before the Arusha agreements, there were Hutu and Tutsi communities which 

had already started to share lives and to help each other, letting go the past ethnic 

conflict and the losses it caused. Burundians were thirsty for peace, unity and reconciliation. 

Some major achievements must be acknowledged: 

a. With the return of security, people do not spend nights in the bush or in holes 

fearing military attacks or rebel group attacks 

b. Hutus and Tutsi live together; no matter what has been said, all ethnic 

groups remain united 

c. Most of the Burundian people are less interested in politics, term limits, and 

leadership positions, but more on economic opportunity and their survival. 

d. Little by little, people are realizing that very few leaders, if any, are more 

sincerely interested in the people’s wellbeing and interests than they are in 

their personal goals, in most cases financial interests. There are no more 

leaders who love and care about their people. 

Different people, different understanding of the crisis, different approaches to resolution 

Current government leaders see few policy issues dividing government from the 

opposition. For them the problem is between the current government and Western 

countries that are denying the principles of democracy and sovereignty of Burundi.There is an underreported cold war competition between the major powers— 

China and Russia on one side and the West on the other. Unexploited mineral resources like nickel and uranium play a major role in that commercial conflict. Exploration for minerals is being performed by two Russian companies. The government, 

however, is now open to sharing extraction with any other countries, especially since 

it became clear that the minerals from Nyabikere and Waga are more numerous 

than it was previously believed. There is so much to extract that more than one 

company can be granted a concession. 

According to current Burundian leaders, the country does not have only one option (a partnership with the United States and European Union). It has also another option to partner with Russia and China in different sectors. Even if it may 

require some time to decide how to construct such an alignment, it is not politically 

or commercially impossible. 

The army was able to contain violence when some armed groups attacked from 

Cibitoke in December 2014 and, more recently, when a group of armed fighters 

came from Rwanda entering through Buyumpu and Kabarore. Note that around 200 

fighters were arrested during the operation in Kibira, where those groups were 

heading. 

The concept of genocide is being invented in minds of the opposition to show that 

the situation is chaotic and they therefore call for external military intervention. As 

Michael Broache of the University of Tampa and Kate Cronin-Furman of Stanford 

University noted in the Washington Post on November 15, Burundi’s situation is 

‘‘not, nor will it ever be, ‘another Rwanda.’ It’s critical that atrocity prevention efforts take seriously the specific context in which violence is unfolding. Crying ’genocide’ instead of calling it what it is—political violence, with the possibility of escalating into crimes against humanity—does nobody any favors, least of all the victims.’’ In response to calls for military intervention, Patrick Hajayandi of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliaton wrote in the Daily Maverick on the same date 

that ‘‘Foreign military intervention could potentially cause a tense situation to become incendiary. A military intervention is likely to radicalize both parties, and pit 

them against each other, creating an all-out civil war.’’ 

Views of the government 

The tension between Burundi and other countries as well as the international 

community started when some countries issued statements that scheduled elections 

could not take place because there were no required conditions for them to be ‘‘fair.’’ 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Despite the withdrawal of international support, the elections for parliament and 

president took place nearly on schedule and the government is ready to maintain 

that achievement through any means. 

In contrast to what many people say, the current government is not opposed to 

dialogue. Inclusive dialogue has started among all Burundians and this dialogue 

will include members of the diaspora. The government, however, insists that dialogue is not the same as negotiation. Neither will the process of dialogue include 

people who were involved in the failed coup of May 2015. 

In terms of openness of the current government, the government put the international community as well as diplomatic missions in Burundi on notice that they 

should state clearly whether they recognize the current government or not. If one 

country makes it clear that it supports and recognizes the current government, 

meetings for diplomats or foreign government officials at any level of the country’s 

leadership will be made easier. Some information about a plan to kill the president 

and some highly positioned leaders has been circulated, explaining why there are 

restrictions on who can see the president. 

Some good initiatives have been taken by the government. A group of teenagers 

who were caught during the protests as well as some people arrested during the 

Kayanza attacks are or have been attending civic education training workshops in 

Rumonge. After their training is complete, they will be sent back home, where, it 

is hoped, they will make positive contributions to their communities. 

The first group made of underage prisoners has been released and the Red Cross 

was in charge of bringing them back to their families. This civic education program 

will continue and needs to be supported. 

For adults who are going through trials because of their involvement in the protests, coup, and armed group attacks, there is a window of opportunity for amnesty, 

but this necessarily will happen after their trials are complete, as a matter of due 

process. 

Finally, the government has pointed out that people working in embassies and 

other diplomatic missions do not even go to the suburbs of Bujumbura, in order to 

inquire what the reality on the ground is. This has resulted in many statements 

being made based on faulty or biased information. The government has issued 

strong requests that all people involved in the process of addressing the current crisis to visit the whole country and to see how differently the suburbs of Bujumbura 

look in comparison to other areas, if they wish to write accurate reports on Burundi. 

Views of the opposition 

Despite the fact that I was unable to meet with the leaders of the opposition in 

Burundi, I had interesting and informative conversations with members of opposition groups and political parties. It was explained to me that the major motivation 

to fight is unequal opportunities that were given to former fighters. While some people were demobilized, another group was left alone even if they were promised to 

be called later; it appeared that no one cared about them after all. 

I heard that the rebellion has structures and that it has members from all ethnic 

groups and includes youth from some suburbs of Bujumbura who were trained during or after protests. I learned that there is close collaboration with some security 

forces currently active within the government. 

One opposition member I met said that, reflecting on his life experience, he is convinced that, no matter what negotiations come up with, he will not hand his gun 

back, unless he is properly demobilized because he was lied too many times and he 

wants to see his life and the life of his family back on track with good economic 

standing. He still complains about the fact that he and some of his colleagues received nothing more than tennis shoes and a radio as demobilization package. He 

concludes that his colleague in the field will not accept any decision from the negotiation, because they want to have a representative to the negotiation whose holds, 

at the very least, the rank of lieutenant. 

Religious leaders, civil society, and educational institutions 

Religious leaders, especially the Catholic Church have noticed that it is not easy 

for them to operate in an environment in which they announced publicly their opposition to President Nkurunziza’s third term. As damage control, they are calling 

both parties to dialogue without pushing too hard. They are also trying to cope with 

the current situation and regain trust because it is the only way they can have their 

word listened to by both the government and the opposition. 

Civil society operates under fear. There are some facts that cannot be addressed 

in the near future and, therefore, instead of taking extreme positions, those operating in Burundi try to cope with the situation and report with more nuanced analysis to the extent that they can. Civil society requests the government to stop immeFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

diately acts of harassment, intimidation and arbitrary detention against members 

of civil society organizations, journalists and other human right activists and 

peacebuilders, as well as members of their families carrying out their activities in 

a risky environment.Burundian civil society would like to see the establishment of 

an independent and rigorous inquiry in order to establish responsibility for the violence observed in Burundi since April 2015 and apply any criminal, civil or administrative sanctions applicable under the law 

Conditions in educational institutions at every level have deteriorated and may 

continue to get worse if no urgent support is brought to the country. People I talked 

to in education unanimously agreed to the following: 

There is a general absence of highly educated people in Burundian politics. This 

may have been due to the many years of civil war, destruction of education facilities, 

death of experienced educators, and use of force by students to get good grades instead of getting them based on merit. This was noticed in many schools, where instructors were killed or forced to allow students to graduate even when the students 

did not fulfill the course requirements. The other component is that, many people 

got positions because they fought the war militarily and this was a reward for the 

efforts they made in the bush, even if they were not otherwise qualified to do the 

job. 

The other major problem is the new education system Bachelor—Masters- Doctorate (LMD, or Licence, Maitrise, Doctorat) which was launched with insufficient 

studies in term of implementation and transition from the previous system. People 

in education leadership with whom I spoke were desperate and shared with me the 

complexity of the situation. They are not very sure where students graduating from 

the ninth grade will go, they worry that the country does not have instructors who 

can teach courses such as art, music, and drawing, among other teacher shortages. 

Some week-long basic workshops were conducted to equip educators with skills to 

teach new courses such as English, Swahili, Music, and Arts. Educators themselves 

testify, however, that they still did not learn enough to allow them to teach those 

courses adequately. 

Finally, some school principals who were dismissed from their leadership position 

and demoted to teach as basic instructors with the new system, prefer to abandon 

the job entirely. This has put education in a dire situation. 

I personally see the deteriorating education system as a real threat to security 

in Burundi. If young people do not have access to good education—and consequently 

to good jobs later—no matter how hard we work to address the current issues, violence will never cease. It is a good thing to call for investments and job creation 

in Burundi to hire thousands of educated and non-educated youth, but this will only 

provide ‘‘negative peace’’ insofar as we will not have put in place structures that 

guarantee better education for all in Burundi. 

The role of neighboring countries 

Throughout the history, Burundi and Rwanda have been following the same trajectory. They either engage in peace together or they get in trouble at the same 

time. Courageous analysts have denounced the negative role that Rwanda has been 

playing in the current crisis in Burundi. It was not until President Kagame, announced it publicly that the international community started to see how Rwanda 

has an active role in the Burundi crisis. Hopefully, Rwanda will be soon pressured 

to abandon that strategy. Other countries also such as Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda have a major role in stopping current violence. I am 

convinced that if all the leaders of the region commit themselves to the cause for 

peace in Burundi and talk to all the parties in conflict in Burundi through unofficial 

ways, the current issue will be addressed soon. The problem is that some actors 

want to use the force and pressure as well as ‘‘rule of law’’ as way to address the 

conflict. Unless we understand that a gun makes stronger a gunman and that humble and smooth approach to the gunman can convince him to put down his weapon 

before innocent lives are lost, we will not address the current Burundi conflict. 

Recommended actions 

I have several recommendations for actions on the part of the international community, including Burundi’s partners in the United States and other countries. 

First, we need to improve the economy (job creation, investment and opportunities 

for youth and other people who are able to work). A big investment plan, not necessarily like the Marshall Plan but sized to fit Burundi’s specific needs, will not only 

promote sustainable peace and security in the country, but will also improve the 

stability of the region as a whole. 

The United States should invest in that small country, because even if it does not 

have the natural resources equivalent to the DRC or Angola, its high number of acFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

tive men and women can either be a real asset to grow the economy or they can 

be a real threat to the region and to the world, if joining terrorist or rebel groups 

offers better pay and opportunities. The announcement that Burundi will be excluded from AGOA is troublesome in this regard, as well as the fact that competing 

countries in the region are open to U.S. (and other foreign) investment and may 

snatch opportunities from Burundi’s hands in a way that is not beneficial to the entire region, economically or politically. 

Second, we should improve education programs (both long- and short-term with 

regard to peace education). The long term would improve people’s thinking as well 

as providing leaders who are highly educated, sparking well-strategized leadership 

and innovative ideologies. We need to make sure the new education model (LMD) 

is supported sufficiently and experts are sent to Burundi to do capacity building in 

teaching some courses such as English, art, Swahili, and so forth. 

PTSD is a continuing problem in Burundi, so, third, we need to create a substantial program of trauma healing that would be implemented nationwide. This should 

incorporate a new type of trauma healing approach that would have different layers 

of activities depending on the roles and responsibilities each person has. The same 

program should be in some ways included in the peace education curriculum that 

is needed in schools. 

This would also include nonviolence activities and teachings. For several generations, the Burundian people have considered violence as the only alternative to deliver themselves and to help them reach their goals. If new generations are not 

taught that nonviolence can play a major role in the transformation of systems as 

well as helping people reach their goals peacefully, it will still be hard for them to 

reach sustainable peace. 

Some other suggestions: 

1. Help the government disarm all militias regardless of political affiliation 

2. Request the government to restore the freedom of expression, allowing private 

media (newspapers and radio) to re-open 

3. Allow civil society to operate freely and without fear of being arrested and reopen soon their bank accounts that have been frozen for investigation purposes. This goes along with training of civil society personnel and journalists 

to improve their capacity for reporting and acting responsibly 

4. Start extensive campaigns calling refugees to return to Burundi because they 

are living in inhumane conditions in camps, where the information they get 

is mostly is biased by political views which overly dramatize the situation in 

Burundi 

5. Strengthen the African Union’s human rights observers and require them to 

have toll-free phones to allow every Burundian to reach them and report misconduct 

6. Urge the Burundian government to have conflict resolution experts working 

with the National Commission for Dialogue, to focus on long-term goals and 

sustainability of peace in Burundi 

7. Sternly urge the Rwandan government not to continue its interference in the 

Burundian crisis and, if necessary, put in place some sanctions against Rwanda 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity 

to speak to you today and I will be happy to answer any questions you have and 

to engage in a productive and informative discussion with my fellow witnesses. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Thank you again for the testimony. 

We have been joined by the ranking member, Senator Cardin. So 

let me ask a few questions before turning to him. 

Mr. Siegle, in your prepared remarks, you mentioned that part 

of what might have motivated Nkurunziza to run for reelection is 

people encouraging him to move away from the Arusha Accords, as 

they seem to be too harsh on the Hutus here. 

If that is the case, moving back to the Arusha Accords, is that 

going to satisfy the president and his followers? Or will the same 

underlying problems as they see them remain, that this accord is 

too restrictive on their rights? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

Dr. SIEGLE. Well, I think absolutely that is the central issue 

here. What we have seen really is a split within the ruling party, 

the CNDD–FDD. 

As with most of the major political parties in Burundi, since 

Arusha, there has been a commitment to a multiethnic coalitionbuilding approach to politics. That is why there was some hope 

that we would see a genuine transition this year. 

But I think it has been, over the last year especially that 

hardliners in the CNDD–FDD have resisted that transition. They 

do see an opportunity to break out of Arusha, which through ethnic 

quotas has limited the influence that Hutus can have, and they feel 

that that is their rightful position to have greater influence within 

the party and outside. 

So I think that is exactly what they are hoping for. They want 

to break Arusha. They want the third term, and then rewrite the 

political rules under the auspices of some sort of national dialogue 

and that way be in a much stronger position for a hard-line Hutu 

position. 

So I think absolutely they will be resistant to moving back to 

Arusha. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Vircoulon, you mentioned that the regional 

spillover conflict is not just a threat, it is now a reality. Can you 

talk more about that in terms of refugees and other issues, in 

terms of the regional aspect of this crisis? 

Mr. VIRCOULON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Indeed, as we sit, there are more than 200,000 refugees in basically 9 months, Burundians who fled their country. Most of them 

are in western Tanzania. About 70,000 of them are in Rwanda. The 

rest are between eastern Congo and Uganda. 

What we have seen since the beginning of this refugee crisis is, 

of course, some cross-border security problems that have increased 

with Rwanda, also with the Democratic Republic of Congo. As it 

has been said previously, there have been some credible reports 

about recruitment in the refugee camps. So those are security problems that have already emerged because of the refugee crisis. 

Of course, there are also some very serious humanitarian problems. There was an outbreak of cholera in western Tanzania in 

June and July that was fortunately contained by the humanitarian 

NGOs. But as the flow of refugees is going to increase, we are likely to see these kinds of epidemics start again in western Tanzania 

and also probably in south. 

The other very important humanitarian problem that I must 

mention is food and security. Burundi is a country that has been 

suffering from food insecurity for a long time now. With this crisis, 

agricultural production is declining in the country. There are reports by humanitarian organizations that the people have more 

and more troubles in the countryside to find food. So I think the 

World Food Program is already making a contingency plan for that. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Nimuraba, you had mentioned that you 

would not advocate sanctions against the regime. Does that include 

travel sanctions against members of the regime or economic sanctions? What are you particularly warning against? 

Mr. NIMURABA. I say that because sanctions really do not have 

any impact, because people who are targeted rarely travel. That is 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

37 

first. And second, when you approach somebody with sanctions, you 

do not approach him. You kind of put a barrier between the person 

and yourself. Then people either from the opposition or from the 

government will be less likely to get involved in any kind of dialogue or conversation to find a common way, because once somebody is already targeted, he will try to protect himself. 

As you can see in the Burundian history, many people have been 

accused of many kinds of mass atrocities and killings and human 

rights violations who have been protecting themselves. Some of the 

problems that we are facing come from that aspect; people try to 

protect themselves. The more we put pressure on them and add 

more sanctions, the more they will strengthen their contentious 

tactics and keep more people around them to make sure they are 

strong and safe enough to resist any kind of invasion or attack 

from outside. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Dr. Siegle, I asked Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield about 

the tipping point between political struggle and pure ethnic conflict. When will we hit that tipping point? What are the warning 

signs we ought to look for? 

Dr. SIEGLE. Well, I think that is the tension that we are facing. 

And I think as Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield mentioned, 

one of the noteworthy observations about what has happened so far 

is the degree to which Burundian society has largely resisted going 

down that path. 

Senator FLAKE. It is always underlying. 

Dr. SIEGLE. Not only that, but I think the government has actively tried to play it up. But I think it is important from an external engagement standpoint to recognize that many people in the 

opposition, including CNARED, the political alliance that has been 

created out of Addis Ababa, they are mostly Hutu. These are people 

who were prominent within the CNDD–FDD. 

To the extent that the political opposition is seen as being multiethnic, it can help defuse the impulse to break down into those ethnic groupings. 

So I think the question will be to what extent do the region’s 

international actors appear that they are going to help be a part 

of this process, so that in the end people on the ground do not feel 

that they have to revert back into those categorizations. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. First, I want to thank Senator Flake for calling 

this hearing. I guess most Americans would have a hard time finding Burundi on the map, but what is happening there is of great 

concern. I think this hearing is extremely important, so that we 

understand that there are people at risk every day, and the numbers are growing. 

We put a great deal of confidence in the Arusha Accords because 

it dealt with some of the fundamental problems of the country— 

constitutional reform, protecting the rights of the minority, dealing 

with proper representation within the military, limitations on 

terms of the president. The international community felt that those 

provisions were the framework for long-term peace in the country. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

38 

There are lots of challenges, as you all point out. I understand 

the concern about sanctions. But there is also a concern that if 

there are no penalties that you just encourage that type of horrible 

conduct. 

We never want to jeopardize the delivery of humanitarian assistance. So we never look at those areas, but we do look at matters 

that can be empowering corruption to make sure that we do not encourage that. 

I guess my question is, I was very disturbed, Mr. Siegle, when 

you said that the president’s desire to run for a third term was in 

a way an attempt to undo the Arusha Accords. Of course, after 

that, he then instituted many repressive practices within the country, taking away the rights of many of the people of the region. 

Now if he is rewarded by the reconfiguration of the Arusha Accords, it seems to me that is not the way we move forward. 

So I am trying to figure out how we bring about peace for Burundi, protecting the integrity of what was behind the Arusha Accords, so at the end of the day, those who are responsible for the 

atrocities are not rewarded and there is some hope for long-term 

stability in the country. 

Try to give me a roadmap as to how you see us moving forward. 

What has happened has happened. I for one do not want to give 

up on the Arusha Accords. 

What are the most important immediate steps to be taken to end 

the risk factors for the population and to get us back into a framework where we can have a lasting peace in the country? Give me 

your priorities. What are the first two or three things we have to 

do? 

Dr. SIEGLE. I will start, and then I am sure my copanelists will 

want add in. 

I think what we want to be doing is both offering a roadmap as 

well as putting pressure on the government. I think it is clearly 

evident over the past—— 

Senator CARDIN. And the roadmap is not the Arusha Accords or 

it is? 

Dr. SIEGLE. Arusha is the framework. I think when I talk about 

roadmap, it is how to get back to Arusha. So Arusha is the goal. 

It is the framework. We have veered off of that, so how do you get 

back on to that? 

It is clear, with all the decisions that Mr. Nkurunziza and his allies have made over the last 9 months, that they are willing to take 

the country down the tubes in order to try to retain their hold on 

power, so they are only going to respond to strong pressure. 

Senator CARDIN. So what is that strong pressure? 

Dr. SIEGLE. I think there are several things. First is I think we 

do need to more actively support a move toward a transitional government that the current Burundian Government does not see as 

a focal point for the political dialogue in Burundi. We have seen in 

Burkina Faso, in Mali, in Guinea, that there needs to be a technocratic-based political government comprising all parties whose goal 

it will be to bring us back to a point of elections that will allow 

for a resumption—— 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

39 

Senator CARDIN. I follow that, but what pressure can the international community bring to bear to cause the government to move 

in that direction? 

Dr. SIEGLE. There are a couple of other things that I would put 

out there. 

One is a push for a peacekeeping force. We were talking about 

this in the earlier panel, a potential Chapter VII mandate for a 

peacekeeping force to go into Burundi. I think, again, if the regional international community demonstrates enough commitment, 

that force would not have to be a peace enforcement force. I think 

they could be sent in as peacekeepers to keep the sides away from 

each other. 

I think it is important to keep in mind that the conflict in Burundi right now is not a typical conflict of two organized armed factions. These are hit-and-run types of attacks, assassinations. 

So an early, strong international military presence can help provide a buffering influence. It will then also isolate the Burundian 

Government. 

I think the role of the ICC is important here, too. We already 

saw with the open letter sent by the ICC prosecutor indicating that 

actions taken in Burundi, the inflammatory language that was 

being used, would be highly scrutinized and be used as evidence in 

any subsequent ICC investigation. 

I think by making that clear, that there are going to be costs to 

be paid, it will be another way of exerting pressure. 

Mr. NIMURABA. Thank you. With respect to everybody’s analysis, 

I would like to say that I strongly disagree with this idea of having 

a transitional government, because if you see how the current government has been trying to work kind of work hard to keep the 

power of the country even when the situation was not easy, I do 

not think this idea of a transitional government would work; suggesting transitional government may bring back another civil war 

and this war may be worse than what we are seeing now. 

For me, a good approach is first started by us. What we do is to 

change the approach as I said not to issue a statement, but to go 

in a kind of nice way to request, ‘‘We really need A, B, C from you, 

the government.’’ 

Those kinds of requests that we bring to the government can include asking the government to integrate people from the opposition. We have many people in Rwanda and everywhere who are 

really strong leaders, if we can negotiate with them in a nice way. 

We are dealing with people who have been fighting for more than 

20 years, and many have post-traumatic stress disorder or something like that. We need to make sure we understand that. 

If we approach them in a nice way and then request them to do 

some kind of concessions, that will allow us not only to have those 

people fearing for their security to come back to Burundi and also 

to be integrated into the government. That would really reduce the 

tensions. That is one side. 

For the other side, I talked to people who are fighting. The major 

concern for them is to be able to survive economically. Along that 

line of effort, if we have some kind of economic incentive to bring 

them to work and to give them some kind of job that would motiFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

40 

vate them to abandon violence practices and contribute to peace, 

development and nation building. 

But if you see how hard the positions are, I do not think any 

transition will really work. Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Vircoulon? 

Mr. VIRCOULON. Senator, in terms of priority action, I think the 

dialogue, the international dialogue is very important and this dialogue must be an opportunity to discuss the Arusha agreement. I 

can elaborate on that later. 

Senator CARDIN. Dialogue for the purposes of modifying? 

Mr. VIRCOULON. Of making some adjustments and changes. I 

think the Arusha agreement, indeed, has been the stumbling block 

of peace and of the new regime. But I have been in conversations 

with the people from the ruling party over the past 5 years and 

they have always been very clear. Their view has always been very 

clear about the fact that this is now a 15-year-old peace agreement 

and the political situation has changed in the country. So they always wanted to make some adjustments. 

I think that sometimes conflict starts because a conversation 

does not happen. Actually, what I think has been missing in Burundi over the past 5 years is that conversation about the Arusha 

agreement. I think if we want to have lasting peace in Burundi, we 

have to facilitate this discussion and find middle ground between 

those who want to make changes and adjustments to the Arusha 

agreement and those who want to keep it. 

It is clear that there are some key principles in the Arusha 

agreement that must not be changed. I think that probably the 

most important provisions in the Arusha agreement are those that 

have not been implemented. I am thinking about the logistics provision of the Arusha agreement because the provisional—I mean, 

a lot of political leaders in Burundi now, and I think it is very important to know that, benefit from provisional amnesty and, therefore, the crimes of the civil war have never been addressed. 

I fully agree with the idea of a peacekeeping force and the planning for a peacekeeping force. MINUSCO, the largest peacekeeping 

force in the world, is just at the border of Burundi. Of course, the 

U.S. Government can help to identify those who are responsible for 

the violence and adopt some targeted sanctions. 

But I think there is leverage that is at this stage very important. 

It is the participation of the Burundian army to the mission in Somalia. I think this is a very important leverage, given the number 

of troops and given the financial support that Burundi gets for that 

mission. I think this leverage should also be used. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Thank you all very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Vircoulon, talking again about the regional 

aspect of this, is the United States playing a constructive role in 

making sure that this does not spill over any further in the region? 

If not, what more could we be doing? 

Mr. VIRCOULON. I think the United States has been quick to look 

at the situation in Burundi. Unfortunately, I think some of the 

statements that were made at the beginning of this year by the 

United States should have been made a bit earlier. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

41 

But now I think it is very important that the administration 

keeps talking to all the stakeholders in the region and I think 

keeps helping the African Union to be in charge of the mediation. 

There is clearly a diplomatic impasse at the moment between the 

African Union and the East African Community. As it was said, 

President Museveni is in charge of the mediation, but this mediation does not seem to go anywhere. But there is still a reluctance, 

actually, to transfer the mediation. 

I think the United States should advise and help with the transfer of that mediation from President Museveni to the African 

Union. As I said, I think it is better to have a collective mediation 

led by the African Union. 

But it is clear that, on the diplomatic side, the United States can 

help convince some stakeholders to transfer the mediation from 

President Museveni to the African Union. 

Senator FLAKE. Let me just drill down a little further, when you 

are talking about going back into the Arusha Accords and adjusting, it can be really only the 60/40 kind of split. Is that what you 

are talking about? Or the term limits on the president? What aspects of the Arusha Accords are most critical to adjust, in terms of 

the ruling party? Are those the two items that they are really concerned about? 

Mr. VIRCOULON. Well, I think they are very concerned about the 

fact that you have that 60/40 percentage rule, indeed, but also the 

50/50 percent rule in the security forces. We must remember that 

actually some counting has been done recently concerning the number of Hutu and Tutsis in the security services. It indicates maybe 

the warning signs you were referring to earlier about the ethnic dimension of that conflict. 

So it is a very important, I think, to address those issues and not 

just to push them aside and think that they must not be taken into 

consideration. It has been a very long-term claim by the CNDD– 

FDD rulers to review that agreement, and they tried to do it with 

a constitutional review in 2014 and did not manage to do it. 

So I think instead of them dismantling the accord, which is what 

they have started doing for many years—and we wrote a report in 

2012 that was titled ‘‘Bye-Bye Arusha?’’ to explain the process. So 

instead of having them dismantle the accord de facto and trying to 

impose a constitutional review next year, I think it would be much 

better to have a discussion to reach a consensus about what must 

be adjusted and changed in this agreement. 

Of course, this can only be decided by the Burundian stakeholders themselves. So I think the role of the international community should just be to facilitate this discussion. 

Senator FLAKE. Dr. Siegle, do you have any thoughts on that? 

Dr. SIEGLE. I do. First, I would reiterate that the commitment to 

Arusha was actually quite strong within the CNDD–FDD, and 

there were 130 senior officials within the party who wrote a petition to Nkurunziza in April requesting that he not seek a third 

term and that he respect the terms of the Arusha Accords. 

So when we talk about people wanting to break out of Arusha, 

it is not the entire party. It is the remnants of the CNDD–FDD. 

It is the hardliners that want this. We have to recall that even 

back into the early stages of the negotiation in the 2000s, there 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

42 

were members and entities within the CNDD–FDD that did not 

want to sign. They were late in signing. So there has always been 

resistance. That will continue to be there. 

But I think within Burundi society writ large, there is actually 

quite a lot of pride in the Arusha Accords. It has provided them 

a pathway for a multiethnic democratic society, and we see that 

within the political sphere. We see that within civil society. We see 

it within the military, which has made great progress in moving toward a multiethnic and professional force. 

So I think, by and large, the benchmark within Burundi society 

more generally is very supportive of Arusha, and they see this as 

a way to move past the ethnic politics of the past. 

I do think that there is concern when we talk about reopening 

Arusha. That is exactly what the government will want to do. It 

is, I think, a very clever negotiating tactic. ‘‘Let us have a national 

dialogue. Let us talk about things we need change.’’ And the real 

goal there is to water down these terms that have helped move the 

country forward. 

I would add to what Thierry mentioned. In addition to the justice 

sector, one of the major flaws, one of the things missing in Arusha, 

was the police, the intelligence services, the gendarmerie were not 

included, so they have remained politicized. Those are the mechanisms that the government has used to try to push forward its political agenda. 

Senator FLAKE. Yes, Thierry? 

Mr. VIRCOULON. Chairman, indeed, I can only agree with Dr. 

Siegal. The whole CNDD–FDD party was not against the Arusha 

agreement. I think the problem now is that most of the moderates 

have left the ruling party. Those who are in control of the party 

now are opposed to the Arusha agreement and its principles. 

I do not want any misinterpretations or misunderstandings 

about what I said previously. I think it is important to have the 

discussion about the Burundians, and the discussion about the 

Arusha agreement, that they did not have really before. I think, of 

course, it must be done in a consensual way. And the outcome of 

the discussion must be, of course, a consensus among all the stakeholders. 

I think the CNDD–FDD rulers have mentioned that they were 

not at the negotiation table when the accord was negotiated between 1996 and 2000. Therefore, that is very often the reason why 

they say they were not part of that negotiation and we do not like 

some of the provisions of the accords. 

So this must be taken into consideration, if we want to have a 

substantial dialogue about this crisis in Burundi. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Yes? 

Mr. NIMURABA. Thank you. I think there are some kinds of 

issues that we do not discuss but which are really more important, 

because when we try to deal with the current issue, we need to see 

where we are and the kind of forces we are facing. 

Coming back to the Arusha Accords, I think it is clear that I do 

not ignore the kind of manipulations that have taken place for the 

past year, but the issue was not of the Arusha Accords, but the interpretation of the Arusha Accords in terms of terms. If the opposiFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

43 

tion and the ruling party agree on several aspects of the Arusha 

Accords, the only issue was the interpretation. 

The problem started, when the constitutional court decided that 

President Nkurunnziza had the right to run for another term. The 

understanding of the Constitution remains the main issue. Now we 

need to see how to move forward with that aspect. Thank you. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

I appreciate the testimony that has been given. This will help us 

as we formulate policy and move forward and work with the State 

Department and the administration on U.S. policy toward Burundi 

and the region. So I appreciate it. 

For the purposes of members and their staff here, the record will 

remain open until the close of business on Friday, including for 

members to submit questions for the record. 

So as they submit these questions, if you could answer promptly, 

that would be appreciated. That will be part of the record. 

Senator FLAKE. With the thanks of the committee, the committee 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY

LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. Last week, U.S. Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Tom Perriello stated 

that Burundi ‘‘is facing a real possibility of civil war.’’ What concrete contingency 

plans have the region and the rest of the international community made to respond 

to the outbreak of conflict? 

Answer. The United States has encouraged the African Union to undertake contingency planning efforts, and we have been in contact with other likeminded partners concerning the need for a coordinated response in the event the crisis in Burundi devolves into a civil war. We are also encouraging the United Nations to work 

with the African Union on contingency planning. 

Question. On December 5, a New York Times article suggested that opposition 

members are stepping up attacks on the government to cast the government in a 

bad light, and pressure it to engage in dialogue. Have the international community’s 

diplomatic efforts provided a perverse incentive for violence from the opposition? 

Answer. We have consistently condemned all violence, whether committed by government or non-government actors, and called upon all stakeholders to commit without preconditions to participating in internationally-mediated talks. We remain convinced that an inclusive and internationally-mediated dialogue provides the best 

route for reaching a consensual and sustainable solution to this crisis. UN and AU 

statements have similarly condemned all parties whose actions have undermined 

the peace and stability of Burundi. The sanctions regimes imposed by the United 

States and European Union have named both government and opposition actors, all 

of whom have been involved in either government-sponsored violence against the civilian population and other human rights abuses, involvement in the coup attempt 

in May 2015, or involvement in supporting violent anti-government acts in Burundi 

since the coup. We will continue to work with our international partners to press 

all parties to refrain from violence, and to commit to serious engagement in the 

internationally mediated dialogue, the ultimate objective is which is to develop a 

consensus path forward to return Burundi to the path of stability and peace it was 

on before President Nkurunziza opted to pursue a third term in office contrary to 

the provisions of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement that ended the 

Burundian civil war. 

Question. The same New York Times report mentions claims by people on the 

ground that they are part of a resistance movement called the ‘‘Abajeune.’’ Are we 

aware of a youth wing of the armed opposition, and what does its existence portend 

as relates to the security situation on the ground? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

44 

Answer. There are multiple anti-Nkurunziza armed groups. The Abajeune developed as a general term for young people involved in demonstrations against the government; it is not, to our knowledge, the name of a specific armed group. The 

Abajeune are, however, primary targets for recruitment into the multiple antiNkurunziza armed groups. The most obvious armed group recruiting Abajeune is 

the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) headed by Alexis Sinduhije. 

Many members of the Abajeune are compensated by the anti-Nkurunziza opposition 

for their activities, a particular enticement as most were unemployed before being 

recruited by opposition groups and becoming involved in anti-government demonstrations. 

The ruling party, the CNDD-FDD, has a youth wing known as the Imbonerakure 

that also has been known to arm some of its members. To the extent that young 

men are readily persuaded to engage in violence, their recruitment by both the ruling party and by opposition groups will make it even more difficult to restore stability to Burundi. 

Question. The East African Community has designated Ugandan President Yoweri 

Museveni as the point man to end the current political crisis, but progress has been 

slow. The late Howard Wolpe, who served as Chair of the Africa subcommittee in 

the House, and who also served as Great Lakes Special Envoy, wrote in 2011 about 

previous regional efforts to bring about peace in Burundi, ‘‘With the benefit of 

hindsighta it appears that regional sponsorship of the Burundi peace process was 

not an unmitigated blessing. The belligerent parties saw several of the regional 

states as partisans of one side or the other and were therefore less inclined to trust 

the neutrality and professionalism of the regionally sponsored facilitation.’’ 

Is there mistrust of the Ugandans and/or Rwandans by Burundian actors? If not, 

why haven’t the talks commenced? What is the international plan to overcome objections of the parties to a dialogue? 

Burundi is reportedly due to take over as chair of the East African Commission 

at the next Heads of State summit and lead the organization for the next year. 

What is the EAC’s intention with regards to the rotation? What impact will it have 

on diplomatic efforts? 

Answer. We have conducted extensive outreach at the highest levels around the 

region, and inside Burundi, urging the immediate start of an internationally-mediated dialogue. The recent dramatic increase in the levels of violence have underscored the urgency in starting the dialogue, but distrust among the regional states 

remains a challenge to the success and legitimacy of the Ugandan-led dialogue. Special Envoy Perriello and the other members of the international Great Lakes Envoy 

team have offered to observe the dialogue, as the international community has done 

during previous peace processes. We continue to work closely with the AU and regional heads of state to ensure that the parties come to the table willing to engage 

in serious dialogue aimed at putting Burundi back on the path toward stability that 

the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement ushers in over a decade ago. Opposition members have now stated their readiness to come to the table without preconditions. We are working with the region to pressure President Nkurunziza to ensure high-level participation by the government throughout the process. 

Burundi is scheduled to take the chair of the East African Community (EAC) in 

2016. Tanzania is the current chair of the EAC. While civil society organizations in 

East Africa have called for Burundi not to assume the chair until it resolves its political and human rights crisis, the EAC has not taken any action concerning the 

chairmanship. Any decision concerning the chairmanship will be made at the next 

summit of the EAC heads of state, which will take place in early 2016. 

Question. On October 17, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council 

issued a communique which asked the AU Commission to ensure that Burundian 

‘‘members of the defense and security forces involved in human rights violations and 

other acts of violence do not take part in AU-led peace support operations.’’ Five 

thousand of the 20,000 troops in the AU mission in Somalia are Burundian. What 

is our contingency plan if we find—for whatever reason— the Burundian contingent 

must be pulled out of Somalia? 

Answer. AMISOM, the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, is organized and led by 

the AU. If AU member states decide to pull out the Burundian contingents in 

AMISOM, we would encourage other capable countries to fill in the gap. The AU 

leadership is seized with this issue. 

Question. The AU Commission deployed human rights monitors and military experts to Bujumbura to ‘‘monitor the human rights situation on the ground and report violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and to verify, 

in collaboration with the Government of Burundi and other concerned actors, the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

45 

process of disarming the militias and other armed groups, respectively.’’ The AU 

Peace and Security Council asked that the number of monitors and military expects 

be increased, and appealed for additional resources to support their mandate. 

What is the status of the agreement between the AU and the government of Burundi on deployment of human rights monitors and military observers? Are they 

able to fulfill their mandate both within and outside the capital? What will their 

mobility accomplish and how will this further regional aims? 

Have we made any contribution to support the deployment? What else are we 

doing to assist with efforts to put in place mechanisms for accountability? 

Are monitors collecting evidence and documenting abuses for possible prosecution? 

Answer. The human rights monitors and military observers are in Bujumbura, 

but there have been numerous delays by the Burundian government in permitting 

them to begin their work, including the government’s demand that a memorandum 

of understanding (MOU) be concluded with the AU. While the MOU remains unsigned, the AU informs us that the monitors are able to perform at least some of 

their mandated duties and have reported on the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Bujumbura and the surrounding areas. The security situation on 

the ground in Burundi also prevents the monitors from moving outside of the capital. 

In addition to the sanctions announced on November 23, we are prepared to consider additional sanctions in an effort to hold accountable those responsible for exacerbating the crisis and committing violations of human rights. We support the EU’s 

sanction regime and the African Union’s consideration of sanctions. 

Furthermore, USAID is currently providing funding to the Office of the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for its Burundi Country Office to 

allow them to fulfill their mission to monitor human rights. This is an additional 

mechanism to the work of the AU team. 

Question. We have spent at least $200 million training and equipping the Burundian military for deployment in AMISOM, MINUSCA, and for counterterrorism efforts. And yet we have spent no money to support democracy and governance activities in the past several years. 

Why haven’t we invested in democracy and governance programs in Burundi? 

To your knowledge, have we ever supported accountability efforts, grassroots reconciliation or democracy and governance programs in Burundi? What have such programs achieved? 

Answer. The U.S. government has supported and continues to support democracy, 

human rights and governance programs (DRG) across Burundi. USAID has a long 

history of supporting reconciliation programs responding to the aftermath of the 

civil war as well as other potential emerging drivers of conflict, including land disputes. USAID is also engaged in advancing respect for human rights and monitoring 

human rights violations throughout Burundi. The focus on the possibility of atrocities in the run up to the 2015 elections prompted an increase starting in 2013 in 

DRG and other resources for activities in Burundi. 

USAID funds programs to promote grassroots reconciliation, reduce the potential 

for conflict, and promote human rights. Through these, the United States supports 

conflict mitigation and resolution programs focused on youth and other potential 

conflict drivers. These programs aim to create a space for constructive dialogue between political and civil society leaders and encourage collaborative youth participation in problem-solving, community development, and reconciliation activities within 

their communities. 

USAID previously provided support to the Ministry of Good Governance through 

the Burundi Policy Reform program, providing technical and material assistance to 

the Ministry in the planning and launch of the government-wide accountability in 

public administration campaign. This program also worked with women leaders and 

provided technical assistance to the process of revising the land code. Accountability 

and transparency were strengthened through support for the development of a communication strategy to inform citizens, taxpayers, stakeholders, and employees of 

why the Burundi Revenue Authority was created; how it would perform its duties 

effectively; and, how it would solicit feedback from customers and response to their 

concerns. 

We have engaged many times with members of the government, civil society, and 

victims’ organizations to craft credible mechanisms and approaches to address Burundi’s legacy of mass atrocities, promote accountability, and engender reconciliation. True accountability often means shining a light in dark places and uncovering 

truths many would prefer to leave alone. However, we are also aware that if the 

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tice and to address the root causes of violence, there is a high risk of repeating the 

violations and abuses of the past. 

Question. On November 23, the President issued an Executive Order which imposed sanctions of four individuals who were deemed to have taken actions that, 

among other things, threaten the peace, security or stability of Burundi. 

What do we expect our sanctions to accomplish? 

Did we collaborate with the European Union, or the African Union on determining 

when to impose the sanctions, and upon whom we imposed them? Would such collective action have a significant impact? 

Answer. Executive Order 13712, signed by President Obama on November 23, is 

a signal that there are serious consequences for anyone, whether in the government 

or the opposition, who exacerbates the crisis by promoting violence. We will continue 

to assess the application of sanctions to other individuals, including anyone found 

to be providing support to individuals already listed. 

We supported the EU’s early use of sanctions, and are in regular contact with 

them about next steps to support a resolution of this conflict. We have commended 

the AU’s threat of sanctions and welcome the continued consideration of AU sanctions, which would have particular weight as they could restrict the ability of sanctioned individuals to travel within the region. 

Question. In recent months, there have been widespread reports of fragmentation 

and desertions within the military. There have also been concerns that Burundian 

soldiers deployed to the AMISOM mission in Somalia have gone for months without 

pay. Some analysts are concerned that the return of 5000 disgruntled soldiers from 

Somalia could lead to the further deterioration of the situation on the ground. 

Where are deserting soldiers going and what effect do we expect the desertion to 

have on the security situation? 

Are Burundian soldiers being consistently paid by the government? 

Answer. While the Burundian military is still one of the more professional institutions in the country, the ongoing crisis is reportedly affecting the morale of many 

soldiers, especially those currently deployed outside Burundi. There are also increasing reports of the ruling party (the National Council for the Defense of Democracy, 

Forces for the Defense of Democracy, or CNDD-FDD) using the relatively undisciplined and untrained Imbonerakure militia as part of the country’s deployed force 

to Somalia alongside police and military, which further impacts the morale of professional soldiers. We are seeing increasing reports of desertions and would expect 

this trend to continue, with some deserters possibly joining the armed insurgency, 

and others becoming either refugees in neighboring countries or internally displaced 

persons. Donors have cut considerable assistance to the Burundian government 

since the start of the crisis in April, and the rising conflict has sent the local economy into freefall. The Burundian government is running out of cash on hand, and 

it is uncertain how long it can continue to pay the salaries of not just its security 

forces, but other civil servants as well. To date, we have received conflicting reports 

regarding the payment of salaries to members of the military, an issue we are consistently tracking. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SIXTE VIGNY NIMURABA BY

SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. There has been more than one documented instance of ethnically-based 

mass killings in Burundi since independence. Hundreds of thousands have been 

murdered in systematic, deliberate attacks based on ethnicity going back over 40 

years. Article 8 of the 2000 Arusha Accords calls for a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be established. A draft law for the TRC’s establishment was 

not even submitted until 2011. 

What is the status of the Commission, and how has the delay affected reconciliation in Burundi? 

Answer. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was finally established on December 4, 2014. Its mission is to investigate and establish the truth about the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed during the period from the date of independence on July 1, 1962 until December 4, 

2008, the date marking the end of the period of belligerence. 

However, the Commission faces several problems. All of its members were appointed by the President and are from the ruling CNDD-FDD party. Opposition parties boycotted the entire process. The law establishing this Commission omitted the 

judicial provisions created by the Arusha Agreement and instead stressed forgiveness as a basis for its work. This undermined the goal of establishing responsibility 

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as a basis to root out impunity as required by the Arusha Accords. The law includes 

no provision for protection of witnesses but instead threatens them with punishment 

if they give false testimony. Furthermore, a 2004 law blocked dissemination of the 

final TRC report. The main effect of these weaknesses in the establishment of the 

TRC is to reinforce an attitude of impunity that remains deeply embedded in the 

culture of Burundian political leaders. 

Consistent with the political nature of the conflict in Burundi, the issue of intercommunal reconciliation is seen as less urgent as there is a general openness of 

Hutus and Tutsis to live together cooperatively. Even now, despite the attempts by 

hardline elements of the CNDD-FDD to stir up ethnic animosities, there is not an 

intrinsic hatred between groups. 

Question. Is the current political turmoil in part a result of this delay? 

Answer. Delays in establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have 

contributed to the current crisis—more by reinforcing the perception of impunity 

rather than by fostering a lack of reconciliation among ordinary Burundians, however. This Commission was established outside the framework created by the 

Arusha Agreement. Accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity was 

a major obstacle during the Arusha negotiations and the issue nearly led the talks 

to collapse. The principal parties to the Agreement, and later the Ceasefire Accords, 

including CNDD/FDD, had all been implicated in serious war crimes, including the 

crime of genocide. If the 2005 National Assembly elections had been held strictly 

within the provisions of the Arusha Agreement, all the prospective candidates, including Pierre Nkurunziza, would have been ineligible for office. The parties, therefore, reached a grand bargain to put aside reconciliation provisions and focus their 

energies on the power sharing protocols. Fearing the prospect of collapse, mediators 

relented but nevertheless included a separate provision establishing temporary immunity from prosecution during the transitional period. This immunity however became a defacto permanent amnesty after the transition. It has created a climate 

where leaders feel that they can get away with serious crimes and this contributes 

to the kind of human rights violations we have seen since the current crisis erupted 

in April 2015. 

Question. How could the international community better ensure that issues of accountability are not ignored as we implement peace agreements? 

Answer. It’s important to keep in mind the context in which these peace agreements are being implemented. Post-conflict environments are typically starting from 

a base of very weak accountability institutions and are subject to constant 

pushback—and setbacks. (An analysis of democratization transitions over the past 

two decades, for example, shows that more than half of these efforts experience at 

least one episode of backsliding). International actors must be prepared for this 

pushback and be willing to sustain their engagement over time in order to work 

through difficult periods. (Of those democratic transitions that have had setbacks, 

two-thirds resume a positive trajectory within three years). 

Experience from contexts where accountability structures have emerged from cultures of impunity highlight the importance of establishing multiple layers of accountability rather than relying on a single entity or focal point—which can be more 

easily circumvented or coopted. Central among these layers are the roles played by 

the media and civil society organizations. The impetus and persistence in the push 

for accountability reforms (often a decade or more long process) typically comes from 

these non-state organizations, particularly until state accountability structures can 

be created. International actors also have a priority role to play in developing accountability norms in these early stages. 

Ensuring space for civil society and media is protected, therefore, is a key priority 

reducing the likelihood that issues of accountability are ignored in peace agreements. Doing so protects the forums where such sensitive issues can be discussed 

publicly. Formalizing the role of civil society in fostering accountability in peace 

agreements can help validate and sustain such civil society engagement. Stipulating 

that civil society provides an annual assessment of progress on accountability processes is one mechanism for doing this. 

While counter-intuitive, international actors can enhance the implementation of 

accountability objectives of peace agreements by accepting the need to leave a heavier footprint. The responsibilities of external guarantors of peace agreements do not 

end with the signing of the agreement but must be sustained for the subsequent 

years until accountability mechanisms are institutionalized. External actors must 

also be more emboldened to call out spoilers to the implementation of these accountability measures. The tendency is for external partners to defer too quickly to state 

authorities without recognizing the very nascent levels of state formation often in 

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play. Linking funding support to continued progress in implementing accountability 

measures can provide further focus to these issues. Incentives for cooperation can 

also be created with commitments by external partners for increases in funding support when certain accountability thresholds are achieved. 

In the case of Burundi, the transitional power-sharing settlement reached by leaders who were themselves implicated in such crimes, was based on the minimum 

common objective that their ability to secure government office would guarantee 

temporary immunity. This is one of the weaknesses of the Arusha Accords. None 

of the leaders at the negotiating table was clean. They put their political differences 

aside to reach a mutual decision to loosen the Arusha Agreement’s accountability 

provisions. The mediators accepted this because the Agreement was faced with the 

serious risk of collapsing. This should be a key lesson going forward. If a genuine 

and inclusive peace process gets underway, the international community should insist on revisiting the issue of accountability as provided for by the Arusha Agreement. Reluctance to accept such accountability measures explains why the CNDDFDD is currently intent on establishing and driving its own internal peace process. 

Question. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1606 adopted in June 2005 

calls for the Secretary General to enter into negotiations for a ‘‘mixed Truth Commission and a Special Chamber within the court system of Burundi.’’ 

What is the status of the establishment of the Commission and the Special Chamber, and how has that impacted political events in Burundi? 

What steps have Burundians themselves undertaken to promote reconciliation 

and healing? 

Answer. There has not been progress in establishing the Special Chamber. It was 

meant to be a support structure embedded inside Burundi’s judicial system to provide the competence necessary to handle war crimes and crimes against humanity. 

These are always difficult issues requiring extremely good capabilities (forensics, anthropology, law, public affairs, research, etc.) It would most likely have been modelled after a similar Chamber that was established in the Uganda High Court. 

There was little political will to begin with in the Burundian government to establish a process that it could not control. Accountability for war crimes is an extremely 

sensitive issue in Burundi because it supports and discredits key political narratives. The hardline Hutu narrative, which is now being revived by the ruling 

party, stresses the genocide against Hutus in 1972, while the hardline Tutsi narrative, which has been dormant since 2005, stresses the genocide against Tutsis in 

1993. Neither narrative accepts its own responsibility for mass atrocities. 

The relationship between the Burundian government and the UN hit an all-time 

low in response to a leaked UN report in July 2014 alleging government recruitment 

of its youth militia, the Imbonerakure, in preparation for the 2015 elections. This 

culminated in the closure of the UN Mission in Burundi. These tensions with the 

UN shut down any prospect that the government would allow the establishment of 

the Special Chamber. Indeed, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission in December 2014 was heavily driven by a desire by the government 

to hold off international and UN involvement in establishing an accountability 

framework. 

In the absence of political will and leadership and an enabling environment, Burundians have relied on alternative mechanisms of reconciliation and survival. After 

the Arusha Accords were signed, a strong civil society, comprising hundreds of organizations, developed in Burundi. Private media also played a critical role. Before the 

May 2015 crackdown on independent media, Burundi was one of the most developed 

countries in the Great Lakes region from the perspective of independent media and 

the freedom of expression. This greatly facilitated public discussion on taboo subjects like ethnicity. 

Traditional restorative justice practices in which the bashingantahe, or community elders, guide mediation processes between parties in conflict were also commonly employed. These were seen as effective because they were rooted in the local 

culture and reconciled people at the village level in a relatively inexpensive manner. 

Efforts by non-governmental organizations (including initiatives led by the late 

Howard Wolpe, Search for Common Ground, and Catholic Relief Services) have also 

been effective. Training across almost 400 peace committees throughout Burundi 

has facilitated grassroots reconciliation. The peace committee approach has engendered willing participation from all social groups (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa communities). 

Indeed, the progress Burundian society has made over the past decade in establishing an inter-ethnic civil society is one of the reasons the current deterioration 

is so tragic. Notably, depth and cohesiveness of civil society is a key predictor for 

democratic resiliency and sustaining governance reforms. This holds out hope that 

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if Burundi can avert slipping back into open civil war, the process of recovery could 

rebound relatively quickly. Along those lines, Burundian women’s groups have been 

in Kampala this week advocating for accountability and reconciliation provisions to 

be incorporated into the mediation process. 

Æ 

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