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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED March 31, 2016

v No. 320559 Wayne Circuit Court REGINALD DESHAWN WALKER, LC No. 13-008885-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M ETER , P.J., and W ILDER and R ONAYNE KRAUSE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of po ssession with intent to deliver 50 grams or more, but less than 450 grams, of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)( iii ); possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)( iv ); possession with intent to deliv er the controlled substance hydr ocodone (Vicodin), MCL 333.7401(2)(b); possession with intent to deliver the controlle d substance alprazolam (Xanax), MCL 333.7401(2)(c); and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2 )(d). Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, t o 24 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the cocaine conviction, 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for th e heroin conviction, 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment for the hydrocodone conviction, 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the alprazolam conviction, and 176 days (time served) for the marij uana conviction. We affirm, but remand for the ministerial tas k of amending a clerical error in the judgment of sentence.

I. FACTS

This case arose from an incident in which police officers reco vered drugs from a house and from defendant’s pocket. Ta ylor Police Officers Ricky Barn osky and Daniel Toth arrived at the scene of the incident after receiving information regarding a crime that occurred at a Red Roof Inn. The two officers rece ived information regarding the location of a vehicle that was involved in the Red Roof Inn incident, and arrived in the area of Superior and Marvin in Taylor, Michigan. They saw a vehicle that matched the description of the vehicle involved in the incident parked outside of a house. The two officers called fo r backup, and additional police officers arrived at the scene. Officer Toth knocked on the doo r of the house, and the owner of the house, Johnny Nettleton, answered the door. He told the of ficers that they could come in and search the whole house because he had nothing to hide. As the officers attempted to enter the-2- house, the door was pushed closed from the inside. Officer Bar nosky and Taylor Police Officer Philip Collop saw that defendant was the person pushing the doo r closed.

The officers pushed their way into the house. Defendant was s tanding near the door of the house when the police officers entered it. There were mult iple people in the house. Taylor Police Officer Dominic Diggs-Taylor recovered a bag containing a variety of controlled substances near the stairs, whi ch were by the door that the off icers came through. Officer Collop detained and searched defendant. He found crack and powder coc aine on defendant. He also found $5,311 in small denominations on defendant during the sea rch. Taylor Police Detective Steven Schwein conducted a search of the home after obtaining asearch warrant. He found a prescription pill bottle with defendant’s name on it during the search. The prescription was for Metformin. The officers also found Metformin pills in the bag of drugs that they recovered from the home, but the pills had a different dosage and shape from the ones that were found in the prescription pill bottle.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it deni ed his motion to suppress because the police officers unlawfully entered Nettleton’s home , without valid consent. We disagree.

This Court reviews for clear e rror the trial court’s findings of fact during a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence under the theory that the police vi olated the defendant’s constitutional rights. People v Hill , 299 Mich App 402, 405; 829 NW2d 908 (2013). “However, matters regarding the application of facts to constitutional pr inciples, such as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, are reviewed de novo.” Id

. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protect s an individual from unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV. “ ‘Searc hes and seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonabl e per se, subject to several s pecifically established and welldelineated exceptions.’ ” People v Brown , 279 Mich App 116, 131; 755 NW2d 664 (2008) (citations omitted). Consent to the search constitutes an exce ption to the warrant requirement. Id . The consent must be “unequivocal, specific, and freely and i ntelligently given.” People v Galloway , 259 Mich App 634, 648; 675 NW2d 883 (2003). Whether the sear ch is valid depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id . Consent may be revoked. People v Frohriep , 247 Mich App 692, 703; 637 NW2d 562 (2001). “ The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendme nt is that of ‘objective’ reaso nableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange betwe en the officer and the suspect.” Id . (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Generally, that co nsent must come from the person whose property is being searched or from a third party who poss esses common auth ority over the property.” Brown , 279 Mich App at 131. There is common authority if the owner and third party have mutual use of the property and joint access or contr ol of the property for most
purposes. Id . “Further, a third party without actual authority to consent to a search may render a search valid if the police offi cer’s belief in the authority to consent was objectively reasonable.” Id . However, a third party may not g ive valid consent to a searc h if the property owner is present and objects. See id . at 131-132. A police officer does not need to locate the own er of the property when the owner is absen t in order to obtain consent to the search. See id . at 132.-3- The court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on January 17, 2014. The prosecutor conceded that standing was not an issue because defendant was alegitimate overnight guest and had standing to challenge the search. Officer Barnosky testifi ed that on August 21, 2013, he and Officer Toth went to the area of Superior and Marvin to find se veral people involved in an assault. Eventually, there were approximately seven or eight o fficers at the scene. The officers gathered in front of the porch of the house, and Officer Toth knocked on the door. Nettleton came out of the house and stated that he was the homeowner. He appeared relaxed. The officers asked Nettleton who was inside the house, and Nettleton replied that some friends were in the house. Officer Toth asked Nettlet on if the officers could come in and speak with them, and Nettleton replied that he had nothing to hide. Nettleton state d that the officers could search the entire house. None of the officers threatened Nettleton. Offi cer Toth went to walk into the house, but a man pushed the door closed. Nettleton did not say anything when the man pushed the door closed. The officers fo rced their way inside. Nobodytold the officers not to come in. Nettleton did not revoke his consent at any point. Instead, Of ficer Toth believed that he had permission to enter the house.

The officers went into the house and saw a man standing on the other side of the door and several other people in the living room of the house. The offi cers detained the people in the house and looked for weapons, and the officers again asked Nett leton for permission to search the house. Nettleton stated that the officers could search the house. He added, “I have nothing to hide. You can search the entire house.” The officers searc hed the house. Detective Schwein interviewed Nettleton after the incident. Nettleton told Detec tive Schwein that he was the homeowner, but that he did not give the officers permission to enter the house. However, Detective Schwein was not at the scene of the incident when the incident occurred, and over 12 hours passed between the incid ent and the interview.

Nettleton testified at the hear ing that the officers knocked o n the door during the incident, and he believed that it was one of his friends. Nettleton open ed the door and started to walk outside. He saw police officer s standing outside of his house on his driveway and by the tree line. Nettleton did not speak to the officers, and the officer s did not ask him any questions. According to Nettleton, three officers rushed at him, picked hi m up, and threw him through the front door. Nettleton did not tell the officers to come inside and that he had nothing to hide. Defendant attempted to shut the door when the officers were rus hing at Nettleton. Nettleton also attempted to shut the door. Nettleton was in the doorway when defendant attempted to close the door. Nettleton told Detective Schwein that he did not give th e officers permission to enter his house, but he gave Detective Schwein permission to enter his ho use during his questioning after the incident. According to Nettleton, he did not have drugs inhis house. The court denied the motion to suppress. The court noted that there were only minor discrepancies between the officers’ testimony, while Nettleto n’s testimony was not believ able. The court reasoned that both Officer Barnosky and Officer T oth testified that Nettletoncame out onto the porch and indicated that he did not have anything to hide.

The trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress because there was evidence presented at the hearing that Nettleton gave his c onsent for the officers to enter his house and search it. The prosecu tor conceded that defendant ha d standing to challenge the search as an overnight guest in the home. An overnight guest h as standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful ent ry into the home. See People v-4- Parker , 230 Mich App 337, 340; 584 NW2d 336 (1998). There was eviden ce presented at the hearing that defendant was an overnight guest in the house beca use the search took place overnight and defendant was a guest in the house during the search. Thus, defendant had standing to challenge the cons titutionality of the search. See id

. Nevertheless, the trial court did not err. According to Offic ers Barnosky and Toth, Nettleton gave his consent to the search; this triggered the co nsent exception to the warrant requirement. See Brown , 279 Mich App at 131. The evide nce indicated that the consent was freely and intelligently given, because Officers Barnosky and T oth testified that Officer Toth asked Nettleton if the officers could enter the house and the o fficers did not threaten Nettleton into giving his consent. Additi onally, the consent was unequiv ocal and specific because the officers testified that Nettleton stated that he had nothing to hide and that the officers could search the entire house. See Galloway , 259 Mich App at 648. Nettleton gave his consent to the search on two different occasions, including after defendant attempted to push the door closed, which further indicates that he une quivocally and specifically consented.

In addition, although defendant ’s act of closing the door sugg ested that he did not consent to the search, there is no indi cation that defendant possessed any common authority over the house so that he was able to revoke Nettleton’s consent. There was no indication that defendant lived at the house or spent any time at the house other than fo r the duration of the party. Nettleton did not revoke his consent to the search at any point in time. Thus, Nettleton gave his consent to the search, and defendant’s action in forcing the do or closed did not retract the consent because defendant, even if he had standing under Parker to raise the instant legal challenge, lacked authority to retract the consent to the searc h by the homeowner. See, generally, Brown , 279 Mich App at 131 (discussi ng common authority).

III. JUDICIAL BIAS

Defendant next argues that the trial judge exhibited bias whenthe judge made several statements allegedly indicating that the jury should reject the defense theory, stated that the defense theory was false, indicated that the bag of drugs was f ound at defendant’s feet, and told the jury that certain facts that were disputed were in fact est ablished. We agree that the trial court exhibited bias when he stated that the redirect examinati on of defendant left the jury with the false impression that defendant was only a drug user, but c onclude that the error did not seriously affect the fairness , integrity, or public reputation of the trial proceedings.

A defendant must raise a claim of judicial bias in the trial c ourt in order to preserve the issue for appellate review. People v Jackson , 292 Mich App 583, 597; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). Defendant failed to raise a claim of judicial bias in the trial court. Therefore, the issue is unpreserved. See id

. This Court reviews an unpreserve d claim of judicial bias for p lain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. Id . “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the e rror was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error a ffected substan tial rights.” People v Carines , 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). With regard to the last requirement, the defendant must show prejudice, meaning that the error affected the outcome in the trial court. Id . Finally, “[r]eversal-5- is warranted only when the plai n, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, i ntegrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Id . at 763-764 (citation and quotation marks omitted; second a lteration in original).

A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by “a ‘neutral and detached magistrate.’ ” Jackson , 292 Mich App at 597 (citation omitted). There is a heavy pre sumption that a trial judge was impartial. Id . at 598. “A judge’s conduct pierces this veil and violates th e constitutional guarantee of a fair trial when, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonably likely that the judge’s conduct improperly influenced the jury by crea ting the appearance of advocacy or partiality against a party.” See People v Stevens , 498 Mich 162, 171; 869 NW2d 233 (2015). A single act of misconduct may pierce the veil of judicial impa rtiality. See id . This Court considers a variety of factors in determining whether a trial j udge’s conduct pierced the veil of judicial impartiality,

including the nature of the j udicial conduct, the tone and deme anor of the trial judge, the scope of the judicial conduct in the context of the length and complexity of the trial and issues therein, the extent to whichthe judge’s conduct was directed at one side more than the other, and the presence of any curative instructions. [ Id . at 172.]

One form of judicial bias is biased commentary in front of the jury. Id . at 173. The tone and demeanor of the trial judge can suggest bias or prejudice, and a trial judge may exhibit bias without intending to do so. Id . at 174-175. The bias of the trial judge may be exhibited in the trial judge’s words. Id . at 175. Further, reversal is proper “ ‘when the trial judge’ s questions or comments were such as to place his great influence on one side or the other in relation to issues which our law leaves to jury verdict.’ ” Id . at 177 (citation omitted). In general, a trial judge’s comment that is hostile to or critical of a party is not suffic ient to pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. Jackson , 292 Mich App at 598. A trial judge’s rulings or opinions do not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality “ ‘unless there is a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism such that the exercise of fair judgment is impossible.’ ” Id . (citation omitted). A curative jury instruction weighs against a finding that th e trial judge was biased becaus e a jury is presumed to follow its instructions, but the trial court may overstep its role so thateven a jury instruction does not cure the error. Stevens , 498 Mich at 177-178.

Defendant argues that the trial judge pierced the veil of judi cial impartiality when he made several comments. Defendant argues that the trial judge e xhibited bias when he made the following statement in ruling on t he proposed admission of evid ence:
[ Defense Counsel ]: This evidence is going to show that Mr. Walker was in possession with intent only f or personal use of the drugs on his, on his person.

The Court : Well, people who sell drugs may also use them. They usually do actually as you know. And so that doesn’t rule out that he may have also been selling or distribu ting drugs. It’s not probative of anything.-6- Although this comment was critica l of the defense and the juror s may have interpreted the comment to mean that defendant sold drugs, the comment did not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality because the trial judge directed his comment at de fense counsel, rather than at defendant, and the comment provided an explanation of the judge ’s reasons for refusing to admit evidence, rather than an explana tion regarding why he believed that defendant was guilty. Therefore, the trial court’s com ment did not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. See Stevens
, 498 Mich at 171-172, and Jackson , 292 Mich App at 598.

Defendant also argues that the trial judge exhibited bias whenhe stated in the context of denying defendant’s request to present evidence that he was a d rug user, “Mr. Short, the man is charged with being in possessionof drugs with the intent to se ll or distribute. His use habits are not relevant to that charge. He’s acknowledged that he uses dr ugs. I, I don’t know how this is -- this, this would lead us anywhere fruitful,” and stated, “I mea n it also invites -- frankly, you know, opening that door, it invite s inquiry into how he support s his habit, too, doesn’t it. So let’s just leave it alone.” The trial judge’s statements did not pie rce the veil of judicial impartiality. The trial judge explained that h e refused defendant’s request t o admit evidence regarding his use of drugs because it would open the door to allow the prosecutio n to discover how he supported his drug addiction. The trial judge did not state that defenda nt sold drugs or possessed the drugs found on him with the intent to d eliver. Instead, the judge wa s merely pointing out that the prosecution could seek to discover how defendant was supporting his drug habit. Therefore, the trial judge did not exhibit bi as during the exchange. See Stevens , 498 Mich at 171-172, and Jackson , 292 Mich App at 598.

Defendant also argues that the t rial court exhibited bias and contributed to the ongoing bias during the trial when he sta ted during his final jury inst ructions:

It is within the range of your -- the -- within the parameters of your findings as a jury to, to either believe or disbelieve that the defendant had possession of the larger amount of cocaine, the cocaine that was found on the flo or by his, according to some of the testimony, near the defendant’s feet a nd add that to the cocaine that was found in his pocket.

The trial judge did not exhibit bias when he made the statemen t. Police adequately explained that the bag of drugs was found where defendant’s fee t had been during the initial entry into the house, rather than where defendant’s feet where when he was arrested. Thus, there was testimony that the bag of drugs was found where defendant’s feet were. To the extent that the trial judge misspoke when he stated that there was evidence that the bag of drugs was found “near the defendant’s feet,” rather than “near where the defend ant’s feet had been,” the misstatement did not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. See Stevens , 498 Mich at 171-172, and Jackson , 292 Mich App at 598.

Finally, defendant takes issue with the following statements o f the trial court in the presence of the jury regarding t he admission of defendant’s pri or convictions:

I used some very careful circumspection here in what I allowed [the prosecutor] to get into in terms of the defendant’s prior convi ctions for selling drugs. And I allowed her to get into only the 2004 -- ’08 conv iction in a case in-7- which Detective Schwein was involved for reasons that I stated on the record before the jury came out.

But the way you and your client conducted this redirect examin ationit leaves the jury with the false impression that he is only a user and that he has received treatment for his use problem . And there’s a sort of a vague implication there that that was successful. And, of course, that is a comp letely false impression as the jury will s oon learn because I’m gonna allow [the prosecutor] to get into the subsequent convictions.

The trial judge exhibited bias when he made the statements. T he trial judge essentially stated that the defense theory was false when he stated that th e redirect examination left the jury with the false impression that defendant was only a drug user and that he rec eived treatment for his addiction. The trial judge p ierced the veil of judicial im partiality because his statements were of a nature that could unduly influence the jury into believing that the defense theory was false. See Stevens
, 498 Mich at 171-172, and Jackson , 292 Mich App at 598.

Judicial bias is a structural error. People v Duncan , 462 Mich 47, 52; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). In People v Vaughn , 491 Mich 642, 666; 821 NW2d 288 (2012), the Michigan Supreme Court clarified that a plain structural error violates the thir d prong in the Carines analysis. However, the Court clarified that, to warrant reversal, the err or must have “ ‘resulted in the conviction of an actually innocen t defendant’ ” or seriously af fected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the trial proceedings. Id . (citation omitted). The issue is examined on a case-by-case basis and on the basis of the facts of each case. People v Cain , 498 Mich 108, 121; 869 NW2d 829 (2015).

Defendant does not argue that the bias resulted in his convict ion in spite of the fact that he was actually innocent. Therefo re, the issue is whether the bias seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the trial. See Vaughn , 491 Mich at 666. The court made the statements on only one occasion. Additionally, and very signif icantly, the court made the comments to defense counsel in the context of explaining its re asoning for allowing the prosecution to admit evidence of d efendant’s prior convictions. For these reasons, we conclude that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity , and public reputation of the proceedings and the error does not require reversal. See id. at 666-667.

IV. REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Defendant next argues that the t rial court abused its discreti on when it admitted evidence regarding his prior drug c onvictions. We disagree.

This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Wood , 307 Mich App 485, 500; 862 NW2d 7 (2014), vacated in part on other grounds ___ Mich ___; 871 NW2d 154 (2015). In addition, “[a]dmission of rebuttal evidence is within the sound disc retion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” People v Figgures , 451 Mich 390, 398; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). This Court reviews de novo any legal issues regarding the admissibility of the evidence. See Wood , 307 Mich App at 500.-8- The trial court has the duty to “evaluate the overall impressi on that might have been created by the defense proofs.” Figgures , 451 Mich at 398. The trial court’s discretion to determine whether to admit rebuttal evidence stems from its authority to determine whether evidence is substantially more prejudicial than it is probative

. Id . at 399. “Rebuttal evidence is admissible to ‘contradict, repel, explain or disprove evidence produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach the same.’ ” Id . (citations omitted). “The question whether rebuttal is proper depe nds on what proofs the defendant introduced and not on merely what the defendant testified about on cross-examination.” Id . The test to determine whether the prosecution properly presented rebuttal evidence is to examine “whether the evidence is properly responsive to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the defendant.” Id . This Court examines whether the rebuttal evidence “is justified by the evi dence it is offered to rebut.” People v Leo , 188 Mich App 417, 422; 470 NW2d 423 (1991). Rebuttal testimo ny may not be admitted as a response to a collateral issue. See People v Hernandez , 423 Mich 340, 352; 377 NW2d 729 (1985). A collateral issue is one that is “not materi al to the resolution of the case.” Id

. MRE 609(a) provides:

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi dence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall not be admitted unl ess the evidence has been elicited from the witness or established by public rec ord during crossexamination, and

(1) the crime contained an ele ment of dishonesty or false stat ement, or

(2) the crime contained an element of theft, and

(A) the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or death under the law under which the witness was convicted, and

(B) the court determines that the evidence has significant pro bative value on the issue of credibility and, i f the witness is the defendan t in a criminal trial, the court further determines that the probative value of the ev idence outweighs its prejudicial effect.

MRE 404(b)(1) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity the rewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mot ive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, k nowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, wh ether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or s ubsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.-9- MRE 404(b)(2) explains:

The prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable no tice in advance of trial, or during tria l if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial and the rationale, whether or no t mentioned in subparagraph (b) (1), for admitting the evidence. If necessary to a determination of the admissibi lity of the evidence under this rule, the defendant shall be required to state the t heory or theories of defense, limited only by the defe ndant’s privilege against self -incrimination.

MRE 403 provides, “Although releva nt, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outwei ghed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, o r needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

Before cross-examination of d efendant on January 29, 2014, the prosecutor argued that defendant opened the door to questioning re garding his prior co nvictions because he testified that he was a narcotics user and alleged that Detective Schwein was biased. The prosecutor explained that defendant was convicted on February 4, 2008, of a cocaine offense. Defendant was also convicted in August 2008 of delivery and manufacture o f Xanax and delivery and manufacture of marijuana. Finally , the prosecutor stated that defendant was convicted on September 21, 2010, of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a controlled substance.

The court noted that the prior convictions were inadmissible u nder MRE 404(b) because the prosecution did not provide prior notice of its intent to o ffer evidence under the rule. The court also stated that the prior convictions were inadmissible under MRE 609. The court explained, however, that Detectiv e Schwein’s testimony on cross -examination, that he told defendant that he did not like defendant’s lifestyle, opened th e door for the jury to learn of defendant’s prior drug offenses . He explained that the convict ions showed why Detective Schwein did not like defendant and that that the reason went be yond the fact that defendant refused to cooperate in an investigation. The court ruled that the testimony was necessary in order to complete the record. T he court explained that the pro bative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect because defendant open ed the door for admission of the prior convictions. The court limited the discussion of the pri or convictions during crossexamination to discussion of the February 4, 2008, case because this was the only prior investigation in which Detect ive Schwein was involved.

During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant wheth er he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine. Defendant testified that he pleaded guilty on February 4, 2008, to possession with intent to deliver cocaine. Defenda nt acknowledged that Detective Schwein arrested him in 2007 with regard to the case and that the case occurred at around the same time as a murder case for which defendant was a witness. During redirect examination, defendant testified that he underw ent drug addiction rehabilita tion therapy because of his February 4, 2008, conviction. The court ruled that defendant’s testimony during redirect examination opened the door for the prosecution to elicit testi mony regarding the other prior convictions by giving the jury the “false impression” that defe ndant was only a drug user. The-10- prosecutor, during recross-exam ination, then elicited testimony from defendant regarding his August 7, 2008, convictions for possession with intent to deliv er Xanax and possession with intent to deliver marijuana , as well as the September 21, 2010, drug conviction.

The prior convictions were notadmissible under MRE 609 or MRE 404(b). A prosecutor is required to provide notice of her intent to introduce eviden ce under MRE 404(b)(2) in order to admit evidence under the rule. See MRE 404(b)(2). The prosecu tor failed to provide notice of her intent to introduce evidence under MRE 404(b)(2). Further, the testimony was inadmissible under MRE 609 because the crimes did not involve an element of theft, dishonesty, or a false statement. See MRE 609(a).

However, the prior convictions were admissible as rebuttal evi dence. The main defense theories at trial were that defendant only possessed the drugs in his pocket, defendant intended to use the drugs in his pocket, rather than sell them, and the Tay lor Police Department was biased against defendant. The testimony regarding defendant’s Februar y 4, 2008, conviction was proper rebuttal evidence. Defenda nt testified during cross-exa mination that he has an unfriendly relationship with Detective Schwein because of a past incident in which he led Detective Schwein to believe that he was going to look for a friend who w as accused of a crime, but he failed to do so. Detective Schwein testified on cross-examinat ion that he told defendant during his interview with defendant in relation to the present case, “ [Y]ou f***** me over back in the day, but I’m past it,” “[W]hen you catch this felony, you’re fi nally going to get what you deserve,” “[Y]ou’re a cancer,” “ I don’t like your lifestyle,” “ [Y]ou put your a** on my plate and now you’re mine,” and “[P]art of me knew I was going to get pla yed and that’s exactly what happened.” He explained on redire ct that his “getting played” comment referred to a homicide case in which defendant was a witness.

We acknowledge that the testimony regarding defendant’s Februa ry 2008 conviction was somewhat prejudicial to defendant because there was a risk that the jury would believe that he had a propensity to commit drug offenses, and the court could h ave limited the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction by prohibiting the prosecution from rev ealing the specific conviction on cross-examination. See MRE 403. However, the testimony rebutt ed defendant’s contention that the police were biased against him by indicating that Detective Schwein was referring, in part, to defendant’s prior violations of the law during the interview an d when he made his “lifestyle” comment. See Figgures , 451 Mich at 399.

The admission of the other prior convictions also constituted proper rebuttal evidence. Defendant testified during redirect examination that he receive d treatment because of his February 4, 2008, conviction of possession with intent to deliv er cocaine. The testimony supported the defense theory that defendant was a drug user, ra ther than a drug seller, by indicating that defendant had to seek treatment because of his conviction. The prior convictions tended to rebut the testimony a nd theory. The prior conviction s were somewhat prejudicial because of the danger that the jury would find that defendant h ad a propensity to possess controlled substances with the int ent to deliver or was a bad p erson who deserved to be punished. See MRE 403. However, defendant opened the door to the rebutta l evidence when he testified that he attended the rehabilitation program because his testimo ny tended to indicate that he was only a drug user. See, generally, Figgures , 451 Mich at 398-399. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that the prior convictions could only be us ed to address defendant’s claim that-11- Detective Schwein was “piling on evidence” against him because Detective Schwein had a prior “beef” with defendant and to “answer the testimony that the def endant gave that he had been to drug rehabilitation after one of his offenses in 2008.” The co urt instructed the jury not to consider the convictions to show that defendant is a bad person or had the propensity to commit crimes that involve drug sales. The specific jury instructions cured the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions. See MRE 403; see also People v Mahone , 294 Mich App 208, 212; 816 NW2d 436 (2011) (noting that the jury instructions cured or cou ld have cured the evidentiary errors in the case). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the rebuttal evidence. See Figgures , 451 Mich at 398.

V. SUFFICIENCY O F THE EVIDENCE

Defendant argues in his Standard 4 brief on appeal that the tr ial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict with regard to the cha rge of possession with intent to deliver 50 grams or more, but less than 450 grams, of cocaine b ecause there was insufficient evidence to prove that there we re over 50 grams of cocaine invo lved in the crime. We disagree.

“In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution in or der to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of t he crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hartuniewicz , 294 Mich App 237, 242; 816 NW2d 442 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The evidence that is considered is the evidence that the prosecution presented before the motion was made. See People v Schultz , 246 Mich App 695, 702; 635 NW2d 491 (2001). This Court does not interfere with t he role of the trier of fact in weighing the evidence or determining the credibility of the witnesses. People v Eisen , 296 Mich App 326, 331; 820 NW2d 229 (2012).

There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to submit th e charge of possession with intent to deliver 50 grams or more, but less than 450 grams, of cocaine to the jury. “The elements of the charge of possession with intent to deliver coc aine, as applied to this case, are as follows: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled sub stance; (2) the defendant intended to deliver this substance to someone else; (3) the sub stance possessed was cocaine and the defendant knew it was cocaine; and (4) the substance was in a mixture that weighed” 50 grams or more but less than 450 grams. People v Crawford , 458 Mich 376, 389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998); see also MCL 333.7401(2)(a)( iii ).

Tiffany Staples, a Michigan State Police forensic scientist, e xplained at trial how she determined the weight of the cocaine in order to obtain an aggr egate amount. Staples initially received a bag from the Taylor Police Department containing sev eral smaller plastic bags containing off-white material, a nd she determined that the subs tance was cocaine. Staples weighed the contents of one of the bags of cocaine, and the sub stance weighed 0.21 grams. She explained that she did not weigh more of the cocaine during herinitial round of testing because she believed that it would weigh less than 50 grams.

Staples tested an additional substance, which was identified i n the test as cocaine and weighed 3.27 grams. Two more evidence bags were tested, and th e result was that the substances were cocaine. Stapl es explained that one of the evi dence bags contained 23 packages,-12- and Staples weighed and tested one of the packages. The cocaine in the package weighed 0.17 grams. Staples multiplied the weight of the one parcel of coca ine by 23 and approximated that the weight of all of the bags combined was 3.91 grams. She tes tified that all of the contents of the 23 bags were approximately the same size. The weight of an other package containing cocaine was 11.03 grams. Staples counted the bags of cocaine f rom her first round of testing in which one rock of cocaine weighed 0.21 grams and determined tha t there were 163 plastic bags containing a substance that was similar in size, shape, and col or to the cocaine she tested. Staples multiplied the weight of the cocaine that she tested inthe initial round of testing by the number of wraps and obtained an approximate weight of 34.23 gra ms. Staples added up the weight of all of the items ide ntified as cocaine, and the appro ximate weight was 52.44 grams.

This evidence was sufficient to submit the charge to the jury. The jurors were aware of how Staples arrived at the conclusion that the cocaine weighed approximately 52.44 grams. The jury could have found that each rock of cocaine weighed approxi mately the same amount and that the total amount of the cocaine was over 50 grams on the b asis of Staple’s testimony that one of the rocks weighed 0.21 grams and another weighed 0.17 gr ams, and it was the role of the jury to make this determination. See Eisen , 296 Mich App at 331, and Hartuniewicz , 294 Mich App at 242.

Defendant argues in his Standard 4 brief that the court erred because it did not combine Counts 1 and 2 in the felony information until after the court rendered its decision on the motion for a directed verdict. Defenda nt was originally charged in Co unt 1 of the information with possession with intent to deliver 50 grams or more, but less th an 450 grams, of cocaine and in Count 2 of the information withpossession with intent to deliv er less than 50 grams of cocaine. The trial court explained when it rendered its decision on the motion for a directed verdict that the issue was a close call. The court noted that Staples could have weighed each rock of cocaine individually to obtain a more accurate amount, but noted that t he jury was aware of how Staples determined that the cocaine weighed 52.44 grams. The court the n combined Counts 1 and 2 in the felony information during the jury instructions and instruc ted the jury that it could find defendant (1) not guilty, (2) guilty of possession with intent to deliver greater than 50 grams of cocaine, (3) guilty of possession wi th intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, or (4) guilty of possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine. Defendant’s ar gument appears to be that the prosecution initially charged him with two separate crimes for the cocaine found in the bag and the cocaine found in his pocket. However, the prosecutor expla ined that Count 2 was an alternative to Count 1 and that the two charges did not refer t o separate amounts of cocaine. Therefore, the trial court did not err in deciding the motion f or a directed verdict before it rearranged the charges in the felony information. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict. See Hartuniewicz , 294 Mich App at 242.

VI. AGGREGATION OF COCAINE

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief that the trial c ourt erred when it permitted the prosecution to aggregate the crack cocaine and powder cocai ne because the crack cocaine and powder cocaine constitute different prohibited substances. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo issu es of statutory interpretation. People v Mineau , 306 Mich App 325, 329; 855 NW2d 755 (2014). As stated above, “[t]h e elements of the charge of-13- possession with intent to deliver cocaine, as applied to this c ase, are as follows: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance; (2) the defendant i ntended to deliver this substance to someone else; (3) the substa nce possessed was cocaine and th e defendant knew it was cocaine; and (4) the substance was in a mixture that weighed” 50 grams or more but less than 450 grams. Crawford , 458 Mich at 389 (emphasis added). The statute corresponding with the crime of possession with intent to deliver 50 grams or more, but less th an 450 grams, of cocaine specifies that the controlled substance may be in “any mixture containing that substance.” See MCL 333.7401(2)(a)( iii ). MCL 333.7214(a)( iv ) provides that the following constitutes a controlled substance:

Coca leaves and any salt, compoun d, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent t o or identical with any of thes e substances, except that the substances do not include decocainized coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves which extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. T he substances include cocaine, its salts, stereoisomers, and salts of stereoi somers when the existence of the salts, stereoisomers, and salts of stereoisome rs is possible within the specific chemical designation.

The statute does not distinguis h between crack cocaine and powd er cocaine. See id

. The trial court did not err when it permitted the prosecution to aggregate the crack cocaine and powder cocaine to obtain a threshold amount. There was testimony presented at trial that the total weight of the powder and crack cocaine was appro ximately 52.44 grams. The prosecution was permitted to aggregate the amounts of the two f orms of cocaine in order to obtain the overall threshold amount. See MCL 333.7214(a)( iv ). Therefore, defendant’s argument fails. See id

.

VII. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

Defendant argues in his Standard 4 brief that the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to present a complete defense by barring admission of photo graphs showing that he lost weight while he was us ing drugs. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo the issue whether a defendant was d enied his right to present a complete defense. People v Unger , 278 Mich App 210, 247; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). In addition, as stated above, this Court reviews a trial court’s r uling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Wood , 307 Mich App at 500. This Court reviews de novo legal issues regarding the admissibility of the evidence. See id

. A criminal defendant has the right to present a defense. Unger , 278 Mich App at 250. However, the right to present evidence is not absolute, and the re are other legitimate interests that may override the right t o present certain evidence. See id . Rules that exclude evidence from criminal trials do not violate the defendant’s right to presenta defense unless the rules are “arbitrary,” or “disproportionate to the purposes they are desi gned to serve.” Id . (citations and quotation marks omitted). MRE 402 provides, “All relevant evid ence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, th e Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Co urt. Evidence which is not-14- relevant is not admissible.” MRE 401 defines the term “relevan t evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse quence to the determination of the action more probable or less proba ble than it would be without the evidence.” See also People v Benton , 294 Mich App 191, 198; 817 NW2d 599 (2011). “ ‘Relevance inv olves two elements, materiality and probative value. Materiality refers to whether the fact was truly at issue.’ ” Id . at 199 (citation omitted).

Defendant testified at trial that he is a drug user and uses p owder and crack cocaine. There was evidence presented at trial that defendant’s weight f luctuates. Defendant testified that he weighed 386 pounds in January 2013. Defendant testified tha t he weighed approximately 340 pounds at the time of trial. Incontrast, he weighed 275 pound s at the time of his arrest. Defense counsel sought to admit photographs from January 2013 and April 2013, which he argued showed defendant’s progressive weight loss since he started usi ng drugs. Defense counsel argued that the photographs were relevant to show that defendan t possessed the drugs at issue in order to use them, rather tha n sell them. The trial court refu sed to admit the photographs.

The trial court did not err when it refused to allow defendant to admit the photographs because defendant failed to establish that the photographs were relevant. The fact at issue was whether defendant possessed the drugs in order to deliver them because defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver. See Benton , 294 Mich App at 199. However, the photographs showing the effects of defendant’s drug use did not tend to make less probable the alleged fact that he possessed the particular drugs at issue in order to deliver them. Contrary to defendant’s assertion in his Standard 4 brief, the photographs did not show anything regarding defendant’s mental capacity to sell drugs. Instead, the photog raphs merely “reiterated” defendant’s own assertions that he is a drug user. The trial c ourt did not err in refusing to admit the photographs because defendant fails to show that the photog raphs were relevant. See MRE 401 and Benton , 294 Mich App at 198-199. Defendant does not otherwise argue that the relevancy rules are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpos es they are designed to serve. See Unger , 278 Mich App at 250. Accordingly, defendant’s argument fails . See id

. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it state d, “Mr. Short, the man is charged with being in possessionof drugs with the intent to se ll or distribute. His use habits are not relevant to that charge. He’s acknowledged that he uses dr ugs. I, I don’t know how this is -- this, this would lead us anywhere fruitful.” Defendant argues that the trial court’s statements amounted to a directed verdict of guilt and impermissibly shift ed the burden of proof onto him because the court foreclosed the defense that he possessed the drugs for his own use. However, the court noted that defendant’s particular use habits were not relevant to whether he possessed the drugs at issue in the case with the intent to deliver them. The court’s statements did not amount to a directed verdict of guilty on any of the charges an d did not shift the burden of proof onto defendant regarding the issu e of intent because the jury w as permitted to find that defendant possessed the drugs for his own pe rsonal use. Defendant’s argu ment fails.

VIII. REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Defendant next argues in his Sta ndard 4 brief that the trial c ourt abused its discretion when it refused to allow defense counsel to question defendant regarding his prior criminal-15- history after the prosecutor que stioned defendant regarding his prior criminal history. We disagree.

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on an evidentiary issue for an abuse of discretion. People v Danto , 294 Mich App 596, 598-599; 822 NW2d 600 (2011). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its de cision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” Id

. “[D]ecisions regarding the order and mode of presentation of e vidence are within the discretion of the trial court.” People v Stevens , 230 Mich App 502, 507; 584 NW2d 369 (1998). MRE 611(a) provides, “The court shall exercise reasonable contr ol over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) ma ke the interrogation and presentation effective for the as certainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassmen t.” MRE 611(c) provides, “A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any iss ue in the case, including credibility. The judge may limit cross-examination with respec t to matters not testified to on direct examination.”

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused t o allow defense counsel to conduct another redirect examination regarding defendant’s prio r convictions. Defense counsel requested permission to conduct a second redirect examination o f defendant after the prosecution cross-examined defendant regarding his prior convictions. The trial court refused to allow defense counsel to question defendant again and explained that defense counsel had already covered the issues. The trial court had the discretion to refu se to allow defense counsel to conduct another redirect examination. See Stevens , 230 Mich App at 507. The redirect examination likely would have amounted to needless consumption of time. See MRE 611(a). As the court explained, defense counsel already had the opportu nity to conduct a redirect examination, and the jury already heard testimony on the issue of defendant’s prior convictions. The trial court instructed the jury that it was to consider def endant’s prior convictions for limited purposes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow defense counsel to conduct another redirect examination of defendant. Id

.

IX. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief that the trial c ourt denied him of his right to a properly instructed jury when it failed to instruct the jury regarding unlawful use of a controlled substance. We disagree.

A defendant must object in the trial court to the omission of a jury instruction in order to preserve an instructional error for appellate review. See People v Cain , 238 Mich App 95, 127; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). Defendant did not object to the trial cour t’s failure to read the jury instruction regarding unlawful use of a controlled substance, and he did not request that the court read the instruction. Therefore , the issue is unpreserved. Se e id

. “ ‘Claims of instructional error are generally reviewed de nov o by this Court, but the trial court’s determination that a jury instruction is applicable to the facts of the case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.’ ” People v Henderson , 306 Mich App 1, 3; 854 NW2d 234 (2014) (citation omitted). “With regard to unpreserved claims of inst ructional error, this Court reviews-16- such claims for plain error that affected substantial rights.” People v Aldrich , 246 Mich App 101, 124-125; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).

“A criminal defendant has the right to have a properly instruc ted jury consider the evidence against him.” Wood , 307 Mich App at 519 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The trial court must properly in struct the jury on the applicab le law. Henderson , 306 Mich App at 4. “The jury instructions must include all elements of the charged offenses, and must not omit material issues, defenses, or the ories that the evidence supports.” Wood , 307 Mich App at 519. This Court examines the jury instructions as a whole to determi ne whether there was an error. Id . “Even when somewhat imperfect, jury instructions do not qual ify as erroneous provided that they fairly present to the jury the issues to be tried and suff iciently protect the defendant’s rights.” Id

. The trial court did not deny defendant of his right to a prope rly instructed jury. M Crim JI 12.6 provides:

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of illega lly using a controlled substance, ____________________________________. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defe ndant used a controlled subst ance.
(3) Second, that the s ubstance used was _____________
______________. (4) Third, that at the time [he / she] used it, the d efendant knew the substance was ____________________________________.

[(5) Fourth, that the substance was not obtained by a valid prescription given to the defendant.]

[(6) Fifth, that the defenda nt was not otherwise authoriz ed by law to use this substance.]

M Crim JI 12.6 applies when the d efendant is charged with ille gally using a controlled substance. The prosecution did not charge defendant with the unlawful use of a controlled substance. In addition, there wa s no evidence presented at tri al that defendant used the drugs that were found in his pocket and in the bag of drugs. Instead, the officers testified that the drugs were found in defendant’s pockets and in a bag of drugs on the floor. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it failed to read M Crim JI 12.6 to the jury b ecause the jury instruction was inapplicable to this case. See M Crim JI 12.6, Wood , 307 Mich App at 519, and Henderson , 306 Mich App at 4.

Further, even assuming that the trial court erred when it fail ed to instruct the jury regarding unlawful use of a controlled substance, the error was not outcome-determinative. As stated above, there was no eviden ce presented at trial that def endant actually used the cocaine that was found in his pocket or the controlled substances that were found in the bag of drugs on the floor. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court did e rr, defendant fails t o show prejudice-17- because the jury could not ha ve found defendant guilty of unlaw ful use of a contro lled substance. See M Crim JI 12.6 and Carines , 460 Mich at 763.

X. CONFRONTATION AND FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief on appeal that the trial court denied him of his right to confront the witnesses against him and a fair tria l when it refused to adjourn the trial until a witness was available to testify. We disagree.

A defendant preserves the issue of whether he was denied his r ight of confrontation by objecting in the trial court. See People v Chambers , 277 Mich App 1, 10; 742 NW2d 610 (2007). Defendant did not object in the trial court that there was a violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him. Therefore, the issue is un preserved. See id . Similarly, the issue of whether a defendant was denied his right to a fair tri al must be raised in the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review. See People v Malone , 193 Mich App 366, 371; 483 NW2d 470 (1992), aff’d 445 Mich 369 (1994). D efendant failed t o preserve the issue of whether the trial court denied him of his right to a fair trial by fail ing to raise the issue in the trial court. See id

. This Court reviews the unpreserve d Confrontation Clause issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. See Carines , 460 Mich at 763-764, and People v Henry (After Remand) , 305 Mich App 127, 152; 854 NW2d 114 (2014).

The United States and Michigan Constitutions grant a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him and the right to a fair tria l. See US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. “ ‘As a rule, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prio r opportunity to confront that wi tness.’ ” Henry (After Remand)
, 305 Mich App at 153 (citation omitted). A statement is testimo nial if the primary purpose of the statement is to establish or prove “past events potentially rel evant to later criminal prosecution.” Id . (citations and quotation marks omitted). A witness is a pers on who bears testimony against the defendant. Id

. Defendant abandons his argument regarding whether the trial co urt denied him of his right to a fair trial. “An appe llant may not merely announce h is position and leave it to this Court to discover a nd rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authorit y.” People v Schumacher , 276 Mich App 165, 178; 740 NW2d 534 (2007) (citations and quotation mark s omitted; alteration in original). Defendant states that the trial court denied him of his right to a fair trial, but he only presents an argument regarding whether the trial court denied h im of his right to confront the witnesses against him. Defendant’s claim is essentially a Conf rontation Clause claim. Therefore, to the extent that defendant raises a claim that he was denied his right to a fair trial, the claim is abandoned. See id

. Further, the trial court did not violate defendant’s Confronta tion Clause rights when it refused to adjourn the trial until Holly Ehrlich, the victim of the assault that occurred at the Red Roof Inn, was available to testify because Ehrlich did not make a testimonial, out-of-court-18- statement that was admitted at trial. The trial court prohibit ed the police officers from testifying at trial regarding Ehrlich’s statements to the police. The tri al court directed the officers to testify that there was another crime th at occurred at the Red Roof Inn that prompted the officers to go to the area of the incident. Offi cers Barnosky and Toth testified that there was an investigation at the Red Roof Inn. The officers ex plained that they arrived at the scene of the incident through following the lead that they obt ained during thei r investigatio n at the Red Roof Inn. Officer Barnosky added that the officers obtained information regarding a vehicle that was involved in the incident. The officers did not testify regarding what Ehrl ich told them about defendant. Therefore, the trial court did not deny defendant his right to confront the witnesses against him because there was no out-of-court testimonial statement against defendant. See Henry (After Remand) , 305 Mich App at 153.

XI. TRIAL ADJOURNMENT

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief on appeal that the trial court erred when it refused to grant his motion for a n adjournment. We disagree.

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision on a motion to adjourn. See People v Steele , 283 Mich App 472, 484; 769 NW2d 256 (2009). For a trial cour t to grant a motion for adjournment, the defendant must show good cause and the exercise of diligence. People v Coy , 258 Mich App 1, 18; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). The factors for determining whether there is “good cause” for the court to gran t an adjournment include “ ‘whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) h ad a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested previo us adjournments.’ ” Id . (citation omitted). In addition, the defendant must show that he was pre judiced because of the trial court’s abuse of discretion. Id . at 18-19. MCR 2.503(B) provides:

(1) Unless the court allows otherwise, a request for an adjour nment must be by motion or stipulation made in writing or orally in open c ourt based on good

cause.
(2) A motion or stipulation f or adjournment must state

(a) which party is reque sting the adjournment,

(b) the reason for it, and

(c) whether other adjournments have been granted in the procee ding and, if so, the number granted.

(3) The entitlement of a motion or stipulation for adjournment must specify whether it is the first or a later request, e.g., “Plai ntiff’s Request for Third Adjournment”.

The trial court explained that it would not adjourn the trial until Ehrlich became available because Ehrlich was not at the scene of the incident. Instead, Ehrlich made the initial emergency call from the Red Roof Inn that prompted the police to go to th e scene of the incident. Defendant argues that Ehrlich would have testified that she never gave th e police defendant’s name or told-19- them that he was at the scene. Defendant also argues that Ehrl ich’s testimony would have established that the police officers falsified their reports an d affidavits because of their bias against him. However, there is no indication that Ehrlich’s te stimony would have been relevant to whether defendant committed the charged crimes. As discusse d above, the officers testified that they received information through an investigation at the Red Roof Inn that led them to the scene of the incident. The offi cers did not specifically refer to Ehrlich or her statements regarding defendant. Further, th e officers did not testify reg arding the probable cause to search and arrest defendant, and the o fficers arrested all of the peop le in the house. Thus, Ehrlich’s proposed testimony did not make a material fact more or less pr obable than it would have been without her testimony. See MRE 401. Additionally, defendant d id not otherwise argue in the trial court that the failure to adjourn the trial would deny hi m of any constitutional right. Thus, there was not good cause to adjourn the trial. See Coy , 258 Mich App at 18. Defendant also cannot show that he was prejudiced by the failure to adjourn th e trial because Ehrlich’s testimony would not have aided th e defense in showing that the police were biased against defendant. See id . at 18-19. Therefore, defendant’s argument fails.

XII. SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL

Defendant next argues in his Sta ndard 4 brief that the trial c ourt abused its discretion when it denied his request to obtain substitute counsel. We di sagree.

This Court reviews a trial cour t’s decision regarding substitu tion of counsel for an abuse of discretion. People v Strickland , 293 Mich App 393, 397; 810 NW2d 660 (2011). “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.’ ” Id . (citation omitted).

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarante es a defendant the right to counsel. US Const, Am XI; People v Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich App 50, 67; 825 NW2d 361 (2012). “However, [a] defendant ‘is not entitled to have t he attorney of his choice appointed simply by requesting that the a ttorney originally appointed be replaced.’ ” Id . (citation omitted). The trial court appoints substitu te counsel only when there is a showing of good cause and when substitution of counsel will not unreasonably disrupt the proce ss in the trial court. Strickland
, 293 Mich App at 397. “ ‘When a defendant asserts that the defe ndant’s assigned attorney is not adequate or diligent, or is disinterested, the trial court shou ld hear the defendant’s claim and, if there is a factual dispute, take testimony and state its findin gs and conclusion on the record.’ ” Id . (citation omitted). “Good cause exists where a legitimate di fference of opinion develops between a defendant and his appointed counsel with regard to a fundamental trial tactic.” Id

. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Whether good cause ex ists depends on the facts of each

case. Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich App at 67. In Strickland , 293 Mich App at 397, this Court held that the fact that the tria l court received a copy of a gr ievance that the defendant filed against his attorney and allowed the defendant to “ ‘say whatev er he wants to say’ ” on the record made the court aware of the defendant’s complaints regar ding his attorney. Strickland
, 293 Mich App at 397.

This situation is unusual because defendant retained defense c ounsel, but requested that the trial court appoint substitute counsel. During the proceeding on January 23, 2014, defendant requested that the trial court appoint substitute counsel, and he did not request that the court-20- permit him to retain another attorney. Thus, the matter was wi thin the discretion of the trial court. See People v Arquette , 202 Mich App 227, 231; 507 NW2d 824 (1993) (“[a]lthough substitution of appointed counsel is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, a defendant must be afforded a reasonable time to select his own retained counsel”) (citation omitted).

In addition, the court did not err when it denied defendant’s request to appoint substitute counsel because defendant failed to show good cause to appoint substitute counsel. The following conversation took place between defendant and the tri al court:

Defendant Walker : Sir, I have -- I would like to present questions to the jury myself.

The Court : No.

Defendant Walker : I won’t be able to ask questions?

The Court : You want to represent yourself in this case?

Defendant Walker : No. I would like dismissal of counsel, yes, sir, and I would like to be appointed an effective counsel.

The Court : Well, Mr. Short is a very capable attorney. He has appeared in front of me any number of times. And to come in here on the day of trial, the day where we are supposed to select a jury and to say oh, all o f a sudden you want a new attorney, is a stall t actic, and we are not going to have that, Mr. Walker.

Defendant explained that he requested substitute counsel becaus e defense counsel disclosed information regarding defendant’s parole to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor mentioned the information during a motion hearing. Defendant stated that the fact that the prosecutor knew about the information indicated that defense counsel told her. The trial court stated that the information was revealed during the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The prosecutor stated that the officer-in-charge on the case, rathe r than defense counsel, told her the information regarding defendant’s parole. Defendant pointed ou t that he retained his attorney and that his request was not a s tall tactic. However, defendan t was not ready to go forward with a new attorney on the day of the proceeding.

The trial court adequately inquired into the issue. The trial court allowed defendant to present an argument with regard to why he was requesting substi tute counsel. The trial court did not need to ask defense counsel any questions in order to under stand defendant’s claim because the prosecutor stated that she obtained the information from th e officer-in-charge, rather than from defense counsel. See, generally, Strickland , 293 Mich App at 397.

Additionally, defendant did not e stablish good cause for the t rial court to appoint substitute counsel. Defendant’s first reason for the request w as that he believed defense counsel gave the prosecutor information that defendant told defense cou nsel. However, the prosecutor explained that she learned the information from the officer-in- charge, rather than from defense counsel. Defendant also points out on appeal that defense coun sel failed to present two-21- necessary witnesses for the defense. However, defendant did no t argue this point in the trial court. Instead, defendant merel y pointed out that one of his w itnesses was unavailable to testify at trial. He did not argue, in the context of his motion and a t the time the trial court needed to decide the motion, that defense counsel failed to call her as a witness at trial. In fact, defendant requested substitute counsel before the start of trial, and def ense counsel had not had the chance to present witnesses before defendant made his request. Theref ore, defendant failed to establish good cause to appoint substitute counsel.

In addition, the trial court di d not abuse its discretion when it decided that the appointment of substitute couns el would unreasonably disrupt th e judicial process. The court noted that defendant was requesting a new attorney on the day s cheduled for trial. Defendant agreed that he was not ready to proceed in the case with a diff erent retained attorney. Instead, he requested that the trial court appoint him a new attorney. The court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that appointment of substitute counsel would unreasonably disrupt the judicial process because the trial would have to have been post poned in order to appoint substitute counsel and for counsel to become familiar with the case, and defendant was dilatory in making his request. See id . at 399 (appointment of substitute counsel would have unreasonably delayed the judicial process when the defendant wa ited until the day of trial to make his request). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See id

.

XIII. BINDOVER

Defendant next argues in his St andard 4 brief that the distric t court imprope rly bound him over for trial because the information used to connect the drug s found in the house to defendant was false and the prosecution knew that it was false. We disag ree.
“ ‘A circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to qua sh charges is reviewed de novo to determine if the district court abused its discretion i n binding over a defendant for trial.’ ” People v Bennett , 290 Mich App 465, 479; 802 NW2d 627 (2010) (citation omitted)

. A district court determines during a preliminary examination w hether a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. People v Redden , 290 Mich App 65, 83; 799 NW2d 184 (2010). “Probable cause is established by evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence a nd caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.” Id . at 83-84 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “In order to establish that a crime has been committ ed, the prosecution need not prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, but must present some e vidence of each element.” Id

. at 84. The defendant may be bound over for trial even if there is conflicting evidence or evidence that raises a reasonabl e doubt regarding the defendant ’s guilt. Id

. Defendant’s argument is that the testimony presented at the pr eliminary examination regarding the Metformin pills di ffered from the testimony prese nted at trial. During the preliminary examination, Officer Toth testified that he found s even “Meterman” pills in the bag of drugs. Detective Schwein te stified that he found a pill bot tle with defendant’s name on it in the kitchen of the house and identified the pills as Metformin. Detective Schwein testified that the pills in the bottle were the same as the seven pills found in the bag. He explained that the pills in the bag and the pills i n the prescription bottle were both blue and had the same imprint on-22- them. At trial, Detective Schwein testified that the pills fou nd in the prescription bottle were a different dosage and different shape from the ones found in the bag of drugs. Although the preliminary examination testimony regarding the Metformin pills differed slightly from the trial testimony regarding the Metformin pills, there was no conflicti ng testimony at the preliminary examination regarding the Metformin pills. Even if there were conflicting testimony regarding the Metformin pills, the district court properly bound defendan t over for trial because a district court may bind a defendant over for trial even if there is conf licting testimony. See id . at 84. Therefore, the district court di d not err in binding defendant over for trial. See id . In addition, there is no evidence that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence, as defendant argues in connection with this issue.

Further, there was sufficient testimony presented at the preli minary examination to provide probable cause that defendant possessed the bag of drug s even without the testimony regarding the Metformin pills. P ossession can be either actual or constructive. People v Williams , 268 Mich App 416, 421; 7 07 NW2d 624 (2005). “Constructive po ssession exists if the defendant knew that the substance was present and had the rightto exercise control over it.” Id

. In other words, there is constructive possession if “ ‘the tota lity of the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between the def endant and the contraband.’ ” Id . (citation omitted). More than one person may jointly control a controlled substance. Id

. At the preliminary examination, Officer Barnosky testified tha t the officers arrived at the scene and encountered Nettleton, who gave them permission to en ter the house. Defendant was standing to the right of the door and right next to the door wh en the officers entered the house. There were six or seven other people in the home when the offic ers entered it. Officer DiggsTaylor encountered two people sitting on the couch, one person standing in the back of the front room toward the kitchen, and one person upstairs. Officer Digg s-Taylor saw a bag of narcotics on the ground near the foot of th e stairs when he entered the h ome. The bag was a few feet away from the door. The bag of drugs was right behind the door, and defendant was by the bag of drugs. Defendant was the only person who was standing by the s ide of the door where the bag was found. Officer Diggs-Taylor retrieved the bag of drugs and took it to his patrol car. This testimony provided probable cause that defendant possessed the bag of drugs because defendant was standing right next to the bag of drugs, and no one else wa s standing near the door where the bag of drugs was found. See id . Accordingly, the district court did not err in binding over defendant for trial. See id

.

XIV. IMPROPER WITHHOLDING OF EVIDENCE

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief on appeal that the prosecutor knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence th at would have proven that defen dant was innocent when it withheld the records of the Metformin pills. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo whether a defendant received due pr ocess. People v Odom
, 276 Mich App 407, 421; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). “For a due process violation to result in reversal of a criminal convicti on, a defendant must prove preju dice to his or her defense.” Id . at 421-422.-23- “ ‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to g uilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ ” People v Chenault , 495 Mich 142, 149; 845 NW2d 731 (2014), quoting Brady v Maryland , 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). The government is responsible for the evidence that ithas control over, even if the prosecution is not aware of the evidence. Chenault , 495 Mich at 150. The test to determine whether a Brady violation occurred is as follows : “ ‘The evidence at issue mus t be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvert ently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” Id . at 149-150 (citation omitted). In other words, the elements of a Brady violation are that “(1) the prosecution ha s suppressed evidence; (2) thatis favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” Id . at 150. The evidence is material if “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A “reasonable probabi lity” is a probability suffici ent to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id . (citation omitted). In other words, the test for materiality “is whether, in the absence of the suppressed evidence, the defendant ‘received a f air trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” Id . at 150-151 (citation omitted). A court will consider all of the evidence co llectively in determining whethe r the evidence was material. Id . at 151.

Defendant fails to show that the prosecution suppressed eviden ce that was favorable to him and material to the case. First, defendant fails to show t hat the prosecution suppressed evidence. Defendant argues that the prosecution withheld the p olice reports or other records regarding the Metformin pills, w hich he claims would have shownthat the Metformin pills in the bag of drugs differed from the Metformin pills that were found in the prescription bottle. Defendant raised the issue of discovery on the first day of tri al, and he argued that the prosecution failed to provide him with police statements or rep orts connecting him with the drugs. However, defendant’s attor ney explained that the prosec ution did provide the defense with a police report. He explai ned that defendant believed tha t each officer should have generated an individual police re port, but that defense counsel was told that each officer’s individual report is compiled in to one report that is narrated by an officer. Officer Barnosky testified at trial that only one police report is generated in each investigation. Defendant fails to show that there were any additional reports or records other th an the one police report that the prosecution gave defense counsel and that was discussed through out trial. Therefore, the prosecution did not suppress evidence.

Second, even assuming that there were individual police report s, defendant fails to show that the reports were favorable to the defense. See id . at 150. Instead, it is not clear whether the reports would have connected the Metformin pills in the bag of drugs with the Metformin pills in the prescription bottle, and defendant fails to show how the re ports would have been exculpatory or impeaching. See id

. Finally, defendant also fails to show that the reports would h ave been material. Defendant argues that the reports would have shown that the Met formin pills in the bag of drugs differed from those in the prescription bottle. However, Detec tive Schwein testified that the Metformin pills that he found in the prescription bottle were o f a different dosage and had a different shape from the ones found in the bag of drugs. There fore, defendant fails to show how-24- the result of the proceedings would have been different if he h ad been given more reports, because there was testimony presented at trial that the pills w ere not identical. See id

. Defendant argues that defense c ounsel would have requested defe ndant’s medical records and learned that defendant was not p rescribed different dosages of Metformin had defense counsel been supplied with the reports. However, defendant fails to sh ow what additional information defense counsel would have learned from an individual police re port that he did not learn from the police report that the prosecution supplied to him that wou ld have prompted him to request defendant’s medical records. Thus, defendant fails to show tha t the evidence was material. For all of the reasons discussed above, the prosecution did not commit a Brady violation; there is no evidence that the prosecution suppressed evidence that was favo rable to defendant and material to the case. See id . at 150-151.

XV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she stated that the Metformin pills that were found in the bag of drugs were defendant’s pills. We disagree.

“In order to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate review, a defendant must have timely and specifically objected below, unl ess objection could not have cured the error.” People v Brown , 294 Mich App 377, 382; 811 NW2d 531 (2011). Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s statements. Therefore, the issue is unpreserved. See id.

“Unpreserved claims of prosecu torial misconduct are reviewed f or plain error affecting substantial rights.” Brown , 294 Mich App at 382.

A prosecutor commits misconduct if she denies the defendant of a fair trial. Brown , 294 Mich App at 382. “Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing court must examine the record and evaluate a prosecut or’s remarks in context.” Id . at 382-383. A prosecutor may not make a statement that is unsuppo rted by the evidence. People v Ackerman , 257 Mich App 434, 450; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). “[A] prosecutor is entitled to argue the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence.” People v Comella , 296 Mich App 643, 654; 823 NW2d 138 (2012).

During her closing argument, th e prosecutor stated that the Me tformin pills were defendant’s pills and were left over from an old prescription. The prosecutor’s comment during her closing argument constituted a reasonable inference from th e evidence. There was evidence presented at trial that the officers found 500-milligram Metfor min pills in the bag of drugs recovered from the home. In addition, Detective Schwein and th e other police officers conducting a search of the house found a prescription pill bott le with defendant’s name on it in the kitchen of the house. The prescription was for 850-milligr am Metformin and was filled on August 19, 2013. The bottle was mostly full of medication. Th e Metformin pills found during the initial raid of the house l ooked different from those foundin the prescription bottle, but Detective Schwein explained that this was consistent with the d ifferent dosage level. The fact that the 500-milligram Metformin pills were defendant’s pills c onstituted a reasonable inference from the testimony presented at trial because the officers foun d Metformin pills that belonged to defendant during the search of the house and found other Metformin pills in the bag of drugs.-25- See id . The prosecutor’s comments reasonably connected the testimonythat defendant possessed Metformin pills with the testimony that Metformin pil ls were found in the bag of drugs on the floor. See id . Therefore, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct.

In addition, even assuming that the prosecutor did commit misc onduct, the prosecutor’s actions did not prejudice defendant. As stated above, the juryis presumed to have followed its instructions, and jury instructi ons can cure most errors. See Mahone , 294 Mich App at 212. The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements and argumen ts of the lawyers are not evidence and that the jury should only consider the lawyers’ statements that are supported by the evidence or by the jurors’ common sense. T herefore, the jury instructio ns cured any error. See id

.

XVI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief that defense cou nsel rendered ineffective assistance 1 when he failed to object to the prosecutor’s statements connec ting defendant with the Metformin found in the bag of drugs and when he failed to inves tigate witnesses. We disagree.

A defendant must bring a motion in the trial court for a new t rial or an evidentiary hearing in order to preserve the issue of ineffective assistanc e of counsel for appellate review. People v Heft , 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). Defendant did not bring a motion for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. Therefore, the issue is unpreserved. See id

.
“When a defendant did not move in the trial court for a new tr ial or an evidentiary hearing, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent fr om the record.” Id . Whether defense counsel was effective raises questions of fact and law. Id . “This Court reviews findings of fact for clear error an d questions of law de novo.” Id

.
A defendant in a criminal case ha s the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id

. To prove that defense counsel was not effective, the defendant must show that (1) defense counsel’s performance was so deficient that it fell bel ow an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probab ility that defense counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. The defendant was prejudiced if, but for defense counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [ Id . at 80-81 (citations omitted).]

There is a strong presumption that defense counsel’s conduct co nstituted sound trial strategy. Id

. at 83. “Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a fut ile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Ericksen , 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).

1 We note that we decline to revis it this Court’s earlier decisi on to deny defendant’s motion for a remand.-26- First, defense counsel did not r ender ineffective assistance f or failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements during her closing argument. As discus sed above, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct when she made statements during her closing a rgument regarding defendant’s ownership of the Metformin in the bag of drugs. Th erefore, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the s tatements because the objection would have been futile. See id . Similarly, defense counsel did not render ineffective assist ance for failing to object to the prosecution’s failure to produce a dditional police reports because the objection would have been futile for the reasons discussed abov e. See id

. Second, defendant has failed to establish ineffective assistan ce of counsel with respect to counsel’s alleged failure to investigate whether the Metformin found in the bag of drugs was defendant’s medication. Defendant states in an affidavit attac hed to his Standard 4 brief that defense counsel did not investigate whether the Metformin pills in the bag of drugs were the same as the pills that were in d efendant’s presc ription bottle. Defendant argues that defense counsel should have called defendant’s doctor to obtain informa tion regarding defendant’s medications. 2

However, even assuming that defense counsel did not investigat e the issue, defendant fails to show that defense counsel’s performance was so deficie nt that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because defendant fails to establishwhat actions defense counsel should have taken to investigat e the difference between the two types of pills. Defendant states in his affidavit that defense counsel failed to contact defendant’s doctor to obtain information regarding defendant’s medications. Defense counsel could have obtained the same information from defendant himself, and defense counsel’s failure to seek a dditional information regarding defendant’s medications did not constitute deficient performanc e. See Heft , 299 Mich App at 80-81. Defendant fails to establish what additional steps defe nse counsel should have taken to investigate the issue. Therefore, defense counsel’s performanc e was not deficient. See id

. Defendant also fails to show how he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to investigate whether the Metf ormin pills in the bag of drugs and in the prescription bottle were the same or different. There was testimony presented at trial that the Metformin pills that the officers found in the bag of drugs were a lower dosage than the Metformin pills found in the prescription bottle with defenda nt’s name on it. Thus, the tes timony at trial established that the pills were different, and defense counsel’s failure to investig ate the issue further did not prejudice defendant. See id

. Third, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance f or failing to call Nate Manning and Ehrlich as witnesses. Defendant states in his affi davit that defense counsel failed

2 In addition, defendant argues that defense counsel should have objected or moved for a mistrial because the prosecutor did not supply him with forensic reports , but defendant fails to establish which forensic reports the prosecutor did not supply. See People v Hoag , 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999) (a defendant must prove the factual predicate of his claim of i neffective assistance of counsel).-27- to call Ehrlich and Manning as w itnesses. However, defendant f ails to establish the factual predicate of his claim because there is no indication that defe nse counsel failed to investigate the witnesses for the defense. See People v Hoag , 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). In fact, the evidence regarding whether Ehrli ch and Manning would testify co nsisted of defendant’s statements during the January 23, 2014, hearing that Ehrlich wa s in the hospital and Manning was in jail or prison. Thus, defendant fails to establish the factual predicate of his claim because it is not clear whether Ehrlich and Manning would have been ava ilable to testify at trial and that defense counsel failed to investigate the witnesses. See id

. In addition, even assuming that Ehrlich and Manning were avail able to testify and that defense counsel failed to inves tigate Ehrlich and Manning as wi tnesses, defense counsel’s performance was not deficient because defendant fails to overco me the strong presumption that defense counsel’s conduct constituted sound trial strategy. Se e Heft , 299 Mich App at 83.

Defendant argues that Ehrlich would have testified that defend ant was not near the scene of the initial fight that led th e officers to the house. Howev er, whether defendant was near the scene of the fight is irrelevant to whether he possessed the dr ugs in the bag or in his pocket. Additionally, the police officers who testified at trial did no t discuss the details of what led them to Nettleton’s house, and they did not discuss defendant’s invo lvement in the altercation. Therefore, defendant fails to overcome the presumption that def ense counsel’s conduct constituted trial strategy. See id . Defendant also fails to establish prejudice with regard to Ehrlich’s testimony because defendant’s involvement in the alte rcation that led to the search of the house is not relevant to whether defendant possessed the dr ugs that were found in the house. See id . at 80-81.

Defendant argues that Manning would have testified that he had drugs and threw cocaine on the floor of the house when h e saw the police. However, def endant fails to overcome the strong presumption of sound trial strategy; for example, Mannin g would have been open to cross-examination regarding whether defendant possessed the bag of drugs, which contained additional types of cont rolled substances. See id. at 83. At any rate, defe ndant failed to establish the factual predicate for hi s claim, as discussed above.

XVII. CUMULATIVE ERROR

Defendant next argues in his Standard 4 brief on appeal that the cumulative effect of the errors warrant reversal. We disagree. Defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court. Therefore, it is unpreserved. This Court reviews this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. See Carines , 460 Mich at 763-764.

In general, this Court reviews this type of issue to determine whether a defendant was denied a fair trial because of the combination of the alleged e rrors. People v Dobek , 274 Mich App 58, 106; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). “The cumulative effect of se veral errors can constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal even when any one of the errors alone would not merit reversal, but the cumulative e ffect of the errors must undermin e the confidence in the reliability of the verdict before a new trial is granted.” Id . However, “[a]bsent the establishment of errors, there can be no cumulative eff ect of errors meriting reversal.” Id

.-28- As discussed above, the error that the trial court committed i n this case occurred when the court stated that the redirect e xamination of defendant left th e jury with the false impression that defendant was only a drug user. As explained above, the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the trial. The trial court did not commit any additional errors in this case. Therefore, there are no “cumul ative” errors that create sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal. See id

. Lastly, we note that the judgmen t of sentence in correctly stat es that defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 gra ms of cocaine, rather than possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin, with regard to Count 3. However, defendant was convicted of possess ion with intent to deliver le ss than 50 grams of heroin with regard to Count 3. This is an obvious typographical error, and we remand for the limited task of correcting the cleric al error in the judgm ent of sentence.

Affirmed, but remanded for correction of the judgment of sente nce consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Kurtis T. Wilder /s/ Amy Ronayne Krause