J-S44018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MARK CORRADO

v.

TAMMY CORRADO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1789 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered June 9, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2021-01953

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2024

Appellant Tammy Corrado (Mother) appeals from the order1 granting 

Mother and Appellee Mark Corrado (Father) shared legal custody, Mother 

primary physical custody, and Father partial physical custody of their minor 

children E.C. and G.C. (collectively, Children). Mother argues that the trial 

court erred by excluding evidence related to Father’s alleged history of child 

abuse, failing to consider Father’s alleged history of child abuse in its custody 

analysis, ordering Father to attend a limited period of anger management 

therapy, and designating Children’s Paternal Grandmother as a custody 

supervisor. We affirm. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother filed a separate appeal from the trial court’s June 9, 2023 order 

holding Mother in contempt. This Court docketed that appeal at 1788 EDA 

2023, and we address that appeal in a separate memorandum. 
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The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this 

matter as follows:

The parties were married on November 8, 2009. They separated 

in July 2020 when Mother removed E.C. and G.C. from the 

[marital] home and moved to a new residence.

* * *

On August 28, 2019, Mother filed a [Protection From Abuse (PFA)

2

petition] against Father, on behalf of herself only, alleging that 

Father had been physically and mentally abusive to her. A hearing 

was a held and an eighteen (18) month final PFA order was 

entered [on September 5, 2019]. Less than two weeks later, 

Mother filed a petition to terminate the PFA [order] because Father 

had enrolled in counseling and anger management classes.

A year later, on July 28, 2020, Mother filed another PFA [petition] 

against Father, this time on behalf of herself and [Children], 

alleging that Father had physically abused the minor child, [E.C.] 

A temporary PFA order was entered on that same date. 

Thereafter, the final PFA hearing was continued numerous times 

due to a pending investigation of Father by the Office of Children 

and Youth (OCY) and pending criminal charges against Father for 

criminal harassment.

Ultimately, OCY made no finding of abuse by Father. 

Furthermore, the criminal harassment charges against Father 

were dropped. The PFA [matter] was then scheduled for a final 

hearing on January 20, 2021. On that date, an order was entered 

to address therapy between the parties and rescheduling the 

matter for a “status conference” on February 22, 2021.

At the February 22, 2021 status conference, a six month agreed 

PFA order was entered with no finding of abuse against Father. 

This order expired on August 22, 2021 without issue. Mother then 

filed a petition to extend the PFA on August 25, 2021 which was 

denied. 

____________________________________________

2 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. 
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At the February 22, 2021 status conference, an agreed order was 

entered in the parties’ custody case. This order provided Mother 

with a six month “civil stay away order” against Father. It directed 

the parties to use the “Our Family Wizard” (OFW) parenting 

application to communicate with each other. It further provided 

for three (3) weekly video calls between Father and [] Children. 

[The order also provided that Father could exercise custodial time 

upon agreement of the parties.] Finally, Father was directed to 

participate in anger management therapy.

* * *

On October 11, 2022, Father filed a petition to modify custody. 

The basis for the modification was Father’s completion of the 

[court-]ordered anger management classes, his belief that the

video calls with [Children] were not improving their relationship 

and that he wanted to play a more active part in their lives after 

not seeing them in person for over two years.

On December 9, 2022, the parties appeared before the court’s

custody conciliator, Lenore Myers, Esquire [(the Conciliator)]. The 

Conciliator issued a report that included the following 

recommendations: 

1. That Mother obtain a letter report from [] Children’s

therapist containing [] Children’s diagnosis, prognosis, 

and plan for treatment including a plan for reunification 

with Father.

2. [] Children would probably benefit from reunification 

counseling. Without therapeutic intervention, the 

relationship between [] Children and Father will never be 

healed and [] Children will continue to re-experience the 

past trauma from their previous interactions with Father.

3. Mother and Father should also have a mental health 

evaluation. 

On February 13, 2023, the parties appeared before the 

undersigned to address the Conciliator’s recommendations. 

Despite the Conciliator’s strong recommendation for therapeutic

intervention in the report, there had been no effort to move 

forward on this point in the six (6) weeks since the date of the 

conciliation [conference]. Additionally, Mother failed to produce a 

letter from [] Children’s therapist, despite the Conciliator’s 

recommendation.
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As a result, a temporary order dated February 15, 2023 was 

entered providing for Father and [] Children to participate in 

reunification counseling. . . .

* * *

On February 22, 2023, Father filed a petition for contempt based 

on Mother’s failure to comply with any provision of the February 

15, 2023 order. . . . 

* * *

On March 9, 2023, the counsel and the parties appeared before 

the undersigned and an order was entered on March 10, 2023[,]

directing Mother to comply with the order of February 15, 2023 or 

face the imposition of potential sanctions pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5232(g). The petition for contempt was scheduled for a 

proceeding on April 6, 2023 (which was later rescheduled for April 

13, 2023).

Rather than comply with any item in the court’s temporary orders 

of February 15, 2023, and March 10, 2023, Mother instead filed a 

notice of appeal to the Superior Court.[fn24]

[fn24] As both orders were temporary, and therefore 

interlocutory, the Superior Court ultimately quashed 

Mother’s appeal in an order dated April 17, 2023. [See

Order, 747 EDA 2023, 4/17/23.]

Trial Ct. Op., 8/31/23, at 1-7 (some footnotes omitted and some formatting 

altered). 

The trial court held a combined custody and contempt hearing on May 

25, 2023. The trial court heard testimony from Father, Mother, and three

other witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held its 

decision under advisement. N.T., 5/25/23, at 232. On June 9, 2023, the trial 

court ordered that the parties would continue to share legal custody, granted 

Mother primary physical custody, and granted Father supervised physical 

custody for the first four periods of physical custody and unsupervised partial 
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physical custody thereafter. The trial court also directed Father to participate 

in four one-hour sessions of anger management therapy within thirty days of 

the date of the order and ordered Father and Children to participate in 

reunification therapy. That same day, the trial court entered an order holding 

Mother in contempt of the trial court’s February 15, 2023 and March 10, 2023 

orders, placing her on probation for six months, and directing Mother to pay 

Father $500 in counsel fees. 

On July 7, 2023, Mother filed timely notices of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) statements from the June 9, 2023 custody order and the June 

9, 2023 contempt order. On July 12, 2023, the trial court issued written 

findings of fact in support of the June 9, 2023 custody order.3 The trial court 

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3

In its June 9, 2023 custody order, the trial court stated:

Either party may make a written request to the chambers of the 

undersigned to issue formal findings of fact within five (5) 

business days of the entry of this order. In that event, findings 

will be issued prior to July 3, 2023 in accordance with C.B. v. J.B., 

65 A.3d 946 (Pa. Super. [] 2013).

Custody Order, 6/9/23, at 9 ¶22 (footnote omitted and some formatting 

altered). The trial court did not issue its findings of facts until after the 

deadline to file a notice of appeal. The trial court places the responsibility on

Mother for the delay because Mother failed to request the trial court to issue 

written findings of fact and filed her notice of appeal on the penultimate day 

of the appeal period. See Trial Ct. Findings of Fact, 7/12/23, at 1 n.1; Trial 

Ct. Op. at 8-9. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(d) provides, “[t]he court shall delineate the reasons for its 

[custody] decision on the record in open court or in a written opinion or order.” 

23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(d). The C.B. Court held that Section 5323(d) “requires the 

trial court to set forth its mandatory assessment of the sixteen factors prior 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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subsequently issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing Mother’s claims in 

both appeals. 

In her appeal from the trial court’s custody order,

4 Mother raises seven

issues for our review, which we reorder as follows:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by issuing its June [9], 2023 order[] after the 

May 25, 2023 trial when the trial court suppressed any 

evidence, physical or oral, pertaining to Father’s physical and 

mental abuse of [] Children, which was allowed in a prior 

court matter, specifically a [PFA] hearing, where the result 

____________________________________________

to the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.” C.B., 65 A.3d 

at 955. Additionally, this Court has concluded that a trial court “erred by 

failing to comply with C.B. and instead making its timely assessment of the 

statutory factors conditional upon either party’s request.” R.D.S. v. B.A.B., 

121 MDA 2023, 2023 WL 7293868, at *4 n.3 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 6, 2023) 

(unpublished mem.); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished 

non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may 

be cited for their persuasive value). Therefore, we disagree with the trial court

that Mother’s decision to file a notice of appeal without first requesting formal 

findings of fact prevented the trial court from issuing those findings in a timely 

fashion. We acknowledge that C.B. affords trial courts some flexibility in 

addressing the statutory factors, but we reiterate that Section 5323(d)

“compels the trial court to perform its mandatory function [of explaining its 

assessment of the sixteen factors] early enough in the [appellate] process to 

permit litigants to move forward, equipped with the information demanded by 

the legislature.” C.B., 65 A.3d at 955 (emphases added); see also R.D.S., 

2023 WL 7293868, at *4 n.3. 

4 As previously noted, Mother separately appealed from the contempt order. 

Here, Mother filed the same appellate brief at both appeal docket numbers. 

Three of the issues that Mother raised in her appellate brief relate to her 

appeal from the contempt order. Therefore, they are not cognizable in the 

instant appeal and will be addressed in a separate memorandum. See, e.g., 

M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1069 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2018) (declining to review 

the grandmother’s appeal from denial of her petition to intervene in 

dependency case where the grandmother only filed a notice of appeal from 

the order dismissing her complaint for custody).
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was a final [PFA] order against Father and keeping [] Children

out of []his custody, thereby protecting them as doing so is 

in the best interests of [] Children?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by issuing its June [9], 2023 order[], . . . where 

Father had previously abused [] Children and the trial court 

refused to hear evidence and testimony of the same, even 

though hearing such evidence and testimony would be crucial 

towards deciding custody utilizing the 16 enumerated factors 

. . . specifically 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(2), pertaining to the 

physical and mental well-being of [] Children, such that 

Father is still a harm to [] Children and granting Father 

custody would lean heavily against the best interests of [] 

Children, . . ?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by issuing its June [9], 2023 order[] and denying 

Mother the ability to produce any evidence or testimony of 

Father’s abuse of Mother that [] Children at issue herein were 

traumatized by witnessing said abuse and thereby allowing 

Father’s modification of the custody order without more, such 

that [] Children’s best interests, as required by Pennsylvania 

law, were not properly taken into consideration?

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by issuing the June [9], 2023 order[], whereby 

said orders modified the parties’ existing custody order, 

including custodial time, and elements of parental contact 

with . . . Children, without hearing relevant testimony or 

evidence pertaining to . . . 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(2), where 

issues of child abuse were involved in the instant matter?

5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by issuing the June [9], 2023 order[], without 

allowing testimony or evidence of the [PFA] order previously 

set forth against Father for abuse of the parties’ Children, 

thereafter substantially modifying the parties’ existing 

custody order, and elements of parental contact with . . . 

Children, and without reviewing in detail said testimony or 

evidence pertaining to Father’s abuse of [] Children, which 

could have directly impacted the second and most important 

factor of the 16 enumerated child custody factors, 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5328(a)(2), . . . ?
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6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by issuing its June [9], 2023 order[], part of 

which requires Father to attend anger management therapy, 

but said order wrongfully places a time limit of thirty (30) 

days on said therapy and further does not require said 

therapist to be made aware of Father’s previous [PFA] order, 

whereby Father had physically abused [] Children, and in 

doing so, the trial court has wrongfully and improperly placed 

[] Children in harm’s way by placing itself in the shoes of a 

mental health provider without any basis for doing so, 

whatsoever?

7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by issuing its June [9], 2023 order[] by allowing 

for Paternal Grandmother to be a supervisor of Father’s

custodial time when [] Children at issue in the matter have 

never met or know of Paternal Grandmother, such that 

introducing [] Children into such an environment is a threat 

to [] Children’s stability under the circumstances and would 

not be in [] Children’s best interests . . . ?

Mother’s Brief at 18-24 (some formatting altered).5 

Father’s Request to Dismiss the Appeal

Initially, we consider Father’s request to dismiss Mother’s appeal from 

the June 9, 2023 custody order on the basis that Mother lacks standing under

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5

In her reply brief, Mother argues that the trial court erred by failing to place 

its findings on the record when it entered its June 9, 2023 custody order. 

Mother’s Reply Brief at 5-9. A party may not raise new issues in a reply brief 

for the first time. See Reginelli v. Boggs, 181 A.3d 293, 307 n.15 (Pa. 

2018). Further, Mother did not include this issue in her Rule 1925(b) 

statements. Therefore, this issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); 

see also R.D.S., 2023 WL 7293868, at *4 n.3 (concluding that the appellantfather was not entitled to relief based on the trial court’s failure to comply with 

23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(d) and C.B. because the father did not raise the issue in 

his Rule 1925(b) statement). Nevertheless, as noted in footnote 3 above, we 

disapprove of the procedure that the trial court applied here in that it is 

incompatible with Section 5323(d) as interpreted by this Court in C.B. 
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Pa.R.A.P. 501. Father’s Brief at 21-23.6 Specifically, Father argues that 

Mother was the prevailing party at the custody hearing because the trial 

court’s June 9, 2023 custody order awarding Father supervised physical 

custody and requiring Father to attend anger management is consistent with 

Mother’s testimony about her preferred custody arrangements. Id. at 22-23. 

Father contends that Mother was the prevailing party, and not an aggrieved 

party, because the custody order did not adversely affect Mother’s interests. 

Id. Therefore, Father concludes that Mother lacks standing to appeal the 

custody order under Pa.R.A.P. 501.

Mother responds that she has standing to appeal the custody order

because she has an interest in the custody of Children and the order impacts 

her custodial rights. Mother’s Reply Brief at 16. 

“Threshold issues of standing are questions of law; thus, our standard 

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” K.W. v. S.L., 157 

A.3d 498, 504 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted). 

Rule 501 states that “[e]xcept where the right of appeal is enlarged by 

statute, any party who is aggrieved by an appealable order, or a fiduciary 

whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom.” Pa.R.A.P. 501. 

“A party is ‘aggrieved’ when the party has been adversely affected by 

the decision from which the appeal is taken. A prevailing party is not 

‘aggrieved’ and therefore, does not have standing to appeal an order that has 

____________________________________________

6 Father does not contest Mother’s standing to appeal the contempt order. 

See Father’s Brief at 21 n.11. 
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been entered in his or her favor.” Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel 

Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 700 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations omitted). 

In the custody context, this Court has concluded that a mother was not 

an aggrieved party where the trial court sustained the mother’s preliminary 

objections and dismissed the custody complaint filed against her. L.D.G. v. 

T.L.W., 68 WDA 2020, 2020 WL 6806214, at *1 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 19, 

2020) (unpublished judgment order) (dismissing the mother’s appeal). 

However, this Court has heard appeals in cases filed by parties who were 

awarded primary physical custody of their children without questioning if those 

appellants were the “prevailing party” or if they were “aggrieved” by the 

orders awarding them primary physical custody. See, e.g., S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 

218 A.3d 905, 908, 911-12 (Pa. Super. 2019); C.M. v. M.M., 215 A.3d 588, 

589-91 (Pa. Super. 2019); R.L.P. v. R.F.M., 110 A.3d 201, 207 (Pa. Super. 

2015). 

In C.M., the mother appealed from a custody order which increased the 

father’s custodial time and removed the supervision requirement from the 

father’s periods of partial physical custody. C.M., 215 A.3d at 590. This Court 

concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in altering the custody 

arrangement, vacated the order, and remanded for further proceedings. Id.

at 593-94. 

Instantly, the procedural history of this case is more akin to that of C.M.

than L.D.G. Here, the February 22, 2021 custody order provided that Father 

could exercise partial physical custody upon agreement of the parties. The 
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June 9, 2023 custody order granted Mother primary physical custody and 

granted Father supervised physical custody for Father’s first four periods of 

physical custody followed by unsupervised partial physical custody of Children.

Compare Custody Order, 6/9/23, at 3-5 ¶¶6-8 and C.M., 215 A.3d at 590

with L.D.G., 2020 WL 6806214, at *1. Therefore, we conclude that Mother 

is an aggrieved party and has standing to appeal the trial court’s June 9, 2023 

custody order because the custody order increases Father’s custodial time.

7

 

See Pa.R.A.P. 501. 

Evidentiary Issues

In her first three issues,8 Mother argues that the trial court erred by 

excluding evidence of Father’s past abuse of Mother and Children. Mother’s

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7 We also note that the courts of this Commonwealth have repeatedly 

explained that “[t]he primary focus in any custody case is the best interests 

of the child.” C.M., 215 A.3d at 591; see also R.L. v. M.A., 209 A.3d 391, 

395 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that “the paramount concern in child custody 

cases is the best interests of the child” (quoting C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 

909 (Pa. 2018)). If this Court were to conclude that the party which has 

primary physical custody lacks standing to appeal from a final custody order,

then that order would never be subject to appellate review if the opposing 

party chose not to appeal. We reject Father’s interpretation of Rule 501 

because it creates an absurd and unreasonable result. See Pa.R.J.A. 109(a) 

(providing that when interpreting a rule adopted by our Supreme Court, we 

presume that the Supreme Court “does not intend a result that is absurd, 

impossible of execution, or unreasonable”). 

8 While Mother identifies seven issues for our review in this appeal from the 

custody order in her statement of questions presented, the argument section 

of her brief pertaining to custody is only divided into five sections: (1) whether 

the trial court erred by failing to consider Father’s alleged history of child 

abuse in its custody analysis; (2 and 5) whether the trial court erred by 

excluding evidence of Father’s alleged history of abuse; (3) whether the trial 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Brief at 47-52, 57-59.9 Specifically, Mother contends that the trial court did 

not allow her to present “nanny cam footage” or photographs depicting

Father’s abuse of Children or the results thereof. Id. at 51 (citing N.T.,

5/25/23, at 107, 155); see also id. at 32 n.13, 33-34. Mother claims that 

the trial court erred by excluding that evidence because in a custody case, a 

trial court is required to consider present and past abuse by a party and 

whether there is a continuing risk of harm. Id. at 49-50 (citing, inter alia, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(2)); see also id. at 58-59. Mother further contends that 

the trial court erred by failing to ensure that a complete record was made at 

the custody hearing. Id. at 51 (citing Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 167 

(Pa. 1993)); see also id. at 39 (citing Costello v. Costello, 666 A.2d 1096, 

1098 (Pa. Super. 1995)). Mother argues that the trial court’s error resulted 

____________________________________________

court erred by ordering Father to attend a limited period of anger management 

therapy; and (4) whether the trial court erred by designating Paternal 

Grandmother as a custody supervisor. Mother’s Brief at 29-60. We note that 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the argument 

section of the brief be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Failure to do so may result in waiver. 

Ramalingam v. Keller Williams Realty Grp., Inc., 121 A.3d 1034, 1042 

(Pa. Super. 2015). While we do not condone Mother’s failure to comply with 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we find that our ability to render meaningful 

appellate review is not hindered; therefore, we decline to find waiver on this

basis. Id. 

9 We note that Mother’s argument with respect to the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings excluding evidence related to Father’s past abuse of Mother and 

Children overlaps with her argument about the trial court’s analysis of the 

statutory custody factors. Compare Mother’s Brief at 47-52, 57-59 with

Mother’s Brief at 29-41. However, we limit our review in this section to the 

trial court’s evidentiary rulings.
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in the trial court awarding Father partial physical custody of Children. Id. at 

51. Therefore, Mother concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in 

excluding this evidence. 

This Court has explained:

The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the 

admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial 

court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed 

an error of law[.] A trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the 

relevancy of evidence and its ruling will not be reversed absent an 

abuse of discretion.

K.T. v. L.S., 118 A.3d 1136, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). 

We will not find an abuse of discretion merely because a reviewing 

court would have reached a different conclusion. Rather, 

appellate courts will find a trial court abuses its discretion if, in 

reaching a conclusion, it overrides or misapplies the law, or the 

record shows that the trial court’s judgment was either manifestly 

unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

R.L., 209 A.3d at 395 (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

Additionally, this Court has explained that “[t]o constitute reversible 

error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or 

unduly prejudicial to the complaining party.” K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 

130 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted and formatting altered); see also

Renninger v. A & R Mach. Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 999 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(explaining that “[a]n evidentiary ruling which did not affect the verdict will 

not provide a basis for disturbing the fact-finder’s judgment” (citation omitted

and formatting altered)). 
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The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state that unless “otherwise 

provided by law,” “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,” while “[e]vidence 

that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: 

(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the 

action.” Pa.R.E. 401. However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence 

if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 

delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 

403. 

Our Supreme Court has also explained that “[i]n the context of a custody 

case a trial court must ensure that as full and complete a record as possible 

is created when a decision as important as the welfare of a child is at issue.” 

Moore, 634 A.2d at 167; cf. Wilson v. Smyers, 284 A.3d 509, 515 (Pa. 

Super. 2022) (concluding that the trial court did not err in restricting mother 

from presenting additional testimony about her relationship with the child’s 

deceased father during a hearing on the paternal grandmother’s petition for 

partial physical custody because the mother had “ample opportunity” to 

explain the “traumatic impact [that the] father’s death had on her” and further 

testimony about that topic “was superfluous and not particularly relevant to 

either [the] mother’s relationship with the child, nor the child’s relationship 

with [the paternal] grandmother” (some formatting altered)). 
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Here, the trial court explained:

Initially, it should be reinforced that the entire theme of Mother’s 

case, throughout every step of the current proceedings, was 

entirely focused on abuse that allegedly occurred up to three years 

ago. Unlike Father (and the court), Mother demonstrated 

absolutely zero interest in a “solution based” approach as to how 

best to proceed to go forward to reunite Father with [] Children. 

The current proceedings were devoted to custody as Father had 

not seen [] Children in-person in nearly three years. The previous 

allegations of abuse had already been addressed during prior PFA 

proceedings, and investigations by [OCY] and law enforcement 

back in 2020.

Notably, give[n] Mother’s entire focus on just one issue, there was 

extremely limited testimony from Mother regarding any of the 

other 15 Factors (aside from Factor 2). Mother’s testimony was 

directed almost solely to the parties[’] toxic history as a couple 

and the events that led her to filing the PFA[ petitions].

Mother testified about Father’s violent behavior towards her 

throughout their relationship. She also made accusations of 

Father hitting [] Children. All of this testimony goes back in time 

to 2020 and before.

While Father did acknowledge hitting [E.C.] back in 2020, there 

was never a finding of abuse against Father. [N.T., 5/25/23, at 

68. OCY] performed two investigations, both of which resulted in 

no finding of abuse. [N.T., 5/25/23, at 26; Exhibits F-1, F-2.] 

Father was never convicted of any crime related to his alleged 

actions. If Mother truly believed that “abuse” was such a 

significant factor, which would then justify Father not having any 

meaningful contact with [] Children for an extended time period, 

she should have insisted on litigating this issue two years ago in 

PFA court. Instead, Mother agreed to a six-month PFA [order]

with no finding of abuse.

In response to Mother’s concerns on this issue, the court received 

Mother’s testimony about the accusations of abuse she alleged 

Father committed prior to their 2020 separation. She was not, 

however, permitted to submit photographs into the record of the 

proceedings which were part of the July 2020 PFA action. As noted 

supra, that matter led to an agreed PFA order for six months with 

no finding of abuse. In addition, Mother’s allegations were 
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investigated by both [OCY] and law enforcement. In both 

instances, there were no findings of abuse.

Trial Ct. Op. at 15-17 (footnotes omitted, some formatting altered, and

emphases in original). 

Following our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the 

proffered evidence10 was cumulative of Mother’s testimony about Father’s

anger issues and his abusive behavior towards Mother and Children. See id.; 

see also N.T., 5/25/23, at 98-102, 107-08, 123-24, 139, 155. Therefore, we 

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in excluding this additional 

evidence. See K.T., 118 A.3d at 1165; Pa.R.E. 403; see also Wilson, 284 

A.3d at 515. 

Further, we conclude that Mother has failed to demonstrate that she 

suffered prejudice as a result of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. As 

discussed further below, Mother testified that she refused to disclose the name 

of the Children’s elementary school to Father because she was afraid that 

Father would take Children from their school, but the trial court concluded that 

her testimony was unreasonable and not credible. See Trial Ct. Findings of 

Fact at 11-12. Additionally, the trial court determined that Mother had 

engaged in a campaign of alienating Children against Father. See id. at 14-

16; Trial Ct. Op. at 17-18. Therefore, even if the trial court abused its 

____________________________________________

10 We note that the trial court did not exclude a video that Mother attempted 

to offer into evidence, rather the trial court sustained Father’s objection to 

Mother testifying about her observations of what the video depicted. See 

N.T., 5/25/23, at 104-07. 
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discretion in excluding Mother’s proffered evidence, we conclude that those 

evidentiary rulings did not affect the outcome of the proceedings. See K.B., 

208 A.3d at 130. For these reasons, Mother is not entitled to relief on these 

claims. 

Custody Factors

In her fourth and fifth issues, Mother argues that the trial court erred in 

its analysis of the custody factors because the trial court refused to consider 

evidence of Father’s past abuse and the continued risk of harm to Children 

and Mother. Mother’s Brief at 29-41;

11 Mother’s Reply Brief at 21-22. 

Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court erred by “minimiz[ing Mother’s] 

fear for herself and [] Children” because the allegations of abuse occurred 

three years ago. Mother’s Brief at 40. Mother contends that the trial court 

also erred by “minimizing [the] weight and significance” of the 2021 PFA order 

because the trial court observed that the PFA order was entered by agreement

without a finding of abuse. Id. at 37-38 n.16; see also Mother’s Reply Brief 

at 21. Mother asserts that “[w]hile there was no admission of guilt [in the 

agreed upon PFA order], there was no denial either.” Mother’s Brief at 38 

n.16. Mother additionally asserts that the trial court failed to consider that 

PFA orders can be entered by agreement to “allow[] victims to avoid the pain 

____________________________________________

11 As noted above, Mother’s argument regarding the trial court’s custody 

determination overlaps with her claims about the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings. Compare Mother’s Brief at 29-41 with Mother’s Brief at 47-52, 57-

59. We limit our review in this section to the trial court’s custody 

determination. 
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of testifying before a judge.” Id.; see also Mother’s Reply Brief at 21 (stating 

that the entry of a PFA order by agreement “provides protection to an abuse 

victim without making that victim suffer the trauma of a full hearing”). Mother 

also claims that because the trial court found that Father admitted to hitting 

E.C. in 2020, this was an acknowledgement of abuse by Father that “should 

automatically have been a determinative factor for the trial court.” Mother’s 

Brief at 39-40. For these reasons, Mother concludes that the trial court abused 

its discretion in making its custody determination.12 

In cases under the Child Custody Act (the Act), 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5321-

5340, our standard of review is as follows:

This Court reviews a custody determination for an abuse of 

discretion. We will not find an abuse of discretion merely because 

a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion. 

Rather, appellate courts will find a trial court abuses its discretion 

if, in reaching a conclusion, it overrides or misapplies the law, or 

the record shows that the trial court’s judgment was either 

____________________________________________

12 Mother additionally argues that the trial court erred in entering its February 

15, 2023 and March 10, 2023 orders without first hearing evidence. Mother’s 

Brief at 35-36. As noted above, Mother previously appealed from these 

orders, and this Court quashed that appeal as interlocutory. See Order, 747 

EDA 2023, 4/17/23. Mother contends that “[t]he June [9], 2023 custody order 

[is] built upon the faulty foundation laid by the February 15, 2023 order, laying 

permanent custody structures upon unexcavated ground.” Mother’s Brief at 

36. Mother has waived this claim because she did not raise it in her Rule 

1925(b) statement or in the statement of questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “[i]ssues not included in the Statement and/or 

not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are 

waived”), 2116(a) (providing that “[n]o question will be considered unless it 

is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested 

thereby”). 
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manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill will.

Further, when this Court reviews a trial court’s best interests 

analysis in custody matters, our scope of review is broad, but we 

are bound by findings supported in the record, and may reject 

conclusions drawn by the trial court only if they involve an error 

of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of 

the trial court. Importantly, on issues of credibility and weight of 

the evidence, we defer to the findings of the trial judge who has 

had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of 

the witnesses. We can only interfere where the custody order is 

manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.

R.L., 209 A.3d at 395 (citations omitted and formatting altered)). 

“The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places 

on evidence.” C.M., 215 A.3d at 591 (citations omitted). Further, abuse of 

discretion is a deferential standard of review, and it is not this Court’s role to 

“re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility.” Wilson, 284 

A.3d at 520 (citation omitted). 

The paramount concern in any custody case decided under the Act is 

the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5328(a), 5338(a); see also

R.L., 209 A.3d at 395. “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-bycase basis, considers all factors which legitimately have an effect upon the 

child’s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being.” R.L., 209 A.3d 

at 395 (citations omitted). 

Section 5328(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the following:
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(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent 

and continuing contact between the child and another party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party 

can better provide adequate physical safeguards and 

supervision of the child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2) 

(relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with 

protective services). 

* * *

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other 

parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable 

safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.

* * *

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

* * *

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one 

another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by 

another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to 

cooperate with that party. 

* * *

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).13 

This Court has explained that “there is no required amount of detail for 

the trial court’s explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors 

____________________________________________

13 To the extent that Mother has cited 23 Pa.C.S. § 5303 in her brief in support 

of her arguments, we note that the General Assembly repealed Section 5303 

and replaced it with present version of the Child Custody Act on January 24, 

2011. See Act of Nov. 23, 2010, P.L. 1106, No. 112, § 1. 
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are considered and that the custody decision is based on those 

considerations.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013). “It 

is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to determine which 

factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.” Id. at 339

(citation omitted). 

The PFA Act provides, in relevant part, that “the court may grant any 

protection order or approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation 

of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(a). This Court 

has held that

the term “consent” ordinarily connotes acquiescence without 

reference to admissions. Consequently, the plain and 

unambiguous language of the PFA[ Act] merely indicates that it 

authorizes and enforces consent-based protective orders. In light 

of the absence of any reference to the necessity that such orders 

be accompanied by admissions of abuse, we find the matter 

excluded from the statute.

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations 

omitted); see also Lower Frederick Twp. v. Clemmer, 543 A.2d 502, 510 

(Pa. 1988) (Clemmer) (stating that “[a] consent decree is not a legal 

determination by the court of the matters in controversy but is merely an 

agreement between the parties—a contract binding the parties thereto to the 

terms thereof” (citation omitted)). 

Here, the trial court thoroughly addressed Mother’s claims regarding 

Father’s history of anger and abuse, as well as Mother’s ongoing efforts at 

parental alienation. See Trial Ct. Findings of Fact at 5-7, 9-16; Trial Ct. Op. 
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at 15-18. Essentially, Mother invites this Court to reweigh factual evidence 

presented at the hearing and to reweigh the Section 5328 factors, which this 

Court will not do. See Wilson, 284 A.3d at 520 (stating that it is not this 

Court’s role to “re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility” 

(citation omitted); M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 339 (explaining that the trial court, as 

the finder of fact, has the discretion “to determine which factors are most 

salient and critical in each particular case” (citation omitted)). 

We are cognizant that the trial court must give weighted consideration 

to factors which affect the safety of Children. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). 

However, contrary to Mother’s argument, there is no bright-line rule that the 

courts must apply when there is evidence that party has abused a child or 

other party in the past. See R.L., 209 A.3d at 395 (explaining that the best 

interests of the child must be determined on a case-by-case basis); M.J.M.,

63 A.3d at 339 (explaining that as the finder of fact, the trial court determines 

which custody factors are most important in each case). Further, there is no 

dispute that the February 22, 2021 PFA order was entered by consent of the 

parties without an admission of abuse. Contrary to Mother’s claims, this 

PFA consent order14 does not constitute evidence of abuse or a judicial 

determination that Father abused Children. See Nelson, 690 A.2d at 731; 

see also Clemmer, 543 A.2d at 510. 

____________________________________________

14 We note that the September 5, 2019 PFA order against Father was entered 

after a hearing and Father acknowledged that the PFA court found that he had 

abused Mother. See N.T., 5/25/23, at 22. 
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Finally, we note that although Mother testified regarding her fear that 

Father would attempt to remove Children from their school if she disclosed 

the name of the Children’s school, the trial court concluded that her testimony 

was not credible. See Trial Ct. Findings of Fact at 11. Because we discern no 

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s weighing of the custody factors, we 

affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. See R.L., 209 A.3d at 395; 

see also Trial Ct. Op. at 15-18. 

Anger Management Course

In her sixth issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred by ordering 

Father to attend thirty days of anger management counseling. Mother’s Brief 

at 52-54. Specifically, Mother contends that the trial court should not have 

imposed the thirty-day limit, which she asserts “is not enough time for 

meaningful change to occur” and “ties the hands of an established medical 

professional from being able to definitively state whether or not [Father] made 

sufficient progress . . . .” Id. at 53. Mother acknowledges that there is “no 

standard requirement for a duration of time for an anger management class” 

but notes that in In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010), the father completed 

seventeen weeks of anger management. Id. 

Here, Mother is asking this Court to conclude that the trial court’s order 

requiring Father to attend additional anger management therapy15 was 

____________________________________________

15 Specifically, the trial court ordered Father to complete four one-hour anger 

management therapy sessions within thirty days of the date of the custody 

order. See Custody Order, 6/9/23, at 1-2 ¶4. 
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inadequate to address Father’s history of anger issues. As previously stated, 

this Court will not reweigh the evidence and cannot substitute our judgment 

for that of the finder of fact. See Wilson, 284 A.3d at 520. Therefore, we 

affirm based on the trial court’s analysis of this issue. See Trial Ct. Op. at 17, 

20-21. 

Custody Supervisor

In her final issue in her appeal from the custody order, Mother argues 

that the trial court erred in by designating Children’s Paternal Grandmother 

as one of the three individuals who may supervise Father’s periods of 

supervised physical custody. Mother’s Brief at 55-56. Specifically, Mother 

contends that the same reasons the trial court relied on to conclude Paternal 

Grandmother was a suitable custody supervisor also “threaten[] the safety 

and security of [] Children.” Id. at 56. 

Again, Mother is essentially asking this Court to reweigh the evidence 

and reassess Paternal Grandmother’s credibility.

16

 This Court will not 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, which was the finder of fact. 

See Wilson, 284 A.3d at 520. Therefore, we affirm based on the trial court’s 

analysis, including its express finding that Paternal Grandmother’s testimony

____________________________________________

16 We also note that Mother failed to cite any legal authority in support of her 

argument regarding this claim, which is required by the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c). While Mother’s failure to develop her 

argument with citation to and discussion of relevant legal authority is grounds 

to find waiver, we decline to do so because this claim is straightforward. Cf. 

In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (finding claims 

that were not sufficiently developed in the appellant’s brief to be waived). 
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was credible. See Trial Ct. Op. at 22-23. Therefore, Mother is not entitled to 

relief on this claim.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s order. 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 2/20/2024