Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 17

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION I

No. CR-22-361

GEOFFERY BASHAM

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

OPINION DELIVERED JANUARY 25, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE MILLER

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 46CR-19-296]

HONORABLE CARLTON D. JONES, 

JUDGE

REVERSED AND DISMISSED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Geoffery Basham appeals the March 14, 2022 revocation of his probationary sentence 

by the Miller County Circuit Court. Basham argues that the circuit court erred in not 

granting his motion for directed verdict and revoking his probation in the absence of proof 

that he received and signed conditions of his probation and that he knew the exact terms of 

his probationary sentence. We reverse and dismiss.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On May 14, 2019, a criminal information was filed against Basham charging him with 

possession of a controlled substance, meth-cocaine, a Class D felony; possession of drug 

paraphernalia, a Class D felony; and simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, a Class 

Y felony.
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In July 2021, Basham pleaded guilty to all three of the charges, and for each, he was 

sentenced to probation—seventy-two months’ probation for the possession-of-a-controlledsubstance and possession-of-paraphernalia charges and 120 months’ probation for the 

possession-of-drugs-and-firearms charge. His sentencing order was entered on August 11, 

2021. Basham’s judgment evidenced that he was advised and understood he would need to 

comply with the conditions imposed in these sentences, which included a total court-ordered 

payment in the amount of $3,165, but there was a failure to attach his signed 

acknowledgment of such in writing. 

On September 22, 2021, the State filed a petition to revoke Basham’s probation 

alleging that he had failed to (1) report to the supervising officer; (2) notify the supervising 

officer of a change of residence; (3) pay court-ordered financial obligations; and (4) pay the 

suspended-sentence or probation-supervision fees ordered by the court.

On February 7, 2022, an amended petition for revocation was filed along with an 

amended revocation report of probated sentence violation and recommendation to revoke, 

which added the additional allegation that Basham had committed an offense against the 

laws of this state—specifically, that on October 18, 2021, he failed to appear in the Miller 

County Circuit Court.

Basham’s revocation hearing was held on February 28. Basham’s probation officer, 

Officer Timothy O’Malley, confirmed that he had been responsible for ensuring Basham’s 

compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation imposed on July 26, 2021; 

however, O’Malley was not present in court that day. He testified that Basham had been
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released on bond following imposition of judgment and noted that, pursuant to procedure, 

he instructed Basham to report to his office for intake on July 27, in part, because Basham 

needed to sign a written acknowledgment of the conditions of his probation.

O’Malley testified that he met with Basham at the probation office on July 27 but 

explained that he was unable to complete the intake process because Basham left early that 

day because of a family emergency. O’Malley acknowledged that the terms of Basham’s 

probation had not yet been uploaded into the CourtConnect system but pointed out that 

he had a spare copy of the conditions routinely imposed on probationers in his office that 

day. O’Malley testified that he provided this document to Basham on July 27, who confirmed 

that he understood his probation was conditioned, in part, on his reporting to the probation 

office, not committing any new offenses for the duration of his sentences, and making his 

court-ordered payments. O’Malley further stated that he “attempted to get him to sign them” 

before Basham left the probation office and, on cross-examination, reiterated, “I did go over 

[the written] conditions” with Basham on July 27, 2021. 

O’Malley also testified that other officers contacted Basham at his residence on July 

30, instructing him to report to the probation office located in Little Rock on August 4 but 

that Basham failed to do so. Thereafter, on August 25, O’Malley spoke to Basham via 

telephone, advised him that his request to transfer his probation to Pulaski County had been 

denied, and directed Basham to report to his office on August 27. O’Malley stated that 

Basham again failed to report and that he “was never able to make contact with [Basham] 

again.” 
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Regarding Basham’s alleged failure to satisfy his court-ordered payments, the State 

presented testimony that Basham had failed to make any payments following the imposition 

of his probation sentences in 2021 and introduced a copy of his payment ledger as an exhibit, 

which evidenced no payments and a total outstanding balance of $3,225. 

Last, the circuit court considered evidence introduced by the State that Basham had 

committed a new offense—specifically, failure to appear on October 5, 2021, in connection 

with then-pending rape charges. 

At the close of the State’s case, Basham moved for a directed verdict specifically 

arguing that the State had failed to prove that he had received express written notice of the 

exact terms and conditions of his probation, citing the absence of any testimony or 

documentation that he had signed the same when he met with O’Malley. 

The circuit court began its ruling by addressing Basham’s argument that no signed 

conditions of probation were introduced into evidence. The circuit court cited Costes v. State, 

103 Ark. App. 171, 267 S.W.3d 639 (2008), and Nelson v. State, 84 Ark. App. 373, 141 

S.W.3d 900 (2004), noting: “There the Court of Appeals stated that whether there is proof 

that a probationer received written conditions of probation is a procedural matter and not 

one of sufficiency of the evidence because the purpose of proving the conditions in writing 

is to permit [sic] confusion on the probationer’s part.” 

The circuit court noted that Basham received something (i.e., the intake packet from 

O’Malley), although it may not have been the exact conditions of his probation , that would 

have advised him of what his obligations were while on probation. The circuit court also 
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found it “[s]omewhat telling” that Basham never asked O’Malley where he might need to 

make his payments. 

The circuit court rejected Basham’s argument, credited O’Malley’s testimony that he 

had provided written notice of the exact conditions to Basham on July 27, 2021, and added 

that he was “certain” Basham had been advised, in court, to report to the probation office 

when judgment was imposed.

Basham presented no evidence in his defense. The State then moved to reopen its 

case to introduce the alleged intake packet that Basham had signed, which O’Malley had 

obtained from his office after he testified, but the circuit court denied the request, finding 

that the previously presented evidence was sufficient to support revocation in light of

Basham’s new failure-to-appear offense, his repeated failures to report to the probation office, 

and the inexcusable failure to have made any attempt to satisfy the court-ordered payments. 

During sentencing, the circuit court directly addressed Basham and asked if he 

understood that he faced a significant prison term for having failed to report to his probation 

officer. Basham acknowledged his failures to do so before he was sentenced to seventy-two 

months on each of the two original charges he had pled to and twenty years on the third 

charge of possession of drugs and firearms, to be served in the Arkansas Department of 

Correction, with all sentences to run concurrently. The sentencing order was filed on March 

14, and the notice of appeal was timely filed on March 15.
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II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A motion to dismiss at a bench trial and a motion for a directed verdict at a jury trial 

are both challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1 (2022). In

Workman v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 74, at 4, 640 S.W.3d 434, 436, we held the following:

To revoke a defendant’s probation, the State must prove that the defendant 

violated a condition of probation. Bennett v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 351, 634 S.W.3d 

581. The State bears the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Daniels v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 473, 588 S.W.3d 116. On appeal, we will 

affirm a circuit court’s revocation of probation unless the decision is clearly against 

the preponderance of the evidence. Id. We have long held that to sustain a revocation, 

the State need only show that the defendant committed one violation. Springs v. State, 

2017 Ark. App. 364, 525 S.W.3d 490.

The State’s burden of proof is less than is required to convict in a criminal trial, and 

evidence that is insufficient to convict may still support revocation. E.g., Johnson v. State, 2014 

Ark. App. 606, at 4–5, 447 S.W.3d 143, 146. When considering sufficiency challenges, this 

court defers to a circuit court’s superior position in evaluating a witness’s credibility and the 

weight to be given his testimony. E.g., Vangilder v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 385, at 3, 555 S.W.3d 

413, 415.

When probation is imposed, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-303(e)(2) (Supp. 

2021) provides that defendants shall be given a written statement explicitly setting forth the 

conditions under which he or she is being released. E.g., Johnson, 2014 Ark. App. 606, at 6, 

447 S.W.3d at 147. The purpose of this written-notice requirement is to assist a defendant 

in leading a law-abiding life, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-303(a), and to avoid any 
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misunderstanding that a violation of the conditions of a probation sentence may result in its 

revocation. E.g., Gilbreth v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 86, at 6, 596 S.W.3d 29, 33.

III. Discussion

Basham argues that in denying his motion for directed verdict based on the State’s 

failure to produce written, signed conditions of probation showing what, exactly, was 

expected of Basham, the circuit court misapplied Costes, 103 Ark. App. 171, 267 S.W.3d 

639, and Nelson, 84 Ark. App. 373, 141 S.W.3d 900. Both cases dealt with the requirement 

that an objection to the lack of written conditions of probation be raised in the circuit court 

in order for the issue to be preserved for appeal. We agree.

Costes had her probation sentence revoked as a result of a drug offense. This court 

ruled that her argument challenging the results of the search and seizure, which was the basis 

of the petition for revocation, was not preserved for review on appeal. Costes also attempted 

to argue that the State failed to enter into evidence conditions of her probation on which to 

establish any violation. This court ruled that because that argument was raised for the first 

time on appeal, it was likewise not preserved for review.

And in Nelson, Nelson’s revocation hearing was held at the same time as his bench 

trial on new charges. The circuit court found Nelson guilty of the new charges and also 

revoked his probation as a result of the supporting evidence produced at the bench trial. 

Nelson failed to object at the revocation hearing on the basis that he was not furnished a 

written statement of his conditions. This court refused to consider issues raised for the first 

time on appeal. 
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In both Costes and Nelson, this court refused to entertain arguments about the failure 

of the State to produce written conditions of probation. We held that the issue was waived 

because the defendants did not raise the written-conditions argument in circuit court. Both 

cases are clearly distinguishable in that during Basham’s revocation hearing, he specifically 

argued that the failure to introduce signed conditions of probation negated the State’s proof 

that he knew the exact conditions of his probation. Although Costes and Nelson demonstrate 

that a defendant must raise in the circuit court an objection to the failure of the introduction 

of conditions of probation to preserve the issue on appeal, it is clear that Basham’s 

contemporaneous objection regarding the missing conditions of probation in his case cause 

it to procedurally fit squarely within the parameters set out in Costes and Nelson. Accordingly, 

we hold that the issues of the State’s failure to produce written, signed conditions of 

probation and Basham’s lack of exact knowledge thereof are preserved for appellate review.

Recent appellate cases reinforce the importance of the requirement that written 

conditions of probation be given to a defendant. For example, in Ball v. State, 2021 Ark. 

App. 209, at 4, 624 S.W.3d 111, 113, this court noted: 

The reason for the statutory requirement to give a defendant conditions in writing is 

to avoid any misunderstanding. Gilbreth v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 86, 596 S.W.3d 29. 

This requirement comports with due process; circuit courts have no power to imply 

and then later revoke on conditions that were not expressly communicated in writing 

to the defendant. Id. Here, the sentencing order expresses in writing the requirement 

of Ball “to complete 15 days community service.” In fact, the prosecuting attorney 

remarked at the end of the revocation hearing that the sentencing order contained in 

writing the requirement that he complete fifteen days of community service. Ball has 

successfully argued that the State failed to prove that he violated that written 

condition and that the circuit court clearly erred. 
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Basham argues that Ball is important because it is a 2021 case and because it (1) tracks 

the language used by the circuit court to deny Basham’s motion for directed verdict and (2) 

demonstrates the appellate court’s stance on the importance of providing a defendant with 

written conditions of his probation. His point is well taken.

The reason for the statutory requirement to provide written conditions to a defendant 

is to avoid any misunderstanding. Gilbreth, supra. Basham’s argument did not go to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to revoke his probation; rather, it was to challenge the State’s 

failure to produce proof that he had exact knowledge of his conditions of probation. He 

argues that without such proof, the State cannot show that he knowingly violated a specific 

condition.

The revocation case brought by the State relied on a single legal theory—that Basham 

violated specific conditions of his probation. The State’s failure to produce any 

documentation to demonstrate that Basham had ever received and acknowledged any 

specific conditions of his probation—specific conditions alleged by the State to have been 

violated—constitutes reversible error.

The relevant statute clearly sets out that the defendant shall be given a written 

statement explicitly setting forth the conditions under which he is being released. See Ark. 

Code Ann. § 5-4-303(e); Wade, 64 Ark. App. at 112, 983 S.W.2d at 150. Yet the circuit court 

noted in its denial of the directed-verdict motion that it “[w]ould love to in the future if there 

be one see the intake packet because if it contains the items that are testified to by Mr. 

O’Malley, then obviously Mr. Basham received something. It may not have been his exact 
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probation conditions, but it would have advised him of what his obligations are while he is 

on probation.”

Although we cannot know the degree to which the notion of an unintroduced intake 

packet played in the court’s denial of Basham’s motion for directed verdict, its repeated 

reference to the intake packet is concerning. No intake packet was introduced into evidence 

during O’Malley’s testimony, and the circuit court ruled against the State’s belated attempt 

to have it introduced after the close of all the evidence.

Moreover, it would not have been proper for the circuit court to rely on the content 

of exhibits not introduced into evidence. Basham’s counsel argued that O’Malley admitted 

that the intake packet contained incorrect information regarding where payments were to be 

sent, yet the circuit court referenced the rejected intake packet, stating, “If it contains the 

items that are testified to by Mr. O’Malley, then obviously Mr. Basham received something.” 

(Emphasis added.)

That is not what is required by the State’s statutory obligation to provide a defendant 

with written conditions of probation as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-

303 and Wade, supra. There is simply insufficient evidence before us that Basham received—

or understood—the exact and specific conditions of his probation. While Officer O’Malley 

testified that, as was his standard practice, he presented a written copy of the terms of 

probation to Basham in his office on July 27, 2021, and confirmed that Basham understood 

he would be required to report as instructed, not commit any new offenses, and make the 

court-ordered payments, the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from Johnson, 
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supra, on which the State relies for the proposition that compliance with section 5-4-303(e) 

neither requires that a probationer sign a written acknowledgement that he received the 

conditions of his probation nor requires that such documentation be introduced at his 

revocation hearing. See Johnson, 2014 Ark. App. 606, at 6, 447 S.W.3d at 147. We note that

in Johnson, the conditions of probation in question were introduced into evidence over the 

defendant’s objection to a lack of foundation.

We also note that this case is distinguishable from Valencia v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 

176, at 3, in which we affirmed a revocation for failure to pay court-ordered payments despite 

the absence of evidence that the defendant was “served” with the terms and conditions of 

her suspended sentence when the sentencing order itself contained all the necessary 

information regarding the court-ordered payments to put the defendant on notice of the 

requirements and process for payment. The sentencing order in the current case does not 

contain such necessary information regarding Basham’s court-ordered payments.

Reversed and dismissed.

ABRAMSON and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Phillip A. McGough, P.A., by: Phillip A. McGough, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.