J-S74007-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES DANIEL SPORISH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2326 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0003043-2006

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2019

James Daniel Sporish appeals, pro se, from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Delaware County denying his “Motion to Strike the Court 

Clerk’s Cost Assessment.” After our review, we conclude the court of common 

pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, we vacate its order.1

On October 26, 2006, a jury found appellant guilty of rape, aggravated 

assault, sexual assault, terroristic threats, simple assault, and indecent 

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1 Although the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction, this 

Court has appellate jurisdiction because the appeal is from a final order. See

Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), (b)(1). “This situation is analogous to where the common 

pleas court has properly sustained preliminary objections to subject matter 

jurisdiction. An appeal to this Court is proper even though the lower court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, since otherwise, we could never (at least 

theoretically) review such an order.” Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 

151, 152 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003). See also Aronson v. Sprint Spectrum, 

L.P., 767 A.2d 564 (Pa. Super. 2001).
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assault in connection with a savage attack on his paramour. On February 20, 

2007, the court sentenced Sporish to 210 to 540 months’ imprisonment (171⁄2 

to 45 years).2 The sentencing judge also imposed upon Sporish the costs of 

prosecution. See Certificate of Imposition of Judgment of Sentence, 2/20/07. 

On February 15, 2018, the Department of Corrections (DOC) informed 

Sporish that, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(b)(5), it would begin making 

deductions from his inmate account to satisfy his obligations. This statute, 

commonly referred to as Act 84, governs the collection of fines and costs, and 

it authorizes the DOC to make monetary deductions from an inmate’s account 

to pay court-ordered fines and costs. Id. 

On June 17, 2018, Sporish filed a motion/complaint in mandamus

seeking to end the Act 84 deductions. The Honorable John P. Capozzi, Sr., 

denied Sporish’s motion. This appeal followed.

In Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 2003), this 

Court, addressing Danysh’s appeal from the trial court’s order denying his 

motion to stop Act 84 deductions, stated: 

The Commonwealth Court possesses both original and appellate 

jurisdiction. Its original jurisdiction is invoked in various classes 

of cases; relevant here is its original jurisdiction over civil suits 

against statewide governmental actors.[] See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

761(a); see, e.g., Harvey v. Department of Corrections, 823 

A.2d 1106 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (exerting original jurisdiction over 

petition for review seeking injunction against DOC to stop Act 84 

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2 On August 7, 2008, this Court affirmed Sporish’s judgment of sentence, and 

on July 22, 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Sporish, 961 A.2d 1283 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 981 A.2d 219 (Pa. 2009).
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deductions). Danysh’s civil action is against the Commonwealth 

government, as DOC falls within the jurisdictional statute’s

definition of that term. DOC is an administrative agency within 

the Executive Branch, see 71 P.S. § 61 (creating DOC among 

other executive departments), and possesses authority to operate 

the State Correctional Institutions throughout the state. See 71 

P.S. §§ 310-0, 310-1. As operator of the State Correctional 

Institutions, it has a wide range of responsibilities relating to the 

care and treatment of inmates and management of the state 

prisons. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.1 (relating to developing 

treatment for sexual offenders), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (giving DOC 

ultimate decision whether offender will be accepted to boot 

camp); 61 P.S. § 390.301 (authorizing DOC to lease or purchase 

three 1,000-cell prisons, two of which may be “anywhere in this 

Commonwealth”). Since DOC effectuates policy decisions 

throughout Pennsylvania, Danysh's claim against DOC “is an 

action against the Commonwealth government for the purposes 

of determining [Commonwealth Court's] original jurisdiction.” 

[State Board of Dentistry v.] Weltman, 649 A.2d 478, 479 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1994) (holding court of common pleas lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to grant injunction against agency with 

statewide authority).

Danysh, 833 A.2d at 153 (footnote omitted). 

In relevant part, section 761(a) of the Judicial Code provides:

(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any 

officer thereof, acting in his official capacity[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a). Reasoning that Danysh had instituted a civil action 

within the meaning of section 761(a), this Court determined that Danysh 

should have brought his petition as a petition for review of a governmental 

determination under Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. Danysh, 

833 A.2d at 153. See Pa.R.A.P. 1501-1561. We concluded that 

Commonwealth Court had exclusive original jurisdiction and, therefore, the 
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court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction and its order was 

void.3 Id. at 154.4

In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627 (Pa. Super. 2004), this 

Court, sitting en banc, reaffirmed Danysh. There, Jackson appealed from the 

court of common pleas’ order that concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address 

the merits of his petition to stop Act 84 deductions. Applying the Danysh

reasoning, the Jackson Court affirmed, stating, “[t]here is no evidence, 

however, that these deductions are being made pursuant to a request by the 

District Attorney of York County or pursuant to an enforcement order of the 

trial court. Thus, the Commonwealth Court, not the trial court, had original 

jurisdiction over [Jackson’s] petition.” 858 A.2d at 630, citing Danysh, 833 

A.2d at 154. See also Commonwealth v. Parella, 834 A.2d 1253, 1255–

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3

 In Danysh, we observed that in a limited class of cases, a defendant would 

properly seek the relief at issue in the common pleas court. We stated:

This situation would occur where the defendant was in a county 

prison. Because the county authorities would not have statewide 

jurisdiction, the matter would fall outside Commonwealth Court’s 

jurisdiction. That would leave it squarely within the courts of 

common pleas’ original jurisdiction. Whether by inadvertence or 

design, the statutes clearly spell out a different procedure where 

the defendant is incarcerated in a county facility. The General 

Assembly, as one of the democratic branches of government, has 

established the courts’ respective jurisdictions and we cannot 

modify its scheme, once properly established.

833 A.2d at 154. Here, like in Danysh, Sporish is incarcerated in a state 

correctional institution. 

4 Subsequent to this Court’s decision, Danysh did file a petition for review in 

the Commonwealth Court. See Danysh v. Dept. of Corrections, 845 A.2d 

260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
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56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (vacating trial court's order denying motion of inmate, 

serving ten to twenty year term of incarceration in state correctional 

institution, to stop Act 84 deductions because Commonwealth Court has 

original jurisdiction; however, “where the method by which an inmate seeks 

to end Act 84 deductions involves the validity or modification of the underlying 

sentence, original jurisdiction lies with the common pleas court” regardless of 

inmate’s place of confinement).

Similarly, here, Sporish has instituted a civil action within the meaning 

of section 761(a). Sporish should have filed his petition for review of this 

governmental determination by the DOC with the Commonwealth Court, 

naming not only the Commonwealth but also an agency of the Commonwealth 

(the DOC) or an officer thereof, as respondent. 

Because exclusive jurisdiction lies with Commonwealth Court, the court 

of common pleas had no jurisdiction to review the merits of Sporish’s petition. 

We, therefore, vacate the court’s order without prejudice to seek relief in 

Commonwealth Court. Jackson, supra; Danysh, supra. 

Order vacated. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/19