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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

Nos. 113,675

 113,834

CENTRAL KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER, d/b/a 

St. Rose Ambulatory and Surgery Center,

Appellant,

v.

STANLEY M. HATESOHL, M.D.; GREAT BEND 

REGIONAL HOSPITAL, L.L.C.; and 

CENTRAL KANSAS FAMILY PRACTICE, P.C.,

Appellees.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. 

The corporate practice of medicine doctrine forbids a corporation from hiring a 

physician to practice medicine that the corporation itself is not licensed to provide. 

Contracts in violation of this doctrine are illegal and unenforceable. 

2. 

The Legislature created an exception to the corporate practice of medicine 

doctrine that permits a corporation with an ambulatory surgical center license to hire 

physicians to provide medical services within the scope of that license.

3. 

A licensed ambulatory surgical center, as defined by K.S.A. 65-425(f), is 

authorized to operate "primarily for the purpose of performing surgical procedures."
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4. 

On the facts of this case, the physician's family medicine practice fell outside the 

scope of the corporation's ambulatory surgical center license. As a result, his employment 

contract with the corporation was void for violating the corporate practice of medicine 

doctrine. 

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed March 18, 2016. 

Appeal from Barton District Court; RON SVATY, judge. Opinion filed September 7, 2018. Judgment of the 

Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Samuel L. Blatnick, of Kutak Rock LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and G. Mark 

Sappington, Meredith A. Webster, and M. Courtney Koger, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs 

for appellant. 

Stephen H. Netherton, of Hite, Fanning & Honeyman, L.L.P, of Wichita, argued the cause, and 

Arthur S. Chalmers and Randy J. Troutt, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for appellee

Stanley Hatesohl, M.D.

Keynen J. Wall, of Forbes Law Group, LLC, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Michael J. 

Fleming, Frankie J. Forbes, and Quentin Templeton, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for 

appellees Great Bend Regional Hospital, LLC, and Central Kansas Family Practice, P.C.

PER CURIAM: This case arises from a contract dispute between Dr. Stanley 

Hatesohl, a family medicine doctor, and his former employer, Central Kansas Medical 

Center (CKMC), d/b/a St. Rose Ambulatory and Surgery Center (St. Rose). CKMC is a 

nonprofit general corporation that is licensed to operate an ambulatory surgical center 

(ASC). CKMC contracted with Dr. Hatesohl to provide family medicine services at St. 

Rose for two years. This contract contained several postemployment covenants. After 

two years, Dr. Hatesohl resigned and began practicing family medicine at Great Bend 

Regional Hospital's (GBRH) Central Kansas Family Practice clinic (CKFP). 
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CKMC sued Dr. Hatesohl for violating the postemployment covenants and GBRH 

and CKFP for tortiously interfering with the contract. The Barton County District Court 

granted summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that the contract between 

CKMC and Dr. Hatesohl violated the Kansas corporate practice of medicine doctrine.

This doctrine forbids a corporation from hiring a physician to practice medicine that the 

corporation itself is not licensed to provide. The Court of Appeals reversed and 

remanded. 

We conclude the district court was correct and hold the contract between CKMC 

and Dr. Hatesohl violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Consequently, we 

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's grant of 

summary judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dr. Hatesohl is a licensed physician who is board certified in family medicine. In 

September 2012, he moved to Great Bend to practice family medicine at CKMC, d/b/a 

St. Rose. He entered into a two-year employment contract with CKMC to provide family 

medicine services at St. Rose until September 30, 2014. The contract stated that Dr. 

Hatesohl "shall provide a minimum of forty (40) hours of professional Family Medicine 

services at [St. Rose's] Family Medicine clinic, known as St. Joseph Family Medicine 

Clinic . . . or such other site or sites as may be mutually agreed upon." The contract also 

required Dr. Hatesohl to "perform other medical and related duties, including, to the 

extent applicable to a physician practicing Family Medicine, as determined by [St. 

Rose]."

The contract contained postemployment covenants that generally prohibited Dr. 

Hatesohl from doing the following for one year after his employment with St. Rose 
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ended: practicing family medicine within a 50-mile radius of St. Rose; employing St. 

Rose's staff; and soliciting St. Rose's patients and staff. The contract also forbid Dr. 

Hatesohl from disclosing or misusing St. Rose's confidential and proprietary information. 

At first, Dr. Hatesohl worked in St. Rose's family medicine clinic. But soon, 

CKMC integrated its family medicine and urgent care practices into one clinic, called St. 

Rose Family Medicine and Urgent Care. In March 2014, Dr. Hatesohl submitted a letter 

of resignation, citing frustration with the integration. However, he later rescinded his 

resignation and worked at St. Rose for the remainder of the contractual period. 

In August 2014, Dr. Hatesohl notified St. Rose that he would not renew his 

contract. When rumors circulated that Dr. Hatesohl was considering employment nearby, 

Centura Health Corp. (Centura), St. Rose's managing organization, sent him a letter 

stating its intent to enforce the postemployment covenants. Counsel for Dr. Hatesohl 

replied that the covenants were not binding because the contract "violates the Kansas 

prohibitions against the corporate practice of medicine [doctrine]."

On October 1, 2014—the day after his contract with St. Rose expired—Dr. 

Hatesohl entered into an employment contract with GBRH to practice family medicine at

CKFP, which was located across the street from St. Rose. Around that time, Dr. Hatesohl 

forwarded emails from his St. Rose account to his personal one, which contained 

information that St. Rose claims was confidential. At CKFP, Dr. Hatesohl continued to 

treat around 50-60 patients from St. Rose. 

In November 2014, CKMC petitioned for injunctive relief and damages against 

Dr. Hatesohl, GBRH, and CKFP, alleging: (1) Dr. Hatesohl breached his contract by 

competing within a 50-mile radius of St. Rose, soliciting its patients and staff, and 

misappropriating its confidential information; (2) GBRH and CKFP (referred to 

collectively as GBRH from now on) tortiously interfered with Dr. Hatesohl's contract 
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with St. Rose; and (3) Dr. Hatesohl was unjustly enriched. CKMC also moved for a 

restraining order and a temporary injunction to prevent Dr. Hatesohl from violating the 

postemployment covenants. 

Dr. Hatesohl and GBRH countered that the contract was unenforceable because it

violated Kansas' common law prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine, as 

set forth in two key cases: Early Detection Center, Inc. v. Wilson, 248 Kan. 869, 811 

P.2d 860 (1991), and St. Francis Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Weiss, 254 Kan. 728, 869 

P.2d 606 (1994). In Early Detection Center, this court held that "[a] general corporation 

is prohibited from providing medical services or acting through licensed practitioners" 

and any such contract is unenforceable. 248 Kan. at 880. In St. Francis, this court 

recognized a statutory exception that permits a corporation with a hospital license to 

contract for the services of licensed physicians. 254 Kan. at 746. Relying on these cases, 

they argued St. Rose violated the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine 

by acting outside the scope of its ASC license to employ Dr. Hatesohl to practice family 

medicine. 

That same month, the Barton County District Court held a hearing on the motion 

for a restraining order. The court denied that motion and scheduled an evidentiary hearing 

on the temporary injunction motion for December. Meanwhile, CKMC filed a reply in 

support of its motion for a temporary injunction, arguing the St. Francis exception 

extends to any licensed medical care facility, including St. Rose. Thus, CKMC claimed 

St. Rose could employ Dr. Hatesohl without violating the corporate practice of medicine 

doctrine. 

In December 2014, the court held a three-day evidentiary hearing on the 

temporary injunction motion. Leanne Irsik, senior vice-president and site administrator of 

Centura at St. Rose, testified about CKMC's corporate structure and medical licenses. She 

explained that CKMC is a Kansas nonprofit general corporation that operates as St. Rose. 
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At that time, St. Rose offered a variety of medical services that were housed in separate 

departments: primary care, laboratory, imaging, cardiopulmonary/sleep lab, home health 

and hospice, general surgery, and ASC. St. Rose held an ASC medical care facility 

license, as well as pharmacy, home health, and radiation materials licenses. 

Irsik testified that Dr. Hatesohl worked in the primary care clinic called St. Rose 

Family Medicine and Urgent Care. He had privileges to provide consulting services in the 

ASC department but did not have privileges to perform surgeries there. Irsik affirmed that 

family medicine "is a branch of medicine that addresses the care of a patient from the 

beginning to the end of life and focuses on general health and wellness of patients" 

whereas an ASC provides primarily surgical and diagnostic services to patients who can 

stay no longer than 24 hours. She emphasized that the primary care clinic and the ASC 

operated as separate sections of St. Rose and had separate identifying numbers for billing 

purposes. But all payments ultimately flowed to CKMC. 

Irsik also traced the history of CKMC's medical care facility licenses. Until 2011, 

CKMC was licensed as a hospital. But in January 2011, CKMC sent a letter to the Kansas 

Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) declaring its intention to transition to 

"an outpatient model, including comprehensive urgent care services, same-day surgery 

and cancer care." The letter explained, "As part of this transition, CKMC will terminate 

its hospital license and seek licensure for part of its existing facility as an ambulatory 

surgery center. The entire new facility will now be referred to as St. Rose Ambulatory &

Surgery Center." 

In April 2011, the KDHE granted St. Rose a medical care facility license that 

recognized St. Rose as "a Kansas ambulatory surgical center as defined at KAR 28-34-50 

et seq." See K.A.R. 28-34-50(b)(2) (defining an ASC as "an establishment with . . . 

permanent facilities that are equipped and operated primarily for the purpose of 

performing surgical procedures and do not provide services or other accommodations for 
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patients to stay more than 24 hours"). The next month, the KDHE sent a letter confirming 

that CKMC "is no longer doing business as a Kansas licensed general hospital." Since 

then, St. Rose has renewed its ASC license each year. 

The parties entered St. Rose's ASC license applications into evidence. Each 

application asked St. Rose to designate the type of medical care facility license requested: 

general hospital, ASC, critical access hospital, or special hospital. St. Rose checked the 

ASC box each time. Each application also contained a check-box list of "optional 

organized services, departments, or units" and asked St. Rose to indicate any it provided. 

The list included surgery, obstetrical, pediatric, and physical therapy departments, among 

others. St. Rose checked only the "surgery department" box each time. 

Dr. Hatesohl testified on his own behalf. He explained that family medicine is a 

specialty that cares for the whole family, from birth to death. A family medicine 

practitioner may perform minor surgical procedures, such as laceration repair and fracture 

care, but not major ones. As Dr. Hatesohl summarized: 

"We're typically . . . the specialty that patients see first for medical problems. If 

they come in with a cough, shortness of breath, chest pain, typically, we're what are 

considered the gatekeepers of the medical system. . . . [W]e can do some initial testing 

and determine if they need to go see a cardiologist or a pulmonologist, or need to be 

hospitalized, or whether they can, you know, safely have surgery, that sort of issues."

Dr. Hatesohl provided preoperation evaluations for his patients who were going to 

have surgery, no matter where the surgery would take place. He needed no privileges to 

perform these evaluations. But he did have privileges with St. Rose to provide 

consultations to clear patients for surgery. He explained:

"In my role at St. Rose . . . these privileges were specifically for patients that didn't have 

a primary doctor to do pre-op clearance, or they came in that morning of surgery and 
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there was either some sort of issue going on, possibly an abnormal EKG, possibly some 

respiratory difficulties, some sort of issue that the surgeon was questioning whether the 

patient was appropriate to undergo general anesthesia."

However, Dr. Hatesohl did not recall providing this consulting at St. Rose. He 

applied for—but did not receive—privileges to perform minor procedures at St. Rose, 

such as shoulder dislocation and laceration repairs. As a result, Dr. Hatesohl never had 

surgical privileges at St. Rose.

The parties also presented extensive evidence about Dr. Hatesohl's alleged 

contract breaches and the healthcare needs of Great Bend. But that evidence is not 

germane to this appeal, given the procedural posture of the case and the sole question 

petitioned for review—whether the district court erred when it granted summary 

judgment because the contract violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. 

In February 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts, 

claiming the undisputed facts showed that CKMC's ASC license did not cover family 

medicine, and therefore, its contract with Dr. Hatesohl violated the corporate practice of 

medicine doctrine. In response, CKMC moved for summary judgment on its breach of 

contract and tortious interference claims, arguing St. Rose was a licensed medical care 

facility that could contract with Dr. Hatesohl under St. Francis. CKMC also argued that

no Kansas statute or regulation prohibited St. Rose from employing Dr. Hatesohl to 

practice family medicine.

At this point, CKMC moved to join St. Catherine's Hospital (St. Catherine) as a 

necessary plaintiff because CKMC had recently transferred its right to enforce Dr. 

Hatesohl's contract to St. Catherine as part of a corporate change. CKMC also moved for 

leave to file an amended petition, which would assert the following new claims: (1) 

tortious interference against Dr. Hatesohl's wife, Ann Hatesohl; (2) intentional spoliation 
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of evidence against Dr. Hatesohl and Ann; and (3) unjust enrichment against GBRH. Dr. 

Hatesohl did not contest the addition of St. Catherine but reserved the right to challenge

any additional claims against himself and his wife. GBRH opposed only the motion to 

add the unjust enrichment claim. 

Later that month, the district court denied the temporary injunction and granted 

summary judgment for the defendants by email, stating the contract was illegal pursuant 

to Early Detection Center and St. Francis. In April 2015, the court formalized the ruling 

in a journal entry containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, the 

parties dispute only the conclusions of law, which state in relevant part: 

"2. Defendant Hatesohl entered in the Employment Agreement, which is the 

subject of this action, on July 30, 2012 with CKMC. The main provision of the contract 

was his agreement to provide a minimum of 40 hours a week of professional family 

medicine services . . . . At the time of signing the contract, CKMC was not operating 

under a hospital license, but under a license as an ambulatory surgical center ('ASC'), as 

defined in K.S.A. 65-425(f). CKMC never had a license as a hospital during the contract 

time with Defendant Hatesohl. CKMC's ASC license did not authorize it to provide 

family practice medical services in a clinic. 

"3. The Employment Agreement is illegal and thus unenforceable because it 

violates Kansas public policy that forbids a corporation from employing licensed medical 

doctors to provide medical services to third-parties that the corporation is not licensed to 

perform. See Early Detection Center, Inc. v. Wilson, 248 Kan. 869 (1991) ([']A general 

corporation is prohibited from providing medical services or acting through licensed 

practitioners; therefore, there can be no contract between the general corporation and 

third parties to perform medical services').

"4. Wilson also stated, 'it is well settled both in law and equity that the courts 

will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. The law leaves the parties where it found 

them.' Id. at 879. Therefore, the [post-employment] covenants . . . are unenforceable and 

invalid.
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"5. In St. Francis Medical Center, Inc. v. Weiss, 254 Kan. 728 (1994), the 

Court acknowledged its precedent, which rejected corporate ownership of medical 

practices, Id. at 734, but found them distinguishable because the plaintiff was a licensed 

hospital. Weiss does not support the [argument that the] Employment Agreement is 

enforceable because CFMC's [sic] medical license, as an ASC, did not extend to 

provision of family practice medical services in a clinic.

"6. CFMC's [sic] claims of tortious interference with contract and unjust 

enrichment both require the Employment Agreement to have been legal and enforceable. 

Therefore, the above rulings make moot any contentions of interference with contract and 

unjust enrichment." 

For the same reasons, the court denied CKMC's motion for summary judgment 

and motion to amend the petition. The court also declined to add St. Catherine as a 

necessary party because it was in privity with CKMC and bound by the judgment. 

Finally, the court assessed costs against CKMC. CKMC promptly appealed the ruling.

When the parties later disputed costs, the court awarded $3,309.70 to Dr. Hatesohl 

and $1,882.10 to GBRH, with postjudgment interest at the highest amount authorized by 

statute. CKMC appealed the costs order, and the two cases were consolidated on appeal.

In the Court of Appeals, CKMC argued the district court erred by: (1) granting 

summary judgment for the defendants; (2) denying its motion to join St. Catherine as a 

plaintiff; (3) denying its motion to add new claims against the Hatesohls; and (4) 

awarding costs and postjudgment interest to the defendants. The panel reversed on all 

four grounds and remanded for further proceedings. Central Kansas Medical Center v. 

Hatesohl, No. 113,675, 2016 WL 1079481 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion). 

The panel reversed summary judgment for three primary reasons. First, the panel 

believed the district court erroneously held that St. Rose "was the equivalent of its 
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ambulatory surgical center clinic." 2016 WL 1079481, at *18. Instead, the panel believed 

the ASC was just one of many departments within St. Rose. Second, the panel held the 

plain language of the Kansas statutes and regulations governing ASCs does not forbid an 

ASC from providing family medicine services or restrict it to providing only surgery. 

2016 WL 1079481, at *9-10. Third, the panel held the contract did not violate the Kansas 

prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine. In so doing, the panel extended the 

St. Francis exception—for corporations with a hospital license—to corporations with an 

ASC license, like CKMC. 2016 WL 1079481, at *15. 

Dr. Hatesohl and GBRH petitioned for review of the panel's reversal of summary 

judgment. CKMC filed no cross-petition. Thus, the only question before us is whether the 

district court erred when it held the contract between CKMC and Dr. Hatesohl violated 

the Kansas corporate practice of medicine doctrine and granted summary judgment for 

the defendants. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(h)(1) (2018 Kan. S. Ct. R. 56) (generally 

"the issues before the Supreme Court include all issues properly before the Court of 

Appeals which the petition for review or cross-petition allege were decided erroneously 

by the Court of Appeals"). Indeed, the remaining issues depend on whether summary 

judgment was proper in the first place. 

ANALYSIS

The core question in this appeal is whether an exception to the corporate practice 

of medicine doctrine permitted CKMC to lawfully contract with Dr. Hatesohl to practice 

family medicine. To answer this, we must first determine whether the rationale of St. 

Francis—which held that a corporation with a hospital license may contract for the 

services of a physician—applies with equal force to a corporation with an ASC license. If 

so, we must next consider whether Dr. Hatesohl's family medicine practice fell within the 

scope of CKMC's ASC license. This requires us to examine the plain language of the 

medical licensing scheme in tandem with the undisputed facts about Dr. Hatesohl's 
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family medicine practice. The bottom line is, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine 

forbids a corporation from contracting with a physician to practice medicine that the 

corporation itself is not licensed to perform. Any contract in contravention of this 

doctrine is unenforceable. 

We hold the logic of St. Francis permits a corporation with an ASC license to hire 

physicians to practice medicine within the scope of that license. An ASC is authorized to

operate "primarily for the purpose of performing surgical procedures." K.S.A. 65-425(f). 

When an ASC offers a medical service that falls outside this scope, it violates the 

corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Here, Dr. Hatesohl's family medicine practice 

fell outside the scope of CKMC's ASC license because it bore no relation to the surgical 

procedures at St. Rose. Accordingly, we hold the contract between Dr. Hatesohl and 

CKMC is unenforceable, reverse the Court of Appeals, and affirm the district court's 

grant of summary judgment for the defendants. 

The standard for reviewing summary judgment is well established:

'"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may 

reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is 

sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come 

forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude 

summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive 

issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable 

minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment 

must be denied.'" Armstrong v. Bromley Quarry & Asphalt, Inc., 305 Kan. 16, 24, 378 

P.3d 1090 (2016).
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See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-256(c)(2). Thus, we review the district court's grant of 

summary judgment de novo. Netahla v. Netahla, 301 Kan. 693, 696, 346 P.3d 1079 

(2015).

Likewise, the interpretation of statutes and administrative regulations presents

questions of law subject to de novo review. In this endeavor, we must give effect to the 

intent expressed by the plain language of the text. Pener v. King, 305 Kan. 1199, 1208, 

391 P.3d 27 (2017). This means we give common words their ordinary meanings, without 

adding to or subtracting from the text as it appears. We only resort to textual construction 

when the language is ambiguous. State v. Gray, 306 Kan. 1287, 1294, 403 P.3d 1220 

(2017); State v. Prine, 297 Kan. 460, 474-75, 303 P.3d 662 (2013). And we give no 

deference to an agency's interpretation of its regulations. May v. Cline, 304 Kan. 671, 

675, 372 P.3d 1242 (2016). 

The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine 

We begin our analysis by clarifying the contours of the corporate practice of 

medicine doctrine. Beginning with Winslow v. Board of Dental Examiners, 115 Kan. 450, 

452, 223 P. 308 (1924), this court held a corporation cannot practice dentistry through the 

employment of a licensed dentist. The court soon extended this rule to optometry, 

holding that "the practice of the [optometry] profession is limited to individuals, and that 

corporations cannot be chartered to engage therein." State, ex rel., v. Goldman Jewelry 

Co., 142 Kan. 881, 890, 51 P.2d 995 (1935); see State, ex rel., v. Zale Jewelry Co., 179 

Kan. 628, 633, 298 P.2d 283 (1956) (prohibiting a jewelry company from practicing 

optometry through the employment of a licensed optometrist). 

These early decisions rested on "judicial interpretation that the licensure 

requirements apply to persons and not to corporations." Early Detection Center, 248 Kan. 

at 874. For example, Winslow held the licensing scheme contemplated a "personal"
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practice of dentistry because: "Corporations may not be graduated from dental colleges, 

they have neither learning nor skill, and they may not be examined, registered, nor 

licensed as dentists. Therefore the legislature does not permit the organization of a 

domestic corporation to practice dentistry." 115 Kan. at 452. Likewise, Goldman

reasoned that a corporation was disqualified from practicing optometry because the 

governing statutes required an optometrist to be a person who was at least 21 years old 

and possessed certain education credentials. Thus, the corporate practice of medicine 

doctrine derived from the legislative intent inherent in the medical licensing statutes, 

which limited the practice of medicine to licensed persons. 

Next, in Early Detection Center, the court considered whether a general 

corporation could lawfully provide noninvasive vascular testing medical services through 

licensed physicians. Part of the analysis centered on what effect, if any, subsequent 

statutory enactments had on prior caselaw. After the early cases but before Early 

Detection Center, the Legislature enacted the Kansas Healing Arts Act (HAA), K.S.A. 

65-2801 et seq., and the Professional Corporation Law of Kansas (PC Law), K.S.A. 17-

2706 et seq. L. 1957, ch. 343, § 1 (HAA); L. 1965, ch. 157, § 1 (PC Law). Generally, the 

HAA prohibits a person from practicing any branch of the healing arts without a license, 

and the PC Law permits licensed physicians to form professional corporations to provide 

medical services. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 65-2803(a) (HAA); K.S.A. 17-2709(a) and 

K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 17-2707(b)(9) (PC Law). 

The Early Detection Center court construed these acts as supplementing, rather 

than replacing, prior caselaw. As the court explained, 

"The Healing Arts Act was passed in 1957, subsequent to our decision in State, 

ex rel., Fatzer v. Zales Jewelry Co., 179 Kan. 628. The legislature, in drafting the 

language of the Healing Arts Act, did not define or broaden the word 'person' such that its 

meaning differed from our decisions in Winslow, Goldman, and Zales.
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"Where a statute has been construed by the highest court having jurisdiction to 

pass on it, such constructions are as much a part of the statute as was written into it 

originally. All statutes are presumed to be enacted with full knowledge of the existing 

condition of the law and with reference to it. State, ex rel., v. Moore, 154 Kan. 193, 199, 

117 P.2d 598 (1941). The legislature in drafting the language of the Healing Arts Act did 

not change the prior judicial interpretation that the licensure requirements apply to 

persons and not to corporations." 248 Kan. at 873-74. 

The court also noted that the Legislature carved out a statutory exception for 

professional corporations to practice medicine through licensed physicians but did not do 

so for general corporations. 248 Kan. at 875-77. 

Ultimately, the Early Detection Center court affirmed prior caselaw and held that 

"[a] general corporation is prohibited from providing medical services or acting through 

licensed practitioners; therefore, there could be no contract between the general 

corporation and the third parties to perform the services." 248 Kan. at 880. We later

summarized Early Detection Center's rationale this way: 

"This court's basic rationale in refusing to enforce the agreement between Early 

Detection Center and Dr. Wilson was as follows: In Kansas, the practice of medicine 

requires a license. An examination must be taken in order to obtain a license. Because 

only individuals can take examinations, only individuals can be licensed to practice 

medicine. The Zale, Goldman, and Winslow cases, decided in 1956, 1935, and 1924, 

respectively, equated a corporation's employing a licensed professional individual who 

practiced dentistry or optometry with a corporation's practicing that profession. When the 

legislature subsequently enacted the Healing Arts Act, the Professional Corporation Law, 

and the General Corporation Code [K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 17-6001 et seq.], it had the 

opportunity to include provisions which would have changed the judicial interpretation, 

but it did not do so. Thus, the rule that a general corporation is prohibited from providing 

medical services or acting through licensed practitioners still applies." St. Francis, 254 

Kan. at 734-35. 
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Most recently, in St. Francis, this court recognized an exception to the corporate 

practice of medicine doctrine for corporations licensed as hospitals. In St. Francis, a 

nonprofit corporation with a hospital license sought to enforce the liquidated damages 

provision of its employment contract with a doctor who resigned. The doctor moved for 

summary judgment, claiming the contract was unenforceable according to Early 

Detection Center, but the district court denied the motion. On appeal, this court held that 

a corporation with a hospital license could contract for the services of a physician. 254 

Kan. at 746. 

The St. Francis decision hinged on the fact that the corporation was "a hospital 

licensed by the State of Kansas as a medical care facility and a health care provider." 254 

Kan. at 746. In contrast, the corporation in Early Detection Center was an unlicensed 

diagnostic clinic. And this distinction made all the difference. In Early Detection Center, 

the court found no statutory exception to save the corporation from the default rule that 

an unlicensed corporation cannot practice medicine through licensed practitioners. 248

Kan. at 876-77. But the St. Francis court observed that the medical care facility licensing

statutes, K.S.A. 65-425 et seq., not only permit a corporation to be licensed as a hospital 

but also require a licensed hospital to employ physicians to accomplish its statutorily

defined purpose. 254 Kan. at 744-46. 

The St. Francis court explained that K.S.A. 65-425(h) defines "medical care 

facility" as "a hospital, ambulatory surgical center or recuperation center." 254 Kan. at

744; see K.S.A. 65-425(j) (the term "hospital" is divided into three types: "general 

hospital," "critical access hospital," and "special hospital"). These medical care facilities 

must be licensed by the KDHE. K.S.A. 65-427; K.S.A. 65-425(e). As defined by statute, 

a "general hospital" must provide "physician services" and "diagnosis and treatment for 

patients who have a variety of medical conditions." K.S.A. 65-425(a). In the same vein, a 

"special hospital" must provide "physician services" and "diagnosis and treatment for 
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patients who have specified medical conditions." K.S.A. 65-425(b). The court also noted 

that the Kansas Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act (HCPIAA) defines 

"health care provider" to include a "medical care facility licensed by the state of Kansas." 

K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 40-3401(f); 254 Kan. at 737.

Given this, the court held that a corporation licensed as a hospital is required by 

statute to provide physician services to treat patients. 254 Kan. at 744-45. Moreover, the

court reasoned that "[i]t would be incongruous to conclude that the legislature intended a 

hospital to accomplish what it is licensed to do without utilizing physicians as 

independent contractors or employees." 254 Kan. at 745. Thus, the court recognized

"what is and has been a reality for decades—hospitals employ physicians." 254 Kan. at 

745. After all, "[w]ithout physicians, nurses, and medical technicians, a hospital cannot 

achieve that for which it is created and licensed—to treat the sick and injured." 254 Kan. 

at 745. 

Finally, the court determined that permitting licensed hospitals to employ 

physicians would not harm the public welfare or run afoul of prior caselaw. 254 Kan. at 

746. The court distinguished St. Francis from past precedent, explaining: 

"As previously noted, in Early Detection Center, Inc. v. Wilson, 248 Kan. 869, 

811 P.2d 860 (1991), we relied upon the cases of Winslow, Goldman, and Zale. The basic 

rationale for those decisions was that to permit a corporation to practice a licensed 

profession would be injurious to the public welfare. Such a prohibition was necessary to 

protect the public health. . . .

. . . .

"None of these early cases dealt with a hospital's employing a physician nor 

prohibited such employment. None of these cases dealt with a corporation in the business 

of providing health care to the general public. We agree that Early Detection Center

should not be extended beyond its facts and is distinguishable from the present case. 
18

Here, the corporation employing the physician is a hospital licensed by the State of 

Kansas as a medical care facility and a health care provider. This difference is crucial to 

our determination and it distinguishes a hospital from a 'diagnostic clinic,' which was 

involved in Early Detection Center." 254 Kan. at 745-46. 

Therefore, the court held that "neither Kansas case law nor statutory law prohibits 

a licensed hospital from contracting for the services of a physician. Such contracts are not 

contrary to the interest of public health, safety, and welfare and, therefore, are legally 

enforceable." 254 Kan. at 746.

To recap, from Winslow to St. Francis, this court has affirmed the general rule that 

a corporation cannot circumvent the medical licensing scheme by hiring a physician to 

practice medicine that the corporation is not licensed to provide. In Early Detection 

Center, the court recognized that the Legislature—with full knowledge of the corporate 

practice of medicine doctrine—carved out an exception for physicians to form 

professional corporations but did not abolish the default rule. See Cochran v. Kansas

Dept. of Agriculture, 291 Kan. 898, 906, 249 P.3d 434 (2011) ("'[C]ourts presume the 

legislature acts with knowledge of existing statutory and case law when it enacts 

legislation.'"); City of Haven v. Gregg, 244 Kan. 117, 122, 766 P.2d 143 (1988) ("In 

Kansas, the common law remains in force, unless modified by constitutional amendment, 

statutory law, or judicial decision."). Later in St. Francis, the court held another statutory 

exception exists for corporations licensed as hospitals.

Because no party asks us to overturn this precedent, we apply it on the basis of 

stare decisis and will not question its validity sua sponte. See Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 

Kan. 358, 362-63, 361 P.3d 504 (2015) ("points of law established by a court are 

generally followed by the same court and courts of lower rank in later cases in which the 

same legal issue is raised"); Rhoten v. Dickson, 290 Kan. 92, 117, 223 P.3d 786 (2010) 

("Appellate courts do not ordinarily consider issues the parties failed to raise unless an 
19

issue's consideration is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of 

fundamental rights."). Accordingly, we now turn to the question presented: whether an 

exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine allowed CKMC to contract with 

Dr. Hatesohl to practice family medicine.

An exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine permits an ASC to hire 

physicians to practice medicine within the scope of the ASC license.

At the outset, we note that no party directs us to any statute that authorizes a 

general corporation to provide medical services without a medical care facility license. 

And upon our review, we also found none. Given this, CKMC's power to provide family 

medicine services must arise from its ASC license.

Generally, St. Francis charts the course for a corporation with an ASC license to 

lawfully hire physicians within the bounds of its statutorily defined purpose. Like the 

licensed hospital in St. Francis, a licensed ASC is a "medical care facility" and "health 

care provider" under the relevant statutes. See K.S.A. 65-425(h) (defining "medical care 

facility" to include an ASC); K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 40-3401(f) (defining "health care 

provider" under the HCPIAA to include "a medical care facility licensed by the state of 

Kansas"). As the Court of Appeals said, 

"It makes little practical sense to allow a licensed hospital to contract for the services of a 

physician but to prohibit a licensed ambulatory surgical center from contracting for the 

services of a physician since both of these entities are included within the definition of a 

'medical care facility' at K.S.A. 65-425(h)." Hatesohl, 2016 WL 1079481, at *15. 
20

But more importantly, the statutory definition of an ASC plainly calls for the 

employment of physicians to treat patients. K.S.A. 65-425(f) defines an ASC as: 

"an establishment with an organized medical staff of one or more physicians; with 

permanent facilities that are equipped and operated primarily for the purpose of 

performing surgical procedures; with continuous physician services during surgical 

procedures and until the patient has recovered from the obvious effects of anesthetic and 

at all other times with physician services available whenever a patient is in the facility; 

with continuous registered professional nursing services whenever a patient is in the 

facility; and which does not provide services or other accommodations for patient to stay 

more than 24 hours. Before discharge from an ambulatory surgical center, each patient 

shall be evaluated by a physician for proper anesthesia recovery. Nothing in this section 

shall be construed to require the office of a physician or physicians to be licensed under 

this act as an ambulatory surgical center." (Emphasis added.) 

The corresponding regulation contains the same definition, though organized differently. 

See K.A.R. 28-34-50(b) (defining an ASC). 

In this way, the definition of an ASC expressly requires the employment of 

physicians to practice medicine—such as performing surgery, administering anesthesia, 

and monitoring recovery—in order to operate "primarily for the purpose of performing 

surgical procedures." K.S.A. 65-425(f). Furthermore, the implementing regulations 

require an ASC to hire medical staff to carry out its purpose. See K.S.A. 65-431(a) (the 

KDHE "shall adopt, amend, promulgate and enforce such rules and regulations and 

standards with respect to the different types of medical care facilities to be licensed 

hereunder"). For example, the regulations state that an ASC "shall have an organized 

medical staff," which may include surgeons, anesthesiologists, and even dentists. 

K.A.R. 28-34-54(a); see K.A.R. 28-34-54(e) (surgeons); K.A.R. 28-34-56a(b)(1) 

(anesthesiologists); K.A.R. 28-34-50(p) (dentists). In light of this, it would be 
21

"incongruous" to conclude that the Legislature intended an ASC "to accomplish what it is 

licensed to do without utilizing physicians as independent contractors or employees."

St. Francis, 254 Kan. at 745. Indeed, it would be absurd. See Northern Natural Gas Co. 

v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906, 918, 296 P.3d 1106 (2013) ("we must 

construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results"). Thus, a corporation with an 

ASC license may, if not must, hire licensed physicians to comply with these rules.

Our decision in St. Francis was premised on the fact that the Legislature 

authorized corporations licensed as hospitals to provide medical services to the public. So 

too here: the Legislature authorized corporations licensed as ASCs to provide medical 

services, and it is within the Legislature's power to create such exception to the corporate 

practice of medicine doctrine. As the Illinois Supreme Court aptly said: 

"[T]he General Assembly has broad regulatory power with respect to the health-care 

professions, and it is within the discretion of the legislature to not only determine what is 

required in the public interest and welfare, but also to determine the measures needed to 

secure such interest. . . . It is within the province of the legislature, in the exercise of its 

broad regulatory power, to expand the exception to the corporate practice doctrine by 

expanding the types of corporate entities that are required to submit to licensing 

requirements and regulatory oversight before they may provide medical services to the 

public. In this way, a corporation, wishing to employ physicians, may demonstrate its 

qualifications and accept its responsibilities as a licensed and regulated participant in the 

medical care system." Carter-Shields, M.D. v. Alton Health Inst., 201 Ill. 2d 441, 462, 

777 N.E.2d 948 (2002). 

Therefore, we hold the corporate practice of medicine doctrine does not apply to a 

corporation with an ASC license that operates in compliance with statutory and 

regulatory mandates. 
22

At this point, we pause to resolve a disagreement between the lower courts and 

clarify the analytical path forward. In short, the lower courts disagreed about whether

CKMC's ASC license applied to the entire facility or just the "ASC," or surgery 

department. The district court held CKMC's ASC license covered the entire facility, and 

all of its departments fell under that umbrella. But the Court of Appeals held CKMC's 

ASC license applied to a subset of medical services, like its pharmacy, home health, and 

radiation materials licenses. Hatesohl, 2016 WL 1079481, at *8. We adopt the district 

court's view because it best reflects the medical care facility licensing framework, as 

summarized below, and clarify that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine requires 

Dr. Hatesohl's practice to fall within the scope of CKMC's ASC license. 

A corporation may apply to the KDHE to obtain a license to operate a medical 

care facility. K.A.R. 28-34-127(a) (2017 Supp.) ("Any person desiring to operate a 

facility shall apply for a license on forms provided by the department."); K.A.R. 28-34-

126(j) (2017 Supp.) ("'Person' means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, 

company, association, or joint-stock association, and the legal successor thereof."); 

K.S.A. 65-425(c) (same definition of "person"). Again, a "medical care facility" is 

defined as "a hospital, ambulatory surgical center or recuperation center." K.S.A. 65-

425(h). Each type of medical care facility is authorized to provide a distinct scope of 

medical services. See K.S.A. 65-431(c) ("In formulating rules and regulations, the 

[licensing] agency shall give due consideration to the size of the medical care facility, the 

type of service it is intended to render, the scope of such service and the financial 

resources in and the needs of the community which such facility serves."). For example, a 

"general hospital" must provide medical services "for not less than 24 hours of every 

day" in order "to provide diagnosis and treatment for patients who have a variety of 

medical conditions." K.S.A. 65-425(a). In contrast, an ASC must be "equipped and 

operated primarily for the purpose of performing surgical procedures" and cannot 

"provide services or other accommodations for patient to stay more than 24 hours."

K.S.A. 65-425(f); K.A.R. 28-34-50(b). 
23

To carry out its mission, a medical care facility may provide medical services that

require separate licensing. For example, K.A.R. 28-34-59a(a) states: "The ambulatory 

surgical center shall provide, either directly or through agreement, laboratory, radiology, 

and pharmacy services to meet the needs of the patients." If an ASC provides these 

services directly, then it must follow the rules specific to those services, which are 

separately licensed and regulated. See K.A.R. 28-34-59a(b)(1) (A laboratory "shall hold a 

valid CLIA certificate for the type and complexity of all tests performed."); 42 C.F.R. 

§ 493.1 et seq. (Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 [CLIA]); K.A.R. 

28-34-59a(d) (Radiology services "shall meet the requirements specified in K.S.A. 48-

1607, and amendments thereto."); K.S.A. 48-1607(a) and K.S.A. 48-1603(o) (authorizing 

the secretary of the KDHE to provide rules for radioactive material licensing); K.A.R. 28-

35-175a (2017 Supp.) et seq. (radioactive material licensing rules); K.A.R. 28-34-59a(h) 

("The pharmaceutical service . . . shall be provided in accordance with K.A.R. 68-7-11."); 

K.A.R. 68-7-11 (pharmacy rules).

Taken together, these statutes and regulations establish that a corporation may be 

licensed to operate a medical care facility, and each type of medical care facility is 

authorized to provide a distinct scope of medical services. Within that scope, a medical 

care facility may (or in some circumstances, must) provide medical services that require 

separate licensing. CKMC's ASC license authorized it to operate "primarily for the 

purpose of performing surgical procedures." K.S.A. 65-425(f); K.A.R. 28-34-50(b). To 

accomplish this purpose, CKMC was required to provide laboratory, radiology, and 

pharmacy services (called "ancillary services") to meet the needs of patients. K.A.R. 28-

34-59a(a). Thus, the district court correctly held that CKMC's ASC license covered the 

facility as a whole. Because of this, Dr. Hatesohl's practice—like any medical service 

CKMC offered—had to fall within the scope of its ASC license to satisfy the corporate 

practice of medicine doctrine.
24

Dr. Hatesohl's family medicine practice fell outside the scope of CKMC's ASC license, 

and as a result, his contract with CKMC violated the corporate practice of medicine 

doctrine.

If CKMC hired Dr. Hatesohl to perform surgery, this case would end here. The 

Legislature created an exception to the corporate practice of medicine doctrine for a 

corporation with an ASC license to hire physicians to practice medicine within the scope 

of that license: to operate "primarily for the purpose of performing surgical procedures." 

K.S.A. 65-425(f). Of course, performing surgery falls within that scope. But Dr. Hatesohl 

was hired to practice family medicine, and it is undisputed that he had no privileges to 

perform surgical procedures at St. Rose. At most, he had consulting privileges to clear 

patients for surgery, which he never used. Thus, we next consider the plain language of 

K.S.A. 65-425, as well as the implementing regulations, to determine whether Dr. 

Hatesohl's practice fell within the scope of an ASC license. 

K.S.A. 65-425 does not mention family medicine, so to speak. K.S.A. 65-425(f) 

defines an ASC as an establishment "with permanent facilities that are equipped and 

operated primarily for the purpose of performing surgical procedures" that provides 

continuous physician services during surgical procedures and recovery. The statute also 

contemplates the administration of anesthesia and limits a patient's stay to 24 hours. 

Beyond this, the statute is silent about what medical services an ASC may provide while 

operating "primarily for the purpose of performing surgical procedures." K.S.A. 65-

425(f). The parties debate how to construe this language and how the list of "ancillary 

services" in K.A.R. 28-34-59a(a) informs its meaning. 

Dr. Hatesohl and GBRH argue K.S.A. 65-425(f) limits the scope of an ASC 

license to medical services that are integral to surgery. To illustrate, they contrast a 

general hospital's broad mandate to "provide diagnosis and treatment for patients who 

have a variety of medical conditions," with an ASC's narrow mandate to operate 
25

"primarily for the purpose of performing surgical procedures." Compare K.S.A. 65-

425(a) with K.S.A. 65-425(f). They point out that an ASC is the only medical care 

facility that, by definition, cannot accommodate a patient more than 24 hours, suggesting

it was designed for same-day surgery. See generally K.S.A. 65-425. They also claim the 

list of "ancillary services" that an ASC must provide is either exclusive or, at the very 

least, informative about what services are integral to surgery. See K.A.R. 28-34-59a(a). 

In sum, they argue Dr. Hatesohl's practice did not belong in an ASC because it was not 

integral to surgery.

CKMC claims K.S.A. 65-425(f) and the related regulations give ASCs wide 

latitude to offer medical services apart from surgery. CKMC emphasizes that K.S.A. 65-

425(f) does not require ASCs to provide surgery exclusively. Similarly, CKMC argues the 

list of "ancillary services" in K.A.R. 28-34-59a(a) is not exclusive but instead sets 

minimum requirements. CKMC also points out that no statute or regulation prohibits an 

ASC from providing family medicine services. In essence, CKMC argues an ASC may 

provide family medicine services because nothing prohibits it from doing so. 

The Court of Appeals agreed with CKMC, reasoning: 

"Both K.S.A. 65-425(f) and the corresponding administrative regulation, K.A.R. 28-34-

50(b), state that an ambulatory surgical center is 'an establishment . . . with permanent 

facilities that are equipped and operated primarily for the purpose of performing surgical 

procedures.' (Emphasis added.) The statute and regulation do not say 'operated 

exclusively for the purpose of performing surgical procedures,' and GBRH points to no 

authority for such a limited reading.

"As CKMC points out, it was also licensed to provide services other than surgical 

procedures; it held licenses for its pharmacy, home health agency, and radiation 

materials. No party points to any statute or regulation that requires a specific license for a 

medical care facility to offer family medicine services. In addition, K.A.R. 28-34-59a(a)

actually requires ambulatory surgical centers to 'provide, either directly or through 
26

agreement, laboratory, radiology, and pharmacy services to meet the needs of the 

patients.' The fact that the legislature expressly allows an ambulatory surgical center to 

directly provide services other than surgical procedures flies in the face of [the] notion 

that Kansas policy limits an ambulatory service center to only provide surgical services." 

2016 WL 1079481, at *9. 

In the end, the panel suggested that an ASC could provide a broad scope of 

medical services, stating: "Like a hospital, an ambulatory surgical center may—and in 

some cases must—provide services other than those directly involving surgery, especially 

when the facility is also licensed to provide other medical services including a pharmacy, 

home health services, and radiation services." 2016 WL 1079481, at *15.

We agree with CKMC and the panel that the scope of an ASC license is not 

limited exclusively to surgical procedures. But we disagree that the scope is expansive 

enough to cover Dr. Hatesohl's family medicine practice, which bore no relation to St. 

Rose's surgical procedures.

The plain language of K.S.A. 65-425(f) requires an ASC to operate "primarily for 

the purpose of performing surgical procedures." Clearly, a medical service that is 

necessary to perform surgery safely falls within this scope. For example, the list of 

"ancillary services" falls into this category. See K.A.R. 28-34-59a(a) ("The ambulatory 

surgical center shall provide . . . laboratory, radiology, and pharmacy services to meet the 

needs of the patients." [Emphasis added.]). Indeed, common experience tells us that a 

person undergoing a surgical procedure may need to have an x-ray done, blood taken, or 

medicine prescribed. But importantly, the list of "ancillary services" is not exclusive. 

K.A.R. 28-34-59a(a) contains no language that limits an ASC to providing only the 

medical services listed or prohibits it from providing additional ones. And elsewhere, the 

ASC regulations mention other medical services that may be necessary for surgery, such 

as dentistry or anesthesiology. See K.A.R. 28-34-54(l) (dentistry); K.A.R. 28-34-

56a(b)(1) (anesthesiology). Thus, the regulations establish the minimum set of services 
27

that an ASC must offer while permitting it to provide additional medical services to meet 

the needs of patients. 

At the other end of the spectrum, a medical service that bears no relation to 

surgical procedures falls outside the scope of an ASC license. K.S.A. 65-425 authorizes a 

general hospital to treat a variety of medical conditions but limits an ASC to operating 

primarily for surgery. To permit an ASC to provide medical services that are unrelated to 

its surgical purpose would erase the distinction the Legislature made between the medical 

care facilities and would defy K.S.A. 65-425's plain language. That said, we will not 

determine the fate of medical services that lie between these two extremes today because 

the facts do not present the opportunity to do so. Based on the facts specific to this case, 

we hold Dr. Hatesohl's family medicine practice fell outside the scope of CKMC's ASC 

license because it bore no relation to the surgical procedures at St. Rose. 

The relevant facts are undisputed. CKMC contracted with Dr. Hatesohl only to 

practice family medicine, which is a specialty that cares for the family from birth to death 

and serves as a gatekeeper to the medical system. Though Dr. Hatesohl could perform 

minor surgical procedures as part of this specialty, CKMC denied his application for 

privileges to do so. Furthermore, the relationship between Dr. Hatesohl's practice and the

surgery department at St. Rose was tenuous at best. As part of his practice, Dr. Hatesohl 

provided preoperation evaluations for his patients, no matter where they planned to have 

surgery—it was not specific to St. Rose. Though Dr. Hatesohl had privileges at St. Rose 

to clear patients for surgery who had no primary care doctor, he never used them. This 

suggests that such consultations were not part of Dr. Hatesohl's regular practice. To 

summarize, Dr. Hatesohl never had surgical privileges with St. Rose; he supplied no 

medical services to the surgery department; and CKMC hired him to provide primary 

care, nothing more. 
28

In conclusion, the evidence shows that Dr. Hatesohl's family medicine practice 

bore no relation to the surgical procedures at St. Rose. Because of this, Dr. Hatesohl's 

practice fell outside the scope of CKMC's ASC license. Put differently, CKMC hired Dr. 

Hatesohl to practice medicine that the corporation was not licensed to perform. This 

means the contract between Dr. Hatesohl and CKMC violated the corporate practice of 

medicine doctrine. 

"[I]t is well settled both in law and in equity that the courts will not aid either party 

to an illegal agreement." Early Detection Center, 248 Kan. at 879; see Petty v. City of El 

Dorado, 270 Kan. 847, 854, 19 P.3d 167 (2001) ("The public policy of a state is the law 

of that state as found in its constitution, its statutory enactments, and its judicial 

decisions. . . . Contracts in contravention of public policy are void and unenforceable."); 

Wycoff v. Quick Way Homes, Inc., 201 Kan. 442, 447, 441 P.2d 886 (1968) ("Illegal 

contracts are generally unenforceable."). Because the contract between Dr. Hatesohl and 

CKMC is unenforceable, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court's 

grant of summary judgment for the defendants. 

Reversed. 

* * *

STEGALL, J., concurring: The corporate practice of medicine doctrine is a judicial 

innovation. The doctrine "was based on a judicial interpretation, which had not been 

expressly overturned by legislation, rather than on any statutory provision(s)." St. Francis 

Regional Med. Center, Inc. v. Weiss, 254 Kan. 728, 736, 869 P.2d 606 (1994). This 

"judicial interpretation" arose from the belief that "to permit a corporation to practice a 

licensed profession would be injurious to the public welfare" and from a desire to 

"protect the public health." 254 Kan. at 745-46.
29

Infirm from the start, the doctrine amounts to an injection of judicial lawmaking 

into a realm of public policy traditionally reserved to the Legislature. See In re Gunn, 

Petitioner, 50 Kan. 155, 223, 32 P. 948 (1893) (Allen, J., dissenting) ("Generally 

speaking, the courts have nothing to do with matters of policy, or with the determination 

of questions as to the expression of the popular will."). More perniciously, the doctrine is 

a species of rent-seeking, coopting this court and its power to make common law in favor 

of a private interest group (in this case organized medical professionals) in order to 

provide shelter from economic competition—all under the guise of public safety and 

welfare. See District Intown Properties v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 885 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., concurring) ("While the resulting proposals are naturally 

advanced in the name of the public good, many are surely driven by interest-group 

purposes, commonly known as 'rent-seeking.'"). Finally, economic and legal changes in 

the century since the adoption of the doctrine have both highlighted its inefficiencies and 

undermined its effectiveness. For these reasons, in the appropriate case, we ought to 

reconsider and discard the doctrine altogether. 

BACKGROUND

In Winslow v. Board of Dental Examiners, 115 Kan. 450, 223 P. 308 (1924), we 

first held a corporation could not practice dentistry through the employment of a licensed 

dentist because: "Corporations may not be graduated from dental colleges, they have 

neither learning nor skill, and they may not be examined, registered, nor licensed as 

dentists. Therefore the legislature does not permit the organization of a domestic 

corporation to practice dentistry." 115 Kan. at 452. In so holding, we said a "personal"—

as opposed to corporate—practice of dentistry was necessary "to protect the public from 

ignorance, unskillfulness, unscrupulousness, deception, and fraud." 115 Kan. at 451-52. 

We even declared the corporate practice of dentistry was "gravely reprehensible from the 

standpoint of morality." 115 Kan. at 452. Thus, without any textual command, we 

"inferred a legislative intent to establish a corporate practice of medicine ban based upon 
30

these public policy grounds." Comment, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate 

Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health 

Care Environment, 47 Emory L.J. 697, 706 (1998).

Arguably the judicial inference of legislative intent drawn by the Winslow court 

arose as a judicial gloss on a statutory scheme that did not give medical licenses to 

corporations. A cursory examination, however, demonstrates that the rule cannot be 

justified as any species of statutory interpretation. Indeed, in what sense would a 

corporation employing a dentist be practicing dentistry? The dentist is the license holder 

and the practitioner. The manner in which the dentist chooses to organize his or her 

business affairs is entirely untouched by the licensure scheme. Much later, in St. Francis, 

we obliquely acknowledged the common law grounding of our corporate practice of 

medicine doctrine when we noted that the rule was not "based . . . on any statutory 

provision." 254 Kan. at 736. Instead, this common law rule was anchored half-heartedly 

in the statutory scheme with a dubious logical leap that "equated a corporation's 

employing a licensed professional individual who practiced dentistry or optometry with a 

corporation's practicing that profession." 254 Kan. at 735. 

Other courts adopting a judicial ban on the corporate practice of medicine 

followed a similar analytical path. As the Minnesota Supreme Court summarized: 

"When adopted by state courts, the general prohibition on corporate employment of 

licensed health care professionals has been based on a corporation's inability to satisfy the 

training and licensure requirements set out in state statutes and related public policy 

considerations. . . . The related public policy considerations underlying the prohibition on 

corporate practice of a profession include concerns raised by the specter of lay control 

over professional judgment, commercial exploitation of health care practice, and the 

possibility that a health care practitioner's loyalty to a patient and an employer will be in 

conflict." See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 517 

(Minn. 2005).
31

Thus, the ban against the corporate practice of medicine took root in fear—fear 

that the quality of medical care would suffer from divided loyalty, lay control, and 

commercial exploitation. See People v. Cole, 38 Cal. 4th 964, 971, 135 P.3d 669, 44 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 261 (2006) ("Courts have said that the ban on the corporate practice of medicine 

'is intended to ameliorate "the evils of divided loyalty and impaired confidence" which 

are thought to be created when a corporation solicits medical business from the general 

public and turns it over to a special group of doctors, who are thus under lay control.'"); 

Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 688 N.E.2d 106 (1997) 

("The prohibition on the corporate employment of physicians is invariably supported by 

several public policy arguments which espouse the dangers of lay control over 

professional judgment, the division of the physician's loyalty between his patient and his 

profitmaking employer, and the commercialization of the profession."); see also 

Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of 

Medicine Doctrine, 14 Health Matrix 243, 251-52 (2004) (citing three "major concerns" 

that "played a part in creating and extending the corporate practice of medicine doctrine": 

divided loyalty, lay control over medical decision-making, and commercial exploitation 

of physicians). 

This fear was sowed long ago by a special interest group, the American Medical 

Association (AMA). That the AMA formulated and promoted the doctrine as a form of 

economic protectionism is well-documented. See generally Gustavson & Taylor, At 

Death's Door—Idaho's Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 47 Idaho L. Rev. 479 

(2011); Huberfeld, 14 Health Matrix 243; Freiman, 47 Emory L.J. 697; Chase-Lubitz,

The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health 

Care Industry, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 445 (1987). The AMA was created in the mid-1800s to 

legitimize the medical profession by imposing higher standards and weeding out the 

"quackery" of lay doctors. 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 449; 14 Health Matrix at 245-46. At first, 

the AMA worked to establish an ethical code, enact medical licensing statutes, and 
32

reform medical education. 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 450-55; 47 Idaho L. Rev. at 484-88. But 

soon the AMA became the medical profession's "central source of power and policymaking." 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 454. 

In the early 1900s, "the AMA targeted a new economic threat to its member 

physicians and their control of the medical profession—the ever-increasing rate of 

corporate involvement in the practice of medicine." 47 Idaho L. Rev. at 488-89; see 40 

Vand. L. Rev. at 455. As one scholar summarized, the corporate threat generally took two 

forms: 

"In the first form, popularly known as contract practice, corporations employed 

physicians to serve the medical needs of employees. In the isolated industries of railroad, 

mining, and lumbering, doctors contracted to treat employees for a predetermined salary. 

Corporations in smaller and more urban industries contracted with independent 

physicians to provide medical care to the corporations' employees for a set rate per 

worker per month. Under both schemes the corporation dictated the choice of physicians.

"In the second form, known as corporate practice, for-profit medical service 

companies marketed physicians' services to the public. Corporate practice developed in 

its largest scale in Oregon and Washington in the early 1900s. Corporations in these 

states contracted with mining and lumber companies to provide medical services to 

company employees for a fixed rate per worker. The corporations first employed their 

own doctors to perform these services, but later subcontracted the work to independent 

doctors. Although physicians founded these corporations, eventually they were managed 

by lay people. Corporate management maintained limited control over the doctors with 

whom they contracted. Management required second opinions before surgery, reviewed 

the length of hospital stays, and refused to pay fees deemed excessive.

"Contract and corporate practice raised myriad concerns among the medical 

establishment. Contract or corporate practice, critics argued, would force doctors to 

maintain a high patient load and, thus, the quality of services delivered would deteriorate.

Furthermore, fixed salaries and fees repudiated the traditional fee-for-service mechanism
33

that allowed physicians to value their own services and, as a result, control their own 

income levels. Fixed salaries and fees paid for indefinite volumes of work, however, 

would result in low earnings and potential out-of-pocket expenses for physicians.

"Opponents of contract and corporate practice also complained that these 

schemes forced doctors to bid against each other for contracts, thus driving their 

reimbursements down to unconscionable levels. The schemes also threatened the 

profession's monopolistic designs by creating stiff competition with individual physicians 

and by permitting lay persons to make policy decisions concerning which patients a 

doctor could see and the amount of services a doctor could provide." 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 

456-58.

See 47 Idaho L. Rev. at 489-90; 14 Health Matrix at 247-48.

In response, the AMA introduced the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. It 

did so "in an effort for doctors to gain better control over the medical profession and to 

prevent the commercialization of the profession through the introduction of profit-making 

incentives." 47 Emory L.J. at 697-98; see 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 455 (describing the 

corporate practice of medicine as a threat to physician autonomy and an unwanted source 

of competition). The AMA argued the corporate practice of medicine would cause 

physician loss of control and "would (i) divide physician loyalty between corporate 

employers and patients, (ii) introduce nonprofessional control over medical decisionmaking, (iii) and sacrifice quality medical care for the sake of for-profit considerations."

47 Idaho L. Rev. at 490-91. The AMA also wove the doctrine into its ethical code. 47 

Emory L.J. at 701-03; 47 Idaho L. Rev. at 491-93. For example, one amendment to the 

code stated that any contract permitting a lay entity to profit directly from the provision 

of medical services is "'beneath the dignity of professional practice, is unfair competition 

with the profession at large, is harmful alike to the profession of medicine and the welfare 

of the people, and is against sound public policy.'" 47 Emory L.J. at 703 (quoting Laufer, 
34

Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice of Medicine, 6 Law 

& Contemp. Probs. 516, 519 [1939]). 

State courts, "heavily influenced by the AMA's articulation of the public policy 

concerns with the corporate practice of medicine, soon established corporate practice of 

medicine doctrines by expansively interpreting state medical practice acts as prohibiting 

the corporate practice of medicine." 47 Idaho L. Rev. at 493; see 14 Health Matrix at 252 

(courts embraced the AMA's arguments against the corporate practice of medicine in the 

early 1900s). In sum, "the existence of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is 

dependent upon sometimes strained interpretations of statutory language in light of the 

various public policy grounds which led the AMA to pursue the doctrine more than 

eighty years ago." 47 Emory L.J. at 732-33. 

ANALYSIS

In light of this history, it is worth asking—does the public interest truly justify a 

judicial ban against the corporate practice of medicine? And was it our job to enter this 

policy debate (and side with one interest group) in the first place? Finally, what are the 

constitutional restraints—if any—on laws that exhibit naked rent-seeking? I will explore 

each question briefly in turn. 

As today's case illustrates, when exceptions begin to swallow the rule, the original 

policy explanations for the rule become suspect. Courts across the country have chipped 

away at the doctrine by recognizing exceptions for professional corporations, hospitals, 

and the like: 

"By 1971, all states had enacted statutes allowing physicians to practice through 

professional corporations, although such laws generally restrict share ownership to 

licensed professionals. Courts in jurisdictions with corporate practice bars have long 
35

taken judicial notice of the fact that hospitals and their affiliates employ physicians, and 

enforcement of restrictive doctrines in some of these jurisdictions is notoriously lax. In 

some jurisdictions, courts have gone out of their way to infer exceptions for specific 

practices, such as employment of physicians by teaching hospitals, private hospitals, 

federal military hospitals, and employers engaging 'company doctors' for employees." 

Fichter, Owning A Piece of the Doc: State Law Restraints on Lay Ownership of 

Healthcare Enterprises, 39 J. Health L. 1, 6-7 (2006). 

Kansas also jumped on the bandwagon. First we recognized exceptions for 

professional corporations and licensed hospitals, and now we recognize one for licensed 

ASCs. In St. Francis, we held the corporate practice of medicine by licensed hospitals is 

"not contrary to the interest of public health, safety, and welfare." 254 Kan. at 746. Today 

we hold the same for licensed ASCs (and, by extension, for all licensed medical care 

facilities). And for good reason—it appears the Legislature authorized corporations to 

practice medicine in these ways to promote the public welfare.

I also question the viability of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine given 

the dramatic changes that have swept the healthcare industry since its inception. Put 

simply, with the rising costs of healthcare, the solo practitioner making house calls has 

become obsolete and the shift to integrated medicine is well underway. See 47 Emory 

L.J. at 738 ("The trend towards integration encompasses both the high level of merger 

activity among hospitals and the movement of physicians away from solo practices and 

toward group practices."); 14 Health Matrix at 257 ("Solo practitioners and small group 

practices increasingly are falling by the wayside as larger group practices and affiliations 

with hospitals become the norm, if for no other reason than the need for cost savings."). 

Furthermore, the modern healthcare market is dominated by corporate managed care 

organizations (MCO) and their "cost-minimizing" approach. 47 Emory L.J. at 740; see 

Harris & Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can 

Learn from the Medical Profession's Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 

775, 813 (2001) (explaining how "the old system of fee-for-service reimbursement and 
36

physician control over the delivery of medical services began to crumble" because of 

rising healthcare costs, paving the way for the rise of MCOs). Given this, the corporate 

practice of medicine doctrine seems impractical at best.

But even more troubling, the doctrine may deny access to medical services for 

rural and low-income populations. As one scholar explains, "[p]hysicians especially have 

a disincentive to practice in rural or remote areas, which inherently pose significant 

economic risks due to their size and disadvantaged status," and therefore, "[a] prohibition 

on the corporate practice of medicine limits the more efficient and economical forms in 

which a physician can practice . . . effectively endangering rural access to health care." 47 

Idaho L. Rev. at 518. As another scholar argues, "there is ample evidence that the 

doctrine raises prices and decreases access to legal and medical services, and there is no 

countervailing evidence that it increases the quality of services rendered." Robertson, 

Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 179, 225 

(2014).

Finally, and perhaps most telling, the AMA was forced to lift its ethical ban 

against the corporate practice of medicine. Isles Wellness, 703 N.W.2d at 528 (Hanson, 

J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); 47 Emory L.J. at 710-11. In 1979, the Federal 

Trade Commission (FTC) determined the AMA engaged in unfair methods of 

competition by "keeping physicians from adopting what may be more economically 

efficient business formats" through its ethical bans on the corporate practice of medicine. 

Matter of the Am. Med. Assoc., 94 F.T.C. 701, 1979 WL 199033, at *241 (1979); see 14 

Health Matrix at 255-56. Ultimately, the FTC ordered the AMA to cease and desist from 

restricting such business formats. 1979 WL 199033, at *251. Thus, the ethical impetus 

for the doctrine no longer exists. 

Because I suspect the doctrine has, at least, "been rendered meaningless and 

unnecessary by the fundamental changes that have occurred in the practice of medicine 
37

over recent decades," Isles Wellness, 703 N.W.2d at 525 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, 

dissenting in part), and has, at worst, created an aggregate public harm, I suggest on 

policy grounds alone the time has come for this court to abolish it. I echo the concern that

"[g]iven the changes which have occurred in the health care industry and the 

exceptions which states have carved out of their corporate practice bans, the public policy 

grounds which gave rise to the doctrine provide less of an imperative for the continued 

existence of the bans. Furthermore, the need for continued movement towards efficiency 

in the health care industry and the barrier that the doctrine places in front of progression 

towards efficiency make its continued existence imprudent." 47 Emory L.J. at 698.

But more importantly, the doctrine should be abolished because we had no 

business jumping into this policy debate in the first place. See Higgins v. Abilene 

Machine, Inc., 288 Kan. 359, 364, 204 P.3d 1156 (2009) ("[W]e are not free to act on . . . 

our view of wise public policy. We leave the guidance of public policy through statutes to 

the legislature."). Now, with the changing tides of healthcare delivery, it is time to send 

this debate back to the Legislature where it belongs. As Justice Edmonds presciently said 

when his colleagues on the California Supreme Court adopted the corporate practice of 

medicine doctrine: 

"In recent years the subjects of health insurance and group medicine have been the 

frequent source of discussion and investigation, and both lay and professional opinion 

concerning them is sharply divided. The need for some such service, particularly for 

persons of low income, is conceded by all parties to the controversy. The courts, in the 

absence of legislation, should not on the ground of public policy place a stumbling-block 

in the way of working out this problem. It is not a proper function of the courts to thus 

block the natural growth of social and economic processes.

. . . .
38

"It is claimed that the medical profession will be commercially exploited if 

private corporations interested solely in a profit are permitted to engage in activities such 

as are here involved. If that is an evil the solution rests with the legislature and not with 

the courts." People ex rel. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 

Cal. 2d 156, 164-65, 82 P.2d 429 (1938) (Edmonds, J., dissenting).

So too here. In the absence of legislation banning the corporate practice of 

medicine, I would not tether the doctrine to "the perilous sands of shifting public policy." 

Apodaca v. Willmore, 306 Kan. 103, 137, 392 P.3d 529 (2017) (Stegall, J., dissenting). 

Or, as Justice Hanson on the Minnesota Supreme Court put it: "I would decline to 

impose prohibitions where none has been imposed by the legislature." Isles Wellness, 703 

N.W.2d at 526 (Hanson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 

As a final matter, I question whether a blanket ban on the corporate practice of 

medicine is constitutional under either our federal or state constitution. For one thing, 

"[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that protecting a discrete interest group from 

economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose." Craigmiles v. Giles, 

312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing and 

Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 122 (2015) (Willett, J., concurring) (rejecting "[n]aked 

economic protectionism" as a constitutional government end). Here, the corporate 

practice of medicine doctrine was created at the behest of the AMA to protect its 

members from economic competition—arguably harming the public in the process. The 

doctrine might fail even the watered-down rational basis review typically applied when 

evaluating economic regulations under the United States Constitution. See, e.g., 

Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding a licensing regulation 

that discriminated between pest-controllers based upon the type of pest controlled failed 

"the relatively easy standard of rational basis review" because it "was designed to favor 

economically certain constituents at the expense of others similarly situated").
39

If, for example, the following was established, rational basis may not be satisfied:

"'[E]vidence of an intent to benefit one group of people at the expense of others, i.e., 

protectionism; evidence refuting the law's ostensible public-interest rationale; the 

presence of less restrictive alternatives to satisfy the law's ostensible purpose; evidence 

showing a harm to competition and consumers; and, perhaps, evidence that the law may 

interfere with interstate commerce.'" 94 B.U. L. Rev. at 224 (quoting Agarwal, 

Protectionism as a Rational Basis? The Impact on E-Commerce in the Funeral Industry, 

3 J.L. Econ. & Policy 189, 213 [2007]). 

Thus, courts inspecting economic regulations for constitutionality "need not be 

oblivious to the iron political and economic truth that the regulatory environment is 

littered with rent-seeking by special-interest factions who crave the exclusive, stateprotected right to pursue their careers." Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 118 (Willett, J., concurring).

In the end, I acknowledge the present court inherited this unfortunate doctrine and 

has applied it on the basis of stare decisis. Furthermore, because no party asks us to 

overturn the doctrine today, I am compelled to concur with the majority. But I propose 

that "though no party in this case has asked us to reconsider these precedents, at some 

point, it behooves us to do so." Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 584 U.S. 

__, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1487, 200 L. Ed. 2d 854 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). And at that 

point, I would discard the doctrine.