J-S20025-16 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

JOHNNY RAY LOGSDON, JR. 

 Appellant No. 1251 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 1, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000387-2013 

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and PLATT,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2016 

Appellant, Johnny Ray Logsdon, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on April 28, 2015 following the revocation of his probation. 

We affirm. 

The certified record establishes the following factual and procedural 

history. On March 5, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five years’ 

probation after accepting his guilty plea to one count of unauthorized use of 

an access device (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4106(a)). While serving this probationary 

sentence, Appellant was convicted of new charges, including possession of a 

controlled substance (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16)) and presenting false 

identification to law enforcement officers (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914). The trial 

court found Appellant to be in violation of the terms of his probation and, on 

August 12, 2014, modified his probationary sentence to include 60 days’ 
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incarceration in the Jefferson County Jail. Pursuant to the terms of the trial 

court’s August 12, 2014 order, Appellant was to serve his sentence 

“beginning August 22 through August 24, 2014 and each weekend thereafter 

until his sentence [was] complete.” Trial Court Order, 8/12/14. 

On April 20, 2015, while on work release, Appellant tested positive for 

opiates in violation of the conditions of his probation and the terms of his 

work release. Because of this violation, the trial court, on July 1, 2015, 

docketed an order that revoked Appellant’s probation and sentenced him to 

three and one-half to seven years’ imprisonment in a state correctional 

facility, with credit for time served. Gagnon Order, 7/2/15. On July 15, 

2015, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the 

court denied on that same date. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 

30, 2015.1

 Appellant presents one issue for our review: 

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked 

Appellant’s probation and resentenced him to serve a sentence 

of incarceration in [a] [s]tate [c]orrectional [i]nstitution for a 

minimum of three and one-half (31⁄2) years to a maximum of 

seven (7) years for [A]ppellant’s violation of probation[?] 

Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 On July 31, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). On August 11, 2015, Appellant filed his concise 

statement. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 25, 

2015. 
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Appellant’s lone issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence.2 See Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 806 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic 

right to appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(b). Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to 

appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id. As this Court has 

explained, in order to reach the merits of a discretionary aspects claim, 

[w]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

see Pa.R.Crim.P. [708]; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a 

fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

 

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

 On July 30, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the 

judgment of sentence issued on July 1, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“notice 

of appeal required by Rule 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed 

within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken”); 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E) (motion to modify revocation sentence does not toll 

30-day appeal period). In addition, Appellant included within his brief a 

____________________________________________ 

2

 By now, it is well-settled that a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a 

revocation sentence represents a cognizable issue on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). 
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statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Hence, Appellant satisfied the first 

and third prongs of the foregoing test. 

 The fourth prong of the foregoing test asks whether the appellant 

raises a substantial question as to whether his sentence is appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code. “An appellant must, pursuant to [Pa.R.A.P.] 2119(f), 

articulate the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific 

provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a 

particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether a substantial question 

exists focuses “on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to 

the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the 

appeal on the merits.” Id.

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that his sentence is 

unreasonable because it constituted too severe a punishment in light of the 

nature of his probation violation. Appellant also claims that the court’s 

explanation for the sentence did not justify its severity. We read Appellant’s 

contentions as alleging that the court failed to consider the sentencing 

factors delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). As such, we hold that 

Appellant raises a substantial question. See Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1042-1043 

(claim that trial court's sentence is inconsistent with gravity of probation 

violation, the need for public protection, or defendant’s rehabilitative needs 
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is tantamount to assertion that sentencing court did not consider the 

appropriate sentencing factors delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), which 

raises a substantial question). 

 We now consider the second prong of the foregoing test; i.e., whether 

Appellant properly preserved his discretionary sentencing challenge before 

the trial court. In this case, Appellant failed to object to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence at the July 1, 2015 resentencing hearing. See N.T., 

7/1/15, at 2-4. However, on July 15, 2015, Appellant filed a post-sentence 

motion seeking modification of his sentence. The trial court denied the 

motion on that same date. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E), “A motion to modify 

a sentence imposed after a revocation shall be filed within 10 days of the 

date of imposition.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E). Thus, Appellant’s motion for 

modification was due on or before Monday, July 13, 2015. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1908 (computation of time). Because Appellant did not seek modification 

of his sentence until July 15, 2015, his discretionary sentencing challenge is 

waived since his post-sentence motion was untimely and, therefore, was not 

properly preserved before the trial court. Nonetheless, even if we were to 

reach the merits of Appellant’s discretionary sentencing claim, we conclude 

that he is not entitled to relief. 

 Appellant argues that his maximum sentence for a technical violation 

is manifestly unreasonable. Specifically, he claims that the trial court failed 
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to explain why a lesser sentence would not have been sufficient to vindicate 

the court’s authority.

“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 

manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). The sentencing court must 

“follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for 

confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity 

of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b). In addition, in all cases where the court “resentences an 

offender following revocation of probation ..., the court shall make as a part 

of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a 

statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.” Id. 

 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court offered the following 

explanation for imposing its sentence of three and one-half to seven years’ 

total confinement following Appellant’s probation violation. 

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c), a sentence of total 

incarceration is warranted if it is deemed to be necessary to 

vindicate the authority of the court. As the [trial c]ourt stated 

on the record, that was the case here. [Appellant] was on work 

release – an opportunity many inmates do not enjoy – when he 

violated his probation by ingesting opiates. What he thereby 

accomplished was to convince the [c]ourt that he had no respect 

or concern for its authority. He had already violated his original 

probationary sentence and was serving weekends in the county 

jail because of it. That lesser penalty clearly did not make the 
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desired impression, though. Something more was required. And 

something more is what the [c]ourt gave [Appellant] on July 1, 

2015. 

As well as addressing the nature of the violation itself, the [trial 

c]ourt advised [Appellant] that it [] reviewed the presentence 

investigation report and [considered] his individual 

circumstances in fashioning his sentence. In doing so, [the trial 

court] adequately articulated its reasons for the sentence, which, 

incidentally, included the boot camp recommendation he 

requested. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/15, at 1-2. 

 We perceive no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed by the 

trial court. Indeed, the record reflects that the court considered the 

sentencing code, the circumstances of Appellant’s probation violation, a 

presentence investigation report, and the individual character of the 

offender. N.T., 7/1/15, at 3. Apart from boilerplate characterizations of the 

sentence as “harsh” and “excessive,” Appellant does not challenge the 

factual findings rendered by the court or allege that the court overlooked or 

ignored relevant factors pertaining to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Significantly, Appellant points to no evidence that the trial court 

harbored any bias, ill will, or prejudice towards him. We also bear in mind 

that the court confronted a situation in which Appellant committed a second 

probation violation. As the trial court determined, Appellant’s repeat 

violation manifested a direct affront to the court’s authority and 

demonstrated Appellant’s inability or unwillingness to refrain from criminal 

activity, even while under judicial supervision. In such circumstances, we 
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see no grounds for finding an abuse of discretion that allows us to disturb 

the trial court’s sentence. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 3/29/2016