After th e a c c id ent le ad in g to th is ap pe al, U tah Va ll ey S tate 1 College changed its nam e to U t a h Valley Univer sity. Because the pleadings and the c ourt s belo w ha ve consistently r eferr ed to t he institution by its name on the dat e of the accident, we likewis e use UVSC througho ut this opinion.

Thi s opi ni on i s su bj ec tt o r ev i si on be f or e f i nal pub l i cat i on in t he Pa ci f i c R epor t er

2014 UT 53

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

S HAW NNA R AE C O PE , Appe lla nt, v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E ,

Appe lle e

.
No. 20130016 Filed Nov ember 21, 2014

On Cer tior ari to the Ut ah Courtof Appeals

Fou rth D is tric t, Provo D ep ’t Th e H ono rab le S amue l D . Mc Ve y

No. 060402488

Att or neys: Terry M. Plant, Stewart B. Harman, Salt Lake Cit y, for appellant
Sean D . Reyes, At t’y Gen., J. Clif ford Peter sen, Ass t. At t’y Gen., S al t La ke C ity, fo r ap pe ll ee Michael D. Zimm erman, Troy L. Booher , Julie J . Nelson,

Salt Lake City , for Amicus Cu riae

J UST I CE D U R H A M authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which C H IEF J UST I CE D UR R ANT , A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE N EHR I NG ,

J UST I CE P A R R I S H and J UST I CE L EE join.

J UST I CE D UR HAM , op in ion of the Cou rt:
INTRODUCTION ¶1 Shaw nna Cope w as inju red w hile practicing with the Ut ah Valley Stat e C o l l ege (UVSC) ball ro om dance team, and s ued the state-owned college. The dis tr ict court dismis sed the laws uit, ru ling 1 tha t th e p ub li c du ty do c trin e d ic tate d th at U VS C ow ed no d uty of care to Ms. Cope. The court o f appeals sub se q ue nt ly held that t heC O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

2 publi c duty doctrine d i d not apply t o Ms. Co pe’s laws uit and

rev ersed the t rial court . We gr anted certio rar i. ¶2 Having r equested additional briefing from the par ties, we take th i s op p or tu n i ty to c l a ri fy th e p u b l i c d u ty d oc tr i n e

. Fi rs t, w e de c li ne to ab rogate the doc trin e, as s evera l oth er sta t es have d one , and retain the pu bl i c duty doctr ine as part of Ut ah’s comm on law. S ec ond , w e ove rtu rn i n p art Webb v. Unive rsity of Utah , 2005 UT 80, 12 5 P .3 d 9 06 , a nd hol d th at th e p ub li c du ty doc trin e a pp li es onl y to the om is s ion s of

a gove rnm entalac tor. Th e d oc trin e d oes not immu nize t he State fro m liabi lity for affirmative acts that har m a pl ai nti ff . T hi rd, w e c la rif y th at th e p ub li c du ty do c trin e i s li mi ted to

s itu ati ons w he re apl ai nti ff see ks to impos e l ia bi li ty f or a d uty to prot ect the ge neral public from ext ernal harms. ¶3 Applying these principles to this case, we hold t ha t the pu bl ic du ty doc trin e doe s not ne gate UV S C’s du ty of car e towa rd student memb ers of a ballroo m danc e team c reat ed and ov erseen by the c o l l e g e

. W e t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , a l t h o u g h f or reasons different from those expr essed by the courtof appeals, and remand for furt her pro ceedings.
BACKGROUND ¶4 Ms . C ope w as a m embe r of a b al lroom

da nc e te am

at U VS C,

a s ta te

- ow n e d c ol l e ge

. S h e w a s a l s o e nro l l e d i n a b a l l ro om dance clas s that awarded her credit for her pa r t i cipatio n with the team. D uri ng atea m p rac tic e, Ms . C ope w as reh ea rs in g a c hore ograp he d dance routine that required her partner to lift her to his shoulder as she c ompleted a back flip. When c ouples on the danc e team learn a new lift, spott ers are us ually prov ided to catch the female danc er if

s he fa ll s . On

thi s pa rtic ul ar o cca s ion, th ou gh, no s pott ers w ere requested or prov ided. Ms. Cope and her partner at tempted t he lift twice, bu t they did not pro perly complete the maneuver. On the first tw o atte mp ts , her partn er l ifted Ms . C ope to h is right s hou ld er,

w hi c h w as ea s ie r tha n li ft in g he r ac ros s hi s bo dy to hi s le fts hou ld er. ¶5 Ms. Cope’s par t ne r t old the class i nstructor that he had

never been able to suc cess fully perform this part icul ar l i ft , and the instr uc t o r t o l d the couple to t ry the lift again, this time to the left shoulder. The instructor told Ms. Cope t o push off w ith gr eater force

an d tol d h er p artn er to lift w ith mo re pow er, bu t di d n ot gi ve furt he r guidance on how to complete the maneuver . The ins tr uctor also said that if the c ouple was unabl e to perfor m the maneuver pro perly, he would have to cut it fr o m the ro utine. On the thir d attempt Ms. Cope’s part ner lost his foot ing, and she fell. Her part ner used hisCite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

3 bo dy to c us hi on t he fa ll , b utMs . C ope s us tai ne d a n i nj uryw he n h er he ad s tru c k he r pa rtne r’s kne e. ¶6 Ms. Cope sued UVSC, alleging the college neglig ently

caus ed her injury. She also alle g e d U VSC w as liab le for t he clas s in s tru c tor’s ne gli genc e u nd er th e d oc trin e of res pon deat s up eri or. UV S C m oved fo r s umma ry j ud gm ent, a rgu in g UV S C ow ed no d uty to pr ote ct Ms. Cope fro m harm bec ause it did not have a special rel ati ons hi p w ith

he r. T he di s tric t c ou rt de ni ed the mo tion an d s et a tri al da te. UV S C th en

ren ew ed its mo tion

fo r s umma ry j ud gm ent, attaching addition al evidence that M s. Cope and her part ner had pra c tic ed li ft in g he r to the partn er’s right s hou ld er prior to the da te of the ac c id ent. ¶7 Th e d is tric t c ou rt granted the ren e w e d m o tion fo r s umma ry judgment and di smis sed Ms. Cope’s laws uit . Relying upon o ur analysis of the pub lic du t y d o ct r i ne in Webb v. Unive rsity of Utah , 20 05 UT80 , 1 25 P .3 d 906 , the di s tric t c ou rt rul ed tha t UV S C d id not fo r m a sp eci al r el at io nshi p wi t h M s. C o pe , a nd t h er efo r e U VSC owed her no duty of care. T he district c ourt reasoned t ha t be cause Ms. Cope w as aware that she was perfor ming a new lift that she and her part ner had not succ essfully completed before, and becaus e the instructor g ave her the opt ion of cu t t i ngthe maneuver fr om the

rou tin e, UV S C d id notin du c e “ de trim entalrel ia nc e crea tin g a gr eater risk of per il than existed ot herwise.” ¶8 Ms. Cope appealed, and the courtof appea l s r ever sed the di s tric t c ou rt be c au s e it fo un d tha t th e s pe c ia l re la tion s hi p e xc ep tion to the publi c duty doctrine applied t o Ms. Co pe. Cope v. Uta h V a lley Sta teCo ll. , 2012 UT App 319, ¶ 27, 290 P.3d 314. The court o f appeals held that “a special relationship is created when (1) a di r e ct ive is give n to a s tu de nt ( 2) bya te ac he r or c oac h (3 ) w ith in the s c ope of the academic enter prise” and found that a speci al relatio nshi p had been formed under the facts of this c ase. Id. ¶ 17. ¶9 Th is courtgranted c erti orarion t he fo ll ow in g is s ue :

“ W h e th e r t h e c ou rtof a p p e a l s e rr e d i ni ts c on s tr u c ti on a nd ap pl ic ati on o f t he s pe c ia l re la tion s hi p te s t arti c ula t ed by Webb v. Un iversity of Utah , 2 0 0 5 U T8 0 , 1 2 5 P

. 3 d 9 0 6

. ” A ft e r t h e p a rtie s presented or al argument t o this cour t, we iss ued an order requesting supp lemental briefing on the following issues : 1. S hou ld the s c ope an d a pp li c ati on o f t he pu bl ic du ty doc trin e b e l im ite d to p ub li c empl oyee s w ith du ties to the public as a wh ole, such as pub lic s afety o ffic ers?C O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

4 2. S hou ld the pu bl ic du ty do c trin e b e a pp li ed to

a f fi rm ative acts of gov ernment employe es or should the doctrine be limited to omissi ons? 3. Should the pu bl i c duty doctr ine be retained in our common law ?

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶10 In this appeal, we review the co ur t of appeals’ de term in ati on tha t the di s tric t c ou rt erred in rul in g tha t ne ith er UV S C n or itsempl oyee ow ed an enfo rc ea bl e d uty o f car e to Ms. Cope. Whether a defendant owes a du ty of care to a plaintiff i s questi o n o f l a w. B. R. ex rel. Je ffs v. W est , 2012 UT 11, ¶ 23, 275 P.3d 22 8. We the ref ore re vie w de novo a l ow er c ou rt’s de term in ati on o f whether a du ty e xists. Slis z e v . Sta nley-B o st it ch , 1999 UT 20, ¶ 9, 979 P.2d 317.
AN AL YSI S ¶11 In or der t o p r e vail in an action for neglig ence, a plaintiff

mu s t prove tha t ( 1) the de fe nd ant ow ed the pl ai nti ff a d uty of

c are , (2) the defendant breached that duty , and (3) the breach prox imately

caus ed (4) the plaintiff to suffer legally compensable dam ages. B. R.

exrel . J eff s v . W est , 2012 UT 11, ¶ 5 n.2, 275 P.3d 228. Th e first element of a negligence claim, a du t y o f ca r e , “may be defined as an ob li gati on, to w hi c h th e l aww il l give r eco g ni tion an d e ffec t, to conform to a particular standard o f condu ct towar d another .” No rma nde a u v. Ha nso n Equ ip
., In c. , 2009 UT 44, ¶ 19, 215 P.3d 152 (i nte rna l quo tati on m arks om itte d)

. “A c ou rt’s c onc lu s ion tha t du ty does or d o e s no t ex ist is an expression of the sum tot al of those considerations of policy whic h lead the law t o say that the plaintiff i s [o r is not] entit led to pr ote ction.” Webb v. Univ. of Utah , 2 0 0 5 UT 80 , ¶ 9, 12 5 P .3 d 9 06 (a lte rati on i n ori gin al ) ( intern al qu otati on m arks omitte d). ¶12 When determining whether a g ov ernment actor owes a du ty of c are to a p la intif

f, w e h ave he ld t ha t c ou rts mu s t eva lu ate

w he the r the pu bl ic du ty do c trin e d ic tate s tha t an in di vid ua l m ay n ot

enfo rc e apu bl ic du ty in tort. Un de r thi s doc trin e, “apl ai nti ff c annot

recov er for the breach of a duty owed to t he general public, b ut mus t show that a duty is owed to him or her as an in dividual.” Madsen v. Bo rt hick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1993); accord Ferree v. S tate , 784 P.2d 14 9, 15 1 (Uta h 1 98 9) (“ For a go vernme nta l a genc y an d i ts age nts to be liable f or negligently caus ed inju ry suffered by a member of the publi c, the plaintiff

must sh ow a breach of a duty owed him as an individual, not merely t he breach o f an obligation owed to theCite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

Adams v. State , 555 P.2d 235, 241– 42 (Alaska 1976); Coffey v. Ci ty 2

o f Milw a ukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 137– 39 (Wis. 1976) ; Co mme rci a l Ca rri er Corp. v. Indian Rive r Cnty. , 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979); Brenne n
v. City of E u ge ne , 591 P.2d 719, 724– 25 (Or. 1979); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (A r i z

. 1982); Sche a r v . B d. o f Cnt y. Co mm’ rs , 687 P.2d 728, 730– 31 (N.M. 1984); Maple v. Ci ty of Omaha , 384 N.W.2d 254, 260 ( N e b

. 1 986) ; Le a k e v . Ca in , 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986); DeWald v. State , 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986); Jean W. v. Commonwealt h , 6 10 N.E.2d 305, 312– 13 (Mass. 1993) ; Doucette v. Town of Bristo l , 635 A.2d 1387, 1390 (N.H. 1993) ; Ficek v. Mo rken , 685 N.W.2d 98, 107– 08 (N.D. 2004); see also Arthurs ex rel. Estate of Munn v. Aiken Cnty. , 551 S.E.2d 57 9, 58 5 ( S .C . 2 00 1) (re tai ni ng the pu bl ic du ty doctrin e w he n a pp li ed to s tatu tory d utie s bu t rej ec tin g th e d oc trin e w he n a pp li ed to common-lawduties).

5 genera l p ub li c at l arge bythe governme nta l offi c ia l. ”) . In oth er words, “a duty to all is a du ty t o none.” Cannon v. Univ. of Utah , 866 P .2 d 5 86 , 5 88 (U tah

Ct. Ap p. 19 93 ) ( intern al qu otati on m arks omitte d). Th e public duty d o ctrine is bas ed on the policy de term in ati on t ha t w he n agovernme nta l e nti ty a ssume s a d uty to prote c t th e ge ne ral pu bl ic fro m h arm s s uc h a s c rim in al ac tivi ty, holding the entit y liable for a breach o f t hi s d uty would caus e
mu ni c ip al iti es to b e “ mi red hop el es s ly in c ivi l l aw s ui ts

. . . f or eve ry infraction of the law.” Pro sse r v. Kenne dy Enters ., In c. , 179 P.3d 1178, 1183 (M o nt

. 2 0 08). If a plaintiff’s negligence claim is bas ed upon a pu b l i c d u ty , c ou rt s w i l l re c ogn i z e th e d u tyonl y i f th e p l a i n tiff

es tab li s he s a sp ec ia l rela tion s hi p tha t impos es a s pe c ific du ty of c are towar d the plaintiff as an individu al that is distinguis hable from a publi c duty owed to t he general public. Ma ds en , 850 P.2d at 444. ¶13 In de c id in g w he the r the pu bl ic du ty doc trine preve nts Ms

. C o p e fr o m e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y d u t y e l e m e n t o f he r
ne gli genc e c au s e of

ac tion , w e firs t exa mi ne the is s ue s ou tli ne d f or supp lemental briefing: (1) whether the publi c duty doctrine should be re ta i n e d , ( 2 ) w h e th e r th e d oc tr i n e a p p l i e s to b ot h a cts and

om is s ion s , a nd (3 ) w he the r the doc trin e i s li mi ted to empl oyee s w ith du tie s to th e p ub li c at l arge . B ec au s e w e h o ld t hat the pu bl ic du ty doctrine should be r etained in our common law, w e finally examine

w he the r the doc trin e b ars Ms . C ope ’s la w s ui t.
I. V AL ID ITY OF T HE P UB LICD UTY D OCT RIN E INUT AH ¶14 The pub lic du ty do ctrine is recognized in mos t j u ri s d i c tions

. See Beaudri e v. Hende rson , 631 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Mich. 2001). By our

c ou nt, how ever, tw el ve s tate s up rem e c ou rts ha ve ex pl ic itl y rej ec ted

or abandoned the doctrine. These c ourt s generallyh ave justified the 2 abandonment of the publi c duty doctrine by reasoning that it was aC O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

6 fo r m o f g o v e r nm e nt a li mmu ni ty an d w as the ref ore i nc ons is tent w ith the ir sta te legi s la tu res ’ abroga tion of ab s olu te s overe ign immu ni ty. E.g., Doucette v. Town of Bri stol , 635 A.2d 1387, 1390 (N.H. 1993) (“ [T ]h e p ub li c du ty ru le impe rmi s s ib ly c onfli c ts w ith the ab rogati on of common law munic ipal immunity . . . .”); Adams v. State , 555 P.2d 235 , 2 4 1 (A l a sk a 1 9 7 6 ) ( “ [W ]e co ns i d e r t ha tt he [p ub l i c duty ] doctrine is in reality a form of sov ereig n immunity, whic h is a m atte r dealt

w ith by s tatu te in Al as ka, an d not to be ampl ifie d b y c ou rt- c rea ted doctrine.”). ¶15 We di s agre e wit h the rea s oni ng o f t he c ou rts tha t ha ve ab an don ed the pu bl ic du ty doc trin e. Th e p ub li c du ty do c trin e i s not

a sub sidiary branch of sovere ign immu nity, as asserted by some courts. SeeAda ms , 555 P.2d at 241. Rather , the d o ct r i ne informs a court’s dete rmination of whether a g ov ernment act o r o wes a common lawduty of care t o a plaintiff. Day v. State, 1999 UT 46, ¶ 10, 98 0 P

. 2 d 1 1 7 1 ( t r e a t i n gt h e p u b l i c d u t y d o c t r i n e a n d s o v e r ei gn immu nity as separate and distinct legal principles) ; Hig gin s v . Sa lt Lake Cnty. , 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) ( same) . “Conceptually, the qu es tion of the ap pl ic ab il ity of a s tatu tory i mmunity d oes noteven ari s e u nti l i t is de termin ed tha t a defen da nt othe rw is e ow es a d uty of c are to th e p la intiff a nd thu s w ou ld be lia ble in th e a bs enc e of

suc h immunity.” Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 153 (U t a h 1 9 8 9) (internal quotat ion mark s omitted); seea lsoTurner v. United

Sta te s , 24 8 U. S . 3 54 , 3 58 (1 91 9) (“ Th e fun da me nta l ob s tac le to rec over [u nd er th e p ub li c du ty doct rin e] is notthe immu ni ty of a s overe ign to s ui t, bu t the la c k of a s ub s tantive right to rec over the da mag es resulting fro m failu re o f a gov ernment or its officers t o ke ep the peace.”). ¶16 We the ref o r e s ee n o rea s on t o de via te fromou r pri or holding that
the le gis la t ur e’s ab rogati on o f a bs olu te s overe ign immu nity doe s not lead to th e co nclu sion that the publi c duty d o ct rine has also been ab ro gate d. Legislative r ecognitio n of a rightto r e co ver from one

w ho h as pre viou s ly b een immu ne fro m l ia bi li ty f or torti ou s ac ts c annot logi c al ly b e rea d a s an el im in ati on of the req ui rem ent tha t be fo re one c an rec over d am age s from anot her, a tort mus t b e prov en. There must still b e proo f of a duty owed to th e o ne cl aiming inj ury and a bre ac h of

tha t du ty.
Ro lli ns v . P eters en , 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 n.3 (Utah 1991); seea lso Ar th urs ex rel. Estate of Munn v. Aiken Cnty. , 551 S.E.2d 579, 583 (S.C. 2001)Cite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

After bri efin g an d oral argu me nt in thi s c as e, t he le g is la tu re 3 enacte d a l aw that appears to be a statutor y endor sement of the spec i a lre l a ti on s hi p e xc eption t o the public du ty do ctrine: “A g eneral du ty th at a governme nta l enti ty owes to the pub li c doe s notc rea te

a s pe c ific du ty to an in di vid ua l me mb er of the pu bl ic , unle ss t he re is a s pecial rel ationship between the gov ernmental entit y and the individual m ember of the public.” S .B. 250, 60th Leg., Gen. Sess. [Utah 2014] (modif

ying Ut ah C ode section 63G-7-202). Becau se this ap pa ren t s tatu tory exp res s ion of the pu bl ic du ty do c t r ine is not ret ro active, it do es not affect the disposition o f this c ase. See S tate v. Cla rk, 2011 U T 2 3 , ¶ 1 1, 251 P.3d 829. We therefor e leave t he interp reta tion

of thi s s tatu te f or an oth er d ay. Webb v. Univ. of Utah , 2005 UT 80, ¶ 16, 125 P.3d 906; Day, 1999 4 UT 46, ¶ 11; Rocky Mo untain Thri ft Stores Inc. v. Sal t L ake City Corp. , 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994); Ma ds en v. Bor th ick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1993); Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151– 52; Christens o n v. Hayw a rd, 694 P.2d 612, 612– 13 (Utah 1984); Obray, 484 P.2d at 161– 62.

7 (“ S inc e th e p ub li c du ty ru le is notgrou nd ed in immu ni ty b utrath er i nd u t y , w e h o l d i th a s n o tb e e na ff e c t e d b y [ t h e l e g is la tive abrog ation o f absolute sover eign immunity].” (Citat ions omitted)). In fact, this court did no t adopt t he publ ic du ty do ctrine until several year s after the leg islature first limited Utah’s sover eign immunity in 1965 by passi ng the Gov ernmental Immunity Ac t. 1965 Ut ah Laws 390– 97; Ob ray v . M

a lmb erg, 484 P.2d 160, 1 6 2 (Utah 1971). Thu s, Uta h’ s ab rogati on o f a bs olu te s overe ign immu ni ty c ou ld not impl ie dl y exti ngu is h adoc trin e n ot yet re c ogn iz ed bythi s c ou rt. 3 ¶17 S tare de c is is bo ls ters ou r de c is ion to reta in the pub li c du ty doc trine. Th is c ou rt has c ons is tently a pp li ed the doc trin e f or over fo rty yea rs

. P res um ab ly, governme nt o ffic ia ls an d empl oyee s ha ve

4 relied upon this long-standing legal principle in p e rfor ming their publi c d ut i e s, and we should n ot disrupt t he status quo without goo d caus e to do so. See C arter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 6, 269 P.3d 14 1. A s n o t e d a b o v e , w e f i n d n o c o m p e l l i n g l e g a l r a t i o n a l e fo r ab a n d on i n g th e p u b l i c d u ty d oc tr i n e , a n d th e re f or e f ol l owour pre c ed ent rec ogn iz in g it. ¶18 Ha vin g affi rme d th e c ont inue d va li di ty of the pu bl ic du ty doc trine i n U tah, w e n ext e xam in e i ts prop er s c ope

. II. APPLICABILI TY OF THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE

TO ACTS AND OMISSIONS ¶19 In Webb v

. Un i v ersity of Utah , w e h el d th at th e p ub li c du ty doctrine applies to bot h acts and omissi ons. 2005 UT 80, ¶ 15, 125 P .3 d 9 06 . H avi ng i nvi ted the pa rtie s to bri ef the c ont inue d vi ab il ity of this principle, w e consider whether to modify this holding. WeC O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

8 “may not do so lightly.” Sta tev. Menz ies , 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 ( Utah 1994). Thi s court should over turn its own precedent o nly “where the de c is ion is c le arl y erron eou s or c ond iti ons ha ve c ha ng ed so as to render the prio r deci s i on i n a p p l icabl e.” Id. (i nte rna l quo tati on m arks omitte d). In addition, w e consider whether ov ert urning a precedent would un dermine the public ’s su bstantial re l i a nce up on an
es tab li s he d l ega l p rinc ip le . As w e ha ve n oted , “ pe opl e s hou ld kno w what their leg al right s are as defined b y judic ial precedent, and ha vin g c ond uc ted the ir a ff ai rs in rel ia nc e on s uc h ri ght s , ou ghtnot to ha v e them swept away by ju dicial fiat.” Carter v. Lehi C ity, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 6, 269 P.3d 141 (inter nal quotatio n marks omitte d). ¶ 20 In de c id in g w he the r Webb was clearly erro neous, we fi rst

exa mi ne the le gals upp o rt f or ou r c onc lu s ion s in tha t opi ni on t o deter mine its precedential weight. Menz ies , 889 P.2d at 399 (over turning t he holding of an opinion becau se it was “n ot t he most weighty o f pr e cedents ”). We then look t o the o rigins and purpose of the public duty doctr ine to det ermine whether our conclu sion in Webb —that t he doctrine ex tends to affirmativ e acts—is c learly

erroneo us. F ina lly , we co ns id er w he the r s ub s tantia l re li anc e inte res ts in the Webb holding counsel agains t ov ert urning our pr ecedent. ¶21 Webb states that “gov ernmental actor s ar e not accountable for t heir affirmativ e acts unless a s pecial relationship is present.” 2005 UT 80, ¶ 16. In support o f this declaration, we cited Day v. State, where we held that a gener al publ ic du ty “do es not impose a sp ecific duty of due care on the gover nment with respect to individuals wh o may be har med by gov ernmental action or inaction , unles s there is”

a speci al relat ionship. 1999 UT 46, ¶ 12, 980 P.2d 1 1 7 1 (e mphasis added). Bu t at t his point in t racing the o rigins of our ho lding in Webb , the tr ail goes cold. The authorities cited in Day do notdisc uss the ext ensio n o f the publi c duty doctrine t o affirmative acts that

caus e harm. See id. Moreove r, th e Day court ex plicitly recog nized in a f oo tn ot e th a t s e ve ra l c ou rt s h a ve h e l d th a t th e p u b l i c d uty r ule does not a p p l y to a ff i rm a ti ve acts. Id. ¶ 13 n. 2 ( “S om e c ou rts ha ve also recog nized an exception to the public duty rule wh ere t here is

an affi rma tive ac t bythe offi c er c au s in g in j ury .” (i nte rna l quo tati on marks omitt ed)). S o, not only is Day’s stat ement that “g ov ernmental

ac tion o r in ac tion ” i s c overe d b y th e p ub li c du ty do c trin e of

unc erta in

origi n a nd de void of

an al ys is , b utthe opi ni on a ls o poi nts to aut horit y that

c ontr a d i c tsthi s c onc lusi on. Thus , Webb ’s c onc lu s ion that t he publ ic du ty do ctrine app lies to affirmativ e acts apparently build s on the s haky foundation o f our unsu bstantiated stray dicta in Day

.Cite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

9 ¶2 2 Ad d i ti on a l l y, th e c l e a r p re p on d e ra n c e of c a s e law contradicts our assert ion in Webb

. Th e origi ns of the pu bl ic d uty doc trine c an

be trac ed ba c k to So ut

h v . M a ry la nd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855). In that ca se, the plaintiff as serted t hat “certain evi l[ -] di s pos ed pe rso ns c am e a bo uthi m, hi nd ered an d p revented hi m, thre ate ne d h is li fe , w ith fo rc e of arm s de ma nd ed of

hi m ala rge
s um of mo ne y, a nd impris one d a nd de tai ne d h im fo r the s pa c e of four days, and until he paid t he m t he sum of $2,500 for his enlargement.” Id. at 401 (internal quot ation mark s omit ted). The plaintiff reques t e d prot ection from t he local sh eriff, who was apparently present for at least a por tion o f the or deal, but the sheriff refused to assis t him. Id. The plaintiff then sued the s heriff, alleging the s he riff h ad ne gle c ted to exec ut e the du ty imp os ed byhi s pos iti on to k eep the peace. Id. The S up r e me Court held, however, t hat the she ri ff c ou l d n ot b e h e l d l i a b l e f or b re a c h of h i s p u b l i c d uties as conservat or of the peace “by those who have suffered inju ry to t heir prop erty or p er s ons thro ugh the vi ole nc e of mo bs , ri ots , or insu rr ections.” Id. at 403. The Court noted t hat becaus e the plaintiff ha d not all ege d tha t hi s in di vid ua l ri ght s an d p rivi le ges ha d “ be en

r e st rained or hindered by the malicious a ct of th e s h e ri ff, ” the plaintiff h ad not pled a viable caus e of action against the sheriff. Id. (emphasis a d d e d ). Th us , t he Su p r e me C o ur te st a bl i shed that a publi c offi c ia l c ou ld not be he ld li ab le fo r a f ai lu re to p erf orma p ub li c du ty, but su gge sted that t he offici a l co uld be li able for harmful acts. See

a lso Turner v. United

Sta te s , 248 U.S. 354, 357– 58 (1919) (tr ibal offic ials not liable for failing to prev ent individuals from destro ying a fence). ¶ 2 3 T h e g r e a tw e i g h to f s t a t e l a w s u p p o r t s t h e d i s t in c tion between omissi ons and affirmativ e acts establis hed by the Supreme Cou rt. Mos t oth er j uri s di c tion s tha t ha ve c ons id ered the is s ue ha ve held that the publi c duty doctrine shields a gov ernmental actor only fr om liability for o miss ions. See , e .g ., Co mmo nwe a lt

h v . B urns , 639 S .E .2 d 2 76 , 2 79 (Va

. 20 07) ( de c li ni ng t o exte nd the pu bl ic du ty doc trine to inc lu de the affi rma tive ac ts of a roa d c ons tru c tion c rew in creating a danger ous condition on a publi c highw ay); Gl e as on v. Pe te rs , 568 N.W.2d 482, 487 (S .D. 1997) ( ho lding that a police de pa rtm ent ha d n o du ty to s top a pa rty be c au s e it w as “u nd is pu ted that no affirmativ e a ct ion by the o ffic ers contr ibuted to, increased,

or changed the risk which would have otherwise existed” (internal quotat ion marks om i t t e d )); W ill is v . W

a rre n Twp. FireDep ’t

, 672 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind

. Ct. App. 1996) (“The [p ublic duty] test . . . is limited in application to cas es in whic h a gov ernment’s pro mise an d sub sequent fail ure to act caus es the plaintiff’s losses.”) ; Coty v. Washo e Cnty ., 83 9 P .2 d 9 7, 99 (N ev. 19 92 ) ( pu bl ic du ty do c trin e d oesC O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

10 notap pl y “w he re a pu bl ic offi c er’sc ond uc t ‘ a ffi rma ti ve ly ca use s ’ ha rm to an individ ua l ” ); Dauffen bach v. City of Wichita , 667 P.2d 380, 385 (Kan. 1983) (public duty doctrine does not apply “where there is an affirmative act by t he officer cau sing inj ury”); Jahnke v. I n c . City of Des Mo ines , 191 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Iowa 1971) (“[T ]he general r ule is that a muni cipality or its employees i s not liable for failure t o supply gener al police or fire pr ote ction.”); Ma s s e ngill v. Yum a Cnty. , 456 P.2d 376, 379 (Ariz. 1969) (“The f ai l ur e of a public officer to per form a publi c duty can c onstitute an individual wrong o nly when s ome pe rs on c an

s howtha t in the pu bl ic du ty w as involve d a ls o a d uty to hims elf as an

individual, and that he has suf fered a special an d peculi a r inju ry by reason o f its no npe rfo rma nce. ” (emphas is added) (i nternal quot ation mark s omitted)), o v e r r ul e d o n o t h e r g ro un d s by Ryan v. State, 6 56 P .2 d 59 7 (Ari z. 19 82 ) ( ab rogati ng t he pu bl ic du ty doctrine); Ba co n v. To wn o f Ro ck y Hi ll , 11 A.2d 399, 402 (Conn. 1940) (g overnme nta l e nti ty m ay b e he ld li ab le fo r affi rma tive ly c rea tin g a dangero us c ondition o n a pub lic hi ghway, but no t for omissi ons in failing to r emedy a danger ous condition it did not creat e). ¶24 Uta h c as el awpri or to Webb was in line with this prevailing view, applying the public du ty do ctrine to shield gover nm ental actor s from liabili ty o nly for neg ligent o missions. Ro ck y Mo unta in Thrift Stores Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994) (city not liable for alleg ed failure to adequately ameliorat e the negativ e effects of a flood); Ma ds en v . B o rt hick, 850 P.2d 442, 444– 45 ( Ut a h1 9 9 3 ) ( s ta te a ge n c y n otl i a b l e f ora l l e ge d f a i l u re to p ro perly reg ulate a financ ial ins titutio n that failed); Ferr e e v. State, 784 P.2d 14 9, 15 1– 52(U tah

19 89 ) ( s tate c orrec tion s offi c ia ls ha d n o du ty to pre vent an inma te on w eek en d rel ea s e fro m ha rming uni de nti fi ed third par ties); C

h r i s te n s o n v

. Ha yw a rd, 694 P.2d 612, 612– 13 (Utah 1984) (polic e officer did not have a du t y t o prev ent a drunk moto rcyclist from driv ing and harming hims elf); Ob ray v. Ma lmb erg, 48 4 P .2 d 1 60 , 1 61

– 62(U tah 19 71 ) ( s he riff n ot li ab le fo r an al le ged fa il ure to pro pe rly i nve s tiga te ac rim e) . In c ont ras t, w e h a v e d e c l in ed to apply the pu blic duty doctr ine where an offic er’s act of engag ing in ahigh-s pe ed veh ic le pu rs ui t affi rma tive ly “ c rea ted an imme di ate , obvio us, an d signifi cant threat of serious harm to other users of the highway.” Day, 1999 UT 46, ¶ 24. The dis tinction between these two lines of Utah c aselaw lies in the s ource of the h arm t o t he p l a intiff. Wh ere t he ha rm i s di rec tly c au s ed bya th ird par t y , the p la intif f’ s own negligence, or an o utside force suc h as a natural dis aster, t he gov ernment is not liable for its failure t o rescue t he plaintiff from t heCite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

The pub lic du ty do ctrine is not confined, however, t o situations 5

w he re a pu bl ic empl oyee take s no a c tion w ha ts oeve r. “ [A ] f ai lu re to perfor m [a pu blic duty], o r a n ina de quate or er ro neo us p erf o rma nce,
mus t be a publi c, not an individual i nju ry . . . .” W hite v . B ea sley, 552 N. W. 2d 1, 3 (M ich. 19 96 ) ( emph as is ad de d) (i nte rna l quo tati on
ma r k s omitte d). In Ro ck y Mo unta in T

hrift Sto res , f ore xa m p l e , S a lt Lake City too k v arious me a su res to combat extr eme flooding. 887 P

. 2 d a t 8 5 1

. T h e p u b l i c d u t y d o c t r i n e , h o w e v e r , s h i e l d e d the c ity fro m l ia bi li ty f or th e p la intif f’ s c laims tha t th es e ef fo rts w ere inadequate. Id. at 852. In other words, gov ernmental actor s are also notli ab le fo r a d efec tive effo rt to perf orm a pu bl ic du ty to a me li orate an exter nally caus ed harm.

11 exte rna l h arm

. Wh ere t he affi rma tive ac ts of a p ub li c employee 5

ac tu al ly c au s e th e h arm, h ow ever, the pu bl ic du ty doc trin e doe s not apply. See Frie d v . A rch er , 775 A.2d 430, 444 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (The pu blic duty doctrine prot ects po lice dispatchers “becau se su ch di s p a t c he rs do n ot c rea te th e p la intif f’ s pe ril . T he governme nt d rive r who inj ures a plaintiff

t hr ough his negligence is l iable bec ause he

c rea ted t he pe r il, n ot b ec au s e h e f ai le d to re s c ue the pl ai nti ff fro m it.”), a ff’ d sub n o m. Muthukumarana v. Montgo mery Cn ty. , 805 A.2d 372 (M d . 2002); Huey

v. To wn o

f Cic ero , 2 4 3 N

. E

. 2 d 2 1 4 , 2 1 6 ( Ill . 1968) (“ [T ]h e ge ne ral rul e i s tha t a munic ip al ity o r it s empl oyee s is not liable for failure t o supp ly gener al police or fire pr ote ction. This rule ha s be en ma intai ne d i n th e f ac e of de c is ion s hol di ng munic ip al iti es liable for affirmative neglig ent o r wilful acts b y their employees.” (Citations omitt ed)). ¶25 Mor eov er, l i mi ting t he publ ic du ty do ctrine to omissi ons
c om ports w ith t he s pe c ia l re la tion s hi p e xc ep tion to th e d oc trin e. Un de r thi s exc ep tion

, ag o v e r nm e nt de fe nd ant m ay b e h el d l ia bl e f or the vio lation of what would other wis e be a publ ic du ty if t he de fe nd ant f orm ed a s pe c ia l re la tion s hi p w ith the pl ai nti ff tha t gave rise to a sp e ci fic d uty o f care toward t he plaintiff as an in dividual. Ma ds en , 8 50 P .2 d a t 44 4. Th is s pe c ia l re lati ons hi p e xc ep tion ma kes

s en s e on ly in

the c ont ext of

om is s ion s . For i ns tanc e, if a p oli c e offi c er affirmatively acts by negligently disc harging his weapon and

w ou nds a c hi ld ten

bl oc ks aw ay, it w ou ld be ab s urd to inqu ire whether the o ffic er had a sp ecial relationship with the innocent vic tim in orde r to imp os e lia bi li ty if the offi c er h ap pe ne d to h ave a speci al relatio nshi p with the chil d, and to d isallow recover y if no

s uc h re la tion s hi p e xis ted . Th e inh erent ab s urd ity o f a pp lyi ng a
s pe c ia l rela tion s hi p exc ep tion to the affirm ati ve a c ts of pu bl ic s af ety employees stems from the fa ct that t he foreseeability o f the harm, rat her than the nature o f the tor tfeasor’ s relationship to t he plaintiff , limits liab ility for affirmative acts caus ing harm. See B. R. ex rel. Je ffsC O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

By excepting from liability the public du ties certain go ver nment 6

em pl oyee s pe rfo rm by virtu e of thei r empl oym ent, the p ub li c du ty doctrine places pub lic sa fe t y e mployees on the same foot ing as pri vate ac tors . N ei the r ma y b e s ub j ec ted to tort li ab il ity fo r a f ai lu re to rescue another from h arm ab sent a speci al r e l a t ionship. Conceptually, it appear s that ther e is little difference be t ween t he

s pe c ia l re la tion s hi p ex cep tion ap pl ie d to apri vate in di vid ua l’ s fail ur e to rescue another fro m harm and the spec ial relatio nshi p exception applied to a publi c employee’s failure to per form a public du ty to s afe gu ard the gen era l p ub li c . B utbe c au s e th e d egre e to

w hi c h th e s pe c ia l rel ati ons hi p exc ep tion ap pl ie d to t he om is s ion s of pri vate in di vid ua ls an d th e s pe c ia l rel ati ons hi p exc ep tion ap pl ie d to the om is s ion s of

pu bl ic s af ety offi c ia ls is nota q ue s tion w e n eed

res olve in

thi s ap pe al , w e res erve i t f or an oth er d ay.

12 v. W est , 2012 UT 11, ¶¶ 19, 27–28, 275 P .3d 228; Furkovich v. Bingham Coal & Lum ber Co. , 143 P. 121, 124 (Utah 1914). In c ontr ast, the special relat ionship exception to the publi c duty doctrine serves a si milar func tion to the tor t principle that a pr ivate individual generally has no duty t o act to rescue anot her from harm unles s t here is a special relat ionship that creates suc h a duty. SeeB. R. , 2012 UT 11, ¶¶ 7–19; R E S T A T E M ENT (T H I RD ) O F T ORTS : P H YS

. & E MOT

. H ARM §§ 37, 40 (2012). For bot h gov ernment actor s and priv ate individuals, the

s pe c ia l re la tion s hi p e xc ep tion pe rmi ts li ab il ity for om is s ion s w he re
a sp e ci a l relat ionship h as been f or med as an exception t o the primary rule that no duty to act exists. 6 ¶26 Finally, any reliance intere sts in Webb are not sub stantial enough to prev ent this court fro m o v err uling it. See Ca rter , 2012 UT2, ¶ 6. Unlike t he pub li c du ty do c trin e i ts el f, w hi c h w e h ave consis tently applied over the last fort y ye ars, supra ¶ 17, our ho lding i n Webb is an is olated application of t hat doctr ine, sup ra ¶¶ 21, 23. B e c a us e Webb has not become a well -entrenched or fr equently applied precedent, the public ’s reliance upon Webb is notas s tron g. Mor eov er, our h olding in Webb involv ed the common law, w hich is

s ub j ec t to c ont inui ng e volu tion and ref in em ent an d m ay n ot engender t he same s or t of reliance interest as an inter pret ation o f a

s tatu te, fo r exa mp le

. ¶27 In sum mary, t he genesis of the pub lic duty do ctrine, the gr eat weight o f foreign author ity, and our prior caselaw all limit the doctrine’s application to omissi ons. This , coupled w ith the dubious supp or t for our holding in Webb , leads us to t he conclu sion that we cle arl y erre d b y exp an di ng t he doc trin e to e nc om pa s s affi rma tive

ac ts . W e th eref ore ove rrul e Webb on this point and hold tha t the pu bl ic du ty do c trin e d oes no t ap ply to c la im s of affi rma tive mi s c ond uc t.Cite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

13 III . SCOPE OF DUTIES P ROTECTED BY THE P UBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE ¶28 We nowtu rn to the qu es tion of w hi c h ty pe s of

dut ie s are “p ub li c du tie s ” th at m ay n ot b e en fo r ced in

a l aw s ui t aga in s t a gov ernmen t a g e ncy o r public employee. Befo re we do so, t hough,

w e fi rs t di s c us s the prop er rel ati ons hi p be tw een the pu bli c duty doctrine and the special relationship exception. ¶29 I n Webb v. Unive rsity of Utah , w e s tate d th at “ [w ]i tho uta speci al relatio nshi p, the Univer sity owed no duty to [the plaintiff] .” 2005 UT 80, ¶ 16, 125 P. 3 d 9 06. Understandably rely ing upon this pe rha ps in artfulde c la rati on, bo th the di s tric t c ou rt an d th e c ou rt of appeals exclu sively focused on the question of whether UVS C had formed a special relationship w ith Ms. Cope. U nd er t his construction o f t he publ ic du ty do ctrine, the pr imary question is whether a special relationship has been establish ed. Examining the

s pe c i a lr e l a t i o n s hi p e x c ep tion fi rs t, h ow ever, di s torts the pu bl ic du ty doctrine. I n ess ence, the doctrine becomes a “spec ial relatio nshi p doctrine,” with go ver nmental actors owing a duty o f car e only

w he re th ey h ave rea c he d ou t to f orma s pe cia l r el ati ons hi p w ith members of the pub lic. ¶30 In s tea d, c ou rts mu s t f irs t de term in e w he the r a p la intif f’ s theor y of li a bi l i t y r e sts upon a pu blic duty. If a plaintiff’s c laim is b a s e d on

th e d e f e n d a n t’ s f a i l u re to a d e q u a te l y d i s c h a rg e a p u b l ic duty, a p res umpti on a ris es tha t th is du ty m ay n ot b e aba s is fo r li ab il ity in a law s ui t. Onl y the n sh ou ld the c ou rt exa mi ne w he the r a speci al relatio nshi p exists that would crea t e a n exception to the gen era l rul e tha t pu bl ic du tie s ma y no t provi de a b as is fo r li ab il ity. ¶31 We ha ve defi ned apu bl ic du ty as “a n ob li gati on o w ed to the gen e r a l p ub l i c at large .” Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). The m ost common examples of pub lic du ties inclu de (1) the du ty a p oli c e offi c er a s s um es to pro tec t th e p ub li c fro m h arm c au s ed bythe c rim in al ac ts of

thi rd p arti es an d ( 2) the du ty of a fire fi ght er to pr ote ct the public from fires or natural disasters. S ee, e.g. , P o we ll

v. Dis trict

o f Co lumb ia , 602 A.2d 1123, 1128 (D.C. 1992) (“[T] he [pub lic duty] doctr ine applies to law enforcement serv ices an d services akin to po lice a nd fi r e p r ote ction . . . .”); Cuff y v . Ci ty o f Ne w Y o rk, 505 N.E.2d 937, 939 (N.Y. 1987) (“As a gener al rule, a munic ipality may notbe he ld li ab le fo r in j uri es res ul ting from

a s impl e f ai lu re to pr o vide police pro tection.”); John H. Derrick, Annot ation, Mo de rn Sta tu s o f Rul e E xcus ingGo ve rnme nta l Unit fro m Tor t L ia bi lit y o n Th eo ry th a t O nly Ge nera l, N

o t P a rt icul a r, Dut

y W a s O w e d U n de r Ci r c u m s ta nces, 3 8 A .L.R.4 TH 11 94 , § 2 ( 19 85 ) ( “Un de r the [p ub li c du ty] doc trin e aC O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

14 governme nta l e nti ty is notli ab le fo r in j uryto a c iti ze n w he re l ia bi li ty is al le ged on the grou nd tha t the governme nta l entity ow es a du ty to the publi c in gener al, as in the cas e of police or fire pro tection.”). Oth er ex ampl es of

pu bl ic du tie s inc lu de : th e d uty to regula te financ ial ins titutio ns to pro tect deposito rs, Ma ds en v . B o rt hick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1993); the du ty to prote ct the public from natural disas ter s, Rocky Mo untain Thri ft Stores Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1 9 94); the duty of pr ison offic ials or paro le boards to consider pub lic s afety when grant ing furloughs or parole to pr isoners, Fer ree, 784 P.2d at 151– 52; the du t y o f g ov ernment safety inspec tor s t o guard t he publ ic from uns afe conditions, Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Minn. 1981) (fire safety inspec tor s); and the duty to avo id iss uing a licen se to an unsafe moto rist or an incom p e t ent physician, Johnson v. Indian River S ch. Dist. , 723 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Del. S uper. Ct. 1998) (driv ing licens e) a ff’ d, 723 A.2d 397 ( D e l

. 1 9 9 8); N

e l s on v. State, 195 P.3d 293, 303 (Mont. 2008) (medic al licens e). ¶32 Th es e ex ampl es of pu bl ic du ties r ai s e th e q ue s tion of how bro ad a d uty m us t be in orde r to qu al if

y as “a n ob li gati on o w ed to the gener al publ ic at large.” Fer ree, 784 P .2 d a t 15 1. More s pe c ific al ly, this cas e raises the question of how e xpansive the obligat ions of an employee o f a pub lic c ollege must be to qualify as a publi c duty. A pu bl ic du ty n eed notexte nd to th e entire w orld . T he duties of firefighter s and polic e officers, which are clearly public obligatio ns,
en d a t th e b orde r of

the c ity o r c ou ntytha t th ey s erve. An d, of

c ou r s e , t h e s t u d e n tb o d i e s o f U t a h ’ s p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s o f h i ghe r learning r ival or exceed the populatio n of many sm all cities an d tow ns thro ughou t th e s tate . T hu s , b y an al ogy to th e ex ampl e of pol ic e offic ers an d fire fi ght ers , adu ty ow ed to a c oll ege or u ni vers ity population as a whole may be suffic iently bro ad to qualify as a publi c duty. For example, a university pol i ce department may

assu me an obligation to secu re t he safety of students, fac ult y, and vis itors to th e c ampu s tha t w ou ld be j us t as exte ns ive as the du tie s
assu med by a sm all-town sh eriff.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE P UBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE TO BALLROO M DANCE INSTRUCTION AT A PUBLIC CO LLEGE ¶33 We now apply the principles laid o ut in t his opinion to the question presented in this appeal: w hether t he publ ic duty doctr ine ba rs Ms . C ope ’s la w s ui t aga in s t UV S C f or in j uri es s he s us tai ne d

w hi le pra c tic in g f or th e c oll ege ’s ba ll roomda nc e t eam. In oth er

w ords , d id Ms . Cope ba s e her negl ige nc e c la im up on a n a ll ega tionCite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

15 that UVSC neglected t o per form a p ub l i c duty that itowed to t he gener al publ ic? ¶34 Firs t, w e ex am in e w he the r Ms. Co pe ’s la w s ui t is fo un de d up on a n a ll ega tion

tha t UV S C’s affi rma tive acti ons c au s ed he r inju ries, or whether she r e st s her laws uit on UVSC’s omiss ions in fa il in g to pe rfo rm apu bl ic du ty. T he pu bl ic du ty do c trin e w ou ld not hi nd er th e f orm er th eory of l ia bi li ty, b utc ou ld ba r a l aw s ui t b as ed on t he la tter prem is e. Th e parti es ha ve emph as iz ed di fferent as pe c ts of Ms. Cope’s claims in an effort to characterize her laws uit as bein g based u pon either an act or an o miss ion. UVSC ass ert s that Ms . C ope ’s la w s ui t is prop erl y vie w ed as a c la im t hat the c oll ege fa il ed to pro vid e s pott ers t ha t c ou ld ha ve p revented he r in j ury

. Ms . C ope , on

the oth er h an d, c ont en ds tha t UV S C’s da nc e i ns tru c tor aff i r m a t i v e l y d i r e c t e d h e r a n d h e r p a r t n e r t o p e r f o r m the ne w
ma ne uve r w ith ou t s pott ers , w hi c h c au s ed he r in j ury

. ¶35 Resolution of t he question whether Ms. Cope’ s law suit is ba s ed up on a n a c t or an omi s s ion, h ow ever, doe s notde pe nd up on the s em antic fra mi ng of he r ne gli genc e c la im as ei the r an al le gati on t hat UV SC fa ile d t o pr o v ide spo t t er s o r a n a l le g at io n t hat UV SC affirmatively directed Ms. Co pe to per form the dance move without spotter s. Affi rmativ e acts inc lude “active misc onduc t wor king pos iti ve i nj ury t o o t he rs ,” w hi le om is s ion s are de fi ne d a s “p as s ive in ac tion , [ i. e. ,] a f ai lu re to ta ke p os iti ve s tep s to be ne fi t oth ers , or to prot ect them from h arm n ot created b y any wrongful act o f t he defendant.” B. R. ex rel. Je ffs v. W est , 2012 U T 1 1 , ¶ 7 , 275 P.3d 228 (internal quotat ion marks omitt ed). A ctive misfeasanc e, however , is notc onfin ed to s itu ati ons w he re a n a ffirm ati ve a c t di rec tly c au s es harm to t he plaintiff . As Jud ge Car dozo no ted:
The hand once set t o a task may not always be withdrawn w ith impunity t hough liability would fail if it had never been applied at all.

. . . If conduc t has gone forward t o s u c h

as tage that [inaction] would c ommonly

res ul t, n ot n ega tive ly m erel y in w ithhol di ng abe ne fi t, bu t pos itivel y or ac tive ly i n w orkin g an in j ury , th ere exi s ts a re la tion

ou t of whic h a ris es a d uty to go fo rw ard

. . . . Th e q ue ry al w ays is w he the r the pu tati ve

w rong do er ha s ad vanc ed to s uc h apoi nt a s to h ave la unc he d a fo rc e or in s tru me nt of ha rm, or ha s s topp ed wher e i nactio n is at most a refusal to become an instrument for g ood.
H.R . Mo ch Co

. v. Rens sel a er W a te r Co ., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928). Judge Cardozo noted that examples o f situatio ns where actions hadC O PE v. U T A H V ALL EY S TATE C OLL EG E Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

16 ad vanc ed to a s tage w he re i na c tion w ou ldc o mm onl y res ul t in in j ury inclu de: (1) a surgeon who fails to ste rilize instruments, cau sing an infec tion; (2) an engineer who fails to shut off s tea m; o r (3) an automobile manuf acturer t hat neglects to adequately inspect an automobile f or defects b efore selling it t o a consumer. Id. In ea c h of these examples, the defendants c ould be held liable for misfeas ance be c au s e th ey h ad affi rma tive ly c rea ted c ond iti ons tha t gave ris e to a duty to act in order to pr eventharm. ¶36 M s. Cop e a ll ege d f ac ts tha t w ou ld , a t m in imum, l ea d to a simi lar duty t o act. UVSC created, funded, and s uper v i se d the ballroom dance team. The college also gav e stude nt s co urse credit for t eam participation. UVSC’s actions in creatingand over seeing the ballroo m danc e team had advanced to a stag e where it had a duty to act in a r e a so na ble mann er t o pre vent injuries caus ed by pa rtic ip ati on w ith the da nc e te am . J us t as a s urg eon w ho u nd erta kes an operat ion a l so assu mes a du ty t o act to sterilize the surg ical in s tru me nts , onc e UVS C c rea ted the ba ll roomda nc e te am an d u s ed tu iti on re venue to hi re an in s tru c tor, the c oll ege “l au nc he d afo rc e or i ns t r um ent of [pote ntial] harm.” Seeid . H avi ng d one s o, U VSC

assu med a duty to act reasonably when prov iding danc e instruction. ¶37 Thus , even if we were t o character ize Ms. Cope’s claim as an allegatio n that UVSC failed to p r o vide spott ers, this is not an “om is s ion ” w ith in the tort- la w de fi ni tion of thi s term . E xampl es of omissi ons for which

a gov ernment entit y may not be held liable inclu de the failure t o pro vide police or fire pro tection and neglecting to pr ote ct the public from harm caused b y a natural disaster. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 887 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1994); Jahnke v . I nc. Cit y o f De s Mo ines , 191 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Iowa 1971). In effec t, a policeman normally may not be held liab le for failing to prev ent the harmful crimin al acts of a third part y, while a firefighter may not be sued for neglecting t o dow se a fire he did not set. I n each of these examples , an o miss ion in the form of a failure t o p e r fo rm a public duty to prot ect or rescue the general population “fro m harm not creat ed by any wr o ng ful ac t of t he defendant” may no t be enforced thro ugh a laws uit for damages. See B. R. , 20 12 UT 11 , ¶ 7

(i nte rna l quo tati on m arks om itte d) . Ms . C ope ’s cla im i s di ssimi la r , ho wev er , in t hat she do es no t al le g e t hat UV SC

an d h er d anc e i ns tru c tor f ai le d to res c ue he r fro m a n e xtern al thre at. At minimum, Ms. Cope asserts that UVSC actively created t he conditions that led to her injury by creat ing the b allroo m danc e team and then failing to prov ide safe in struction. Because Ms. Cope can, at l ea s t in the ory, trac e her harm ba c k to an a ffirm ati ve a c t b y UV S C, the public duty doctr ine does not bar her claim

.Cite as: 2014 UT 53 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

UV S C a rgu ed in

its ope ni ng br ie f t ha t Uta h s hou ld fo ll ow 7

c as el awfro m o the r j uri s di c tion s hol di ng tha t a c oac h’ s du ty of c are is li m i t e d t o a d u t y “ n o tt o i n c r e a s e t h e r i s ki nh e r e n ti nl e a r n i ng, practicing, or perfor ming in the sport.” Kahn v. E. SideUnion High Sch. D ist. , 75 P .3 d 3 0, 39 (C al . 2 00 3) . T hi s pri nc ip le ad opte d b y oth er
c ou rts , h ow ever, was no t di s c us s ed in the di s tric t c ou rt’s orde r or the c ou rt of

ap pe al s ’ op in ion, a nd w e d id notgrant c erti orarior req ue s t ad di tion al br ie fin g on thi s is s ue . W e th eref ore d o no t address this i ss ue becau se it lies outside the sc ope of t he iss ue defined in

our o rd er g ranting cer tior ari or the issu es desc ribed in our request f or additional briefing. SeeDeB ry v. No bl e , 889 P.2d 428, 443 (U tah 19 95 ) (“ Is s ue s

. . . not inc lu de d in the orde r grantin g c erti orari or f ai rly e nc om pa s s ed w ith in s uc h i s s ue s , a re n ot pro pe rly b ef ore this Court o n the merits.”).

17 ¶3 8 We a l s o h ol d th a t t h e p u b l i c d u tyd oc tr i n e d oe s n ota p ply becau se ballroom dance instruction is not a pub lic du ty “o wed to the gener al publ ic at large”—o r, in this case, UVSC’s student body and facu lty. See F erree v. S tate , 7 8 4 P

. 2 d 1 4 9 , 1 5 1 ( U t a h1 9 8 9 )

. N e ith er UVSC nor its ballroom dance instructor assu med a duty to pr ov ide dance in struction to the enti r e college. The scope of UVSC’s dance instr uc t i o n duties is not t he only impediment to it s cl aim to public duty doctrine prot ections, though. Th e nature of a duty to prov ide

s af e d anc e i ns tru c tion

is fu nd am ental ly d iffe rent fromrec ogn iz ed publi c duties s uch

as prov iding police and fire pr ote ction, safeguarding the public from natural disasters, considering public safet y when granting par ole to prisoners, re gulating financial institut ions to pr ote ct depositor s, and li cens ing moto rists and doctor s to pro mote safety. See su pra ¶ 31. Each of t he se wellestablish ed publi c duties i nvolv e obl i g a t ions ass umed b y gov ernmental entit ies to pro tect t he general public fro m exter nal harms. Ballroom dance ins tr uction, however, is no t a serv ice that prote c ts the pu bl ic fro m h arm . T hu s , Ms . C ope ’s theor y of li ab il ity does not r ely upon a public duty owed to the gener al publ ic. ¶39 We the ref ore h old tha t Ms

. Cop e’s la w s ui t is notba s ed on a publi c duty. Consequ ently, t he publ ic du ty do ctrine does notbar her neglig ence cl aim, and w e need not consider the special rel ati ons hi p e xc ep tion

to th is doc trin e. Wer e v e r s e th e d i s t r i c tc ou rt’s orde r di s mi s s in g Ms . C ope ’s law s ui t an d re ma nd fo r fu rthe r proceedings consis tent with this opinion. 7