* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the lim ited circumstances set forth in 5 T H C IR

. R.

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 97-10965

(Summary Calendar)

_________________

PHYLLIS L. RANDALL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

METHODIST HOSPITAL OF DALLAS, doing business

as Charlton Methodist Hospital,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(3:96-CV-1590-R)

February 26, 1998

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Phyllis L. Randall, e mployed as a nurse with Methodist

Hospital of Dallas (“Methodist”) fr om July 1989 to June 1994,

appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

Methodist on Randall’s claim of discriminatory term ination under-2-

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §

12201 et seq. Randall admits that her on-the-job back injury has

rendered her unable to perform the heavy lifting that is an

e ssential function of a nurse’s job, but contends that Method ist

violated the ADA by refusing to place her in other, vacant

positions for which she was qualified. S ee 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)

(noting that “reasonable accommodation” may include “reassignment

to a vacant position.”). See also Daugherty v. City of El Paso

, 56

F. 3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1995), c ert. denied

, 116 S. Ct. 1263

(1996).

The district court fo und no evidence that Randall was

qualified for any of the allegedly vacant positions and granted

summary judgment to Methodist on those grounds. S ee Saunders v.

Michelin Tire Corp

., 942 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that

when the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving

party may show itself entitled to summa ry judgment merely by

“point[ing] out the absence of evidence supporting the essential

elements of the opposing party’s case.”); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.

,

119 F.3d 305, 320 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied

, 118 S. Ct. 871

(1998) (hol ding that an ADA plaintiff, in order to make out a

circumstantial, prima facie case of discrimination, must

demonstrate that (1) she is disabled, (2) she is “qualified” for

the position, (3) she was “subject to an adverse employment

action,” and (4) she was replaced by a non-disabled person or-3-

treated “less favorably” than non-disabled employees.).

We review summary judgment determination s d e novo

, applying

the same standards as the di strict court. S ee Skotak v. Tenneco

Resins, Inc.

, 953 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1992). Thus, we look

first to see whether Methodist has demonstra ted an absence of

evidence supporting any element of an ADA claim on which Randall

bears the burden of proof. S ee Forsyth v. Barr

, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533

(5th Cir. 1994). We then ask whether Randall has responded with

sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as

to each of those elements. See id

.

Here, we find that regardless of whether the record contains

any evid ence supporting Randall’s qualifications for the vacant

jobs, Methodist has demonstrated a lack of evidence supporting

Randall’s claim that she was treat ed less favorably than nondisabled employees. Indeed, Randall’s complaint makes not even a

passing reference to the treatment non-disabled people may have

received at Methodist. Moreover, in response to Methodist’s motion

for summary ju dgment, Randall submitted only her own affidavit,

alleging, in relevant part:

I am personally aware of another nurse, Miosha Hill, who

was allowed to return to the floor to be a nurse after

she received a back injury that did not allow her to

perform all of the functions of a nurse. This injury

occurred when she was not on the job at the hospital.

She was unable to perform the lifting and other exertions

n ecessary as a nurse. She was given the necessary

assistance by support staff to allow her to remain on the

floor as a nurse until such time as she was rehabilitated

to the point that she was able to work without-4-

assistance.

Yet Randall also states in her affidavit that from the time of

her injury in Janua ry 1994 until the time her doctor opined that

she had reached maximum medical improvement in April 1994, she too

was permitted to work “light duty.” Thus, Randall’s allegations

concerning Hill, even if true, establish only that Hill, like

Randall, was permitted to remain in her position as a nurse until

reaching maximum medical recovery. Fortunately for Hill, maximum

recovery meant full recovery, and she therefore could remain on the

job permanently. For Randall, however, maximum recovery meant only

partial improvement, indicating, in her doctor’s opinion, that she

would n ever be able to resume her full duties as a nurse. We

cannot say, therefore, that Methodist has treated Randall any “less

favorably” than Hill.

In light of this failure to produce any evidence that

Methodist treated Randall less favorably than non-disabled

employees, Randall has no t met her burden under F ED

. R. C IV

. P ROC

.

56. The district court’s grant of summary judgment to Methodist is

AFFIRMED.