alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Times Square Automobile Company, Defendant in Error, v. E. S. Good, Plaintiff in Error.

Gen. No. 15,192.

*Verdicts—when not disturbed as against the evidence.*A verdict will not be set aside on review as against the evidence unless clearly and manifestly against its weight.

Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Frank Crowe, Judge, presiding.

Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1909.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed February 14, 1911.

John K. Prindiville, for plaintiff in error.

Edward R. Litzinger, for defendant in error.

Mr. Presiding Justice Smith

delivered the opinion of the court.

The statement of claim of the defendant in error, plaintiff below, is for $289 balance due on the purchase price of an automobile. Defendant below, plaintiff in error, filed a counterclaim for $1,000' for alleged damages suffered by him because of the failure of defendant in error to deliver the automobile as contracted. The case was tried before the court without a jury. No propositions of law were tendered to the court to be held as the law of the case. The only real question involved is whether the finding and judgment of the court is contrary to the law and the evidence.

Upon an examination of the evidence in the record, and without discussing it in detail, we are of the opinion that the finding and judgment of the trial court should not he set aside. We have found no basis in the evidence for holding that the finding of the trial court is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court saw and heard the witnesses, and was m a better position for determining the truth than is this court, depending, as we must, on the printed page alone. The judgment is affirmed.

I'Affirmed.
§ 222.140 What definitions apply to this subpart? In addition to the terms referenced or defined in § 222.2, the following definitions apply to this subpart: *Minimum school facilities* means those school facilities for which the Secretary may provide assistance under this part as follows: ( 1 ) The Secretary, after consultation with the State educational agency and the local educational agency (LEA), considers these facilities necessary to support an educational program— ( i ) For the membership of students residing on Federal property to be served at normal capacity; and
( ii ) In accordance with applicable Federal and State laws and, if necessary or appropriate, common practice in the State.
( 2 ) The term includes, but is not restricted to— ( i ) Classrooms and related facilities; and
( ii ) Machinery, utilities, and initial equipment, to the extent that these are necessary or appropriate for school purposes.
*Providing assistance* means constructing, leasing, renovating, remodeling, rehabilitating, or otherwise providing minimum school facilities.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 7708)
#### § 206.30 How does the Secretary evaluate an application?

The Secretary evaluates an application under the procedures in 34 CFR part 75.

(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1070d-2(a) and (e))

[62 FR 10403, Mar. 6, 1997]
### §16. Crime of violence defined

The term "crime of violence" means—

(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or

(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

(Added Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §1001(a), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2136.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Constitutionality

For information regarding the constitutionality of this section, as added by section 1001(a) of Pub. L. 98–473, see the Table of Laws Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court on the Constitution Annotated website, constitution.congress.gov.
§ 367.41 How does the Secretary evaluate an application for a discretionary grant? ( a ) The Secretary evaluates an application for a discretionary grant based on the selection criteria chosen from the general selection criteria found in EDGAR regulations at 34 CFR 75.210.
( b ) In addition to the selection criteria, the Secretary considers the geographic distribution of projects in making an award.
(Authority: Section 752(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended; 29 U.S.C. 796k(b); 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3 and 3474)
§ 303.703 Secretary's review and determination regarding State performance. ( a ) *Review.* The Secretary annually reviews the State's performance report submitted pursuant to § 303.702(b)(2).
( b ) *Determination.* ( 1 ) *General.* Based on the information provided by the State in the State's annual performance report, information obtained through monitoring visits, and any other public information made available, the Secretary determines if the State— ( i ) Meets the requirements and purposes of part C of the Act;
( ii ) Needs assistance in implementing the requirements of part C of the Act;
( iii ) Needs intervention in implementing the requirements of part C of the Act; or
( iv ) Needs substantial intervention in implementing the requirements of part C of the Act.
( 2 ) *Notice and opportunity for a hearing.* ( i ) For determinations made under paragraphs (b)(1)(iii) and (b)(1)(iv) of this section, the Secretary provides reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing on those determinations.
( ii ) The hearing described in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section consists of an opportunity to meet with the Assistant Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services to demonstrate why the Secretary should not make the determination described in paragraph (b)(1)(iii) or (b)(1)(iv) of this section.
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1416(d), 1442)
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-05-00683-CV

Earnest Taylor, Appellant

v.

Vernice Hill, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEE COUNTY, 21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 12334, HONORABLE TERRY L. FLENNIKEN, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Earnest Taylor filed his notice of appeal on October 13, 2005, and the

clerk’s record was filed on November 28, 2005. On February 10, 2006, Taylor requested an

extension of time to file his brief. On March 30, 2006, this Court granted Taylor an extension of

time to file his brief until May 1, 2006. On May 8, 2006, this Court notified Taylor that his brief

was overdue. On May 11, 2006, Taylor sought another extension of time to file his brief and

notified this Court that, although no motion to withdraw had been filed, he was proceeding pro se.

On June 13, 2006, this Court granted Taylor an extension of time to file his brief until July 3,

2006. On July 18, 2006, this Court notified Taylor that his brief was again overdue and asked him

to file a motion by July 28, 2006, explaining his failure to file his brief. Taylor did not respond

to that notice. On August 17, 2006, the Clerk of this Court sent Taylor notice that his brief was
2

“long overdue” and directed him to tender his brief pro se or obtain counsel and file a brief by

September 18, 2006. That notice warned Taylor that his failure to take such action by September

18, 2006, would result in the dismissal of his appeal for want of prosecution. To date, Taylor has

not responded to this Court’s notice. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution.

Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b), (c).

__________________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Pemberton

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: October 6, 2006
**Exhibit (31.1)**
**Certifications**
I, Timothy J. Hearn, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Imperial Oil Limited; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared; b) [Paragraph omitted pursuant to SECRelease Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986] c) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluation; and d) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions):
a) All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlsover financial reporting.
Date: March 11, 2004 /s/ T.J. Hearn  Timothy J. HearnChairman of the Board,President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer(Principal Executive Officer)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MICHAEL ALAN WILKINS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 178 MM 2016

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 2nd day of February , 201 7

, the Petition for Leave to File Petition

for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is DENIED

.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of the Interior

###### Bureau of Land Management

          - [WY-923-1310-FI; WYW164400]

# AGENCY:

Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

Under the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) received a petition for reinstatement from Tyler Rockies Exploration, Ltd. for competitive oil and gas lease WYW164400 for land in Natrona County, Wyoming. The petition was filed on time and was accompanied by all the rentals due since the date the lease terminated under the law.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Bureau of Land Management, Julie L. Weaver, Chief, Fluid Minerals Adjudication, at (307) 775-6176.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The lessee has agreed to the amended lease terms for rentals and royalties at rates of $10 per acre or fraction thereof, per year and 16                    2/3                     percent, respectively. The lessee has paid the required $500 administrative fee and $163 to reimburse the Department for the cost of this                     **Federal Register**                     notice. The lessee has met all the requirements for reinstatement of the lease as set out in Sections 31(d) and (e) of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. 188), and the BLM is proposing to reinstate lease WYW164400 effective October 1, 2010, under the original terms and conditions of the lease and the increased rental and royalty rates cited above. The BLM has not issued a valid lease to any other interest affecting the lands.                

Julie L. Weaver,

Chief, Fluid Minerals Adjudication.

[FR Doc. 2011-7594 Filed 3-31-11; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4310-22-P
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30971 Summary Calendar

HERSCHEL BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CITY OF SHREVEPORT; ROBERT W. WILLIAMS, Mayor, City of Shreveport; JERALD JONES, City Attorney for the City of Shreveport; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JANET RENO, U.S. Attorney General; MICHAEL D. SKINNER, U.S. Attorney, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 96-CV-2343

- - - - - - - - - - August 31, 1998 Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Herschel Brown appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Voting Rights Act action. He argues that the district court erred in dismissing his action against the United States, Janet Reno, and Michael D. Skinner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court for the District of Columbia has exclusive jurisdiction over actions against federal officersNo. 97-30971 -2- or employees challenging the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(b); South Carolina v. Katzenbach , 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966). The district court did not err in dismissing Brown’s action against the United States, Janet Reno, and Michael Skinner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Brown argues that the district court erred in dismissing his action against the City of Shreveport and the city officials for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because Brown failed to allege sufficient facts to meet the three threshold requirements to establish a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the district court did not err in dismissing Brown’s Section 2 claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986). Because Brown acknowledges that the City submitted the redistricting plan to the United States Attorney General for preclearance and that the Attorney General did not object to the plan, the district court did not err in dismissing Brown’s claim under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Brown has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments that the City’s redistricting plan was enacted with the purpose of intentional discrimination against the black minority registered voters or that an actual discriminatory effect resulted. See Davis v. Bandemer , 478 U.S. 109, 127-134 (1986); City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden , 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980). Further, Brown has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the City was unresponsive to black registered voters. See Lodge v. Buxton ,No. 97-30971 -3- 639 F.2d 1358, 1375 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1981), aff’d , 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Brown’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.1



Certification

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) and (b))



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) and (b)), the undersigned hereby individually
certifies in his capacity as an officer of USI Holdings Corporation (the Company) that the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the end of and for the periods covered by such Report.



|                      |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Dated: August 9, 2005 |  | /s/ DAVID L. ESLICK    
|                      |  | David L. Eslick        
|                      |  | Chief Executive Officer



The foregoing
certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C. §1350(a) and (b)) and is, to the extent permitted by law, provided by the above signatory to the extent of his
respective knowledge.



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
USI Holdings Corporation and will be retained by USI Holdings Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



50
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

June 25, 2012

s0618

Order 

June 25, 2012

144793

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 144793

COA: 298157

Wayne CC: 08-016177-FC

ASHTON ARNIZE SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 19, 2012 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

October 31, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

128840 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. SARAH SAUNDERS f/k/a SARAH ELROD, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices 

v SC: 128840 

 COA: 260607 

Livingston CC: 97-025956-DM

DOUGLAS J. ELROD,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 10, 2005 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

t1024 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 31, 2005 

Clerk
#### § 106.71 Retaliation.

A recipient must prohibit retaliation, including peer retaliation, in its education program or activity. When a recipient has information about conduct that reasonably may constitute retaliation under Title IX or this part, the recipient is obligated to comply with § 106.44. Upon receiving a complaint alleging retaliation, a recipient must initiate its grievance procedures under § 106.45, or, as appropriate, an informal resolution process under § 106.44(k). As set out in § 106.45(e), if the complaint is consolidated with a complaint of sex-based harassment involving a student complainant or student respondent at a postsecondary institution, the grievance procedures initiated by the consolidated complaint must comply with the requirements of both §§ 106.45 and 106.46.

[89 FR 33896, Apr. 29, 2024]
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

SERGE LEGER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-3099

[January 17, 2019]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Laura Johnson, Judge; 

L.T. Case No. 501997CF011660B.

Jeremy Dicker and Robin Bresky of The Law Offices of Robin Bresky, 

Boca Raton, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MAY, CIKLIN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
### §6556. Termination of effectiveness

The authority provided by this subchapter terminates effective October 1, 2023.

(Pub. L. 108–148, title IV, §406, Dec. 3, 2003, 117 Stat. 1911; Pub. L. 115–334, title VIII, §8406(a), Dec. 20, 2018, 132 Stat. 4845.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–334 amended section generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this subchapter for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2008."