NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

WILLIAM W. HULVEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 

Respondent. 

__________________________ 

2011-3065 

__________________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in Case No. PH0831100249-I-1. 

____________________________ 

Decided: June 13, 2011 

____________________________ 

WILLIAM W. HULVEY, Morgantown, West Virginia, pro 

se. 

MELISSA M. DEVINE, Trial Attorney, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, 

for respondent. With her on the brief were TONY WEST, 

Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and DEBORAH A. BYNUM, Assistant Director. 

__________________________ 
HULVEY v. OPM 2

Before RADER, Chief Judge, and LOURIE and BRYSON, 

Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

William W. Hulvey appeals from the decision of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) affirming 

that Hulvey’s Civil Service Retirement System (“CSRS”) 

annuity had been correctly computed by the Office of 

Personnel Management (“OPM”). Because OPM did not 

miscalculate Hulvey’s annuity, and because OPM’s 

method of calculation is a reasonable interpretation of 

§ 8332, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are undisputed. Petitioner William Hulvey is a CSRS annuitant who retired effective 

May 5, 2005. Hulvey had two pertinent periods of federal 

employment: military service from October 22, 1970, 

through February 26, 1971; and civilian service from 

April 14, 1974, through September 6, 2006.1 Hulvey also 

had 1,567 hours of accumulated unused sick leave. 

OPM computed Hulvey’s total service to be 33 years, 5 

months, and 29 days (i.e., 4 months and 5 days of military 

service; 32 years, 4 months, and 23 days of civilian service; and 9 months and 1 day of unused sick leave pursuant to OPM’s chart for converting hours of unused sick 

leave to months and days, J.A. 78). The 29 days were 

eliminated as an impermissible fraction of a month under 

5 U.S.C § 8332(a). Thus, according to OPM, Hulvey’s 

 1 As the Board noted, Hulvey indicated that after 

prevailing on an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint of discrimination he was awarded a retroactive 

promotion, salary increase, and extension of his retirement date to September 6, 2006. J.A. 12. 
3 HULVEY v. OPM

total creditable service was 33 years and 5 months. 

Hulvey petitioned for recalculation, J.A. 23, and OPM 

affirmed its determination of 33 years and 5 months of 

creditable service, J.A. 19. 

Hulvey appealed to the MSPB, asserting that his total 

creditable service was miscalculated. J.A. 31. With 

regard to his military service, Hulvey asserted that he 

served a total of 3 months and 36 days (i.e., 10 days in 

October 1970; 3 full months from November 1970 to 

January 1971; and 26 days in February 1971). After 

applying OPM’s rule that each month contains 30 days 

(discussed below), Hulvey asserted that his creditable 

military service totaled 4 months and 6 days. Adding this 

military service to the beginning date of his civilian 

service (April 14, 1974), Hulvey asserted that his beginning “service computation date” should be December 8, 

1973. (In contrast, OPM’s service computation date, 

based on one fewer day of creditable military service, was 

December 9, 1973.) Using this allegedly correct service 

computation date, Hulvey then calculated his total creditable service to be 33 years, 6 months, and 1 day (i.e., 24 

days in December 1973; 32 years and 8 full months from 

January 1974 through August 2006; and 6 days in September 2006; plus 9 months and 1 day of unused sick 

leave). 

In an initial decision dated May 12, 2010, the Board 

affirmed OPM’s calculation, determining that the calculation was correct and that, pursuant to Begley v. Office of 

Personnel Management, 60 F.3d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1995), 

OPM’s calculation method was a reasonable interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 8332(a). J.A. 11–15. Hulvey filed a 

petition for review at the Board, and in a final order dated 

November 19, 2010, the Board denied the petition. J.A. 
HULVEY v. OPM 4

6–9. Hulvey timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

DISCUSSION

In an appeal from a decision of the MSPB, we must 

affirm the decision unless it is found to be: “(1) arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures 

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; 

or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c) (2006); see also Koyen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 

973 F.2d 919, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 

When reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute 

that it administers, we look first to the language of the 

statute and ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to 

the precise question at issue.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 

If the statute is silent or ambiguous as to the specific 

issue, we ask “whether the agency’s answer is based on a 

permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. In 

cases involving implicit legislative delegation to the 

agency, “a court may not substitute its own construction 

of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 

made by the administrator of an agency.” Id. at 844. 

On appeal, Hulvey asserts that OPM’s method of 

computing total federal service credit pursuant to 5 

U.S.C. § 8332 is “inequitable and randomly discriminatory,” because, by considering each month to have 30 

days, it can in some circumstances credit a federal employee with fewer than all of the days the employee 

actually worked. Hulvey thus asserts that OPM’s service 

calculation method is “inherently unreasonably” and 

impermissible under Chevron. 
5 HULVEY v. OPM

Hulvey contends in particular that OPM’s method 

misapplied 5 U.S.C. § 8332(a), disregarded § 8332(b), and 

failed to follow the method of calculation set forth in the 

Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees 

Retirement System Handbook for Personnel and Payroll 

Offices (“CSRS and FERS Handbook”). According to 

Hulvey, these errors resulted in a miscalculation of his 

creditable service, as detailed above. Specifically, Hulvey 

asserts that he served in the military for 4 months and 6 

days, not 4 months and 5 days as calculated by OPM. He 

further contends that he was denied an additional day of 

service when OPM merged his military and civilian 

services to determine his total creditable federal service. 

Thus, Hulvey maintains, he is entitled to a total of 33 

years, 6 months, and 1 day of creditable service. Hulvey 

requests that we reverse the Board’s decision, order the 

Board to recalculate his federal creditable service, and 

order payment of prior annuity underpayments with 

interest. 

The government responds by arguing that the Board 

correctly affirmed OPM’s calculation of Hulvey’s creditable service periods. The government asserts that the 

Board properly followed Begley, which held that OPM’s 

method of calculation is a reasonable interpretation of its 

statutory authority to compute creditable service. Moreover, the government contends that OPM’s calculation 

complies with § 8332(b) and the CSRS and FERS Handbook. 

We agree with the government that the Board properly applied our holding in Begley to affirm OPM’s calculation of Hulvey’s creditable service. The statute 

governing creditable service is 5 U.S.C. § 8332. In relevant part, it provides: 
HULVEY v. OPM 6

(a) The total service of an employee or Member is the full years and twelfth parts thereof, excluding from the aggregate the fractional part of a 

month, if any. 

(b) The service of an employee shall be credited from the date of original employment to the 

date of separation on which title to annuity is 

based in the civilian service of the Government. 

. . . 

Because § 8332(a) does not define the term “twelfth 

parts,” OPM was obligated to devise its own formula to 

give effect to this statutory language. Begley, 60 F.3d at 

805–06. Under its formula, OPM considers a year to have 

360 days and each month to have 30 days, and OPM gives 

30 days’ credit for each full calendar month that an employee works regardless of the actual number of days 

contained in the particular month’s work. Id. at 806 

(citing CSRS and FERS Handbook § 50A2.1-3(B)); see also

J.A. 72–78. 

In Begley, we upheld OPM’s system of calculating service credit as a reasonable interpretation of the references 

in § 8332(a) to “twelfth parts” and “months.” Begley, 60 

F.3d at 806. Hulvey seeks to distinguish Begley from the 

facts of this case by arguing that the calculation in Begley

involved a “fractional year,” whereas Hulvey’s calculation 

involves a “fractional month.” We reject this alleged 

distinction. Both Begley and this case involve the calculation of creditable service under 5 U.S.C § 8332 using 

OPM’s method. We held there, as we do here, that OPM’s 

method is a reasonable interpretation of § 8332(a). The 

Board correctly determined that it was bound by Begley
7 HULVEY v. OPM

with regard to the reasonableness of OPM’s computation 

method.2

Our holding is also consistent with the language of 

§ 8332(b) and the CSRS and FERS Handbook. Hulvey 

contends that OPM’s computation method violates the 

statutory requirement that “[t]he service of an employee 

shall be credited from the date of original employment to 

the date of separation.” 5 U.S.C. § 8332(b). Although 

Begley explicitly addressed only § 8332(a), its holding 

equally applies to the language of § 8332(b). OPM’s 

calculation expressly accounted for Hulvey’s dates of 

original employment and his dates of separation, both for 

his military and civilian periods of service. J.A. 20. Thus, 

OPM’s method, which necessarily accounts for dates of 

original employment and separation, is a reasonable 

interpretation of both subsections (a) and (b) of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8332. See Begley, 60 F.3d at 806. Further, because the 

CSRS and FERS Handbook merely sets forth the rules 

and procedures for applying OPM’s calculation method, 

we reject Hulvey’s argument that OPM’s method is contrary to the Handbook. 

Hulvey nevertheless contends that OPM’s method as 

applied to him is unfair. Be that as it may, we recognized 

in Begley that in rare instances OPM’s method may credit 

an employee with fewer days than he or she actually 

worked. Begley, 60 F.3d at 806. To the extent that Hul-

 2 We note, moreover, that in his own allegedly correct creditable service calculation Hulvey relies in part on 

OPM’s practice of converting 30 days into a full month of 

service. Pet’r’s Informal Br. at Question 3. Hulvey’s 

approach of selectively adopting only the parts of the 

OPM method that he likes “cannot be squared with any 

coherent construction of section 8332(a).” Begley, 60 F.3d 

at 806.
HULVEY v. OPM 8

vey’s case presents one such instance, our holding in 

Begley specifically accounted for this possibility. 

Finally, Hulvey alleges that OPM’s calculation 

method discriminates against Hulvey and all federal 

employees in general, and that OPM thereby engages in 

personnel practices prohibited by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) 

and 2302(b)(11). We reject these allegations. Section 2302(b)(10) prohibits discrimination on the basis of 

conduct that does not adversely affect the performance of 

the employee or the performance of others. Section 

2302(b)(11) prohibits personnel actions that violate a 

veterans’ preference requirement. Aside from alleging 

unfairness in OPM’s method of calculating creditable 

service—a method we have upheld as a reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision—Hulvey does not allege 

any conduct or action that violates 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) 

or 2302(b)(11). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Hulvey’s arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the 

determination of the Board. 

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

No costs.