No. 82-212 IN THE SUPREI~IECOURT OF THE S.TATE OF FIONTANA 1982

CHARLES SHANNON, Plaintiff and Respondent,

DONALD E. HULETT, EAST VALLEY TRUCI<ING, and STEVEN LUKSHA, Defendants and Apsellants.

Ap2eal from: District Court 

### of the FifthJudicial District, 

### In and for the County of 

### Jefferson, The IIonorable Frank Blair, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record: ForAppellants: Corette, Smith, Pohlrnan & Allen; Robert Carlson, Butte, Montana
For Respondent: John L. Peterson, Butte, Montana

Submitted

### on Briefs: September 9, 1982 Decided: 

### January 19, 1983

# . Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Defendants appeal an order of the Jefferson County District Court grantingpla.intiff a new trialaftera jury returned a defense verdict in a personal injury case. Although defendants raise several issues concerning a claim that the trial court abused 

### its discretion, 

### we decline todecide the case on the 

### meritsatthis

### time because the trial court, 

### in granting a new trial, failed tocanply with Rule 59(f),M.R.Civ.P., which requires that: "Any ord-er of the court granting a new trial, shall specify 

### the grounds therefor with sufficient particularity as to aprise 

### the parties and 

### the appellate court of the rationale underlying the ruling, and this may be done in

### the 

### body of the order, or

### in an attachedmrandum. " In granting a new trial the court entered an order 

### me1e.1-y stating that "on good cause shown the motion byplaintiff fora new trial is hereby granted.

### " The defendants then apaled, and three and a half months after the notice of appeal was filed, 

### the trial court filed a document with +this Court entitled "Certification of Issues on Apal in Granting Motion for a New Trial." This document, prepared by plaintiff's counsel, 

### sets forth +the reasons 

### the trialcourt granted a new trial. For policyreasons, 

### we decline toconsider thatorderwhich attempts torelateback totheoriginalorder grantinaa new trial. In Churchhill v. Holly Sugar Corp. (19811, Mont

# . I 629 P.2d 758, 38 St.Rep. 860, 

### we held that amended findings of fact filed after 

### a notice of appeal has been filedcannot be considered. The policyreasons underlying thisholding alsoapply here. In addition, in Ballantyne ~7. Anaconda Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 406, 574 P.2d 582, because the trialcourthad fa.iledtocomplywith Rule 59(f) in granting a new trial, 

### we remanded to

### the trialcourt toenter reasons for granting a new trial. After thiswas done 

### the
case

### wzs not again appealed tothis Court. Rule 59(f)assures that+hisCourt will not have to guess at a trial court's reasons for granting a new trial, that we will not have to search for 

### the ~roverbialneedle in the haystack. Further, where reasons are absent it isdifficult

### to determinewhether the trialcourtproperly exercised itsdiscretion ingranting a new trial. The ruleprovides


### an imprtant safeguard to the trial court's use of discretion. Requiring reasons means that the trial court must discipline 

### its thinking in the process of considerinq the claimed reasons a new trial should be granted. This process should result in a higher probability that a proper decisionwill

### he reached. The costsof a
new trialinmany cases are significant; the tria.1court

### owes a duty tothe litigants, tothe public, and tothis Court, 

### tofollowthese safeguards 

### in determining whether a new trial should be granted. We are aware that \re accepted a so-called later certificati-on of reasons forgranting a new trial in Gilesv. FlintValley Forest Products (1979), 179Mont. 382, 588 P.2d 535, and held thatthe late certification nonetheless fulfilled the policy behind Rule 59(f). To the extent Giles is inconsistent with our holding here, it is 0~7errul.ed. An order, whether prepared by an attorney for the trial court's signature, or an order prepared bv the trial court itself, entered after the decision granting a new trial, fails todisclose the reasoning process used 

### in reaching the decision to grant a new trial. To 

### he of value, that reasoning process 

### must precede the order granting a new trial and it must be set forth inwriting at least simul~taneously with the orcler grantingthe new trial. We dismiss the appeal without prejudice and remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration and entry of an order in compliancewith Rule 59(f)

# .We Concur:

Chief 

### Justice

### fir. Chief Justice FranK I. 

### Haswell, 

### dissenting: The majority hold that a subsequent certification of the reasons why the District Court granted a new trial is ineffective and remand the case back to the District Court for reconslderatlon. In my view thls rullng exalts form over substance, technicality over purpose, and is quite unrealistic. The result is delay in final disposition of cases, an unnecessary burden on Montana's District Courts, many of which are alreaay staggering under unmanageable caseloads, and promotes only an academic and theoretical objective. 

### We already have before us for review the Distrlct Court's order granting a new trial and the District Court's
reasons for that order. If the majority feel the order granting a new trial is erroneous, this Court can so rule on appeal. What is accomplished by remanding the case back to the District Court for entry of another order with contemporaneous reasons therefor? 1s it realistic to think that anything of substance will be changed in this process? The Dlstrlct Court has already ruled and given its reasons. I would follow our prior decision in Giles v. Flint Valley Forest Products (1953), 179 Mont. 382, 

### 588 P.2d 535, holding that later certification of the reasons for an order yrantlng a new trial satisfies the purpose and policy behind Rule 59(b), M.R.Civ.P. The District Court's order is either correct or incorrect. It is our duty to determine this on appeal.
%.AOUe.p,

# & Chief 

### usl lice