15-1207 

Silva v. Lynch 

BIA 

Montante, IJ 

A088 939 797

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

6th 4 day of July, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JON O. NEWMAN,

8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

9 GERARD E. LYNCH,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 OSVALDO C. SILVA, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-1207 

17 NAC 

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Joel C. Haims; Malcolm Dort, 

24 Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York, 

25 N.Y.; Brian R. Matsui, Morrison & 

26 Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C. 

27 

28 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

29 Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. 

30 Ferrier, Assistant Director; 

31 Lindsay M. Murphy, Trial Attorney, 

32 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

33 United States Department of Justice, 

34 Washington, D.C. 
2

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Osvaldo C. Silva, a native and citizen of 

6 Angola, seeks review of a March 17, 2015 decision of the BIA 

7 affirming a March 22, 2013 decision of an Immigration Judge 

8 (“IJ”), which denied Silva’s application for asylum, 

9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

10 Torture (“CAT”). In re Osvaldo C. Silva, No. A088 939 797 

11 (B.I.A. Mar. 17, 2015), aff’g No. A088 939 797 (Immig. Ct. 

12 Buffalo Mar. 22, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

13 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

14 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for 

15 the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 

16 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

17 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. 

18 Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

19 Silva did not base his claims for relief on past harm; 

20 instead, he claimed only that he would be persecuted in the 

21 future by his father and by the Angolan population because he 

22 is gay. To establish asylum eligibility based on a 

23 well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must show that 
3

1 he subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is 

2 objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 

3 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, J.). An alien may make the 

4 latter showing either by offering evidence that “he or she would 

5 be singled out individually for persecution” or by “prov[ing] 

6 the existence of ‘a pattern or practice in his or her 

7 country . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly 

8 situated to the applicant.’” Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 

9 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)). 

10 Private action constitutes “persecution” only when the 

11 government is unwilling or unable to control it. Rizal v. 

12 Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2006). The agency reasonably 

13 concluded that Silva failed to meet his burden of proof for 

14 asylum because his fear of persecution was not objectively 

15 reasonable. 

16 As to any persecution by Silva’s father, the agency 

17 reasonably concluded that there was no evidence in the record 

18 that the Angolan government would be unwilling or unable to 

19 prevent Silva’s father from harming him or punishing his father 

20 if he did. See id.; Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 

21 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that “[i]n the absence of solid support 

22 in the record for [an applicant’s] assertion that he will be 

23 [persecuted], his fear is speculative at best”). The only 
4

1 evidence in the record supporting Silva’s allegation that his 

2 father could harm him with impunity is a letter from his mother 

3 stating that she was forced to flee to the Congo to avoid Silva’s 

4 father. The agency reasonably gave limited weight to this 

5 letter, however, which was from an interested witness who was 

6 not subject to cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 

7 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013); In re H-L-H & Z-Y-Z, 25 I. & N. Dec. 

8 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010), rev’d on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang 

9 v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). Silva argues that the 

10 agency failed to show that any other evidence was reasonably 

11 available. However, even if this evidence was the only 

12 evidence available, the agency found it insufficient to meet 

13 his burden. Accordingly, the agency reasonably concluded that 

14 Silva failed to show that the Government would allow his father 

15 to harm him if removed and therefore failed to show that his 

16 fear of persecution by his father was objectively reasonable. 

17 The agency also reasonably concluded that Silva’s fear of 

18 persecution by the Angolan population at large was not 

19 objectively reasonable. Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129. The 

20 record contains conflicting evidence concerning the prevalence 

21 of violence against gay men in Angola, and the task of resolving 

22 conflicts in the record evidence is “largely within the 

23 discretion of the agency.” Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 
5

1 138, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). The 2011 State Department Report notes 

2 that gay men in Angola report facing violence and 

3 discrimination, but it does not disclose the extent of that 

4 violence or its frequency. Silva submitted an additional 

5 article stating that homosexuals in Angola do not reveal their 

6 sexual orientation for fear of stigma and social exclusion; the 

7 article also reported on one gay man who had rocks thrown at 

8 him. DHS submitted two articles, one of which states that, 

9 although homosexuality is technically illegal in Angola, there 

10 are no reports of any prosecutions for violating the law, and 

11 that a new proposed law criminalizes discrimination based on 

12 sexual orientation. Moreover, the articles quote an HIV/AIDS 

13 activist, as well as a human rights observer, to the effect that 

14 violence against gay men is uncommon in Angola and that Angola 

15 is ahead of other African nations with respect to the treatment 

16 of LGBT individuals. Given the conflicting evidence in the 

17 record, the agency reasonably determined that Silva had not 

18 shown that his fear of persecution by the Angolan population 

19 was objectively reasonable. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 171; 

20 Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129. 

21 Silva does not advance distinct challenges to the agency’s 

22 denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief in his brief 

23 to his Court; his challenges to the denials of these forms of 
6

1 relief are entirely derivative of his challenges to the denial 

2 of asylum. Because Silva’s claims for asylum, withholding of 

3 removal, and CAT relief were all based on the same factual 

4 predicate—Silva’s status as a gay man—the agency did not err 

5 in denying these applications for relief. See Ramsameachire, 

6 357 F.3d at 185. 

7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

8 DENIED. 

9 FOR THE COURT: 

10 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk