[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-15369

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-01674-VEH

SHERYL HARVEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

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(May 20, 2014)

Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Sheryl Harvey appeals the dismissal of her second complaint against the 

Standard Insurance Company to recover long term disability benefits under her 

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employer’s group policy as governed by the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. We affirm.

In 2010, Harvey filed in an Alabama court a complaint seeking a judicial 

award of long term benefits from Standard. See id. § 1132. Standard removed the 

action to the district court, after which Standard and Harvey moved for summary 

judgment. The district court denied Harvey’s motion and granted the motion of 

Standard. The district court ruled, relevant to this appeal, that an extra-contractual 

appeal undertaken voluntarily by Standard, which Harvey halted by filing her civil 

action, did not change the standard of review from arbitrary and capricious to de

novo. Harvey v. Standard Ins. Co., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1278–81 (N.D. Ala.

2012). We affirmed. Harvey v. Standard Ins. Co., 503 Fed. App’x 845 (11th Cir. 

2013).

In September 2013, Harvey filed a second complaint against Standard in an 

Alabama court, which Standard also removed to the district court. Harvey again 

sought a judicial award of long term benefits, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132, on the ground 

that she was entitled to consideration of evidence submitted to Standard after it 

agreed to undertake the extra-contractual appeal. Standard moved to dismiss the 

complaint as barred by the three-year period of limitation provided in Harvey’s

policy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

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The district court dismissed Harvey’s complaint as untimely. The district 

court ruled that the limitation period in the policy commenced, at the latest, on 

October 27, 2009, when Standard denied Harvey’s claim for benefits, and then ran 

uninterrupted for more than three years, until August 8, 2013, when Harvey filed 

her second complaint. The district court declined to consider as “wholly 

undeveloped and without support” Harvey’s two-sentence argument that “[t]he 

statute of limitations is not a bar” and “began to run on 7/15/13 when Standard 

refused to issue a decision on the [extra-contractual] appeal.” The district court 

saw “no need to explore” the alternative defenses raised by Standard.

The district court did not err by dismissing Harvey’s second complaint. 

Harvey argues, for the first time, that her complaint is timely because her extracontractual appeal tolled the limitation period, see 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-

1(c)(3)(ii), but we decline to consider an argument that Harvey failed to raise in the 

district court, see Slater v. Energy Servs. Group Int’l., Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1332 

(11th Cir. 2011), and that she fails to discuss substantively in her brief, see Fed. R. 

App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). And Harvey has abandoned her argument that the limitation 

period commenced running on the date Standard refused to issue its decision. See

Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012).

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Harvey’s complaint.

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