Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 10 / Friday, January 14, 2011 / Notices 2725 

equipment is being used, the equipment 

will be immediately de-energized and 

withdrawn to outby the last open 

crosscut; (7) all hand-held methane 

detectors will be MSHA approved and 

maintained in permissible and proper 

operating condition as defined in 

existing 30 CFR 75.320; (8) coal 

production will cease, except for the 

time necessary to troubleshoot under 

actual mining conditions. Coal may 

remain in or on the equipment in order 

to test and diagnose the equipment 

under a load. This change will require 

production to cease except during actual 

testing. Accumulations of coal and 

combustible materials referenced in 30 

CFR 75.400 will be removed before 

testing begins to provide additional 

safety to miners; (9) non-permissible 

electronic test and diagnostic equipment 

will not be used to test equipment when 

float coal dust is in suspension; (10) all 

electronic and diagnostic equipment 

will be used in accordance with the 

manufacturer’s recommended safe use 

procedures; (11) qualified personnel 

engaged in the use of electronic test and 

diagnostic equipment will be properly 

trained to recognize the hazards and 

limitations associated with the use of 

electronic test and diagnostic 

equipment; (12) any piece of equipment 

subject to this petition will be inspected 

by an authorized representative of the 

Secretary prior to initially placing it in 

service underground; (13) within 60 

days after this petition for modification 

becomes final, the petitioner will submit 

proposed revisions for their approved 

30 CFR Part 48 training plan to the 

District Manager. In addition to the 

requirements specified in Item No. 8 

and 9, these proposed revisions will 

specify initial and refresher training 

regarding compliance with the terms 

and conditions stated in the Proposed 

Decision and Order; (14) cables 

supplying power to low-voltage test and 

diagnostic equipment will only be used 

when permissible testing and diagnostic 

equipment are unavailable. The 

petitioner asserts that the proposed 

alternative method will guarantee no 

less than the same protection afforded 

by the standard. 

Docket Number: M–2010–049–C. 

Petitioner: Speed Mining, Inc., 1600 

Laidley Tower, P.O. Box 553, 

Charleston, West Virginia 25322. 

Mine: American Eagle Mine, MSHA 

I.D. No. 46–05437, located in Kanawha 

County, West Virginia. 

Regulation Affected: 30 CFR 75.1403– 

5(g) (Criteria—Belt conveyors). 

Modification Request: The petitioner 

requests a modification of the existing 

standard to allow less than 24 inches of 

clearance at belt locations due to initial 

design and construction of the entries 

by the former owner of the mine. The 

petitioner states that: (1) Speed Mining 

is unable to maintain 24 inches of 

clearance because of the initial design 

and construction of the entries by the 

former owner of the mine; (2) 

approximately eight years ago, the 

former operator designed the section 

such that the track and conveyor belt 

would run in the same entry; (3) 

because the track and belt run together, 

and there is a need for some 

supplemental roof control along certain 

portions of the belt, it is impossible to 

provide 24 inches of clearance along the 

belt; (4) the requested modification has 

essentially been in place since the 

former operator’s construction of the 

entries, with no objection from MSHA. 

Speed Mining is seeking to continue the 

former owner’s practice. The petitioner 

further states that: (1) Adequate signs 

indicating close clearance will be 

installed on the inby and outby sides of 

the close clearance areas; (2) no work or 

travel will be allowed in the close 

clearance area while the belt is running; 

(3) belt cut-off switches will be installed 

on the inby and outby sides of the close 

clearance area; (4) the belt stoppage 

switches will be installed in a manner 

that will not allow the belt to be started 

at another location; (5) before any work 

is performed in the affected area, the 

power to the belt will be cut, locked and 

tagged; (6) signs will be installed to 

direct foot traffic traveling on the off 

side of the belt around the block until 

the close clearance area has been 

passed; (7) all employees who will be 

affected by this modification approval 

will be made aware of the stipulations. 

The petitioner asserts that the proposed 

alternative method will not result in a 

diminution of safety to the miners. 

Dated: January 10, 2011. 

Patricia W. Silvey, 

Certifying Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2011–687 Filed 1–13–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–43–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2011–0011] 

Draft Regulatory Guide: Issuance, 

Availability 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Issuance, Availability of Draft 

Regulatory Guide (DG)–1245. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mark P. Orr, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, telephone: 301–415–7495 or email Mark.Orr@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has issued for public 

comment a draft guide in the agency’s 

‘‘Regulatory Guide’’ series. This series 

was developed to describe and make 

available to the public such information 

as methods that are acceptable to the 

NRC staff for implementing specific 

parts of the NRC’s regulations, 

techniques that the staff uses in 

evaluating specific problems or 

postulated accidents, and data that the 

staff needs in its review of applications 

for permits and licenses. 

The draft regulatory guide, entitled, 

‘‘Inspection of Water-Control Structures 

Associated with Nuclear Power Plants,’’ 

is temporarily identified by its task 

number, DG–1245, which should be 

mentioned in all related 

correspondence. DG–1245 is proposed 

Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.127, 

dated March 1978. 

This guide describes a basis 

acceptable to the NRC staff for 

developing an appropriate inservice 

inspection and surveillance program for 

dams, slopes, canals, and other watercontrol structures associated with 

emergency cooling water systems or 

flood protection of nuclear power 

plants. 

II. Further Information 

The NRC staff is soliciting comments 

on DG–1245. Comments may be 

accompanied by relevant information or 

supporting data, and should mention 

DG–1245 in the subject line. Comments 

submitted in writing or in electronic 

form will be made available to the 

public in their entirety through the 

NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS). 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2011– 

0011 in the subject line of your 

comments. Comments submitted in 

writing or in electronic form will be 

posted on the NRC Web site and on the 

Federal rulemaking Web site 

Regulations.gov. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

The NRC requests that any party 

soliciting or aggregating comments 

received from other persons for 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES

2726 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 10 / Friday, January 14, 2011 / Notices 

submission to the NRC inform those 

persons that the NRC will not edit their 

comments to remove any identifying or 

contact information, and therefore, they 

should not include any information in 

their comments that they do not want 

publicly disclosed. 

Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

NRC–2011–0011. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 

301–492–3668; e-mail 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

Mail comments to: Cindy K. Bladey, 

Chief, Rules, Announcements, and 

Directives Branch (RADB), Office of 

Administration, Mail Stop: TWB–05– 

B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, or by fax to RDB at 301–492–3446. 

You can access publicly available 

documents related to this notice using 

the following methods: 

NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR): 

The public may examine and copy for 

a fee publicly available documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS): 

Publicly available documents created or 

received at the NRC are available 

electronically at the NRC’s Electronic 

Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, 

the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 

which provides text and image files of 

NRC’s public documents. If you do not 

have access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the documents 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC’s 

PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 

301–415–4737, or by e-mail to 

pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The Regulatory 

Analysis is available electronically 

under ADAMS Accession Number 

ML102380594. 

Comments would be most helpful if 

received by March 15, 2011. Comments 

received after that date will be 

considered if it is practical to do so, but 

the NRC is able to ensure consideration 

only for comments received on or before 

this date. Although a time limit is given, 

comments and suggestions in 

connection with items for inclusion in 

guides currently being developed or 

improvements in all published guides 

are encouraged at any time. 

Electronic copies of DG–1245 are 

available through the NRC’s public Web 

site under Draft Regulatory Guides in 

the ‘‘Regulatory Guides’’ collection of 

the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/. Electronic copies are also 

available in ADAMS (http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html), 

under Accession No. ML093060150. 

Regulatory guides are not 

copyrighted, and Commission approval 

is not required to reproduce them. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day 

of January 2011. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Harriet Karagiannis, 

Acting Chief, Regulatory Guide Development 

Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research. 

[FR Doc. 2011–724 Filed 1–13–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2011–0010] 

Withdrawal of Regulatory Guide 1.154 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Withdrawal of Regulatory Guide 

1.154, ‘‘Format and Content of PlantSpecific Pressurized Thermal Shock 

Safety Analysis Reports for Pressurized 

Water Reactors.’’ 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mekonen M. Bayssie, Regulatory Guide 

Development Branch, Division of 

Engineering, Office of Nuclear 

Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–251– 

7489 or e-mail: 

Mekonen.Bayssie@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is withdrawing 

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.154, ‘‘Format 

and Content of Plant-Specific 

Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety 

Analysis Reports for Pressurized Water 

Reactors.’’ RG 1.154 was issued by NRC 

in January 1987 to describe the format 

and content acceptable to the NRC staff 

for plant-specific pressurized thermal 

shock (PTS) safety analyses, and to 

describe acceptance criteria that NRC 

staff will use in evaluating licensee 

analyses and proposed corrective 

measures. 

In recent years, the NRC’s Office of 

Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) 

developed a technical basis that 

supported updating the PTS regulations 

in Title 10, Section 50.61, of the Code 

of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.61). 

This technical basis, as described in 

NUREG–1806 and in NUREG–1874, 

concluded that the risk of through-wall 

pressure vessel cracking due to a PTS 

event is much lower than previously 

estimated. This finding indicated that 

the reference temperature (RT) 

screening criteria in 10 CFR 50.61 are 

overly conservative and may impose an 

unnecessary burden on some licensees. 

Therefore, the NRC developed a new 

rule, 10 CFR 50.61a, ‘‘Alternate Fracture 

Requirements for Protection against 

Pressurized Thermal Shock Events’’ 

(SECY–09–0059: ‘‘Final Rule Related to 

Alternate Fracture Toughness 

Requirements for Protection Against 

Pressurized Thermal Shock Events,’’ RIN 

3150–AI01, April 9, 2009). The 

alternative rule allows, but does not 

require, that licensees may comply with 

more permissive RT limits that were 

derived in a risk-informed manner 

provided that certain requirements 

regarding vessel inspection and 

surveillance programs, as outlined in 10 

CFR 50.61a, are met. 

In the course of developing 10 CFR 

50.61a, it became clear to staff that the 

guidance provided by RG 1.154 is 

significantly outdated and, in some 

cases, technically deficient. As such, a 

plant-specific PTS analysis performed 

based on guidance in RG 1.154 will not 

be acceptable to the staff. While the 

methods and procedures were 

appropriate based on the situation in the 

industry when RG 1.154 was developed 

(1987), the methods and procedures 

have since either passed into common 

practice among plant operators, or were 

accounted for in the development of 10 

CFR 50.61a. A fundamental premise 

underlying RG 1.154 is that the RT 

screening criteria in 10 CFR 50.61 are 

based on a large number of conservative 

assumptions. As such, RG 1.154 

postulates that it is possible to perform 

a plant-specific analysis to show that 

some conservatism could reasonably be 

removed while still demonstrating that 

a plant can be operated at an acceptably 

low level of risk. The technical basis for 

10 CFR 50.61a, however, considered the 

most accurate models and input values 

presently available given the current 

state of the science. This had the effect 

of eliminating much of the conservatism 

that was embedded in the more 

restrictive 10 CFR 50.61 RT screening 

criteria. This calls into question whether 

a strong case could be made to remove 

further conservatism in a plant-specific 

PTS analysis performed in accordance 

with RG 1.154. Moreover, RG 1.154 

frequently discusses the ‘‘licensee’s 

proposed program of corrective 

measures,’’ reflecting the view that there 

are actions that an individual licensee 

can take, beyond present practices, that 

will mitigate the PTS risk. The 

continued validity of this premise is 

also questionable. An assessment of 

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