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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 14a0158p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

IN RE: MICHAEL ALLEN BOWERS; MARGARITA VILLE 

BOWERS, 

Debtors. 

_________________________________________ 

PLYMOUTH PARK TAX SERVICES, LLC, 

Appellants, 

v. 

MICHAEL ALLEN BOWERS; MARGARITA VILLE 

BOWERS, 

Appellees. 

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No. 13-4404 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron 

No. 12-51549—No. 12-51549. 

Argued: June 18, 2014 

Decided and Filed: July 21, 2014 

Before: KEITH, CLAY, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Scott W. Paris, KEITH D. WEINER & ASSOCIATES CO., LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, 

for Appellant. Robert M. Whittington, Jr., Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Scott W. 

Paris, KEITH D. WEINER & ASSOCIATES CO., LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Robert 

M. Whittington, Jr., Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. 

 

>
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 2 

_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

 McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Plymouth Park appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s Order 

which held that under Ohio law, the interest rate a Chapter 13 debtor must pay under his plan 

during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding to a tax certificate holder is the “certificate rate 

of interest” shown on the face of the tax certificate. Plymouth Park alleges that the appropriate 

interest rate is 18%, as provided in Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) § 5721.38 (2010), instead of 

0.25%, the rate provided in the tax certificate. This is an issue of first impression for this Circuit. 

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court was correct and AFFIRM. 

I.

 We begin with a brief overview of Ohio tax lien law. When real estate taxes are not paid 

by a property owner, a tax lien attaches to the subject property, annually, on the first of every 

January, which includes interest, penalties, and other fees accrued until paid. O.R.C. § 323.11. 

Summit County and several other Ohio counties sell outstanding tax obligations to investors in 

the form of tax lien certificates (“tax certificates”). O.R.C. § 5721.1

 By selling these tax 

certificates, the county creates much needed revenue from unpaid property taxes. The investor 

purchasing a tax certificate obtains a lien against the taxpayer’s property and the right to pursue 

the taxpayer for unpaid taxes. O.R.C. § 5721.30–.43. 

 The tax certificate entitles the tax certificate holder to the first lien on the property. 

O.R.C. § 5721.32. Property owners are given notice of the opportunity to redeem the tax 

certificate and thereby remove the lien by paying the certificate holder the purchase price plus 

interest, penalties, and costs pursuant to O.R.C. § 5721.32. The tax certificate holder also has the 

 1

As an initial matter, it is important to note what version of the Ohio Revised Code is being referenced. 

The version of the O.R.C. applicable to this case is the version effective on November 3, 2010, the date the tax 

certificate was purchased. See CapitalSource Bank FBO Aeon Fin., L.L.C. v. Donshirs Dev. Corp., No. 99032, 2013 

WL 1697492, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. April 18, 2013) (stating that the trial court “erred” when it applied the version of 

the O.R.C. effective at the time of foreclosure instead of the version effective at the time the tax certificate was 

purchased); Eastwood Local School Dist. v. Eastwood Educ. Ass’n, 875 N.E. 2d 139, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) 

(“Except where a contrary intent is evident, the parties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with reference to 

existing law.”). Unless stated otherwise, the Ohio Revised Code referenced in the opinion is the version in effect on 

November 3, 2010. 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 3 

right, after complying with all statutory requirements, to initiate foreclosure proceedings on the 

real property after one year passes from the tax certificate purchase date, but no later than the end 

of the certificate period, which is six years. Id. To initiate foreclosure, the certificate holder 

must file a notice of intent to foreclose with the county treasurer. O.R.C. § 5721.37. The tax 

certificate holder can file its notice of intent to foreclose as long as the property owner has not 

“redeemed” (i.e., paid off) the certificate. Id. 

 The facts of this case are not in dispute. Michael Allen Bowers and Margarita Ville 

Bowers (the “Debtors”) allowed the taxes to become delinquent on their property located in 

Akron, Ohio. After the Debtors became delinquent on their taxes, the Summit County Treasurer 

held a tax certificate sale and Plymouth Park Tax Services (“Plymouth Park”) purchased two 

delinquent tax certificates pursuant to statute. The first tax lien certificate (Certificate #1) was 

filed on November 5, 2010 with the Summit Count Fiscal Officer indicating a purchase price of 

$4,083.73 with a negotiated interest rate of 0.25%. On October 3, 2011, the second tax lien 

certificate (Certificate #2) was filed with the Summit County Fiscal Officer indicating a purchase 

price of $2,045.44 with a negotiated interest rate of 18.00%. Both of these certificates are titled 

“Tax Certificate (Negotiated sale).” R. 32, Stipulation as to Undisputed Facts at 7–9.2 The 

certificates are signed by the “Treasurer/Fiscal Officer or Designee,” Shelly Davis, who certified: 

“I do hereby certify that at a negotiated sale pursuant to O.R.C. § 5721.33 this tax certificate for 

the parcel listed below was offered and sold . . . .” Id. 

 Both certificates also state that “[t]his certificate will be canceled six years after the date 

of delivery pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 5721.37, unless the date is extended because of 

bankruptcy pursuant to O.R.C. 5721.37(A)(3)(b).” Id. The tax certificates stated that “[t]he 

purchaser of this Tax Certificate or any transferee is entitled to file a notice of intent to foreclose 

on this parcel within six years after the purchase of the Tax Certificate, or by the date negotiated 

with the county treasurer.” Id. 

 On April 17, 2012, the Summit County Fiscal Officer filed a tax lien foreclosure 

complaint against the Debtors. The complaint was filed “pursuant to a request for foreclosure 

 2

Any reference to docket numbers refers to the Bankruptcy Court docket (Case No. 12-51549). 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 4 

form sent to the Fiscal Officer by Plymouth [Park].” Id. at 2, ¶ 6. The foreclosure complaint 

stated that “as provided by Section 5721.38(b) of the Ohio Revised Code” the “redemption 

price” calculated by the Fiscal Officer was $10,585.82. Id. at ¶ 6; at 11, Ex. D. 

 On May 10, 2012, the Debtors filed their Chapter 13 plan and petition. R. 1, Chapter 13 

Petition. The Debtors did not file any notice to “redeem” their property during the pendency of 

the bankruptcy action. Rather, the Chapter 13 petition and “payment plan” was the plan filed by 

the Debtors pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1321. The Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan 

proposed to pay interest on Plymouth Park’s tax certificates at the interest rates listed on those 

certificates: 0.25% on Certificate #1 and 18.00% on Certificate #2. R. 3, Chapter 13 Plan Filed 

by Debtor Michael Bowers at 3. On May 23, 2012, Plymouth Park filed a proof of claim based 

on both certificates in the amount of $10,521.46, an amount that included $2,120.00 in fees and 

the principal balance of $7,781.19 plus 18% interest on both certificates from June 1, 2012. 

Accordingly, the Debtors’ plan and Plymouth Park’s claim put the parties at odds: while the 

Debtors sought an interest rate of 0.25% on Certificate #1 and 18% on Certificate #2, Plymouth 

Park demanded that the Debtors pay 18% on both certificates. 

 The Bankruptcy Court held an Evidentiary Hearing on August 16, 2012 where testimony 

was taken regarding the procedures and fees involved in Summit County’s tax lien foreclosure 

process. On December 5, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the parties to file additional briefs 

“regarding the applicability and/or inapplicability of Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38 to the issues 

before the Court, specifically to what extent, if any, a debtor’s chapter 13 plan treatment of the 

tax certificate holder’s claim should be equated with the process of redemption contemplated by 

§ 5721.38.” R. 44, Order Directing Parties to File Briefs at 1. The parties filed their respective 

briefs. 

 On March 22, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order and Memorandum Opinion 

overruling and sustaining in part both Plymouth Park’s Objection to Confirmation and Debtors’ 

Objection to Proof of Claim. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with Plymouth Park that Plymouth 

Park’s claim was a tax claim3

 under 11 U.S.C. § 511 and that state law governed the interest rate 

 3

Neither party now disputes that this claim is a “tax claim” under federal law. In 2005, under the 

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), Congress included a provision for Interest 

on Tax Claims, 11 U.S.C. § 511(a), which provides: 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 5 

at issue. However, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the proposition that the 18% rate in O.R.C. 

§ 5721.38(B) should apply to the Debtors’ plan. The Bankruptcy Court stated: 

According to Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38(B)(2), the owner of the property 

“may redeem the parcel by paying . . . interest on the certificate purchase price for 

each tax certificate sold respecting the parcel at the rate of eighteen per cent per 

year.” The debtors allege that Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38(B) is limited to 

those instances where “a party redeems real estate from a certificate sale by 

paying cash to the county treasurer.” Debtors’ Reply at 1. The debtors further 

allege that this redemption does not contemplate “redemption by way of periodic 

payments as in a chapter 13 plan.” December 14, 2012 Brief at 4. The Court 

agrees. Creditor has not established, and the Court finds no support for, the 

contention that the negotiated interest rate does not apply. Here, the debtors are 

not redeeming their property as contemplated by Ohio Revised Code 

§ 5721.38(B); therefore, the statute does not apply. 

R. 51, Bankruptcy Ct. Order and Memo. Op. at 4. 

 The Bankruptcy Court further explained: “Moreover, ‘Ohio law establishes that the 

Creditor is entitled to the interest rate established by the tax certificate auction on the Debtor’s 

delinquent real estate taxes.’” Id. (quoting In re Cortner, 400 B.R. 608, 612 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 

2009)). The Court thus held that the appropriate interest rate for Certificate #1 was 0.25%, the 

rate listed on the tax certificate. 

 Plymouth Park timely appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) on April 2, 

2013. After hearing oral arguments, the BAP issued an opinion affirming the Bankruptcy 

Court’s order. In re Bowers, 506 B.R. 249 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.). The BAP concluded that the 0.25% 

interest rate on Certificate #1 should apply. Applying the 2010 O.R.C. § 5721.37(a)(3)(b) and (c) 

to the case, the BAP concluded that the 0.25% interest rate listed on the tax certificate was the 

“certificate rate of interest” and continued to accrue during the pendency of the bankruptcy 

action. O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c). 

 Plymouth Park timely appealed. 

 If any provision of this title requires the payment of interest on a tax claim or on an administrative 

expense tax, or the payment of interest to enable a creditor to receive the present value of the 

allowed amount of a tax claim, the rate of interest shall be the rate determined under applicable 

nonbankruptcy law. 

(emphasis added). 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 6 

II.

 The Court reviews the decision of the bankruptcy court directly, giving no deference to 

the decision of the BAP. Dickson v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Dickson), 655 F.3d 585, 

589–90 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court reviews conclusions of law, such as a bankruptcy court’s 

interpretation of state law, de novo. Id. De novo review requires the appellate court to determine 

the law at issue independently of the Bankruptcy Court’s determination. Hamerly v. Fifth Third 

Mortg. Co. (In re J & M Salupo Dev. Co.), 388 B.R. 795, 800 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008) (citing First 

Union Mortg. Corp. v. Eubanks (In re Eubanks), 219 B.R. 468, 469 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998)). 

A. Overview of Parties’ Arguments 

 The parties approach the issue at hand in two distinct ways. The Debtors claim that 

O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) provides the answer to the question of what interest rate applies to the 

tax certificate during the pendency of the Debtors’ Chapter 13 bankruptcy. That section 

addresses when a tax certificate holder may file for foreclosure and also provides the guidelines 

for how the filing of bankruptcy effects the tax certificate holder’s rights to foreclose. The 

Debtors claim that O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) mandates that interest on the tax certificate 

accrues at the “certificate rate of interest” (the interest listed on the tax certificate) during any 

pending bankruptcy claim. 

 Plymouth Park approaches the issue differently—by relying on O.R.C. § 5721.38, which 

addresses a taxpayer’s right to “redemption.” Section 5721.38 allows a taxpayer to redeem a 

parcel after the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose by paying the county treasurer a set 

amount. The Debtors did not seek to “redeem” their property, as set forth in the statute. 

However, Plymouth Park contends that the 18% statutory interest applies because they filed the 

notice of intent to foreclose and the Debtors did not redeem the property. Plymouth Park 

contends that even if a formal redemption is required to trigger the 18% statutory interest, the 

bankruptcy “payment plan” could constitute such a redemption. 

 Because these two approaches are distinct, we lay out the Debtors’ and Plymouth Park’s 

approaches separately. 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 7 

B. Debtors’ Interpretation of O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) 

 As the Bankruptcy Appellate Court correctly noted, the Ohio Revised Code’s tax 

certificate provisions specifically address situations where delinquent taxpayers file for 

bankruptcy protection. O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b), effective when the tax certificate was 

purchased on November 3, 2010, stated: 

If, before six years after the date a tax certificate was sold or before the date 

negotiated by the county treasurer, the owner of the property files a petition in 

bankruptcy, the county treasurer, upon being notified of the filing of the petition, 

shall notify the certificate holder by ordinary first-class or certified mail or by 

binary means of the filing of the petition. It is the obligation of the certificate 

holder to file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court to protect the holder’s 

interest in the certificate parcel. The last day on which the certificate holder may 

file a notice of intent to foreclose is the later of six years after the date the tax 

certificate was sold or the date negotiated by the county treasurer, or one hundred 

eighty days after the certificate parcel is no longer property of the bankruptcy 

estate; however, the six-year or negotiated period being measured after the date 

the certificate was sold is tolled while the property owner’s bankruptcy case 

remains open. 

O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) (current version at O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(2) (2011)). In essence, 

O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) places a six-year statute of limitations period running from the date of 

sale or negotiation of the tax certificate in which the tax certificate holder must file a notice of 

intent to foreclose. As the BAP noted, “if a taxpayer filed for bankruptcy at some point within 

those six years and the certificate holder filed a claim with the bankruptcy court, then the six year 

period would be tolled ‘while the property owner’s [the taxpayer’s] bankruptcy case remains 

open.’” In re Bowers, 506 B.R. 249, 255 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.) (alteration in original) (quoting 

O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b)). 

 The statutory provision immediately following this section, O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c), 

provides that “[i]nterest at the certificate rate of interest continues to accrue during any extension 

of time required by division (A)(3)(a) or (b) of this section unless otherwise provided under Title 

11 of the United States Code.” Accordingly, the Debtors argue that during the six years running 

from the date of the sale of the tax certificate to Plymouth Park, and during the pendency of the 

Debtors’ Chapter 13 case, interest accrues on the certificate at the “certificate rate of interest.” 

As defined by O.R.C. § 5721.30(G), the “certificate rate of interest” is the “rate of simple interest 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 8 

per year not to exceed eighteen per cent per year fixed . . . by the county treasurer with respect to 

any tax certificate sold or transferred pursuant to a negotiated sale under section 5721.33 of the 

Revised Code.” See In re Cortner, 400 B.R. 608, 614–15 (S.D. Ohio 2009). The “certificate 

rate of interest” on Certificate #1 is 0.25%. 

 Plymouth Park rebuts this reading of the statutory scheme with a few arguments. First, 

Plymouth Park argues that O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) is inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

Plymouth Park correctly notes that it filed its notice of intent to foreclose on February 10, 2012, 

three months prior to the initiation of the Debtors’ bankruptcy proceedings. Plymouth Park 

contends that because they had filed a notice of intent to foreclose, there would be no basis to toll 

the filing of that notice, and the 18% statutory interest rate would apply. Plymouth Park argues 

that the interest set forth in O.R.C. § 5721.38(B) attaches with the filing of a Notice of Intent to 

Foreclose pursuant to O.R.C. § 5721.37 and § 5721.38. The notice of intent to foreclose was 

filed on February 10, 2012, and Plymouth Park claims 18% statutory interest attached to the 

subject certificate at that time. O.R.C. § 5721.38(B). 

 Plymouth Park’s reading of the statute, however, assumes a fact: that the filing of a notice 

of intent to foreclose forces the early expiration of the six-year period and triggers the 

application of the 18% interest rate. The BAP noted this assumption and held that the 2010 Ohio 

Revised Code contained no indication that the “six year period for certificate holders to initiate 

the foreclosure process against taxpayers somehow expires early when a notice of intent to 

foreclose is filed.” In re Bowers, 506 B.R. 249, 255 n.5 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.). The BAP went on to 

state: 

In fact, it appears that the six year period survives the filing of a notice of intent to 

foreclose and the initiation of foreclosure proceedings and continues to provide 

important limitations on the rights of both tax certificate holders and taxpayers. 

For example, if a tax certificate holder files a notice of intent to foreclose but has 

its foreclosure action dismissed without prejudice, it can file another notice of 

intent to foreclose, but must do so before the six year period ends. See Lakeview 

Holding, L.L.C. v. DeBerry, No. 99033, 2013 WL 1501640, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 

April 11, 2013) (“[T]he certificate has not expired and the six year statute of 

limitations had not yet expired . . . [the tax certificate holder] may therefore 

simply refile its notice of intent . . . .”). 

Id.
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 9 

 Plymouth Park has not pointed to any statutory provision or case which provides a basis 

for assuming that the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose triggers an early expiration of the six 

year period. While no case law on a particular subject is certainly not grounds for foreclosing 

Plymouth Park’s statutory reading of O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b), further reasons support the 

Debtors’ interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. As the BAP noted in its opinion, the 

Court of Appeals of Ohio in Lakeview Holding, L.L.C. v. DeBerry applied the six year limitation 

period to the case, even though the tax certificate holder had filed a notice of intent to foreclose. 

Lakeview Holding, L.L.C. v. DeBerry, No. 99033, 2013 WL 1501640, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 

11, 2013). While the factual situation in Deberry did not involve a bankruptcy filing after a 

notice of intent to foreclose, the case involved the filing of a notice of intent to foreclose. If 

Plymouth Park’s reading of O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) was correct, the court in Deberry would 

not be concerned about the six year limitation period, because the filing of the notice of intent to 

foreclose would mean the six year limitation expired early. However, the court in DeBerry, after 

the notice of intent to foreclose was dismissed because the foreclosure complaint was not timely 

filed, continued to consider O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) and the six year limitation period, 

irrespective of the filing of the notice of intent. 

 We hold that O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) applies to the instant case. As the Bankruptcy 

Court and the BAP correctly stated, the 0.25% interest rate on the face of the tax certificate is the 

“certificate rate of interest” and continues to accrue during the extension of time because of the 

bankruptcy filing. In re Bowers, 506 B.R. 249, 255–56 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.). Applicable Ohio law 

(O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b)),4

 therefore, imposes an interest rate of 0.25% on Plymouth Park’s 

 4

The BAP aptly noted that the result of this case remains the same under current Ohio law: 

The Ohio Legislature’s 2011 amendments to O.R.C. § 5721.37 replaced O.R.C. 

§ 5721.37(A)(3)(b) and O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) with current O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(2), a 

division identical to the divisions it replaced except that the six year period in the 2010 O.R.C. has 

been replaced by the term “certificate period.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5721.37(A)(2). That term 

is defined in current O.R.C. § O.R.C. 5721.30(Q) as “the period of time after the sale or delivery 

of tax certificate within which a certificate holder must initiate an action to foreclose the tax lien 

represented by the certificate . . . .” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5721.30(Q). Under both the 2010 and 

current statute a certificate holder has a certain period of time in which to foreclose, that period of 

time is tolled during a taxpayer’s bankruptcy case, and interest accrues during the tolling period at 

the certificate rate of interest. Were the current version of O.R.C. § 5721.37 to apply to this case, 

the “certificate period” would be tolled while the Debtors’ bankruptcy case remains open, and 

during that time interest would accrue at the “certificate rate of interest,” or 0.25%. 

In re Bowers, 506 B.R. 249, 256 n.7 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.) 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 10 

claim while the Debtor’s bankruptcy case remains open. O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(b) controls the 

answer to the question of what interest rate should apply to Certificate #1: namely the certificate 

rate of interest listed on the face of Certificate #1. 

C. Plymouth Park’s Interpretation of O.R.C. § 5721.38 

 Plymouth Park maintains that O.R.C. § 5721.38 guarantees it an 18% interest rate on its 

claim. Plymouth Park argues that because the Debtors did not redeem (i.e., pay off) the 

certificates at issue before or after Plymouth Park filed the notice of intent to foreclose, the 18% 

statutory interest set forth in O.R.C. § 5721.38 attached to Certificate #1. Plymouth Park 

believes that the statutory interest listed in O.R.C. § 5721.38 does not require a redemption to be 

formally sought. However, Plymouth Park argues that assuming that the statutory rate of interest 

were dependent on redemption, this Court should hold that the Debtors’ Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 

payment plan constitutes “redemption” as contemplated by Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38. 

 This section allows a taxpayer to redeem a parcel after the filing of a notice of intent to 

foreclose by paying the county treasurer an amount equal to the total of the “certificate 

redemption prices” of all tax certificates respecting the parcel, certain fees and costs, and 

“interest on the certificates at the rate of eighteen per cent per year for the period beginning on 

the date on which the payment was submitted by the certificate holder [to initiate foreclosure 

proceedings] and ending on the day the parcel is redeemed under this division.” O.R.C. 

§ 5721.38(B)(2). Under Plymouth Park’s reading, because the Debtors filed the notice of intent 

to foreclose and the Debtors did not redeem the property, the 18% statutory interest applies. 

 There are a few problems with Plymouth Park’s interpretation of O.R.C. § 5721.38(B). 

The statute states that the interest on the tax certificate is in connection to the taxpayer seeking to 

redeem their property. O.R.C. § 5721.38(B)(2). The statute does not state that the mere filing of 

a notice of intent to foreclose triggers the 18% interest rate on the tax certificate. Rather, O.R.C. 

§ 5721.38(B)(2) makes clear that at any time after “payment to the county treasurer by the 

certificate holder to initiate foreclosure proceedings . . . and before the filing of the entry of 

confirmation of sale of a certificate parcel . . . and before the decree conveying title to the 

certificate holder . . . the owner of record of the certificate parcel . . . may redeem the parcel by 

paying to the county treasurer the sum of the following . . . .” The statute then proceeds to list 
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 11 

the items which the taxpayer must pay, including the tax certificate amount, the interest on the 

tax certificate, plus interest at a rate of 18% per year for the period beginning on the day when 

the payment was submitted by the certificate holder and ending on the day when the parcel is 

redeemed. Id. The parties both admit that a foreclosure decree was never issued in the instant 

case. Ohio caselaw remains clear that in order for a foreclosure judgment to be a “final order,” 

the decree must be issued and address the rights of all lienholders and the responsibilities of the 

mortgagor. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski, ---N.E.2d----, 2014 WL 1924774, at *5 (Ohio May 

15, 2014); Countrywide Home Loans Servicing v. Nichpor, 990 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio 2013) (holding 

that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale, the foreclosure action 

cannot be dismissed, as the judgment is final). Accordingly, Plymouth Park’s interpretation of 

the statute appears to be at odds with the statutory language. The statute makes clear that the 

interest rate attaches to the actual “redemption” of the property by the taxpayer. As the Debtors 

did not attempt to redeem the property here, and no foreclosure decree has been issued, 

Plymouth Park’s reading is simply untenable given the language of O.R.C. § 5721.38(B). 

 Plymouth Park next suggests that if “redemption” is required to trigger the 18% interest 

rate, the institution of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings and the payment plan in place for 

the bankruptcy may constitute a “redemption.” Plymouth Park is correct that there is no case law 

addressing this particular issue—whether a Chapter 13 bankruptcy payment plan constitutes a 

“redemption” as contemplated by O.R.C. § 5721.38. Plymouth Park reaches the conclusion that 

the bankruptcy payment plan could constitute a “redemption” because O.R.C. § 5721.38(C)(2)5

provides for redemption via payment plan. Plymouth Park contends that a Chapter 13 payment 

plan could satisfy this “payment plan.” The Debtors counter by arguing that O.R.C. § 5721.38(B) 

only applies to lump sum redemptions, not to payment plan redemptions like those carried out in 

 5

Ohio Revised Code § 5721.38(C)(2) states: 

During the period beginning on the date a tax certificate is sold under section 5721.33 of the 

Revised Code and ending on the date the decree is rendered on the foreclosure proceeding under 

division (F) of section 5721.37 of the Revised Code, the owner of record of the certificate parcel, 

or any other person entitled to redeem that parcel, may enter into a redemption payment plan with 

the certificate holder and all secured parties of the certificate holder. The plan shall require the 

owner or other person to pay the certificate redemption price for the tax certificate, an 

administrative fee not to exceed one hundred dollars per year, and the actual fees and costs 

incurred, in installments, with the final installment due no later than the expiration of the 

certificate period.
No. 13-4404 Plymouth Park Tax Serv. v. Bowers, et al. Page 12 

a Chapter 13 plan, and that they therefore need only pay the 0.25% interest rate stated on the tax 

certificate. Debtors’ Br. at 1. 

 Ohio does not have a case which articulates the difference between a redemption of real 

estate from a tax certificate and the treatment of a tax certificate holder’s claim in a Chapter 13 

plan. However, the Court does not need to reach this distinction. The 2010 O.R.C. provisions 

specifically require that the interest rate on the tax certificate to accrue at 0.25% while the 

Debtors’ bankruptcy case remains open. O.R.C. 5721.37(A)(3)(b). Applying traditional tenets of 

statutory construction to the instant case, specific statutory provisions prevail over more general 

provisions. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070–71 

(2012). As O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) specifically addresses the effect of a Chapter 13 

bankruptcy filing on tax certificates, this specific statutory provision would “trump” the more 

general provision of O.R.C. § 5721.38, which addresses redemption generally. Hartmann v. 

Duffey, 768 N.E.2d 1170, 1172– 73 (Ohio 2002). Furthermore, adoption of Plymouth Park’s 

theory would render O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) mere surplusage, in violation of another basic 

tenet of statutory construction. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[W]hen two 

statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard each as effective. 

When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible . . . .” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). As explained above, O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) directly 

addresses the question of what interest rate applies to a tax certificate following the filing of 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy. If the Court were to apply O.R.C. § 5721.38 to the case as Plymouth 

Park suggests, this Court would be ignoring O.R.C. § 5721.37(A)(3)(c) and would be failing to 

give effect to this section which directly discusses bankruptcy. We therefore decline to adopt 

Plymouth Park’s interpretation of what constitutes a “redemption” and apply the 0.25% interest 

rate to Certificate #1. 

III.

 For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the Bankruptcy Court.