Slip Op. 16-120 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

____________________________________

 : 

FINE FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) : 

LIMITED, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

ARMSTRONG WOOD PRODUCTS : 

(KUNSHAN) CO., LTD., GUANGDONG : 

YIHUA TIMBER INDUSTRY CO., LTD., : 

OLD MASTER PRODUCTS, INC., : 

LUMBER LIQUIDATORS SERVICES, : 

LLC, SHANGHAI LAIRUNDE WOOD : Before: Richard K. Eaton, Judge 

CO., LTD., CHANGZHOU HAWD : 

FLOORING CO., LTD., DALIAN : Consol. Court No. 16-00145 

HUILONG WOODEN PRODUCTS CO., : 

LTD., DUNHUA CITY JISEN WOOD : 

INDUSTRY CO., LTD., DUNHUA CITY : 

DEXIN WOOD INDUSTRY CO., LTD., : 

DUNHUA CITY HONGYUAN WOOD : 

INDUSTRY CO., LTD., JIAXING : 

HENGTONG WOOD CO., LTD., : 

KARLY WOOD PRODUCT LIMITED, : 

YINGYI-NATURE (KUNSHAN) WOOD : 

INDUSTRY CO., LTD., XIAMEN YUNG : 

DE ORNAMENT CO., LTD., ZHEJIANG : 

SHUIMOJIANGNAN NEW MATERIAL : 

TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Intervenors, : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

UNITED STATES, : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

____________________________________

[Plaintiff-intervenor’s motion for a preliminary injunction is granted.] 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 2 

Dated: December 28, 2016 

Harold Deen Kaplan and Craig Anderson Lewis, Hogan Lovells US LLP, of Washington, DC, 

were on the brief for plaintiff-intervenor. 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, 

International Trade Field Office, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, and Tara K. Hogan,

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, were on 

the brief for defendant. Mercedes C. Morno, Office of Trade Enforcement & Compliance, Department 

of Commerce, was of counsel on the brief. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER1

 EATON, Judge: Before the court is plaintiff-intervenor Armstrong Wood Products 

(Kunshan) Co., Ltd.’s (“plaintiff-intervenor” or “Armstrong”) partial consent2

 motion for a preliminary 

injunction to enjoin defendant, the United States (“defendant” or “the Government”), from liquidating 

its entries of multilayered wood flooring from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) during the 

pendency of this action. Pl.-Int.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 1 (ECF Dkt. No. 16) (“Pl.-Int.’s Br.”). 

Specifically, Armstrong, as a plaintiff-intervenor, asks that liquidation be enjoined for all of its 

unliquidated entries of multilayered wood flooring from the PRC that “were entered, or withdrawn from 

warehouse, for consumption during the period December 1, 2013 through November 30, 2014, 

inclusive;” and are subject to the Department of Commerce’s (“the Department” or “Commerce”) 

multilayered wood flooring from the PRC December 1, 2013 through November 30, 2014 administrative 

1 The following cases are consolidated under lead court number 16-00145: 16-00146, 16-

00147, 16-00148, 16-00155, and 16-00156. 

2 Plaintiff Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Limited (“plaintiff” or “Fine Furniture”) consented to 

plaintiff-intervenor’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Pl.-Int.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 1 (ECF Dkt. 

No. 16) (“Pl.-Int.’s Br.”). 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 3 

review of the corresponding antidumping duty order. Pl.-Int.’s Br. 1–2; Multilayered Wood Flooring 

From the PRC, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,899, 46,901–02 (Dep’t of Commerce July 19, 2016) (final results of 

antidumping duty administrative review; 2013–2014) (“Final Results”) (determining that the weightedaverage dumping margins for the POR from December 1, 2013 through November 30, 2014 are 17.37 

percent); Multilayered Wood Flooring From the PRC, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,318, 64,318 (Dep’t of Commerce 

Oct. 18, 2011) (final determination of sales at less than fair value). 

 The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2012) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2) 

(2012). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff-intervenor’s motion for a preliminary injunction is 

granted.

BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2016, the Department published the Final Results of its third administrative review 

of multilayered wood flooring from the PRC. Final Results, 81 Fed. Reg. at 46,899. The plaintiff in 

this case, Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Limited (“plaintiff” or “Fine Furniture”), a selected mandatory 

respondent, filed a summons on August 9, 2016, and its Complaint on September 1, 2016, contesting 

Commerce’s Final Results. Summons (ECF Dkt. No. 1) (Aug. 9, 2016); Compl. ¶ 13 (ECF Dkt. No. 9) 

(Sept. 1, 2016). Plaintiff’s Complaint challenged: (1) Commerce’s determination to select Romania as 

the surrogate country, and not Thailand; (2) Commerce’s use of certain financial statements in its 

financial ratios calculations; and (3) Commerce’s surrogate value determination for plaintiff’s face 

veneer inputs. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21, 23. 

Plaintiff-intervenor, whose motion is now before the court, is a separate rate respondent and an 

exporter of multilayered wood flooring from the PRC whose merchandise is also subject to the 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 4 

Department’s determination. See Pl.-Int.’s Br. 3. On September 2, 2016, the court granted plaintiffintervenor’s consent motion to intervene because the company participated in the underlying 

administrative proceedings and timely filed its motion.3

 Order (ECF Dkt. No. 19) (Sept. 2, 2016) 

(granting plaintiff-intervenor’s motion to intervene); 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1). 

Along with its motion to intervene, Armstrong also filed motions for a preliminary injunction 

and a temporary restraining order, which the Government opposed. Pl.-Int.’s Consent Mot. to Intervene 

(ECF Dkt. No. 10) (Sept. 1, 2016) (“Mot. to Intervene”); Pl.-Int.’s Mot. for TRO (ECF Dkt. No. 17) 

(Sept. 1, 2016). Also, on September 2, 2016, the court granted plaintiff-intervenor’s request for a TRO. 

TRO (ECF Dkt. No. 20) (Sept. 2, 2016) (ordering that “this injunction shall expire on the later of 

fourteen days from the date of this order or the date upon which this Court rules upon Armstrong Wood 

Products (Kunshan) Co., Ltd.’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF Dkt. No. 16).” (citing Tianjin

Wanhua Co., Ltd. v. United States, 38 CIT __, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1283 (2014); Union Steel v. United States,

33 CIT 614, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (2009))). 

On September 20, 2016, plaintiff Fine Furniture filed a motion, consented to by the Government, 

for a preliminary injunction to prevent liquidation of its entries. Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF Dkt. 

No. 43). The court granted the motion on the same day. Prelim. Inj. Order (ECF Dkt. No. 44) (Sept. 

20, 2016); TRO (ECF Dkt. No. 45) (Sept. 20, 2016). 

3

 It is worth noting that Armstrong did not bring its own action in this Court challenging 

Commerce’s administrative determination. See Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.-Int.’s Mot. for a Prelim. 

Inj. & TRO (ECF Dkt. No. 18) (“Def.’s Br.”). In addition, at the time Armstrong filed its motion to 

intervene in this action and sought injunctive relief, the time period to file its own action in this Court 

had already expired. Def.’s Br. 5. 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 5 

Now before the court is plaintiff-intervenor’s partial consent motion to enjoin the Government 

from liquidating its entries of multilayered wood flooring from the PRC. Pl.-Int.’s Br. 1. The 

Government opposes this motion arguing that plaintiff-intervenor (1) “seeks to enlarge the issues” in the 

Complaint, and (2) is untimely requesting an injunction for its entries. Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.-

Int.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. & TRO 2, 5 (ECF Dkt. No. 18) (“Def.’s Br.”). 

DISCUSSION 

I. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

“In international trade cases, the CIT has authority to grant preliminary injunctions barring 

liquidation in order to preserve a party’s right to challenge the assessed duties.” Qingdao Taifa Grp. 

Co., Ltd. v. United States, 581 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “To prevail on its motion for a 

preliminary injunction, [plaintiff-intervenor] must show (1) that it will be immediately and irreparably 

injured; (2) that there is a likelihood of success on the merits; (3) that the public interest would be better 

served by the relief requested; and (4) that the balance of hardship on all the parties favors the [plaintiffintervenor].” Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Union Steel v. 

United States, 33 CIT 614, 621–22, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1381 (2009). 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 6 

Additionally, a qualified interested person may join a previously commenced action as an 

intervenor.4 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1); USCIT R. 24 (2016). An intervenor may also preserve its 

unliquidated entries for eventual liquidation at the rates finally determined by the litigation by moving 

for a preliminary injunction to bar the liquidation of those entries. USCIT R. 56.2(a). For injunctive 

relief, an “intervenor must file a motion for a preliminary injunction no earlier than the date of filing of 

its motion to intervene and no later than 30 days after the date of service of the order granting 

intervention, or at such later time, but only for good cause shown.” USCIT R. 56.2(a). 

4

 Rule 24 provides: 

(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene 

who:

(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or 

(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the 

action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter 

impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 

adequately represent that interest. 

(3) In an action described in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), a timely motion must be made 

no later than 30 days after the date of service of the complaint as provided for in 

Rule 3(f), unless for good cause shown at such later time for the following reasons: 

(i) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; or 

(ii) under circumstances in which by due diligence a motion to intervene 

under this subsection could not have been made within the 30-day period. 

Also, in an action described in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), at the time a party’s 

motion for intervention is made, attorneys for that party are required to 

comply with the procedures set forth in Rule 73.2 (c) by filing of a Business 

Proprietary Information Certification where appropriate. 

USCIT R. 24 (2016). 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 7 

II. PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR MAY SEEK A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A. Enjoining the Government From Liquidating Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Entries Is Not 

an Enlargement of the Action 

The Government first opposes Armstrong’s motion because it asserts that plaintiff-intervenor 

seeks to enlarge the issues in the Complaint by requesting an injunction for entries not listed in the 

Complaint. Def.’s Br. 3; Vinson v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489, 498 (1944) (“[A]n intervenor is 

admitted to the proceeding as it stands, and in respect of the pending issues, but is not permitted to 

enlarge those issues or compel an alteration of the nature of the proceeding.”). The Government argues 

that an intervenor’s role “is limited to supporting the plaintiff[] in asserting [its] own claim[] for relief.” 

Def.’s Br. 3; Laizhou Auto Break Equip. Co. v. United States, 31 CIT 212, 214, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 

1300–01 (2007). For the Government, the plaintiff-intervenor may “support Fine Furniture’s case 

against the United States,” but cannot “expand the case to include its own separate entries affected by 

Commerce’s decision.” Def.’s Br. 2–3. Defendant maintains that plaintiff-intervenor is impermissibly 

attempting to enlarge the issues in this case, by seeking to have its, now suspended, entries liquidated in 

accordance with the ultimate judicial decision in this case. 

Plaintiff-intervenor maintains that it is not enlarging the case set out in plaintiff’s Complaint by 

introducing new substantive issues or theories. Pl.-Int.’s Br. 4. Rather, plaintiff-intervenor insists it 

merely hopes to obtain the same benefit plaintiff would receive, if plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a lower 

duty rate, for its entries that come into the United States prior to the conclusion of the litigation. Pl.-

Int.’s Br. 4. According to plaintiff-intervenor, were its entries to be liquidated before the case’s 

conclusion, it could lose the relief that plaintiff would get for its entries. Pl.-Int.’s Br. 4; see 19 C.F.R. 

§ 159.1 (“Liquidation means the final computation or ascertainment of duties on entries for consumption 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 8 

or drawback entries.”); Qingdao, 581 F.3d at 1380 (“[O]nce the entries [are] liquidated the law 

provide[s] no viable method to recover any additional money even if the liquidation rate [is] later 

deemed incorrect.”). Plaintiff-intervenor further argues that “because this Court has already found that 

plaintiff[’s] action satisfies the criteria for a preliminary injunction, it should find that proposed plaintiffintervenor has also satisfied those criteria.” Pl.-Int.’s Br. 4 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff-intervenor cites to earlier cases in this Court that have found that guarding its entries to 

obtain future relief does not expand the case. Pl.-Int.’s Br. 4. Where a plaintiff-intervenor “is not 

introducing any new issues or legal theories into the litigation,” but rather “seek[s] to simply obtain for 

its entries the benefit of any affirmative relief that may inure to [plaintiff]” the court may properly enjoin 

the Government from liquidating its entries. Tianjin Wanhua, 38 CIT at __, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1285–86; 

NSK Corp. v. United States, 32 CIT 161, 166, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (2008) (“[T]he fact that an 

intervenor brings additional entries to the litigation carries no weight with regard to enlargement.”); see

also Union Steel, 33 CIT at 623–24, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1382. 

The court is persuaded by plaintiff-intervenor’s arguments and the case law. A plaintiffintervenor’s motion for a preliminary injunction, which does not raise additional substantive issues, does 

not enlarge the Complaint since it simply requires that the “final judicial determination resulting from 

this litigation . . . govern entries that already were the subject of the administrative review and the Final 

Results,” and does “not, in any meaningful sense, ‘compel an alteration of the nature of the 

proceeding.’” Union Steel, 33 CIT at 624, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (quoting Vinson, 321 U.S. at 498). 

Indeed, the facts and arguments in this case are almost identical to those raised in the earlier case 

of Union Steel. See Union Steel, 33 CIT at 614, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1374. There, plaintiff-intervenor 

moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to keep U.S. Customs and Border 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 9 

Protection (“Customs”) from liquidating its entries during the pending litigation. Id. at 614, 617 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1375. Moreover, as is the case here, the plaintiff in Union Steel was granted a preliminary 

injunction preventing liquidation of its entries under the challenged administrative review. Id. at 622, 

617 F. Supp. 2d at 1381. The Government in Union Steel likewise opposed the plaintiff-intervenor’s 

motion by arguing that granting a preliminary injunction would impermissibly “enlarge [the] issues” by 

covering entries not listed in the Complaint. Id. at 623, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1382; Def.’s Br. 4–5. 

Relying on Vinson, the Government in Union Steel asserted that “an intervenor is admitted to the 

proceeding as it stands, and in respect of the pending issues, but is not permitted to enlarge those issues 

or compel an alteration of the nature of the proceeding.” Union Steel, 33 CIT at 623, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 

1382 (citation omitted). Distinguishing its facts from Vinson, the Union Steel Court found that 

[b]ecause it need do no more than allow the final judicial determination resulting from this 

litigation to govern entries that already were the subject of the administrative review and 

the Final Results, the grant of the injunction Whirlpool seeks would not, in any meaningful 

sense, “compel an alteration of the nature of the proceeding[s].” 

Id. at 624, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1382–83 (citations omitted). Moreover, unlike in Vinson, the plaintiffintervenor in Union Steel did not “raise before the court any substantive issues that [were] not raised by 

plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. at 624, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1382. 

 As in Union Steel, the court, here, granted plaintiff’s consent motion for a preliminary 

injunction enjoining the liquidation of its entries pending the outcome of the judicial proceeding 

related to the contested administrative review. Prelim. Inj. Order 1. In addition, as in Union

Steel, plaintiff-intervenor here also seeks to have the Government enjoined from liquidating its 

entries that are subject to the same administrative review as plaintiff’s. Pl.-Int.’s Br. 3. The 

Government makes no claim that plaintiff-intervenor is attempting to enlarge the issues in the 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 10 

case by raising new substantive arguments. Rather, the Government merely claims that 

plaintiff-intervenor is trying to unlawfully enlarge the case by seeking to protect its entries from 

being liquidated. 

The court agrees with the reasoning in Union Steel and the other earlier cases and finds 

that plaintiff-intervenor’s motion for a preliminary injunction does not enlarge the Complaint 

because “bring[ing] additional entries [into] the litigation carries no weight with regard to 

enlargement,” NSK, 32 CIT at 166, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 1318, and denying the motion on this 

ground “would be tantamount to providing [p]laintiff–[i]ntervenors (as interested parties to the 

underlying administrative proceeding) with a statutory right to participate in the litigation (via 

intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)) without any chance for relief.” Tianjin Wanhau, 38 CIT 

at __, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1286. 

 Accordingly, Armstrong’s position in this litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor does not 

foreclose its request for a preliminary injunction preventing defendant from liquidating its entries 

while this case is pending. 

B. Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Was Timely 

The Government next asserts that the court should not enjoin liquidation, because plaintiffintervenor’s time to file its own action contesting the Final Results has lapsed. Def.’s Br. 5. That is, 

the Government contends that Armstrong cannot now “piggyback on the original timely filed 

complaint” by successfully moving to enjoin liquidation of its entries when it would be out of time in 

suing, and moving for an injunction, on its own behalf. Def.’s Br. 4. The Government further argues 

that, despite USCIT Rule 24(a)(3) permitting plaintiff-intervenor’s intervention as of right, granting the 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 11 

preliminary injunction extends the jurisdiction of the court by providing relief to a party that failed to 

timely bring its own action in this Court. Def.’s Br. 5 (“Permitting Armstrong to do so would be to 

open a loophole to expand the time limit Congress has set forth for an aggrieved party to seek review of 

a final determination by Commerce.”). Thus, according to defendant, “Armstrong seeks relief, via

intervention, that it was untimely to seek through the normal course of filing a complaint within 

statutory deadlines.” Def.’s Br. 5. 

The court finds that because plaintiff-intervenor timely intervened, granting a preliminary 

injunction to prevent liquidation of its entries is proper. See Order (ECF Dkt. No. 19). The 

Government appears to argue that Armstrong should be estopped from seeking a preliminary injunction 

in this action because it is too late for it to seek the same relief by bringing its own action in this Court. 

Def.’s Br. 4–5. That is, according to defendant, because a complaint filed by plaintiff-intervenor at this 

juncture would be untimely, plaintiff-intervenor should not receive relief by way of an injunction 

through its intervention, even if the intervention is timely. See Def.’s Br. 5. 

This argument is hard to credit. Armstrong timely intervened in this action in accordance with 

USCIT Rule 24, by filing its Motion to Intervene on September 1, 2016, the same day that plaintiff Fine 

Furniture filed its Complaint. Order (ECF Dkt. No. 19); Compl. ¶ 13; USCIT R. 24(a)(3) (“In an action 

described in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), a timely motion must be made no later than 30 days after the date of 

service of the compliant as provided for in Rule 3(f), unless for good cause shown . . . .”). By 

intervening, plaintiff-intervenor receives the same status to apply for an injunction as any other party in 

the action. See, e.g., Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 

Qingdao, 581 F.3d at 1378 (“[T]he CIT has authority to grant preliminary injunctions barring liquidation 

in order to preserve a party’s right to challenge the assessed duties.”) (emphasis added). 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 12 

Defendant’s argument that granting plaintiff-intervenor’s motion “would expand the time limit 

Congress has set forth for an aggrieved party to seek review of a final determination,” however, seems to 

be aimed at allowing Armstrong to gain any benefit by intervention, not at its motion for a preliminary 

injunction. See Def.’s Br. 5 (emphasis added). The defendant, though, cites no law, and the court 

could find none, to support the proposition that, as a result of not filing its own timely summons and 

complaint, Armstrong could not (1) intervene; (2) move for a preliminary injunction; or (3) have the 

status of a full party to the action.5

 In fact, the Rules of this Court clearly anticipate that a participant in 

the underlying administrative review may intervene; and that a timely intervenor may seek an 

injunction. USCIT R. 56.2(a). In other words, this Court’s Rules contemplate that a plaintiffintervenor may seek a preliminary injunction to protect its entries where it timely intervenes in an action 

before this Court; and these Rules contain no suggestion that any motion be made within the time the 

intervenor could have sued as a plaintiff. See USCIT R. 56.2(a) (“[A]n intervenor must file a motion 

for a preliminary injunction no earlier than the date of filing of its motion to intervene and no later than 

5

 The Court of International Trade’s procedure statute, which permits intervention in the 

circumstances such as those before the court, does not include a time limit by which a party must 

intervene or move for a preliminary injunction. 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(1) (stating that where the movant 

was “an interested party who was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose,” 

and “would be adversely affected or aggrieved by an adverse decision in a civil action pending in the 

Court of International Trade,” then it may intervene in a civil action pending before the Court). The 

statute, instead, defers to the Court of International Trade’s own Rules for jurisdictional time limits. 

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2633(b) (“The Court of International Trade shall prescribe rules governing the 

summons, pleadings, and other papers, for their amendment, service, and filing, for consolidations, 

severances, suspensions of cases, and for other procedural matters.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2632 (“[A]s 

prescribed in such section, with the content and in the form, manner, and style prescribed by the rules of 

the court.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2636(c) (“[C]ommenced in accordance with the rules of the Court of 

International Trade within the time specified in such section.”). 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 13 

30 days after the date of service of the order granting intervention, or at such later time, but only for 

good cause shown.”) (emphasis added); USCIT R. 24(a). 

Thus, Commerce’s jurisdictional argument is unconvincing, as there is simply nothing to suggest 

that, after lawfully intervening, a plaintiff-intervenor is untimely in seeking an injunction and unable to 

preserve its means to obtain any future relief. 

The Government made a similar argument in Union Steel, where the Court observed: 

In opposition to the grant of an injunction, defendant also relies on the language of 

USCIT Rule 56.2(a), which provides that “[a]ny motion for a preliminary injunction to 

enjoin the liquidation of entries that are the subject of the action must be filed by a party to 

the action within 30 days after service of the complaint, or at such later time, for good cause 

shown.” Defendant’s argument reads too much into the language of the Rule, which 

addresses generally the time at which a party must file its motion for the injunction and is 

not specifically directed to the intervention-related issue before the court. Moreover, 

defendant’s overly broad construction of the language of the Rule would disregard 

considerations that were important to Congress in enacting the statutory scheme that the 

Rule, in part, is intended to effectuate. Congress considered an injunction against 

liquidation to be so significant to the judicial review of a determination in an antidumping 

proceeding that it expressly provided the opportunity for such an injunction in 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(c)(2). Congress also attached importance to a party’s opportunity to intervene in 

an action brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, as demonstrated by its providing that the 

intervention of an interested party who was a party to the underlying administrative 

proceeding is an intervention as a matter of right. By seeking to deny the availability of 

an injunction in the general circumstances posed by Whirlpool’s motion, defendant’s 

litigation position, if adopted by the court, would diminish the significance of the 

intervention procedure established by those statutory provisions. 

Union Steel, 33 CIT at 624–25, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1383 (citations omitted). 

Thus, the court finds that plaintiff-intervenor’s timely motion to intervene preserved its right to 

seek a preliminary injunction against liquidation in this action. 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 14 

C. Plaintiff-Intervenor Satisfied the Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction 

 Plaintiff-intervenor argues that it has established the requirements for a preliminary injunction. 

Specifically, Armstrong argues that: (1) it will suffer irreparable injury if its entries are liquidated in 

accordance with Commerce’s determination before a decision by this Court or the Federal Circuit, Pl.-

Int.’s Br. 5; (2) it established that it has a likelihood of success on the merits because it raises “serious 

questions as to Commerce’s methodology,” Pl.-Int.’s Br. 7; (3) the public interest is served by ensuring 

Commerce accurately calculates antidumping duties, Pl.-Int.’s Br. 8; and (4) the balance of hardships 

weighs in its favor because, although the preliminary injunction will postpone liquidation, Customs 

holds cash deposits securing the duties’ value and would not otherwise be prejudiced, Pl.-Int.’s Br. 9. 

As a result, according to plaintiff-intervenor, the court should enjoin the Government from liquidating 

its entries of subject merchandise through the pendency of the litigation, including all appeals. Pl.-Int.’s 

Br. 9–10. 

 The Government does not contend that plaintiff-intervenor has failed to meet the equitable 

requirements for a preliminary injunction. Indeed, defendant does not mention the requirements 

necessary for the granting of a preliminary injunction in its papers. Instead, the defendant’s opposition 

rests solely on its assertions that plaintiff-intervenor cannot seek an injunction that expands the issues 

raised in the Complaint and that its request for an injunction is untimely. Def.’s Br. 2, 5. Also, the 

Government consented to plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, only preserving its arguments 

as to the plaintiff’s “likelihood of the success on the merits.” Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 7 (ECF Dkt. 

No. 43). 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 15 

 i. Irreparable Injury 

As to immediate and irreparable injury, Armstrong has demonstrated that if its entries were to be 

liquidated in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(1),6

 it would be unable to benefit from relief 

obtained by plaintiff. Pl.-Int.’s Br. 6–7; Qingdao, 581 F.3d at 1380 (“[O]nce the entries were liquidated 

the law provided no viable method to recover any additional money even if the liquidation rate was later 

deemed incorrect.”); Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Prod. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States,

39 CIT __, __, 61 F. Supp. 3d 1358, 1368 (2015) (“[I]t is apparent that irreparable harm can be shown 

irrespective of whether the results of an investigation are negative or affirmative, find sales at [less than 

fair value], or whether the injunction is sought by foreign producers or exporters, or by domestic 

producers. In each of these cases, without injunctive relief, the parties face the prospect of losing the 

only remedy they have with respect to [entries of] merchandise liquidated prior to a court ruling.”). 

6 The statute provides in full: 

Unless such liquidation is enjoined by the court under paragraph (2) of this subsection, 

entries of merchandise of the character covered by a determination of the Secretary, the 

administering authority, or the Commission contested under subsection (a) of this section 

shall be liquidated in accordance with the determination of the Secretary, the administering 

authority, or the Commission, if they are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for 

consumption on or before the date of publication in the Federal Register by the Secretary 

or the administering authority of a notice of a decision of the United States Court of 

International Trade, or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, not in 

harmony with that determination. Such notice of a decision shall be published within ten 

days from the date of the issuance of the court decision. 

19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(1). 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 16 

ii. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

Next, the court previously granted plaintiff Fine Furniture’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 

and because plaintiff-intervenor’s “success on the merits is intrinsically tied to that of [p]laintiff[],” the 

court finds Armstrong similarly has demonstrated a likelihood of “success on the merits.” Tianjin

Wanhau, 38 CIT at __, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1286; Prelim. Inj. Order. 

iii. The Public Interest Will Be Served 

With regard to the public interest, “it is well-settled that ‘an overriding purpose of Commerce’s 

administration of antidumping laws is to calculate dumping margins as accurately as possible.” Union

Steel, 33 CIT at 622, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (quoting Parkdale Int’l v. United States, 475 F.3d 1375, 

1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Should the injunction be granted, the result of having the dumping margins 

accurately calculated will be that plaintiff-intervenor’s entries will be liquidated in accordance with 

those margins. Union Steel, 33 CIT at 622, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1381. Thus, the public interest will be 

served by the liquidation of plaintiff-intervenor’s entries at the margins determined by this litigation. 

iv. The Balance of Hardships Weighs in Favor of Plaintiff-Intervenor 

Last, the balance of the hardships weighs in favor of plaintiff-intervenor because the plaintiffintervenor might suffer great hardship if its entries were liquidated before the conclusion of this case, 

and the Government is unlikely to suffer any hardship because it has obtained cash deposits securing the 

payment of duties for these entries. Union Steel, 33 CIT at 622, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (“Should the 

final rate determined after judicial review exceed the cash deposit, the United States will be entitled to 

collect the duties owed, with interest. Contrastingly, the absence of an injunction would result in 
Consol. Court No. 16-00145 Page 17 

liquidations of [plaintiff-intervenor’s] entries at the amounts of antidumping duty set forth in the entry 

documentation, which liquidation would preclude any revision of the assessment rate.”). 

As a result, the court concludes that Armstrong may seek a preliminary injunction as a matter of 

law and fact and has demonstrated irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, that it is in the 

public interest to grant the preliminary injunction, and that the balance of hardships weigh in favor of 

granting injunctive relief. Therefore, liquidation of plaintiff-intervenor’s entries shall be enjoined in 

accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2). 

CONCLUSION 

The court grants plaintiff-intervenor’s motion for a preliminary injunction and directs the 

plaintiff-intervenor to confer with the Government and file a proposed preliminary injunction with the 

court.

Dated: December 28, 2016 

New York, New York 

 \s\ Richard K. Eaton 

 ________________________________ 

 Richard K. Eaton, Judge