The Attorney General of Texas 

August 4, 1983 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 12548 

Austin, TX. 78711. 2548 

5121475-2501 

Telex 910/874-1367 

Telecopier 5121475-0266 

1607 Main St.. Suite 1400 

Dallas. TX. 75201.4709 

2141742.6944 

4624 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160 

El Paso, TX. 79905.2793 

9151533.3464 

P 

20 Dallas Ave.. Suite 202 

Houston, TX. 77002-6966 

7131650-0666 

606 Broadway. Suite 312 

Lubbock. TX. 79401-3479 

8061747-5236 

4309 N. Tenth. Suite S 

McAllen, TX. 76501-1665 

5121682.4547 

200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 

San Antonio. TX. 78205.2797 

5121225.4191 

An Equal Opportunity/ 

Affirmative Action Employer 

Honorable Carl A. Parker 

Chairman 

Committee on Education 

Texas State Senate 

P. 0. Box 12068, Capitol Station 

Austin, Texas 78711 

Opinion No. JM-53 

Re: Whether union dues and 

other payroll deductions constitute an "indebtedness" under 

section 2.07 of the Education 

Code 

Dear Senator Parker: 

You have requested our opinion regarding certain payroll 

deductions for a married employee of an independent school district. 

Specifically, you ask whether section 2.07 of the Texas Education Code 

requires consent of the married employee's spouse for the following 

types of deductions: 

1. payment of dues to a union or other 

employee organization; 

2. payment of a donation to a charitable 

organization; 

3. payment of installments on a loan from a 

financial institution; or 

4. payment of the premiums on an insurance 

policy. 

Section 2.07 of the Education Code, formerly article 2883a. 

V.T.C.S., provides in pertinent part that: 

(b) Any teacher's or school employee's 

assignment, pledge, or transfer of his [or her] 

salary or wages as security for indebtedness -- or 

any interest or part of his [or her] salary or 

wages -- then due or which may become due under an 

existing contract of employment shall be 

enforceable only under the following conditions: 

. . . . 

p. 220 
Honorable Carl A. Parker - Page 2 (JM-53) 

(2) Any assignment, pledge, or transfer must 

be in writing and acknowledged as required for the 

acknowledgment of deeds or other recorded 

instruments, and if executed by a married person, 

it must also be executed and acknowledged in a 

like manner by his or her spouse;. . . and 

(3) An assignment, pledge, or transfer shall 

be enforceable only to the extent that the 

indebtedness it secures is a valid and enforceable 

obligation. (Emphasis added). 

This section authorizes salary or wage deductions "as security for 

indebtedness, that is, to pay an obligation to a third party" which is 

both valid and enforceable. Attorney General Opinion MW-566 (1982). 

Therefore, your question is, in essence, whether deductions of the 

type listed above are valid and enforceable obligations, i.e., 

"indebtedness," and thus require consent of the employee's spouse. 

Indebtedness has been characterized as "that for which an action 

of debt would lie; a sum of money due by certain and express 

agreement .'I Merriman V. Swift and Company. 204 S.W. 775, 776 (Tex. 

Civ. App. - Fort Worth 1918, writ ref'd). Article 3.53, section 2B(2) 

of the Insurance Code defines indebtedness as "the total amount 

payable by a debtor to a creditor in connection with a loan or other 

credit transaction." The Debt Collection Practices Act defines "debt" 

as "any obligation or alleged obligation arising out of a consumer 

transaction." V.T.C.S. art. 5069-11.01. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th 

edition, defines "debt" as a "specified sum of money owing to one 

person from another, including not only obligation of debtor to pay 

but right of creditor to receive and enforce payment," (citing State 

v. Ducey, 266 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970)). It is clear, 

then. that in order for there to be an "indebtednessuthere must be an 

obligation, legally enforceable against the debtor, to pay a 

determinable sum of money. With this in mind, we shall examine each 

of the deductions about which you inquire. 

This office has recognized the authority of school district 

employees to approve and school districts to deduct union dues 

checkoffs and hospitalization plan premiums. Attorney General 

Opinions M-613 (1970); o-4033, O-3474 (1941); O-2141 (1940). This 

office has also determined that section 2.07 was not impliedly 

repealed by section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code which provides that 

personal earnings are within the sole management of each spouse. 

Attorney General Opinion MW-485 (1982). These opinions, however, do 

not address the issue of indebtedness and their silence on this matter 

is not to be construed as a tacit conclusion that such deductions 

constitute indebtedness. On the contrary, this office has recognized 

p. 221 
Honorable Carl A. Parker - Page 3 (JM-53) 

that such deductions are voluntary in nature and impose no obligation 

on either employee or employer: 

The proposed plan imposes no financial obligation 

,on the part of the district. The teachers would 

enter the plan on a purely voluntary basis, and we 

see no reason why the teachers may not authorize 

the district to make deductions from their 

salaries. . . As we have mentioned above, 

narticioation in the elan is ourelv voluntary: 

iherefore, the teachers could withdraw both their 

membership in the plan and their authorization to 

the district to make deductions at any time. 

(Emphasis added). 

Attorney General Opinion O-4033 (1941). Furthermore, the Texas 

,- 

Right-To-Work Law, article 5207a, V.T.C.S., and article 5154~ (as 

applied to public employees) protect the right of all persons to 

accept or decline membership in labor unions. Lunsford v. City of 

Bryan, 297 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. 1957). Accordingly, we conclude 

that, since checkoff authorizations for school district employees are 

voluntary and revocable at will, it follows that consent of married 

employees' spouses to union dues deductions is not required by section 

2.07 of the Education Code. 

Donations to charitable organizations deducted from salary or 

wages likewise need not receive approval of the married employee's 

spouse. Charitable donations are similar to union dues in that the 

employee undertakes no enforceable obligation to pay any sum; rather, 

the deduction system serves as an alternate method of donation that 

the employee may exercise at his or her discretion. As with dues 

checkoffs, the purpose of charitable deductions is to provide 

employee, employer, and charitable organization with a simple, 

efficient method of transferring funds. The essential requisites for 

a charitable donation or gift are (1) capacity of the donor, (2) 

intention of the donor to make a gift, (3) completed delivery of the 

gift to or for the donee, and (4) acceptance of the gift by the donee. 

In re Greenberg's Will, 286 N.Y.S. 56, 58 (N.Y. Surrogate's Ct. 1936), 

Black's Law Dictionary 619 (5th ed. 1979). Moreover, a valid donation 

requires the donor to divest himself or herself of title and control 

of the gift without expectation of its return. Walker v. Commissioner 

of Internal Revenue, 91 F.2d 297, 298 (5th Cir. 1937). A charitable 

deduction, therefore, does not become a donation until it has been 

transferred to the particular charity. The authorization for such a 

deduction does not amount to an enforceable obligation and may be 

terminated by the employee at any time. Consequently, such deductions 

do not constitute indebtedness within the purview of section 2.07. 

” 

p. 222 
Honorable Carl A. Parker - Page 4 (JM-53) 

Deductions for payments of installments on loans and insurance 

premiums are more likely to be categorized as indebtedness, for either 

may arise in connection-with a credit or consumer transaction. See 

Ins. Code art. 3.53, §2B(5); V.T.C.S. art. 5069-11.01. However, the 

amount of indebtedness, if any, and method of repayment are fact 

determinations, dependent upon the terms of each contract. Absent 

more specific information concerning such deductions, we cannot 

categorically conclude that they constitute indebtedness as required 

by section 2.07. 

SUMMARY 

Section 2.07 of the Texas Education Code 

requires a married employee to obtain his or her 

spouse's consent for salary deductions only when 

such deductions are offered as security for a 

valid and enforceable obligation. Deductions for 

dues and charitable donations do not require 

spouse's consent. Deductions for loan payments 

and insurance premiums may constitute indebtedness 

but such a determination is dependent upon the 

terms of individual contracts. 

Very truly yours 

J 4 /I* 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DAVID R. RICHARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Rick Gilpin 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Rick Gilpin, Acting Chairman 

Jon Bible 

David Brooks 

Colin Carl 

Jim Moellinger 

Nancy Sutton 

p. 223