The B oard w as abolishe d i n 2 0 05. See Act of Ma y 30, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 281, 1 § 7.01, sec. 2301.002( 2), (10) , 2005 Tex. Gen. L aws 778, 839. W e will, howeve r, continue to re fer to the Boa

rd as it issued the order under revie w. The Motor Vehicle Division o f t h e T ex as Depa rtment of Tra

nsportation is now heade d by a division director. See id. A Su ba ru pr oc e e din g is r e qu ir e d w he n a pa rt y fi le s su it in dis tr ic t c ourt , b ut i nc lud e s c la ims 2 within the Boa

rd’s e x clusive jurisdiction under the Texas Occ upations Code as issues to be dec ided in the lawsuit. As the supreme court c oncluded in Su ba ru , th e dis tr ic t c ourt la c ks jur isd ic tio n to consider c ode-ba sed cla ims falling within the B oard’ s exclusive jurisd i ct i o n an d should abate the trial proce eding s to allow this jurisdi ctional def ect to be c ured by

prese nting those c laims to the Boa rd for revie w and f

inal decision. Subaru of Am., Inc. v . David Mc David Nissan, Inc. , 84 S.W .3d 212, 227-28 (Te x . 2002). Once the B oard r ender s a final de cision on the code -base d claims, the parties may

then utiliz e the B oard’ s findings f or purpose s of the lawsuit. Id. at 228. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 NO. 03-05-00355- CV

444 444 444 444 444
Aus ti n Ch e vr ole t, Inc . d/ b/ a M undayChe vr ole t/ Ge o a nd General Mot ors Cor poration, Appellan ts

v. MotorVehicle Board and Motor Ve hicle Division of the Texas De partme nt of Transportation and Land mark Chevr olet Cor poration, Appellees

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444444444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 44 FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COU NTY, 98TH J UDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. GN500875 , HONO RABLE W. JEANNE MEURER, J UDGE PRESIDING

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444444444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 44
O P I N I O N
This is an appea l f

rom a final order issued by the Motor Vehicle Boa rd of the Te x as Depa rtment of Tra

nsportation in a Subaru p ro ce ed i n g. Se e Su ba ru of Am ., In c . v . D av id M

c Da v id 1 2A n e w c ar d e a le r may pr ote st a man uf a c tur e r’ s dec isi on to es ta

bli sh a ne w ca

r d e a le rs hip 3 of the same line-make within a fiftee n-mile radius of the exist ing de aler ship. See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.652(b)( 2) (West 2004). 2 Nissan, Inc. , 84 S
. W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2002). I n this case, L andmar k Chevrolet Corporation (L andmar k) filed a lawsuit ag ainst Gene ral Motors Corporation (GM) and Austin Chevrolet, Inc., d/b/a Munday

Chevrolet/Geo ( Munday ) (tog ether

“GM/Munday”), a lleg ing that GM defr auded L andmar k out of its right to protest Mu n d ay ’s dealership application in 1993 and discriminated 3 ag ainst L andmar

k in the allocation of Suburbans and Tahoe s from 1994 to 1997. The district cour t abate d the suit and ref

err ed t h es e t wo issues to the Boa rd for deter mination. See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §§ 23 01 .1 51 , .2 51 -. 26 6 (We st 2 00 4) ; Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 8 4 S. W. 3 d 1 9 8 , 2 0 6 ( T e x. 20 02 ); Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d at 223. Afte r an a dminist rative la w judg e (A L J ) conduc ted a he aringand prepa red a proposal for

decision ( P FD ), the B oard r uled for L andmar

k on the first issue and f

or GM/Munday

on the sec ond issue. GM/Munday now appea l the issue decide d in favor of L andmar k, contendingthat the Boa rd acte d in a

n arbitra ry and capr icious manner by ref using to a nswer the question posed by the district court and by

ignor ing the Boa

rd’s pre cede nt. We affirm the B oard’ s order
.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND This appea l arises out of a dispute over the e stablishment and reloc ation of the Munday deale rship in the north Houston are a. In 1993, Munday filed an a pplication with the Boa

rd3

fo r a ne w f ra nc his e d mo tor

ve hic le de a le r’ s li cens e for a de a le rs hip to b e loc a te d in no rt hw e st Ho us ton , at F .M . 1 96 0 a

nd Cy pr e ss S ta tio n D ri ve , a

pp ro xima te ly

on e -h a lf mil e we st o f I

nte rs ta te Hig hway 45. This application was timely protested by L andmar k, a lar g e-volume de aler ship located ten miles south of the proposed Munday location on I nterstate H ighw ay 45. GM intervene d in the protest proceeding on Munday ’s behalf. A pretrial confe renc e was held, di scover y conducte d, and a hea ring on the merits was sc heduled. Prior t o t h e co m m encement of the he aring , L andmar k dismiss ed its protest of t he Munday application af

ter, it contends, it was a ssured that GM would g ive considera ti o n to L an d ma r k ’ s c o n c e r

n s a b o u t th e p r o p o s e d d e a le r s h ip
. T h e B o ar d th e n is s u ed a license to Munday . Soon after, Munda y completed construction of the dea lership and c ommenced op e ratio ns . I n 1 99 7, M u n d a y f i l e d a n a p p l i c a t i on wi th t he B oa rd to r e loc a te the de a le rs hip dir e c tly onto I nterstate H ighw ay

45. L andmar

k filed this lawsuit ag ainst GM/Munday , alleg ing, a mong othe r things, that GM de fra

uded L andmar

k o ut of its right to protest Munday ’s 1993 application. L andmar k alleg ed that GM wa s biased in the 1993 matter beca use GM had c onditioned its offer of the Che vrol et fran c his e to M un da y on Mund ay ’s pu

rc ha se , f or a bo ve -m ark e t va lue , o f t

he GM

owned pr operty

at F.M. 1960 a

nd Cy press Station Drive. On motions filed by GM/Munday , the di strict court abated the suit and ref err ed the
ma tte r t o th e B oa

rd to a ns we r t he fo llo wi ngqu e sti on

a t is su e in t

his a pp e a l:
I f L andmark

ha d n ot w ith dr awn

its pr ote st o f t

he lic e ns e a

pp lic a tio n at is sue i n Wil liam F. Mun d ay

d/b/a Bill Munday

Chevrolet/Geo, A

pplicant v. L andmar

k Chevrolet Corp., Protestant and G ener al Motors Corporation, I nterve nor, bef ore the Texas Depar

tment of Transpor

tation, Division of Motor Tra nsportation; Docket No.The for mer Te x as Motor Ve hicle Commissi on Code, the B oard’ s enabli n g statute, was 4 codified at Chapter 2301 of the Texas O ccupations Code, eff ective on J une 1, 2003. See Act of Ma y 22, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1421, § 5, se c. 2301, 2001 Te x . Gen. L aws 2570, 4921-68. T he B oard or de r u nd e r r e vie w i nv olv e d th e “ pr ote st” pr ov isi on in t he 1 99 3 v e rs ion

of the Mo tor

Ve hic le Commi ssion Code. Although c odification alter ed the number ing sy stem, the rele vant portions of the pr ote st p ro vis ion

have no t c ha

ng e d. We w ill refer to the c ur re nt c od e pr ov isi on s, un le ss otherwise stated. The district court ref

err ed a second question to the Board, but that question is not at issue 5 in t his a pp e a l. 4 93 -0 9 4 , u n d e r

§ 4
. 0 6 ( c ) o f

t h e T e xa s M o t o r

V e h i c l e C o m m i s s i o nC o d e , w ou ld 4 L andmar k have obta ined a f

inal order denying the license a

pplication? 5
This aba te me nt w a s p r e d ic a

te d u p o n d e c isions issued by

the supreme court in Bu tna ru and Su ba ru , wher ein the cour t determined that the Boa

rd has the exclusive jurisdiction to deter mine violations of t h e m o t o r v eh icle code
. Se e Bu tna ru , 8 4 S. W.3 d at 20 6; Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d at 223. Following the district court’s a batement, L andmar

k initiated a contested- case proce eding by filing a complaint with the B oard a g ainst GM/Mu nday so the Boa

rd could a

nswer the district court’s qu e sti on . T he ro le of the B oa rd in thi s mat te r wa s to inte rp re t the c od e so tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c ou ld deter mine if damag es we re to be assessed a g ainst GM/Munday
. See Subaru, 84 S.W .3d at 224.

I n th e c on te ste d- c a se pr oc e e din g , G M/M un da y ha d the burd e n to sh owg oo d c a us e for the e stablishment of the new Munda y deale rship pursuant to § 2301.652( a) of the occ upations
c od e , w hic h s ta te s, ( a ) The board m ay deny ana p p li c a ti o nf

o r a li c e n s e to e s ta

b li s h a d e a le r s h ip if, following a prote st, the applicant fails to establish g ood cause for e stablishing the dea lership. I n deter

mining g ood cause , the boar d shall consider: ( 1 ) whether the m anuf

a c tu r e r o r d is tr ib u to r

o f th e s a me li n e - ma

k e o f n ew motor vehicle is beingadequately repr esente d as to sales a

nd service ;5 (2) whether the protesting franchised dealer repr esenting the s ame line- make of newmotor vehicle is in s ubstantial compliance with the deale r’s fra nchise to the extent that the fra nchise is not in conflict with this chapter ; (3) the desira

bility of a c ompetitive marketplac e; (4) any harm to the prote sting fr anchise d deale r; and (5 ) the pu

bli c int e re st.
See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.652(a) (West 20 0 4 ). T h e s ec o n d fac tor was not in dispute; the other four fac tors wer e conte sted. The B oard f

ound that GM/Munday

failed to prove g ood cause for the addition of the Munday deale rship. As a re sult, the Boa rd found that if L andmar

k had not withdrawn its protest of Munday ’s license application in 1993, its protest would have b e en g rante d and Munday ’s application would have be en denied. GM/Munday filed an administrative appea l in district c ourt and L andmar k
remove d the appea l to this Court pursuant to se ction 2301.751(b) of the occupations code. See id. § 2301.751(b) ( West 2004).
AN AL YSI S The Cont ro v e rsy GM/Munday

contend t h at after the par ties had ag ree d to refe r the que stion to t he Boa rd, the B oard imprope rly rec ast the question. GM/ M u n d ay further contend that the B oard improperly

excluded eviden ce, spe cifica lly the testimony

of the for

mer e x ecutive dir ector

of the B oa rd , w hic h it

so ug ht t o p ro ff

e r. GM /Mu

nd ay a lso argue that, i n a

na ly zing the statut or

y g oo d- c a us e fac tors on harm a

nd adequa cy

of re prese ntation, the Boa rd aba ndo n ed prece dent and pe nalized6

GM/Munday

for using a pre viously

app ro v ed st andar d, thus violating their due proce ss and equa l pr ote c tio n r ig hts
.

L an d m ar k

an d t h e Bo ar d re s p o n d t h at t h e Bo ar d p ro p er l y co n d u ct edt h e p ro ce ed i n gs and that its decision was suppor ted by substantial evidence
. Stan dard of Revie w

We review the Board’ s decision under the s ubstantial-evidenc e st andar d. Tex. Occ. Cod e Ann. § 2 30 1. 75 1( a ); see Te x. Go v’ t Cod e Ann. § 2 00 1. 17 4 ( Wes t 20 00 ); Su ba ru , 84 S.W .3d
a t 22 4. “ ‘B ro a dly

sp e a kin g , th e su

bs tanti a l e vid e nc e ru le is a c ourt re vie w d e vic e to k e e p th e c ourt s out of the business of a dminist eringregulatory statutes enac ted by

the L eg islature; but it remains the business of the courts to se e that justice is a dminist ere d to c ompeting p ar t i es b y g overnme ntal ag encie s.’” Board of Regents v. M artine , 6 07 S.W. 2d

63 8, 64 1 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1 98 0, wr it
re f’ d n . r. e. ) ( qu o t i n g Lewis v. Metropolitan Savs. and Loan Ass’n , 550 S.W .2d 11, 13 (Tex. 1977)).

Under a substantial-e vidence revie w, we presume that the Board’ s order is supported by substantial evi d en ce , and the a ppellant has the bur den of ove rcoming this presumption. Graff Chevrolet Co., Inc. v. Tex as Motor Vehicle B d. , 6 0 S. W.3 d 1 54 , 1 59 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 01 , p e t. denied) . When a cour

t is apply ing the substantial-evidenc e standa rd of r eview to a

n ag ency decision, the issue for the revie wing court is not whether the ag ency ’s decision was corr ect, but w hether the
rec ord demonstrates some reasonable ba sis for the ag ency ’s ac tion. Central Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n , 3 6 S.W .3d 547, 561 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). We may not
s u b s ti tute o u r

ju d g me n t f

o r th a t o f th e a g e n c y

o nma tt e rs commi tted to a g e n c y d is c r e ti o n . T e x.7

Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 2 00 1. 17 4; H.G. Sledge, Inc. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co., Ltd., 36 S.W .3d 597, 602 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). The a g ency is the sole judge of the we ight of the evidenc e and the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s. Central Power & Light , 36 S.W .3d at 561.
District Cou rt’s Question

I n it s f ir st a nd se c on d issu e s, GM /Mund ay c on te nd that th e B oa

rd imp ro pe rl y

re c a st the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s iss ue a s “ wh a t w ou ld h a ve ha pp e ne d h a d it

take n th e pa

rt ie s to 20 02 to g e t to hear i n g, b u t with evidence of marke t data beyond 1993 excluded? ” GM/Munday asser t that by
rec asting the case i n this manner , and by excluding the testimony of the for mer e x ecutive dir ector of the B oard in 1993, the B oard “ eng ag ed in an irr eleva nt thought experiment” that failed to answe r the qu e sti on

po se d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt
. We disag ree . I n this case, the district c ourt’s orde r d i d n o t i nstruct the B oard on methodology ; rather , it properly defe rre d to the Boa

rd’s a uthority and ex p er t i s e in determining whether there was g ood cause to add the Munday deale rship in 1993. I n defe rring to the B oard, the district court followed the g uidance of the supre me cour t in Su ba ru . See Subaru, 84 S.W .3d at 221. I n Subaru, the cour

t state d, “ Tr ia l c ourt s sh ou ld allo w a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc y

to initially decide an is sue when: (1) an ag ency is ty pically staffe d with experts trained in handling the complex problems in the ag ency ’s purview ; and (2) g reat b en ef i t is derived f

rom an a g ency ’s uniformly interpre ting its laws, rule s, and re g ulations . .
. .” Id . I n the district court’s or der, it soug ht the B oard’ s “spec ial competenc e, expertise and ex p erience” in interpretingand apply ing the code to case s involving the proposed addition of a dealer ship to a market. The order rec og nized that the Boa rd and its staff

regularly deal with the que stions raised in the issue in th eir a dminist ration of8

protest proc eeding s, and that the B oard ha d develope d rules for d et er m ining suc h issues, had expertise in applying those rules, and had made prior dec isions on applications for the a ddition of a dea lership into a marke t.

GM/Munday

contend that the pr oper way to a nswer this que stion wa s to determine how B oard me mbers sitting at that time would have ru l ed af t er consideringthe evidenc e and witnesses that would have been pr esente d in 1993. We disagr ee. T he inqui ry p ro p o s ed by GM/Munday

would have be en beyond the B oard’ s jurisdiction because it is not authorized by the former motor vehicle commission code or the oc cupations code . Fur thermore , althoug h the B oard has expertise and experience in making the g ood cause deter mination in protest procee dings a nd has develope d rules and pr ocedur es for these proc eeding s, i t h as n o expertise, experience , or rules rele vant to a dete rmination of how B oard me mbers sitting in the past would have r easone d or ruled,
or in d e te rm ini ngwh a t e vid e nc e , w itn e sse s, and the or ie s the pa rt ie s mig ht have pr of

fe re d in a pa st p ro ce ed i n g. GM /Mund ay a sk the B oa rd to c on du c t an imp os sib le ta sk , on e that it a dmi tte d in

its pleading s was “too spe culative f or the B oard t o d efinit ively answe r.” I f the B oard w ere to have chosen this path, it would have had to r esolve many complicating fac tors. For example, discovery
wa s ne ve r c omp le te d in the 19 93 pr oc e e din g , se ve ra l of the lis te d e xpe rt s h a d n ot p re pa re d r e po rt s when L andmar

k withdrew its prote st, a

nd it is impossibl e to know when the PF D would have been
c omp le te d in

an e ff or t to de te rm ine who wo uld have be e n o n th e B oa

rd a t th e tim e of

its
c on sid e ratio n. Ev e n if

a ll the se c omp lic a tio ns c ou ld b e re so lve d, the fi na l de te rm inatio n w ou ld s til l,We do n o t address the district court’s c onsideration of the Boa rd’s orde r in the pending 6 laws uit
. 9 in the words of the Boa rd, “ine scapa

bly require speculation concerning the subjective me ntal perc eptions of past B oard me mbers.”

Neither the supreme c ourt in Su ba ru nor the district cour t here contemplated that the Boa rd would make a dete rmination for which it had no rele vant expertise, experienc e, or r ules, nor does the for

mer motor vehicle c ommissi on code or the occ upations code a

uthorize it. R ather , the district court followed the rationale and languag e of Su ba ru by a sk ingthe c ur

re nt B oa rd to u se its authority and expertise, within the B oard’ s sound discretion, to apply the st at u t o ry fa ctors and deter mine whether

there was g ood cause to add the Munday deale rship in 1993. See id. 6 Evidentiary Ru lings

I n acc ord with its position that the curr ent B oard must step into the shoes of the 1993 Bo ar d , GM / M u n d ay co n t en d t h at t h e Bo ar d erro n eo u s l y ex cl u d edt h e t es t i m o n y

o f Ru s s el l Ha rd i n g, Ex ecutive D irec tor of the Motor Ve hicle Division from 1975 to 1993, who wa s prepa red to testify that “it was highly unlikely ” that L andmar k’s 1993 protest would have preva iled befor e the B oard as composed in 1993.

We r eview an ag ency ’s ruling s on the admission or exclusion of evidenc e under the abuse of di s cr et ion standard we apply to trial courts. City of Amarill o v. Railroad Comm’n , 894 S.W .2d 491, 495 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied). S p ecif ically , the B oard ha s broad dis c re tio n in

de c idi ngwhether

to a dmi t e xpe rt

te sti mony

in a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e he ari ng , a nd its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discre tion. Se e Fa y -R ay Cor

p. v . Te x as Alc oh oli c10

Bev . Comm’n , 959 S.W .2d 362, 367 (Tex. App.—Austin 1 9 9 8 , n o p et.). Bec ause the leg islature g ave the Boa

rd exclusive jurisdiction to de termine the issue of g ood cause , based on its ex pertise a nd
e xpe ri e nc e in m a kin g thi s det erm inatio n, it w a s, a s a ma tte r o f l aw, un iqu e ly and e xclu siv e ly qualified to make that deter mination in this case . The question of how best to resolve the issue was a matter for the B oard’ s discretion, and it did not abuse its discre tion when i t concluded that Ha rd ing ’s te sti mony

wa s ir re levan t to thi s in qu ir

y . We c on c lud e that th e B oa rd a c te d w ith in i ts d i s c r e t i o nw h e ni tr e

j e c t e d H ar d i n g ’ s p r o p o s e d

t e s t i m o n y. GM/Munday

further argue that the Board’ s exclusion of post -1993 marke t data wa s
e rr or . H ow e ve r, po st- 19 93 mark e t data is i rr e levan t to a

de te rm inatio n o f w he the r g oo d c a us e exis ted to add the Munda y deale rship in 1993. To be sure , post-1993 m ar k et data w ould be irre le v an t to G M /M u n d ay ’ s p r e f e r r e d d e te r mi n a ti o n
— h o w th e B o ar d s itti n g in 1 9 9 3 w o u ld ha ve ruled. In any

event, a g encie s are aff

orded broad discretion in a dmitti ng and excluding e vidence , and it was within the Boa

rd’s discr etion to limi t the evidenc e in this case a s it did. We o ve rr ule GM /Mund ay ’s fi rs t and se c on d is su e s.
Har m I n demonstrating g ood cause for the establishment of a new dea lership, GM/Munday
wer e re quired to show that the Munda y deale rship would not “ h a

r m” th e p rotesting fra

nchised de aler
. GM /Mund ay

c on te nd that th e B oa

rd ’s fi nd ingof

ha rm to L andmark

ba se d o n a

le sse nin g of

pr of its is inconsistent with previous Boar d prec edent equating harm with “ demise, threatened viability , or signific ant har

m.” GM/Munday

further contend that ther e is n o evidenc e of a ny decr ease in sales by L andmar k.Un til 19 89 , th e pr ote st s e c tio n d id n ot i nc lud e ha rm to the pr ote sti ng de a le r as a se pa rate 7 fa c tor to b e c on sid e re d in

pr ote st p ro c e e din g s. I ns te a d, it c on sid e re d h arm a s a n a sp e c t of

“ pu bli c interest.” See , e.g. , Texas Dep’t of T ransp., Voltex Corp d/b/a Nil s Sefeldt Volvo v. B arney G arver Motors and Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., Proc. No. 126, 1, 25-26 (Motor Vehicle B d. J uly 5, 1978) (final order) . This section was amended in 1989 to state that the “ Boa rd sh all consider
. . . any harm to the protesting fra

nchise de aler .” See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.652( 4) (e mphasis added)
. 11 The B oard ha s addressed har m to protesting de aler s where , as her e, ther e is no showing of lost opportunity in any signific ant quantity bey ond that which is alre ady being captur ed by the exist ing de aler

body . I n Lewisville Cyc le Center v. Ac tion Imports and Z Y amaha , the B oard state d, “ I n e va luatin g the po te nti a l e ff e c ts o f t he g ra nti ng of the a

pp lic a tio n up on the Pr ote sta nts , it must ag ain be pointed out that ther e has be en no showing of any inadequa cy

of re p re s entation of Yamaha .” See Texas Dep’t of T ransp., Lewisville Cyc le Center v. Action Imports and Z Y amaha , Proc. No. 247, 1, 32 (Motor V ehicle B d. Aug . 26, 1982) (f inal order ). The B oard c ontinued,
With ou t so me sh ow ingthat th e re is a n e xistin g un ta

pp e d ma rk e t po te nti a l ava ila

ble in the L ewisville are a which c an ser ve the Applica

nt and the Protestants without erodingthe Protestants’ existi ng marke t, it is not rea sonable to conc lude that the g ranting of the a

pplication will not be harmful to the Prot es t an t s an d there fore the a pp ro va l of

the a pp lic a tio n w ou ld n ot b e in t he pu bli c int e re st. 7
Id. at 33. I n the instant case , GM/Munday failed to prove t hat there was a signific ant amount of lost opportunity bey ond that which was alre ady being captur ed by the exis ting de aler body . The Boa rd found a

level of oppor t u n i t y s o l o w that Munday ’s options, upon entry into the Houston
mark e t, w e re lim ite d to “ c ann iba lizatio n o f i ts c los e st i ntr a br and c omp e tit or s in

or de r t o me re ly survive.” A s a “hig h-cost, hig h-volume dea ler,” the evidence showed that L andmar k’s new c ar sa les depar tment had oper ated at a loss even dur ing its best y ear s, and it ha d relied on its used car , service ,12

pa rt s and bo dy sh op bu sin e ss to mai nta in i ts p ro fi ta bil ity . T he B oa

rd fo un d th a t a dd ingMund a y to this marke t in 1993 would have decr ease d L andmar k’s l ow profitabilit y acr oss all depar tments, and
cause d it and other de aler ships in the market t o ch ang e their ope rations in a wa y that would have
re su lte d in

po or e r s e rv ic e to t

he pu bli c . T he B oa

rd fu rt he r p re dic te d th a t th e a dd iti on of Mund a y to the dea ler body

in H ouston, w here sufficie nt oppor tunity had not bee n verifie d, was likely to have
ram if ic a ti o n s in a ll c o r

n e r s o f th e ma

r k e t, a s “ d e a le r s h ip o p e r a ti o n a l s tr a te g ie s ar e a lt e r e d to the public’s detriment in an e ffor t to reg ain or re tain profit.” The B oard a lso found, consistent wi t h p re cede nt, that exi sting de aler s in a marke t with litt le to no opportunity should not be forc ed to re duce se rvice to the public for the bene fit of a new de aler
. See , e.g. , Texas Dep’t of T ransp., Bi ll M un da yPo nti ac, I

nc . v . H e nd rix GM C Tru c k s, In c ., e t. a l. , Docke t No. 80-213 , 1 , 2 2 (Motor Ve hicle B d. Marc h 13, 1981) (f inal order ) (if the probable result of the e stablishment of an additional dea ler in the Austin ma rket would be the f

ailure
o f an ex isting dea ler or

there du c tio n o

f se rv ic e to t

he pu bli c , t h e n i t w o u l d n o t b e i nthe pu bli c interest for

the Commiss ion to approve the application); Te x as De p’t of Tra nsp., Hu dib e rg Che v ro le t, In c . v . Fr on tie r GM C, In c ., e t. a l. , Docke t No. 80-193, 1, 40 (Jan. 8, 1981) (f inal order ) (i t w ou ld n ot b e in the pu

bli c int e re st f

or the Com mis sio n to a

pp ro ve the a

pp lic a tio n if

it r e su lts in the de mis e or

fa ilu re of on e or bo th o f t he de a le rs hip s or

re du c tio n o

f se rv ic e to t

he pu bli c ). GM/Mun d ay

ci t e B o ar d

d ec i s i o n s th at s t an d

fo r t h e p ro p o s i t i o nt h at an ex isting dea ler in a flourishing marke t is not ne cessa rily harme d beca

use it must share the marke t with a new de aler , even if it means that the ex isting dealer will profit l ess after the dealer network e x pands. See , e.g. , Texas D ep’t of Tra

nsp., Marathon Corp. v. Ame rican Kawasaki of Garland, Inc ., Docke t No. 93- 159, 1, 20 (Sept. 29, 1994) (final order ); Texas D ep’t of T ransp., Ge ne Ha rm on Fo rd , I nc . v . D av id13

McD avid Nissan , Docke t No. 96-151, 1, 22 (Sept. 18, 1997) (f inal order ). He re the Boa rd ag ree d, stating that if L andmar

k had bee n in a flourishing marke t, the Boa rd would expect L andmar k to have adjust ed i t s business strateg y to capture untapped oppor tunity in the marke t. But this was not the
case in 1993. Fur

thermore , we disa gre e wi th GM/Munday ’s contention that ther e is no evidenc e of any decr ease in sa les on the part of L andmar k. L andmar

k’s expert, Dr. Er

nest Manuel, testified in h is r e p o rt th a t if M u n d ay h a d b e e n in e xis te n c e in 1 9 9 2 , th e mo s t r e c e n t y e ar a v a il able f or the purp os e s o f t

his su it, “ L andmark ’s ne w r e ta il Che vr ole t sa le s w ou ld h a ve be e n f ro m 15 pe rc e nt t o 30 perc ent lower

than they actua lly were.” D r. Manue l also testified that if Munday wer e adde d, L andmar k’s future sales would be 15% to 30% lower tha n what they

would have be en had Munda y
no t be e n p re se nt.

GM/Munday

contend that Dr . Manuel’s te stimony reg ardingL andm a

r k ’ s f utu r e sale s is insufficient t o p rove harm bec ause it prove s only that L andmar

k would have be en depr ived of inc re a se d p ro fi ts i f M un da y ha d b e e n a dd e d to the de a le r ba se . We di sa g re e . D r. Manu e l f or e c a st an absolute de cline in L andmar k’s future sales had Munday been added to the m arke t as it exi sted in 1993. L andmar

k e li c it e d te stimony

that in 1993 the Houston economy and auto mar

ket wer e suffe ring from an ext ended decline. L andmar k prese nted t he ex pert report of Dr. M. Ray Perry man that descr ibed the state of the ec onomy

in the Houston area at t h e end of 1992 as “slug g ish and stag nant.” The repor

t further stated that the ove rriding climate in t he Houston ar ea dur ing this per iod
was o n e o f “ u n e mp lo y

me n t an d jo b in s e c u r it

y , ” a s th e u n e mp lo y

me n t r a te in H o u s to n in 1992
rea ched 7.4% , double t he rate i n 1980, and the city fac ed a corr esponding decline in the r eal wa g es14

of wo rk e rs and

inc re a se in p e rs on a l ba

nk ru ptc y fi lin g s. Ac c or din gto the report, ne w a uto mob ile
sa le s, a s re pr e se nte d by re ta il re g istratio n da ta , exhib ite d a patte rn sim ila r to the e mpl oy

me nt f ig ur e s. New a utomobile sal es i n Ho u s ton in 1992 were 20.7% below the sales leve l in 1984, and new automobile sales in the north Houston ar ea de clined in 1991 and 1992. The re port conc luded that the mark et was chara c te ri zed by “ a de c a de of

slu g g ish ne ss, a

de c lin ingtr e nd

in n e w a uto mob ile sales, stag nant wag es, substantial lay offs, a nd only modest g rowth projec tions.” With in t he c on te xt of

the slu g g ish

Ho us ton mark e t in 19 92 , D r. Ma

nu e l te sti fi e d, “ if the [autom ob ile ] mark e t w e re fl a t or on ly inc re a sin g sli g htl y , th en y ou c ou ld h a ve an a

bs olute decline, but if the automobile marke t is expanding at a rapid rate
. . . then we w ould be looking at
a re duction in what L andmar k s al es would have be en other wise.” I n other wor ds, Dr. Manue l fore c a s t a na b s o lute d e c li n e in

f u tu r e s a le s b y

L an d ma r k if M u n d ay w a s a d d e d

to th e marke t descr ib ed i n Dr . Perry

man’s re port. Dr. Ma

nuel conc luded that a mar ket “did not exist ” for Munday ’s 2,000-plus unit planned new vehicle volume a nd that the public intere st would not have be e n s e rv e d b y

a dd ingMund ay ’s re dund ant f a c ili tie s a nd c a pit a l. B e c a us e the B oa

rd ’s hold ing is c on sis te nt w ithits pr e vio us de c isi on s and its statutor y duty to consider “ any harm to the prote sting fr anchise deale r,” see Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2301.652(4) ( emphasis adde d), we overr ule GM/Munday ’s third issue. Adequacy of Re

presentation GM /Mund ay conte nd

that th e B oa

rd a c te d a rb itr ari ly wh e n it fa ile d to fo llo w i ts prec edent by

reje cting the Texas aver ag e adjusted ( “TAA ”) stan dard f or mea suring “ade quacy

of repr esentation” in the Houston market. See Tex. Occ . Code Ann. § 2301.652(1) . GM/Munday asser t15

that it relied upon this standa rd in pr esenting its c ase on the issue of ade quacy of re prese ntation, and that, without notice , the Boa rd decide d that the standar d was fla wed a nd that GM/Munday

had not proven the ir ca se. The B oar d responds that the a pplication of a diff

ere nt standard—the T exas multipl e dea ler a

rea (MDA) standard—w as consistent with its prece dents, within its di scre tion, and
mor e a pp ro pr ia te to t

he Ho us ton

mark e t. The Bo ar d h as not committed itself to the use of a single standard a

nd has used a
va ri e ty of sta nd ard s in its de c isi on s. Th e sta

nd ard e mpl oy e d b y

the B oa rd va ri e s b a se d o n th e fa c ts
an d circumstances in ea ch ca se. See , e.g. , Texas Dep’t of T ransp., J o h n R o b e r ts B

M W , I n c . v. Classi c Cars, Inc ., Pr oc . N o. 16 9, 1, 14 (M oto r V e hic le B d. Se pt. 18 , 1 97 9) (f ina l or de r) (B MW natio n al av era g e and top f ifteen me tropolitan markets avera g e); Te x as De p’t of Tra nsp., Burns Mo tor s v. Ed Pay ne Motors, Inc ., Docke t No. 00-0001 L I C, 1, 31 (Motor Vehicle Bd. O ct. 18, 2001) (final or der) (national a

nd zone aver ag es). GM/Munday acknow ledg ed the B oard’ s use of more than one standa

rd in their motion to the Boa rd for rehe aring , which stated, “ The B oard has neve r said that any one ave rag e or statistical a pproac h must be used,” and GM has prese nted evidenc e compa ring differ ent standar ds in prior ca ses bef ore the Boa

rd. In rec ommending a standar d in Jupiter Chevrolet-G eo, Inc. v . Y

oung Chevrolet , GM, throug h the s ame ex pert that testified before the B oard in the instant case, James Ander son, prese nted a c omparison of the D allas MDA standa rd, the Te x as standard, the national standard and adjusted versions of the latter two. See Texas Dep’t of T ransp., Jupiter Chevrolet-G eo, Inc. v. Y oung Chevrolet , Do ck et No
. 9 3 -1 3 0 , 1 , 1 7 (M o t o r V eh i cl e B d
. Au g. 15, 1994) (f

inal order ). In the instant ca s e, An derson c onsidered a nd compar ed two diffe rent sta nd ard s, the natio na l st and ard a nd Te xas a ve ra g e sta

nd ard. Aft e r c on sid e ri ngbo th s tand a rd s,16

Ander son selecte d the TAA standa rd, which is the Te x as ave rag e standa rd “a djusted for loca l Houston are a consume r pre fer ence s.”

We disag ree that GM /Munday should have be en able to rely on the B oard’ s use of the TAA standa

rd alone . GM/Munday

knew f rom previous d ec i s i o n s t hat the B oard’ s choice of sta nd ard wa s v ari e d, a nd

its ow n ex pert ’s rep or

t a nd te sti mony

sh owthat it

pr e pa re d it s c a se
acc ording ly . Additionally , beca use GM/Munday

and L andmar

k exchang ed exp er t re ports and exhibi ts and deposed e ach othe r’s e x perts prior to tria l, GM/Munday had n o t i ce t h at L andmar k
wo uld att ack the TA A s tand ard

and pr op os e a

dif fe re nt s tand ard

to t he B oa rd . A s a re su lt, GM/Munday ’s contention that, “without notice, the Boa rd suddenly

decide d that the standar d was fl awe d” ha s n o me ri t.

F ur the rm or e , th e B oa

rd did no t de te rm ine that th e TA A s tand ard wa s f lawe d in a ll
case s. I t determined, ba sed on the evidenc e prese nted at the hear ing, that L andmar k’s standar d was
more a ppropriate to calculate ade quacy of re prese ntation on the fac ts of this case. The Boa rd descr ibed L andmar

k’s attack on Ander son’s methodology as “sc athing ,” and re counted a

n “all- o u t war over the a ppropriate method by

which to g aug e ade quacy of repr esentation.” Although t h e Board had a cce pted Ander son’s methodolog y befor e, on diffe rent evidenc e from a differ en t m arke t, see Texas Dep’t of T ransp., Nor th A rli ng ton Au to. Co. , d /b/ a PerformanceChevrolet, v. G raff Chevrolet Co. and Ge neral Motors Corp., Docke t No. 97-777, 1, 15 (Motor Ve hicle Bd. Sept. 9, 1999) (final order ), i t noted t hat “the evidenc e and argument offe red by L andmar k and hig hlighting signific ant problems wi th Mr. Ander son’s methodolog y [had not been] rea dily

appar ent . . . in past ca ses bef ore the Boa

rd. ” T h e Bo ard a dded that, in this case, L andmar k had broug ht forth a plausible a lternative to Ande rson’s standa rd.17 L andmar k attacke d the applica

bility of t he TAA standard to the Houst on marke t as it e xiste d in 19 93 by pr ov ing that it wa s fu nd a me nta lly dis sim ila

r to the va st ma

jor ity of the mark e ts used in cr ea ting the T AA standa rd. L andmar

k, throug h its ex pert, Dr . Manuel, a dduced e vidence that 249 of the 259 Chevr olet marke ts in Te x as used by Ander son to calculate Chevrolet’ s expected marke t penetration were single deale r are as (SDAs), while only ten wer e MDAs. The Boa rd found that Ch e vr ole t de a ler s in S DAs have a “ biga dv anta g e ” ov e r C he vr ole t de a le rs in M DA s b e c a us e the y ar e n o t r e qu ir e d to c o mp e te w it h in th e ir ar e a s o f p r im ar

y r e s p o n s ib il it

y w it h o th er Chevr olet deale rs and do not have the same level of competition f rom interbra

nd competitors. As a r esult, the Boa rd found that the expected penetration rate for Chevr olet deale rs in SDAs are , “as a rule, hig her tha n th os e of Che vr ole t de a le rs in f

ie rc e ly c omp e tit ive MD As .” Th e B oa rd c on c lud e d th a t it

c ou ld
no t “ e nd or se a

pr oc e ss t hat c ha ra c te ri zes a

mark e t as ‘und e rp e rf

or min g ’ s imp ly

be c a us e it f a ils to
me e t a sta nd ard so pr of ound ly inf lue nc e d by mark e ts be ari ng so lit tle re se mbl anc e to the mark e t in question.” L andmar

k further attacke d the TAA standard by targ eting Ander son’s “seg mentation analy sis,” by

which h e a d justed the Texas aver ag e to ac count for dif fer ence s in consumer pre fer ence s and pr o d u ct m i x from mar ket to marke t. L andmar

k disputed that seg mentation was c apable of
r e f i n i n g t h e T A A s t an d ar d

t o a c c o u n tf

o r t h e p r o f

o u n d d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e nM D A s an d S D A s . In
a dd iti on to t he e vid e nc e a lr e a dy di scu ssed , L andmark a dd uc e d e vid e nc e tha

t pe op le wh o li ve in MDAs have a pre fer ence for imported au t o m obiles, showing that manufac turers of Asian automobiles alone made 40% of a ll retail sales in the Houston MDA in 1992. L andmar k argued that the TA A w a s fur

the r ske we d by the fa c t tha t it is dom inate d by mark e ts wh e re imp or ts a re no t r e a dil y
a va ila ble , s ho wi ngthat 61 % o f t he imp or t de a le rs hip s in

Te xas a re loc a te d in

the 10 MD As
.18

Additionally , L andmar

k adduce d testimony

that product pre fer ence co n t ri b utes to the hig her Chevrolet penet ra t i o n in SDAs, specifica lly beca use of the popula

rity of trucks in SDAs and Che vr ole t’ s r e la tiv e str e ng th in t hat ma rk e t. L andmark

a lso a dd uc e d te sti mony

sh ow ingan in ve rs e relationship between hig h household income a nd propensity

to buy a Chevrole t, and showed that household income in S DAs wa s 40% lower than in MDAs. I n light of this evidenc e, the B oard
a g re e d th a t A nd e rs on ’s se g me ntatio n a na ly sis did

no t “ su ff

ic ie ntl y a c c ount f

or a ll measur a

ble differ ence s.” Despite L andmar k’s “sc athing ” attac k on the TAA standa rd and A nderson’ s methodology , the B oard r ecounte d “a r efusa l by GM to addre ss, head- on, any shortcoming s in the Texas standard that motivated L andmar k to o ff er a n alternative standard in the f irst place.” Additionally , by

not providing a

ny evidenc e based on the Texas MDA standar d, GM/Munday took the ca lculated r isk that if the Board acce pted t hat s tandar d, it would be left with no evidence . The Boa rd’s orde r noted that “ Munday and GM have g iven the AL J prec ious l ittle reason to re ject the Texas MDA standar d out of hand.”

I n sum, the Boa

rd did not find the TAA standa rd to be pe r se unr easona

ble. I nstead, based on the evidenc e pre sented and the facts of t his case , the B oard f ound that the re cord did not support a finding that the TAA standard was “a useful tool f or acc urate ly g au gi n g C h ev ro let’s perf ormanc e in the Houston MDA.” Fu rt h er , the B oard f ound the Texas MDA standar d to be ap p r o p r iate b e c a

u s e it d id n o t “ u n f

a ir ly r a is e th e e xp e c te d a v e r a g e f o r th e H o u s to n MDA by including in its ca lculation the routinely highe r expected a

vera g es enjoy ed by

SDA marke ts,” and
c on se rv a tiv e be c a

u s e “ i t i n c l u de d in

its c a lc ulatio n ma

rk e ts that are bo th a de qu a te ly and ina de qu a te ly19

repr esente d.” We find that the B oard’ s use of the Te x as MDA stand ar d wa s supported by the evidenc e and w ithin the Boar d’s discre tion.

The B oard f

ound that a compar ison of Chevrolet’s perf ormanc e in the Houston MDA to any of the standards, i ncluding the TAA proposed by GM/Munday , “fa iled to confirm a suf ficient amount of shortfa ll t o j u s t i fy a finding in respondent’ s favor on the issue of a dequac y of repr esentation.” As the B oard noted, even using the TAA standard, t he reg istration shortfall i n the
e nti re Ho us ton

MD A i n 1 99 2 w a s only 1, 17 3 unit s, a fi g ur e that de c re a se d e ve n f ur the r t o 5 49 un its in 1 99 3. Th e se fi g ur e s w e re fa r b e low the 1, 20 0 to 1, 50 0- un it b re a k- e ve n p oin t and the 2, 29 6- un it planned potential f

or the propose d Munday

deale rship. GM /Mund ay

re sp on d th a t th e B oard ’s nu mbe rs are ina c c ur a te be c a us e it f a ile d to pr op e rl y c on sid e r g ro ss l os s and

ins e ll. Ho we ve r, the Board dis mis se d G M/M un da

y ’s g ro ss l os s fig ure, de termined by

GM/Munday

by adding toge ther the shortfall in e ach census trac k that did not meet the e x pecte d penetr ation based on the TAA standa rd, bec ause of

its reliance on the flaw ed TAA standard. T he B oard dismissed GM/Munday ’s insell fig ure, w hich is the number of units reg istered in t he Ho us ton

MD A that w e re so ld b y

Che vr ole t de a le rs ou tsi de of the Ho us ton

MD A, be c a

us e it did not a dequate ly consider the marke ting a dvantag es enjoy ed by deale rs on the g eog raphic al fring es of the Houston mar

ket. The Boa

rd found that there was insufficient evidenc e in the rec ord to support
a fi nd ingthat Mund ay

wa s c a pa ble of c a ptu ri ngins ell fro m f

ri ng e de a le rs , w ho have be e n a ble to
su c c e s s f u l l y c o m m u n i c a t e t o H o u s t o n i an s t h a tt h e y s e l l t h e i r p r o d u c t s a tl o w e r

p r i c e s t h an t h e ir MD A c omp e tit or s.

The B oard f

ound that GM/Munday ’s ca lculation of g ross loss and insell were further skewe d beca

use GM/Munday relied on fig ures f rom the entire MDA, without reg ard to the a mount20

of g ross loss or insell available to Munday within a twenty -mile radius fr om its l ocation, a distanc e be y on d w hic h a

de a le r’ s c ha

nc e of c on tr ibutin g to i ts b ra

nd ’s mark e t sh are wa s c on sid e re d r e mot e by the B oa rd . T he B oa

rd no te d tha t GM/M un da

y fa ile d to pro vid e e no ug h in fo rm a tio n to pr op e rl y calc ulate g ross loss or insell based on a mor e re asonable standard a nd distance.
Due Proce

ss and E qual Protection As part of

its fourth issue, GM/Munday contend that its equa l protecti o n an d due proce ss rig hts were violated when t h e Board de viated fr om prior announc ed standa rds without notice. See U.S. Const. amend. XI V, § 1 (equal protec tion, due proce ss); Tex. C onst. art. I , §§ 3, 19 (equa l protect i o n , d ue proc ess). Spec ifically , GM/Munday contend that the B oard a cted in an arbitra ry and ca pricious manner

when the B oard r ejec ted GM/Munday ’s use of the TAA standa rd, and the data der ived there from, and a pplied a diff

er en t and new standard “ afte r the he aring ” and without ex planation.

I n administrative proc eeding s, due process re quires that par ties be ac corde d a full and f a ir h e ar in g o n d is p u te d f a c t is s u e s . Of

fice of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Public Util. Comm’n , 185 S.W .3d 555, 576 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. filed). At a minimum , it requires that the “rudiments of f

air play” be obse rved. Id. ; State v. Crank , 6 6 6 S
. W
. 2 d 9 1 , 9 4 (T ex . 1 9 8 4 ). Al t h o u gh the strict rules a

pplicable to cour

ts do not apply

to ag encie s, ag encie s cannot b e arbitrary or i n h er en t ly

unfair. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel , 1 8 5 S. W. 3 d a t 5 7 6
. F u rth e r

mo r e , a li c ensing authority acts arbitrarily and unlawfully if it treats similarly

situated applica

nts differe ntly

without
an ar ticulated justification. BMW of N. Am. v. Motor Vehic le Bd. , 1 1 5 S. W. 3 d 7 2 2 , 7 2 6 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied)
.21 As pr e vio us ly

dis c us se d, the B oa

rd a pp lie d e sta

bli sh e d s tand ard s in

thi s c a se and

did not cre ate new rules or pol icies after the hear ing. Be cause GM/Munday wer e g iven notice dur ing pre- trial discover

y of the standa

rds L andmar

k would employ

to measure harm a

nd adequa cy

of repr esentation, there wa s no surprise to GM/Munday or lac k o f o p p o rtunity to introduce contravening evidenc e. F urthermor e, the B oard f ully explained its decisions reg arding adequa cy of repr esentation and harm a nd did not act in an ar

bitrary or ca pricious manner
. The c ases c ited by

GM/Munday

do not hold otherwise. GM/Munday cite Flores v. Employe rs Retirement Sy stem of Texas , 7 4 S. W.3 d 5 32 , 5 33 -3 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us ti n 2003 , p e t. d en i ed ), and Ma dd

e n v . Te x as Bo ar d o f Ch iro prac tic Ex am ine rs, 6 6 3 S
. W
. 2 d 6 2 2 , 6 2 7 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref ’d n.r.e .), ca ses in which this Court determined that it was imprope r for
ana g e n c y t o r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l y a n e w l y c r e a t e d

r u l e o r p o l i c y. I n Fl or es we state d, “an a g ency is not bound to follow its decisions in contested ca ses in the same wa

y that a cour

t is bound by

prec edent.” Flores, 74 S.W .3d at 544. We added, how ever , that an ag ency

is require d by

courts to “ex plain its rea soning when it ‘appe ars to the r eviewingcourt that an ag ency

has d ep arte d from its ear lier administrative policy or there exis ts an appa rent inconsistency

in ag ency deter minations.’” Id. a t 544- 45
. Af te r ac kn ow le dg ing that it ha d p re vio us ly
acc epted Ande rson’s methodolog y on adequa cy

of re prese ntation, the Boa rd explained why

it was tr ump e d in the ins tant c a se by the e vid e nc e and argume nt of fe re d b y L andmark , w hic h d id n ot i nf la te the expectations for the Houston marke t. Reg arding harm, the Boa rd acknow ledg ed it s p ri or decisions and distinguished the instant c ase, finding that GM/Munday failed to p ro v i d e s ufficie nt evidenc e of lost opportunity bey ond that which wa s alrea dy being captur ed by

the exist i n g deale r b o dy.22 I t nece ssarily

follows and we hold that the Boa rd did not cre ate a

new policy

or rule. The B oard de termined, ba sed on t he evidence presente d during the hearing proce ss, that L andmar k had the more convincing experts a nd more appropr iate methodology to evaluate the statutory

g ood
cause fac tors for the H ouston market duringthe time in question.

GM/Munday

also cite Starr Count

y v. Starr Industrial

Servic es, Inc

. , in

wh ic h th is Court determined that it was arbitra ry and ca pricious for a

n ag ency to consider, a fter the hear ing, a fac tor outside the statutory criter ia. 584 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex . Civ. App.—Austin 1977, writ ref’d
n. r. e .) . B ut i n th e ins tant c a se , the Bo ard di d no t add any ne w c ri te ri a

to t he statut or

y g oo d c a us e fa c tor s. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule G M/Munday ’s fourth issue.
CO NC LU SION Be cause we f

ind that the Boa

rd did not act in an ar

bitrary or ca pricious manner

and its order is supported by

substantial evidence , we a ffirm the B oard’ s order
.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: June 9, 2006