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EXAMINING LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF CELL 

PHONE TRACKING DEVICES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 21, 2015 

Serial No. 114–69 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK, MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DeSAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

TROY D. STOCK, IT Subcommittee Staff Director 

SHARON CASEY, Deputy Chief Clerk 


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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

WILL HURD, Texas, Chairman 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice Chair 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois, Ranking Member 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

TED LIEU, California 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on October 21, 2015 .......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Ms. Elana Tyrangiel, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office 

of Legal Policy, U.S. Department of Justice 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Mr. Seth Stodder, Assistant Secretary, Threat Prevention and Security Policy, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

APPENDIX 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 32 


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EXAMINING LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF 

CELL PHONE TRACKING DEVICES 

Wednesday, October 21, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:52 p.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Will Hurd [chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hurd, Walker, Blum, Chaffetz, Connolly, and Lieu. 

Mr. HURD. The Subcommittee on Information Technology will 

come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare 

a recess at any time. 

Today’s hearing has a narrow but very important focus, Federal 

law enforcement agencies’ use of cell site simulator devices, otherwise known as IMSI-catchers or stingrays. 

Today’s hearing also touches on fundamental questions of privacy 

that we have grappled with since the founding of this country. 

When and how, can or should the government use technology to locate people? What notice or information, if any, must people be 

given about the technology used to locate them? To what extent 

must the government take into account the rights of innocent people who may be swept into a law enforcement dragnet? And how 

can we protect our civil liberties and defend the homeland at the 

same time? These are essential questions. 

Today’s hearing won’t give us a definitive answer to all these 

questions, but I hope that representatives from DHS, and DOJ, will 

be able to shed light on some of them and that this conversation 

will begin to reveal answers on others. 

Tracking a person’s movements for an extended period of time 

can reveal almost anything and everything about them. What establishments they frequent, whether or not they are church goers, 

who their friends are, and their day-to-day hobbies. Geolocation is 

more than a record of where you are or were, it’s a window into 

who we are. 

The Founders considered the ability of average citizens to keep 

things private from the government of such importance, that they 

built it into the Constitution. Thanks to the Fourth Amendment, 

we have the right to be secure in our persons, houses, papers, and 

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Simply put, unless, and until law enforcement can convince a judge to issue a 

probable cause warrant, they don’t get to disrupt that security. 


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Cell site simulator devices work by impersonating a cell phone 

tower and forcing all mobile phones within range into connecting 

with the device. Once a stingray connects with a cellular phone, it 

is able to identify that cell phone’s unique identifying number and 

to identify the approximate location of the phone. 

There are also collateral consequences for the owners of non-targeted phones in the area. While searching for the target phone, the 

device will also make contact with other non-target cell phones that 

happen to be within range of the simulator device, even if those 

phones’ owners are not suspected of criminal wrongdoing. 

After considerable congressional, public, and media interest, both 

DOJ and DHS decided to create agency-wide policies governing the 

use of these devices. While there may be some lingering concerns 

about the substance of the policies, which we will discuss here 

today, in balance the policies are a big step forward for DOJ and 

DHS, and a win for transparency and privacy advocates everywhere, as well as this is a win for the American people. What does 

worry me, however, is that it took the extra scrutiny to convince 

DOJ and DHS to make these changes, and I remain troubled that 

Federal law enforcement is still not embracing transparency the 

way they need to in 2015. 

I know, and I think, better than most, the need for the government to keep certain things secret from the public. Secrets in the 

wrong hands get people killed, but secrecy is a double-edged sword. 

Right now only about one in four Americans trust the Federal Government. If you do not have the trust of the people you are fighting 

for and with, you have nothing. 

I commend DOJ and DHS for their efforts here, but this can’t be 

the exception. Law enforcement must continually strive to appropriately balance privacy and security issues in the digital age and 

they must continue to be transparent with Congress, and the public, about the choices and trade-offs we face. 

I hope today’s hearing is a small step in beginning to bridge the 

gulf that has developed between our Nation’s policies and the citizens they are meant to protect. 

Our witnesses today are Elana Tyrangiel, the Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General for Office of Legal Policy at the U.S. 

Department of Justice, and Seth Stodder, the Assistant Secretary 

of Threat Prevention and Security Policy at the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security. I thank the witnesses for being here today 

and look forward to their testimony. 

And now it’s a pleasure to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Lieu, for 5 minutes for your opening statement. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Chairman Hurd, for holding today’s hearing to examine law enforcement’s use of cell phone tracking devices. 

In September of this year, the Department of Justice announced 

its new policy on cell site simulators, commonly known as stingrays, aimed at enhancing privacy protections and establishing a 

consistent legal standard for obtaining authority to use a simulator. Most Federal law enforcement will now be required to obtain 

a search warrant supported by probably cause, consistent with the 

protections of the Fourth Amendment. 


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Earlier this week the Department of Homeland Security announced its Department-wide policy, which similarly establishes a 

higher and more consistent legal standard of a search warrant requirement. At the time of the DOJ announcement, I released a 

statement calling the policy change a welcome first step and suggested we need committee hearings on this issue, and I am pleased 

Chairman Hurd is holding this hearing today. 

As new technology empowered law enforcement with unique capabilities, stringent rules are needed to safeguard against abuse of 

our civil liberties. The search warrant requirement establishes a 

consistent legal standard for Federal authorities and will allow increased oversight of the use of cell site simulators. Even those limited circumstances when a warrant is not required for use of such 

a cell site simulator, there are controls in place that help ensure 

that the exceptions are not abused. I look forward to the witnesses 

today providing more details on what those exceptions are and the 

safeguards that are put in place. 

These further policies are needed to guard against abuse of individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. Their data collection retention 

practices, and new policy are intended to enhance privacy protections, and hopefully they do so without undermining a law enforcement tool. 

I believe that these policy changes by DOJ and DHS, while a 

good step forward, could, and should go further. As the ACLU has 

noted, the policy guidance contains significant gaps, including 

overbroad exceptions to warrant requirement, lack of notice to individuals impacted by stingrays, and lack of transparency reporting. 

These agency policy changes also do not meaningfully restrict State 

and local officials who use stingrays and the majority of U.S. States 

that do not regulate them. I hope that State and local law enforcement agencies follow the lead of these Federal policies and implement stringent privacy protections and legal standards. 

In my home State of California, for example, Governor Jerry 

Brown recently signed into law the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, joining nine other States with laws that require State law enforcement to get a warrant before using cell site 

simulators. The California law also requires a warrant before law 

enforcement can search metadata or other electronic communications. 

I also note that the Federal policy changes discussed today here 

are reversible, and they do not apply to all Federal agencies. As we 

have seen in the past, not all administrations or agencies have had 

respect for the Fourth Amendment or our civil liberties. We should 

follow the lead of multiple States, including my own, and enshrine 

these policies into law across all agencies to make clear that the 

Fourth Amendment needs to be respected and persons have the 

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure by the government. 

I would like to commend Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Cummings, Subcommittee Chair Hurd, and Ranking Member 

Kelly, for the oversight work related to cell site simulators. In April 

of this year, the committee sent letters to DOJ and DHS requesting 

information and briefings on policies surrounding cell site simulaVerDate Sep 11 2014 11:06 Sep 26, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21433.TXT APRIL

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tors, which increased the committee’s visibility into the policies 

governing the use of this law enforcement tool. 

I also want to thank the agencies appearing today for taking the 

time to testify about these important policy changes, and thank the 

witnesses especially for being here. 

As with other policies regulating government use of technology 

for law enforcement and surveillance purposes, it is vital that we 

closely examine the rules to ensure we fully understand what is 

permitted. I look forward to reviewing policies related to the collection of geolocation and other electronic data to ensure that law enforcement tools are being employed consistently and with respect 

for privacy and civil liberties. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you, Congressman Lieu. 

Mr. HURD. And thank you and Ranking Member Kelly. 

Mr. LIEU. Sure. 

Mr. HURD. I yield back. 

Mr. LIEU. One more thing before I conclude. I would like to enter 

the ACLU letter for the record, if that’s okay. 

Mr. HURD. So moved. 

Mr. LIEU. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. HURD. I will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for 

any members who would like to submit a written statement. 

Mr. HURD. And now we will recognize our panel of witnesses. I’m 

pleased to welcome Ms. Elana Tyrangiel, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Office of Legal Policy at the Department of Justice. Thanks for being here. And, again, Mr. Seth 

Stodder, Assistant Secretary of Threat Prevention and Security 

Policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Welcome to 

you both. 

And pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in 

before they testify. So please rise and raise your right hands. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Thank you. Please be seated. 

Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit you all’s testimony for 5 minutes, and your entire written statement will be 

made part of the record. 

Ms. Tyrangiel, we will start with you. You are recognized now for 

5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF ELANA TYRANGIEL 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Lieu, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

on behalf of the Department of Justice regarding the Department’s 

policy guidance on the use of cell site simulator technology. We appreciate the opportunity to engage with the subcommittee on this 

important topic. 


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Cell site simulators are critical tools that play an essential role 

in the Department’s law enforcement and public safety missions. 

The Department has deployed this technology, for example, in efforts to locate and recover kidnapping victims, in operations to apprehend dangerous and violent fugitives, and in complex drug trafficking investigations. The Department uses cell site simulators 

only in the fraction of cases in which the tool is the most effective 

means of achieving a particular public safety objective, and as with 

any law enforcement capability, Department personnel must use 

cell site simulators consistent with constitutional and statutory requirements. 

As you know, in September the Department announced a new 

policy governing its use of cell site simulators. The policy applies 

Department-wide, establishing common principles for the use of 

cell site simulators in support of criminal investigations in the 

United States. It applies when Department personnel are working 

in cooperation with State and local law enforcement and it makes 

clear that cell site simulators may not be used to collect the content 

of any communication. 

The policy seeks to accomplish four basic objectives: first, to improve training and supervision, second, to establish a higher and 

more consistent legal standard, third, to enhance transparency and 

accountability, and finally, to increase privacy protections. I’d like 

to briefly discuss each of these. 

First, the policy sets forth a number of measures to ensure that 

law enforcement officers using cell site simulators are trained and 

supervised appropriately. Each law enforcement agency must establish training protocols, which must include training on privacy 

and civil liberties. Each agency must also name an executive level 

point of contact, who will be responsible for ensuring implementation of, and compliance with, the policy in each jurisdiction. Finally, any use of a cell site simulator must be approved in advance 

by appropriate personnel. The required level of seniority for the approval depends on the type of use involved. 

Second, the policy generally requires law enforcement agents to 

obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause before using 

a cell site simulator. There are two limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. The first is an exigent circumstances, a well established exception under Fourth Amendment law, where the 

needs of law enforcement are so compelling that they render a 

warrantless search objectively reasonable. Even in these circumstances, agents still must comply with the Pen Register statute. The second limited exception is for cases in which the Fourth 

Amendment does not require a warrant, and circumstances make 

obtaining a search warrant impracticable. Again, in these circumstances agents still would need to comply with the Pen Register statute. 

Third, the policy enhances transparency to courts by requiring 

law enforcement agents to make clear in their warrant applications 

that a cell site simulator may be used. Finally, the policy protects 

individuals’ privacy interests by establishing consistent practices 

for handling the data obtained by these devices. 

As I have noted, the policy prohibits the use of cell site simulators to obtain the contents of any communication, nor do the deVerDate Sep 11 2014 11:06 Sep 26, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\21433.TXT APRIL

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vices obtain subscriber information. Even so, the policy establishes 

deletion requirements for the types of information that they do collect. Auditing programs in each agency will ensure that these requirements are followed. 

In sum, cell site simulators offer critical support of the Department’s public safety and law enforcement missions, but as with 

other capabilities, the Department is committed to using the technology in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and all 

other legal authorities while respecting individuals’ privacy and 

civil liberties. We hope and believe the policy properly accomplishes 

these objectives while clearing up any misperceptions. 

The Department of Justice appreciates the opportunity to discuss 

our policy with the committee, and I look forward to your questions 

here today. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Tyrangiel follows:] 


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Mr. HURD. Mr. Stodder, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SETH STODDER 

Mr. STODDER. Thank you. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member 

Lieu, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to talk with you today about the Department 

of Homeland Security’s policy for how our officers use cell site simulator technology in support of criminal investigations to protect 

the American public, and in some cases to locate and rescue victims 

of human trafficking, child exploitation, and kidnapping. 

In fact, in one recent case, ICE officers used the technology to 

rescue a 6-year-old girl who was held hostage by human smugglers 

in Arizona. And this technology is also used by the Secret Service 

to protect the President and other dignitaries under the service’s 

protective umbrella. 

Needless to say, this is an important tool, but it’s also a technology that must be used responsibly and consistent with our duty 

to protect the constitutional rights of the American people. In that 

spirit, DHS issued a new policy this week on the use of this technology by our officers. I believe the new DHS policy draws the right 

balance between enabling our officers to use this important tool 

and protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. 

Cell site simulators allow DHS officers to identify and generally 

locate the mobile devices of the subjects and victims of active criminal investigations. They work by collecting signals from cellular devices within the cell site simulator’s vicinity, usually within under 

1,000 feet, and providing the operator the relative signal strength 

in the general direction of a subject’s cellular device. A cell site 

simulator, though, is not a GPS locator. It does not provide precise 

geolocation. 

And a few other things worth highlighting here as well in terms 

of what cell site simulators can’t do. They don’t provide sending 

subscriber account information or any other personal information. 

And the cell site simulators used by DHS do not collect the content 

of any communications, no data, no emails, no text messages, no 

voice communications. No content. 

The new policy issued this week supports the continued use of 

cell site simulators by our officers, but it also strengthens management controls over the use of this technology. Let me highlight a 

few provisions that are similar to the DOJ policy. 

First, the new policy clarifies that before using cell site simulator 

technology, our officers generally must obtain a warrant from a 

court founded upon probable cause. There’s no Supreme Court authority on this issue, but as a matter of DHS policy, we’ve concluded that requiring our officers to obtain a warrant, founded on 

probable cause, is the appropriate standard here. It draws the right 

balance between protecting the public and preserving the privacy 

and civil liberties of Americans. There are two narrow exceptions 

to this general rule. 

First, exigent circumstances, as my compatriot here discussed, 

the well-established exception under the Fourth Amendment in 

emergency cases. And, again, as with the DOJ policy, we require 


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these circumstances, a showing of probable cause, but also the use 

of the Pen Register statute. 

Second, under the DHS policy, there is an exception for exceptional circumstances. It’s another very specific exception, and in 

practice, really only applies to the Secret Service’s protective mission. The Secret Service’s duty is to investigate potential threats to 

the President or other protected persons, and often this involves 

very limited information in immediate timeframes. And sometimes 

the information’s cryptic, it may not meet the probable cause 

standard that is required under exigent circumstances. 

But the threat is imminent, the President’s nearby, the consequences of attack obviously are significant and high. In these circumstances, the Secret Service needs to locate an individual immediately in order to ensure the President’s safety. This is a very limited and narrow exception to the general rule, and in these circumstances, DHS policy does not require probable cause or a warrant, but does require approval of both an executive within the Secret Service as well as the local U.S. attorney. The policy also requires a court order under the Pen Register statute or an emergency Pen Register. 

The policy also establishes several other key management controls that we believe also draw the right balance between protecting the public and protecting civil liberties and privacy rights. 

First, the DHS policy requires that applications for search warrants must include an affidavit explaining to the court what a cell 

site simulator is, how it works, why it will be used in a particular 

case, and the minor impact it might have on cellular devices in the 

area; no hiding the ball from the court. 

Second, the DHS policy draws a strong line on data retention. 

Bottom line, after a mission is done and the target is identified or 

located, the operator of a cell site simulator must delete all data 

from the device. 

Third, the DHS policy requires components to train and supervise their officers using the cell site simulators. 

In sum, we believe that the new DHS policy draws the right balance here between enabling our officers to use cell site simulator 

technology to keep dangerous criminals off the street and protect 

the public, and also making sure that we protect the civil liberties 

and privacy rights of the American people. 

Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Lieu, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to 

testify today. Look forward to answering any questions you might 

have. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you for your opening remarks. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Stodder follows:] 


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Mr. HURD. And now it’s a pleasure to recognize my friend and 

colleague from the great State of North Carolina, Mr. Walker, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Tyrangiel, Mr. Stodder, thank you for being here. 

Mr. STODDER. Thank you. 

Mr. WALKER. I commend both your Departments for requiring 

warrants for the use of these cell site simulators. 

Ms. Tyrangiel, you mentioned that these are now only used on 

a fraction of cases. Numeric-wise, statistics, do you have any data, 

when you say fraction of cases, what percentage are we looking at? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. So as I mentioned, these are critical technologies 

that are deployed in things like kidnappings and complex narcotics 

investigations and fugitive apprehensions. Those things do occur 

every day. But, the fraction of those cases in which a cell site simulator is deployed is small. I don’t have numbers for you today, but 

I’m happy to get back with you. 

Mr. WALKER. If you would get those numbers to us, because a 

fraction, may be broad definitions there. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Stodder, do you have anything to add to that? 

Mr. STODDER. I have a similar response, in the sense that, I 

mean, they are a very important tool that’s used by both Homeland 

Security investigations within ICE, as well as the Secret Service, 

and they are used in a very small fraction of cases, but I don’t have 

the numbers with me here, but we can get those. 

Mr. WALKER. Fair enough. 

Mr. WALKER. Several of you mentioned—both of you mentioned 

as far as new policy, Mr. Stodder, and some things that changed 

September the 1st. Before that timeline, were you allowed to retain, or ascertain communication before the new policy was instituted? Ms. Tyrangiel? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. This policy makes clear that devices must be 

configured not to collect content. 

Mr. WALKER. Before September 1, did you collect other content? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. I will have to get back to you about what the 

policy said, but—I’ll have to take that back. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. Mr. Stodder? 

Mr. STODDER. Well, this is the first overarching DHS policy on 

the use of cell site simulators, but the components before this policy certainly used cell site simulators but did not use them to collect content at all. I mean, literally the technology is not configured 

to collect content, at least the technology that DHS—— 

Mr. WALKER. Well, I’m glad to hear that we have new policies. 

I do have some trepidation about what we were collecting before 

then. I hope that we can get that information back as well. 

Mr. STODDER. Sure. 

Mr. WALKER. It leads me to the question, would it be better to 

enact legislation to make sure these policies are clear, because my 

concern is if you have new agency department heads, who makes 

the standard, who makes the rules there? Ms. Tyrangiel, would you 

like to comment on that? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Sure. Because we have just implemented these 

policies and because we are about to see how they are implemented 

and how they work, we would recommend that we evaluate how 


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they are going in practice before anything is codified. On the other 

hand, anything you wish to work on, we would be happy to work 

on you with. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Stodder, would you—— 

Mr. STODDER. I’d have a similar response, in the sense that, I 

mean, we obviously just issued our policy this week. We feel very 

good about the policy and strong about the policy. Our operating 

components definitely believe that the policy draws the right balance between enabling the use of these important technologies and 

privacy, but certainly if this committee were to walk down the road 

of considering legislation, we would obviously work with the committee on it. 

Mr. WALKER. If the warrant requirements for these cell site 

catchers, if you will, both the DOJ created—the DOJ created an exception for circumstances, okay, where the law does not require a 

search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant impracticable. Can you talk a little bit about what those impracticable circumstances—I mean, that’s a kind of a broad definition. Would you mind expounding on that, Ms. Tyrangiel? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Yeah. This exception is intended to be deployed 

very rarely, very rare circumstances. And, in fact, from the Department’s perspective, this is more like a safety valve in the policy, in 

the event there are circumstances that we could not foresee when 

we went to a flat warrant requirement. 

So in order to use that exception even now, there would need to 

be no problem under the Fourth Amendment, and it would need to 

be impracticable to get a warrant, and there would need to be a 

series of high level sign-offs in order to use that exception, including a high level agency official, the U.S. attorney in a jurisdiction, 

and a deputy attorney general in the criminal division. 

And any exceptions that are granted under this provision will be 

tracked by the criminal division, so that if there is a set of circumstances that is emerging and the policy needs to be tweaked or 

adjusted, we can do that. 

Mr. WALKER. Sure. So each one of those circumstances, you’re 

telling me that there’s a consistency there that all high levels sign 

off no matter what the situation might be? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. That’s correct. In order to be able to use that exception, all of those people would need to sign off. 

Mr. WALKER. I’m concerned about this exception and maybe the 

augmentation of it or the growth of it where—good intentions here, 

but I would assert if we are not able to put some teeth into this, 

that it could be a very broad definition. 

Mr. Stodder, I’ve got about 15 seconds. Did you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. STODDER. Well, I mean, the analogous exception of the DHS 

policy is the exceptional circumstances exception, which as I think 

I’ve discussed, it’s—I mean, the main focus of that exception, at 

least within DHS, I mean, without putting any conceivable other 

option, is the Secret Service protective mission, in the sense of 

where it is an exceptional circumstance where probable cause may 

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Mr. WALKER. Okay. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you, Mr. Walker. 

I’d now like to recognize Ranking Member Lieu for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

I have a question about the capabilities of these stingrays, not 

how they can be configured. Just in terms of capability, can they 

collect content or they cannot? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. As I said, our policy requires that they be configured not to collect content. The kind of configuration we’re talking 

about, and understanding that I am a lawyer, not a technologist, 

is the software configuration, not an on and off switch where someone could switch it on and off. 

Mr. STODDER. I’m similarly hampered by being a lawyer, not a 

technologist, but, I will say the DHS—I mean, the cell site simulators that DHS agencies use, both HSI as well as Secret Service, are 

absolutely configured by the vendor not to collect content. I mean, 

I couldn’t tell you one way or the other as to whether they could 

be, theoretically could be configured to collect content, but I know 

for a fact that the cell site simulators that DHS uses do not collect 

content and cannot collect content. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. If you could get an answer back as to whether 

they have the capability to—— 

Mr. STODDER. Sure. 

Mr. LIEU. —not just—— 

Mr. STODDER. We can get back to you on that in terms of whether there are cell site simulators on the market that could, but DHS 

does not as a matter of policy. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. I share some of the same concerns of Mr. Walker regarding the exigent circumstances exception, but specifically I 

had one about the Secret Service. 

Mr. STODDER. Yep. 

Mr. LIEU. Is it a blanket exception for the entire Secret Service? 

Mr. STODDER. Well, no. I mean, it’s an exception within the DHS 

policy that—I mean, and the key exception that we can envision is 

the Secret Service’s protective mission. So it’s not an exception for 

the Secret Service, but in certain circumstances where you could 

have an immediate threat to the President and you have cryptic information. Our conclusion in terms of drawing the right balance between security and privacy here, is to err on the side here of protection. 

Mr. LIEU. But why wouldn’t they just fall under exigent circumstances? 

Mr. STODDER. Well, because you could have a circumstance 

where—because the issue with the exigent circumstances exception 

is that the exigent circumstances exception still requires probable 

cause. And so you could have a circumstance with the Secret Service where—I mean, I’m trying to think of a fact situation where it 

could arise, but where you might have a cryptic email or something 

like that, or something that indicates there’s a threat to the President or to a distinguished person within the Secret Service protective umbrella where the Secret Service would not have the capability, or the time, or enough information to determine whether 


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there’s probable cause, but you need to locate that person before 

there’s an attack on the President. 

Mr. LIEU. I see. So let’s say it’s dealing with the Secret Service 

in a counterfeiting case. That exception would not apply? 

Mr. STODDER. No, that would not apply. In a criminal investigative case, like a counterfeiting case, absolutely not, it would not 

apply. I mean, in a normal, I can’t imagine a circumstance where 

this exception would apply in a counterfeiting case. 

Mr. LIEU. Now, it looks like there’s also an exception for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, is that correct, in the policy? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. The Department’s policy applies to the use of cell 

site simulators in furtherance of criminal investigations inside the 

United States. There is a note, a footnote in the policy that discusses national security investigations that says, when working 

under FISA, the Department will make probable cause-based 

showings and make appropriate disclosures to the court in a manner that is consistent with the policy. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. What does that mean in terms of—— 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Well, of course FISA and national security authorities are different than criminal authorities, but the policy does 

indicate via footnote that attorneys will make probable cause-based 

showings to the court and that they will make appropriate disclosures. And, of course, there is a whole section in the policy about 

transparency and the importance of transparency and letting the 

court know of the technology to be used. But because those authorities are different, different protocols, different structure, and statutes, they are not further defined. 

Mr. LIEU. Could the Department just apply it the same way with 

the FISA court? Why would it have to be applied differently? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. That is a function of a different court and a different procedural setup based on FISA and that authority particularly, and so it’s not the same system or the same authorities, and 

therefore, they’re just slightly differently oriented. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. In non-FISA courts if there’s a case that is 

brought, the ACLU letter references information where prosecutors 

will not disclose a stingray was used, in fact, they will say it was 

a confidential source. Do you have any thoughts on that or can 

your policy say that ought to be disclosed rather than using the, 

quote-unquote, confidential source phrase? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. I’m not familiar with the ACLU letter. I can tell 

you that the policy has a detailed section on transparency that the 

prosecutor must let the court know about the technology to be 

used, how it will be used, the disruption it might cause, to ensure 

that—should the court have questions or that the court knows in 

advance about this technology. 

Mr. LIEU. So I’ve entered the ACLU letter in the record. I’ll also 

send it to you. If you don’t mind, if you could respond to the issues 

they raised, that would be terrific. 

And then if I could take one more question. In terms of how you 

think this is going to be applied, how are you training your folks 

on this? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Implementation is ongoing and the components 

are actively working on ensuring that all the pieces of this are falling into place. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. LIEU. And what about local and State law enforcement? Do 

you do any guidance, any training? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. So I can tell you that a couple of—anecdotally, 

that a couple of State and local agencies have asked about this policy. We are hopeful that it will serve as a model. Beyond that at 

this time, that’s all the information that I have. 

Mr. LIEU. Great. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. I’ll recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Let’s pick up on Congressman Lieu’s line. So when local law enforcement, they can attain these devices without DOJ’s permission? 

Is that correct? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. They can buy and operate this equipment on 

their own, yes. 

Mr. HURD. Is DOJ planning to require State and local law enforcement agencies to adhere to DOJ’s policy or have similar policies of their own? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. So this policy, the Department’s policy, will 

apply to State and locals when we are working together and when 

we are assisting State and locals. It is complicated and difficult beyond that for us to oversee the State and locals, but as I said, we 

are really hopeful that this will serve as a model for State and 

locals as they think about their own policies. 

Mr. HURD. Does DOJ provide any of these stingrays to local law 

enforcement? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Not that I’m aware of, but I would want to double-check and get back to you. 

Mr. HURD. Yeah. My question there is, if DOJ is providing the 

equipment to local law enforcement, then can they be bound by the 

rules of DOJ in the operation of this? That would be my question. 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. I’d be happy to take it back. 

Mr. HURD. Great. 

Mr. HURD. And, Mr. Stodder, can people apply for this within 

DHS? 

Mr. STODDER. Well, I mean, you’re asking in terms of the State 

and locals. I mean, similarly the DHS policy says that if DHS officers are working on a case with State and local governments, I 

mean, certainly the DHS policy applies in that circumstance to the 

DHS officers in that task force sort of environment. 

DHS does not actually give or loan this equipment to State and 

local law enforcement. DHS does not do that. And the State and 

local governments can purchase this equipment on their own using 

their State funds, and consistent with their own State laws and the 

Federal Constitution, under their own police powers under the 

Constitution. 

The issue here I think you’re getting at perhaps is certainly 

State and local governments can apply for Federal grant funds 

from FEMA. And the Federal Government under FEMA, and I believe the Justice Department as well, I mean, we give grant monies 

to the States, and then the States, and then subgrantees to local 

governments can purchase equipment that is on an authorized 

equipment list, and certainly some States could conceivably purchase cell site simulator technology. 

And our position on that essentially is—I mean, our standard 

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ernments is essentially to—you know, they have to apply—they 

have to use the technologies that they buy consistent with the law 

and consistent with the Constitution, but we haven’t imposed essentially our internal DHS policies in that context or other contexts 

on the State and local governments with regard to the grant dollar—with regard to the equipment that they buy using Federal 

grant dollars. 

Mr. HURD. So, just so I’m clear, I’m a local law enforcement, let’s 

say I’m a county sheriff—— 

Mr. STODDER. Yep. 

Mr. HURD. —I apply for Stonegarden funds, I get them, I buy an 

IMSI-catcher, and I would not be bound by DHS policy on the use 

of said IMSI-catchers? 

Mr. STODDER. Yeah, correct. You would not be bound by DHS 

policy with regard to the use of cell site simulators yourself. And 

essentially, that’s correct. 

Mr. HURD. So is there any effort on the way to have folks using 

Federal funds, using DHS funds or DOJ funds, to adhere to the 

rules and regulations? Because aren’t there some significant nondisclosure agreements that are signed by local law enforcement? Is 

it with you all or with the companies when it comes to this issue? 

Mr. STODDER. Not with the Department of Homeland Security. 

We do not require those kinds of nondisclosure agreements when 

the State and local governments, say, were to use something like 

that. And the question of whether the Department of Homeland Security would essentially require the use—essentially State and 

local governments using of Federal funds to, you know, the City of 

Bakersfield or whatever else, to apply internal DHS policies, we 

have not sort of determined that that would be the right approach, 

for any number of reasons from federalism. But also from the perspective of you’re talking about a $1.5 billion grant program with 56 grantees and thousands of subgrantees, 

and the ability to track the use of all these subgrantees of all this 

equipment, I mean, I think that would be—it would be a significant, you know, consideration to think about. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. 

Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. I’m sorry. 

Mr. HURD. Yeah. The same question. I believe some local law enforcement in terms of NDAs with the FBI on some of the use of 

this technology. Is that correct, and how does that work? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Yeah. So the nondisclosure agreements that 

you’re referring to are agreements between the FBI and State and 

local law enforcement. Those agreements are intended to protect 

particularly sensitive information about the operations, the operation of the technology, the capabilities of the technology. They’re 

not meant actually to preclude more transparency in terms of disclosing that they’ve been used in any particular case, and actually 

FBI is revising those agreements now. But as to the question about 

how they intersect with State and local use, traditionally they’re 

not a means to oversee the actual use of the equipment, rather 

they’re an agreement about the sensitivity of the information involved. 

Mr. HURD. Okay. Thank you. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
25 

I’m going to now recognize Mr. Lieu for an additional 5 minutes. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

Let me follow up on Chairman Hurd’s questions about the FBI. 

So I have a letter from April 13, 2015, written from the Federal 

Communications Commission to Senator Bill Nelson. My understanding, according to this letter, is that for these devices to be 

used by law enforcement, they have to be certified by the FCC, and 

the commission places two conditions on them: one is that these devices will be used in fact by law enforcement, and second, that 

State and local law enforcement agencies must coordinate in advance with the FBI the acquisition and use of the equipment. 

Is there any reason we couldn’t, consistent with DOJ policy, ask 

the FBI to say, okay, if you’re going to use this equipment, you 

need to use it consistent with our FBI standards, which are DOJ 

standards, which is you need to get a warrant before you use it? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. So as I was mentioning, these agreements that 

you referenced to are—with respect to the sensitivity of the information and agreements about how to manage that sensitivity, they 

may be more or less effective at managing and effecting oversight 

over the use of this technology, but it is something we’re happy to 

look at. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

And then, Mr. Stodder, I forgot to ask you the first time. 

Mr. STODDER. Yeah. 

Mr. LIEU. We’ll send you the ACLU letter as well—— 

Mr. STODDER. Thank you. 

Mr. LIEU. —and if you could respond to some of the issues that 

they raised, that would be great as well. 

Mr. STODDER. Be happy to do that. 

Mr. LIEU. So I have a different line of questioning, which is, 

these policies don’t apply to the NSA or CIA or other agencies other 

than your own, correct? 

Mr. STODDER. Correct. 

Mr. LIEU. What happens if the FBI is doing an operation with 

local law enforcement? Can they sort of say, hey, you local law enforcement, you go use the stingray and do what we can’t do? Is 

there anything in policy that keeps them from doing that? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. If I’m understanding your question correctly, if 

the FBI is working with the locals and using a cell site simulator, 

this—— 

Mr. LIEU. Well, the FBI is not using it, but the local—— 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Oh. 

Mr. LIEU. —person is—— 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. As in—yeah, they get around this policy—— 

Mr. LIEU. Correct. 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. That is not permitted. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. Thank you. 

In terms of these other agencies, what law enforcement other 

than—we’ll take out the intelligence agencies, but what other law 

enforcement would not be covered by the two policies here today? 

Mr. STODDER. Well, it would be law enforcement that’s not part 

of the Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Justice, so presumably the Park Police, or I’m informed of the—I guess 

the Government Printing Office potentially has a—— 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. LIEU. Correct. 

Mr. STODDER. Yeah. So are there other law enforcement agencies 

that would not be covered? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. I’m not aware of which other law enforcement 

agencies would even have this capability. 

Mr. STODDER. Yeah. 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. So—— 

Mr. LIEU. And then you had mentioned earlier there’s going to 

be tracking of the number of times that these devices are used, or 

only when they’re used without a warrant? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. No. The policy requires a tracking of numbers 

annually of how many times they’re used and how many times 

they’re used in emergency circumstances in addition to the requirement under the exceptional circumstances exception to track any 

and all exceptions under that provision of the policy. 

Mr. LIEU. And that’s both agencies? 

Mr. STODDER. Correct. 

Mr. LIEU. And who gets this information? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. The agencies are required to track and collect 

their use, and the criminal division tracks the number of exceptions granted. 

Mr. LIEU. Would this committee get that information or could 

this committee get that information? Is it public? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. We’d be happy to work with you on any requests 

you have for that information. 

Mr. LIEU. Okay. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. STODDER. Similarly with the DHS. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. HURD. I’d like to recognize the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. 

Blum, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BLUM. Thank you, Chairman Hurd. 

And thank you, Ms. Tyrangiel, is it? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Tyrangiel. 

Mr. BLUM. Tyrangiel, and Mr. Stodder for appearing here today. 

Appreciate it very much. I’ve got about 5 questions to each one of 

you, so if you can be quasi brief, we can get through this in 5 minutes. 

First question, does your agency take the position that it does 

not, does not need a warrant to use the device to track a known 

suspect, a known suspect, in public? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Our agency has gone to a policy that requires a 

warrant with two narrow circumstances for exceptions. So, we are 

now using a warrant as a general matter except in two circumstances. And I—— 

Mr. BLUM. And those are? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Exigent circumstances that would satisfy the 

Fourth Amendment warrant exception and exceptional circumstances where the Fourth Amendment is not implicated and 

getting a warrant is impracticable. So even if the Fourth Amendment isn’t implicated, if it’s not impracticable to get a warrant, 

agents must get a warrant. 

And if there are exceptional circumstances, that we expect to 

occur very rarely, then there would need to be sign-off from a high 

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torney general from the criminal division. And even in such circumstances—— 

Mr. BLUM. To not get a warrant? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Exactly. 

Mr. BLUM. What were those three individuals, a high level—— 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. A high level agency official within the law enforcement agency, the U.S. attorney in the district, and the deputy 

assistant attorney general in the criminal division. 

Mr. BLUM. Is it all three or any of those three? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. All three. 

Mr. BLUM. All three to not get a warrant? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. That’s right. 

Mr. BLUM. Okay. 

Mr. Stodder? 

Mr. STODDER. As a matter of DHS policy, similarly to the DOJ 

policy, DHS policy, we have determined that before the use of cell 

site simulators, that we will require probable cause in a warrant 

in most cases, with two exceptions, similar exceptions to the Justice Department: one is exigent circumstances, so involving, you 

know, well-recognized Fourth Amendment exception if there’s life 

and limb at issue, et cetera. 

And the second is exceptional circumstances, which in the DHS 

context is—the main example here would be the Secret Service protective mission with regard to protection of the President, which is 

not a criminal investigative mission, but it’s where probable cause 

may not necessarily be the right standard in that context. 

And, again, we also have, you know, significant sign-off where 

the Secret Service believes that it needs to have a cell site simulator but does not have probable cause or won’t get a warrant, but 

we would need sign-off from a senior level executive within the Secret Service as well as the local U.S. attorney. And even there, we 

would also apply the Pen Register statute essentially to obtain a 

court order to use the technology or in an emergency Pen Register 

under the Pen Register statute. 

Mr. BLUM. So both of those signatures required or just one of the 

two? 

Mr. STODDER. Both. 

Mr. BLUM. Both. Well, what about when the suspect is the subject of an arrest warrant? Is there any change there? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. No. A search warrant is still required under the 

policy, again, barring exigent circumstances that would satisfy the 

Fourth Amendment’s warrant exception or the exceptional circumstances provision that I described to you that requires all that 

sign-off and fitting in with particular circumstances. 

Mr. STODDER. Same with DHS. 

Mr. BLUM. Mr. Stodder. Tell me if this is correct or not. I believe 

I have it correct. Each agency’s policy requires deletion of the data 

at least once every 30 days? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. So our policy—— 

Mr. BLUM. Is that correct? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Yes. And it also requires deletion as soon as the 

mission is completed. So if it’s before 30 days, in the circumstance 

where you’re trying to identify an unknown phone, it gets deleted 

immediately. It doesn’t wait until the 30 days. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. STODDER. And the same is true under the DHS policy. It requires deletion immediately after the mission. 

Mr. BLUM. Right after the mission? 

Mr. STODDER. Yeah. 

Mr. BLUM. Now, the government’s great at making laws, setting 

rules and regulations. I’m from the private sector. Where we’re 

weak is follow-through. 

So my question is what mechanism is there in place to ensure 

that what you just said actually happens? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. So there are a couple provisions in the policy 

that address this: one is there needs to be an auditing procedure 

put in place by each agency to make sure that the data is deleted 

consistent with the policy; and second, the policy requires each 

agency to designate an executive level point of contact in each jurisdiction to ensure that the policy’s implemented and complied 

with. 

Mr. BLUM. Mr. Stodder? 

Mr. STODDER. The DHS policy is identical in that respect. 

Mr. BLUM. So is this currently in place or is this—— 

Mr. STODDER. Yes. 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. The policy is effective immediately and—— 

Mr. STODDER. In place. 

Mr. BLUM. And out of curiosity, what will the punishment be if 

this policy is not followed? Because I’ve sat in on enough of these 

hearings and have people sit in your chairs where things, you 

know, weren’t followed through on, things were messed up, they 

were against the rules, the IG says they need to change, and they 

don’t change, and they receive bonuses instead of being terminated. 

So what happens if the rules are not followed? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. As with any technology procedure within an 

agency, if individuals violate their agency’s orders, they are accountable to their agencies and subject to discipline. 

Mr. BLUM. Mr. Stodder? 

Mr. STODDER. And the same thing is true in DHS. I mean, each 

component will have a structure essentially to hold their employees 

accountable for not using technologies in a way that’s authorized 

by DHS policy, and certainly DHS headquarters would have a similar sort of capability of management response. 

Mr. BLUM. So you’re saying it’s the Department’s policy? 

Mr. STODDER. Yes. 

Mr. BLUM. Yeah. I hope you will tell us today at this hearing 

that if someone doesn’t follow these policies and somebody’s privacy 

rights are in question, that you’re going to take the appropriate actions—— 

Mr. STODDER. Yes. 

Mr. HURD. —if it’s—— 

Mr. STODDER. Department—— 

Mr. BLUM. Go ahead. 

Mr. STODDER. At the Department of Homeland Security it certainly—you know, the component leaderships would take the— 

whatever appropriate action would make sense under the facts and 

circumstances of that case. 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. Same here. 


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Mr. BLUM. Great. I think my time is up. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HURD. I have a very basic question before we end. Is the private use of IMSI-catchers, is that illegal? 

Ms. TYRANGIEL. I don’t know the details of sort of how the manufacturers market themselves or to whom they can provide this, 

whether it is illegal. I can speak, you know, obviously to the government use and to these agreements between the State and locals 

and the FBIs, but not the private use. 

Mr. STODDER. Yeah. I’m similarly hampered by lack of knowledge 

on that in this sense, but we are happy to get back to you on that. 

Mr. HURD. Great. Thank you. 

I apologize we started late today, but this is an important issue 

of being able to protect our civil liberties and ensure that law enforcement has the tools they need in order to do their jobs. 

I think the plans have come a long way over these past few 

months. And we look forward to the additional information that we 

requested and having further conversations on this, and looking 

forward on how we can have some legislative fixes to this across 

the Federal Government. 

I appreciate you all’s time here today. And without—I thank you 

for taking your time to appear. 

And if there’s no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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