J-S37002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: F.S.L.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: K.R., MOTHER : No. 239 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree December 9, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000305-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2015

Appellant, K.R. (“Mother”), appeals from the decree entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of 

Appellee, Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”), for 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights as to her minor child, 

F.S.L.R. (“Child”). We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

The minor mother was in the custody of DHS at the time of 

[Child’s] birth. 

[Mother] has been in three different mother/baby 

placement foster homes due to her poor behavior. 

On October 17, 2011, DHS held a Family Service Plan 

(“FSP”) meeting. The FSP objectives for the mother were 

as follows: 1) to ensure adequate supervision for [Child]; 

2) to ensure for [Child’s] safety and basic needs; and 3) to 

attend the Achieving Independence Center (“AIC”) for 

training on proper care for [Child]. [Mother] failed to 

attend the FSP meeting. 
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On July 23, 2012, [Mother] was placed by DHS at Guardian 

Angel group home where she demonstrated significant 

behavioral problems. [Mother] voluntarily left placement 

with [Child] several times and refused to disclose her 

whereabouts with [Child] during the absences. [Mother] 

was verbally abusive and physically threatening toward 

staff at her placement. Furthermore, [Mother] missed 

medical appointments for [C]hild. Lastly, on September 

11, 2012, during a room check, [M]other barricaded 

herself and [Child] in her room with dressers and the staff 

had to forcibly open the door. 

On October 23, 2012, at a dependent hearing for [Child], 

... [M]other testified that she would continue to be noncompliant with the rules of the group home. [The court] 

ordered that DHS obtain an Order of Protective Custody 

(“OPC”) for [Child]. [Mother] abruptly left the courtroom, 

ran to another floor in the Family Court building and broke 

the glass of two door windows. [Mother] was restrained 

by security and taken to the hospital where she was 

treated for lacerations to her hands. 

On October 23, 2012, DHS obtained an [OPC] for [Child] 

and placed her at the Baring House. 

A shelter care hearing was held on October 25, 2012.... 

[The court] ordered that [Child] be temporarily committed 

to DHS. 

On November 5, 2012, an adjudicatory hearing was held.... 

[Child] was adjudicated dependent and committed to DHS. 

On December 20, 2012, DHS held an FSP meeting. The 

FSP objectives for [M]other were: 1) to receive mental 

health services, including anger management counseling; 

2) to comply with the Achieving Reunification Center 

(“ARC”); 3) to attend [F]amily [S]chool; and 4) to attend 

medical appointments for [Child]. 

On March 7, 2014, DHS held an FSP meeting with the 

following objectives for [Mother]: 1) to attend Family 

School; 2) to complete an anger management program; 3) 

to obtain suitable housing; 4) to participate in mental 

health treatment; 5) to obtain employment; [and] 6) to 
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participate in visits with [Child]. 

The matter was then listed on a regular basis before 

Judges of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas―Family 

Court Division―Juvenile Branch pursuant to...the Juvenile 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351, and evaluated for the purpose of 

determining or reviewing the permanency plan of [Child] 

with the goal of reunification of the family. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed February 23, 2015, at 1-2). 

On June 20, 2014, DHS filed a petition for involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights.1 The court conducted a termination hearing on 

December 9, 2014. Immediately following the hearing, the court entered a 

final decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. On January 8, 

2015, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, which included a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i). 

Mother raises four issues for our review: 

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE 

PETITIONER, DHS, MET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING, BY 

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUNDS FOR 

TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S [PARENTAL] RIGHTS 

PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) AND (b). 

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE 

PETITIONER, DHS, MET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING, BY 

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUNDS FOR 

TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S [PARENTAL] RIGHTS 

PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) AND (b). 

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE 

 

1 DHS also sought the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights, 

which the court granted in a decree entered December 9, 2014. Father is 

not a party to the current appeal. 
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PETITIONER, DHS, MET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING, BY 

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUNDS FOR 

TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S [PARENTAL] RIGHTS 

PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) AND (b). 

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT THE 

PETITIONER, DHS, MET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING, BY 

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE GROUNDS FOR 

TERMINATION OF MOTHER’S [PARENTAL] RIGHTS 

PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) AND (b).

(Mother’s Brief at 5). 

On appeal, Mother asserts she did not demonstrate a settled purpose 

of relinquishing her parental claim to Child. Mother contends she devoted 

countless hours to maintaining her parental rights by consistently visiting 

Child, obtaining suitable housing and employment, participating in mental 

health therapy sessions and anger management counseling, attending 

Family School, and carrying a full-time college course load. Regarding her 

mental health, Mother insists she attended therapy sessions at Life 

Counseling Services on a weekly basis for three months, followed by less 

frequent participation for another three months. Mother argues her 

considerable efforts do not establish any refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. Mother further argues she remedied the factors that led to 

DHS’s involvement, and the conditions necessitating Child’s placement no 

longer exist. Additionally, Mother emphasizes the social worker’s testimony 

that some bond exists between Mother and Child. Mother concludes the 

court erroneously terminated her parental rights. We disagree. 

Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the 
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following principles:

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether the 

order of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate 

consideration to the effect of such a decree on the welfare 

of the child.” 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972 

A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)). 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. ... We must 

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record 

in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) 

(internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the 

finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility 

of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be 

resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof 

is on the party seeking termination to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so.

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means 

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. 

In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We 

may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis 

exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 

1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings 

are supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even if the record could support an 
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opposite result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191[-92] 

(Pa.Super. 2004).

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 

1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 

1165 (2008)). 

DHS sought the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights on 

the following grounds:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of 

the following grounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately preceding

the filing of the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child or has refused or failed to perform parental 

duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of 

the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent. 

* * * 

(5) The child has been removed from the 

care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency for a period of at least six 

months, the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist, the parent 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a 

reasonable period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to 
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remedy the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child within a reasonable period of 

time and termination of the parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

* * * 

(8) The child has been removed from the 

care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have 

elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8); (b). “Parental rights may be 

involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is 

satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In 

re Z.P., supra at 1117. 

“A court may terminate parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(1) 

when the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim 

to a child or fails to perform parental duties for at least six months prior to 
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the filing of the termination petition.” In re I.J., supra at 10. 

Although it is the six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition that is most critical to the analysis, the 

trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations 

offered by the parent facing termination of...her parental 

rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality 

of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 

“The bases for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In 

re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 771 (Pa.Super. 2010). “Parents are required to 

make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full 

parental responsibilities.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (quoting In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 959 (Pa.Super. 1990)). The 

fundamental test in termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2), 

was stated in In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that under what is now Section 

2511(a)(2), “the petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential 
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parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In 

Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 1998). 

“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires 

that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six 

months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child 

continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118. 

“[T]o terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), 

the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The child has been removed 

from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 

(Pa.Super. 2003). 

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 

will best serve the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.” Id.

at 520. “In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond 

exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an 

existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Z.P., supra at 1121. 
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“It is universally agreed that the bond of parental affection is unique 

and irreplaceable.” In re Diaz, 669 A.2d 372, 377 (Pa.Super. 1995).

When parents act in accordance with the natural bonds of 

parental affection, preservation of the parent-child bond is 

prima facie in the best interest of the child, and the state 

has no justification to terminate that bond. On the other 

hand, a court may properly terminate parental bonds 

which exist in form but not in substance when 

preservation of the parental bond would consign a child to 

an indefinite, unhappy, and unstable future devoid of the 

irreducible minimum parental care to which that child is 

entitled. 

Id. (quoting In re J.W., supra at 958) (emphasis in original). 

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and may properly have...her rights terminated.” In re 

B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said: 

There is no simple or easy definition of parental 

duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. A child needs love, 

protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation 

is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance. 

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child. 
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Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert [herself] 

to take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life. 

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of...her ability, even in difficult circumstances. 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical 

and emotional needs. 

In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing 

of...her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill...her parental duties, to 

the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of...her potential in 

a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

Instantly, Child has been in the continuous custody of DHS since 

October 23, 2012. At the termination hearing, the court received testimony 

from Megan Flanagan, the social worker assigned to the case. Ms. Flanagan 

confirmed that Mother consistently visited with Child, but Mother would not 

arrive on time for the visits. Specifically, Mother would arrive thirty to fortyfive minutes late for a two-hour visit. Ms. Flanagan also noted that Child 

acted out after some of Mother’s visits. 

Ms. Flanagan explained the circumstances surrounding Mother’s 
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discharge from Family School: 

[MS. FLANAGAN]: It was reported that [M]other...and 

[C]hild had gotten everything out of Family School, it had 

gone as far as it would go. Mother...also had irregular 

attendance...and from my agency it was very difficult to be 

taking the child from the Northeast to West Philadelphia in 

that sometimes [M]other didn’t show up. 

[DHS ATTORNEY]: So, in terms of being discharged from 

Family School, you said that [M]other wasn’t going to get 

anything else out of it, is that because she achieved all 

that a person could achieve at Family School or because 

she wasn’t holding up her end of the bargain at Family 

School? 

[MS. FLANAGAN]: She didn’t hold up her end of the 

bargain at Family School. 

[DHS ATTORNEY]: So there was progress for her to 

make, it’s just that she wasn’t going to make it 

(inaudible)? 

[MS. FLANAGAN]: They even said to me that she 

basically hit a wall, you know, she had met enough criteria 

but it didn’t look like she had effort to move forward with 

anything else. 

(See N.T. Termination Hearing at 15; R.R. at 53a.) 

Regarding mental health treatment, Ms. Flanagan reiterated that 

Mother did not complete her FSP goal. Ms. Flanagan stated that the agency 

had referred Mother for mental health evaluations, but Mother failed to 

provide documentation memorializing her mental health treatment. On 

cross-examination, Ms. Flanagan elaborated: “[Life Counseling Services] told 

me that they had documentation that [Mother] had attended therapy, but 

they did not discharge her from therapy, that she had stopped going.” (Id.
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at 20; 58a). 

Significantly, Ms. Flanagan opined that Mother does not have a 

parent/child bond with Child: 

[DHS ATTORNEY]: What kind of bond would you say that 

[Mother] has [with Child]? 

[MS. FLANAGAN]: Friendship. 

[DHS ATTORNEY]: And what’s your basis for saying that? 

[MS. FLANAGAN]: When [Child] is upset, anything 

happens to [Child], if she’s feeling tired, if she’s off, she 

always cries out for her grandmother. She sometimes 

asks where [M]om-[M]om [is], that’s what she calls her 

paternal grandmother. It appears to me that is the 

parental bond that she has at this time. 

(Id. at 17; R.R. at 55a). 

Mother also testified at the hearing, claiming she attended mental 

health therapy sessions at Life Counseling Services in 2013. Mother said she 

signed a release form to allow DHS and the court to access her mental 

health records. Mother insisted she had completed two mental health 

evaluations, and “both came back stating I didn’t need any medical 

treatment, I didn’t need any further...therapy or mental health help.” (Id. at 

37; R.R. at 75a). Additionally, Mother asserted she had ceased 

communicating with her therapist, because Mother still owed money to Life 

Counseling Services. In support of her testimony, Mother submitted a billing 

ledger from Life Counseling Services, which indicated Life Counseling 

Services had billed Mother for an “eval” and three “individual therapy” 
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sessions occurring in August and September 2013. (See Mother’s Exhibit 2, 

dated 4/18/14, at 1.) 

Based upon the foregoing, the court issued the following credibility 

determinations: 

[T]he trial court found that the social worker for [DHS] 

testified credibly. The testimony regarding [M]other’s 

failure to provide mental health documentation to the 

social worker was credible. The testimony regarding 

Mother’s failure to act in accordance with her [FSP] 

objectives was consistent. Lastly, the [c]ourt did not find 

the testimony of [Mother] credible. 

(See Trial Court Opinion at 6) (internal citations to the record omitted). 

Consequently, the court concluded that DHS had satisfied its burden by 

presenting clear and convincing evidence of the need to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Child. The record supports the court’s conclusion that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. See In

re Z.P., supra; In re B.L.L., supra. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2015