1 Rule 10 (Court of Appeals). Memorandum Opinion . -- (b) The Court, with the

concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the ac tions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case. 

# FILED February 23, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE WESTERN SECTION AT JACKSON

______________________________________________ SHELBY COUNTY DEPUTY FROM THE SHELBY COUNTY SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION, CHANCERY COURT, THE SGT. RONALD A. HOUSTON, HONORABLE D. J. SGT. ROBERT MICHAEL SHELBY, ALISSANDRATOS, CHANCELLOR SGT. RONALD RAY, AND No. 108352-3 SGT. MARK ROCHEVOT, C.A. No. 02A01-9706-CH-00126 Plaintiffs-Appel

lants, AFFIRMED Vs. Alan Bryant Chambe rs of Memphis For Appellants SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Danny A. Presley, Executive Assistant THE SHELBY COUNTY County Attorney; Jennifer A. Beene, COMMISSION, MAYOR JIM ROUT, Senior Assistant County Attorney AND SHERIFF A.C. GILLESS, JR., For Julian Bolton and Jim Rout Defendants-Ap

pellees. Charlie Ashford o f Memphis For A.C. Gilless, Jr.

___________

________________________________________________________________ _ MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

___________________________________________________________________________ CRAWFORD, J. This appeal involves a declar atory judgment suit i

n chancery court related to a previous proceeding in criminal court pursuant to the provisions of the “anti-fee statutes,” T.C.A. § 8-20- 101 et seq .. The plaintiffs ar e Shelby County Depu

ty Sheriff’s Association, Sergeant Ronald A. Houston, Sergeant

Robert Michael Shelby, Sergeant Ronald Ray, and Ser

geant Mark Roche

vot. The defendants are

Shelby County , Tennesse e, the Shelby County Commission, Mayor Jim Rout and Sheriff A. C. G

illess, Jr. The com

plaint alleges in su

bstance as follow

s: Pursuant to the anti-fee statutes , T.C.A. § § 8-20-101 and 102, Sheriff Gilless filed a petition in the crimina l cour t for pay increases for his deputies effective as of July 1, 1996. Previously, the county commission adopted Resolution No. 68, captioned “Resolution Approving the Shelby County Salary Policy for Fisca l 1996-19 97.” This resolution provided for pay increases an d purported to require elected officials to follow the procedures which2

requirethat pay increases be effective as of October 1, 1996. At the hearing concerning the fee application in criminal court, the sheriff acquiesced in the recommendation by the county for the pay raises to be effective October 1 a nd amended his petition and the order accordingly. The complaint further avers t

hat the sheriff w

as misled by the may

or and commissi

on, failed to exercise his independent judgment and discretion and that plaintiffs wer e deprived of pay increases as requested pursuant to the anti-fee statutes. Plaintiffs allege that Resolution No. 68
v iolate s the statutory sche me of the anti-fe

e statute, and tha

t the sheriff shou

ld be required to reconsider

the presentation of the fe e petition. The complaint prays that the court declare Resolution No. 68 illegal as it applies to fee officers, and in particular to Sheriff Gilless, and that
an injunction be granted to require the defendants to determine salaries pursuant to the anti-fee statu te and to ref

rain from applying Resolution No. 68 because it deprives “the sheriff of discretion presenting the fee petition.” The complaint further prays that the cou

rt declare “it

was
an abuse of discretion for the sheriff to de termine his fee petition under the erroneous interpretation that he was required as a matter of law to follow Resolution 68.” In response to the complaint, defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a cl aim forwhich relief can be granted, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs lack standing to bring the suit. Subsequently, defendants filed
answers asserting the same defenses and in addition averred that She

riff Gilless

was not bound b y pro visions of Resolution 68 and that he exercised his independent good judgment and discretion in deciding on when the pay increase should take effect. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the groundthat the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have appealed, and the only issue for rev

iew is whether the

trial court erre

d in dismissing the com

plaint. We cannot

agree with the trial court that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment and ot her r elief and the court does have subject matter jurisdicti on to ente

rtain such a complaint. T.C.A. § 29-14-102 (1980). However, the court correctly dismissed the complaint because there is no justiciable controversy, and the complaint fails to state a cl

aim upon which relief can be granted. Moreover, plaintiffs have no standing to maintain

the suit.3 The complaint recognizes that Resolution 68 cannot be used to override theprovisions of the anti-fee statute. The criminal court entertained Sheriff Gilless’s petition for pay increases pursuant to the anti-fee statute. The plaintiffs in th e instant case

attempted to intervene in that proceeding and, upon the trial court’s denial of their pe

tition to intervene

, appealed to this

Court. Shelby County Deputy Sheriff’s Association, et al v. A.C. Gilless, Jr., etal, C.A. No. 02A01- 9703-CR-00065, 1997 WL 675465 (Tenn. App. Oct. 29, 1997) . This Court determined, among
o ther things, that the pet

itioning interveno

rs had sustained no

cognizable injur

ies sufficient to grant them standin

g. The Court said: At best, the propose

d raise to be given deputies and assistants was only an expectancy. As stated earlier, the Sheriff may seek any necessary raise or none at all. In addition, any r eques t made by the Sh eriff

is subject to agreement with the county executive, and/or subject to court a

pproval. Therefore, a public statement by the Sheriff that he wo

uld seek a certa

in raise effective on

a certain date is merely a reque

st contingent upon a

greement wit

h the c ounty or approval of the court. Any “injur

y” sustained as a result of the Sheriff changing his mind, or as a result of the court modifying the terms of an ag reement, is not injury to a present, substantial interest suffici ent to grant standi

ng to eit he r the Sheriff’s Associ

ation or the individ

ual deputies. Id. at *3. The sheriff has an absolute right to petition the court pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-20-101, but is not required to seek pay raises for his deputies. T he matter of whet

her toseek pay raises and under what terms is a matter w

ithinthe discretion of the sheriff, but his request must abide the decision of the court entertaining the petition. Plaintiffs in this case, as in the fee petition case, have no vested right to a pay raise in any amount or at any time. Resolution 68 which adopted the salary policy and wa s promulgated pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 110 of the Private Acts of 1971 establishing the civilservice system for Shelby County does not affect plaintiffs because the she riff fil ed a salary petition in criminal court. In Key v. Bolton , No. 02A01-9703-CR-00072, 1997 WL 464771 (Tenn. App. Aug. 13, 1997), this Court had befo re it the precise

issue of whether Chapter 110of the Private Acts of 1971 “precludes a She

lby County official

from filing a petit

ion to seek a pay increase for the employees of his department pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-20-101.” Id . at *1. The Court he ld that it did not.4 Plaintiffs in the instant case seek another court decision

for a matter that has already been decided. Theresimply is no justiciable controversy. The complaint on its face shows that the plaintiffs have sustained no cognizable injury and that the correct procedure for p ay in creases for deputy sheriffs was followed by the defendant sheriff. Although the trial court co rrectly dismissed

the case, it

appears that it

was for the wrong
reason. Where a trial court rules correctly but for an erroneous rea

son, the appellate

court will sustain the ruling upon what it conceives to be the correct theory. Duck v. Howell , 729 S.W.2d 110 (Tenn. App. 1986). Accordingly, the order of th e trial court dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint is affirmed. Costs of the appea

l are assessed a

gainst the appella

nts.

_________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S. CONCUR:

____________________________________ ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE

____________________________________ HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, JU DGE