India’s Naxalite Insurgency: History, Trajectory, and 

Implications for U.S.-India Security Cooperation on 

Domestic Counterinsurgency

by Thomas F. Lynch III

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 22

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy. The military and civilian 

analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute 

their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and 

participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the 

Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at 

NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and 

the broader national security community. 

Cover: Hard-line communists, belonging to the political group Naxalite, pose 

with bows and arrows during protest rally in eastern Indian city of Calcutta 

December 15, 2004. More than 5,000 Naxalites from across the country, 

including the Maoist Communist Centre and the Peoples War, took part in a 

rally to protest against the government’s economic policies

(REUTERS/Jayanta Shaw)
India’s Naxalite Insurgency

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

Series Editor: Laura J. Junor

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

October 2016

By Thomas F. Lynch III

India’s Naxalite Insurgency:

History, Trajectory, and Implications for

U.S.-India Security Cooperation on Domestic 

Counterinsurgency
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit inss.ndu.edu/Publications.aspx.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, October 2016

The author thanks Alex Johnson, Brittney Laufer, and Graham Vickowski for their research, administrative, and technical assistance during the composition of this paper.
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................... 1

Introduction........................................................................................................ 2

Expanding U.S.-India Security Framework, with Limits.............................. 2

Scoping Bilateral Security Collaboration Limits: Indian

Domestic Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism................................... 5

India’s Approach to Domestic Insurgency ...................................................... 5

The Naxalite Insurgency—History and Context: Phases 1 and 2 ................ 7

Third Phase, 2004–2015 ..................................................................................12

U.S. Security Engagement with Indian Ministry of Home Affairs.............21

Lessons Learned and Policy Implications for U.S.-India Relations...........27

Appendix A. Naxalite Insurgency Statistics Tracker ...................................28

Appendix B. Central Armed Police Forces, Ministry of

Home Affairs.....................................................................................................30

Appendix C. “Balance Iroquois” (or “Vajra Prahar”) and

Other U.S.- India Bilateral Special Operations Forces Exercises ..............31

Notes ..................................................................................................................33

About the Author .............................................................................................41

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India’s Naxalite Insurgency

Executive Summary

The pace of U.S.-India defense cooperation over the past decade—and especially the past 

2 years—has been unprecedented and impressive in many areas. These areas include defense 

technology cooperation, the discussion of a framework for military-to-military agreements, 

and the expansion of joint military exercises. U.S.-India defense cooperation, however, will 

remain limited in critical areas where India’s historical independent interests remain firm. 

Among these areas of Indian reserve include strategic autonomy, the imperatives of domestic 

federalism, and the preference for a go-slow approach toward redressing civil unrest. Attempts 

by U.S. policymakers to press harder in these areas will likely prove counterproductive.

India’s long-running class-based, economic insurgency—the Naxalite insurgency (or 

Community Party of India [CPI]-Maoist insurgency)—is a case study in which external security partnerships will remain limited, if not mostly unwelcomed, in New Delhi. Known as “the 

greatest domestic security threat faced by India” from 2006 to 2011, the Naxalite insurgency 

has receded and largely been contained—albeit still far from eliminated—as of 2016. India’s 

security response to the Naxalite insurgency from 2004 to 2015 demonstrates that New Delhi 

will prefer limited interaction with external security partners when addressing matters of domestic counterinsurgency.

With this insight, U.S. policymakers should not expect that New Delhi will accept direct 

assistance for its domestic counterinsurgency units in the foreseeable future, and the United 

States should not press India too hard on this issue. Washington would be ill-served by an Indian backlash to such unwelcomed assertiveness. Any Indian backlash might curb or reverse 

far more important bilateral military-to-military interactions including joint maritime security activities in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific, bilateral interoperability exercises 

that improve Indian confidence and capabilities against potential Chinese encroachment in 

disputed Sino-Indian border areas, and military-to-military collaboration in global counterterrorism intelligence-sharing and operations. The United States instead should focus on not 

only its offers of major near-term bilateral military assistance for security cooperation but also, 

to the extent that Indian sensitivities will allow, actions by China that threaten mutually held 

security concerns in New Delhi and Washington.
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

Introduction

This paper frames the contours of the recent and ongoing expansion in U.S.-India security 

ties. Then it briefly sketches the trajectory of the Naxalite insurgency through its first two phases 

and then focuses on the factors that made its third phase—from 2004 to the present—such a 

serious security challenge. The paper highlights the unique domestic factors that allowed the 

Naxalite rebellion’s rise to the status of India’s most significant internal security challenge from 

2007 to 2010. It also identifies those domestic factors that enabled effective counterinsurgency 

actions beginning in 2011 and effective containment of the threat by 2014. After indicating the 

kinds of bilateral security assistance offered by the United States to India in recent years, the 

paper indicates the limited appeal of outside assistance to India in the domestic counterinsurgency arena and assesses why India’s self-selected counterinsurgency partnership limitations 

remain firmly in place. It concludes with some lessons learned for U.S. policymakers in terms 

of the opportunities and limitations for working with India in matters of domestic insurgency, 

advising that these limitations make sense on many levels. It also asserts that India’s limitations 

should be respected in Washington and Honolulu to avoid backlash from New Delhi. Any such 

backlash might threaten far more important U.S.-India bilateral interests in which shared maritime and other strategic interests seem to increasingly diverge with those of China and in areas 

of mutual benefit from global counterterrorism cooperation.

The analysis in this paper is based on 3 years of author research into the unique features 

of the Naxalite insurgency in India. The research includes field interviews conducted on three 

visits to India during 2014 and 2015, one of which featured time in Kolkata and West Bengal.

Expanding U.S.-India Security Framework, with Limits

Growing for more than a decade, bilateral defense and security cooperation between the 

United States and India began accelerating quickly in 2014 and continued into 2016. Much of 

this acceleration, although not all of it, owed to the tone and tenor of the Indian government of 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, elected and seated in 2014. Modi’s government, which is Indian 

nationalist with a dynamic economic, diplomatic, and security agenda, followed a decade-long 

Indian National Congress (INC) government that had become sclerotic in its dealings with the 

United States and other global partners from 2009 to 2013. The INC government set the table 

for U.S.-India defense and security cooperation during the mid-2000s, demonstrating a broadbased Indian commitment to improved bilateral relations with the United States after decades 
3

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

of limited transactions. But the nationalist government of Prime Minister Modi has been driving it forward vigorously.

The ongoing acceleration in broad Indo-American relations has taken many forms, including high diplomacy. Prime Minister Modi made visiting the United States a priority, traveling to America within 4 months of his May 2014 accession to the position of prime minister. 

Modi then made President Barack Obama the first ever U.S. President bestowed the high honor 

as chief guest at India’s Republic Day Parade in January 2015. During this visit, Obama and 

Modi signed a historic Joint U.S.-India Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean 

Region.1

 Modi made a third informal visit to the United States in September 2015, using this 

historically rapid return to enhance economic relations between the national private and public 

sectors.2

 The United States has committed to a wide array of economic projects in India featuring public-private innovation, deeper financial cooperation and inclusive digital networks, 

“smart city” development in selected Indian cities, and support for increasing economic connectivity between India and the states of South and Southeast Asia.3

The acceleration of broad bilateral ties has been showcased by the steady increase in defense and security cooperation between the two countries. In June 2016, on a historic fourth 

visit to the United States and in conjunction with a third bilateral summit,4

 Prime Minister 

Modi made a joint statement with President Obama declaring India and the United States to be 

“major defense partners,” expressing aspirations for expanded exchange of dual-use technologies and maritime security cooperation.5

 The outcomes from this mid-2016 leadership engagement underscored the fact that there have been noteworthy enhancements in military technology interaction processes, basic military logistics and administrative arrangements, and joint 

military exercises.

Since 2014, Prime Minister Modi has accelerated the process of bilateral security collaboration on military modernization with emphasis on greater foreign investment in the Indian 

defense sector than ever before. Modi’s government covets American participation in India’s 

defense industry build-out to a degree not seen in the previous Indian government. The United 

States has worked to expand its 2012 bilateral defense initiative with India known as the U.S.-

India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Pursuant to President Obama’s January 

2015 visit for Republic Day, the United States has focused DTTI in pursuit of six major defense 

technology co-development and co-production efforts. There has been a particular focus on 

deeper cooperation in the areas of maritime security and maritime domain awareness.6

The United States and India also have done serious work on establishing basic framework defense agreements that would enable closer cooperation and collaboration between their 
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

militaries. Throughout 2015 and early 2016, both governments worked hard to develop mutually acceptable text for three critical military-to-military agreements. The Communication and 

Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), and—perhaps the most consequential of the three—Logistics Supply 

Agreement.7

 Aimed to move beyond the limited U.S.-India 2002 General Security of Military 

Information Agreement that underpinned modest U.S.-India defense interactions for more 

than a decade, the bilateral effort on these documents demonstrated important forward progress. Yet this progress did not beget culmination in formal agreements. Many observers hoped 

that these arrangements would be ready for signature during Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s 

April 2016 visit to New Delhi for discussions with Minister of Defense Manohar Parrikar. But 

Indian sensitivities and complications in language and trust limited the April joint announcement to one confirming that the defense leaders were agreed in principal—but had not yet 

signed—a modified Logistics Supply Agreement, known as a Logistics Exchange Memorandum 

of Agreement.8

 It also signaled that both parties must continue to work on “other” agreements 

to enhance military cooperation and technology transfer. The CISMOA and BECA were not 

formally mentioned in the final statement of the meeting.9

In the area of joint military exercises, the U.S.-India partnership has been expanding. In 

2015, India conducted more joint military exercises with the U.S. military than any other in the 

world.10 India and United States agreed in 2015 to extend a permanent invitation for Japanese 

naval forces to participate annually in Exercise Malabar. The United States, India, and Japan 

held Malabar 2016 in early June in the northern waters of the Philippine Sea, an area close to the 

East and South China seas, signaling to Beijing that the three nations hold a common interest in 

freedom of high seas navigation in all areas of the Pacific Ocean.11

But the acceleration and expansion of bilateral security interactions come with Indian 

limitations—ones that must temper U.S. policymaker aims, ambitions, and expectations. While 

agreeing to participate in the 2016 Malabar exercise with Japan and the United States in the 

northern Philippines, India firmly declined an offer by the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, 

Admiral Harry Harris, to sign on for joint naval patrols with the United States, Japan, and Australia in the South Pacific.12 India also has remained wary of any firm commitment to a bilateral 

defense CISMOA or BECA. Despite more than 2 years of bilateral effort, there remains no real 

progress on the joint development of jet engines or aircraft carrier technologies—both of which 

are target technologies for joint development.13 Each of these factors and more demonstrate that 

crafting a bilateral defense partnership between the United States and India will be a slow process 
5

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

that requires better understanding of differing critical equities. This process requires sustained, 

patient leadership in both countries in the face of certain frustrations moving forward.

Scoping Bilateral Security Collaboration Limits: Indian Domestic 

Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism

The U.S. and Indian militaries have their own detailed and unique experiences in counterinsurgency operations, so counterinsurgency seems a logical focal point for greater U.S.-India 

defense collaboration and partnership, and in many ways it is. But in other ways, it is not. U.S. 

policymakers and security analysts should understand the differences.

When it comes to outside assistance and security partnership collaboration with India in 

its ongoing experiences with domestic insurgency, U.S. policymakers and military leaders must 

remain aware that India does not—and likely will not—treat U.S. military offers of direct assistance with a warm welcome. India’s experiences with its long-running domestic Naxalite insurgency provide a powerful example about the limited scope for U.S. military engagement and the 

circumspect manner in which any U.S. security assistance must be approached with New Delhi. 

The lessons about context, tenor, and tone found in the example of the Naxalite insurgency over 

the past 10 years demonstrate that the United States is a better partner for India when remaining 

at distance, as New Delhi deals with its unique domestic insurgency challenges.

India’s Approach to Domestic Insurgency

Over the past 60 years, India has confronted three major domestic insurgencies.14 In Jammu and Kashmir, disaffected Muslim groups and unsatisfied local populations have contested 

India’s so-called occupation of its territories on the southeastern side of the Line of Control. 

India’s northeast has undergone multiple, overlapping waves of tribal, socioethnic-based insurgent movements since the mid-1950s. These northeastern separatist insurgencies have ebbed 

and flowed as Indian military and political approaches to their grievances eliminated some and 

catalyzed others. India also has been confronted with economic class–based violence and armed 

confrontation in its eastern regions, violence referred to as a Naxalite or Maoist insurgency.

Numerous Indian analysts, and some outsiders, argue that India has among the best records in the world when combating insurgencies.15 The claim is debatable on many levels. 

Yet it does accurately reflect that India has persistent experience with a variety of domestic 

insurgencies over a considerable period of time. Official Indian counterinsurgency doctrine 

formally espouses a population-centric strategy focused on winning “hearts and minds.”16

A more detailed examination of India’s record reveals that India often does take a political 
6 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

approach in combination with a military one when facing domestic insurgencies. However, 

India’s political approaches often are less about hearts and minds and more often feature extended periods of national-level tolerance of state- and local-level politician and police leadership manipulation of insurgent groups. Often this manipulation is in the pursuit of regional 

and local vote banks (or vote blocks). Frequently manipulation is followed by the co-option of 

rebellion elites in an effort to buy-out, or limit the insurgency once it festers to a level beyond 

the ability of the state and regional authorities to manage. Co-option approaches have taken 

the forms of turning insurgents through monetary compensation, creating new political space 

for a “turned” insurgent group, or abducting and torturing key insurgent leaders.17 Quite often 

these nonkinetic approaches have created their own problems with corrupt security forces, 

increased criminal activity, and a litany of human rights complaints and investigations.18

India’s employment of military forces in domestic counterinsurgency operations has featured a number of innovative practices, some successful and others counterproductive. When 

engaged fully, the Indian national response tends to feature a combination of state police forces, 

Central Armed Police Forces, special paramilitary units, and—in some cases such as Kashmir 

and India’s Northeast—the introduction of regular army units. India’s federal statutes mandate 

that the chief minister (or governor) of a state formally request national police (including Central Armed Police Forces units), paramilitary, or national army support before such forces can 

be introduced into a counterinsurgency fight. In those cases when the army is introduced, it 

must be authorized by the prime minister and given authorities by the Indian parliament to 

operate under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which includes the authority for military 

forces to make arrests, search without warrants, and shoot to kill civilians when required.19 India’s martial counterinsurgency activities are normally “enemy centric” and have been assessed 

to regularly feature a strategy of attrition and raw coercion where overwhelming numbers of 

security forces attempt to suffocate the insurgency at the same time that political activities are 

conducted to co-opt its leadership.20

There are several important conclusions to be drawn about India’s historical approach to 

domestic counterinsurgency. First, India does pursue varied counterinsurgency approaches to 

its multiple domestic insurgencies, depending on the unique context of each. Some responses—such as those in Jammu and Kashmir and Northeast India—have featured a permanent 

deployment of the Indian army. Other responses, such as those toward the respective phases 

of the Naxalite insurgency in eastern India, have been limited to national central armed police 

forces (mainly but not exclusively Central Reserve Police Forces [CRPF]) deployment into the 

unsettled states from the central government (see appendix B for detail on national special 
7

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

police units). Second, India’s political and military approaches toward domestic insurgency 

generally do not follow a classic hearts and minds approach. Instead, they normally feature 

enemy-centric and highly kinetic military operations combined with creative, and often controversial, political co-option of selected insurgent groups and group leaders. Third, India’s 

federal democratic structure often drives domestic counterinsurgency responses that feature 

uncomfortable political tradeoffs at the local level, state level, and between the state and the 

national governments. The political mobilization aspect of domestic insurgent groups creates 

incentives for political parties to harness these groups for their own ends.21 Invariably, this 

political utility makes them hard to counter in a timely manner and then difficult to address 

in the face of growing corruption, illegal activities, and often human rights questions as they 

embed into the political and social space.

In general, Indian domestic counterinsurgency has worked for the country out and its 

distinctive system of governance and its complex national ethnic makeup. India’s approaches 

have contained, but not eliminated, the three major insurgencies that it has faced since independence. But for many Westerners, India’s domestic counterinsurgency “successes” can look 

exceptionally violent and uncomfortably incomplete.22 This divergence in perspectives is important. It indicates why India prefers strict autonomy in the conduct of its domestic counterinsurgent operations, routinely brushing aside the limited offers of direct outside military support 

that it receives. It also demonstrates why outside partners, including the United States, should 

realize that if they push too aggressively in offering well-intentioned direct assistance in these 

areas, they could encounter significant resistance in New Delhi—possible to the point where 

security cooperation could be dampened in other more important areas of mutual interest. 

India’s deep past and recent experiences with the Naxalite insurgency demonstrate the wisdom 

of these conclusions.

The Naxalite Insurgency—History and Context: Phases 1 and 2

The Naxalite insurgency started as a communist peasant revolt in the late 1950s and early 

1960s. It later evolved into a combination of ethnic-, caste-, and class-based political violence 

across a number of the poorest provinces in India’s east.23 It became known as Naxalism, or 

the Naxalite movement, given its late 1950s origins as a Maoist movement struggling for independence in the small village of Naxalbari in the state of West Bengal, along the Indo-Nepal 

border (see map 1).24 The 1967 Naxalbari uprising against feudal landlords sowed the seeds for 

insurgency in India.25
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

The Naxalites were a group of far-left radical communists who promoted Maoist political 

sentiment and ideology to fight exploitation by landlords in India’s feudal postcolonial socioeconomic system. In this approach, the Naxalites broke from the tradition of Indian communist 

Map 1. States and Union Territories of India
9

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

political participation in the electoral system supplemented by general worker strikes that had 

been the staple of Communist Party of India activity from the 1920s through the 1950s.26 During the 1940s and 1950s, the CPI had become aligned with Moscow in its international leanings, 

functioning in India mainly as a political party. Around the same time, communism in India 

split in a third direction, with the CPI-Marxist group taking a more radical approach to its political rhetoric but mainly pursuing its own independent parliamentary path.27

Naxalism is based upon an extremist belief that the Indian government is a semicolonial, 

feudalistic, and imperial entity that needs to be overthrown. Naxalism’s objective is to seize state 

power through a protracted armed struggle against big landlords and petty government officials. Naxalism takes up the cause of the marginalized sections of society. It often opposes the 

implementation of various developmental projects such as construction of roads, rails, schools, 

and hospitals in affected areas in order to demonstrate to the people the ineffectiveness of the 

state. When successful, the Naxalite movement has operated in a vacuum created by the absence 

or collapse of the administrative structure at the local, provincial, or state level.28

The Naxalite movement has evolved through three separate phases in India. The first phase 

ran from the late 1960s through 1973. The second phase occurred from the late 1970s through 

1994. The third and most significant phase formally began in 2004, reaching a peak of violence 

from 2005 to 2011 and declining to a nadir in 2014. A short review of the first two phases of the 

Naxalite insurgency establishes its patterns and India’s preferred security framework for dealing 

with this domestic stability threat. A more detailed review of the third and most noteworthy 

phase of the Naxalite insurgency follows in a subsequent section.

First Phase, 1967–1973

Inspired by Maoist revolutionary tactics and the Cultural Revolution in China, the Naxalite 

movement gained momentum and began in the late 1960s and 1970s. Initially the movement 

centered in the Indian states of West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh (map 1). It featured peasants 

seizing land by force and then taking up arms to protect themselves against police and landlord 

response.29 Soon these rural activities merged with politically disillusioned and ideologically 

driven university students from Kolkata and other urban areas in India’s Far East—with active 

cells stretching from the state of Bihar in the north to Adhra Pradesh in the south. By 1969 under charismatic leader Charu Mazumdar, the Naxalites organized as the CPI–Marxist-Leninist 

(CPI-ML) and attempted more centralized and violent tactics.30 CPI-ML moved to organize 

peasants and seize political power through guerilla warfare while focusing on annihilation of its 

class enemies.31 In urban areas such as Kolkata (then known as Calcutta), Naxalite insurgents 
10 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

targeted police and local constables, attacking police outposts and patrols with an aim to capture weapons.32

Despite some limited weapons assistance and rhetorical support from Mao’s Communist 

government in the 1960s, China never undertook a strong campaign of support for the Naxalites.33 The Naxalites remained fragmented and without much training or organization. This 

first wave of Naxalite violence peaked in 1971 when over 3,650 acts of class-based attacks were 

reported and more than 850 people were reported killed. But it quickly succumbed to its own 

weaknesses and a state counterinsurgency response that featured two waves of activity.

From the summer of 1969 through the end of 1971, state-led counterinsurgency campaigns 

against the rural Naxalite cadres decimated much of those insurgency cadres. State police, assisted by the CRPF, moved against poorly armed Naxalites with great effect. By 1971 these police forces were joined by army units deployed into West Bengal. It took the failure of local and 

state police to contain Naxalite insurgents for more than 2 years before the West Bengal deputy 

chief minister—himself a politician from the CPI-Maoist party—requested assistance from a 

central paramilitary force, the Eastern Frontier Rifles, to assist state security forces. Then in 

July and August of 1971 a more dangerous component of the Naxalite insurgency in West Bengal’s Birbhum District was put down by a joint campaign led by the army known as Operation 

Steeplechase. Army involvement only came after the collapse of an Indian National Congress–

led coalition government in West Bengal and the New Delhi declaration of “President’s Rule” 

throughout the region. This made the central government responsible for the fight against the 

Naxalites and enabled Prime Minister Indira Ghandi to divert elements of the army massing 

along the East Pakistan border for what would become the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War 

that assisted local police in decisive counterinsurgency operations.34

The urban dimension of the first wave of the Naxalite insurgency remained violent 

throughout 1971 and festered into the next 2 years, even as the rural component succumbed to 

Operation Steeplechase. Interparty political violence in Kolkata among the INC, CPI-M, and 

CPI-ML led to a swirl of assassinations and attacks against security forces and political leaders 

across urban areas. The election of a new West Bengal chief minister from the INC in March 

1972 turned the tide on the urban Naxals. The law and order platform of Chief Minister Siddharth Shankar Ray played out in a much more muscular police role across Kolkata and its 

surroundings throughout mid-1972 and into mid-1973. Kolkata police apprehended Naxalite 

leader Charu Maumdar in July 1972, and he died in custody several weeks later. Naxalite leaders across the city succumbed to increasing police and state paramilitary presence. By 1973 the 

main cadres of the Naxalites had been eliminated and were dead or behind bars.35
11

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

In this first Naxalite insurgent phase, the national government followed a pattern that 

would be repeated in subsequent phases. It did not forcibly intervene in the beginning. In keeping with the federalist framework of the constitution, the government in New Delhi left it to 

local and state officials in West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and other afflicted states to take their own 

security actions to stop the threat. In the late 1960s, these state and local responses were often 

inadequate and ineffective.36 The central government only engaged with security forces once 

it had a critical mass of army forces in the region for the 1971–1972 war with Pakistan over 

Bangladesh and when the President’s Rule special authorities were in place, which enabled the 

military the power to make preventative arrests, search premises without a warrant, and shoot 

to kill civilians. Once engaged, the slowly evolving national response became one featuring 

intense force and coercion, eradicating the violence without eliminating the insurgency’s socioeconomic preconditions.

Second Phase, 1977–1994

India’s first wave of insurgent violence ended badly for this domestic left-wing extremist 

movement but did not eliminate the conditions inspiring the movement or all of those willing to 

hold to the Naxalite cause. The movement fractured into more than 40 separate small groups.37

Slowly—over the course of a decade—these groups began to remobilize and consolidate. Particularly in the southeastern Indian state of Adhra Pradesh, a new Naxalite organization called 

People’s War emerged. Its leader, Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, sought a more efficient structure 

to boost morale, recruitment, and funding. By 1978 Naxalite peasant revolts had spread to the 

Karimnagar District of Telangana and Adilabad District of Adhra Pradesh. The major grievance 

was unpaid wages. Second-wave Naxalite insurgents kidnapped landlords and forced them to 

confess to crimes, apologize to villagers, and repay forced bribes. By the early 1980s insurgents 

had established a stronghold and sanctuary in the interlinked North Telangana village and Dandakaranya forests areas along the Adhra Pradesh and Orissa border.38

In 1985 Naxalite insurgents began ambushing police. After they killed a police sub-inspector in Warangal, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh responded by creating a special task force called 

the Greyhounds to establish control in the seven worst affected districts. An elite anti-Naxalite 

commando unit that still exists today, the Greyhounds were drawn from within the Andhra 

Pradesh police forces and given special treatment. A 2,000-strong force in 2015, the Greyhounds were given preferred payment and training—better than federal or state paramilitary 

forces. They were also highly supported by the entire state police force. The Greyhounds played 

a minimal role in combatting the Naxalites during the second phase of the Maoist insurgency.39
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

In 1987 the Naxalite political party (People’s War) and other Maoist groups in Andhra 

Pradesh were barred from elections after kidnapped government officials were exchanged for 

Naxalite prisoners. The ban was briefly lifted in 1991. In December of that year, however, insurgent attacks increased. Affected states responded by establishing special laws that enabled police 

to focus on capture, detention, and extra-normal means of violence against Naxalite cadres—

fighters and presumed supporters.40 Adhra Pradesh and Orissa invited additional central paramilitary forces in Telangana to augment state and federal government security forces already 

there. Besides brute force, the state set up rival mass organizations to attract youth away from 

the Naxalites, started rehabilitation programs, and established new informant networks.41

The new counterinsurgency strategy reduced violent incidents, and nearly 9,000 Naxalites 

surrendered. Consequently in 1994 the ban on ostensibly moderate Naxalite political parties 

was lifted.42 The second wave of the Naxalite insurgency had been stopped. However, and as at 

the end of the first phase of the Naxalite insurgency, the socioeconomic conditions underpinning Naxalism remained largely unchanged in many regions of eastern India.

Third Phase, 2004–2015

From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s the Naxalite insurgency remained largely out of the 

public eye, but the movement had not gone away. Taking advantage of rising local support for 

violent response to economic conditions, fragmented Naxalite groups created a united front: 

the People’s War, Party Unity, and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) combined to form 

the People’s War Group (PWG). Naxalism manifested itself in episodic spurts of violence by 

the PWG, which had its most pronounced presence in Adhra Pradesh. From 1999–2002, local 

level violence increased. The PWG accelerated attacks on state government locations in Andhra 

Pradesh, Orissa, and Chhattisgarh. By 2000 an estimated 3,000 armed Naxalite rebels were reportedly active in India’s east.43

During this time, Indian government agencies took actions that accelerated grievances 

among the poor and displaced with sympathies for left-wing violence. First, economic growth 

and development led to local and state government appropriation of land for infrastructure 

and resource development, displacing many underprivileged people who had no political voice. 

Second, governments responded to Naxalite violence with acute violence, reportedly including the extra-judicial murder and torture of suspected rebels and rebel families.44 The MCC 

intensified its campaign of violence against Indian security forces and government agencies in 

2002–2003 after its leader was killed by police.45
13

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

In 2004, the PWG was superseded by the CPI-M.46 From this 2004 merger of the two largest Naxalite factions—the PWG and MCC—into the CPI-M, Maoist ideology was fused with 

a cadre of armed groups for the first time.47 A third and more lethal wave of violence—more 

sophisticated and more destructive—rapidly spread throughout eastern India. Naxalite leaders 

expanded control over natural resource rich areas (for example, coal, gas, precious minerals, and 

timber). They also collected taxes and extortion money to fund weapons production, including 

the production of crude but effective improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Estimates from 2004 

to 2011 suggest the Naxalites extracted at least $18.4 million annually from government offices, 

contractors, businessmen, and industrialists.They embarked upon more choreographed terror 

campaigns including the murder of local politicians, overwhelming attacks on local police stations, impressment of child soldiers, and a general campaign to scare away outside investors.

By the second half of 2005, Naxalites demonstrated a lethality and reach far beyond the 

capacity of other domestic terrorist and insurgent groups. They destroyed buildings, captured 

weapons, and killed several local policemen in an attack on a village in Uttar Pradesh. They also 

attacked the Jehanabad Prison in Bihar, killing two, freeing more than 300 inmates, and abducting about 30 inmates who were members of an anti-Naxalite group. Total deaths from Naxaliteattributed insurgency and terrorism grew to more than 800 in the impacted east and northeastern regions.48 In 2006 and 2007, this trend expanded. In 2006, Naxalite groups launched 

several high-profile attacks against civilians and security forces, expanding the rural territory 

under Maoist control and under threat of extreme violence. In one event, an attack by some 800 

armed Naxalites in Chhattisgarh killed 25, injured 80 more, and saw some 250 people declared 

missing.49 In 2006, the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh grew concerned about 

the mounting threat posed by Naxalite groups to internal stability and democratic traditions 

across the east and southeast of India. The Naxalite menace had grown such that 18 of India’s 

federal states and 194 of its total districts were effected by Naxalite violence. For the first time 

Prime Minister Singh called the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency and associated terrorism “the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”50 In 2007 Naxalite and Maoist 

violence reached an apex where it would remain for the next 4 years through 2010 (see map 2). 

Over 971 Naxalite attacks were recorded in the first seven months of 2007. That number would 

grow to over 1,500 attacks by the end of the year (see table51). Left-wing extremists began targeting elected officials including a member of the Indian parliament from Jharkhand state and the 

son of a former chief minister (or governor) of Andhra Pradesh.52

By 2010 the Naxalites were active in nine Indian states and reported to have a strong foothold in parts of seven: West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, 
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

and Maharashtra. This region happened to sit atop tremendous iron ore, coal, and aluminum 

deposits as well as irrigation and hydroelectric power potential. Across these states there were 

more than 2,200 incidents of Naxalite violence and almost 1,200 killed in 2010 alone (table).53

Map 2. India Naxalite-Affected Districts, 2007
15

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

The threat to Indian national interests became obvious to the federal government and more coordinated actions followed.

From 2005 through 2010, Naxalite violence and the insufficient state-led, federally supported efforts to counter it cost India an average of more than 700 deaths per year. Most of these 

individuals were classified as civilian (see appendix A). Recruited from the disaffected rural 

poor, Naxalite cadres grew by 2010 to an estimated 20,000 armed fighters and an additional 

50,000 supporters.54

In 2010, as he had first done in 2006, Prime Minister Singh trumpeted the risks of Naxalite 

violence to the stability and the ever important economic growth for the country. In May of 

that year, Prime Minister Singh referred to Naxalism as the “biggest internal security challenge” 

India has ever faced.55 The national government was understandably frustrated. From January 

to June 2009, India witnessed over 1,100 Naxalite-generated incidents of violence. These would 

double by the end of 2009 (table). Major violence occurred during national elections held from 

April to May 2009 as Naxalites called for an election boycott, attacked polling places, set off 

land mines, and even took control of a region of West Bengal known as Lalgarh. Paramilitary 

and police response operations against Naxalite locations were largely unsuccessful.56 Naxalite 

atrocities gained national notoriety. But simultaneously, accusations of systematic local police 

brutality and local and federal police human rights abuses against innocent civilians grew more 

vocal throughout the affected zones.57 In 2010 Naxalite violence inflicted 9 separate states of 

India and over 200 individual districts.58

Year 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004

All 

Incidents 

1,088 1,091 1,136 1,415 1,760 2,212 2,258 1,591 1,565 1,509 1,608 1,533

Attacks on 

Police

118 155 143 135 131 230 250 192 N/A 210 194 N/A

Total 

Deaths

251 280 376 321 532 1,138 907 648 650 685 846 636

N/A = specific data not available

Sources: “Left Wing Extremist (LWE) Data,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, available at <www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/2011/Left_Wing_Extremist_Data.htm>; “State-Wise Extent of Naxal Violence During 

2008 to 2012,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, available at <www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/

papers/SWENV-2008-12.pdf>; “State-Wise Extent of LWE Violence During 2011 to 2016 (up to 31.03.2016),” South 

Asia Terrorism Portal, available at <http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/LWEViolanceStatistic2016.PDF>; 

Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, “Annual Reports,” available at <http://mha.nic.in/AnnualReports>.

Table. Major Incidents During Naxalite Insurgency, Third Phase
16 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

In March 2010, after months of prevarication and confusion, the national government 

launched Operation Green Hunt. The initiative added an additional estimated 20,000 federal 

paramilitary troops, mainly from the CRPF battalions, to existing state, local, and already present Ministry of Home Affairs forces from the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Border Security Forces, and Shashastra Seema Bal.59 (See appendix B for detail on MHA special police units.) The 

operation sent federal, state, and local police and paramilitary forces into former no-go zones 

deep in the forests of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra states to rid them of militants, but these 

operations struggled. In April 2010, Naxalite insurgents ambushed 80 troops of the Indian Central Police Security Forces (CPSF) in Chhattisgarh, killing an estimated 75 in the worst attack 

on Indian security forces since the third phase of the Naxalite insurgency began.60 In February 

2011 Naxalites kidnapped two Indian government officials, demanding a halt to Green Hunt. 

The government agreed. The Naxalites also demanded the release of seven top imprisoned leaders in exchange for the two officials. After a May 2011 Naxalite attack, 10 bodies of policemen 

were found dismembered in dense forest.61

Despite the major setbacks of 2010–2011, Indian federal and state authorities made some 

headway against a Naxalite insurgency now generating international headlines.62 Better coordinated joint federal-state anti-Naxalite security operations killed a prominent Naxalite military 

leader, Koteswara Rao, in a November 2011 operation. In 2012 government paramilitary and 

police operations in West Bengal and Chhattisgarh began to produce results, with more than 

1,800 Naxalite insurgents reported arrested and another 440 surrendered during the year.63 In 

late 2012 several Naxalite regional military leaders were captured and killed in those provinces.

Acts of extreme violence continued during 2012 and 2013, but the expanse of the insurgency began to abate. Insurgency-related fatalities declined in 2012 and remained below 400 

in 2013 (table). West Bengal reported sharp declines in Naxalite presence and activities during 2013, although some observers declared that the decline in those states was offset by a 

corresponding increase of Naxalite violence in neighboring states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and 

Orissa (appendix A). The Naxalites began the practice of including booby-trapping the bodies 

of dead Indian soldiers with IEDs in their stomachs. They killed national Congressman, and anti-Naxalite militia Salwa Judum founder, Mahendra Karma in an attack on his convoy while he 

was campaigning for election in rural Chhattisgarh communities. Prime Minister Singh called 

for a two-pronged approach to dismantle the Naxalite network: sustaining joint and proactive 

military operations with greater economic development and responsible governance programs 

in the areas with strongest Maoist support. The CRPF successfully launched a 5-day interstate 

offensive in late December 2013 to dismantle core Maoist groups.64 It shut down a gun manu-
17

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

facturing factory and recovered numerous weapons and explosives. Remote triggering devices 

were also found, indicating that the insurgency was using more advanced weaponry.

By 2014 fatalities from Naxalite violence dropped below 300 for the first time in more 

than a decade (table). Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh remained most affected by the violence, 

and some Naxalite groups conducted operations and expanded into southern regions of Tamil 

Nadu, Kerala, and Karnataka states. But a review of the map in 2013 of Naxalite-impacted areas 

revealed a significant drop in the overall number of affected districts since 2007—from 165 to 

120 overall—and an even more significant drop in districts categorized as experiencing severe 

or moderate amounts of violence from Naxalite activities over the same period—from 69 districts in 2007 to just 28 in 2013 (see map 3). Eighty percent of Naxalite violence now afflicted 

only three states of India, down from the nine states impacted by serious Naxalite violence in 

2010. On balance the tide had turned. By the end of 2014 the Naxalite insurgency was down if 

not out.65 In 2015, Indian joint security and economic efforts to counter the remaining Naxalite 

threat focused on 30 key districts in these 3 most impacted states, enabling more concentrated 

efforts matching gradually applied paramilitary enforcement with legal reforms and development activities.66

As in the first two waves of Naxalite insurgency, the Indian federal-state government disconnect hampered its counterinsurgency efforts throughout the 2000s. Under the Indian constitution, states bear the responsibility for enforcing law and order. When required, however, 

the federal government can send police and—under more limited conditions—military troops. 

In the case of federal police, assistance can come only upon request from the state government. 

In the case of military troops, assistance can come in the event of a state of emergency declaration—as during the first phase of the Naxalite insurgency.

Throughout the period from 2000 to 2010, the federal and state home (interior) ministries 

supervised multiple police and intelligence agencies without much unity of effort or command. 

An operation against Naxalite groups in the state of Bihar early in the 2000s faltered. Federal 

paramilitary border security forces in seven districts helped the local police, and millions of rupees were promised in economic development opportunities. But the economic promises were 

broken, and poorly coordinated security operations only further alienated Naxalite moderates, 

derailing hoped for results by early 2002. In advance of 2004 elections in Chhattisgarh, the federal government sent 180 companies of paramilitary forces armed with helicopters and other 

advanced equipment. The Naxalites disappeared. Once the elections were over, federal troops 

and equipment departed and the Naxalites returned.
18 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

From the 2004 merger of Naxalite groups, the Indian government, particularly at the 

federal level, applied both carrots and sticks, incentivizing insurgents to pick constitutional 

remedies and brutally punishing those who refused. But the splits between state and federal 

authorities limited effectiveness. In part, state and local governments saw themselves in a conundrum; they wanted an end to the organized Naxalite violence targeting them, their infraMap 3. India Naxalite-Affected Districts, 2013
19

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

structure, and their legal enforcement structure. However, they did not want to alienate the 

vote banks across their states who sympathized with the Naxalite view of economic injustice 

but did not actively participate in violence. In one notable but far from unique instance, the 

chief minister (or governor) of the Naxalite-wracked state of Jharkhand won election in 2009 

with strong insurgent sympathizer and insurgent vote bank support.67 State-level leaders desired greater economic support from the central government, not overwhelming force, as the 

primary means to redress deeply held communist sympathies in their vote constituencies. National political leaders within the INC empathized with these state-level concerns, offering 

some economic support and some additional policing support—but too little of either to make 

significant headway prior to 2010–2011. The politics of left-wing issues and voter concerns 

made effective coordination of counterinsurgency versus the Naxalites difficult.

It took the extensive violence and loss of life between 2007 and 2010 to demonstrate the 

failure of an ill-coordinated approach. In 2009 the central government signaled that it wanted 

to provide 80,000 paramilitary and federal police to help in the fight, but these were too slowly 

fed into the region without strong local coordination. From the desperation of the peak year of 

Naxalite (CPI-Maoist) violence in 2010, and then–Prime Minister Singh’s second declaration 

that Maoist violence was India’s most grave internal security threat, a combination of statelevel requests and federal-level policy improvements paved the way for late-arriving successes 

against the Naxalites.68 The path to success was also paved by corresponding Naxalite failures.

Beginning in 2010, the Indian federal government finally undertook several successful initiatives that slowly but steadily spanned the coordination gap between federal and state security 

forces and linked with improved local economic development aid.69 First, the government took 

steps to increase the costs to Maoist insurgent group operations—both financial and physical. 

Second, the central government deployed an additional 66 federal paramilitary security battalions, CPSF and others, into the field where the insurgency had been winning against small and 

poorly trained local police. As noted above, these came slowly and in tranches between 2010 

and 2014 but reached an impressive number of more than 200,000 by early 2014.70 India’s military and its special operations forces (SOF) have not participated directly in the third phase of 

Naxalite counterinsurgency operations. Instead, SOF units have provided indirect assistance—

offering specialized training to Indian Central Armed Police Forces (see appendix B) preparing 

to deploy to the anti-Maoist counterinsurgency fight.71 Third, the federal government built 444 

new police stations in affected areas and regenerated the policing capability in them.72 Fourth, 

the government established a civil development program in the worst affected areas. Finally, 

government security forces worked more effectively in a combined action environment where 
20 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

economic development and human rights were established in the communities most vulnerable 

to Naxalite recruiting and propaganda.73

These five national factors interacted with several organizational failures by the Naxalites 

themselves. First, the Maoists failed to generate a message of systematic economic exploitation 

to the degree necessary for serious attention in Indian urban areas, where the gulf between rich 

and poor was great and growing every year. Second, despite their highly publicized violence, 

the Naxalites never won the “mindspace” in India; the Maoist ideology of class conflict generated limited appeal outside of primitive and tribal areas in India, never resonating in urban areas other than with a marginalized group of activist university students.74 Indian youth moved 

onto other causes and other areas of activism in the wider Indian economy.75 Third, Naxalites 

proved to be their own worst enemies. They often splintered into criminal syndicates dealing narcotics and running both extortion and kidnapping rackets. This profiteering, evident 

from as early as 2009–2010, revealed that Naxalism was less about communist ideology or 

well-coordinated violent insurgent activity and much more about local and regional organized 

criminal activity, which exploits rather than benefits the lower class (and lower caste) Indian 

Hindus who live there.76

In self-reflective statements, ministry-level officials in the Indian federal government acknowledged that most Naxalite gains before 2010 had come too often because local governments and security officials incorrectly assessed and mishandled the problems of the disgruntled Indian minority groups in rural areas. At the same time the central government remained 

tepid in its involvement—unable to induce state governments to request more assertive federal 

security assistance and caught in a political conundrum where some of the state government 

leadership was both courting Naxalite sympathizer votes while simultaneously fighting Naxalite 

militant cadres. Once the federal government got serious and increased paramilitary security 

presence with a wider number of local economic development programs, the Naxalites began 

to wane.77 Attention to a holistic approach by the Indian central government caused the worst 

of the Naxalite insurgency to recede in a visible manner.78

In 2016 the Naxalite insurgency in eastern India remains a security factor, but one far from 

the menace publicly announced by then–Prime Minister Singh in 2006 and again in 2010.79

Instead it is now much more of a nuisance, largely a constellation of organized criminal enterprises with a loose affiliation to a Maoist credo than an ideological insurgency. The socioeconomic factors that inspire Naxalite groups remain in place, and this insurgency could again 

evolve into a more serious threat to local security agents in India. In the poor eastern districts 

of India, the possibility of a fourth wave of Naxalite insurgency cannot be dismissed if the rich 
21

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

continue to get richer without the benefits of economic growth filtering down to the people who 

really need it.80

India’s long slog toward corralling the third phase of its Naxalite insurgency again demonstrated the challenges and strengths of its counterinsurgency framework. State and local government police forces must fail obviously and admit to their failures before major federal assistance 

can come forward. Left-wing (or communist) inspired violence mixes awkwardly with Indian 

electoral politics in many eastern states of the country. Communist political party voters often 

sympathize with Naxalite grievances but not their violent means. State and local officials thus 

have incentives to take uncertain and indecisive action with their police and security forces. Too 

often, they can tolerate incompetence and even human rights abuses by local-level counterinsurgency police and militias, exacerbating wider grievances. They appeal for national economic 

help while avoiding national security help out of a fear that too much outside intervention 

might harm their local political interests. Federal-level forces, when these do arrive, come with 

their own issues. They can lack local knowledge and fail to be sensitive to popular culture and 

traditions. This leaves them vulnerable to insurgent ambush and to charges of torture or human 

rights abuses from an uncertain or frightened local population.

U.S. Security Engagement with Indian Ministry of Home Affairs

U.S. engagement with India in the areas of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency has 

developed over a 16-year period from January 2000. This engagement has advanced along three 

parallel lines of interaction. One line has been through bilateral dialogue and exercises between 

U.S. and Indian SOF, which have focused on counterterrorism training events and conversations. A second line has been through collaboration between the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). This collaboration has focused on 

criminal investigative techniques; port, rail, and maritime security training and best practices; 

and a general growth in liaison and information exchange between respective special police 

and border security agencies. A third line of interaction has evolved in more general bilateral 

military-to-military exchanges between the national armies, navies, air forces, and coast guards. 

Advancements in each of these areas have been noteworthy but not comprehensive. For all 

the noteworthy advances, limitations have remained, especially when it comes to the matter of 

outside assistance for Indian units and organizations conducting domestic counterinsurgency.

The history of special operations training and exercising is most noteworthy. Bilateral U.S.-

Indian SOF have undertaken joint exercises that work on interoperability in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operation skills and drills. Small-scale counterterrorism training 
22 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

exercises have been conducted on a recurring basis since 2002, including exercises in India’s 

northeast territories where longstanding domestic insurgencies continue.81 Under the broad 

definition of U.S.-India maritime security cooperation, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 

SOF also have been training Indian military special forces officers in counterterrorism, learning 

from Indian counterterrorism experiences at the same time. In the main, these exercises have 

focused upon special techniques and capabilities for SOF activities in counterterrorism operations (see appendix C).

Despite a decade of offers by U.S. senior commanders and defense officials, Indian leaders 

declined to have U.S. SOF engage with or provide direct assistance to the MHA paramilitary and 

police forces optimized for domestic counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations.82 But 

in October 2015, India, for the first time, welcomed U.S. SOF to a joint training exercise with its 

MHA counterterrorism unit, the National Security Guards (NSG).83 This was a meaningful step 

forward and, as most observers believe, became possible only after the change in perspective accompanying the government of Prime Minister Modi. Yet the limit of U.S. SOF interaction with 

that of only the NSG—the single special police unit focused on counterterrorism rather than 

counterinsurgency operations—is telling. After more than a decade of U.S. offers, the Indian 

government still remains uncomfortable about direct bilateral counterinsurgency training with 

its large array of MHA domestic counterinsurgency forces.

Washington and New Delhi first established the U.S.-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (JWG) in January 2000. Among more than a dozen major steps, the United States and 

India initiated antiterrorism training programs for Indian law enforcement officials and began a 

dialogue on cooperation in homeland and internal security.84 First, these programs involved limited military-to-military counterterrorism engagements. Then, after the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, a more formal set of interactions between DHS and MHA counterterrorism 

and law enforcement officials began to take shape. Notably, however, neither of these lines of 

engagement have witnessed the MHA welcoming direct U.S. military or special police assistance 

for its special police or border police engaged in combating the Naxalite insurgency.

In September 2005, USPACOM conducted a counterterrorism tabletop exercise that 

brought together Indian and American military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and humanitarian assistance leaders. A U.S. National Guard unit co-trained with Indian troops at India’s Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram. U.S. antiterrorism assistance advanced 

again after the November 2008 terrorist attacks in the commercial district of Mumbai. The U.S. 

Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) provided enhanced training 
23

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

consultations with senior Indian Police Service (IPS) officials on the topics of hotel security, rail 

security, responses to an active shooter incident, as well as major event security management.85

In 2010, the two governments began the U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue. 

Since then the dialogue has enabled bilateral cooperation on mutual strategic interests and 

strengthened “security cooperation through expanded dialogues and exercises as well as sharing of advanced technologies.”86 A subsequent 2010 U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation 

Initiative allows the United States to facilitate capacity-building and training in India across a 

number of specific areas, including but not limited to:

■ developing investigative skills

■ promoting cooperation between forensic science laboratories

■ establishing procedures to provide mutual investigative assistance

■ improving capabilities to act against money-laundering, counterfeit currency, and 

terrorist financing

■ trading best practices on mass transit and rail security

■ increasing interactions between coast guards and navies on maritime security

■ exchanging experience and expertise on port and border security

■ enhancing liaison and training between specialist counterterrorism units, including the 

National Security Guard and its U.S. counterparts.87

Beginning in February 2012, American trainers under the ATA have been training Indian 

police in cooperation with the MHA. This training includes forensic examination of terrorist 

crime scenes and advanced explosives incident countermeasures. These courses are also available 

to state police, for example, in Kolkata (West Bengal). Intelligence agencies of both countries are 

sharing resources to support specific counterterrorism operations.88 These training courses have 

had a positive impact upon hundreds of Indian local and national police, including IPS. They 

have also engaged some members of the MHA special police units such as the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and CPSF. Noteworthy and prudent, these bits of individual training have occurred 
24 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

with individual Indian police and paramilitary officers and jawans (junior paramilitary soldiers) 

who have later participated in counterinsurgency operations against the Naxalites and other 

rebel groups.89 At the same time, though, direct U.S. military engagement with Indian domestic 

counterinsurgency police and security forces units involved in domestic counterinsurgency has 

remained limited.

American military interactions with regular Indian army units also have grown in an impressive manner over the past decade. As discussed earlier, Indian, just as American, military 

and defense leaders are keen to state that India has more joint military training events and exercises with the United States than with any other defense partner worldwide.90 Yet India’s civilian 

defense establishment leadership appears amenable to many military-to-military training and 

exercise interactions with the United States but continues to view access to military technology 

to be the litmus test of fruitful bilateral defense relations.91

Although the Indian military highly prizes joint service-to-service interactions and exercises, no U.S. military units have been engaged with or even indirectly assisted Indian central 

police or paramilitary units directly involved in the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

operations against the Naxalites. In those instances in which the U.S. military and DHS personnel have had interaction with Indian domestic counterinsurgency police and paramilitary 

forces, the rule has been that indirect general skills training is acceptable for Indian leadership, 

but specific engagement and activities directly with Indian domestic insurgency forces is altogether something else.

Some analysts have recommended that the United States formally inject direct domestic 

counterinsurgency assistance into the U.S.-India security relationship. In 2013, one such analyst, Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, made a robust proposal, stating that the United States should 

formally generate a $400 million India counterinsurgency initiative, jointly run by the Department of Defense (DOD), State, and DHS.92 He proposed that this initiative should bundle together the indirect assistance provided by the ATA and DOD International Military Education 

and Training program, as well as establish a Foreign Military Finance Account for India (where 

one then did not exist) and apportion other money into DHS and Justice department accounts 

to better enable Federal Bureau of Information resources for its India-focused international police training program. In this well-intentioned recommendation, U.S. largesse could be used to 

provide vital equipment to India’s CRPF, including armored personnel vehicles, mine-resistant 

vehicles, flak jackets, GPS trackers, and night-vision goggles. As Indian attack helicopters and 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were deemed vital for providing counterinsurgency ground 
25

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

support, this proposal provided for U.S. funding to assist the Indian air force in creating dedicated air surveillance and support for the CRPF—including helicopter and UAV support.93

Noble in intent, Mullick’s recommendation of a major U.S. push to provide direct assistance to Indian domestic counterinsurgency units and operations remains as misguided today 

as it was in 2013. Likewise, periodic offers by U.S. defense officials of direct U.S. military assistance to Indian counterinsurgency forces are similarly well intentioned but off target.94 These 

and similar initiatives ultimately push unhelpfully against Indian protection of its absolute sovereignty in domestic counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, even if India were to unexpectedly welcome direct U.S. military and whole-of-government support for its domestic counterinsurgency activities, that very success would create significant problems for the growing but 

delicate U.S.-India security relationship. These problems are evident in the patterns observed 

during Indian counterinsurgency operations against the Naxalites.

Direct American support for Indian domestic counterinsurgency operations (such as 

those against the Naxalites) would quickly expose significant divergence between views in 

Washington and Indian cultural and political concerns with its domestic insurgents. First, Indians are historically tolerant of long, protracted counterinsurgency operations, including the 

four-and-a-half-decade Naxalite rebellion, a six-decade swirl of insurgency in northeast India, 

and the insurgency and rebellion extant in Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. American patience 

with such protracted counterinsurgency operations has not been a hallmark of its international 

ventures over the past century.

Second, Indian domestic insurgencies have a political cadence and rhythm about them 

that is alien to American sensibilities. In all three phases of the Naxalite insurgency, state and 

local political dynamics played to Naxalite sympathizer vote banks, allowing insurgent activities to grow to an uncomfortable level. In the second phase and especially the third phase of 

the Naxalite insurgency, Indian national police and paramilitary assistance began with limited 

but targeted security help for local authorities that focused upon managing major events—like 

election security—but then quickly vanished. Only when the political calculus of local, state, 

and national officials aligned did coordinated and effective policing, paramilitary, and local assistance programs come together. American patience with the dynamics of this Indian political 

rhythm would be sorely tried.

Third, with much of India’s Naxalite insurgency featuring organized criminal activity as its 

underpinning by 2014–2016, it is arguably more useful and feasible for the United States and 

India to focus meaningful collaboration on individual policing techniques and investigative 

activities to counter these dimensions of residual Naxalism. There will be less Indian resistance 
26 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

to this kind of DHS-to-MHA support. Thereafter, the focus of the U.S. military and its SOF can 

then better orient on wider regional and international counterterrorism activities.

In addition to these historically supported cautions, direct American training and equipment support for Indian domestic counterinsurgency operations might run afoul of U.S. legislative mandates and human rights standards. All U.S. assistance to foreign security forces must 

conform to what is known as the Leahy Law, named for legislative author Senator Patrick Leahy 

(D-VT). One part of the law applies to State Department foreign assistance programs and the 

second applies to DOD training and assistance programs for the security forces of a foreign 

country. Both versions prohibit any U.S. security assistance if the Secretary of State or Secretary 

of Defense have credible information that a military, paramilitary, or police unit of a foreign 

government has committed a gross violation of human rights in the conduct of its activities—

past or present. The law allows for an exception (or waiver) permitting resumption of security 

assistance if the Secretary of State or Defense reports to Congress that the government of the 

assisted country is taking effective steps to bring the violating members of the security forces to 

justice.95 Direct U.S. assistance to India’s paramilitary and police units combatting the Naxalite 

insurgency (as others) could quickly run into a problem with the Leahy Law. There have been 

frequent reports of Indian local police units’ involvement in human rights violations against 

innocents in the Naxalite insurgency areas.96 Indian central policy forces, including units from 

the CRPF, have been accused of human rights abuses and torture against apprehended militants 

and presumed supporters in Naxalite-afflicted areas.97 It is hard to imagine Indian pride reacting well to American demands for certification of the human rights corrections made on its 

national counterinsurgency paramilitary forces.

It also is hard to imagine the U.S.-India security relationship holding up well if, in order to 

secure training and equipment for its already well-supported national paramilitary units, New 

Delhi must face repetitive Leahy Law inquiries. Indeed, in a country with growing wealth and 

a proud belief in the relative successes of its autonomous, indigenous paramilitary counterinsurgency forces, U.S. direct assistance (with strings) is not likely to be well received.98 At the 

least, such conditioned assistance would strain security relations that both sides desire to see 

improve. At the worst, the outcome might set back bilateral security progress on far more important U.S.-India security initiatives including those involving joint maritime security activities in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific Ocean, interoperability exercises that improve 

Indian confidence and capabilities against potential Chinese encroachment in disputed border 

areas, and military-to-military collaboration in global counterterrorism intelligence sharing 

and broader operations.
27

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

Lessons Learned and Policy Implications for U.S.-India Relations

A review of the history of Indian approach to dealing with its Naxalite insurgency indicates the unique nature of New Delhi’s approach to domestic security. The limited engagement 

with the United States on military and security assistance offers also indicates the continuing 

barriers inhibiting a deep and unbridled bilateral security alliance at this time. A decade of U.S. 

interaction with India on the Naxalite insurgency reinforces the notion that Washington should 

not expect New Delhi to become a tightly coupled military ally anytime soon. Instead, New Delhi is more likely to be a friendly strategic partner with the United States where mutual security 

interests align, while interacting more often in a restrained and limited manner where U.S. and 

Indian security interests and prerogatives do not well align—as in the case of the Naxalites.99

Given this insight, U.S. policymakers should focus on bilateral counterterrorism and counterinsurgency security cooperation efforts toward externally sponsored Islamist terrorist groups 

and, to the extent that Indian sensitivities will allow, against actions by China that threaten 

mutually held security concerns. As a complement, U.S. military assistance programs focusing 

on technical skills and practices for individual Indian police, paramilitary, and SOF will remain 

most promising and prominent for the foreseeable future.
28 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

Appendix A. Naxalite Insurgency Statistics Tracker 

Bihar West 

Bengal*

Jharkhand Chhattisgarh Odisha Anhadra 

Pradesh

TOTAL

2015 T 9 21 58 120 35 8 251

C 4 13 16 34 20 6 93

SF 3 4 5 41 4 0 57

M 2 4 37 45 11 2 101

2014 T 17 0 97 113 41 12 280

C 7 0 48 25 31 6 117

SF 7 0 12 55 1 1 76

M 3 0 37 33 9 5 87

2013 T 48 2 131 128 54 13 376

C 21 0 48 48 22 10 149

SF 25 0 26 45 7 1 104

M 2 2 57 35 25 2 123

2012 T 41 4 98 108 60 10 321

C 15 2 48 26 27 6 124

SF 10 0 24 36 19 1 90

M 15 2 26 46 14 3 106

2011 T 61 53 157 176 75 10 532

C 39 41 79 39 36 6 240

SF 3 2 30 67 16 0 118

M 19 10 48 70 23 4 174

2010 T 98 425 147 327 108 33 1,138

C 54 328 71 72 62 17 604

SF 24 36 27 153 21 0 261

M 20 61 49 102 25 16 273

2009 T 78 158 217 345 81 28 907

C 37 134 74 87 36 10 378

SF 25 15 67 121 32 0 260

M 16 9 76 137 13 18 269

2008 T 71 39 163 168 132 66 648

C 35 9 74 35 24 28 220

SF 21 10 39 67 76 1 214

M 15 10 50 66 32 37 214

2007 T 49 7 120 350 23 73 650

C 23 6 69 95 13 24 240

SF 21 0 6 182 2 4 218

M 5 1 45 73 8 45 192
29

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

Key: T = total deaths; C = civilian deaths; SF = security forces; M = militants (Naxalites)

*West Bengal data in italics include other states not listed, mainly Maharashtra and Telengana

Sources: Main data from South Asia Data Portal, available at <www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/

data_sheets/maoist_datasheet.html>; totals for West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Anhadra 

Pradesh for 2003–2005 cross-checked at <www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.

html?cmaid=2543&mmacmaid=794>; Indian Ministry of Home Affairs data.

2006 T 40 20 94 361 23 147 685

C 16 9 18 189 3 18 253

SF 5 7 47 55 4 7 125

M 19 4 29 117 16 122 307

2005 T 107 27 126 200 17 369 846

C 72 11 92 121 13 186 495

SF 24 8 27 47 1 22 129

M 11 8 7 32 3 161 222

2004 T 172 48 189 98 8 121 636

C 166 16 128 75 4 68 457

SF 5 30 41 8 4 6 94

M 1 2 20 15 0 47 85

2003 T 137 16 138 82 16 302 691

C 102 10 101 44 3 127 387

SF 26 1 16 30 12 12 97

M 9 5 21 8 1 163 207

Appendix A. Naxalite Insurgency Statistics Tracker, cont. 

Bihar West 

Bengal*

Jharkhand Chhattisgarh Odisha Anhadra 

Pradesh

TOTAL
30 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

Appendix B. Central Armed Police Forces, Ministry of Home Affairs

Unit Est. Composition Main Purpose Ongoing Engagements

Assam 

Rifles

1835 65,000 personnel; 

46 battalions

Counterinsurgency and 

border security for IndoMyanmar border and 

Northeast India tribal 

areas; infrastructure 

development (MHA controls 

administration; Ministry of 

Defence controls operations)

Border guard force for Indo-Myanmar 

border; counterinsurgency operations 

in Northeast India tribal areas; 

humanitarian aid and development 

to Northeast India underdeveloped 

regions; has deployed to overseas 

counterinsurgency/counterterrorism 

with Indian army

Border 

Security 

Force

1965 222,000 personnel; 

159 battalions

Counterinsurgency, border 

security for Indo-Pakistan 

and Indo-Bangladesh borders

Contributes to border security and 

counterinsurgency, including in 

Jammu/Kashmir; participates in United 

Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions; 

deploys to domestic counterinsurgency/

counter-terrorism in India on request

Central 

Industrial 

Security 

Force

1939 139,400 personnel Infrastructure security Secures airports, seaports, power 

plants, government buildings, airports, 

subways, and so forth

Central 

Reserve 

Police 

Force

1949 288,000 personnel; 

236 battalions

Security force during 

partition and accession 

of princely states, general 

internal security (crowd 

control, riot control, rescue 

and relief, elections)

Performs domestic counterinsurgency 

operations in support of local forces 

or on national government mandate; 

protects government buildings in 

insurgent areas; participates in UN 

missions

IndoTibetan 

Border 

Police

1962 45,000 personnel; 

45 battalions

Border security along 

Indo-China border, natural 

disaster response

Provides border security between 

India and China; provides rescue/

relief operations and natural disaster 

response in Himalayan region; combats 

smuggling in Himalayan region; 

secures Indian embassy and consulates 

in Afghanistan since 2008–2009; 

participates in UN Mission to Congo 

since 2005

National 

Security 

Guard

1984 10,000 personnel Specialized operations for 

combatting terrorism; Special 

Action Group; Special 

Rangers Group

Involved in special operations and 

counterterrorism efforts

Sashastra 

Seema 

Bal

1963 76,337 personnel Grass roots activities for 

strengthening national 

support at borders, border 

security for Indo-Nepal, and 

Indo-Bhutan borders

Engages in counterinsurgency and 

some internal security duties; provides 

intelligence from areas of operations; 

prevents smuggling/trafficking; 

provides election security

Note: Originally known as the Cachar Levy, the name Assam Rifles became official in 1917. Originally known as 

the Crown Representative’s Police, the name Central Reserve Police Force became official in 1949. Once known 

as the Federal Contingency Deployment Force, the force was renamed the National Security Guard. The Special 

Services Bureau (SSB) was named in 2003. See “Central Armed Police Forces,” May 13, 2014, available at <http://

mha.nic.in/armedforces>; Rakesh Kr Sinha, “Give the Central Armed Police Forces Their Due,” Swarajya.com, 

April 30, 2016, available at <http://swarajyamag.com/defence/give-the-central-armed-police-forces-their-due>.
31

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

Appendix C. “Balance Iroquois” (or “Vajra Prahar”) and Other U.S.- 

India Bilateral Special Operations Forces Exercises 

Yr./Mon. Location Indian Unit Operational Focus

2002

May Agra Indian special operations 

forces (SOF)

Interoperability, joint operations, airborne assault 

operations

2003

Apr. Mizoram 21 Para Strike Force Training at Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare 

School (CIJW)

May Guam Indian SOF Counterterrorism

Aug. Washington 

state

Indian SOF Close-quarter combat

Sept. Jammu/

Kashmir

Indian SOF High-altitude warfare

2004

Mar. Mizoram Indian SOF Training at CIJW School

Oct. Jammu/

Kashmir

Navy SOF High-altitude warfare

2005

Sept. Mizoram Para Commandos Combat skills training at CIJW School

2007

Aug. Mizoram Para Commandos Counterinsurgency wargame at CIJW School

2008 

Aug. Mizoram Army SOF Counterinsurgency at the CIJW School

Aug. Guam Army SOF Counterterrorism, counterinsurgency

2010

Sept. Karnataka Indian SOF Counterterrorism

2011

Sept.–Oct. Washington 

state

1 Para Special Forces Marksmanship, urban terrain operations, counter–

improvised explosive device techniques

2012 

Aug. Uttarakhand 3 Para Special Forces Mountain terrain exercise

Oct.–Nov. Himachal 

Pradesh

Indian army commandos Mock war games

2015

Oct.–Nov. Manesar NSG-SAG (see appendix 

B for NSG description)

Specialist training (including flat range work, tape 

drills, night-vision goggle–assisted firing into a 

facility), inter-operability

2016

Jan. Washington 

state

Indian SOF Interoperability, maritime and airborne training 
32 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

Sources: After a 7-year hiatus due to U.S. sanctions for India’s nuclear weapons program, U.S.-India joint military exercises resumed in 2002. Among the first of these exercises, the “Balance Iroquois” (or “Vajra Prahar”) 

special operations forces series, stood out. See Pete Brush, “U.S., India in Military Exercise,” CBS News, May 

16, 2002, available at <www.cbsnews.com/news/us-india-in-military-exercise/>. Also see Christine Fair, “U.S.-

India Army-to-Army Relations: Prospects for Future Coalition Operations,” Asia Security 1, no. 2 (April 2005), 

164–165; “Defense Relations: Shared Strategic Future,” available at <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/uploads/

images/7tIuOzAx8UV0mdK5nGCpJw/wwwfpppdef.pdf>; Annual Report 2004–05 (Mumbai: Ministry of Defence, 

Government of India, 2004); “Joint India-U.S. Special Force Exercise ‘Strengthened’ Military Ties,” Government 

of India Press Information Bureau, August 25, 2005; “Indian, U.S. Troops to Hold Anti-Terror Drill in Mizoram,” 

DNAIndia.com, August 16, 2007, available at <www.dnaindia.com/india/report-indian-us-troops-to-hold-antiterror-drill-in-mizoram-1115948>; “U.S. troops Train at Indian Jungle War School,” The Hindu (Chennai), August 

12, 2008, available at <www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/us-troops-train-at-indian-jungle-war-school/

article1315148.ece>; “Military Pacts on Hold but India, U.S. Continue with Exercises, Arms Deals,” The Times of India (Mumbai), September 22, 2010, available at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Military-pacts-on-holdbut-India-US-continue-with-exercises-arms-deals/articleshow/6601777.cms>; “A Legacy of Courage,” The Tribune

(Chandigarh), October 15, 2011, available at <www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20111015/saturday/main1.htm>; “U.S., 

India to Hold Joint Military Exercise in March; Tanks to Roll Out in Rajasthan,” Deccan Herald Online, January 23, 

2012; “U.S. Army’s Special Forces Conduct Joint Counterterror Training with NSG at Haryana,” The Indian Express

(Uttar Pradesh), available at <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-us-anti-terror-cooperation-for-the-first-time-nsg-commandos-train-with-us-special-forces/>; “U.S., Indian Armies to Hold 20-Day 

Joint Exercise in Himachal Pradesh from 15 Oct,” Political and Defence Weekly 11, no. 49 (2012), 22; “Joint Training 

Exercise of India, U.S. Special Forces to Be Held after Four Years,” The Indian Express (Uttar Pradesh), available at 

<http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/joint-training-exercise-of-india-us-special-forces-to-beheld-after-four-years/>.
33

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

Notes 1 See U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (Washington, DC: The White House, January 25, 2015), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region>.

2 Raghavan Jagannathan, “Assessing the PM’s U.S. Trip: Narendra Modi Is the Best Salesman 

India Has Ever Had,” FirstPost.com, September 30, 2015, available at <www.firstpost.com/world/assessing-pms-us-trip-narendra-modi-is-the-best-salesman-india-has-had-2448904.html>.

3 See Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Economic Cooperation and People-to-People Ties (Washington, DC: 

The White House, June 7, 2016), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07/factsheet-us-india-economic-cooperation-and-people-people-ties>.

4 Tanvi Madan, “Mr. Modi Goes to Washington (Again),” Brookings Institution blog, June 3, 

2016, available at <www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/06/03-modi-visits-washington-madan>.

5 See Joint Statement—The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century

(Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 7, 2016), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/06/07/joint-statement-united-states-and-india-enduring-global-partners-21st>; Joe Gould, 

“U.S. Names India ‘Major Defense Partner,” DefenseNews.com, June 7, 2016, available at <www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/06/07/us-names-india-major-defense-partner/85571518/>.

6 “U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI),” Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, available at <www.acq.osd.mil/ic/DTTI.html>. 

Also see Franz-Stefan Gady, “India and United States Agree to Deepen Military ties, Technology Collaboration,” The Diplomat, April 13, 2016, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/india-andunited-states-agree-to-deepen-military-ties-technology-collaboration/>.

7 The Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA) would set a framework for the two countries to share 

military logistics. Under the reciprocal agreement, both New Delhi and Washington would have the 

ability, but not the obligation, to assist each other’s armed forces with simple military logistics. The 

Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) would allow the 

United States to supply India with its proprietary encrypted communications equipment and systems, 

allowing secure peacetime and wartime communication between high-level military leaders on both 

sides. CISMOA would extend this capability to Indian and U.S. military assets, including aircraft and 

ships. The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) would set a framework through which 

the United States could share sensitive data to aid targeting and navigation with India. See Ankit Panda, 

“LSA, CISMOA, BECA, and the Future of the U.S.-India Defense Partnership,” The Diplomat, April 7, 

2016, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/lsa-cismoa-beca-and-the-future-of-the-us-indiadefense-partnership/>.

8 The long-negotiated—and long-delayed—U.S.-India Logistics Exchange Memorandum of 

Agreement was finally signed in late August 2016 during Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar’s 

visit to the United States. See Rahul Bedi, “India and U.S. Sign Long-Awaited Military Logistics Agreement,” Janes.com, August 30, 2016, available at <www.janes.com/article/63299/india-and-us-sign-longawaited-military-logistics-agreement>; Alyssa Ayers, “Three Takeaways on U.S.-India Defense Ties,” 
34 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

Council on Foreign Relations, August 29, 2016, available at <http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2016/08/29/threetakeaways-on-u-s-india-defense-ties/>.

9 Gady.

10 Sushant Singh, “India to Participate in World’s Largest Maritime Warfare Exercise in U.S. 

Next Year,” Indian Express (New Delhi), December 11, 2015, available at <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-to-participate-in-exercises-rimpac-and-red-flag-in-us-next-year/>; 

author interview with U.S. Military Attaché in New Delhi, December 12, 2015.

11 See Nikhara Mandhana, “U.S., India, Japan Plan Joint Naval Exercises Near South China 

Sea,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2016, available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-india-japanplan-joint-naval-exercises-near-south-china-sea-1457010828>; Sushant Singh, “Four Navy Ships 

to Join Trilateral Malabar Exercise,” Indian Express (New Delhi), May 4, 2016, available at <http://

indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/four-navy-ships-to-join-trilateral-malabar-exercise-2783422/>.

12 “No Joint Sea Patrol with U.S. against China, Says India,” Tribune (New Delhi), March 4, 

2016, available at <www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/no-joint-sea-patrol-with-us-against-china-saysindia/204842.html>; Anjana Pasricha, “India Rejects Joint Naval Patrols with U.S. in South China Sea,” 

Voice of America News, March 11, 2016, available at <www.voanews.com/content/india-rejects-jointnaval-patrols-with-us-in-south-china-sea/3231567.html>; Singh, “Four Navy Ships.”

13 Harsh V. Pant, “The Limits of U.S. Engagement,” Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2016, available 

at <www.wsj.com/articles/the-limits-of-u-s-engagement-1460997733>.

14 As many other analysts of Indian insurgency, the author omits inclusion of two other counterinsurgency efforts from this list of major ongoing Indian counterinsurgency operations: the Punjab 

uprising of 1978–1993 and the Indian Peacekeeping Force experience in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990. For 

more details on these important but discrete counterinsurgency experiences, see Sumit Ganguly and 

David P. Fidler, eds., India and Counterinsurgency: Lesson Learned (London: Routledge, 2009).

15 For example, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Force and Compromise: India’s Counter-Insurgency 

Grand Strategy,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (April 2007).

16 Rajesh Rajagopalan, “‘Restoring Normalcy’: The Evolution of the Indian Army’s Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 44–68; Rajagopalan, “Force 

and Compromise.”

17 Anit Mukherjee, “Lessons from Another Insurgency,” New York Times, May 4, 2006.

18 H.S. Sidhu and S.S. Bains, “Public Expenditure on Police Services in India: With Special 

Reference to Punjab,” The Indian Police Journal 55, no. 1 (2008); ibid.

19 See The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act [AFSPA], 1958—Act 20 of 1958, 11th September, 

1958, available at <www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/actandordinances/armed_forces_special_power_act_1958.htm>. For a recent critique of the AFSPA as excessive, see Sudha Ramachandaran, “India’s Controversial Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act,” The Diplomat, July 2, 2015, 

available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/indias-controversial-armed-forces-special-powers-act/>.

20 Arvind Verma, “The Police and India’s Maoist Insurgency,” in Policing Insurgencies: Cops as 

Counterinsurgents, ed. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 

309–313.
35

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

21 Sameer Lalwani, “India’s Approach to Counterinsurgency and the Naxalite Problem,” CTC 

Sentinel 4, no. 10 (October 2011), 5–6, available at <www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/india%E2%80%99s-approach-to-counterinsurgency-and-the-naxalite-problem>.

22 Ibid., 9.

23 It is also known as a Maoist insurgency, Communist Party of India–Maoist insurgency, and 

a key element of an Indian left-wing extremist insurgency. This paper primarily uses the term Naxalite 

insurgency to describe the movement.

24 Group Captain Srinivas Ganapathiraju, “Maoist Insurgency in India: Emerging Vulnerabilities,” CTX Journal 3, no. 2 (May 2013), available at <https://globalecco.org/maoist-insurgency-in-indiaemerging-vulnerabilities>. 

25 Sumanta Banerjee, India’s Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising (New Delhi: Zed Books, 

1984), 15–16; Saibal Gupta, “Naxalbari Revisited,” The Times of India (Mumbai), April 25, 2015, available 

at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Naxalbari-revisited/articleshow/47044695.cms>.

26 Burton Stein, A History of India, 2nd ed. (West Sussex: Wiley, 2010), 406–409.

27 Ibid., 408.

28 Banerjee, 17; K.S. Sood, “The Naxal Insurgency: Challenges for the Para Military Forces,” in 

The Naxal Threat: Causes, State Response and Consequences, ed. V.R. Raghavan (Chennai, India: Centre 

for Security Analysis, 2011), 161–163.

29 Jennifer L. Oetken, “Counterinsurgency against Naxalites in India,” in India and Counterinsurgency, 127–128.

30 Nadeem Ahmed, “Charu Majumdar—The Father of Naxalism,” HindustanTimes.com, December 15, 2015, available at <www.hindustantimes.com/india/charu-majumdar-the-father-of-naxalism/story-xMbqnzd7MJp8nm4NamCxqJ.html>.

31 Oetken, 132–133.

32 Banerjee, 193.

33 See Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India Since Independence

(London: Penguin, 2008), 15–16; V. Sirnate, “Ideological Insurgencies in South Asia,” in Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia: Identities, Interests and Challenges to State Authority, ed. Jugdep S. 

Chima (Oxon, England: Routledge, 2015), 166.

34 Banerjee, 224–225.

35 K.P. Singh, “The Trajectory of the Movement,” in The Naxal Challenge: Causes, Linkages 

and Policy Options, P.V. Ramana (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, Ltc., 2008), 10–11; Anup K. Pahari, 

“Unequal Rebellions: The Continuum of ‘People’s War’ in Nepal and India,” in The Maoist Insurgency 

in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari (London: 

Routledge, 2010), 208–210.

36 Banerjee, 260; Verma, 296–299.

37 P.V. Ramana, “India’s Maoist Insurgency: Evolution, Current Trends, and Responses,” in 

India’s Contemporary Security Challenges, ed. Michael Kugelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars, 2011), 29–30; Oetken, 138–141.

38 E.N. Rammohan, “Rise of Naxalism, Its Implications for National Security, and the Way 

Forward,” in The Naxal Threat, 98–100.
36 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 22

39 Verma, 298–299, 312–314; “Andhra Model,” India Today, April 8, 2010, available at <http://

indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Andhra+model/1/91900.html>; Bharti Jain, “Andhra Greyhound Model for 

Other Maoist-Hit states on Anvil,” The Times of India (Mumbai), February 17, 2013, available at <http://

timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Andhra-Greyhound-model-for-other-Maoist-hit-states-on-anvil/

articleshow/18538474.cms>.

40 See Conflict Resolution: Learning Lessons from Dialogue Processes in India (New Delhi: The 

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011), 10–11.

41 Ibid., 11.

42 Ibid.

43 Ramana, 32.

44 Verma, 296–298, 307.

45 Ramana, 32.

46 Rammohan, 102; Ramana, 32.

47 G.K. Pillai, “Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in India,” Journal of Defence Studies 4, no. 2 (April 

2010), available at <www.idsa.in/jds/4_2_2010_Left-wingExtremisminINdia_gkpillai>.

48 In 2005, India suffered major terrorism episodes from other domestic insurgent groups. On 

May 22, there were nearly simultaneous bombings of two movie theaters in New Delhi by a Sikh terrorist 

organization, Babbar Khalsa International, which many thought was defunct. The attacks left 1 person 

dead and more than 60 injured. On October 29, a series of explosions in crowded marketplaces and on a 

public bus in New Delhi killed approximately 60 and injured more than 150 on the eve of Diwali, India’s 

most important Hindu holiday. The Indian government blamed the designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar e-Tayyiba for the attack. See U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2005—

India, Washington, DC, April 28, 2006, available at <www.refworld.org/docid/4681083b2.html>.

49 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2006—India, Washington, DC, April 

17, 2007, available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/83383.pdf>.

50 See Government of India Press Information Bureau, Prime Minister’s Speech to the 2nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers on Naxalism, April 13, 2006, available at <http://pib.

nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128>. Also see “India Says Maoists Are Top Internal Threat,” 

New York Times, April 16, 2012, available at <www.nytimes.com/aponline/2012/04/16/world/asia/ap-asindia-terror.html?_r=1&ref=world&pagewanted=print>; “Naxalism Is the Gravest Internal Threat: PM,” 

The Times of India (Mumbai), April 13, 2006, available at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/

delhi/Naxalism-is-gravest-internal-threat-PM/articleshow/1489633.cms>.

51 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2007—India, Washington, DC, April 

30, 2007, available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf>.

52 See Observer Research Foundation, available at <www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/

modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=2543&mmacmaid=794>; Yatish Yadav, “Police vs. Maoists: Are Indian Security Forces Strong Against Naxals?” The New Indian Express (Chennai), April 25, 

2015, available at <www.newindianexpress.com/magazine/Police-vs-Maoists-Are-Indian-SecurityForces-Strong-Against-Naxals/2015/04/25/article2779418.ece>.

53 Asad Ismi, “Maoist Insurgency Spreads to Over 40% of India: Mass Poverty and Delhi’s Embrace of Corporate Neoliberalism Fuels Social Uprising,” Global Research, December 20, 2013, available 
37

India’s Naxalite Insurgency

at <www.globalresearch.ca/maoist-insurgency-spreads-to-over-40-of-indiamass-poverty-and-delhisembrace-of-corporate-neoliberalism-fuels-social-uprising/5362276>.

54 “Naxalism Biggest Threat to Internal Security: Manmohan,” The Hindu (Chennai), May 24, 

2010, available at <www.thehindu.com/news/national/naxalism-biggest-threat-to-internal-securitymanmohan/article436781.ece>.

55 Ravik Bhattarcharya, “Day 5, Operation Lalgarh: Lull before the Storm?” The Indian Express

(Uttar Pradesh), June 23, 2009, available at <http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/kolkata/day-5-operation-lalgarh-lull-before-the-storm/>.

56 “Green Hunt: The Anatomy of an Operation,” The Hindu (Chennai), February 6, 2010, available 

at <www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/green-hunt-the-anatomy-of-an-operation/article101706.ece>.

57 Statement by Indian senior advisor to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and a former 

commander of Indian internal security forces at an author-attended security panel of the India Foundation Counterterrorism Symposium in Jaipur, India, March 19, 2015.

58 See “Green Hunt.” On the composition and duties of the MHA’s various Central Armed 

Police Forces—Assam Rifles, Border Security Forces, Central Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve 

Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, National Security Guard, and Sashastra Seema Bal—see 

“Central Armed Police Forces,” available at <http://mha.nic.in/armedforces>. Also see appendix B.

59 “India’s Naxalite Insurgency: Politics with Bloodshed,” The Economist, April 7, 2010, available 

at <www.economist.com/node/15863697>.

60 “A Chronology of Naxal Attacks on Security Forces,” The Economic Times (Mumbai), March 

11, 2014, available at <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-03-11/news/48118452_1_

landmine-blast-narayanpur-naxal-attack>.

61 For examples of global coverage see Simon Robinson, “India’s Secret War,” Time.com, May 

29, 2008, available at <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1810169,00.html>; “India’s 

Naxalite Rebellion: The Red Heart of India, The Economist, November 5, 2009, available at <www.

economist.com/node/14820724>; “India’s Naxalite Insurgency: Politics with Bloodshed.”

62 “Naxalite Violence—News,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, available at <www.ipcs.

org/news/naxalite-violence/index-43.html>.

63 “Naxalite—News,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, available at <www.ipcs.org/news/

peace-and-conflict-database-naxal/index-3.html>.

64 Statement by Indian senior advisor to the MHA.

65 Ibid.

66 “India’s Naxalite Insurgency: Politics with Bloodshed.”

67 Statement by former Indian Ministry of Interior Joint Secretary for Internal Affairs at an 

author-attended security panel of the India Foundation Counterterrorism Symposium in Jaipur, India, 

March 19, 2015.

68 In part, this improved federal-state coordination was inspired by Naxalite battlefield successes. But it also came about after Naxalite groups began to focus on controlling areas rich in natural 

resources such as iron and destroying state infrastructure such as railroads, telephone exchanges, and 

industrial plants. By 2010 Naxalite presence overlapped critical areas such as Bihar, Jharkhand, and 

Orissa, which contain the bulk of India’s iron ore, and Andhra Pradesh has large reserves of bauxite, 
38 

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key inputs to Indian industry. Naxalites had also come to dominate areas containing 85 percent of the 

country’s coal resources, which are used to power 55 percent of India’s energy supply and 75 percent of 

its electricity. These economic realities made piecemeal solutions and state-level toleration of Naxalite 

activities untenable—driving better coordination. See “Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division,” available 

at <http://mha.nic.in/naxal_new>. Also see Schuyler Null, “India’s Maoists: South Asia’s ‘Other’ Insurgency,” Wilson Center blog, available at <www.newsecuritybeat.org/2010/07/indias-maoists-southasias-other-insurgency/>.

69 Estimates of actual numbers of federal police committed to countering Naxalite insurgents 

vary. On the high end there is the estimate of more than 380 by Guatam Navlakha, “Ambush Amplifies 

a Struggle,” Sanhati.com, March 30, 2014, available at <http://sanhati.com/excerpted/9499/>. On the 

low end there is the estimate of about 165,000 by Yatish Yadav, “Police vs. Maoists: Are Indian Security 

Forces Strong Against Naxals?” The New Indian Express (Chennai), April 25, 2015, available at <www.

newindianexpress.com/magazine/Police-vs-Maoists-Are-Indian-Security-Forces-Strong-Against-Naxals/2015/04/25/article2779418.ece>.

70 Namrata Goswami, Indian National Security and Counterinsurgency: The Use of Force vs. 

Non-Violent Response (London: Routledge, 2015), 150–151; Yadav.

71 Shreya Pareek, “400 Police Stations to Be Built in Naxal Affected States,” TheBetterIndian.

com, June 1, 2015, available at <www.thebetterindia.com/24724/400-police-stations-to-be-built-innaxal-affected-states/>; Verma, 308–311.

72 Statements by former Indian Ministry of Interior Joint Secretary for Internal Affairs.

73 In large measure this is because liberal economic reforms in Indian urban areas have undermined the bases for discontent that fuels left-wing extremist movements such as Naxalism. See Namrata 

Goswami, India’s Internal Security Situation: Present Realities and Future Pathways, Monograph Series 

No. 23 (New Delhi: Institute for Defence and Security Analyses, September 2013), 29–30.

74 Statement by former Indian Ministry of Interior Joint Secretary for Internal Affairs.

75 Author telephone interview with former police leader of Naxalite-impacted provinces of 

Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Chhattisgarh, August 21, 2014.

76 Statement by Indian Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

77 Author interviews with economic and political analysts at U.S. Consulate in Kolkata, August 

17–18, 2014.

78 “Naxalism Biggest Threat to Internal Security.” In addition—as of early 2016—Indian state 

security leaders report that they find no nexus between the various Naxalite groups remaining in India 

and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. See “Indian Minister Says No Nexus between Maoists, ISIL 

‘Has’ Come to Government’s Notice So Far,” The Times of India (Mumbai), April 28, 2016, available at 

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/>.

79 John R. Schmidt, “Has India Peaked?” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 3 (Fall 2014), 88.

80 These special operations forces’ interactions have been dubbed the “Iroquois Exercises” by 

the United States and known as “Vajra Prahar” in India. They have occurred on a recurring basis for 

over a decade. See Christine Fair, “U.S.-India Army-to-Army Relations: Prospects for Future Coalition 

Operations,” Asia Security 1, no. 2 (April 2005), 164–165.

81 Author interview with U.S. political affairs officials, U.S. Consulate in Kolkata, August 2014; 
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India’s Naxalite Insurgency

Shushant Singh, “India-U.S. Anti-Terror Cooperation: For the First Time NSG Commandos Train with 

U.S. Special Forces,” The Indian Express (Uttar Pradesh), November 2, 2015, available at <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-us-anti-terror-cooperation-for-the-first-time-nsgcommandos-train-with-us-special-forces/>.

82 Singh.

83 Joint Statement of the India-U.S. Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: 

Embassy of India, July 12, 2002), available at <www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=426>.

84 The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program is run by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Its interactions are mainly with the Indian Police Services. See Office of Antiterrorism 

Assistance: Fiscal Year 2010 in Review (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2010), available at <www.

state.gov/documents/organization/177500.pdf>.

85 See “Security Partnership for the 21st Century,” Department of State, Washington, DC, July 

19, 2011, available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168744.htm >.

86 Ozzie Nelson et. al., U.S.-India Homeland Security Cooperation (Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 2013), available at <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130618_Nelson_US-IndiaHomeland_WEB.pdf>; “Ambassador Roemer 

Signs U.S.-India Counterterror Cooperation Agreement,” Embassy of the United States, New Delhi, 

July 23, 2010, available at <http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr072310.html>; “India-U.S. Sign Counter 

Terrorism Cooperation Initiative,” Embassy of India, Washington, DC, July 23, 2010, available at <www.

indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=1292>.

87 Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “The Naxalite Rebellions,” The American Interest 9., no. 1 (August 2013), available at <www.the-american-interest.com/2013/08/11/the-naxalite-rebellions/>.

88 Author interview with U.S. political affairs officials, U.S. Consulate in Kolkata.

89 “Joint Press Briefing by Secretary Carter and Minster Parrikar in the Pentagon Briefing 

Room,” December 10, 2015, available at <www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/

Article/633703/joint-press-briefing-by-secretary-carter-and-minister-parrikar-in-the-pentagon>.

90 This reinforces a similar conclusion made in Fair, 169–170.

91 Mullick.

92 Ibid.

93 Author interviews with Department of Defense civilian officials in 2014 and 2015 and U.S. 

Pacific Command military officials in 2015 confirmed that the United States has periodically offered to 

provide the Indian military and paramilitary leaders with more direct assistance and counterinsurgency 

expertise in support of its anti-Naxalite operations. These offers have been politely declined by midlevel Indian Ministry of Defence and MHA leaders.

94 “Leahy Fact Sheet,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor, March 3, 2016, available 

at <www.humanrights.gov/dyn/03/leahy-fact-sheet/>.

95 “India: Draconian Response to Naxalite Violence,” Human Rights Watch, April 27, 2006, 

available at <www.hrw.org/news/2006/04/27/india-draconian-response-naxalite-violence>; Azaan 

Javaid, “Maharashtra Police Used to Torture Me: JNU Student Hem Mishra,” DNAIndia.com, September 

27, 2015, available at <www.dnaindia.com/india/report-maharashtra-police-used-to-torture-me-jnustudent-hem-mishra-2129032>.
40 

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96 Verma, 307, 313; “CRPF Personnel Death in Naxal No Human Rights Violation,” BusinessStandard.com, May 25, 2014, available at <www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/crpfpersonnel-death-in-naxal-attack-no-human-rights-violation-114052500099_1.html>.

97 Well-intentioned, but ill-timed conditionality on U.S. security assistance has harmed bilateral 

relations with aspiring strategic partners in several historic instances. Most recently, U.S. congressional 

conditionality on the Kerry-Berman-Lugar strategic assistance package to Pakistan of 2009 requiring 

that Pakistan’s military relinquish absolute control of its general officer selection process to civilian 

oversight substantially strained U.S.-Pakistan relations at a moment that Washington aimed to make 

them tighter. India in 2016 is not Pakistan of 2009, but the caution against unhelpful conditionality 

remains a worthy one. See S. 1707, “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009,” 111th Cong., 1st

sess. (2010), available at <www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/s1707/text>; Omar Wariach, “How a U.S. 

Aid Package to Pakistan Could Threaten Zardari,” Time.com, October 8, 2019, available at <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1929306,00.html>.

98 For a similar assessment about the inherent limitations of U.S.-Indian security collaboration 

moving forward, see Dinshaw Mistry, Aligning Unevenly: India and the United States, Policy Studies 74 

(Honolulu: East-West Center, 2016), xii–xiii, 24–27, 47–51.
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About the Author

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III is the Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia, the Near 

East, and Radical Islam in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, at the National Defense University (NDU). He researches, writes, lectures, and organizes workshops and conferences for Department of Defense customers on the topics of 

Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and the Subcontinent, the Gulf Arab states, and the past and future trajectory of radical Islam. Dr. Lynch has published widely on the politics and security of 

South Asia, the Near East, and radical Islam including articles in Orbis, The American Interest, 

The Washington Quarterly, and Joint Force Quarterly; book chapters in publications by NDU 

Press, Oxford University Press, and Johns Hopkins University Press; and feature monographs 

with the New America Foundation, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Hudson Institute, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and NDU Press. Dr. Lynch joined 

NDU in 2010 after a 28-year career as an Active-duty U.S. Army officer, serving in a variety of 

command and staff positions as an armor/cavalry officer and as a senior level politico-military 

analyst. Dr. Lynch holds a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and an MPA, MA, and 

Ph.D. in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International 

Affairs at Princeton University.

Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

COL KRIS A. BAUMAN, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

DR. T.X. HAMMES

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. FRANK G. HOFFMAN

Senior Research Fellow

DR. LAURA J. JUNOR

Director

DR. CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. ANDRE LE SAGE

Senior Research Fellow

DR. THOMAS F. LYNCH III

Distinguished Research Fellow

DR. DENISE NATALI

Senior Research Fellow

DR. JAMES J. PRZYSTUP

Senior Research Fellow

DR. PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS

Distinguished Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit inss.ndu.edu.