alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §79. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, act Feb. 15, 1901, ch. 372, 31 Stat. 790; Pub. L. 94–579, title VII, §706(a), Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2793; Pub. L. 113–287, §7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272, which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to permit the use of rights-of-way through the public lands, forest and other reservations of the United States, and the Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant National Parks, California, for various public utility purposes, was omitted in view of the repeal of its provisions by Pub. L. 94–579 as they relate to public lands and lands in the National Forest System and by Pub. L. 113–287 as they relate to National Park System units. See section 100902(a) of Title 54, National Park Service and Related Programs. Act Feb. 15, 1901, is also classified to section 959 of Title 43, Public Lands, and was also classified to section 522 of this title prior to its omission from the Code. Section was formerly classified to section 419 of this title.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Manouch Moshayedi, Chief Executive Officer of STEC, Inc. (the Company), certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) the Quarterly Report of
the Company on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ MANOUCH MOSHAYEDI  
|Manouch Moshayedi      
|Chief Executive Officer

May 9, 2008
#### Bridget SHEEHAN’S Administrator, Movant, v. John B. GORHAM, Opposed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 6, 1941.

Robert M. Odear for movant.

Ben L. Kessinger, opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal denied; judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF HECHINGER COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES AS OF
SEPTEMBER 27, 1997 AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR 34 WEEKS THEN
ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH TRANSITION REPORT
ON FORM 10-K FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD FROM FEBRUARY 2, 1997 TO SEPTEMBER 27,
1997.
</LEGEND>
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<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-02-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-27-1997
<CASH>                                          87,215
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    973,139
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,137,678
<PP&E>                                         554,727
<DEPRECIATION>                                 229,090
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,668,399
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          935,060
<BONDS>                                        352,960
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     276,468
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,668,399
<SALES>                                      1,360,891
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,363,921
<CGS>                                        1,127,258
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,403,038
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               132,878
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              32,749
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (204,744)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,267
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (206,011)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (206,011)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
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</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Form 10-Q of DAC Technologies Group
International, Inc. (the "Company") for the quarter ended March 31, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Robert C. Goodwin Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify
that:

         o  the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         o  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
            respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
            Company.



         /s/ ROBERT C. GOODWIN
         ---------------------------
         Chief Financial Officer

Date:    May 15, 2003
Exhibit 32.1

The following certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and pursuant to SEC Release
No. 33-8238 is being furnished to the SEC rather than filed either as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure statement, and is not to be incorporated by reference into the Report or any other filing of the
Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing. The following certification shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, as amended, or otherwise subject to the liabilities of Section 18 or Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Manouch Moshayedi, Chief Executive Officer of STEC, Inc. (the Company), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the quarterly
period ended March 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                         
|-----------------------------------------
|/s/ MANOUCH MOSHAYEDI                    
|Manouch Moshayedi Chief
Executive Officer

May 6, 2010
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****Evaluation of TRIM.FaTE.**
 
SuDoc Number:EP 4.52:T 73/2/

Item Number:0488-E-22 (online)
CGP systemNumber:000703497
 
Vol. 1: Report | Vol.2: ReportAppendices | Vol. 3: ReportAppendices
 
March 10, 2020
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-14-0000895 26-OCT-2015 08:34 AM
### Geology of the Ewing quadrangle, Kentucky and Virginia

By: Kenneth John EnglundH.L. SmithLarry D. HarrisJ.G. Stephens

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/b1142B

#### Links

- More information:  **National Geologic Map Database Index Page**                            (html)
-                                                                                                                             Document:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  **Report**                                                                                                     (pdf)                                                                                                                                     
- Plate:  **Plate 1**                            (pdf)
- Download citation as:  RIS                         |                         Dublin                            Core

#### Abstract

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format                        (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it is recommended that you download                        the documents to your computer and open them with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your                        browser may not display or print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge. More information                        about viewing, downloading, and printing report files can be found at the common download problems FAQ.
#### Natty Mishkin, Respondent, v. Moritz Weisberger and Others, Appellants.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Present—Ingraham, P. J., Clarke, Scott, Dowling and Hotchkiss, JJ.
#### Deskins v. Coleman.

May 20, 1941.

*625John S. Cline, Jr., for appellant.

P. B. Stratton and W. W. Reynolds for appellee.

Opinion op the Court by

Stanley, Commissioner—

Affirming.

For $78.25 the appellant, T. H. Desldns, bought 150 acres of land of the appraised value of $1,500 at a sheriff’s sale to collect an execution. In due course he obtained the sheriff’s deed. On his motion for a writ of possession, the execution defendant and owner pleaded invalidity of the sale upon several grounds. The circuit court held there was no judgment authorizing the issuance of the execution and denied the writ of possession.

It is said in the briefs that Kenis Coleman had filed a contest of the election of Y. A. Belcher for the office of magistrate of Pike County and that the order appearing of record was entered after the pleadings had been completed and some proof taken. That entry, styled “Agreed order,” is as follows: “By agreement the contestant, Kenis Coleman, dismisses this action at the cost of the contestant. This 3rd day of February, 1938.” It was signed by the parties and their respective attorneys. The costs in that proceeding chargeable against the contestant amounted to $32.45, and that against the contestee $24.05. The clerk issued an execution for $57.85 on April 23, 1938, returnable June 16th. The difference between that sum and $78.25 represented costs of the sale. The sheriff levied the execution upon the property on August 18th and sold the same thereunder on September 5th. He executed a deed on September 5, 1939, to Deskins.

We readily concur in the opinion of the circuit judge that the order was not a judgment for costs. It is simply a recitation that the contestant had agreed to dismiss the action and to pay the costs. The effect of *626the order is like that held in Casebolt v. Collingsworth, 219 Ky. 656, 294 S. W. 181, not to-be a judgment on which an execution could issue. That decision also disposes of appellant’s argument that Coleman is estopped to question the proceeding.

But if it should be held that the order was a judgment (as it apparently was intended to be), there is at least one reason why the sale is void. The levy creating the lien was made on a dead execution. The return day was two months before the date of the levy and the officer had no power to make the levy after the date when the return was required by law to be made thereof. Gaines v. Clark, 1 Bibb 608, 4 Ky. 608; Aloes v. Abbott, 9 Ky. Op. 822. See also Sections 1651, 1714, 1716, Kentucky Statutes, and Carmical v. Broughton’s Adm’x, 249 Ky. 749, 61 S. W. (2d) 612.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### STATE, Respondent, v. KUNKEL, et al, Appellants.

(251 N. W. 809.)

(File No. 7620.

Opinion filed December 19, 1933.)

*Lars A. Bruce,*of Yankton, for Appellants.

*Walter Conway,*Attorney General, *Herman L. Bode,*Assistant Attorney General, and *William J. Metzger,*State’s Attorney, of Olivet, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The defendants were convicted of the crime of grand larceny.

The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed.

All the Judges concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT (23)
 
                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS CONSENT
 
    We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements Nos.
2-64351,  2-98660, 33-29442,  33-44282, 33-44283,  33-44284, 33-49819, 33-59355,
33-59357 and 33-59359 on Form S-8, and  Nos. 33-62300 and 33-57135 on Form  S-3,
of our report dated February 13, 1996 (February 29, 1996 and March 1, 1996 as to
certain  information  included in  Note  22 and  March  15, 1996  as  to certain
information included in Note 24), appearing  in this Annual Report on Form  10-K
of Honeywell Inc. for the year ended December 31, 1995.
 
Deloitte & Touche LLP
Minneapolis, Minnesota
March 25, 1996
 
                                       52
§ 811.2 Applicability. ( a ) Sex offender registration requirements apply to all persons who live, reside, work, or attend school in the District of Columbia, and who: ( 1 ) committed a registration offense on or after July 11, 2000;
( 2 ) committed a registration offense at any time and were in custody or under supervision on or after July 11, 2000;
( 3 ) were required to register under the law of the District of Columbia as was in effect on July 10, 2000; or
( 4 ) committed a registration offense at any time in another jurisdiction and, within the registration period (see §§ 811.5 and 811.6), entered the District of Columbia to live, reside, work or attend school.
( b ) “Committed a registration offense” means that a person was found guilty or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a registration offense or was determined to be a sexual psychopath. Registration offenses are defined in section 2(8) of the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1999 (D.C. Official Code § 22-4001(8)), subject to the exceptions in section 17(b) of that Act (D.C. Official Code section 22-4016), and are listed descriptively in the Appendix to Part 811 (which also provides information on registration and notification classes). Any future revision to the statutory provisions designating registration offenses will be effective notwithstanding the timing of any conforming revision of these regulations, including the Appendix.
#### Eagle Brewing Company, Defendant in Error, v. August Netzel, Plaintiff in Error.

Gen. No. 16,186.

Landlord and *tenant—power of joint tenant to lease.*As against every one except only his -cotenant, either one of two joint tenants can grant a lease of the entire premises and thereby enable his lessee to recover possession of the entire premises and not merely of an undivided half, as against any one wrongfully withholding the same.

Forcible detainer. Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Michael F. Girten, Judge, presiding.

Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1910.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed January 6, 1911.

Mayer, Meyer, Austrian *&*Platt, for plaintiff in error.

Stanley S. Walkowiak, for defendant in error; Marvin E. Barnhart, of counsel.

Mr. Presiding Justice Mack

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff recovered against defendant in a forcible *376detainer suit in the Municipal Court of Chicago. To reverse this judgment a writ of error was sued out of this court.

There is considerable conflict in the evidence. Most of the witnesses gave their testimony in Polish; the trial judge, to whom the cause was submitted without a jury, and who understood this language, acted also as interpreter. We have carefully considered the record in the case and we are unable to say, under these circumstances, that the court was not justified in finding that the preponderance of the evidence was with the plaintiff.

Its claim was based on a lease signed by husband and wife, joint tenants, in the body of which, however, only the husband was named as lessor. Defendant’s claim was. based on a document signed by the husband alone in which there were combined a receipt for one month’s rent and an agreement to give a five years ’ lease of the premises to defendant.

The trial court was justified in finding that this agreement for a lease was a nullity as having been procured by fraud and without the knowledge or consent of the signer inasmuch as he, being nearly deaf, did not hear the interpreter, who knew nothing of the deafness, translate that part of the document, and he never intended to sign such an agreement.

While defendant was the assignee of a former tenant whose lease however prohibited him from assigning it, he did not take possession of such assignee but only by virtue of the tenancy from month to month and the alleged agreement for a five-year lease contained in the receipt given by one only of two joint tenants. Inasmuch therefore as his right of possession is based on an alleged tenancy derived from one joint tenant, he would be estopped from denying the right of his landlord or of one claiming under him, in this proceeding.

Moreover we are of the opinion that as against every *377one except only his co-tenant, either one of two joint tenants could grant a lease of the entire premises and thereby enable his lessee to recover possession of the entire premises and not merely of an undivided half, as against any one wrongfully withholding the same. Freeman Cotenancy, 2nd ed., secs. 253, 343 and 344.

*Affirmed.*
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

September 12, 2000 Session

 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL G. UPSHAW

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 98-03610 James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

No. W1999-00777-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 11, 2001

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., concurring.

While agreeing with the majority opinion in section IV that criminally negligent homicide

should not have been charged to the jury under State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), I dissent

to the remaining portion of section IV. I agree that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included

offense of second degree murder, but under Burns, I feel that evidence does not exist that reasonable

minds could accept as to voluntary manslaughter as opposed to second degree murder. The majority

opinion relies entirely upon portions of Defendant’s pre-trial statement in support of its conclusion

that there is evidence to warrant a charge of voluntary manslaughter. The following excerpts from

the Defendant’s pre-trial statement contain the information regarding the circumstances of the

shooting: 

Q: Michael, on Monday, November 3, 1997, at approximately 8:00 p.m., did you

shoot a male white at Percy Delta Rd.?

A: Yes, sir, by mistake.

* * *

Q: Did the white male that was shot have a gun?

A: He drew for somethin, [sic] that’s what was had me paranoid.

* * *

Q: Michael, why did you shoot the male white?

A: Cause Mario said he had ran off with his money and then he faked like he

was gone [sic] shoot first.
-2-

Q: Michael, in your own words, tell me what happened before, during and after

the shooting.

A: Mario came picked me up at the house, I jumped in the car with Mario

Merritt and Eric Jones and uh Vyron and they went round to Delta and Percy

and that’s when we saw the white man and the girl, and Mario pulled around

the car and tried to block the white man in and Mario Merritt asked them

what was up with his money? Me and Vyron got out the car, uh, that’s when

the white man looked like he was fixin [sic] to pull up his gun, I shot the gun

at the red car window and we got back in the car. I got in the backseat and

Vyron got in the front and Mario drove off and got his gun back from me.

Mario took me home and dropped me off.

I respectfully disagree that the fact that Defendant mentioned in his statement that “Mario”

stated that the victim had ran off with Mario’s money is sufficient proof of “adequate provocation”

to justify a conclusion that reasonable minds could accept a conviction of voluntary manslaughter.

Defendant’s statement, in effect, was that the Defendant did not raise his gun to shoot at the victim

until the victim appeared to be going for a weapon, in essence, a shooting by the Defendant in selfdefense. 

I would hold that, as with the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide, the

proof did not justify a charge of voluntary manslaughter.

__________________________________________

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  Exhibit 10-c-1

                                  NORDSON CORPORATION

                           RESOLUTION AMENDING 1982 INCENTIVE
                        STOCK OPTION PLAN TO PROVIDE FOR OPTIONS
                            EXERCISABLE IN INSTALLMENTS AND
                                    GRANTING OPTIONS

                                     April 20, 1982



                  RESOLVED, that the third sentence in Section 7 of the
Company's 1982 Incentive Stock Option Plan (the "Plan") be, and hereby is,
deleted and the following sentence inserted in its place:

           Thereafter, each option shall become exercisable at such
           time or times, wholly or in such installments, as the
           Committee may determine at the time of grant.

                  RESOLVED FURTHER, that incentive stock options be, and hereby
are, granted under the Plan to the persons named, and for the respective numbers
of shares, indicated on the list attached to this resolution, with a term of
five years ending at the close of business on April 19, 1987, exercisable in
cumulative installments of 25% per year beginning on April 20, 1983, at an
option price of $20.75 per share.

                  RESOLVED FURTHER, that pursuant to Section 10 of the Plan,
this Board hereby determined that the option price may be paid in cash, by
delivery of Common Shares of the Company, or partly in cash and partly by
delivery of Common Shares.