-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re CARY, Minors. February 15, 2018

No. 339423

Marquette Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 13-009738-NA

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals by right from an order terminating her parental rights with respect to 

her three children, AC, LC, and EMC, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to 

adjudication continue to exist) and (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody).1 We affirm.

I. FACTS

This is the fourth instance in which Child Protective Services (CPS) has been involved 

with respondent’s children. In this instance, respondent came to CPS’s attention because she 

was filling AC’s prescriptions, but was not providing the medication to AC. Respondent was 

also homeless and involved in a relationship marked by multiple domestic violence incidents. 

The children were removed from respondent’s care. 

According to Amanda Wetelainen, a foster care worker, respondent faced four barriers to 

reunification: a lack of housing, domestic violence, mental health issues, and inadequate 

parenting skills. Following adjudication, petitioner identified substance abuse as another barrier. 

Respondent was homeless throughout the pendency of this case. Wetelainen stated that she 

offered various housing services, but respondent was unable to secure housing. Regarding 

domestic violence, respondent acknowledged that she had been in a relationship for five years 

with a man who had assaulted her. Wetelainen testified that she recommended a mental health 

assessment for respondent, but that respondent had failed to complete an intake appointment. As 

for parenting skills, Wetelainen reported that during supervised parenting time, the children were 

“wild” and “out of control.” Workers testified that respondent had been inconsistent with her 

 1 It is unclear whether the court also relied on MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) (subsequently identified 

conditions continued to exist).
-2-

attendance for the Infant Mental Health program for EC, and that her parenting skills had not 

improved. The foster mother for AC and EC explained that their behaviors had improved since 

they came into care, and a worker from Teaching Family Homes, where LC was placed, reported 

improvement by LC. Finally, with respect to substance abuse, respondent had passed only seven 

of 18 drug screens, and had tested positive for methamphetamine on one occasion.

Following the termination hearing, the trial court found that the statutory grounds had 

been proven by clear and convincing evidence, citing respondent’s inconsistency and inability to 

“put into practice the skills she has been taught.” The trial court also determined that termination 

was in the children’s best interests because of the progress made by the children outside of 

respondent’s care. Accordingly, the trial court ordered respondent’s parental rights terminated 

with respect to all three children.

II. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that the trial court committed error when it determined that statutory 

grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and when it 

determined that termination of her parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. We 

disagree. 

This Court reviews a circuit court’s decision to terminate parental rights, as well as its 

determination of the child’s best interests, under the clear error standard. In re Williams, 286 

Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the 

reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due 

regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 

286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). Under that standard, the lower court’s decision must be 

“more than just maybe or probably wrong.” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356; 612 NW2d 

407 (2000) (citation omitted). 

“The petitioner bears the burden of establishing the existence of at least one of [the 

statutory grounds for termination of parental rights] by clear and convincing evidence.” In re 

JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Parental rights may be terminated under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i) when “182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial 

dispositional order,” and the “conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time 

considering the child’s age.” 

Here, Wetelainen testified that the conditions that led to adjudications were inadequate 

housing, domestic violence, mental health issues, and issues with parenting skills. Among other 

things, the parent-agency agreement required respondent to complete paperwork with various 

housing agencies in an effort to secure housing, that she participate in mental health services to 

address domestic violence and her mental health issues, and that she attend parenting time 

regularly. Wetelainen stated that little progress had been made and that there was no reasonable 

likelihood that the conditions that led to adjudication would be rectified in a reasonable amount 

of time. She explained that respondent did not have appropriate housing and respondent 

indicated that she was homeless. Wetelainen indicated that respondent had been offered housing 

assistance and that one location may have been an option except that respondent was excluded 
-3-

because she possessed a medical marijuana card. Wetelainen indicated that she was not aware of 

any other service she could provide that could assist respondent in finding housing. Respondent 

did profess that she would give up her medical marijuana card in order to get housing. However, 

even if she did and she were able to get housing, she did not overcome the other barriers to 

reunification.

Wetelainen testified that respondent’s domestic violence issues had not been resolved. 

She had been observed with the person who had assaulted her. Specifically, they were observed

“screaming” at each other, swearing, and calling each other names before respondent’s parenting 

time. Respondent noted that he was not involved in the children’s lives. But respondent was 

still engaged with her abuser, and there was no guarantee he would remain inactive in the 

children’s lives if they were returned to respondent’s care.

Regarding mental health issues, respondent began an intake appointment for mental 

health services with one facility, but she became frustrated when she learned that she would not 

be receiving prescription medication, only counseling, and left the appointment. Further, 

respondent cancelled or missed multiple intake appointments at another facility. She did not 

attend mental health counseling.

Respondent also failed to complete parenting classes. Although she could not have 

completed one set of parenting classes that were cancelled, she failed to complete a parenting 

handbook. Moreover, respondent had not consistently attended parenting time, only attending 

about 70 percent of visits. She had attended only 25 of the 52 scheduled meetings for EC’s 

Infant Mental Health program. The Infant Mental Health counselor explained that no progress 

had been made on respondent’s goals, and she could not identify a better attachment between 

respondent and EC. 

The testimony introduced at the hearing established that respondent had made no 

progress or no significant progress in attaining suitable housing, addressing domestic violence or 

mental health issues, or in improving her parenting skills. Therefore, we cannot conclude that 

the trial court was “more than just maybe or probably wrong,” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich at 

356 (citation omitted), in concluding that the “conditions that led to the adjudication continue to 

exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a 

reasonable time considering the child’s age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). 

Parental rights may be terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) when “[t]he parent, 

without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no 

reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a 

reasonable time considering the child’s age.” “[A] parent’s failure to comply with the parentagency agreement is evidence of a parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody for the 

child.” In re JK, 468 Mich at 214. As discussed above, respondent was homeless and had been 

unable to attain housing. She continued a romantic relationship with her abuser, who had been 

convicted of assaulting her. She had refused to complete a mental health intake appointment. 

She had made little to no progress with her parenting skills. Considering this evidence, we 

cannot conclude that the trial court was “more than just maybe or probably wrong,” In re Trejo 

Minors, 462 Mich at 356 (citation omitted), in concluding that petitioner had introduced clear 

and convincing evidence, In re JK, 468 Mich at 210, to establish that respondent failed to
-4-

provide proper care or custody and there was no reasonable expectation that she would be able to 

do so within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).

Respondent also argues that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to rectify the 

conditions that led to adjudication. Under the Probate Code, MCL 710.21 et seq., petitioner “has 

an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of 

parental rights.” In re Hicks, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 

712A.18f(3)(b) and (c); MCL 712A.19a(2). Those reasonable efforts must include petitioner’s 

creation of a service plan that states the steps that it, along with the parent, will take to resolve 

“the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.” Id. at 85-86. Before a 

child who has come within the jurisdiction of the family court will be returned to a parent, that 

parent must show that he or she can meet their child’s basic needs. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 

14, 28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). “If a parent cannot or will not meet her irreducible minimum 

parental responsibilities, the needs of the child must prevail over the needs of the parent.” Id. 

Although petitioner has “a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to 

secure reunification,” a respondent must participate in, and benefit from, services that are 

offered. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). 

The trial court found that petitioner had made reasonable efforts to preserve and unify the 

family. Petitioner referred respondent for drug and alcohol counseling, drug screens, Infant 

Mental Health for EC, Wraparound,2 and parenting classes. Additionally, petitioner offered a 

family support educator, housing assistance, supervised visitation and supportive visitation 

services, bus tickets, and therapy for AC. Thus, it appears that petitioner offered ample services 

to respondent. The services offered addressed all the identified barriers to reunification. 

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court was “more than just maybe or probably 

wrong,” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich at 356 (citation omitted), in concluding that petitioner had 

introduced clear and convincing evidence, In re JK, 468 Mich at 210, that petitioner made 

reasonable efforts to reunify the family prior to seeking termination of parental rights. In re 

Hicks, 500 Mich at 85-86.

Respondent also argues that the trial court committed clear error when it determined that 

termination was in the children’s best interests. We disagree. 

“Once a statutory ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence, 

the trial court must terminate parental rights unless it finds from the whole record that 

termination clearly is not in the child’s best interests.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App at 301; MCL 

712A.19b(5). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is 

in the best interests of the child. In re Laster, 303 Mich App 485, 496; 845 NW2d 540 (2013). 

 2 “Wraparound refers to an individually designed set of services and supports provided to 

children with serious emotional disturbance or serious mental illness and their families that 

includes treatment services, personal support services or any other supports necessary to 

maintain the child in the family home.” Michigan Department of Health & Human Services, 

Wraparound Services, <http://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-

71550_2941_4868_7145-14676--,00.html> (accessed November 22, 2017).
-5-

Factors to consider include the child’s bond to the parent; the parenting ability of the respondent; 

the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality; and a comparison between the parent’s 

home and the child’s foster home. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 

NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court may also consider “the length of time the child was in care, 

the likelihood that ‘the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the foreseeable 

future, if at all,’ and compliance with the case service plan.” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 

311 Mich App 49, 64; 874 NW2d 205 (2015), quoting In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249. In 

addition, the court may consider “the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of 

adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). 

The trial court concluded that termination was in the best interest of all three children. 

The Infant Mental Health counselor stated that EC attempted to bond with respondent, but that 

he also pushed her away at times, and she indicated that the two were not close. Wetelainen 

stated that LC usually did not participate in parenting time. The Teaching Family Homes worker

testified that LC did not display excitement either before or after parenting time. This indicates 

that there was little bond between respondent and EC and LC. According to her foster mother, 

AC would be excited prior to seeing respondent for parenting time and would become upset 

when respondent cancelled parenting time. This testimony indicates that there is at least some

bond between respondent and AC. 

As discussed above, respondent’s parenting skills were poor, and it appears that they 

were unlikely to improve. Additionally, the children had already been removed from respondent 

on three prior occasions. Therefore, the need for stability weighed in favor of termination. In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42. Further, as discussed above, respondent failed to 

comply with the parent-agency treatment plan, which also weighed in favor or termination. In re 

Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App at 64. 

Notably, the children demonstrated behavioral improvement while outside of 

respondent’s care. AC and EC were in foster care. Wetelainen stated that when AC first entered 

foster care “she was out of control,” and would “threaten to hurt her siblings.” Additionally, AC

did not consistently take her medications. Wetelainen testified that in foster care, AC “has made 

a lot of progress.” According to her foster mother, AC is “a typical teenager,” but she “listens 

pretty well to me and my husband.” AC’s foster mother testified that AC had “definitely” 

improved during the seven months they had been together. Shortly after AC moved in with her, 

stated her foster mother, AC ran away after school because her foster parents would not let her 

spend the night at a friend’s house, “[b]ut, after that, . . . she knew the consequences of being 

grounded, it’s just a normal typical teenager.” LC was placed at Teaching Family Homes and 

showed improvement in communicating when she was upset, accepting a decision that she could 

not do what she would like, and behaving appropriately rather than acting out to get attention. 

Wetelainen stated that five-year-old EC swears “a lot less frequent[ly]” now that he is in foster 

care and has established bonds with his foster parents. Given the evidence that the children were 

improving in their placements, “the children’s well-being while in care,” In re White, 303 Mich 

App at 714, weighed in favor of termination.

Considering the evidence presented, we cannot conclude that the trial court was “more 

than just maybe or probably wrong,” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich at 356 (citation omitted), in 
-6-

concluding that a preponderance of the evidence established that termination of parental rights 

was in the children’s best interests. In re Laster, 303 Mich App at 496.

We affirm. 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron