CAMP LEJEUNE: CONTAMINATION

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ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

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CAMP LEJEUNE: CONTAMINATION

AND COMPENSATION, LOOKING

BACK, MOVING FORWARD

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 16, 2010

Serial No. 111–108

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHY DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director 

EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel 

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS S. PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member 

KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member 

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

September 16, 2010

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 10

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 13

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15

Panel I:

Mr. Michael Partain, Member, ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistance 

Panel (CAP) and Breast Cancer Survivor Born on Camp Lejeune 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20

Biography .......................................................................................................... 41

Mr. James Watters, Director, Graduate Medical Education, Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, Former Navy Lieutenant, Retired Commander, Navy Reserve, Medical Service Corps and Camp Lejeune Veteran 

Diagnosed with Kidney Cancer 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 41

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44

Biography .......................................................................................................... 45

Mr. Peter Devereux, Former Marine Corps Corporal and Camp Lejeune Veteran Diagnosed with Breast Cancer 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 46

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 47

Biography .......................................................................................................... 52

Dr. Richard Clapp, Professor Emeritus, Department of Environmental Health, 

Boston University School of Public Health, Environmental Health Policy 

Consultant and Member of the ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistant Panel (CAP) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 52

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 54

Biography .......................................................................................................... 55

Mr. Michael Hargett, General Director, Anchimeric Associates and Former 

Co-Owner of Grainger Laboratories 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 55

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 59

Biography .......................................................................................................... 62
Page

IV

Panel II:

Major General Eugene G. Payne, Jr., Assistant Deputy Commandant for 

Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, United States Marine 

Corps 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 70

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 71

Biography .......................................................................................................... 76

Dr. Chris Portier, Director, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 

(ATSDR) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 77

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 78

Biography .......................................................................................................... 82

Mr. Thomas J. Pamperin, Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and 

Program Management, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. Department 

of Veterans Affairs 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 83

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 85

Biography .......................................................................................................... 88

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. Michael Partain, Member, ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistance 

Panel (CAP) and Breast Cancer Survivor Born on Camp Lejeune .................. 98

Dr. Richard Clapp, Professor Emeritus, Department of Environmental Health, 

Boston University School of Public Health, Environmental Health Policy 

Consultant and Member of the ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistant Panel (CAP) ................................................................................................... 111

Mr. Michael Hargett, General Director, Anchimeric Associates and Former 

Co-Owner of Grainger Laboratories ................................................................... 115

Major General Eugene G. Payne, Jr., Assistant Deputy Commandant for 

Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, United States Marine 

Corps ..................................................................................................................... 120

Dr. Chris Portier, Director, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 

(ATSDR) ................................................................................................................ 140

Mr. Thomas J. Pamperin, Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and 

Program Management, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. Department 

of Veterans Affairs ............................................................................................... 145

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

U.S. Department of the Navy U.S. Marine Corps Camp Lejeune Documents 

for the Record ....................................................................................................... 154

Supporting Reference Documents to Accompany Written Testimony of Mr. 

Michael Partain .................................................................................................... 425
(1)

CAMP LEJEUNE: CONTAMINATION AND COMPENSATION, LOOKING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
2
3

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Camp Lejeune: Contamination and Compensation,

Looking Back, Moving Forward 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2010

10:00 A.M. TO 12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

The Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Committee on 

Science and Technology will convene a hearing at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, September 16, 2010, to examine the toxic legacy of drinking water contamination at 

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. The hearing will examine the 

Department of the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps’ knowledge of past contamination 

at Camp Lejeune, as well as prior and current analyses by the Agency for Toxic 

Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a sister agency of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), regarding toxic exposures at Camp Lejeune. 

The hearing will also review current cooperative efforts by the U.S. Navy and 

ATSDR concerning the identification and access to records required to complete 

these studies. In addition, the hearing will examine the process by which veterans 

have been compensated for illnesses due to environmental exposures at Camp 

Lejeune and what steps the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and U.S. Navy are 

currently taking to ensure that Camp Lejeune veterans and their dependents are 

quickly and appropriately compensated for any illnesses or health issues related to 

toxic exposures while serving at the Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base.

Key Issues.

1. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). For thirty years, Marines and their dependents serving at Camp LeJeune were exposed to toxic chemicals in their 

drinking water. It took the USMC more than four years to shut down drinking water wells they knew to be contaminated with toxic chemicals and another 24 years and an act of Congress to force them to inform veterans about 

this contamination of potential health problems. For two decades the U.S. 

Marine Corps prevented full disclosure regarding the true extent of contamination at Camp Lejeune. In the past, ATSDR has struggled to obtain complete cooperation and support from the Navy in providing them with records 

necessary to conduct accurate and comprehensive public health assessments 

of Camp Lejeune’s toxic hazards. The U.S. Marine Corps continue to view 

past environmental contamination at Camp Lejeune as a public relations 

battle rather than a public health hazard. In July 2010, for instance, they 

released a glossy booklet on Camp Lejeune’s Historic Drinking Water which 

excludes critical information and misrepresents scientific conclusions about 

the health impact of past toxic exposures on Camp Lejeune residents.

2. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). In 1997 

ATSDR published a Public Health Assessment (PHA) on Camp Lejeune that 

concluded exposures to volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the tap water, 

including trichloroethylene (TCE), tetrachloroethylene (PCE), and 1,2-

dichloroethylene (DCE), were a past public health hazard. But ATSDR failed 

to adequately investigate exposures to another toxic contaminant found in 

the Camp Lejeune water supply: benzene. The final PHA included a single 

reference to benzene in an appendix despite the fact the agency had records 

indicating high levels of benzene contamination in wells on the base. Last 

year ATSDR withdrew that Public Health Assessment, partly because they 

claimed that in the intervening years since it was published in 1997 they discovered additional records about the extent of toxic contamination at Camp 

Lejeune. Indeed, the recent discovery of Navy records drastically alters previous conclusions about the extent of benzene contamination at Camp 

Lejeune. However, even the information ATSDR had in 1997 should have 
4

1William C. Neal, Jr., Chief, Laboratory Services, TTHM (trihalomethane) Surveillance Report Form, Installation: MCB—LA JEUNE (sic)—HADNOT POINT, Date Collected: 21 Oct. 

1980, Date Received: 30 Oct. 1980, Data Analyzed: 31 Oct. 1980. 2William C. Neal, Jr., Chief, Laboratory Services, TTHM (trihalomethane) Surveillance Report Form, Installation: CAMP LA JEUNE (sic) HADNOT POINT, Date Collected: 29 Jan., 

1981, Date Received: 30 Jan., 1981, Data Analyzed: 9 Feb. 1981. 3William C. Neal, Jr., Chief, Laboratory Services, TTHM (trihalomethane) Surveillance Report Form, Installation: CAMP LA JEUNE (sic) HADNOT POINT, Date Collected: 26 Feb. 1981, 

Date Received: 9 Mar. 1981, Data Analyzed: 9 Mar. 1981. 4 Bruce A. Babson, Chemist, Grainger Laboratories to Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Base, Camp Lejeune, NC, Attention: AC/S Facilities, August 10, 1982, Subject: Analyses of samples 206 and 207 from site coded ‘‘TT’’ and samples 208 and 209 from site coded ‘‘HP’’. Samples 

received July 29, 1982.

sparked a much more aggressive investigation of the benzene exposures at 

the time.

3. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA currently has 191 claims 

from Camp Lejeune veterans. They have reviewed 15–16 of those cases and 

granted claims to 5–6 veterans determining that their illnesses are ‘more 

likely than not’ tied to toxic chemical exposures from Camp Lejeune’s drinking water. Two of those six veterans who received claims will be testifying 

at the Subcommittee’s hearing. Currently the VA handles disability claims 

based on exposure to contaminated water at Camp Lejeune on a case-by-case 

basis. However, the Secretary of the VA is currently weighing a decision regarding the establishment of specific presumptive health conditions tied to 

environmental exposures at Camp Lejeune. Subcommittee Chairman Miller 

introduced a bill last year called the Janey Ensminger Act that would have 

the VA provide health care services to both veterans and their family members who have experienced adverse health effects as a result of exposures to 

contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune.

Background 

Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune covers approximately 233 square miles 

in Onslow County, North Carolina. The base and surrounding area is home to an 

active duty, dependant, retiree and civilian population of approximately 170,000. 

Camp Lejeune’s mission is to maintain combat ready units for expeditionary deployment. Since MCB Camp Lejeune began operations in 1941, environmental contamination has occurred in many areas due to the use, handling, and disposal of hazardous chemicals. Contaminated areas are scattered within the industrial, training 

and residential areas on the base. As many as one million individuals have been 

exposed to these contaminants. 

Warnings of the base’s contaminated drinking water problems first surfaced in 

1980. The laboratory of the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency collected 

water samples at Camp Lejeune on October 21, 1980, and ran tests on those samples ten days later. A handwritten surveillance report form noted:

WATER IS HIGHLY CONTAMINATED WITH LOW MOLECULAR WEIGHT 

HALO-GENERATED HYDROCARBONS.1

The Army ran follow-up tests in January, February and March 1981. Both the 

January and February 1981 surveillance report forms said:

YOU NEED TO ANALYZE FOR CHLORINATED ORGANICS . . . .2

Each report carried similar warnings about contamination and showed there was 

strong interference in getting accurate test results due to unidentified chemicals. 

The Chief of Laboratory Services again offered warnings on his remarks regarding 

the results of the March 1981 test data:

WATER HIGHLY CONTAMINATED WITH OTHER CHLORINATED HYDROCARBONS (SOLVENTS)! 3

On August 10, 1982, Bruce A. Babson, a chemist at Grainger Laboratories who 

had been contracted by the Marine Corps to conduct environmental sampling at 

Camp Lejeune wrote to the Commanding General of the Camp Lejeune Marine 

Corps Base:

Interferences which were thought to be chlorinated hydrocarbons hindered the 

quantitation (sic) of certain Trihalomethanes. These appeared to be at high levels and hence more important from a health standpoint than the total 

Trihalomethane content. For these reasons we called the situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune personnel.4
5

5Memorandum, Subj: Grainger Laboratories Letter of 10 August 1982, From: Ms. Betz, Quality Control Lab., Environmental Section, NREAB, BMaintDiv; To: Mr. Sharpe, Supervisory 

Ecologist, Environmental Section, NREAB, BMaintDiv, Date: 19 August 1982.

Nine days later, Elizabeth A. Betz, the Supervisory Chemist in the Quality Control Lab at Camp Lejeune wrote a memorandum to one of her colleagues regarding 

the August 10, 1982 letter from Grainger Labs chemist Bruce Babson and previous 

conversations she had had with Grainger Lab co-owner Mike Hargett. The lab had 

identified the chemicals that had been interfering with previous test results. In the 

Tarawa Terrace water treatment plant and system the interfering chlorinated hydrocarbon was determined to be tetrachloroethylene, otherwise known as 

perchloroethylene, wrote Betz. An analysis of the Hadnot Point water treatment 

plant and system showed trichloroethylene and low levels of tetrachloroethylene. 

Betz indicated that neither of these chemicals were regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act at the time. Nevertheless, Betz noted that they were still harmful 

to humans:

Trichloroethylene, like tetrachloroethylene and other halogenated hydrocarbons 

(ie Trihalomethanes), at high levels, has been reported to produce liver and kidney damage and central nervous system disturbances in humans.5

Despite these warnings it took more than two more years, and the discovery of 

another more sinister contaminant, benzene, before Department of the Navy or the 

U.S. Marine Corps took steps to actually close the contaminated wells. In July 1984 

test data from another contractor indicated that well #602 in the Hadnot Point Industrial Area had a benzene level of 380-parts per billion (ppb). The current maximum contaminant limit for benzene exposure set by the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) is 5-ppb. 

The Marine Corps claim they did not receive this disturbing test data until November 1984 and took immediate actions to shut down the well. One record from 

Camp Lejeune’s supervisory chemist, Elizabeth Betz, in April 1989 suggests that 

base officials were not informed of the benzene contamination in Well #602 at the 

Hadnot Point Fuel Farm until November 30, 1984, when they received a call about 

the test results from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Atlantic Division 

(LANTDIV) based in Norfolk, Virginia. It has remained unclear, however, when 

Navy officials at LANTDIV were made aware of the July 1984 benzene test results. 

Finally, however, after more than four years after Camp Lejeune officials first 

learned of toxic contamination in some of the base’s drinking water wells they took 

action to shut these wells down. Between November 1984 and February 1985, ten 

potable water wells at Camp Lejeune, including Hadnot Point’s well #602 were finally shut down and taken out of service due to contamination with volatile organic 

chemicals (VOCs).

ATSDR Steps In. 

In December 1988, the Department of the Navy issued a letter to ATSDR requesting that the agency perform a health assessment at Camp Lejeune. In October 1989, 

Camp Lejeune was placed on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) National Priorities List (NPL). In 1991 

ATSDR began a Public Health Assessment (PHA) of toxic contamination at Camp 

Lejeune. In October 1994 ATSDR published an ‘‘Initial Release’’ version of its assessment and in 1997 it released the final version of the report. 

The ATSDR assessment found three past public health hazards: 1) exposure to 

lead in the tap water in on-base buildings containing lead plumbing; 2) past exposure to VOCs in three drinking water systems on base (Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot 

Point, and Holcombe Boulevard); and 3) past exposure to pesticides in the soil at 

a former day-care center. It also considered three issues to be of no apparent hazard: 1) groundwater contamination on base; 2) exposure from eating fish from Wallace Creek, Bear Head Creek, Cogdels Creek, Orde Pond, Everett Creek, and the 

New River near Sites 28, 69, and 48 and; 3) Soil Contamination at Site 69. 

The 1997 Public Health Assessment stated:

‘‘Volatile organic compound (VOC) levels in three base drinking water systems 

(Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point, and Holcombe Boulevard) were a health concern until 1985 when use of contaminated wells stopped. Well contamination 

was caused from leaks in off-base and on-base underground tanks that were installed in the 1940s and 1950s. Human exposure to trichloroethylene (TCE), 

tetrachloroethylene (PCE), and 1,2-dichloroethylene (DCE) in drinking water 

systems at MCB Camp Lejeune have been documented over a period of 34 
6

6 ‘‘Public Health Assessment for U.S. Marine Corps Camp LeJeune Military Reservation Camp 

LeJeune, Onslow County, North Carolina, August 4, 1997, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, p.2.

months, but likely occurred for a longer period of time, perhaps as long as 30 

years.’’ 6

But the ATSDR Public Health Assessment (PHA) had a critical omission. It failed 

to address the issue of known benzene contamination in Camp Lejeune’s drinking 

water supply. The report contained a single reference to benzene in a chart in the 

appendix of the publication regarding well 602 at the Hadnot Point Industrial Area 

Tank Farm. ‘‘Groundwater contamination (benzene, etc.) was detected in base drinking water supply well 602,’’ said the assessment. ‘‘That well has not been used since 

1984.’’ Yet, references in the final 1997 and the previous two drafts of the document 

released by ATSDR in 1994 and 1995 all contained references to a May 1988 ‘‘confirmation study’’ by Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc. that highlighted 

extremely elevated levels of benzene in the water supply wells at Camp Lejeune. 

ATSDR scientists involved in the PHA say they did not pursue the benzene issue 

further at the time because there was no evidence benzene was detected ‘‘at the 

tap.’’ This justification for not evaluating the likelihood of benzene exposure at the 

base was cited in a 1994 draft of ATSDR’s Public Health Assessment, but was removed from the final version. However, an August 1998 publication by ATSDR on 

‘‘Adverse Pregnancy Outcomes’’ at Camp Lejeune says that while benzene was not 

detected in the ‘‘Hadnot Point tap water,’’ ‘‘Nonetheless, low level exposure (an estimated 35 ppb) would have been expected among women receiving Hadnot Point 

water before December 1984.’’ The contaminated well was shut down in November 

1984, four months after the benzene was first discovered in well #602 in July 1984. 

In addition, at some point between 1995 and the publication of the final ATSDR 

Public Health Assessment on Camp Lejeune in 1997, the agency’s entire file on 

Camp Lejeune was mistakenly thrown out—tossed in the trash—by a contractor. It 

is still unclear how ATSDR published a final version of the Public Health Assessment without the supporting documents, but ATSDR says they knew where to go 

to retrieve the scientific references in the 1997 Public Health Assessment even if 

they did not actually have the data on hand. 

Last year ATSDR withdrew its 1997 PHA, partly because they claimed that in 

the intervening years since its publication new material was discovered about the 

extent of toxic benzene contamination at Camp Lejeune. It is true that new data 

ATSDR has obtained from a Department of Navy database in the past year regarding the degree of benzene contamination at Camp Lejeune significantly alters the 

evaluation of the public health impact of exposures to this toxic chemical at Camp 

Lejeune. ATSDR did, however, acknowledge the flaws in the 1997 assessment when 

they publicly removed it from their web-site. ‘‘Also, at the Camp Lejeune site, benzene was present in one drinking-water supply well in the Hadnot Point drinking 

water system,’’ ATSDR said. ‘‘That well was shut down sometime prior to 1985. This 

information should have been included in the PHA but was not. The PHA should 

have mentioned the contamination and stated that the extent of exposure to benzene from that well was unknown.’’

ATSDR has struggled to obtain full access to U.S. Marine Corps and Department 

of Navy records regarding Camp Lejeune’s environmental contamination for years. 

As early as 1994 ATSDR began writing letters to the U.S. Marine Corps complaining that they were not receiving the cooperation or access to vital records regarding the full extent of toxic contamination on Camp Lejeune or the potential 

health impact. These issues have flared up sporadically ever since. In 2005 ATSDR 

informed investigators at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that it had 

learned there were a ‘‘substantial number of additional documents that had not 

been previously provided to them by Camp Lejeune officials.’’

It is difficult to provide clear scientific analyses when you cannot be certain that 

the records you are relying on for that analysis are complete. In the past most estimates assumed between 20,000 to 30,000 gallons of fuel had leaked from the underground storage tanks at Camp Lejeune, for instance. The newly discovered Navy 

documents, however, estimate that between 1988 and 1991 there was as much as 

1.1 million gallons of gasoline floating on top of the groundwater table at Camp 

Lejeune. The report noted: ‘‘While this estimated volume seems incredibly large, it 

must be remembered that this took place over 50 years, yielding an average loss 

of over 21,200 gallons/year (or 58 gallons/day.)’’ Benzene is a key component of gasoline. ATSDR officials say they had never been informed of these records previously 

and stumbled upon them without any direction from the U.S. Marine Corps or Department of the Navy. 
7

[1] NRC report, page 13 7 ‘‘Camp Lejeune: Historic Drinking Water, Questions and Answers,’’ U.S. Marine Corps, July 

2010, p. 10.

Despite this, it is also clear from the Subcommittee’s review of records that 

ATSDR had significant information about benzene contamination at Camp Lejeune 

when they conducted their health assessment in 1997 and should have been more 

diligent in investigating the public health implications of the benzene contamination 

at the time. To help resolve issues regarding identification and access to Camp 

Lejeune environmental documents necessary for ATSDR to complete its ongoing 

health studies and analyses regarding toxic exposures at the base ATSDR and the 

Department of the Navy have formed a datamining work group that is attempting 

to resolve these access issues quickly. 

ATSDR currently has five separate health investigations regarding Camp Lejeune 

in the works. Some of these projects have been ongoing for years and four of the 

five studies will not be completed until at least spring 2012. The last one is expected 

in 2013. Considering these studies have taken years already to complete ATSDR 

should make every effort to finalize them as soon as possible without jeopardizing 

the scientific integrity of the products they deliver.

National Research Council (NRC) report. 

In 2009 the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies published Contaminated Water Supplies at Camp Lejeune—Assessing the Potential 

Health Effects. The NRC study was mandated at the direction of Congress in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364, 

109th Congress). The legislation specifically called for the Secretary of the Navy to 

enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of the available scientific and medical evidence regarding associations of human exposure to drinking water contaminated with trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The legislation never directed the NRC to evaluate exposures to benzene and 

they did not do so. 

The committee divided its review into two major categories: (1) evaluating the exposures of former residents and workers to the contamination of the Tarawa Terrace 

and Hadnot Point water-supply systems, and (2) evaluating the potential health effects associated with the water contaminants TCE and PCE. The assessments were 

then considered together to ascertain whether conclusions could be drawn about 

whether any adverse health outcomes could be attributed to the water contaminants. The report’s main conclusion:

It cannot be determined reliably whether diseases and disorders experienced by 

former residents and workers at Camp Lejeune are associated with their exposure to contaminants in the water supply because of data shortcomings and 

methodological limitations, and these limitations cannot be overcome with additional study. Thus, the committee concludes that there is no scientific justification for the Navy and Marine Corps to wait for the results of additional health 

studies before making decisions about how to follow up on the evident solvent 

exposures on the base and their possible health consequences. The services 

should undertake the assessments they deem appropriate to determine how to 

respond in light of the available information.[1]

‘‘Camp Lejeune: Historic Drinking Water, Questions and Answers,’’ U.S. Marine Corps, July 2010

The U.S. Marine Corps has attempted to mischaracterize the National Research 

Council (NRC) report as well as ATSDR’s past health studies in their most recent 

public relations document regarding contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune. 

In July, the U.S. Marine Corps published a glossy booklet that sought to provide 

‘‘questions and answers’’ regarding Camp Lejeune’s drinking water history. But the 

booklet is misleading in several regards. 

The Marine Corps booklet asserts:

Since 1991, several health initiatives have been conducted to identify the possible effects of exposure to contaminated water at Camp Lejeune. The studies 

conducted to date have not shown any causal link between exposure to contaminated water at Camp Lejeune and illnesses.7

In fact, in at least three separate places in the short Marine Corps booklet they 

claim that no studies have shown an ‘‘association between exposure to the contaminated water and health conditions reported by former residents of Camp Lejeune.’’ 
8

8Memorandum, Subj: Grainger Laboratories Letter of 10 August 1982, From: Ms. Betz, Quality Control Lab., Environmental Section, NREAB, BMaintDiv; To: Mr. Sharpe, Supervisory 

Ecologist, Environmental Section, NREAB, BMaintDiv, Date: 19 August 1982.

However, ATSDR informed the Marine Corps on September 10, 2010, that these 

statements are incorrect and said the only completed health study at Camp Lejeune 

which was conducted by ATSDR did, in fact, find an association between adverse 

health effects and exposures to PCE on the base. 

ATSDR reminded the Marine Corps that in their report ‘‘associations were found 

with Small for Gestational Age (SGA) and specific sub-groupings of PCE-exposed 

mothers. SGA was not a health condition ‘‘reported by former residents’’ but instead 

was an adverse outcome that has been found in other studies at other sites to be 

associated with environmental exposures including exposures to chemical drinking 

water contaminants,’’ wrote ATSDR. ‘‘Evidence exists, based mostly on occupational 

studies, of associations between these chemical contaminants and cancers and other 

adverse health outcomes.’’ ATSDR recommended that the Marine Corps ‘‘booklet 

should report these findings and state that research on other illnesses is still underway.’’

In addition, the Marine Corps booklet uses several arguments to explain why they 

did not immediately shut down water wells they knew were contaminated with toxic 

chemicals. They have argued that they immediately shut down the wells once they 

identified the ‘‘source’’ of the contamination. But this response fails to answer the 

question why they did not shut the wells down once they first learned that they 

were contaminated with hazardous chemicals. 

The Marine pamphlet suggests that the chemicals in the drinking water, at the 

time, were not regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act so they had no obligation 

or legal responsibility to close them. ‘‘In 1982, the interfering chemicals in the base 

water system were identified as trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene 

(PCE), which were not regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act at the time,’’ the 

Marine Corps booklet states. ‘‘When contaminants were subsequently discovered in 

certain wells, these wells were promptly removed from service.’’

But back in 1982 when Navy chemist Elizabeth Betz wrote her memorandum on 

Grainger Laboratories’ discovery of high levels of trichloroethylene (TCE) in the 

Camp Lejeune water supply she also noted that it was not regulated by the Safe 

Drinking Water Act at the time. Still, this did not obscure her knowledge that it 

was still hazardous to human health in spite of the lack of regulations governing 

human exposures to it. Even before TCE, PCE and benzene were added to the list 

of chemicals that were regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act between 1989 and 

1992, it was well established these chemicals were hazardous. It is important to remember that in 1982 when Betz wrote that memo warning of the health implications of exposures to these chemicals they were not regulated by the Safe Drinking 

Water Act, but were clearly dangerous to human health nonetheless. Betz warned:

Trichloroethylene, like tetrachloroethylene and other halogenated 

hyudrocarbons (ie Trihalomethands), at high levels, has been reported to 

produce liver and kidney damage and central nervous system disturbances in 

humans.8

Today, the Department of Veterans Affairs is beginning to provide benefits to 

Camp Lejeune veterans who were exposed to TCE, for instance, and developed kidney cancer as a result. One of the witnesses at the Subcommittee hearing, Jim 

Watters, is a Camp Lejeune vet who developed kidney cancer from his exposures 

to these chemicals at Camp Lejeune and received a 100-percent disability award 

from the VA last year. 

The unofficial motto of the U.S. Marine Corps is to ‘‘never leave a Marine behind.’’ 

This should be applied not just to the brave Marines that have fought for our nation 

around the world but for those at home as well. And Camp Lejeune veterans should 

be no exception.

Witnesses:

Panel I

Dr. Richard Clapp, Professor Emeritus, Department of Environmental Health, Boston University School of Public Health, environmental health policy consultant and 

member of the ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistance Panel (CAP)

Mr. Mike Partain, Member, ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistance Panel 

(CAP) and breast cancer survivor born on Camp Lejeune
9

Mr. Peter Devereaux, Former Marine Corps Corporal and Camp Lejeune veteran 

diagnosed with breast cancer

Mr. Jim Watters, Director, Graduate Medical Education, Texas Tech University 

Health Sciences Center, former Navy Lieutenant, retired Commander, Navy Reserve, 

Medical Service Corps and Camp Lejeune veteran diagnosed with kidney cancer

Mr. Michael Hargett, General Director, Anchimeric Associates and former coowner of Grainger Laboratories

Panel II

Dr. Chris Portier, Director, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 

(ATSDR)

Mr. Thomas J. Pamperin, Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and Program Management, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans 

Affairs

Major General Eugene G. Payne, Jr., Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

10:00a.m. – 12:00p.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building (WEBCAST)
10

Chairman MILLER. This hearing will now come to order. 

Just a quick word on pronunciation. The Marines properly honored General Lejeune by naming an installation after him but they 

placed the installation in eastern North Carolina, where North 

Carolinians immediately called it Camp Lejeune. I suspect if they 

had located it in rural Georgia, Georgians would have said Camp 

Lejeune as well, and all of my life I have heard it called Camp 

Lejeune by North Carolinians and by Marines alike. I understand 

recently the Marines have decided that it would more appropriately 

honor General Lejeune if they called the base named after him 

Camp Lejeune. That is the way he pronounced his own name. He 

was from Louisiana. That is the proper French Creole pronunciation. That is the way his family pronounces his name. But I think 

the view of most North Carolinians is that if the Navy wanted to 

name a base Camp Lejeune, they should have put it in Louisiana. 

And just as soon as South Dakotans start calling their state capital 

Pierre instead of Pierre we would start saying Camp Lejeune. So 

it is with no disrespect to General Lejeune that I will say Camp 

Lejeune today because it would be changing the habits of a lifetime 

which would be difficult to do for today’s hearing. 

Good morning, and welcome to today’s hearing entitled ‘‘Camp 

Lejeune: Contamination and Compensation, Looking Back, Moving 

Forward.’’

For 30 years, as many as one million Marines and their families 

training and living on the base at Camp Lejeune were exposed to 

toxic chemicals in their drinking water. Solvents such as trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene (PCE) and byproducts of fuel 

such as benzene leeched into the base water supply and were consumed by Marines, their wives, their children and by members of 

the community who worked on the base. 

We will never be certain about all the adverse health consequences that come from consuming that toxic cocktail, but we can 

be certain that some Marines and their dependants will develop 

cancers that will shorten their lives. In fact, that has already happened. We are certain that the Marine Corps failed to close the 

wells promptly when they were informed of the presence of TCE 

and PCE in their water. Instead, they provided that water to their 

people for two more years. 

The wells were shut down in the mid-1980s. For the two decades, 

the Marine Corps leadership and the Department of the Navy have 

denied that they had a water problem at Camp Lejeune. Because 

no law was broken and the contaminated wells were eventually 

shut down, the Navy continues to deny that they bear responsibility for taking care of those veterans, for those Marines and their 

families. Children have died from rare forms of leukemia, but the 

Navy says they are not responsible for that. Marines and their dependants have developed male breast cancer, but the Navy says it 

is not their problem. While the Department of Veterans Affairs has 

begun to extend benefits for cancers that they view as more likely 

than not caused by exposure to the toxic water, to drinking the 

toxic water, the Navy continues to wait for scientific certainty of 

causation. The Navy expresses deep concern, and waits on science 

to answer with certainty the question of whether the toxic chemi-
11

cals they admit contaminated the water at Camp Lejeune are responsible for any adverse health conditions. 

As anyone who has followed science in public health should 

know, there will never be scientific certainty that any particular 

disease in any particular person is tied to any particular exposure. 

Toxic chemicals and human health tends to be about probabilities, 

not certainties. Science will never give the Navy certainty and so 

long as they wait, no veteran and no family member will ever receive their due from the Navy. 

The Marine Corps has recently put out a glossy booklet regarding the history of Camp Lejeune’s drinking water and their response to the toxic contamination at the base. It is their side of the 

story, but it is not a complete factual history of what happened at 

Camp Lejeune, what happened to Camp Lejeune’s drinking water 

supply, nor does it accurately portray when the Marines became 

aware of those hazards, those known hazards, how they responded 

to that information or the actual public health implications of those 

toxic chemicals on those exposed to them. 

Relying on the advice of lawyers, hiding behind science that is 

slow and uncertain, and spending more energy on public relations 

than on helping Marines and their families, the leadership of the 

Marine Corps and Navy appears to have qualified their sense of 

service and obligation by concerns about possible legal liability. 

They are faithful only to the point that their attorneys tell them 

not to admit responsibility or accept liability. 

The facts are these: The U.S. Marine Corps failed to act quickly 

or forcefully enough in the 1980s to close down water supply wells 

it knew were contaminated with toxic chemicals that were endangering the health and safety of its Marines and their families at 

Camp Lejeune. 

I would like to understand why it took so long for the Marine 

Corps to respond because they have so far failed to provide any 

adequate explanation to the public, Congress or the Marines who 

served at Camp Lejeune and their families. I hope that U.S. Marine Corps Major General Payne can address those issues today. 

He will be on the second panel. 

For its part, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a sister agency of the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (CDC), produced a public health assessment of 

human health hazards posed by Camp Lejeune’s drinking water 

supply in 1997 that was inadequate. I am glad to see that the 

agency has acknowledged that inadequacy and had withdrawn this 

publication last year. The 1997 health assessment evaluated the 

public health impact from exposures to TCE and PCE that infiltrated the drinking water supply at Camp Lejeune up through the 

1980s, but it failed to investigate and evaluate the effect of benzene 

contamination at the base at that time. It is critically important 

that ATSDR carry out its slate of proposed studies as quickly as 

possible. These studies will not provide the certainty regarding exposure and disease that some expect, but they should help identify 

the range of possible cancers and other conditions that could be 

produced from exposure to the polluted drinking water at Camp 

Lejeune. 
12

We will hear today from the Department of Veterans Affairs. I 

am pleased that the VA has begun to award some Camp Lejeune 

veterans for illnesses they developed that the VA has found were 

more likely than not caused by exposures to toxic chemicals in the 

drinking water at Camp Lejeune. Two of our witnesses are among 

the half dozen awards the VA has already granted. But that leaves 

dependants of Marine veterans who have been harmed by these exposures, like Mike Partain, to fall through the cracks. 

I introduced a bill last year called the Janey Ensminger Act that 

would have the VA provide health care services to both veterans 

and their family members who have experienced adverse health effects as a result of exposure to contaminated drinking water at 

Camp Lejeune. The bill is named for Janey Ensminger, a nineyear-old girl who died from childhood Leukemia in 1985 after being 

exposed to the drinking water while her mother was pregnant with 

her. Her father is 24-year Marine veteran, Jerry Ensminger, who 

is here today, who has testified powerfully before this Committee 

in the past, and Jerry has been a tireless advocate for military 

families exposed to the contamination at Camp Lejeune. 

I believe the VA has begun to move in the right direction by 

awarding this small pool of veterans the compensation they need 

and deserve. I believe it is time that the Department of the Navy 

and U.S. Marine Corps stop fighting those efforts and focus their 

energies on taking care of their own now and in the future. It is 

time that the leadership of the Navy and Marine Corp lived up to 

the motto of the Corps. They could learn from the example of Jerry 

Ensminger, who has been faithful always to the memory of his 

daughter and to all the victims of the toxic drinking water at Camp 

Lejeune. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

The title of today’s hearing is: ‘‘Camp Lejeune: Contamination and Compensation, 

Looking Back, Moving Forward.’’

For thirty years, as many as one million Marines and their families training and 

living on the base at Camp LeJeune were exposed to toxic chemicals in their drinking water. Solvents such as trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene (PCE) 

and by-products of fuel such as benzene leeched into the base water supply and 

were consumed by Marines, their wives, their children and by members of the community who worked on the base. 

We will never be certain about all the adverse health consequences that come 

from consuming that toxic cocktail, but we can be certain that some Marines and 

some dependents will develop cancers that will shorten their lives. We are certain 

that the Marine Corp failed to close the wells promptly when they were informed 

of the presence of TCE and PCE in their water. Instead, they provided that water 

to their people for two more years. 

The wells were shut down in the mid-1980s. For the two decades since, the Marine Corp leadership and the Department of the Navy have denied that they have 

a water problem. Because ‘‘no law was broken’’ and the contaminated wells were, 

eventually, shut down, the Navy continues to deny that they bear responsibility for 

taking care of these veterans and their families. Children have died from rare forms 

of leukemia, but the Navy says they are not responsible. Marines and dependents 

have developed male breast cancer, but the Navy says, ‘‘not our problem’’. While the 

Department of Veterans Affairs has begun to extend benefits for cancers that they 

view as ‘‘more likely than not’’ caused by drinking the toxic water, the Navy continues to wait for scientific certainty of causation. 

The Navy expresses deep concern, and waits on science to answer with certainty 

the question of whether the toxic chemicals they admit contaminated the water at 

LeJeune are responsible for any adverse health conditions. As anyone who has followed science in public health should know, there will never be scientific certainty 
13

that any particular disease in any particular person is tied to any particular exposure. Toxic chemicals and human health tends to be about probabilities, not certainties. Science will never give the Navy certainty and so long as they wait, no veteran and no family members will ever receive their due from the Navy. 

The Marine Corps has recently put out a glossy booklet regarding the history of 

Camp Lejeune’s drinking water and their response to the toxic contamination at the 

base. It may be their side of the story, but it is not the complete factual history of 

what happened to Camp Lejeune’s drinking water supply, nor does it accurately portray when the Marines became aware of these known hazards, how they responded 

to this information or the actual public health implications of these toxic chemicals 

on those exposed to them. 

Relying on the advice of lawyers, hiding behind science that is slow and uncertain, 

and spending more energy on public relations than on helping Marines and their 

families, the leadership of the Marine Corps and Navy appears to have qualified 

their sense of service and obligation by concerns about possible legal liability. They 

are faithful only to the point where their attorneys tell them not to admit responsibility or accept liability. 

The facts are these: The U.S. Marine Corps failed to act quickly or forcefully 

enough in the 1980s to close down water supply wells it knew were contaminated 

with toxic chemicals that were endangering the health and safety of its Marines and 

their families on Camp Lejeune. 

I would like to understand why it took so long for the Marine Corps to respond 

because they have so far failed to provide an adequate explanation to the public, 

Congress or the Marines who served at Camp Lejeune and their families. I hope 

that U.S. Marine Corps Major General Payne can help address those issues today. 

For its part, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a 

sister agency of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), produced a 

Public Health Assessment of human health hazards posed by Camp Lejeune’s drinking water supply in 1997 that was inadequate. I am glad to see that the agency 

has acknowledged that inadequacy and withdrew this publication last year. The 

1997 health assessment evaluated the public health impact from exposures to TCE 

and PCE that infiltrated the drinking water supply at Camp Lejeune up through 

the 1980s, but it failed to investigate and evaluate the effect of benzene contamination at the base at that time. It is critically important that ATSDR carry out its 

slate of promised studies as quickly as possible. These studies will not provide the 

certainty regarding exposure and disease that some expect, but they should help 

identify the range of possible cancers and other conditions that could be produced 

from exposure to the polluted drinking water at Camp LeJeune. 

We will also hear from the Department of Veterans Affairs today. I am pleased 

that the VA has begun to award some Camp Lejeune veterans for illnesses they developed that the VA has found were ‘‘more likely than not’’ caused by exposures to 

toxic chemical contamination in the drinking water at Camp Lejeune. Two of our 

witnesses are among the half dozen awards the VA has already granted. But that 

leaves dependents of Marine veterans who have been harmed by these exposures, 

like Mike Partain, to fall through the cracks. 

I introduced a bill last year called the Janey Ensminger Act that would have the 

VA provide health care services to both veterans and their family members who 

have experienced adverse health effects as a result of exposure to contaminated 

drinking water at Camp Lejeune. The bill is named for Janey Ensminger, a 9-year 

old girl who died from childhood Leukemia in 1985 after being exposed to the water 

at Camp Lejeune while in utero. Her father is 24-year Marine Corps veteran Jerry 

Ensminger who has been a tireless advocate for military families exposed to contamination at Camp Lejeune. 

I believe the VA has begun to move in the right direction by awarding this small 

pool of veterans the compensation they need and deserve. I believe it is time that 

the Department of the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps stop fighting these efforts, and 

focus their energies on taking care of their own now and in the future. It is time 

that the leadership of the Navy and Marine Corp lived up to the motto of the Corps. 

They could learn from the example of Jerry Ensminger, who has been faithful always to the memory of his daughter and to all the victims of the toxic drinking 

water at Camp Lejeune.

Chairman MILLER. The Chair now recognizes our ranking member from Georgia, Dr. Broun, for an opening statement. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Speculating how people 

in Georgia would pronounce General Lejeune’s name is just speculation. We have a city called Cairo, Georgia. Most people would 
14

pronounce that Cairo. We have the University of Georgia in Albany, Georgia, where General Payne admirably served down there. 

But as a Marine, I know it as Camp Lejeune. 

Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today 

and also want to thank the chairman for holding this hearing. As 

a Marine, a family doctor and a legislator, I am very sensitive to 

the health of our service members and our veterans and to their 

families. We owe them a debt of gratitude for their service, a debt 

that must include vigilance in caring for them after leaving the 

military. It’s a sacred obligation of this government to take care of 

our troops not only while they are on active duty but as well after 

they leave active duty. 

Camp Lejeune has a proud history of training Marines to defend 

our Nation. Unfortunately, throughout that history the drinking 

water consumed on Camp Lejeune was contaminated by numerous 

chemicals such as TCE, DCE, PCE and benzene. Since the early 

1990s, there have been multiple agencies that have looked into this 

issue including ATSDR, EPA, GAO and the National Academies, 

just to name a few. In 1997, ATSDR issued a public health assessment required under the Superfund statute. This assessment was 

eventually retracted in 2009 because of new information on the 

amount of benzene contamination that may challenge the results of 

that study. However, since that initial report was issued, ATSDR 

has initiated several other studies related to the effect of these 

chemicals on fetuses and the subsequent health problems of children born to mothers living and working on the base. 

ATSDR is the principal investigator of the health effects related 

to the contamination at Camp Lejeune and there are positive steps 

being taken to ensure that the agency has all the information it 

needs to evaluate the exposures and potential health impacts but 

all parties must continue to cooperate. The Navy and Marine Corps 

have become more forthcoming with documents and data, and I applaud that. ATSDR is working to improve their processes and I 

hope their document retention protocols. 

While I am pleased that ATSDR is continuing to look into this 

issue and that the VA seems to be moving in a proactive manner 

to ensure that veterans and their families are taken care of, this 

issue simply will not go away. Progress needs to continue to a successful conclusion. 

When the chemicals were discovered in the water supply, the 

Navy and the Marine Corps shut down the contaminated wells. 

Whether or not this reaction was immediate or permanent is not 

as important as the fact that we now know that possibly hundreds 

of thousands may have been exposed to harmful chemicals that 

could have lasting impacts upon their health and their lives. 

When our service members provide a blanket of security for us 

abroad, they reasonably expect us to ensure their safety as well as 

the safety of their families here at home even if the threat is from 

environmental hazards. Fulfilling that expectation is the least we 

can do. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, 

sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]
15

1Please see Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN

Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. I also want to 

thank the Chairman for holding this hearing. As a Marine, family doctor, and a legislator, I am very sensitive to the health of our service members, our veterans, and 

their families. We owe them a debt of gratitude for their service, a debt that must 

include vigilance in caring for them after leaving the military. 

Camp Lejeune has a proud history of training Marines to defend our nation. Unfortunately, throughout that history, the drinking water consumed on Camp Lejeune 

was contaminated with numerous chemicals such as TCE, DCE, PCE, and benzene. 

Since the early 1990s, there have been multiple agencies that have looked into this 

issue, including ATSDR, EPA, GAO, and the National Academies—to name just a 

few. 

In 1997, ATSDR issued a Public Health Assessment required under the Superfund statute. This Assessment was eventually retracted in 2009 because of new information on the amount of benzene contamination that may challenge the results 

of the 1997 study. However, since that initial report was issued, ATSDR has initiated several other studies related to the effects of these chemicals on fetuses and 

the subsequent health problems of children born to mothers living and working on 

the base. 

ATSDR is the principle investigator of the health effects related to the contamination at Camp Lejeune, and there are positive steps being taken to ensure that the 

agency has all the information it needs to evaluate the exposures and potential 

health impacts, but all parties must continue to cooperate. 

The Navy and Marine Corps have become more forthcoming with documents and 

data, and ATSDR is working to improve their processes and—I hope—their document retention protocols. While I am pleased that ATSDR is continuing to look at 

the issue, and that the VA seems to be moving in a proactive manner to ensure veterans and their families are taken care of, this issue won’t simply go away. Progress 

needs to continue to a successful conclusion. 

When the chemicals were discovered in the water supply, the Navy and the Marine Corps shut down the contaminated wells. Whether or not this reaction was immediate or permanent is not as important as the fact that we now know that possibly hundreds of thousands may have been exposed to harmful chemicals that could 

have lasting impacts on their health. When our service members provide a blanket 

of security for us abroad, they reasonably expect us to ensure their safety, as well 

as the safety of their families, at home—even if the threat is from environmental 

hazards. Fulfilling that expectation is the LEAST we can do. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. 

There is one inexcusable error in my printed statement that I did 

correct orally but I cannot believe I let go through in editing the 

statement. There is a reference to soldiers. Please strike that word 

and insert instead the word ‘‘Marines.’’

Thank you, sir. 

Any additional opening statements submitted by members will 

be included in the record. 

We do have a set of documents to be included in the record. 

Without objection, they will be ordered included.1

Panel I 

Chairman MILLER. It is now my pleasure to introduce our first 

panel of witnesses. Mr. Mike Partain was diagnosed with male 

breast cancer in 2007 and he has since become a community advocate and representative of the ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community 

Assistance Panel. Mr. Jim Watters is the Assistant Dean for Graduate Medical Education at Texas Tech University Health Sciences 

Center School of Medicine. As a former Navy lieutenant and retired 
16

commander, Mr. Watters also served in the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy 

and the U.S. Naval Reserve and is a Camp Lejeune veteran diagnosed with kidney cancer. Mr. Peter Devereux is a former Marine 

Corps corporal who was diagnosed with male breast cancer in 2008. 

In August of this year, the Department of Veterans Affairs granted 

him 100 percent disability linking Mr. Devereux’s breast cancer to 

his exposure to toxic chemicals in Camp Lejeune’s drinking water 

during his military service. Dr. Richard Clapp is Professor Emeritus of the Department of Environmental Health at Boston University’s School of Public Health. He is an environmental health policy 

consultant and a member of the ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community 

Advisory Panel. And Mr. Michael Hargett, who I have not had a 

chance to greet, is the General Director of Anchimeric Associates 

and former co-owner of Grainger Laboratories, which performed 

tests for Lejeune drinking water in the 1980s. 

As our witnesses should know, you have five minutes for your 

spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be included in its 

entirety in the record for the hearing. When you all have completed 

your spoken testimony, we will begin with questions. Each member 

will have five minutes to question the panel. It is the practice of 

the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight to receive testimony under oath. Do any of you have any objection to taking an 

oath? Okay. The record should show, should reflect that all the witnesses were willing to take an oath. You may also be represented 

by counsel. Do any of you have counsel here? The record should reflect that none of the witnesses have counsel. 

If would now please stand and raise your right hand. Do you 

swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth? The record 

should reflect that all those witnesses, all the witnesses participating have taken the oath. We will start with Mr. Partain. Mr. 

Partain, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PARTAIN, MEMBER, ATSDR CAMP 

LEJEUNE COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE PANEL (CAP) AND 

BREAST CANCER SURVIVOR BORN ON CAMP LEJEUNE 

Mr. PARTAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

‘‘You have male breast cancer’’ were the words which greeted me 

and my wife on our 18th wedding anniversary. My name is Michael 

Partain and I am the son and grandson of United States Marine 

Corps officers. My parents were stationed aboard Marine Corps 

Base Camp Lejeune shortly after my father graduated from the 

United States Naval Academy. I was conceived, carried and then 

born at the base Naval Hospital during the drinking water contamination period at Camp Lejeune. 

Three years ago, I was diagnosed with male breast cancer at the 

age of 39. In fact, I am one of 64 men who share the unique commonality of male breast cancer and exposure to the contaminated 

water aboard Camp Lejeune. There is no history of the disease in 

my family, and I have tested negative for the hereditary breast 

cancer markers BRCA1 and BRCA2. I do not drink nor do I smoke. 

The history of the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination 

has been chronicled in many forms over the past 26 years. Currently, the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps constantly beat a drum that the health, safety and welfare of their 
17

Marines, sailors and families has been and always will be a top priority for the Marine Corps. Two months ago, the Marine Corps distributed an informational booklet detailing their version of the 

Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination to every Member of 

Congress. This booklet is a written testament to the mountain of 

lies and years of open deceit that the servicemen, the servicewomen 

and their families have endured since the drinking water contamination was first announced in December of 1984. 

The initial warnings that Camp Lejeune’s drinking water contamination began in October of 1980. A representative from the 

Navy’s Atlantic Division, LantDiv, arrived at Camp Lejeune to collect composite samples to ensure there was no Love Canal present 

aboard the base. TCE and PCE were specifically detected in this 

base-wide composite sample. No further action was taken. 

Later that month, an Army laboratory base out of Fort McPherson, Georgia, tested the tap water for Hadnot Point’s water distribution system. The laboratory was unable to obtain accurate 

readings because of interferences in the samples and was apparently concerned enough to handwrite ‘‘water is highly contaminated 

with low molecular weight halogenated carbons.’’ A series of warnings then ensued: ‘‘Heavy organic interference. You need to analyze 

for chlorinated organics’’ by GCMS, December 1980. ‘‘You need to 

analyze for chlorinated organics’’ by GCMS February 1981. ‘‘Your 

water is highly contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons,’’ and 

then they put in parentheses in capital letters the word ‘‘solvents’’ 

with an exclamation point, March 1981. ‘‘Interferences on this 

peak’’ December 1981. No further action was taken. 

Concurrently with the warnings from the Army lab, another 

problem was discovered at the base’s rifle range water treatment 

plant. Something different occurred at the rifle range that did not 

happen at Hadnot Point. The rifle range water treatment plant and 

well fields were tested. The offending well was identified and action 

taken to eliminate the problem. Why the different standard of care? 

Grainger Laboratory was the third laboratory to test Camp 

Lejeune’s water. With their very first sample, the VOC contamination was again confirmed. The owner of the laboratory, who will 

testify later, informed the base chemist, Elizabeth Betz, that PCE 

and TCE were contaminating the tap water samples. The findings 

were reported up the chain of command, and 8 days later Mrs. Betz 

was summoned to a briefing with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, and his assistant. Ms. Betz stated in her memorandum for 

the record, ‘‘It appeared to me that they had not been informed 

about the findings. I did not inform them.’’

As a result of Mr. Hargett’s efforts, the respective well fields for 

Tarawa Terrance were identified as the source of the contamination. Despite the immediate danger of exposure to the personnel on 

the base, no further action was taken. 

Furthermore, a change order for the Navy environmental program was executed in December of 1982. Grainger’s findings were 

not included in this change order. Nowhere in the 1983 initial assessment study for Camp Lejeune was there any discussion concerning the VOCs found by the three laboratories. Instead, the report concluded, ‘‘that while none of these sites pose an immediate 

threat to human health or the environment, 22 warrant further in-
18

vestigation on the Navy Assessment and Control of Installation 

Pollutants Program.’’

The leadership of the United States Navy and Marine Corps repeatedly assert that the chemicals found in the tap water at Camp 

Lejeune were not specifically regulated in the Safe Drinking Water 

Act. While this may be true, they consistently failed to recognize 

their own naval potable water regulation BUMED 6240.3b and 

6240.3c which date back to 1963. These regulations contain a set 

of definitions to clearly specify the meaning of key terms used within the document. Three key terms illustrate and provide a clear understanding that the Marine Corps had the ability to protect their 

Marines and sailors and their families as early as 1963. 

Health hazards as defined in the instructions means any conditions, devices or practices in the water supply system and its operation which create or may create a danger to the health and wellbeing of the water consumer. An example of a health hazard is a 

defect in the water supply system whether of location, design or 

construction which may regularly or occasionally prevent satisfactory purification of the water supply or cause it to be polluted from 

extraneous sources, as is the case at Camp Lejeune. Pollution is defined in the standards means the presence of any foreign substance 

organic, inorganic, radiological or biological in water which tends to 

degrade its quality so as to constitute a hazard to impair the users 

of the water. Chemical characteristics: substances which may have 

a deleterious physiological effect or for which the effects are not 

known shall not be introduced into the water system in a manner 

which would permit them to reach the consumer. 

During the course of our research, we discovered an order issued 

by the commanding general of Camp Lejeune regarding organic solvents. Base Order 5100.13b was written to inform the general’s 

command about the safe disposal of contaminants or hazardous 

waste. The order declared organic solvents as hazardous and that 

improper disposal of hazardous materials could lead to drinking 

water contamination. 

Last year, the Marine Corps was asked by Senators Burr and 

Hagan from North Carolina whether the Marine Corps agreed that 

base order 5100.13b declared organic solvents hazardous. The official Marine Corps response signed by Brigadier General Regner 

was: ‘‘The 1974 Base Order speaks for itself.’’

Why the leadership of the United States Marine Corps failed to 

follow these orders and protect our health remains a mystery. 

Whatever happened to, we take care of our own. If the United 

States Marine Corps is so concerned about the health and safety 

and welfare of their Marine Corps family, then why is it so hard 

for them to tell the truth? 

This quote appeared in a June 1984 article announcing the commencement of the confirmation study: ‘‘While contractors will routinely wear personal protective equipment such as chemical resistant overalls, we do not expect to expose anyone to contaminants. 

The results of the survey are due in August 1984. If any contaminations are discovered, a review of alternatives will determine action necessary to meet the health and environmental standards.’’ 

What the article didn’t tell the personnel on the base was that they 

were already exposed. 
19

July 6, 1984, Hadnot Point well 602 was tested by a Navy contractor. Many of this contractor’s subsequent reports are missing. 

However, their final report concluded that of extreme importance 

is the high level of benzenes, 380 parts per billion, detected in the 

sample collected from the deepwater well number 602. This benzene—I am sorry. The use of this well should be discontinued immediately. The well was closed in November of 1984. To date, the 

Marine Corps cannot produce any documentation, written documentation to show their notification that the well was contaminated. 

December 1984, the first article appeared in the press about the 

announcement of the contamination. As a result of the water samples taken on December 3rd, not July 6th, four wells in the Hadnot 

Point industrial area were found to contain some traces of organic 

contamination. None of the compounds noted in the test samples 

are listed in the regulations under the Safe Drinking Water Act. 

Daily water samples are being taken from the water treatment 

plant to ensure drinking water remains within prescribed federal 

and state regulations established by the Safe Drinking Water Act. 

Every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality of water 

supply provided to the residents of Camp Lejeune. 

April 1985, notice from the commanding general to the residents 

of Tarawa Terrace. Two of the wells that supplied Tarawa Terrace 

have been taken offline because of minute trace amounts of organic 

solvents—sorry—organic chemicals have been detected in the 

water. 

May 1985, a Marine Corps public affairs spokesman, Gunnery 

Sergeant Simmons, said he had no information on whether the well 

water was dangerous to humans. Simmons stated that while there 

were no State or Federal regulations that maintained an acceptable 

level of such contaminants in the drinking water, ‘‘we ordered the 

closure of all wells that showed even a trace amount.’’

September 1985, the base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, was quoted in the paper as saying, ‘‘We sampled nearly 

wells and one near the fuel farm. We did not detect fuel but we 

detected organic solvents.’’ And then he went on to say that no one 

had been harmed. 

Chairman MILLER. I am sorry. Can you begin to wrap up? 

Mr. PARTAIN. Okay. Also in September 1985, Mr. Alexander advised the residents of the base that no one had been exposed, directly exposed to the pollutants. 

Is this how the leadership of the United States Marine Corps 

demonstrates their concern for the Marine Corps family? 

Last year the ATSDR withdrew their flawed Public Health Assessment for Camp Lejeune due to benzene contamination. Prior to 

2010, the United States Marine Corps admitted to losing up to 

50,000 gallons at the Hadnot Point fuel farm during the 49-year 

history of the facility. That number has now changed to 1.1 million 

gallons of fuel released into the groundwater at Hadnot Point. 

Shortly afterwards—sorry. That number has now changed to 1.1 

million gallons of fuel released into the groundwater at Hadnot 

Point. Last year, ATSDR stumbled across a previously undisclosed 

Navy electronic library. Also within this portal were documents detailing the former fleet refueling and service area with seven un-
20

1 USMC Camp Lejeune Historic Drinking Water Q&A Booklet, USMC July 2010.

derground storage tanks located within 300 feet of well 602. We 

would like to know when the leadership of the United States Marine Corps and Navy were planning to inform ATSDR of these vital 

facts. Where was their written notification to ATSDR that 1 million 

gallons of fuel were released into the groundwater and the existence of the new fuel contamination at building 1115? As the old 

adage goes, actions speak louder than words. Trying to pin down 

the truth with the leadership of the Marine Corps is like trying to 

nail Jell-O to the wall. 

In conclusion, our country has seen a renewed appreciation for 

our volunteer military and the sacrifices made by our fighting men, 

women and their families. It is hard to drive down the road without seeing a ‘‘Support the Troops’’ ribbon on someone’s car. How 

can we profess a respect for our military personnel and families 

when in their time of need this country not only abandoned them 

but abandoned their families. We trusted the Marine Corps would 

do the right thing for the Marines and their families. 

The subtitle of this hearing is ‘‘Looking Back, Moving Forward.’’ 

We looked back and found the Marine Corps statements do not 

match the historical documents. We cannot move forward with understanding Camp Lejeune’s drinking water contamination unless 

there is a full disclosure from the Navy Marine Corps. Congress is 

where this issue must be resolved. Our exposures are established 

and well documented. The negligence of the Marine Corps is clear. 

There are thousands of Marines, sailors, family members and base 

employees who were sickened by the foul water at Camp Lejeune. 

When will our country fulfill our commitment to support the 

troops? 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Partain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PARTAIN

My Name is Michael Partain and I am the son and grandson of United States 

Marine Corps Officers. My parents were stationed aboard Marine Corps Base Camp 

Lejeune shortly after my father graduated from the United States Naval Academy. 

I was conceived, carried and then born at the base Naval Hospital while my parents 

lived in base housing. During the time of my mother’s pregnancy, we were exposed 

to high levels of tetrachloroethylene (PCE), trichloroethylene (TCE), 

dichloroethylene (DCE), benzene and vinyl chloride in the tap water provided to my 

family by the Marine Corps. Three years ago, I was diagnosed with male breast cancer at the age of thirty nine. In fact, I am one of about sixty four men who share 

this unique commonality of male breast cancer and exposure to contaminated tap 

water aboard Camp Lejeune. There is no history of the disease in my family and 

I tested negative for the hereditary breast cancer markers BRCA 1 and 2. I do not 

drink nor do I smoke. 

The history of the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination has been chronicled in many forms over the past twenty six years since the first announcement 

made by the United States Marine Corps revealing the existence of drinking contamination problem aboard the base. Currently, the Department of the Navy and 

the Marine Corps beat a constant drum that the health, safety and welfare of their 

Marines, Sailors and their families has been and always will be a top priority for 

the Marine Corps 1. In July of this year, the USMC distributed an informational 

booklet on the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination to every member of 

Congress. This booklet is a testament to the mountain of lies and years of open deceit the service men, women and their families have endured since the drinking 

water contamination was first revealed. 
21

2 USMC CL Booklet page 4. 

3 USMC CL Booklet page 6. 

4 Camp Lejeune Water (CLW) USMC document 1818, Pdf page 2, April 1989. These documents are found on an electronic library from ATSDR in the form of DVD discs accompanying 

the release of the Tarawa Terrace Water Model in 2007. 5 CLW 425, March 1980. 

6 CLW 613, August 1982. 

7 430 October 1980 and CLW 613 August 1982. 

8 CLW 613 August 1982. 

9 CLW 436, October 1980.

10 CLW 438, January 1981 11 CLW 441, February 1981

Discovery of Camp Lejeune’s Drinking Water Contamination. 

The recent Marine Corps informational booklet first describes the discovery of the 

Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) problem at the base in the Executive Timeline 

by stating that ‘‘unidentified VOC’s interfered with total trihalomethane (TTHM) 

testing between 1980–1982.2 A few pages later, the reader then discovers that ‘‘targeted’’ sampling in August 1982 identified the contaminants as tetrachloroethylene 

(PCE) and trichloroethylene (TCE). The reader is then told the chemicals were unregulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act at the time.3 A careful examination of 

Marine Corps and Navy documents reveal a totally different scenario unfolded at 

Naval Facilities and Engineering Command (LantDiv) and the base after the initial 

warnings about the contamination poisoning the drinking water surfaced. 

On 1 October 1980 a representative from LantDiv arrived at Camp Lejeune to collect a composite sample from all eight water treatment plants in an effort to ensure 

there was no ‘‘Love Canal’’ present aboard the base.4 Seven months prior to this 

visit, the State of North Carolina assumed primacy for the enforcement of the Safe 

Drinking Water Act.5 Officials at LantDiv were worried that the State might find 

a problem with Camp Lejeune’s water that the Navy had not previously uncovered. 

If a problem was discovered, then further analysis of the eight individual systems 

would be done to locate the source of the problem.6 The results from the composite 

sample were released to LantDiv on 31 October 1980 and the composite samples 

showed contamination of the drinking water from PCE, TCE, dichloroethylene 

(DCE), and vinyl chloride just under the detection limits set for the laboratory.7 According to the Base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz, these results were not received at Camp Lejeune until June 1982. Ms. Betz documented in her memorandum 

for the record that she did not know how LantDiv determined the amount of water 

to take from each system to comprise the volume used in making the composite 

sample. Betz also recognized the percentage of total volume did not accurately reflect the corresponding usage for each system sampled or the daily flow of each system. Ms. Betz ominously noted that the 1980 analysis showed no problems for the 

priority pollutants listed for the eight water treatment systems aboard Camp 

Lejeune as a whole, but the same may not necessarily be true for each individual 

water treatment system aboard the base.8 No further investigation was initiated. 

The second laboratory to find contamination in Camp Lejeune’s drinking water 

was the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (USAEHA lab) located in Ft. 

McPherson, Georgia. The laboratory was tasked by LantDiv to sample Camp 

Lejeune’s treated water for an upcoming EPA regulation concerning dangerous compounds formed during the treatment of potable water known as trihalomethanes 

(TTHMs). The initial samples were collected on 21 October of 1980 and the sample 

was read on 31 October 1980. The water system sampled was Hadnot Point and the 

sampling included a sample collected from the Naval Hospital’s emergency room 

sink. The Laboratory Chief, William Neal, was apparently concerned enough to take 

the time to hand write:

‘‘Water is highly contaminated with low molecular weight halogenated 

hydrocarbons’’

upon the analytical sheet delivered to LantDiv.9 This initial warning began a series 

from the USAEHA laboratory about the treated water produced by the Hadnot Point 

water treatment plant (WTP). These warnings took place between October 1980 

through December 1981. 

1. ‘‘Heavy Organic Interference at CHCL2BR, You Need to Analyze for 

Chlorinated Organics by GCMS.’’ 10

2. ‘‘You need to Analyze for Chlorinated Organics by GC/MC.’’ 11
22

12 CLW 443, March 1981 13 CLW 5739, December 1981, PDF page 2. 14 CLW 5791, July 1981. 15 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Cercla) document 226, Pdf page 13, March 1982. These documents are found on an electronic library from 

ATSDR in the form of DVD discs accompanying the release of the Tarawa Terrace Water Model 

in 2007. 16 CLW 3757, Pdf page 3, July 1981. 17 CLW 6124, Pdf page 1, August 1981. 18Public Health Assessments for Willow Grove NAS and Warminster Naval Air Warfare Center, The Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry, 2002. 19 CLW 468, Pdf page 2, February 1982.

3. ‘‘Water Highly Contaminated with other Chlorinated Hydrocarbons 

(SOLVENTS)!’’ 12

4. ‘‘Interferences on this Peak (CHCL2BR).’’ 13

Concurrently with the warnings from the USAEHA lab, another problem was discovered at the base’s Rifle Range water treatment plant (WTP). Potable water sampling was initiated at the Rifle Range WTP in 1981 at the request of LantDiv. The 

tests were ordered in response to concerns about the water system’s location to a 

nearby chemical dump.14 This chemical dump was registered with the EPA and had 

been in operation from sometime in 1959 until 1976.15 Between March and May of 

1981 a series of potable water sampling revealed a similar organic contamination 

within the Rifle Range water distribution system. The findings precipitated a letter 

from LantDiv in July of 1981 which stated that Rifle Range well RR–97 contained 

low levels of organic contamination and two other wells were to be operated in preference to well RR–97.16 The Commanding General of Camp Lejeune then wrote the 

State of North Carolina and informed the state regulators that: 

‘‘based on the laboratory analyses mentioned above and on-site inspections of the landfill and the Rifle Range system, LANTNAVFACENGCOM 

(LantDiv) officials have concluded that the Rifle Range drinking water 

meets current drinking water standards.’’

There was no mention to the State of the organic contamination found at the Rifle 

Range potable water system between March 1981 and May 1981.17 During this 

time, no known testing was performed on any of the 35 Hadnot Point potable water 

supply wells despite concurrent warnings from the USAEHA laboratory that Hadnot 

Point treated water was highly contaminated with (SOLVENTS)! Surprisingly, 

LantDiv did have prior experience with VOC/organic contamination problems within 

Naval owned and operated water distribution systems. One year prior to the discovery of VOCs in Camp Lejeune drinking water systems, two Naval installations 

experienced PCE and TCE contamination. However, something different occurred at 

Warminster Naval Air Warfare Center and Willow Grove Naval Air Station. The 

contaminated wells producing PCE and TCE in the base’s drinking water were identified and closed.18 Why did the Navy fail to implement testing of the potable water 

wells for each water distribution system aboard Camp Lejeune after the first indication of contamination was discovered? Why was the Rifle Range potable water distribution system treated differently from the Hadnot Point potable water distribution system? At the time of the testing in 1981, the Rifle Range WTP served only 

a few permanent houses and Marines temporarily training at the range. During this 

same time, the Hadnot Point WTP served the what is known as Main-side which 

included the base barracks, the Naval Hospital, and with that thousands of Marines, Sailors and their families. Where was the Marine Corps’ concern for the 

health, safety and welfare for their Marines, Sailors and their families? 

By the Fall of 1981, the USAEHA laboratory experienced an equipment breakdown which resulted in a back log of work from Camp Lejeune and other Department of Defense installations.19 A replacement laboratory was needed and a state 

certified laboratory was selected to continue Camp Lejeune’s mandated TTHM testing. Grainger Laboratory was owned by Fred Grainger and Mike Hargett. The laboratory entered into a contract with Camp Lejeune to test the Tarawa Terrace and 

Hadnot point WTPs for TTHMs. This testing did not include testing for VOCs. The 

first sample for each of the distribution systems was collected in late April of 1982. 

The samples were analyzed for TTHMs, and as was the case with the USAEHA lab, 

solvents were found not only in the Hadnot Point samples but also in the newly 

tested Tarawa Terrace water distribution system. Mr. Hargett then contacted Camp 

Lejeune’s Base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz, and informed her that the synthetic organic cleaning solvents PCE and TCE were found in both samples submitted for both Handot Point and Tarawa Terrace. Ms. Betz then reported the find-
23

20 CLW 5176, Pdf page 5, May 1982. 21 CLW 564, June 1982. 22 CLW 589, July 1982. 23 CLW 592, August 1982. 24 CLW 592, August 1982. 25 USMC CL Booklet, Page 7, July 2010. 26 CLW 606, Pdf page 2, August 1982. 27 CLW 5183. Pdf page 25, December 1982. 

ings to her supervisor, Danny Sharpe who then pushed them up the chain of command which included the base Utilities director Fred Cone. Eight days later, Ms. 

Betz briefed Col Millice, Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, and LtCol. Fitzgerald 

about the April TTHM test results. Ms Betz stated in her memorandum for the 

record that: 

‘‘It Appeared to me that they had not been informed about the findings, 

I didn’t inform them.’’ 20

Later that same month, a second series of samples were taken from the Hadnot 

Point and Tarawa Terrace water distributions systems. This time there was a problem with the caps for the samples taken. However, Mr. Hargett advised Ms. Betz 

the solvents noted on the 6 May phone call were still present.21 A second Grainger 

contract was written in July 1982 for additional testing of four samples taken from 

the water treatment plants for Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point. The first set of 

samples were collected from the raw water line which fed each plant from a distinct 

well field. The second set of samples were collected from the respective plant’s reservoir containing treated water.22 The results of this special testing for the Hadnot 

Point and Tarawa Terrace WTPs were compiled in a formal letter to the base on 

10 August 1982 by Grainger Laboratory chemist Bruce Babson. Mr. Babson wrote 

the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities: 

‘‘Interferences which were thought to be chlorinated hydrocarbons hindered the quantification of certain Trihalomethanes. These appeared to 

be at high levels and hence more important from a health standpoint 

than the total Trihalomethane content. For these reasons we called the 

situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune personnel.’’ 23

Mr. Babson also concluded that the well fields for the WTPs were the source of 

the contamination found in the water treatment plants. He identified the contaminants as PCE and TCE.24 Disturbingly, Grainger Laboratory quantified TCE in a 

sample taken from the Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital at 1,400 ppb. Instead of immediate action to test each and every potable water well for VOCs/organic and ensure 

the health, safety and welfare of the service personnel and their families aboard 

Camp Lejeune was protected, an excuse was given to explain away Grainger’s confirmation of what the USAEHA and Jennings Laboratories both found in the potable 

water samplings from October of 1980. 

According to the recent USMC informational booklet for the Camp Lejeune Historic Drinking Water problem:

‘‘Base officials compared these results against EPA recommended levels 

and found the average levels of TCE and PCE were within those levels 

and thus not thought to be a health concern.’’ 25

The immediate problem with the current Marine Corps rendition of why no further action was taken after Grainger’s warnings is that their assertion that the TCE 

and PCE levels were within the EPA’s recommended levels is not true. The Base 

Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz noted in her findings that the levels of PCE 

at Tarawa Terrace exceeded the EPA’s recommended level of 40 ppb for long term 

exposures. Furthermore, the May TCE reading of 1,400 ppb taken from the Emergency Room sink of the base Naval Hospital was summarily dismissed with no explanation offered to explain the existence of the extreme levels of the chemical found 

in the sample or why the levels dropped to 20 ppb in subsequent testing. Only by 

arbitrarily dismissing the May 1,400 ppb TCE value does the Hadnot Point sampling fall into line with the EPA’s recommended values for chronic exposure to 

TCE.26 Three months after Betz’s August 1982 memorandum for the record, the 

base performed the quarterly testing for TTHMs and sent the samples to Grainger 

Laboratory. Once again the analytical data sheets noted interference in the samples 

from Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point.27 Ms. Betz then called the Grainger Chemist, Bruce Babson to discuss a typographical error on his report. Mr. Babson then 

expressed his concern that the solvents which interfered in Hadnot Point’s testing 
24

28 CLW 698, December 1982. 29 CLW 703, January 1983. 30 Report Defense Health Care: Activities related to Past Drinking Water Contamination at 

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Government Accountability Office, Pdf Page 30, May 2007. 31 CLW 5996, Pdf page 2, June 1974. 32 USMC Response to Senator Burr and Hagan Queries on Camp Lejeune, Pdf page 3, July 

2009.

which had previously dropped were relatively high again.28 Ms. Betz memorandum 

was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities and then on to the newly 

hired base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander.29 From that point on, the 

prolific note keeping and memorandums written by Elizabeth Betz inexplicably 

cease. A prior flawed Government Accountability Office (GAO) sponsored investigation 

into the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination cited entirely different reasons why the base failed to act after Grainger’s warnings in August 1982:

‘‘they had limited knowledge of these chemicals; second there were no 

regulations establishing enforceable limits for these chemicals in the 

drinking water; and third they made assumptions about why the levels 

of TCE and PCE varied and about the possible sources of the TCE and 

PCE.’’

‘‘Specifically, because the levels of TCE and PCE varied, they attributed 

the higher levels to short term environmental exposures, such as spilled 

paint inside a water treatment plant, or to laboratory or sampling errors. Additionally, in an August 1982 memorandum, a Camp Lejeune official suggested that, based on the sampling results provided by the private laboratory, the levels of PCE detected could be the result of using 

coated pipes in the untreated water lines at Tarawa Terrace.30

Missing from the GAO’s limited review of the Camp Lejeune document inventory 

are two key documents which undermine the validity of the GAO investigation. The 

first document is an unusual Base Order written in 1974. Unlike most military orders, there are no references indicating on what authority or guidance the general 

issued the order. Base Order 5100.13B was written to inform the general’s command 

about the ‘‘Safe Disposal of Contaminants or Hazardous Waste.’’ What is significant 

about this order was that it clearly demonstrated that the Marine Corps knew at 

least by 1974, or perhaps earlier if the prior copies of this order are ever found:

• Organic solvents were hazardous materials, and

• Improper disposal practices create hazards such as the contamination of drinking water.

The designated disposal sites were the dumps located at the Rifle Range.31 Last 

year the Marine was asked by Senators Burr and Hagan from North Carolina 

whether the Marine Corps agreed that Base Order 5100.13B declared organic solvents hazardous. The official Marine Corps reply signed by Brigadier General 

Regner was: 

‘‘The 1974 Base Order Speaks for itself.’’ 32

The second document was a set of potable water instructions dating back to 1963. 

The instructions are known as BUMED 6240.3B (1963) and revision 3C (1972). The 

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) was the entity within the Department 

of the Navy responsible for setting potable water standards for the Navy. While 

there were no set specific standards for VOCs/organic solvents within the instruction, there were preventive measures and requirements that if followed should have 

led to the disqualification for use, of most if not all, of the contaminated wells found 

at Camp Lejeune. The regulations contained a set of definitions to clearly specify 

the meaning of terms used within the document. Three key terms illustrate and provide a clear understanding that the Marine Corps had the ability to protect their 

Marines, Sailors, and families as early as 1963.

Health Hazards means any conditions, devices or practices in the water supply 

system and its operation which create, or may create, a danger to the health 

and well-being of the water consumer. An example of a health hazard is a structural defect in the water supply system whether of location, design, or construction, which may regularly or occasionally prevent satisfactory purification of the 

water supply or cause it to be polluted from extraneous sources.

Pollution as used in these standards, means the presence of any foreign substance (organic, inorganic, radiological, or biological) in water which tends to de-
25

33 CLW 144, December 1972 34 Naval Medical Command Instruction 6240.1, Naval Military Personnel Command, December 1988. 35 CLW 5176, Pdf page7, August 1982. 36 CLW 391, April 1980. 37 CLW 3884, Pdf page 4, September 1982 38 CLW 6332, Pdf page 3, August 1982. 39 CLW 6332, Pdf page 2, August 1982.

grade its quality so as to constitute a hazard or impair the usefulness of the 

water. 

Chemical Characteristics Drinking water shall not contain impurities in concentrations which may be hazardous to the health of the consumers. It should 

not be excessively corrosive to the water supply system. Substances used in its 

treatment shall not remain in the water in concentrations greater than required 

by good practice. Substances which may have deleterious physiological effect or 

for which physiological effects are not known, shall not be introduced into the 

system in a manner which would permit them to reach the consumer.33

To date, the Marine Corps has failed to provide Congress, the media and their 

Marines, Sailors and their families with a clear answer as to why these orders were 

not reviewed in the Commandant’s Blue Ribbon panel and why the Navy’s BUMED 

6240.3B and 3C regulations were not followed. Four years after the closure of 

Hadnot Point well HP 602, the BUMED 6240.3C order was canceled and revised 

with NAVMEDCOMIST 6240.1. Missing from the new instructions were the definitions for Health Hazards, Pollution and the strong language found within the Chemical Characteristics section of BUMED 6240.3B and C. The new regulations replaced 

what was then a more advance and comprehensive potable water standard with a 

new standard which was in agreement with the Safe Drinking Water Act.34 The existence of Base Order 5100.13B married with BUMED 6240.3B and C meant that 

the Marine Corps possessed at least an operational knowledge that organic solvents 

and other hazardous materials could and did contaminate the groundwater aboard 

Camp Lejeune as early as 1974 and as such their groundwater wells were vulnerable. Another word for this type of knowledge and lack of due care is called gross 

negligence. 

The other fallacy cited above and contained in the GAO report was the assertion 

that vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes were the possible source for PCE contamination for the base. The basis for this fallacy is contained in a memorandum written 

by Elizabeth Betz asserting her opinion that she believed the contamination was 

possibly the result of vinyl line asbestos coated pipes in the raw water lines at 

Tarawa Terrace.35 The basis for this assumption was apparently due to a 9 April 

1980 EPA bulletin which cited vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes as a source for 

drinking water contamination. The EPA also noted that their suggested action guidance did not condone the presence of any level of PCE contamination in drinking 

water.36 The problem with Betz’s conclusion was that according to base construction 

records, no vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes were ever used in any of the base’s potable water distribution systems.37

Shortly after the Bruce Babson’s August Grainger Laboratory report arrived on 

the desk of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, a draft copy of the Navy’s Naval 

Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants (NACIP) Initial Assessment 

Study (IAS) for Camp Lejeune arrived as an attachment to a 5 August 1982 letter 

from Wallace Eakes of LantDiv to Col Marshall at Camp Lejeune. Mr. Eakes requested Col. J. T Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities to review the Draft 

IAS for completeness, accuracy and concurrence for recommendations no later than 

25 August 1982.38 Col. Marshall completed his assigned task and replied on 25 August 1982. Contained in his comments for the Draft IAS: 

‘‘It is important to note that accuracy of the data provided by U.S. Army 

Laboratory is questionable. It is recommended that TTHM information 

be de-emphasized throughout the report.’’ 39

There was no mention of the August 1982 Grainger letter confirming the U.S. 

Army laboratory’s findings from October 1980 and warning him that the potable 

water for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace was highly contaminated with VOCs/

Organic solvents in the Colonel’s 25 August reply to LantDiv. Four months later a 

change order to the IAS was executed to include two new disposal sites located on 

the base after the IAS team departed in March 1982. The base’s potable water contamination was not mentioned in the change order, nor were there any requests 
26

40 Cercla 2059, December 1982. 41 CLW 709, Pdf page 3, April 1983. 42 CLW 709. Pdf page 29, April 1983. 43 CLW 3039, Pdf pp 5&6, February 1999. 44 CLW 1195, April 1985. 45 CLW 940, June 1983. 46 CLW 6348, December 1983.

made to test the wells for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace to locate the specific 

wells with VOC/Organic solvent contamination.40

The Initial Assessment Study for Camp Lejeune was released in April of 1983 and 

listed 76 potentially contaminated sites aboard the base and 22 of these sites warranted further investigation in the form of a Confirmation Study phase of the 

NACIP program.

‘‘The Study concludes that, while none of the sites pose an immediate 

threat to human health or the environment, 22 warrant further investigation under the Navy Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants (NACIP) Program to assess potential long-term impacts. A confirmation study is recommended to confirm or deny the existence of the 

suspected contamination and quantify the extent of any problems which 

may exist.’’ 41

Nowhere in the 221 page document were there any recommendations to test any 

of the potable water wells for Tarawa Terrace and only 2 out of 35 wells were recommended for testing at Hadnot Point.42 How could the official Navy environmental 

(NACIP IAS) study for Camp Lejeune conclude there was no immediate threat to 

human health aboard the base if the report failed to address the Army and Grainger 

laboratory’s findings of VOC/Organic solvents in two of the base’s potable water system? A month after the release of the IAS, LantDiv Environmental Engineer and 

Engineer in charge of the Confirmation study for Camp Lejeune wrote a letter apparently addressing the ongoing VOC/Organic solvent contamination aboard the 

base. Unfortunately, that letter has since vanished. Sixteen years later the 

Wallmeyer letter, as it has since come to be known, was the subject of a four week 

document search at LantDiv.43 The letter was reportedly never found. According to 

a subsequent reference in a message from April of 1985, the Wallmeyer letter attempted to address the VOC/Organic Solvent contamination problem with the base’s 

potable water system.44 The problem was that the official Confirmation Study did 

not include any of the measures described in the message referencing the 

Wallmeyer letter. Was LantDiv attempting to quietly remediate the VOC/Organic 

solvent drinking water contamination without full disclosure of the problem to the 

State and Federal agencies? 

As part of our investigation into what transpired aboard Camp Lejeune prior to 

the official announcement of the drinking water contamination in December 1984, 

we located and interviewed Mike Hargett and Bruce Babson, both formerly of 

Grainger Laboratory. Curiously, neither of them were ever contacted by either the 

GAO or the Commandant’s investigations into the Camp Lejeune drinking water 

contamination. Mr. Hargett informed me that he had been asked by the Base Supervisory Chemist to accompany her in a meeting to explain the significance of 

Grainger’s findings. Mr. Hargett stated that the meeting lasted less than five minutes before they were dismissed. Frustrated by the Marine Corps’ recalcitrance, Mr. 

Hargett then tipped off the State of North Carolina about the problems with the 

base’s potable water system. In June of 1983, a letter from the State’s environmental engineer, Mr. Elmore, arrived on Col. Marshall’s desk requesting the original copies of Grainger’s analytical data sheets instead of the tables summarizing 

them previously submitted by the Marine Corps.45 The analytical data sheets were 

exclusive property of the Marine Corps and written upon them were Bruce Babson’s 

warnings that PCE and TCE were interfering with the TTHM testing. Six months 

later this request was formally denied by the new Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, 

Col. Lilley. Col. Lilley advised Mr. Elmore that the original reports were not required and thus not submitted to the state.46 Sadly, the State of North Carolina 

agreed with the Marine Corps assertion and another opportunity to stop the drinking water contamination aboard Camp Lejeune slipped by and was forgotten. Bruce 

Babson’s notations and warnings were toned down but the asterisk notating interferences with the TTHM testing remained on almost every known Grainger Laboratory analytical data sheet through the Summer of 1984. Ironically, it was another 

contamination problem with a different chemical which forced the VOC/Organic solvent drinking water contamination issue to the surface. When it did surface, the 
27

47 Cerlca 417, Pdf page 5, December 1988. 48 CLW 709. Pdf page 133, April 1983. 49 Cercla 96, Pdf pp 11–16, June 1980 50 Cerlca 96, Pdf page 17, March 1981. 51 Cerlca 96, Pdf page 29, August 1989. 52 Cercla 96, Pdf page 30, August 1989. 53 Cercla 96 Pdf page 34, March 1988 54 CLW 144, Pdf page 3, August 1972. 55 USMC CL Booklet, page 8, July 2010. 56 Cercla 332, Pdf page 52, June 1982.

VOC/Organic solvent drinking water contamination was subsequently used to hide 

a more sinister contaminant, benzene. 

Massive fuel leaks at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. 

The Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (HPFF) was constructed on the Southeast corner of 

Holcomb Blvd and Ash Street sometime in 1941. The fuel farm was comprised of 

fourteen fuel tanks buried in the ground and one large 600,000 gallon tank located 

above ground. The fuel farm was located in what is now known as the Hadnot Point 

Industrial area and within 1,200 feet from potable water well HP–602 which was 

also constructed in 1941.47 The first documented fuel leak at the HPFF occurred in 

1979 when an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 gallons of fuel leaked from an underground valve.48 A condition survey for the HPFF was scheduled the following year 

and other problems were found at the HPFF. The LantDiv engineer concluded that 

because of age, failure to clean the tanks, and lack of maintenance, there had been 

a general condition of corrosion and deterioration of the tanks and connecting pipelines. Many of the interconnecting valves and flanges could not be inspected because 

they were buried and/or could not be located. The engineer recommended replacing 

the connecting piping, the inspection of all of the tanks for leaks and repair existing 

leaks.49 The Condition Survey was followed in 1981 with a Military Construction 

Data project number LE201M to repair the HPFF facilities and $537,200 was then 

allocated to clean and repair the petroleum tanks.50 By March of 1983, Navy and 

Marine Corps officials determined that piece meal rehabilitation of the HPFF was 

not cost effective and in 1985, the recommendation was made to replace the HPFF 

with a new facility.51 The fuel farm was finally replaced in 1990. 

There are no known records indicating that the Marine Corps made any attempt 

to remediate the 20,000 to 30,000 gallon 1979 fuel leak between 1980 and 1988. In 

May 1988 correspondence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities finally notified the 

State of North Carolina that a 15 foot thick fuel plume was contaminating the 

groundwater underlying the bulk fuel facility.52 The base Staff Judge Advocate, Col. 

Tokarz, noted that the fuel farm was losing fuel into the groundwater at the rate 

of 1,500 gallons per month. The colonel also warned that delays will result in an 

indefensible waste of money and a continuing threat to human health and the environment.53

Knowing the existence of a massive 20,000–30,000 gallon fuel leak in 1979 which 

drained into the ground at the Hadnot Point Industrial area with no attempts to 

remediate or recover the lost fuel until at least 1989, leads a rational, prudent person to speculate why it took the Marine Corps five years to sample the nearest potable water well (HP–602) to ensure the well was free of fuel contamination. After all, 

BUMED 6240.3B and version C carried an obligation for the Marine Corps to make 

sure potable water was obtained from the most desirable source feasible and efforts 

be made to prevent or control pollution of the source.54 Where are the documents 

detailing these required efforts? Instead, the Marine Corps relies on their assertion 

that VOCs, including the SVOC benzene, were not regulated by the Safe Drinking 

Water Act until the late 1980’s and early 1990’s to avoid addressing the issue.55

Does there have to be a set standard or maximum containment level for a polluter 

to be negligent in their duties to protect human health? Where does common sense 

enter into the equation? Prior to 1984, there are no known records indicating that 

the Marine Corps took any action to protect the water supply for well HP–602 from 

fuel contamination and consequently the entire Hadnot Point water distribution system. 

One of the few potable water wells selected for sampling by the Navy’s NACIP 

program was well HP–602. The 1982 draft copy of the IAS report stated that well 

HP–602 was designated for sampling in the Confirmation study because it was located 1,100 feet down-gradient from the HPFF and actively pumping.56 The final 

IAS report released in April 1983 detailed the fuel losses for the HPFF totaled 

somewhere between 20,000 to 50,000 gallons of fuel. This figure became the basis 

for the fuel loss estimates for the public, Congress and more importantly, the Agen-
28

57 USMC CL Booklet, page 18, July 2010. 58 Excerpt from Document #1185. This document was found by ATSDR within the recently discovered limited access web portal for the Navy’s Underground Storage Tank Program, 

NavFacEngCom. 59 Cerlca 337, Pdf page 33, May 1984. 60 Cercla 3428, June 1984. 61 Cercla 3429, July 1984. 

cy for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), the agency tasked with 

studying the health effects resulting from the potential exposures at Camp Lejeune. 

This misconception remained until 2010 when it was discovered that the fuel losses 

at the HPFF amounted to much more than what was previously disclosed by the 

Navy and the Marine Corps. Once again a reference from the current Camp Lejeune 

informational brochure is appropriate. According to the Marine Corps: 

‘‘Question: Has the Marine Corps intentionally withheld information 

from ATSDR in order to delay their studies?

Answer: No. The Marine Corps has made extraordinary efforts to provide 

ATSDR access to any potentially relevant information we control. We 

recognize that this issue deals with complex science, and we have been 

working with ATSDR to get our former residents the answers they deserve in a timely manner.

The Marine Corps does not benefit in any way from delays to ATSDR’s 

work. The people who were exposed are our family members and fellow 

Marines. We are much as anyone, want to be able to give them accurate 

answers in a timely manner.’’ 57

In March of last year, the ATSDR stumbled across a previously undisclosed web 

portal belonging to the Navy. A sub contractor to ATSDR was inadvertently given 

access to this portal by a Marine Corps’ librarian. Contained within the 

NavFacEngCom’s Underground Storage Tank (UST) web portal were documents 

previously withheld from the ATSDR including details on the size and scope of the 

fuel loss from the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm underground storage tanks. According 

to documents discovered in the portal, the Marine Corps lost 1.1 million gallons of 

fuel at the HPFF over the course of the 49 year operational history of the facility. 

Much of this fuel was located within 300–1,100 feet away from well HP–602. The 

fuel was found at all levels in the aquifer including the deep aquifer.58 Where is 

the Navy’s notification to ATSDR advising them of the existence of this portal and 

the 1.1 million gallons of fuel trapped in the ground at Hadnot Point? What does 

the Navy and the Marine Corps stand to gain if the public, the scientists and Congress were not aware of the extreme nature of the loss fuel at the HPFF? 

The Confirmation Study for Camp Lejeune commenced in May of 1984 with the 

release of the Work and Safety Plan. The work plan detailed how and where the 

sampling for the Confirmation Study was executed. The plan also detailed the 

schedule of the project and what reports were required by the contractor. The contractor was an Environmental Engineering firm from Gainesville, Florida known as 

Environmental Sciences Engineering (ESE). A monthly progress report was required 

by the 15th day of each month for the duration of the contract. The tests results 

were scheduled to be evaluated between June and August and a draft report prepared by the end of August. The Final report was scheduled to be completed by 10 

September 1984 and the presentation made on the same date.59 According to the 

May/June progress report, work was underway and 14 ground water monitoring 

wells were installed. The engineer noted a one week delay due to decontamination 

of equipment.60 The June/July progress report advised the LantDiv engineer in 

charge of the Confirmation study that 36 of 75 wells (this number included monitoring wells drilled for the study) were sampled. The sampling included site 22, the 

Hadnot Point Fuel Farm and well HP–602 (sampled 6 July 1984). A two week delay 

was noted due to equipment problems and the re-drilling of five new wells to replace 

wells inadvertently contaminated by an ESE subcontractor. The project was scheduled for completion on 4 August 1984. The samples were shipped to ESE laboratory 

in Gainesville, Florida for analysis.61 After the 15 July progress report all documentation regarding ESE’s efforts on the Confirmation Study ceased until January 

of 1985. The August progress report and all subsequent progress reports are missing, as is the draft report summarizing the evaluation of data from the sampling. 

The only clue to what transpired during the missing months between July 1984 

and December 1984 recently surfaced a few months ago when we located a State 

of North Carolina document written by Rick Shiver, N.C. Regional Hydrologist. The 

document was titled Groundwater Pollution Source Inventory and discussed the 

HPFF and the multiple leaking underground storage tanks (UST). The inventory is 
29

62 North Carolina Groundwater Pollution Inventory, Rick Shiver, August 1980 63 USMC Response to Senator Burr and Hagan Queries on Camp Lejeune, Pdf page 11, July 

2009. 64 CLW 1089, December 1984. 65 CLW 4546, February 1985. 

dated 1 August 1984 and located in the groundwater pollution box is a handwritten 

circle indicating that the groundwater pollution was confirmed.62 At the time of this 

report, the State of North Carolina was supposedly not privy to the details of the 

Confirmation Study then underway at Camp Lejeune. The contractor was not required and did not report their findings to anyone else but the Navy personnel at 

LantDiv. What basis did Mr. Shiver have to conclude that the groundwater at the 

HPFF was contaminated with gasoline three months before the Marine Corps allegedly received ESE’s Confirmation Study report revealing fuel contamination at the 

HPFF and potable well HP–602. 

Last year Senators Burr and Hagan posed a series of questions about Camp 

Lejeune to the Marine Corps. One of these questions asked why the Navy and Marine Corps waited until 30 November 1984 to close well HP–602. The Navy/Marine 

Corps replied:

‘‘According to the record, the Marine Corps did not ‘‘wait’’ to shut down 

well HP–602. Well HP–602 was taken out of service as of 21 November 

1984 as part of the normal rotation of well (CLW 1089). Records indicate 

that the results from the 6 July 1984 sample were received by the base 

on 30 November 1984 (CLW 4546). Upon receipt of the sample results, 

well HP–602 was never reactivated and was permanently taken out of 

service.’’ 63

The document titled CLW 1089 is a Question and Answer sheet prepared for the 

base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander in advance of a media interview 

concerning the contamination found at Camp Lejeune. Judging from the context of 

the document, mainly the omission of well HP–651 discovered contaminated in February 1985, the document was most likely written in December 1984. Mr. Alexander 

stated that benzene and industrial solvents were found in well HP–602 and then 

cited test results implying they were the results which closed well HP–602 in November of 1984. In fact, the test results on the Q&A sheet were collected on 3 December 1984, after the 30 November 1984 date in which the Marine Corps states 

that the base was allegedly notified that well HP–602 was contaminated and then 

closed. This mischaracterization of why well HP–602 was closed remained a fact 

until 2009. Mr. Alexander then wove a false sense of security for those potentially 

exposed by informing the community that all of the wells were located in the industrial area approximately 1 mile from the barracks.64 Did this mean that the wells 

only served the shops and offices in the industrial area and not the barracks? If well 

602 was closed as a result of the receipt of ESE’s Confirmation Study results, then 

why was the July 1984 380 ppb finding omitted from the Q&A sheet? If well HP–

602 was taken off line due to a normal rotation, then where are the well and plant 

production log books to support the Navy/USMC position? To date, the log books are 

all missing from the historical record for Camp Lejeune. The Navy and Marine 

Corps also cite CLW 4546 as evidence that they closed well HP–602 upon receipt 

of the ESE Confirmation Study. The document was written after the Bob Alexander 

Q&A sheet and at least three months after well HP–602 was closed.65 The lack of 

primary supporting evidence on how the contamination at Hadnot Point was discovered is extremely disturbing. Why is everyone trusting the very entity who polluted 

the drinking water aboard Camp Lejeune to tell and not show us how it happened? 

Where is the November transmittal sheet for the ESE Confirmation Study? Where 

is the draft ESE Confirmation Study due in August 1984? Where is the telephone 

record log or memorandum to the base ordering them to close well HP–602 on 30 

November 1984? Why was the Hadnot Point WTP tested for benzene only after the 

contaminated well was closed? Where are the missing progress reports from ESE? 

Where are the missing well and plant production log books? Every shred of evidence 

which would either condemn the Navy and Marine Corps or exonerate them is missing. Why? 

A December 1984 base news paper article assured their readers that none of the 

organic compounds found in the base’s water were listed under the Safe Drinking 

Water Act. The article ended with a chilling quote from the base environmental engineer, Robert Alexander:
30

66 Cercla, 523, December 1984. 67 CLW 1105, January 1985. 68 Cercla 388, Pdf pp 48–52, January 1985. 69 Cercla 388, Pdf page 52, January 1985. 70 CLW 4869, Pdf page 5, October 1985. 71 CLW 4514, February 1985. 72 CLW 4546, February 1985. 

‘‘Every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality water supply 

traditionally provided to the residents of Camp Lejeune.’’ 66

Finally on 8 January 1985 a memo from LantDiv indicated that the Navy agreed 

to officially look at the other systems on the base for possible drinking water contamination. ESE, the Confirmation Study contractor was then assigned the task to 

sample all of the wells on the base for VOCs.67 The ESE Evaluation of Data Report 

was released a week later. According to the project schedule previously discussed, 

the report was due in September 1984 and was four months late. Within the report, 

ESE indicated that there was extensive fuel contamination at the HPFF. The contractor wrote in their report: 

‘‘Of extreme importance is the high level of benzene (380 ppb) detected 

in the sample collected from the deep water supply well No. 602 (Well 

22GW3). This benzene concentration far exceeds the 10 to minus 5 

human health risk limit of 6.6 ppb; therefore, the use of this well should 

be discontinued immediately.’’

On the margin a curious handwritten from an unknown LantDiv official note 

reads:

‘‘We must send them our (1141’s) report on well data, what it means and 

what wells to keep shut down.’’

‘‘The absence of contamination at Well 22GW2 indicates that the migration pathway is deep and not shallow.’’ 68

The Evaluation of Data report did not discuss the VOCs found in Tarawa Terrace 

beginning in 1982 and no wells in that system were sampled during the July 1984 

testing period. The report also noted that subsequent to the July 1984 testing, well 

HP 602 experienced a dramatic increase in organic solvents after further testing by 

LantDiv. They concluded that the main industrial area was a logical source of the 

solvents.69 This industrial area included the HPFF, the base maintenance shops, 

and building 1115 (the former Fleet Refueling and Service area). Also included in 

the industrial area were several water supply wells, among them was well HP–602. 

These wells all served the Hadnot Point WTP and were a source of drinking water 

for the service men, women and their families living within the treatment plant’s 

service area. Later that year, when the State of North Carolina asked for copies of 

the ESE report, the Marine Corps refused: 

‘‘as the Marine Corps disagrees with the conclusions in this report, it 

will not release a copy of it to any outside agency.’’ 70

VOC contamination in well HP–651 and Tarawa Terrace 

By then end of January 1985 it appeared that LantDiv and base officials had a 

handle on the VOC contamination found at Hadnot Point. They had closed 10 supply wells for the system and the water treatment plant appeared to be free of benzene and TCE. Two phone calls from residents in Paradise and Berkley manner set 

off a series of events which ultimately changed the course of the contamination 

story. The calls were concerning a gasoline smell in the drinking water provided by 

the Holcomb Boulevard WTP. The calls resulted in the discovery of a leaking generator fuel line at the treatment plant allowing gasoline to collect in the plant’s reservoir. The plant was shut down and two connecting transfer valves were opened 

allowing Hadnot Point to supply water to the service area served by Holcomb Boulevard.71 Prior to 1972, the Holcomb Blvd area was serviced by the Hadnot Point 

WTP and the intra-connection was preserved when the new plant began production. 

From January 27th through February 4th, Hadnot Point supplied all the treated 

water for Hadnot Point and the Holcomb Blvd systems. During this time, the Holcomb Blvd system was repeatedly flushed and cleaned. The state was brought in 

and split water samples were taken after the plant was cleaned.72 However, unbeknownst to Navy and Marine Corps officials, one contaminated well had been 

missed in earlier testing for VOCs. 

Well HP–651 was located along Piney Green Road and immediately adjacent to 

Lots 201 and 203, the base junkyard. Lots 201 and 203 was one of the 22 sites tar-
31

73 CLW 709, Pdf page 18, April 1983. 74 Cercla 429, Pdf page 43, August 1991. 75 CLW 2253, Pdf page 2, May 1993. 76 CLW 5594, Pdf page 34, February 1985. 77 CLW 5237, Pdf page 23, February 1985. 78 CLW 5570, Pdf pp 18& 24, February 1985. 79 CLW 5237, Pdf page 33, February 1985. 

geted for additional study but for some reason, well HP–651 was not selected to be 

sampled in July 1984.73 The well site selected in 1971 by LantDiv engineers and 

installed in 1972. It is not known whether the engineers involved in selecting the 

site for well HP–651were knew of BUMED 6240.3c and the preventive measures 

built into the Navy’s potable water regulations. It was their job to know and comply 

with these regulations. How could they possibly begin to justify the selection of a 

potable water supply well site less than 300 feet from the base junk yard and the 

base VOC disposal area (site 82).74 This one well was the sole source for the horrific 

VOC readings found in the January 1985 samples taken from the Holcomb and 

Hadnot Point WTP service areas received in February of 1985.75

Well 651 was sampled and closed on 4 February 1985. The tests were completed 

on 8 February 1985. Both the January and February samples taken from well HP–

651 were contaminated with extreme amounts of organic solvents.

In their apparent attempt to demonstrate to the State of North Carolina their 

good stewardship of the environment, the Navy and Marine Corps inadvertently and 

independently documented the worst VOC contaminated supply well on the base 

and its corresponding affect on the finished water supplied to the residents of Camp 

Lejeune. 

The Tarawa Terrace (TT) water distribution system test results for VOCs were 

received on the heels of the confirmation of contamination in well HP–651. Just as 

Mike Hargett and Bruce Babson had warned the base in 1982, The Tarawa Terrace 

well field was highly contaminated with VOCs, Specifically wells TT–26 and TT–

23.78

A subsequent test found the finished water provided to the families at Tarawa 

Terrace contained 215 ppb of PCE.79 The contaminated wells were then immediately 

closed, almost three years after the initial warning from Mike Hargett and Grainger 

Laboratory. 

The water supply problems at Tarawa Terrace presented the Navy and Marine 

Corps a different and more complex problem than with the Hadnot Point and Holcomb Blvd WTPs. Like the other treatment plants, the TT system served a large 

residential population with treated water. Unlike the other two systems on main-
32

80 CLW 707, March 1983. 81 CLW 1129, March 1985. 82 CLW 6520, February 1985. 83 CLW 1237, May 1985.

side, there was not intra-connection in the advent of an emergency. To further complicate the issue, the availability of raw water for the TT well fields was limited. 

Even before the closure of wells TT–26 and 23, TT was experiencing trouble with 

the availability of raw water for the treatment plant. A memo from W. R. Price, the 

Utility System Operator General Foreman, warned that the existing well field was 

unable to keep with the demands placed on the TT system and that continued over 

use of the wells in the system without periodic rest could lead to well failures.80

With the closure of wells TT–26 and TT–23, Tarawa Terrace was expected to experience a 300,000 gallon per day shortfall of water for the residents of TT. 

On 1 March 1985, a staff meeting for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities was 

held on the base. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss water alternatives for 

Tarawa Terrace. A list of seven alternatives was developed by Colonel Lilley, Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities.

1. Install a new well at Tarawa Terrace. The problem with a newer well was 

that water, in significant quantities was difficult to locate at Tarawa Terrace. Estimate cost: $80,000.

2. Transport water via tanker trucks from other water plants. However, the logistic of hauling 300,000 gallons per day was questionable. Estimated cost: 

$2,000 per day.

3. Tap into existing City of Jacksonville water line under Lejeune Blvd. There 

was a concern that the city may not be able to provide the water and there 

was a fear that the city would request reciprocating favors to the Marine 

Corps. Estimated cost: Unknown.

4. Change the existing contract for Holcomb Blvd to construct a water line to 

Tarawa Terrace immediately. The contractor was thought to be unable to 

perform this option in the time frame required. Estimate cost: Unknown.

5. Construction of a 8inch raw water line from Brewster Blvd to Tarawa Terrace across the railroad trestle on Northeast Creek. At the time, it was unknown if the state would approve the measure. Estimated Cost: $75,000.

6. Modify Tarawa Terrace plant to include aeration or granular activated carbon unit capable of removing VOCs. The alternative was rejected because of 

they felt the modifications could not be made in the time frame required. Estimated Cost: $300,000.

7. Re-activate and use contaminated well(s) that have been closed if required to maintain adequate water levels and pressure. Lack of Federal MCLs for VOCs or restrictions for using VOC contaminated water is 

used to justify this measure. However, the brief also reads ‘‘the potential 

health hazards must be weighed against the need and cost of providing 

water from other sources.’’ (Please see entry for BUMED 6240.3B and 

6240.3C and note the language concerning chemicals in the water: ‘‘substances which may have a deleterious (harmful) physiological effect or for 

which the physiological effects are not known, shall not be introduced into the 

water system in a manner which would permit them to reach the consumer.’’ 

Estimated Cost: zero.

Alternative 5 was selected for implementation but the estimated completion date 

was 5 June 1985 and state approval for the project was needed. There was no discussion concerning how to provide for the impending water shortage during while 

the auxiliary line was under construction.81 Two days prior to the meeting, a letter 

from the Calgon Activated Carbon Division in response to a LantDiv inquiry about 

emergency potable water treatment systems for VOCs arrived at LantDiv. Calgon 

advised LantDiv that based on the organic solvent and its corresponding concentration supplied by LantDiv, they could deliver as system capable of treating the potable water within 24–48 hours.82 The Calgon system was never ordered According 

to Marine Corps documents, VOC contaminated well TT–23 was operated and supplied water to the residents of Tarawa Terrace on at least three different occasions 

until the temporary water line was completed in June of 1985.83 The Tarawa Terrace WTP was finally closed on 1 March 1987. According to the water model completed by ATSDR in 2007, Tarawa Terrace remained contaminated with VOCs 

throughout this time period. 
33

84 Cercla 132, Pdf page 6, June 1984 85 Cercla, 523, December 1984. 86 CLW 1191, April 1985. 87 Cercla 132, Pdf page 7, May 1985.

The USMC’s Camp Lejeune contaminated drinking water media and public 

relations campaign. 

At no point between the first warning of a problem with the base water supply 

discovered in October 1980 and the appearance of the first announcement informing 

the residents of the base that their drinking water was contaminated in December 

1984, were any of the residents and the State of North Carolina informed about the 

contaminants found in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace drinking water systems. The first indication of a problem from the Marine Corps was an article announcing the commencement of the Confirmation Study. The article appeared in the 

base newspaper and was titled ‘‘Environmental Study kicks-off’’ Col. Lilley advised 

the residents of the base that’’

‘‘while contractors will routinely wear personal protective equipment 

such as chemical resistant overalls, we do not expect to expose anyone 

to any contaminants. The results of the survey are due in August 1984. 

If any contaminants are discovered, a review of alternatives will determine action necessary to meet health and environmental standards.’’ 84

What the Colonel failed to inform the residents was that they were already being 

exposed. The survey referenced in the article was the Confirmation Study. 

The first announcement of drinking water contamination occurred in December 

1984 when the base newspaper informed the residents of Camp Lejeune that:

‘‘Environmental officials here are taking precautionary measures to ensure drinking water is free from possible contamination.’’

‘‘As a result of water sampling taken on 3 December, four wells in the 

Hadnot Point industrial area were found to contain some traces of organic contamination.’’

‘‘none of the compounds noted in the test samples are listed in the regulations under the Safe Drinking Water Act.’’

‘‘Testing is being conducted as part of a basewide confirmation study 

which is currently underway to verify whether any groundwater contamination exists.’’

‘‘Daily water samples are being taken from the water treatment plant to 

ensure drinking water remains within prescribed federal and state 

guidelines established by the Safe Drinking Water Act.’’

‘‘Every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality water supply 

traditionally provided to the residents of Camp Lejeune.’’ 85

On 30 April 1985, the Commanding General of Camp Lejeune issued a Notice to 

Residents of Tarawa Terrace informing them that two supply wells for TT were 

taken off line because ‘‘minute (trace) amounts of several organic chemicals have 

been detected in the water.’’ The general then stated there were no definitive State 

of Federal regulations for the ‘‘compounds’’ and that as a ‘‘precaution’’ he ordered 

them closed. The remainder of the memo discussed the impending water shortages 

expected at Tarawa Terrace. At no point were the residents informed that well TT–

23 had been used to supply water to them after its closure.86 The next series of 

newspaper articles appeared in May 1985. The Jacksonville Daily News titled their 

article ‘‘Chemical discovered in Lejeune water wells.’’ The article informed the reader 

that: 

‘‘Substances found in the wells were described today as volatile organic 

chemical by Gunnery Sgt John Simmons of Lejeune’s Joint Public Affairs Office. He said he had no information on whether the well water 

was dangerous to humans.’’ 87

The Wilmington Morning Star’s article was contained more details and false assurances than the Daily News. The State head of the Water Supply Branch which 

regulates drinking water in North Carolina was quoted as stating’’

‘‘he did not think Camp Lejeune residents need to worry about getting 

bad drinking water. I think we kind of caught it right at the beginning.’’
34

88 Cercla 132, Pdf page 11, May 1985. 89 Cercla 132, Pdf page 7, May 1985. 90 CLW 4855, September 1985. 91 CLW 4855. September 1985. 92 CLW 4903. November 1985. 93 CLW 5430, February 1986. 

Another paper expanded this quote to include ‘‘It’s not something that 

has been running for two or three years.’’ 88

Base Spokesman Gunnery Sergeant John Simmons ended the article with what 

has become a standard Marine Corps anthem regarding the Camp Lejeune drinking 

water contamination and then wrapped it in a total fabrication.

‘‘Simmons stated that while there were no state or federal regulations 

that mandate an unacceptable level of such contaminants in drinking 

water, ‘‘we ordered the closure of all wells that showed even a trace 

amount.’’ 89

These three articles and the general’s notice to Tarawa Terrace constituted the 

first notifications that personnel and their families aboard Camp Lejeune received 

for an exposure that they could not touch, taste, see nor hear. They were relying 

on the Marine Corps to protect them and their families and for their trust they received and continue to receive betrayal. 

As time passed between the discovery of the drinking water contamination and 

the news reports the Marine Corps’ story began to change. An important point to 

remember is that Camp Lejeune, like many military bases, has a large mobile population. Some families spent years at the base while others rotated out over a period 

from months to years. By September of 1985, the Marine Corps’ story became more 

direct as evidenced by a quote from the base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, the same person who received Betz’s memo in January 1983 concerning 

Grainger’s tests performed on the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace WTPs and the 

water provided to the system’s consumers:

‘‘Alexander said the 22 sites are not considered dangerous because only 

trace amounts of contamination have been found to have escaped from 

the dumps. He said that people had not been directly exposed to the pollutants.’’

‘‘the last thing we want to find is that there is a large piece of Camp 

Lejeune that can’t be used because of toxic waste disposal.’’

‘‘Alexander said there is no clear relationship between the closing of the 

wells and any specific waste site.’’

‘‘The way we got onto the well problem was in sampling near one of our 

fuel farms, or fuel storage facilities. We sampled nearby wells. In one 

near the fuel farm, we didn’t detect fuel but did detect organic solvents.’’ 90

The same article also informed the reader that:

‘‘Eight (wells) had been tainted by small amounts of fuel and solvents 

used to clean weapons and vehicles. Solvents found in two of the wells, 

in a residential neighborhood at the northern edge of the base, have 

been tentatively linked to civilian dry-cleaning firms in nearby Jacksonville.’’

‘‘No one has been harmed by the wastes.’’

‘‘Linton (EPA) said the most serious problem at Camp Lejeune was contamination of the groundwater with solvents that are suspected of causing cancer.’’

‘‘Col. Tiebout, Camp Lejeune’s assistant chief of staff for facilities characterized all of the actions so far—closing wells, relocating the day care 

center, and extensive testing—as precautionary measures.’’ 91

In the public arena, fact was becoming fiction and the Marine Corps’ spin on what 

transpired at the base between 1980 and 1984 was rapidly solidifying into reality. 

Behind the scenes, the EPA moved to force Camp Lejeune onto the National Priority 

List (NPL) also known as the Superfund list. In a meeting which took place at the 

base in November of 1985, Robert Alexander told the EPA that their contractor’s 

report was in error and resisted the idea of placing the base on the NPL.92 Somehow 

or another, the EPA walked away with the idea that no contamination was detected 

in treated potable water at the Hadnot Point WTP.93 Two weeks after this meeting, 
35

94 CLW 1406, January 1986. 95 Cercla 132, Pdf page 18, January 1986. 96 Cercla 132, Pdf page 20, December 1987. 97 Cercla 132, Pdf page 28, February 1988. 98 Cercla 417, December 1988.

the treated water at the Hadnot Point WTP was sampled and found to contain benzene in the extreme amount of 2,500 ppb.94 The analytical data sheets for this test 

and a subsequent benzene finding several weeks later are both missing. There are 

no known notifications of this finding to the residents at Camp Lejeune and the 

words ‘‘Not Representative’’ were handwritten over the 14 November 1985 test results for the Hadnot Point WTP. The false contention that people were not directly 

exposed to the pollutants appeared again in a media story detailing the contamination written in January 1986.95

On Christmas Eve 1987, the Jacksonville Daily News again repeated Robert Alexander’s September 1985 assertion that people had not been directly exposed to the 

pollutants. The paper also informed the public that the EPA was considering Camp 

Lejeune for the NPL. The contamination steadily devolved into ‘‘traces of TCE, DCE 

and PCE.’’ The fuel found at Hadnot Point had entirely disappeared in the media.96

Colonel Thomas Dalzell, Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities was designated as the 

overall coordinator for Camp Lejeune’s incorporation onto the National Priorities 

List. In February 1988, he was featured in a question and answer press release 

which became the basis for several media news stories on the drinking water contamination aboard the base.

‘‘Q. Is my health or the health of my family in any danger?

A. No it’s not. All the wells which we get our raw water out of are continually tested and the wells that were identified as being contaminated 

have been closed off.’’

‘‘Q. What about prior to 1983?

A. At that time we were not aware of any of these particular compounds 

that might have been in the ground water and we have no information 

that anyone’s health was in any danger at that time.’’

‘‘Q. What are the long term effects of exposure to these contaminants?

A. Heavy long term exposure to these chemicals could cause some health 

hazards, depending on the amount of chemical ingested.’’

Q. What was the source of the contamination?

A. Most of the sources of contamination were the motor pools that existed 

down in the Hadnot Point area. At that time oil, greases, solvents, gasoline and cleaning fluids and other types of chemicals were just being 

dumped in the ground or dumped in sewers or things like that; and we 

were really not aware back in the 60’s and 70’s of the effects on groundwater contamination. Now we are more aware of these things and have 

taken appropriate precautions to ensure the ground water contamination is not progressing any further.’’ 97

How could the man placed in charge of coordinating the placement of Camp 

Lejeune on the NPL be ignorant of the fact that warnings about the contamination 

began in October of 1980? Was his claim that there was no knowledge of the drinking water contamination prior to 1983? Was this misrepresentation fabricated by design or ignorance? 

The massive Hadnot Point Fuel Farm fuel spill surfaced again in late 1988. The 

attention was more than likely due to the impending release of O’Brien and Gere’s 

Final Report for the Contaminated Ground Water Study at Hadnot Point.98 The engineer’s report detailed large losses of fuel from the HPFF and a fuel plume 15ft 

thick was identified floating in the semi confined aquifer at Hadnot Point. Once 

again, Marine Corps statements in the media did not match up what was actually 

known at the time. A Jacksonville Daily News article titled ‘‘Base officials study 

cleanup of fuel leaks’’ appeared in print in October. 

‘‘leaks from an underground tank system were confined to an are two 

square blocks around the fuel farm.’’

‘‘The spill is contained by the section’s natural flat terrain and water 

table conditions.’’

‘‘the number of gallons leaked is unknown.’’
36

99 Cercla 132, Pdf page 36, October 1988. 100 Cercla 132, Pdf page 47, August 1989. 101 Cercla 132, Pdf page 57, October 1989. 102 CLW 1854, August 1989. 103 USMC CL Booklet, Page 13, July 2010. 

‘‘Cleanup is expected to start after final design of glue/ recovery system. 

Recovered gasoline products are expected to be recycled for use on the 

base.’’ 99

By the following year, the base was ready for listing on the NPL and the old pattern of ‘‘no single source had been found for the chemicals (solvents) along with the 

1983 IAS conclusion that none of the 22 sites selected for further investigation 

posed an immediate threat to human health were rehashed in the media.100 Of the 

22 sites, the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm was designated as the first site to be cleaned 

up once Lejeune was placed on the Superfund list.101 Camp Lejeune was officially 

added to the NPL in October 1989. Shortly before the base was listed on the NPL 

an article appeared in the base newspaper featuring Base Supervisory Chemist, 

Elizabeth Betz who had laboriously documented the early stages of the contamination from May 1982 through January 1983. 

‘‘You’d have to look at each VOC individually, but many of them are carcinogens. That’s the main reason we immediately shut the wells down, 

although the levels we found in the tests were not near the EPA limit.’’

‘‘We were puzzled when the chemicals showed up. At first, we couldn’t 

figure out how it had gotten into the Tarawa Terrace system. Then we 

looked across Highway 24. There were dry-cleaning businesses right 

across the road from the housing area.’’

‘‘Once you have identified where the potential for a threat is, you start 

taking action to correct it. You can not leave a contaminant in the 

groundwater.’’ 102

The Marine Corps controlled the message and information surrounding the details 

of the drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. With the addition of Camp 

Lejeune onto the NPL, the Marine Corps was required to establish and administrative record for public use. This repository is located in the Onslow County Public 

Library. The problem is that a large number of personnel and families exposed at 

Camp Lejeune no longer live near the base to have access and view the CERCLA 

library. Beginning in the mid to late 2000’s, the Marine Corps placed portions of 

the administrative record on the internet. The online library is known as the ‘‘Baker 

website.’’ This website is cumbersome and largely unusable. A brief document library appeared on the USMC’s website but was removed after the Congressional 

hearing in 2007. Without access to original sources of information, the affected community is left to the mercy and whim of the Marine Corps. A breakthrough in gathering information occurred in 2007 with the release of ATSDR’s water model for 

Tarawa Terrace. The corresponding discs contained electronic files of the Marine 

Corps’ Camp Lejeune Water document library and the Cercla administrative record. 

Through these discs the affected community has had the opportunity to educate ourselves and revisit the Marine Corps’ version of what happened at Camp Lejeune. 

Our advantage is the Corps told their lies up front. The truth is in their documents and they do tell a far different story than what the Marine Corps has asserted to the media and Congress. What is now needed is for an authoritative body 

such as Congress to work objectively with the Marine Corps and the affected community to ascertain what really happened at Camp Lejeune and what chemicals we 

were exposed to in our drinking water aboard the base. The stumbling block is that 

our government is the source and remedy for this issue and there is an inherent 

conflict of interest in securing the full and objective co-operation of the various agencies capable of providing the answer and ultimate relief from our exposures. 

The recent Marine Corps informational brochure proudly boasts that the USMC 

has investigated three separate times and found to be exonerated of blame in the 

contamination.103 Each of these prior investigations occurred before the release of 

the initial electronic document library to the public and our subsequent enlightenment of what transpired at Camp Lejeune during the contamination period. Both 

the Commandant’s 2004 Blue Ribbon panel and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2007 Report on Camp Lejeune share a common fatal flaw. Each report 

failed to identify the true extent of the fuel problem at Hadnot Point, the Navy and 

Marine Corps’ own internal directives and standards for potable water systems 

aboard Naval vessels and facilities, including Camp Lejeune and the Marine Corps’s 

1974 Base Order identifying Organic Solvents as hazardous materials. Each report 
37

104Official Transcripts for the ‘‘Poisoned Patriots: Contaminated Drinking Water at Camp 

Lejeune’’ hearing, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy 

and Commerce, House of Representatives. Pdf page 144. June 2007. 105 ATSDR Website, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/pha/pha.asp?docid=1082&pg=0 106 National Research Council, ‘‘Contaminated Water Supplies at Camp Lejeune: Assessing Potential Health Affects, June 2009. 

failed to locate and interview the owner and lead chemist from Grainger Laboratory 

concerning the events in 1982. Instead, the reports relied on LantDiv and base employees who, to one degree or another, seemed to suffer a collective form of selective 

memory. In fact, during the 2007 Congressional ‘‘Poisoned Patriot’s’’ hearing, Chairman Bart Stupak asked the EPA’s Special Agent, Tyler Amon if he had personally 

recommended that obstruction of justice charges be brought up against the former 

LantDiv and base personnel who appeared to have been coached and were uncooperative with his investigation. Agent Amon confirmed that he had identified areas 

of concern for obstruction of justice charges but these recommendations were overruled by the Department of Justice.104 This same department is currently tasked 

with representing the government (the Navy and USMC) for any and all Federal 

Tort claims filed because of the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination. This 

blatant lack of objectivity by the Department of the Navy continues to this day. 

Early this summer, the Secretary of the Navy established a Camp Lejeune Assistance Team (CLAT) in response to the pressure placed upon the Navy by Congress, 

the media and the affected community over the recent discoveries pertaining to the 

Hadnot Point Fuel Farm and the electronic portal. The CLAT is tasked to provide 

a report to Secretary Mabus. There is no input whatsoever from the affected community nor is there any shred of independent oversight or objectivity. Members of 

the CLAT are required not to do anything which may compromise the Navy’s legal 

defense against the families. All in all, the CLAT, as with the prior government investigations into Camp Lejeune’s contaminated drinking water, sounds like a classic 

case of the ‘‘Emperor’s New Clothes’’

Perhaps one the most important single recent event in the Camp Lejeune contaminated drinking water story occurred last April when the ATSDR withdrew their 

flawed public health assessment (PHA) for Camp Lejeune. The assessment was 

fraught with errors including but not limited to, improper usage of exposure duration and dosage models used to characterize our risks for adverse health outcomes, 

the disappearance of the assessments supporting references and interviews, and the 

omission of benzene from the 1997 Camp Lejeune Public Health Assessment.105 The 

Camp Lejeune PHA failed to recognize that our exposures on the base surpassed 

mere occupational settings. The models used to evaluate our exposures failed to account for the fact that the resident population on the base was exposed 24 hours 

a day and 7 days a week throughout the year. The PHA also underestimated the 

amount of contaminated water consumed by the personnel exposed on the base. To 

add insult to injury, the supporting interviews and documentation for the agency’s 

work on the assessment were allegedly ‘‘accidently destroyed’’ by a contractor after 

the assessment was published. What this meant, was that there was no way for 

other scientists or the affected community to fact check ATSDR’s work. The breaking point for ATSDR came when members of the Community Assistance Panel 

(CAP) for Camp Lejeune correctly identified that well HP–602 was discovered contaminated with fuel products while the well was actively pumping water for the 

Hadnot Point Water Treatment Plant. ATSDR’s leadership found their prior position 

that no direct proof existed that benzene was in our water, suddenly untenable. On 

28 April 2009, the ATSDR withdrew their Camp Lejeune PHA at our CAP meeting 

held in Atlanta. This event was the first time a PHA was withdrawn in the agencies 

history. 

The ATSDR PHA for Camp Lejeune was not the only report which failed to address the benzene exposure at Camp Lejeune. In June of last year, the National Research Council (NRC) released their controversial report on Camp Lejeune.106 This 

report was the result of well intended, but poorly overseen legislation, in which the 

Department of the Navy was allowed to write the charge, or directions to the scientist on how to conduct their review of scientific literature concerning the chemicals we were exposed to at Camp Lejeune. The committee focused their efforts on 

PCE and TCE and omitted benzene in their evaluations and assessments. I am not 

a scientist and thus not qualified to comment on the specifics of why the report is 

flawed. This area has been openly addressed by other scientists including one who 

participated in a peer review of the NRC report and who is present today as a witness before the committee. I will defer discussion of the scientific issues about the 

validity of the NRC to Dr. Richard Clapp of Boston University. However, there are 

some non scientific issues that have come to light concerning the report. First and 
38

107 Chairman Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology Brad Miller Letter to Dr. Ralph Cicerone, President National Academy of Sciences, November 2009. With attachments. 108 USMC letter to Camp Lejeune Registrants, General Payne USMC, June 2009. 109 Excerpt from Document #1185. This document was found by ATSDR within the recently 

discovered limited access web portal for the Navy’s Underground Storage Tank Program, 

NavFacEngCom. 110 Cercla 258, May 1988. 111 USMC Response to Senator Burr and Hagan Queries on Camp Lejeune, Pdf page 10 July 

2009. 112 Cercla 96, Pdf Page 33–34, March 1988.

foremost, shortly after the report was released to the public, we discovered that the 

National Academy of Science entered into a $600,000 contract with the Department 

of Defense to effectively serve as the DOD’s hired gun and consultant for work at 

Camp Lejeune. What was more disturbing was that the contract was negotiated and 

signed while the NRC committee was engaged in their work on the Camp Lejeune 

NRC report.107 Earlier this year, we learned that the National Academies quietly 

dissolved the contract with the DOD. 

Shortly after the NRC report was released, the Marine Corps mailed a letter 

signed by Major General Payne to every registrant with the Marine Corps for Camp 

Lejeune. The letter notified the registrants that ATSDR withdrew their PHA for 

Camp Lejeune because of the omission of benzene contamination but was written 

in such a way as to infer the NRC committee did review and assess the benzene 

exposures at Camp Lejeune.108 What is puzzling is that much of what we now know 

about the benzene contamination was not provided to the NRC reviewers. Like 

ATSDR, there are no supporting documents indicating that the NRC Committee 

members knew of the existence of up to 1.1 million gallons of fuel lost into the 

groundwater at Camp Lejeune.109 It is a mystery how the Marine Corps and Major 

General Payne are able to conclude that the NRC did indeed evaluate and assess 

our benzene exposures in the drinking water at Camp Lejeune. 

Just how did the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm’s massive fuel loss escape the attention 

of ATSDR in their 1997 PHA? We may never know the complete answer to that 

question but what the historical documents make clear is that ATSDR should have 

known about our benzene exposures, investigated them and assessed the risk of 

those exposures. The Navy and Marine Corps were also complicit in casting a 

shroud over the fuel losses at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. It was their base, their 

facility where the contamination occurred, their documents detailed the extent of 

the contamination and their people were the ones exposed. The Navy and Marine 

Corps had a moral obligation to ensure the State and Federal regulatory agencies, 

especially the ATSDR knew we were exposed to benzene. If the subcontractor for 

the ATSDR had not found the UST portal in 2009, just when did the Navy and Marine Corps plan to disclose the fuel losses at Hadnot Point? Was this a game of catch 

me if you can? 

The defunct ATSDR PHA did contain a reference to a Marine Corps sponsored 

report on the Hadnot Point Industrial Area issued in May of 1988. Contained on 

page 18 of 373 is a statement by the contractor in which benzene was described as 

a contaminant in well 602. The lost fuel was also found in the deep aquifer at 

Hadnot Point.110 There was no excuse for the personnel working for ATSDR at that 

time to have missed this vital fact which confirmed benzene was a major contaminant at Camp Lejeune. However, with this being said, once it was established that 

the ATSDR was in error, the 1997 PHA for Camp Lejeune was rescinded. The same 

was not true for the polluter. Instead of acknowledging their role in the omission 

of benzene in the PHA by ATSDR, the Navy and Marine Corps leveled sole blame 

at the ATSDR: 

‘‘If benzene was not fully addressed in the PHA, it was not for lack of 

data.’’ 111

According to Col Tokarz’s March 1988 letter concerning the Hadnot Point Fuel 

farm, the upcoming Technical Review Committee (TRC) was slated to discuss the 

details about the HPFF and fully explain the situation to the members of the committee which included the community and representatives of the EPA.112 Four 

months later, the first TRC meeting took place aboard Camp Lejeune. The TRC was 

a requirement of CERCLA and served to bring the affected community, DOD and 

EPA together to discuss developments for cleaning up the base. When the time came 

to discuss the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm, as promised in Tokarz’s letter, something 

entirely different happened: 
39

113 Cercla 496, Pdf page 74, August 1988. 114 Cercla 496, Pdf page 54, August 1988. 115 Cercla 417, Pdf page 8 &24, December 1988. 116 USMC Response to Senator Burr and Hagan Queries on Camp Lejeune, Pdf page 12, July 

2009. 117 Cerlca 493, Pdf pp 4–11, July 1990. 118 Cercla 724, April 1992.

Cheryl Barnett, LantDiv: ‘‘Well, they’re part of the other 22 sites that we 

said we are looking at, we just don’t have any data to present to you 

today.’’ 113

Earlier in the meeting, the base environmental engineer was asked what kind of 

readings were found in the water samples from the 1980’s. Mr. Alexander who was 

present during that time period and fulfilled the role of base environmental engineer stated:

‘‘We had very little, if any data, before we realized our groundwater was 

contaminated.’’ 114

Why the deception? In December 1988, the O’Brien and Gere Contaminated 

Ground Water Study for Camp Lejeune was released. The report identified two 

pools of free floating gasoline in the groundwater at Hadnot Point. The engineers 

were unable to clearly define the exact boundaries and extent of the plumes. Clearly, the fuel contamination was much worse than the 23,150 to 33,150 gallons cited 

in base inventory records.115

Sometime between 1985 and 1990, the Navy moved handling of the HPFF fuel 

loss problem to LantDiv’s Underground Storage Tank Program. We have been unable to ascertain the exact date and how this was accomplished. The Navy stated 

in their 2009 written responses to Senator Burr and Hagan that:

‘‘After 1986, the sites were evaluated to determine whether they were 

under the CERCLA, in which the EPA or RCRA, in which the state has 

primacy. In 1988 it was determined that corrective action at the HPFF 

fell under RCRA and therefore the State of North Carolina had primacy.’’ 116

Apparently, the Navy and Marine Corps forgot to inform the EPA of their evaluation. There was another problem with their arbitrary determination. The CERCLA 

vs. RCRA delineations did not apply if mixed contaminants were present. If mixed 

contaminants were present at a Superfund site, CERCLA is primary. The issue 

came to a head at a TRC meeting in July of 1990. During the meeting, Camp 

Lejeune officials informed the EPA representative that HPFF was not part of the 

Federal Facilities Agreement and thus out of the purview of the EPA. Base officials 

advised the EPA that a fuel recovery system for the HPFF was finalized and ready 

for bidding. Once bidding was completed, the Navy and Marine Corps were ready 

to begin remediation of the shallow aquifer around the HPFF. The EPA representative, Victor Weeks, disagreed and advised the attendees of the meeting there was 

a mixing of solvent plumes and fuel plumes and as such, the groundwater cleanup 

in the HPIA is all interconnected.

‘‘Just because it’s an underground storage tank at this point doesn’t matter to us because we have a combined plume.’’ Mr. Weeks went on to conclude: 

‘‘If this was an isolated area separated from Hadnot Point, we could agree 

with that (Handling under the state’s UST program) we feel like it’s part of 

the CERCLA program as well’’. He also warned that the Navy was doing work 

at their own risk.117

By April of 1992, Mr. Weeks was no longer the EPA representative working on 

Camp Lejeune. The EPA replacement received a letter from Paul Rakowski at 

LantDiv requesting that the HPFF be exempt from CERCLA under the petroleum 

exclusion because Jet Fuel was the only source of contamination at the HPFF.118

Shortly afterwards the HPFF was officially moved to the RCRA program and under 

the purview of the State of North Carolina. The result of this move was the HPFF 

was dropped from CERCLA and corresponding reports pertaining to CERCLA sites 

on the base. For example, the 1994 Final Remedial Investigation Report for Operable Unit 1 (Sites 21, 24 and 78 in the Hadnot Point Industrial Area) mentions the 

existence of the HPFF within the Operable Unit, but then the report added that: 
40

119 Cercla 1161, Pdf page 78, June 1994. 120 Cercla 366, Pdf pp 91–94, July 1994. 121 Cercla, 1866, Pdf page 4, November 1996. 122 Cercla 2358, Pdf page 289, January 1989. 123 Cercla 651, October 1986. 124 CLW 1917, March 1993. 125 North Carolina UST Document Library, April 1994. 

‘‘Since the fuel farm area is a UST problem, it is not included as part 

of the CERCLA RI/FS process, but is being handled as a separate study 

under the UST Program.’’ 119

Another result of the move from RCRA to CERCLA was that documents pertaining to the UST Program were not required to be filed for public view in the 

CERCLA Administrative Record. This is evident when one compares the CERCLA 

administrative records file to what was filed with the State of North Carolina. The 

end result was that control of information concerning the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm 

lay at the discretion of the Navy and what reports they chose to submit to the State 

of North Carolina. The EPA was effectively out of the HPFF picture. 

A July 1994 court recorded public hearing was held at Camp Lejeune concerning 

the proposed clean up for the Hadnot Point Industrial area, except the HPFF. A 

base representative was asked why there was no public hearing for the HPFF. Neal 

Paul, The base Installation Restoration Program Manager for Camp Lejeune responded:

‘‘There are some public relations requirements and this predates me.’’

Mr. Paul failed to answer the question and advised the attendees of the meeting:

‘‘to date there’s like 25,000 gallons of gasoline from the inventory records 

that were shown to be missing. And to date we have recovered about 

20,000 gallons of gasoline.’’

‘‘but the plume treatment is pretty close to being remediated.’’

‘‘If you get 75% of the free product that you think you spilled into the 

groundwater, then you’re doing a great job, and 20 out of 25 is almost 

80 percent. So, we done probably as good as we can do.’’

‘‘And that is really one of our big success stories.’’

‘‘From the people I’ve talk to in the state agree it is a success.’’ 120

Two years later a partnering meeting hosted by Mr. Paul was held at Camp 

Lejeune. The attendees included base officials, the Navy’s contractor for the remediation work on the base, representatives from the State of North Carolina, EPA and 

personnel from LantDiv. The meeting was not open to the public. A contractor for 

the Navy advised the attendees that based on data from an engineering contractor 

working on the HPFF, an estimated 800,000 gallons of fuel had been lost at the 

HPFF and benzene was appearing in the deep aquifer.121 Notably absent from the 

meeting were representatives from the ATSDR. The ATSDR 1997 PHA for Camp 

Lejeune was still in draft form at the time of the meeting. The brief reference to 

the 800,000 gallon fuel loss was the only place we have found in the entire CERCLA 

library which quantified the size and scope of the fuel plumes at Hadnot Point and 

is more than the disclosed 23,150 to 33,150 gallons lost in Marine Corps inventory 

records. 

The former base Fleet Service and Refueling area was located within 300 feet and 

up-gradient from well HP–602. Buildings 1100, 1111, 1115 and seven underground 

storage tanks comprised the facility. The USTs were intra-connected to the fuel 

farm by underground piping.122 The facility served as a service station from 1957–

1965, and administrative office from 1965–1972, a data processing center 1972–1976 

and a printing plant from 1976–1986.123 The tanks were removed from the ground 

in 1993 and the contents of the tanks were described as diesel fuel and gasoline.124

Building 1115 turned out to be a separate and distinct source of fuel loss at the 

Hadnot Point Industrial Area. Last week the Navy released many of the documents 

on the web portal discovered by ATSDR last year to the public. We are currently 

reviewing this previously undisclosed document library and we are finding indications organic solvents were mixed in the fuel plume at this site. As far as we know, 

no specific risk assessment or remedial investigation was ever performed for building 1115. Instead, the Navy sent a letter to the State of North Carolina advising 

the State that building 1115 was being incorporated into the Hadnot Point Fuel 

Farm and the two were handled as one site.125 Who gave the Navy the authority 

to make this decision and why was it not challenged by the EPA? Building 1115 

was only mentioned in the CLW and CERLCA libraries. The extent of the contami-
41

126 Cercla 71, Pdf page 5, October 1991. 127 Cercla 27, December 1991. 

nation found in the groundwater underneath the former Fleet Service and Refueling 

Area was not previously disclosed to ATSDR. Details of the contaminants found at 

building 1115 are currently surfacing as we review the documents. The concealment 

of building 1115 did not stop with ATSDR. In 1991 the EPA queried the Navy 

whether USTs existed at building 1100/1115.126 Paul Rakoswki from LantDiv responded that a leaking 55 gallon drum of PCE was found at the site but failed to 

answer the EPA’s question on the USTs.127 If one agency of our government chooses 

to misrepresent and conceal material facts to Federal regulators in another agency 

and nothing happens when the truth is revealed, where is the accountability? 

It is now thirteen years since the release of the 1997 Public Health Assessment 

for Camp Lejeune and the community still has no clear answer to what happened 

to us while we or our loved ones served our country. Our country has seen a renewed appreciation for our volunteer military and the sacrifices made by our fighting men, women and their families. It is hard to drive down the road without seeing 

a ‘‘support the troops’’ ribbon on someone’s car. How can we profess respect for our 

military personnel and families when in their time of need, this country not only 

abandoned them but abandoned their families as well. We trusted the Marine Corps 

would do the right thing for their Marines and their families. We trusted that the 

EPA and the State of North Carolina would ensure the Marine Corps fully disclosed 

the extent of the contamination at Camp Lejeune. The subtitle of this hearing is 

‘‘Looking back, Moving Forward.’’ We looked back and found the Marine Corps’ 

statements do not match the historical documents. We can not move forward with 

understanding the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination unless there is a 

full disclosure from the Navy and Marine Corps. We can not rely on the agencies 

of the Executive branch to provide our answers. The Department of Defense was the 

polluter. The Department of Justice represents the government for all claims 

brought against the Navy and Marine Corps and overruled the EPA special agent 

investigating government wrong doing at Camp Lejeune. Congress is where this 

issue must be resolved. What other measures has the DoJ taken to bolster their defense for the government? Our exposures are known and well documented. The negligence of the Marine Corps is clear. There are thousands of Marines, Sailors, their 

family members and base employees who were sickened by he fouled water at Camp 

Lejeune. When will this country fulfill our commitment to support the troops?

BIOGRAPHY FOR MICHAEL PARTAIN

Michael Partain is the dependent son of Captain Warren Partain and was born 

at Camp Lejeune in 1968 during the drinking water contamination. His parents 

lived aboard the base at Tarawa Terrace. The Partain family settled in Florida in 

1972 after leaving the Marine Corps. Three years ago Michael was diagnosed with 

male breast cancer at the age of 39. Since then he has located 63 other men from 

Camp Lejeune with the disease. Michael became involved with the Camp Lejeune 

after viewing a television report about Camp Lejeune while he was treating his 

breast cancer. Since then he has become a community advocate and a community 

representative of the ATSDR Community Assistance Panel (CAP) for Camp Lejeune.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Partain. 

We probably are going to be interrupted by votes, so we do need 

to try to keep some kind of schedule, and I appreciate your testimony. It is an important contribution to today’s hearing. 

Mr. Watters, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES WATTERS, DIRECTOR, GRADUATE 

MEDICAL EDUCATION, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH 

SCIENCES CENTER, FORMER NAVY LIEUTENANT, RETIRED 

COMMANDER, NAVY RESERVE, MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS 

AND CAMP LEJEUNE VETERAN DIAGNOSED WITH KIDNEY 

CANCER 

Mr. WATTERS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Broun, members 

of the Committee, thank you for taking the time to address this important issue and permitting me the honor of appearing before you 
42

to tell my story. I believe it is similar to the stories of thousands 

of others who were at Camp Lejeune. 

I am a retired Navy Medical Service Corps Commander who 

served at Naval Regional Medical Center, Marine Corps Base 

Camp Lejeune from June 1977 until November 1979. Prior to my 

naval service, I served in the U.S. Army Infantry in Vietnam from 

November 1969 until I was wounded in combat while walking point 

for my infantry company on September 6, 1970. When I was 

wounded, my commanding officer, Captain Allen G. Vitters, ran 

and crawled through enemy fire to drag me to safety. This is what 

a leader does. 

In November 2007, I was diagnosed with advanced renal cell carcinoma, stage 3, almost stage 4. I had a kidney removed in December 2007, and in January 2008 was told by my oncologist I had 

about a year to live. In approximately July 2008, I received an envelope from the IRS which contained a letter from General Payne 

advising me I had been exposed to trichlorethylene and other hazardous chemicals while serving at Camp Lejeune. It is important 

to note this letter came 21 years after the Marine Corps and the 

Department of the Navy knew in 1987 that I and many others had 

been exposed to volatile organic compounds. 

I researched the possible link between TCE and RCC, renal cell 

carcinoma, and found a probability of the link between TCE and 

RCC. I then filed a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs 

in order to obtain benefits for my family for after my death. The 

VA, of course, denied the claim. I resubmitted my VA claim including additional information about the link between TCE and renal 

cell carcinoma. The claim was again denied in March of 2009. I 

then consulted three science faculty, two of whom are toxicologists 

who work at the medical school where I work as an Assistant Dean 

for Graduate Medical Education. They wrote strong letters of support for my claim, and I requested a hearing with a decision review 

officer at the VA regional office in Waco, Texas. I was granted the 

opportunity to appear before the decision review officer in July—

I am sorry—in June of 2009 to present my case. The evidence I 

presented met the VA criteria ‘‘as likely as not’’ so the claim was 

decided in my favor and I was granted 100 percent service-connected disability for the renal cell carcinoma as a result of my exposure to TCE at Camp Lejeune. Receiving this disability rating 

made my wife and my adult disabled son eligible for CHAMP VA 

insurance coverage for the rest of their lives, and CHAMP VA is 

similar to TRICARE. 

I would have appreciated being notified by the Marine Corps 

even 18 months before the July 2008 notice. It would have made 

a difference in when my kidney cancer was diagnosed and my prognosis. 

As I researched the Camp Lejeune situation, I was horrified to 

find out how many people the Marine Corps had poisoned and the 

obstructionist tactics the U.S. Marine Corps and Department of the 

Navy has used to avoid responsibility and avoid providing any type 

of assistance with health care or any financial assistance to those 

they have sickened and to the families of those whose deaths they 

have caused. Examples of obstructionist tactics include the Marine 

Corps’s failure to cooperate with the State of North Carolina’s ef-
43

forts to analyze and address this problem in the 1980s, The 21 

years it took for the Marine Corps to notify those they poisoned, 

the intense pressure it took to have the Marine Corps fund the 

ATSDR study, the failure of the Marine Corps to turn over critical 

documents until forced to do so, and numerous other examples of 

the Marine Corps and Department of the Navy strategy to deny 

and delay as long as possible. 

I firmly believe this strategy is based upon financial considerations and I do not know what role the Department of Defense has 

in this strategy. It is possible that the Marine Corps and Department of the Navy senior leaders are ‘‘just following orders.’’

It is my firm belief that the United States Marine Corps and Department of the Navy leadership have abandoned and betrayed 

their wounded from Camp Lejeune including women and children 

and left them to suffer and die. I am very sensitive to caring for 

the wounded because in the Army we were trained to never leave 

our wounded behind. I saw men wounded and killed in Vietnam 

trying to recover our wounded. The U.S. Soldier’s Creed specifically 

states, ‘‘I will never leave a fallen comrade.’’ If the Marines have 

a similar creed, their senior leaders seem to think it does not apply 

in this case. 

Suggestions for immediate action: Because it is crystal clear 

there is a leadership vacuum at the United States Marine Corps 

and Department of the Navy on this issue, I suggest Congress step 

in immediately to pass legislation to provide health care to those 

who have been sickened by the Camp Lejeune poisonings. Everyone 

in this room knows this is morally and ethically the right thing to 

do. The United States Marine Corps and Navy have proven they 

will not and cannot be trusted to do the right thing. Time is of the 

essence, so political party differences should not be permitted to 

delay taking effective action. 

Number two: The Department of Veterans Affairs should immediately consider how they can streamline the disability claims process for those who have been sickened by the Camp Lejeune poisons. 

The only reason I was able to win my claim was because of the resources at my disposal in the school of medicine where I work. Very 

few veterans have such resources available to them. Eventually the 

VA will develop a list of presumptive illnesses for those exposed at 

Camp Lejeune. It should not take 10 or 15 years as it did for Agent 

Orange. People are sick and they and their families need help now. 

Also, the VA should publicize this matter in their outpatient clinics 

and hospitals to alert those who were poisoned. I have tried for 

over one year to have my local VA hospital in Amarillo, Texas post 

notices of the Camp Lejeune situation to alert veterans who may 

have been exposed. When I told them that I was coming to this 

hearing, they decided to finally post the notices. 

Lastly, as you hear from the United States Marine Corps and the 

Department of the Navy about all they have done to address this 

matter, I would urge you to consider the evidence of the steps the 

U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of the Navy have taken to 

obstruct resolution of this very serious environmental disaster. 

This is basically a ‘‘friendly fire’’ incident in slow motion and every 

possible measure has been taken by the Marine Corps and the Department of the Navy to deny and delay providing any assistance 
44

whatsoever to their victims. The Marines claim to have spent $22 

million to address this but I would point out that this amount over 

20 to 25 years is a pittance and I would ask you to consider what 

amount of this total was the Marine Corps compelled to spend and 

how much was spent on obstructing any efforts to provide any assistance whatsoever to Marine Corps victims. 

Finally, the U.S. government has a very poor track record of assisting in a timely manner those who have been harmed by the Department of Defense. Examples include the atomic vets, the Agent 

Orange vets, the Gulf War syndrome vets, and now this. Congress 

has the opportunity to deal with this in a timely and effective manner and to do the right thing. I urge Members of Congress to do 

what you know should be done. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Watters follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES L. WATTERS

I start today by thanking the Members of this Congressional Committee for taking the time to address this important issue and permitting me the honor of appearing before you to tell my story. 

My name is James Watters and I am a retired U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps 

Commander who served at the Naval Regional Medical Center, Marine Corps Base 

Camp Lejeune from June, 1977 until November, 1979. Prior to my Naval service I 

served in the U.S. Army infantry in Vietnam from November, 1969 until I was 

wounded in combat while walking point for my infantry company on September 6, 

1970. When I was wounded, my commanding officer, Captain Allen G. Vitters ran 

and crawled through enemy fire to drag me to safety. That is what a leader does. 

In November, 2007 I was diagnosed with advanced (stage 3, almost stage 4) renal 

cell carcinoma (RCC). I had a kidney removed in December, 2007 and in January, 

2008 was told by my oncologist I had about a year to live. 

My initial thought about the cause of the cancer was my exposure to agent orange 

because there is no history of renal cell carcinoma in my family. My research 

showed no link between agent orange and RCC. 

In approximately July, 2008 I received an envelope from the IRS which contained 

a letter from a Marine Corps General advising me I had been exposed to trichloroethylene (TCE) and other hazardous chemicals while serving at Camp Lejeune. It 

is important to note that this letter came 21 years after the USMC and the Department of the Navy knew, in 1987, that I and many others had been exposed to volatile organic compounds. (VOCs) I researched the possible link between TCE and 

RCC and found a probability of the link between TCE and RCC. I then filed a claim 

with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in order to obtain benefits for my 

family for after my death. 

The VA of course denied my claim. I resubmitted my VA claim including additional information about the link between TCE and RCC. The claim was again denied in March of 2009. I then consulted three science faculty, two of whom are toxicologists who work at the medical school where I work as an Assistant Dean for 

Graduate Medical Education. They wrote strong letters of support for my VA claim 

and I requested a hearing with a Decision Review Officer (DRO) at the VA Regional 

Office in Waco, Texas. 

I was granted the opportunity to appear before the DRO in June, 2009 to present 

my case. The evidence I presented met the VA criterion ‘‘as likely as not’’ so the 

claim was decided in my favor and I was granted 100% service connected disability 

for the RCC as a result of my exposure to TCE at Camp Lejeune. Receiving this 

disability rating made my wife and my adult disabled son eligible for CHAMPVA 

insurance coverage for the rest of their lives. (CHAMPVA is very similar to 

TRICARE.) 

I would have appreciated being notified by the USMC even 18 months before the 

July, 2008 notice. It would have made a difference in when my RCC was diagnosed 

and my prognosis. 

As I researched the Camp Lejeune situation I was horrified to find out how many 

people the USMC had poisoned and the obstructionist tactics the USMC and the 

Department of the Navy have used to avoid responsibility and avoid providing any 

type of assistance with health care or any financial assistance to those they have 

sickened, and to the families of those whose deaths they have caused. Examples of 

obstructionist tactics include the USMC’s failure to cooperate with the State of 
45

North Carolina’s efforts to analyze and address the problem in the 80s, the 21 years 

it took for the USMC to notify those they poisoned, the intense pressure it took to 

have the USMC fund the ATSDR study, the failure of the USMC to turn over critical documents until forced to do so and numerous other examples that the USMC’s 

and Department of the Navy’s strategy is to deny and delay as long as possible. I 

firmly believe this strategy is based upon financial considerations and I do not know 

what role the Department of Defense has in this strategy. It is possible the USMC 

and Department of the Navy senior leaders are ‘‘just following orders.’’

It is my firm belief that the USMC and Department of the Navy leadership have abandoned and betrayed their wounded from Camp Lejeune, 

including women and children, and left them to suffer and die!

I am very sensitive to caring for the wounded because in the U. S. Army we were 

trained to never leave our wounded behind. I saw men wounded and killed in Vietnam trying to recover our wounded. The U.S. Soldier’s Creed specifically states ‘‘I 

will never leave a fallen comrade.’’ If the Marines have a similar creed their senior 

leaders seem to think it does not apply in this case. 

Suggestions for immediate action:

1. Because it is crystal clear there is a leadership vacuum at the USMC and 

the Department of the Navy on this issue I suggest Congress step in immediately to pass legislation to provide health care to those who have been 

sickened by the Camp Lejeune poisonings. Everyone in this room knows this 

is morally and ethically the right thing to do. The USMC and the Navy have 

proven they will not and cannot be trusted to do the right thing. Time is of 

the essence so political party differences should not be permitted to delay 

taking effective action.

2. The Department of Veterans Affairs should immediately consider how they 

can streamline the disability claims process for those who have been 

sickened by the Camp Lejeune poisons. The only reason I was able to ‘‘win’’ 

my claim was because of the resources at my disposal in the school of medicine where I work Very few veterans have such resources available to them.

Eventually the VA will develop a list of presumptive illnesses for those exposed 

at Camp Lejeune. It should not take 10 or 15 years as it did for agent orange. People are sick and they and their families need help now. 

Also, the VA should publicize this matter in their outpatient clinics and hospitals 

to alert those who were poisoned. I have tried for over one year to have my local 

VA Hospital in Amarillo, Texas post notices of the Camp Lejeune situation to alert 

veterans who may have been exposed. Thus far they have refused to post any notices including VA information regarding this matter. 

Lastly, as you hear from the USMC and the Department of the Navy about all 

they have done to address this matter I would urge you to consider the evidence 

of the steps the USMC and the Department of the Navy have taken to obstruct resolution of this very serious environmental disaster. This is basically a ‘‘friendly fire’’ 

incident in slow motion and every possible measure has been taken by the USMC 

and the Department of the Navy to deny and delay providing any assistance whatsoever to their victims. The Marines claim to have spent $22,000,000 to address this 

but I would point out that this amount over 20–25 years is a pittance and I would 

ask you to consider what amount of this total was the USMC compelled to spend 

and how much was spent on obstructing any efforts to provide any assistance whatsoever to the USMC’s victims. 

Thank you for listening.

BIOGRAPHY FOR JAMES L. WATTERS

Date of birth: April 20, 1950

Current residence: Lubbock, Texas

Current position: Assistant Dean for Graduate Medical Education 

Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center School of Medicine

Education: B.S. Business Management—Roger Williams University 

Masters of Hospital Administration—VA. Commonwealth University

Military Service: U.S. Army 1969–1972 (Vietnam 1969–1970) 

U.S. Navy active duty 1975–1981 (Camp Lejeune 1977–1979) 

U.S. Naval Reserve 1981–2000

Positions held: Hospital Administrator, Public Health Administrator, Consultant
46

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Watters. 

Mr. Devereux, you are next. I assume with a name like 

Devereux, you may very well say Lejeune. If that is your preference, you may go right ahead. You are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PETER DEVEREUX, FORMER MARINE CORPS 

CORPORAL AND CAMP LEJEUNE VETERAN DIAGNOSED 

WITH BREAST CANCER 

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman and guests, good morning. My 

name is Peter Devereux. I was in the Marines from September 

1980 until December 1984. I was stationed at Camp Lejeune from 

December of 1980 until April of 1982. I was assigned to the 8th 

Communication Battalion in the French Creek area of Hadnot 

Point. 

I was diagnosed with invasive ductal carcinoma, a very aggressive form of breast cancer, on January 8, 2008. I had mastectomy 

surgery which removed my left breast along with 22 cancerous 

lymph nodes on January 28, 2008. The following month I began a 

treatment regimen which consisted of 29 chemotherapy treatments, 

30 radiation treatments along with daily medication. 

My treatment was scheduled to end April 8, 2009. At that point 

it was discovered my cancer had spread to my spine, my ribs and 

my hips. It is now classified metastatic breast cancer. There is no 

cure. The average life expectancy after metastasis is two to three 

years. Since my diagnosis, I have had 18 more chemotherapy treatments for a total of 47, 15 more radiation treatments to my spine 

and eight more to my hip for a total of 53 treatments. I will be in 

treatment until I die. I will be in treatment until I die. Presently 

I receive chemotherapy every three weeks and take prescription 

medicine daily. 

I am constantly fatigued both mentally and physically and need 

to take multiple rests daily. My body has changed tremendously 

and is always sore. Prior to my diagnosis I was in perfect health, 

always active between work and working out. I ate well, never 

smoked and hardly ever drank. I always had tremendous energy. 

Of course that is no longer true. 

I have a great wife and we have a 12-year-old daughter. This disease has not only ravaged me, it has ravaged my entire family. It 

has impacted my daughter severely. She is not confident of her future with me and I am not confident of my future with her. I have 

no idea if I will see my daughter graduate high school, go to college 

or get married. 

Before my diagnosis I had been a very productive person. I feel 

like such a burden to everyone especially my wife and daughter. I 

am no longer able to work due to the devastating side effects and 

physical limitations from my treatments and surgeries. 

The water contamination at Camp Lejeune has wreaked havoc on 

my family and me. On August 1, 2008, I received a letter from the 

Department of the Navy stating unregulated chemicals were discovered in some of the base drinking water systems in the early 

1980s at Camp Lejeune. The Hadnot Point water distribution system was one of those. 
47

I had decided to move forward with genetic testing for the breast 

cancer gene at that point, which I tested negative for both of them. 

It was then that I really discovered and understood that my cancer 

came from my chemical exposure due to the chemicals in the drinking water at Camp Lejeune. 

The wells were discovered to be contaminated in 1980 when I arrived. The Marines knew about it and said nothing, knowing full 

well we were bathing in and drinking contaminated water on a 

daily basis. The water reports all state that the wells were contaminated and action needed to be taken and nothing was done. 

In March of 1982 a switch to Grainger Analytical Laboratories 

once again showed contamination and still nothing was done. I 

would also like to point out in 1974 the base commander declared 

organic solvents as a hazardous substance and then warned the 

commands at Camp Lejeune that improper disposal would result in 

the contamination of the drinking water. 

After receiving my letter in August in 2008, I filled out the 

United States Marine Corps Water Registry as requested. It was 

then that Mike Partain contacted me and let me know that I was 

the seventh man that was diagnosed with male breast cancer from 

Lejeune, and that was in August of 2008. There are now currently 

64 men with male breast cancer from Camp Lejeune. 

I originally filed a claim for VA benefits on November 11, 2008, 

to be denied in April of 2009. I appealed the claim and requested 

a hearing, which I received in May 2010 in Boston, Massachusetts. 

I had one hour to present my information about my case—the doctor’s letters, letters from Dr. Clapp and Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. 

My case was approved with 100 percent disability in August of 

2010. This will greatly help my wife, my daughter and myself, and 

I hope the VA will continue to help veterans and civilians affected 

by the contamination. 

Thank you for allowing me to speak. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Devereux follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER DEVEREAUX

Good morning, my name is Peter Devereaux I was in the Marines from Sep 1980–

Dec 1984 and was stationed at Camp Lejeune from Dec 1980–April 1982. I was assigned to the 8th Communication Battalion in the French Creek area of Hadnot 

Point. 

I was diagnosed with invasive ductal carcinoma, a very aggressive form of breast 

cancer on Jan 8th 2008. I had mastectomy surgery that involved removal of my left 

breast along with 22 cancerous lymph nodes on Jan 28th 2008. 

The following month I began a 14-month treatment regimen which consisted of 

29 chemotherapy and 30 radiation treatments along with daily medication. 

My treatment was scheduled to end April 8th 2009 when it was discovered my 

cancer had spread to my spine, ribs and hip. It is now classified metastatic breast 

cancer, THERE IS NO CURE! The average life expectancy after Metastasis is 2–

3 years. Since my metastatic diagnosis I have had 18 more chemotherapy treatments for a total of 47, and also 15 more radiation treatments to my spine and 8 

more to my hip for a total of 53. 

I will be in treatment until I die. Presently I receive chemotherapy every 3 weeks 

and take prescription medication daily. 

I am constantly fatigued both mentally and physically and need to take multiple 

rests daily; my body has changed completely and is always sore. Prior to my diagnosis I was in perfect health; always active between work and working out, I ate 

well, never smoked and hardly drank. I always had tremendous energy; of course 

that is no longer true. 
48

I have a great wife and we have a 12-year-old daughter. This disease has not only 

ravaged me it has also ravaged my entire family. It has impacted my daughter severely. She is not confident of her future with me nor am I of my own future with 

her. I have no idea if I will see my daughter graduate high school, go to college or 

get married. 

Before my diagnosis I had been a very productive person; I feel like such a burden 

to everyone especially my wife and daughter. I am no longer able to work due to 

the devastating side effects and physical limitations from my treatments and surgeries. The water contamination at Camp Lejeune has wreaked havoc on my family 

and me. 

August 1, 2008 I received a letter from the Department of the Navy stating ‘‘unregulated chemicals were discovered in some of the base drinking water systems in 

the early 1980’s at Camp Lejeune.’’ The Hadnot Point Water Distribution system 

was one of those. 

I then decided to move forward with genetic testing for the breast cancer gene 

(BRCA 1 and BRCA 2), which I tested negative for both. It was then that I really 

understood my cancer came from my chemical exposure due to the chemicals in the 

drinking water at Camp Lejeune. 

The wells were discovered to be contaminated in1980 when I arrived, the Marines 

knew about it and said nothing, knowing full well we were bathing in and drinking 

contaminated water on a daily basis. The water reports all state that the wells were 

contaminated and action needed to be taken and nothing was done. 

In March of 1982 a switch to Grainger Analytical Laboratories once again showed 

contamination and still nothing was done. I would also like to point out in 1974 the 

Base Commander declared ‘‘organic solvents as a hazardous substance’’ and then 

warned the commands at Camp Lejeune that improper disposal practices could result in the contamination of the drinking water. (Ref: Base Order 5100.13B)
49
50
51

After receiving my letter in August in 2008, I filled out the USMC Water Registry 

as requested. It was then Mike Partain contacted me and let me know that I was 

the 7th man that was diagnosed with Male Breast Cancer that was in August of 

2008. There are currently 64 men! 

I originally filed a VA claim for benefits on Nov 11, 2008 to be denied in April 

2009. I appealed the claim and requested a hearing, which I received in May 2010 

in Boston, MA. I had 1 hour to present new information about my case with my 

doctors letters, and letters from Dr Clapp and Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. 

My case was approved with 100% disability in August 2010. This will greatly help 

my wife, daughter and me and I hope the VA will continue to help veterans and 

civilians affected by the contamination. 

Thank you for allowing me to speak.
52

BIOGRAPHY FOR PETER DEVEREAUX

My name is Peter Devereaux I am 48 years old and I currently reside in Massachusetts. I was in the Marines from September 10, 1980 until December 7, 1984. 

I was assigned to Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina and lived 

in the French Creek area of Hadnot Point from December 1980 until April 1982 

with the 8th Communication Battalion. I was diagnosed with breast cancer on January 11, 2008. Seven months later I received a letter from the U.S. Marine Corps 

on August 1st, 2008 informing me that I was exposed to unregulated chemicals at 

Camp Lejeune. 

My breast cancer has since metastasized to my spine, ribs and hip. On August 

6, 2010, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) granted me a 100% disability linking my breast cancer to toxic chemicals I was exposed to in the drinking water supply at Camp Lejeune during my military service.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Devereux. Mr. Devereux, Mr. 

Watters is not a Marine and you are. He said the Army has a slogan, ‘‘Leave no comrade behind’’ but did not know if the Marines 

have a similar slogan. Do the Marines have a similar slogan? 

Mr. DEVEREUX. Yes. You know, semper fidelis, always faithful, 

and you never leave a man behind, absolutely. Always protect your 

own. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. Clapp, you are now recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD CLAPP, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL 

HEALTH POLICY CONSULTANT AND MEMBER OF THE ATSDR 

CAMP LEJEUNE COMMUNITY ASSISTANT PANEL (CAP) 

Dr. CLAPP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mrs. Dahlkemper and 

staff. I feel like I am an academic and almost never speak only for 

five minutes, but——

Chairman MILLER. Please try to keep it less than 50. 

Dr. CLAPP. I think the real teachers have already spoken, so I 

will be brief. 

In your letter to me dated September 1st, you asked me to address several questions, so I will limit my oral comments to those 

questions. 

First, I became involved with Camp Lejeune issue in early 2006 

when I was asked by ATSDR to provide epidemiologic advice to the 

Community Assistance Panel. In the past 4-1/2 years since that 

time, I have attended meetings of the CAP, as we call it, meetings 

of other scientific advisory panels convened by ATSDR and in particular looking at epidemiologic and water modeling issues. My 

training is in epidemiology. 

In addition, I have given comments to the National Research 

Council of the National Academy of Sciences on their draft consideration of the issues regarding the Camp Lejeune water contamination and I was a peer reviewer on a draft of their document, and 

then subsequent to the release of their document in 2009, I and 

some colleagues of mine expressed our disappointment in that report, which I can provide to the committee if you are interested. 

The three specific questions that you asked me to address were 

the degree of contamination at Camp Lejeune. I think we have already heard that the degree of contamination was extraordinary in 

Camp Lejeune during the period especially while the measurements that were available were actually reported, as Mike Partain 
53

has indicated. At least one measurement in 1982 showed that in 

one of the drinking water treatment plants there was a 1,400-

parts-per-billion level of trichlorethylene in the drinking water, and 

this is about 280 times what would currently be allowed in drinking water in this country, and it is five times the level that was 

found at about that same time in the water in Woburn, Massachusetts, which was the location of a childhood leukemia cluster that 

was subsequently investigated by several agencies and about which 

there have been books and a movie. 

So I think that this was an extraordinary amount of contamination and one of the members of a 2005 National Academy of 

Sciences panel said that this was the largest drinking water contamination of any population of humans in this country from 

trichlorethylene. It turns out trichlorethylene is a widespread contaminant in this country but this was specifically referring to a discrete population with very high levels of trichlorethylene. This is 

the largest such exposure in our country’s history. 

The second question that you asked me to address was, based on 

my experience as an epidemiologist, what types of health effects 

might be expected from this kind of contamination of these chemicals that have been documented and you documented, Mr. Chairman, and it would be in my view a variety of cancers, some of 

which have been mentioned here today—breast cancer in males 

and females, kidney cancer or renal cell carcinoma, non-Hodgkin’s 

lymphoma, bladder cancer, and then some reproductive effects in 

the offspring including childhood cancer, in my view, and also adverse reproductive outcomes such as birth defects, small for gestational age children, et cetera. These have been listed actually in a 

feasibility study that was done by ATSDR staff. I have great respect for the ATSDR staff that have been working on this Camp 

Lejeune series of studies and their feasibility assessment actually 

lists a fairly long list of cancers and other adverse health effects 

that I would endorse. 

And then the last question you asked me to address was, what 

steps might the Navy or the Department of Veterans Affairs take 

to determine presumptive disability in Camp Lejeune veterans, and 

the veterans themselves can avail themselves of the VA and the 

appeal process which has been described by two of the previous 

witnesses, and so I think that is already in motion. It is a caseby-case thing. I have participated in some of those cases myself as 

an expert providing information, but that takes too long, and I 

think that Congress needs to act, and an act that was done for 

Vietnam Veterans, the Agent Orange Act of 1991, may provide a 

model for actions such as could be taken with respect to Camp 

Lejeune. 

I understand there is an act that has been proposed. I don’t—I 

am not going to comment on the details of that. I am not a legislator nor have I ever been a staff member, but either of those approaches seems to me would move this forward. 

Thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Clapp follows:]
54

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD CLAPP

I became involved with the Camp Lejeune issue in early 2006 when I was asked 

by ATSDR to provide epidemiologic advice to the Community Assistance Panel. In 

the past four and a half years, I have attended meetings of the CAP, meetings of 

other scientific advisory panels convened by ATSDR whose work focused on epidemiologic and water modeling issues at Camp Lejeune. In addition, I went on a 

tour of Camp Lejeune in February, 2008 and saw the various contamination sites 

and base components. Also in 2008, I provided input to the National Research Council committee considering the Camp Lejeune issues, and in 2009, I provided peer 

review comments to the NRC prior to release of its report. 

1. The degree of contamination of drinking water at Camp Lejeune in the 

years between 1957 and 1985 is the highest I have observed in my career 

as an environmental epidemiologist. For example, the trichloroethylene 

concentration found in drinking water from one treatment plant in 1982 

was 1,400 parts per billion. This is two hundred and eighty times the current allowable level of TCE in drinking water in the U.S. It is more than five 

times the highest level found in well water in Woburn, Massachusetts at about the 

same time as the childhood leukemia cluster was identified in that town. 

A member of a 2005 National Academy of Sciences panel assessing the scope of 

contamination issues at Camp Lejeune described it as the largest human exposure 

to TCE from drinking water in this nation’s history. There were hundreds of thousands of Marines, civilians and dependents exposed to a variety of contaminants 

over nearly three decades at Camp Lejeune. The historical reconstruction and modeling of the likely extent of the exposure is not completed, but it is already clear 

that this is an unprecedented situation that demands the level of attention that it 

is currently getting from the Committee. 

2. Once the exposure modeling has been completed, it will be possible to examine the patterns of mortality from a wide range of cancers, including breast 

cancer, kidney cancer, and other diseases. The final water model can also 

be used in on-going studies of adverse reproductive outcomes and childhood cancer and in potential studies of other non-fatal conditions such as 

some cancers, kidney diseases, autoimmune diseases such as lupus and 

scleroderma, and neurological diseases such as Parkinson’s Disease. The 

mortality study recommended in 2005 is currently underway and will likely be very 

informative. Additional studies of non-fatal conditions will depend on the outcome 

of a health survey which is also underway. 

3. Some of the steps that might be taken by the Navy or the Dept. of Veterans Affairs to determine presumptive disability in Camp Lejeune veterans have already begun. According to a presentation made to the Community 

Assistance Panel earlier this year, the VA considers veterans to have been ‘‘exposed’’ 

if they were resident at Camp Lejeune during a specific time period. The next requirement under the current VA procedures is a ‘‘nexus letter’’ from a competent 

medical authority that connects the specific disease or condition claimed by the veteran to the exposures documented at the base. This currently happens on a caseby-case basis and undoubtedly differs from one region or local office to another. 

A more comprehensive approach could be taken along the lines of the 

Agent Orange Act of 1991. This legislation listed three conditions (two cancers 

and chloracne) that would be considered service-connected in those veterans who 

could document service in Vietnam. It also established a process for periodically reviewing the literature about other health effects and adding to the list of Vietnam 

Agent Orange service-connected diseases or conditions. This review is conducted by 

independent panels established by the National Academy of Sciences and has resulted in several biannual reports and a longer list of compensable diseases over the 

past two decades. I have participated in various stages of the Vietnam veterans 

Agent Orange compensation program and I recommend it for your consideration. 

In addition to the above points, I was asked to comment on the 1997 Public 

Health Assessment of Camp Lejeune released by ATSDR. This was retracted in 

2009 once it was revealed that a much larger amount of benzene had been released 

into the ground than was recognized at the time of the original report. The decision 

to retract the report was clearly required by the facts, but it would not have been 

necessary had the full extent of the benzene contamination been known in 1997. 

The recent information will need to be incorporated into the water exposure model 

used in the on-going and proposed health studies.
55

BIOGRAPHY FOR RICHARD CLAPP

Dr. Clapp received his MPH degree from the Harvard School of Public Health in 

1974 and his D.Sc. Degree in Epidemiology from B.U. School of Public Health in 

1989. He was the founding Director of the Massachusetts Cancer Registry in the 

Department of Public Health from 1980–1989. Dr. Clapp has worked at two nonprofit consulting companies, the JSI Center for Environmental Health Studies, and 

Tellus Institute. He joined the B.U. School of Public Health Environmental Health 

Department as a full-time Faculty member in 1993, where he is now Professor 

Emeritus. He is also on the Adjunct Faculty at the U. of Massachusetts—Lowell 

School of Health and Environment. 

Dr. Clapp has done research and taught courses in epidemiology and environmental health. His research interests included the health effects of dioxin and Agent 

Orange, the health effects of ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, and other environmental exposures to toxic chemicals. He is a member of several professional organizations and served as an Associate Editor of Environmental Health Perspectives. 

Dr. Clapp is a member of the Community Assistance Panel for the Camp Lejeune 

health studies, for which he receives compensation from ATSDR.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Clapp. 

Mr. Hargett, you are now recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL HARGETT, GENERAL DIRECTOR, 

ANCHIMERIC ASSOCIATES AND FORMER CO-OWNER OF 

GRAINGER LABORATORIES 

Mr. HARGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the drinking water analyses performed by 

Grainger Laboratories at the request of the United States Marine 

Corps at Camp Lejeune. 

I am a former co-owner and vice president of Grainger Laboratories in Raleigh, North Carolina. Grainger Laboratories was 

founded in 1973 to provide analytical and consulting services to industry, government and commercial customers throughout the 

southeastern United States. Our services include drinking water 

analyses that were certified under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 

otherwise designated as Public Law 92–523. That Act has subsequently been amended and expanded several times. 

The Safe Drinking Water Act applies to every public water system in the United States. There are currently more than 160,000 

public water systems regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act 

providing water to almost all Americans at some time during their 

lives. Safe Drinking Water Act and derivative legislation define 

public water systems as an entity that provides water for human 

consumption through pipes or other constructed conveyances to at 

least 15 service connections or serves an average of at least 25 people for at least 60 days per year. 

The Safe Drinking Water Act was at that time, at the time of our 

service to the Corps administered by the State of North Carolina, 

Public Water Supply Section of the Department of Environmental 

and Natural Resources. They had a Water Supply Protection Program under a primacy agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency. 

In 1970, Executive Order 11514 for Protection and Enhancement 

of Environmental Quality directed the Federal Government to provide leadership in protecting and enhancing the quality of our Nation’s environment and to sustain and enrich human life. As a result, federal agencies initiated measures to direct their policies, 

plans and programs so as to meet national environmental goals. 

The Safe Drinking Water Act included clearly established goals 
56

that instituted standards for water quality, supply and appropriate 

distribution practices throughout the United States. 

United States Marine Corps personnel at Camp Lejeune initiated 

discussions with my office in 1982 to determine their compliance 

with the Safe Drinking Water Act. Over the months that followed, 

our team assisted personnel in defining their compliance with the 

expectations of the State of North Carolina and also the Safe 

Drinking Water Act. We assisted them in identification and quantification of contaminants in the drinking water and discussed operating practices that could avoid exposure for the Marines, dependants and base personnel that were consuming this potable 

water supply. 

Copies of our analytical reports and correspondence with base 

personnel have been provided to this committee and agencies and 

contractors reviewing the history of water quality at the base and 

its associated housing units. Additional telephone discussions, trips 

to the base for meetings with utility personnel, and an attempt to 

bring to the attention of base personnel the implications of the contaminated water were included in our support to the base utility 

program. 

The initial requests from the base required a statement of our 

qualifications as a certified laboratory to perform trihalomethane 

analysis under the Safe Drinking Water Act, sampling instructions, 

a formal price quotation and special sample containers that were 

both suitable and compliant with the established protocols for sampling, transport and preservation of the samples. The sampling required a bottle that would avoid the collection of bubbles or an air 

space so as to minimize the volatilization of the water content. This 

was a special technique that needed to apply a septum or membrane to the mouth of the bottle, and the sampling method was 

new to many utility personnel and frequently, training, re-sampling, sampling again and discussions were required from our office 

to make sure that we had a representative sample. 

The first set of samples we received from the base were not in 

compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act and had a very significant interference present. This interference was exceptional, 

and after discussions with the analytical chemist, Mr. Bruce Babson, and his supervisor, Mr. Paul Brafford, we decided to request 

an additional set of samples from the base. A second set of samples 

presented similar results. In discussions with our management 

team, a decision to define the interference at the expense of our 

company was made and chlorinated solvents were identified. We 

also determined the level of contamination in each of the samples. 

A decision to visit the base and initiate discussions. This decision 

was based on the potential health effects for the contaminants. 

I visited the base myself with fresh sample bottles and met with 

the base chemist, a Ms. Betsy Betz, to obtain a third set of samples 

and discuss the implications of the contaminated water. 

Chlorinated solvents in the drinking water was deemed a hazard 

to consumers at the base and warranted delineation, control and 

mitigation of the risk. A third set of samples taken by myself was 

also not in compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act and a 

monthly sampling for trihalomethanes was initiated. A campaign 

to define the well or wells generating the highest levels of 
57

trihalomethanes and the chlorinated solvents was also started. 

From the analytical results, you can see that the wells with the 

highest levels of chlorinated solvents were clearly established. 

In a letter of August 10, 1982, Ms. Betz points out the health effects of exposure to the chlorinated solvents present in the drinking 

water and she appropriately points out that the pollutants are unregulated at that time. Her repeated reference to the toxicity of 

chlorinated solvents demonstrates concern and an awareness of the 

importance of the issue. I must ask why this urgent alarm was unanswered. Exposure to chlorinated solvents included liver, kidney, 

nervous system, and other disruptions to human physiology. 

Another trip to the base was made to meet with the water well 

operators who were civilian employees. They were responsible for 

the daily operation of the wells. We visited the wells with 

chlorinated solvents and discussed potential sources of the contamination. Information including hydrogeological data was not available that would have assisted in this determination. At the conclusion of the field discussions, I strongly suggested to Ms. Betz and 

the operator that the well field operation avoid those wells with 

high chlorinated solvent concentrations. It was agreed that it was 

a good idea and to quarantine that source. Afterward, in discussions with Ms. Betz, the health effects and issues of Safe Drinking 

Water Act compliance were further discussed. 

One week later, Ms. Betz called my office to request that I come 

to the base and meet with base personnel—base utility personnel. 

I agreed to do so and suggested that would be a good time for an 

additional sampling. We met with the deputy utilities manager. 

This person was a uniformed lieutenant colonel, and after much deliberation I am unable to remember his name but I do remember 

being ushered into his office, the introduction by Ms. Betz introducing me as a person that was very familiar with water supplies 

in eastern North Carolina, compliance with the Safe Drinking 

Water Act, State of North Carolina, requirements, and stating that 

I was present to discuss the water quality issues at Hadnot Point 

and other residential supplies. The lieutenant colonel responded 

that this was something he would have to look into and we were 

summarily dismissed. The total time in the lieutenant colonel’s office was less than five minutes. 

Following the meeting, Ms. Betz apologized for the brusque treatment and explained that others would have to know about the 

problems. We went on to obtain additional samples that did show 

improvement in compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act and 

a lower chlorinated solvent concentration. The operating well field 

conditions and parameters were unknown to me at the time of 

sampling. 

Sampling continued, and a few months later an engineer from 

the State of North Carolina, Mr. Mike Bell, asked me if Grainger 

Labs was performing the certified analyses for the Marine Corps 

Base. I responded yes, and he asked for a copy of the analysis. I 

said I could not provide this report since it was the property of the 

government and I provided him contact information for Ms. Betz. 

A few weeks later at a meeting of the American Water Works Association state chapter, Mr. Chuck Rundgren, who was the chief of 

the water supply branch and Mr. Bell’s supervisor, again asked me 
58

the same question. I gave him the same response and he asked if 

I had provided any recommendations to the base. I replied, ‘‘Yes, 

and I hope your new field office in Wilmington is working with 

them.’’ Mr. Rundgren replied that they were. I further replied that 

base needed assistance and his department would be of great 

value. 

I left the laboratory in 1984 and the company was sold in 1985. 

Until being contacted my Mr. Mike Partain in 2009, I am unaware 

of any communications concerning the water quality at the base, 

our analysis, recommendations for water quality improvement or 

supplemental discussions being directed to myself or former employees of Grainger Labs. 

Subsequent to leaving Grainger Labs, I continued an active profile in environmental compliance and consulting work and that included discussions with U.S. Navy personnel at the Atlantic Division, known as LantDiv, who were responsible for environmental 

cleanup at the base. I remember asking about the contaminated 

drinking water and being told that there were several problems to 

be addressed at the base. No details were provided except a passing reference that a dry cleaning operation near the base was determined to be responsible for some of the contamination. 

It is disappointing to know of an absence of response by the Marine Corps to the contaminated water conditions. I attribute this to 

be a lack of knowledge surrounding the Safe Drinking Water Act, 

conventional water utility operations and an unawareness of the 

toxicological potential of the contaminants. In retrospect, I genuinely regret that my organization and myself were not more diligent in presenting this hazard to base personnel for surely many 

would have been saved from this health hazard, the exposure, and 

if the Marine Corps was more alert and committed to corrective actions. The Marine Corps explanation in their historic dinking water 

brochure does not account for a direct historic perspective of the 

water quality and the exposure of base personnel. Instead, a reactive profile for corrections after the exposure of base personnel is 

present. There is no question that military personnel, dependants, 

and base personnel were exposed to a hazard and that corrections 

were eventually accomplished. The poor interest from the utility 

manager leads me to believe that the corrective actions were certainly slow and due to a lack of knowledge. I also question what 

the independent research initiative referenced in the brochure 

could accomplish with a literature study and no review of compliance analysis of the drinking water supply. 

The presence of any contaminant in a potable water supply 

should drive a diligent pursuit of the source of the contamination. 

The fact that a contaminant is not a regulated compound is not a 

reason to simply ignore it. That indicator says there is something 

else in the water, there is a source, and in normal operations, the 

practice is to pursue that source, define it completely and certainly 

quarantine that water supply until you make that determination. 

Most of the U.S. military bases were established as enclaves that 

were independent and self-sufficient. These same bases are now 

commonly bordered by municipalities with utility options that are 

superior to current base operations. The recent move for privatiza-
59

tion by the Department of Defense may solve many of these operational problems. 

With whatever path the utility operations for military facilities 

is improved, an oversight should continue to assure that the wellbeing of military personnel, their dependants and base personnel 

will be sustained. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hargett follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. HARGETT

Subject: Drinking Water Analysis Performed by Grainger Laboratories for the 

United States Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 

I am Michael C. Hargett a former co-owner and vice president of Grainger Laboratories in Raleigh, NC. Grainger Laboratories was founded in 1973 to provide analytical and consulting services to industry, government and commercial customers 

in the southeastern United States. Our services included drinking water analyses 

that were certified under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) otherwise designated as Public Law 92–523. 

The SDWA applies to every public water system in the United States. There are 

currently more than 160,000 public water systems regulated by the SDWA providing 

water to almost all Americans at some time in their lives. The SDWA and derivative 

legislation define public water system as an entity that provides ‘‘water for human 

consumption through pipes or other constructed conveyances to at least 15 service 

connections or serves an average of at least 25 people for at least 60 days a year.’’

The Safe Drinking Water Act was, at the time of our service to the US Marine 

Corps Base at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (MCB) administered by the State of 

North Carolina, Public Water Supply Section of the Dept. of Environmental and 

Natural Resources, Water Supply Protection Program under a Primacy agreement 

that is still in place today. 

In 1970 Executive Order 11514 for Protection and enhancement of environmental 

quality directed The Federal Government to provide leadership in protecting and enhancing the quality of the Nation’s environment to sustain and enrich human life. 

As a result, Federal agencies initiated measures to direct their policies, plans and 

programs so as to meet national environmental goals. The SDWA included clearly 

established goals that instituted standards for water quality, supply and distribution throughout the United States. 

In 1974 Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (P.L. 93–523, 88 

Stat. 1660) to protect the quality of both actual and potential drinking water in the 

United States. Congress had created the SDWA in response to a nationwide survey 

that revealed health risks from inadequate public water-supply facilities, polluted 

supplies, and operating procedures that did not achieve a safe water quality. To 

achieve its goal the SDWA provides water quality standards for drinking-water suppliers, protects underground drinking-water sources, and directs appropriate deepwell injection of wastes. 

The SDWA requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate 

all ‘‘public water systems,’’ defined as systems that provide piped water for human 

consumption for at least sixty days a year to at least fifteen service connections or 

twenty-five people. The EPA does this through Primary Drinking Water Regulations, by which it first identifies contaminants that may pose a risk to human 

health and that occur in drinking water at potentially unsafe levels. Then the EPA 

specifies a Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (MCLG) for each contaminant, which 

is set at the level below which there is no predicted health risk. Finally the EPA 

creates a legally enforceable Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL), which is the 

greatest amount of contaminant that will be allowed in the public water supply. 

This MCL must be set as close as is feasible to the MCLG after taking into account 

the best technology, treatment techniques, and costs. Since the 1996 amendments 

discussed below, the EPA may instead require a Treatment Technique for removing 

the contaminant if there is neither an economically or technologically feasible MCL, 

nor an accurate way to measure the contaminant in water. 

States generally obtain primary authority to implement the SDWA after proving 

to the EPA that they will adopt and enforce standards at least as stringent as the 

national standards. While the states may oversee the program, the public water systems themselves physically ensure the safety of the tap water through treatment, 

testing, and reporting. In addition to these ‘‘at the tap’’ protections, the SDWA requires states and public water suppliers to protect initial water sources from con-
60

tamination. In particular, the SDWA provides for an Underground Injection Control 

(UIC) program to prevent contamination of underground water sources by underground injection of contaminated fluids. 

Due to criticism that the original act was an inflexible, unfunded mandate with 

an unattainable regulatory schedule, the 104th Congress extensively amended the 

act in 1996 (P.L. 104–182, 110 Stat. 1613). These amendments included new pollution prevention approaches, public information requirements, added flexibility to the 

regulatory process, and a Drinking Water State Revolving Fund. Pollution prevention took the form primarily of source-water quality assessment programs to determine the current health of water supplies and delineate the area to be protected. 

In addition, public water suppliers were required to inform their year-round customers about the source and quality of their tap water with an annual consumer 

confidence report. 

The most important element of the amendments was the critically necessary funding mechanism added to the SDWA’s stringent water quality requirements. This 

fund provided federal monetary aid to public water systems to repair and upgrade 

their facilities, focusing particularly on assisting small and disadvantaged communities that might otherwise find these repairs too expensive. The fund also gave priority to programs using pollution prevention to safeguard their drinking water supply. 

US Marine Corps Base personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC initiated discussions with 

my office in 1982 to determine compliance with the SDWA. Over the months that 

followed, our team assisted base personnel in defining their compliance with the expectations of the State of North Carolina and the SDWA, identification and quantification of contaminants in the drinking water supply, and discussions on operating practices that could avoid exposure for the Marines, dependants, and base personnel that were consuming this potable water supply. 

Copies of our analytical reports and correspondence with base personnel have 

been provided to this committee and agencies and contractors reviewing the history 

of water quality at the base and its associated housing units. Additional telephone 

discussions, trips to the base for meetings with utility personnel, and an attempt 

to bring to the attention of base utility personnel the implications of the contaminated water were included in our support of base personnel. 

The initial requests from the base required a statement of our qualifications as 

a certified laboratory to perform Trihalomethane (THM) analysis under the SDWA, 

sampling instructions, a formal price quotation, and special sample containers that 

were both suitable and compliant with established protocols for sampling, transport 

and preservation of the samples. The sampling required a sample withour bubbles 

or an air space above the sample to minimize volitization of the water content. A 

special technique was needed to apply a septum to the mouth of the sampling container for a full sample and later extraction through the septum without contaminating or releasing the targeted analytes. The sampling method was new to many 

utility personnel and frequently, training, resampling and discussions were needed 

to establish a representative sample. 

The first set of samples we received from the base were not in compliance with 

the SDWA and had a significant interference present. This interference was exceptional and after discussions with the analytical chemist, Mr. Bruce Babson and his 

supervisor, Mr. Paul Brafford, we decided to request additional samples from the 

base. A second set of samples presented similar results. In discussions with the 

Grainger Laboratories management team, a decision to define the interference at 

the expense of our company was made and the chlorinated solvents were identified 

and the contamination level was established. A decision to visit the base and initiate 

discussions resulted. 

I visited the base with fresh sample bottles and met with the Base Chemist, Ms. 

Betsy Betz, to obtain a third set of samples and discuss the implications of the contaminated water. Chlorinated solvents in the drinking water was deemed a hazard 

to consumers at the MCB and warranted delineation, control and mitigation of the 

risk. The third set of samples taken by myself was also not in compliance with the 

SDWA and the monthly sampling for THM. A campaign to define the well or wells 

generating the highest levels of THM and chlorinated solvents was started. From 

the analytical results you may see that the wells with chlorinated solvents were established. 

In a letter of August 10, 1982, Ms. Betz points out the health effects of exposure 

to the chlorinated solvents present in the drinking water and she appropriately 

points out that the pollutants were unregulated at that time. Her repeated reference 

to the toxicity of the chlorinated solvents demonstrates concern and an awareness 

of the importance of the issue. I must ask why this urgent alarm was unanswered. 

Exposure to chlorinated solvents incuded liver, kidney, nervous system, and other 
61

disruptions to human physiology. A more precise definition of the toxicological burden of these chemicals can be addressed by experts in this arena. 

Another trip to the base was made to meet with the water well operators (maintenance personnel) who were responsible for the wells. We visited the wells with 

chlorinated solvents and discussed potential sources of the contamination. Information including hydrologic data was not available that could assist in this determination. At the conclusion of the field discussions, I strongly suggested to Ms. Betz and 

the operator that the well field operation avoid the wells with high chlorinated solvent concentration. It was agreed that it was a good idea to quarantene this source. 

Afterwards, in discussions with Ms. Betz, the health effects and issues of SDWA 

compliance were discussed. 

A week later, Ms. Betz called my office to request that I come to the base to meet 

with base utility personnel. I agreed to do so and suggested that an additional sampling of current water quality would be appropriate. A meeting with the Deputy 

Utilities Manager for the base was set for the next week. This person was a Lt. Col. 

and after much deliberation I am unable to remember his name but I do remember 

being ushered into his office, Ms. Betz introducing me as a person that was very 

familiar with water supplies in eastern North Carolina, compliance with the SDWA 

and State of NC requirements, and stating that I was present to discuss the water 

quality issues at Hadnot Point and other residential water supplies. The Lt. Col. 

responded that this was something he would have to look into and we were dismissed. The total time in the Lt. Col.’s office chair was less than 5 minutes. 

Following the meeting, Ms. Betz apologized for the brusk treatment and explained 

that others would have to know about the problems. We went on to obtain additional samples that showed an improvement in compliance with SDWA and lower 

chlorinated solvent concentrations. The operating well field conditions and parameters were unknown at the time of sampling. 

Sampling at the MCB continued and a few months later, an engineer with the 

State of NC, Mr. Mike Bell, asked me if Grainger Laboratories was performing the 

water analysis for the MCB. I responded yes and he requested a copy of the analysis. I said I could not provide this report since it was the property of the Government and I provided the contact information for Ms. Betz. A few weeks later at a 

meeting of the American Water Works Association State Chapter, Mr. Chuck 

Rundgren, Chief of the Water Supply Branch and also Mr. Bell’s supervisor, asked 

me the same question. I gave him the same response and he asked if I had provided 

any recommendations to the base. I replied ,’’ .... .yes, and I hope your new field 

office in Wilmington is working with them.’’ Mr. Rundgren replied that they were. 

I further replied that they (MCB) needed assistance and his department would be 

of great value to them. No further discussion with NC Government personnel concerning the MCB is recalled. 

I left the laboratory in 1984 and the company was sold in 1985. Until being contacted my Mr. Mike Partain in 2009, I am unaware of any communications concerning the water quality at the MCB, our analysis, recommendations for water 

quality improvement, or supplemental discussions directed to myself or any other 

former employees of Grainger Laboratories. 

Subsequent to leaving Grainger Laboratories, I continued an active profile in environmental compliance and consulting work that included discussions with U.S. 

Navy personnel at the Atlantic Division (LANTDIV) who were responsible for environmental cleanup at the MCB. I remember asking about the contaminated drinking water and being told that there were several problems that were to be addressed 

at the base. No details were provided except passing reference that a dry cleaning 

operation near the base was determined to be responsible for some of the contamination. 

It is disappointing to know of an absence of response by the MCB to the contaminated water conditions. I attribute this to be a lack of knowledge surrounding the 

SDWA, conventional water utility operations and an awareness of the toxicological 

potential of the contaminants. 

The Marine Corps explanation in the Camp Lejeune Historic Drinking Water brochure does not account for adirector historic perspective of the water quality and 

the exposure of base personnel. Instead a reactive profile for corrections after the 

exposure of base personnel is present. There is no question that military personnel, 

dependents, and base personnel were exposed to the hazard and that corrections 

were eventually accomplished. The poor interest from the Deputy Utilities Manager 

leads me to believe that the corrective actions were slow. I also question what the 

independent research initiative could accomplish with a literature study and no review of the compliance analysis of the distributed water supply;. 

Most of the US military bases were established as enclaves that were independent 

and self-sufficient. These same bases have now been surrounded by municipalities 
62

with utility operations that are superior to the independent, underfunded base utilities and with a higher quality set of resources than the Government installation. 

This deficiency is the responsibility of the US Congress and Department of Defense 

management. 

During the last 15 years the Congress has moved to privatize military base electrical, gas, water, wastewater and other utilities to commercial and utility companies with superior operational knowledge, engineering, system capabilities, and financial resources. It is possible that this transfer of Federal assets will improve the 

quality of utility operations including water supply to insure reliable, consistent 

water quality for our base personnel. 

With whatever path the utility operation for military facilities is improved, an 

oversight that assures the well being of military personnel, their dependants, and 

base personnel must be sustained. 

Thank you for this opportunity to address the committee and support its interest 

in the well being of the US warfighter.

BIOGRAPHY FOR MICHAEL C. HARGETT

Mr. Hargett holds an undergraduate Bachelor of Science in Zoology and Masters 

Degree in Microbiology from North Carolina State University. For the last thirty 

eight years he has worked to apply new technologies to environmental challenges. 

He has been active in testing, evaluation, feasibility, demonstration and application 

of advanced technologies providing economical, reliable options for industrial, government and institutional compliance and environmental remediation problems. 

Mr. Hargett has successfully used innovative new solutions for his work with municipal and industrial water and wastewater plants, super-fund site remediation, 

hazardous waste minimization, chemical weapons demilitarization, Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear-explosives protection and security, and refining of radioactively contaminated materials from nuclear operations for beneficial reuse as 

clean/safe metals. 

He is currently the General Director of Anchimeric Associates and provides consulting services for new technologies in emerging markets. His responsibilities include sponsorship, strategic planning and leadership of new products, technologies 

and programs for environmental problems and challenges.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Hargett. 

At this point we will begin our first round of questions. We will 

probably be interrupted by votes in a short while. The Chair now 

recognizes himself for five minutes. 

Dr. Clapp, I am not sure I have seen two witnesses’ testimony 

that was as different as yours and General Payne’s. In his written 

testimony, he says, ‘‘Currently, scientific studies haven’t determined reliably whether diseases and disorders experienced by 

former residents and workers at Camp Lejeune are associated with 

their exposure to contaminants in the water supply because of data 

shortcomings and methodological limitations.’’ Do you agree with 

that? 

Dr. CLAPP. Well, the studies of Camp Lejeune residents and family and dependants are still ongoing, so I suppose there are no finished—well, even studies that are finished are now being reevaluated because of additional information about what was in the 

water, so what we have to look at in coming to some kind of determination in this matter is other places where people have been exposed to these same chemicals. There is plenty in the literature 

about trichlorethylene, perchlorethylene and benzene and their 

health effects. So I guess it is true that the full scope of Camp 

Lejeune resident and dependent studies is not finished yet but that 

doesn’t mean we don’t know enough to act. 

Chairman MILLER. So knowing what you do about the extent of 

the exposure, the levels of contamination of TCE, PCE and ben-
63

zene, do you think it is correct that we do know that there are consequences? 

Dr. CLAPP. Absolutely, yes. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Also in his testimony, General Payne 

said, ‘‘I want to begin by saying that the welfare of our Marines, 

their family members and our civilian employees is always of paramount importance to us in an organization and as individual Department of the Navy leaders,’’ but at the same time does discuss 

the lack of regulations, that these chemicals were not subject to 

regulations, the Safe Drinking Water Act at the time. Mr. Hargett 

makes that point in his testimony. What was the state of the 

science in the early 1980s about the effect of TCE and PCE, even 

if they were not specifically forbidden by the Safe Drinking Water 

Act? What did we know about the consequences of exposure to 

those chemicals? 

Dr. CLAPP. Well, and benzene. Benzene a lot was known about 

by the early 1980s. TCE was, as I mentioned, the contaminant of 

most concern in Woburn, Massachusetts, and that came to national 

attention in 1979, and in the early 1980s there were several studies actually, one by the state health department, one by researchers at Harvard School of Public Health, and the Dana Farber Cancer Institute, that suggested a number of childhood illnesses and 

childhood leukemia were associated with exposure to contaminated 

water, primarily with trichlorethylene, and that was known in the 

early 1980s. Studies in New Jersey had been done, or either had 

been done or were underway at that point, again showing adverse 

reproductive outcomes in people who lived in towns that had contaminated drinking water. Colleagues from ATSDR previously 

worked at the New Jersey Health Department and carried out 

those studies. So I would say that there was some convincing evidence in the early 1980s that these kinds of things in drinking 

water were harmful for at least children and perhaps adults as 

well. And then for workers, lots was known about both of these 

chemicals, all three of these chemicals. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Partain, perhaps with the exception of 

lawyers and perhaps some of the ATSDR experts, you probably 

know more than anybody about the documents, Camp Lejeune’s 

documents. You have emphasized in your testimony that many of 

the documents about the contamination of the drinking water have 

really just become public in the last year. Do you believe that the 

failure to discover those documents was that the Navy simply 

didn’t know they had them or what do you think? 

Mr. PARTAIN. Well, as the polluter, the Navy and the Marine 

Corps have the responsibility to retain these documents and know 

what they have, and this electronic portal that was discovered accidentally by ATSDR in March of 2009 was a repository for the 

Hadnot Point fuel farm UST program and contained in that repository was the documentation that the fuel loss at Hadnot Point was 

1.1 million gallons of fuel. Now, prior to discovery of this information in that portal, the Marine Corps had informed the media, the 

public, Congress that according to their inventory records, up to 

50,000 gallons of fuel had been lost at Hadnot Point. There is a big 

disparity between 50,000 gallons and 1.1 million gallons of fuel in 

the groundwater, and I would like to see the Navy and the Marine 
64

Corps produce written notification—or, I am sorry—produce documents, written documents showing that they notified the Marine 

Corps—I mean the ATSDR of this information, which has affected 

their studies. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Partain. 

My time is expired. I am going to set a good example to others. 

I will now recognize Dr. Broun for five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask the three patients, I consider patients, as well 

as your testimony, and I apologize for having to leave for a few 

minutes; I am very well aware of your testimony, but what is your 

assessment of the claims appeals process in which you have participated and succeeded as well as the ongoing status of disability approval for the rest of Camp Lejeune veterans? Let me start with 

Mr. Partain. 

Mr. PARTAIN. Well, as a dependant child of a Marine officer, I do 

not qualify for VA care nor have I made a claim in the VA because 

of that. My care was given to me through my private insurance I 

had with my employer, and even with that, it put my family to the 

brink of bankruptcy. 

I have talked to Mr. Devereux and some of the other veterans 

who have gone through the VA process, and it has been nothing 

short of a nightmare, from what I understand. A lot of these people 

that do put the claims in are denied. Many of them give up and 

walk away thinking that there is no way they can prove this. They 

are frustrated by their medical doctors, you know, not being able 

to provide a nexus letter because of, for lack of a better word, fear 

that they will be ridiculed in the professional community. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Devereux. 

Mr. DEVEREUX. Yeah, I want to just say not only is it personally 

devastating to be diagnosed with something like this and then you 

feel like you have to beg, you know, for something like you have 

to prove that you are right, you know. It was really not only am 

I am physically challenged now, of course financially, it affected my 

family tremendous. We made unbelievable changes. So it was very 

difficult to go through this process, and I really hope that they can 

speed up the process for people. There is a lot of people in my situation that unfortunately don’t have a lot of time to live based on 

the past results, you know, so it would be nice if they could really 

expedite the process for a lot of people and I commend them for at 

least allowing me benefits and a few other people. I hope they can 

continue this type of action in a more speedy process. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Watters? 

Mr. WATTERS. My experience with the VA claims process was 

that the denials I got apparently came from people who were extremely inexperienced. There were lots of errors, lots of mistakes 

in the written reason for the denials, and it was only when I was 

able to talk with a decision review officer who is a senior person 

who has much more experience that I was able to get the message 

across. 

The other thing is, as I mentioned, I had resources available to 

me in the medical school that most veterans don’t have. Had I not 

had those, I would still be fighting with the Veterans Administration on my claim. I think the speed of the process or the slowness 
65

of the process is a major issue, and as Mr. Partain knows, I had 

reached a level of frustration and I even stated this in writing, I 

was planning on going down to the VA office in Waco. I was going 

to publicly announce a hunger strike. I was going to stop all of my 

cancer medications in order to try to speed the process and get 

someone at the VA at the regional office in Waco to listen to what 

I had to say. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, sir. 

Certainly, as one who believes very strongly in fulfilling the government’s promise to veterans and their families, I am very eager 

to pursue this further with all of you all because I believe very 

firmly that the VA needs to take care of our veterans, once they 

have left the military, and their families also. It is a sacred duty 

that we have. 

Dr. Clapp, you suggested the Department of Veterans Affairs determine a presumption classification for veterans exposed while 

they were residents at Camp Lejeune similar to legislation that established the classification for Agent Orange. What is the difference in the scientific knowledge between these cases and how 

many veterans make claims to the VA for diseases resulting from 

exposure to Agent Orange before Congress passed that legislation? 

Dr. CLAPP. Two very complicated questions. The state of the 

knowledge——

Mr. BROUN. You have 16 seconds to answer. 

Dr. CLAPP. I would say the state of the knowledge is comparable 

actually. When we started out with the Agent Orange Act in 1991, 

there was quite a bit of published literature by then, including 

some of my own. 

And then how many claims have been filed by Agent Orange exposed, I don’t have that off the top of my head. The VA certainly 

can tell you that. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mrs. Dahlkemper is recognized for five minutes. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here today. I am from western Pennsylvania, a fair distance from Camp Lejeune but I have 

a gentleman in my district who I have met who spent time at 

Camp Lejeune named Cliff Armstrong who has suffered terrible ailments which he believes are a direct result of the time that he has 

spent there. He fears it will be impossible for him to win a disability claim from the VA, so I appreciate the time each one of you 

has dedicated to the men, women and their families who spent 

time at Camp Lejeune during those years, and I applaud your courage in continuing to fight for your rights and the rights of all those 

who really do need a voice, and I thank you for being that voice 

for so many. 

Mr. Partain, you seem to have really got great information on 

this whole case. What is the incidence of breast cancer in the general public of men in our country? 

Mr. PARTAIN. Well, according to SEER, which is the Surveillance 

Epidemiology and End Results, the occurrence of male breast cancer in the general population is generally one in 100,000. The aver-
66

age, the percent chance a male has of experiencing breast cancer 

in his lifetime from birth to age 85 is .01 percent, and the younger 

the man is at diagnosis, the rarer the cancer. Generally, male 

breast cancer is seen in men at age 70 or older. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. And of those who contract it at a younger 

age, do they normally have the marker, the genetic marker? 

Mr. PARTAIN. Yeah, the BRCA markers are, like in women it is 

a significant marker for breast cancer risk. In men, a lot of the 

breast cancer in men are associated with the marker, and the absence of the markers does increase the rarity of the cancer. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. You don’t know what those figures are, do 

you? 

Mr. PARTAIN. I don’t have them off the top of my head. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Dr. Clapp, would you know that? 

Dr. CLAPP. Not off the top of my head. 

Mr. PARTAIN. I did have the genetic testing. The people told me 

there that without the markers, my chance would drop down to 

like .05 percent in the general population. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. I mean, I know it is very rare in the general 

public. 

Mr. PARTAIN. Yes, the average is about 1,900 men per year are 

diagnosed with breast cancer out of a total of 235,000 people diagnosed with breast cancer annually. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you. 

Dr. Clapp, in the two years that the Marine Corps knowingly allowed the Marines and their dependants to continue to drink that 

polluted water, do you have any how many Marines and their dependants would have been exposed to benzene, TCE or PCE? 

Dr. CLAPP. I think the water modeling process that is going on 

right now would answer that question. It is not finished yet, especially the benzene part is still being worked on, so I don’t think 

there is a way to answer that question quite yet. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. When will we have that information and how 

soon do they think they will have that? 

Dr. CLAPP. I think the next panel will have that. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. I appreciate that. And so you already 

talked about some of the kinds of diseases that are associated with 

such exposures, and so you don’t have any hard numbers on those 

diseases yet either? 

Dr. CLAPP. That have occurred in Camp Lejeune veterans and 

families? Not yet. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. 

Dr. Hargett, do you believe that the Marine Corps knew, that 

they understood when you came in front of them with your test results of the potential harm to human health of those that were 

being exposed? 

Mr. HARGETT. That would be somewhat speculative on my part, 

but no, I don’t think they had an awareness of the nature of the 

contaminant or its potential impact. I don’t think I was dealing 

with utility personnel other than the base chemist that understood 

what a chlorinated solvent was. The priority for the base utility 

personnel is to make sure that, number one, the water was sanitary, and secondly, that there was an adequate supply in the line 
67

at all times. Those were the priorities for the operators. The chemical nature of the water was not a concern. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. So the woman that you had met with——

Mr. HARGETT. Ms. Betsy Betz. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. You don’t believe that she understood? 

Mr. HARGETT. She sought to understand. She asked many questions, and I gave her references, and indeed, she did her own research to determine what the impact of this contaminant was in 

the water, and I think she was genuinely concerned over the dependants and Marines that were consuming it. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. And then in the short meeting that you had 

that lasted less than five minutes, as you said, I think it was 

with—was it with a——

Mr. HARGETT. A Lieutenant Colonel. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Were you able at all to talk about the effects 

of these chemicals? 

Mr. HARGETT. No. Ms. Betz presented him a rather large stack 

of our reports and her own memos concerning the water and he 

simply put those to the side and then we were dismissed, but I did 

not have any opportunity to discuss the significance, and I had 

made some preparation to do so, but no, we did not have an opportunity to have a discussion about that water. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Well, my time has expired, and I will yield 

back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

We have been called to votes but we have some time to get there, 

so perhaps we can get a shortened second round of questions in, 

excuse this panel, then we need to go to votes, and then have the 

second panel when we return for votes. 

Mr. Watters and Mr. Devereux, both of you have now had your 

claims honored but Mr. Partain is not a veteran. He is a dependant. Do you think it is fair that you are being compensated and Mr. 

Partain is not? 

Mr. DEVEREUX. No, I absolutely do not. I think even in my statement, if I didn’t publish, I apologize, but one of the things that I 

did agree on, not only was it just the Marines, the dependants, the 

civilians, I mean, he was really still part of the Marine Corps really. At Camp Lejeune, I mean, there were civilians also that I think 

should be under this, absolutely, no question about it. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Watters? 

Mr. WATTERS. I am very concerned about the dependants, about 

the folks who cannot file a claim with the VA. I am also very concerned about the civil service personnel. The base had a huge civil 

service population and those people, many of those people worked 

there for 20 or 30 years and they drank this water. You know, I 

don’t even know what their status is but I think it would be unfair 

to not address their concerns and do something about their health 

issues. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Hargett, one of the peculiar arguments is 

that the Marines did not act more quickly because they knew that 

the water was contaminated with PCE and TCE but didn’t know 

the source of it and therefore they did not act because they didn’t 

know the source. When I have seen a fire truck careening down the 

street with sirens going, I would assume that they were in a hurry 
68

to get to a fire to put it out, not to get to a fire to investigate the 

source of the fire. Does it make sense to you that they would not 

close the well when they knew that it was contaminated, even if 

they did not know the source? 

Mr. HARGETT. Mr. Chairman, it was—this one particular well, 

the 602 well, was one of six or eight wells in the field. Now, this 

was a field of wells drawing water from a rather shallow aquifer. 

That contaminated area would have been influenced by a local 

source. It would have been very easy to simply shut that well 

down, and that was the recommendation that I gave Ms. Betz and 

the operator, to not use that well. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Clapp, quickly on the same point. 

Dr. CLAPP. I am sorry. The——

Chairman MILLER. Does it make sense not to close the well if you 

don’t know the source of the contamination but you know that it 

is in fact contaminated at the levels that we now know what we 

knew then? 

Dr. CLAPP. I think it makes no sense not to close such a well. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Without knowing the source? 

Dr. CLAPP. Correct. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. I will now recognize Dr. Broun for a 

shortened period of time. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hargett, did you test water samples from other sites listed 

on the national priority list, and if so, how did the Department of 

Defense’s response to the results you communicated differ from the 

response from other government entities facing similar situations 

at the time? 

Mr. HARGETT. Most of our services for Safe Drinking Water Act 

compliance were for municipalities. Those municipalities were very 

concerned of any contamination of any kind that would show up in 

their water supply. If, for example, the city of Jacksonville adjacent 

to the base would find a well with anything, any contaminant, either chemical or biological, they would isolate that well and take 

it out of service until they knew what was going on in that well. 

We did not do additional priority pollutant analyses or additional 

screening. Our focus from the start was identifying the interference 

to our trihalomethane analysis. We wanted to know why we had 

trouble in getting an accurate quantification. So we focused on that 

area, the chlorinated solvents, because it interfered with our tests. 

We did not do additional survey work. It was discussed with Ms. 

Betz that additional evaluation was needed but we had no further 

activity in that area. 

Mr. BROUN. Did you test any other wells besides those on Camp 

Lejeune, any in the general area? 

Mr. HARGETT. We did the neighboring wells for the city of Jacksonville. We did analyses throughout eastern North Carolina for 

compliance. This was a regulatory requirement from the State of 

North Carolina that they define the level of trihalomethanes and 

report to the state those results. 

By the way, there was some absence of reporting protocol from 

the base, and that was part of the reason that the water supply 

section was concerned. If we were doing the analyses, where were 

their quarterly reports? 
69

Mr. BROUN. Did you find any contamination in other wells besides those specifically on the base that eventually were closed? 

Mr. HARGETT. No. 

Mr. BROUN. No other place? 

Mr. HARGETT. No other water supply systems in that area did we 

find that contaminant. 

Mr. BROUN. But you did extensive testing in areas other than at 

Camp Lejeune itself? 

Mr. HARGETT. That is correct. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Mrs. Dahlkemper is now recognized for two minutes. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Clapp, both Mr. Watters and Mr. Devereux, and I would say 

probably Mr. Partain might say the same thing, that if they had 

known of their exposure earlier, that they would have been more 

careful in monitoring their physical state for any kind of cancers 

that possibly could be caused by benzene, TCE and PCE. As it is, 

their cancers were identified late and they now are suffering the 

terrible consequences of that. The Navy only notified Lejeune veterans of problems with benzene, TCE and PCE in 2008 after Congress made them do it. If the Navy had acted earlier, say in the 

1990s even, do you believe that it would have made a difference in 

the lives of not only those who are sitting here on this panel but 

maybe the lives of people who are no longer with us? 

Dr. CLAPP. Yes, I do. I mean, I think it is sort of axiomatic that 

earlier diagnosis produces a better outcome. So if people had been 

notified, had gone to their physicians, gotten checked for, for example, kidney cancer or even male breast cancer, there would have 

been an earlier diagnosis of those tumors and less damage as a result. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Can I just ask your opinion of this booklet? 

Dr. CLAPP. I haven’t had a chance to review it. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. You haven’t had a chance to review it. Okay. 

I just was wondering. 

Well, I know that our time is limited because we have to go vote, 

but the booklet claims that there is no scientific studies that have 

shown an association between pollutants in water and human 

health outcomes, and so is there no literature on the exposure to 

these chemicals? 

Dr. CLAPP. There is lots of literature that I think I have referred 

to. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you very much, and I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

We now thank this panel, and they are excused, and when we 

return from votes, probably in perhaps half an hour, we will have 

the second panel. Thank you very much. We will be at ease. 

[Recess.]

Panel II 

Chairman MILLER. We will now begin with the second panel 

and—yeah, but I haven’t introduced them yet. It is my pleasure to 

introduce our second panel. First is Major General Eugene G. 

Payne, Jr., the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations 
70

and Logistics for the Headquarters of the United States Marine 

Corps. Dr. Chris Portier is the new Director of the Agency for Toxic 

Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). I have asked that he be 

accompanied by Mr. Frank Bove ́ of (ATSDR) who is familiar with 

these issues. Dr. Portier is new to this task, but Mr. Bove ́ has 

worked on Camp Lejeune analysis for many years. And Mr. Thomas Pamperin is the Assistant Director under Secretary for Policy 

and Program Management of the Veterans Benefits Administration 

for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. 

As all of you should know by now you will have five minutes for 

your spoken testimony, your written testimony will be included in 

its entirety in the record for the hearing. And when you have completed your spoken testimony we will have questions from the 

members and each member will have five minutes to question the 

panel. It is the practice of this Subcommittee to take testimony 

under oath. Do any of you have any objection to taking an oath? 

Let the records reflect that none of the witnesses had any objection 

to taking an oath. You may also be represented by counsel. Do you 

have personal counsel here? And let the records reflect that all the 

witness said that they have no personal counsel here. If you will 

now please stand and Mr. Bove ́, if you could stand as well. Do you 

swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth? Okay, the record 

should reflect that all the witnesses and Mr. Bove ́ did take the 

oath. We will begin with General Payne. General Payne, you are 

recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL EUGENE G. PAYNE, JR., ASSISTANT DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR INSTALLATIONS AND 

LOGISTICS (FACILITIES), HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES 

MARINE CORPS 

General PAYNE. Chairman Miller, Congressman Broun, Distinguished Members of this Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and to participate in this hearing regarding past drinking water exposures at Marine Corps base Camp 

Lejeune. My name is Major General Grey Payne, and until recently 

I was the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics for Facilities. I was responsible for Marine Corps facilities 

and services issues on our installations and bases to include environmental protection. I want to begin by saying that the welfare 

of our Marines, their family members, and our civilian employees 

is always of paramount importance to us as an organization and 

as individual leaders in the Department of the Navy. The Marine 

Corps is deeply concerned for any military or civilian families who 

are experiencing or have experienced health issues for any reason, 

and we understand that some believe their health conditions may 

have resulted from past exposure to the water at Camp Lejeune. 

Beyond my duties as Assistant Deputy Commandant I also have 

a personal interest in this issue, as do many of us in the senior 

leadership of the Marine Corps. The Corps is and always has been 

a large family, and we all knew people who were stationed or 

worked at Camp Lejeune during their military careers. My first 

tour of duty was at Camp Lejeune in 1970. Many of my friends and 

most of the senior leadership of the Corps, both officers and enlisted were at Camp Lejeune during the period when this water 
71

was contaminated. We have a personal and professional interest in 

finding answers to questions about the health of our Marine families. The best way to provide those answers at the present time is 

for us to continue to support scientific studies that will improve our 

knowledge of the situation. The Department of the Navy has funded $22 million in such scientific efforts and we are committed to 

working closely with ATSDR and other scientific organizations in 

the quest for answers. 

As for any issue that impacts the public, accurate dissemination 

of information is imperative. The Marine Corps takes this responsibility seriously and will continue to keep our Marine family informed of the scientific findings and reports regarding those studies. The Marine Corps continues to operate a call center, an internet based notification registry in conjunction with a robust radio, 

print, and internet advertising campaign that has resulted in over 

163,000 individuals on our registry. 

In closing, I want you to know that I have received and responded to many letters and have personally spoken with individuals who feel that they have been harmed by past Camp Lejeune 

water. Their situations are often sad and my heart goes out to 

them. The Marine Corps is committed to fully and properly utilizing the tools available to support our Marines, family members, 

and civilian employees. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUGENE G. PAYNE, JR. 

Representative Miller, Representative Broun, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and participate in 

this hearing regarding past drinking water exposures at Marine Corps Base Camp 

Lejeune. My name is Major General Gray Payne and until recently, I was the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics for Facilities. I was responsible for Marine Corps facilities and services issues on our installations, to include environmental protection. 

I want to begin by saying that the welfare of our Marines, their family members, 

and our civilian employees is always of paramount importance to us as an organization and as individual Department of the Navy leaders. The Marine Corps is deeply 

concerned for any military or civilian families who are experiencing or have experienced health issues for any reason and we understand that some may believe their 

health conditions resulted from past exposure to the water at Camp Lejeune. 

Beyond my duties as Assistant Deputy Commandant, I also have a personal interest in this issue, as do many of us in the senior leadership of the Corps. The Marine 

Corps is and always has been a large family, and we all know people who were stationed or worked at Camp Lejeune during their military careers. My first tour of 

duty was at Camp Lejeune in 1970. Many of my friends and most of the senior leadership of the Marine Corps, both officer and enlisted, were at Camp Lejeune during 

the period when the water was contaminated. We have a personal and professional 

interest in finding factually and scientifically supported answers to questions about 

the health of our Marine families. The best way to provide those answers at the 

present time is to support scientific studies that will improve our knowledge of the 

situation. We will also keep our Marine family informed of the scientific findings 

and reports regarding these studies. The Marine Corps is primarily a war-fighting 

organization, not a scientific one. In order to accomplish this scientific mission for 

our people, we are funding and receiving assistance from independent, objective, 

well-recognized leaders in the scientific community. In this situation we rely on the 

expertise of scientific organizations like the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), in the Department of Health and Human Services, and the 

National Academies, National Research Council (NRC) to inform our understanding 

of the ‘‘state of the science’’ on these important issues. The Department of the Navy 

has funded $22 million in scientific efforts and has exhausted countless hours in direct support of research initiatives. 
72

1 A separate investigation by the State of North Carolina in 1985 revealed leaks from an offbase dry cleaner had contaminated the wells near the Tarawa Terrace housing area. The 

Hadnot Point water system was contaminated by on-base sources. 

As with any issue that impacts the public, prompt and accurate dissemination of 

information is imperative. The Marine Corps takes this responsibility seriously and 

will continue to inform those who lived or worked at Camp Lejeune about any new 

developments. The Marine Corps operates a call center and internet-based notification registry to collect contact information from anyone who may have concerns 

about past water contamination at Camp Lejeune in order to provide current information to them. The Marine Corps is also continuing its robust outreach campaign 

including radio, print and internet advertising. Our efforts have resulted in over 

163,000 individuals joining our notification registry. 

In addition to our communications with the public, the Marine Corps will continue 

to support and cooperate with the independent organizations like the ATSDR, Department of Veteran’s Affairs, and others in an effort to get answers for those of 

our Marine Corps family and keep them informed of our progress.

KNOWLEDGE OF PAST ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION 

In 1981, Camp Lejeune officials became aware that volatile organic compounds 

(VOCs) were interfering with the analysis of potable water samples that were being 

collected in preparation for the implementation of future drinking water standards 

for Total Trihalomethanes (TTHM). Sampling conducted by a Navy contractor revealed that another chemical present in the water sample was interfering with the 

analysis; however, the specific type of chemical and source were unknown. Base personnel continued to sample the water for TTHMs over the next several years using 

various laboratories with varying results. Through targeted sampling in 1982 the 

Base detected that two of Camp Lejeune’s eight public drinking water systems contained trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene (PCE). TCE and PCE are 

chemicals commonly found in degreasing agents and dry cleaning solvents, respectively. It is important to note two key points. First, there were no drinking water 

regulations in place for TCE or PCE at the time of this discovery. Second, although 

the chemicals were identified in the drinking water systems, their origin remained 

unknown. 

In the early 1980’s, the Naval Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants 

(NACIP) program, a predecessor of the current Department of the Navy (DON) Installation Restoration (cleanup) Program, was already in the process of identifying 

contaminated sites on Base for further sampling and investigation. Plans were in 

place to sample potable wells near the identified contaminated sites. It was this 

sampling that eventually identified, between late 1984 and early 1985, individual 

wells drawing groundwater containing TCE, PCE and other VOC’s such as benzene. 

Base officials engaged in a concentrated effort to sample all wells on the installation 

as soon as they learned that the first well was impacted in late 1984. The Base completed this evaluation effort in 1985. If and when the Base officials received information that a well was contaminated, it was promptly removed from service.1 Although the Base began its proactive responses in 1984, initial Safe Drinking Water 

Act regulation of these VOCs did not begin until three years later. Final regulations 

were not in force for TCE and benzene until 1989 and not until 1992 for PCE. 

It is important to keep in mind that the events surrounding this situation occurred anywhere from 25 to over 50 years ago. Environmental standards and regulations have changed dramatically over the intervening years as a result of advances 

in scientific knowledge and increased awareness. The events at Camp Lejeune must 

be considered in light of the scientific knowledge, regulatory framework, and accepted practices that existed at the time, not in the context of today’s standards.

NOTIFICATION 

Camp Lejeune first notified military personnel and family members about the 

drinking water issue on December 13, 1984 through an article appearing in Camp 

Lejeune’s newspaper, The Globe. Camp Lejeune also distributed a public notice to 

residents of Tarawa Terrace on April 30, 1985. In May 1985, Camp Lejeune issued 

a press release announcing the water contamination problem. In that press release 

the Base explained the steps planned to restore water services to the affected base 

residents. Following a May 1985 Camp Lejeune press event, the Jacksonville Daily 

News, Wilmington Morning Star, and Raleigh News and Observer printed several 

stories on the situation and further disseminated the information. These were just 

the early steps in what evolved into a 25 year public outreach campaign. 
73

From 2000 through 2001, the Marine Corps undertook an extensive outreach campaign in support of ATSDR’s children’s health survey – including press briefings and 

releases, messages to Marines world-wide, stories in base publications and websites, 

and a town hall meeting in Jacksonville, North Carolina. These efforts resulted in 

numerous stories in local and regional print and television news outlets across 

America. Because of the Marine Corps outreach efforts, ATSDR was able to obtain 

enough respondents to continue their current epidemiological study on birth defects 

and childhood cancers. 

Congress later became interested in the public outreach program, resulting in the 

FY08 National Defense Authorization Act mandate that the Secretary of the Navy 

attempt to directly notify former residents of Camp Lejeune of their potential exposure to the chemicals. The Act also required that ATSDR develop a health survey 

to be included with the notification letter. On September 14, 2007, the Marine Corps 

posted a link to the registration database on its website (www.marines.mil/clsurvey) 

to provide easy access for former Camp Lejeune residents and workers, as well as 

other interested parties, to register to receive updates on the ongoing studies or information about other new developments on this important issue. The Marine Corps 

also created an enhanced call center, which became operational on September 17, 

2007, to allow people to register by phone. Each new registrant receives a welcome 

packet that includes information about the issue and points of contact for additional 

information. 

The Marine Corps continues to encourage former base residents and workers to 

register through general notification efforts. These general notifications include articles and/or advertisements in newspapers such as USA Today; periodicals such as 

Time, Newsweek, Sports Illustrated, and Good Housekeeping; internet advertisements on general consumer websites such as WebMD, Weather.com, and NFL.com; 

military related websites such as the Leatherneck, U.S. Navy Institute, and the 

Vietnam Veterans Association; internet search engines such as Yahoo and Google; 

and radio broadcasts. In addition, the Marine Corps sendt posters to Veterans of 

Foreign Wars District Offices, Veterans’ Centers, commissaries, and Veteran’s Affairs treatment centers across the country. To date, more than 163,000 individuals 

are on the registry. We receive new registrations each week, and we continue our 

pro-active outreach efforts.

COORDINATION WITH DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 

As part of the Marine Corp’s robust outreach and notification campaign we have 

worked extensively with various Veterans Affairs (VA) offices. In 2007 and 2008 we 

sent notification and registry posters to over 200 VA centers in all 50 states as well 

as the US Territories and Washington, DC. We also sent copies of posters in 2007 

and 2008 to Veterans of Foreign Wars District Offices and Military Treatment Facilities. In March 2009, we worked with VA public affairs personnel to prepare an 

email to alert VA program directors and other executives of new information about 

the water contamination; in particular, the pending release of the National Research 

Council report regarding Camp Lejeune Water. The email established a direct communication mechanism for VA personnel to contact Headquarters Marine Corps for 

additional information and assistance. We currently provide periodic updates of our 

notification registry information to the VA to enable them to assist us in our outreach activities.

SUPPORT OF ATSDR HEALTH INITIATIVES 

All military installations on the National Priorities List of hazardous waste sites, 

including Camp Lejeune which was listed in 1989, undergo a Public Health Assessment (PHA) conducted by the ATSDR to determine if there are any current or past 

health concerns resulting from past practices. 

ATSDR first visited Camp Lejeune in 1991. Beginning with this trip, Camp 

Lejeune provided information to ATSDR as part of the development of the PHA; the 

Marine Corps continues to provide ATSDR open access to any potentially relevant 

data in our possession today. As a result of the PHA, the ATSDR recommended an 

epidemiological study of former Camp Lejeune residents to determine what effect, 

if any, the VOCs may have had on the health of children exposed prenatally, a population ATSDR considered to be the most susceptible to health impacts from VOCs. 

In support of this recommendation, a health survey was conducted in 1999 to identify children with certain health conditions who might be included in a case control 

study. 

In 2000, ATSDR requested assistance from the Marine Corps to reach additional 

participants for the health survey started in 1999. At the time, ATSDR had approximately 6,500 participants and they needed more for a statistically valid study. The 
74

Marine Corps helped ATSDR identify participants eligible for the survey through 

targeted and global notifications. For example, in January 2000, Camp Lejeune held 

an ‘‘open house’’ with base residents and the Jacksonville community to discuss 

issues about the drinking water previously discovered to contain VOCs. In August 

2000, Headquarters Marine Corps sent a message to all Marines worldwide in an 

effort to reach potential ATSDR survey participants. The Marine Corps published 

articles in numerous base newspapers including the Quantico Sentry, Camp Lejeune 

Globe, and Camp Pendleton Scout. Camp Lejeune sent a press release to other military base publications. In November 2000, Headquarters Marine Corps held a press 

briefing at the Pentagon asking media to assist in helping to reach potential survey 

participants. On January 25, 2001, Headquarters Marine Corps sent a second message to all Marines worldwide in an effort to reach potential ATSDR survey participants. In February 2001, the Marine Corps began regional media outreach efforts, 

and reached the following outlets:

(A) TV Stations—1027 outlets

(B) Daily Newspapers—1373 outlets

(C) Weekly Newspapers—1171 outlets

Total: 3571 media outlets contacted.

In order to support the ATSDR survey, in 2001, Headquarters Marine Corps obtained approval from the Department of Defense for a limited release of Social Security Number information covered by the Privacy Act to the ATSDR. Headquarters 

Marine Corps conducted extensive data searches for contact information to help 

ATSDR locate potential survey participants. 

Partly as a result of these efforts, ATSDR closed their survey in January 2002 

with 12,598 participants; enough to go forward with their current epidemiological 

study on birth defects and childhood cancers. 

In July 2003, the ATSDR released a progress report of the survey and concluded 

that a follow-on case control/epidemiological study was warranted. The Marine 

Corps actively participated in publicizing this report through a press release, a 

webcast by the Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics, and by posting 

survey information on the Marine Corps Camp Lejeune drinking water webpage. 

ATSDR also determined in 2003 that extensive water modeling would be needed at 

Camp Lejeune in support of the case control study. That water modeling continues 

today and is currently projected to be complete in mid to late 2011. The case control 

study will be completed sometime thereafter. 

In July 2005, in an effort to fully identify the universe of information related to 

the historic drinking water issue at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune (MCBCL), 

Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) contracted to provide a comprehensive, transparent document search and collection effort covering Camp Lejeune areas and facilities. The contractor conducted a preliminary assessment and on 7 November 

2005, invited ATSDR to attend its kick-off brief for the base-wide document search. 

ATSDR staff made comments that the Marine Corps integrated into search parameters. In December of 2005, the Marine Corps provided ATSDR a copy of the ‘‘Camp 

Lejeune Water’’ (CLW) database on CD per ATSDR request. 

From February through July 2006, the contractor conducted an exhaustive search 

of MCBCL and its facilities. The Marine Corps intended to systematically identify 

and inventory pre-1988 documents pertinent or useful to analyzing the water issue 

at MCB Camp Lejeune. The search encompassed the contents of 718 buildings and 

resulted in locating 8,599 documents (390,782 PDF pages). In July 2006, ATSDR followed up this search with another visit to MCBCL to review more documents. 

From February 2008 through March 2009, the contractor converted documents 

into electronic formats by scanning, indexing, and image-preserving, as part of the 

on-going records management initiatives in direct support of the document repository. In November 2008, ATSDR made another site visit to review collected documents. In early 2009, the Marine Corps provided ATSDR with user name and password access to hundreds of MCBCL environmental documents via a controlled internet gateway in order to facilitate ATSDR’s receipt of information. Furthermore, 

ATSDR was provided with a full document repository index prior to another visit 

on 26–27 May 2009. ATSDR used this index to identify documents they wanted to 

review for further evaluation. ATSDR reviewed the documents while at Camp 

Lejeune and the Marine Corps again provided copies of requested documents. 

In June 2010, the Department of the Navy and ATSDR established a Data Mining 

Technical Workgroup to complete the identification, review, and exchange of documents, data, and information needed for ATSDR’s studies. Both agencies felt that 

the most effective way for ATSDR to continue with its studies was to establish this 

Workgroup that will closely review all repositories of available data and information 
75

in order to identify any additional data and information that may be of value to 

ATSDR’s health initiatives at Camp Lejeune. The Workgroup’s efforts serve to formalize the existing shared commitment to complete the data mining activities to 

completion. The Workgroup has convened three times and has made significant 

progress to complete its goals.

INDEPENDENT REVIEWS AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Three independent reviews have been conducted of the actions taken by Marine 

Corps personnel on this matter: an independent Fact-Finding Panel chartered by 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, an EPA Criminal Investigation Division 

(CID) investigation, and a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review. 

In 2004 the Fact-Finding Panel determined, among other things, that Camp 

Lejeune provided drinking water at a level of quality consistent with general water 

industry practices in light of the evolving regulatory requirements at the time. 

Among the EPA CID’s 2005 conclusions was a determination that there had been 

no violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act, no conspiracy to withhold information, 

falsify data, or conceal evidence. 

In 2007 the GAO issued a report reviewing the Camp Lejeune drinking water factual history and technical aspects of ATSDR study. The report had no findings or 

recommendations for the Marine Corps. 

In accordance with the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, the Marine 

Corps contracted with the National Academies’ National Research Council (NRC) to 

review the evidence regarding potential associations between exposure to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and adverse health effects in prenatal children, children, and adults. The NRC review report concluded that while former 

Camp Lejeune residents and workers were exposed to unregulated solvents, the 

committee did not find sufficient evidence to justify causal inference for any health 

effects it reviewed. The report also noted that the exposures required to cause adverse effects in laboratory animals were much larger than the highest measurements available on the Camp Lejeune water supplies; evidence that humans have 

lower sensitivity to TCE and PCE than rodents; epidemiological data largely from 

occupational settings with higher, longer-term exposures to TCE and PCE that has 

not generated compelling evidence of adverse health effects; and the relatively shortterm intermittent nature of the exposures incurred at Camp Lejeune. The review 

concluded, however, that adverse health effects could not be ruled out and that the 

DON (and other policy makers) should move forward with responses they deem appropriate based on available information.

CONCLUSION 

As I mentioned above at the beginning of my testimony, the welfare of our Marines, their family members, and our civilian employees is of paramount importance 

I have received many letters and have personally spoken with individuals who feel 

that they have been harmed by Camp Lejeune water. Their situations are often sad, 

and my heart goes out to them. The Marine Corps is committed to fully and properly utilizing the tools available to support our Marines and family members. However, under current law the Department of the Navy cannot provide compensation 

for claims for illness, disease, or injury without a demonstration of causation and 

we do not have that at this time. Currently, scientific studies haven’t determined 

reliably whether diseases and disorders experienced by former residents and workers at Camp Lejeune are associated with their exposure to contaminants in the 

water supply because of data shortcomings and methodological limitations. We assure you that we will continue maximum efforts to take appropriate actions for our 

Marines, their family members, and civilian employees.
76

BIOGRAPHY FOR EUGENE G. PAYNE, JR.

Major General Payne currently serves as Assistant Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. 

A graduate of North Carolina State University, Major General Payne entered the 

Marine Corps in 1970 as a recruit at Parris Island, SC. On January 1, 1976 he was 

promoted from Staff Sergeant to Second Lieutenant and received an Infantry Officer 

MOS. 

His nine command tours include three companies: Truck Company, 6th Motor 

Transport Battalion, Orlando, FL (October 1985 to May 1988); Company C, 4th 

Landing Support Battalion, Charleston, SC (October 1989 to August 1990); and 

H&S Company, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Camp Lejeune, NC (September 

1990 to July 1992). From October 1993 to October 1995 he served as Commanding 

Officer, 4th Landing Support Battalion, 4th FSSG, Seattle, WA. During this twoyear tour, the Battalion won five major awards for excellence, including two Cates 

Awards, two Hanson Awards, and the Schmidt Award. Major General Payne served 

as Commanding Officer, 4th FSSG Forward (East), Camp Lejeune, NC, from March 

1999 to March 2001, as Deputy Commander, 4th FSSG, New Orleans, LA from June 

2001 to September 2002, Commanding General, Marine Corps Mobilization Command, Kansas City, MO from May 2003 to November 2004, as Commanding General, Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, GA from November 2004 to July 

2005, and Commanding General 4th Marine Logistics Group, New Orleans, LA from 

July 2005 to August 2007. 

Major General Payne’s staff billets include Operations Officer, 2d BTO, Savannah, 

GA; G–4 Ops and Deputy G–4, 2d MEB, Camp Lejeune, NC; G–3 Plans, Deputy G–

3, and Assistant Chief of Staff G–3, 4th FSSG, New Orleans, LA; Assistant Chief 

of Staff G–3, Marine Forces Korea; Assistant Chief of Staff G–4, II MEF, Camp 

Lejeune, NC; Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Reserve Support Command, Kansas City, 

MO; and Director of the CENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, Kuwait. 

During his service in the Marine Corps Reserve, Major General Payne has completed numerous schools, including Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Staff 

College, Landing Force Staff Planning, LOGTECH, and the U. S. Army War College, 

where he was awarded a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies. He is President of 

the Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board and currently serves on the MCA Board of 

Governors. His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion 

of Merit Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with two gold stars, and the Navy and 

Marine Corps Commendation Medal with gold star.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, General Payne. Dr. Portier. Dr. 

Portier, I should note that you are new to this job and this Subcommittee, and I have been very critical of ATSDR in the past. And 

I appreciate your coming to meet with me, and you do come well 

recommended by people I know at NIEHS and NIH and certainly 

hope that the ATSDR performs at least—perform an important 

function. And there are many very dedicated professionals there 
77

who want—who believe in the mission of ATSDR and want to do 

better in the future. So I welcome you to your new role. 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS PORTIER, DIRECTOR, AGENCY FOR 

TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY (ATSDR) 

Dr. PORTIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I believe in that 

mission as well. Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member 

Broun, and other Distinguished Members of this Subcommittee. On 

behalf of the CDC Director, ATSDR Administrator Dr. Thomas 

Friedan, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am Dr. 

Christopher Portier, Director of the Agency for Toxic Substances 

and Disease Registry and Centers for Disease Control and Preventions National Center for Environmental Health; a position I have 

held since August of this year. Prior to that I served for 30—for 

over 30 years at the NIEHS. I am accompanied today by Dr. Frank 

Bove ́ from our Division of Health Studies. As I approach my new 

position at ATSDR I am keenly aware of the agency’s important 

role in providing public health assistance and expertise to people 

and communities affected by hazardous substances. And I am committed to continuing the critical work of the agency at Camp 

Lejeune. 

In my testimony I will discuss ATSDR’s involvement at Camp 

Lejeune. First, I will provide background on our health assessments and on the primary drinking water contaminants at Camp 

Lejeune. I will then address ongoing agency activities related to the 

base focusing on the community assistance panel, water modeling 

and health studies. 

In 1989, EPA placed U.S. Marine Corps base Camp Lejeune and 

ABC One Hour Cleaners, which is located very close to the base, 

on its National Priorities List of hazardous waste sites. Shortly 

thereafter in August of 1990, ATSDR completed a PHA, a public 

health assessment, addressing contamination from the ABC One 

Hour Cleaners. This assessment found that tetrachloroethylene—or 

PCE—was in the Tarawa Terrace water system and its supply 

wells. In 1997, ATSDR completed a PHA addressing all of Camp 

Lejeune. ATSDR’s investigation at Camp Lejeune identified potential exposures to drinking water contaminated with benzene, trichloroethylene, known as TCE, PCE, and their degradation products in a number of those. Long term exposure to benzene has effects on the bone marrow and can cause anemia and leukemia. The 

National Toxicology Program Report on Carcinogens recognizes 

benzene as a known human carcinogen. The NTP lists trichloroethylene as reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen based 

on limited evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in humans and 

sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in experimental 

animals. The NTP lists PCE as reasonably anticipated to be a 

human carcinogen based on sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in 

experimental animals. In the 13 years since the 1997 PHA was 

published, ATSDR, with help from ATSDR’s Camp Lejeune Community Assistance Panel and others, has located additional information on VOC’s in drinking water at Camp Lejeune, based in part 

on information obtained through ATSDR’s ongoing water modeling 

and exposure reconstruction study. We have determined that persons in housing served by the Holcomb Boulevard system were ex-
78

posed to contaminated drinking water for a longer period than we 

suspected in 1997, suggesting the possibility of increased risks. 

Further, recently discovered information indicates that benzene 

contamination at Hadnot Point was greater than what was assumed in 1997. ATSDR removed the PHA from its website in 2009, 

and we plan to reassess the drinking water pathway and revise the 

PHA when water modeling analyses are completed. It is becoming 

increasingly clear that information available in 1994 suggests to 

me greater emphasis should have been placed on benzene. 

In 2005, ATSDR established a Community Assistance Panel or 

CAP to facilitate the direct participation of the affected community 

in our Camp Lejeune related health activities. The CAP consists of 

seven community members. Also participating in CAP meetings are 

one representative from the Department of Defense, two independent scientific experts, and the ATSDR staff. The CAP has been 

instrumental in helping ATSDR by providing information vital both 

to the water modeling effort and to the design and implementation 

of the epidemiological studies. Water modeling is a key component 

of ATSDR’s ongoing studies at Camp Lejeune, because only limited 

measurements of contaminant concentrations are available. ATSDR 

is using complex modeling techniques to reconstruct historical conditions of ground water flow, contaminant fate and transport, and 

the distribution of drinking water contaminated with VOC’s delivered to family housing areas. 

Because of the vast amount of data and the historical nature of 

the information, it has been extremely difficult for ATSDR to obtain relevant information needed to complete its work at Camp 

Lejeune. While ATSDR has been provided with much information 

and given access to a large amount of information in the past, several new sources of critical and relevant information have recently 

been identified and relevant documents exist in several large storage systems in catalogues maintained by the Navy. ATSDR and the 

Department of Navy established a Camp Lejeune data mining technical work group in June 2010. The goal of this joint agency work 

group is to identify and inventory relevant information and data. 

I will quickly summarize: in addition to the data mining and 

modeling exercise we are doing four different epidemiological studies, and redoing one that we did earlier. Those studies depend upon 

that water modeling in order that we can address what individuals 

were exposed to, for how long, and to what contaminants, and use 

that in deciding if there is a relationship between the exposures 

and the diseases we will be looking at. 

I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to be here 

today and that ends my presentation. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Portier follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER PORTIER

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and other distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. On behalf of CDC Director/ATSDR Administrator 

Dr. Thomas Frieden, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. 

I am Dr. Christopher Portier, Director of the Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry (ATSDR) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 

(CDC’s) National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH), a position I have held 

since August of this year. I came to CDC from another agency in the Department 

of Health and Human Services, the National Institute of Environmental Health 

Sciences (NIEHS) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). At NIEHS, I served 
79

most recently as the Senior Advisor to the Director and as a Principal Investigator 

in environmental systems biology. Prior to my time in that role, I served as Associate Director of NIEHS, Director of the Environmental Toxicology Program, and as 

Associate Director of the National Toxicology Program. 

ATSDR has a unique mandate to conduct human health studies and research related to community exposures to hazardous substances. Although knowledge of the 

relationships between chemical exposures and human health is often based upon 

studies of highly exposed workers or animal toxicology testing, there remains a 

pressing need to know whether lower level exposures and exposures away from the 

workplace can cause human illness. Drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune 

was identified as a circumstance that would benefit from this type of investigation. 

As I approach my new position at ATSDR, I am keenly aware of the Agency’s important role in providing public health assistance and expertise to people and communities impacted by hazardous substances. And, I am committed to continuing the 

critical work of the Agency at Camp Lejeune. 

In my testimony I will discuss ATSDR’s involvement at Camp Lejeune. First I will 

provide background on our health assessments and on the primary drinking water 

contaminants at Camp Lejeune. I will then address ongoing Agency activities related to the base, focusing on the Community Assistance Panel, water modeling, and 

health studies.

Background: 

In 1989, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed U.S. Marine Corps 

Base Camp Lejeune and ABC One-Hour Cleaners, which is located very close to the 

base, on its National Priorities List of hazardous waste sites. Information that EPA 

had at the time indicated that releases of chemicals from both the cleaners and activities at Camp Lejeune contributed to contamination of two of the water supply 

systems serving certain areas of base housing.

ATSDR Public Health Assessments: 

In August 1990, ATSDR completed a Public Health Assessment (PHA) addressing 

contamination from the ABC One-Hour Cleaners. This assessment found that 

tetrachloroethylene—also known as perchloroethylene or PCE—was in the Tarawa 

Terrace water system and its supply wells. This raised ATSDR’s concerns regarding 

the health of persons who consumed this water over extended periods, leading the 

Agency to conduct a more thorough evaluation of the contamination. 

In 1997, ATSDR completed a PHA addressing environmental contamination at 

Camp Lejeune. In this PHA, ATSDR concluded that past exposures in three drinking water systems on base to certain chemicals, including benzene and two common 

groundwater contaminants, trichloroethylene (TCE) and PCE, and their degradation 

products, posed a public health hazard. However, because of the limitations of the 

available scientific data relating to the harmful effects of these chemicals, the PHA 

recommended conducting an epidemiological study to assess risk to infants and children from potential maternal exposure during pregnancy to the VOC-contaminated 

drinking water. 

In the 13 years since the 1997 PHA was published, ATSDR, with help from 

ATSDR’s Camp Lejeune Community Assistance Panel (CAP) and others, has located 

additional information on VOCs in drinking water at Camp Lejeune. Based in part 

on information obtained through ATSDR’s ongoing extensive water modeling and exposure reconstruction study, we have determined that persons in housing serviced 

by a third water distribution system, referred to as the Holcomb Boulevard system, 

were exposed to contaminated drinking water for a longer period than we knew in 

1997, suggesting the possibility of increased risks. Further, recently discovered information indicates that benzene contamination at Hadnot Point was greater than 

what was known in 1997. ATSDR removed the PHA from its website in 2009 and 

plans to reassess the drinking water pathway and revise the PHA when water modeling analyses are completed.

Primary Contaminants 

Benzene is a widely used chemical formed from both natural processes and 

human activities. Long-term benzene exposure has effects on the bone marrow and 

can cause anemia and leukemia. The National Toxicology Program (NTP) Report on 

Carcinogens has recognized benzene as a known carcinogen. 

TCE is a colorless liquid which is used as a solvent for cleaning metal parts. The 

NTP Report on Carcinogens classifies TCE as reasonably anticipated to be a human 

carcinogen based on limited evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in humans and 

sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in experimental animals. Most 
80

available information comes from animal studies or studies of workers who use 

these chemicals in the workplace. Very few studies have been conducted of people 

exposed to low levels of these chemicals in their drinking water. A meta-analysis 

of seven cohort studies found that occupational exposure to TCE was associated 

with excess incidences of liver cancer, kidney cancer, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, 

prostate cancer, and multiple myeloma, with the strongest evidence for the first 

three cancers (Wartenberg et al. 2000). 

PCE is a manufactured chemical used for dry cleaning and metal degreasing. The 

NTP lists PCE as reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen, based on sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals. According to the NTP’s 

11th Report on Carcinogens, there is limited evidence for the carcinogenicity of PCE 

in humans.

Community Assistance Panel 

Based on recommendations from a scientific panel convened by ATSDR in 2005, 

ATSDR established a Community Assistance Panel—or CAP—to facilitate the direct 

participation of the affected community in our Camp Lejeune-related health activities. The original purpose of the CAP was to voice the concerns of the affected community of Marines and their families and to provide input for future health studies. 

In its January 2010 meeting, the OAP’s mission was articulated as: ‘‘To represent 

the interests, consequences, and quality of life of those impacted by exposure to 

toxic substances at Camp Lejeune. ATSDR will look at the potential for future studies at Camp Lejeune with the full inclusion of the community members affected.’’ 

The CAP does not provide consensus advice to ATSDR in carrying out agency programs and activities, nor do CAP members speak for or represent ATSDR. The CAP 

consists of seven community members. Also participating in CAP meetings are one 

representative from the Department of Defense (DOD), two independent scientific 

experts, and ATSDR staff. Members of the CAP provide individual input, as well 

as represent the views of the community and groups to which they belong. Meetings 

are held quarterly and are open to the public. 

The CAP has been instrumental in helping ATSDR by providing information vital 

both to the water modeling effort and to the design and implementation of the epidemiological studies. The CAP has reviewed archived data, disseminated information about historical drinking water contamination at the base, advised other members of the affected community on how to apply for benefits from the Department 

of Veterans Affairs (VA), and represented the affected community’s health concerns 

in discussions with VA administrators.

Water Modeling 

Water modeling is a key component of ATSDR’s ongoing studies at Camp Lejeune. 

Because only limited measurements of contaminant concentrations are available, 

ATSDR is using complex modeling techniques to reconstruct historical conditions of 

groundwater flow, contaminant fate and transport, and the distribution of drinking 

water contaminated with VOCs delivered to family housing areas. 

Prior to the end of 1987, two of the water systems at Camp Lejeune were continuously contaminated, and one water system, Holcomb Boulevard, was intermittently 

contaminated with VOCs. This contamination changed in concentration over time 

depending on the source wells and other factors. Using water modeling ATSDR will 

estimate exposures for each housing area. 

These models are being used to characterize historical contamination sources and 

predict drinking water concentrations of PCE (and its degradation by-products of 

TCE, 1,2-DCE, and vinyl chloride), TCE (and its degradation by-products of 1,2 DCE 

and vinyl chloride), and benzene. ATSDR published Tarawa Terrace reconstructed 

drinking water results during 2007–2009. 

ATSDR–Department of the Navy Camp Lejeune Data Mining Technical 

Workgroup. Because of the vast amount of data and the historical nature of the information, it has been extremely difficult for ATSDR to obtain relevant information 

needed to complete its work at Camp Lejeune. While ATSDR has been provided 

with much information and access to a large amount of information in the past, several new sources of critical and relevant information have recently been identified, 

and relevant documents exist in several large storage systems and catalogs maintained by the Navy. To make sure that relevant information is located, ATSDR and 

the Department of the Navy established a Camp Lejeune Data Mining Technical 

Workgroup in June 2010. The goal of this joint-agency workgroup is to identify and 

inventory relevant information and data. These data are necessary to complete current water modeling activities and other Camp Lejeune health activities. The work 
81

of the group is ongoing, and the group is planning to complete its major activities 

in the fall of 2010. 

Completion of Water Modeling. Modeling of reconstructed drinking water concentrations for Hadnot Point and Holcomb Boulevard began in June 2007. Predictions from the modeling are expected to be available to ATSDR scientists conducting the epidemiological studies within a year, with publication of the water 

modeling results anticipated by the spring of 2012.

Health Studies 

Adverse Pregnancy Outcomes Reanalysis. In 1995, ATSDR began a study of adverse pregnancy outcomes at Camp Lejeune in relation to exposure to VOCs in 

drinking water. ATSDR found statistically significant associations for some subgroups (older mothers and mothers with histories of fetal loss) living in homes in 

Tarawa Terrace (PCE), and elevated risks of small for gestational age (SGA) births 

and low birth weights. 

Later information indicated that some women, who were considered not to be exposed because they were served by the Holcomb Boulevard system, were potentially 

exposed during pregnancy. ATSDR and the Department of Navy are engaged in intensive efforts to identify information needed for water modeling. ATSDR will conduct a new evaluation of adverse pregnancy outcomes when the modeled water concentrations are available. 

Case-Control Study of Specific Birth Defects and Childhood Cancers. ATSDR identified children born during 1968–1985 to mothers who were exposed to VOC-contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune at any time during their pregnancy. 

Cases of neural tube defects (i.e., spina bifida and anencephaly), cleft lip, cleft palate, leukemia or non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma were identified during a telephone survey 

conducted during 1999–2002, and have been confirmed by medical records. The parents of confirmed cases and a random sample of controls (i.e., children who did not 

have birth defects or childhood cancers) were interviewed in 2005. Analyses of this 

data will be conducted once the results of the water modeling become available.

Scientific Panel 

In February 2005, ATSDR convened a scientific panel composed of scientists from 

government and academia with expertise in epidemiology and public health, biostatistics, drinking water contaminants, pesticides, toxicology, reproductive health, 

and environmental health. The panel was asked to provide advice on whether additional epidemiological studies on the health effects of exposures to contaminated 

water at Camp Lejeune should be conducted. ATSDR convened this panel in response to concerns that ATSDR’s studies of adverse birth outcomes and childhood 

cancers were too narrowly focused, and may have missed adult cancers and non-cancer diseases among children and adults. As this panel was not a federal advisory 

committee, panel members were asked to provide their individual opinions. ATSDR 

accepted panel recommendations to assess the feasibility of conducting a mortality 

study and a cancer incidence study. ATSDR subsequently concluded that a mortality 

study and a cancer incidence study are feasible. 

Mortality Study of Former Marines and Civilian Employees. This study will look 

at all causes of death, including cancers and other fatal diseases. All active duty 

Marines stationed on base at any time between June 1975 and September 1987 who 

began active duty service on or after June 1975 have been identified. In addition, 

all civilians employed at the base at any time between June 1974 and September 

1987 who began U.S. Department of Defense employment on or after June 1974 

have been identified. These cohorts will be compared to cohorts of active duty Marines and civilian employees from Camp Pendleton who were not stationed at Camp 

Lejeune during the period of drinking water contamination. The study is designed 

to identify significant changes in causes of death between the Camp Lejeune cohort 

and the Camp Pendleton cohort. 

Health Survey/Morbidity Study. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act requires development of a health survey of persons possibly exposed to contaminated 

drinking water at Camp Lejeune. The survey will obtain information about cancers 

and other diseases thought to be related to exposures to the chemicals found in the 

drinking water at Camp Lejeune. The morbidity study will focus on those who were: 

active duty Marines stationed on base at any time between June 1975 and September 1987; civilians employed at the base at any time from December 1972 to 

September 1987; comparison cohorts of active duty Marines and civilian employees 

from Camp Pendleton who were not stationed at Camp Lejeune during the period 

of drinking water contamination; and active duty Marines and their dependents 

(spouses and children who are now all adults) who participated in the 1999–2002 
82

survey to identify cases for the case-control study of specific birth defects and childhood cancers. Those who registered with the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), but who 

are not members of these cohorts, will be sent a survey but will not be included in 

the morbidity study.

Conclusion 

ATSDR has an essential role in providing public health support to people and 

communities impacted by hazardous substances. Our goal is to provide objective, scientific information to all who lived and worked at Camp Lejeune who want to know 

about the health risks from past exposures. 

Much of our remaining work at Camp Lejeune depends on the data and analyses 

that will come from our water modeling effort. The state-of-the-art analysis, which 

predicts drinking water concentrations, will provide us with the best possible exposure estimate. 

However, the quality of the information produced by the water modeling effort is 

heavily dependent on beginning with the most accurate and complete data. The 

ATSDR /Department of the Navy joint Data Mining Technical Work Group was developed to provide high-level guidance in an intensive effort to identify and review 

Navy and Marine Corps documents, and to insure that any and all existing pertinent data is available to ATSDR’s engineers and scientists. 

ATSDR serves the men and women—and their families—who lived and worked 

at Camp Lejeune while the drinking water was contaminated. As an Agency, we are 

honored to have the trust and support of former Marines, their family members, and 

the civilian employees of Camp Lejeune. Our work at Camp Lejeune and many 

other sites would not be possible without the support and partnership of multiple 

people and organizations. 

Thank you once again for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee.

BIOGRAPHY FOR CHRISTOPHER PORTIER

Christopher J. Portier, PhD, joined CDC in 2010 as the Director of the National 

Center for Environmental Health and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Dr. Portier came to CDC from the National Institute of Environmental Health 

Sciences (NIEHS), where he was the Senior Advisor to the Director and a Principal 

Investigator in environmental systems biology. Formerly, Dr. Portier was Associate 

Director of NIEHS, Director of the Environmental Toxicology Program at the 

NIEHS, and Associate Director of the National Toxicology Program. 

Dr. Portier is an internationally recognized expert in the design, analysis, and interpretation of environmental health data. His research efforts and interests include 

such diverse topics as cancer biology, risk assessment, climate change, 

bioinformatics, immunology, neurodevelopment, genetically modified foods, and 

genomics. From 2000 to 2006, he managed the NTP and developed a strategic initiative that is internationally recognized for its innovation. He has contributed to the 

development of cancer risk assessment guidelines for national and international 

agencies and has either directed or contributed significantly to numerous risk assessments. He led the U.S. evaluation of electromagnetic fields by national and 

international scientists, which was the first comprehensive review in this field. Dr. 
83

Portier directed efforts of the U.S. government to develop a collaborative research 

agenda with Vietnam on the health effects of Agent Orange in that country. He has 

just directed a multiagency review of research needs for the health effects of climate 

change for the entire U.S. government. He has served as an advisor to the Finnish 

Academy of Sciences on the Centers of Excellence Research Program, as a member 

of World Health Organization/International Agency for Research on Cancer scientific committees, and as a reviewer for grants for the United States, the European 

Union, and many other grant-sponsoring organizations. 

Dr. Portier received his B.Sc. degree (1977) in mathematics (summa cum laude) 

and his MS (1979) and PhD (1981) degrees in biostatistics. He has authored more 

than 150 peer-reviewed publications, 30 book chapters, and 40 technical reports. In 

the past 5 years, he has given more than 70 invited lectures, many of them at international meetings. 

He has received numerous awards including the prestigious Spiegelman Award 

from the American Public Health Association and the Outstanding Practitioner of 

the Year Award from the International Society for Risk Analysis. He is a Fellow 

of the International Statistics Institute, the World Innovation Foundation, and the 

American Statistical Association.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Portier. Mr. Pamperin, you 

are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. PAMPERIN, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 

Mr. PAMPERIN. Thank you. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member 

Broun, and Members of the Subcommittee thanks for the opportunity to discuss the efforts undertaken by the Department of Veterans Affairs regarding water contamination at Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base in North Carolina, and to explain the disability 

compensation process for potentially affected veterans. 

A 2007 final report of the Veterans Disability Benefits Commission, a congressionally mandated independent review board raised 

general awareness at VA of the potential water contamination at 

Camp Lejeune. The report indicated that the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and the Department of Health and 

Human Services had conducted an environmental assessment of 

Camp Lejeune during 1997 which found that from the ’50s to the 

mid-’80s persons residing or working at Camp Lejeune were potentially exposed to drinking water supplies contaminated with volatile organic compounds from an off base dry cleaning facility. Subsequent investigations also found evidence of benzene in the same 

water supplies presumably caused by leaking fuel storage tanks. In 

2009, the National Academy of Sciences National Research Council 

released a study titled ‘‘Contaminated Water Supplies at Camp 

Lejeune’’ assessing potential health effects. Currently additional 

studies on the contaminated water parameters of likely exposures 

and potential adverse health effects are being conducted by 

ATSDR. 

In response to the NCR’s study, VA assembled a task force to determine whether the NCR report provided sufficient scientific basis 

for determining whether the population at Camp Lejeune had in 

fact suffered adverse health effects as a result of exposure to contaminants in the water supply. The task force is continuing to work 

and will submit its findings to the Secretary for consideration. 

In keeping with our mission, VA stands ready to provide treatment and compensation for any veteran whose current disability is 
84

the result of service at Camp Lejeune. My testimony outlines VA’s 

disability claims process including the issue of presumptive disabilities, and addresses the specific situation at Camp Lejeune. VA 

provides compensation payments to veterans with current disability conditions that were caused or aggravated by an event, injury or disease that occurred during military service. These conditions are referred to as service-connected disabilities. There is more 

than one way of obtaining a service-connected disability. The most 

common is direct service-connection, which is achieved when the 

record indicates an in-service event, a current medical condition, 

and a nexus between that event and the current condition. The 

nexus is normally provided through competent medical authority. 

However, another method of providing service-connection is 

through the use of a presumption of service-connection. Presumptive service-connection may be appropriate, for example, to overcome difficulties of proof in establishing that condition appearing 

after service is the result of a particular hazard encountered during 

such service or where the fact of exposure to the hazard is difficult 

to document. In particular, widespread herbicide use in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War has been well-documented, 

but is not feasible to determine whether and to what extent a particular Vietnam veteran was actually exposed. As a result, veterans 

who served in the ground—on the ground in Vietnam and on inland waterways are presumed to have been exposed to herbicides 

for purposes of application of the presumptions of service-connection for diseases recognized by VA as associated with such exposure. 

Presumptive service-connection differs from direct service-connection in that the nexus between the current medical condition and 

the in-service event need not be established by additional medical 

evidence. VA has identified presumptive diseases associated with 

in-service events that include internment as a prisoner of war, 

service in a tropical environment, service in the Persian Gulf, certain service involving radiation exposure, and service involving exposure to herbicides such as Agent Orange. The Agent Orange Act 

of 1991 created a procedure for establishing presumptions for service-connection for diseases associated with exposure. 

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs is required to consider reports 

received from the National Academy of Sciences and all other medical and scientific information and analysis on the health effects of 

herbicide exposure. When the Secretary finds a positive association 

between herbicide exposure and the occurrence of a disease, the 

Secretary initiates a rule-making procedure to add the disease. A 

similar process was created by Congress to address concerns of 

Gulf War veterans. Presumptions can be a powerful tool for promoting efficiency, fairness, and justice claims adjudication. 

With specific respect to Camp Lejeune, VA does not operate a 

registry for this population or have special authority to enroll for 

health care veterans or their family members based upon service 

at Lejeune. The Marine Corps does have such a registry and VA 

has been working with DOD to get useful data for veterans who 

were stationed at Lejeune from the database. It has been estimated 

that approximately one million veterans and their dependents were 

assigned to Camp Lejeune during the period of the drinking water 
85

contamination. Veterans who are part of this cohort may apply for 

health care enrollment if they are otherwise eligible and are encouraged to discuss any specific concerns with their health care 

provider. 

VA processes disability claims based on service at Camp Lejeune 

and possible exposure to chemical contaminants on a case by case 

basis. This approach has been adopted because the evidence to date 

on the long term health effects due to potential contaminated 

drinking water at Lejeune is inconclusive. Establishing presumptive diseases at this point would be premature. Approximately 200 

claims have been received based upon service at Camp Lejeune and 

approximately 20 veterans thus far have been granted service-connection on a direct basis, most commonly for kidney diseases, nonHodgkin’s, and other cancers. For those cases that have been denied, claims have normally not been granted because of one or 

three criteria: the veteran did not serve at Lejeune during the period of the contamination, the current disease, or disability and the 

medical nexus between the current disease was not established. 

VA takes seriously its mission to ensure that veterans receive 

adequate services and compensation to honor their service to this 

nation. We are also committed to ensuring that the best medical 

and scientific information available informs the decisions we make. 

The exposure at Camp Lejeune presents a number of unique challenges. We are confident that we are addressing these challenges 

using the best possible science at our disposal to provide for the effected veterans, and we will continue to award benefits to veterans 

who present substantiated claims. 

This concludes my testimony and I would be happy to answer 

any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pamperin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. PAMPERIN

Chairman Miller and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the efforts undertaken by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regarding water contamination at the Camp Lejeune 

Marine Corps Base in North Carolina and to explain the disability compensation 

process for potentially affected Veterans. I am pleased to be accompanied by Dr. Victoria Cassano, Director, Radiation and Physical Exposures Service, Veterans Health 

Administration.

Potential Water Contamination 

A 2007 final report of the Veterans Disability Benefits Commission, a Congressionally mandated independent review board, raised general awareness at VA of the 

potential water contamination at Camp Lejeune. The report indicated that the 

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), in the Department of 

Health and Human Services, had conducted an environmental assessment of Camp 

Lejeune during 1997. ATSDR found that from the 1950s through the mid-1980s, 

persons residing or working at Camp Lejeune were potentially exposed to drinking 

water supplies contaminated with volatile organic compounds from an off-base dry 

cleaning facility and from on-base sources. These organic compounds included trichloroethylene and perchloroethylene. Subsequent investigations also found evidence of benzene in the same water supplies, presumably caused by leaking fuel 

storage tanks. 

In October 2008, the Department of the Navy issued a letter to Veterans who 

were stationed at Camp Lejeune. The letter explained that the Navy had established a health registry and encouraged those who served there to participate. In 

December 2008, VA issued a VA Health Care Fact Sheet on the contamination of 

the ground water at Camp Lejeune. 
86

In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council (NRC) released a study titled, Contaminated Water Supplies at Camp Lejeune, Assessing Potential Health Effects. Currently, additional studies on the contaminated water, parameters of likely exposures, and potential adverse health effects, are being conducted by ATSDR. 

In response to the NRC’s study, VA assembled a Task Force consisting of the 

Under Secretary for Health, the Acting Under Secretary for Benefits, the General 

Counsel, and the Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning. The Task Force’s mission is to determine whether the NRC provided a sufficient scientific basis for determining whether the population of Camp Lejeune has, in fact, suffered adverse 

health effects as a result of exposure to contaminants in the water supply. The Task 

Force is continuing its work and will submit its findings to the Secretary for consideration.

VA Disability Compensation Benefits 

In keeping with our mission to care for Veterans, VA stands ready to provide 

treatment and compensation for any Veteran whose current disability is the result 

of service at Camp Lejeune. My testimony today will outline VA’s disability claims 

process, including the issue of presumptive disabilities, and then address the specific situation at Camp Lejeune. 

VA provides compensation payments to Veterans with current disabling conditions that, among other things, were caused or aggravated by an event, injury, or 

disease that occurred during military service. These conditions resulting from military service are referred to as ‘‘service-connected disabilities.’’ There is more than 

one way to establish service connection. Establishing service connection on a ‘‘direct’’ 

basis is the most common means. Service connection generally requires sufficient 

evidence of an in-service event or injury, a current disability, and a link or nexus 

between the disability and the in-service event or injury. The medical nexus is often 

established through an examination and opinion from a competent medical authority. 

Another method of establishing service connection is through use of a presumption of service connection. ‘‘Presumptive’’ service connection may be appropriate, for 

example, to overcome difficulties of proof in establishing that a condition appearing 

after military service is the result of a particular hazard encountered during such 

service. A presumption may also be used in appropriate circumstances to establish 

exposure to a particular hazard in military service where the fact of exposure to the 

hazard is difficult to document. In particular, widespread tactical herbicide use in 

the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era has been well-documented, but it 

is not feasible to determine whether, and to what extent, a particular Vietnam Veteran was actually exposed. As a result, Veterans who served on the ground in Vietnam, or on its inland waterways, are presumed to have been exposed to herbicides 

for purposes of application of the presumptions of service connection for the diseases 

recognized by VA as associated with herbicide exposure. 

Presumptive service connection differs from direct service connection in that the 

nexus between the current medical condition and the in-service event need not be 

established by additional medical evidence. The nexus is presumed to exist based 

solely on experiencing the in-service event and subsequently developing the disabling medical condition that is scientifically linked to the in-service event. Diseases 

that are presumed associated with specific in-service events are commonly called 

‘‘presumptive diseases.’’ VA has identified presumptive diseases associated with inservice events that include: internment as a prisoner of war; service in a tropical 

environment; service in the Gulf War; certain service involving radiation exposure; 

and service involving exposure to certain herbicides, such as Agent Orange.

Presumptive Decision Processes 

The Agent Orange Act, passed by Congress in 1991, created a procedure for establishing presumptions of service connection for diseases associated with herbicide exposure. The procedure for establishing presumptions for particular diseases associated with herbicide exposure requires the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to consider 

reports received from the National Academy of Sciences and all other sound medical 

and scientific information and analysis on the health effects of herbicide exposure. 

When the Secretary finds a positive association exists between herbicide exposure 

and the occurrence of a disease in humans, the Secretary initiates a public rulemaking proceeding to add the disease to the presumptive list. 

Although the procedure established by the Agent Orange Act addresses presumptive service connection based on herbicide exposure among Vietnam Veterans, a 
87

similar process was created by Congress to address the concerns of Gulf War Veterans. 

These procedures rely on consideration of sound scientific and medical evidence 

and analysis from the respected National Academy of Sciences and a standard of 

evaluation based on association rather than causation. Presumptions can be powerful tools for promoting efficiency, fairness, and justice, but they must be considered 

with great care and respect for the science involved. They will continue to be an 

important part of the Veterans’ benefits scheme for the foreseeable future.

Disability Claims Based on Service at Camp Lejeune 

VA does not operate a registry for this population and does not have special authority to enroll for health care Veterans or their family members based upon service at Camp Lejeune. It has been estimated that approximately one million Veterans 

and their dependents were assigned to Camp Lejeune during the period of drinking 

water contamination. Veterans who are a part of this cohort may apply for health 

care enrollment, if they are otherwise eligible, and are encouraged to discuss any 

specific concerns they have about this issue with their health care provider. VA environmental health clinicians can provide these Veterans with information regarding the potential health effects of exposure to volatile organic compounds, and VA’s 

three War-Related Illness and Injury Study Centers are also available as a resource 

to providers. However, the Marine Corps does have a registry and VA has been 

working with DOD to use this registry database to get useful data on Veterans who 

were stationed at Camp Lejeune. 

VA processes disability claims based on service at Camp Lejeune, and possible exposure to chemical contaminants, on a case-by-case basis. This approach has been 

adopted because the evidence to date on the long-term health effects on Veterans 

due to potential contaminated drinking water exposure at Camp Lejeune is inconclusive. Establishing presumptive diseases at this point would be premature. 

The NRC study on Camp Lejeune underscores the difficulty involved with determining which part of the water supply was contaminated, who may have been exposed to contamination, and to what extent any exposure may have occurred. To address these issues, ATDSR is conducting ongoing studies. In addition, as noted earlier, the Task Force is continuing its work. At this time, we consider direct service 

connection to be the most feasible and equitable option for addressing disability 

claims based on service at Camp Lejeune. 

VA regional office personnel were alerted to the Camp Lejeune situation in a nationwide broadcast in June 2009 and instructed to evaluate related claims on a caseby-case basis. A training letter followed on April 26, 2010, which outlined specific 

directions on developing evidence and ordering medical examinations for Camp 

Lejeune-related claims. 

As part of the current examination procedure, VA medical examiners receive information on the chemical contaminants present in the water supply and are asked 

to provide an informed medical opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not 

that the Veteran’s current disability is related to service at Camp Lejeune. This evidence, as well as evidence based on examinations and opinions from private physicians and medical providers, is used to determine eligibility for service connection. 

In cases where the evidence for and against service connection is approximately 

equivalent, the benefit of doubt is given to the Veteran and service connection is 

granted. 

Currently, VA has received approximately 200 disability claims based on service 

at Camp Lejeune, and approximately 20 Veterans have been granted service connection on a direct basis. Those that were not granted service connection failed to meet 

one or more of the’ three criteria of: (1) service at Camp Lejeune during the period 

of water contamination; (2) a current disease or disability; and (3) a medical nexus 

or link between a current disability and service at Camp Lejeune.

Conclusion 

VA takes seriously its mission to ensure that Veterans receive adequate services 

and compensation to honor their sacrifices in service to our Nation. We are also 

committed to ensuring that the best medical and scientific evidence available informs the decisions we make. The exposure at Camp Lejeune presents a number of 

unique challenges, but we are confident that we are addressing these challenges 

using the best possible science at our disposal to provide compensation to affected 

Veterans. As I said earlier, VA has already awarded benefits to Veterans who have 

demonstrated that they are suffering due to adverse exposures at Camp Lejeune. 

We will continue to award benefits to Veterans who present substantiated claims, 
88

and the Secretary will review the findings of the Task Force to determine if any 

further action is necessary. 

This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions Members 

of the Subcommittee may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR THOMAS J. PAMPERIN

Mr. Pamperin is the Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and Program 

Management of the Veterans Benefits Administration for the U.S. Department of 

Veterans Affairs.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Pamperin. We will now have 

questions and I now recognize myself for five minutes. You all have 

all said that you did not have personal counsel here, but it does 

appear that you all are pretty lawyered up, that there is a great 

deal of concern at ONV and at the Pentagon about potential liability. I understand that all of your testimony was reviewed closely 

by lawyers of public justice for any effect it might have on any potential liability claims. 

Dr. Portier, this Subcommittee’s interest in ATSDR and my interest began with their conduct in the FEMA trailers case where 

FEMA’s lawyers asked specific for health assessment for use in 

pending litigation and asked that for purposes of the assessment 

that ATSDR assumed that the exposure to formaldehyde was two 

weeks or less when in fact people living in those trailers had lived 

in those trailers for well more than a year already by that point 

with no end in sight. And stunningly ATSDR did that. And Dr. 

Frumkin when he testified that there was no way that ATSDR 

should have provided a health assessment that was driven or affected by litigation concerns. They should have given a straight up 

assessment of what the effect of formaldehyde exposure could be. 

There are now several ATSDR studies pending in this area. 

What role do you expect lawyers to—and I have nothing against 

lawyers, I am in recovery myself, but there is a difference between 

Government lawyers and lawyers for private entities. Government 

lawyers serve the whole people. A—they are—they perhaps should 

not do what a lawyer for a private company might do which would 

be to assert any defense legal or factual for which there is some 

basis. But Government lawyers should perhaps serve the whole 

people. What role, Doctor, and the rules of professional conduct recognize that with respect to Government lawyers and DA’s. They 

aren’t expected just to get convictions but to do justice. What role, 

Dr. Portier, do you expect lawyers to have in reviewing the work 

of the ATSDR in this area? 

Dr. PORTIER. Mr. Chairman, having been at ATSDR for a short 

period, it is somewhat difficult for me to know exactly what the 

pathway is through internal clearance. So I will speak from the 

point of view of what I would perceive as what I would like to see. 

And if there is a different pathway that is required that takes me 

through the Department of Justice for approval, I will come back 

to you and respond directly on that issue. 

As a general rule, I believe that lawyers are very helpful in the 

types of exercises we are doing here. They help us avoid pitfalls of 

improperly storing our data, improperly reaching conclusions. They 

provide a good challenge for us in terms of defending our science 

appropriately and correctly. However, I don’t see any pathway that 

would take what we are doing for Camp Lejeune through internal 
89

legal review at CDC or the Department of Health and Human 

Services. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. General Payne, you were interviewed 

by CBS News and said that the wells were closed within 30 days 

of finding the source of the contamination. I said earlier because 

the first panel that I found it puzzling that you would wait to find 

the source to act. That if it certainly appeared that once you found 

that there was contamination you would act to close the wells rather than wait to find the source. What was the reason for waiting 

to find the source to act to close the wells? 

General PAYNE. Sir, there may have been a poor use of words on 

my part by saying source. My intent in that answer was to say that 

once we knew the specific wells that were contaminated, those specific wells, those 10 wells were closed down immediately. 

Chairman MILLER. Immediately within 30 days of when you determined that there was contamination of specific wells? 

General PAYNE. That is my understanding, yes, sir. Once we 

knew the specific well, that well was shut down right away. 

Chairman MILLER. My time has expired. I now recognize Dr. 

Broun for five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. General Payne, thank you for your service to the Nation, sir. Semper fi. Dr. Clapp, as the Chairman pointed out when 

he was interviewing the first panel, Dr. Clapp had an apparent discrepancy related to your testimony and just wanted to be sure that 

in all fairness even prior to your presenting your testimony that 

you had an ample opportunity to rebut or respond to that if there 

is anything more that you would like to say, I would certainly give 

you that opportunity right now, sir. 

General PAYNE. Sir, I think that we really do not have a disagreement with anything that Dr. Clapp said. And I think the 

question that came up was relative to a statement we made in the 

pamphlet that we produced. And I think that statement was factual. Perhaps it could have been worded differently. Perhaps it 

could have been lengthier with a greater explanation. 

I think that the only rebuttal that I would offer is that we are 

looking forward to continually—continuously working closely with 

ATSDR and other scientific organizations to try find answers. And 

I think we are all in concurrence there. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, General. There have been many criticisms on how the Marine Corps, the Navy has responded to the 

contamination of the water supply there at Camp Lejeune. Looking 

back over the past 30 years is there any action or inaction that you 

would have changed? 

General PAYNE. Sir, there are a number of actions that I would 

have changed. I would—I can’t tell you how many times over the 

last three years in working with this issue on behalf of the Marine 

Corps, I would have given anything to have rolled back the clock 

and to have known and to have been able to influence during that 

era what we know today to be the case. It is astounding some of 

the things that happened, and I think that they happened for a 

number of reasons. I think part of it was mentioned earlier. I think 

we were ignorant, quite frankly, of some of the implications. I 

think we were lulled into a sense of complacency or at least a lack 

of urgency by the fact that we were not out of compliance. And I 
90

am not trying to excuse what happened. I think that there were 

many, many errors made on behalf of the Marine Corps. But it is 

difficult to look back through the lens of 2010 at what we did or 

did not know, or should or should not have done in the ’60s, ’70s, 

and early ’80s, but there are many things that I would have done 

differently. There are things I would have done differently 5 and 

ten years ago. I have only been working this for about three years 

and it is—one normally shakes their head and wonders at some of 

the things that did or did not occur. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, General. I appreciate your diligence in 

pursuing this. And had we look back and President Washington 

was bled to death by a physician thinking that that was going to 

cure his disease and his pneumonia at the time, and obviously that 

was the wrong medical decision as a physician, just what I was 

taught in medical school as being absolute truth has been just 

within five years after graduation we were treating patients totally 

different in a different manner. And certainly it is difficult looking 

in a retrospectoscope and saying what we should have or could 

have done at a particular period of time. We have to act on the 

knowledge that we have the science we have at the period of time. 

And I thank you for your diligence in trying to head in the proper 

direction on this issue. 

Let us see, Dr. Portier, the NAS report also stated that based on 

review of toxicological studies—that is hard for a southerner to say, 

while there is some evidence linking certain diseases and health effects to PCE and TCE exposure, studies suggest that the highest 

level exposure at Camp Lejeune were ‘‘much lower than the lowest 

dose that cause adverse effects in the most sensitive strains in species laboratory animals’’. 

Furthermore, the NAS report also concluded that there is limited 

evidence to suggest a correlation between diseases exposure to TCE 

and PCE in epidemiological studies. How do the conclusions 

reached by the NAS report compare with the evidence gathered 

and analyzed by ATSDR over the last 20 years? 

Dr. PORTIER. Thank you for the question. The ATSDR has not 

really released a formal response on their opinion of the academy’s 

report. I guess personally I would say that my opinion matches 

that of Dr. Clapp and his colleagues that I have some degree of 

confusion over how the academy reached these decisions. 

In terms of ATSDR, our actions speak louder than our words and 

in this case we are moving forward with the studies. We are doing 

the water modeling. We are going to go forward and evaluate this 

population because we believe it is scientifically credible. We believe it is the right public health move, and we believe it is what 

needs to be done. And so we will do it. And I think that is our answer to the report from the academy. 

In terms of their finding that there is limited information relating TCE and PCE to disease, I simply need to look at the disease 

of cancer and point out to them that virtually every national authority or international authority that look at—that has looked at 

TCE and PCE has labeled it reasonably anticipated to be a human 

carcinogen or a probable human carcinogen. And so the linkage 

there is extremely strong. There is no doubt in my mind that these 

are toxins that you do not want in your water. 
91

Mr. BROUN. Thank you. My time is up, but if I may, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask Dr. Portier, do you have any idea of when we 

will get another health assessment report and when will that be 

available, sir? Do you have any prospect? 

Dr. PORTIER. There will be a series of reports coming out. I am 

very confident that the data mining working team will have all the 

data hopefully in hand by the end of next month. And that done, 

we should have the water modeling by about a year from now 

available internally to use in the EPI studies. We have already paralleled working the EPI studies, so hopefully they will be finished 

probably about March of 2012 and that is when we will begin 

issuing reports at about that time. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for your diligence——

Chairman MILLER. Indulgence. 

Mr. BROUN. —indulgence. Thank you. 

Chairman MILLER. The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Dahlkemper 

for five minutes. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

the witnesses for coming today and for your testimony. Mr. 

Pamperin, I want to ask you a little bit about the claims process. 

And the VA has granted just a handful of claims to all of these veterans resulting from their service at Camp Lejeune. What criteria 

does the VA use to determine that harm has been done to these 

veterans as a result of their service there? And do you believe that 

the standards are appropriate to justify small claims process and 

that it’s consistently applied to each person coming forward? 

Mr. PAMPERIN. Thank you, ma’am. We sent a fairly extensive 

training letter to our field stations back in 2009 that covered a 

number of environmental hazard locations and situations, one of 

which was Camp Lejeune. Prior to that I would not have confidence that our claims examiners would have had the kind of information they needed to ask the appropriate questions, to solicit 

the appropriate medical opinions. 

That training letter served basically three purposes. First was to 

educate our staff. The second was to tell our staff on how to develop these kinds of claims, and the third was to provide our staff 

with a fact sheet on each particular exposure that was to be provided to the clinician who was going to be doing the exams, so that 

they understood the nature of the exposure that was made. Because of the relatively—relative certainty of the known outcomes of 

benzene, what we are dealing with with these cases is the fact that 

there is invariably nothing in their service medical record that 

would indicate a disease since most of these diseases take years to 

develop. So what our rating officials are doing with this a current 

a disability and now a known exposure. And that—what they need 

is clinical evidence attaching that current disability to that exposure. If they have that kind of medical evidence, they can award 

service-connection on a direct basis, and that is what we have been 

doing thus far. That does require that we assist these veterans in 

getting that kind of clear and concise clinical opinion and that is 

what the purpose of the fact sheet to be provided to the examiner 

was for. 
92

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Can we get a copy of that letter and the fact 

sheets for the record please? 

Mr. PAMPERIN. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. So your education staff and I think it was 

Mr. Watters who said he was having trouble even getting something posted at the VA in his community until he said he was coming here to testify today. He said that during his testimony. Can 

you tell me if that is standard in all VA’s? I only have two in my 

district. I am going to be following up on this when I get out of 

here today. 

Mr. PAMPERIN. Ma’am, I am not sure what has been posted in 

VA Medical Centers. We can certainly take that for the record. I 

believe that the training letter was shared with the Veterans 

Health Administration so that it would be generally known inside 

that community as to what kind of claims we were getting. But we 

can take that for the record. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. And one of my concerns is I know even now 

we are trying to help some of our soldiers with a stop-loss payments we are supposed to receive. We can’t even find them, so and 

these people over the years are scattered all over this country and 

across this globe and probably have no idea of possible exposure 

that they have had. 

Mr. PAMPERIN. Ma’am, all I would say is that if a soldier, or a 

Marine, or a naval personnel who were at Camp Lejeune is concerned about their health they should apply for enrollment in VHA. 

And if they have a condition that in their mind may possibly be 

related to their service at Lejeune that they should file a claim and 

we will adjudicate it appropriately. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you. My time is running short, so just 

one quick question for General Payne. There is a difference I think 

between saying no study has been completed on the health effects 

of exposure to chemicals and saying that studies have not found a 

link between chemical exposure and specific illnesses or diseases. 

The language in the brochure is simply misleading on this issue. 

So I guess I am going to ask you would you like to correct that for 

the record? 

General PAYNE. Ma’am, I would agree with the wording issue 

just presented that studies are ongoing. It is of—I don’t think we 

were factually wrong in the brochure as I understand it, but we—

it was not our intent to mislead in any way. We are still working 

very hard to try to find answers. We are working very hard to locate former Marines, and their dependents, and civilian employees. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Can I ask how this is distributed, or how any 

of this information is distributed? As I said we are having trouble 

getting more recent Marines and soldiers to apply for stop-loss payments and so how are we trying to find these individuals? 

General PAYNE. It is a combination of ways that we are trying 

to locate them. As I mentioned earlier we have got about 163,000 

registered to date. We’ve had over 30,000 in the last year. We get 

new registrations every week. We are pursuing it through the 

media, through radio, television, through the print media, through 

magazines, through the internet. We even are using social media 

like Facebook. We utilize other governmental agencies like the Veterans Administration who have been very good about distributing 
93

posters and letting people know. We use a lot of military journals, 

and newsletters, and magazines, and we are searching for additional ways to try to get the word out. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. I appreciate your efforts on that. I—one short 

question, just one answer. When did you start doing this reach out? 

What was the date of when this started to try to locate all these 

individuals? 

General PAYNE. It started in 2007. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. Okay, thank you very much. 

General PAYNE. Yes, Ma’am. 

Mrs. DAHLKEMPER. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. I think we have time for a second 

round, and I now recognize myself for five minutes. General Payne, 

you said that the wells were closed promptly when you figured out 

which wells were contaminated. That that was what you meant by 

source, which wells were contaminated. But the memo from Ms. 

Betts dated August 10, 19—or 10 August 1982, I guess the military—which referred to the tests which were conducted three or 

four months earlier in May said with respect to tetrachloroethylene 

that while they were not regulated, they were not subject to Safe 

Drinking Water Act at that point. They were—that was known to 

cause certain cancers. And trichloroethylene—liver damage, kidney 

damage, central nervous system disturbances in humans. There 

does not appear to have been a sense of urgency if the problem was 

identifying which wells, there doesn’t seem to have been a great 

sense of urgency in figuring out which of the 22 wells. Did it take 

two years to figure out which of the 22 wells and why was there 

not more urgency than that to the task? 

General PAYNE. In answer to your question, yes, it did take that 

long. It—but also I would concur with you, sir, that there was not 

the level of urgency that there should have been. And it is astounding to me why there wasn’t. I can only surmise, I can only speculate at this point, but I think it was a combination of about three 

things that contributed to that. I think that we genuinely were ignorant of the potential health effects. I think number two, the fact 

that we were not out of compliance decreased a sense of urgency 

that should have been there. Knowing what we know today it is 

amazing that there wasn’t an absolute, all out effort immediately. 

And I think number three, the other contributing factor was the inconsistency of the test results. We would test the water, and we 

were doing it at not—we were not testing at that time individual 

wells. We were testing the water treatment plants. And we would 

test and we might end up with a result of, I mean, 1,100 parts per 

billion which is exceedingly high. And so we would retest and on 

our retest we might come up with five parts per billion which 

would be exceedingly low. And I think that inconsistency because 

of the water distribution system at that time also confused the 

issue and added to the amount of time. But I concur with you 100 

percent that there should have been a greater sense of urgency 

knowing what we know today and it is amazing to me that there 

was not. 

Chairman MILLER. General Payne, you heard my earlier question 

of Dr. Portier about what role lawyers would have. The—we have 

asked the question about who had reviewed the booklet Mrs. 
94

Dahlkemper asked about earlier and the answer we got was—the 

question was has anyone reviewed it, any other agency. VF recalls 

that there are cases pending in court where the Department of Justice represents the part of Navy. We provided DOG attorneys—

DOJ attorneys to a preview of the booklet in order to avoid inadvertently harming their cases. Again, going to the example of 

FEMA and the FEMA trailers with high levels of formaldehyde, 

not only was that health assessment used by FEMA attorneys in 

negotiating with claimants—settlements with claimants, based 

upon supposedly expert testimony or expert evidence that was 

based upon wrong assumptions but FEMA took that assessment to 

tell the people in the trailers they didn’t have anything to worry 

about. They could just open the windows and doors if the formaldehyde gave them a headache. Are you having your—what you are 

telling people who were exposed to this are you having that shaped 

by lawyers who were worried—are worried about litigation issues 

not telling what they need to know? 

General PAYNE. Sir, I can’t really speak for what might have 

happened prior to my engagement in this issue, but I can tell you 

sincerely over the last three years even though we run this stuff 

routinely through our legal personnel, never in the last three years 

have I been advised by our attorneys or by DOJ not to say something. And I don’t know whether they trust that I won’t say the 

wrong thing or if they believe that telling me that won’t do any 

good. But for whatever the reason I can tell you that I have not 

been counseled by our attorneys as to specific answers. 

Chairman MILLER. And it did take the Marines 20 years to tell 

the people exposed, the Marines and their families of the exposure. 

It took an act of Congress. I recognize Senator Dole for that effort. 

Why did it take 20 years to let Lejeune veterans, the Marines who 

served at Lejeune know of the exposure? 

General PAYNE. Sir, I think the initial efforts by the Marine 

Corps which lasted way too long, the initial position was that we 

could do the best we could be number one, trying to find answers. 

I am contacted continuously by former Marines and their families, 

and the number one thing that they want to know is—they want 

answers to questions that we can’t provide them. That’s why we 

have taken that approach. Now, I would agree with you that it 

should have happened long before, but there are two schools of 

thought. And I even heard a school of thought recently that said 

until you have answers, just contacting them raises more doubts 

and puts in more fears. I disagree with that and I think that we 

have done the right thing for the last three years. I wish we had 

done it sooner, far sooner that we owed it—we owed a responsibility to those Marines and their families. And we should have 

done that rather than just concentrating on trying to find answers. 

We should have had a dual effort, and it should have been aggressive, and it should have been far sooner. 

Chairman MILLER. My time has expired. I now recognize Dr. 

Broun for five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pamperin, in the National Academy of Sciences study, the Department of Veterans Affairs convened a task force to determine whether the NRC provided 

a sufficient scientific basis for its conclusions. Who is on this task 
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force? Are they doctors, scientists, epidemiologists, toxicologists, or 

other specialists that are qualified to make this determination? 

And when is the task force planning on submitting these findings 

for the Secretary? Once the task force has submitted its findings 

how long will the Secretary issue his determinations? 

Mr. PAMPERIN. Congressman Broun, I will take those questions 

for the record in terms of the specific people who are on the panel, 

but routinely these are members of the Veterans Health Administration Clinicians who review this sort of stuff. People from out environmental exposures staff. I do not know when they are going to 

be done. I would be happy to provide that answer in written form, 

and based upon that response the Secretary will need to assess 

that. I can’t give you a specific date when he’ll be done. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, and you are 

very generous in your indulgence and I will yield back and we will 

present other questions from written answers. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. I am always generous 

in indulgence. The Chair now recognizes himself for one final question. Dr. Portier, the ATSDR is now preparing several reports, five 

separate studies on the human health consequences of the exposures, the toxic exposures at Camp Lejeune. And I know that you 

can’t know in advance what the studies will show, but some apparently think that the studies will establish with certainty which specific people got which specific diseases as a result of exposure 

versus who would have gotten it anyway—who might have gotten 

breast cancer anyway. There is a 1 in 100,000 chance of that, so 

maybe a few of those folks would have gotten breast cancer anyway. Probably a few would have. What kind of—and Dr. Clapp said 

in his testimony that that was not the way it worked. What kind 

of certainty should we expect to come out of ATSDR’s reports? 

Dr. PORTIER. An excellent question, Mr. Chairman, an excellent 

question. The studies will—are designed to address the questions 

of TCE, PCE, and benzene exposure as they relate to large human 

populations, in this case the population of people who have moved 

in and out of Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base. Each individual 

in any one of these studies, whether it is Camp Lejeune or anywhere else in the world, individuals’ risk to a particular toxin exposure depends upon not only the toxin exposure, but other things 

they are in their lifespan. The food, their genetics, everything else 

plays a role in terms of their overall risk. What you are looking at 

though is shifts in risk in the population. That is what this type 

of study will give us. When you look at the brochure that the Marine Corps had put together one of the issues with that brochure 

that we have is that it assumes that the only way in that you can 

answer the question is through studying the marines at Camp 

Lejeune. But the data we are getting from Camp Lejeune is part 

of the broader scientific literature that already exists that deals 

with these particular types of exposures. We expect that we will 

see some positive results, some negative results that match or disagree with what is in the literature. Hopefully if we have done it 

right, we will strengthen that literature and by strengthening that 

literature help groups like the Veterans Administration better understand what to do with this population based exposure. But it is 
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not just these studies that should be used in that overall evaluation. It is the broader scientific literature and the contribution of 

these is important, but that is not all that should be used. 

Chairman MILLER. And let the record reflect that I did not think 

that anyone should be exposed to toxic chemicals for the purpose 

of conducting research. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Broun for 

five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, likely I won’t need that much. I appreciate it. 

Just to add to a comment or a questions on top of Dr. Portier, from 

what you—the question of the Chairman, when we compare epidemiological instances of any subgroup of a population to the general 

population in studies to look for instance or increased instances of 

disease entities, we looked at the general population and I am just 

wondering if you are looking at the general population in the general area instead of the population overall in trying to figure out 

the epidemiological association in the health risk. Are you looking 

at people within the Jacksonville area or that part of the state of 

North Carolina and comparing them to the population at Camp 

Lejeune or are you looking just generally at the whole—the population at the whole of the country? 

Dr. PORTIER. Dr. Broun, that is a question we really spent a lot 

of time looking at and it depends on the type of study that we are 

doing. But to answer your question most specifically, the studies 

that we are most interested in pursuing, the ones that were most—

we think that will be most informative—are our cohort study and 

the health survey study. I think those will be the most extensively 

useful. In those cases we actually have a control population. We 

are comparing—because Marines are inherently healthier than the 

rest of us—we are comparing the people who were at Camp 

Lejeune to people who were at Camp Pendleton at the same time. 

So we are looking at a comparison that is effectively, hopefully 

about the same in terms of age, in terms of fitness, in terms of the 

type of food, in terms of the types of environments they are in so 

we can potentially get a very good, solid comparison. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, Dr. Portier, I suggest that you are not comparing apples to apples there because you are certainly in some respects you are, but the people who living at Camp Pendleton are 

not living in the Jacksonville area. So I encourage you to look at 

the general population not just at Camp Lejeune, not comparing 

Camp Pendleton versus Lejeune, but look at the people in that 

area of North Carolina and include them in seeing if you see any 

differential, because you are selectively eliminating a population 

that I think from a scientific perspective needs to be looked at. So 

I encourage you to do so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, we—before we bring the hearing 

to a close I want to thank our witnesses for testifying before our 

Subcommittee today. The record will remain open for two weeks for 

additional statements from the members and will remain open for 

answers to any follow-up questions the Subcommittee will have for 

witnesses. The witnesses are excused. The hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(97)

Appendix 1: 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Michael Partain, Member, ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistance Panel (CAP) and Breast Cancer Survivor Born on Camp Lejeune

Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller

Q1. Are there any factual inaccuracies or clarifications you would recommend the 

U.S. Marine Corps make to its recently released publication: ‘‘Camp Lejeune: 

Historic Drinking Water, Questions and Answers,’’ July 2010, available here: 

https://clnr.hqi.usmc.mil/clwater/Documents/CLHDW¥Booklet.pdf

A1. Unfortunately, the United States Marine Corps continues to abuse their responsibility to keep the affected community properly informed concerning the Camp 

Lejeune drinking water contamination. To date there has been no acknowledgment 

or listing of any community sponsored website on the official Marine Corps web site 

for Camp Lejeune. There has been no attempt by Marine Corps Leadership to meet 

with any of the members of the affected community and address our concerns and/

or grievances with the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps routinely abuses their custodial possession of the Camp Lejeune victim registry to disseminate information 

that supports only their point of view. General Conway stated in the preface of the 

July 2010 informational booklet that ‘‘This booklet is designed to provide relevant 

information on the issue and answer many of the questions that have arisen concerning this matter.’’ Until there is an objective reckoning of the historical facts pertaining to the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination between the United 

States Marine Corps and the affected community, the Marine Corps’ message will 

simply be nothing more than self serving propaganda. 

Overall, We feel the booklet should be retracted and redone with input from both 

the Marine Corps and the affected community. I sincerely doubt that the Marine 

Corps would ever agree to this proposal. 

Beginning on page 2 in the last paragraph, the sentence beginning with ‘‘These 

chemicals, primarily found’’ would be more accurate if it advised the reader that the 

chemicals were found both in the wells and tap water provided to the service personnel and their families on the base. 

On page 3 the Marine Corps claims that ‘‘once identified, the impacted wells were 

promptly taken out service.’’ What the Marine Corps failed to inform the reader was 

that they were first warned about the contamination beginning in October of 1980 

and failed to take any direct action to identify the source of the contamination until 

July 1984. The first well was then closed in December 1984. 

On page 4 the time line fails to inform the reader about the existence of the 

Navy’s potable water instruction issued in 1963 (BUMED 6240.3B). The time line 

also omits Camp Lejeune’ 1974 Base Order 5100.13B declaring organic solvents hazardous and warning that disposal practices would contaminate the drinking water. 

The time line omits the Army laboratory’s 1980 recommendation to test for 

chlorinated hydrocarbons by GC/MS and that this same laboratory advised the Navy 

that the contaminants found in the drinking water samples were solvents in February/March 1981. The timeline also failed to mention the President’s May 2010 annual President’s Cancer Panel report which recognized Camp Lejeune as an issue. 

On page 5, the map showing the wells should also display the numerous contamination plumes of PCE, TCE, Vinyl Chloride and benzene found on the base. 

On Page 6 the booklet once again fails to inform the reader of the Navy’s potable 

water regulations dating back from 1963. There is no mention of the initial warnings from the Army laboratory from 1980 through 1981. The booklet correctly informs the reader that PCE and TCE were identified as the contaminants in 1982 

but failed to inform the reader that the wells were not ‘‘promptly’’ removed from 

service as claimed. The booklet should give the correct date and read ‘‘beginning in 

December 1984, the wells were removed from service.’’

The timeline on the bottom of page 6 incorrectly stated that targeted TCE/PCE 

samples taken in 1982 were within EPA recommended levels. Please see CLW 606 

PDF page 2 paragraph 8. 

The incorrect information concerning the targeted 1982 sampling event is repeated again as a written Q&A on page 7. The response to this question should be 

rewritten or withdrawn altogether. 

The USMC’s response to the second question concerning well 602 on page 7 cannot be substantiated by the existing historical record. The well was tested in July 

1984 (CERCLA 388) and then closed on 30 November 1984. The actual report or 

letter from the contractor conducting the Confirmation Study which officially notified the Navy and the Marine Corps that well was contaminated is missing. If the 
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Marine Corps wishes to assert that they aggressively began testing and identifying 

the contaminated wells in 

1984, then they need to explain why they did not perform the same individual 

well testing in 1981, as they did for the drinking water system located at the base’s 

Rifle Range. Please see USMC document CLW 3757. 

On page 8, the USMC discussed the Navy’s 1972 BUMED 6240.3C regulation for 

potable water systems for all Naval ships and stations. The UMSC correctly stated 

that BUMED 6240.3C does not specifically regulate TCE and PCE as an individual 

chemical but failed to explain the preventive measures found in the document designed to protect potable water systems from contamination and pollution, nor do 

they recognize that the regulation forbade ‘‘Substances which may have a deleterious physiological effect, or for which the effects are not known’’ in a manner in 

which would permit them to reach the consumer. 

On page 10, the Marine Corps discusses three past investigations into the drinking water contamination and all three investigations were conducted without addressing the existence of BUMED 6240.3 regulations, the Base Order 5100.13B or 

the extent of the fuel loss at the Hadnot Point fuel farm. Furthermore, during the 

2007 Congressional hearing regarding Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination, 

Tyler Amon of the USEPA revealed that he had recommended obstruction of justice 

charges be filed against certain LantDiv employees. The recommendations were 

later overruled by the U.S. Attorney. 

The question found on page 12 needs to be re-written to reflect Dr. Portier’s October 22 2010 letter (attached) to the Navy and this letter needs to be distributed to 

the affected community. 

In response to the second question on page 12, the Marine Corps failed to inform 

the reader about the existence of a contract between the National Academies and 

the Navy/USMC concerning Camp Lejeune which was negotiated and signed prior 

to the release of the 2009 NRC report. Nor is it noted that the contract has since 

been dissolved after its existence was revealed in the media. 

Please see the above response for page 10 in regard to our concerns with page 

13. 

Page 14 does not include the 2007 Congressional hearing nor does the timeline 

state why the ATSDR Public Health Assessment was withdrawn. 

On pages 16–18 the Marine Corps informed the reader that they are supporting 

ATSDR’s efforts determine when the contamination began but failed to advise the 

reader that they attempted to withhold funding for ATSDR’s studies in January 

2010, that they did not inform ATSDR about the extent of the fuel loss at Hadnot 

Point until it was discovered by a member of the affected community earlier this 

year nor did the Navy reveal to the ATSDR the existence of a password protected 

electronic portal containing contamination documents vital to ATSDR’s water modeling efforts until after the portal was accidently discovered by an ATSDR subcontractor. 

On Page 21, the second question concerning notification should advise the reader 

that an act of Congress, signed into law in 2008, required the Navy/USMC to notify 

all residents of Tarawa Terrace of their exposures and that notification of the residents for the Hadnot Point system will begin only after ATSDR completes their 

water modeling project for Hadnot Point. 

The third question on the page regarding whether the Marine Corps tried to cover 

up the contamination aboard the base is best answered by reprinting the attached 

Raleigh News and Observer’s article containing a quote from the base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, that ‘‘People had not been directly exposed to 

the pollutants.’’

The timeline for Notification and Outreach found on page 23 should be withdrawn. The timeline is misleading, inaccurate and has many omissions from 1980–

1985. 

Over the past several weeks we have been informed by members on our web site 

that the Marine Corps is now distributing their booklet to the affected community. 

It is our understanding that this same booklet was distributed to every member of 

Congress immediately prior to the September 2010 hearing. How and when will the 

affected community be able to air our concerns and grievances with the Marine 

Corps? The hearing was an important step forward but how can we, the affected 

community, compete against the self serving propaganda and virtually unlimited resources of the United States Marine Corps and their ability to state whatever they 

want to say, whenever they wish to say it to whoever they chose?

Q2. As a Member of ATSDR’s Camp Lejeune Community Assistance Program (CAP) 

and a: Camp Lejeune activist you are intimately familiar with those Department 

of Navy (DON) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) documents that have been pub-
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licly released. Based on your review of those documents please indicate the DON 

and/or the USMC’s knowledge concerning the dangers of organic solvents in the 

drinking water supplies at Camp Lejeune prior to these wells being shut down 

in 1984. Are there any indications based upon the available records that the 

Camp Lejeune base command staff influenced or concealed the public health 

warnings issued by both the Army and Grainger Laboratories in the early 1980s 

regarding the chemical contaminants in the drinking water supply at Camp 

Lejeune.

A1. Yes there are several indications that both representatives from the Navy’s Atlantic Division (LantDiv) and the base command staff attempted to minimize the 

early contamination warnings issued by the Army and Grainger laboratories from 

1980–1984. 

According to the historical documents found in the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Camp Lejeune Water 

(CLW) Libraries for Camp Lejeune there are clear indications that the leadership 

of the Navy and United States Marine Corps knew or at least should have known 

about the danger of groundwater used for potable water by pollutants used in and 

around Camp Lejeune. The Navy issued a substantial revision of their potable water 

regulations in 1963. These regulations known as BUMED 6240.3B applied to all 

Naval vessels and installations including Camp Lejeune. While the regulation did 

not specifically regulate PCE, TCE, Vinyl Chloride and Benzene individually as contaminants, the regulation did set forth strict guidelines and preventive measures to 

prevent contamination of a water supply from extraneous sources. A second order, 

Base Order 5100.13B, from the base’s Commanding General in 1974 revealed that 

Marine Corps leadership knew that organic solvents were hazardous and that there 

was a danger of drinking water contamination from improper disposal practices of 

these chemicals. A 1979 base environmental survey (CLW 245) lists Dry cleaning 

solvents, trichloroethylene, toluene, xylene and mogas as hazardous materials. Then 

in 1982 the Base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz, noted several adverse health 

effects linked to tetrachloroethylene and tricholorethylene exposures in her memorandum for the record concerning the 10 August 1982 Grainger Laboratory letter 

to Camp Lejeune (CLW 606). These documents clearly show that at least by 1963 

the Navy understood the dangers between industrial pollution and groundwater contamination. 

It is not known at what exact date this relationship was established because the 

preceding versions for Base Order 5100.13B are missing from the historical record. 

Furthermore, the order lacked any higher headquarter references which would explain and justify why the Commanding General of Camp Lejeune issued the order 

in the first place. Without these references we cannot ascertain the exact date when 

the Navy knew organic solvents and other industrial pollutants including benzene 

was a hazard to ground water sources used for drinking water purposes. However, 

a 1986 court case, Clark vs. USA, did establish that by the 1950’s it was generally 

known that TCE was unfit for human consumption. 

The Navy’s LantDiv was responsible for providing engineering support for Naval 

facilities, including Camp Lejeune. In 1979 two Naval facilities in Pennsylvania 

(Warminster and Willow Grove) detected PCE and TCE in their potable water systems. The contaminated wells were identified and closed immediately. Why did 

LantDiv fail to follow this same policy at Camp Lejeune? As cited in my testimony, 

representatives from LantDiv accompanied base officials in 1981 to test the Rifle 

Range system for organic contamination; this testing included the potable wells for 

that drinking water system. In July 1981 a letter from the Commander of Atlantic 

Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command to Camp Lejeune’s Commanding 

General, Mr. Bailey of LantDiv advised Camp Lejeune not to use a Rifle Range potable water well found to be contaminated with organics. Concurrently with the 

testing of the Rifle Range, LantDiv received several warnings that the Hadnot Point 

water system was highly contaminated with chlorinated organics, including solvents. No action was taken by base officials or LantDiv personnel. 

There are two specific examples which illustrate what we believe was a conscious 

decision by two separate Facility Assistant Chief of Staff Colonels to quash the significance of the Army and Grainger Laboratory’s warnings to the base and LantDiv. 

The first example took place on 25 August 1982 when Colonel J.T. Marshall responded to a letter from the Navy’s Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity (NEESA) concerning the draft copy of the base’s Initial Assessment Study for 

Camp Lejeune (CLW 6332). The Colonel was tasked to review the draft copy of the 

report and provide comments by 25 August 1982. During the interim, the 10 August 

1982 letter from Grainger Laboratory arrived on the Colonel’s desk (CLW 592). Fifteen days later the Colonel responded to NEESA and advised that ‘‘Discussion of 
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Trihalomethane content of Rifle Range on page 2–18 and extensive data shown on 

pages 6–12 through 6–18 overly stresses relationship with hazardous material/waste 

disposal. It is important to note that accuracy of data provided by U.S. Army laboratory is questionable. It is recommended that TTHM information be de-emphasized 

throughout the report.’’ (CLW 6332). 

Shortly after the August 1982 response to NEESA, a change order was issued for 

the IAS in December 1982 (CERCLA 2059). The Grainger findings contained in the 

10 August 1982 letter were not included in the change order. The lAS report for 

Camp Lejeune was then released in April of 1983. The Army and Grainger Laboratory’s warnings concerning the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace drinking water 

contamination were not included in the findings of the report. 

The second incident occurred in June of 1983 after Mike Hargett of Grainger Laboratory informed the State of North Carolina about the problem with the base’s 

drinking water systems. On 1 June 1983, Colonel Marshall compiled a table for all 

of the trihalomethane testing done on the base. He did not include the actual analytical data sheets provided by Grainger Laboratory. The original Grainger data 

sheets contained written warnings about the TCE and PCE contamination present 

in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace potable water systems. 

On 2 June 1983, Mr. Larry Elmore, Environmental Engineer from the State’s 

Water Supply Branch sent a letter to Colonel Marshall specifically requesting the 

analytical data sheets provided to the base by Grainger Laboratory (CLW 940). The 

base waited almost six months to provide a response. By then, Colonel Marshall was 

replaced by Colonel Lilley who finally responded to the Mr. Elmore’s letter. The 

Colonel wrote to Mr. Rundgren, head of the Water Supply Branch for the State of 

North Carolina and resubmitted the trihalomethane tables previously complied by 

Colonel Marshall along with two additional tables explaining the results. Colonel 

Lilley also noted that per a 30 November 1983 telephone conversation with Dick 

Caspers at the Water Supply Branch, the original Grainger lab reports were not 

submitted as previously requested by Mr. Elmore in his 21 June 1983 letter. Colonel. Lilley then requested that Hadnot Point be reduced from quarterly 

trihalotmethane sampling to once a year. This same sampling was the source of the 

initial warning concerning the PCE and TCE contamination on the base (CLW 

6348). It is important to note that benzene does not interfere with this type of testing and thus was not detected by either the Army or Grainger Laboratories. 

Undoubtedly the interference from these two officers delayed the revelation of 

Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination for years. During that time tens of 

thousands of Marines, Sailors, their families and employees of the base were needlessly exposed to dangerous levels of PCE and TCE in the base’s drinking water system.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Richard Clapp, Professor Emeritus, Department of Environmental 

Health, Boston University School of Public Health, Environmental Health Policy 

Consultant and Member of the ATSDR Camp Lejeune Community Assistant 

Panel (CAP)

Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller

Q1. Are there any factual inaccuracies or clarifications you would recommend the 

U.S. Marine Corps make to its recently released publication: ‘‘Camp Lejeune: 

Historic Drinking Water, Questions and Answers,’’ July 2010, available here: 

https://clnr.hqi.usmc.mil/clwater/Documents/CLHDW¥Booklet.pdf

A1. In that regard, I note that the cover letter by Commandant Conway says ‘‘the 

scientific community has not established an association between exposure to the 

contaminated water and health conditions reported by former residents of Camp 

Lejeune,’’ and the text of the booklet on page eight says ‘‘studies to date have not 

shown any causal link between exposure to contaminated water at Camp Lejeune 

and illnesses,’’ and ‘‘At this time, scientific studies have not linked exposure to the 

impacted drinking water at Camp Lejeune to any illnesses.’’ As I said in my testimony, the Camp Lejeune health studies are not complete but there is considerable 

literature about the health effects of these contaminants and adverse health outcomes. For example, the Woburn, Massachusetts drinking water contaminated with 

TCE and PCE has been statistically linked to childhood leukemia in two published 

studies. (see Lagakos, et al., 1986 and Costas, et al., 2002) I think the Marine Corps 

booklet should acknowledge these other studies, since the ATSDR studies of Camp 

Lejeune illnesses are not completed yet. 

The booklet also says in the timeline entry for 1982 on p. 7, ‘‘Base officials determine that sampling results were within Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

recommended levels.’’ I do not have the EPA documentation for 1982 readily available, but from my experience in Massachusetts at that time, I know that the 

Woburn wells contaminated with TCE (267 ppb) and PCE (21 ppb) were considered 

above acceptable levels and shut off in 1979. This should be clarified in the booklet. 

I believe another expert who testified at the September 16 hearing can comment on 

a statement on p. 4 of the booklet that ‘‘Once identified, the impacted wells were 

promptly taken out of service.’’ It is my understanding that there was a considerable 

delay in shutting off Well 602, but I would defer to Mr. Hargett on this specific 

issue.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Michael Hargett, General Director, Anchimeric Associates and 

Former Co-Owner of Grainger Laboratories

Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller

Q1. Are there any factual inaccuracies or clarifications you would recommend the 

U.S. Marine Corps make to its recently released publication: ‘‘Camp Lejeune: 

Historic Drinking Water, Questions and Answers,’’ July 2010, available here: 

https://clnr.hqi.usmc.mil/clwater/Documents/CLHDW¥Booklet.pdf

A1. 1) Presentation of ‘‘chemicals’’ in the drinking water is somewhat naive and reflects a poor understanding of the problem to be addressed and common utility communications for water systems. 

In chemistry, a chemical substance is a material with a specific chemical composition. 

A common example of a chemical substance is pure water; it has the same properties and the same ratio of hydrogen to oxygen whether it is isolated from a river 

or made in a laboratory. Some typical chemical substances are diamond, gold, salt 

(sodium chloride) and sugar (sucrose). Generally, chemical substances exist as a 

solid, liquid, gas, or plasma and may change between these phases of matter with 

changes in temperature or pressure. Chemical reactions convert one chemical substance into another. 

Chemical substances (also sometimes referred to as a pure substance) are often 

defined as ‘‘any material with a definite chemical composition’’ in most introductory 

general chemistry textbooks. According to this definition a chemical substance can 

either be a pure chemical element or a pure chemical compound. But, there are exceptions to this definition; a pure substance can also be defined as a form of matter 

that has both definite composition and distinct properties. The chemical substance 

index published by CAS also includes several alloys of uncertain composition. 

Non-stoichiometric compounds are a special case (in inorganic chemistry) that violates the law of constant composition, and for them, it is sometimes difficult to draw 

the line between a mixture and a compound, as in the case of palladium hydride. 

Broader definitions of chemicals or chemical substances can be found, for example: 

‘‘the term ’chemical substance’ means any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including—any combination of such substances occurring 

in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature’’

The correct expression would be a reference to contaminants. 

2) The statement that the ‘‘groundwater’’ was the source of the contaminants is 

absurd. ALL drinking water at the base is groundwater. 

3) The drinking water at the base was subject to the Safe Drinking Water Act 

(Public Law 93–523) as early as 1981 when primacy for enforcement of the act was 

assumed by the State of North Carolina and the grace period provided by EPA and 

Congress for compliance expired. 

This is why, when informed by regional engineers for the Water Supply Branch 

for the State of North Carolina, Camp LeJeune contracted with Grainger Laboratories for water analyses that were consistent with certification requirements of the 

ACt. This is referenced in the purchase order from the base to Grainger Laboratories. 

In 1974 Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (P.L. 93–523, 88 

Stat. 1660) to protect the quality of both actual and potential drinking water in the 

United States. Congress had created the SDWA in response to a nationwide survey 

that revealed health risks from inadequate public water-supply facilities, polluted 

supplies, and operating procedures that did not achieve a safe water quality. To 

achieve its goal the SDWA provides water quality standards for drinking-water suppliers, protects underground drinking-water sources, and directs appropriate deepwell injection of wastes. 

The SDWA requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate 

all ‘‘public water systems,’’ defined as systems that provide piped water for human 

consumption for at least sixty days a year to at least fifteen service connections or 

twenty-five people. The EPA does this through Primary Drinking Water Regulations, by which it first identifies contaminants that may pose a risk to human 

health and that occur in drinking water at potentially unsafe levels. Then the EPA 

specifies a Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (MCLG) for each contaminant, which 

is set at the level below which there is no predicted health risk. Finally the EPA 

creates a legally enforceable Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL), which is the 

greatest amount of contaminant that will be allowed in the public water supply. 
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This MCL must be set as close as is feasible to the MCLG after taking into account 

the best technology, treatment techniques, and costs. Since the 1996 amendments 

discussed below, the EPA may instead require a Treatment Technique for removing 

the contaminant if there is neither an economically or technologically feasible MCL, 

nor an accurate way to measure the contaminant in water. 

4) The contaminated wells were not immediately shutdown as claimed by the 

USMC as evidenced by the continuation of sampling and consultations with base 

personnel for corrective actions. 

5) Public communications (as prescribed in PL 93–523 and detailed in EPA 

advisories and communications at the time) were not initiated until 7 years later 

after additional events had occurred to further contaminate the groundwater. 

6) The brochure does not address the high levels of Trihalomethanes noted in the 

drinking water or the corrective actions initiated to lower the levels of this carcinogen. 

7) The statement that ‘‘. . . The ability to test for various chemicals in drinking 

water and requirements to conduct such testing were evolving through the late 

1970s and early 1980s . . .’’, is misleading and incomplete in fact the contaminants 

of interest had well established analytical methods for drinking water as early as 

the 1950s and were used by US Government agencies for similar evaluation and 

contaminant source identification. 

8) The health effects of chlorinated solvents was well established in the 1960s and 

1970s and the basis of warning to the base in 1982 and 1983 was based on known 

health impacts. The statement referencing the absence of regulatory limits in the 

SDWA at that time is irresponsible and without merit. 

9) As indicated in my testimony, the motivation for discussion and further corrective actions were based on the hazards associated with continuing exposure. 

10) The USMC demonstrated gross negligence under the SDWA in 1983–1987 in 

a failure to seek resolution of a clearly defined and communicated peril to base occupants and workers. 

My opinion is this document was written by a contractor with poor understanding 

of the SDWA and water utility industry operations. The brochure is defensive and 

lacks objectivity and an honest exchange of meaningful communications. 

Please feel free to contact me if there are further questions where I can assist.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Major General Eugene G. Payne, Jr., Assistant Deputy Commandant 

for Installations and Logistics (Facilities), Headquarters, United States Marine 

Corps

Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller

Q1. Please provide the Committee with a list of what specific ‘‘scientific efforts’’ this $22 million has funded, which should include the following details:

a. A brief description of the specific ‘‘scientific effort’’ funded;

b. The amount of funding provided;

c. When the funding was provided and when the,project was completed or is expected to be completed; and

d. The agency, contractor, consultant or individual who received this funding.

e. Please include a description of the primary ‘‘deliverables’’ the Department of 

the Navy and or U.S. Marine Corps received as a result of funding the project 

or ‘‘scientific effort.’’

A1a. The scientific efforts include:

- Health studies and initiatives conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances 

and Disease Registry (ATSDR). These studies and initiatives include:

i. A Public Health Assessment (1997).

ii. An Adverse Pregnancy Outcomes Study (1998).

iii. A National Survey of Children who were born at Camp Lejeune 1968–

1985 (2001).

iv. A Birth Defects and Childhood Cancer Study (Ongoing).

v. Historic Water Modeling Dose Exposure Reconstruction (Ongoing).

vi. Community Assistance Panel Meetings (Ongoing).

vii. Congressionally Mandated Health Survey (Ongoing).

viii. Mortality Study (Ongoing).

ix. Cancer Incidence Study (Ongoing).

- A review by the National Academies National Research Council (NRC) on the 

scientific evidence on associations between adverse health effects and historical data on prenatal, childhood, and adult exposures to contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune.

A1b. The Department of the Navy (DON) has provided ATSDR approximately $21.7 

million between Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 and FY2010. The DON provided NRC with 

$0.948 million for their review. In addition, prior to the release of the results of 

NRC’s review, DON provided the NRC with $0.600 million to do potential followon reports. To date, the DON has not tasked the NRC to do any follow-on reports.

A1c. ATSDR is the appropriate party to provide these answers. However, regarding 

ATSDR’s work, please find enclosed with this response, for reference, copies of the 

Annual Plans of Work negotiated between DON and ATSDR for FY 2000–2010. 

These provide information on ATSDR’s planned work and the funding provided by 

FY. Questions regarding ATSDR study completion dates should be directed to 

ATSDR. 

Regarding the NRC review, DON provided $0.850 million in FY07 and $0.098 million in FY08. This project is complete. In addition, prior to the release of the NRC 

report in June 2009, DON provided the NRC with $0.600 million in FY09 funds for 

any necessary follow-on reports. To date, NRC has not been tasked to do any followon reports.

A1d. DoN funding for these efforts were provided directly to ATSDR and the NRC. 

Questions regarding any contractors, consultants or individuals that they may have 

used as part of the studies should be directed to these organizations.

A1e. At present, there is one published ATSDR health study concerning Camp 

Lejeune, a 1998 Adverse Pregnancy Outcomes Study that looked at birth weights 

of children born at Camp Lejeune. However, we have been advised that ATSDR 

plans to reevaluate this study. ATSDR also published a Public Health Assessment 

(PHA) in 1997 evaluating the risk to human health and the environment from hazardous waste sites but it was later withdrawn from ATSDR’s website for reevaluation. PHAs are conducted by ATSDR for all National Priorities List installations. 
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2https://clnr.hqi.usmc.mil/clwater/Documents/CLHDW¥Booklet.pdf

Questions regarding interim reports on ongoing ATSDR health studies should be directed to ATSDR. 

The DoN received a report from the NRC in June 2009, ‘‘Contaminated Water 

Supplies at Camp Lejeune, Assessing Potential Health Effects.’’ In the report, the 

committee assessed the strength of evidence in establishing a link or association between exposure to trichloroethylene, tetrachloroethylene, and other contaminants 

and each adverse health effect suspected to be associated with such exposure.

Q2. Please also provide the Committee with a copy of the U.S. Marine Corps booklet, 

‘‘Camp Lejeune: Historic Drinking Water, Questions and Answers’’ July 2010, 

for insertion into the record.

A2. U. S. Marine Corps’ Camp Lejeune Historic Drinking Water booklet attached 

(enclosure 1).2

Q3. Are you aware of any interagency review as part of the OMB testimony review 

process? If so, what agencies, that you are aware of, have reviewed your draft 

testimony?

A3. As the lead agency for interagency testimony review, OMB is the appropriate 

agency to provide information about what agencies were involved in the OMB testimony review process.
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Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

The question below was originally submitted by Ranking Member Broun to 

Mr. Thomas J. Pamperin, Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and 

Program Management, Veterans Benefit Administration, U.S. Department 

of Veterans Affairs. The VA and Mr. Pamperin deferred the question to the 

Department of Defense with the concurrence of Dr. Broun’s staff. The response to that question from Major General Payne is listed below.

Q1. During the time that the water at Camp Lejeune was contaminated, it was not 

only military personnel who were exposed, but civil servants and dependents 

were also potentially exposed.

c. In the past 50 years, have there been similar situations in which dependents 

and civil servants were exposed to the same contamination as military personnel?

A1. The Marine Corps is not aware of similar situations at other installations in 

which Marine Corps dependents, dependents of personnel from other services living 

aboard Marine Corps installations, or civilian employees were exposed to environmental contamination at levels of potential concern. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) conducts public health assessments (PHAs) 

for all sites on the National Priorities List. A review of PHAs for Marine Corps installations indicates that ATSDR only identified potential public health hazards 

from environmental contaminants at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune and 

the former Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro. The PHA for MCB Camp 

Lejeune, which was removed from ATSDR’s website in April 2009 for re-evaluation, 

indicated a past public health hazard related to environmental contamination. 

While the PHA for MCAS El Toro indicated an ‘‘indeterminate public health hazard’’ 

related to environmental contamination due to a lack of data, ATSDR found that 

identified exposures (carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, trichloroethylene, 

perchloroethylene, and nitrates-N) detected in regional groundwater at the levels 

detected ‘‘does not represent a public health hazard’’ at this time.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Chris Portier, Director, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 

Registry (ATSDR)

Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller

Q1. Are you aware of any interagency review as part of the OMB testimony review 

process? If so, what agencies, that you are aware of, have reviewed your draft 

testimony?

A1. Interagency review is part of the standard procedures for clearance of testimony 

of federal agency witnesses, since such witnesses are Administration witnesses. Pursuant to long-standing OMB protocols, federal agencies are required to submit draft 

Congressional testimony to OMB. OMB coordinates clearance of the testimony so as 

to assure appropriate consideration of the views of all affected agencies. ATSDR’s 

testimony for the Camp Lejeune hearing went through interagency clearance, and 

ATSDR addressed comments received from other agencies. Where ATSDR made 

changes to the testimony after consideration of other agencies’ comments, the 

changes were approved by me, as was the final testimony.

Q2. Please describe what steps you intend to take to speed up the pace of the five 

projects ATSDR is currently involved in related to Camp Lejeune? Some of these 

studies were begun years ago, yet according to ATSDR, four of those projects 

won’t be completed until the spring of 2012 and the fifth one will not be completed until September 2013. It is important these studies be completed promptly. Please describe any steps that ATSDR intends to take to complete these studies in a more timely fashion.

Water modeling is a key component of ATSDR’s ongoing studies at Camp Lejeune. 

Because only limited measurements of contaminant concentrations are available, 

ATSDR is using complex modeling techniques to reconstruct historical conditions of 

groundwater flow, contaminant fate and transport, and the distribution of contaminated drinking water delivered to family housing areas. The modeling requires identification, review and organization of vast amounts of historical data and other information. Delays in obtaining from DOD data for water modeling have delayed 

completion of the studies that rely on the modeling. 

ATSDR has taken several steps, which the Agency intends to maintain, in an effort to complete all water-modeling activities more rapidly, without compromising 

accuracy or thoroughness. For example:

• ATSDR has added technical and administrative staff to the water-modeling 

team:

Æ A senior-level hydrogeologist has been brought on board full time, 

through an interagency agreement with the US Geological Survey; this 

team member, who resides at ATSDR, conducts data and water-modeling 

analyses.

Æ An ATSDR environmental health scientist with petroleum engineering 

academic and professional experience has been assigned to the watermodeling effort 60 percent of the time to assist with geohydrologic analyses and characterizations.

Æ A fulltime employee has been brought on board through the Senior Environmental Employment Program to further assist with data and information analyses.

Æ An administrative assistant has been assigned for water-modeling project 

use, 50 percent time, to assist with administrative tasks such as Quality 

Assessment/Quality Control review of reports and data, and other project 

administrative tasks.

• To promptly complete all data discovery activities:

Æ ATSDR assigned additional staff to represent ATSDR on the ATSDR/

DON/USMC data mining and discovery technical work group.

Æ An ATSDR staff was assigned as a liaison to Camp Lejeune for this activity.

• Computational capacity continues to be enhanced through the purchase during FY 2010 of ten 64-bit, high-end scientific workstations, to enable simultaneous simulation runs of groundwater flow, fate, and transport.
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The above measures are increasing the pace of water modeling of Hadnot Point 

and Holcomb Boulevard, and in turn will expedite completion of (1) the re-analysis 

of the pregnancy outcome study (also known as the small for gestational age, or 

SGA, study), (2) the case-control study of neural tube defects, oral clefts, and childhood hematopoietic cancers, and (3) the mortality study. ATSDR will use the results 

from this modeling to conduct the analyses for these studies. 

Also to complete these studies as quickly as possible, ATSDR plans to do virtually 

all of the analyses with the preliminary results from the water modeling, plugging 

in the final results of the water modeling when they become available. 

As for the health survey, the contract was awarded in September, 2010, and work 

began in October, 2010. The first wave of health surveys will be sent out in the late 

winter and early spring of next year. The additional mailings to encourage participation will take approximately 6 months, i.e., until near the end of the summer. 

Analyzing the surveys and determining whether to go forward with the morbidity 

study (i.e., confirmation of participant-reported cancers and other diseases of interest) will take approximately an additional 2 to 3 months. The health survey part 

of the project is expected to be completed by the end of November 2011. An expert 

panel will be convened to review the results from the initial phase and to make recommendations as to whether to go forward. If ATSDR does go forward, then confirmation of reported diseases, data analyses and report writing will take at least 

another 18 months. We anticipate that the currently planned projects associated 

with Camp Lejeune will be completed by summer of 2013.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Thomas J. Pamperin, Associate Deputy Under Secretary for Policy 

and Program Management, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. Department 

of Veterans Affairs

Questions submitted by Chairman Brad Miller

Q1. Are you aware of any interagency review as part of the OMB testimony review 

process? If so, what agencies, that you are aware of, have reviewed your testimony?

A1. OMB Circular A–19, ‘‘Legislative Coordination and Clearance,’’ outlines the 

process by which all Executive Branch agencies provide testimony to and receive 

clearance from OMB as part of submitting reports, including testimony, to Congress. 

Section 8 outlines the interagency coordination process. As part of this hearing, we 

are aware of our testimony being coordinated with the Departments of Defense and 

Health and Human Services.

Q2. Your testimony regarding the number of Camp Lejeune veterans compensated by 

VA due to their exposures to toxic chemicals in the drinking water supply was 

at odds with numbers provided to Subcommittee staff prior to the hearing. 

Please provide the Subcommittee with an accurate list of the number of Camp 

Lejeune veterans that the VA has compensated due to toxic chemical exposures 

at the base, when their claims were granted, and the proportion of the claim 

granted, i.e. 100-percent, 30-percent, etc.

A2. Provided below is a table reflecting the results of VA’s initial data search of 

those Camp Lejeune Veterans compensated between 1997 and 2010. VA is still reviewing its records, and will update the Committee should any substantial new findings occur as a result of this ongoing review.

Q3. In addition, in your testimony you indicated that you did not know when the 

VA’s Camp Lejeune Task Force would complete its work and submit its report 

to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. However, prior to your testimony the Subcommittee staff was led to believe that the task force’s work had already been 

completed and that it had already delivered its report to the Secretary. Please 

provide a clear response indicating the status of the task force’s work, whether 

the task force has completed its report and recommendations to the VA Secretary 

and if so when this work was completed. If the task force has not yet completed 

its work, please indicate when the task force intends to complete its work and 

deliver its report to the Secretary if it has not done so already.
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A3. Task Force recently acquired additional and significant information from CDC’s 

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). Based on this new information, the Task Force is re-evaluating its recommendations to the Secretary. We 

anticipate that the Task Force report will be finalized and presented to the Secretary by the end of January, 2011.

Q4. At the hearing you stated that: ‘‘Establishing presumptive diseases [tied to exposures at Camp Lejeune] at this point would be premature.’’ Was this assertion 

based upon recommendations by the VA’s Camp Lejeune Task Force? What data 

does the VA believe it requires in order to establish ‘‘presumptive’’ health claims 

tied to Camp Lejeune?

A4. VA’s Task Force is currently re-evaluating its recommendations in light of recent information from ATSDR. This new information from ATSDR, as well as the 

June 2009 National Research Council report and other scientific information will 

serve as the basis for recommendations regarding data needs and presumptive service connections related to service at Camp Lejeune.

Q5. In your written testimony you wrote: ‘‘For those cases that have been denied, 

claims have normally been—not been granted because of one or [sic] three criteria: the veteran did not serve at Lejeune during the period of the contamination, the current disease, or disability and the medical nexus between the current 

disease was not established.’’ Your statement appears to only indicate two criteria. Please indicate the third criteria upon which most Camp Lejeune denials 

have been based.

A5. Service connection for a disability related to service at Camp Lejeune requires 

that all three of the following criteria are met: (1) evidence that the Veteran served 

at Camp Lejeune during the period of water contamination, (2) evidence of a current 

chronic disease or disability, and (3) evidence providing a nexus or causal link between the current disability and the service at Camp Lejeune. Evidence of causation 

would likely come from a qualified medical professional who provides a rational scientific basis for establishing the nexus. However, such a nexus may be difficult to 

establish because there are unresolved issues related to the amount and duration 

of potential toxic exposure among the exposed Camp Lejeune Veteran population, 

as well as a lack of scientific certainty on what diseases may be associated with the 

drinking water contaminants.

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Q1. During the time that the water at Camp Lejeune was contaminated, it was not 

only military personnel who were exposed, but civil servants and dependents 

were also potentially exposed.

a. What are the current rules regarding benefits or resources provided to dependents of military personnel exhibiting illnesses that may be attributable to their 

time living on the base during the exposure period?

A1a. Congress authorizes VA to provide benefits, including compensation for disabilities resulting from service, to Veterans. Congress has not authorized disability 

compensation for family members and dependents of Veterans who develop disabilities related to living with the Veteran during the period of military service. This 

includes family members and dependents of Veterans who lived at Camp Lejeune.

b. Are they eligible to receive benefits under current law?

A1b. Surviving dependents of deceased Veterans who served at Camp Lejeune may 

be eligible to receive monthly payments for dependency and indemnity compensation 

if the Veteran’s service-connected disability was a primary or secondary cause of 

death or if the Veteran’s disability was rated at 100 percent disabling for 10 consecutive years immediately before the Veteran’s death or for 5 consecutive years following separation from service.

Q2. The original claims of Mr. Watters and Mr. Deveraux were rejected by low level 

claims adjusters at the VA. Since those initial rejections, the claims have been 

determined to be valid, since both men testified that they have been granted 

100% disability, but only after having presented their cases and substantial information to upper level management in the VA.

a. On what basis were these claims initially denied?

A2. Service connection for a disability related to service at Camp Lejeune requires: 

(1) evidence that the Veteran served at Camp Lejeune during the period of water 
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contamination, (2) evidence of a current chronic disease or disability, and (3) evidence providing a nexus or link between the current disability and the service at 

Camp Lejeune. Regional Office personnel understand these requirements and adjudicate cases based on these criteria. 

In the case of Mr. Devereaux’s breast cancer, there was insufficient evidence of 

a nexus or causal link between the breast cancer and the service at Camp Lejeune 

presented with the initial claim. In the case of Mr. Watters, there was insufficient 

initial evidence of a medical association between exposure to contaminated water at 

Camp Lejeune and his renal cancer.

Q3. When asked about protocols in place at the VA to ensure that lower level VA 

personnel are properly informed and are not denying claims as a matter of 

course, you testified that in 2009, a training letter was dispatched to all claims 

handlers.

a. Do you feel that a letter is a sufficient amount of training required to make 

fair determinations regarding claims of exposure from Camp Lejeune?

A3a. Regional Office (RO) personnel were alerted to the Camp Lejeune situation 

during a nationwide broadcast in June 2009, when they were asked to adjudicate 

these claims based on the evidence available in each individual case. A training letter followed on April 26, 2010, which outlined details of developing evidence and ordering medical examinations for Camp Lejeune-related claims. 

In an effort to ensure consistency in the adjudication of these claims and establish 

a statistical database of information, VBA will consolidate Camp Lejeune-related 

claims to the Louisville Regional Office. Policies and procedures for implementing 

this decision, including training of claims personnel, are scheduled to be completed 

by January 2011. These efforts will ensure that disability claims based on service 

at Camp Lejeune receive fair and consistent evaluations and determinations.

b. Have there been instances since the training letter went out in which veterans 

were initially denied their claims, but after gathering significantly more evidence and presenting to upper level personnel, were granted 100% benefits 

similar to the situations described by Mr. Watters and Mr. Devereaux?

A3b. VA does not track initial service connection denials for claims based on service 

at Camp Lejeune that are later re-adjudicated and granted. Therefore, we are unable to determine at this time if a subsequent rating decision grants 100 percent 

disability or any other disability rating percentage. A denied claim may be subsequently granted upon appellate review or by the submission of new evidence sufficient to warrant service connection. 
(153)

Appendix 2: 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY U.S. MARINE CORPS CAMP LEJEUNE DOCUMENTS

FOR THE RECORD
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SUPPORTING REFERENCE DOCUMENTS TO ACCOMPANY WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF MR. 

MICHAEL PARTAIN
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Æ