No. 13216 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1975 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, ex rel. 

SAMMONS TRUCKING INC., a Montana 

corporation, et al., 

Relators, 

-vs - 

GORDON BOLLINGER, THOMAS G. MONAHAN, 

P.J. GILFEATHER, JAMES R, SHEA and GEORGE TURMAN, 

as members of and comprising the PUBLIC 

SERVICE COMMISSION, et al., 

Respondents. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : 

Counsel of Record : 

For Relators : 

Scribner and Huss, Helena, Montana 

Lawrence D, Huss argued, Helena, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Charles Dickman and Russell Doty, Helena, Montana 

Charles Dickman argued, Helena, Montana 

Submitted: December 3, 1975 

Decided : JflN 2 6 1975 

1" 4: '?i ; ;?'j'E Filed : !.JM;~ 
Mr. Justice Gene R. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court: 

This is an original proceeding brought by relators as 

common carriers operating motor vehicles engaged in interstate 

commerce and using Montana highways. Relators seek a declaratory 

judgment and writ of mandate adjudging invalid the state registration fee imposed by the Public Service Commission upon such vehicles 

to the extent that such fee imposes a greater and conflicting 

requirement than that imposed by federal laws and regulations. 

Upon hearing counsel for relators ex parte this Court 

desired an adversary hearing. Such hearing was had on December 3, 

1975. 

Under Title 8, Chapter 1, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, 

and 49 U.S.C. 8302, the Public Service Commission has statutory 

authority to regulate all "for hire" motor vehicles operating on 

the public highways of the state of Montana. Section 8-116(a), 

R.C.M. 1947, provides for an assessment of an annual five dollar 

fee on each commercial motor vehicle which serves to register and 

identify such vehicle. Pursuant to this authority the Public Service 

Commission, in November 1975, sent a memo to all interstate motor 

carriers operating on Montana highways. The memo stated that due to 

legislative changes in section 8-101, R.C.M. 1947, defining motor 

vehicles, that term now included not only the motor carrier but 

also any trailer, semitrailer or dollie attached thereto and pursuant 

to section 8-116(a) each such vehic.Cr9dri- unit is subject to the 

five dollar registration fee. It is upon the basis of this memo 

that relators seek a declaratory judgment and writ of mandate. 

With these facts in mind, the issue for this Court's consideration is whether such a fee imposition is contrary to federal 

laws and regulations and thus nonenforceable to the extent that it 

creates an undue burden on interstate commerce. 
In State ex rel. Sammons Trucking, Inc. v. Boedecker, 

158 >font. 397, 492 P.2d 919 (1972), this Court ruled that a 

ten dollar fee imposed on motor vehicles engaged in interstate 

commerce pursuant to section 8-116, R.C.M. 1947, was a burden 

on interstate commerce and therefore could not stand. Subsequently the legislature in 1973 amended section 8-116 to bring 

it into compliance with 49 U.S.C. $302 and 49 C.F.R. 1023.33 

which require only a five dollar fee per interstate motor vehicle. 

However at the same time, the legislature also amended section 

8-101(f), R.C.M. 1947, as to the definition of a motor vehicle. 

Prior to amendment the definition of a motor vehicle as set forth 

in section 8-101(f), read: 

 he term 'motor vehicle' shall include all 

vehicles or machines propelled by any power 

other than muscular used upon the public highways 

for the transportation of persons and/or property. I I 

Subsequent to amendment, the definition of a motor vehicle as 

set forth in section 8-101(6), reads: 

" '~otor vehicle ' includes vehicles or machines, 

motor trucks, tractors or other self-propelled 

vehicles used for the transportation of property 

or persons over the public highways of the state, 

- and any trailer, semitrailer, dollie or other 

vehicle drawn thereby. " (Emphasis supplied. ) 

The effect then of this state's definition of a motor 

vehicle as amended is to require a five dollar registration 

fee, under section 8-116(a), on each unit of an interstate 

transport. That this conflicts with federal law is apparent 

upon examination of Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) 

regulations promulgated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §302(a). 49 C.F.R. 

1023.l(h) defines a motor vehicle to be: 

"* * * a self-propelled or motor-driven vehicle 

operated by a motor carrier under authority issued 

by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 11 

Nowhere in the I.C.C. definition is any mention made of 

dollies, trailers, or semitrailers as being motor vehicles. ath her, 

the I.C.C. definition is similar to the old Montana definition in 

that it applies only to the vehicle containing the mechanical 
drive unit, not to whatever is being pulled by that power unit. 

In addition, the I.C.C. regulations provide at 49 C.F.R. 1023.33, 

that where any state prescribes registration or identification stamp 

fees for such motor vehicles: 

"* * * such fee shall not exceed $5." 

In conjunction with this five dollar maximum fee, 

federal statutory law states that any state motor vehicle fee 

greater than that allowed by I.C.C. regulation constitutes an undue 

burden on interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. 5 302(b)(2)(d). Therefore the effect of the state legislation, if enforced by the Public 

Service Commission, would be to impose a five dollar fee not only 

for the motor unit but also each unit towed thereby. This would 

impose fees substantially in excess of what I.C.C. regulations 

provide with the resulting undue burden on interstate commerce. 

There can be no doubt thatwkre a state statute conflicts with federal legislation in the same subject area and the 

federal legislation is within the competency of Congress to enact, 

the federal legislation is controlling. Interstate Commerce 

Commission v. Detroit, G.H. & M.R.Company, 167 U.S.633, 17 S.Ct. 

986, 42 L.Ed. 306; Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R.Co. v. Interstate 

Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 184, 16 S.Ct. 700, 40 L.Ed. 935; 

United A.A. & A.1.W. v. Wisconsin Emp.Rel.Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 76 

S.Ct. 794, 100 L.Ed. 1162. In the specific area of interstate 

commerce this Court in State ex rel. Sammons Trucking Inc. v. 

Boedecker, 158 Mont. 397, 399, 400, 492 P.2d 919 (1972), stated: 

"We hold the federal statute and regulations 

promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission 

in connection therewith to be controlling over 

contrary provisions of state law." 

Then, as to the specific subject of regulation of interstate 

commercial motor vehicles this Court, in Sammons, said: 
II By enacting this legislation Congress has pre-empted 

the filed of state regulation and identification of 

interstate motor vehicles using Montana highways. The 

laws and regulations of the United States supersede the 

statutes of the state of Montana on the same subject 

to the extent that they are in conflict therewith and 

impose upon the Public Service Commission the duty to 

carry out such provisions by registration and identifi-. ' , 

cation of interstate motor vehicles operated by common 

carriers using the highways, of Montana in the manner 

prescribed by the federal statutes and regulations * *.I1 

See also Eisenman Seed Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.P.& P.R,R., 

161 Mont. 197, 505 P.2d 81. 

Accordingly, we find the provisions of 49 U.S.C. §302(b) 

and 49 C.F.R. 1023 are controlling as to the registration and 

identification of motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce 

using the highwaysof Montana, and to the extent that Montana 

statutes impose greater conflicting requirements, they constitute 

an undue burden on interstate commerce and must yield to federal 

authority. This Court specifically holds the state definition 

of a motor vehicle in section 8-101(6), R.C.M. 1947, relied upon 

by the Public Service Commission, expressly conflicts with federal 

law and the state may require a fee no greater than five dollars 

per motor vehicle, with the definition of such motor vehicle not 

to include the dollie, trailer or semitrailer for purposes of 

section 8-116(a), R.C.M. 1947. 

This opinion constitutes a declaratory judgment. Let 

a peremptory writ of mandate issue. 

Relators seek attorney fees in this cause. We decline 

to grant the same as the Public Service Commission was only 

following the command of the legislature,