COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DENNIS LEE FELTNER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2596-95-4 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 OCTOBER 1, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARKE COUNTY 

James L. Berry, Judge 

 Spencer D. Ault (Ault & Stein, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Dennis Lee Feltner (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in 

violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, he argues that the 

trial court erred in: (1) finding that the chain of custody of 

the drugs was not broken when a police officer left the drugs in 

the trunk of his car and on his desk; (2) admitting the 

certificate of analysis when the evidence failed to show that an 

authorized agent received the drugs at the laboratory; and (3) 

finding the evidence sufficient to convict him of possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm the conviction. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

 BACKGROUND

 In December 1994, Investigator Robert Eckman (Eckman) and 

Lieutenant Harvey R. Norris (Norris), Frederick County Sheriffs 

assigned to a Regional Drug Task Force, received information 

that, on December 5, 1994, appellant, an employee of a fruit 

stand in Clarke County, would travel to Maryland to pick up some 

produce and "would also pick up some cocaine." On the night of 

December 5, 1994, Eckman, Norris, and other officers set up 

surveillance, saw the produce truck return to Clarke County at 

3:00 a.m., and followed the truck into the fruit stand's parking 

lot. Appellant denied that there were any drugs in the produce 

truck and consented to a search of the truck and his person. 

While patting appellant's leg, Norris felt something in his pant 

pocket and asked what it was. Appellant responded, "You found 

it." Norris removed twelve grams of cocaine from appellant's 

pocket and gave the drugs to Eckman. Investigator Michael 

Donohoe (Donohoe), searched appellant's personal vehicle after 

receiving permission, and found a Tupperware container with two 

baggies of a white substance on the front driver's side 

floorboard. Donohoe gave the baggies to Eckman. 

 Appellant identified the white substance as cocaine and told 

Donohoe that he needed the cocaine to stay awake because he drove 

during the night. Appellant also told Donohoe that "he would 

pick up cocaine in Maryland for his friends in the area." 

Appellant "never actually said that he sold" cocaine, but that 
 3 

"he would collect the money and go get it." 

 Eckman took the drugs recovered from appellant and his car, 

placed them in a brown paper bag, and locked them in the trunk of 

his car. No other paper bags with similar substances were in the 

trunk of Eckman's car. Eckman went home to sleep at 5:00 a.m. 

and left for the Task Force office at 7:30 a.m. The drugs 

remained locked in his trunk during this period, and only Captain 

Richards, a fellow police officer and head of the motor pool, had 

another set of keys to the car. At trial, Eckman testified that, 

when he left for work, his car "showed no signs of entry." 

 When Eckman arrived at the Task Force office, he removed the 

paper bag containing the drugs from his trunk. They were in the 

same place and the same condition as when he placed them there. 

Eckman put the bag on his desk and completed paperwork. Later, 

he packaged and sealed the items in an evidence bag and placed 

the drugs in his evidence locker. He had the only key. The 

drugs remained in Eckman's evidence locker until December 20, 

1994, when he delivered them to the [laboratory] in Fairfax, 

Virginia, and handed the drugs to Steve McNeil. Prior to trial, 

on May 19, 1995, Eckman picked up the drugs from the laboratory. 

 The analyzed substance was eighteen grams of cocaine with a 

street value of $1,800. 

 At trial, Eckman, Donohoe, and Norris testified that the 

amount of cocaine and the method of packaging was inconsistent 

with personal use. Eckman identified the drugs introduced at 
 4 

trial as the same drugs seized from appellant and from the 

container in his car. Appellant testified, never denied the 

drugs were his, but stated that the cocaine was for his personal 

use. He denied telling Donohoe that he would give cocaine to his 

friends. He testified that he earned $600 to $700 per week and 

spent $600 at least once per week on cocaine. 

 Appellant objected to the admission of the certificate of 

analysis, arguing that the chain of custody was broken when the 

drugs were left in Eckman's trunk and when they were delivered to 

the laboratory. The trial court found that "the Commonwealth has 

shown with reasonable certainty that there has been no alteration 

or substitution of the items examined." 

 Additionally, appellant argued that the Commonwealth failed 

to prove his intent to distribute cocaine. The trial court found 

that "the quantities involved, these statements of the 

[d]efendant and his testimony here in [c]ourt today of his income 

among other things all indicate an intent to distribute in the 

[c]ourt's opinion beyond a reasonable doubt." 

CHAIN OF CUSTODY

 "'The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.'" Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 552, 555, 466 S.E.2d 116, 117 (1996) 

(quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 115, 118, 442 S.E.2d 

407, 409 (1994)). The chain of custody rule requires "'a showing 
 5 

with reasonable certainty that the item [has] not been altered, 

substituted, or contaminated prior to analysis, in any way that 

would affect the results of the analysis.'" Reedy v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 386, 387, 388 S.E.2d 650, 650-51 (1990) 

(quoting Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 550, 323 S.E.2d 

577, 587 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985)). In proving 

the chain of custody, however, the Commonwealth "'is not required 

to exclude every conceivable possibility of substitution, 

alteration or tampering.'" Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. 

App. 854, 857, 406 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1991) (quoting Pope v. 

Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 129, 360 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987), cert. 

denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988)). "'Where there is mere speculation 

that contamination or tampering could have occurred, it is not an 

abuse of discretion to admit the evidence and let what doubt 

there may be go to the weight to be given the evidence.'" Brown, 

21 Va. App. at 556, 466 S.E.2d at 117 (quoting Reedy, 9 Va. App. 

at 391, 388 S.E.2d at 652). 

 In the instant case, the evidence established that, after 

Eckman received the drugs, he placed them in a paper bag and 

locked the bag in the trunk of his car for several hours. No 

evidence suggested any break in of the car or that the condition 

of the item had been changed. When Eckman retrieved the drugs 

from his trunk, the paper bag was in the same place in his trunk 

and appeared unchanged. Although Captain Richards had access to 

Eckman's car, "he too was an employee of the police department." 
 6 

Brown, 21 Va. App. at 556, 466 S.E.2d at 118. The access of 

Captain Richards, "without more, did not constitute a break in 

the chain of custody." Id. Appellant presented no evidence of 

tampering or alteration. The suggestion that a break in the 

chain of custody occurred while the drugs were in the trunk of 

Eckman's car is based on mere speculation. 

 Appellant's additional contention that the chain of custody 

was broken when the drugs were left on Eckman's desk is 

procedurally barred. "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was 

stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the 

ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of 

Appeals to attain the ends of justice." Rule 5A:18. We will not 

consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the 

trial court. Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 

S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991) (citing Rule 5A:18). 

ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS

 Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in 

admitting the certificate of analysis into evidence when it 

failed to show that an authorized agent received the drugs at the 

laboratory. 

 We agree that to establish a proper chain of custody, it 

must be shown that the laboratory received the material to be 

analyzed. However, the statutory scheme for establishing proper 

receipt is not the only method of proof available to the 
 7 

Commonwealth. Code § 19.2-187.01 does not require the signature 

of the person who received the evidence to be on the certificate 

of analysis; rather, Code § 19.2-187.01 specifies that a 

signature on the request for laboratory examination form is prima

facie evidence that the individual is an authorized agent of the 

laboratory.1 "Code § 19.2-187.01 does not 'specifically require' 

the Commonwealth to identify the recipient of analyzed material 

evidence only through a 'request for laboratory examination 

form.' The agency relationship may be established by other 

evidence." Harshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 69, 72, 427 

S.E.2d 733, 736 (1993). 

 The trial court properly admitted the certificate of 

analysis into evidence. The court could reasonably infer that 

McNeil was an authorized agent of the lab, as Eckman testified 

that he went to the lab and delivered the drugs to McNeil. 

Appellant presented no evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's prima

facie case to show that McNeil was not an authorized agent of the 

lab. Thus, because the signature of the recipient is not 

 

 1Code § 19.2-187.01 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 The signature of the person who received the 

material for the laboratory on the request 

for laboratory examination form shall be 

deemed prima facie evidencethat the person 

receiving the material was an authorized 

agent and that such receipt constitutes 

proper receipt by the laboratory for purposes 

of this section. 

(Emphasis added.) 
 8 

required for the certificate of analysis to be admissible, no 

error occurred. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 Lastly, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

finding the evidence sufficient to convict him of possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute. 

 "'Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom.'" Brown, 21 Va. App. at 555, 466 S.E.2d at 117 

(quoting Crews, 18 Va. App. at 117, 442 S.E.2d at 408). "The 

credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony 

are matters solely for the trier of fact." Bell v. Commonwealth, 

22 Va. App. 93, 99, 468 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1996). 

 "Possession with intent to distribute is a crime which 

requires 'an act coupled with a specific intent.'" Stanley v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 867, 869, 407 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1991) (en 

banc) (quoting Adkins v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 437, 440, 229 

S.E.2d 869, 871 (1976)). "'Possession of a quantity [of cocaine] 

greater than that ordinarily possessed for one's personal use may 

be sufficient to establish an intent to distribute it.'" 

Gregory v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 100, 110, 468 S.E.2d 117, 

122 (1996) (quoting Iglesias v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 93, 110, 

372 S.E.2d 170, 180 (1988) (en banc)). 

 In the instant case, viewing the evidence in the light most 
 9 

favorable to the Commonwealth, we hold that the evidence was 

sufficient to establish that appellant possessed cocaine with the 

intent to distribute. Appellant admitted picking up cocaine to 

give to his friends for money. Eckman, Donohoe, and Norris all 

testified that the amount of cocaine seized from appellant was 

inconsistent with personal use. Additionally, Norris indicated 

that the method of packaging was inconsistent with personal use. 

 Although, at trial, appellant denied earlier stating to police 

that he picked up cocaine that he later gave to his friends, the 

trial judge, as finder of fact, was entitled to disbelieve 

appellant's testimony and accept that of the Commonwealth's 

witnesses. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.