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NO. 1099

UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

The Capture ofthe USS Pueblo and Its

Effect on SIGINT Operations (8 CeO)

@'pproved for Release by NSA on 09-14-2012, FOIA Case # 407Z]

THIS DO CONTAI ORO MATERIAL

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This monograph is a product of the National Security Agency history

program. Its contents and conclusions are those of the author, based on

original research, and do not necessarily represent the official views of

the National Security Agency. Please address divergent opinion or

additional detail to the Centerfor Cryptologic History (D9).

Contents of this publkation should not be reproduced or further disseminated outside the U.S. Intelligence

CommODity without the permission of the Director, NSA. Inquiries about reproduction and dissemination

should be directed to the Center for Cryptologic HIstory, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade,

MD 20755-6000, ATTN: D91.

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UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Special Series

Crisis Collection

Volume 7

The Capture ofthe USS Pueblo and Its

Effect on SIGINT Operations (8 CeO)

Robert E. Newton

CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

1992

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Table of Contents

Page

Foreword v

Introduction 1

Chapter 1: The Political and Military Setting 3

Chapter 2: Ship Mission and Preparation 15

Chapter 3: The Patrol 45

Chapter 4: North Korean Attack and Seizure 51

Chapter 5: Indecision in Washington

and the Pacific 73

Chapter 6: Reaction -The Next Week 95

Chapter 7: North Korean Interrogation 113

Chapter 8: Return and Debriefing ofthe Pueblo Crew

Chapter 9: Post-Incident Reviews,

Damage Assessment, and Damage Control

131

143

Chapter 10: Conclusion 169

Appendix 177

Notes '" . . .. . .. 179

Bibliography 209

Index....................................................................... 221

.I. _

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Foreword

The story of the Pueblo incident of 1968 is inherently a distasteful one for

intelligence professionals, but the factors which make it unpleasant at the

same time make it imperative reading. The lessons to be leamed from failed

operations in general and this incident in particular are many and should be

widely studied throughout the intelligence community so that we may prevent

similar disasters from occurring in the future.

Indeed, as the present monograph makes clear, the components of the

intelligence community conducted reviews, postmortems, and "lessons leamed"

exercises of many types in the aftermath of the Pueblo incident and made

numerous beneficial changes in the policy and procedure as a result.

What we must recognize, however, is that the lessons to be leamed go

beyond the mechanical, i.e., that intelligence officers must remain flexible in

their thinking and skeptical in their approach to any problem. It is arguable

that some of the fundamental problems in the case of the Pueblo were the

great haste to get the operation under way and an unwillingness to challenge

preconceived assumptions about the way operations should be conducted. This

was compounded by a failure to communicate fully to all who needed to know

about the operation - and by a failure to communicate candidly when problems

or doubts appeared.

Mr. Robert Newton's monograph, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its

Effect on BIGINT Operations, presents a thorough discussion of the incident,

including the details of the ship's commissioning, its mission, the capture of

ship and crew in waters adjacent to North Korea, official reactions in

Washington and overseas, and the release of the crew. Mr. Newton also

discusses the reaction of the cryptologic community and assesses carefully the

serious damage done to the U.S. SIGINT effort by the North Korean capture of

equipment, publications, and personnel.

This monograph makes an excellent companion piece to three other

publications available from the Center for Cryptologic History. Background

on surface collection may be found in George F. Howe, Technical Research

Ships,1956-1969. The interested reader is encouraged to refer also to two

volumes from the Special Series Crisis Collection: William D. Gerhard and

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Henry W. Millington, Attack on a BIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty (SCeO), andI IThe National Security Agency and the EC-121

Shootdown (S-eeO). Taken together with this most recent publication, these

monographs provide a stimulating discussion of the promises and manifest

problems of mobile collection operations.

Henry F. Schorreck

NSA Historian

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Acknowledgments

:Ib) (3)-P.L. 86-36

There are a number of NSA people who participated in this work; all

made a very substantial contribution to the final form of this history.

Responsibility for the analysis, interpretation, and damage assessment,

however, to include any errors, are mine.

First, the author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the efforts of

Henry Millington, a former historian here at NSA, who completed the

painstaking tasks ofinitial research and drafting. His was a pioneer effort

on this subject. My thanks also go to the members of the staffof the Center

for Cryptologic History at NSA: to David Hatch, who reviewed the

sequence of redrafts and made so many helpful suggestions during the

course of research and writing; to the publications personnel~ Barry

Carleen, for his invaluable editorial review, andl Ifor her

patience and understanding in handling an ttavalanche" of changes in

preparing this document for publication; to Henry Schorreck,the NSA

Historian, for his encouragement and review ofthe manuscript; and finally,

to David Gaddy, Chief, Center for Cryptologic History, for his critical

review of the manuscript and for sharing his insight as chief of the

cognizant NSA operationsstaff at the time ofthe Pueblo incident.

I also extend a sincere note of appreciation to I Ian NSA

North Korean target analyst at the time of the incident, and to Benjamin

Hoover of NSA's communications security office for their very helpful

review and comments on the manuscript.

ROBERT E. NEWTON

April 1992

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Introduction

Few events in recent history have plagued the U.S. conscience more than the North

Korean attack on and seizure ofthe United States SIGINT ship Pueblo in January 1968. It

followed by less than a year a previous savage attack on a SIGINT collector by Israeli air

and sea forces in the Mediterranean. Once again, a U.S. naval SIGINT collector had been

caught without protection. For the U.S. public, unfamiliar at this time with SIGINT and all

ofits aspects, it was the seizure of one ofits ships and the humiliation and frustration that

came with it. For the U.S. Navy in particular, it was the realization that one of its ships

had been fired upon and seized on the high seas for the first time in 160 years. Worse, not a

shot had been fired in its defense at the time, nor was retaliation ever carried out in its

aftermath. More significantly for those involved in the U.S. cryptologic effort, the loss that

resulted from the subsequent compromise of classified material aboard the ship would

dwarf anything in previous U.S. cryptologic history. It also gave the North Koreans and

no doubt the Soviets a rare view of the complex technology behind U.S. cryptographic

systems. Over the long term, the compromise would severely affect the U.S. SIGINT

capability to exploit several major target areas for years to come.

This study describes the events leading up to the seizure of the ship on 23 January

1968. It relates how the United States was preoccupied with a war to the point wherein it

complacently relied on international law to provide the only protection for a SIGINT

collector. It describes a U.S. SIGINT ship whose captain and crew, split apart by personal

differences, were poorly equipped and trained by the Navy and by the ship's captain in

particular to handle the emergency that confronted them that day in the Sea of Japan.

From the unique standpoint of SIGINT, this study presents an account of the mission of the

ship and its seizure; the massive compromise of classified materials; the damage

assessment following the debriefings of its crew members on their return from captivity a

year later; and, finally, some of the actions taken by the target nations in the years after

1968 to deny the United States continued access to their communications.

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Chapter I

The Political and Military Setting

The North Korean attack upon and seizure of the USS Pueblo in the Sea ofJapan in

January 1968 shocked U.S. officials. The attention of the United States, both politically

and militarily, was focused overwhelmingly on Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War.

Since 1964, U.S. military planners and tacticians had committed increasing numbers of

U.S. forces to the Vietnam struggle. By January 1968, several hundred thousand U.S.

ground troops were fighting in South Vietnam, supported byU.S. Air Force tactical fighter

and bomber aircraft. The U.S. Seventh Fleet was patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin to provide

close-in naval artillery support, amphibious assaults, and air strikes from carrier-based

planes. In brief, the principal goal of the United States was to find a political or military

solution to the war in Vietnam.

Similarly, the priority activity at.NSA was to support the U.S. military effort in.

Vietnam by keeping a close watch over indirect suPWrt rp.ndp.rp.d to the North Vietnamese.

from Soviet and/or Chinese Communist forces. r

1....- ---'IActive hostilities in this area were not considered imminent.

Nevertheless, the end ofthe Korean War and the subsequent Armistice Agreement of

1953 had not resolved the issues that divided North and South Korea and their respective

allies. Bound to the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) by

military assistance treaties, North Korea looked to these countries for support. Although

North Korea tried to steer a middle course in the Sino-Soviet dispute, from the mid-1960s

it drew closer to the USSR for badly needed political and economic support, particularly

after Soviet premier Alexej Kosygin visited Pyongyang in February 1965. South Korea

continued to depend on its former Korean War allies, primarily the United States. Those

sixteen nations, including the United States, had affirmed in 1953 that they would resist

any renewed aggression against South Korea. 1

Despite the armistice agreement of July 1953, the United States had maintained

about 80,000 U.S. troops in South Korea to counter any North Korean threat. These were

in addition to several hundred thousand South Korean troops.2 General Charles H.

Bonesteel III was the Commanding General,U.S. Army, Korea. He was also Commander,

U.S. Forces, Korea,which included the U.S. Eighth Army, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea, and

U.S. Air Forces, Korea. In this capacity, he was under the direct command of the

Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral U.S.G. Sharp. General Bonesteel also served as

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (UNC). In this latter capacity, Bonesteel

also exercised operational control over Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. 3

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TENSIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

During the years following the Korean War, North Korean agents periodically

infiltrated South Korea for the purpose of setting ambushes, laying mines, conducting

raids near the Demilitarized Zone and engaging in other subversive activities. Such

incidents increased in number and severity in the year or so before the Pueblo seizure.

South Korea, the United Nations Command, and the U.S. government had all expressed

concern over the increased North Korean violations of the armistice agreement. The

United States and the UNC recorded 610 violations by North Korea in the thirteen months

before the Pueblo incident, with over 200 North Korean infiltrators being killed. In

contrast, only ilfty such violations had occurred in all of 1966.4 Two days before the Pueblo

incident, a band ofthirty-one North Korean infiltrators attacked the presidential palace in

Seoul in an attempt to assassinate the South Korean president. 5

From North Korea's viewpoint, the provocations were all coming from South Korea,

and North Korean statements before the Military Armistice Commission revealed

particular sensitivity to intrusions into North Korean coastal waters. At various times

between 1961 and 1967, North Korea complained to the commission about "infiltrating

naval craft and armed espionage vessels" entering North Korea's coastal waters as well as

"mobilized naval craft" intruding and attacking North Korean ilsherman. These charges

were often followed by threats of retaliation. 6 On 19 January 1967, for example, a ROK

naval patrol craft was controlling ROK ilshing boats at a position ilve and one-half miles

off the North Korean coast. North Korean shore batteries opened ilre and sank the patrol

craft four miles off the North Korean coast. The patrol craft did not violate a three-mile

limit, although it was within the twelve-mile territorial limit claimed by North Korea. 7 In

general, there were a large number of intrusions by ilshing vessels from both North and

South Korea.

At a Military Armistice Commission meeting just three days before the Pueblo

incident, North Korea summed up its grievances against the United Nations Command:

However, your side, far from stopping such criminal acts, has been running amuck to prepare

another war of aggression in Korea, and perpetrating incessantly and continuously provocative

acts of dispatching into our coastal waters spy boats disguised as fishing boats and villainous

spies together with fleets ofSouth Korean fishing boats.8

The North Korean charges and propaganda were so vociferous and in such great amounts

that it was difficult to determine what the North Koreans considered important and to

what they would react.

Thus, tensions that had existed between North and South Korea since the 1953

armistice were accelerated in the days preceding the Pueblo incident.

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NORTH KOREAN COMMUNICATIONS AND ORDER OF BA1'TLE

As might be expected, the principal communications targets in North Korea were its

army, navy, air force, and air defense organizations. The North Korean Army used

manual Morse, radiotelephone, and radioprinter communications. All echelons, from the

Ministry of National Defense through battalion and sometimes company level, used

manual Morse and sometimes radiotelephone for standby communications. They also used

these modes for operational messages, especially at the division, regiment, and lower

levels.I

Naval headquarters at Pyongyang controlled three components on the east coast.

These were the First Naval Base at Wonsan, the Third Naval Base at Kimch'aek, and the

Naval Academy at Najin. The composition ofthese components was as follows:

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First Naval Base with foue Komar-elass mUisile boats, PT boats, minesweepers, and

squadrons 65 subchasers

Third Naval Base with \\

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Najin Naval Academy 45 Not positively identified \\ \\

/i \\ \\

\ .................

I The three east coast units used manual Morse and

radiotelephone for ship-shore, shore-ship, and ship-ship communications. 13

Elements of the North Korean Air Force on the east coast consisted of the Second

Fighter Division and the Air Force School. The disposition of these units in January 1968

was asfollows:

KNOWN AIRFIELD UNIT AIRCRAFT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOCATION TYPE

Second Division -- -- So'ndo'k

Twenty-sixth Regiment MiG 15/17 37 Wonsan

Fifty-eighth Regiment MiG 15/17 37 Wonsan

Fifty-eighth Regiment MiG 15/17 37 So'ndo'k

Air Force School MiG 15/17 63 Ch'o'ngin

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SIGINT RESOURCES AGAINST NORTH KOREAN TARGETS

The cryptologic organizations on which the United States depended for intelligence

about North Korea were to a large extent a legacy of the Korean War. With only limited

knowledge of North Korean communications at the outset of the war, the United States

built a system that provided for collection, field processing, and reporting by the services

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with backup support by the Afmed Forces Security Agency, predecessor of the National

Security Agency. SIGIN1'pr~duction was/also coordinated with that of thec=:Jand other I lIn 1968, the primary SIGINT organizations directed against North

Korean military communications consisted of NSA, the three service cryptologic

organizations of the United States, and associated cryptologic units I I I· Critical Intelligence Communications (CRITICOMM)

and Operational Communications (OPSCOMM) linked the principals of these

organization. I

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The U.S. intelligence gap against Nottlt Korea was in the area of indications and

warning information: U.S. intelligence users alsl) lacked complete information on North

Korean military and naval targets. It was believed thl:it some of this information could be

obtained by targeting those short-range communications that would be more accessible to

a mobile platform stationed offthe North Korean coast for exten4ed periods.

In late 1967, NSA established its own analytic and reporting effort against North

Korean communications.I I

..............

Although there were no plans to coordinate the two efforts in advance, the separate

NSA analytic and reporting effort on the North Korean Navy occurred at the same time as

the U.S. Navy's desire for an Auxiliary, General Environmental Research (AGER)

collection effort against this target. 22

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE AGER PROGRAM

The U.S. naval collection effort focused on the Technical Research Ship Program.

Although the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) and its predecessor organizations

had placed communications support detachments aboard Navy ships from the First World

War on, it was not until the mid-1950s that NSA and the U.S. Navy began arranging for

the use ofships primarily for SIGINT collection. The first of these was a converted Libertytype cargo vessel, the USS Oxford, that was readied for operation in September 1961. In

the following years, four more Liberty-type (Navy designation: Auxiliary General

Technical Research or AGTR) and two Victory-type (Navy designation: TechnicalAuxiliary General or T-AG) cargo vessels underwent the same transformation to dedicated

SIGINT platforms. Compared to ships of the Pueblo type (900 tons), these were relatively

large ships at that time (11,000 to 12,000 tons for the AGTR and 5,000 to 6,000 tons for the

T_AG.)23

In 1964 the interest of the Department of Defense (DoD) and, in particular, the

Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR and E), Eugene Fubini, centered on

the possibility of acquiring and testing smaller ships for SIGINT collection. He believed

that ifthe Soviets could be so successful with such a program for so many years, the United

States could do likewise. The ships would provide greater flexibility and be more

responsive to intelligence requirements and, perhaps more importantly, would provide an

attractive alternative to the large and expensive AGTRs and T-AGs. DoD and Navy

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USS Pueblo shown following its conversion to AGER, December 1967.

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interest focused on the use oftrawler type hulls as a substitute. In addition to efficiency

and economy, the Navy saw thepr~posedtrawler program as a means of counterbalancing

the Soviet intelligence collection trawler fleet, which at that time consisted of some fortyeight vessels on missions that provided surveillance of U.S. coastlines, overseas bases, and

fleet operations. The U.S. Navy also wanted an inexpensive alternative to the practice of

equipping Navy combat and service-type ships for.tactical surveillance patrols in areas of

intelligence interest. NSA viewed the program as a means ofsatisfying many intelligence

requirements that were inadequately covered by eXistin~ Isites

and other mobile collectors.24

The difficulty was that the U.S. Navy did not at that time possess any oceangoing

ships of the trawler type for purposes of conversion to SIGINT ships. If the United States

was to have a SlGINT trawler program, it would mean an entirely new ship construction

program. The cost of such a program would be far in excess of the cost of converting an

existing ship type. The closest that the United States could come to approximating a ship

the size of a trawler hull was that class of light cargo ship (Navy designation AKL) built

for the U.S. Army for interisland transport in the Pacific during World War II. A number

of these ships had been mothballed after the end of the war and were available for

conversion. The first of these ships to undergo conversion was to be renamed the USS

Banner, and work on the ship began at the Bremerton, Washington, naval shipyard in

1964.

With the problem of selection of a ship hull now solved, NSA and the Navy

Department turned their attention to the matter of determining who was to control this

SIGINT collection program. Although NSA and the Navy were not always in full

agreement on the issue of controlling SIGINT ships' missions, NSA agreed rather

reluctantly to a concept of operations by which Navy tasking of the converted AKL for

direct support purposes would have priority over national SlGINT tasking by NSA. This

agreement was in accordance with NSA's 1953 delegation of operational control of

seaborne SIGINT platforms to the Chiefof Naval Operations (CNO) when missions were of a

direct support nature.25 NAVSECGRU elements would then exercise this control for the

naval component commanders and assign SIGINT personnel to the ships. NSA would retain

responsibility for the technical direction of the SlGINT functions being performed and

ordinarily would discharge this responsibility through the Director, NAVSECGRU. In

September 1967 Admiral John J. Hyland, CINCPACFLT, would provide command

guidance along these lines to the SIGINT detachment aboard the Pueblo. Eventually, NSA

and the Navy came to a working arrangement whereby the two alternated primary

tasking for AGER operations, namely Mode 1 (Navy direction) and Mode 2 (NSA

direction).26 At the time ofthe Pueblo's patrol, the ship was in Mode 1.

Intercept relating to a commander's information requirements in direct support of his

mission took precedence, therefore, over collection tasks to satisfy information needs

established in Washington. CINCPAC could then overrule Washington in such instances.

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Acting as picket ships to provide early warning for U.S. aircraft carriers in transit or for

the U.S. fleet during exercises and operations, the direct\5upport intercept activity

included th~ rThe provision for

direct support tasking of the small AGER ships by the\Navy was in sharp contrast to the

SIGINT tasking of AGTR and T-AG ships, which operated under the operational and

technical control ofNSA.

The Banner, first ofthe small cargo ships to complete conversion and bearing the Navy

designation AGER-l, was ready for SIGINT operations in October 1965.1\

fa In addition to the USS ~~----~--:-=~---::--~-=~~~~":"":""==-~ Banner, two other AGER vessels, the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) and the USS Palm Beach

(AGER-3), would soon join the U.S. surface ship collection program.

In addition to differences in control and tasking, AGER vessels, because of their

considerably smaller size, also differed from AGTR and T-AG ships in their capacity to

accommodate SIGINT collection equipment and personnel. The AGERs had only five or six

collection positions, Le., about one-fourth that of the AGTRs; with only limited means for

analytic processing tasks and for on-line communications. An AGER accommodated some

thirty-three SIGINT specialists, again about one-fourth the detachment personnel strength

of AGTR ships. Because of space and resource limitations, NAVSECGRU personnel

aboard AGERs were limited in their analytic processing tasks; most intercepted

communications were therefore forwarded to NSA for more detailed analysis. 29

There were, of course, distinct advantages for the employment of these smaller AGER

vessels. The cost for converting them for SIGINT use was considerably less than that for the

conversion of the larger ships. The AGER speed of 12-13 knots compared favorably with

that ofAGTR vessels such as the Oxford (11 knots), and it was faster than T-AG ships like

the USNS Valdez (9 knots) and USNS Muller (10 knots). The improvement in speed, it

was felt, would be especially useful in reacting to the movements of ships under U.S.

surveillance during the fleet exercises ofother nations.

In view of the potential of the AGERs, the NSA budget staff considered the need to

develop some twenty-five AGER platforms, and after much deliberation by NSA and Navy

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SIGINT specialists, NSA indicated the need for fifteen such ships in its Combined

Cryptologic Program (CCP) submission for fiscal years 1966-72.30 Even this number was

not approved for the DoD budget - there would be only three AGERs, the Banner, the

Pueblo, and the Palm Beach.

In brief, the number of SIGINT resources devoted to the Korean peninsula in the late

1960s had been considered inadequate by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

Additional collection requirements for indications and warning information against North

Korean targets were not being satisfied with existing resources. This was one of the

reasons for the subsequent deployment of the USS Pueblo (and the USS Banner before it)

to Korea.

Both NSA and the U.S. Navy planned for a modified AGER program. The Department

of Defense believed that such platforms would be a suitable response to the Soviet SIGINT

trawler cOllection program. The AGERs could increase surveil1a.nceQ~ L

\

:Jand, as time permitted, would augment United. States and 1""":,,,:-:--__]

foverage of North Korean military targets. These platformswould become

~a:-v~a"'ll~a"'b"'le~a'T't...Ja \time of heightened tensions between Northand South Korea caused by an

increasing number of violations of the Armistice A eement of1953. Althou h North

Korea was

"---_--:- -=-~--=---":"" posed a considerable thr~at. For that reason, intelligence

requirements fOf\ informatton on North Kor.ean military installations,equipments, and

movements could\not be overlooked. AGER collection efforts might help satisfy some of

those intelligence needs.

~;', '

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

13 T9P SEER!T UMBRA
!P0CID: 3997429

TO' SEEREf l:IMBftA

Chapter II

Ship Mission and Preparation

On 7 October 1965, Secretary ofthe Navy Paul H. Nitze expressed concern to Secretary

of Defense Robert McNamara about acquiring up-to-date intelligence on the operating

capabilities, tactical doctrine, procedures, and state of training of the Soviet Navy. In

order to accomplish this task, Nitze stated an immediate requirement for additional ship

platforms of the AGER type. The USS Banner was already being outfitted as such, and

Nitze stated, ..... the urgency of the program warrants two more ships with the minimum

delay."l The following month, Nitze formally requested funds from the Department of

Defense for two additional SIGINT ships to augment the USS Banner's surveillance and

collection capability. At the same time, Nitze stated that, contingent upon approval ofthe

funds, he would ask the Secretary of the Army to identify a good FS (Freight and Supply)

class hull similar to the Bannerfor transfer to the Navy.2

Later in 1965, DoD did approve funding for two ships, the USS Pueblo and the USS

Palm Beach, although not as much as originally requested. By December 1965, the

Bureau of Ships was selecting hulls (one of which was being sought from the Army),

determining a schedule of reactivation and conversion, and providing for installation of

SIGINT gear at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington.

In response to the Bureau of Ships request, the U.S. Army transferred the small cargo

ship that was to become the USS Pueblo to the Navy. Subsequently, the ship was brought

to the naval shipyard at Bremerton in April 1966. This ship had been built in 1944 by the

Kewayne Shipbuilding Company, Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, and, as the FS-44 in the

United States Army, transported supplies to islands in the South Pacific. Following ten

years of active service, the Pueblo had been decommissioned in December 1954 at

Clatskanie, Oregon. When it was reactivated and turned over to the Navy in 1966, the

Pueblo was designated AKL-44, for light cargo ship, to await conversion to an AGER

(Auxiliary, General Environmental Research).a

Although the Pueblo had arrived at Bremerton on 22 April 1966, actual refitting and

installation of the SIGINT collection equipment could not begin until the start of the next

fiscal year (1967) because offunding arrangements. The ship's conversion began promptly

on 5 July 1966. Members ofall trades besieged the Pueblo, sandblasting its hull, removing

cargo winches and boom, testing engines and machinery, and examining every inch of

cable.'

Rear Admiral Floyd B. Schultz, Commandant of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard,

could not understand why Washington was making such a fuss about the Pueblo. He had

been ordered not to make any announcement of the Pueblo's arrival or say anything that

15 fO' SEERE' l:IMBItA
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TO' 5E(RET l:IM8RA

(bill I

------+ (b) 131 ~50 -YSC 403

Ibl.131~18 USC 798

1b 1 13 1 P . L . 8 6 3 6

might attract attention to the ship. Hisjob was to convert the sh.ip without question. Yet

he still had not received any specific set of plans for installing any.new equipment.5 The

sense of urgency for SIGINT ships expressed by Secretary Nitze during their funding

approval process did not infect those entrusted with the ship's conversion since they were

left with no knowledge ofthe ultimate mission.

As the Pueblo was being towed to Bremerton for conversion, the Director of NSA,

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, gave initial concurrence in wha.t was known

as the Phase II Trawler program, Le., the conversion of USS Pueblo and theUSS Palm

Beach. (Phase I had been the refitting of the USS Banner.) In responding to the Navy's

Phase II Trawler proposal, Carter mentioned major equipment for selected position

capabilities, although no specific antennas or antenna systems were mentioned. At the

working level, there was consensus between the Naval Ships System Command

(NAVSHIPSYSCOM), the Director, Naval Security Group, and NSA (K3) that the

existing ship, USS Banner, would be used as a "model" with certain improvements to

overcome deficiencies in ELINT capabi1it~ I 16 ""----------

In August 1966, DoD imposed a limit of 1.5 million dollars for SIGINT equipment to be

installed on the Pueblo. Because the NAVSHIPSYSCOM was the procurement office for

any NAVSECGRU program, it convened a meeting at the Main Navy Building to discuss

the development, design, and procurement relevant to the Phase II trawler configuration.

Representatives from NAVSECGRU and NSA's collection office (K321) attended this

meeting, in addition to the NAVSHIPSYSCOM personnel. Daniel Preece, Systems

Command project officer, revealed that the ship's hull work was to be completed by 1

January 1967 so that the SIGINT installation contractor could begin work on that date; this

contractor was to be Ling-Tempco-Vought (LTV) of Greenville, Texas. This choice, on a

noncompetitive bid, was made because of LTV's assumed capability and experience gained

as the installation contractors for the USS Banner. Initial cost estimates for installation

were approximately $700,000, leaving $800,000 for equipment procurement; all

equipment was to be procured by the government, to avoid higher contractor costs in

procurement actions. Preece stated that new commercial components or equipment would

be obtained by the Navy Shipyard Supply Procurement Office at Bremerton. Any

equipment that could be provided by participating agencies was also requested. It was also

agreed that special items procurable only from NSA would be handled by Systems

Command in the Office of the Chief of Naval Materiel. Antenna systems were discussed,

and there was general agreement that the USS Banner system would be incorporated,

with some additions. 7

At a meeting on 28 September 1966, representatives of NAVSHIPSYSCOM,

NAVSECGRU, and NSA (K321) held further discussions on the antenna system design.

The representatives agreed that the Pueblo would be configured like the USS Banner and

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DOCID: 3997429

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DOCID: 3997429

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that the antennas would be placed toward the bow to minimize possible interference from

the transmitting antennas located aft of the main mast. All antennas were to be standard

U.S. Navy shipboard types or commercially available ones as specified by the NSA

representative. The precise location ofspecific antennas was left to the Systems Command

and contractor personnel. Antenna locations would depend on hull restrictions. 8

SELECTION OF CREW

Once the conversion of the Pueblo's hull was well under way, the Navy Department

turned to the selection of personnel to man the Pueblo, both general service and Naval

Security Group personnel. The Navy made the first of these selections in December 1966

when Lieutenant Commander Lloyd Mark Bucher was chosen to be the Pueblo's

commanding officer. Following his commissioning as a reserve officer in 1953, Bucher had

attended the Combat Information Center (CIC) School in Glenview, Illinois, and from

there reported aboard the USS Mount McKinley, an amphibious force flagship. Early in

1955, Bucher's request to attend the U.S. Naval Submarine School in New London,

Connecticut, was approved, and upon graduation in December he was assigned to the

submarine USS Besugo as the supply, communications, and weapons officer plus a short

tour as engineering officer. When the Besugo was decommissioned in February 1958,

Bucher was assigned to another diesel submarine, the USS Caiman, as operations officer

and navigator. His tour on the Caiman was brief, and in July 1959 he reported to Long

Beach, California, as assistant plans officer for logistics on the staff of the Commander,

Mine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Two years later, in the summer of 1961, Bucher received

orders to another submarine, a diesel-powered Guppy-2A-class boat named USS Ronquil

and for the next three years remained aboard, rising from third officer to navigator and

executive officer. In July 1964, Bucherjoined the staff ofCommander, Submarine Flotilla

Seven, in Yokosuka, Japan, as assistant operations officer.9

Being named captain ofthe AKL-44 was distasteful to Bucher. According to him such

orders "meant that I had been 'surfaced' out of the submarine service, a polite term for

submariners who are transferred to other duties because they have reached the limits of

usefulness and no longer have good prospects to command a boat of their own. The orders

came as a painful turning point in my career. For eleven years my life had been dedicated

to seagoing experience aboard submarines, and my goal had been to command one ... the

new orders dashed the last of my hopes to remain in the submarine service .. " Instead I

was to become involved with a mysterious operation about which I had some knowledge

through my work at Submarine Flotilla Seven, but without having developed any

particular admiration for the way it was being handled. It seemed in no way a happy

exchange."lo

The officer selected to be in charge of Pueblo's NAVSECGRU detachment was

Lieutenant Stephen R. Harris. He had received a Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps

liST RSCSAS1tBCS 'fS 8Sli'fR1\8'fSRB liS'f ftB~Si\S1tB~STS PSRSISli W,'fISliAbS

Tep SECRET l:JMBRA 18
DOCID: 3-9-9-7-4-2-9-----------------------------",.-i

i

Tap !I!CRE i UMBRA

(NROTC) commission upon his graduation from Harvard in 1960. His first assignment

was as a communications officer aboard the destroyer tender USS Grand Canyon based at

Newport. In April 1962, Harris was transferred to the destroyer USS Forest Sherman,

again as communications officer. After twenty months ofsuch duty, he requested and was

granted a transfer to the Defense Language Institute, East Coast Branch; he reported

there in January 1964 and studied Russian for the next nine months. Upon graduation,

Harris was assigned to the NAVSECGRU staff at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, and

occasionally served as officer in charge (OIC) of various Naval Security Group

detachments afloat. In addition to his primary duty as OIC of the Pueblo's detachment

(USN-467Y), Harris also served as registered publications custodian and as cryptosecurity

officer. 11

Personality differences and the command arrangement aboard the Pueblo were to be

the cause of constant friction between the ship's captain and the OIC of the SIGINT

detachment. 12 Commander Bucher and Lieutenant Harris had met in early January 1967

when Bucher was visiting NAVSECGRU headquarters in Washington, D.C., for briefings

on the Pueblo's mission, tasking, and deployment. 13 It was there that Captain Oater Rear

Admiral) Ralph E. Cook had assured Bucher that the NAVSECGRU component aboard

the Pueblo would constitute a department instead of a detachment, Le., the NAVSECGRU

personnel would be under the total command and control of the ship's captain. Later,

however, Bucher learned that Admiral John J. Hyland, Commander in Chief, Pacific

Fleet, had convinced Washington that the NAVSECGRU elements should be considered a

detachment under his direct operational control with Director, NAVSECGRU, Pacific,

responsible to him for the detachment's use, operation, and administration. Such a

shipboard command relationship was a constant irritant to Bucher in organizing the ship's

activities. To set up damage control teams or fire fighting parties and to establish watch

schedules, for example, Bucher had to request assistance from Lieutenant Harris. 14

Bucher was used to giving orders rather than requesting help. In addition, as detachment

commander, Harris had the authority to communicate directly with NAVSECGRU,

Pacific, concerning his operations without such messages being released by Bucher. This,

too, grated against Bucher's concept of command and increased friction between him and

Harris. 1s

Lieutenant Edward R. Murphy was selected to be Pueblo's executive officer.

Commissioned in March 1961 as a graduate of Naval Officers' School, Newport, Rhode

Island, Murphy was assigned to a fleet oiler, the USS Guadelupe, as communications

officer. In September 1962, he was transferred for one year to the Naval Station, Subic

Bay, Philippines, followed by a short period ofsea duty aboard the destroyer USS Twining,

where Murphy served as ship's secretary and qualified as officer-of-the-deck (OOD) (fleet

steaming). In April 1964 Murphy was sent to the U.S. Naval Destroyer School, Newport.

Upon graduation, he was assigned as head ofthe navigation department aboard the guided

missile destroyer USS Robinson. Murphy's next assignment came in June 1965 when he

l"OT ft!:L!:AS"JI[ftU: TO eOI,TltAeTOftS H'OT ftI!JLI!JA:SA:BLI!J 'f8 F8ftBI6U UA'fI8fr/'AI=JS

19 Tap SECRET UMBFbtc
DOCID: 3997429

TO,. !I!CRI!!l' tlMBItA

was ordered to the naval facility, Centerville Beach, Ferndale, California, as assistant

operations officer after a six-week training course at Fleet Sonar School, Key West,

Florida. From Centerville, Murphy was ordered to the Pueblo. 16

Personality clashes also occurred between Murphy and Bucher from the moment of

Murphy's arrival. At the officer's club bar one evening, Bucher recalls "Our little

wardroom group kept wondering how a stiffly proper officer [Murphy] who neither smoked

tobacco, drank beer or liquor, or even indulged in the stimulant ofstrong navy coffee, could

ever fit into our freewheeling, informal ways of work and play. On such a small ship as the

Pueblo, with many different personalities and talents forced to live close together,

compatibility was as important as competence; pristine perfection was as unwelcome as

sloppy dereliction." 17

From Murphy's point of view, Bucher was far too informal as a commanding officer,

both in his dress and personal mannerisms; he did not act as Murphy felt a commanding

officer should. He expected Bucher to run a tight ship but noted that he played favorites

with men who saw only his point of view. As a result of these differences, communications

soon broke down between the commanding officer and his executive officer. 18 In the

coming weeks, these personality clashes between Bucher and Murphy would adversely

affect the other members of the crew and the operation of the ship. It was not long before

Bucher began to ignore his executive officer and went to his operations officer,

Schumacher, when something needed to be done.

Commander Bucher's operations officer, Lieutenant Junior Grade Frederick C.

Schumacher, Jr., reported aboard during the period ofthe Pueblo's sea trials off San Diego.

Commissioned in March 1967, Schumacher had been sent directly into Communications

School, Newport. Following that seven-week course, he was assigned as communications

officer aboard a refrigerated stores ship, the USS Vega. In September 1967, Schumacher

had been detached from the Vega and ordered to the Pueblo as operations officer and first

lieutenant. Like Ensign Harris, Schumacher had no Special Intelligence clearance when

he reported aboard and did not receive it until about two weeks before the Pueblo departed

on its fateful mission. 19 Bucher reported his reaction to Schumacher's arrival: "I could feel

that he was going to do a good job for me and immediately began to depend a great deal on

him. He was a crackeIjack officer and he was ready to go; he was totally prepared

mentally and I thought he had a terrific attitude."20

Bucher was also pleased to find that a very capable engineering officer, Chief Warrant

Officer Gene Howard Lacy, had been selected for his ship. Commissioned as a warrant

officer in 1959, Lacy attended engineering officers' school in San Diego and was then

assigned as main propulsion assistant on the attack transport USS Okanogan until June

1963. His next tour of duty was aboard the icebreaker USS Burton Island, again as main

propulsion assistant. In December, Lacy was ordered to the Pueblo and reported aboard on

4 January 1967. In addition to his normal engineering duties, Lacy also acted as ship's

no'P RBI::B2\S*BI:iB 'PO oon'PR1\:O'PORS no'P RBI::Blt&ABI:iB 'PO FORBIS?, W'k'PIOnAI::S

TO,. SI!CRl!!f tlMBItA 20
·DOCID: 3997429

TOP SECRET tJMBItA

supply officer until the arrival of Ensign Timothy L. Harris, the last of the Pueblo's

complement ofsix officers. 21

Commissioned in April 1967, Harris had dropped out offlight school and was then sent

to San Diego for crash courses in storekeeping, registered publications, cryptology, and

emergency ship handling. He had never had any sea duty and when he reported to the

Pueblo, he lacked a Special Intelligence clearance; in fact, that clearance was not received

until one week before the Pueblo set out on its operational mission.

The enlisted crewmen on board the Pueblo comprised general service personnel (who

would man the ship) and communications technicians (who would conduct the SIGINT

operations in the Special Operations Department or SOD hut spaces.) Two ofCommander

Bucher's key enlisted personnel were Quartermaster First Class Charles Benton Law,

operations chief petty officer and assistant navigator, and Chief Engineman Monroe Orel

Goldman, who had enlisted in 1950 and was to serve later as the Pueblo's chief master-atarms. Most of the general service crewmen were assigned to the Pueblo prior to the

communications technicians (CTs). Approximately forty-four percent of the general

service crew had never had sea duty.

Of the twenty-nine enlisted men assigned to the Pueblo's Naval Security Group

detachment, only two had had any sea duty. While the Pueblo was being refitted, the

communications technicians had little to do and no opportunity to gain any training in

their individual specialties.

SHIPYARD DELAYS AND SECURITY PROBLEMS

On 29 January 1967, when Bucher took command of USS Pueblo at the Puget Sound

Naval Shipyard, he was dismayed at the slow rate of conversion. Bucher had been led to

believe that Pueblo would be on its way to Japan in April; now he realized that the

conversion task would not be finished until July. To Bucher, it seemed that there should

have been "a little closer rapport between the shipyard people, the Bureau of Ships people,

the Naval Security Group people, and the OPNAV people."22

Meanwhile, the Naval Ship Systems Command was also having problems. Plans for

the hull conversion had been drawn up based on the configuration of the USS Palm Beach

with the assumption that the USS Pueblo was an identical sijip. Many man-hours were

wasted before it was discovered that the two hulls were differerlt. 23

During the Pueblo's conversion, the ship was assigned to the commander, Service

Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and the only person on that staff who was cleared for Pueblo's

operations was the admiral himself. Because of this security blanket, the Pueblo, as a

matter ofroutine, was continually receiving supplies for a bona fide AKL-type cargo ship.

Many ofthese supplies were inappropriate for an intelligence collection vessel. 24

fi6'f ftflbElA:SA:8bEl 'f6 e6fof'f1tJli:e'f6ftS fofOT nLEASArJI;!; TO J OnION NAIIONALS

I

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21 TOP "CRET l::IMBRA
OOCIO: 3997429

Radioprinter collection equipment aboard USS Pu£blo.
Manual Morse and radiotelephone collection equipment, USSPueblo.
DOCID: 3997429

,...

'~

; .

p.I.,. , .. \r - . . -- .

EUNT collection equipment in tbe SOD hut, USS Pueblu.
--tLQGID: 3997429

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

rep SECRET l::JMBRA

EUNT collection equipment in the SOD hut, USS PlU!blo.

Within the research spaces, the LTV contractors busily worked away installing the

elaborate electronic gear that was to be the heart of the Pueblo's operational body. It

included equipment for the intercept and recording of ELINT, manual Morse, radioprinter,

radiotelephon~ lnd telemetry signals. Other

equipment fitted mto the research spaces mcluded radIO irection finding gear, signal

NO [ RELEA5ABLI'; [0 C\5MTltAeT\5~ !qo\5,. IU;L)i;ASA~L)i; 'f6 fi'6ftElem NA'fI6NALS

25 TOP SECRET UMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

TOP SECRET l:JMBItA

converters, and narrowband and wideband receivers and recorders. In all, the Pueblo was

well fitted to intercept the signals it would encounter on its voyage. 25

The principal NAVSECGRU detachment member working with the contractors was

Senior Chief Communications Technician Ralph D. Bouden. This was his first sea duty

assignment, and he wanted the equipment installed accurately. As the work progressed,

however, Chief Bouden realized that gross mistakes were being made; gear that would be

seldom used had been accessibly installed at eye level while that which would be used

constantly had been put out of reach near the overhead or down on the deck. When the

LTV contractors were asked how this had happened, they told Bucher that everything had

been installed the way the company drafting department had laid it out, that every sheet

of the plans had been approved by the Navy. To correct the situation would require an

additional six to ten weeks' work and would delay the Pueblo's sea trials until late July. 26

To Bucher, the Pueblo's internal communications system was especially frustrating.

He had a general announcement system, a loud speaker microphone (LMC) that was

adequate except that there was no speaker in the research detachment spaces. The only

additional communications facility was a sound-powered secure phone from the research

space to either the captain's cabin or the signal bridge; a switch at each station was used to

select the called party. In Bucher's words, "We were not prepared to get information back

and forth as quickly as I needed to in a battle-type situation ... I didn't have a ship control

system, no sound-powered ship control system of any kind. I relied entirely on a voice tube

(which, by the way, I had to fight like hell to get) just to talk to the helmsman .. , I was

authorized to put in these extra sound-powered telephones using ship's company [but] ... I

had one Interior Communications Electrician aboard ... and it would have taken him

three years to install the system ....27

BUCHER'S CONCERN WITH LACK OF DESTRUCTION SYSTEMS

At Bremerton, Bucher was also concerned about the lack of any type of emergency

destruction system aboard the Pueblo. He was well a ware of the vast amount of equipment

and documentation located within the Special Operations Department hut and wanted

some means of destroying it rapidly should the need ever arise. Bucher voiced his concern

both orally and in writing but without success. In his debriefing, he said: "The rationale

that was used in refusing my request was that the Army said that it would cost too much

money. The Army apparently had done things of this nature; the Navy not so much. And

so the Army was approached on this subject.,,28

From having read the operational reports and recommendations of the USS Banner,

Bucher formed a number ofopinions as to how the Pueblo should be fitted out. However, in

his words, "1 did not voice all of these opinions because this was my first command and I

was not going to place myself in a position of trying to tell somebody how to run, how to fix

N6'f ftELEA:Sl'tBLE 'f6 €6N'f'RA€'fORS NOT RFJL6ASABb6 TQ l"QRFJIQ?1 ?IATIQ?IAbS

Tefl seCReT l:JMBItA 26
-pee-ID: 3997429

a ship, when this was my first ship. I didn't feel that it was my place at the time, without

having any experience at all to strongly criticize things that were being done, although I

privately did so to ship superintendents and to one or two of my own officers.,,29

Finally, toward the end of August 1967, the reconfiguration of the Pueblo was

completed to the point that the ship was readied for tests by the Board of Inspection and

Survey. For three days, a team of nine officers from the board's office in San Francisco

inspected the ship thoroughly, examining the engine room, machinery, hull structure,

habitability, electronics capabilities - even the ship's medical facilities. In a forty-two

page report, the inspection team cited 462 separate deficiencies and stated that 77 of them

must be corrected before the Pueblo left Bremerton.3o The board's report received prompt

action. Shipyard workers corrected most of the critical deficiencies, and on 11 September

the Pueblo steamed out of Bremerton en route to San Diego for shakedown training.

To break the long trip, Bucher arranged a three-day call in San Francisco, and on 15

September the Pueblo tied up at the docks of Treasure Island Naval Base. For Bucher, the

stop was especially rewarding. While there, he learned that he had been selected for

promotion to full commander, as had the captains of the other AGERs, Banner and Palm

Beach. 31

Reaching San Diego on 22 September, the Pueblo was berthed at the Navy's

antisubmarine school's docks and came under the jurisdiction of the Training Command,

Pacific, for a period of refresher and predeployment training. Once again, Bucher

encountered the frustration resulting from secrecy about the Pueblo's purpose. The

Training Command had received information that the Pueblo was an AKL and prepared

its training plan based on that type of ship. Although portions of this training were

completely inappropriate for an intelligence collector, for example, cargo transfer at sea,

Bucher believed that other parts of the training did benefit the crew. These were in such

areas as familiarity with the operation of the ship at sea, working the ship's equipment,

and working out watch sections. 32

While the underway training was 10 progress, and because there would be no

electronic training for the CTs, Lieutenant Harris, with Bucher's approval, traveled to

Washington, D.C., for about two weeks of briefings by NAVSECGRU and NSA about

possible missions for the Pueblo. 33

Upon the conclusion of the training program, the Pueblo was given another inspection

by Commander, Service Group One, also located in San Diego. Lieutenant Junior Grade

Schumacher wrote of that inspection: "The inspecting team that came aboard found that

many questions on their list did not apply or could not be answered by Pueblo officers for

security reasons. Frustrated, they gave up and declared us ready - for something.,,34

r(f:'T It~L~AS1d~LE Tf:' Cf:'N"fM:C'ff:'ftS Nf:''f RBLBltSABLB 'f8 F8REJIGN NNfI8~h\bS

27 lOP "ERET liMBRA
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PUEBW HEADS FOR THE PACIFIC

On 6 November 1967, the Pueblo departed San Diego and headed for Hawaii.

Although Pueblo's home port was to be Yokosuka, it had to travel to Hawaii because its

fuel capacity was insufficient for a direct nonstop crossing to Japan. Looking back at that

time, Bucher believed that the Pueblo and its crew were ready to go to sea but did not feel

that ship and crew were prepared to go out on a specific mission and perform well.35

During the eight-day voyage to Hawaii, the CTs in the SOD hut had little to do except

to copy weather broadcasts and to try to familiarize themselves with the new equipment.36

Some of the equipment broke down, however, and because of the lack of spare parts, could

not be repaired until the Pueblo reached Hawaii,37 The Pueblo's most serious mechanical

problem continued to be its steering system: sixty malfunctions in the transit.38 Upon

arrival at Pearl Harbor, the ship repair facility immediately began to fix the ship's faulty

steering mechanism, a task requiring two days.

While his ship was being repaired, replenished, and refueled, Commander Bucher

visited the Pacific Fleet staff. Here Lieutenant Commander Ervin R. Easton apprised him

that the Pueblo would probably be conducting its first operations off the coast of North

Korea in the Sea ofJapan. Bucher recalls, "He [Easton] gave me a rundown on what to

expect - which he said would probably not be very much. He said that we had been given

this assignment first of all to give us a chance to shake ourselves down ... to let us get our

sea legs, so to speak, and work out some of the bugs.,,39 When Bucher asked what would

happen if he were attacked, Easton referred him to Captain Charles R. Cassel, Assistant

Chief of Stafffor Operations, Pacific Fleet.40 According to Bucher, "this captain told me if

you are attacked, there's absolutely nothing we can do about it at the time. There is no

way that we can react fast enough. All the planes and so forth that our Fifth Air Force, the

Thirteenth Air Force, and the people in Korea, the Air Force people are committed ... and

can't be used in a situation like this.,,41

On the afternoon of 18 November 1967, with its steering engine supposedly repaired,

the Pueblo slipped out of Pearl Harbor to begin the long journey to its home port of

Yokosuka, Japan. As the Pueblo proceeded northwesterly, the temperature began to fall

and the weather turned foul. Conning the ship from the flying bridge was chilling duty as

the heavy seas pitched the Pueblo about. At times the ship experienced fifty degree rolls.

In the research spaces, it was almost impossible to operate with any efficiency. Upright

chairs had to be tied down by nylon straps through rings in the deck plates and even then

it was not unusual for a man to be thrown over backward when a severe roll hit. Locks on

the equipment racks kept breaking and units slid out, yet the Pueblo rode out the weather

and proved that it could survive, albeit barely.42

On 13 December 1967, thirteen days out of Pearl Harbor, the Pueblo sailed into the

shelter of Tokyo Bay and headed for a berth in Yokosuka. At this point the steering

engine, which had performed erratically since leaving Pearl Harbor, failed completely,

l'QP S&C;REl l:IMBRA 28
DOCl D: 3-9-Eq..~Q-97+·.4-4~2..qg,-------------------------- 'I' I

and, to avoid damage to the ship while docking, the ship made a somewhat ignominious

entrance with assistance from a yard tug. 43 Fortunately, the shipyard turned to and

completely rebuilt the steering engine. The yard also installed a tinted, plexiglass

windscreen on the flying bridge to provide the officer of the deck (OOD) with protection

from wind and salt spray during rough weather.

In Yokosuka, the Pueblo came under the operational control of Rear Admiral Frank L.

Johnson, Commander, Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN). Although specific

dates had yet to be established for the Pueblo's first patrol, Admiral Johnson wanted the

ship readied quickly and made as fit as possible. As he had at Bremerton, Bucher again

expressed his concern to Admiral Johnson's staff about the lack of any emergency

destruction system and was referred to the OIC of the Azuma Island Naval Ammunition

Depot. In turn, an explosives and demolition (EOD) officer was sent to take a look at the

Pueblo's SOD hut and make appropriate recommendations. From his examination, the

EOD officer suggested to Bucher that thermite canisters be attached directly to the

equipment racks. Once set off, the thermite would melt down the gear and continue

burning right through the ship. As Bucher remembers, "I thought it over for two days and

I discussed it with Skip Schumacher and I discussed it with Steve Harris and I finally

decided that ... I was just too afraid to put it on there. I was afraid that somebody, either

intentionally or unintentionally, would set one of those damn things off and just ruin, ruin

thousands of dollars worth of equipment, plus perhaps endangering the entire ship."

Bucher later regretted his decision. 44

Although very concerned about the absence of destruction gear for his ship and its

highly classified contents, Bucher did not take the time to ensure the training of his crew

in emergency destruction procedures nor drill his men in the Navy standard "repel

boarders" procedures. 45 He was fully aware, from his reading of the Banner reports, that

the Soviets, as well as the Chinese Communists, had harassed this ship in the Sea ofJapan

and in the South China Sea on a number of occasions. He had made it a point to avail

himself of the Banner reports and talk to its skipper prior to departure of the Pueblo on its

mission. The Banner had encountered Soviet and Chinese Communist harassment during

its previous missions in the Sea ofJapan and in the East China Sea. Bucher fully expected

to encounter the same kind of treatment. The technique used by Soviet and Chinese naval

units was to employ a number of naval vessels to surround a U.S. SIGINT ship, even in

international waters, thus making it extremely difficult for the U.S. ship to maneuver one

way or the other without a collision. On two occasions, the Soviets and Chinese had even

signaled the Banner to "Heave to or I will open fire." Fortunately for the Banner on these

occasions, the Soviets and the Chinese had stopped short of opening fire. 46 Bucher's ship

was to encounter the same situation a few weeks later off the coast of North Korea.

Subsequent events would reveal a significant difference, however: North Korean naval

units would not hesitate to open fire.

tia'f ft8L81l:SAI'lL8 'fa eemfft1l:ef~K:S Iq~T ItI!:LI!:A~BLI!:T~ l"OREIGN NAIIONALS

29 TOP SECRET l:IMIiRA
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Low-capacity incinerator aboard the USS Pueblo.

At the end of December, about a week before the Pueblo was due to begin its first

patrol, something new was added to the ship. The Chief of Naval Operations ordered that

both the Pueblo and the Banner be armed with .50-caliber machine guns. With some

assistance from Japanese planners on the shipyard repair staff, the installation of two

machine guns was finally completed the day before the Pueblo left Yokosuka. No one

aboard the Pueblo had any prior experience with this type of weapon except Seaman

Maggard, who had once served a hitch in the Army and knew something about the

weapon. Bucher made arrangements for most of the crew to receive orientation firing of

the weapon at a nearby firing range.47

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Bucher had insisted that the .50-caliber guns be installed in the forward and after

sections of the main deck. He did this over the objections of Lieutenant Murphy, his

executive officer, who recommended installation on the port and starboard sections of the

superstructure where there was better protection. Bucher also regretted this decision

later, when he.was unable to order members of the crew to man the weapons because of

their exposed positions. 48

In addition to changes in the Pueblo's equipment, there were also changes in the

personnel complement as a result of disciplinary, medical, and normal rotational

assignments. Someof these changes were critical. Personnel who had just reported

aboard had no opportunity to become familiar with their surroundings before departing on

the mission. Other personnel were not competent in their assignments and had tried to

make this known to NAVSECGRU authorities before sailing but to no avail. Lieutenant

Stephen Harris's senior enlisted assistant was transferred to Edzell, Scotland, and

nt replaced at the last moment by Chief Communications Technician James F.Kell from 9 In response to Harris's request for Korean linguists,c::::::::J

Ddetalled two Manne sergeants who had completed Korean language instruction at

the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California, two years earlier. One hour before

the Pueblo sailed, Radioman First Class Lee Roy Hayes hurried aboard to serve as the

ship's leading radio operator - having been transferred at the last moment from a combat

stores ship. 50

During December 1967, two oceanographers from the U.S. Naval Oceanographic

Office slated to accompany the Pueblo arrived in Yokosuka. Their job was to collect

oceanographic data in order to develop sound velocity profiles that could be useful for

submarine operations. Dunnie R. Tuck, Jr., and Harry Iredale had made previous trips

on the USSBanner. 51

PUEBLO COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Command and control of the various aspects of the Pueblo's mission, a fairly

straightforward matter on most naval ships, was obscure and fragmented, and led to

antagonism between Bucher and the OIC of the SIGINT detachment, Harris. In September

1967, CINCPACFLT had prescribed command and control relationships that governed the

Naval Security Group detachment aboard the Pueblo. Military command of the

detachment was to be exercised by Bucher as the ship's commanding officer but

operational and management control of the detachment was exercised by the Chief of

Naval Operations and delegated to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The technical

direction of the detachment's SIGINT function was vested in the National Security Agency

and was exercised through the channels of NAVSECGRU headquarters to the

NAVSECGRU, Pacific. CINCPACFLTI when it selected the cryptologic station designator

for the Pueblo's NAVSECGRU detachment as USN-467Y, also said that the detachment

N"S'f RFlbS:hSABbEl 'fS Om,'fR:hO'fSRS N"S'f RFlbS*S*BLFl 'fS F'SRSI8N" N"J't'fIm,:hbS

I

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personnel should not be employed in non-NAVSECGRU functions except as required on an

interim basis. 52 This personnel utilization constraint was observed by Bucher very loosely.

While the Pueblo was in Yokosuka, NAVSECGRU, Pacific, issued SIGINT Letter of

Instruction (LOn 1-68 containing specific guidance for the operations of its detachments

aboard both the USS Pueblo and the USS Banner during their deployments in the Pacific

area. When applied to the Pueblo,this letter prescribed that command of the detachment

would be exercised through the detachment's officer in charge, Lieutenant Harris. 53 In

turn, Harris was to exercise military and administrative control of detachment personnel

and equipment under his cognizance and was responsible directly to Commander Bucher

in the execution of his duties. 54

The mission and functions of the Naval Security Group detachments outlined in LOI

1-68 provided for the dual role of furnishing SIGINT direct support to the ship's

commanding officer as a primary function and, as a secondary mission, satisfying specified

fleet and national SIGINT collection requirements. The LOI defined five possible modes of

operation for the AGERs Pueblo and Banner. The first of these was that proposed for the

Pueblo's first mission - Mode 1: Continuous operation in one of the areas [North Korea

Coast!. .. by one ship at a time for an indefinite period of fairly long duration for

operational test and evaluation of all sensors, and for utilization as a counterirritant to

Soviet trawlers. In summary, the command arrangement aboard the Pueblo was

fragmented. The ship was given a direct support mission as its primary task and,

therefore, the Navy controlled its operations and SIGINT tasking. NSA SIGINT tasking was

secondary and on a not-to-interfere basis with the ship's direct support mission. Bucher's

command of the SIGINT detachment could only be accomplished through the officer in

charge ofthe detachment. 55

Bucher, although not in command of the detachment, held a clearance for Special

Intelligence and was well aware of the Pueblo's SIGINT mission. Prior to taking command

of Pueblo, Bucher had had a week of briefings about the AGER program by the

NAVSECGRU headquarters in Washington, D.C.; in addition, in Yokosuka, before

sailing, he had read the Banner's reports about its operations. When the Korean linguists

were assigned to the Pueblo, Bucher felt that he could expect good direct support from the

detachment's Interpretive Branch. 56

NO I RELEA:5"A~U':: TO CON I rtACTOttS I~ 0 I Rf:Lf:A~A~LI!: ro P'OftEIGI~ NATIOI~AL~

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PUEBLO MISSION RISK ASSESSMENT

The initial planning for Pueblo's patrol began with Admiral Johnson's staff in October

1967, well before the ship arrived in Japan. By the end of November, Admiral Hyland at

CINCPACFLT had approved a schedule for the first six months of operation for both the

Banner and the Pueblo.~7 Thereafter, Johnson's operations and intelligence staffs

collaborated in preparing a detailed mission proposal message about the Pueblo's January

operation. On 16 December 1967, Admiral Johnson approved the message and sent it to

Admiral Hyland. Concerning the risk assessment ofthe Pueblo's mission, Johnson stated

I personally made the initial determination that risk would be minimal since Pueblo would be

operating in international waters during the entire operation .... Specifically, in evaluating the

risk, three key factors weighed heavily in the final decision: (1) Pueblo operations throughout the

mission in international waters; (2) low level of North Korean naval activity at sea in January

and February; and (3) the complete lack of any North Korean reaction to the USS BanTUlr's

presence off North Korean coast on two occasions, one of which it loitered off Wo'nsan for about

one and one-halfdays.58

From Admiral Hyland, the mission proposal message was transmitted to Admiral

U.S.G. Sharp, CINCPAC, who quickly assented and transmitted the proposal to the Joint

Chiefs ofStaffin Washington on 23 December 1967.

Before examining what happened to this message once it reached the JCS, it is

appropriate that we look first at what the normal procedures were in Washington for

reviewing and approving requests for reconnaissance operations.

In December 1967, all military reconnaissance operations required approval by the

JCS. Procedures for obtaining such approval were contained in JCS document SM-676,

dated 19 August 1966, which stated that commanders of unified and specified commands

and chiefs of military services might submit proposals to the JCS for'missions in any area,

"including those adjudged to be especially critical or sensitive." JCS approval was to be

based upon current considerations of the sensitivity of the area, the possibility of hostile

reaction, political factors where applicable, and the importance of the intelligence

operations in relation to the risks involved. 59

Before the JCS would take formal action on a proposed mission, the proposal had to be

processed through the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) Staff. This staff included

representatives of each of the four military services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the

National Security Agency, the Department of State and the Secretary of Defense. It

therefore provided the actual working mechanism of the JCS for coordinating the

processing of individual missions to determine, among other things, whether the proposal

was necessary to meet national service and command intelligence requirements and, at

the same time, avoid unnecessary duplication in the national reconnaissance program.

Once an individual mission deployment had been coordinated and staffed within the JRC,

it received a formal input from each ofthe four services and DIA, which either concurred in

the proposed mission, suggested a modification, or recommended its cancellation.60 Under

H6T ltI!:LI!:ASAf'LI!: T6 e6nTltAeT6M I{6T ltI!:LI!:ASAf'LI!: T6 l"6lt1!:I6h I'-ATI6I{ALS

33 fap SECRET l:JMBRA
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JCS regulations, the Defense Intelligence Agency was specifically charged with the risk

assessment evaluation of each mission as well as its intelligence validation. However,

these regulations did not seem to require an affirmative statement that responsible DIA

authorities had fully discharged their responsibility for risk evaluation on each of the

missions submitted for JCS review. 61

After the staffing of each mission, the JRC would consolidate (usually on the 23d of

each month) all reconnaissance proposals into a monthly schedule of reconnaissance

operations for action by the Joint Chiefs ofStalT. This schedule was prepared in the form of

a book that set out in broad, general terms the necessity for each mission, its objectives, its

area ofoperations, its duration, and finally, its risk assessment. 62

Admiral Sharp's formal message to the JCS used this wording: "Risk to Pueblo is

estimated to be minimal since operations will be conducted in international waters." In

spite of the paucity of information about risk evaluation in the proposal messages, JRC

representatives supposedly had telephone conversations with their counterparts at

CINCPAC headquarters concerning the Pueblo mission. However, no record was made of

these informal discussions. 63

Although NSA was also aware of the Pueblo's proposed deployment, none of the NSA

officials who regularly communicated informally with the JRC staff had any specific

substantive discussions affecting the Pueblo's proposed mission. 64

Concerning DINs responsibility to evaluate Pueblo's risk assessment, its then

director, Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, later commented,

On the basis of this message (CINCPAC 230230Z December 1967), and there being no

information available to DIA at the time to alter the risk assessment assigned by the operational

commander and the theater commander, the JRC entered the proposed mission into the monthly

schedule as a risk assessment ofCategory Four [minimal risk I... there were daily considerations

of changes in the military or political situation, increased sensitivity and reactions to other

reconnaissance missions. There was nothing in these considerations to cause us in DIA or the

JRC to alter the risk assessment which had tentatively been assigned to the proposed mission. 65

General Carroll further stated that he did not recall any instance in which DIA had

disagreed with a minimal risk assessment on an individual mission after the monthly

reconnaissance schedule had been formally prepared.

The timing of the mission review process at the Washington level should not be

overlooked. CINCPAC's mission proposal arrived at JCS on Saturday, 23 December.

Sunday was Christmas Eve and Monday, of course, Christmas Day; normal manning

levels of many government offices were reduced to minimum staffing. This time of year

was not conducive to high levels of official concentration and thoughtful analysis. During

the week between Christmas and New Year's, the Chairman, JCS, General Earle G.

Wheeler, was out of town on leave; the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson,

was visiting Southeast Asia and acting for him was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

K6'f ftF:JLF:JASABLF:J 'f6 e6U'ffrAe'f6RS N'6'f ftF:JLF:JASABLF:J 'f6 F6ftF:Jf8H HA'ff6HALS

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General Ralph E. Haines. Also absent was General Wallace Greene, Jr., Commandant of

the Marine Corps, who was retiring, although filling in for him was General Leonard

F.Chapman Jr., Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Only the Air Force Chief of

Staff, General John P. McConnell and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H.

Moorer, respectively, were in Washington. 66

At 11:00 A.M. on Wednesday, 27 December, the operations deputies of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff met to consider all recommendations concerning the monthly reconnaissance

schedule for January 1968. In General Wheeler's words, "This is a staff action ... to

resolve any differences of view between the service representatives and representatives of

the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. In other words, to

make sure that everyone understands, everyone is in accord that these are the problem

areas and so on ...,,67 The monthly reconnaissance book was distributed by the JRC that

same afternoon to all affected agencies, the armed services, DIA, NSA, CIA, and the

Department of State.

The JCS usually would have met on the following Friday afternoon, 29 December, to

take final JCS action on the monthly reconnaissance schedule. This time, however, the

usual routine was changed. General Wheeler later revealed why: "Now it happens that

this January program was released by each Chief telling his Operations deputy that he

had no dissatisfaction with the program and therefore gave him permission to release it at

the Operations deputies' meeting which was held on Friday morning, the 29th of

December." 68

Thus it was that the monthly reconnaissance schedule, which included the Pueblo

mission as well as hundreds of others, was granted approval by the JCS without their

having convened any formal meeting. After the morning meeting of the JCS operations

deputies, the monthly reconnaissance book was presented to Deputy Secretary of Defense

Paul H. Nitze, who reviewed the entire schedule and gave his approval the same day.69

One more review of the reconnaissance schedule remained, that of the 303 Committee,

which gave civilian approval for the monthly schedule on behalf of the executive branch. 70

The existence of the 303 Committee was closely held. It was headed by a senior White

House aide and was so named because it had once met in Room 303 of the Executive Office

Building. It was composed of Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI);

Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State; Paul Nitze, Deputy Secretary of

Defense; and Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor to the President, as the White House

representative. The "book" was forwarded to this committee also on 29 December for a

policy review of the planned missions, particularly those that were directed at sensitive

areas peripheral to unfriendly territory.

Because Richard Helms was on a ten-day trip outside the country, his deputy, Admiral

Rufus Taylor, acted as DCI in reviewing the reconnaissance schedule proposed for January

1968.71 Helms later described the 303 Committee deliberations in congressional testimony.

P'H:H' RSbS/tSABb"8 'F8 G8P'f'FR·ItG'F8RB P'l8'F R"8bSASABbS 'F8 F8RSIGP'f P'lA'F18P'fAbS

35 19P §~(AH ~M8AA
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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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DOCID: 3997429

According to Helms, the 303 Committee passed on the January schedule, which

contained the Pueblo mission. The Committee did not regard this mission as routine.

Helms pointed out that there were four missions in the docket - one of them the Pueblo's -

that were singled out for Admiral Taylor's special attention in a staff memorandum

recommending his concurrence in the proposal.

It was the assessment of the 303 Committee, according to Helms, based on the

experience of Pueblo's sister ship Banner in the Far East, and on the belligerent North

Korean attitude, that this was a risk mission. In this sense it differed from the Navy

assessment of minimal risk. The committee felt that there was indeed a possibility that

the ship would encounter difficulties and possibly serious harassment but not seizure in

international waters. The committee expected the Pueblo to be "shadowed, bullied, and

bumped, but there was no reason to expect seizure on the high seas.'>72 In the face of the

committee's assessment of the possibility of serious harassment, it would have been

incumbent upon the Navy to have at least a minimum protective force available within a

reasonable distance ofthe Pueblo should there have been a need, but ....

The 303 Committee approved the reconnaissance schedule on the 29th of December

and returned it to the JCS by the end of that same day, Friday. The Pueblo's mission was

approved by the JCS, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the 303 Committee all on the

same day. Such speed suggests that no more than a cursory review could have been made

of the reconnaissance schedule. With this final approval, the JCS sent the resulting

decision to the responsible area commander in chieffor his action.

Meanwhile, NSA was also taking certain actions concerning the Pueblo. At midafternoon on 29 December 1967, B1,thell

sent a message t~ landtoal1~$fH_50 usc 403

sites associated with the Korean target, requesting them to be especially watchful fop)afrlcJl-18 usc 798

to report any SIGINT evidence of North Korean reaction to the scheduled transit b~)tfik-P.L. 86-36

Pueblo ofT the North Korean east coast in January 1968. This message was the normal

advisory to SIGINT sites asking them to report reactions to U.S. operations. 73

H'6'f ftELEASABLE 'f6 e6N'fR"Ae'f6KS N6'f ftELEAS:ABLE 'f6 F6ftEI6N N:A'fI6NALS

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'fOil S!(:I\!T UMBRA

Within a half hour, the NSA Office of Mobile Collection (K12) released a message to

Naval Security Group headquarters that answered the Pacific Fleet's request for

secondary SIGINT tasking for the Pueblo. This message provided the specific COMINT and

ELINT collection requirements for the Pueblo. 74

NSA ADVISORY ON POSSIBLE NORTH KOREAN HOSTILE ACTION

On 29 December, there was much soul-searching and anxiety within NSA over the

suggestion that NSA send a message to the JRC/JCS expressing concern over the

possibility of a hostile reaction from the North Koreans to the forthcoming Pueblo patrol.

Action in favor ofsuch a message was most strongly felt at the analytic level in Bll. Here,

analysts had observed SIGINT data reflecting hostile North Korean reactions to U.S.

airborne missions over a period of several years. Based on this precedent and lacking a

precedent for naval surface collection, they believed that the chances of such a reaction

from the North Koreans toward a surface vessel were high. 75

More senior levels within NSA believed that the Agency would be overstepping its

responsibility by getting involved in a Navy operational matter and thus leaving itself

open to criticism. The result of these opposing views was a strongly worded message

drafted at the analytic level in NSA and modified as it was coordinated with the senior

levels prior to its release. During this coordination process, the statements "But there is

no SIGINT evidence of provocative or harassing activities by North Korean vessels beyond

twelve n[autical] m[iles] from the coast." and "[This message] is provided to aid in

evaluating the requirement for ship protective measures and is not intended to reflect

adversely on CINCPACFLT deployment proposal" were added in order to make the

message less obtrusive. 76 The Assistant Director, Production, and number-three man in

NSA, Oliver R. Kirby, authorized its release in the absence of Marshall S. Carter, the

Director ofNSA, who was out of town for the Christmas holidays.77 The Assistant Director

for the National Cryptologic Staff (ADN), Admiral Lester R. Schulz, concurred in the

message release.

A year later, when justifying this message action to Secretary of Defense Melvin

Laird, Carter said: "... though this Agency is not directly involved in the approval chain

of military reconnaissance missions, we at NSA consider it an appropriate function to

review pertinent Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) information and comment on SIGINT

reflections where such information will be of assistance to our customers. This was the

case with regard to the NSA message concerning the Pueblo mission. It was simply a case

ofNSA people doing theirjobs in a normal and competent manner .... "78

Although NSA, as pointed out by Carter, had no approval role in regard to direct

support missions operated by the services, the intent of this message was quite clear: it

was an advisory, based on past SIGINT experience, that the North Koreans were

unpredictable and might precipitate hostile action at any time. Consequently, the JRC

nQ'f R~I,,~AgA8b~'fQ GQ~f'fR-AG'fQRS ~rQ'f R~b~AgA8b~'fQ FQR~Imr~f!t'fIQ~rAbg

37 'fOja S!ERH UMBRA
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might, therefore, consider the Pueblo a risk mission and assign appropriate protective

measures for the ship. It was a most unusual action by NSA. It expressed an after-thefact reservation by NSA concerning the safety of the Pueblo patrol. Unfortunately, the

message got "lost in the system," and no change was made in the Pueblo mission.

Released at 5:28 P.M. Washington time, this NSA message to JCS/JRC reached the

Pentagon later that evening. Unfortunately, because this was the beginning of the New

Year's holiday weekend, the NSA message received no attention until the following

Tuesday, 2 January 1968, when Brigadier General Ralph D. Steakely, USAF, the Director

ofJRC, simply retransmitted it to CINCPAC. An information copy was supposed to have

been sent via courier to the CNO in the Pentagon, but the forwarding instructions were

misinterpreted and no copy reached the CNO. No other action was taken by the Office of

the Joint Chiefs ofStafT. Nor did anyone take action on the message at DlA. 79

In Hawaii, at CINCPAC headquarters, the retransmitted NSA message was received

at 2026Z on 2 January 1968. The CINCPAC staff, believing that the message contained no

new information that would change the risk evaluation of the Pueblo's mission, did not

bring it to Admiral Sharp's attention. 80

On the morning of 2 January, JCS transmitted the approval of the Pueblo's mission to

Hawaii. With this message, the events that would lead to the attack and seizure of the

ship within a few weeks were set in motion.

This NSA message concerning the Pueblo mission was the second advisory message

that NSA sent to the JRC/JCS and Navy commands on the subject of the possibility of

danger to a U.S. surface collection mission. Early in 1967, the Agency sent a similar

message to the JRC/JCS and a large number of Navy commands advising of possible

hostile actions by the North Koreans against a forthcoming mission by the USS Banner off

the North Korean coast. 81 During that mission, the Banner paused briefly for a day or two

off the North Korean coast. No hostile reaction occurred on that occasion.

In general, the military forces of the USSR, the PRC, and, in more recent years, those

of North Korea had a history of hostile reactions to U.S. airborne collection platforms.

Since the late 1940s- early 1950s Soviet air forces were involved in the shootdown of about

twelve-fifteen U.S. reconnaissance aircraft operating in international airspace in the

Atlantic and Pacific areas. The same was true to a lesser extent in regard to Chinese

Communist forces in the Far East. North Korean air forces reacted to U.S. airborne

collection missions after 1964-65.

Reactions to surface collection platforms by the Soviets dated from at least the 1960s

and involved harassment in the form of passing close aboard, bumping, and, in general,

creating a serious danger to navigation. Unlike their reactions to airborne missions, none

of these Soviet reactions to surface collection missions involved the use of weaponry. The

same was true ofChinese Communist naval forces.

14'01 I\P;LP;ASA~Lf: TO eorq'TltAeTOKS nOT !tf:Ll!JltSltBLfJ 'fe peRSIa?i ?i/t'Y'I8fh\l::S

38
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In recommendating a "minimal risk" category for the Pueblo mission, U.S. naval

commands pointed to the previous single Banner patrol off North Korea, albeit brief, as a

precedent for the absence of a hostile reaction. Perhaps too, the Navy believed that the

North Koreans, as did the Soviets and Chinese Communists, would also maintain the

distinction between air and seaborne collection platforms in regard to the form that their

reactions would take.

PUEBW SAILING ORDERS

For administrative purposes, the Pueblo was assigned to the Service Force, Pacific

Fleet, but for its reconnaissance mission it was assigned to the operational control of

Admiral Frank Johnson, Commander, Task Force 96 (CTF 96), who was also Commander,

Naval Forces, Japan. On 4 January 1968, Admiral Johnson inspected the Pueblo and

ordered Bucher to get under way on 5 January for Sasebo, Japan, in order to be in position

for the coming mission·82 The formal plan for the Pueblo's operation was contained in CTF

96 Operation Order No. 301-68, which provided specific guidance and instructions for the

assigned mission, including reporting instructions and operating and communications

plans. The sailing order issued 5 January augmented the operations order by including

the following specific instructions:

Depart Sasebo about BJanuary and proceed via Tsushima Strait to arrive in Operational Area

MARS about 10 January.

Conduct collection operations in area designated MARS (4000N to 3900N), VENUS (4100N to

4000N), and PLUTO (4200N to 4100N), concentrating on most productive areas.

Avoid detection and maintain emission control procedures except when establishing contact with

Soviet naval units. At this time, break emission control and transmit a daily situation report.

The closest point of approach (CPA) to North Korea, the Soviet landmass, and offshore islands is

13 nm.

Defensive armament (machine guns) should be stowed or covered in such a manner so that it does

not cause unusual interest by surveyed units. It should be used only in the event of a threat to

survival.

The provisions ofCINCPAC Instructions 003120.24A and 003100.3D apply in regard to the rules

of engagement and concerning conduct in the event of harassment or intimidation by foreign

units.83

The sailing order for the Pueblo used the codeword ICHTHYIC for the operation. All

previous references had cited the codeword PINKROOT, but when the USS Palm Beach was

assigned to the Atlantic instead of the Pacific Fleet, it became necessary to establish a

codeword for worldwide AGER operations. For this purpose, CNO assigned the codeword

BREEDER CLICKBEETLE (formerly used for the Banner's operations), and PINKROOT was

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(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

canceled. Henceforth, AGER operations in theL//// ~e~e to be ref~rred to by the

codeword FROSTFISH and those in the I ~yICHTHYIC I. 84

While the details ofthe Pueblo's mission were being finalized and the ship made ready,

Lieutenant Schumacher, the operations officer, received his Speci;:t.l Intelligence (SI)

clearance. He was upset about the delay in receiving it, saying ".. ,il think an error was

made in ordering me, as appointing me as operations officer without expediting my SI

clearance ... so that I could adequately perform my job as operations officer ... "85

Commander Bucher, following COMNAVFORJAPAN's o.rder of 4 January, made

hurried preparations to depart Yokosuka on the 5th. His operation order from CTF 96

arrived at 3:00 A.M. on that day, hardly time to review it/prior to an early morning

departure. As the Pueblo pulled away from its berth in YOkosuka, only a partial sailing

order had been received. The Pueblo was to get the remainder of its orders while the ship

was en route to Sasebo. 86

86-36

NSA, meanwhile, was taking steps to ensure that support to the Pueblo's mission

would be complete. It providel Iwith the details

of the Pueblo's mission as well as the ship's planned locations during the forthcoming

patrol so that these intercept sites would be fUlly. aware of the POSSi.bility of North Korean

reactions. In addition, NSA requestedl lto include the Pueblo as an addressee for

all South Korean-originated s ot re orts disseminate durin the eriod of its

mission. Also, NSA requeste

to readdress to the Pueblo 1orrl~T""""""--""""""'----:--"Ir'!"""-"""_---""",,,,,,,,,",,,,oJ..0 M

NAVSUM) to support the patro1.87

Looking back on that occasion, Bucher said, "I was proud of this ship and I was ready

to go, wanted to get out there and get this job on the road so that we could get this

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-P.L.

Normally, the voyage from Yokosuka/to Sasebo on the western coast of Kyushu would

have taken three days. However, because of stormy conditions in the Sea of Japan, the

Pueblo arrived on 9 January, a day later than planned. While en route to Sasebo, the

Pueblo received from Admiral Johnson a list of cryptographic equipment and publications

that it was authorized to hold. All items in excess of those listed were to be removed at

Sasebo "due to sensitive nature/ of operations in relatively shallow waters during

upcoming ICHTHYIC 1."88 This instruction was not consistent with the

COMNAVFORJAPAN and CIN"CPACFLT initial "minimal risk" category originally

assigned the mission. Also during the trip to Sasebo, the WLR-1 ELINT receiver in the SOD

hut had broken down and needed repair. 89 Before reaching port, the Pueblo informed COMNCFO:IA::N ~~iS malfunction, and, in response, a new part was flown to

Sasebo Off-loading cryptomaterials and repairing the WLR-1 took

another ay, t use aymg the Pueblo's departure from Sasebo until the predawn hours of

11 January 1968.91

41 Telit 5~(ReT l::JM81tA
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experience behind US.,,92 Admiral Johnson ofCOMNAVFORJAPAN also said that he was

satisfied that the USS Pueblo was in a satisfactory state of readiness and could carry out

its assigned mission. 93

Nearly three and one-half years had passed since the Department of Defense had first

mentioned the possibility of an AGER-type program; nineteen months had elapsed for the

conversion of a deactivated small cargo ship into the AGER Pueblo. Now it was to embark

on its first operational mission. In the minds of the Pueblo's captain and its task force

commander, the ship was officially deemed ready.

In a number of storms, however, the ship had pitched about violently. At best, the

steering machinery was antiquated and its reliability questionable. Small as the ship

was, rough seas caused rolling and "unsettled" conditions for operators seated in the

research detachment spaces; chairs fell over, equipment worked loose in the racks, and

stored paper fell from overhead.

Several of Pueblo's mechanical systems and devices were far from satisfactory. The

standard destruction system for classified documents was rudimentary. A small

incinerator of twenty-five pounds per hour capacity and two electrical, hand-fed, paper

shredders that could handle two reams per hour were barely adequate to dispose of the

normal daily burn requirements. These devices were augmented by fire axes, sledges, and

chipping hammers for equipment destruction. Any emergency destruction that might

become necessary wherein time was a critical factor would require extraordinary

measures. Although Bucher would later claim that he was attempting to devise such

methods of mass destruction, he did not do so. Pueblo's internal communication system

left much to be desired, and it was totally inadequate to meet the needs of any battle or

emergency situation. In practice, it was discovered that, because of temperamental

adjustments to the firing mechanisms, the .50-caliber machine guns took at least ten

minutes to activate. 94 Only one crew member, with former army experience, had ever had

any experience with such weapons, although members of the crew had received

rudimentary instruction on the weapons immediately prior to the ship's deployment.

In regard to general service crew staffing, it had been on the basis of AKL needs and

specialities; forty-four percent had never been to sea when first assigned. Of the NSG

detachment, only four had had prior sea duty, and one third were assigned duties in which

they had no practical experience apart from that received in Communications Technician

(CT) school. In addition, none of the CTs had had live experience in their specialties for

approximately nine months. This fact, coupled with the commanding officer's practice of

assigning CTs to deck duties when necessary, had markedly lowered the morale of the

NSG detachment. The assistant to the detachment's OIC joined the ship when it left

Yokosuka, six days before the operation began. This was hardly sufficient time for him to

become familiar with the capabilities of the individual CTs in order to use them effectively

- or to earn their respect and trust. The Korean linguists, too, boarded the Pueblo when it

left Yokosuka. These two Marine sergeants made no secret of their Korean language

fiaT ftl'JLI'JASABLI'J Ta eaI(TltAeT~~ I(~T ftJ!:LJ!:A!mI'>LJ!: to FOREtGN NAiiONALS

TOP SECRET l:IMBRA 42
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ineptitude. A similar situation pertained to the ship's ranking radioman. He too had

scrambled aboard the Pueblo just an hour before its departure from Yokosuka - and, like

the linguists, the radioman had little confidence in his own abilities.

In short, the upcoming voyage of the Pueblo had all the earmarks of a training cruise

rather tha,n an operational intelligence collection mission. A more experienced crew

would have gone a long way toward relieving some of the confusion aboard the Pueblo

when it was accosted by the North Koreans. It was clear the voyage would be a troubled

one, danger from the North Koreans aside.

We have seen how the review and approval of the Pueblo's proposed mission was

handled in Washington. Arriving as it did at the beginning of the 1967 Christmas and

New Year holiday season, the proposal was buried under several hundred other missions

in the January 1968 reconnaissance schedule. Absenteeism at the JCS level precluded the

JCS from following their normal pattern of meeting personally to review the schedule;

instead, approval was given by their several staffs. In fact, the JCS, DoD, and 303

Committee reviews and approvals were all accomplished within the space of a single day.

Although something of a record for speedy efficiency, such procedural achievement

suggested only cursory or token examination of the total reconnaissance schedule - not to

mention a detailed look at the Pueblo's operational mission. The NSA message to JCS,

summarizing SIGINT information on North Korean aggressiveness, was intended to serve

as an advisory to those personnel looking at such things as risk assessment and back-up

ship protection measures for the Pueblo. Instead, the message was virtually ignored by

DIA, JCS, and CINCPAC. The Pueblo sailed into the Sea ofJapan for operations off the

North Korean east coast poorly prepared for its mission and subsequent actions by the

North Koreans.

P'fQ'f R:SbliJJ,S,\BMl 'fa eaU'ffblte'feftS NeT :IU'::L~1i~1i~LEI"fi "REIGN NA IIONALS

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OCID: 3997429

Chapter III

The Patrol

lell SECRET I::IMBRA

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The Pueblo's sailing orders specified that upon leaving Sasebo, it was to check out of

the U.S. Navy's ship movements reporting syst~m and maintain radio silence, i.e.,

emission control (EMCON). Only ifdetected was/the ship to transmit and giveits position.

Before departing port, Bucher discussed with Admiral Johnson's staff just what

constituted "detection." It was agreed that/this meant visual observation by a ship or

aircraft that would most likely report the Pueblo's presence to either the Soviets or North

Koreans; this definition excluded radar detection. 1

To help avoid detection, Bucher relied on /both SIGINT and collateral intelligence

sources. The day before the Pueblo departed SaseboJ ......

I I

I>?

IThis information was transmitted to the Pueblo via the

U.S. Navy's operational intelligence/broadcast.

Daily reconnaissance flights out ofl Ikept track of the

location of Soviet naval units, and thus Bucher knew, when leaving Sasebo, that a Soviet

destroyer and tanker were plying the Tsushima Strait.' To avoid detection, Bucher

decided to hug the coast of the Japanese island of Honshu and give the Soviet ships a wide

berth. His intention was to proceed northward through the Sea ofJapan, keeping forty to

fifty miles from the coast of North Korea until the Pueblo reached its northernmost

operating area, PLUTO (see Operational Map, page 40).5

Weather forecasts monitored by the Pueblo on its first day out were not favorable. The

prognosis from Guam~ Iwas for rough

weather immediately ahead. This was confirmed by the English language weather

broadcas! IBucher found that these reports were very reliable. 6

On 12 January 1968, at a point approximately 35 degrees, 15 minutes north, the

Pueblo headed into the Sea ofJapan on a track toward the Demilitarized Zone7 so as to pass

roughly twenty miles south of the South Korean island ofUllung-do. 8 Shortly beyond that

point, as it entered operational area MARS (see Operational Map, page 40), the Pueblo ran

into a severe winter storm. The ship reacted violently and forced Bucher to go some

:::~=

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45 lell SECRET UM8RA
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(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

seventy miles out to sea in order to maintain a safe condition. Many of the crew were sick,

including all of the officers except Warrant Officer Lacy and Bucher himself. This

alteration of course delayed the Pueblo in keeping to its planned itinerary.

By Sunday, 14 January, the worst of the storm was Qver. The Pueblo turned back

toward the North Korean east coast through heavy swells and proceeded north following

the contour of the coast but well out to sea. The weather now was overcast with six miles

visibility and westerly winds at fourteen to twenty knots. Although the storm was over,

the Pueblo faced still another problem. As the ship worked its way northward, the

temperature turned bitterly cold, and the Pueblo began to ice up. Sometimes as much as

two inches ofice would form during the night over the entire deck,and Bucher would have

the crew, including CTs, chipping away at it. 9

On Tuesday, 16 January, the Pueblo arrived at the 42d paranel, the northernmost

limit of its operating area, just south of Vladivostok and the boundary separating North

Korea and the USSR. The ship was still approximately twenty-five to thirty miles from

the coast, but that same day it cruised to a point off Ch'ongjin and came within fifteen

miles ofshore, closer than at any previous time. By using the "Big Eyes" (twenty-two-inch

binoculars), Bucher could see smoke coming from chimneys. LO

At this time, to make certain that the Pueblo did not approach the shore closer than

thirteen nautical miles, navigation became critical. Bucher ordered navigational fixes

every half-hour during the day and every twenty minutes at night. He also. ordered all

officers-of-the-deck to head the ship out to sea whenever they had any doubts about where

the ship was and to call Bucher immediately. Once they were positive they were a good

fifteen miles from land, they were to come to "all stop" so that the exact position\could be

determined. Apart from Lieutenant Murphy and Quartermaster First Class Law,

Bucher's crew had marginal navigational experience. In his words: "I had only one other

quartermaster on board, Plucker, who is a third class and he did not have much

experience. My other two people standing quartermaster watches were Electronics

Technician Second Class Nolte, who never had any experience along this line, and

Crandell, Radioman Third Class, who never had any experience. . .. I did not hav€\.a

highly professional group ofseamen to do my navigational chores for me. "11

____I

Having arrived at the patrol's northern limit, and before beginning the transit down

the North Korean east coast, Bucher called together all his general service chiefs, first

class, and leading petty officers to brief them on the general operations of the ship.

Nothing about the SIGINT mission was disclosed. He advised them that they were on a

classified intelligence operation, that they were not to get any closer to the coast than

NOT REI FA '3" ir..F 1'0 Qo~rnb\G'fOR8 N8'f RBh8ASABbfiJ 'fa FaftfiJI6I( H1'<TIOI(AL0!5

Tap SECRET blMBRA 46
1'6P SECRET ~MIIR.o.

thirteen miles, that the coast and shipping were to be surveyed, and to perform correctly

because they might not get a chance to do it twice. Photographer's Mate First Class Mack

remembered thinking that navigation shouldn't be a problem because Quartermaster

First Class Charles Law was such a good navigator. 13

Commander Bucher was sure that he hadn't been detected while traveling northward

to operational area PLUTO. He had taken particular pains to avoid observation. When

debriefed, he said, "IfI saw a mast on the horizon in the direction I was going, if necessary I

would turn and run in the other direction in order to avoid coming into real good view. 14

Operating closer to shore, however, the Pueblo saw occasional merchant ships going in

or out of ports such as Ch'ongjin. None of these evidenced any interest in the Pueblo; in

fact, the closest passed one evening at about five to eight thousand yards. Photographer's

Mate First Class Mack would photograph the vessels and then prepare slides for

Commander Bucher's use in identifying the ships by comparing them with photographs

contained in on-board publications about merchant ships of the world. is In total, Mack

estimated that he photographed about eight different ships while the Pueblo was on

patrol. 16

As sundown approached each evening, Bucher ordered his officer of the deck (OOD) to

take the Pueblo farther out to sea,usually to a distance of eighteen to twenty miles. Then

on the morning watch (4:00 to 8:00 A.M.), the OOD would turn the Pueblo around so that

the ship would again be fourteen to fifteen miles from shore by dawn. 17

On the way to the PLUTO area, one of the Pueblo's three generators blew up. Fireman

Bandera completely tore it down but realized that its repair would have to wait until the

ship returned to Yokosuka. Later, one of the auxiliary generators also broke down and

remained inoperable for lack ofspare parts. 18

The frigid weather encountered in the PLUTO operational area required constant

chipping of ice. Not only were the crew's quarters cold because the heating system wasn't

working well, but according to Communications Technician Third Class Ralph

McClintock, there were other discomforts as well: "... we had trouble with the water all

the time...the bilge pump was backing up or something and I'd wake up in the morning

sometimes and find everything floating around the deck."19

In the research detachment spaces, SIGINT collection was at a low level. Since the

Pueblo had stayed some forty miles from the coast on the way northward, about the only

activity which occurred at that range was the taking ofbearings on some HF signals. 20

Although there was little intercept, the crew established a routine for burning

classified material, particularly incoming traffic collected by the "0" Branch

(Communications) that was not needed by the Pueblo. Every day at about 8:00 A.M., two or

three CTs from the SOD hut would use the incinerator. Usually eight or nine burn bags

required destruction. Using the on-board shredders was so time consuming that most

P-,ElY' RJilbJil}tSltBbEl Y'El GElnY'RJ.GY'ElRS P-,ElY' RJilbEltSABbE Y'El F'ElRElI€m nAY'IEln1zbS

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47 1'6P SECRET UMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

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often paper was balled up instead and fed into the incinerator, which had a capacity of one

or two "burn bags" at a time. After burning, the incinerator was stoked to shake down the

ashes that, when cooled, were loaded into buckets and thrown over the side. During this

operation, no general service crewmen were allowed in the incinerator area. 21

After spending about two days ofT Ch'ongjin, the Pueblo deployed farther south under

cover of darkness on the night of 17 January. By the next morning, it had entered the

VENUS operational area and was stationed off So'ngjin (now Kimch'aek), some sixteen

miles out at about parallel 41 degrees and 14 minutes north longitude. 22 In this location as

well as at Ch'ongjin, SIGINT activity was very slight, but at least the weather had

improved. Skies were clear and, although the temperature was cold, the ship was no

longer icing Up.23

On 19 January, Lieutenant Harris recommended that the Pueblo depart the So'ngjin

area and head south toward the next coastal target, the port of Mayang-do. This area was

thought to be the major base for North Korea's small submarine fleet. The Pueblo arrived

opposite Mayang-do during the night of 19 January and was operating some fourteen to

fifteen miles offshore on the morning of 20 January.24 The Pueblo was now in area MARS,

the southernmost ofthe three operational areas.

PUEBLO SIGINT DETACHMENT AND ITS MISSION

The SIGINT detachment aboard was organized similarly to other NAVSECGRU units

ashore and afloat. Any differences were primarily ofsize rather than basic function. For

example, the Administrative Branch (A) consisted of one CTl, and the Maintenance

Branch (M) was staffed by a CTCS and two CT3s. Four men manned the Communications

Branch (0), just barely enough to cover a three-shift operation responsible for operating

the teletypewriters and cryptographic equipment, handling message routing and

cryptographic procedures, and assuring proper use of circuits. Aboard the Pueblo, the

NAVSECGRU crew carried out intercept and processing operations as follows:

The Collection Branch (R), with four people, was responsible for Morse

intercept, high frequency direction finding, and radiotelephone intercept that

did not require linguistic skills.

The Technical Branch (T), with a personnel strength of twelve men, did the

intercepting, recording, processing, and analyzing of all types of non-Morse

systems.

The Intercept Branch (I) CTs, five in number, performed all tasks requiring

foreign language proficiency and served as radiotelephone operators and

transcribers. 25

The U.S. Navy had provided the primary operational tasking for the Pueblo's patrol: in

particular, CINCPAC wanted the Pueblo to sample the electronic environment of the east

ua'f RELEA:Sl\BLE 'fa e6fift'ftl\e'f6KS I~6T ftP::LP::RSR!!lLP:: T6 F6rtEIGN NR I 16N ALS

TOP !S!eR!T tJMBRA 48
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'!lb)13)-50 USC 403

fb) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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coast of North Korea with emphasis on the intercepl1'mdfixingof coastal radars. 26 NSA

provided secondary tasking that was more specjfi:c. 27NSA expressed special interest inlhe

1//

searching and recording of any signals emanating from North Korea that might he

Llnaddition, NSA requested that special

efforts be made to intercept c011lmunications signalsin thel,--_~-:-...,...-:,"""",_""",--:-":""""",,,,,_

and, if intercepted, to fix accurately the location of the emitters. Other COMINT tasking on

North Korean targetsinduded the collectiooof a North Korean Air Force voice net; all

Army single charmel voice communications in the rangel ,Ito include cQastal

artillery coll1munications; aIINavy single-channel voice communications betweenl, ,I I Ito include ship~to~ship and ship-to-shore communications; and the intercept of

I I

In addition to the COMINT' signals described above, NSA gave the Pueblo secondary

tasking for the following sl als in which it had a articular interest: adar

signals associated with I II IradL.a-r-s"'\-g-n-a"T"'""s-a-s-s-o-c"'\-a':"'"te-d"l""""w~l t"T"'""""'lK"l"o-m-a-r---c"'"a-s-s...· -g-u""'i"T"""e"'Td-m""i"'s-s""ir-e......b-o-a"':"'ts----l

berthed at Wonsan; cruise missile emitters emanating from within a ten-nautical-mile

radius of 38 degrees, 42 minutes north latitude and 128 degrees, 17 minutes east

longitude. NSA also gave the Pueblo secondary tasking for ELINT search operations. This

tasking covered new, unusual, and unidentified signals, and land-based, shipborne, and

airborne radar emissions. NSA tasked the Pueblo NAVSECGRU detachment with

visually correlating airborne and shipborne signals with emitter platforms and, for landbased emitters, to obtain direction finding bearings to determine their locations. 28

Although the Pueblo's operational SIGINT tasking was dear, the ship's performance in

pursuit ofsuch requirements was poor and plagued with problems. The Technical Branch

discovered that its technical support documentation with Yistings of North Korean manual

Morse callsigns and frequencies was outdated. As a result, the branch could not determine

whether it was copyingI P9 As for radioprinter traffic, the

branch found nothing. 30 In the Technical Branch, s 'veral operators were either poorly

trained or had never used the signal detection equipment, ANIWLR-1. 31 In fact, there were

no qualified non-Morse search and development operators aboard. 32 Nevertheless, the

branch did log about 135 signals, including a number of Soviet-developed North Korean

navigational, surveillance, and target acquisition radars. 33 The linguists in the Intercept

Branch, because of their limited knowledge of Korean, were unable to transcribe what

they had recorded, which was very little. At the time of capture, they had intercepted no

more than twenty tapes, including some Russian. 34 Marine Sergeants Chicca and

Hammond did not have any experience on the North Korean target. 35 Maintenance

Branch personnel echoed the fact that many operators in the other branches were so

inexperienced that they could not make full use oftheir equipment. 36

Just prior to the Pueblo's capture, Lieutenant Harris released two technical reports

that gave details about the patrol's SIGINT collection activities between 12 and 13
(b)(3)d8 USC 798

(b)f3)-P;L. 86-36

TO' 5EeRET UMBRA

January.37 The reports showed that the amount of intercept.collected at eathotth~ major

ports off which the Pueblo stationed itself during its southward transit of the North

Korean coast

This result was far below ....._--------------------------' expectations. The ELINT collection was much the same. The Pueblo's first technical report

message stated that only unidentified signals had been intercepted and g;ivethe technical

characteristics of each.

As the Pueblo neared the Wonsan area, some of the senior people aboard had some

thoughts about the Pueblo's attempt to remain undetected. Communications Technician

First Class James A. Shepard, the ship's senior ELINT analyst, firmly believed that the

North Koreans were always aware of the Pueblo's presence. At his intelligence del::>riefing

on his return to the United States, he stated, "During the whole course of the operatiooi

the transit up and the transit back,

In preparing his daily reports about patrol operations, Commander Bucher made some

strong comments about the desirability of not conducting a mission at that particular time

ofyear because ofthe lack of activity. Lieutenant Schumacher, Pueblo's operations officer,

said of the SIGINT effort, "The opinion I'd got from Lieutenant Harris every time I went

through the SOD hut was

We could have come up with some positive recommendationsfor not

L.g-o-l-n-g""T'""a-c"T"""-u-p""TT-e..... re.Be~ause of, primarily the time of year, mid-winter, everybody was

staying home, while we wereol.lt there trying to chip offthe deck.,,40

The Pueblo continued to operateQff Mayang-do. The Pueblo crew did.not realize that

North Korean guerrillas were at that mmnent preparing to infiltrate South Korea in an

attempt to assassinate President Pak ChungHee in his residence, th~Blue House, on the

following day. The weather was overcast with unlimited visibility<and light southwesterly

winds. There was no hint of the difficult times in store for the Pueblo.

(b) (1)

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(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Tep SECRET UMBRA 50
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Chapter IV

North Korean Attack and Seizure

On Saturday, 20 January, the Pueblo was dead in the water in the MARS Operational

Area about 15.4 miles southwest of Mayang-do. At 5:30 p.M.,l while located at position 39

degrees, 47 minutes north, and 128 degrees, 25.5 minutes east, a North Korean modified

SO-I-class subchaser passed the Pueblo at a range of about 4,000 yards. In the twilight,

the subchaser appeared only as a silhouette, and no identification could be made. This

ship was apparently headed for Wonsan. The Pueblo reported that the subchaser showed

no apparent interest in the Pueblo. In the light of subsequent events, it may only be

guessed that this ship conducted an initial North Korean reconnaissance of the Pueblo. 2

That night the Pueblo headed south toward Wonsan, the last area of interest in the

MARS Operational Area. Commander Bucher intended to arrive at a point fIfteen miles

east ofWonsan at 7:00 A.M. on 22 January.3

NORTH KOREAN VISUAL SURVEILLANCE

Arriving on station as planned, the Pueblo remained dead in the water for most of the

day. It was a bright, brisk day with a temperature of 36 degrees and a slight breeze. At

12:25 P.M., two North Korean ships were sighted at a range of about 10,000 yards, bearing

170 degrees and an estimated speed of eight knots. When the ships were within 1,500

yards, one changed course and passed close aboard the Pueblo's starboard beam at about

100 yards. The two North Korean ships then hove to about 9,000 yards apart. 4 This was a

more identifiable North Korean reconnaissance effort.

Noting some Korean writing on the ships' sterns, Bucher called for the Korean

linguists in the research spaces to come to the bridge and translate the Korean characters.

Marine Sergeants Chicca and Hammond could not translate the names immediately but,

after obtaining a dictionary in the SOD hut, identifIed the ships as Rice Paddy 1 and Rice

Paddy 2. Bucher also called Lieutenant Harris to the bridge to ask if the detachment was

intercepting any communications between the two ships. When none was indicated,

Bucher expressed dismay at the linguists' lack of proficiency. Until now he had been

unaware ofthe sergeants' limited capability.5

Both ships were identically painted navy gray and closely resembled the Soviet

Lentra-class intelligence collection trawler. Each had stack markings of black, red, and

black bands with a red star in a white circle in the center of the red band. No radar or

ELINT equipment was observed. but each had a triple long wire antenna between the

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masts. Neither ship carried an ensign nor flew any flag. Both appeared heavily laden and

fishing nets and lines were stowed neatly on each. At 3:00 P.M. both ships began another

approach. The Pueblo remained dead in the water at 39 degrees, 14.8 minutes north and

128 degrees, 7.33 minutes east. This time, the trawlers closed to about thirty yards and

proceeded aft along the Pueblo's port side, cutting closely across the stern and down the

starboard side. During their passage, it appeared that all hands (about nineteen people on

each) observed the Pueblo. No flag signal or oral exchange was initiated and following this

surveillance, both ships retired on course 340 degrees iand disappeared by 4 P.M.

Throughout this incident the Pueblo was showing the iinternational signal flag for

hydrographic operations. 6

Convinced that the two trawlers would notify North/Korean authorities ofthe Pueblo's

presence, Bucher ordered his operations officer, Lieutenant Schumacher, to draft a

message notifying Admiral Johnson, COMNAVFORJAPAN, of the Pueblo's detection.

This message would mark the first time that Pueblo had broken radio silence since

departing Sasebo. Schumacher notified the CTs in/the research area to bring up a circuit

to Kami Seya and then began to prepare the messa,ge. 7

Bucher's assumption that he had been detected was valid. NSA's subsequent

reevaluation of all U.S.I rt that time revealed SIGINT reflections

(unknown to the Pueblo) of this encounter in North Korean naval communications that

showed the radar tracking oftwo fishing vessels in a corresponding area from 4 to 7:30 P.M.

An unidentified vessel, probably the Pueblo, was tracked by two different North Korean

radar facilities. This ship was reported dead in the water at 39 degrees, 19 minutes north,

128 degrees, 10 minutes east through approximately 9:30 P.M. on 22 January. The Pueblo

was also possibly under surveillance by North Korean Air Force MiG-17s during this

period, since tracking reports from about 9:30 P.M. reflected aircraft activity over

Tongjoson Bay, which encompassed the area in which the Pueblo was located.8 During this

period, no U.S. official knew where the Pueblo was located because of the ship's radio

silence.

After completing his draft, Schumacher gave the message to Bucher who, with the

executive officer, Lieutenant Murphy, continued to work on the exact wording. Finally, at

about 2200, the message was returned to Schumacher for transmission. Knowing that he

was scheduled for the 4 A.M. to 8 A.M. watch, Schumacher left the message in the

cryptoroom and went to bed. 9

Following Schumacher's instructions, Communications Technician First Class Donald

E. Bailey, in the NAVSECGRU Communications Branch, started to make contact with

Kami Seya. Attempts to use the circuit were frustrating; when transmission seemed good,

the Pueblo reception was nil and vice versa. At about midnight, the circuit was activated

for a short time but not long enough to pass any traffic. to Poor atmospheric conditions

were working to the Pueblo's disadvantage. Bailey kept trying to set up communications

all night long with no success. At 8 A.M. on the 23d he went off watch and was relieved by

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DOCID: 3997429

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Communications technician Third Class Sidney J. Karnes; the circuit to Kami Seya was

still out. 11

During the night, the midwatch had detected eighteen different vessels in the Pueblo's

vicinity, the closest contact being 3,000 yards. At 1:45 A.M. one of these vessels lit a large

orange flare that glowed for about thirty seconds. The purpose of the illumination was

unclear. There were, however, no further attempts at close surveillance or harassment

throughout the remainder of the night. Thereupon, another message was drafted to notify

COMNAVFORJAPAN that the Pueblo no longer considered itself under surveillance and

was reverting to radio silence but intended to remain in the Wonsan area. 12 Unfortunately,

the earlier message reporting the initial detection had yet to be transmitted.

On the 23d of January, after having breakfast in the wardroom with Commander

Bucher, Schumacher dropped by the cryptoroom to see if the CTs had transmitted the

message he had left with them the previous night. In Schumacher's words: "I went in

there and it was 'all stop,' nobody was doing anything ... n He discovered that Kami Seya

had given the ship a choice of about four frequencies to try. Schumacher himself cut a

transmission tape and started sending it on one of the given frequencies. He then switched

to the cryptosetting for the new radio day and could hear Kami Seya trying to answer.

Reception wasn't clear, andSchumacher could not spend any more time on the problem so

he left it with the CTs to keep trying. 13 Cipher communications were finally established

with Kami Seya at 1054 on 23 January, and Schumacher transmitted his entire backlog of

three messages. The first announced that the Pueblo had been sighted and that it intended

to institute at least daily situation reports. Bucher gave the position of his vessel and a

detailed description of the North Korean vessels and their reaction to the Pueblo. The

second was a detailed list of activity since the Pueblo entered the operational area, and it

was addressed only to a SIGINTaudience. In the third, written to fulfill the daily reporting

schedule already proposed, Bucher gave an operational summary of the Pueblo's activity,

stated that he felt that they Were no longer under surveillance, and announced his

intention to discontinue reporting. In the last of these messages, the Pueblo reported its

position as 39 degrees, 24 minutes north and 127 degrees, 59 seconds east (18.2 nautical

miles from Ung-do).14

Thus, Admiral Johnson's command, COMNAVFORJAPAN, finally learned around

noon on 23 January of the Pueblo's position and that, although it had been detected by the

North Korean vessels, the Pueblo was no longer under surveillance.

It should be noted in the ensuing discussion of the seizure of the Pueblo that most of

the SIGINT data intercepted by U.S.I Isites were not available for

NSA reporting until after the event occurred, a period covering several hours to several

days.

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The intercepted voice communications referred to below concerning the involvement of the

North Korean Ministry of National Defense in the seizure were not available-for NSA

reporting until about a month after the event. I ._-.-.-.-._. I

._-.-.-.-.-.-.-.

Although the Pueblo reported that it was not under visual observation, subsequent

SIGINT revealed that it had probably been tracked by the North Korean radar station at

Kukchi-bong during the late night of the 22d and early morning of the 23d. This station

reported an unidentified vessel, moving very slowly from a position dead in the water at 39

degrees, 14 minutes north and 128 degrees, 17 minutes east at 4:15 A.M. to 39 degrees, 12

minutes north and 128 degrees, 12 minu.tes east. SIGINT also indicated that the Pueblo

may also have come under the surveillance of MiGs of the Second Fighter Division during

the period from 1000 to 1100 hours, when exercises involving these aircraft were noted

over Tongjoson Bay. It was during this time that the North Koreans referred to the Pueblo

as an "enemy ship" in North Korean naval communications, and the Kukchi-bong radar

station was noted directing the activity of two North Korean Navy (NKN) vessels toward

it. 15 These SIGINT data clearly indicated that the North Koreans at this time held some

information on the identity ofthe Pueblo.

Of particular importance prior to the approach of the North Korean subchaser and

torpedo boats to the Pueblo operating area was the intercept of North Korean voice

communications from the Kukchi-bong naval radar station. While directing the naval

units toward the Pueblo, Kukchi-bong made reference to an unidentified element of the

North Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND).16 It became clear that the MND was

at least cognizant of, and probably directing, an event of major significance, in this

instance, an attack upon and seizure ofan American ship in international waters.

When Schumacher joined Bucher for breakfast on the 23d, he found Bucher slightly

upset that the Pueblo had gotten about twenty-five miles ofT the coast during the night.

Bucher immediately ordered the OOD to steam back in. 17 At about 0800, Lieutenant

Harris reported to Bucher that SIGINT activity was definitely picking up and that this was

going to be the most fruitful area in which the Pueblo had operated. The SIGINT

detachment was detecting quite a number of radars, but there were no indications of any

hostile intent. 18

As noon approached, the Pueblo was lying to, dead in the water. The temperature was

near freezing, and there was a breeze of four knots from the northwest. At 11:40 A.M.,

Quartermaster First Class Charles B. Law relieved Chief Warrant Officer Lacy as OOD.

Shortly thereafter, Law spotted a vessel coming up fairly fast ofT the Pueblo's port quarter

at a distance estimated at six miles. Law notified Bucher immediately and was told to

notify him again when the ship had closed to about three miles. 19 As Bucher was finishing

lunch in the wardroom, he got word from the bridge that the ship, identified as an SO-l-

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class subchaser, was still closing and had not swung toward the coast. Arriving topside,

Bucher summoned Harris from the SOD hut, Schumacher, and his signalman, Wendell G.

Leach. After verifying that the approaching ship was an 50-1 subchaser and noting that it

carried a SKINHEAD fire control radar, Harris returned to the research spaces. 20

As the subchaser drew closer, approaching from the south, Bucher had Dunnie Tuck,

one of the two oceanographers aboard, make a Nansen cast (to collect water samples) and

simultaneously ordered Leach to display the flag signals indicating hydrographic work in

progress. 21 Traveling at about 15 knots, the subchaser closed to 500 yards from the Pueblo,

circled it, and then laid to toward the shore. Again the 50-1 (bearing hull number 35, i.e.,

SC-35) circled the Pueblo and this time hoisted a flag signal querying the Pueblo's

nationality. Bucher immediately told his signalman to show it and Leach broke out a

brand new American flag and hoisted it up the mast. 22

Meanwhile (according to later SIGINT analysis that was not available until after the

attack and seizure), the subchaser was reporting back to shore that "... the name of the

target is GER 2 .. ,judge it to be a reconnaissance search ship" and, after the U.S. flag was

displayed, "it is American, guys ... a hydrographic mapping ship ... weapons are not

visible." Ten minutes later the subchaser reported, "... the ship has a lot of antennas on it;

radar-type antennas and radio antennas ... think it is a ship for detecting something."23

The research detachment aboard the Pueblo was receiving a lot of this Korean voice

traffic on VHF nets; however, the very limited language ability of the Korean linguists

aboard the Pueblo precluded any direct support intelligence being derived from it for use

by the Pueblo. 24 Moreover, even if the linguists aboard the Pueblo had been able to

interpret this voice intercept, none of this intelligence would have been of any use to the

Pueblo crewmen in preparing them for what happened in the next instant.

By this time, the subchaser was more certain of its target, i.e" it knew the nationality

of the Pueblo, it knew its hull number, i.e., GER-2, and, according to SIGINT, it also knew

that its mission was electronic surveillance. This information was apparently sufficient

for the North Koreans, and it soon became apparent that the Pueblo would receive special

attention. For the Pueblo, it would not be a simple matter of being chased out of the area

similar to what the North Korean subchaser, SC-34, had done to the South Korean fishing

vessels on 10 January when a number of them came across the Northern Limit Line (see

Chapter III, page 1). It would also not be a case of simple harassment such as that

previously received by the USS Banner while in waters off the coasts of the USSR and the

PRC.

NORTH KOREAN WARNING SIGNAL

For a third time, the subchaser circled the Pueblo and this time hoisted the flag signal

"Heave to or I will open fire." This signal had been seen before by U.S. surface collection

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North Korean subchaser, SO-I, which fired on the USS Pueblo.
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platforms. The USS Banner had received this signal from Soviet ships while in the Sea of

Japan off Vladivostok in 1965-66. The Banner had encountered it again at the hands of

the Chinese Communists in the East China Sea off Shanghai in 1967. 25 The Chinese had

known what the Banner was from the moment the ship first appeared off Shanghai on its

first mission to that area in November 1966. Harassment had begun almost immediately.

It had been met by armed Chinese trawlers that were probably vectored to the Banner by

Chinese shore authorities. To the captain ofthe Banner, it had appeared that the trawlers

were waiting for the Banner. 26 This suggests that the Soviets may have given the Chinese

an advance tip-off of the identity of the Banner and its mission. The Banner had first

operated off the coast of the USSR in 1965-66, and Soviet officials were familiar with the

ship.

On the Pueblo's flying bridge, Bucher reacted to the North Korean signal. He turned

and ordered Schumacher to send out a flash precedence message to report the Pueblo's

harassment and the Pueblo's intention to remain in the area if at all possible. Schumacher

returned to the radio shack to draft the message, getting the Pueblo's position from the

executive officer and other instructions by voice tube from the pilot house. 27

Schumacher had already called down to the cryptoroom and told them to keep open the

teletype circuit to Kami Seya. 28 Communications Technician Don Bailey had just finished

transmitting all the traffic the Pueblo had for Kami Seya when someone came by the

cryptoroom and told him that there were some more ships coming out toward the Pueblo.

The North Koreans could not have had this quick a reaction to the Pueblo without some

suspicion beforehand of what the Pueblo was and not without some degree of preplanning

on what their actions would be if their suspicions had proved correct. Bailey quickly

informed the Kami Seya operator that the Pueblo was getting "some more company." 29

A few seconds before, Bucher had spotted three torpedo boats headed for the Pueblo at

a high rate ofspeed. Overhead, two MiGs flew past the Pueblo at an altitude of about 4,000

feet in a north to south direction. Intercepted communications among the North Korean

Navy vessels at this time confirmed that the North Korean fighter aircraft were on the

scene and standing by in case of need. 30 Bucher personally verified the radar readings that

showed the Pueblo to be 15.6 miles from land. A fourth torpedo boat soon joined the others,

and they surrounded the Pueblo, that is, two forward and two aft. It soon became apparent

just what the North Koreans had in mind; Bucher had read about this deployment when

reviewing the Banner reports prior to the Pueblo's departure from Japan. The Soviets had

used it against the Banner in the Sea ofJapan off Vladivostok. It had also been used by the

Chinese Communists in 1967 in the East China Sea off Shanghai. The pattern was

designed to cut off any possible escape attempt by a vessel caught in its center. It was a

good pattern with which to intimidate a ship's crew, especially when the intended victim

was outgunned.
DOClD- 3997429

North Korean torpedo boat involved in the attack and seizure ofthe USS PlUblo.

. ; t t J
QOCID: 3997429

TOP 5ECIIt!" tJM8RA

Bucher told the OOD not to go to General Quarters because he did not want people

corning on deck with helmets on, nor did he want the .50-caliber guns uncovered. He

wanted to avoid any hostile appearance and did not want to give the Koreans any excuse to

open fire on him. Bucher wanted to appear as nothing more than an innocent

hydrographic ship for as long as possible. 31 However, if the NAVSECGRU detachment

aboard the Pueblo had been able to read the Korean voice material intercepted by the

Pueblo, Bucher would have known that any further hope he had of disguising his ship as a

hydrographic vessel was no longer a possibility. The North Koreans knew by this time

that the Pueblo was an electronic surveillance ship.

In response to the subchaser's flag signal, "Heave to or I will open fire," Bucher

ordered Signalman Leach to hoist a signal flag to indicate that the North Koreans were

interfering with the Pueblo's free passage of international waters. Leach, however, was

unable to find the exact flag signal for this in the International Code of Signals (H. O. No.

103), and so he tried to get the attention of SC-35 by flashing signal light. The subchaser

did not answer or acknowledge Leach's light call, probably because it was interested only

in having its order carried out. The Pueblo did not send its message. 32

Finishing the initial flash message, Schumacher took it to the cryptoroom for

transmission. The message advised Air Intelligence Group 7623, the United States

National Military Command Center in Washington, D.C., and the USS Banner of the

encounter with the subchaser and that it had ordered the Pueblo to heave to or it would

open fire. 33 Bailey, alerted to the message preparation, had already told Kami Seya "Got a

flash coming for you ... Stand by." Bailey transmitted the message (date/time group

230352Z January 1968) twice, and Kami Seya acknowledged receipt. The Pueblo's

position was reported as 39 degrees, 25.2 minutes north and 127 degrees, 55 minutes east

at 1200 hours. The message was immediately followed by Bailey's chatter to the Kami

Seya operator: "It is worse out here now. Got more company and not doing good with them

so will have to keep this circuit up." 34

Returning to the bridge, Schumacher arrived in time to see one of the torpedo boats

approaching the Pueblo's starboard quarter with about eight to ten armed men positioned

and ready to attempt to board the Pueblo. This was a clear indication that the North

Koreans had something far more serious in mind than mere intimidation. Bucher, too,

saw this maneuver and immediately signalled his engine room "all ahead full" while

ordering the helmsman to course 080 that would take him directly toward the open sea. 35

At the same time he ordered Signalman Leach to make up the signal that the Pueblo was

departing the area. Not being able to compose this signal by international flag signal,

Leach tried again to call by flashing light but got no reply from the subchaser. Bucher

next told Leach to thank them for their hospitality. Since the signal light had proved

ineffective, Leach attempted to send this message by semaphore; again he got no

response. 36 Once again, the North Koreans proved that they were only interested in

having their orders obeyed and in getting aboard the Pueblo.

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DOCID: 3997429

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Schumacher, in the meantime, had retired to the radio shack to prepare another flash

message to update the Pueblo's situation. Desiring to make this follow-up message as

accurate and as complete as possible, Schumacher scampered back to the bridge to see

what signals were flying and to identify the torpedo boats so that he could include these

details in the message text. This done, he typed a smooth copy and raced down to the

cryptoroom to have it transmitted. 37 This message advisedthe same addressees as the first

message that SC-35 had been joined by three North Korean fast patrol boats and that

these vessels had surrounded the Pueblo at close range. Fur.ther, the message stated that

SC-35 had signalled the Pueblo, "Follow in my wake. I have a pilot aboard." This

instruction to the Pueblo again indicated that the North Koreans, with a pilot aboard one

oftheir ships, had planned to take the ship in tow prior to departing base. The second flash

message from the Pueblo also advised that two MiG fighter aircraft were circling

overhead; that one of the patrol boats had come alongside the Pueblo's bow with fenders

rigged; that there was an armed party of North Koreans on the.bow of the patrol boat

ready to board; and, finally, that it was Pueblo's intention to departthe area. This second

message, date/time group 230415Z January, was also sent twice and receipted for by Kami

Seya. 38

It was now approaching 1320 hours, about eighty minutes since the Pueblo was first

challenged by the subchaser. The North Koreans had been frustrated in their boarding

attempt when Bucher had suddenly ordered his ship to proceed immediately toward the

open sea. The Pueblo had left the intended boarding party on the bow of the PT boat with

the space between the two vessels increasing as the Pueblo moved away.SIGINT analysis

by NSA after the fact revealed that, having raised the flag signal "Heave to or I will open

fire," the subchaser ordered one ofthe torpedo boats to "get a decision quickly.:" From 1245

to 1300, more ships were brought up to support SC-35. SIGINT revealed that the plan was to

transfer troops (a boarding party of five men and a unit commander) from SC-.35 to one of

the torpedo boats and from the torpedo boat to the Pueblo. Initially, the North Koreans

had planned for SC-35 to tow the target back to Wonsan. By about 1320, the transfer of the

boarding party to the PT was completed, but conversations between this boat and SC-35

indicated a reluctance to board the Pueblo because "the distance was too great:!. 39 The

North Koreans probably did not wish to get caught aboard the U.S. ship in interna.tional

waters if there were a possible U.S. rescue attempt. They desired to get as close to North

Korean territorial waters as possible before going aboard the Pueblo.

Down in the research spaces, these intercepted communications were unintelligible.

The only information gained by Lieutenant Harris was that the Korean voice nets were

active; the excellent signal strength indicated the closeness of the transmitters and the

shouting back and forth between the North Koreans was evidence of their excitement

II

about something - something that the Pueblo's on-board linguists could not translate. At

Teft 5l!eft!T UMBRA 60
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TOP SECRET UM8RA

I I' In his debriefing later in the United States, Lieutenant Harris of the SIGINT

detachment reported that this information was passed to the bridge.40 Bucher, however,

later told U.S. debriefers that he had never been informed about the volume of

communications among the surrounding North Korean ships.41 Even if he had received it,

this information would have been of little use to him because these voice communications

could not be translated by the NAVSECGRU detachment.

Topside, Bucher was totally engaged in conning the Pueblo as he attempted to

maneuver it toward the open sea and away from the North Korean subchaser. As the

Pueblo began to pick up speed, the PT boats tried to force it in a more southerly direction.

Running somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 to 35 knots, the PTs on the Pueblo's bow

criss-crossed in front of the ship, often cutting as close as 10 yards. Bucher saw that all PT

boats had their machine guns trained on him, and one on his starboard quarter had

uncovered one of its torpedo tubes to aim it in the Pueblo's general direction. SC-35

remained lying to as the Pueblo opened up 2,000-3,000 yards between them. Bucher saw

SC-35 lower its flag signal "Heave to or I will open fire," and shortly thereafter watched a

second North Korean vessel pull alongside SC-35, and the two seemed to exchange

personnel. A few minutes later, SC-35 again raised the flag signal "Oscar Lima," meaning

"Heave to or I will open fire." At this time, Bucher thought, "The guy may be bluffing and

I may get out ofthis yet." 42

In the research detachment, Chief Communications Technician James F. Kell,

assistant to Lieutenant Harris, was convinced that the situation was deteriorating

dangerously and asked Harris to request permission from the bridge to begin emergency

destruction. When Harris was refused permission, Kell took it upon himself to order the

detachment to commence emergency destruction immediately - he was convinced that

they simply could not wait any longer.43

NORTH KOREAN SHIPS OPEN FIRE

Had the Pueblo's Korean linguists been proficient, they would have heard SC-35, at

this time, asking permission to fire since the target was attempting to escape.44 Bucher's

hopes of escaping were about to be dashed. On the flying bridge, Bucher observed the PT

boats preserve their positions all around the Pueblo but open up a range of about 300 yards

from his ship in all directions. Then he saw SC-35 begin closing at a high rate of speed.

Bucher had an inkling of what was coming. In Bucher's words, "He had a large bone in his

teeth and was closing rapidly." Bucher immediately ordered a course change of twenty

degrees to starboard in order to keep the subchaser dead astern and thus give the Korean

ship the smallest possible target should it open fire. It was obvious, however, that this was

going to be very difficult to maintain in view of the subchaser's vastly superior speed and

maneuverability. The Pueblo was being forced farther and farther south and eventually

would be headed for land. SC-35 kept coming, and when it reached a position just forward

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of the Pueblo's stern ofT the port quarter, it fired its first salvo from its 57mm batteries.

Almost simultaneously, a number of the surrounding PT boats raked the Pueblo with

machine gun fire. 45

These first rounds struck the Pueblo's forward mast, knocking out one of the antennas,

and shrapnel exploded all about the flying bridge. Signalman Leach was struck in his left

calf and upper right side. Bucher, too, received slight shrapnel wounds, but they were not

incapacitating. Immediately, Bucher passed the word to begin emergency destruction

with the exception of the communication equipment then in use and turning to Chief

Warrant Officer Lacy, his engineering officer, he asked if the ship could be scuttled. Lacy

replied that it would take hours to do so. Bucher promptly dismissed this action. Lacy

then asked, "Shall we go to General Quarters?" and Bucher replied, "Not yet" - because

the ship had not been hit hard, and there was no damage along the water line. 46

Within seconds, the subchaser fired additional 57mm salvos that made a shambles of

the plexiglass screen on the flying bridge. To Bucher, it was obvious that the Koreans

were deliberately trying to knock out the Pueblo's command and control. None of the

North Korean gunfire from the 57mm mount hit the Pueblo near the waterline; all of it

was directed at the superstructure. It indicated that the North Koreans did not want to

sink the ship but, rather, to get aboard and seize it. According to one crew member, the

North Koreans had raked the ship with machine gun fire to keep the Pueblo crew from

destroying or disposing ofmaterial. 47

When the firing continued, Bucher immediately ordered everyone on the flying bridge

into the pilot house where there was more cover. Simultaneously, he ordered General

Quarters but modified it by ordering no one to come topside. In doing so, Bucher's purpose

was only to man General Quarters in order to combat flooding and fire. He did not want a

large number of crewmen in helmets running about on the deck in full view of the North

Koreans. He still wished to prevent any display of a hostile attitude. 48

Bucher's order to begin emergency destruction triggered a frenzy of activity

throughout the ship. The incinerator installed just aft of the pilot house was put into use

at once, but it was quickly apparent that this device could not keep up with the volume of

materials to be burned. The destruction activity was, of course, hampered by Bucher's GQ

order not to go on deck.

In the research spaces, just after the Korean subchaser first appeared, Harris removed

his emergency destruction bill from a backlog file and posted it for possible reference. The

bill had been routed to all detachment personnel to read several weeks earlier so that each

man would know his individual destruction responsibilities. 49 However, actual simulation

of emergency destruction procedures aboard the Pueblo had never been carried out.

Emergency destruction related both to classified equipment (particularly the

cryptographic gear) and to classified cryptologic and cryptographic documents of all

shapes, sizes, and bindings. The primary tools for equipment destruction were three fire

axes, three sledges, and some small chipping hammers. 5o Two electric shredders which

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were stored outside the research spaces up near the incinerator, although used under

normal conditions for pre-incinerator preparation of materials, were never broken out.

These devices could accept only six or seven sheets of paper at one time, and through use,

the cutters dulled quickly; for mass destruction, they were worthless. It was clear that this

effort would require an extraordinary measure, one that would destroy a large amount of

paper in the very minimum oftime.

Within two or three minutes after Chief Kell ordered his men to begin emergency

destruction, the official order to do so was passed from the bridge. By then, destruction had

begun with sledges and axes. 51 Upon getting the official word, Harris asked Murphy, the

executive officer, what the water's depth was in their location. He was told it was about

thirty-five fathoms. 52 This meant it would be risky to jettison material overboard where it

might be recovered from such relatively shallow water. Nevertheless, since it was obvious

that it would be impossible to burn everything, many documents and publications were

tossed into lead-weighted, canvas bags that had been specially made for the Pueblo while it

was being outfitted at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.53 Mattress covers and laundry

bags, too, were used to hold classified materials that would have to be jettisoned if

necessary.

Realizing the inadequacy of the incinerator, Communications Technician First Class

James A. Shepard went to the crew's head and grabbed several metal waste cans and

distributed them in the passageway just outside of the research area for use in burning

publications. 54 Soon after these fires were started, however, the smoke build-up inside was

too great to endure, and the cans were moved up to the starboard weather deck. With the

Pueblo in a General Quarters condition, its internal ventilation system was shut down and

this, of course, made the smoky conditions in the research detachment passageway

worse. 55 When burning was slowed down because of the smoke, crewmen attempted to

keep up with the bulk of material to be destroyed by tearing up publications into small

pieces and scattering these about to make it difficult to piece them together. 56

The frantic burning efforts by the Pueblo crew did not escape the eyes of the North

Koreans aboard the vessels near the Pueblo. 57 This burning activity and the fact that the

North Koreans knew that the Pueblo was still transmitting were probably additional

reasons for the North Korean urgency in getting aboard and stopping these activities by

the crew.

In the cryptoroom, Senior Chief Communications Technician Ralph W. Bouden began

smashing equipment not then in use. He found the fire axe to be effective for destroying

chassis; the sledge, however, just seemed to bounce off open drawers. Although this was

testimony to the solid durability of the equipment, it was also a deterrent to rapid

destruction. In the cramped cryptospaces too, there was virtually no room to swing either

an axe or sledge. Bouden used a chipping hammer to destroy cryptoboards, rotors, and key

cards by pounding them on the metal deck. 58

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Outside, Bucher, having abandoned the damaged flying bridge, scrambled into the

pilot house for additional protection. Once inside, Bucher called Harris by telephone to

find out how the destruction was progressing and was told that things were going all right.

It is difficult to understand why Harris, in the SOD hut, gave Bucher such a response in

view ofthe mass of material yet to be destroyed at that point in time and the large amount

of material eventually compromised. It is a clear indication that Harris did not have

control of the destruction operations in the SOD area.

Bucher reported later that all he could think of at this time was how he could augment

the destruction process. In the mass of confusion caused by the North Korean firing, no

one thought of using one of the Pueblo's small compartments, opening the porthole, sealing

off the room, and using this space as a large incinerator with flammable liquid that was

available aboard the Pueblo. Mter his return from captivity, Bucher admitted that this

was one solution he had not thought of at the time. 59

Bucher also believed that his reasoning in not having crewmen come topside in a full

General Quarters alarm was a valid one. He did not want to give the North Koreans

another excuse to continue their firing by having a large number of his crew on deck with

helmets on and thinking that the Pueblo was about to do battle. A limited number of

crewmen on deck would keep down the number of casualties. Those crewmembers not

topside would also be available to help in destroying equipment and documents. 6o

It was a forlorn hope. Although there was a destruction bill made up prior to the

arrival of the ship in the Sea of Japan, the crew was never drilled in its application.

Consequently, many members of the crew did not know where they were assigned during

the destruction activity; relatively few crewmembers, including CTs, during their debrief

in the United States, said that they had a duty station during the emergency destruction

activity while others said that they had never seen the destruction bill. It was truly a

chaotic emergency destruction effort, and the result was that a massive amount of

classified material was left untouched.

By now, the subchaser was only 800 yards from the Pueblo, and it began pumping 57-

mm shells into the Pueblo's superstructure at point-blank range. One salvo ripped

through the pilot house. Fortunately, no one was seriously wounded, but Bucher could see

that his executive officer, Lieutenant Murphy, was hugging the deck of the pilot house and

not reacting. Bucher lashed out with his foot and ordered Murphy to get off the deck. 61

When the next salvo struck the Pueblo seconds later, Chief Warrant Officer Gene Lacy,

Bucher's engineering officer, turned to his commanding officer and said, "Are you going to

stop this goddam ship before we're all killed?" Thereupon, in Bucher's words, "I looked at

him and Gene looked at me and I lowered my eyes and I was trying to think how the hell to

answer him because I didn't want to panic the rest of the people in the pilot house 'cause

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him ... and without any further ado, Gene goes over to the annunciator and rings up 'all

stop'. ,,62 Bucher, for the moment, had lost control of his ship.

As the ship stopped, so did the firing. At this point, Bucher decided not to do anything

about Lacy but rather to leave the ship at "all stop" for a few minutes and go below to get

rid of the classified materials in his stateroom. Returning to the bridge in about two

minutes, Bucher saw the subchaser flying the flag signal "Follow me, I have a pilot

aboard." Deciding to heed the message and follow SC-35 while checking the progress of

destruction of classified materials, Bucher rang up "all ahead one-third" and turned in a

wide circle to starboard behind the subchaser. 63

North Korean firing on the Pueblo occurred at two intervals between 1:32 and 1:51

P.M. At 1:36 P.M., NSA reported from intercepted communications that SC-35 stated that it

had brought the target to a stop by firing "warning shots." (No warning shots were fired

by the subchaser; from the moment it opened fire, the rounds were directed at the Pueblo.)

At 1:40 P.M., SC-35 said that it intended to fire a few more rounds to make the target "come

in," 64 i.e., turn around and come in closer toward the Korean coast. From the beginning of

this situation, Bucher had been depending on Schumacher to report developments to U.S.

naval authorities by means of the circuit to Kami Seya. As soon as the North Koreans

began firing on the Pueblo, Bucher ordered a CRITIC message transmitted. In the

cryptoroom, Lieutenant Harris and Communications Technician First Class Bailey were

frantically searching for a prepoked tape that contained all the formal CRITIC message

heading prescribed by pertinent instructions. Upon stepping into the room and seeing this

frenzy, Communications Technician First Class James D. Layton shoved Bailey out of his

chair and took over the circuit. Layton phased the KW-7 cryptodevice and immediately

started sending the "zebra" and "bell" flash indicators. He reported the Pueblo's position

as 39 degrees, 25 minutes north and 127 degrees, 54.3 minutes east followed by a string of

SOS's; he notified Kami Seya that the Pueblo was holding emergency destruction, was

being boarded, and asked for assistance. At 1:52 P.M., Layton sent word that the Pueblo

was probably being escorted into Wonsan. Seeing that Bailey had gotten over his

nervousness, Layton returned the circuit to him. 65 Kami Seya, in reply, said that "word

has gone to all authorities and Admiral Johnson is requesting assistance."66 (In regard to

Admiral Johnson, the Kami Seya operator may have been trying to give the Pueblo crew

some encouragement. Johnson could not have known about the Pueblo's difficulty until

some time afterward, since he was on temporary duty in Tokyo at the time and did not

have access to secure communications to his command. He did, nevertheless, leave Tokyo

immediately after notification and returned to his command.)

With the Pueblo now following the subchaser, Bucher decided to check on the

destruction being done at the incinerator. From the bridge, he could see people working

furiously to burn his own communications publications piled up by the incinerator.

Realizing that there was still quite a bit to destroy, Bucher ordered "all stop." 67

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The subchaser, at this time, was about 800 yards ahead of Pueblo ofT its starboard bow.

When the North Korean ship saw that the Pueblo had come to a stop, its reaction was swift

and deadly. It fired two salvos of 57mm shells, which struck the Pueblo aft ofthe bridge on

the starboard side. One of the shells exploded in the passageway outside the wardroom,

virtually severing the right leg of Fireman Duane Hodges at the thigh and seriously

wounding Fireman Steven Woelk, both of whom had been helping to destroy publications.

A second shell struck nearby and both Sergeant Robert Chicca (one of the Korean

linguists) and Radioman Third Class Charles Crandell sustained shrapnel wounds.

Following this shelling, Bucher ordered the Pueblo "all ahead one-third" and then

departed the bridge on the port side through the interior passageway to assess the damage.

He could see that Hodges was mortally wounded and went immediately to the research

spaces to make a personal report of the Pueblo's situation. Arriving there he saw a great

quantity of paper and publications lying around on the deck and the banks of equipment

being attacked with fire axes and sledges. He ordered Harris to get rid of all the material

on the deck and then stepped into the cryptoroom. Bucher told the teletype operator to

notify COMNAVFORJAPAN that he had several wounded and was surrendering the

ship.58 Thereupon, at 2:03 P.M., Bailey typed the following: "Have been requested (sic) to

follow into Wonsan. Have three wounded and one man with leg blown ofT. Have not used

any weapons nor uncovered 50 cal MG [machine gun]. Destroying all key lists and as

much elec equip as possible. How about some help, these guys mean business. Have

sustained small wound in rectum. Do not intend to ofTer any resistance. Do not know how

long will be able to hold u ckt [to maintain communications with you on this circuit). And

do not know ifcomms spaces will be entered." Bucher waited for a few moments to be sure

the message was received and for any reply. The Kami Seya operator came back with: "We

still with you and doing all we can, old man. Everyone really turning to and figure by now

Air Force got some bird winging ur way." 69 In his attempt to encourage the Pueblo crew,

however, the Kami Seya operator was holding out a false hope of assistance. With this

word from COMNAVFORJAPAN, Bucher returned to the bridge.

The senior chief petty officers on watch had responsibility for the supervision of

destruction activities in the research detachment spaces. As soon as Bucher gave the order

for destruction, Harris left the area to destroy registered publications and then went to the

cryptoroom to oversee what was being reported to Kami Seya. Harris later reported

during his debrief in the United States: "I spent most of my time overseeing the circuit,

making sure that nothing went out, that wasn't fully approved ... so I didn't pay any

attention to the emergency destruction, but I would like to have, but I felt that there

should be no unauthorized information transmitted because this was being watched very

closely by high-ranking people."70 It was another example of misdirection by the Pueblo

crew in not recognizing what the priorities should have been, i.e., destruction of classified

material.

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There was an extremely l~rge mass of material to destroy. In his debriefing, Harris

recalled, "... we had retained on board the obsolete publications and had all good

intentions of getting rid of these things but had not done so at the time we had started the

mission. I wanted to get the place organized eventually and we had excessive numbers of

copies on board... "71 Harris believed that, considering the size of the task confronting

them and the fact that there had been no formal shipboard training sessions on either the

methods or priorities of destruction, it was surprising how much the research detachment

CTs accomplished. 72 It was Wishful thinking on Harris's part. Only a small percentage of

the total classified material aboard the ship was destroyed.

Harris himself characterized the situation as one of panic and admitted, when

debriefed, that he was "a little bit scared" and "pretty confused."73 It was at this same time

too that Bucher realized the magnitude of the detachment's store of publications. In his

words, "There was a just fantastic amount of paper, almost I would say ten times what I

would have expected that we would have had on board. I just had no idea of how damn

much of this stuff there. was on board ... no concept that there was this much

documentation on board; no concept whatsoever.'>74 The desperation of this destruction

situation finally became clear to Bucher as he returned to the bridge.

Arriving in the wheelhouse, Bucher ordered Signalman Leach to raise the signal for

"Medical Assistance Required."75 Lieutenant Murphy was ordered to go below and break

out the morphine for Baldridge to use in treating Hodges and Woelk.

When he had left the bridge earlier, Bucher had ordered "all ahead one-third." Now he

noticed that the ship was making "two thirds" speed. Gene Lacy, OOD at the time, told

Bucher that he had increased the speed because the PT boats had urged him to go faster. 76

Bucher dropped the speed back to "one third" and ordered Lacy to leave it there, reminding

him that he was giving the orders and not the North Koreans.

Once the Pueblo had resumed its westerly track, SC-35 and the torpedo boats arranged

themselves preparatory to boarding. At about 2:08 P.M., according to later SIGINT, SC-35

was told that orders "from the top" were to go farther in before boarding. 77 This order

suggests two possibitities. One is that the North Koreans were also mindful of

international waters and wanted to get as close to this boundary as possible before

boarding so that there would be fewer questions about the seizure of the ship. It was also

possible that the North Koreans did not want to get caught aboard the Pueblo in

international waters in the event a U.S. military rescue force appeared on the scene.

Throughout the time that the North Koreans were forcing the Pueblo toward Wonsan,

they continually tried to get the Pueblo to increase its speed. 78

In the cryptoroom, Bailey was frantically destroying as much equipment as possible

and Communications Technician Second Class Donald McClarren had relieved him on the

circuit t~ IKami Seya requested information about the status of classified

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material remaining to be destroyed and McClarren reported on the Pueblo's helplessness

and the fact that several publications would be compromised. 79

PUEBLO IS BOARDED

After following in the wake ofSC-35 for about twenty-five minutes, the North Koreans

signalled Bucher to come to "all stop" and he complied. It was apparent that the North

Koreans now intended to board, the Pueblo having reached a more satisfactory position,

probably immediately inside the claimed twelve-mile territorial waters limit. Realizing

this, Bucher hurried below to get his commander's cap, change his bloodied socks and put

on a pair of heavy navy boots. Quickly returning to the bridge, he ordered Boatswain's

Mate First Class N. J. Klepac to prepare to receive boarders. 80

The teletype operator in the cryptoroom began typing the Pueblo's last words to Kami

Seya: "Have been directed to come to all stop and being boarded. Four men injured and

one critically. Going off the air now and destroying this gear." Kami Seya's repeated reply

to "please transmit in the clear" went unheeded. The time was 1:45 P.M., 23 January

1968.81

Senior Chief Communications Technician Bouden and Communications Technician

First Class Bailey began smashing the KW-7 cryptogear to render it useless. Their efforts

were only partially successfu1. 82 With this act, the Pueblo's link with U.S. authorities was

severed.

From the bridge, while watching the approaching PT boat with the boarding party,

Bucher accepted Chief Warrant Officer Lacy's recommendation and advised the crew over

the Pueblo's intercom to give only their name, rank, and serial number. 83

On the port side of the main deck, Klepac and another crewman secured a line passed

from the PT boat as it worked itself alongside the Pueblo. Two North Korean officers with

pistols drawn stepped aboard the Pueblo. They were followed by eight enlisted men, each

carrying a bayonet-tipped AK-47 automatic weapon. Bucher presented himself to the first

officer as the Pueblo's captain. 84 None of the boarders spoke English, but by sign language,

one officer indicated that he wanted to know how many men were on board and for all to

assemble on the well deck. 85 Another officer and an enlisted man went to the pilot house

and ordered Helmsman Berens off the bridge and back to the fantail. The Korean guard

stationed there fired a short burst from his AK-47 over the heads of crewmen standing on

the fantail to demonstrate his authority and readiness to use his weapon. 86 The North

Koreans ordered Bucher up to the bridge and, shortly thereafter, Berens was returned to

the bridge to take the helm again. They ordered Bucher to increase the speed from "one

third," but when he said he couldn't go faster, the Koreans didn't insist. 87

Meanwhile, some of the North Korean enlisted men went below and brought back

sheets which they tore up in strips. They then ordered the Pueblo crewmen to blindfold

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each other. For almost an hour, the crew shivered on the open deck before being ordered

into the forward berthing compartment.88 In the engine room, Chief Engineman M.O.

Goldman and Engineman First Class R. S. Blansett were permitted to remain to tend the

engines as the Pueblo followed the subchaser toward Wonsan.89 Corpsman Baldridge,

although guarded by a North Korean enlisted man, was also permitted to continue

treating Hodges and Woelk. 90

About an hour after the initial boarding, the North Korean officer on the bridge

ordered the Pueblo "all stop" to receive another group of officers who had boarded from one

ofthe PT boats. In this party was a senior colonel (later referred to as "Colonel Scar"), who

was the officer in command of the North Korean force, and an interpreter.91 As senior

officer, he probably did not think it prudent to board the Pueblo until it had been brought

closer to shore and the initial North Korean boarding party had gotten complete control of

the ship. The senior colonel immediately ordered Bucher to take him on a complete tour of

the ship, including the research detachment spaces.

The door to the research spaces was open, and Bucher was surprised to see the same

bags that were lying on the deck an hour before still lying in the same position with

nothing done to them. There was a deep layer of loose codeword papers scattered about the

passageway.92 Upon entering the crypto-area, the North Koreans noticed that a few of the

teletype machines were still clattering away and immediately began jerking out patch

panel wiring and hitting power switches, but even then they could not completely shut

down the equipment. According to Bucher, "the Koreans' eyes really bugged open when

they saw that shack in there. They just didn't know what the hell they had ..." 93

Another member of the second boarding party was a civilian pilot who went directly to

the bridge and sent Berens down below to join the rest of the Pueblo crew. The pilot rang

up "all ahead flank," and the engine room responded promptly so that the Pueblo began

making about 12.5 knots. 94

Later analysis ofSIGINT revealed that the radar station at Kalgoch'iri was tracking the

vessels as they proceeded back to Wonsan. The initial track showed six vessels, five at 39

degrees, 24 minutes north and 127 degrees, 58 minutes east, and one ship at 39 degrees, 19

minutes north and 128 degrees, 04 minutes east. For an hour, the boarding party was

conducting searches of the Pueblo spaces in accordance with instructions from SC-35. The

party reported that there were sixty-four people on board (actual total was eighty-three)

and no women or children. SC-35 instructed the party to "question them and determine

their units." The party reported that they had been collecting all weapons and

interrogating the crew one at a time. 95

Following the tour of the ship, Bucher's captors returned him to the passageway just

forward of his stateroom and ordered him to sit there on the deck beside the blanketcovered body ofFireman Hodges. Corpsman Baldridge told Bucher that Hodges had died a

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short time before and remembers that the commander "seemed to be rather emotionally

upset and more or lessjust had a shocked look on his face.,,96

Probably because of the variety of clothing worn by the Pueblo's crew, it was difficult

for the North Koreans to readily identify the other Pueblo officers. In any case, none of the

other officers were singled out and given special attention. In Bucher's words "... none of

us looked very Navy ... the crew were in dungarees with either blue or leather jackets ...

some ofthem had on foul weather gear ... we were not a really military looking group." 97

Thus subdued and subject to North Korean military control, the Pueblo plowed on toward

Wonsan. Sometime after sunset at about 7:00 P.M., the ship was brought to "full stop" and

moored to a concrete pier in Wonsan. Its crew was about to begin its harrowing ordeal of

detention. There was still no reliefin sight from U.S. military forces.

In summary, the maiden voyage of the newly recommissioned USS Pueblo in January

1968 was not a well-planned operation. The ship's preparation was hurried, and the crew

was not adequately trained to meet the emergency that confronted them. The SIGINT

detachment did not know how to conduct aspects of its mission and, more importantly, did

not train in emergency destruction measures. There were numerous highly classified

documents aboard the ship that were outdated, some were not needed to carry out the

mission, and still others were in unnecessary duplicate copies. When the destruction order

finally came, the Pueblo crew was thrown into complete disorder.

By at least 20 January, North Korean military authorities were aware of the Pueblo's

presence off North Korea. Visual reconnaissance of the Pueblo began shortly thereafter.

Once the Pueblo was confirmed by the North Koreans as an American vessel and as an

intelligence collector, the North Korean purpose was to force the ship into submission and

to seize it.

On the basis of a striking similarity in the manner of treatment, it would appear that

the Soviets, Chinese, and the North Koreans had coordinated their efforts and procedures

against U.S. SIGINT ships in international waters. This conclusion is drawn from the fact

that all used the same tactics and signals against U.S. AGERs. In the Sea of Japan off

Vladivostok in 1965-66, and in the East China Sea off Shanghai in 1967, and finally off

Korea in 1968, the objective of such tactics may have been to get aboard the U.S. ships

either by force or intimidation and to seize what was available of classified material; this

purpose was carried out by the North Koreans. They avoided sinking the ship in contrast

to their treatment of a number of South Korean fishing vessels; they carefully directed

their fire in order to knock out the command and control of the Pueblo, thus making it

easier to seize control ofthe ship; none of the North Korean gunfire hit the Pueblo near the

waterline - all ofit was directed at the superstructure.

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Whatever their intentions, the North Koreans had now captured an American SIGINT

collector - giving them unfettered access to equipment, documentation, and the crew's

knowledge.

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Chapter V

Indecision in Washington and the Pacific

u.s. PREOCCUPATION WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

On 23 January 1968, the United States government was preoccupied with events in

Southeast Asia. Now in early January 1968, there was evidence that the North

Vietnamese were planning an assault on the Khe Sanh Combat Base in the far northwest

corner of South Vietnam. This brought forth memories of the French debacle at Dien Bien

Phu (1954). In Washington, the White House Situation Room was dominated by a large

aerial photographic mosaic of the Khe Sanh area showing details of the U.S. Marine

trench line and the latest-reported communist positions; a large terrain model of the Khe

Sanh area had also been acquired for the president's use.

U.S. Air Force operations also reflected the sharp increase in hostilities in Southeast

Asia. Because of the increased movement of North Vietnamese troops and truck convoys

along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos during January 1968, the USAF temporarily shifted

most of its attention from targets in North and South Vietnam in order to concentrate on

this major infiltration route to South Vietnam. An estimated 250 planes a day, more than

triple the average daily rate, carried out these air strikes. l If there were to be serious

trouble for the United States in the immediate future, it was expected to come in South

Vietnam.

u.s. MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE PACIFIC

NUl RELEASABLE lOGON iMGIORS NOT R:I!:LI!:ASAftL~ TO POIt~le+f!,A'fIOHALS

It was against this background that the Pueblo incident took place. To appreciate the

U.S. military reaction to news of the attack on the Pueblo, one should be aware of the

geographic location of the headquarters of the command echelons that could respond to the

Pueblo's plight. These commands and their locations were as follows: Commander, Naval

Forces, Japan, Yokosuka, Japan; Commander, Seventh Fleet, aboard the cruiser USS

Providence, deployed in the Gulf of Tonkin off Vietnam; Commander in Chief, Pacific

Fleet, Honolulu; Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu; Commander, Fifth Air Force,

Fuchu, Japan; Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force, Honolulu; Commander in Chief,

United Nations Command, Seoul, South Korea; National Military Command Center,

Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington.

Although all of these commands were linked by communications facilities, the physical

distances restricted easy and rapid military response to the Pueblo's needs. In effect, the

Pueblo's chain of command threaded itselffrom a point approximately sixteen miles off the

port of Wonsan, North Korea, through Japan, down to the Gulf of Tonkin, then eastward

73 Tep SECRET UMBRA
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across the Pacific to Hawaii and from there to Washington. It stretched almost halfway

around the globe. This would prove to be a major problem.

PACIFIC COMMAND RESPONSE TO PUEBLO EMERGENCY

Shortly after noon on Tuesday, 23'January, Li~utenant Commander Carl L. Hokenson

Jr., the duty officer at Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, received Situation Report

(SITREP) #1 message of the previous evening in which the Pueblo reported being observed

and circled by two North Korean trawlers. Within ten minutes, Hokenson received

SITREP#2. This message reported that no surveillance attempt had been made during

the night and that this message/would be the last SITREP on this incident. The Pueblo

would return to radio silence. After reading both messages, the duty officer took no action

other than to post them on the intelligence interest board at headquarters. 2

In less than an hour, at 12:52 P.M.~ IKami Seya, (twenty-nine miles from

Yokosuka) received Pueblo's/message labeled JOPREP Pinnacle #1, which reported that

the Pueblo had been ordered to heave to or be fited upon. The label designated the

message as a Joint Operational Report (JOPREP) of special interest to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the National Military Command Center, and. the White House. This was quickly

relayed to Lieutenant CQmmander Hokenson, who immediately took the message to the

Chief of Staff, Captain Forest A. Pease, USN. Upon reading it, Pease said, "Looks like we

might have some trouble ... let me know what develops."s Thereafter, at 1:25 P.M.,

LieuVnant Commander Hokenson directed that the Pinnacle #1 message plus the

SITREP messages be ,delivered to the Operations Staff (N3), Captain William H. Everett,

USN, located in Building C-39 several hundred yards away. Looking at the messages,

Everett interpreted the North Korean action as only harassment and intimidation. 4 After

all, the Soviets had issued a similar threat to the Banner while in the Sea ofJapan a short

time earlier.

This assessment of the situation changed quickly. The Intelligence Staff offices at

COMNAVFORJAPAN received the Pueblo's Pinnacle Number 2 message at 1:39 P.M. and

delivered it to Captain Pease. This report of attempted boarding prompted Pease to direct

Hokenson to notify Captain Everett to "relay this info to Fifth Air Force and push the

button for contingency action." This action indicated that Pease also believed that

contingency/back-up protective forces for the Pueblo were in place and that they could be

called upon/in case of need. The Intelligence Staff (N2) was ordered to be ready to issue a

CRITIC message, and almost simultaneouslyl Ibegan relaying to N2 the on-line

point-to-pOint operator chatter between it and the Pueblo. 5 COMNAVFORJAPAN's initial

CRITIC was released at 1:36 P.M. (230436Z) based upon the Pueblo's Pinnacle #2 message;

I lalso relayed the Pueblo's message in CRITICOMM channels.

At about the same time, Lieutenant Commander Ager L. Wilson on the N3 Staff,

COMNAVFORJAPAN, placed a secure telephone call to the Fifth Air Force Command

C

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Center at Fuchu. At that headquarters, knowledge ofthe Pueblo's operation was minimal.

Although the Fifth Air Force had been an information addressee on Pacific Fleet and

Naval Forces, Japan, planning messages in December 1967, it was included as an

addressee of the execution message of 5 January 1968 only in an address indicator group

distribution. As a result, only a limited number of officers in the Fifth Air Force

Intelligence and Operations saw the execution message. Because the message did not

request air cover or strip alert by the Fifth Air Force, and since the planning message had

estimated risk to be "minimal," the execution message was not brought to the attention of

the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Fifth Air Force, or anyone in the command section.

As a result, none ofthese officers knew that the Pueblo operation was under way.6

When the Fifth Air Force Command Center received Wilson's telephone call for

Lieutenant Colonel James F. Duggan, the call was considered routine since Wilson did not

give any precedence indicator. Because Duggan (assigned to Operations and Training)

was not assigned to the Command Center, the operator telephoned Duggan's secretary

only to learn that he was on temporary detached duty. Duggan's assistant, Major

Raymond A. Priest, Jr., was present, however, and was asked to come to the command

center to take a secure telephone call. It was 1:45 P.M. when Priest arrived at the secure

phone in the Fifth Air Force Command Center. Wilson advised him of the codeword

"ICHTHYIC," gave the Pueblo's position, stated that it was being circled by two MiG aircraft

and North Korean boats and was under attack. He requested Air Force assistance. This

word from Wilson meant nothing to Priest as he had never heard of the Pueblo. He asked

Wilson to repeat the message to ensure that he, Priest, had the correct information.

Wilson did so, and this time he added that the codeword was formerly "CLICKBEETLE." This

was a term that Wilson recognized, but since the telephone call had no precedence, he

believed it to be an exercise and started for an office he knew was familiar with

CLICKBEETLE operations. On his way, Priest encountered Commander Thomas E.

McDonald, Seventh Fleet liaison officer to Fifth Air Force, and asked if Wilson's message

meant anything to him. McDonald said "yes" and that he would take care of it. The time

was 1:50 P.M. Thereafter, Commander McDonald notified the Fifth Air Force cognizant

officer and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, and briefed them. They plotted

the Pueblo's position and requested information on the status of Fifth Air Force aircraft. 7

Back at Yokosuka, COMNAVFORJAPAN issued a second CRITIC at 1:46 P.M. based

on the Pueblo's operator chatter indicating that the ship was being boarded. A few

minutes later Captain Pease placed a call to Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson,

COMNAVFORJAPAN, at the Sanno Hotel in Tokyo where Johnson was attending the

annual Pacific Command TROPICAL CYCLONE Conference at which he delivered the

welcoming address. The unclassified telephone circuit permitted Pease to report on the

Pueblo incident only sketchily. He indicated that the Pueblo was in trouble and stated,

"She is probably gone." Admiral Johnson asked ifthe Fifth Air Force had been alerted and

whether search and rescue operations had been requested since he had drawn the

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inference that the Pueblo had been sunk. In reply to Pease's information, Johnson said

that he would return to Yokosuka immediately. A United States Army helicopter was

obtained from Camp Zama to take Johnson to Hardy Barracks in Tokyo. From there, he

transferred to another helicopter and arrived at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka heliport, at

3:05 P.M. Five minutes later he was in his headquarters where he received a briefing on

the Pueblo situation. 8

NO U.S. FORCES AVAILABLE TO ASSIST PUEBW

At 1408, Wilson again telephoned the Fifth Air Force to find out what action had been

taken in response to his earlier call for assistance. McDonald told Wilson that no action on

the scene could be expected in less than three hours, and he further asked Wilson to

confirm his request by message. COMNAVFORJAPAN sent this confirming message to

the Fifth Air Force at 1420. It had now been an hour and a half since the Pueblo's first

distress message. About ten minutes later the Fifth Air Force telephoned Yokosuka and

reported that there were no aircraft on strip alert; in fact, the policy for Sea of Japan

missions did not call for specific alerts by the Fifth Air Force as had been previously

requested for East China Sea operations. The Fifth Air Force estimated that there would

be a two- to three-hour delay in launching aircraft. Soon after this telephone call, Admiral

Johnson received word that the Pueblo was being taken to Wonsan and, in view of this

development, made no further requests for assistance from any other command. 9 Later in

the evening, Admiral Johnson, as Commander, Task Force 96, instructed the USS Banner

(AGER 1), just beginning a patrol, to return to Yokosuka because of the Pueblo incident

and the probable compromise of its on-board key lists. The Banner returned to port at

approximately 0700 the following day.

At Fuchu, Lieutenant General Seth J. McKee, Commander, Fifth Air Force, was

informed of the Pueblo matter at 2: 15 P.M. by his Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff,

Operations; the Chief, Reconnaissance Division; and Commander McDonald.

Immediately, General McKee went to his command center and placed a secure telephone

call to headquarters, Pacific Air Force, in Hawaii. While waiting for this call to be

completed, McKee called the commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing in Okinawa and

directed him to prepare for immediate deployment of F-105 fighter bombers to Osan Air

Force Base, South Korea. In order to expedite their deployment, these aircraft were to be

launched on an incremental basis with only the first six available configured with loaded

guns. By 1446, General John D. Ryan, CINCPACAF, had arrived at his secure telephone

in Hawaii and was advised of the situation and actions taken. His staff also informed him

of General McKee's attempt to launch strikes in support of the Pueblo, provided the

aircraft could get to the scene before darkness and prior to the time that the ship arrived

inside the three-mile limit of North Korea. General Ryan agreed with the actions taken

and those proposed. 10

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About 510 miles$outh of the Pueblo, the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise, America's

largest aircraft carrier, was steaming southward in the Sea of Japan toward Subic Bay,

Philippine Islands. The Enterprise had recently departed the United States for Southeast

Asia, had made a brief stop in Sasebo, Japan, and was to proceed south to the Philippines

area as rapidly as poSSIble to engage in several days of refresher air operations in order to

prepare for action in the Gulf of Tonkin. Theship had encountered a severe storm in

crossing the Pacific, and many of the aircraft were under repair because of corrosion and

water damage. Aboard t.he Enterprise were four F-4B Phantom fighter bombers on alert

with pilots standing by, hut these aircraft were armedwith air-to-air ordnance only. The

planes were not equipped for an air-to-surface engagement,ll

At 2:30 P.M.,I ~board the Enterprise

received a copy of the Pueblo's Number 1 message relayed byl ~n CRITICOMM

channels. This was deliverEld at once to Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes, Jr., Commander,

Carrier Division One and Task Force 71, with his flag on board the Enterprise. Admiral

Epes had never heard of the Pueblo but assumed that, ifhe were to have responsibility for

it, he would have been so informed. Not being familiar with the Pueblo's mission, Epes

sent for naval publications that might contain a description of the Pueblo. At the same

time, he sent for a chart and had the Pueblo's position plotted. The ship appeared to be

close to Wonsan Harbor. He got the distance from the Enterprise to Wonsan and obtained

from the Enterprise's captain th~ status of his aircraft and the amount of time it would

take the carrier to get some aircraft in the air. The time given was one and one half hours.

Epes's staff got out all the intelligence material on board regarding North Korea - charts,

air order of battle, missile and antiaircraft order of battle, an estimate of weather

conditions at Wonsan, and the time of darkness. The pilots of the four ready aircraft,

however, were not briefed, and no one had officially requested help from the Enterprise. 12

By 3:00 P.M., Admiral Epes had received additional messages about the shooting

incident and reached the judgment that it would be futile to launch aircraft to assist the

Pueblo. He concluded that by the time he could get any aircraft there, it would be well

inside the North Korean three-mile limit. In Epes's opinion, to fuel and suitably arm a

group of aircraft and to ready the carrier deck for a launching would have taken an hour

and a half, even if the flight crew had known what they were going to do and had all the

materials on hand for that purposeY\Probably, the naval task force commander

believed that he had done all that he could in regard to the Pueblo's situation.

In the Gulf of Tonkin, the guided missile cruiser USS Providence, flagship of the

Seventh Fleet, was steaming toward the South China Sea. For the past several weeks, it

had been stationed off the coast of Vietnam, and it was now headed for a few days ofliberty

in Hong Kong. 14 It was 2:10 P.M. Korean time when the Providence received the Pueblo's

Pinnacle #2 message that an armed North Korean party was attempting to board the ship.

This information had been passed byl Ivia torn tape relay at Naval

~fQ1' REbEASA8bE 1'Q GQUTR,o"GTeRS NeT RElbEh'tSABLFJ TO FORBI6N Nl't'fI6NALS

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Communications Station, Philippines. Shortly thereafter, the relayed, fragmentary,

operator chatter revealed that four men had been injured and that the Pueblo was being

ordered into Wonsan Harbor. 15 With this news, the Seventh Fleet staff immediately

notified its commander, Vice Admiral William A. Bringle. The admiral unfortunately was

not personally aware of the specifics of the Pueblo mission and did not know that it was

operating off Wonsan. Naval Forces, Japan, had failed to send a copy of the Pueblo's

sailing orders to Seventh Fleet by electrical means. \Instead, it forwarded a copy of the

orders via the Armed Forces Courier Service, and this copy would not reach the flagship

until 27 January.16

Mter assessing the status and location of the Pueblo and the nearest Seventh Fleet

units, Admiral Bringle ordered the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to proceed together

with the nuclear-powered guided missile frigate USS Truxton at best possible speed to a

holding area at 32 degrees, 30 minutes north and 127 degrees, 30 minutes east, a location

about four hundred miles from Wonsan and there to await further developments. 17 The

Pueblo's time was 3:06 P.M. Admiral Bringle's message also\directed the destroyers Higbee

(in Sasebo), Collett (located 120 miles south of Yokosuka), and the O'Bannon (in

Yokosuka) to rendezvous with the Enterprise and Truxton.

In Honolulu, it was 7:15 P.M. local time, 22 January, when the War Room at Pacific

Headquarters received a telephone call from the National Military Command Center in

Washington notifying it of the Pueblo incident. Almost immediately, the same

information in fragmented form began arriving on the War Room teletype followed by

receipt of the Pueblo's Pinnacle #1 message as relayed b~ I

Appropriate Pacific Fleet staff personnel were notified immediately, including the Chief of

Stafffor Plans and Operations, Major General Royal B. Allison, USAF. IS Admiral Ulysses

S. G. Sharp, CINCPAC, was in Danang, South Vietnam, conferring with General

Westmoreland and Lieutenant General Cushman concerning the threat of a serious enemy

offensive.

~TQT RI!:bl!:ASA8bS Y'8 68NY'RAG'f8RS HSl' ftfi]hEA:~A:f'U';y" p'mtl!:IGN NAI IONALS

Five minutes later, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Center received simultaneous

telephone calls from the Pacific Indications Center and from Lieutenant Commander

Wilson in Yokosuka to alert it to the Pueblo incident. Wilson reported that the Fifth Air

Force had been requested to provide air support. The Intelligence Center quickly took

action to augment existing watch personnel and notified Admiral John J. Hyland,

CINCPACFLT.

Staff officers established telephone communications with CINCPAC,

COMNAVFORJAPAN, the Fleet Activities at Yokosuka and Sasebo, and the Fifth Air

Force to determine the availability of forces that might assist the Pueblo. At 7:41 P.M.

Hawaii time, the Intelligence Center received the Pueblo's Pinnacle #2 message

confirming the attempted boarding. Although the situation was tense, it was not

interpreted as being out of control. Within the next forty-five minutes, Pacific Fleet

headquarters had received all follow-ups to Yokosuka's original CRITIC message. The

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NSA RESPONSE TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

Pueblo's deteriorating situation, personnel injuries, equipment destruction, and final

circuit deactivatioll.. were all now known. 19

Meanwhile, at Fuchu,\Lieutenant General McKee was trying to determine what his

Fifth Air Force could do to support the Pueblo. The outlook was bleak. At Osan Air Force

Base there were four\F-4 aircraft on strategic alert,

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3•9•• ·9•• 7.•. 4~.·.··..• · 3)-50 USC 403 ~.:r 3)-P.L. 86-36

L...:----:'__-:-__~-;--~AlthoughMeKeedoubtedthattheF~4sc6~1~fea.c~'Y(jIisa.Iibefoie

darkness, he nevertheless ordered the F-4sl land configured with 3,OOO-pound

bombs, the only ordnance they could carry with equipment available. Racks for smaller

bombs were located at main support bases in Japan. Further,there were no air-to-air

rockets nor launching rails and pylons in Korea with which to arm the F-4s. The F-I05s

stationed at Yokota, Japan, could not.reach Wonsan before darkness. Flying time was

about an hour and forty-five minutes, but darkness would occur in an hour and a half. At

3:20 P.M., PACAF headquarters telephoned General McKee and, when advised of the

situation, General Ryan authorized McKee to attack the North Korean ships in the

vicinity of the Pueblo but only if they were.outside the three-mile limit. Further, Ryan

instructed McKee not to send in the F-4s unle.ss they were armed against the threat of the

MiG cover over the Pueblo. 20

NSA representatives in the Far East responded r-.;.;..;....;..0.,1;.....;........;"';"'O:.....;..;;.....;.....;.-...;;.......;.~.....;.~

Pueblo's plight. At 2:40 P.M.,JiJ"'.a_m_e_s_H_a_rr_i....:s,:.L... ...........:----.,

I ~, advise '----..,....------------------,,.,....._... of the Pueblo capture and requested the VI;) ort any SIGINT reflection ofthat activity.21 Ten

minutes later, Henry DeCourt, sent a similar message

to SIGINT site equestingpromptreporting.

In Washington, ..l.·..t.w... as a..l...most\ ......midnight {local time on 22 January, 1:45 P.M. Pueblo

time on 23 January) when the initial CRITIC message froml Jmd Naval Forces,

Japan, arrived atboth the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and at the

National SecurityAgenc,Y SIGINT Command Center (NSASCC), Fort Meade, Maryland. In

the next twenty/minutes, the NMCC notified the White House Situation Room, the State

Department Watch Office, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. At NSA,I I I Ithe NSA Senior Operations Officer (SNOO) in the SIGINT Command Center,

first notl.·fi.le.i.d. U~e B Group Operations «enter whjch in turn hN]n Calling key personnel from the cognizant office at NSA, Bl L _ Thereafter,1 1

inforIlledGeneral Carter, Director, NSA; Brigadier General John E. Morrison, USAF,

Assistant Director, NSA, for Production (ADP); Rear Admiral Lester/R/Schulz, USN,

Head, National Cryptologic Staff (03); Captain Barr, USN, Assistant Director, Naval

DOCID:

~IQ:J' Rl!lbl!llzSABbS :J'Q 6SN:J'RJ\O:J'SR5 HS'f RFlbBkSABLI'J 'f8 F8tt8ISU NJIt'fI8NJltLS

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Security GrollP,(ADN"SG);~n(l1 land Nona

Sohn ofthe Information ahdRepo....r"l"tI~n~g~e..,l-em---e-n"l"t.,.(P"'"'2)l"'",""II:N"I'lS...Ar--·~.--------

At twenty minutes past midnigl1t, General Morrison arrived at the Command Center

followed very shortly byCaptain BarrdJ\P2; Leonard Bienvenu, Chief,

Office ofSecurity (M5); Richa.rd Harvey of Mobile Collection{I\12); Milton Zaslow, Deputy

Chief, B Group; Francis Smead and John Apollony from BO,5; arId I Ifrom

B11. As the Pueblo operator chatter being relayed via CRITIC circuits reflected the

worsening situation, General Morrisonnotified the Deputy Director, NSA, Dr. Louis

Tordella. The NSA Communications Security Watch Officer\was also called to report to

work.

Apart from the natural concern for the physical safety of the Pueblo and its crew,

NSA's immediate concern about the Pueblo's seizure and wherea.bouts was centered on the

damage that would result from compromise of the cryptologic materials and cryptographic

equipment aboard the ship. The B Group Watch Office and~'nJapan held

informal teletype discussions, as did Milton Zaslow, with James Harris in order to

determine what assistance from NSA was needed; to ensure that all SIGINT co lectors had

been alerted; to request a summary of technical reporting; and to advise them of NSA's

intent to request continuous I ~overage of

the Korean east coast. 22

Elsewhere in Washington, others were also scrambling to find out info.rmation about

the Pueblo. Having been advised by the White House Situation Room, Special Assistant to

the President Walt W. Rostow arrived at the White House and telephoned General Carter

at NSA to ask what command and control procedures were applicable to/instances such as

the Pueblo. The Director replied that there was a clear division of responsibility between

NSA and the JCS concerning such reconnaissance patrols. General Carter also informed

Rostow that NSA provided technical guidance and support for the SIGINT collection

mission but that the JCS/JRC retained full responsibility for deployment of the ship

including evaluation of physical risk factors. Carter indicatedi that any action taken

regarding the Pueblo was a matter underJCS cognizance. 23 The time in Washington, D.C.,

was 1:30 A.M. (3:30 P.M. Pueblo time), 23 January 1968.

After talking with General Carter, Rostow telephoned Ha.waii asking for information

on the Enterprise's distance from Wonsan and the status of efforts to assist the Pueblo.

General Allison told him that it was estimated that no aircraft could reach the Pueblo in

time to help the ship.24 Following further telephone conversations with Secretaries Rusk

and McNamara, Rostow notified President Lyndon Johnson ofthe situation at 2:25 A.M.

At the Pentagon, too, activity was brisk. The National Military Command Center

notified both Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and his deputy, Paul Nitze. In turn,

McNamara discussed the situation with Secretary/of State Dean Rusk and then huddled

with his assistant for public affairs, Phillip G. Goulding, to discuss the Pueblo's status and

(b) (1)

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NOT REI E A SA 81 i '];0 ~OWT~' GTOMg

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I

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DOCID: 3997429

the preparation of a press release. In the interim, at 2:31 A.M. EST, the NMCC telephoned

CINCPAC to notify all forces not to make any public release concerning the Pueblo

incident. Nearby, the JCS/JRC was hurriedly trying to find information about the

Pueblo's patrol. At 3:20 A.M., General Morrison at NSA told Captain Vineyard, USN

(JCS/JRC), that because the Pueblo had been operating under radio silence during its

patrol, NSA had not received any messages from the ship prior to the incident. Thereupon,

Captain Vineyard requested that NSA query all appropriate stations for any SIGINT

reflections ofthe Pueblo's location since 8 January 1968. NSA released this message query

at 3:55 A.M. Z5

U.S. PREPARES PRESS RELEASE ON PUEBLO

At NSA, Robert X. Boucher, the Public Information Officer, telephoned Phillip

Goulding, the Secretary of State's Assistant for Public Affairs, at 8:30 A.M. and learned

that the White House, the Department of State, and the Secretary of Defense had approved

a press release about the Pueblo incident. Goulding's secretary dictated the approved

release to one ofBoucher's staff, and copies were distributed to the NSA Directorate. 26 At

9:15 A.M., the Department of Defense formally issued the release which identified the

Pueblo as a "Navy intelligence collection auxiliary ship ... designated the AGER-2." The

release gave the bare details of the seizure in international waters, the size of the ship's

personnel complement, and its physical dimensions.

In less than an hour, Captain Pickett Lumpkin, Deputy Chief of Information of the

Navy Department, called Boucher and asked if the Pueblo might be likened to the USS

Liberty. Boucher referred him to the Department of Defense press release. When

Lumpkin asked for a photograph of the Pueblo, Boucher said he would call him back.

Boucher discussed the request with Gerard P. Burke and Lieutenant Commander Koczak

from the executive office of the Director (DO. Both agreed that because the ship was a

naval vessel, Lumpkin should be referred to the NAVSECGRU. 27

Soon thereafter, both the Department of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency

realized that inquiries would now be made concerning the risk assessment that was

assigned to the Pueblo's mission prior to its departure for the Sea ofJapan. They therefore

requested copies of NSA's message of 29 December 1967 to the JCS concerning North

Korean aggressiveness. Both were denied because NSA believed that JCS should provide

such information, if at all. General Carter instructed his staff that no historical

information about the ship was to be released to any outside agency. This policy had been

discussed with Brigadier General Ralph D. Steakely, USAF, JCS/JRC, and he agreed with

General Carter's decision. zB Based on this instruction, Boucher called Lumpkin at the

Navy Office of Information to advise him to check with JCS/JRC for all background

information on the Pueblo. 29

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By mid-morning at NSA, General Carter had briefed Patrick Coyne, secretary to the

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and explained that the Pueblo

was a Navy responsibility and that NSA was only peripherally involved. In addition,

General Carter briefed Admiral Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, CIA; Lieutenant General

Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA; and Bromley Smith from the White House staff.

Meanwhile, Louis Tordella, Deputy Director of NSA, talked with Coyne about the

cryptographic equipment aboard the Pueblo. 30

Whatever course of action that the U.S. government decision makers might choose,

NSA wanted to be prepared to assist. At 2:30 P.M., David McManis, the NSA

representative to the White House Situation Room, telephoned Arthur J. McCafferty, an

aide at the Situation Room, to learn of any decisions. McCafferty said that he had heard

nothing from either the JCS or from the outcome of the White House luncheon discussions.

An hour later, General Carter talked to Patrick Coyne to be sure he was receiving all the

information he needed. Coyne replied that the White House Situation Room was taking

care of him. Coyne then asked if NSA had any additional information on the incident,

including any contemplated action by the United States. In reply, Carter said that he had

not learned of any planned actions but assumed that discussions were taking place, and

that he was not about to get involved in the White House and Department of State

decisions. 31

PACIFIC COMMAND PREPARES MILITARY OPTIONS

While Washington officials hastily sought to get information about the Pueblo attack

and seizure, U.S. military commands in the Pacific prepared to take some action against

North Korea if requested. From Hawaii, Admiral Hyland, at approximately 5:00 P.M.

Pueblo time, directed the Seventh Fleet to take steps as soon as possible to place and

support a destroyer offWonsan immediately outside the twelve-mile limit. This ship was

to be prepared to engage in operations that might include towing the Pueblo and/or

retrieving its crew. The Seventh Fleet was also to provide air cover for the ship.32 Admiral

Bringle of the Seventh Fleet recommended to Hyland that the presence of a naval task

group in the Sea ofJapan be made known to the North Koreans, and that this warning be

accompanied by U.S. government demands for immediate release of the Pueblo and its

crew. He also recommended compensation for material damage and personnel injuries,

action against guilty parties and guarantees against any recurrence. Failing such

response from North Korea, Bringle recommended naval air strikes against a suitable

military target. 33 CINCPACFLT was also considering other options, such as strikes by

land-based aircraft; sending the Enterprise, Truxton and several other destroyers into the

Sea of Japan to begin photoreconnaissance at first light; locating and seizing any North

Korean ship on the high seas; sailing the USS Banner to the Wonsan area under heavy

~,Q'f RSbSltSABbS 'fEl 6ElN'+'RA6'fORS NO,+, REJhEJASABhEJ 'f0 f'6ftfilI8N' rqt"'fI6I4'J!rL~

'6' seEReT tJM8RA 82
DOCID: 3997429

TO" 5fECRET l:IM8RA

escort as a show of resolve and to provide possible assistance to the Pueblo; and blockading

the port ofWonsan. 34

In Fuchu, at about 4:00 P.M. local time, General McKee, from his Fifth Air Force

headquarters, telephoned General Ryan to give him a readiness report. Six F-I05s armed

only with guns were already airborne from Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa. The first

flight of these was due at Osan within the hour and would be reconfigured, if necessary,

but would not be able to strike before dark. The remaining F-I05s from Kadena, equipped

with pylons only, would continue to be deployed and reconfigured upon arrival at Osan.

General McKee had instructed the Eighteenth Tactical Fighter Wing to commandeer

three C-130 aircraft in Okinawa to support the F-I05 squadron's deployment to South

Korea. General Ryan readily approved. The F-4s, downloading at Osan, could probably

launch within a half hour, but General McKee did not recommend such a launch because

of the MiG screen over Wonsan. He pointed out that there were over 100 MiGs stationed

within the Wonsan area. General Ryan again concurred. All aircraft in Japan (four FlOSs and six F-4s at Yokota and seven F-4s at Misawa) were being readied for deployment

to Itazuke Air Force Base on 24 January if needed. 35

To give additional armament support to the Fifth Air Force aircraft being readied in

Japan, General Ryan directed the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Force Base in the

Philippines to fly thirty-eight Sparrow air-to-air missiles to Itazuke, Japan, as quickly as

possible, together with their loading crews. Delivery would take about twelve hours.

General Ryan advised the Fifth Air Force of this action and directed that the RF-4s

(reconnaissance version of the F4) be positioned to reach Wonsan on the 24th and to

consider the possibility ofusing an RB-57 for oblique offshore photography.36

In South Korea, meanwhile, U.S./UN commander General Bonesteel had received

word from Yokosuka at 2:25 P.M. local time about the Pueblo situation. He immediately

passed this information to his component commanders with instruction to increase their

alert status. I DOS

1/././ /,\g£!'

NO I RELEASABLE 10 CON tRAC IORS NUl RELEASABLE 10 FOREIGN NAt IONALS

Admiral Sharp, having completed his meeting in Danang, flew to the aircraft carrier

USS Kitty Hawk, flagship of the Commander, Task Force 77. Vice Admiral Bringle and

Rear Admiral Cousins, Commander, Task Force 77, met Sharp and briefed him

immediately on the Pueblo situation at about 6:00 P.M. Korean time. 40 During the night,

Admiral Sharp developed action recommendations and sent these to JCS at approximately

83 Tap SfECRfEf l:JMSRA

.1

1i

I

I

II

'1'1.,

I,

I:,'

\~.~

~:
DOCID: 3997429

TO' 5!(ft!T UMlutA

7:00 A.M., 24 January, Korean time. He recommended that the North Korean action be

met with a stern protest and demand for immediate release of the Pueblo and crew, full

explanation ofthis act of piracy, and indemnity for all damages.41 Sharp did not direct nor

explicitly approve of the order to position a destroyer off Wonsan outside the twelve-mile

limit to be prepared to engage in operations including towing Pueblo and/or retrieving the

crew. Admiral Hyland, CINCPACFLT, had issued this order. Sharp did believe, however,

that the presence of a V.S. ship off Wonsan would provide one means whereby custody of

the Pueblo and crew could be returned to the V nited States expeditiously even though the

ship might be disabled. In order to minimize tension in any such act, the decision to carry

out this plan should be preceded by an announcement to the North Korean government

concerning the purpose ofsuch a mission.

In this light, Admiral Sharp recommended that authority be granted to carry out the

plan to station a destroyer off Wonsan in international waters for a prescribed and preannounced purpose and duration. He also recommended that the Enterprise and escorting

destroyers proceed to a point about 100 miles south of Wonsan in the Sea ofJapan and be

prepared to come to the assistance of the destroyer in the event of any hostile action. In

addition, Sharp stated that the Fifth Air Force should have aircraft, preferably F-4s, on

strip alert ready to assist.42

While the military commands in the Pacific assumed a readiness posture, senior

officials at the Pentagon considered the possibility of taking direct military action.

General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, telephoned Admiral Hyland at about 1030

hours Washington time to direct that there be "no repeat no show of force in incident

area.,,43 Specifically, Wheeler ordered that no air or surface forces were to reconnoiter or

approach the subject area and no destroyer was to be positioned off Wonsan. Fleet units

that had been repositioned as a result of the Pueblo incident were directed to proceed no

farther north than their current positions. 44 At least for the moment, there would be no

V.S. military response to the seizure ofthe Pueblo.

Later in the evening, JCS amplified its instructions to the Pacific commands. V.S.

naval and air forces were to remain outside the area within eighty nautical miles of the

coast of North Korea north of a line extending east of the DMZ. The JCS also ordered the

VSS Enterprise task group to operate in the southern part of the Sea of Japan south of

latitude 38 degrees north. Following these instructions, JCS informed CINCPAC that

V.S. forces in Korea would be maintained at present levels unless otherwise authorized by

JCS. 45

~lSi RSbSASA8bS is 6Sn'fll.A6'fSR8 ~lS'f RSbSAS/,8bS is F8RSlmf nA'fISn/,bS

Tap SECRET ijM8RA 84

1
Earlier in the day, the. USAF command post in the Pentagon forwarded a request from

Secretary of Defense McNa.mara to General Ryan asking for the number and type of USAF

aircraft that could have resPQnded to the Pueblo within an hour and forty-five minutes of

the request for help and within three hours. The Fifth Air Force provided these answers:

at one hour and forty-five minutes, zero aitcraft; after three hours, four F-4s that had been

reconfigured to carry conventional bombs butwith no air-to-air combat capability.46 From

these and other facts, General Wheeler realized.that there would be questions from many

sources as to why\ the U.S. armed. services failed to prevent the Pueblo's capture.

Accordingly, he sent.a Flash precedence message toCINCPAC, with information copies to

CINCPACFLT, Pacific Air Force, U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Forces Korea. The message

requested these commands to provide as soon as possible a complete and detailed

chronology of events that had occurred up to the time of reporting, and also the identity of

combat forces by location, type, quantity, and readiness tha.t could have come to the

assistance of the Pueblo during the time the incident was takingplace. Commanders were

also asked to report all actions they considered taking and subsequently ruled out. Later

instructions specified that replies to JCS were dueno laterthan 8:00 A.M. Washington time

on 24 January.47

The JCS also tasked the Defense Intelligence Agency to gather some information. At

2100 hours local time, the DIA Alert Center in the Pentagon senta facsimile transmission

to the NSA SIGINT Command Center asking the following questions about the Pueblo

incident:

U.S. MILITARY GIRDS FORQUESTIONS ON LACK OF RESPONSE

A DOCID:

'lb) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

399~IA~-Qi3 USC 798 (bi~:fr-~L. 86-36

"Fe, SECRH t:JM81tA

II

I

1.···1

)1

J

~:

as the Pueblo fired on by the North Korean vessels? Were any U.S.

personnel wounded through enemy action?

Colonel Robert E. Duvall, DIA team chief, indicated that the questions had been asked

originally by the chairman, JCS, and that a reply was desired by S:OO A.M., 24 January.

The NSA Command Center passed this query tol lin the Navy htarich<ofthe (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

North Korean analytic division (B11) for action.

At 2:45 A.M. on the 24th, the NSA Command Center telephoned Colonel Duvall at DIA

!\\fhe,ewas

also no clear evidence that the USS Pueblo was actually fired on by North Korea; and

SIGINT revealed no information on U.s. personnel wounded through North Korean action. 48

Na'f RI!lLl!lltSABbI!l 'fa eaH'fK'Ae'faftS lof6'f ft~LI!:ASA~L~ 'f6 P'61tP::Iem I~A 1IOI~AL5

85 "Fe, SECRH t:JMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

TO' !E(RET tJMISR:A:

u.s. BEGINS ASSESSMENT OF SIGINT COMPROMISE

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

DIA notified the NSA SIGINT Command Center about midnight on 23 January that the

JCS had directed DIA, in coordination with NSA, to assess\the impact and potential

compromise resulting from the seizure of the Pueblo. DIA had sent a similar message to

Headquarters, Naval Security Group Command. The NSA Comml;:lnd Center made certain

that the NSA S13 Compromise Watch was aware of the DIA request and then notified

Howard C. Barlow, the NSA Assistant Director for Communications Security. The

Command Center then telephoned Madison E. Mitchell, Executive to the Assistant

Director for Production at NSA, and requested that he report to work to take action on the

JCS task. About three hours later, Mitchell sent an interim reply to DlA stating that an

assessment ofthe security impact would be made as soon as NSA acquired a complete list

of all COMINT-cleared personnel aboard the Pueblo and a compilation of SIGINT materials

aboard the ship.49 The Assistant Director, Naval Security Group, had already advised

NSA that NSG Headquarters was sending a message to Commander, Naval Forces Japan,

at Yokosuka requesting the names of the Pueblo crew and a list of cryptologic\documents

held aboard the ship.50 At 5:00 A.M. on 24 January, NSG forwarded to NSA!'-- ____

listing of all classified material that the station had provided to the Pueblo. In addition,

the NSA Operations Group, colocated with Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii, had

telephoned to the Command Center a partial list of the Pueblo crew. The Command

Center gave the list to M5, NSA's Office of Security,which was compiling a list of COMINTcleared personnel aboard the Pueblo for the Director, NSA. 51

General Carter's concern about communications security compromises had prompted

him to telephone the NSA Command Center at 6:00 P.M. to ask if the COMSEC organization

at NSA had sent out any information on probable cryptographic compromises. Carter

learned that these messages were then being drafted. By 7:45 P.M. Washington time, NSA

had released messages to its British and Canadian counterparts as well as the COMSEC

components ofthe Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA concerning the possible compromise of

keying materials for specific cryptographic systems and what follow-on actions would be

required.52

NSA concentrated its efforts in two areas. Of first importance was the need to collect

and analyze all available North Korean signals that occurred prior to and during the

attack on the Pueblo. Such signals might reveal the Pueblo's exact location at the time of

the assault and indicate ifthere had been prior planning to capture the ship. Second, there

was an immediate need to expand the continuous coverage of North Korean military

communications in order to detect offensive preparations, defensive postures, and any

information about the whereabouts ofthe Pueblo and its crew. Both of these requirements

necessitated close cooperation and liaison between continental U.S. headquarters such as

NSA, JCS, USAFSS, NSG, and the field activities involved, for example, NSG and

NO I RELEASABLE 10 CON IMCI O~ lifO! It~L~AS1r~L~ TO ~Oft1!lI6n nATIOnALS

TOP §~CAET l:JMBRA 86
DOCID: 3997429

Tap SEERE' tJM!RA

USAFSS intercept sites NSA field representativesl

NSA WASHINGTON ESTABLISHES SIGINT READINESS

Back in Washington, NSA, at 4:35 A.M. on 24 January, established SIGrNT Readiness

ALPHA. (This was a stand-by condition requiring an increased degree of watchfulness

during a serious situation, and it sometimes included a modification in operating

procedures.) The ALPHA was in effect for the followin~ stations:1

USM-81 had already established a SIGINT Readiness BRAVO for all subordinate stations

because of the North Korean naval reaction tQa U.S. ship off the east coast. (A SIGrNT

Readiness BRAVO was an alert condition d(lclared by NSA requiring a high degree of

vigilance, cancellation of leave, adjustments to collection posture, and reporting

periodicity.M four to six hours.) Within twenty-five minutes,I ~hangedi.ts

readiness /condition to ALPHA to conform with NSA instructions. 55

At Fort Meade~ I(B Group) at NSA, while

assessing tpeimpact of the Pueblo seIzure, reacted to events as it became aware of them.

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Ne'f R8L8z'tBz'tBLl"J 'fe eerf'fRAe'f8M !(8'f Rl"JLP;A~AeLl"JTO ll'OItl"JIG1~ NA LIONAL5

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

87 Tap SECRET UMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

fep SECRET UMBRA

(b) (1)

(brt3)-50 usc 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

When the Korean Division (B11) learned of the movement of the USSRntrprise task

group toward Wonsan, it requeste4 report any

SIGINT reflections of North Korean reactions to this naval movement.59

Similarly, when the Seventh Fleet acted to place a destroyer outside the twelve-mile

limit off Won.an, the B G'OU~ Watch Office drrected those inteccept sites as well as the

I Ito report all SIGINT reflections of possible rescue

operatIOns by tnat destroyer. At I :30 A.M. Washmgton time, the U.S. ForeIgn Broadcast

Information Service (FBIS) monitored.Radio Pyongyang's report that the USS P~e?loJlad

been captured in North Korean territorial waters. NSA (811) then directed an immediate

message t~ I lemphasizing the critical

need for the immediate reporting of SIGINT reflections (especially from North Korean

communications) of the Puebldsposition prior to and at the time of capture.61 A half hour

later, Harris advised NSA thatl Ihad searched its files and had not

uncovered any information on the Pueblo'smovementsbetween 11 January and the time

ofthe attack.62

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 us 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 6-36

Subsequently, Harris reported that, while intercepted voiceeommunications (from the

I lin4ic~ted that the reported capt.\lr~ bytheNorth Korean SO-1

class subchaser took place between 3:10;;Lll~3:35 A.M.,it did notr~flectthe location of the

U.S. vessel.l IMors~tr~ckingofthisactixity by Kalgoch'i~ridid not begin

until 5:40 A.M.,over two hours later.63 Workingwith.theih-f0rma.tio~at hand,BII released

a summary report that gave SIGINT reflections of the Notth Korean c:aptllre ofthe USS

Pueblo. 54 This report, however, contained no SIGINT information abouttheP~~.blo's

location at the time ofseizure. :~: :~:-50 usc 403

(b) (3)-18 usc 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

u.s. ADVISES ROK OF PUEBLO INCIDENT

As mentioned earlier, concern over cryptologic damage resulting from the Pueblo's

capture was intense. The Korean Division at NSA, at 6:40 A.M. WaShington time, sent a

message tol IrElquesting that he alertDto the possible compromise of the

technical support package aboard the Pueblo. NSA's intention was to providec=J with a

warning in the event that the compromise precipitated an extensive\North Korean

communications change. The Korean Division instructe~ Ito accomplish this

task without divulging any details of what may have been compromised.65 Toadd his.own

personal concern about such a com romise, General Carter also sent an Exclusive message

to Harris asking him to advis f the probable compromise.\ In

addition, Carter told Harris to impress upon he extreme Sensitivity of this

information and requested that it be retained withi Harris wasalso to

inform General Bonesteel and appropriate U.S. em assy 0 ICI:aSofthispotential

intelligence compromise. 66 In reply to Carter, Harris reported that hel1addiscussedthe

situation privately with I IwhQappreciated being informed ancl who shared the

"FOP SECRET l:JM8RA 88

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 U C 403

(b) (3)-18 U C 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

..."~m._~_~__..-. ....... _
DOCID: 3997429

TOl' SEERET UMBRA

concern over the actions of the North Koreans.iDave his assurance that his lips would

remain closed as he fully understood the extreme sensitivity of the information. 0

I I

reporting on the Pueblo incident. 57

I I

I . Ibemadea\¥8:reof\Vha.t~ad happened to the Pueblo. Thus, the deputy

commander, United Nations Command, in the+ateafternQQl1of23~~~~~?,briefed the

South Korean minister of defense and several other ROK officials concerning the incident.

IRecognizing this delicate diplomatic position and wanting to preserve ......._~--------~~ good ROK-U.S. relations, General Bonesteel felt that he needed more timely information

and asked JCS to advise him, in advance, of the estimated time of arrival of any U.S. Navy

.craft off Wonsan in international waters. He also voiced his concern about not being

informed of actions occurring at the national/level and of not receiving messages that his

command should have been aware of. He justified these needs on the basis of a

requirement to briefPresident Pak ofSo\lth Korea and for operational requirements. 7o

U.S. ADVISORYTOiJAPAN

'(b) (1)

OpA

DOS

) (1)

DOS

In ad"d,ition to U.S. rghter yr",c,raft arriving in Japan from Okinawa, there was

increased activity at Air Base from which Airborne Communications

Reconnaissance Platform (ACRP) aircraft were staged. Upon learning of the Pueblo

incident, the NSA Representative,I, Irequestedth~ ~ecurity

Squadron I It()provide maximum coverage of NorthKoreansllip-toNary' RBLB/rSA:8bE 'fa eaH'fItAe'faRS H6'f KBLrJ1llSJlt"LE 'f6 l"6ftl':Iem N'ATI6!¢AL~

(b) (3)-P.L. 8

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

89 IUP SECRET UMRItA

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
~:©)fll

1~'J'(3)~5. 0 Usc 403

(b)DOC['-D.~-363997429 \'\'::<:'~'" ,', ....,..

"';ep"SEERET l:JMBRA "'"

...." " "..,

<ShipandSb:iP-tO-Sh~;~···ca~.re.unicationsconcerning the Pueblo. 72 I~;~~porise,I,--- __---,

c:JlauncbedaC-I30 ACRP'I ..",. IWith instructians to

rerriainsouth of the 39th parallel.73 U;S.~:cific Headquarters supported this action and

reques~dthe Pacific Air Force to maintainI ~overage on as near

continuous basis as possihle~hile canceling otherrec()rtnaissance missions as necessary

(seeACRP()rbitmap, p. 91tTherecannaissance aircraftw(:lrealso given authorization

for the use ofqAir Baseasne~ded.74 Because there wasl_~~~~~ .....

capability withirr.theU.S. SIGINT forcesl Ithe approval for ACRP flights to use

Dthelocationo~ Iwas vitaltospeedy translation.

At N$A headquarters, an, the North Korean division, also recognized the critical

need for airborne SIGINTeollection. At 5:05 A.M. Washington time, B11 requested JCS/JRC

toa.uthorize\immediate and continuous ACRP flights. ofT the east coast of Korea. North

Korel,ln service<¢ommunications were the targets with primary attention to the intercept

of North KoreanI1avai I I

Bll also requested that the aircraft deliverintercept materials tce::::Jtnd that the first

priority be given toils.processing. 75 (b) (3) -I? L. 86-36

At Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, the United States Air Force Security

SElrvice (USAFSS), whose\personnel manned the SIGINT collection positions aboard the

ACRP aircraft, was conc.erned about the safety of airborne collection platforms off the

coast of Nor.th Korea. From discussions with JCS/JRC, llS8..ES:ile.ar:rd that

;::~;'::~:7~~~Sa:ei~~o~~:t;~~~:;;d~,g:~~:e:;~~g~O::hjl:rer:,mg:a~tii~:~t; ACRP flights and\their recoveryat USAFSS sent a Flash message to NSA advising

that there was an ACRP aircraft in orbit at that time (3:45p.M. on the 23d). It stated that

according to NSA Representative to JCS/JRC I Ithe mission then being

conducted was only in the orbit area during Uie hours of darKness and therefore did not

require fighter coYer. USAFSS was\still concerned because of the Pueblo incident,

nevertheless, and qUeried NSA and JCS/JRC whether the aircraft should be recalled. the

message also instructedl Inot to launch any additional ACRPaircraft, other than

those previously scheduled and approved, without the authority of the JOS. The message

also advised NSA thatl Idid not have adequate airborne portable transcriber

positions, and therefore it would be preferable to have recovery of the aircraft ai • ~or

processing purposes. 76

Fifteen minutes after receiving the USAFSS message, NSA received one from 0

I ladyising that General Bonesteel had approved continuous ACRP coverage and

necessary flightc1eara~ces The message also advise~ Ithat the ACRP .. fl..• ights

would recover aDandprovided instructions to both[ Ifor handling

and processing the intercept tapes,?7

mH' RBbS:\SABbB 'FO GO~t'FRAG'FORS ~tO'F RBbSAS:\BbB 'FO FORBlQPHh\'FIONAbS,

TOl' S!eR!f UM81tA 90 (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
(l:;J) (1)

(b1~3)-50 USC 403

DOCID: 39~~~R;?L~S~6~~~

'fOP SECRET I:IMBAA

US'f RSMiASltBbS 'fS OSU'TR/r6'fSRS US'f R8b8ASltBbS 'fe F8aSlSN ~flt'fIS~fAbS

91 19P SECAH l:IMBAA
\(b) (1)

(.b) (3)-50 USC 403

DOCID: 3997429 (b)(3)-P.L.86-36

, UP SECRET YM8RA

..;:.;tlb) (3) -P.L. 86-36

The USAFSS instructions were confusing and corrl1icting,/ Pacwc\headquarters had

earlier directed the Pacific\Air Force to maintain continuous AGRP coverage and approved

recovery ac::::::::J The NSA elements in the Pacific were ar:ranging and coordinating the

details incident to tape handling and transcription. Now, USAFSS was issuing directives

to I • ~hat were contrar:)' to the earlier plans. At this point, the JCS

still had not responded to NSA's requestfor ACRPcoverage.

At NSA the Pueblo incident had/caused theOffice of Mobile Collection (KI2) to set up

a twenty-four-hour watch to keep abreast/of and guide changes in SIGINT collection

resources and tasking; the ACRreffort wasofprimeconcern. At 12:50 P.M.,Harold Welch

from USAFSS call... ed the.... N.....SA K12 w.a.t.C.. hofficer.,.li .,/ find wante.... d to know if

USAFSS or JCS should recall th~ ./ / /. f\CRP that was airborne at

that time. Welch furthE!rstated thatseventy fighters would be needed to provide air cover

for round-the-clock AGRP flights. Sheck then had a series of telephone conversations with

I ..' • Ithe NSA reptesentativeto JCSIJRC at the Pentagon·I'-- _

reported that General Steakley, JCS/JRC, authorized the ACRP flight in progress and its

recovery atE:]I ladcled, however, that Steakley wanted the aircraft out of the

area before sun-up in Korea and would take action to recall it accordingly. At 1:24 P.M.,

IIcaIIed Welch to pass./along this i...nformatl.·.. on and requested that Welch take no

~raction until he heard from NSA. 78

Acting for General Steakley, .Colonel/ Joseph Cutrona, in the JCS Joint

Reconnaissance Center, telephoned the CINCPAC Joint Reconnaissance Center at 2:00

P.M. (Washington time) and directed the recall of the aircraft. Cutrona also ordered that no

other reconnaissance aircraft be launched against Korea pending a decision by the JCS

whether such flights should be escorted by fighter aircraft. 79

The JCS.... and DIA were deli...b.erring on~ow to respond to NSA's request for extended

ACRP coverage. Earlier in the day ad given NSA Representative to the JCS/JRC I Ithe following information about the proposed flights: the ACRP aircraft would

1'-----------.----__------- DIA also requested in£ormation about NSA's ACRP proposal. At three o'clock in the

afternoon, I rChief of Bl at NSA, informed Edward Dakin, DIA, that NSA r:....:..::..:..:..:..:..:..:....:..!:=====!......:-=.:..:....:..:.....:...:....:.:....:.-=..:..:..=..:..:..:..:..::11r==.=.::..=-.:=-=:::.:.:.:....::.::llt-.:~:...;~~1·········· i( b) (1)

bGA

DOS

NUl RELEASABLE iOCONiRACiORS

TO" SECRET YMBAA

NOI RELEASABLE 10 l'UR~jW\"LlJ'lAIIONALS

(b)(3)-50 usc 403

92 (b) (3)-18 usc 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
OTHER CONCERNS

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET I:JMBRAIC

hours with take-oli ~t~ppr:();l{i1llatelY6;O()AM.Jocaltime.Acknowledging

USAFSS's request, NSA alsoasked for recover'~ i I~s p-reviously

recommended. 82 On the heels a(this message, NSAseI1t~ne to USAFSS andl _

advising them of the revised ACRPrequirement and askin 0 send copies to

of an

NSAalso askedl'--__-:---:--__"""":""----=-~"""":""--~~­ ri----'T"":""::""":'~__rr--..L..~ ny linguistic or transcription assistance it might need. 83

Although the JCS had restrained all military operations, the Joint Reconnaissance

Center was still considering NSA's request for ACRP coverage. At 4:30 P.M. the JRC

interpreted the proposed ten-hour coverage as a minimum, and it decided to increase this

to twenty-f<)ur~hourcoverage with a fighter combat air pa.trol of four aircraft at all times. I !tthe JCS/JRC telephoned K12 to advise of this development but added that

the schedule should be considered tentative because it still required approval by Secretary

of State Dean Rusk, who was busily engaged at the White House and wouldn't see the

proposaluntil the 24th. Under the circumstances, it was decided not to call USAFSS until

there was a definite and final plan for ACRP coverage.&l

\(bHll

D~~:Q~i~~%t~~~7429

The ripple effect of the Pueblo seizure extended to the operations of other U.S. SIGINT

collection ships. NSA advised the SIGINT collectorUSNS Muller and other sites targeting

In Washington, in addition to the high level of activity in military circles, there was

also diplomatic activity concerning the Pueblo. The Department of State had asked the

Soviet Union to convey to the North Koreans the U.S. urgent request for the immediate

release of the Pueblo and its crew, but th.e initial Soviet response was completely negative.

In the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Arthur (}Qldberg expressed the concern of the

United States to the Secretary General.87 If Goldberg were to bring the Pueblo matter

before the United Nations Security Council, he would have to be completely briefed

beforehand. Therefore, at 4:45 P.M., General John Morrison, Assistant Director, NSA, for

Production, talked withl rt the JCS/JRC about such a briefing. Immediately

f(~'f ItELEABABLE 'f~ e~H''fltA:e'f~HB H'6'f HI'JLI'JASABLI'J 'f8 P8REJ16N Nh'f18~f1rbS b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(-13) (3)-P.L. 86-36 93 1'6' !!CRE I UMBRA
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thereafter, Morrison telephoned Admiral Jackson, Goldberg's senior military advisor, to

brief him on the impact of the Pueblo's seizure as it related to collection equipment,

cryptologic documents, cryptographic gear, and the SIGINT personnel aboard the ship.BB

Twenty-four hours had passed since U.S. authorities first became aware of the USS

Pueblo's emergency situation. The unprepared posture of the U.S. armed forces in the area

had precluded prevention of the Pueblo's capture, and any immediate counterblow had

been ruled out. The Pueblo's exact current position was unknown as was the disposition of

its crew. Information concerning the vessel's precise location at the time of boarding was

also tenuous. Photographic and SIGINT reconnaissance flights that might collect

intelligence information about the ship were ordered to stand down. Concerned about

enlarging the incident, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken precautions to prevent any

military action that might aggravate the situation. Prior to the departure of the Pueblo,

one U.S. naval authority in Japan told Commander Bucher not to expect any help if he

got into trouble - and, indeed, none was forthcoming.

The Department of Defense had released to the public a statement giving the barest of

facts about the ship and its seizure. For a few days, the Pueblo replaced the war in

Vietnam in press headlines. One fact, however, was certain. Compromise of the

intelligence materials aboard the Pueblo and the SIGINT information held by its crewmen

posed a potentially crippling blow not only to the U.S. intelligence community but to the

whole of U.S. naval communications. Cognizant ofthis, the JCS requested an assessment

of the loss. The SIGINT community began to tally the damage. The United States also

continued deliberations at the policy level to determine its response to North Korean

aggression.

NUl RELEASABLE IOCONlRACIORS NUl RELEASABLE 10 FOREIGN NAtIONALS

TOP SECRET I:IMBRA 94

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Chapter VI

Reaction

The Next Week

U. S. ASSESSMENTS OF NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, Richard Helms - the Director of Central

Intelligence - submitted a preliminary assessment of North Korean intentions to the other

decision makers at the White House, the Departments of Defense and State, and the

directors ofDIA and NSA. This report of23 January 1968 stated that the circumstances of

the Pueblo's capture indicated that this was a deliberate act and not the result of a local

North Korean commander exceeding his instructions. It further stated that the North

Koreans were prepared to face a period of sharply heightened tensions. This report also

estimated that the North Koreans would probably not release the crew or the ship

promptly unless they judged that the United States would resort to retaliatory action, such

as an air attack against the patrol craft involved in seizing the Pueblo. Should tensions

rise sharply, the assessment concluded that the Soviets would be bound to take a hand at

least privately and would almost certainly advise the North Koreans to terminate the

episode at an early date. l

On the morning of 24 January, Arthur McCafferty at the White House informed

General Carter at NSA that a "kitchen cabinet," composed of Walter Rostow, National

Security Council (NSC), Earle Wheeler, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Helms, Director of

Central Intelligence, and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Undersecretary of State, was

meeting in the Situation Room to discuss the Pueblo incident. The NSC discussed only the

Cyprus situation, not the Pueblo matter. 2

Later in the day, a larger group of individuals met at the Department of State to

consider North Korea's objective in seizing the Pueblo, its future plans, and how the

United States should respond. Attending this meeting were Secretary of Defense Robert

McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Rostow, Paul Nitze, Clark Clifford, Samuel

Berger, Paul Warnke, Bromley Smith, and George Christian. Rostow believed that the

Soviets were really the ones behind this action and suggested that "we might take the

unusual move of getting the South Koreans to pick up the Soviet ship that has been

shadowing the Enterprise." The others opposed this proposal. General Wheeler suggested

a number of military actions but stated that "before we do anything we need

reconnaissance." McNamara recommended a build-up offorces including the call-up of Air

Force Reserve units and extension of terms ofservice. The meeting finally resulted in the

group listing possible pressure actions, to include a blockade of North Korean ports;

seizure of North Korean ships; air or ground strikes against North Korea; and replacing

P'fQ~ RIilblilASA8blil ~Q OQP'f~MO~QRS ~fQ~ RlilbIilA&'t8blil ~Q FQRIilISP'f P'fA~IQ~fAbS

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the Pueblo with the Banner. Although the group proposed a number of retaliatory

measures, it could not decide on a final course of action. 3

Helms's preliminary assessment prepared for Secretary McNamara had included the

belief that the North Koreans would "undertake a heavy propaganda exploitation of the

affair for some days at least." At about 11:30 A.M. (Washington time) on the 24th, that

prediction was fulfilled. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Pyongyang,

broadcast a "confession" statement, in English, ascribed to Commander Bucher following

an introduction in Korean. The broadcast did not state that the "confession" was given by

Bucher himself. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) monitored this

transmission and immediately relayed it to Washington. Subsequent KCNA

transmissions, both in English and Korean, repeated the "confession" statement.

In Washington, questions were raised about the broadcast's authenticity. Although

the speaker had an American accent, the language was stilted and contained awkward

constructions and expressions an American was unlikely to use. It appeared that the

statement was prepared by someone not very familiar with the English language. 4 There

was some doubt that the male voice speaking English on the "confession" broadcast was

indeed that of Commander Bucher. At NSA, the Speech Research Division (R44) made a

comparison of voices on the FBIS tapes with that of Bucher's recorded at the Pueblo's

commissioning ceremony in May 1967. From this effort, R44 informed Deputy Director

Louis Tordella that the comparison of the two tapes indicated that the voices were the

same. 5 Mrs. Rose Bucher, however, upon hearing the broadcast, adamantly denied that it

was her husband's voice. Subsequently, after the return of the crew, government officials

learned that Mrs. Bucher was right. Commander Bucher had never recorded this

"confession" before it was first broadcast by KCNA on 24 January 1968. He had signed a

"confession" statement prepared by the North Koreans after being kicked unconscious,

personally threatened with being shot, and being told that unless he signed, his crew

would be executed one-by-one right before his eyes. 6

Apart from its questionable authenticity, the "confession's" content concerning

"criminal" intrusions into North Korean waters and orders to "execute assignments given

by the Central Intelligence Agency" demanded an immediate rebuttal. At once, the

Pentagon began assembling a response, and at about 4:30 P.M. it was released to the press.

The text of the news release included the following paragraphs:

The Pueblo's position as determined by the radar track of the North Koreans themselves was 39

degrees, 25 minutes north and 127 degrees, 56 minutes east. The Pueblo was under orders from

the beginning ofits mission to stay at least thirteen miles from North Korean territory. There is

no evidence to suggest that these orders were disobeyed. There is much evidence, both from [the

Pueblo's] own radio transmission and from the information broadcast from North Koreans

themselves in their own internal reports, that the orders were obeyed.

~J9T KJi,lU \eA8bJi,l T9 e9nTR/.8TQRS nQT REbEASA:8bE TQ POREJI8N NA:'fIOK2\LS

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This release marked the first official revelation that the United States had intercepted

North Korean communications containing their radar tracking of the Pueblo at the time

of the attack and seizure.

The circumstances surrounding the preparation and clearance of the press release

were disjointed and perhaps reflected the haste accompanying the desire to rebut Bucher's

"confession." According to Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Brown, executive officer to the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the press release had been cleared with

Ambassador Berger at the Department of State, George Christian,White House Press

Secretary, and Secretary of Defense McNamara. The paragraphs concerning North

Korean radar tracking were inserted about 3:00 P.M., after Brown had collected this

information from Brigadier General Steakely at the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center.

Brown assumed that General Carter knew of this SIGINT revelation because he had

overheard General Steakely telephoning General Carter and saying, "Pat, they're getting

ready to release it.',7 The unilateral action of the Department of Defense became clear to

General Carter later in the day when he telephoned both Helms and Bromley Smith

regarding the release of SIGlNT information. Carter learned that neither Helms nor Smith

had seen the text ofthe press statement prior to its release. 8

While Carter wrestled with the problem of the release of SIGINT data to the media, the

Military Armistice Commission met in Korea on 24 January. Rear Admiral John Smith,

the senior U.S. negotiator, demanded that Pyongyang return the Pueblo and its crew,

apologize for the incident, and be aware that the United States reserved the right to

demand compensation. The North Koreans laughed at such demands and the senior

communist delegate, Major General Pak Chung Kuk, flatly rejected the U.S. request. 9

As for the Pueblo itself, SIGINT revealed that the North Koreans had begun to examine

the ship and they believed that most of the newer equipment may have been destroyed or

thrown overboard before capture. The North Koreans planned to remove the remaining

equipment for storage, presumably for closer examination. North Korean communications

also suggested that divers would be sent to the scene of the capture to salvage some of the

equipment that had been jettisoned. SIGINT also revealed that antiaircraft units in the

Wonsan area were on alert for a possible U.S. response. 10

Recognizing the gravity of the Pueblo incident and its far-reaching implications,

General Carter established a task team at NSA on 25 January to prepare a complete study

of the incident insofar as it pertained to U.S. SIGINT and COMSEC activities. This study was

to be the basis for reports the Director would be required to make to the Secretary of

Defense, the United States Intelligence Board, and the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board, and for responses to such inquiries that may have been made by other

authorities. Preparation of this study was to take priority over all administrative

activities of the Agency. Benjamin Price, NSA's Assistant Director for Personnel

Management, was designated head of a task team that was to have at least one

representative from NSA's Offices of Production, Communications Security,

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Telecommunications, and Planning and Programming. At his staff meeting the following

day, Carter expanded on his rationale for establishing this Pueblo task team and stated

that he had a number of questions. One of the most important of these was how his

national responsibilities for the protection of SIGINT encroached upon direct support and

mobile SIGINT operations, at least those over which he, as Director of NSA, exercised

limited SIGINT control.

U.S. ACTIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

In other actions taken by U.S. authorities, President Johnson also requested UN

ambassador Arthur Goldberg to seek an "urgent session" of the UN Security Council.

Although Johnson did not expect the United Nations to accomplish anything, he perhaps

reasoned that it would be wise to establish a strong U.S. case at the international forum.

For the emergency session presentation, Goldberg, a former intelligence officer with

experience with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, got Johnson's

approval to use SIGINT evidence because it contained the unique information that the

Pueblo had remained in international waters throughout the incident.ll Goldberg's

request to address the U.N. Security Council was placed on that body's agenda for Friday,

26 January.

In the interim, the Special Security Office (SSO) in New York handled a steady stream

of messages that flowed between NSA and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations

(USUN). Although HI and B1104 were usually the action offices at NSA responsible for

preparing replies to inquiries from Goldberg's staff, Chief B, ADP, ADN, D/DIR, or DIR

reviewed these responses before release.

NSA was especially sensitive to the needs

of its USUN customer and wanted to make

sure that the information provided to it was

scrupulously accurate and without

ambiguity. To realize this objective, NSA

sent a group of personnel from B Group to

the SSO office in New York to work with

Goldberg's staff in precisely wording the

SIGINT portions of the U.S. statement to the

United Nations. The NSA group, led by

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NSA groupwas a primary participant in advising Goldberg throughout the proceedings.

I Icontribution was particularly noteworthy. He provided excellent linguistic

support to the USUN delegation and to NSA analytic elements throughout the crisis. This

type of NSA support to a major SIGINT user was a new experience for the Agency in 1968.12

With this assistance from NSA, Goldberg's staff prepared a memorandum on the

Pueblo's location throughout the incident, thus reinforceing the claim of the Pueblo's

innocence. 13 Goldberg's staff forwarded the completed draft statement to NSA for

coordination. On 4 March, Bl gave its approval to the memorandum with only slight

changes to the text. 14 White House interest in the precise nature of Goldberg's revelations

was equally intense; Johnson directed that he too see the final statement well in advance

ofits delivery before the Security Council. 15

At this time, North Korean radar tracking stations did not report ship positions by

latitude and longitude. They used a "cardinal point" system as a point of reference to

Ireport tZimuth and range tracking·.1 [FJ

Group personnel prepared a lar.ge detailed map depicting the movements of the Pueblo.

The map was later given to Ambassador Goldberg to accompany the text that was

prepared for his U.N. presentation.16

On the afternoon of the 26th, Goldberg addressed the Security Council with NSA

official I Ipresent in the Security Council chamber. 17 Goldberg revealed that

the United States had intercepted the attacking North Korean subchaser's manual Morse

communications as well as voice communications between the North Korean ships

involved in the incident. In fact, several of the exact conversations were included in

Goldberg's text as.proofthat the North Koreans knew that the Pueblo was a U.S. ship, that

it was virtually/unarmed, and that it was in international waters when attacked and

captured.

USSR representative to the U.N. Platon Morosov immediately discounted Goldberg's

presentatil)n and refuted it by quoting from Commander Bucher's "confession" in which it

was stated that the Pueblo had "... reached a point 7.6 miles from Nodo." This, according

to Morosov, was the truth of the matter. 18 In rebuttal, Goldberg noted that under "... the

old rule of law ... it is the contemporary account at the time which is entitled to weight,

not a subsequent one which may be invented to suit the needs ofthe party involved."19

NSA analysts learned about a week later that the position reports given for the Pueblo

ere not entirel accurate. North Korea had chan ed its cardinal point

equatIOns an 0 Fortunately,

it did notchange e aSlC a e ue 0 was In In erna lOna waters when it

was accosted by North Korean naval units. For NSA's B Group (as well as for other

analytic areas in NSA), it was another example of the difficulties involved in relying on a

1 leffort during a crisis situation. 21

(b) (1) NOt RELEASABLE IO CON IMCloM NOT ftI!:LI!:AMBLfJ Ttl FtlRFHOK HA~I8NAr"S

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

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U.S. MILITARY REACTIONS

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Simultaneous with these diplomatic initiatives, the United States was reviewing its

military options. Prior to any military actions to recover the Pueblo, however, U.S. forces

required precise. information about the ship's location, and t.hus the Strategic Air

Command (SAC) was tasked to photograph the Pueblo in Wonsan liarbor. Altough NSA

had not been an addressee on the SAC message of instructions concerning this planned

photographic reconnaissance mission, the NSAPAC Operations Group (NOG) staff at

Pacific Headquarters alertedNSA of SAC's intentions by OPSCOMM message. The NSA

representative at SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, also advised NSA of SAC's

plans and arranged for SAC to notify NSA of the time and execution details of the mission.

In turn, NSA notified James Harrisl ~ndl Jf the plans for

photographing the Wonsan area. 22 The mission, a SR-71 aircraft, was flown at high

altitude on 26 January. Photographic analysis showed the Pueblo anchored offshore in

Changjahwan Bay, a few miles east-northeast of Munch'on Naval Base, Wonsan. A P-6

motor torpedo boat was moored alongside, and a miscellaneous service craft (YAG) was off

the port beam. Imagery quality precluded detailed interpretation to determine if the ship

had been damaged or if any dismantling had taken place. In addition, there was no

evidence of salvage operations in the vicinity of the position where the Pueblo crewmen

had jettisoned some ofthe special equipment. 23

Additional contingency actions taken by the president included the acceptance of the

recommendation by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the JCS to call certain reserve

and National Guard units to active duty. These units included eight Air Force Reserve, six

Naval Reserve, and fourteen Air National Guard units totaling 14,600 personnel and 372

aircraft including fighter, attack, reconnaissance, transport, and rescue. All personnel

were to report to their respective units by 26 January. According to Department of

Defense officials, this step was taken as a "precautionary measure to strengthen our

forces" because ofthe Pueblo incident. 24

The JCS were also formulating plans to increase USAF strength in South Korea by

deploying additional tactical fighters and reconnaissance aircraft to Korean and Japanese

bases. The JCS directed the deployment of 112 aircraft from the United States, 63 from

Okinawa, 13 from the Philippines, and 4 from Japan. 25

In the Sea ofJapan, a task group comprising the USS Enterprise and accompanying

destroyers was ordered to an area 120 nm south of South Korea. The JCS ordered Pacific

Headquarters to augment the Enterprise group with a second attack carrier. 26 The task

group's offensive/defensive operations in the Sea ofJapan were assigned the unclassified

nickname FORMATIONSTAR. 27

The JCS decided to have the USS Banner (AGER-1) join the Enterprise formation and

thereafter position it, with suitable escort, in the same area where the Pueblo incident had

146" ItI!1LI!1A:SA:ftLI!1 '1'6 e6h"ltA:e'f6R:S h6'f Itji]LI!1A:SA:ftLf '1'6 fi'6Itflft!4 14A:'f16hA:LS

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?/8'f REbElz8ltBM!) 1'8 S8~I'ffe'tG'f8RS NO,+, RElhEh'zSttBLS 'FO FORfHSN' NJ't'fIOUALS

occurred. The JCS had discussed this proposal with General Carter at NSA on the

afternoon of 24 January, and he stated that such action should pose no problem to NSA

although the SIGINT configuration was a bit different from that of the Pueblo. According to

Carter, however, the type of escort was a JCS problem and not within his purview. 28 The

JCS order to Pacific headquarters directed that the Banner rendezvous with units of

FORMATION STAR as soon as possible. 29

The Banner was now under Seventh Fleet command, but any movement of the ship to

a position off Wonsan similar to the Pueblo's location was to be directed only by the JCS.

Unlike the Pueblo, plans for the Banner's protection during such possible deployment were

intense. It was estimated that, after reaching the Enterprise and other FORMATION STAR

units, it would take an additional twenty-one hours ofsteaming for the Banner to assume a

station off Wonsan. The Seventh Fleet commander ordered the destroyers Ozbourn and

Higbee as well as the guided missile heavy cruiser Canberra to provide gun,missile, and

surface helicopter support in the immediate vicinity of the Banner. These units would also

provide air cover and antisubmarine protection. CINCPAC further established a

minimum posture for land-based air support before beginning the Banner operation:

twenty-four F-10S's and eighteen F-4's were to be available at South Korean air bases, on

alert and fully loaded for conventional operations with both air-to-air and air-to-ground

ordnance. CINCPAC also recommended that ROK forces, particularly ROKAF, should be

in a high state of alert and informed of the U.S. planned course of action and planned

response in the event of a North Korean attack on the U.S. vessel. CINCPAC also

arranged for the alerting of the U.S. Eighth Army.30 In addition to these elaborate

defensive plans, COMSEVENTHFLT directed the Banner, ifattacked, to "use all means at

her disposal, including all weapons as necessary, to insure aggressive self-protection."3L In

this instance, the Navy chose to issue an order giving a clear indication of just what it

expected ofits SIGINT ships in an emergency situation.

While the Banner was en route to its rendezvous with the FORMATION STAR force,

Pacific Fleet headquarters requested it to provide information about its emergency

destruction procedures and about any discussions held with the Pueblo concerning

destruction plans. In response, the Banner stated that it had reduced its publication

inventory to an operational minimum; in the past week, it had destroyed 300 burn bags of

excess material, and almost 200 pounds of classified material had been transferred to

Headquarters, Naval Forces, Japan, for storage.32 PACFLT headquarters also asked the

Banner to compare the Pueblo's instructions with its own. In its reply, the Banner cited

extracts ofthe implementation portion ofits on-board instructions. The Banner also noted

that its personnel had never seen the Pueblo's emergency destruction procedures, although

personnel of the Pueblo had reviewed those of the Banner. From discussions between the

commanders of the Banner and the Pueblo, they had learned that the shredding machine

on the Pueblo was considered adequate for key lists only; incinerators were inadequate for

publications; thermite bombs would result in probable loss of the ship even if the attack

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were aborted. The general consensus reached by the two commanders had been that their

destruction capability was inadequate. 33

SOVIET REACTIONS

On the evening of the Banner's third day out of Yokosuka,while in the Tsushima

Strait, a Soviet Riga-class escort vessel approached to within 450 yards and illuminated

the Banner with flares for ten minutes. It seemed an unusual procedure for the Soviets at

the time and suggests that they may have been confused by the sudden appearance of

another ship with a silhouette similar to the Pueblo. The Soviet ship continued to follow

the Banner at a distance of 5,000 yards for about two hours before reversing course to

resume its patro1.34 At 6:30 P.M. on 30 January, the Bannerjoined the Enterprise and other

FORMATION STAR units and took station in an area about 125 miles off P'ohang, South

Korea. 35

While the JCS increased U.S. air and naval strength in South Korea and Japan as a

result of the crisis, the USSR took measures to increase its information on the U.S. buildup in the area. In the southern Sea of Japan, the Enterprise task group attracted the

attention ofseveral Soviet naval units. By 26 January, the intelligence collector Gidrolog,

which had been trailing the Enterprise, was joined by a Kil'din-class rocket destroyer, the

Riga-class escort, and a tanker. The destroyer had departed the Vladivostok area on 24

January and made a rapid southerly transit of the Sea of Japan while the escort and a

tanker had been patrolling north of the Tsushima Strait.1 .1

The Soviet air forces also participated in the surveillance effort. On the morning of 24

January, two TU-16 (Badger) aircraft flew a reconnaissance mission over the Sea ofJapan

reconnaIssance 0

During this interval, they probably conducted a

IpS operating in the Sea of Japan. 37 In/addition,

b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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EFFECTS OF PUEBlJ] ON OTHERCOLLECTORS

Anhe same tiine, the ripple effect of the Pueblo inciden.tb~~antQ~~achtb.Elwatersof

..lli£/ ..... ~here thetechnicalresearch ship USS Geargetown.(desilp1ate;;';···~l::::::===;_

c=Jwas conducting operations. On 24 January, the Georgetown returIled t~ I I Isince the

beginning of the rnonth. 39 In view of the Pueblo capture and the Israeli attack on the USS

Liberty seven months earlier, General Lyman L.Lemnitzer, Commander in Chief, Europe,

requested that the U.S. Navy provide protection for.the Georgetown by air and sea forces

during its planned Febr-uary operationsl r The Department

of State took a more cautious stance and requested JOS to direct the Georgetown "to

remain I Iuntil \..such time as reduction in repereussions from the USS Pueblo

incident make It possible to resume February operations." NSA concurred in the State

Department recommendat:J\. 41 . naval authorit~es also took the precaution of

ordering the USNS Valde . operating off the east coast o~ Iat the time, to

remain at least five miles ms ea 0 wo miles outside of all claimed territorial waters. 42

As a further precaution, CNO directed all technical research ships to off-load all classified

material not considered absolutely essential to the technical mission of their next

deployment even though such action would restrict their cryptographic flexibility and

generate problems in timely cryptologic technical support. 43

Shipborne SIGINT operation~ Iwere also called into question. The USNS Muller

was directed to remain at Port Everglades, Florida, until further notice. The Joint

Reconnaissance Center queried General Morrison at NSA on 31 January to see how

strongly NSA felt about the situation. Morrison! replied that the Muller's operation

(particularly against it tar et was essential if NSA was to satisfy its current

SIGINT requirements invo vmg e problems. Morrison also stated that

the ultimate decision/to deploy the shipand any protective measures were beyond NSA's

purview. An hour laterfi Ithe NSA representative to the JRC,

telephoned Morrison to inform him that,.although the JCS had decided to deploy the

Muller with an armed escort, the final decision was being coordinated with other

concerned agencies at the nationalleve1. 44 Commander in Chi~(,1 indicated that

the Muller would be back on statio~ to time fori~sFebruaryoperations. 45

ENHANCEMENT OF SIGINT RESOURCES

Thereinforcementof U.S. navalforces in the Sea ofJapan required increased SIGINT

technical support.to the addition.alNaval Security Group detachments embarked in the I ~naIDelY,1 . / /./ /// ; and, i~fc?uI'Seil Fuss

Banner), whose original mission had been targeted against. Chinese Communist and

DOS

103

l(Br ft!'LI!:AS1tBLI!: 'f6 e6N'fHA:e'f6RS HeT H13LEh'kS*BLEl 'fe FeREJlGn nA'FIQ?TAbS

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

IJj~ SEERHfct:JM8RA

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

:;>

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
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Soviet communications. I Icompiled

technical support kits applicable to Korean Communist naval air and air defense targets

and forwarded these tor----1sthec()~~izantshore station (COGSTA) supporting units

afloat.I Ithen f~the kits lothel. III1~ddition, NSA

directedl I andl Ito update their technical supportkitsbyelec:t~ically

transmitting appropriate techmcal supplements to the detachments. 46 At the sametimf:l"

the detl;l.chments were added to the distribution of related I ~rodl.lct.t~~':~: :~:-50 usc 03

very short time, the Banner reported that "the volume of high precedence end product has (b) (3) -18 usc 98

smothered operational and technical support traffic required by the ship and its (b) (3)-P.L. 8 36

deta¢hment."47 To lllleviate this communications pl'oblem, NSA then taske~ Iwith

screening all Korean Communist technical support material destined for the SIGINT

detachments .1 . I Originators of end product and technical

material immediately suspended dIrect distribution to SIGINT shipboard detachments. 48

I Ihowever, was hard-pressed to fulfill its new responsibilities. The station did

not have analysts familiar with the North Korean naval problem who could adequately

review incoming material and assess which should be forwarded to the detachments. I I requested Henry DeCourt to assist it in acquiring four intelligence/traffic

analysts from other sources. In response,1 Idirected originators of North Korean

naval technical support messages to restrict them to those technical facts required for dayto-day collection, processing, and identification. Such action was intended to reduce the

volumeoftechnical material to a manageable size. Further, DeCourt worked closely with

...... Ipersonnel in screening technical support traffic. 49

As military planners were engaged in the build-up of U.S. air forces in South Korea

and Japan, they were also formulating plans for the use of U.S. armed forces in that area.

NSAwas also revising contingency plans to provide the requisite SIGINT support. NSA

hastily prepared a tentative change in the cryptologic annex to its SIGINT support planPacific that supported the CINCFAC operational plan for the defense of Korea. 5o In

comntenting on the proposed.change, Major General Charles H. Denholm, USA,

Commanding General, UnitedStates Army Security Agency, (CGUSASA) informed NSA

thanhe availability of Korean linguists was a critical problem that could be solved only by

either transferring USASA linguists assigned to NSA afldl ~r hiring linguists as

a.uthorized by NSA. Denholm added that the resour~esof his continental U.S. units had

been depleted in ord.er to meet Southeast Asia needs and that USASA reserve elements

were neither manned, equipped, nor trained to meet deployment needs. Further, USASA

would be unable to assume a posture for tactical operations rapidly because its tactical

equipment required considerable maintenance brought about by a lack of periodic exercise

and shortage of spare parts. For example, of four tactical ELINT positions, only one was

operational; the other three were set aside for cannibalization. 51

0027 January Brigadier General James informed NSA headquarters that his Korean

linguistic capability throughout the Pacific area was at a minimum and that the Pacific

f(6'f ftELEA:~A:BLE'1'6 CeU'ftb\C'f6KS Ue'f ftELEA:~A:BLE'fe F6ftEI6U UA:'fleUA:L~

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Air Force was preparing a request to USAF for immediate deployment of a AFSS

Emergency Reaction Unit (ERU) to Korea, contingent on approval from USAFSS to

provide cryptologic support for the tactical operational build-up. The next day, USAFSS

advised NSA that eight Korean linguists were en route I ItoasslstiriACRP

processing and that ERU resources, including two intercept vans, two communications

vans and operators, linguists, analysts, and support personnel, were in full readiness and

waiting approval to be airlifted to Korea. 52

NSA took a number of additional steps. First, it took the precaution of extending

SIGINT Readiness ALPHAI I _________Ientities so that reactions to the Pueblo situation could be monitored

and carefully evaluated, 53

To consolidate SIGINT reporting on the Pueblo incident, the B11 division at NSA

decided on 29 January to publish a summary report that would be issued at least daily and

more frequently if developments warranted. This report, entitled Korean Situation

Summary (KORSITSUM), was designed to provide complete and comprehensive coverage

of current developments related to the Pueblo situation and its aftermath and was

intended to reduce redundant reporting. In addition, the report was to incorporate

pertinent SIGIN'r material from A and G Groups. The first report in this series was issued

on 29 January/I 968. 54

INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS

Increased reporting on the Pueblo incident was not NSA's only concern. In addition to

NSA's responsibility to advise appropriate U.S. agencies of the potential compromise of

SIGINT resources or communications security methods and equipments, it also had the

obligation to keep collaborating centers abreast of developments suchas the Pueblo affair.

For/example, although there was no evidence that any Second Party materials were

aboard the Pueblo, Carter reported the assumed compromise to the directors of the

collaborating SIGINT centers on the day after the incident. 55 On 25 January, Britain's

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) responded to Carter with a message

of sympathy and regret, and it expressed gratitude for being advised. 56 The Australian

authorities expressed their appreciation for notification of the loss and stated that further

dissemination of such information would be on a reasonablv discreet basis. 57 1 I

(b) (1)

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N6'f ftfi::Lfi::A:SABLfi:: 'f6 CeU'fRAC'feRS U8'f RSbSASlt8M3 'f8 F8RSlm, ~fA'fI8)IA"bg (b) (1)

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I lother South Korean government circles expressed

widespread and serIOUS IrrItatIOn over the priority the United States accorded the Pueblo

incident in contrast with the mild D,S. reaction to the North Korean attempt to

assassinate the president of South Korea..When General Bonesteel met with ROK Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 27 January, the chiefs str~ssed this point and asked that the United

States make a firm commitment to deliver more military and naval equipment to the

ROK. The ROK JCS also expressed the importance of taking clear, punitive action to

teach Pyongyang a lesson, and gave voice to their concern that, when the Pueblo incident

was settled, the U.S. air and naval forces used for the.build-up would be removed from

Korea and vicinity. Such action, they said, would have a grave effect on ROK/U.S.

relations and would only encourage the CommunistsY

(b) (1)

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CIA

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The United States was not the only country concerned about the incident spreading.

In Japan, Foreign Minister Miki called U.S. ambassador Johnson to the Foreign Office and

read a prepared statement (unusual for him) that expressed his government's concern over

the situation in North Korea. Miki also expressed the hope that the United States would

adopt a careful and well-thought-out attitude toward the problem. To satisfy his desire to

keep the Diet and people of Japan well informed, the foreign minister then asked

Ambassador Johnson to apprise him of new developments and of U.S. plans in the United

Nations and elsewhere bearing on the matter. Miki also told Johnson that he had

expressed similar views to the Soviet ambassador, noting that it should be in the Soviet

interest to keep the crisis from spreading. The Soviet ambassador had placed

responsibility for the incident entirely on the United States but agreed to transmit the

Japanese government's views to MoSCOW. 64

In New Delhi, Soviet premier Aleksej Kosygin played down the Pueblo incident and

told reporters that it was an issue over the violation of territorial waters and must be

settled as such by the two countries involved.6s In Washington, the Soviet view was

further detailed. At a social gathering on 26 January, General Major Ivan Valentin

Meshcheryakov, the Soviet military attache, discussed the Soviet views on the Pueblo with

Colonel Fitzgerald of the U.S. Army War College and a former U.S. Army attache in

Moscow. Meshcheryakov opened the discussion, and the tone of his remarks was low-key

and without threats. He stated that the easiest way out ofthe situation was for the United

States to meet the North Korean demands for acknowledgement of its guilt and apologize.

He pointed out that those in the United States who threatened to use force must remember

that a mutual assistance treaty with North Korea obligated the Soviets to provide direct

assistance with troops. Meshcheryakov offered his personal opinion that the United States

might be able to execute one bombing raid on North Korea and possibly get away with it,

but any use offorce beyond this would have disastrous consequences for all. He concluded

that the situation could be resolved only by seeking to obtain the release of the crew first

(and this would take time) and thereafter concentrating on the return ofthe ship. Further,

because the North Koreans possessed solid evidence of the Pueblo's territorial violations,

Moscow was in no position to act as a third party despite its desire to see no further

complications to the problem. 66

The United States awaited Beijing's reaction to the Pueblo incident with obvious

concern. On 26 January, the New China News Agency released the North Korean official

communique without comment. Two days later, the Chinese issued a statement quoting

North Korea's charges against the United States for violating North Korean territorial

}I"e'f ftEJLFJ1rS1rBLEJ 'fe Cen'fR1rC'feRS ne'f RtlLFJ2\S1rBLFJ 'fe FeRFJI8N N1r'fleNALS

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waters. Beijing's only reference to the Chinese position, however, was the affirmation that

the "Chinese government and people firmly support the just stand of the Korean

government and people in countering U.S. imperialism's flagrant provocations." There

was no mention of possible aid to Pyongyang. Beijing was undoubtedly gratified at the

turn of events whereby some U.S. forces were diverted from Vietnam to Korea without

direct Communist Chinese responsibility for solution of the Pueblo incident.67

Following up on the JCS-NSA exchange of 24 January about modifications to ACRP

I

coverage r

and

ith

SIGINT

a fighter

collection,

combat air

the

patrol

JCS

at

increased

all times.

flights

ThiseclSlon

~I

was delayed unhl the

Department of State approved the plan. At 1:35 p.m. (Washington time) on 25 January,

JC~ finally Sent a flash precedence message to Hawaii requesting initiation ofl I I IAll nIghts were

to have fighter escort and were to follow a modified track. tB Within five~ours, however,

JCS revised its plan and sent a second message to Pacific headquarters stating that,

because of operational considerations, ACRP missions against North. Korean targets

I IThis message also authorized CINQPAC

to increase fighter strength in South Korea by twelve aircraft for fighter escort duty.69

THE RECONNAISSANCE QUESTION

Upon receipt of these two JCS messages, Admiral Sharp sent implementing

instructions to General Ryan and requested that he begin I ~CRP flights

on as nearly a continuous basis as possible. This was done III order to cover North Korea

//

At this point, USAFSS requested guidance from NSA as to which ACRP missions

targeted against eithe~ I IShould be canceled

in order to provide the increased coverage that had been ordered against North/Korea.

The number offlights available for areas other than North Korea was contingentupon the

JCS final decision on staging bases for ACRP missions. I I

Within NSA there were differing views about this. situation. On ACRP flights, B

Group preferred that, other than those targeted against NorthJKorea, tWQmissions

against I tt3:rgets be flown for each misSioh\ a~ainstCJtargets. A

NO I RELEASABLE ra COrq'TltACTOKS HOT ltI!lLEA:BA:BL~'f6F~f6N HA'i'f8NAbS

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the other hand, desired an equal split of available flights because of thd ____

Sea ofJapan. Madison Mitchell, NSA's Executive Officer for P,.concurred

position, and USAFSS was so advised on 26 January.72

sen wo messages 0 suppor mg e propos ,an a so

supported USAFSS. 75 As Saturday evening slipped into Sunday/morning, the JCS position

had not officially changed, and it proved impossible to get a new message coordinated.76

JCS at last concurred with thr--l proposal on Monday morning; however, the

missions still required fighter esco~ deployment of aircraft was delayed until the

State Department obtained country clearance.77 The Department of State sent the country

clearance request to the U.S. embassy in Seoul atabout 4:00 P.M. Washington time on

Monday. In another three hours, a message of approval was on its way back from Seou1. 78

On Tuesday, 30 January, JCS was able to inform all concerned that the ACRP operations

could be i and that the necessary/aircraft and equipment could be deployed to

L..- ""':":""... 79 Implementing instructions were relayed to the Fifth Air Force that

afternoon. 8o It had taken four days to getapproval for the increased flights.

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As NSA was attempting to improve its processing and reporting posture at field units,

North Korea continued its propaganda exploitation of the Pueblo. At noon (Washington

time) on 26 January, the Pyongyang KCNA International Service broadcast, in English,

the text of an alleged interview with Commander Bucher by the North Korean press. Four

hours later, the Korean Domestic Service also made a similar broadcast in Korea. The

Foreign Broadcast Information Service monitored and reported both broadcasts.

Commander Bucher allegedly stated that the Pueblo's intelligence mission against

North Korea was in preparation for "a new war of aggression in Asia" and added that the

United States considered Korea and Vietnam as two fronts ofthe same war. In a reference

to the Pueblo crew. the names of the two civilians aboard were announced. In addition,

Bucher stated that "when the patrol craft of the People's Army appeared ... we fired at

them." The interview revealed no details about either the Pueblo's SIGINT mission or onboard equipment and ended with Bucher's plea for leniency and the expression of hope that

the Pueblo's crew would soon be released.

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Eventually, NSA learned that this contrived "interview" of Commander Bucher had

been carefully staged by his captors. Five minutes before the press conference, Bucher was

given a typed script of questions with the answers he was to read verbatim. He was told

that failure to do so would result in mistreatment of his crew and the abandonment of care

for the wounded. At that time, Bucher had had no sleep nor had he been able to eat. 88

In Washington, General Carter at NSA established a special task force to study the

Pueblo and all ofits SIGINT and COMSEC ramifications. At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff formed a study group to examine all aspects of the seaborne intelligence collection

program.89

For a week, the Pueblo had overshadowed the war in Vietnam. This was to be shortlived. Late on 30 January and in the early hours of 31 January 1968, Vietnamese

Communist troops launched their Tet offensive. Once again, news headlines focused on

the major war in Southeast Asia as did the concern of military commanders and

government leaders. Although not forgotten, the Pueblo had become of secondary

importance in terms ofU.S. military priorities. Resolution ofthe situation, it was realized,

would not come quickly. Gaining the release of the crew was the paramount objective of

U.S. officials, but it was evident that a long period of negotiations lay ahead.

In summary, the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo threw the U.S. government

decision-making process into disarray. It could not decide whether to make a military

response to North Korea. When the decision was finally made, the United States opted for

a build-up of its forces in the Sea ofJapan area in preparation for what it perceived as the

possibility offurther North Korean aggression.

U.S. government officials were looking closely at the reactions of other nations, both

friendly and hostile, in the Far East. The U.S. intelligence community was also

monitoring the reactions of other countries from the standpoint of the threat posed.

In New York, Ambassador Goldberg initiated efforts in the U.N. Security Council to

condemn North Korea's action and to support the U.S. request for recovery of the ship and

return of the crew. While these diplomatic moves were taking place, the only word from

the Pueblo's crew during this first week consisted of the North Korean propaganda

broadcasts of Commander Bucher's "confession" and press interview in which he had

admitted to the espionage mission ofthe Pueblo.

During the week, the United States realigned its SIGINT resources to provide both

necessary tactical support to increased U.S. naval and air forces in the region and greater

coverage of North Korean communications targets. The U.S. SIGINT System also took steps

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to curtail the dissemination of cryptologic materials to mobile units to prevent another

compromise similar to the Pueblo.

By the end of the week, the initial shock of the Pueblo's seizure had given way to a

mood of depression and anger sparked by the futility of the situation. There was to be no

immediate challenge or confrontation with North Korea, but air and sea combat strength

was raised to counter possible further aggressive action by North Korea.

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Chapter VII

North Korean Interrogation

While military commanders in the Far East prepared for a possible escalation of

events and confrontation with North Korea, in Washington the Congress focused on the

past and began a series of investigations to explore why the Pueblo incident had occurred,

who was responsible, and what could be done to prevent such incidents.

On 1 February Secretary of Defense McNamara and the JCS chairman, General Earle

Wheeler, testified for over three hours before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

During this hearing, NSA was never mentioned. Secretary McNamara said that, at that

time, it was not possible to determine conclusively what equipment had been lost, and he

revealed no details of how the North Korean intercepted communications had been

obtained. Both McNamara and Wheeler testified that this type of intelligence operation

had not been suspended and that the primary objective now was to obtain the release of the

crew. The committee members took a constructive attitude toward the Pueblo incident

and appeared more concerned with preventing future incidents than with how this one had

happened.!

On the same date, General Carter gave testimony before the House Armed Services

Policy Subcommittee, chaired by Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina, on

the possible damage resulting from the compromise of equipment and personnel on board

the Pueblo. 2 Even as the Director spoke to the subcommittee, additional indications of the

security compromises arising from the Pueblo's seizure originated from the Far East with

the Pyongyang KCNA International Service broadcasting in English the "confession" of

Lieutenant Stephen Harris, officer in charge of the SIGlNT detachment aboard the Pueblo.

Harris gave information about his naval career, the Pueblo's assigned mission, the

chronology of the voyage, and stated that he received his instructions "from the U.S.

National Security Agency through the U.S. Pacific Command, Electronics Intelligence

Center in Japan."

Reuters news service commented that the "confession" was spoken slowly for about

thirteen minutes as if from a prepared text. 3 When debriefed on his return, Harris stated

that although he knew that such a "confession" was a violation of the code of conduct, he

felt that it would be known that it was done under duress. The North Koreans told him

that unless he complied, something would happen to his men. The North Koreans

prepared a "confession" statement for Harris, which he copied by hand and signed. 4

Thereafter, on each of the following four days, the North Koreans broadcast a new

"confession" from one of the Pueblo crew. This orchestrated propaganda effort featured

"confessions" from Lieutenant Frederick C. Schumacher, Jr., the operations officer;

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Lieutenant Edward R. Murphy, the executive officer:: and navigator; Dunnie R. Tuck Jr.,

oceanographer; and Marine Sergeant Robert J. Hammond, Korean linguist and intercept

operator. In every case, after extensive interrQgati<m of the crewmen, a "confession"

statement was prepared by the North Korean captors~ who then demanded that it be

copied and signed by the prisoner.

Schumacher later stated that he had been threatenedwith starvation and execution. 5

Murphy told of being beaten and tortured before giving in;l'te wasn't allowed to sleep and

lost consciousness at least six times. 6 Hammond, too, rep?rted being interrogated for

nineteen hours during which he said "they beat the hell out of me for six hours because I

wouldn't admit that I spoke Korean." According to Hammond, his "confession" was

brought to him two days after the interrogation and, when he hap completed copying it, he

was photographed and directed to read portions aloud. 7 The coipmon theme to all these

"confessions" was that the Pueblo had deliberately penetrated deep into North Korean

coastal waters for espionage purposes.

NSA·USAFSS STRUGGLE OVER RESOURCES

The capture of the Pueblo focused attention on the SIGINT resourcesl

"""";'~~~---,~Everyoneassociated with the decision-making process, frQj""""'W""""as""'h""'t""n""'g""t""on",......l,

D.C., down to.the tactical units in the Far East, wanted the best intelligence available on

North Korea. The wide variety of interested parties produced a struggle for the control of

assets and resulted in precedent-setting decisions.

An early decision grew out of differences over the control of Air Forde collection

resources. The U.S. SIGINT System began to build up its collection resources atl7ir=====

These resources soon included an Emergency Reaction Unit (ERU), designated!L...- _

from the USAFSS and augmented linguistic support. In General Carter's view, the

resources could best function in a "direct service" role. H~believed that this would permit

SIGINT to flow directly and rapidly to tactical commanders, withNSA directing the

mission. 8 General Stapleton at USAFSS headquarters in San Antonio disagreed. He

believed that the situation was made to order for the delegation of operational control of

these resources to the theater commander. In his view, the USAFSS resources could

mean conflicts between NSA national tasking priorities andtacticalcollection priorities of

the theater commander. Further, he felt that failure to delegate operational control could

result in Fifth Air Force resources relocating to Taegu without the NSA resources; if this

happened, the effectiveness ofsupport would be greatly diminished. 9

General Carter attempted to defuse the situation by authorizing a direct line of

tasking from the Pacific area commander tol He insisted that this would

provide the required responsiveness.ll General Stapleton was just as insistent that

delegation of operational control was the best way to handle the problem. The main

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difficultY~Qnewhichwasto reappear again and again in such situations, was a lack of

SIGINT expertise OJ'l the staff orthe supported commander, in this case, Fifth Air Force. To

remedy this,\ Stapleton sent one of his own SIGINT-trained officers and a staff of

noncomrnissionedoffl.eers tol ~ohelp translate Air Force intelligence needs into

instructions \£0[1\ \<\ 12

The Joint Chiefs of Stafi'supported the USAFSS argument, and in early February the

issue boiled down to a. decision about who was to decide. Carter believed that the

comparatively recent and unte$ted directive on SIGINT$upport to tactical commanders

(MJCS 506·67) left him with the decision as to how best todothis;13 in the JCS view, the

deployment\of an ERU made. the process of delegation of operational control an automatic

one. 14 The dispute hinged on ambigU()Us wording in the memorandum that had never been

completely resolved, Since it was a .lOS memorandum in the first place, the JCS view

finally prevailed, and on 19 February NSAdelegated operational controlofl Ito

the Fifth Air Force. 15

With the questionof the control.of the unit settled, the ERU concentrated on its

assigned tasks. One orits contributions wasl I

I I

There was also a struggl.e over the number of ACRPtesources to dedicate to the North

Korean problem.Althoug~ Blights out 0 began on 2 February (see

Chapter Vn, the Fifth Air Force desired to.....-,.,..,.----.........,....."""""...,...,,,,..,.-=-=-..,,....,,..,,,..,-----,1 airborne coverage.\ This position was eventually supported by PACAF. 17 NSA and

USAFSS both felt\that this was unacceptable hecause of an inadequate number of

linguists and because it would also require an additional aircraft,which would strip the

SIGINT System of badly neededl Icoverage.18 However, it was

later discovered that what the Fifth Air Force really wanted was airh()rne coverage to

begin two hours before dawn and \.continue until two hours after dusk.\With careful

juggling of orbit times, this could be\managed by the aircraft and linguists atDat the

time. 19 This arrangement satisfied everyone and the issue didnot lead to the confrontation

that had occurred overthe ERU.

.--_...H.emWlliJ~JJ.e:J:1I:aceSl:i.i.cJZ.I.li.aw:.J:1W:o.e.in tercept, initial instruc.tions required that~

prepare duplicate tapesl.L. __......

'i---~r;:-7 __-""77';"""";:_:_1-....-------...-~~··..,·· Thist!IfifFcOfislimifigprocess, however, was

later changed so tha was gIven copIes of all transcripts, with selected tapes being

fu.f...n.....I....S.heO.... o..n•••••.r.equest.

20

Stll....l.. later,. t.he f<..o....r...w.....a.. r:Oftranscripts of KORCOM air activity was terminated. when it was determined that requirements could be satisfied from

data contained in Special Intelligence Reports IRS) and technical supplements to

prOdu,liltreports produced llyl f1

(b) (1)

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(b) (1)

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NOI RELEASABLE 10 FOREIGN NAtIONALS

0/

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NUL RELEASABLE 10 CON tMe IORS

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The Pueblo incident continued to generate requests for specialized SIGINT support from

different commands. The Fifth Air ••• Force requested more collectio~ I

ground forces, while the Eighth Army asked for authority to downgrade plaintext voice

transcripts to Category I COMI~T so th~ttheY could be used at lower command echelons.

The only request of this nature approved by NSA was to downgrade to Category I that

surface tracking data intercepted by naval direct support units (DSUs) and provided for

1

fleet support.II

_

On a personal level, Gerteral Carter sent a\message to General Bonesteel to inform

him of the actions taken to improve the I lin support of his

command. Carter stated: "I would emphasize\thatI intend to see that yoU receive first-rate

SIGINT support tailored to your exact needs, and will continue to direct all efforts to that

end.,,23 Bonesteel replied with thanks for support in this "very hairy situation here," and

noted, "Never a dull moment in the Land of the Morning Calm ...."24

NSA AND NAVY AGER ACTIONS

As NSA was arranging for enhanced SIGINT supportto Far East commands, the Navy

was taking steps to make technical research ships less\yulnerable.The Chief of Naval

Operations had earlier directed all technical research \ships to off-load all classified

materials not absolutely required for their immediate mission. It was an order that was

known and understood from the time that the first U.S. SIGINTcollection ship had

conducted its first voyage on the high seas but had been loosely interpreted.

In many instances in the past, U.S. navall'IGINT $hips had carried more than what was

essential for the performance oftheir miSsion,\ It was a case ofoverkill. If doubts arose as

to whether a document was needed by a SIGIN'l' detachment, it had usually been resolved in

favor of providing it to the ship. In some lnstances, as\we have seen, there were a number

of different SIGINT organizations, including NSA,that provided copies of SIGINT documents

to detachments aboard naval ships.25 The Pueblo 'detachment had received SIGINT

publications from NSA, NSGPAC and NSAPAC in Hawaii, thel I. .• 1In s()me\ instances,....=m....u...r""b""/p,.,.Ie"...."c,.,.o.".p...,l€""'s,.....,..,of.....,th""'e".....

same documents were provIded, compoundmg t~e destruction problems aboard the Pueblo.

Following the seizure of the Pueblo, NSA examined with a critical eye the document

inventory of these ships. Representatives from each oethe analytical elements, as well as

the collection and production staffs, screened every item.\This review resulted in messages

sent to the USNS Georgetow~ IuSS Jamestow~ ~nd USNS Muller I Iwhich cited hundreds of specific documents that were to be removed from the

ships.26

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While the CNO andNSA took action to reduce the potential loss of classified material

aboard technical researchships in the event of another seizure, the Commander, Military

Sea Transport Service, Atlantic (COMSTSLANT) issued revised instructions to the USNS

Muller concerning harassment by ships of the Soviet Union and its satellites. These

instructions specified that attemptstoboard the ship were to be resisted by operating the

ship at full speed on a serpentine coursE!, or in such other fashion as to make boarding as

difficult\ and hazardous as possible and thatthe commander of the research detachment

was to actively resist the boarding with his armed party. The instructions further stated

that COMSTSLANT expected a consistently firm. response to harassing tactics, with

strong and vigorous action, including the use of available weapons in the event of an

attempt to board. 27 Once again, the Navy had spelled out what it expected of its SIGINT

ships during harassment and in the event ofboarding attempts(see Chapter VI, p. 101).

In addition to spelling out what it expected of naval personnel on board U.S. SIGINT

ships, the Navy also took other measures to protect its ships, crews, and classified

materia.ls. I Ithe technical research ship USS Georgetown was sent

back on station on 12 February froml Ibutnowitwastohavenotonlyades{royer

escort but also continuous air support provided by aircraft from the base a~ I

I I

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SOVIET SURVEILLANCE

In the Sea of Japan, Soviet ships continued to shadow the U.S. naval task force,

FORMATION STAR. 29 On the third of February, two Soviet TU-16 (Badger) aircraft, flying

generally southward, overflew the ships of FORMATION STAR and then, when out of radar

range, turned and made a second pass over the task force on their homeward leg.! ,I

Two days later, the JCS ordered the Enterprise with necessary supporting ships to

move southwest through the Tsushima Strait to an operating area that would permit their

return to their original operating area within twelvehours. 31 At the same time, five

additional Soviet naval ships deployed from Vla,divostok to the southern Sea ofJapan. In

addition, the Soviet intelligence collectorPfotraktor returned to the FORMATION STAR

surveillance area. 32 By 7 February, tht(considerable Soviet naval presence in the Sea of

Japan-Tsushima Strait area nUll)hered thirteen surface ships and a possible submarine.

An additional Kynda-class cruiser had joined the group mentioned above. 33

As the U.S. armed forces in the Korea-Japan area positioned and prepared themselves

for possible military operations in the wake of the Pueblo incident, the State Department

searched for some type of diplomatic solution to the crisis. In Tokyo, influential Japanese

and f9reign military and diplomatic officials, who were sympathetic to U.S. aims and

policies in the Pacific, believed that the United States had suffered a loss in prestige, and

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that the lack of a quick response by the United States to the Pueblo's seizure had raised

questions concerning U.S. capabilities in the Pacific. To these persons, U.S. intentions

with respect to diplomatic and/or military actions were unclear.34

SOUTH KOREAN SUSPICIONS OF U.S.

In Seoul, the South Korean government was SUSpICIOUS of and sensitive to any

indication that the United States might deal unilaterally with North Korea or fail to treat

North Korean infiltration of South Korea as seriously as the Pueblo seizure.35 When a

North Korean party leader hinted that the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom

would be an acceptable site for negotiations on the Pueblo issue, South Korea's initial

reaction was one of grudging approval. A foreign ministry official was quoted as saying,

"It is more favorable to have the seizure discussed at Panmunjom than at the UN or in a

third country; however, it is doubtful that productive results will emerge." The South

Korean independent newspaper Chungang Ilbo echoed this line, saying that military

action was the solution, the Military Armistice Commission had been historically

ineffective, and the abortive attack on President Pak's residence was being played down as

a result. 36

When talks actually began at Panmunjom between U.S. and North Korean

negotiators, the ROK reaction became more strident. The ROK foreign ministry became

upset because they were not notified of the meetings and because no South Korean

representatives were present. These protestations occurred even though South Korea was

not a signatory to the Korean War armistice agreement and thus had no legal status at

Panmunjom. They contended that the United States was putting much emphasis on the

release of the ship and not enough on the infiltration of North Korean raiders. The

chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of South Korea's National Assembly

criticized the United States for conducting the talks and said that the ROK should

withdraw its troops from Vietnam to defend the homeland. 37 The U.S. ambassador in

Seoul reported that the ROK foreign minister had even proposed that a special U.S. envoy

be sent to South Korea to facilitate closer U.S.lROK responses to and mutual agreements

on North Korean belligerency.38

U.S. MEDIA FOCUS ON PUEBLO

The Tet offensive in Vietnam together with the Pueblo incident drew the special

attention of the U.S. news media to events in the Far East. Secretary of State Dean Rusk

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and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appeared as guests on the NBC television

program "Meet the Press" on Sunday, 4 February 1968. Although most of the program

dealt with the Vietnam situation, several questions were posed about the Pueblo affair.

Max Frankel, New York Times correspondent, asked Secretary McNamara if the Navy

knew whether the Pueblo at any time had entered North Korean waters. McNamara

replied

No, I think we can'tsay beyond a shadow of a doubt, at no time during its voyage it entered North

Korean waters.. ,. at the time ofseizure, we are quite positive it was in international waters... ,

there was a period of radio silence appropriate to its mission from the period ofroughly January

10 to January 21,and it is in that period that we lack knowledge and we will not be able to obtain

knowledge ofthat until the crew and the commander are released.4o

It seemed a strange admission for the Secretary of Defense to make in the absence of any

information to the contrary and in view of the Navy's explicit orders to the captain of the

Pueblo. The statement later provoked the anger ofJapan, South Korea, and some NATO

countries.41 It appeared to them that the United States was beginning to hedge on its

previous statements concerning the location ofthe Pueblo. The United States, in response,

attempted to reassure its allies that there was no attempt to admit to the possibility of a

Pueblo violation of North Korean teritorial waters in exchange for obtaining the release of

the crew and ship.42 (The U.S. government, however, would be forced to do exactly that by

the end ofthe year.)

Later, the program moderator, Lawrence Spivak, asked McNamara: "Why wasn't it

[the Pueblo] better protected?" McNamara replied

I think that is a good question and the answer is threefold. First, to have protected it would have

been a provocative act. Secondly, it would have compromised the mission. This ship went

undetected by the North Koreans for ten to twelve days. During that time it carried out its

mission. Not only would it have been subject to capture during that period had it been detected,

but also their reaction,a reaction it was sent there to determine, would have been quite different.

And finally, the protection itself always runs the risk ofleading to a military escalation.43

NSA became involved as South Korean displeasure with U.S. policy toward North

Korea seemed to be mounting along with a feeling that the ROK should take some

retaliatory military action. After South Korean President Pak, in an emotionally charged

meeting with U.S. ambassador Porter, emphasized that the solution to the Korean

problem was "to get Kim II Sung now," General Bonesteel requested the urgent

Because the Rusk-McNamara "Meet the Press" interview had sparked speculation

about U.S. initial versions ofthe Pueblo's location at the time ofseizure, pressure mounted

within NSA to verify the SIGINT evidence that reflected the ship's position in international

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waters. NSA tasked its Korean Division (B11) with reanalyzing all available data. B11

subjected the original tapes of intercepted voice material to intensive retranscription and

retranslation. On 7 February B11 issued a report giving the most authoritative view of

North Korean naval voice communications related to the capture. 45 This report confirmed

that, according to intercepted North Korean communications, the North Koreans

themselves had located the Pueblo in international waters at the time that they seized the

ship.

The next day, the U.S. air attache in Tokyo reported that he had learned from a

reliable senior officer in the Japanese Defense Force that the captain of a Japanese

merchant ship that had departed the North Korean port of Konan on the afternoon of 23

January, had observed the Pueblo at 1500 hours surrounded by North Korean escort

vessels at a position about fourteen miles from the nearest land.46 Realizing the value of

such a third party confirmation of the Pueblo's location, U.S. ambassador Johnson in

Tokyo appealed to Japanese prime minister Sato to surface the report of this sighting.

After considering the question, Sato regretfully concluded that to do so would be

counterproductive. The prime minister reasoned that the captain of the merchant ship,

under press questioning, would almost certainly deny the sighting because offear of North

Korean retaliation. Further, because the owner of the merchant ship conducted most of

his trade with North Korea, there was no way of forcing the captain to substantiate his

report. Finally, without the captain's substantiation, the Japanese press would make it

appear that the prime minister, with U.S. backing, had attempted to "manufacture" the

story.47

NSA SENSITIVITY TO NORTH KOREAN COMSEC

III

DOS

Naturally, the lack of hard information about the Pueblo's course when it was running

under radio silence before its seizure (the question posed by McNamara), coupled with the

critical unknowns regarding the extent of destruction of classified information and

equipment aboard the ship, created apprehension throughout the intelligence community.

NSA, however, was especially sensitive to overreactions to the situation. 1 I·············.· .

1 1

CIA

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Although no positive indicators of an impending North Korean communications

change or other extraordinary COMSEC measures had been identified, NSA was sensitive to

the fact that the capture of the Pueblo had potentially provided North Korea with data on

which to base increased COMSEC measures..1

The Pueblo incident produced a large number of investigations, boards, and inquiries.

Following the lead of congressional investigations that began almost immediately after

the Pueblo incident, otherigovernment components soon started asking questions. When

Dr. Gardiner Tucker, Deputy Director (Electronics and Information Systems), Defense

Research and Engineering, DoD, asked for a damage assessment, Dr. Tordella provided

him with a four-pag.e paper that described the impact of the compromise on Soviet,

Communist China,.and Korean Communist SIGINT targets and concluded by saying

it is reasona.ole to postulate that Soviet, KORCOM, and CHlCOM efforts to strengthen the

communications security practices throughout the entire communist bloc will be undertaken.

Should this in fact occur, the general level of SIGINT information now available to the U.S.

intelligence community will be reduced. Exactly how much and in what areas we cannot say at

this time. 52

Within the Navy, Vice Admiral Bernard F. Roeder was appointed the investigating

officer./ Although he began his investigation in late January, NSA was not consulted and

learned of it only by accident on 5 February.53 Poor coordination and parochialism was to

mark the Navy-NSA relationship during the entire ordeal of the Pueblo; this was just one

example.

On 12 February General Carter learne~ I

reported that the Pueblo had been moved from its mooring in Changjahwa~~a.)',Wonsari

to Munp'yong-no Naval Base in Wonsan.1 Ithe relocation was

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ommander, u.s. aval Forces, Korea, stated that the Pueblo's original location

was a logical one at which to inspect the ship for booby traps without risk of extensive

damage to port facilities. Once this threat was resolved, relocation at a naval dockside

would facilitate examination of equipment and wiring while diminishing the possibility of

attack by frogmen. 55

NORTH KOREAN PUEBLO REVELATIONS

While there was speculation about the Pueblo's current location, the North Koreans

began to disclose some of the documentation they had recovered from the ship. On 13

February, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released photographs allegedly of

the Pueblo's navigational plot and log book as evidential records of the ship's violation of

North Korean territorial waters. In Yokosuka, Navy elements were unable to make a

definitive statement regarding the authenticity of the photographs. They said that,

although the log book and handwriting used in making the entries looked authentic,

anyone could have forged the entries on blank pages. 56 DIA commented that the track on

the navigational chart was probably laid down after the capture of the Pueblo because a

chart ofthe scale shown was not normally used for local area navigation. 57

Later, on his return from captivity, Lieutenant Murphy, executive officer and

navigator aboard the Pueblo, reported that the ship had never intruded into North Korean

territorial waters and that the navigational logs displayed by the North Koreans were

forgeries. 58 Murphy's statements were confirmed by SIGINT evidence of the ship's

movements. At the time of attack and seizure, the Pueblo was well beyond North Korean

territorial waters. 59

North Korean revelations on the following day impacted more directly on the SIGINT

community. At 10:30 A.M. (Washington time) on 14 February, KCNA broadcast an

additional report about evidence seized aboard the Pueblo that told of its "espionage

targets." This broadcast included the verbatim text of CINCPACFLT's message to

DIRNSA that outlined the proposed operational schedules for both the Pueblo and the

Banner as well as their primary collection tasks. 60 Accompanying the KCNA broadcast

was ictures of U.S. documents taken from the Pueblo:D

intercepted the KCNA transmission I------------------ L...- ----_------!Two .....'----~..., photographs, both of

poor quality, were intercepted. The first photograph contained SIGINT reportcover sheets

used by NSA; classifications of "SECRET SAVIN" and "TOP\SECRET TRINE" along with source

attribution to "National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD" were clearly readable. In the

second photograph, there appeared to be either Top Secret codeword documents or pages

from a single document spread out on a table; page contents were unreadable. NSAPAC

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I~----:-----:-------:-:~-~---:-:-----:-=~-~ photographs; three specific SIGINT report serials were identified and some contained the

~s"F41"1 Immummuum)

L---.JAnotherphotogtaphsh6wedpartsofalargeassortment of Specific Intelligence

Collection Requirements (SICRs) documents carried by the Pueblo. 61 (SICRs were

especially revealing documents. They contained listings of intelligence gaps within the

U.S. intelligence community. They also contained extensive background information

from all-source intelligence concerning the target area on which information was sought

by the U.S. customer.)

For the first time since the seizure of the ship on 23 January, it was now quite clear

that a considerable portion of the extensive COMINT holdings aboard the Pueblo had not

been destroyed but was in the hands ofthe North Koreans.

From Pyongyang, North Korea continued its well-planned propaganda campaign. On

15 February 1968, KCNA broadcast the recording of a press conference with the officers of

the Pueblo for the purpose of confirming once again the espionage mission of the ship and

its violations of North Korean waters. The press conference served to reveal the function

of the Pueblo's "Special Research Detachment" and its association with NSA, Pacific

Electronic Intelligence Center, and Naval Security Group, Pacific. The alleged interview

not only associated the Pueblo with the USS Banner, the USS Palm Beach, and operation

PINKROOT, but exposed details of the Pueblo's operations, chain of command, and activities

of all personnel in command.62 Later, Commander Bucher described how, during the press

conference, "... the answers were printed out and we [the officers] were asked to memorize

the answers and to stand up and give them as the questions were asked."63

On 16 February, KCNA broadcast a joint letter of apology to the government of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by the entire Pueblo crew. The text of the

letter recapped the ship's positions during the alleged intrusion of the DPRK's territorial

waters; named the three operational areas ("MARS," "VENUS," and "PLUTO"); referenced

U.S. naval bases, naval patrols, the chain of command, naval commands, and stated that

oceanographic sound measurements were carried out to gather information necessary for

U.S. submarine operations. 54 Later, it was learned from Bucher's intelligence debriefing

that the "apology" was initially drafted by Bucher and his operations officer, Lieutenant

Schumacher. According to Bucher, "eventually what happened was that all the things

that were in there were written by them [the North Koreans] and we were forced to use

their ideas; they wanted us to put it into better English and in many cases we did but in

many cases we did not. "65

Although North Korea's propaganda exploitation of the Pueblo incident heated up

during mid-February, there was evidence that the threat of imminent hostilities was

cooling off. On 12 February, DIA discontinued its special daily report, Situation in North

Korea, and on the 13th,1 I

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I IBothl

abandoned their twenty-four-hour manning schedule-s-o-n--:-18~F:-e":"'b-r-u-a-ry-."l!'67"""'-------

At NSA meantime elements were notinlt a marked decrease in SIGlNT reflections of

atmosphere was begmmng to subside.

As the crisis dimension of the Pueblo situation diminished, it was ironic that in early

March, NSA, along with CNO, received a request from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to

comment on a letter (dated prior to the Pueblo incident) from Dr. Eugene Fubini

recommending that "we build and equip a significant number (between nine and thirty) of

trawlers for SIGINT collection. 59 In reply, General Carter at NSA mostly deferred to CNO;

however, he did forward to CNO a copy of NSA SlGINT Trawler (AGER) Study with the

comment that it might be useful in responding to the Deputy Secretary albeit with the

understanding that it might be partially overtaken py events. Carter also commented in

the response that changes in NSA views might become necessary.70 NSA's collection office,

K04, had developed this study in October 1967 based on the possible use of trawlers in lieu

of larger ships for improved SIGlNT collectio~ I

I I The letter to CNO that forwarded the study was intended to stress

the use of the study as a.coordinated, informative document. 71

CODEWORDCHANGECONIDDERED

Following the Pueblo seizure and the subsequent public disclosure of codewords/by the

North Koreans, DIRNSA requested D32, the Policy Division, to look into the advisability

of changing the existing COMINT codewords. This evaluation produced soUd arguments

both pro and con, and there was sufficient precedent to justify either posHion:/ General

Carter and Dr. Tordella were inclined to believe that a change of codewords at that time

would be more trouble, more ex ense and cause more confusion than would beworthwhile

from a security standpoint.

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By 13 May, the Director's staff at NSA had compiled an impact assessment of the loss

of the Pueblo and the possible damage resulting from the compromise of SIGINT technical

support material and collection equipment aboard the ship. This assessment was sent to

USIB for the information of its principals. 78 A slightly sanitized version (COMSEC portion

deleted) of this assessment was also provided to each of the collaborating centers through

the appropriate SUSLO. 79

Upon receiving the NSA impact assessment, the Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence, Vice Admiral\ Rufus Taylor, requested that the matter of the Pueblo be

considered by USIB, and it was taken up at the 6 June meeting. 8o In brief, Carter

explained to USIB the steps. taken to hold shipboard classified material to an absolute

minimum for specific SIGINT missions of TRS and AGER platforms and said that some of

the platforms were being provided escorts. Carter noted, however, that the NSA policy to

limit classified material holdings aboard ship might result in a less effective scheduled

operation and would undoubtedly hamper SIGINT operations if a ship were diverted to a

nonscheduled contingency missi<m. 81

On the same date (12 September 1968) that North Korea was publicizing yet another

Pueblo press conference, DIRNSA terminated SIGINT Readiness ALPHA which was

established for Korea in January when the Pueblo was seized. A week earlier, JCS had

advised NSA that the services ofl the USAFSS Emergency Reaction Unit I Jhad been terminated because the threatened hostilities

aICm we se1ZUI e 01 we r ueblV n d failed to materialize. Based on this evaluation of the

Korean situation, General Carter decided to terminate the alert. 82

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PUEBLO CREW CAPTIVITY AND INTERROGATIONS

Thus far, reactions to the Pueblo seizure have been described, its impact on the U.S.

intelligence community examined, and the significance of the event in the spectrum of

U.S. foreign relations and domestic turmoil during the troubled year of 1968 reviewed.

But what had happened to the Pueblo's crew? How were they being treated and how were

they coping with the ordeal ofinterrogation and detention?

Upon reaching Wonsan in the evening of 23 January, the Pueblo's crew had been

taken by train to a detention center outside Pyongyang. Early the next morning, the

North Koreans assigned the crew to rooms on the third floor of a building in a military

compound. The rooms were filled with no attempt to segregate the enlisted men by rating,

specialty, or any other criteria with the exception of the three wounded men: Woelk,

Chicca, and Crandell were placed in the same room with Fireman Rigby to attend them.

Each officer was given a separate room.

Initial interrogation ofthe Pueblo crew began immediately after its arrival at the first

detention center in Pyongyang. The North Koreans called crewmen in groups according to

NAVSECGRU specialty (e.g., intercept operator, translator, cryptogear operator,

technician, etc.) Each crewmen was required to complete personal history forms that

included background data from birth to present. The Koreans then checked answers

against crew members' service jackets that they recovered from the Pueblo and the

captives were required to correct any discrepancies. The North Koreans then centered

their interest on navigation and communications personnel as well as officers. The

interrogations that took place at this first detention center took on a personal nature (crew

background, experience, and assignment.) Many of these interrogations were for the

purpose of gathering data for the more intensive interrogations and the extensive

propaganda campaign that followed. 83

On the night of 4 March 1968, without any prior notice, the entire crew was moved to

another building located about a twenty-minute drive from the first. At this second site,

the men were housed in eight-man rooms on the second and third floors. Again, room

assignments were made at random with no attempt to segregate men in any way. As was

the case at the first site, each officer had his own room.

At the second site, the North Koreans established a chain of command structure for

the enlisted men. Noting that Commander Bucher selected Quartermaster First Class

Charles Law to lead exercises for the crew, the North Koreans designated Law as the

second floor leader and overall leader of the enlisted men with Staff Sergeant Hammond

named third floor leader. The senior man by rank in each room was named room

supervisor. Later, because of his "insincerity," the North Koreans replaced Hammond

with Communications Technician First Class Ginther. The door to each room was kept

shut but never locked. Guards, armed with submachine guns, patrolled the passageways

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constantly. The North Koreans made unscheduled informal head counts, and occasionally

they thoroughly searched the crew's rooms.

During confinement at the second site, a North Korean Army doctor and nurse were

available twenty-four hours a day to provide medical care and treatment for the Pueblo's

crew. The doctor performed physical examinations on all the crew at one time or another

and treated colds, sore throats, ear infections, sprains, athlete's foot, and skin disease. On

occasion, the physician used local anesthesia by injection but on most occasions, he used no

anesthesia. All of the Pueblo crew members who had eye problems were examined and eye

glasses were made for those who needed them. No dentist was available but the North

Korean doctor fashioned a few temporary fillings as necessary. The doctor also dispensed

medicine twice a week to each man to prevent malaria.84 Occasionally, the doctor, through

an interpreter, asked Hospital Corpsman First Class Herman Baldridge of the Pueblo crew

for medical advice, especially on crew member complaints and on medical methods of

treatment known to Baldridge. At no time, however, was Baldridge permitted to assist in

treating his fellow crewmen.85

At the second site, the North Koreans gave the crew the following orders, which they

termed "Rules of Life":

1. Obey all orders.

2. Show respect to all people in charge.

3. Do not sing in room.

4. Do not lie on floors.

5. Do not lie on bed with clothes on.

6. Do not resist interrogation.

7. Do not encourage others to resist interrogation.

8. No communication between rooms.

9. Do not write anything except what is authorized.

10. Keep clean.

11. Take good care of public property.

12. Observe public morality.86

Orders 6 and 7 made it clear that the North Koreans would not tolerate any

interference with their interrogations. Orders 3 and 9 are also curious. Crew members

reported during their later debriefings in the United States that they had checked and

found no listening devices in their confinement spaces. In spite of these crew assurances,

U.S. authorities, in keeping with a "worst case" scenario, assumed that the quarters were

electronically monitored for purposes of drawing up the damage assessment. The North

NOT !t!U;ASAftL~TO eONTItAe'f'OIt~ NOT ftEL~A:SABLRJ'1'0 FOftEf8f\ UA'ff8UALS

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Korean orders, however, suggest that the crew's quarters at the second site were

electronically monitored. Orders 3 and 9 could have been intended to prevent the crewmen

from circumventing conversation in their spaces and preventing interference with North

Korean monitoring.

Interrogation teams usually consisted of at least three people, one of whom was an

interpreter, with some teams having as many as two officers and two enlisted personnel.

Interrogation techniques consisted ofthe following:

Making crew members walk around the floor on their knees.

Making crew members hold chairs over their heads for long periods of time.

Forcing the crew to sit in straight chairs at attention for lengthy periods.

Requiring crew members to get down on their knees with their backs straight and

lean backward for hours with a 2 X 4 piece of wood placed between their thighs and

calves.

Exploiting the element of fear by creating noises in an adjoining room which

sounded as though other crew members were being killed.

Slapping and punching crewmen or hitting them with gun butts.

Holding a gun to crewmen's heads with threats to kill.

Telling crew members that they might as well confess because the North Koreans

had captured everything anyway and that the U.S. government had tricked the

crew.

Informing the crew that they would be shot as spies ifthey did not confess.

During the interrogation sessions, the North Koreans attempted to convince the crew

that it had been abandoned by the U.S. government and that its only hope was the U.S.

people. The North Koreans also told the crew that the United States was crumbling on

three fronts: Vietnam, social unrest, and the effects of the worldwide money crisis. 8

?

The North Koreans singled out NSG crew members for intensivE interrogation. Each

was interrogated on an average offrom three to twelve times with a few as many as twenty

times. Each interrogation session lasted from a few minutes up to several hours. 88 It was

no surprise to anyone that the general service crewmen were never interrogated in depth

beyond the point of filling out background data forms. The interrogations were

accompanied by severe beatings to some members of the NSG detachment and a few of the

general line officers.

Several months after the initial phase of interrogations, the North Koreans took a

special interest in members of the SIGINT detachment who spoke the Russian language and

who were assigned, in the past, to the intercept and exploitation of Soviet communications

targets. A North Korean colonel, who spoke fluent Russian and tested the language

tlfO! rtt':Lt':ASAI!lL! TO eON!ftAeTO~ NOT rtt':Lt':ASAI5Lt': TO P'Oftt':rdH'I\fATIOllfALS

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._... _.'-,---~-_._ .. ~~~-~~=========
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ability of the.NSG personnel, ledth:ese interrogations. This team obtained details of the

U.S. intercept and exploitation statu'~ of Soviet communications.89 It directed its

questioning toward the U.S. intercept otSQvietl Icommunications and links

covered Soviet nd information{)o the

L- .....,._---1whoibecauseDfhisterrifiedcondition,(ldmitteddurlflghisdebtiefirig

that he voluntarily provided the North Koteansentirely too much detail. He provided

information on the organization of NSG and itsintercept taskingatl las well as

that of NSG activitiesI I He also identified to the NortIi Koreans those NSG

members of the crew who were Russia.tl linguists, intercept operators, and cryptographic

personnepo At least some of this inf{)rmation was already available to the North Koreans

from personnel "jackets" captured when the ship was seized.

From other members of the detachment, the North Koreans obtained details of the

substance of these interrogations was in contradiction to the statements made by a

number of detac.hment crew members during their U.S. debriefings, namely, that the

North Koreans were not interested in the U.S. SIGINT effort against the USSR. NSA

believed that.this was a deliberate North Korean attempt to mislead the crew.92

Statements given to U.S. debriefers were that the North Koreans were "stupid" and of

"low mentality," unable to grasp the significance of much of the information provided to

them;93/0ther NSG crewmembers, however, told their U.S. debriefers that some of the

NorthKorean interrogators were very knowledgeable and could not be deceived.94 In spite

of/these conflicting points of view, the North Koreans obtained a significant amount of

r~hl~claSSi1iedinformation from the interrogation of Pueblo crew members,/l

staff chief of NSA's Office of Production, directed the Agency's particlL-p-at::""'l-on.......i-nt e de riefing of the Pueblo's crew in San Diego in early 1969. On his return,i he notified

General CarterofNSA that "... the Pueblo crew were more talkative and cooperative than

originally imagined'These facts certainly compound and strengthen our [NSA'sl original

assessment [worst case circumstance], not weaken it.")95

(b) (1)

OGA

DOS

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Na'f RI3LFJl'tf3l'tBLS 'fa C8N'ffh\O'faRS N8'fRSLSASftBLFJ 'fa P8RSIaN Nlt'fI8NALS

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One disturbing aspect that came to light during the U.S. debriefings of the crew was

the belief by some debriefers that some members of the crew withheld information

pertaining to classified data that they had given to the North Koreans. This may have

been prompted by shame or fear of the upcoming court of inquiry proceedings. One crew

member told U.S. debriefers initially that "he was not really interrogated in detail" but

later admitted that he had given the North Koreans details of his assignment as an

intercept operator at I IThere were several other instances in which crewmen

downplayed classified information revealed by them to the North Koreans or were

suspected of revealing SIGINT data that they did not admit. 97 If such information were in

fact withheld from U.S. debriefers, there was an additional body of information

compromised to the North Koreans and probably to the Soviets for which no damage

assessment could be made.

All of this information was in addition to the bulk of documents seized from the Pueblo.

The interest of the North Koreans in\obtaining intelligence information on the U.S. SIGINT

effort against the USSR through interrogation also brought NSA to conclude that the

special intelligence interests of the tJSSR were covered, albeit indirectly, by the North

Koreans. It also prompted NSA to conclude at the time that the captured SIGINT

documents had been or would in the future be provided to the USSR. 98

Press coverage accorded the Pueblo was of short duration. Although this factor and

the period of relative U.S. inaction seemed to indicate that the Pueblo's crew had been

forgotten, such was not the case. Plans for the crew's return had begun shortly after its

seizure, and negotiations with the North Koreans for the crew's release had continued

quietly throughout the year. U.S. planning was beset by clashes between the military and

intelligence services, and negotiations were dominated by attempts to find diplomatic,

face-saving solutions. We will look next at how planning actions and negotiations

developed.

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Chapter VIII

Return and Debriefing ofthe Pueblo Crew

On 26 January 1968, the Director, NSA, informed JCS of his "extreme" concern about

the exposure and potential compromise of the cryptographic equipment, systems, and

SIGINT materials aboard the USS Pueblo. He requested that arrangements be made to

permit NSA personnel to make a technical survey of the ship at its first port of call,

whenever it was returned. Further, NSA made it clear that it considered it "essential that

qualified NSA technicians be afforded the earliest opportunity to interrogate all

repatriated Pueblo SIGINT personnel and any other members of the crew as necessary in

order to gain as much insight as possible regarding the actual disposition of the classified

equipment and material held aboard the ship at the time ofthe incident. "1

The Navy, however, had plans of its own. This was, after all, the first such surrender

of a U.S. Navy ship since the War of 1812. It was forming these plans simultaneous with

and independent of NSA's planning. From the very first, Navy commands involved

envisioned an all-Navy operation, with personnel from NSG doing the special intelligence

debriefs. Late in January, the Navy placed CINCPACFL'r in charge of the debrief plans

and operations. NSA learned of this planning only accidentally. In early February, JCS

directed NSA's participation in the debriefings. CINCPACFLT viewed this as only

"technical" assistance and opposed any detailed interrogation of the crew until a later

date, but the CNO office decided in favor of a complete debrief at an early date. 2 This

arrangement appeared to guarantee NSA a place on the debriefing team. The various

commands involved in the planning continued their disagreements over the precise

composition of the debriefing team and interview methodology. General Carter

recognized the need to obtain a complete assessment as quickly as possible. He opposed

the superficial initial intelligence debrief, saying, "I cannot accept the philosophy of quick

return to families prior to complete debriefing ..." 3

The location of the debriefing operation took a meandering course. The first candidate

was Yokosuka, recommended by CINCPACFLT because of excellent medical and special

intelligence facilities. 4 By 10 February it had been changed to Hawaii because of possible

leftist demonstrations in Japan. 5 In late June it was again changed, this time to San Diego

so that crew morale and welfare needs (i.e., reuniting with their families) could be

attended to. The processing would be in three phases: (1) medical screening and

intelligence debriefing; (2) leave period; and (3) an investigation or court of inquiry, if

appropriate, to determine if there were any negligence in the loss of the Pueblo. 6 The

selection of San Diego resol ved the dispute over quick versus complete initial debrief.

Once reunited with their families in San Diego, morale and welfare considerations would

Nery RFJbFJASA:BbFJ 'fe OeN'fft"AO'ft'HtS r,6'f ft~t~A~ld!,tP;T6 P',",ftI!:IGM N A I mNALS

131 f6P SECRET l::JMBRA
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be taken care of, and the Navy could proceed with a fairly exhaustive initial debriefing. A

second intelligence interview session would not be necessary.

NSA and the Navy continued to wrangle over procedure. There were disputes over the

number of debriefers to be used, over essential elements of information (EEl), and over

whose ultimate responsibility it was to assess cryptologic compromise. Many of these

disputes were ironed out at a meeting in the Pentagon on 9 and to July (see below).7 Other

issues were decided during an NSA trip to San Diego to see the debrief site, designated

Building 24 at the Naval Hospital, San Diego,S This post-capture conflict between NSA

and the Navy closely paralleled the problems that bedeviled the collection program prior

to the Pueblo incident, demonstrating that catastrophe does not inevitably bring

compromise or cooperation.

In Washington, specific personnel assignments were being made. To complement

Captain C.O. Everhart of CINCPACFLT as project coordinator, William Abbott of the

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was designated debrief analysis coordinator. Captain

T.P, Saylor of NSG became head of the Cryptologic Compromise Damage Assessment

(CCDA) team, and the NSA coordinator, Richmond D. "Don" Snow, was named Abbott's

assistant. Saylor was also named "Assistant Interview Coordinator for Special

Intelligence Matters,,,g NSA, meanwhile, proposed a team of thirty-nine for the debriefing

sessions, including ten interviewers, nine administrative and secretarial people, and

twenty transcribers. lO All of these personneI were accepted as part of the debriefing team.

At a meeting at Nebraska Avenue, the participants agreed on a three-day interview

period. ll

NEGOTIAnONS AT PANMUNJOM

It was almost Thanksgiving Day 1968. Planning for handling the release of Pueblo's

crew had been going on for ten months. Although actual release seemed no closer than it

had immediately following the crew's capture, the time was fast approaching when these

plans would be implemented.

Negotiations for the release of the crew had been going on for months at Panmunjom,

Korea, between the U.S. senior member of the Military Armistice Commission and his

North Korean counterpart. Throughout this period, the United States had also tried

approaches through many other diplomatic and private channels but with no knowledge of

what effect, if any, these approaches may have had. The U,S. State Department had kept

the Soviets informed of developments concerning the Pueblo and, while the role they

played during the negotiations was not clear, it was known that in some instances the

Soviets acted as a channel of communications to the North Koreans. 12 In the early stages

of negotiations, the United States made a number of proposals involving the submission of

the Pueblo case to an impartial third party. The United States said that it would apologize

ifsuch action were warranted by the results of an impartial investigation. This offer had

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been made in the conviction that the Pueblo had not intruded into territorial waters as

claimed by the North Koreans since the ship's orders expressly forbade such intrusion.

Moreover, the United States had proof that the North Korean "evidence" had been

"faked," but fearing further danger to the crew, it could not make public the proof that it

held.

The North Koreans flatly rejected all U.S. initial proposals, insisting upon an

unqualified, unconditional admission by the United States of their charges coupled with

an apology for these "crimes." In May 1968, they presented a draft apology for U.S.

signature. The United States responded in June with an alternative: the Korean draft

apology would be made the basis for solution, and the U.S. senior representative would be

authorized to sign his name on that document provided that he wrote above his name the

sentence: "I hereby acknowledge the receipt ofthe Pueblo crew." In so doing, he would sign

a receipt on the document but not sign the document itself - a distinction that had been

made clear to the North Koreans. The North Koreans gave no answer to this proposal.

For a long time, moreover, they refused to say what would happen ifthe United States met

their demands, merely hinting that in due course the crew would probably be released.

Not until 30 September did they state clearly that the entire crew would be released

simultaneously with a U.S. signature on an apology.

By late November 1968, because of the months of fruitless negotiations at

Panmunjom, U.S. negotiators were convinced that the North Koreans would not moderate

their demands in the near future. It was therefore decided to use the approach of

Christmas combined with the change of administration shortly thereafter, to press the

North Koreans for release of the crew, while avoiding any serious risk of a break in

negotiations if they rejected the U.s. offer. The United States therefore presented to the

North Koreans what it said (and meant) was the administration's last offer, warning them

that unless they accepted promptly so that the men could be home by Christmas, the U.S.

offer would be withdrawn and the incoming administration would be given a free hand for

any subsequent dealings. A new alternative was offered: the U.S. senior representative at

Panmunjom would be authorized simply to sign his name to the document drafted by the

North Koreans. At the same time, he would declare, in a formal statement, that the

document was false. The North Koreans were given a copy of the statement which the

United States proposed to make. The North Korean document was not modified at any

time by negotiation and did not contain any U.S. input whatsoever. On 17 December

1968, the North Koreans accepted this new alternative in principle. 13 It was the only

means that the United States could employ to break the diplomatic stalemate and to

obtain the release ofthe crew.

By flash precedence message on 22 December, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea,

advised all interested U.S. commands that release of the Pueblo crew had been scheduled

for the following day at 11:00 A.M. local timeY Don Snow, the NSA project officer for

BREECHES BUOY (the Navy code name for the debriefing), left Washington for San Diego

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the same day, and his contingent departed for the West Coast the day after Christmas.

CINCPACFLT set 28 December as the date on which the BREECHES BUOY debriefings

would begin. 15 CNO later changed the date to 27 December. 16

In Panmunjom, at about 9:00 A.M. on 23 December 1968, Major General Gilbert H.

Woodward, USA, chief U.S. negotiator, prepared to sign a document drafted by the North

Koreans. Just before signing, however, Woodward made the following formal statement

for the record:

The position of the United States Government with regard to the Pueblo, as consistently

expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not

engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time

intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for

actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was

prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will

not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the

crew. 17

Woodward then signed the North Korean document. At 1130 the crew was released to U.S.

custody.

A light snow was falling over the truce village at Panmunjom as the Pueblo crew, led

by Commander Bucher, walked single file across the short concrete bridge into the

southern half of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing North and South Korea. The

eighty-two crewmen carried with them the body of Fireman Duane D. Hodges, killed on

the day of capture. After initial identification procedures at a makeshift reception, the

crewmen boarded three U.S. Army buses that took them to the advance U.S. Army camp

south of the DMZ. From there the crew boarded helicopters and flew to the 121st

Evacuation Hospital at a U.S. Army base west ofSeoul for a medical check-up.

In Korea on the day following their release, Pueblo crew members were ready for

return to the United States. At the 121st Evacuation Hospital, the commanding officer

briefed the press, stating that the men evidenced beatings and malnutrition, but there was

no medical evidence that the men needed psychiatric treatment. Admiral Rosenburg

announced the planned departure times and tactfully stated that a court of inquiry would

be held as an official fact-finding process. 18

This was the first public indication that the Navy would seek to discover if there were

any culpability in the loss of the Pueblo and the compromise of its extensive cryptologic

and cryptographic contents. This court would be convened at a later date after the arrival

ofthe crew in the United States and after the debriefing process was completed.

On the afternoon of 24 December, U.S. authorities transferred the Pueblo crew to

Kimpo Air Base, near Seoul, where they boarded two transport aircraft for the flight

home. 19 The Pueblo's crew left South Korea the afternoon of 24 December, but the long

flight to San Diego still terminated on Christmas eve because.it crossed the international

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Pueblo Crew crossing the bridge at the truce village, Demilitarized Zone, following their release on 23 December 1968.
DOCID: 3997429

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date line. At 2:00 P.M., both aircraft landed at Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego. The

crew then departed for the naval hospital and the debriefing site.20

As the CCDA team arrived, thorough medical and psychological examinations of each

crew member began. Commander Bucher was plagued with a respiratory infection and

was physically and emotionally exhausted. On doctor's orders, he was transferred to a

private room at the senior officers' quarters, Naval Hospital, Balboa, for a period of rest.

Although Bucher, of course, retained his status as captain of the Pueblo, as a practical

matter, his executive officer, Lieutenant Murphy, acted as commanding officer of the

crew. 21

DEBRIEFING BEGINS

On 26 December Rear Admiral Horace D. Warden, commanding officer of the U.S.

Naval Base Hospital, San Diego, declared fourteen Pueblo returnees to be medically fit to

undergo intelligence debriefing. On the advice of doctors, however, Captain Everhart of

CINCPACFLT, BREECHES BUOY project coordinator, stipulated that debriefings should end

by 1800 daily.22 These crewmen were then interviewed for several hours on the essential

elements of information concerning cryptologic and cryptographic subjects; a total of 17.7

hours of debriefing was achieved. The first step in the cycle toward making a national

damage assessment had been taken. 23

The NSA team decided to issue a daily intelligence sit\lation report (SITREP) that

would summarize the day's activities. Generally, it included major intelligence items of

interest; information learned from the crew debriefings concerning the status of U.S.

cryptographic and cryptologic equipments and documents; COMSEC items of interest; and

the status ofthe debriefing process, to include the number ofreturnees debriefed. 24

A limited debriefing schedule on 26 and 27 December was followed by the onset of a

full schedule on the 28th and 29th. As things progressed on the 28th, improvements and

adjustments were made in the flow and handling of debrief material; also, it was found

that a large number of questions generated by the technicians could be used during the

next interview of a particular crew member to explore in greater detail points that were

not covered sufficiently in the initial interview. As the number of interviews grew, NSA

and NSG technicians as well as Naval Intelligence Command (NAVINTCOM) and Naval

Intelligence Service (NAVINSERV) analysts organized into specialty teams that

concentrated, for example, on cryptologic, COMSEC, or cryptographic aspects of the

debriefing process. The team approach facilitated optimum use of time in studying

transcripts and improved the selection of items for the SITREP. By the end of the day on

28 December, the teams had interviewed fifty returnees, and 149 hours of interview tape

had been produced for transcription. 25

Disagreement between NSA and the Navy continued into the debriefing phase. At one

point, Captain Everhart attempted to restrict communication between NSA and the

~19~ RBbBltSABhB ~9 G9~1~R/IG~9RS n9~ RBbBA:SltBbB ~9 F9RBI6N Nlt~I9Nltl':::S

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Agency damage.assessment team to Navy chann;is.26 I Ithe head of

the NSA team, was.Jorced to resort to privacy channels to communicate with General

Carter and outlined hi$ difficulties with the Navy chain of command.27 Carter understood

that the Navy resented.what it regarded as Washington-level intrusions with no good

purpose, and knew h()w t().deal with it. Rather than voicing a complaint, Carter sent a

laudatory message to Admir.al Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, in which he

praised the efforts of the combined team, whose efforts, he stated, would be well

appreciated by NSA and the United States Intelligence Board. 28 The message had the

desired effect in San Diego.o described the Navy officials there as "bubbling over

with kind words for the Agency, and confirmed that NSA team morale had improved

several notches as a result ofthe better.atmosphere. 29 If General Carter believed in the old

axiom that you can catch more flies with honey, it worked; the damage assessment team

rapidly acquired more work than it could handle. NSA people were working extremely

long hours and could not hold up indefinitely.r---lsked for an additional eleven people

and got them in twenty-four hours. The Nav~yGroup added twenty transcribers,

and with these additions, the BREECHES BUOY group had enough people to finish their

task.30

Throughout these high-level exchanges ofinformation and position, the working level

contingent continued a vigorous program of intelligence debriefing in spite of

interruptions necessitated by public affairs matters, medical appointments, legal

counseling and other activities of the crew, particularly during the Christmas and New

Year holidays. For the most part, one interviewer conducted the initial session in a

private room, and these sessions were recorded by mutual consent. Exceptions to the one

interviewer procedure occurred in those instances when it was necessary to have technical

personnel present to clarify specific points. Interview sessions ranged from a minimum of

twenty minutes (due to scheduling problems) to a (predetermined) maximum of four

hours. The interview approach was low-key and emphasized the rapport between

interviewers and crew members.31 By the close of business on 3 January, the interview

teams had completed 953 interview tapes.

Nine days had now passed since the interview process began on 26 December, and

eighty-one crewmen had been made available for debriefing. Although the operation had

been proceeding extremely well, pressure was beginning to build to complete Phase I so

that the Navy could begin its court ofinquiry.32 The pressure to complete the debriefings

increased because the enlistments of twenty-seven crew members had expired while they

were prisoners of North Korea. In such circumstances, these men could be retained on

active duty no longer than thirty days following their return to the United States and they

were scheduled for discharge on 23 January 1969.33 Once these twenty-seven men left the

Navy they could be subpoenaed to appear before a court of inquiry, but it would be under

different ground rules.

,i\ ,,II

f:

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'(Q) (3)-P.L. 86-36

By 2 Januar~ ~ad talked with William Abbott, the..debrief analysis

coordinator, about the composition of the Debrief Termination Board that was prescribed

by lhe CINCPACFLT BREECHES BUOY ,procedural iluide and lhe nexl day, ~:: I

Everhart activated the board. Don Snow.{NSA) was named executive secretary an

(NSA) was designated one offive members ofthe board. Other board members repr

NAVINTCOM, NSG, NIS, and OP-92C (Director of Naval Intelligence). Abbott (ACNO)

chaired the board. Captain Everhart also convened two worki~)()ards to analyze and

augment the documentation produeed during the intelligence debdef in order to prepare

recommendations which the Debrief Termination \Board could submit to the

CINCPACFLT Debrief Project Officer. One board was made up of the NSA and NSG

representatives, and the second consisted of NIS, NIC, and OP-92C personnel.34 The

Debdef Termination Review Board was both a management tool for internal procedures

and a means of formally deciding when to terminate the debriefing of a particular

individual.

NSA and NSG personnel were paired into teams to provide, whenever possible,

complementary expertise, for example, one cryptologic/general operations man with one

cryptologic/equipmentiman. Each returnee was assigned as the responsibility of one of

these teams.r--!>fNSA also established an ad hoc NSA-NSG.. analytic review group to

survey the a~theteams.

In a message to CINCPACFLT on 4 January 1969, CINCPACFLTREP, San Diego,

summarized the status ofthe intelligence debriefing effort and stated that, although there

were many variables in estimating its completion, it was tentatively expected to conclude

on 10 January. This schedule would make the crew available for the court of inquiry on 14

January following a briefinterval ofrest and rehabilitation.35

All of the crew except Bucher had been interviewed. Finally, on the afternoon of

Saturday, 4 January, he was released from medical and psychological evaluation and

granted weekend liberty with his family. Although still requiring extensive dental

treatment, Bucher became available for initial debriefing on 6 January.36 Medical

authorities gave permission for two three-hour sessions to be held the next day with an

evening session ifdesired.37

With a decrease in the number of daily debriefs, the analysis effort accelerated rapidly

as pressure mounted to complete Phase I of the BREECHES BUOY operations. While the

debriefing teams were preparing case studies on each crew member,l lassigned

technical subjects to be analyzed by other specific personnel.38 By the afternoon of 7

January, the ad hoc NSA-NSG analytic review group had arrived at its initial findings on

debrief releasability for each of the thirty-three SI-cleared crew members. Although

twenty-seven of the thirty-three crewmen were considered eligible for release, the group

cautioned that its findings could not be considered final because, in several cases, the

analysis of a considerable number ofdebriefings was still incomplete. In addition, debriefs

of the general service crew members were revealing data that might require further

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debriefs of SI-cleared personnel or, at a minimum, modification to the category until

certain EEl were resolved.39 Releasability criteria were discussed at the second meeting of

the DebriefTermination Board on 7 January.

Members at this board meeting noted some resistance of the crew to the interview

process. This had become evident while cross-che~kingthe statements on one transcript

with those on another. It was apparent that the crew was apprehensive about the official

court of inquiry and consequently were reluctant to say anything they considered

incriminating. There were indications that the presence of a tape recorder and the

"question/answer" method of interviewing also raised the suspicions of some crew

members and prevented them from relating all that they might otherwise say.40 The

board was determined that, with the exception of Commander Bucher (whose interview

began on 6 January) and perhaps two other cases, all debriefings could be completed by 10

January. 41

The Debrief Termination Board met again for the third and last time in the late

afternoon of 8 January 1969 to complete the substance of a message to CINCPACFLT on

the status of Phase I. The message stated that formal interviews had been terminated

with all but eighteen crew members and that the available database was virtually

complete. The completion of debrief interviews and informal discussion sessions with all

crew members was anticipated by close of business on 10 January with a possible overlap

in Phase II for Bucher and Harris.42

Close-out of the debriefing process continued on schedule; by 9 January the debrief

team eliminated the tape transcription backlog, and on 10 January it completed the

interview sessions except for those of Bucher. The initial damage assessment phase

concluded, the team members were directed to gather again at Naval Security Group

headquarters in Washington on 20 January to prepare a final assessment. 43 The BREECHES

BUOY files, consisting of audiotapes, memoranda, messages, and intelligence card files

were flown to Washington where they were transferred to NSG headquarters.«

The United States did not have a similar situation from the past that it could use as a

model to aid in planning for the repatriation and debriefing of personnel detained by a

hostile power. With the termination of BREECHES BUOY, there now existed a body of

experience that could serve as a guide for future such incidents involving captured U.S.

personnel. The final administrative report prepared from the BREECHES BUOY intelligence

debriefings recognized that there were lessons to be learned from this experience and

devoted a section ofthe report to that topic.

i'

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fife!' ft!!lL!!lA:~A:BL!!l!'e eerffftA:eTeRS neT ftI!JLI!Jlt:Si\BLFJ Te FeftFJI6Pf nA'Y'IeNIrCS

139 lOP 5!CRI!T bMBRA
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DEBRIEFING ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

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From San Diego, the scene shifted to Washington, D.C., where the CNO directed that

the CCDA team convene at 9:.00 A.M. on Tuesda.y, 21 January 1969, at the Naval Security

Station (NSS) on NebraskaAvenue, N.W.'5 Twenty,:two NSA personnel assembled on that

date to begin their task.; NSGi augmented the NSA team with additional analysts

integrated under the direction otthe NSA team chief~ "6

Early in the week, Dlearned that the Navy, still attempting to bypass NSA, had

already forwarded draft terms of reference for the Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage

Assessment Team (SPIDAT) to CNO for signature before he had an opportunity to review

them.1 Idiscussed this aspect with Captain Holschuh, the ACNO representative at

the Naval Security Station, who accepted some modification in wording. In substance, the

terms of reference stated that the reconstituted CCDA team would comprise

representatives of the Naval Intelligence Command, Naval Investigative Service, Naval

Security Group Command, and National Security Agency, plus other intelligence

commands or agencies as might from time to time be necessary. The team was to operate

under the coordination of a representative of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations

(Intelligence). Among its tasks were the review of all intelligence material developed

during the Phase I intelligence debrief of the Pueblo crew; preparation of a report of the

intelligence damage resulting from the capture of the Pueblo and subsequent internment

of its crew; r:....:.:~::.:::..::.!.1---------------------..,...---.-"T"".............,..=....,.,.J •••••·······························.bl (11

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In addition to the intelligence collected from the debriefs, the team realized that it

would also have to assess the damage resulting from the compromise of messages

transmitted by the Western Pacific Operational IntelHgence Broadcast (as relayed by

Guam and designated GOpn. These messages were on board the Pueblo at the time it was

seized. NSA and NSG team members began a message-by-message analysis of all GOPI

traffic for the period 5-23 January 1968 to assess the cryptologic techniques or operations

revealed in this traffic, as opposed to the hard intelligence content of message texts.'7

During the first week of SPIDAT operations at NSS,I ~et with Rear Admiral

Donald Showers and Commander Paul Keast of DIA to discuss the relationship between

the damage assessment team and the USIB Intelligence Damage Assessment Review

Group being formed under Admiral Showers. Members of the Review Group were

expected to move into Naval Security Group spaces but, according to Showers, would do no

analysis ofraw transcripts; rather, they would only monitor SPIDAT operations. Showers

requested an interim report on damage assessment by 1 March 1969.'8

neT RSbElItS*BbEl 'f6 e6r~'fR*e'f6ftS H06'f ttt:LJ!:A:S1d~L!: TO fO!t!:IGN NAlIONAL5

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DOCl D: 3997429 (.b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

On 24 Februaryl1inf'ormed Carter at NSA that SPIDAT was still on schedule

and would have the ~aftolthe damage assessment readied for him by 1 March. He

also reported that, when the question was raised ofmaking a damage assessment based on

the court of inquiry transcripts, he voiced his opposition to anyone on the CCDA team

having access to the court's transcripts.at that time. He reasoned that the team's work

should be based solely on information obtained from the privileged debrief of the Pueblo

crew and that to mix privileged information with semilegal testimony from the court of

inquiry would give the appearance of prejudicing CCDA conclusions.49

Finally, on 3 March the CCDA final damage assessment report was forwarded to

General Carter. In his covering memorandum,1 Iexplained that paramount

considerations in drawing up the report's format were protection of the information

contained therein and a rigorous "need to know." Each volume of the report was designed

to be read and understood independent ofthe total report (see Chapter IX for a description

ofthe report's contents).

The entire report was based on those recommendations that were a result of the

factual, technical, damage assessment drawn from pre-Pueblo records and data

accumulated during the privileged debrief of the crew conducted in San Diego. 50 The

document numbered some 1,200 pages and was made up of three categories of information.

The first category described the complete cryptologic and cryptographic damage. (These

sections served as DIRNSA's assessment of COMINT and COMSEC damage for the USIB.)

The second category consisted of technical volumes containing all the pertinent details on

SIGINT/COMSEC materials compromised. The third category consisted of crew debrief

summaries. Supplement I to the cryptologic damage assessment covered individual target

nations. A separately bound special supplement assessed the damage accruing to

cryptologically related compartmented activities.51

Upon completion of the final damage assessment report, the NSA members of the

Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment Team were released to return to their

parent NSA organizations. Their detail to this assignment, first in San Diego and then at

the Naval Security Station in Washington, D.C., had extended to almost two months, and

many were worried over the status of their regularjobs at NSA. 52

In brief, U.S. planning for the release of the Pueblo crew began shortly after the ship

was seized on 23 January 1968. There followed ten months ofdifficult negotiation with the

North Koreans at Panmunjom. With the release of the crew on 23 December 1968, the

United States began the painful task of debriefing the crew and assessing the cryptologic

and cryptographic damage.

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NSA, as the responsible U.S. governmental agency for SIGINT matters, was anxious to

come to grips with the total compromise resulting from the seizure and maintained that it

should be done as soon as possible. The Navy, on the other hand, fought hard to keep the

whole investigative process within Navy channels and did not recognize any overriding

national authority of NSA in the SIGINT arena. Disagreements arose over the timing and

location of the debriefings, the composition of the debriefing teams, debriefing

methodology, and even dissemination ofinformation on the status of debriefings. Finally,

JCS resolved many of these questions when it defined NSA's responsibility for SIGINT

compromises. The debriefing process continued over a period of about ten days. Each

member of the crew, and especially the Navy communications intelligence personnel,

underwent debriefing by a team of Navy and NSA analysts and technicians. The team

completed its damage assessment report based on these privileged debriefings on 3 March

1969 and submitted it to General Carter at NSA. The report also served as NSA's damage

assessment report to the United States Intelligence Board.

The following chapter will discuss the cryptologic and cryptographic damage to the

United States as described in this report and some of the implications it had for NSA's

future exploitation oftarget communications.

NOT !t!:L!:l\SIIlBLI!l 'f6 e6lfflbfte'f8HS N8'f Rl!JUl.ShRbK TQ rQKKIQ)J' )J' A TIONAI S

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Chapter IX

Post-Incident Reviews, Damage Assessment, and Damage Control

Following the return of the Pueblo's crew, a number of inquiries into the incident

began. The first of these was a congressional investigation by a subcommittee of the

House Armed Services Committee. Other investigations included the Navy's promised

board of inquiry, one of whose purposes was to determine if any members of the Pueblo's

crew or anyone in the chain of command was culpable of misconduct. Finally, NBC

prepared a documentary news program that gave the background of the Pueblo's mission

and the events surrounding the seizure.

Admiral John G. Hyland, CINCPACFLT, designated five admirals, all of whom were

Annapolis graduates, to form the court to examine whether the Pueblo had intruded at any

time into North Korean territorial waters. The court also was to examine the matter ofthe

boarding of the ship and the subsequent detention of the ship and crew. Hyland charged

the court with giving an opinion as to whether any member of the crew or anyone in the

chain of command was culpable of misconduct and also recommending any administrative

or disciplinary action. 1

The Navy court of inquiry planned to convene on 20 January following the intelligence

debriefing of the crew. Early in January, the Commander, Naval Air Command, Pacific,

attempted to declassify or downgrade certain NSA documentation for probable use by the

court of inquiry. NSA reviewed the classification and categorization of the documentation

and decided that declassification was not justified because of the need for protection of

COMINT commensurate with the codeword assigned.

Because of concern about inadvertent disclosure of cryptologic information, NSA

General Counsel Roy Banner, accompanied by Assistant General Counsel for the

Department of Defense (DoD) Frank Bartimo, met with acting Navy Judge Advocate

General Rear Admiral Donald D. Chapman on 16 January 1969. The purpose of this

meeting was to offer the Navy the support and assistance, if needed, of NSA and the Office

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in preventing the unauthorized disclosure of signals

intelligence sources and methods during the conduct of the Navy court of inquiry

concerning the Pueblo.

Admiral Chapman advised his visitors that counsel for the court, attorneys for the

parties involved, and the president of the court had all been cleared. Further, he stated

that if, to be responsive, a witness had to disclose classified information, the court would

operate in closed session to hear such testimony. NSA and OSD recommended that the

Navy consider appointing a SIGINT advisor to the court as a precautionary measure to

prevent the inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. Admiral Chapman said that

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he would pass this on to the president of the court, noting that the president had an

intelligence background. 2 A SIGINT advisor was never appointed.

On 20 January the Navy court of inquiry began its deliberations. The Navy took

particular pains to point out that the court was a fact-finding body only; it had no punitive

power and its proceedings were not to be construed as a trial in any sense. The president of

the court compared it to a grand jury as the closest civilian legal proceeding.3

During the first days of February 1969, the office of the Director of Defense Research

and Engineering (DDR&E) made two inquiries of NSA. Howard C. Barlow, Assistant

Director, NSA, for Communications Security, was asked if NSA planned any acceleration

of COMSEC research and development as a result of the Pueblo loss. Barlow replied that

NSA's standard planning documents emphasized that tactical COMSEC equipment should

be expected to be physically compromised occasionally, and the security of

communications should be maintained by the daily changing variables. He said that the

NSA standard assessment always concluded no emergency change of the basic COMSEC

hardware was required or desired, even though the loss of the technology was greatly

regretted. 4 Barlow, NSA, and other U.S. government officials, however, were unaware at

this time that the John Walker espionage ring had begun providing the Soviets with U.S.

cryptovariable data on U.S. encryption systems and would continue to do so over a period of

eighteen years (1967-1985).

On 7 February 1969, NSA Deputy Director Tordella sent a memorandum to DDR&E

in response to that office's request for information concerning NSA's actions taken as a

result of the Pueblo's capture. Tordella's reply explained that NSA had taken the

precautionary steps ofsuspending the use of some COMSEC items and curtailing the use of

others. These precautionary steps, however, did not include the permanent suspension of

the use of the COMSEC hardware systems that were aboard the Pueblo at the time of

seizure. There was no reason to do so at this time since it was believed that U.S.

communications were still protected by the use of key cards. Tordella's memorandum also

told of NSA's actions in reviewing the inventories of all SIGINT documents for all mobile

platforms in order to limit technical material carried on board ships to that considered

absolutely essential to the accomplishment of a SIGINT mission. 5

Standing instructions for the distribution of cryptologic materials to mobile collection

platforms had always been on the basis of that which was required to accomplish the

mission and the need to know. In the case of the Pueblo and other platforms, there was a

liberal interpretation of these instructions, and much more than what was needed found

its way on board. On occasion, several different cryptologic organizations supplied a single

mobile platform with classified documents, oftentimes providing duplicate and even

triplicate copies of the same documents, as in the Pueblo case. The Pueblo seizure caused

the U.S. Navy and the cryptologic community to reduce the volume of classified materials

aboard SIGINT collection ships to more manageable proportions. Within a week of the

Pueblo seizure, CNO ordered the technical research ships to off-load all extraneous

f~6T ftJilLJilAS1tBLE T6 eeIffR1teTeFl:S NeT RSr:.SAEW.Br:.S 'i'9 P9RSIsn ~fATI9~fAbS

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material as soon as possible. At almost the same time, NSA (P04) requested the service

cryptologic agencies to initiate inventories of all SlGlNT documents for all mobile platforms

and forward them to NSA by 1 March 1968. 6 Mer reviewing the individual inventories

and determining which documents were not required for the platforms' missions, NSA

advised the service cryptologic agencies.

In about one year, CNO issued an instruction concerning the control of classified

material aboard AGERs, AGTRs, and T-AGs. The purpose of this instruction was to

ensure that these ships carried only what was absolutely required for the successful

accomplishment ofthe mission to which they were currently assigned; an exact inventory

of the classified material on board was known by the controlling authority; and all

classified material required for a specific mission could be rapidly destroyed beyond

recognition.

Later; USIB extended the policy of limited document dissemination to units operating

in medium- or high-risk areas as well as mobile platforms - and, in fact, broadened its

concern to cover the entire conduct ofCOMINT activities in exposed areas. In October, USIB

directed that all USIB departments and agencies, including the military departments, be

guided in accordance with a new statement ofpolicy.7 This policy statement covered the

dissemination of COMlNT to exposed areas, levying requirements, tasking, emergency

destruction, and enduring enemy detention. It called for a very restricted distribution of

COMINT materials to such high risk areas. When the cryptologic community sent classified

materials to high-risk areas, it had to ensure that those areas were equipped with

adequate destruction facilities.

The NSA role in physical destruction procedures related to cryptomaterial and

cryptoequipment. The destruction ofthese items was considered a part of physical security

and an aspect of COMSEC that NSA carried out in conjunction with the military

departments. NSA prescribed standards or criteria for destruction, but the approval of

specific devices was the prerogative of the appropriate department or agency COMSEC

authority who would ensure that the NSA criteria would be met.s

Navy Department efforts to develop systems to destroy classified materials began in

February 1968, one month after the seizure of the Pueblo. CNO requested that the chief of

the Navy Materiel Command conduct research into techniques in emergency destruction

to meet the following objective without endangering the safety of the ship: to provide

AGERs, AGTRs, and other naval ships (including submarines) with the capability to

conduct emergency destruction of classified matter within thirty minutes. The ultimate

goal ofCNO was to give such ships a destruction capability within five minutes. 9

MO'l' gUO: • i UiUi ';Q SQ~f';lbtIS'feRS fie'f Rl!lL:I!1:A:S*8LE 'f6 F6ftElt:H( MATIONALS

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In March 1969 some type of destruction system for documents and electronic gear had

been installed in a number of AGER- and AGTR-type ships, and the remainder were

scheduled to be completed by June 1969. The systems were incendiary devices activated

from a firing panel on the ship's bridge. At this point, no certain method had been

developed for the destruction of hardware and software. The incendiary devices were

suspected to be marginally satisfactory in the destruction of classified material in thirty

minutes. 1o The destruction systems were only interim solutions, and a research effort was

under way to improve destruction of paper products in bulk; destruction of information on

magnetic tape and photographic film material; destruction of classified information that

may be recovered from equipment; reduction of documents to microfilm and microfiche

with provisions for readout without a requirement to reproduce the documents; and

reproduction ofprinted material on water-soluble paper. 11

In the years since 1969, NSA has made a number of improvements in the destruction

and handling of classified materials. Examples ofthese changes include such measures as

a reduction in the amount of materials allowed in exposed locations; cryptographic

maintenance manuals no longer contain details of a system's logic; more sensitive pages in

cryptographic manuals are formatted so that they can be easily recognized and destroyed;

other sensitive material is put on microfilm so that it can be quickly dissolved; and the

capacity of paper shredders has been considerably improved. In addition to these

measures, NSA now requires the destruction of cryptomaterials within a few hours after

use rather than once a month. These and other improvements have taken place in NSA

even though no one agency or individual has been given responsibility for this type of

research and development within the U.S. government-l2

Another area for corrective action was the matter of crew training. Following the

Pueblo incident, more attention was given to proficiency. Requirements for linguistic

skills, in particular, became more stringent. In general, the experience level of a SIGINT

group became a major consideration before a mission was dispatched.

In 1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard sent a memorandum to

SECNAV, JCS, and CNO expressing his concern over the adequacy of corrective measures

taken in the operation of the AGERs. 13 Among Packard's interests were the adequacy of

written guidance for AGER crews concerning contingency planning and interpretation of

existing rules ofengagement as well as the criteria and procedures for tasking AGERs. 14

The Chief of Naval Operations, after reviewing all directives covering AGER, AGTR,

and T-AG operations, directed CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR to

issue an operations order concerning ships of these types. Because the Navy would tailor

these operations orders to meet the needs of intelligence collection ships, the orders would

be much more specific than the existing general written guidance concerning

contingencies. They would require less interpretation by the ship's commanding officer. 15

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TOil S!CIt!'f tJMBItA 146
DOCID: 3997429

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At the time the Navy scheduled the Pueblo mission, the document that spelled out the

procedures for such sensitive, peacetime reconnaissance operations was JCS SM-676 of 19

August 1966. This document stated that, although the Navy made known certain

limitations for reconnaissance and data collection in sensitive areas, normally the JCS did

not consider any area to be prohibited. Therefore, commanders of unified and specified

commands and chiefs of military services might submit reconnaissance proposals to the

JCS for missions in any areas, "including those adjudged to be especially critical or

sensitive." Approval was based upon consideration of the sensitivity of the area, the

possibility of hostile action, political factors where applicable, and the importance of the

intelligence operations in relation to the risks involved. 16

These JCS procedures were revised and republished in October 1968 as JCS SM-701-

68, "Peacetime Reconnaissance and Sensitive Operations." The revisions to the document,

in essence, greatly tightened up the accountability factor for such missions. The old

system was replaced by one that forced a judgment at each successive level of command on

the military and operational risks, the adequacy of command, control, and protection, and

the continued validity and priority ofthe requirement for each proposed mission. 17

Two specific improvements in this area occurred at the Washington level. First, the

Department of State began working with the Joint Reconnaissance Center to review,

coordinate, and evaluate proposed missions prior to the time the schedule was approved.

Thus, the Department of State had an opportunity to make an early judgment on the

political risk for every mission proposed. The JCS and the OSO then considered the

Department of State judgment prior to recommending approval/disapproval of each

mission. Secondly, DIA began a continuous analytical assessment of all indicators oflevels

of risk in peripheral mission areas, and DIA continually put these assessments before the

JRC stafT. 18 The Assistant Secretary of Defense tasked NSA with providing DIA with

SIGINT information that might bear on risk. 19

Another positive result ofthe peripheral reconnaissancce program since 1968 has been

the protection of missions. Those missions judged to be in exposed areas did not depart

without some contingency plan. Ifthere were no U.S. armed forces available to defend the

mission in the event of need, the mission was aborted. In this respect, the community

learned from the experience ofthe Pueblo.

When the Pueblo began its mission, the embarked Naval Security Group detachment

was, by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, under the control of CINCPACFLT,

which had delegated its authority, in turn, to DIRNAVSECGRUPAC. DIRNSA had

delegated this authority to the respective fleet commanders in the Atlantic, Pacific, and

European areas as early as 1959. This delegation of authority was in accordance with the

direct support provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 6

and appropriate Department of Defense implementing directives. 20

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Although DIRNAVSECGRU, on behalf of CINCPACFLT, exercised operational

control of mobile missions in the Far East, NSA could still provide SIGINT tasking for such

missions. NSA, however, would do so only through the Naval Security Group and then

only as secondary tasking for use when the primary resources ofthe ship were not engaged

in the task of supporting the commanding officer and satisfying specified fleet collection

requirements. 21 The Pueblo's mode of operation had been consistent with the JCS concept

of SIGINT support to a military commander. The following statement from the JCS paper

reflected the JCS philosophy on multisensor units:

This military commander exercising operational control over DSUs (Direct Support Units) will

direct the tasking, allocation of effort, deployment, and product reporting formats to be employed

in satisfaction oftactical mission requirements. The Director, NSA, exercises technical control

of, and provides technical support to, DSUs. DSUs. which may be single or multisensor units or

platforms, perform a variety ofsustained tactical direct support missions in peacetime, including

missions to satisfy peacetime training requirements, and provide continuity of SIGINT support

during hostilities. DSUs must be configured with signals intercept and communications systems

specifically tailored to meet the intelligence requirements ofthe supported commander. As such,

these systems must be sufficiently flexible to meetrapidly changing environments and they must

be capable ofinterfacing with the military command and control systems.22

The Pueblo incident prompted changes in the authority and responsibility for SIGINT

operational control of AGER ships and this came fIfteen months after the event. In April

1969, DlRNSA delegated SIGINT operational control of the two remaining AGERs (USS

Banner and USS Palm Beach) to the senior naval component commander responsible for

the area in which the ships were operating. At the same time, it was agreed that Navy and

NSA representatives should meet semiannually to coordinate the SIGINT objectives for

AGER operations. This method of delegating SIGINT operational control was more direct

than the previous procedure, which required going through the Chiefof Naval Operations.

In addition, the semiannual conference did assure an NSA voice in the SIGINT tasking.

More worrisome for General Carter at NSA were the several governmental

investigations prompted by the Pueblo incident. At an NSA staff meeting on 7 February,

General Carter expressed his concern over these investigations and their apparent lack of

direction and coordination, but he desired that NSA respond whenever necessary. Carter

informed his staff that he was appointing Lieutenant Commander Edward J. Koczak, Jr.,

at that time assigned to the Director's secretariat, as his "chief of staff" on all matters

relating to the Pueblo. Carter stressed that it was imperative that the Agency speak with

one voice about the Pueblo. Carter noted frankly that for obvious reasons people were

looking for a scapegoat and that NSA was not an unlikely target; hence, it was imperative

that all answers be approved by the Director through Koczak. He stated that as ofthen the

Agency was "doing all right" in the testimony and documentation areas but that NSA

would be "dead" ifit ever engaged in concealing information or providing misinformation.

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Carter said that he habitually made it a practice, when in his view it was necessary, to

provide sensitive and accurate information to representatives of the Appropriations and

Armed Services Committees- and he said that no member of either committee had ever let

himdown. 23

Knowing that a task force had been established to brief the new Deputy Secretary of

Defense, David Packard, about the Pueblo, Carter wrote to him about the damage

assessment. Carter described the damage as most serious and that it probably would

reach the "worst case circumstance" as predicted in the initial assessment provided to

USIB in May 1968. 24

On 14 February 1969, the Navy briefed Packard on the Pueblo incident. Also present

at the briefing were Secretary ofDefense Melvin Laird and Vice ChiefofNaval Operations

Admiral Clarey. Subsequently, both Laird and Packard stated that it was NSA's job and

not the Navy's to give the damage assessment. 25 Approximately two weeks after the Navy

briefing, Deputy Secretary Packard visited NSA and heard from Carter that the damage to

the cryptologic effort might be even greater than Carter's earlier statement to Packard in

his letter of13 February.

Tuesday, 18 February, saw Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee

Mendel Rivers appoint a special subcommittee to conduct a thorough inquiry into the

capture and internment ofthe Pueblo and its crew by North Korean forces. Rivers charged

the subcommittee with the responsibility of reviewing the national security implications

resulting from the loss of the ship and determining whether deficiencies existed in the

command responses to emergencies of that kind. Representative Otis G. Pike was named

chairman ofthe special subcommittee. 26 The subcommittee was directed to proceed as soon

as practicable to begin its inquiry and, ultimately, the formal hearings began on 4 March

in open session.

On 10 March, General Carter was called to testify. During the first hour and a half,

Carter briefed the subcommittee on the mission of NSA. He first outlined NSA's role in

the control and production of COMINT and ELINT, described the CRITICOMM system and

NSA's operation of it as the executive agent, and discussed NSA's role in COMSEC. Carter

then pointed out that, in the operation of the COMSEC equipment, the United States

assumed that such equipment was subject to compromise. NSA's design effort was based

on that premise, and the security of U.S. communications was guaranteed by the daily

changing variables that NSA supplied to all users of cryptographic equipment. These

variables produced a completely different cryptographic cipher for each period of use, and

these periods never extended beyond twenty-four hours. 27

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Carter discussed the respective roles and missions of NSA and the armed services in

operations such as that of the Pueblo, drawing a careful distinction between "operational"

and "technical" control. He then got specific about the Pueblo. He pointed out that the

patrol was conducted in response to U.S. Navy direct support requirements and that the

platform was under the operational control of CINCPACFLT. NSA's general role, he

explained, was to provide SIGINT technical guidance and assistance upon the request of the

Navy. He reported that NSA was advised of the scheduled patrol by the Navy at the time

of the Navy's proposal to the JCS in early December 1967, and that CINCPACFLT had

solicited from NSA secondary tasking assignments for the mission. In late December

1967, he said, NSA supplied the Navy with secondary tasking collection requirements and

separately commented to JCS on SIGINT reflections of actions taken by the North Koreans

in response to past reconnaissance efforts. Carter stated that the SIGINT collected at the

time of the capture indicated clearly that the Pueblo was in international waters, adding

that there was no SIGINT evidence to indicate that the ship had ever penetrated North

Korean territorial waters. 28

The subcommittee members questioned Carter on the nature of the messages

transmitted by NSA to the Navy in which it supplied the secondary tasking requirements

for the Pueblo. Among other matters, he was asked to read into the record the message

that NSA sent to the JCS on the North Korean reactions to past reconnaissance efforts. 29

General Carter was then questioned about his assessment of the SIGINT/COMSEC

damage resulting from the capture of the men and material of the Pueblo. He pointed out

that the North Koreans obtained extensive information on U.S. SIGINT efforts against

North Korea, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, and North Vietnam. It was

reasonable to assume, he said, that some ofthe documents and material captured from the

Pueblo had been turned over to the Soviets and possibly to the Chinese and that the great

danger was that the Soviets and the Chinese could also improve their communications

security as a result of obtaining direct knowledge of the extent of U.S. penetration of their

respective communications.

In regard to the cryptographic damage assessment, General Carter said that the

Pueblo carried four types of cryptographic equipment, associated keying materials,

maintenance manuals, operating instructions, and the general COMSEC publications

necessary to support a cryptographic operation. Carter stated that while communications

security depended essentially on keying variables, the compromise of cryptographic logic

could be of benefit to communist cryptologists in forecasting future U.S. developments.

Moreover, he noted, some of the engineering technology incorporated into U.S.

cryptoequipments could well be appropriated to increase the overall communications

security ofthe communist bloc's next generation of cryptographic hardware. No doubt, he

said, the North Koreans had acquired some advanced technological data. 30

Na'f ftflbEl*B*BbFl 'fa eaN'fIb\8'fSRS NS'f RElbFlAS1tBbFl 'fa FSRFlI8N Nh'fISNAbS

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On Friday, 14 March, Representative Pike, chairman of the special subcommittee,

made public certain portions of Carter's testimony that had been given in executive

session. Carter set forth his objections to this in a letter to Melvin Laird, Secretary of

Defense, "to set the record straight." What clearly bothered Carter more than some

misstatements (which involved some rather technical points about message releasing

authorities, who was allowed to do what at NSA, and questions concerning the Pueblo

damage assessment) was the purveying of information about NSA to the press. He felt

that his statements, which had all been made in executive session, should have been kept

in confidence. It was the cause of friction between the U.S. Congress and a very

circumspect General Carter, who felt that the cryptologic business was getting too much

exposure through the Pueblo affair.31

In San Diego, the Navy court of inquiry finally concluded its sessions on 13 March.

Thereafter, the court members would deliberate over the testimony presented and prepare

the recommendations of the court for submission to CINCPACFLT. Toward the end of

March 1969, the NSA team finished its assessment of the cryptologic and cryptographic

damage resulting from the capture of the ship and the interrogation of its crew. Carter

provided this information to USIB. In a very detailed study of some one thousand pages,

the task group set forth the SIGlNT documents and equipment aboard the vessel, analyzed

the crew debriefings, and published a set of findings that would mark the Pueblo incident

for a special place in the annals of the U.S. cryptologic profession. The store of classified

materials aboard the Pueblo consisted of 539 documents and pieces of equipment·32 These

included the following:

• Fifty-eight NSA publications designated TECHINS and TECHDOCS ( technical

SIGlNT instructions now designated USSIDs).

• One hundred and twenty-six user intelligence requirements.

• Thirty-seven technical manuals.

• Thirty-three COMINT Technical Reports.

• Fifteen SIGlNTWorking Aids.

• Nine hard copy SIGINT reports.

• About eight thousand messages containing SIGINT data that were transmitted on

the Western Pacific Operational Intelligence Broadcast and copied by the Pueblo

during its voyage.

• U.S. Navy and NATO callsign books for ships and aircraft.

• Cryptographic materials, including four different types of crypto-equipment and

their operating and maintenance manuals, key lists and key cards,

authentication tables and instructions, and registered publications materials.33

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151 Tep SECRET l:IM8RA
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The NSA report concluded that "... the compromise, to at least the North Koreans, of

information concerning the cryptologic community collection, processing, and reporting

operations and techniques on a worldwide basis is without precedent in U.S. cryptologic

history.,,34

152

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The North Korean target was morel ~n the sense that the Pueblo was

tasked with Korean radio transmissions, and, hence, the ship carried extensive working

aids on this target. A catalog of these/revealed everything one would want to know about

the American attack on North Korean communications, including callsign system

recoveries, net and communications system reconstruction and diagrams, and the

association of communications systems with platforms and transmission systems. The

task team concluded that the documents assumed to have been captured "reveal the full

extent of U.S. information on North Korean armed forces communications activities and

U.S. successes in the techniques of collection, analysis, exploitation, and reporting applied

to this target." 42

This was not the only concern ofthe United States. It now had to look to the possibility

of disclosure of very sensitive compartmented information. The information concerning

these compartmented l:ireas was considered so sensitive at the time that all intelligence

end product reporting on them was accomplished at NSA; there was no product reporting

on these compartmented problems from field sites. Neither were any of the NSA

intelligence reports disseminated to the field - only a few major intelligence consumers in

the United States were recipients. The irony is that there were documents concerning

these sensitive a.reas on board the Pueblo - located twelve to thirteen miles from North

Korean shores.

In addition to the possibility of the compromise of documents, members of the Pueblo

crew were or had been cleared at one time for sensitive compartmented information and

special projects, both in the collection and cryptanalytic areas. Certain members of the

crew had extensive background knowledge of these compartmented areas. Captured

Pueblo/personnel knew that the North Koreans had recovered personnel "jackets" of the

crew when the ship was seized and that these "jackets" indicated what clearances each

crewman held. The United States had good reason to fear what might have been divulged

during the North Korean interrogations ofthese personnel.

There was another aspect to oral disclosure than through interrogation. Crewmen

cleared for compartmented information were themselves especially nervous about

revealing these projects during interrogation, so much so that they discussed details of the

projects among themselves in what they believed to be the safety of their confinement

areas. One of the purposes of these conversations by the crew was to coordinate their

responses to North Korean interrogators so that the response of one was consistant with

that of another. The North Koreans used whatever information they obtained from one

prisoner against another. They used this tactic to confirm data, to confuse their prisoners,

and oftentimes as an excuse to administer beatings when they believed that they were not

getting the right answers. Although crewmembers, on their return from captivity,

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informed U.S. debriefing personnel that they had checked their spaces for the presence of

North Korean listening devices and had found none, United States authorities insisted

that this had to be considered a possibility.43

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a mInIS ra Ion 0 Ice on e ue o. ese ocumen s were amos orgo en In e

confusion once the destruct order was issued. Crew members stuffed these documents into

jettison bags and mattress covers in the last moments before the North Koreans seized

command of the ship and put them on the deck with the intention of throwing them

overboard once the ship reached the 100 fathom depth. (The crew erroneously believed

this to be the minimum depth required by 1968 U.S. naval regulations for dumping

classified material over the side.) Since the ship, in its attempt to reach the open sea, did

not reach water deeper than thirty-five fathoms, the crew never jettisoned the bags, and

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the documents were recovered by the North Koreans. The crew did manage to throw one

bag over the side, but it was recovered by the North Koreans. 53 According to one crew

member in his debriefing statement in the United States in January 1969, this appeared to

be a valid statement; he commented that a number of the documents put on display by the

North Koreans and shown to the crew during their internment in North Korea appeared to

have been water stained.

There were no personnel aboard the Pueblo cleared for this compartmented area. The

U.S. debriefing team included it along with other compartmented areas because there

were a number of crew members aboard the ship who had acquired knowledge thtough

their association with personnel who had been officially cleared for other compartm.ented

information. Although there were no personnel aboard the Pueblo cleared for this

compartmented area and there was no tasking given to the ship, there were a number of

documents aboard that concernedI I

The U.S. debriefing team established that no crewmen were knowledgeable of this

area, nor were they interrogated by the North Koreans. All information compromised on I ~as contained in publications recovered by the North Koreans.

.... / .. /

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;gp S[ERn YMBRA

Following the realization that the Pueblo had been seized with a massive number of

documents and equipment on board, the United States had taken immediate

countermeasures to protect the security of its communications worldwide. All users of

those cryptographic systems that were seized from the Pueblo, the KL-47, KW-7, KG-14,

and KWR-37, were instructed to temporarily cease communications on these systems until

NSA could provide new key lists and key cards. This measure, so believed NSA

authorities, would ensure the continued security of the nation's communications. NSA

could take some measure of comfort in the realization that the Soviets would need another

essential element in order to decrypt U.S. communications. It was one thing to obtain the

actual encryption devices and operating and maintenance manuals from on board the

Pueblo but quite something else to get one's hands on the keying material for these same

machines.

What NSA did not know at that time was that John Walker and Jerry Whitworth from

the Walker espionage ring were providing the Soviets with keying materials and other

highly classifed documents the Soviets could use to decrypt and read U.S. communications.

This espionage group, led by U.S. Navy radioman John Walker, included his son Michael

(a seaman aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz with access to classified documents), his

brother Arthur (an antisubmarine warfare officer and instructor in the U.S. Navy and

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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 157 TOP !!CR!T tlMSItA
later a civilian contractor, also with access to classified information), and his friend, Jerry

Whitworth, also a navy radioman. Collectively, they passed the Soviets a \mass of highly

classified material over eighteen years, from 1967 until the time of their apprehension in

mid-1985. As one would expect, the usual high priority on the Soviet shopping list was for

key lists Walker and Whitworth provided for the KL-47, KW-7, and KG-14, as well as key

cards for the KWR-37. In addition to the key lists and key cards, John Walker and

Whitworth also provided the Soviets a host of cryptographic machine operating and

maintenance manuals.

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The cryptomachines and manuals the North Koreans seized from the Pueblo and

passed to the Soviets were identical to those heavily used by U.S. naval commands

worldwide. The sudden Soviet acquisition of U.S. cryptographic equipment from the

Pueblo in late January 1968, as well as the acquisition of U.S. keying material for the

same machines from John Walker beginning in late December 1967 and later from Jerry

Whitworth, gave the Soviets all they needed to read selected U.S. strategic and \tactical

encrypted communications. It must have created an urgent requirement within the Soviet

SIGINT organization for a more intensive intercept effort against U.S. \naval

communications,I Iwere

scarce.

During this time, the Soviets obtained a steady flow of keying material from Walker,

who was stationed at U.S. Submarine Force Headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia. His duties

as radioman at Norfolk gave him access to KW-37, KG-14 and KW-7 equipments. He had

access to the keying material that was used for U.S. naval satellite broadcasts being

intercepted by the Cuban SIGINT organization. Cuba forwarded this intercepted material

to Moscow.

____________1

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The Pueblo seizure also occasioned an extensive cryptologic compromise of United

States SIGINT holdings on the North Korean target. Ofthe 397 SIGINT documents on board

the Pueblo, 55 concerned the SIGINT exploitation of North Korean targets. Many of these

documents were known to have been compromised on the basis of their identification in

propaganda film, photographs, or press releases originated by the North Koreans after the

seizure. Other documents were identified on the basis of their recognition by crew

members who were shown these documents by the North Koreans during detention. Still

others were identified by crew members to U.S. debriefers as not having been destroyed at

the time of the seizure. These documents were in addition to some forty North Koreanrelated items contained in the U.S. naval operational intelligence broadcast that were also

recovered from the ship by the North Koreans. Crew member disclosures made during

interrogations by North Koreans also contributed to the compromise of cryptologic

information. The totality of the compromise revealed "the full extent of U.S. SIGINT

information on North Korean armed forces communications activities and U.S. successes

in the techniques of collection, analysis, exploitation, and reporting applied to this

target.,,66

The NSA assessment stated that this compromise revealed the U.s. capability to

I land it predicted that it would result in a change

in North Korean use of existing systems or.a decision to use more secure systems. The

assessment said that total knowledge of the types and amounts OfSIGINTobtained and the

techniques involved in the exploitation of North Korean military communications was

compromised and the U.S. SIGINT community should anticipate a significant loss of this

source ofintelligence as a result. 67

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!

The NSA report concluded that several factors contributed to the extensive loss of

information. One was the possession of a complete set of working aids and technical

manuals, once again many of them in duplicate or triplicate because of the eagerness of

several different cryptologic organizations to insure that the Pueblo had all it would need.

Some of the extra copies were stored in the administrative compartment, which was

largely overlooked in the frantic destruction efforts before capture. 71

The OPINTEL Broadcast, through which the Navy supplied the Pueblo with

intelligence support during such missions, presented another special problem. It was

prudent to have the Pueblo included on the broadcast to keep the crew informed of

developments in its area. Unfortunately, the broadcast carried large amoUnts of

gratuitous information on Southeast Asia and the People's Republic of CMna that'

collectively revealed the status ofthe U.S. attack on their communications.

In addition to the absence of adequate destruction facilities aboard the Pueblo, the loss

can be attributed to the lack of training of the crew in destruction measures. Bucher,

despite his stated concern about the possibility of an attack and inadequate destruction

means before the ship got under way from Japan, also was lulled into believing that there

was safety for his ship as long as it was in international waters. Most of the NSG

personnel aboard the Pueblo never saw a destruction bill, and none had ever had a

destruction drill. 73 In regard to equipment destruction, the NSA report concluded that "it

is estimated that only about five percent of the total equipment was destroyed beyond

repair or usefulness. 74 Even this five percent estimate cannot be viewed with optimism in

view of the number of related maintenance manuals and spare parts captured intact as

well as the knowledge gained from interrogations of the Pueblo crew. In some cases, the

extra attention paid to the destruction of certain pieces of equipment aroused North

Korean suspicions and resulted in more intensive interrogations regarding their use. This

was the case with theI I

NSA characterized the destruction procedures as "highly disorganized" and

"accomplished in almost total confusion. 72 Estimates of the amount of material

compromised ranged up to 80 percent of what wason board. Because of the uncertainty of

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exactly what material was destroyed and what was compromised, NSA correctly had to

assume total loss.

Damage in the cryptographic area, if it had not been for the later operations of the

Walker espionage ring, would have been much less extensive. This was because of the

principle, in use for many years in the communications security business, that one must

assume capture of a piece of equipment, and the state of the art must be that this will not

result in the compromise of U.S. communications without attendant keying material.

NSA concluded that equipment destruction had been "ineffective" and assumed that North

Korea had been able to examine the cryptographic logic employed, even iftheir state ofthe

art did not permit duplication. More serious was the loss of maintenance and operating

manuals, which permitted even more detailed knowledge of our techniques. The North

Koreans immediately focused on these equipments and manuals. Following the USS

Pueblo's capture, highly competent North Korean electronic experts conducted intensive

interrogations ofselected qualified cryptographic technicians among the Pueblo crew. The

interrogations homed in on the technical principles of the cryptographic equipment, the

equipment operating procedures, and the relationship ofthe associated keying material to

the cryptographic equipment. 76

During the briefings in San Diego, the debriefing team discovered that the Pueblo had

on board superseded keying material for November and December 1967 that was not

destroyed. If the North Koreans had intercepted U.S. communications for that period of

time, it would have been possible to read the encrypted traffic. The conclusion of NSA at

the time was that, for the Koreans, this level of technological and operational

sophistication was too great, but that the Soviets, as we have seen, might possess this level

of expertise and sophistication. Thus, concluded NSA, it was conceivable that a great deal

of U.S. naval communications for those months was an open book. 77 We have also seen

that there was far more than a few months involved in the loss of U.S. encrypted traffic - in

terms of what the Walker spy ring provided, the Soviets were able to read U.S. naval

traffic over a period of eighteen years.

The other category ofinformation compromised from the Pueblo consisted ofespecially

revealing documents. Included in the hoard ofdocuments recovered by the North Koreans

were 126 Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs). These documents

contained detailed background data concerning signals and activity desired by

intelligence user organizations of the U.S. intelligence community. They described the

status of U.S. knowledge of the target area and identified the intelligence gaps on these

topics that existed within the community. One example was a requirement on the Soviet

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While official, governmental investigations were taking place, the NBC television

network began preparing a documentary news program on the background of the Pueblo

mission, the circumstances of the seizure, and subsequent events. Walter Sheridan of

NBC called NSA to set up an interview with General Carter, but received a peremptory

"no" from the general. Carter said that he would submit to an interview only ifdirected by

the Secretary of Defense.78 He was never interviewed, upholding a long-standing N$A

policy of not commenting publicly on cryptologic matters.

In Hawaii, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Hyland, finished reviewing

the recommendations of the Navy's court of inquiry. The court recommended that both

Commander Bucher and Lieutenant Stephen Harris be brought to trial by generalcourt

martial. The charges against Bucher were permitting his ship to be searched while he still

had the power to resist; failing to take immediate and aggressive protective measures

when his ship was attacked by the North Koreans; complying with the orders of the North

Korean forces to follow them into port; negligently failing to destroy all classified material

aboard the USS Pueblo and permitting such material to fall into the hands of the North

Koreans; and negligently failing to insure before departure for sea that his officers and

crew were properly organized, stationed, and trained for emergency destruction of

classified materia1.79

The charges against Lieutenant Harris as the officer in charge ofthe NSGdetachment

numbered three counts: failure to inform the commanding officer of a certain deficiency in

the classsified support facilities of the research detachment; failure to train; and drill the

research detachment properly in emergency destruction procedures; and failure to take

effective action to complete emergency destruction after having been ordered by the

commanding officer to dispose of all remaining classified materials. The court also

recommended that Edward R. Murphy, executive officer of the Pueblo, receive a letter of

admonition for "alleged dereliction in the performance of his duties as executive officer in

that he negligently failed to organize the crew on the day ofseizure, especially in the ship's

major internal task of emergency destruction of classified materials." 80

Other recommendations by the court of inquiry concerned charges against Rear

Admiral Frank Johnson, Commander, Naval Forces, Japan, and Captain Everett

Gladding, Director, Naval Security Group, Pacific. The court recommended a letter of

reprimand for Johnson, charging him with failure to provide effective emergency support

forces for the Pueblo and failing to verify the existence of adequate destruction facilities

aboard the ship. Finally, the court charged Captain Gladding with negligence in failing to

ensure the readiness of the Pueblo's NSG detachment for its mission and in failing to

provide adequate intelligence support to the Pueblo. 81

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CINCPACFLT concurred with the findings of the court of inquiry concerning the

charges but did not accept the court martial recommendation for Bucher and Harris;

instead it recommended a letter of reprimand to both for dereliction of duty. It also

concurred with the findings of the court in that Admiral Frank Johnson, Commander,

Naval Forces Japan, be given a letter of reprimand and that Lieutenant Murphy be given

a letter of admonition. Finally, CINCPACFLT recommended against issuing a letter of

reprimand to the Director, Naval Security Group, Pacific, Captain Everett Gladding.

The Chiefof Naval Operations accepted the findings of the court ofinquiry as amended

by CINCPACFLT, but Secretary of the Navy John Chaffee overruled him and halted all

punitive actions. In justifying his actions, Chaffee stated

I have reviewed the record of the court of inquiry and the recommendations of the convening

authority and the Chief of Naval Operations. I make no judgment regarding the guilt or

innocence of any of the officers of the offenses alleged against them. Such judgment could

legitimately be reached by duly constituted authority only after further legal proceedings, such

as trial by court martial or the hearing required prior to issuance of a letter of reprimand or

admonition.

I am convinced, however, that neither individual discipline nor the state of discipline or morale

in the Navy, nor any other interest requires further legal proceedings with respect to any

personnel involved in the Pueblo incident.

In reviewing the court's recommendations with respect to Commander Bucher, Lieutenant

Murphy, and Lieutenant Harris, it is my opinion that ... they have suffered enough, and further

punishment would not be justified ...

The charges against Rear Admiral Johnson and Captain Gladding relate to the failure to

anticipate the emergency thatsubsequently developed. This basic, general accusation, however,

could be leveled in various degrees at responsible superior authorities in the chain of command

and control and in the collateral supportstructure.

The major factor which led to the Pueblo's lonely confrontation by unanticipatedly bold and

hostile forces was the sudden collapse of a premise which had been assumed at every level of

responsibility and upon which every other aspect ofthe mission had been based - freedom of the

high seas, at that particular point in history, the common confidence in the historic inviolability

of a sovereign ship on the high seas in peacetime was shown to have been misplaced. The

consequences must in fairness be borne by all, rather than by one or two individuals whom

circumstances had placed closer to the crucial event.

In light ofthe considerations set out above, I have determined that the charges against all ofthe

officers concerned will be dismissed and I have directed the Chief of Naval Operations to take

appropriate action to that end.·52

With this pronouncement, the Navy Department concluded its official investigation of the

Pueblo incident.

The congressional investigation ended in June 1969, and the report was published a

month later. The special subcommittee concluded that, while warning information was

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166

available, the complex military and political structure was simply not able to respond in

time. A key conclusion ofthe report was as follows:

The reluctant but inescapable conclusion finally reached by the subcommittee is that because of

the vastness ofthe military structure, with its complex division into multiple layers ofcommand,

and the failure of responsible authorities at the seat of government to either delegate

responsibility or in the alternative provide clear and unequivocal guidelines governing policy in

emergency situations - our military command structure is now simply unable to meet the

emergency criterion as suggested by the president himself. The subcommittee inquiry was not of

sufficient scope to permit it to offer a proposed solution to the problem. It is evident, however,

that the problem exists and it has frightful implications.83

By mid-August 1969, NBC had completed its preparation of the television production

"Pueblo: A Question of Intelligence," and the Department of Defense arranged a reviewscreening limited to changes that might be necessary for security and accuracy in those

portions of the documentary made possible by DoD assistance. NSA was among the DoD

components that viewed the screening on Friday, 15 August 1969, at the Pentagon. 84

NSA's General Counsel made no comment, and the documentary proceeded without any

Agency changes. 85

At the USIB level, the Intelligence Damage Assessment Group rendered its report

recommending that procedures, criteria, and appropriate regulations be developed to

minimize the intelligence losses that might occur as a result of possible future incidents

like the Pueblo. Several areas of concern were minimizing the amount of sensitive

intelligence materials held by activities in exposed areas; insuring that procedures for

destruction ofthose materials were adequate; and training intelligence personnel assigned

to exposed areas on how to endure enemy detention. 86 By 8 September, the USIB Special

Ad Hoc Group had concluded that, from the standpoint of general guidance, no change was

needed in that portion of DCID 6/3 dealing with exposed areas. The Group was

unanimous, however, in its belief that the provisions of the directive had not been strictly

followed and that it was necessary to tighten implementation controls.87

In brief, the return of the Pueblo's crew in December 1968 initiated congressional,

naval, and media inquiries into the incident. Pressure also mounted for a definitive

national damage assessment based on crew debriefings. NSA's preliminary "worst case"

assessment given shortly after the seizure of the ship was confirmed when the results of

the crew debriefings became known to the intelligence community a year later. In

addition to extensive cryptologic damage in the Soviet, North Korean, and Chinese target

areas, several compartmented areas were also believed to have been compromised. These

compromises resulted from the loss of documents aboard the Pueblo as well as from North

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Korean interrogations of the crew. All of the information obtained by the North Koreans

was assumed to have been turned over to the Soviets.

The North Korean acquisition of U.S. cryptologic and cryptographic information did

not cease with the seizure of the Pueblo and its documents, equipment, and crew.

Cryptographic data supplied to the Soviets by the Walker espionage ring together with

cryptographic equipment seized aboard the Pueblo would enable the Soviets to read U.S.

naval communications for years.

More difficult to identify were countermeasures that might have been implemented by

the targets of the U.S. SIGINTeffort following their realization that the United States was

exploiting their communications. Because of the nature of certain COMSEC changes and

the timing oftheirimpIementation, the PRC, the USSR, and North Korea may have begun

such measures in the months following the compromise.

At the USIB level, within NSA, and in the Navy, authorities began to implement

restrictions designed to minimize the loss of classified data in the event of any further

incidents such as the Pueblo.

NO I RELEA5"ABLE TO GOlft!tAGTOltS Iq'OT ft1!:LEASAftLE TO f'OltEI6Iq' nA:'fIOnA:LS

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Chapter X

Conclusion

In 1964, the Director for Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense,

proposed that the United States begin a program of seaborne surface collection using

trawler-type vessels. U.S. surface collection platforms up until that time included large

World War II Liberty- and Victory-class ships that were expensive to operate and

maintain. Lacking sufficient funds to build a completely new trawler-type hull, the U.S.

Navy converted several small cargo ships that were then in the reserve fleet. This was the

beginning ofthe AGER program.

The first ofthese ships to be converted, the USS Banner, conducted its first operational

patrol I I The

Soviets, perhaps recognizing the configuration of the ship and the reason for its presence,

immediately began a series of harassing maneuvers and signals. The Banner later

encountered the same type of harassment from PRe naval units during a deployment off

Shanghai in 1967. Communist harassment of U.S. AGER units culminated in the seizure

ofthe USSPueblo by North Korean naval forces in January 1968.

When the U.S. Navy deployed the USS Pueblo to the coast of North Korea in January

1968, it set in motion a series of events over which it eventually lost control. The cost of

this deployment to the nation in terms of the amount of cryptologic material compromised

was enormous. The gravest error by the Navy was in not ensuring that protective forces

for the ship were in place in case ofneed. There was considerable confusion on this point at

the time of the seizure. There were no U.S. naval combat forces on standby in the Sea of

Japan at the time. U.S. naval commands in the area believed that the U.S. Fifth Air Force

would provide the necessary forces and were convinced that they would not be needed at

all; hence, they did not notify this command. Naval authorities did not ensure the

availability ofAir Force assistance prior to deploying the Pueblo. Such was the confidence

that the Navy placed on the sanctity of rights of passage through international waters for

the ship's protection. In that event, the Navy at least should have so advised the Air Force

prior to the ship's deployment. When the Pueblo got into trouble, the Navy went

immediately to the Fifth Air Force for assistance. Fifth Air Force authorities, however,

had no knowledge of the Pueblo. In reality, there were no forces of any kind available in

the area with the appropriate weapons to handle the situation.

The Navy left the ship in North Korean waters virtually defenseless in spite of the

experience seven months previously when Israeli air and naval units attacked the SIGINT

ship USS Liberty resulting in the loss of thirty-seven ofits crew. Following that attack on

the Liberty, it was discovered that at least four of the Liberty-class SIGINT platforms held

SIGINT documents in their inventories far in excess of what was actually needed for their

na'f ftrJLtJl'tSl'tBb8 'fa eaHl'fbltel'aRS Hal' RSUiASASJ"I!i l'Q li'QIUHQl'f l'fA'f:[Q1'f,0 bS

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

169 lap SEERElI:IMBRA

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i
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(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

lb) (3)-P.L. 86-36

mIssIons. One of the recominendations that came out of the Liberty incident pertained to

a reduction and better control of classified documents aboard technical research ships. 1

The situation did not improve by January 1968 when the Pueblo positioned itself off North

Korea.

The crew of the Pueblo was not trained, nor was there any apparent thought given to

adequate training - the Navy seemed to put on board whoever happened to be available. I Iand AGER vessels could and

did satisfy many of these requirements. However, according to a former commanding

officer of a SIGINT detachment, the real urgency in getting AGER ships deployed as soon as

possible seemed to be as a visible response to the Soviet's SIGINT trawler program.2

The problem of assigning:more qualified personnel to the.naval cryptologic service was

not a new problem in 1968.3 Lieutenant Harris of the Pueblo's SIGINT detachment was the

only officer on board assigned to the Naval Security Group. The situation in the SOD hut,

with its multiple copies of SlGlNT documents, haphazard method of storage, and the

presence of documents for which there was no SIGINT tasking, were not conducive to good

security practices; they compounded the destruction problem.••. Harris did not drill the crew

in emergency destruction procedures. Neither did he take charge of the emergency

destruction effort when time became the critical factor. He admitted spending some ofthis

time in the Pueblo's radio room because he believed it more important to oversee what was

being transmitted tollThe result of this lack of direction was confusion by the

crew during the em~structionprocess and a consequent large amount of

material compromised to the North Koreans.

The remaining general service officers aboard the Pueblo did not have an adequate

appreciation for the need to protect classified materials. The executive and operations

officers ofthe ship received their SIGINT clearances in the last weeks before the ship sailed.

Neither officer probably had any concept ofthe destruction problem in the research spaces.

Although Bucher raised the issue of inadequate emergency destruction equipment on the

Pueblo prior to departure from the shipyard, he did not follow through with his concerns by

ensuring that his crew knew what to do in an emergency.

The two Korean linguists of the Pueblo's SIGINT detachment were not qualified for

their assignments. Had they been qualified, they would have understood a full twenty

minutes before the first shots were fired that the North Koreans were in the process of

maneuvering to fire. It would not, however, have enabled Commander Bucher to extricate

his ship - he was already caught and surrounded by the North Koreans, who had an

overwhelming advantage in numbers ofships, ship speed, and most importantly, weapons.

At most, it might have provided a totally disorganized crew a few more minutes to destroy

classified materials.

The destruction ofsuch a large volume of materials called fot the use of extraordinary

measures by the crew. It was incumbent upon Bucher and the officer in charge of the

NS'i RBbBA&ABbB 'is 6SU'ifblr:OTSRS NST Mbr:1<S1<8br: 'fa f'a~I6f(I(J!['fIOI(J![LS

Tep 5EERn tiM8ItA 170

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
DOCID: 3997429

'fOP Sl!eRI!'f tJMBItA

SIGINT detachment to train the crew in those measures. For example, when it became

apparent to the crew that the ship was not going to reach the 100 fathom curve in its

aborted attempt to escape, the classified material already stuffed into sacks and lying on

the deck should have been dumped over the side regardless of depth and what Bucher

believed at the time to be existing naval regulations. In the absence of any means to

destroy publications in bulk, one of the compartments aboard the ship should have been

designated as an emergency destruction area wherein it could be sealed off and classified

publications dumped for mass burning with a flammable material. Adequate destruction

facilities aboard the Pueblo were clearly lacking. This situation left it to the crew to

determine methods of getting rid of a large volume of classified documents as quickly as

possible. Training in destruction procedures was nil; the evidence for this was the crew's

floundering and completely ineffective attempts to destroy material. Bucher also

admitted, during the court of inquiry in the United States in January 1969, that no

destruction drills were ever held aboard the Pueblo. 4

The Navy belief that international waters would provide adequate protection for the

Pueblo was questionable at best. The North Koreans already had a history of ignoring

international agreements by sending their forces south across the DMZ prior to the seizure

of the Pueblo in 1968. In the opinion of this author, the NSA advisory message of 29

December 1967 that was sent to the JCS/JRC and readdressed to U.S. naval commands in

the Pacific should have been sufficient to give U.S. naval authorities an appreciation for

North Korean sensitivity to foreign air and sea units operating off the North Korean east

coast since 1965. The very first sentence of the message cited the previous assessment of

minimal risk assigned by the Navy, which was approved later as the mission proposal

made its way up the chain of command. The message then went on to point out vividly a

listing of North Korean violations in this area and requested that the Navy look at these

violations in assessing the need for protective measures. NSA could not have done

anything more beyond this message and remain within the parameters ofits mission, Le.,

without running the risk of being accused of meddling in Navy affairs. It was intended to

make the Navy aware of what NSA perceived as a need for the presence of protective forces

for the Pueblo and so mentioned this need, at the same time being very careful not to

intrude on Navy prerogatives for direct support missions.

The Pueblo was hopelessly outgunned. In addition, Bucher was emphatic in his

instructions to his crew that they were not to give the North Koreans an excuse to fire on

his ship, even after the North Koreans opened fire. One example of this was his reluctance

to order general quarters and, finally, his order for a modified general quarters, Le., a

minimum number of crewmen above decks. He badly misjudged North Korean

determination and their disregard for international law. Bucher did not realize that the

North Koreans did not need an excuse; they were determined to seize the ship and were

prepared to do anything required to bring that about.

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171 'fap SECRET blMBM.
DOCID: 3997429

'FOP SECRET liMBRA

At least since the Korean War, there had been a pattern of North Korean incidents

staged to generate propaganda. In the late 1960s there was a heightened sense of tension

on the Korean peninsula, partly because of the Blue House attack and numerous other

North Korean violations of the DMZ. The North Koreans had shown great sensitivity to

South Korean fishing vessels above the Northern Limit Line (an extension of the DMZ

into the Sea ofJapan) in early and mid-January.

They had tracked the Pueblo throughout most of the southern leg of its journey

beginning on 20 January and had to be aware that it displayed characteristics similar to

the USS Banner, which had been there before. In addition, they had closely reconnoitered

the Pueblo the day before they attacked and seized it. In fact, during the interrogations of

the Pueblo crew, one North Korean officer stated that he was familiar with the Banner and

that North Korea was waiting for the chance to seize it. 5

Voice transcripts intercepted during the capture of the Pueblo portray some confusion

on the part of the North Koreans over identification of the Pueblo. The North Koreans

seemed reassured when the Pueblo ran up the American ensign; however, once its

nationality was established, it did not deter the North Koreans. Apparently, there was

still some confusion in the minds of the North Koreans about the ship's hull designator.

Voice communications between SC-35 and a command authority aboard one ofthe torpedo

boats indicated that the North Koreans continually attempted to establish the identity of

the Pueblo as GER 2. Perhaps the appearance of the hull number GER 2 (USS Pueblo)

instead of hull number GER 1 (USS Banner) confused them.

There is evidence that the North Koreans planned to attack and seize the

Pueblo/Banner. The air and sea forces that challenged the Pueblo certainly required some

degree of coordination. The presence of a pilot aboard one of the North Korean vessels

when it departed its base and when it confronted the Pueblo would indicate a prior

intention to seize the ship and bring it back to a North Korean base. More significantly,

the involvement ofthe North Korean Ministry ofNational Defense just prior to the attack

and seizure was a necessary requirement as far as the North Korean government was

concerned because its target was a U. S. ship.

When the North Koreans did open fire on the Pueblo, it was directed at the upper

superstructure of the ship, indicating a concentrated attempt to knock out the command

and control of the vessel rather than to sink the ship. Not one round struck the Pueblo

near the waterline. 6 This again suggests seizure as the North Korean objective. There is

certainly conclusive evidence that it was not a North Korean spontaneous attack and

seizure of an unarmed American ship. North Korean surprise at what they had captured

certainly was reflected by the boarding party that came aboard the Pueblo - they probably

had never seen a sophisticated SIGINT ship before. This did not signify that the North

Koreans were totally unaware that their target was in fact a SIGlNT ship. North Korean

lifO! ftELEAS1i:ftU: TO eOI{T!tAe'f6ltB I{6'f ftI!;LI!;AS*Bbl!; '1'6 F8RElI8?i NATI8NAbS

TOP !!ERET liMBRA 172
TOP SIECIU!T t:JMBItA

communications intercepted prior to time of seizure indicated that their naval personnel

knew that the Pueblo was an American electronic surveillance ship.

The SIGINT evidence pointing to the involvement of the North Korean Ministry of

National Defense confirmed that the seizure ofthe Pueblo was not a spontaneous action as

first believed. On the contrary, it showed that a senior authority of the North Korean

government was at least cognizant of, and probably directed, the forces involved in the

seizure.

Intelligence information su ports the view that the Soviets benefited from the North

Korean seizure.

Collateral sources likewise

~~m'1rntlrnm:t7'tl'lit:1:'1m1rrnrn:m'1rnrTS""m'tJVIilI'e'lrtll'rn'"~rn!tS"'WI'tYtPue blo material immediately

after the seizure and arranged for the exchange of technicians to examine the captured

material. Other collateral SOUrces reported that a group of Soviet military intelligence

officers frQ'm the Sixth Directorate (responsible for Soviet SIGINT matters) of the Chief

Intelligence Directorate (GRU) visited North Korea shortly after the seizure of the ship

and inspected the vessel. Later, the North Koreans were reported to have turned over

some ofthe captured equipment to the GRU. 9 Apparently, some of this equipment was

taken .to Soviet radio plants in Kharkov, Voronezh, and Gorkij for examination by

technicians. lO As we have seen, the North Koreans made adequate provision for Soviet

intelligence information requirements during the Pueblo crew interrogations by having

Nor~h Korean Russian language military personnel conduct some ofthe interrogations.

In this way, any Soviet involvement in the incident could still be concealed. If Soviet

involvement were to became known to the United States, the Soviets would be concerned

about; U.S. retaliation against their own intelligence trawler fleet. At the time of the

Pueblo seizure, some of these units were operating.immediately beyond U.S. territorial

/waters and in proximity to U.S. naval installations overseas.

But what was the extent of Soviet involvement? TheSoviets established the precedent

for the treatment of U.S. SIGINT ships on the high seas during the initial voyages of the

Banne~ IThe Soviets had possessed a large

SIGINT trawler fleet of their own for many years, and they were well acquainted with the

configuration and "electronic signature" ofSIGINT ships. They knew that the Banner was a

SIGINT vessel. From the time that the Banner first appeared I I I Ithe Soviets harassed the American counterpart in order to

discourage further missions and to make collection as difficult as possible. Soviet tactics

included approaching a U.S. SIGINT ship at high speed and passing close aboard, bumping

incidents, and on one occasion, surrounding an American vessel and hoisting the

international signal, "Heave to or I will open fire." Even the Chinese Communists used

similar tactics and the same signal. For example, in December 1967, about a month before

tfO'f R8bEhS/.BhB 'fO SOPf'fFbt.S'fORB no'f R8bEAS/.BbB 'fO PORElSPf Pfh'fION/.CS

I

I

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173 Tap SECRET tJMBItA

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36
DOCID: 3997429

the Pueblo incident, the Banner was operating off Shanghai in the East China Sea against

Chinese Communist targets. On 12 December the Banner was approached by six armed

Chinese trawlers, one ofwhich signaled, "Heave to or I will open fire." The six surrounded

the Banner so that it had great difficulty in attempting to maneuver. The Banner was able

to escape only because the Chinese,like the Soviets, were unwilling to open fire to prevent

the ship's escape. At the time, the captain of the Banner reported that the Chinese

reaction appeared to be a "premeditated, coordinated effort."ll

The tactics used by the Soviets, Chinese, and finally the North Koreans in the 1965-68

period suggest a combined, coordinated effort against the operations of U.S. AGER SIGINT

ships. The Soviets had the most to gain from the seizure of a U.S. SIGINT ship. A seizure

would and did provide them with an unprecedented view ofthe U.S. SIGINT success against

their communications as well as U.S. cryptographic details. The Soviets, in late December

1967, began to obtain possession of U.S. cryptographic keying material for a number of

U.S. cryptographic machines from the John Walker espionage ring. Moreover, for the

Soviets, the Walker ring held the promise of a continuous supply ofsuch material over the

long term. With the key lists from the Walker espionage ring, four different types of U.S.

cryptographic machines with spare parts from the Pueblo, and collection assistance from

the Cubans and North Koreans, the Soviets had everything they needed to read certain

U.S. naval strategic and tactical communications.

The Soviets would have a general idea, from their own intercept operations against the

United States and from their extensive experience with their own SIGINT trawler fleet,

what materials were aboard the Pueblo before it was seized. The Soviets fully realized that

they could probably harass U.S. SIGINT ships but could never go to the limit of carrying out

the threat to open fire on one. The North Koreans, however, would have no such

inhibitions, and they demonstrated this in any number of attacks against the South

Koreans offthe east coast of Korea and against U.S. and South Korean forces in the DMZ.

They might solve the Soviet dilemma.

While the capture ofthe Pueblo was beneficial to the Soviets - and evidence suggests a

degree of Soviet complicity - the exact nature and extent of Soviet involvement in the

planning and execution ofthe capture cannot be established with certainty.

The North Korean success in capturing a U.S. SIGINT collector was not to be repeated.

A Republican administration had come to power in Washington, and budget cutting

became an an important goal. By August 1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense David

Packard had accepted a recommendation that two T-AGs (the Muller and Valdez), one

AGTR (the Georgetown), and the two remaining AGERs (the Banner and Palm Beach) be

taken out ofservice as a cost-saving measure. The Navy Department, subject to further

budget cuts, was inclined to drop the Oxford and Jamestown too ifthe JCS would agree. 12

The Navy was forced to choose between combatant and intelligence ships for retention

on the active list. The Navy now came up with a number of reasons why it should not

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1'9P SECRE' t:JMBRA 174
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19P SEER!' t1MBRA

retain the intelligence collectors, factors that were certainly valid for the Navy when it

first planned the AGER deployment. The reasons were that the AGTRs and AGERs were

aging, slow, vulnerable to attack, and they occasionally needed escorts. In addition, they

were costly in proportion to their effectiveness. Limitations on their approach to foreign

coasts rendered their collection far less valuable than when they could move in close

enough to intercep~ Isignals. In the Navy's view, these

ships were considered marginally useful in an era of budget cutting. In reality, the USS

Pueblo incident probably sounded the death knell for the AGER dedicated maritime

collection program. 13

NSA quickly protested the loss ofthe shipborne platforms and set forth in its objection

that the minimum requirement for national SIGINT production was for three operating

TRSs - one each fo

active in this arear-------"""'"t.,......,--~~--.--l"""'"!--T'"I'".,...----,r--rT""T'll~"'""r---I

believed that AGE co ec IOn wou e p ease a chronic collection situation wherein there

were always too many collection priorities and never enough collectors. The NSA

objection, however, was in vain.

The final blow came on 1 October 1969 when Packard informed. the secretaries of.the

military services, the Chairman, JCS, and the Director, NSA, thathe had accepted! the

recommendation ofthe Secretary ofthe Navy to eliminate all shipboard collectors. He had

concluded that no SIGINT ships would be needed in order to satisfy national intelligence or

military requirements.

On 14 November and 2 December 1969, respectively, the USS Banner and the USS

Palm Beach were deactivated, and the AGER program came to an end. 1s

(b) (1)

OGA

DOS

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

NeT RFJ{"FJz\&ABbEl 'fe SeU'ffMO'fens ue'f RflbflABABbfl 'fe f'eftJi316U r,2\TIOr42\LS

175 lOP SECRET liMBItA
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Tap SEER!' tJMIR"A

Appendix

The NSA Advisory Message of 29 December 1967 Concerning the

Risk Assessment ofthe Pueblo Mission

SECRET SAVIN

FROM: DIRNSA 29 DEC 67

TO: JCSlJRC

SEC RET SAVIN LIMDIS NOFORN

ADP-541

PINKROOT OPERATION I (C)

CINCPAC 2302309Z NOTAL

1. REF STATES "RISK TO PUEBLO IS ESTIMATED TO BE MINIMAL, SINCE

OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS."

2. FOLLOWING INFO IS FORWARDED TO AID IN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF

CINCPAC ESTIMATE OF RISK. SIGINT INDICATES: (1) THE NKAF HAS BEEN

EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO PERIPHERAL RECON FLIGHTS IN THIS AREA SINCE

EARLY 1965 (THIS SENSITIVITY WAS EMPHASIZED ON 28 APRIL 1965 WHEN A

USAF RB-47 WAS FIRED ON AND SEVERELY DAMAGED 35-40 NM FROM THE

COAST), (2) THE NKAF HAS ASSUMED AN ADDITIONAL ROLE OF NAVAL

SUPPORT SINCE LATE 1966, (3) THE NKN REACTS TO ANY ROKN VESSEL OR

ROK FISHING VESSEL NEAR THE NK COASTLINE (THIS WAS EMPHASIZED ON

19 JAN 67 WHEN A ROKN VESSEL WAS SUNK BY COASTAL ARTILLERY), AND (4)

INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES AS THEY RELATE TO

AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES ARE GENERALLY NOT HONORED BY NK ON THE EAST

COAST OF KOREA. BUT THERE IS NO SIGINT EVIDENCE OF

PROVOCATIVEIHARASSING ACTIVITIES BY NORTH KOREAN VESSELS BEYOND

12 NM FROM THE COAST.

3. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED TO AID IN EVALUATING THE REQUIREMENT FOR

SHIP PROTECTIVE MEASURES, AND IS NOT INTENDED TO REFLECT

ADVERSELYON CINCPACFLT DEPLOYMENT PROPOSAL.

1(6' ftI!:Ul\Sl\BLI!: '6 e6N'ltAe'6R:S f(6' ftI!:LfJl\S1tBLfJ 'f6 F6ft816N f(Jt'fI6f(JtLS

177 Tep SECRET l:JMBfb\
DOCID: 3997429

(hi (3 I - P . L . 86 - 3 6

CONCUR:

ADM Schulz, ADN Mr. Harvey, K12

MIR: Refis CINCPAC's notification of PINKROOT I areas ofoperation, and their estimate of

the risk factor quoted in para 1 of the above message. Above message is to insure that all

SIGINT factors have been considered relative to the Pueblo's mission against North Korea.

Additionally, in B1-082, 291940Z, field stations associated with the KORCOM target were

advised of Pueblo's operation ofT the east coast of NK (l3NM-60NM) from 10 to 27 Jan 68

and were instructed to be especially alert for any NK reaction to the trawler. This will be

Pueblo's initial operation. The SIGINT collection is to be conducted in MODE I (basically

Navy Direct Support) on a schedule which was proposed by CINCPAC.

DRAFTER: B. K. BUFFHAMICHIEF, B

RELEASING OFFICER: OLIVER R. KIRBY/ADP

SECRET SAVIN

I4'()T M:LEleSleBLI!l 'f6 e6li'fR*e'f8RS 118'f Hl!Jbl!h\S.A8U 'W FQRi:IQ~)T ATIO)T A [ S

lep SECRET UMBItA 178
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Notes

Chapter I

1. Pueblo Incident, Question and Answer Briefing Book, Tabs A2, A5, A6, ca. 29 January 1968 (U). CCH, NSA.

2. HarryJ. Middleton, The Compact History ofthe Korean War {New York: Hawthorne Boolts,Inc., 1965), 231.

3. CINCPAC message, 292242ZJanuary 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

4. Pueblo Incident, Question and Answer Briefing Book, Tabs A9, A16. Letter to UN Security Council from U.S.

Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, serial Sl8217, 2 November 1968 (U). CCH,NSA.

5. OIA Special Intelligence Summary (OIASIS 26-68), 26 January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

6. NSA staft'paper, RepresentativeNorth Korean Statements on Sea Incursions, compiled from Military Armistice

Commission reports, 1968 (U). Hereafter cited as RepresentativeNorth Korean Statements (U). CCH, NSA.

7. Ibid., 737.

8. NSA staft'paper, Representative North Korean Statements. CCH, NSA.

9. NSA task team report to the director, The Seizure ofthe ass Pueblo and Crew by the North Koreans on 23

January 1968: A Record and Review ofIts Major Cryptologic Ramifications,12 February 1968, Part 5, Tab J, 15

and 20. Hereafter referred to as the "Price Report" (named for Benjamin J .Price, head ofthe task team) (TSC-NF).

CCH,NSA.

10. NSA staft'paper, "An Assessment of the SIGINT Capability to Detect a Military Attack on the ROK," 1968

(SC). CCH, NSA.

11. 3/0tI'EUR26-67,l May 1967 (TSC). OIRNSA message 042050Z February 1968 (SC). CCH, NSA.

12. NSA staft'paper, "An Assessment ofthe SIGINTCapability."

13. 3/0tI'EUR28-66, 28 July 1966 (TSC-ISHTAR).

14. 3/0/KCN-EIR01-66, 15 August 1966 (TSC-ISHTAR). NSA, The Voyage and Capture of the USS Pueblo: A

SIGINT Overview, March-April 1968,37 (TSC). Hereafter cited as Voyage and Capture. CCH, NSA.

15. NSA staff paper, "An Assessment ofthe SIGINT Capability."

C....C.Ii, NSA. Voyage and

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

16. 3/0/KCA-EIR01-66 (Change 4),10 May 1967 aSC). Voyage and Capture, 36.

17. OIA Special Intelligence Summary, (OIASIS 26-68), 26 January 1968 (TSC).

Capture, 36 and 37.

18. "An Assess:entofthe~I~IN"TCIlPabilitY;"

19.1 ImeSSage,110009Z December 1968 (SC). CCH, NSA.

20. Price Report, Section 6 D, Attachment Al (SC).

21. NSA, Question and Answer File regarding USSPueblo, February 1969, ADP Question 61 (TSC).

22. Personal communicationfroml INSA B7, to author, 14 April 1992 (TS[C]-NOFORN). CCH, NSA.

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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23.George Howe, T54 NSA, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series No.2, Technical Research Ships

1956-1969,1974(TSC-NF). CCH,NSA.

24. NSA, shipboard SIGINT collection study, Sigint Trawler AGER (S), March 1968, (TSC). Navy Department

memorandum to Secretary of Defense, serial 00224, 7 October 1965 (S). CCH,NSA. NSA memorandum to Deputy

Director, Defense Research and Engineering,serial N1337, 2 November 1965 (TS-CCO). CCH,NSA.

25. NSA letter to Chief of Naval Operations, serial 000232S, subject: "Communications Intelligence Close

Support Requirements," 13 April 1953 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

26. CINCPACFLT message 29011lZ September 1967 (S-NF). CCH,NSA. CINCPACFLT message to DIRNSA,

130406Z December 1967 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA. DIRNSA message to NSAPAC ,Office,Japan, 202028Z December

1967 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

27. Director Naval Security Group message, 162302Z December 1965 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA. NSG staffstudy,

"Optimum Organization for Personnel Performing SIGINT Tasks on Integrated Intelligence Collection Ships," 27

July 1966 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

28. NSA staff paper, "The Mission of USS BanMr in Far East Operations," ca. 1967. (TSC) CCH, NSA. NSA,

shipboard SIGINTcollection study, "SIGINT Trawler AGER (S)," March 1968,3-3,5-1 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

29. NSA, DIRNSA Question and Answer File regarding Pueblo, February 1969, assistant director, Production,

questions 65,66, 69 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

30. Price Report, Section 6, Tab F (SCl. NSA Question and Answer File regarding Pueblo, February 1969,

Assistant Director, National Cryptologic Staff, question 30 (TSC). NSA shipboard SIGINT collection study,

"SIGINT Trawler AGER (S)" March 1968, 1-1 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

Chapter II

1. SECNAV memorandum to SECDEF, serial 00224, 7 October 1965 (S). CCH, NSA.

2. SECNAV memorandum to deputy SECDEF, serial 0001726-65,12 November 1965. (S) CCH, NSA. The FSclassships,ofabout 900 tons and a maximum speedof13 knots, were operated by the U.S. Army in the Pacific as

inter-island transports toward the end ofWorld War II and in the late 1940s and early 1950s. When these ships

were transferred to the Navy in the mid-1960s, they were given the designation AKL and, eventually, AGER.

3. Program ofCommissioning Ceremonies for United States Ships Pueblo and Palm Beach, Puget Sound Naval

Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, 13 May 1967. Hereafter cited as Program of Commissioning Ceremonies for

Pueblo and Palm Beach. CCH, NSA.

4. Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The Full Story of the Pueblo Affair (New York: CowardMcCann Inc., 1970),89. Hereafter cited as A Matter ofAccountability.

5. Ibid.

6. NSA (K3) memorandum, "DIRNSA (K3) Participation in the SIGINT Equipment Facilities and System Design

for the USS Pueblo (AGER-2)," 25 January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

7. Ibid., 2-4.

8. Ibid., 5-6.

I4'6T Kl!lLl!l1lS*BLl!l T6 e6I4'Tft1leT6ftS I4'6T MLl!l1lS*BLl!l T6 f'6Kl!l16I4' I4'1lTI6I4'1lLS

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9. Program ofCommU16wning Ceremonies for Pueblo and Palm Beach.

10. CDR Lloyd M. Bucher with Mark Rascovich. Bucher: My Srory (Garden City. New York: Doubleday and Co.•

1970),2-3.

11. Commander. Naval Air Force. U.S. Pacific Fleet.transcripts of the cryptologicfcryptographic intelligence

debriefofthe PlUblo crew subsequent to their return to San Diego. Each crewman was interviewed at least one or

more times and a transcript prepared for every interview. The nickname for the debrief was "BREECHES

BUOY." Hereafter, references to this source are cited thus: interviewee's name, BREECHES BUOY, date of

transcript, and security classification. This one is LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY 2 January 1969

(TSC). Accession Number 24103. CBOJ17. NSA Archives.

12. NSA oral interview OH-7-91, Richard Fine,former officer in charge, SIGINT Detachment, USS Palm Beach

(Ager-3), 30 September 1991 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

13. Armbrister, A Matter ofAccountability, 107.

14. CDR Lloyd M. Bucher. BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC). Accession Number 24103. CBOJ14, NSA

Archives.

15. Ibid.

16. LT Edward R. Murphy Jr., BREECHES BUOY, 30 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103,

CBOJ24. Edward R. Murphy Jr., with Curt Gentry, Second in Command: The Uncensored Account of the

Capture of the Spy Ship Pueblo (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), 14. Hereafter cited as Second In

Command,

17. Bucher and Rascovich ,Bucher: My Srory, 34-35.

18. Ibid., 131. Murphy and Gentry, Second ill Command, 56-57.

19. Frederick Carl Schumacher, Jr., and George C. Wilson, Bridge ofNo Return: The Ordeal ofthe USS Pueblo

(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971),49. Hereafter cited as Bridge ofNo Return.

20. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

21. CWO Gene H. Lacy, BREECHES BUOY, 27 December 1968. (TSC) Accession Number 24103, CBOJ31, NSA

Archives.

22. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

23. Murphy, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

24. Ibid.

25. NSA listing, "SIGINT Configuration," USN-467Y, undated (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

26. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Srory, 60-61.

27. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY. 6 January 1969 (TSC).

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Armbrister. A Matter ofAccountability, 148-149.

31. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: MySrory, 91-93.

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181 lep SECREl l:IMBRA
NOT RE' E A i A In Ii: 'W CON'l:R A C'l:OR~ ~O'l: REU: 6~ARU: '}:Q ~RSISl'f I'fA'I'IQl'fA:bS

47. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

182

38. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

39. Ibid.

52. CINCPACFLT messages, 290111Z September 1967 (S-NFILIMDIS) and 290226Z September 1968 (S-NFLIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

51. Dunnie R. Tuck. BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ31. NSA

Archives. Harry Iredale, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ31, NSA

Archives.

49. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 2 January 1969 (TSC).

50. RM2 Lee Roy Hayes, BREECHES BUOY, 31 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103. CBOJ16, NSA

Archives.

48. Trevor Armbrister. A Matter ofAccountability, 401.

32. Bucher. BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

"

33. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Story. 97.

34. Schumacher and Wilson. Bridge ofNo Return. 50.

40. Bucher, Bucher: My Story, 108.

41. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

42. Strano. BREECHES BUOY. 28 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ28, NSA Archives.

43. Bucher.Bucher: My Story, 116-117.

44. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

36. Anthony A. Lamantia, BREECHES BUOY. 28 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ28.

NSA Archives.

45. Murphy and Gentry, Second in Command. 436.

46. Bucher, Bucher: My Story, 125-126. Oral interview. 12 July 1990, Anthony W. White, former officer in

charge. SlGINT detachment, USS Banner. 1967 (TSC-NF). CCH, NSA.

35. Bucher, BREECHESBUOY 6 January 1969 (TSC).

37. CT3 Angelo S. Strano. BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103. CBOJ28.

NSA Archives.

55. Ibid., Appendix 1 to Annex. A (S-NF).

56. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

53. DIRNAVSECGRUPAC Letter ofInstruction 1-68.2 January 1968.4 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

54. Ibid.• AI.

57. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on the USS Pueblo. Hearings on

the Inquiry into the USS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, 9Ist Congress. 1st Session, 1969,736. Hereafter

cited as Hearings. CCH, NSA.

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58. Ibid., 737.

59. Price Report, Pt. 7, Tab A (S-CCOILIMDIS).

60. U.S. CongreBB, House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on the USSPueblo, Report oftM

Inquiry into tM USS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incident8, 91st Congress, 1st SeBBion, 1969, 1635-36. Hereafter

cited as CongreBBional Report. CCH, NSA.

61. Ibid., 1643 and 1652.

62. Ibid.,1643 and 1645.

63. Ibid., 1643.

64. NSA, General Counsel memorandum to Frank M. Slatinshek, counsel for Special Subcommittee ofthe House

Armed Services Committee on the USS Pueblo, 21 March 1969,2 (S). CCH, NSA.

65. Congressional Report, 1653.

66. Hearings, 893.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 888.

69. CongressionalReport, 1645.

70. Ibid., 1636.

1'-----

73. DIRNSA message, 291940Z December 1967 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

_ 74. DIRNSA message, 292017Z December 1967 (SC). CCH, NSA.

75. Interview 13-92'DSAB7,13 May 1992 (TSC INOFORNILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

76. Interview,13-92SAB7.bIRNSAmessage292228Z December 1967 (S-NF- LIMDIS). CCH,

NSA.

77. DIRNSA lettertoSECDEF,18 March 1969 (S). CCH,NSA.

78. Ibid. Carter's instruction to NSA personnel during the period ofinvestigative review following the seizure of

the Pueblo was to downplay this message and not draw it to the .Ilttention of any review committee investigating

the 10BB ofthe ship. He felt that it would be far better, ifit were pointed out by non·NSA people. Carter believed

that the meBBage was certain to receive its due attention and that NSA could come out of the whole matter

relatively unscathed. Carter's instructions were carried out to the letter. As he had predicted, the message

caught the attention of the House Armed Services Committee during its investigation of the Pueblo incident in

1969 and it received much attention when U.S.. ltuthorities decided to release it to the media (Congressional

Report, 1654).

79. Congressional Report, 1655.

(b) (1)

OGA

CIA

80. Ibid.

81. Interview 13-92.c=JNSAB7,13 May 1992 (TSC-NF-LIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

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82. Hearings,818.

83. Ibid., 738-739.

84. CTF96 message, 050512Z January 1968. (S-NFILIMDl8) CCH, N8A. CNO messages, 151410Z December

1967 (S), and 172126Z December 1967 (C). CCH, NSA. CINCPAC messages 230332Z December 1967 (8) and

292111Z December 1967 (8). CCH, NSA. CINCLANTFLT message, 191710Z December 1967 (C). CCH, N8A.

85. LT (JG) Frederick C. SchwnacherJr., BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (T8C). Accession Nwnber 24103,

CBOJ26, NSA Archives.

86. Bucher,Bucher: My Story, 137-138.

87. DlRNSA messages, 031944Z January 1968 (S-CCOILIMDlS) and 032226Z January 1968 (SC-NFILIMDlS).

CCH,NSA.

88. COMNAVFORJAPAN messages, 042304Z January 1968, (8-NFILIMDlS), and 050640Z January 1968 (C).

CCH,NSA.

89. Strano, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC).

90. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

91. CTF 96 message, 110042Z January 1968 (S/-NFILIMDl8). CCH, NSA.

92. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

93. Hearings, 739-740.

94. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

Chapter III

1. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

2. The Northern Limit Line was an extension of the DMZ into the Sea of Japan and was used by the North

Koreansto demarcate the southern edge oftheir maritime control.

3. Voyage and Capture, 9-10.

4. QMl Charles M. Law, BREECHES BUOY, 27 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Nwnber 24103, CBOJ31, NSA

Archives.

5. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

6. Ibid.

7. The Demilitarized Zone was established by the armistice agreement of 27 July 1953 between the United

Nations Command and North Korean and Chinese Communistforces. The Zone is a two·kilometer buffer area on

either side afthe Military Demarcation Line that separates North from South Korea.(Hermes, Walter G., United

States Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front. (Washington, D.C.: Office ofthe Chiefof Military

History, United States Army, 1966, appendix C, 516.)

8. Murphy, BREECHES BUOY, 9 January 1969 (TSC).

9. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (T8C).

NUl RELEASABLE 10 CON rMCIUM I~OT !tI!:Ll':A~A:eLl':TO fi'OltJi:leH I(1['fIOHALS

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10. Murphy and Gentry, Second in Command, 113-114.

11. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY. 7 January 1969 (TSC).

12. Voyage and Capture, 17. (TSC)

13. PHI Lawrence W. Mack, BREECHES BUOY, 2 January 1969. (TSC) Accession Number 24103, CBOJ31,

NSA Archives. Bucher. BREECHES BUOY 8 January 1969 (TSC).

14. Bucher,BREECHESB,UOY,7 January 1969 (TSC).

15. Ibid.

16. Mack. BREECHES BUOY, 2 January 1969 (TSC).

17. Bucher. BREECHES BUOY,7 January 1969 (TSC).

18. Fireman Peter M. Bandera, BREECHES BUOY, 27 December 1968 and 8 January 1969 (TSC). Accession

Number 24103, CBOJ31, NSA Archives.

19. CT3 Ralph McClintock, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968. (TSC) Accession Number 24103, CBOJ23,

NSA Archives. Strano, BREECHES BUOY, 5 January 1969 (TSC).

20. Schumacher. BREECHES BUOY, 6 January 1969 (TSC).

21. McClintock. BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC). CT3 Steven J. Robin, BREECHES BUOY, 31

December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ23, NSA Archives.

22. Murphy and Gentry, Second in Command, 115.

23. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

24. Murphy and Gentry, Second in Command, 115. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

25. NSA, nCryptologic/Cryptographic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January-23 December

1968," Section VI, npersonnel Background and DebriefSummaries," 29 February 1969 (TSC). Accession Number

24103, CBOJ37, NSA Archives.

26. CINCPAC message. 230230Z December 1967 (S-NFILIMDlS).

27. DlRNSA message, 292017Z December 1967 (SC).

28. Ibid.

29. CT3 Bradley Reed Crowe, BREECHES BUOY, 31 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103,CBOJ15,

NSA Archives.

30. CTI James Dewar Layton, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103,

CBOJ22, NSA Archives.

31. CTl Francis John Ginther, BREECHES BUOY, 31 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103,

CBOJ26, NSA Archives. CTSN Steven Ray Robin, BREECHES BUOY, 31 Decemberl968 (TSCl. Accession

Number 24103, CBOJ25, NSA Archives.

32. CTI James Francis KelJ, BREECHES BUOY 5 January 1969 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ32,

NSA Archives.

33. CTI James Antwyne Shepard, BREECHES BUOY, 1 January 1969 (TSC). Accession Number 24103,

CBOJ27, NSA Archives.

fiS'f RECEh'rSftBbB 'fS OSfi'fRo',O'fSR:S fiS'f RBbBltSABbB 'fS PSRBISN ~lA'fISNltbS

185 TOil !!CR!T tJMBIb\

i

j

'"II

.~1111'
34. SGT RobertJoseph Chicca, USMC, BREECHES BUOY, 26 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Nwnber 24103,

CBOJ15, NSA Archives.

35. Personal communication fro~ rSA B7, to author, 14 April 1992,5 (TS[Cj-NOFORN). CCH,

NSA.

36. Strano,BREECHES BUOY, 4 January 1969 (TSC).

37. USN-467Y messages 220820Z and 230206ZJanuary 1968 (SC). CTl James A. Shepard, BREECHES BUOY,

1 and 4 January 1969 (TSC).

38. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

39. Schwnacher,BREECHESBUOY,6January 1969 (TSC).

40. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 2 January 1969 (TSC).

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(b) (3)-18 USC

(b) (3)-P.L. 86

Chapter IV

1. Throughout this chapter, unless stated otherwise, the time of day is given in Korean local time so that the

reader can obtain an accurate picture of events under the daytime or nighttime conditions that prevailed when

they occurred. For reference purposes, Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and Eastern Standard Time (EST) are,

respectively, nine and fourteen hours behind Korean time. In some cases, therefore, events recorded in Korean

time may fall on different days than the same events recorded in Greenwich and/or Eastern Standard Time.

2. USSPuebio message, 220915ZJanuary 1968 (S-NF~ ~CCH;NSA:

3. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

4. USS Pueblo message, 220915Z January 1968 (S-N~,-- _

5. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

6. USS Pueblo message, 220915Z January 1968 (S-NF1---------,

7. Schwnacher, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC).

8. Voyage and Capture, 3 (TSC).

9. Schwnacher, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 968 (TSC).

10. DlRNSA message, 042331Z March 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA

11. CT1 Donald E. Bailey, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Nwnber 24103, CBOJ22,

NSA Archives.

12. USSPuebio message, 230150Z January 1968 (S). CCH, NSA

13. Schwnacher, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC). This account differs from that given on page 166

ofBucMr: My Story by Bucher and Rascovich wherein Bucher reports: "The night dragged on and I plagued the

responsible CTs every hour and sometimes more often ... Let me know the minute we have a solid signal ..." In

Bucher's BREECHES BUOY debriefing of 7 January 1969, he recounts: "Now let's see, I'm wondering now

whether or not we didn't have some difficulty making radio contact that night [22 January 1968] ... It seems to

me it [the message] went outlate at night ... it took us several hours to effect the receipt." The debriefs ofthe CTs

3

8

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involved, plus those of LTJG Frederick Schumacher and LT Stephen Harris reveal no personal intervention by

Bucher in the communications activities as he reports in his book.

14. USB Pueblo messages, 220915Z, 220820Z and 230150Z January 1968, all received at Kami Seya between

231100 and 231150 Korean time. CCH, NSA.

15. Voyage and Capture, 3 (TSC).

16. NSA, The Voyage and Capture ofthe USS Pueblo: A SIGINT Rel/iew, March-April 1968, 31 (TSC). CCH,

NSA.

17. Schumacher, BREECHESBUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC).

18. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

19. Law, BREECHES BUOY, 27 December 1968 (TSC).

20. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 26 December 1968 (TSC).

21. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

22. SM2 Wendell G. Leach, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ31,

NSA Archives.

23. 3/00/KCJIR13-68, 072040Z February 1968 (TSC-ISHTAR).

24. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 26 December 1968 (TSC).

25. Oral interview OH-09-90, 12 July 1990, Anthony W. White, former officer in charge, SIGINT detachment,

USS Banner, 1967 (TSC-VRKI9INF). CCH, NSA. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Story, 126.

26. COMNAVFORJAPAN message to CNO, 160753Z January 1968. (SC) Informal listing, Cruises by Technical

Research Ships, 1969. (S-CCO) CCH, NSA. Del/elopment of TRS Program, 1968, background papers, NSA

Archives, ACC 24104, CBOJ 35. S-CCO)

27. Schumacher, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC).

28.lbid. 29 December 1968 (TSC) .

29. Bailey, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC).

30. 3/KCJIRI13-68, 072040Z February 1968.

31. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 9 January 1969 (TSC).

32. Leach, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC). It should be noted that this information from the

signalman himself is at variance with information in Pueblo's message 230352Z January 1968 and with that

given by Bucher and other officers on the bridge who also heard Bucher's order.

33. Hearings, 842. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Story, 174.

34. Copy of transmissions sent and received from USS Pueblo, 23 January 1968, at NAVSECGRUDET, Kami

Seya,Japan (S-NFILIMDlS).

35. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

36. Leach, BREECHES BUOY, 30 December 1968 (TSC).

37. Schumacher, BREECHESBUOY, 31 December 1968 (TSC).

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38. Copy of transmissions sent and received from USS Pueblo, at NAVSECGRUDET, Kami Seya, Japan (8-

NFILIMDlS).

39. Voyage and Capture, 4 (TSC).

40. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 26 December 1968 (TSC).

41. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

42. Ibid.

43. CTC James F. Kell, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ18, NSA

Archives.

44. Voyage and Capture, 4 (TSC).

45. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

46. Ibid.

47. Informal note, Code Entry Subject Code #15,1. "North Korean Capture, Planned or Unplanned," 1969 (TSC).

NSA, Archives.

48. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 9 January 1969 (TSC).

49. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 2 January 1969 (TSC).

50. Ibid., 3 January 1969 (TSC).

51. Kell, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC).

52. Lacy, BREECHES BUOY, 27 December 1968 (TSC).

53. LT Stephen R.Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 3 January 1969 (TSC).

54. CTI James A. Shepard, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968. (TSC) Accession Number 24103, CBOJ26,

NSA Archives.

55. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 3 January 1969 (TSC).

56. Kell, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 (TSC).

57. 3/0IKCJIR13·68, 072040Z February 1968.

58. CTCS Ralph D. Bouden, BREECHES BUOY, 5 January 1969 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ14, NSA

Archives.

59. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Story, 394.

60. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

61. Ibid. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Story, 185.

62. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Story, 183.

63. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 9 January 1969 (TSC).

64. Voyage and Capture, 4 (TSC).

65. Layton, BREECHES BUOY, 31 December 1968 (TSC).

NOT RfT FA i AiU: TO CQ~TTR A Cl'Q51.8 ~TOTR:gb:gAS"'Rb:g 1'0 FQR:gIQ~{ ~{A1'lQNhbB

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66. Copy of transmissions sent and received from USS Pueblo, 23 January 1968, at NAVSECGRUDET, Kami

Seya,Japan (S-NFILIMDIS).

67. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 9 January 1969 (TSC).

68. Ibid.

69. Copy of transmissions sent and received from USS Pueblo, 23 January 1968, at NAVSECGRUDET, Kami

Seya,Japan (S-NFILIMDIS).

70. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 3 January 1969 (TSC).

71. Ibid., 31 December 1968 (TSC).

72. Ibid., 4 January 1969 (TSC).

73. Ibid., 2 and 4 January 1969 (TSC).

74. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

75. Leach, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

76. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

77. 3/0IKCJIR13-68, 072040Z February 1968.

78. Voyage and Capture, 5 (TSC).

79. Copy of transmissions sent and received from USS Pueblo, 23 January 1968, at NAVSECGRUDET, Kami

Seya,Japan (S-NFILIMDIS).

80. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

81. Copy oftransmissions sent and received from USS Pueblo, 23 January 1968,at NAVSECGRUDET, Kami

Seya,Japan (S-NFILIMDIS).

82. Bouden, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC).

83. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 9 Janauary 1969 (TSC).

84. BMI NorbertJ. Klepac, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ31,

NSA Archives.

85. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

86. BM2 Ronald L. Berens, BREECHES BUOY, 9 January 1969 (TSC). Accession Number 24103, CBOJ31, NSA

Archives.

87. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 9 January 1969 (TSC).

88. Law, BREECHES BUOY, 27 December 1968 (TSC).

89. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

90. HMI Herman P. Baldridge, BREECHES BUOY, 29 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number 24103,

CBOJ31, NSA Archives.

91. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

92. Ibid.

N9'1' REbl'lASltBbE '1'9 SSUTRlteTSRS fiST ftl!1bl!1AS1l:Bbl!1 '6 ,,61tf:16I( N'KTIOI4'KLS

189 lap SECRET liMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

Tap SEeRET t:JMBItA

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Voyage and Capture, 5 (TSC).

96. Baldridge, BREECHES BUOY, 28 December 1968 mc).

97. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 7 January 1969 (TSC).

Chapter V

1. 8tanley Millet, editor, South Vietnam: "U.S. Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia," Facts on File,

Volume 3.1968 (New York: 1974),30.

2. COMNAVFORJAPAN message, 282355Z January 1968 (S). CCH,NSA.

3. Hearings, 172.

4. COMNAVFORJAPAN message,231610ZJanuary 1968(8). C CH,NSA.

5. COMNAVFORJAPAN message, 282355ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH,NSA.

6. Fifth Air Force message, 251012ZJanuary 1968(8). CCH,NSA.

7. Ibid.

8 Hearings, 740.

9. COMNAVFORJAPAN message, 231610Z January 1968 (S).

10. Fifth Air Force message, 251012ZJanuary 1968 (S).

11. Hearings, 894-896.

12. Hearings,89700S99.

13. Ibid., 896-917.

14. Armbrister, A Matter ofAccountability, 217.

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

15. COMSEVENTHFLT message, 231456ZJanuary 1968 (8). CCH,NSA.

16 Armbrister, A Matter ofAccountability, 218.

17. COMSEVENTHFLT message, 230606Z January 1968 (8). CCH,NSA.

18. ADMINO CINCPACFLT message, 240435ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, NSA

19. CINCPACFLT message 282152Z January 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

20. Fifth Air Force message,251012Z January 1968 (8). CINCPACAF message, 240600Z January 1968 (S) .

CCH,NSA.

211 ressage, 230540ZJanuary 1968 (8). CCH,NSA.

22 NSA, B Group Watch Office Chronology (Pueblo log) containing 1,227 entries of events, messages, and actions

(TSC). CCH, NSA.

~f9'1' ~bS:h8A8bS '1'9 G9~f'fR,,"G'I'9RS ~f9'1' RSbSA8A8bS '1'9 F9RSI8~f NA'I'I8~fAbB

1=9P SECRET YMBRA 190
DOClD: 3997429

1'81' SECRET l:IMBAA

23. NSA SIGINT Command Center, "Chronology ofActions Taken in Response to USS Puebw Incident," 2345, 22

January~605..23January 1968" (TSC·NF). CCH,NSA.

24. ADMINO CINCPAC message 240435ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH,NSA.

25. Chronology. DIRNSA message, 230855ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

26. NSA, Chronology ofActions Taken by NSA Public Information Officer between 0830-1700, 23 January 1968

(S). CCH, NSA.

27. Ibid.

28. NSA,listofmajor events at Director's level for period 1035,23 January 1968-1130,27 January 1968 (TSC).

CCH,N8A.

29. NSA, Chronology ofActions Taken by Public Information Officer between 0830-1700, 23 January 1968 (8).

30. N8A,listofmajor events at Director's level for period 1035,23 January-1130, 27 January 1968 (TSC).

31. Ibid.

32. CINCPACFLTmessage, 231021ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH,NSA.

33. COMSEVENTHFLT message, 231456Z January 1968 (S). CCH,NSA.

34. CINCPACFLT message, 240008Z January 1968 (8). CCH, NSA.

35. CINCPACFLT message, 240600ZJanuary 1968 (8). CCH, NSA.

36. Ibid.

37. CINCUNC message, 240555ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

38. Armbrister, A Matur ofAccountability,239.

39. ADMINO CINCPAC message, 240435Z January 1968 (S).

40. Hearings, 796, 802, 809.

41. CINCPAC message, 231352Z January 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

42. CINCPAC message, 232210ZJanuary 1968 (8). CCH, NSA.

43. Armbrister, A Matur ofAccountability, 239.

44 ADMINO CINCPAC message, 232227Z January 1968 (S). CCH,NSA.

45. JCS message, 232309Z January 1968. (8) CCH, NSA. JCS message 232310ZJanuary 1968 (TS). CCH, N8A.

46. CINCPACFLT message, 240600ZJanuary 1968 (8).

47. JCS message, 231651ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, N8A.

48. N8A 81GINT Command Center logs for period 0730, 23January~80024 January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

49. DIRNSA message, 240804Z January 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

50. NSA 8IGINT Command Center, "Chronology ofActions Taken in Response to USS Pueblo Incident, 2345, 22

January~605,23 January 1968" (TSC·NF).

51. NSA SIGINTCommand Center,logsfor period 0730, 23 January~800, 24 January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

191 TO,. SeCReT l:1MBRA
52. DIRNSA messages. 240022Z. 240029Z. 240042ZJanuary 1968 (S) . CCH, NSA.

53.1 Imessage. 230920ZJanuary 1968(SC). CCH, NSA.

54. 2/01KCJ1R0 1-68, 230935Z J anuaryl968. CCH, NSA.

55. NSA. Manual of United States SIGINT Operations (MUSSO),TECHINS 4002 of 26 Octob6r 1959. (TSC)

NSA's United States SignallntelligenceDirective (USSID) 302 superseded TECHINS 4002 on 28 February 1973

(TSC).

56. DIRNAVSECGRUPAC message, 231109ZJanWiryJ968 (S-CCO).

57.c::::::::Jmessage 240823Z January 1968 (C-CCO). CCH.NS;\..

58. NSAPAC OFF JAPAN message, 240705Z January 1968 (S-CCO). eCfI, NSA.

59. DIRNSA message. 231010ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

60. DIRNSA message, 231155ZJanuary 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

61 DIRNSA message, 231227ZJanuary 1968 (SC). CCH. NSA.

~::::::::;:;:;~::::::;:~:~::::SA 64. 3/0IKCJIR02-68. 23 January 1968. CCH, NSA.

65. DIRNSA message. 231140Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH. NSA.

66. DIRNSA message, 231658Z Jl\nuary 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

67Dessage;240418Z January 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA...

68 essage. 230920ZJanuary 1968 (SC).

69. CINCUNC message, 231403ZJanuary 1968 (S-NF). CCH, N$A.

70. CINCUNC message, 232255ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

DOCID: 3997429

lap SEERH l:JMBItA

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

"(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

) (1)

A

72. NSAPAC OFF Japan message, 230653ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH. NSA.

73. ADMINO CINCPAC message, 240318Z January 1968 (S). CCH. NSA.

74. ADMINO CINCPAC message, 231058Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

75. DIRNSA message, 231005Z January 1968 (SC-NFILIMDIS). CCH. NSA.

76. USAFSS message, 231545ZJanuary 1968 (SC-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

771 pessage, 231615ZJanuary 1968 (SC-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

78. NSA, K12 log of watch office actions during period: 1225,23 January-2230, 31 January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH,

NSA.

79. JCS message 231941Z January 1968 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH. NSA.

80. NSA. K12 log ofwatch office actions during period: 1225.23 January-2230. 31 January 1968 (S-CCO).

He! ftl!lf::BJlcSjIj;:8LB !e eeH!R-Ae!eRS He! ftBLBhSABf::S 'Fe FeRSISt( NNi'leNALS

CIA

19P SECRH tJMBRA 192

~--_._------
DOCID: 3997429

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81. NSA 81 memorandum, "Queries Received from DlA Concerning Pueblo Incident," 23 January 1968 (SCl.

CCH,NSA.

82. DlRNSA message, 232100ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCQ). CCH, NSA.

83. DlRNSA message, 232101Z January 1968 (S-CCQ). CCH, NSA.

84. NSA K12 log ofwateh office actions during period: 1225,23 J anuary-2230, 31 January 1968 (S-CCO).

85. DlRNSA message, 232227ZJanuary 1968 (SCl. CCH, NSA.

86. NSA SIGINT Command Center, logs for the period 0730, 23January-0800, 24 January 1968 (TSCl.

CINCLANTFLT message,242312Z January 1968 (S-LIMDlS). CCH, NSA.

87. NMCC memorandum for the record, 23 January 1968,1730EST (TSlLIMDlS). CCH, NSA.

88. NSA list ofmajor events at director's levelfor period 1035,23 January-U30, 27 January 1968 aSC).

Chapter VI

2. NSA,listofmajor events at Director's level for period 1035,23 January - 1120,27 January 1968 (TSC). CCH,

NSA.

3. White House, Press Secretary "Notes ofMeeting at the State Department on the Pueblo," 24 Januaryl968 (U).

CCH,NSA.

5. NSA R44, "Pueblo Tapes," 1200, 27 January 1968 (TSlLIMDlS). CCH,NSA.

6. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY,8 January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

7. NSA Public Information Officer, memorandum, "Information Re Goulding Press Release, 24 January 1968,

Repudiating CDR Bucher's Confession" (S). CCH, NSA.

8. NSA,list of major events at Director's level for period 1035,23 January 1968 - 1120,27 January 1968 (TSC).

CCH,NSA.

9. American embassy, Seoul, message 24l0l8Z January 1968 (C). CCH, NSA.

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

10. 3/0/KCJIR06-68, 24130n January 1968.

11. Ibid. Armbrister, A Matter ofAccountability, 263-265.

12. Personal communication from I INSAB7, to author, 14 April1992, 4 [TS[C)-NOFORN). CCH,

NSA.

13. SSO New York message, 151924Z February 1968 (TSC). CCH,NSA.

14. DlRNSA message, 042331Z March 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

15. White House, notes of an 11:00 AM meeting 26 Ja,nuary 1968.

16. Personal communication from I ~NSA 87, to author, 14 April 1992, 2 (TS[Cj-NOFORN). CCH,

NSA.

(6) (1)

OGA

CIA

~f€H" RI!H,Fh\SltBfoFi 'Fe 6en'FfbttO'feftS nef RfiJLfiJ*S*BbfiJ f6 P6RfJI6f( f(j!(ff6f(1\L8

193 lOP SeCRET t1MaftA
17.1 INSABl, notes on "Mission to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations," 1968,5 [SECRET

SAVIN]. CCH, NSA.

18. United Nations Security Council, Document SlPV, 1388, 26 January 1968,62-65. CCH, NSA.

19. Ibid., 67.

20. Personal communication fro~,--__---,~,NSA87, to author, 14 April 1992, 2.

DOCID: 3997429

Tep SECRET l::IMBRA

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

21. Ibid.

22. NSA NOG, telecon 250525Z January 1968 (S-CCO). NSAREPSAC message 251740Z January 1968 (S-CCO).

DIRNSA, message 261247ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

23. NPICIR-17/68, North Korean Missionl 128 Jallll8l1'1968(S-NF). CCH, NSA.

24 Department ofDefense, "Commander's Digest," Vol. 4, No.9 J anuary31, 1968 (U). CCH, NSA.

25. JCS, message 262016Z January 1968 (TSlLIMDIS). USAFSTRIKE TAC, message 262016ZJanuary 1968 (8).

SECSTATE,message 270214ZJanuary 1968 (TS). CCH, N8A. (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

26. JCS, message 262016ZJanuary 1968 (TSlLIMDI8). CCH, NSA. (b) (3) -P. L. 86-36

27. COMSEVENTHFLT, messages 250332Z, 251004Z, and 251150ZJanuary 1968 (8). CCH, N8A.

28. N8A, list ofmajor events at Director's level for period 1035, 23 January 1968 - 113027 January 1968 (T8C).

CCH,N8A.

29. JCS, message 251401ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, N8A.

30. COMSEVENTHFLT, message 260722Z January 1968 (S-NFILIMDIS). CINCPAC, message 280712Z

January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

31. COM8EVENTHFLT, message 300704ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH,N8A.

32. USSBanner, message 291219Z January 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

33. CINCPACFLT,message 280328ZJanuary 1968 (8). USS Banner, message 29121OZ January 1968,(S). CCH,

NSA.

34. USSBanner,messages 291125Z and 291350ZJanuary 1968 (8). CCH, N8A. (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

35. CTG

a

70.6, message 301620Z J anuary1968(g..lF):C;'~~A.' j~: : := L s~ 6 ~ ~

36. 2/0 . 0-68,251938Z.raJ1uary1968. 2/0 1-68, 261835ZJanuary 1968.

37. 2/0 ·11-68, 241846ZJanuary 1968.

38. 2/0 19-68, 242136ZJanuary 1868.

39. NSA, K12 study, "A Review of the Technical Research Ship Program, 1961-1969," 1 May 1970,36 (TSC).

CCH,NSA.

40. USCINCEUR,message 262149ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, N8A.

41. DIRNSA, message 262149Z January 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

42. COM8TSLANT, message 302045ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

43. CNO, messages 262305Z, 262306Z, and 312304ZJanuary 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

fep SECRET l::IMBRA 194
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44. N8A ADP, memorandum for the record, "USS Muller," 270658Z January 1968 (S-CCO). eCH, NSA.

45. CINCLANTFLT, message 242312Z January 1968 (S-LIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

46. DIRNSA, message 270500Z January 1968 (S-CCO).1 Imessage 270658Z January 1968 (S). CCH,

N8A.

47.1 Imessage 290721ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

48 DIRNSA, message3Q1917Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

49.1 Imellsage 290303ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). NSAPAC OFFJ apan,message 290820ZJanuary 1968 (SCCO). CCH, NSA.

50. DIRNSA, message 271831ZJanlUJ,ry 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

51. CGUSASA, message 301717ZJanuary 1968(~C). CCH,NSA.

52. HQ NSAPAC, message 270440Z January 1968 (TSCI.USi\FSSil)lessages 280132Z January 1968 (S-CCO)

and 281941ZJanuary 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

53. DIRNSA, messages 260045Z, 260855ZJanuary 1968 (SC). CCH, NSA.

NQT RKUh\SA8bI!1 TQ SQ~JTIb\STSRS ~JS'f RElbFh',Si\BbEl 'fS P8Rt!JISff I(A'fI8H'AbS

54. NSA 805, memorandum serial 805/026/68, 29 January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

55. DIRNSA, message 241515ZJanuary 1968 (TS-CCOI. CCH, NSA.

56. SUSLO(L), message 251647ZJanuary 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

57. SUSLO(M), message 250440ZJanuary 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH,NSA.

58. DSD, message 280220Z January 1968 (SC). CCH, NSA.

59. DIRNSA, message 261501Z January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

60~ ~esse:ge280142ZJariuary·1968·(S-CCO).··CCH:NSA..

61. C1NCUNC/COMUS KOREA, message 271225Z January 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

62 DIRNSA, message 291927ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

63. DIRNSA, message 310001ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

64. American embassy, Tokyo, message 27141lZ January 1968 (8). CCH, NSA.

65. SSO CONAD, message 292125Z January 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

66. Department ofthe Army, message 272340Z January 1968 (C). CCH, NSA.

67. American Consul, Hong Kong, message 291002Z January 1968 (C). CCH, NSA.

68. JCS, message 251745ZJanuary 1968 (SC-NF-LIMDISI. CCH,NSA.

69. JCS, message 252235ZJanuary 1968 (SC-NF-LIMDIS). CCH,NSA.

70. CINCPAC, message 260346Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

71. USAFSS, message 262030ZJanuary 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

72. DIRNSA, message 262204Z January 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

73. USAFSS, message 270142ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

195

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Tell S!CREI UMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

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74. USAFSS, message 270458Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

75. D1RNSA. messages 272200Z, and 272201Z, January 1968 (S-CCO). CINCPAC. message 280337Z January

1968 (S-CCo>. D1RNSA, message 281522Z January 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

76. NSA K12, log of watch office operations during period: 1225,23 January - 2230, 31 January 1968 (S-CCO).

CCH.NSA.

77. JCS message 291633ZJanuary 1968 (S·CCO). CCH, NSA.

78. Department of State, message 292949Z January 1968 (TS). American embassy, Seoul, message 292345Z

January 1968 (TS). CCH, NSA.

79. NSA K12. message log ofwatch office operations during period 1225,23 January, 2230, 31 January 1968 (TS).

CCH,NSA.

80. AFSSO PACAF, message 310025Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

81. D1RNSA, message 291548Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

82.1 Im~ssage3{)0500ZJanuary 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

83. Ibid.

84.1 lmessage·291945Z·JafitiatY·1968·(S~CCO).··CCH;NSA:

85. DIRNSA, message 292302ZJanUary1968(~c:~()).CCH,NSA.

86.1 Imessage 300730Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

87. DIRNSA, message 312129Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

88. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY, 8 January 1969 (TSC).

89. JCS, memorandum DJSM·I08-68. "Joint StaffStudy Group," 30 January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

Chapter VII

1. NSA General Counsel memorandum for the Director, "Secretary McNamara's Testimony Before the Senate

Armed Services Committee," 2 February 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

2. DIRNSA message, 021716Z February 1968 (TSC-NF). CCH, NSA.

3. Department ofState, Operations Center message, 022347Z February 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

4. LT Stephen R. Harris, BREECHES BUOY, 5 January 1969 (TSC).

5. Schumacher, BREECHES BUOY, 31 December 1968 (TSC).

6. Murphy, BREECHES BUOY, 2 and 3 January 1968 (TSC).

7. SGT RobertJ. Hammond, USMC, BREECHES BUOY, 24 and 27 December 1968 (TSC). Accession Number

24103, CBOJ17, NSA Archives.

8. D1RNSA message, 010001Z February 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

NOI REL"A5A!5LE T15 e15r{'fltAeT61\:S r"6'f ftfJhfJASABhEl 'fe FeRSISN NA'fIe!'L\bS

(b) (3)-P.L. 86 6

Tep SECRET UMBRA

c~ • _

196
DOCID: 3997429

(hi (11

(blt3)-50 USC 403

(bl (31"'18 USC 798

(b I (3 I - P . 15, 86 - 3 6

Tep SECRET UMBftA

9. USAFSS, Special Historical Study, The ERU Deploymentl ~s a Result ofthe PUEBLO Incident,

23 January-19 February 1968,15 July 1968,55-56 (TSC). (Hereafter cited as USAFSS Special Study.) CCH,

NSA.

10. DIRNSA message, 022341Z February 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

11. DIRNSA mes$age, 042138Z February 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

12. USAFSS Special Study, 55-56 (TSC).

13. DIRNSA message, 072300Z February 1968 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

14. JCS message, 061320Z February 1968 (TS-CCOJ. CCH, NSA.

15. USAFSS Special Study, 60-61 (TSC).

16. SSgt Virgil P. Hansen, U8AFSS, Office ofInformation, A Special Historical Study ofthe ERU Deployment to

I las aResult ofthe P~blo Incident, 23 January-13 February 1968,15 July 1968,62 (TSC-NOFORNJ.

CCH,NSA.

17. NSAPAC OFF Japan messge, 020715Z February 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA. USAFSS Special Study, 67

(TSC).

18. DIRNSA message, 062332Z February 1968 (SC).CCH, NSA.DIRNSA message, 100024Z February 1968 (S·

CCO). CCH, NSA.

19. AFSSO PACAF message, 102317Z February 1968 (S·CCOINFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA. DIRNSA message,

. 121822Z February 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

20. DIRNSA message, 012305Z February 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.I resSage,030005Z

February 1968 (S-CCO). CCH,NSA;

21 [ ~messagce'080127~~ebr~1lI'Y1968{~-cc(».QCH'NSA.", (b I (3 I - P . L .

22.1 essage,020920Z February 1968 (TS-CCOJ.??Ii,NSkDIRNSA message, 082213Z

February 1968 (S:CCO). C H, NSA. DIRNSA message, 020013ZFebruary 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

23. DIRNSA message, 092128ZFebr~arYl~68(TS~CCO).CCH, NSA.

241 ressage, 100750Z February 1968 (TS-CCOJ. CCH, NSA.

25. N8A oral interview OH·7·91, Richard Fine (former Officer in Charge, SIGINT Detachment, USS Palm Beach,

AGER-3), 30 September 1991 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

26. DIRNSA messages, 010002Z, 070109Z, 070111Z February 1968 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

27. CINCLANTFLT message, 022336Z February 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

28. CTF 67 message, 120326Z February 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

29. CINCPAC message, 030601Z February 1968 iTS-NF). CCH, NSA.

30. DIA Special Intelligence Summary. DIASIS 35-68, 4 February 1968,2 (TSC). CCH, NSA. CTG 70.6 message,

040735Z February 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA. CTG041535Z February 1968 (8). CCH, NSA.

31. CINCPAC message, 060447Z February 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

32. CTG 70.0 message, 060838Z February 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

33. DIA Special Intelligence Summaries, 7 and 8 February 1968, 1 (TSC). CCH, NSA.

86-36

N6'f ItELfA:S*Bbf 'fa €af{'fR::1't€'f6RS 1#6'1' RBbEi1,&t;:BbS '1'8 FElRSIS?f ~,,"''I'IEl~TltbS

197 Tep 5!eI\ET tJNlBRA
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-

DOCID: 3997429

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34. USDAO Tokyo message, 020707Z February 1968 (C-NF). CCH, NSA.

37. State Department, Korean Task Force Situation Reports, 1800 hours, 3 February 1968 (Limited Official Use)

and 0600 hours, 4 February 1968. CCH, NSA.

38. American embassy, Seoul, message 030610Z February 1968 (C-LlMDIS). CCH, NSA.

391 ~e$llage, 020855Z February 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

40. National Broadcasting Company, transcript of radio and television program "Meet the Press," 4 February

1968,9-10, and 41 (U).

41. State Department, Korean Task Force SituatiollRepor:t,1800 hours, 5 February 1968 (C). CCH, NSA. State

Department, Korean Task Force Situation Report, 1800 hours,6February 1968 (C). CCH, NSA.

42. U.S. Mission, NATO message, 061719Z February 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

43. National Broadcasting Company, transcript of radio and television program "Meet thePres,s," 4 February

1968,9-10,41.

44~ ~eSSage;081100ZFebr\l.ll.ry·i968·(S~CCO).··CCH:·NSA.

45. 3/0IKCJIR13-68, 072040Z February 1968 (TSC).

46. USOAO Tokyo message, 080noz February 1968 (C-NFILIMDlS).

47. American embassy, Tokyo message, 141000Z February 1968 (C-LlMDlS). CCH, NSA.

(1 )

CIA

49. DlRNSA message, 072139Z February 1968 (TSC-NF). CCH, NSA.

50. DlRNSA message, 082052Z February 1968 (SC). CCH, NSA.

51. DlRNSA message, 090425Z February 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

52. NSA, Deputy Director's memorandum to OIDIR, ORE, serial: 00-68-25-1, 5 February 1968 (TSC-NFLIMDlS). CCH, NSA.

53. SECDEF message, 072308Z February 1968 (S). NSAPAC OFF JAPAN message, 050620Z February 1968 (SCCO). NSAPAC message, 052310Z February 1968 (S-CCO>. DlRNSA message, 060039Z February 1968 (CCCO). CCH, NSA.

57. DlA memorandum for Bromley Smith, White House, "Interim Evaluation of Pueblo Photos," 17 February

1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

58. Murphy and Gentry, Second in Command, 195-196.

59. 3/01KCJfR05-68, 231059Z January 1968.

60. FBIS Oaily Report, 15 February 1968, North Korea (FOUO>. CCH, NSA.

If6T ftJ!:LJ!:l'l:S1lBUl '1'6 e6HTR*eTaftS HaT ftFJhFJ1t9ABhFJ 'fa paftFJlsn PfAft8PfAcS

) (1)

CIA

Tep SEEAET UMBRA 198
DOCID: 3997429

. (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

'f6' SECRET tJMBftA

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

61. NSA SIGINT Command Center memorandum to the Director, USS Pueblo Documents, 15 February 1968

(TSC). CCH, NSA.

62. DmeBS&ge, 162212Z February 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

63. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY,l1 January 1969 (TSC).

64. L:]mesB8ge, 162212Z February 1968 (S-CCO).

65. Bucher, BREECHES BUOY,II January 1969 (TSC).

66. DSD message, 130108Z~ebrU8ryl968(§<:).CCH,NSA.

67.1 ~eBSage, 180220Z February 1968 (S-:<;<;()).GCH,NSA.

68. 2IOQol~68,212205ZFeb~~ry.·i968(Sc).

69. Deputy SECDEF memorandum for SECNAV and DIRNSA, 1 March 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

70. DIRNSA letter,serial N0365, 8 March 1968 as-CCO). CCH, NSA.

71. NSA D312 memorandum for the record,NSA SWINT Trawler(AGER) Study, 8 March 1968.

72. Director, NSA letter to Director, GCHQ. 23 April 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

73. NSA D33 memorandum, serial D33M-0820, subject: "Pueblo Compromise," 25 April 1968 (S-CCO). CCH,

NSA.

74. USIa Executive Secretary meBSage, 012047ZJuly 1968 (TSICCOILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

75. Director GCHQ letter,serial D/629712304l10,10 May 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

76. Director NSA letter to GCHQ, 29 May 1968 (S-CCO).

77. USIB memorandum, USIB-AM-68I2, 13 September 1968 (Ts-CCO). CCH, NSA. The first change ofcodewords

by U.S. and U.K. SIGINT authorities since the end of World War II occurred in March 1946. Thereafter,

codewords were routinely changed every 1-2 years with the exception of 1955-59. Codewords were changed on 1

December 1968 following a number of compromises ofthe codewords then in use, not just as a result ofthe Pueblo

incident. After 1968, the cost of changing codewords became 80 exorbitant because ofthe computerization factor

that all subsequent changes have been put oft'indermitely. (R. Newton, memorandum for the record, subject:

"Conversation with Mr. MeyerJ. Levin, Q4, Regarding Requestfor Information on PastChanges ofCodewords by

NSA," 22 May 1991 (C). CCH, NSA.

78. Director, NSA memorandum to USIa principals,serial N-668. "Assessment ofthe Loss olthe USSPueblo," 13

May 1968 (TSCINFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

79. NSA D33 memorandum serial D33M 1007, "Assessment of the LoBS of the USS Pueblo," 23 May 1968 (TsCCO). CCH, NSA.

80. NSA D12 memorandum to ADN, ADP, "USIB Agenda Item (Eucutive Session), 6 June 1968, NSA Interim

Report on Impact ofLoBS ofthe Pueblo," 23 May 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

81. NSA 012 "Talking Paper," 6 June 1968 (Ts-CCO). CCH, NSA.

82. DIRNSA meBSage, 121448Z September 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

83. NIS, Counterintelligence SITREP, 3 January 1969 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

84. Baldridge,BREECHESBUOY, 28 December 1968 <TSC).

}'6"ft'ELEASAl'Lf:; '1'6 e6H'fltAe'1'6ft8 1.6'1' ft'EUASAl'Lf:; '1'6 "6ft'Eftl=I' lfA:Tf61fA:LS

199 Te, SECRET tlMBItA
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

85. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

200

}JQ:r ilKbEil.SA8bK l'Q QQNl'R/rQ'PQRS NQ'f ftEH:::FJASA8I:::FJ 'f6 !i'6ftl!:f~f4'14'Affm,ALS

91. Ibid., 25-45.

86. Murphy, BREECHES BUOY, 2 and 3 January 1968, Accession No. 24103, CBOJ24, NSA Archives.

Tap SECRET l::JMB~

Chapter VIII

98. NSA memorandum, subject: "USS Pueblo Incident," 4.

96. Ibid., 25.

97. Ibid., 12, 25 and 70.

93. Ibid., 1 and 20.

94. Ibid., 18.

95. NSA Memorandum fro~ Fhi~f, P04 (and senior NSA representative to the BREECHES

BUOY Operation, San Diego) to DIRNSA, serial P04J0750-69, Subject: 'The Pueblo Damage Assessment as

Reported to the Members ofUSIB," 2 (TS-NF). Accession No. 24105, CBOJ38, NSA Archives.

92. NSA memorandum, subject: "USSPueblo Incident," 4.

89. NSA memorandum, subject: "USS Pueblo Incident: Impact and Loss on Group A Targets and Operations,"

January 1969, Supplement I, Part A: "Impact on the U.S. SIGINT Effort Against the USSR," 4, (TSC). CCH,

NSA. Hereafter cited as NSA memorandum, subject: "USSPueblo Incident."

90. NSA, Crypwlogic/Crypwgraphic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, AGER-2. March 1969, Section VI,

Personnel Background and Debrief Summaries, USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January-23 December 1968, 1 (TSCNF-LIMDIS). CCH, NSA. Hereafter cited as NSA, Section VI, Personnel Background and Debrief Summaries.

Accession Number 24105, CBOJ37, NSA Archives.

88. NIS, Counterintelligence SITREP, 3 January 1969 (S-NFILIMDIS).

3. NSA, Director's handwritten note to DI, 10 February 1968 (U). CCH, NSA.

Tap SECRET l::JMBRA

7. NSA, P04 (Richmond Snow) memorandum for the record, "Recent Developments in Pueblo Debrief Plans," 12

July 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

1. DIRNSA message, 262326Z January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

2. CINCPACFLT message, 281947Z January 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA. CINCPAC message, 282305Z January

1968 (S). CCH, NSA. NFOID message, 292113Z January 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA. JCS message, 011752Z

February 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA. HQ NSAPAC message, 060320Z February 1968 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

CND message, 061700Z February 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

4. CDMNAVFDRJAPAN message, 300910Z January 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

5. CINCPACFLT message, 110044Z February 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

6. CND message, 291249ZJune 1968 (S·NF). CCH, NSA.

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TOP !!CR!T tJMBIM

8. NSA, P04 (Pueblo project officer) memorandum for the record, "Report ofTDY to San Diego, California, 23-26

July, 1968," 15 August 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

9. CNO message,191955Z AugWlt 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

10. DIRNSA message, 252211Z October 1968 (S-CCOINFl. CCH, NSA.

11. NSA, P04 (Pueblo project officer) memorandum for the record, "BREECHES BUOY Meeting at Naval

Security Group Command," 25 November 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

12. Department ofState message, 262334Z December 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

13. Ibid.

14. COMUSKOREA message, 220354Z December 1968 (Cl. CCH, NSA.

15. CINCPACFLT message, 222208Z December 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

16. CNO message, 232010Z December 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

17. COMUSKOREA message, 230610Z December 1968 (U). CCH, NSA.

18. COMUSKOREA message, 240335Z December 1968 (C). CCH, NSA.

19. COMUSKOREA message, 240740Z December 1968 (U). CCH, NSA.

20. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 250017Z December 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

21. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 270619Z December 1968 (C). CCH, NSA.

22. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 270231Z December 1968 (C). eCH, NSA.

23. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 270603Z December 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

24. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 280820Z December 1968 (TS-CCOI NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

25. NSA REP San Diego draft message to director, NSA, 29 December 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

26. NSA, senior NSA representative to BREECHES BUOY operation memorandum to CINCPACFLT REP San

Diego, subject: "Communication with Parent Agency," 30 December 1968 (S). CCH, NSA.

27. NSA, Director's staffmeeting notes, 3 January 1969 (TSl. CCH, NSA.

28. DIRNSA message, 032315Z 1969 (C-CCOl. CCH, NSA.

29. NSA senior NSA representative to BREECHES BUOY operation message, 050257Z January 1969 (cite

Charge-0048l (TS-CCOINFILIMDISIPRIVACY CRYPTO). CCH, NSA. Good will was also enhanced among the

NSA and Navy representatives in San Diego when the NSA delegation hosted a New Year's Eve gathering at one

ofthe local hotels. (Personal communication from I tNSAB7,toa,uthor, 14 April 1992 4 (TS[C]). CCH,

NSA.

30. NSA P04 memorandum, "Pueblo DebriefReport #3," 3 January 1969 (TSC).

31. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego letter, serial :00/0011, 13 January 1969, End #1 (S-NF). CCH, NSA

32. NSA senior representative to BREECHES BUOY operation message, 050257Z January 1969 (TSCCOINFILIMDISIPRIVACY/CRYPTO).

33. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 040013ZJanuary 1969 (C). CCH, NSA.

~fQt RI!JbI!JA8ABbI!J tQ SQ~ftRAStQR8 ~fQt Rl!Jbl!J.\8I.Bbl!J tQ FQRI!JU;m ~fAtIQ~f"'b8

201 fap SECREf UMBR-A
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34. BREECHES BUOY operation, debrief analysis coordinator memorandum of information, "Debrief

Termination Board," 4 January 1969 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

35. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 040544ZJanuary 1969 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

36. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 040605Z January 1969 (C). CCH, NSA.

37. BREECHES BUOY operation, memorandum for the record, "First Meeting ofthe BREECHES BUOY Debrief

Termination Board," 6 January 1969 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

38. NSA senior representative to BREECHES BUOY operation, memorandum to cryptologidcryptographic

analysts, 6 January 1969 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

39. BREECHES BUOY operation, report for the senior NSA representative, "Initial Findings of the AD HOC

NSA-NSG Analytic Review Group on DebriefReleasability," 7 January 1969 (S-CCOINF). CCH, NSA.

40. BREECHES BUOY operation memorandum for the record, "Second Meeting of the BREECHES BUOY

DebriefTermination Board," 7 January 1969 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

41. BREECHES BUOY operation memorandum for the record, "Second Meeting of the BREECHES BUOY

DebriefTermination Board," 8 January 1969 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

42. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 090317Z January 1969 (S-NFILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

43. CNO message, 111740ZJanuary 1969 (S). CCH, NSA.

44. CINCPACFLT REP San Diego message, 140535ZJanuary 1969 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

45. CNO message, 162204ZJanuary 1969 (S). CCH, NSA.

46. NSA team chief, Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment (SPIDA) memorandum to DIRNSA,

"Weekly Status Report # 1," 29 January 1969 (TS-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

47. NSA team chief, Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment (SPIDA) INFOCOM #7, "Procedures for

Assessments ofGOPI Messages," 10 February 1969 (S-CCO>. CCH, NSA.

48. NSA team chief, Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment (SPIDA) memorandum to DIRNSA,

"Weekly Status Report #1," 29 January 1969 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

49. NSA team chief, Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment (SPIDA) memorandum to DIRNSA,

"Weekly Status Report #3," 24 February 1969 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

50. NSA team chief, Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment (SPIDA) memorandum to DIRNSA, "Final

Damage Assessment Report," 5 March 1969 (S). CCH, NSA.

51. This assessment appears as item #3 under Investigative Reviews of Pueblo Incident in the bibliography

appearing at the end ofthis study.

52. NSA team chief, Special Intelligence Damage Assessment (SPIDA) memorandum to DIRNSA, "Weekly

Status Report #3," 24 February 1969.

U8'f RBhl!h\S*BbS 'f8 S81"'fR:l.S'f8ns n8'f RSbSAS1.BbS 'f8 F8RSI81'1I'M'fI8I'MbS

Tap SECRET tJMBItA 202
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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Tep 5EERET I::JMBRA

Chapter IX

1. Armbrister, A Matter ofAccountability, 349-50.

2. NSA, General Counsel Memorandum for the Record, 16 January 1969 (V). CCH, NSA.

3. CINCPACFLT REP 8DIEGO message, 170030ZJanuary 1969 (C). CCH, NSA.

4. NSA, ADC Memorandum for the Record, "DDR&E Inquiry Re Pueblo COMSEC," 5 February 1969 (8). CCH,

NSA.

5. NSA, Director's Memorandum to DDR&E, serial No. 119, "National Security Agency (NSA) Actions as a Result

ofthe Capture ofthe USS Pueblo," 7 February 1969 (S-CCOJ. CCH, NSA.

6. DIRNSA message, 311543Z January 1968 (S-CCOJ. CCH, NSA.

7. USIB Executive Secretary memorandum for holders of USIB-S-13.5/58, "Conduct of COMINT Activities in

Exposed Areas," 7 October 1969 (TS-CCOILIMDIS). CCH, NSA.

8. NSA, informal paper prepared by S concerning NSA's role in destruction methods, 6 January 1969, 1 (S-NF).

CCH,NSA.

9. CNO message, 211920Z February 1968 (8). CCH, NSAr

10. NSA, K17 synopsis ofJCS working committee reportdealing with prevention of compromise on intelligence

collection ships, 8 May 1969, 12-14 (S-NF). CCH, NSA. r

11. Ibid., 11.

12. Personal communication froml INSA.X42CI, to author, 14 April 1992. CCH, NSA.

13. Deputy SECDEF memorandum, "Prevention ofCompromise to Intelligence Collection Ships," 14 March 1969

(S-NF). CCH, NSA.

14. Ibid.

15.NSA, K17 synopsis ofJCS working committee report dealing with prevention of compromise on intelligence

collection ships, 8 May 1969,4.

16. Price Report, Section 7, Tab A.

17. Assistant SECDEF (Intelligence) memorandum for NSA (Mr. Menlo Autry) [stafT at office of NSA

Representative, Pentagon] "Pueblo Incident," 21 January 1972 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

18. Ibid

19.JCS Memorandum,JCSM 700·68,24 October 1968 (S-CCO). CCH. NSA.

20. Price Report, Section 7, Tab A.

21. DIRNAVSECGRUPAC letter ofinstruction 1-68,2 January 1968 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

22. JCS Memorandum,JCSM·506-67, 13 November 1967 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

rf6T ft:@;UJA:SA:BL:@; T6 e6rfTftA:eT6KS N6T ft:@;L:@;A:S*BL:@; T6 f6ft:@;f6rflfA:Tf6lfA:LS

203 T9P SECRET tlM81tA
DOCID: 3997429

Tap SECRET l:IMBRA

'(b) (1)

{b)(3)-SO USC 403

(.b) (3)-18 USC 798

(hi (3)-P.L. 86-36

23. NSA, minutes ofDirector'sstaffmeeting, 7 February 1969 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA. It isimportant to remember

that at that time there were no regularly constituted congressional committees for oversight of the intelligence

community.

24. NSA, Director's letter to Deputy SECDEF, 13 February 1969 (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

25. NSA, K17 synopsis ofJCS working committee report dealing with compromise on intelligence colection ships,

8 May 1969,4.

26. Congressman L. Mendell Rivers press release, 19 February 1969 (U).

27. NSA,GeneralCounsel Memorandum for the Record, 11 March 1969 (S). CCH, NSA.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Marshall S. Carter, Director, NSA, Memorandum to Secretary ofDefense Melvin R. Laird, 18 March.l968 (S).

CCH,NSA.

32. Department ofthe Navy, Office ofthe Chiefof Naval Operations memorandum OP92CZJcoj, Ser 0061P92 of 4

September 1968 (S-NF). CCH, NSA.

33. NSA, CryptologidCryptographic Damage Assessment, USSPueblo, March 1969, 17 (TS-NF-LIMDIS). NSA

Archives. Personal communication fro~ INSAX42C1,toauthOt,14APdlT992 (b) (3) - P. L. 86 6

(SECRETINOFORNINO CONTRACT). CCH, NSA.

34. Ibid., Supplement I, Part A, Soviet, 186 (TSC-NF-LIMDIS).

\

36. Ibid., 185.

37. Ibid., 179.

38. Ibid., 167.

39. Ibid., 136-137.

40. Ibid., Supplement I, Part I, Communist China, North Vietnam~ ~5 (TSCNF- LIMDIS). '-------------

41. Ibid., 8.

42. Ibid., Supplement I, Part C Korea (All), 2 (TSC-NF-LIMDIS).

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43. NSA Special Supplement, Cryptologic Damage Assessment of Compartmented and Restricted SIGINT

Activities, USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January-23 December 1968, 3 (TSC-Limited Distribution-NF). Accession

Number 24105, CBOJ37, NSA Archives. Hereafter cited as NSA Special Supplement.

44. Ibid., Annex A, 8.

45. The classification of this compartmented area involving signals I I lorll1(}re was downgraded to SECRET CODEWORD in 1971,-(.-------------......

46. NSA Special Supplement,9;

47. Ibid., 9·10.

48. Ibid., 28. NSA A538 Techni:al Report,I:::-:"",:":,:::,,,,:,,__IAl'zalYS'i8'~lJ~cember1970, 1-2, (TSC~ Limited Distribution, US-UK-Eyes Only). CCH, NSA. .....--....

49. NSA Special Supplement, Annex C, 22.

50. Ibid., 35.

51. Ibid., 23.

52. Ibid., 26-28.

53. Ibid., 26.

54. Ibid., 29.

55. NSA Special Supplement, Annex E, 34-35.

56. Discussion with ChiefWarrant Office~..... ....fSNi.NSAB64;20·Decelriber·1.989.•

57.3/00/25827-74,14 August 1974.

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

:;/ (b) (3) - P . L . 86 - 3 6

(b) (1)

OGA

59. NSA, Charles Weigand, S5, ~Chronological Notes/on/the Walker/Whitworth Net," (UID 05/05/89,

SECRETINOFORNINO CONTRACTIWNINTEUCr,.OCHElSensitiveSoutce Information. S5 records, NSA.

Personal communication froml INSK X42CI, to author,14 April 1992

(SECRETINOFORNINO CONTRACT).CCH, NSA.

60. NSA,I j;s,"Chronological Notes ontheWalkerlWhitworth Net."

61.1bid.

1'---__-===-----.,----------

63. Discussion wittliChief, A27, NSA, 2 November 1989.

64. DiscussionWit~NSA A509, 10 October 1989.

65. NSA A57 COMINT Technical Report 1-72,1 October 1972, 1 (TSC). CCH NSA.

66. NSA, Cryptologic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, Supplement 1, Part C, Korea, All, 2 (TSCILIMDISINF.

Accession Nr. 24105, CBOJ 37. NSA Archives.

67. Ibid.,2.

68. Ibid., 9.

CIA

205 'fa, SECRET tJMBItA
74. Ibid., 4.

73. Murphy with Curt Gentry, Second inCommand, 113-114.

69. Ibid., 2-3.

70. NSA unpublished study,1 ~n the KORCOM Problem Since 1964with Treatises on North

Korean Post-Pueblo COMSEC Measures," 13 (TSC-Limited Distribution, NOFORN). CC~SA.

71. NSA, Cryptologic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, 2-3 (TSC-Limited Distribution-NOFbRN).

72. Ibid., 3. \

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

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75. NSA, Special Supplement, 2.

76. NSA, CryptologiclCryptographic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, 11-12.

77. Ibid., 10-12.

78. NSA, Director's handwritten notation on [NSAj Public Information Officer memorandum, subject: "NBC-TV

Documentary on the USS Pueblo," 14 April 1969 (U). CCH, NSA.

79. Bucher with Mark Rascovich, Bucher: My Story, 381.

80. Murphy with Curt Gentry, Second in Command, 399-400.

81. Ibid., 401.

82. SECNAV message, 061454Z May 1969 (U). CCH, NSA.

83. Congressional Report, 1619-20.

84. Chief, Audio-Visual Division, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) memorandum for the Public

Affairs Office, NSA, subject: "Review of NBC White Paper Report on Pueblo," 14 August 1969 (U). CCH, NSA.

85. NSA, Public Information Officer Memorandum for the Record, 21 August 1969 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

86. USIB, Memorandum USIB-S-13-.5/56, 3 June 1969 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

87. USIB, Memorandum USIB-S-13.5/58, 8 September 1969 (TS-CCO). CCH, NSA.

Chapter X

1. William D. Gerhard, and Henry W. Millington, NSAlCSS, Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty,

1981,63 (TSC-NOFORN). George F. Howe, NSA, ,Technical Research Ships, 1956-1959, May 1970, 107-108

(TSC-NOFORN). CCH, NSA.

2. Oral interview, OH-09-90 12 July 1990, Anthony W. White, former officer in charge, SIGINT Detachment,

USS Banner, 1967 (TSC- VRKI9INF). CCH, NSA.

3. Jasper Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets, U.s. Naval Operations in the Pacific During World War 11 (Annapolis,

Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 22-23.

4. Bucher and Rascovich, Bucher: My Story, 394. Murphy and Gentry,Second inCommand, 436.

ua'f MJ:iJ:!lJtS*BbJ:!l 'fa eaU'fRlte'f8RS ua'f RBCBhS*BJ:iJ:!l 'fa F8RBIElN Ult'fI8"PM:bB

206
DOCID: 3997429

5. Ibid., 217.

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

fap SECRH UMBR-A

6. Bucher and Raacovich, Bucher: My Seery, 180-182. Schumacher and Wilaon, Bridge ofNo Return, 91-92.

7. 2/0c::::Jlt100.68 and 2/oe=JR40-68. DIA Intelligence Summary 24-68, 29 January 1968. (TSCNF/Controlled Dissemination). CCH, NSA.

8. NSA, "Interim Assessment of Damage Resulting from Capture ofUSS Pueblo," April 1968, 12 (TSC-NF). CCH,

NSA.

11. Commander, Naval Forces,Japan, message to CNO, 160753ZJanuary 1968 (SC). Oral Interview,OH 09-90,

12 July 1990, Anthony W. White, former officer in charge, SIGINT Detachment, USS Banner, 1967 (TSCVRK19)/NOFORN). CCH, NSA.

12. George F. Howe, NSA, Technical Research Ships, 1956-1969, 1974,51 (TSC-NF). CCH, NSA.

13. Oral interview, OH 09-90, 12 July 1990, Anthony W. White (TSC-VRK19/NOFORN).

14. George F. Howe, NSA, Technical Research Ships, 1956-1969,1974, 51.

15. Ibid., 52.

P18'f R8b8AS/rBb8 'f8 S8Pl'fR:lrS'f8RS Pl8'f Ri'lb8/rS/rBb8 'f0 F8R8ISPl NA'f'IONAbS

(b) (1)

OGA

CIA

207 'fap SECRET UMBRA
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Bibliography

SIGINT electrical product listed in the following bibliography is available from the

National Security Agency SIGINT On-Line Information System (SOLIS). All other SIGINT

and classified source documents are held in either the NSA Center for Cryptologic History

or the NSA Archives.

Primary Sources

SlGINTProduct

2/0C:::J:Wl-68, 212205Z February 1968,

2/0/KCJ/ROI-68, 230935ZJan:uary 1968.

2/0 Rll-68, 24()846ZJanuary 1968.

2/0 R19c68, 242136ZJanuary 1968.

2/0 20-68, 251938Z January 1968.

2/0 R21-68, 261835ZJanuilty 1968.

3/0/KCA-EIR01-66, Change4, 10 May 1968.

3/0/KCJIR05-68, 231059ZJanuary 1968. (ISHTAR)

3/0/KCJIR06-68, 2413012 January 1968.

3/0/KCJ/RI3"68, 072040ZJanuary 1968. (ISHTAR)

3/o.C::=lE/ROI-66, 15 August 1966. (ISHTAR)

3/0ITEUR28-66, 28 July 1966. (ISHTAR)

3/0ITEUR26-67, 1 May 1967.

SIGINT Technical ~eports

'(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

jb)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(\b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

A57 CO MINT Technical Report 1-72,1 October 1972. (TSC) (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

209 TOP SECRET tJMBRA
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Cryptologic Histories

(b) (1)

jib) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

SSgt. Virgil P. Hansen, Office of Information, USAFSS, A Special Historical Study of the

ERU Deployment I las a Result of the Pueblo Incident, 23 January-13

February 1968.15 July 1968. (TSC-NOFORN)

NSNCSS, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series Crisis; Collection,Vol. I,

Attack on aSIGINTCollector, the USS Liberty. (TSC-NOFORN)

NSNCSS, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series Number 2, Technical

Research Ships, 1956-1969, 1974. (TSC-NOFORN)

Investigative Reviews

Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Transcripts of the

Cryptologic/Cryptographic Intelligence Debrief of the Pueblo Crew. This operation was

nicknamed "Breeches Buoy." 26 December-1f January 1969. (TSC)

Joint AD HOC Team (CIA, DIA, NIC, AFNIN, and ACSI) "Damage Assessment of

Compromise of Operational Intelligence Broadcast Messages on Board USS Pueblo

(AGER-2)," 17 March 1969. (TSC)

NSA, Cryptologic/Cryptographic Damage Assessment, USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January23 December 1968, March 1969. (TSC-NOFORN)

Sections I, II, and III, in a single binding; sometimes referred to as the

"executive summary."

Section IV, "Cryptologic Damage Assessment," two volumes, plus Supplement

I in four separately bound parts: Part A, Soviet; Part B, Communist China, rorth Vietnamj :-J.C' Korea (All); and

Section V, "Cryptographic Damage Assessment," includes seven supplements.

Section VI, "Personnel Background and Debrief Summaries, Special

Supplement, "Compartmented Problems and Restricted SIGINT Operations

Damage Assessment."

Special Supplement, "Cryptologic Damage Assessment of Compartmented

and Restricted SIGINT Activities, USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January-23

December 1968." (TSC-Limited Distribution-NF)

1'OP SE(IU!' UMBKA 210
DOCID: 3997429

"fep SECRET t:JM81tA

NSA, DIRNSA's Question and Answer file regarding Pueblo (ADC, ADN, and ADP

responses.) February 1969. (TSC)

NSA, "The Voyage and Capture of the VSS Pueblo, 10-23 January 1968: A SIGINT

Review," ca. MarchiApril1968. (TSC)

NSA Task Team (Benjamin J. Price, Chair), Report to the Director, NSA, The VSS Pueblo,

AGER-2, 23 January-12 February 1968. (TSC-Limited Distribution-NOFORN)

NSA, Pueblo Incident, Question and Answer Briefing Book, ca. 29 January 1968. (V)

NSA [BIll study, "Cryptologic Trends on the KORCOM Problem Since 1964 with Treatises

on North Korean Post-Pueblo COMSEC Measures." (TSC-Limited Distribution-NOFORN)

V.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on the VSS

Pueblo, "Hearings on the Inquiry into the VSS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents,"

(March 4, 5,6, 10, 14, 17, 19,20, April 25 and 28,1969), 91st Congress, 1st session, 1969.

Committee Print 91-10. (V)

"(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Oral Interviews

NSA interview OH-07-91, Richard Fine, former officer in charge, SIGINT detachment, VSS

Palm Beach (AGER-3), 30 September 1991. (S-CCO). CCH, NSA.

NSA interview 26-82,16 December 1982, Eugene Sheck, ,formerly Rl, NSA, (TSC)

NSA interview OH-09-90, 12 July 1990, AnthonyW. White, former officer in charge,

SIGINTdetachment, VSSBanner, AGER-l, 196.7. (TSC-NF)

NSA interview OH 14-89,I Iformer NSA analyst, North Korean analytic

division, 28 November 1989 (TSC-NOFORN).

NSA interview OH 13-92, I"-- INSA, 13 May 1992 (TSC-NOFORN-LIMDIS).

Messages

The Pueblo crisis generated literally hundreds of electrical messages. A complete file of

messages from the Pueblo, including operator circuit chatter, is contained In

"Chronological Events Relating to Position ofPueblo at Time ofSeizure," CCH, NSA.

N6'f RJ3I'::J3ASABI'::B 'f6 06N''fR:A:O'f6RS NS'f RElI'::BltSABI'::B 'fS FSRBlGn N!r'FIS~L'thS

211 TQP SECRET t:JM8RA
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TOil seCRET liMBRA

Bulletins, Letters, Memoranda, and Reports

Defense Intelligence Agency:

Special Intelligence Summary (SIS) 26-68, 26 January 19B8;(TSC-NF)

Special Intelligence Summary 29-68, 29 January 1968. (TSC-NF)

Special Intelligence Summary 32-68, 1 February 1968. (TSC-NF)

Special Intelligence Summary 35-68, 4 February 1968. (TSC)

Special Intelligence Summary 38-68, 7 February 1968. (TSC)

(b(l)

OG

CIA

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

-iOP SECRET tJMBRA 212
DOCID: 3997429

TOP SECRET UIVIBFtA

Special Intelligence Summary 39-68,8 February 1968. (TSC)

Memorandum for Bromley Smith, White House staff, "Interim Evaluation of

Pueblo Photos," 17 February 1968. (S)

Department of Defense:

Commander's Digest, Vol. 4, No.9, 31 January 1968. (V)

Deputy secretary memorandum for SECNAV and DIRNSA, 1 March 1968. (S)

Deputy secretary memorandum for military departments and JCS, "Policy for

Processing ofV.S.Prisoners ofWar and Other Detained Military Personnel," 8

June 1968. (V)

Deputy secretary memorandum, "Prevention of Compromise to Intelligence

Collection Ships (S)," 14 March 1969. (S-NF)

Assistant secretary (Public Affairs), chief, Audio-Visual Division

memorandum for Public Affairs officer, NSA, "Review of NBC White Paper

Report on Pueblo," 14 August 1969. (V)

Assistant secretary (Intelligence) memorandum for NSA (Mr. Autry), "Pueblo

Incident," 21 January 1972. (S-NF)

Department ofthe Navy:

Secretary memorandum for SECDEF, "Small Tactical Surveillance and

Intelligence Collection Ships, Requirements for," serial 00224, 7 October

1965.(S)

Chief of Naval Operations (OP-30G) memorandum to deputy SECDEF, serial

0001726M-65, 12 November 1965, enclosure #2. (TS)

Chief of Naval Operations letter to CINCPACFLT, serial 00974PG1,

"Planning for the Return ofVSS Pueblo Personnel," 17 July 1968. (S-NF)

Chief of Naval Operations letter to NAVINTCOM, serial NIC-35, 00640P092,

"Terms of Reference for Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment

(SPIDA) Team," 4 February 1969.(S)

Chief of Naval Operations memorandum for chairman, VSIB, serial SSO-3-

00067-69,4 April 1969. (TSC)

Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications) letter to NSA,

"Planning for Debrief of VSS Pueblo (AGER-2) Returnees," serial 004008P94.

18 April 1968. (S-NF)

Pla'f' REH::I3A:S*BI::13 'fa eaIoq'fRAe'fC'ft;S NC'T ~!:L!:A~AeL!: TO F"REIGN NA 1IONALS

213 TQP SECRET tJMBRA
DOCID:- 3997429

lQP SECRET tJMBRA

CINCPACFLT representative, San Diego, letter serial 00100111, 13 January

1969. (S-NF)

Program of Commissioning Ceremonies for United States Ships Pueblo and

Palm Beach, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington, 13 May

1967. (U)

Department of State:

Korean Task Force Situation Reports: 1800,3 February 1968 (Limited Official

Use); 0600, 3 February 1968 (C-LIMDIS); 1800,6 February 1968 (C); 1800, 23

February 1968 (C); 1200, 19 March 1968. (C)

Ambassador to the United Nations (Arthur J. Goldberg) letter to UN Security

Council, serial S/8317, 2 November 1967. (U)

United Nations Security Council document SlPV, 1388, 26 January 1968. (U)

Foreign Broadcast Information Service:

Daily Report, North Korea, 15 Februry 1968. (FOUO)

Joint Chiefs ofStaff:

Memorandum JCSM-506-67, 13 November 1967. (S-CCO)

Memorandum DJSM-106-68, "Joint Staff Study Group," 30 January 1968. (S)

Memorandum JCSM 700-68,24 October 1968. (S-CCO)

National Military Command Center:

Memorandum for the record, 1730 EST, 23 January 1968. (TS-LIMDIS)

Naval Security Group:

Headquarters, NSG staff study, "Optimum Organization for Personnel

Performing SIGINT Tasks on Integrated Intelligence Collection Ships," 27 July

1968. (S-CCO) Naval Security Group, Pacific, Letter of Instruction 1-68, 2

January 1968. (S-CCO)

NSA:

Memorandum from director to DDR&E, serial N1337, "SIGINT Trawlers," 2

November 1965. (TS-CCO)

Pie~ RB~BAS/tB~B 'fe eeN'fiM:6'feH:S NeT IU!]L8ASABL8 '1'6 F6ft816I, I,)['f16H'ALS

TO' SECRET t:lMBRA 214
Tap SECRET tJMBFtA

Handwritten note from director to Dl, 10 February 1968. (U)

Memorandum from director "Unauthorized Discussion of Classifed

Information," 14 February 1968. (C)

Memorandum from director to ADC, ADN, ADP, "Report ofNSA Study ofUSS

Pueblo Incident," 23 February 1968. (TS-NF-LIMDIS)

Letter from director to director, GCHQ, 23 April 1968. (S-CCO)

Memorandum from director to USIB principals, serial N0668, "Assessment of

the Loss ofthe USS Pueblo (C)," 13 May 1968. (TSC-NF-LIMDIS)

Director's letter to GCHQ, 29 May 1968. (S-CCO)

Director's staff meeting notes, 3 January 1969. (TS)

Director's memorandum for the record, 3 June 1969. (S-SensitivelPrivacy)

Director's memorandum to DDR&E, serial N0119, "National Security Agency

(NSA) Actions as a Result of the Capture of the USS Pueblo (C)," 7 February

1969 (S-CCO)

Director's memorandum to ADPM, "Pueblo Damage Assessment Team," 10

February 1969. (S-CCO)

Director's letter to deputy secretary of Defense, 13 February 1969. (S-CCO)

Director's letter to secretary of Defense, 18 March 1969. (S)

Director's handwritten notation on [NSAj public information officer

memorandum, "NBC-TV Documentary on the USS Pueblo" 14 April 1969. (U)

Director's memorandum to USIB principals, serial N0282, "NSA Damage

Assessment Report Concerning the Loss of the USS Pueblo (C)," 26 May 1969.

(TSC-NF-Special LIMDIS)

Deputy director's memorandum to deputy director, Defense Research and

Engineering, serial DD-68-25-1, 5 February 1968. (TSC-NF-LIMDIS)

Deputy director's memorandum to assistant secretary of Defense (Atomic

Energy), serial N0473, "Intelligence Assessment on USS Pueblo (U)," 19 May

1969. (TS-CCO-NF-CRYPTO)

Staff paper, "An Assessment of the SIGINT Capability to Detect a Military

Attack on the ROK," 1968. (SC)

Personal communication froml INSi\B7, to D93, 14 April 1992.

(TSC-NOFORN)

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

NVI RELEASABLE 10 CON lRACIO~ NOT !tELE1\~1\8L~ TO "Olt~IClf~ fOtTIOf~1\LS

215 fa.. seeRef tJMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Personal communication fro~'-- -.Jr NSA X42CI, to D93, circa 14

April 1992, (TSC).

List of Major Events at Director's Level for P~riod 1035, 23 January-1130, 27

January 1968. (TSC)

Notes exchanged between Dll, ADPM, and M3, 19 and 23 September 1968.

(C)

Minutes of director's staff meeting, 7 February 1969. (TS-CCO) Staff paper,

"The Mission ofthe USS Banner in Far East Operations," ca. 1967. (TSC)

Staff paper, "Representative North Korean Statements on Sea Incursions,"

(compiled from Military Armistice Commission reports), 1968. (U)

Staff paper, "Shipboard SIGINT Collection Study, SIGINT Trawler AGER (S),"

12 February 1968. (TS-CCO)

Task Team memorandum to the director, NSA, "USS Pueblo," 12 February

1968. (TS-CCO-NF-LIMDIS)

ADC memorandum for the record, "DDR&E Inquiry Regarding Pueblo

COMSEC," 5 February 1969. (S)

Informal paper prepared by S concerning NSA's role in destruction methods, 6

January 1969. (S-NF)

ADN letter, serial N0365, "NSA SIGINT Trawler Study," 8 March 1968. (SCCO)

ADN handwritten note to deputy director, NSA, 31 January 1969. (S-CCO)

ADP memorandum for the record, "USS Mueller," 31 Janaury 1968. (S-CCO)

Development ofTRS Program, 1968, background papers. (S)

EAD (LCDR Edward Koczak) memorandum for the record, "Pueblo Briefing to

Secretary of Defense," 19 February 1969. (S-CCO-Sensitive)

EAD I'-- fmemorandum for the record, 27 February 1969. (C)

EAD memorandum for the record, 3 April 1969. (Admin.-Sensitive)

GC memorandum for the director, NSA, "Secretary McNamara's Testimony

before the Senate Armed Services Committee," 2 February 1968. (S)

GC memorandum for the record, 16 January 1969. (C)

ue'f Rf!]LEJ*8'JItBLEJ 'fe eeU'fRItO'fORS no'F R8b8ASABb8 'FO F0R8IQ~1 ~1"'TIO~IAbl3

Tell SE€RHtJMBRA 216
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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

GC memorandum for the record, 11 March 1969. (SC)

GC memorandum to Frank M. Slatinshak, Counsel to Special Subcommittee

ofHouse Armed Services Committee on the USS Pueblo, 21 March 1969. (S)

Informal listing, "Cruises by Technical Research Ships," ca. 1969 [Sl

S5 t 1.;~Chronological Notes on the WalkerlWhitworth Net"

(UID 05/89, SINFlNo ContractIWNINTELISensitive Source Information.

SIGINT Command Center, "Chronology of Actions Taken in Response to USS

Pueblo Incident," 2345, 22 January - 0605, 23 January 1968. (TSC-NF)

SIGINT Command Center, logs for period 0730, 23 January - 0800, 24 January

1968. (TSC)

SIGINT Command Center memorandum, "USS Pueblo Documents," 15

February 1968. (TSC)

Team chief, Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment (SPIDA)

INFOCOM #7, "Procedures for Assessment of GOPI Messages," 10 February

1969. (S-CCO)

Team Chief, SPIDA memorandum to director, NSA, "Weekly Status Report

#2," 3 February 1969. (TS-CCO)

Team Chief, SPIDA memorandum to director, NSA, "Weekly Status Report

#3," 24 February 1969. (S-CCO)

Team Chief, SPIDA memorandum to director, NSA, "Final Damage

Assessment Report," 5 March 1969. (S-CCO)

Member, Intelligence Damage Assessment Group (IDAG) memorandum to

deputy director, NSA, "Status Report on Activities of the USIB AD HOC

Pueblo Damage Assessment Group," 30 April 1969. (TS-CCO)

Senior NSA representative to Breeches Buoy Operation, memorandum to

CINCPACFLT representative, San Diego, "Communications with Parent

Agency," 30 December 1968. (S)

Senior NSA representative to Breeches Buoy Operation, memorandum to

Cryptologic/Cryptographic Analysts, 6 Janaury 1969. (S-CCO)

Head, NSA Pueblo Damage Assessment Team memorandum to director, NSA,

24June 1969. (U)

NO¥ REiLEiAS/tBbE ¥o GOf',¥IMG'fQmJ PIQ'f R~UAIijA~U TQ ¥'QR~IQW PtT A TIQP.T A I,,1ij

217 TOP Seeft!T UMBRA
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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Tep SECRET l:JMBRA

Dl I lri~te for director, NSA, "NSA Pueblo Damage Assessment

Team," 31 Janaury 1969. (U)

P04 (Richmond D. Snow) letter to deputy chief, NSAPAC, 18 March 1968.

P04 (Richmond D. Snow) memorandum for the record, "Recent Development

in Pueblo Debrief Plans," 12 July 1968. (S-CCO)

P04 (Pueblo Project Officer) memorandum for the record, "Report of TDY to

San Diego, California, 23-26 July 1968," 15 August 1968. (S-NF)

P04 (Pueblo Project Officer) memorandum for the record, "Report of TDY to

San Diego, California, 11-13 September 1968," 23 September 1968. (S-NF)

P04 (Pueblo Project Officer) memorandum for the record, "Breeches Buoy

Meeting at Naval Security Group Command," 25 November 1968. (S-CCO)

P04 memorandum, "Pueblo DebriefReport #3," 3 January 1969. (TSC)

P2 (White House liaison officer) note to director, NSA, 18 December 1968. (TS)

Public information officer memorandum, "Information Re Goulding Press

release, 24 January 1968 Repudiating CDR Bucher's Confession." (S)

Public information officer memorandum for the record, 8 April 1969. (Admin.

Sensitive)

Public information officer memorandum for the record, 21 August 1969. (U)

"Chronology of Actions Taken by NSA Public Information Officer between

0830-1700,23 January 1968." (SC)

B05 memorandum, serial B05/026168, 29 January 1968. (S-CCO) Bl

memorandum, "Queries Received from DIA Concerning Pueblo Incident," 23

Janaury 1968. (SC)

B11 memorandum, serial 811-328/68, "USS Pueblo/Mission of USASAFS I I(~)," 7 October 1968. (S-CCO)

D12 memorandum to ADN, ADP, "USIB Agenda Item (Executive Session), 6

June 1968, NSA Interim Report on the Impact of Loss of the Pueblo," 23 May

1968. (TS-CCO)

D312 memorandum for the recordj~'NSA SIGINT Trawler (AGER) Study," 8

March 1968. (S-CCO)

D33 memorandum to F6, F7, and F8, serial D33M0258, "Publications Aboard

the USS Pueblo," 13 February 1968. (TS-CCO)

~fe'f RSMJAS...BJ"S 'fe 6eN'ffl:AO'f'QRB UQ'f' RElLEh\S*BLEl 'f6 P6MI6N NA'f16I,ALS

'fell !!CR!'f UMBRA 218 (b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

I

l _
DOCID: 3997429

"fe, 5ECRE"f UM!1b\

D33 memorandum, serial D33M0820, "Pueblo Compromise," 25 April 1968.(SCCO)

D33 memorandum, serial D33MI007, "Assessment of the Loss of the USS

Pueblo (C)," 23 May 1968. (TS-CCO)

K12 log of watch office actions during period: 1225, 23 January - 2230, 31

January 1968. (S-CCO)

K17 synopsis of JCS working committee report dealing with prevention of

compromise on intelligence collection ships, 8 May 1969. (S-NF)

I IK18,"AReviewoftheJ'echnicaJResearch Ship Program, 1961-

1969," 1 May 1970. (TSC) Ib) (3) -P.L. 86-36

K3 memorandum, "DIRNSA (K3) Participation in the SlGINT Equipment

Facilities and System Design for the USS Pueblo (AGER-2)," (S-CCO)

M3 memorandum, "Sustained Superior Work Performance Awards," 17

February 1969. (U)

M5 memorandum, "Unauthorized Discussion of Classified Defense

Information," 9 February 1968. (C)

M5 memorandum, "USSPueblo," 27 September 1968. (S-NF)

R44 memorandum, "Pueblo Tapes," 1200,27 January 1968. (TS-LIMDIS)

United States Intelligence Board:

Memorandum, USIB-AM-68/2, 13 September 1968. (TS-CCO)

Memorandum, USIB-S-13.5/56, 13June 1969. (TS-CCO)

Memorandum, USIB-S-13.5/58, 8 September 1969. (TS-CCO)

Executive secretary, memorandum for holders ofUSIB-S-13.5/58, "Conduct of

COMINT Activities in Exposed Areas." 7 October 1969. (TS-CCO-LIMDIS)

White House:

Press secretary (George Christian), "Notes of Meeting at the State Department on the

Pueblo," 24 January 1968. (U) (Declassified on 23 October 1981.)

Notes of an 11:00 A.M. meeting, 26 January 1968. (U) (Declassified on 23 October 1981.)

N6'1' RtJLtJA:StiBLtJ '1'6 C6N'I'ft*C'I'61tS 14'6'1' RtJLtJA:S)[~LI!: 'f6 P'6:ItEI~H'I()[TIOI\f)[LS

219 1=9P SECRET UMBRA
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Secondary Sources

Books

Armbrister, Trevor. A Matter ofAccountability: The True Story ofthe Pueblo Affai:-. New

York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970.

Bucher, Lloyd M., with Mark Rascovich. Bucher: My Story. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday

and Co., 1970.

Holmes, Jasper. Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Operations in the Pacific During World

War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974.

Millet, Stanley, editor. South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in. Southeast Asia,

Vo1.3, 1968. New York: Facts on File Inc. 1974.

Murphy, Edward R., Jr., with Curt Gentry. Second in Command. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart,

and Winston, 1970.

Oberdorfer, Don. Tet! Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1971.

Schumacher, Frederick Carl, Jr., and George C. Wilson. Bridge ofNo Return: The Ordeal

ofthe USS Pueblo. N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1971.

Media

Transcript ofradio and television program "Meet the Press," 4 February 1968.

Radio-TV Reports Inc. full text of NBC-TV network program "Pueblo: A Question of

Intelligence," broadcast of7:30 P.M., 25 August 1969.

News Bureau (Fred Freed), letter to Norman T. Hatch, Directorate for Defense

Information, 31 March 1969.

Rivers, Mendel L., congressman, South Carolina. Press release, 18 February 1969.

United Press International, wire service item 7,7 February 1968.

NST RFJLFJ1\SABLFJ 'fS 6SNTfbtt6TSns NS'f RFJLFJ1\SABLFJ 'fS FSRFJI8N Nlr:'fISN1\LS

TOP SECRET UM81tA 220

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Index

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

A51 I

Abbot, William: 132, 138

A Group: 108-109

Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Platform (ACRP): 89-93,108,115,129

Air Defense Command Center: 7

Air Force School (North Korea): 6-7

Air National Guard: 100

AKL-44 (light cargo ship): 15,18

Allison, Major General Royal B., USAF: 78,80

AN/WLR-1 (ELINT receiving systems): 16,49,60

Apollony, John: 80

Armed Forces Courier Service: 78

Armistice Agreement: 3-4, 14

Atsugi Naval Air Station: 87,129

Auxiliary General Environmental Research (AGER) ships: 9-15,27,32,39,41-42,71,

125,171-172,177

Auxiliary General Technical Research (AGTR) ships: 9,12

Azuma Island Naval Ammunition Depot: 29

Bailey, Communications Technician First Class Donald E.: 52,57,59,66-69

Baldridge, Hospital Corpsman First Class Herman: 68,70,127

Bandera, Fireman: 47

Banner, Roy: 143

Barlow, Howard C.: 86, 144

Barr, Captain, USN: 79-80

Bartimo, Frank: 143

_____~80

Berens, Helmsman: 69-70

B05: 80

B11""-- t36,19, 92, 98-99

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

ue'f RELEASl'tBLE 'fe oeU'fR-AO'feRS r,e'f RELEl'tSl'tBLE 'f6 F6KEI8H r,1\'fI6r,1\LS

221 TOP §EEAET YMBR:A:
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TOP SECRET l:JMBRA

Bll: 37,80,85,88,90,98,105,120

BII04: 98

B Group (Office o~'--- .....,j1:87-88,92

B Group Operations Center: 79

B Group Watch Office: 80,88

Berger, Ambassador Samuel: 95,97

Bienvenu, Leonard: 80

Blansett, Engineman First Class R.S.: 69

Blue House (raid): 89

Board ofNational Estimates: 36

Bonesteel, General Charles Ho, III: 3,83,88-90,106,109,116,119

Boucher, Robert Xo: 81

Bouden, Senior ChiefCommunications Technician Ralph D.: 26,64,69

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

BREECHES BUOY: 133-134,136-139

BREEDER CLICKBEETLE: 39

Bremerton (Washington naval shipyard); 11,15-16,29

BRIGHT CRESCENT: 156

Bringle, Vice Admiral William: 78,82-83

Brown, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce: 97

Bucher, Lieutenant Commander Lloyd Mark: 18-21,27-32,39,41-42,45-47,50-55,57,

59-61,63-70,94,96,99,110-111,123,126, 134,136,138-139, 162,164-165

Bucher, Mrs. Rose: 96

Bureau ofShips: 15,21

Burke, Gerard P.: 81

C-130: 8,90

Carroll, Lieutenant General Joseph F. (DIA Director): 34,82

Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall So, USA, DIRNSA: 16,37,79-82,86,88,95,97-98,

101,105-106,109-111,113-116,118,120-121,124-125, 129, 131,137,141-142,

149-151, 164

Cassel, Captain Charles R. (Ass't ChiefofStafTfor Operations, Pacific Fleet): 28

Pf8~ REihEh\S/,BhEi '1'8 emi'l'Fb',S'l'ORS Pf8'1' REi~Ei ...SltBhEi '1'0 F8REi16Pf PfA'I'18nAbS

lQP SECRET l:JMBft* 222
;DOCID: 3997429

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 Tep 'EeR!T t1M81tA

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 35,86,96,106,120

CGUSASA: 110

Chaffee, John (Secretaryofthe Navy): 165

Chapman, General Leonard F., Jr. (Ass't Commandant ofthe Marine Corps): 35

Chapman, Rear Admiral Donald D.: 143-144

Chicca, Sergeant, USMC: 49,51,67,126

ChiefofNaval Operations (CNO): 11,39,103,116,124,131,140,145-148

Chinese Communist Forces: 3,29,38-39,57,103,105,107,108,115,121,124,152,

156-157,173-174

Christian, George: 95,97

Chungang llbo: 118

CINCPAC: 11,34,38,43,48,84-85,101,104,108-109

CINCPACFLT: 31,33,37,41,85,122,131-132,134,136,138-139,143, 146-147, 149,

151, 165

CITADEL: 160

Clarey, Admiral: 149

Clifford, Clark: 95

CNO: See Chief of Naval Operations

Combat Information Center (CIC) School: 18

Combined Cryptologic Program (CCP): 13

Commander Mine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet: 18

I I

COMNAVFORJAPAN: 41,67

COMSEC: 86,97,111,121,125,141,144-145,149-150,160-161,167

Cook, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Ralph E.: 19

Cousins, Rear Admiral: 83

Coyne, Patrick: 82

Crandell, Radioman Third Class Charles: 46,67,126

CRITIC: 66,74-75,78-80

Critical Intelligence Communications (CRITICOMM): 8,74,77

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

223 Tep SECRET I:JMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

"fep SECRH l::IMBRA

Cryptologic Compromise Damage Assessment (CCDA) Team: 132, 136, 140-141

Cushman, General: 78

Cutrona, Colonel Joseph: 92

D1 (Office ofthe Director): 81

D3 (National Cryptologic Stam: 79

D32 (Policy Division): 124

D33 (Foreign Relations Division): 109,124

Dakin, Edward: 92

DebriefTermination Board: 138--139

""-- tNSAPACRep;}:79,87,89,104

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): 7,33-35,38,43,82,85-86,92,95,122-123,147

Defense Language Institute (East Coast Branch): 19,31

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E): 144

Defence Signals Division (DSD) (Australia): 105

Demarcation Line: 8

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): 4-5,8,45,84-85,108--109,134,172

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK): 123

Denholm, Major General Charles, USA: 104

Department of Defense (DoD): 9,14-16,42-43,81,94-95,97,100,143,146,158,166

Department of State: 35,81,89,93,95,97,103,108--109,132

(b) (1)

Deputy Secretary of Defense: 36,124 (b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

Director, Communications Security, Ottavva(DCS): 125 (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Direct Support Units (DSU): 148

DIRNSA: 124-125,141

I I

Duggan, Lieutenant Colonel James F.: 75

Duvall, Colonel Robert C.: 85

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET ~M8RA 224

_I
DOCID: 3997429

lap !;~~IItET UMBRA

Eastern Sector Filter Center: 7

Easton, Lieutenant Commander ErviIlR:28

Eighteenth Tactical Fighter Wing: 83

Eighth Army: 116

1"'-----__----1

Emergency Reaction Unit (ERU): 105,114-115,125

Emission Control (EMCON): 45

Epes, Rear Admiral Horace H., Jr.: 77

Everett, Captain William H.: 74

Everhart, Captain C.O.: 132,136-138

Fifth Air Force: 28,74-76, 7l3,83-85, 90, 109, 114-115, 169

Fifty-eighth Regiment (North Korea): 6

I 1129,137-138,140-141

Fitzgerald, Colonel: 107

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): 96, 110

FORMATION STAR: 100-102,117

FROSTFISH: 41

FS-44: 15

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Fubini, Eugene (Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR and E): 9, 124

GER 1 (USS Banner): 172

GER 2 (USSPueblo): 172

Gidrolog (Soviet ship): 102

Ginther, Communications Technician First Class: 126

Gladding, Captain Everett: 165-166

Goldberg, Arthur (U.S. ambassador): 93-94,98-99,106,111

Goldman, ChiefEngineman Monroe Orel: 21,69

Goulding, Phillip G.: 80-81

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ): 105,124-125

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

225 lap SECREf UMBRA
DOCID:-3997429

'6" S!ER!' tJMBR"A

Greene, General Wallace (Commandant ofthe Marine Corps): 35

Haines, General Ralph E. (Vice ChiefofStaffofthe Army): 34-35 I IColonel,USA: 80

Hammond, Marine Sergeant Robert J.: 49,51,114,126

HAMPDEN: 129, 164

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Harvey, Richard: 80

Hayes, Radioman First Class Lee Roy: 31

Helms, Richard (Director ofCentral Intelligence): 35-36,95-97,120

High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF): 8

Hodges, Fireman Duane: 67-68,70,134

Hokenson, Lieutenant Commander Carl L., Jr.: 74

Hooper, Sir Leonard J. (Director, GCHQ): 124-125

HOST: 153-154

_____________18,3(),41,79~80,87-90,100,106-107,109, 110

Harris, Lieutenant Stephen R.: 18-21,27,31-32,48,50-51,54-55,60-61,64-68,113,139,

162,164,166-167,172

House Armed Services Committee: 143, 148

Hyland, Admiral JohnJ.: 11,19,33,78,82,84,143

Hyun, Yu Byung Major General: 109

I (Intercept Branch): 48-49

ICHTHYIC (codeword): 39,41,75

Intensification ofCommunications Security by North Korea (Report): 121

Intelligence Damage Assessment Group: 166

Iredale, Harry: 31

Itazuke Air Force Base: 83

Jackson, Admiral: 94

James, Brigadier General: 104

JCS (Joint Chiefs ofStam: 33-38,43,74,79-86,89-90,92-94,100-103,108-109,111,

115,125,131,146-150,171,174

It(6T ft:~LI!:2\S2\ftU:T6 e6HTltAeT6fiS H6'f ftI!:L~2\S2\ftLfJ'f6 f'6ft:fJl6'H H2\'f16HALS

'6P SECRET liMBRA 226
Tep SECRET l:JMBIbIc

Johnson, General Harold K.: 34

Johnson, President Lyndon: 80,98-100

Johnson, Rear Admiral Frank L. (COMNAVFORJAPAN): 29,33,39,41-42,45,52-53,

66,75-76,165-166

Johnson (U.S. ambassador): 89,107,120

Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC): 33-34,37-38,80-81,90,92-93,97,103,147,171

(bl (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

fb) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

K04 (NSA Collection Office): 124

K12 (Office ofMobile Collection): 37,80,92-93

K321 (NSA's Collection Office): 16

K-73: 87

Kadena Air Force Base: 83

Kalgoch'i-ri: 6, 70, 88

Kami Seya: 31,41,52-53,57,59,66-67,69,74,78,129

Karnes, Communication Technician Third Class Sidney J.: 53

Katzenbach, Nicholas de B. (Under Secretary ofState):.35, 95

Keast, Commander Paul: 140

Kell, ChiefCommunications Technician James F.: 31,61,64

Kelly Air Force Base: 90

Kelpac, Boatswain's Mate First Class N.J.: 69

Kewayne Shipbuilding Company: 15

Kim II Sung: 119

1 198-99

Kirby, Oliver R.: 37

Koczak, Lieutenant Commander EdwardJ., Jr.: 81,148

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA): 96,110,113,122-123

Korean Communist Naval Summary (KORCOMNAVSUM): 41

Korean Situation Summary (KORSITSUM): 105

Korean War: 3-4,7,174

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

227 Tep SECRET l:JMBRA
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

DOCID: 3997429

T9P SECRET l:IMBRA

Kosygin, Soviet premier Alexej: 3,107

Kukchi-bong: 6, 54

KW-7 (cryptodevice): 66,69

Lacy, ChiefWarrant Officer Gene Howard: 20,46,54,63,65,68-69

Laird, Secretary of Defense Melvin: 37,149,150

Layton, Communications Technician First Class James D.: 66

Law, Quartermaster First Class Charles Benton: 21,47,54,126

Leach, Signalman Wendell G.: 55,59,63,68

Lee, General YungJu (Director, DSA): 88,106,109,118

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.(CommanderinChief, Europe): 103

Ling-Tempco-Vought (LTV):J6

I I{NSA Rep to JCSlJRC): 90,92-93, 103

I 1125

Lumpkin, Captain Pickett: 81

M5 (Office of Security): 86

Mack, Photographer's Mate First Class: 47

Maggard, Seaman: 30

Maintenance Branch: 48,49

MARS (Operational Area): 45,48,51, 123

McCafferty, Arthur J.: 82,95

McClintock, Communications Technician Third Class Ralph: 47

McConnell, General John P. (Air Force Chief ofStaffi: 35

McDonald, Communications Technician Thomas E.: 75-76

McKee, Lieutenant General Seth J.: 76,79

McLarren, Communications Technician Second Class Donald: 68

McManis, David: 82

McNamara, Robert (Secretary of Defense): 15,80,85,95-96,100,113,119-120

"Meet the Press": 119

I I

(b) (1)

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

N 6'f 1tfi3[:;f<lA:SA:BLfi3 'f8 e8N'fRAe'f8RS NO'f RF5bF5ASASbF> 1'0 FQRF>IQ:-r :-r A1'IQ:-r Ab~

T9P SECRET l:IMBRA 228
DOCID: 3997429

TOP SECRET UMBRA

Meshcheryakov, General Major Ivan Valentin (Soviet military attache): 107

Miki, Foreign Minister: 107

Military Armistice Commission: 4,97,118,132

Ministry of National Defense (North Korea): 5,54,172,173

Mitchell, Madison E.: 86, 109

Mode 1 (Navy Direction): 12

Mode 2 (NSA Direction): 12

,--~_I Moorer, Admiral Thomas H. (Navy ChiefofStafl): 35,137

Morosov, Platon (USSR representative to the UN): 99

Morrison, Brigadier General John E.: 79-81,93-94,106

Munch'on Naval Base: 100

Munp'yong-no Naval Base: 121

Murphy, Lieutenant Edward R.: 19-20,31,46,52,64-65,68,113-114,122,164-165

N2 (Intelligence Stafl): 74

N3 (Operations Starn: 74

National Guard: 100

National Military Command Center (NMCC): 78-81

National Security Agency SIGINT Command Center (NSASCC): 79,85-86,93

National Security Council (NSC): 95

Naval Air Command, Pacific: 143

Naval Intelligence Command (NAVINTCOM): 136,138,140

Naval Intelligence Service (NAVINTSER): 136

Naval Investigative Service (NIS): 138,140

Naval Security Group SIGINT Operator's Manual: 156

Naval Ships System Command (NAVSHIPSYSCOM): 16,18,21

Navy Department: 11,18,145,166,174

NBC television network: 166, 168

New China News Agency: 107

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

229 TOl' !U!CR~T UM8RA
DOCID: 3997429

Tap SECRET tJMBRA

New York Times: 119

Nitze, Paul H. (Secretary ofthe Navy): 15-16,35,80,95

Nolte, Electronics Technician Second Class: 46

Northern Limit Line (NLL): 45-46,55

North Korean Air Force: 6,49,52,161

North Korean Army: 5

North Korean Navy (NKN): 45-46,49,54

I 1123

NSAPAC: 122

NSAPAC Operations Group (NOG): 100

NSA SIGINT Collector (AGER) Study: 124

NSA TEXTAManual: 162

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI): 132

Office ofStrategic Services (OSS): 98

121st Evacuation Hospital: 134

Operational Communications (OPSCOMM): 8

Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) Broadcast: 152,163

OPNAV: 21

OP-92C: 138

P2 (Information and Reporting Element): 80

Pacific Air Force: 90, 92

Pacific Fleet (PACFLT): 101

Pacific Fleet Intelligence Center: 78

Pacific Fleet Indications Center: 78

Packard, David: 146,149,174

Pak, Major General Chung Kuk: 97

Pak, President (S. Korea): 4,50,89,118-119

Panmunjom: 118, 132-134, 141

Pease, Captain Forest A., USN: 74-76

foto:r lun.1i: A 51 A su: :ro {:O)T:rR A {:TO~ )TOT IU:bIU8A8bE '1'0 FOMEIG)T nh'l'IC;mhb8

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Tap SEERET tJMBRA 230
DOCID: 3997429

People's Republic ofChina (PRC): 3,7-8,38,55, 156-157, 163, 169

Phase I Trawler Program: 16

Phase II Trawler Program: 16

Pike, Otis G.: 149,150

PINKROOT (codeword): 39,123

Plucker, Quartermaster Third Class: 46

PLUTO: 45,47,123

iPre"dent'sFore,gn l:~;~o=~(~~I~~).~~,:; Preece, Daniel (Systems Command Project Officer): 16

Price, Benjamin: 97

Priest, Major Raymond A. Jr.: 75

Protraktor (Soviet ship): 117

Pueblo: A Question ofIntelligence: 166

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard: 15,21,64

R (Collection Branch): 48

R44 (Speech Research Division): 96

Radio Direction Finding (RDF): 154

Radio Direction Finding (RDF) Outstations: 8

Radioprinter Communication: 5, 8, 25

Radiotelephone (RIT): 5,7-8,25,90,92

'----__I

Rice Paddy 1: 51

R ice Paddy 2: 51

Rigby, Fireman: 126

Rivers, Representative L. Mendel: 113,149

1....- ......192,98-99

Roeder, Vice Admiral Bernard F.: 121

ROK Joint Chiefs ofStaff: 106

Rosenburg, Admiral: 134

'FOP SECRH l:JMB~

(b1(1)

{b)(3)-50 usc 403

fb) (3)-18 usc 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

IiQ'OT ftr:Lr;ASld~Lr: TO eO!iQ'TftAeTO~ IiQ'OT ftr:Lr:ASA8Lr: TO fi'Oftr:h~!4' !4'ATIOI4'ALS

231 'FOP SECRH l:JMB~
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

DOCID: 3997429

lOP SECRET ijM8RA

Rostow, Walt (National Security Advisor to the President): 35,80,95

Rusk, Secretary of State: 80,93,118

Ryan, General John D.: 76,79,83,85,108

SO-l (subchaser): 54-55

Sato (Japanese Prime Minister): 120

Saylor, Captain T.P.: 132

SC-34: 55

SC-35: 59-62,66, 68-70, 172

1 1

79

Schultz, Rear Admiral Floyd B. (Commandant ofthe Puget Sound Naval Shipyard): 15

Schulz, Admiral Lester R. (Ass't Director for the National Cryptologic Stam: 37

Schumacher, Lieutenant Junior Grade Frederick C., Jr.: 20,27,29,41,52-54,57,59-60,

66,113-114, 123

Second Air Division (North Korea): 7

Second Fighter Division (North Korea): 6

Security Council: See United Nations Security Council

Senior United Kingdom Liaison Officer (SUKLO): 124-125

Seventh Fleet: 3,77-78,82,88,101

Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S. G.: 3,33-34,38,78,84, 108

Sheck, Eugene: 92

Shepard, Communications First Class James A.: 50,64

Sheridan, Walter: 164

Showers, Admiral Donald: 140

SIGINT Alert One: 105,123

SIGINT Command Center: See National Security Agency SIGINT Command Center

(NSASCC)

SIGINT Operator's Collection Manual: 152

SIGINT Readiness ALPHA: 87,105,124-125

SlGINT Readiness BRAVO: 87

Situation Report (SITREP) #1: 74

I I

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

HO'f R6LEh'r&tBL6 'fO 60U'fR-h6'fORS HO'f R~L~AS*8L~'fO fi'Oft~Itm lofJ!l:'f16H'J!l:LS

TOP 5!(:R!T Ul'O'l8RA 232

l
DOCID: 3997429

yep SECRET liMBRA

SM-676 (JCS document): 33

Smead, Francis: 80

Smith, Bromley: 82,95,97

Smith, Rear Admiral John: ~7

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Snow, Richmond D.: 132-134,138

Sohn, Nona: 80

Soviet Communists: 105, 115, 153

Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships (SMRIS): 129

Soviet SIGINT: 13,121

Soviet Union: 3,5, 93, 117

Special Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs); 123, 164

Special Intelligence Reports (SIRS): 115

Special Operations Department (SOD) hut: 21,25-26,28-29,41,47,50-51,65,170

Special Pueblo Intelligence Damage Assessment Team (SPIDAT): 140-141

Special Security Office (SSO): 98

I 18,19,87~88,106;t2(i6i

Spivak, Lawrence: 119

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-18 USC 798

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 Taylor, Vice Admiral Rufus: 35,82,120,125

Technical-Auxiliary General (T-AG): 9, 13, 145

Thirteenth Air Force: 28

Stapelton, General: 114-115

State Department Watch Office: 79

Steakely, Brigadier General Ralph D., USAF (DireCtoro[JRC): 38,81,92,97

Strategic Air Command (SAC): 100

Submarine Flotilla Seven: 18

NEl't' fHlLEJIiSABLEJ TEl CElN't'fbItC't'ElHS NEl't' REJbEiItS1tBbEi TEl FElREil8N N:A't'I8f'MLS

233 TOP 5!CR!T UMSR1(
-DOCID: 39-'-7429

TOP Jl!eR!T tJMBIb'

303 Committee: 35-36, 43

Tordella, Dr. Louis (NSA Deputy Director): 80,82,96,106,120-121,124,144

TROPICAL CYCLONE Conference: 75

T (Technical Branch): 48-49

Tuck, Dunnie R,Jr.: 31,55,114

Tucker, Dr. Gardiner: 121

Twenty-sixth Regiment (NKAF): 6

UHF: 49,92,155

I

United Nations: 93,98,106--107

United Nations Command (UNC): 4, 7, 83;89

United Nations Security Council: 93,98,99,111

United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS): 8,87, 90, 9~93,108-110, 114-115

United States Intelligence Board (USIB): 14,97,125,137,140-142,145,151,161

'(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

USN-467Y: 31

ne'f ftl!Jf:::I!JA"S'ABf:::1!J 'fe eelffltAeTe~ I~eT ltELEA5ABLE 10 FOREIGN NA 1IONALS

1'611 5!eRET tJMBItA 234
(b) (1)

(b)(3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

DOCID: 3997429

TOP SECRET tJMBRA

U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN): 98-99

U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office: 31

U.S. Pacific Headquarters: 90

USNS Muller: 12,93,103,116-117,174

USNS Valdez: 12,103,174

USS Banner: 12, 15-16,26-27,29-33,36,38-39,55,57,59,74,76,82,96, 101-104, 123,

169,172-174

USSEnterprise: 77-78,80,82,84,87-88,95,100-102,117

USSGeorgetown: 103,116-117,177

USS Jamestown: 116,177

USS Liberty: 9,81,103, 171-172

USS Oxford: 9,13,174

USSPalmBeach(AGER-3): 13,15-16,21,27,39,123,174

VENUS: 48, 123

VHF: 8,90,92, 152, 155

Vineyard, Captain: 81

Walker, Arthur: 159

Walker, John: 157-159,174

Walker, Michael: 157-158

Warden, Rear. Admiral Horace D.: 136

Warnke, Paul: 95

Welch, Harold: 92

I 185

Western Pacific Operational Intelligence Broadcast: 140

Wheeler, General Earle G.: 34-35,84-85,95, 113

White House Situation Room: 73, 79-80, 82, 95

Whitworth, Jerry: 157-159

Wilson, Lieutenant Commander Ager L. 74-76, 78

Woelk, Fireman Steven: 67-68, 70, 126

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

tie'f R8b8hSABb8 'fe OeHTFb\O'feRS HeT R8b8hS*BL8 'f6 P6R816N HA'f16NALS

235 fO' 5!tR!T tJMBRA
DOCID: 3997429

lOP SECRH t:lM8RA

Woodward, Major General Gilbert H.: 134

L....- Iso

Zaslow, Milton: 80,120

ne'f RFJLFJASABLJ!J 'fe e6H'fR"AeT6~ I(6T ftr;L!:A~ftLr:10 FOREiGN NA nON ALS

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECRET t:lMBRA

D9l • DEC 92· Y12- 397771

236
DOCID: 3997429

NOTES
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NOTES
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NOTES
DOCID: 3997429

_.-_,_.-,--,-=--,.cc__ '-'-~ .

NOTES
DOCID: 3997429

NOTES
DOCID: 3S-9!429

NOTES
---D-O-C-I-D-: 3 9 9"J 4 2 9

NOTES
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--DOClD: 3997429

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F~"'J1m MATERIAL

~~~:e'REIGN NATIONALS

ULJT-..o...I.-1ACTORS

TOP SECRET