59–006 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 114–767 

PROHIBITING FUTURE RANSOM PAYMENTS TO IRAN ACT 

SEPTEMBER 20, 2016.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. ROYCE, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 5931] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 5931) to provide for the prohibition on cash payments to the 

Government of Iran, and for other purposes, having considered the 

same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Summary and Purpose ............................................................................................ 4 

Background and Need for Legislation .................................................................... 5 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 10 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 12 

Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 13 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 13 

New Budget Authority, Tax Expenditures, and Federal Mandates .................... 14 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 14 

Directed Rule Making ............................................................................................. 15 

Non-Duplication of Federal Programs ................................................................... 15 

Congressional Accountability Act ........................................................................... 15 

New Advisory Committees ...................................................................................... 15 

Earmark Identification ............................................................................................ 15 

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 15 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 17 


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THE AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prohibiting Future Ransom Payments to Iran Act’’. 

SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) Since 1979, when it held more than 50 United States citizens for 444 days, 

Iran has repeatedly held United States citizens hostage. 

(2) Presidential Policy Directive 30 issued by President Barack Obama on 

June 24, 2015, states that ‘‘It is United States policy to deny hostage-takers the 

benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession.’’. 

(3) On January 17, 2016, the President announced that Iran would release 

several United States citizens while the United States would grant clemency to 

and release seven Iranian nationals serving sentences or awaiting trial in the 

United States for serious crimes. 

(4) Senior officials of the Department of State have acknowledged that these 

United States citizens were released as part of a ‘‘prisoner swap’’ and Iranian 

negotiators reportedly asked for a cash payment. 

(5) On January 17, 2016, the President also announced that ‘‘The United 

States and Iran are now settling a longstanding Iranian government claim 

against the United States Government.’’. (6) The overall amount of the settlement is approximately $1,700,000,000. 

(7) Subsequent reports revealed that $400,000,000 of this $1,700,000,000 settlement was secretly flown to Iran, in cash, simultaneously with the release of 

these United States citizens. 

(8) One of the United States citizens released that night, Pastor Saeed 

Abedini, has stated that Iranian officials explained a delay in their departure 

was due to the status of another plane. 

(9) Senior officials at the National Security Division of the Department of Jus- tice reportedly objected to the $400,000,000 cash payment, warning that Iran 

would see it as a ransom. 

(10) On August 18, 2016, a Department of State spokesman admitted that the $400,000,000 cash payment was ‘‘leverage’’ to gain the release of Americans 

held hostage by Iran. 

(11) Iranian State Television quoted General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, commander of the Basij militia, as claiming ‘‘Taking this much money back was in 

return for the release of the American spies.’’. 

(12) According to Presidential Policy Directive 30, the United States policy 

against paying ransom and releasing prisoners ‘‘protects United States nationals and strengthens national security by removing a key incentive for hostagetakers to target United States nationals, thereby interrupting the vicious cycle 

of hostage-takings, and by helping to deny terrorists and other malicious actors 

the money, personnel, and other resources they need to conduct attacks against 

the United States, its nationals, and its interests.’’. 

(13) Since the United States released Iranians serving sentences or awaiting 

trial in the United States for serious crimes and provided Iran with 

$400,000,000 in cash, Iran has taken several more United States citizens hostage. 

(14) On August 22, 2016, the Department of State issued an ‘‘Iran Travel 

Warning’’ noting that ‘‘Iranian authorities continue to unjustly detain and imprison U.S. citizens, particularly Iranian-Americans, including students, journalists, business travelers, and academics, on charges including espionage and 

posing a threat to national security.’’. 

(15) The Government of the United States has designated Iran as a state 

sponsor of terrorism since 1984 and a jurisdiction of primary money laundering 

concern since 2011. 

(16) The Department of State’s most recent Country Reports on Terrorism 

makes clear that ‘‘Iran continued its terrorist-related activity in 2015, including 

support for Hizballah, Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, and various groups 

in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.’’. 

(17) In announcing Iran’s designation as a jurisdiction of primary money 

laundering concern, the Department of the Treasury made clear that ‘‘any and 

every financial transaction with Iran poses grave risk of supporting’’ Iran’s ongoing illicit activities, including terrorism. 


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(18) On March 17, 2016, the Department of State acknowledged in a letter 

to Congress that there remain some ‘‘large claims’’ pending before the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, ‘‘many of which are against the United States’’. 

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

It shall be the policy of the United States Government not to pay ransom or release prisoners for the purpose of securing the release of United States citizens 

taken hostage abroad. 

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON CASH PAYMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. 

(a) PROHIBITION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning on the 

date of the enactment of this Act, the United States Government may not provide, 

directly or indirectly, promissory notes (including currency) issued by the United 

States Government or promissory notes (including currency) issued by a foreign government, to the Government of Iran. 

(b) LICENSING REQUIREMENT.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the conduct of a transaction or payment in connection with an agreement to settle a 

claim or claims brought before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal may be 

made only— 

(A) on a case-by-case basis and pursuant to a specific license by the Office 

of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury; and 

(B) in a manner that is not in contravention of the prohibition in subsection (a). 

(2) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER.—The President shall publish in the 

Federal Register a list of transactions and payments, including the amount and 

method of each such transaction and payment, by the United States Government to the Government of Iran in connection with the agreement described in 

paragraph (1). 

(c) TERMINATION.—The prohibition in subsection (a) and the licensing requirement 

in subsection (b) shall remain in effect until the date on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that— 

(1) the President has rescinded a preliminary draft rule or final rule (as in 

effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) that provides for 

the designation of Iran as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern 

pursuant to section 5318A of title 31, United States Code; and 

(2) the Secretary of State has removed Iran from the list of countries determined to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism 

under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 

of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961, or any other provision of law. 

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the 

term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and 

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, 

Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate. 

SEC. 5. REPORT ON OUTSTANDING CLAIMS BEFORE THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL. 

(a) REPORT.—The President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that lists and evaluates each outstanding claim before the Iran-United 

States Claims Tribunal. 

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following: 

(1) The total value of each outstanding claim. 

(2) The current status of each outstanding claim. 

(3) The likelihood that each claim will be resolved in the next 6 months. 

(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be 

submitted to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter for a period 

not to exceed 3 years. 

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the 

term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and 

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 


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SEC. 6. NOTIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION RELATING TO SETTLEMENTS OF OUTSTANDING 

CLAIMS BEFORE THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL. 

(a) NOTIFICATION.—The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not later than 30 days prior to conducting a transaction or payment from 

the Government of the United States to the Government of Iran in connection with 

an agreement to settle a claim or claims brought before the Iran-United States 

Claims Tribunal. 

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The notification required under subsection (a) 

shall include the following: 

(1) The total amount of the settlement, including the total principal and interest, and an explanation of the calculation of the interest. 

(2) A legal analysis of why the settlement was made, including a detailed description of all claims and counter-claims covered by the settlement. 

(3) A certification by the President that the settlement is not a ransom for 

the release of individuals held hostage by Iran. 

(4) An identification of each entity of the Government of Iran that will receive 

amounts from the settlement. 

(5) A certification that the funds provided to Iran under the settlement will 

not be used to provide support to foreign terrorist organizations, the regime of 

Bashar al-Assad, or other destabilizing activities. 

(6) Whether an equal amount of Iranian funds are available and accessible 

in the United States to satisfy judgments against Iran by victims of Iraniansponsored terrorism. 

(7) A copy of the settlement agreement. 

(8) A description of the disposition of any related claims that have been subrogated to the United States Government. 

(9) A certification that the settlement is in the best interest of the United 

States. 

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term 

‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and 

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 

SEC. 7. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES. 

Nothing in this Act shall apply to any activities subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947. 

SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize any payment by the Government of the United States to the Government of Iran. 

SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS. 

In this Act: 

(1) GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.—The term ‘‘Government of Iran’’ means— 

(A) the state and the Government of Iran, as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof; 

(B) any entity owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the foregoing; 

(C) any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, or to the 

extent that there is reasonable cause to believe that such person is, or has 

been, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly on behalf of any of 

the foregoing; and 

(D) any person or entity identified by the Secretary of the Treasury to 

be the Government of Iran under part 560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations. 

(2) IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL.—The term ‘‘Iran-United States 

Claims Tribunal’’ means the tribunal established pursuant to the Algiers Accords on January 19, 1981, to resolve certain claims by nationals of one party 

against the other party and certain claims between the parties. 

SUMMARY AND PURPOSE

H.R. 5931, the Prohibiting Future Ransom Payments to Iran Act, 

is a legislative response to the Obama Administration’s action of 

January 17, 2016. On that day, simultaneous with the release of 

several Americans who had been detained in Iran, President 

Obama announced that the United States would pay Tehran $1.7 

billion to settle a decades-old dispute over aborted arms sales that 

pre-dated the Iranian revolution of 1979. This settlement payment 


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occurred without any consultation with the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs. 

Of the upmost concern to the committee, it was subsequently revealed that this $1.7 billion delivered to the terrorist regime in 

Tehran was paid in cash. Indeed, according to the Financial Action 

Task Force—the international body charged with developing policies to combat money laundering and terrorism financing—the 

‘‘physical transportation of currency’’ is ‘‘one of the main methods 

used to move criminal assets, launder money and finance terrorism.’’ 

H.R. 5931 adheres to longstanding U.S. policy against paying 

ransom for hostages by prohibiting future cash payments to Iran 

until it stops sponsoring terrorism and is no longer a primary 

money laundering concern. It further enhances transparency and 

oversight by requiring a 30-day Congressional notification and review of any future settlements related to the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal. If this legislation had been law, the Obama Administration’s 

dangerous actions of last January could not have happened. 

The committee believes that this piece of legislation strikes the 

right balance between ending cash payments to a state sponsor of 

terrorism on the one hand, while ensuring the United can meet its 

international commitments on the other. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Americans Held Hostage by Iran 

In 1979, the radicals that still rule Iran took over the country, 

stormed the U.S. Embassy, and held more than 50 Americans hostage for 444 days. Since that time Iran has repeatedly taken Americans hostage, a policy that continues to this day. Iranian laws are 

vaguely written and inconsistently applied in support of these politically motivated detentions, and those held are often denied access to legal counsel. Many have been dual nationals of the U.S. 

and Iran. Iran refuses to recognize their American citizenship, and 

denies them consular services. 

As the Obama Administration negotiated the ‘‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’’ to address Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran held 

several Americans hostage. They included Pastor Saeed Abedini, 

former U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati, and Washington Post correspondent Jason Rezaian. Despite Secretary Kerry’s claim that he 

and other senior officials ‘‘repeatedly raised’’ the cases of ‘‘detained 

or missing U.S. citizens directly with Iranian officials,’’ the Obama 

Administration rejected calls from Congress to demand the release 

of these Americans before the nuclear negotiations could continue. 

As State Department Spokeswoman Marie Harf made clear, the 

Obama Administration considered that the nuclear negotiations 

and the Americans held hostage in Iran ‘‘really are separate 

issues.’’ 

The fate of another American, Robert Levinson, remains a top 

concern of the committee. A sixty-seven year old former FBI agent, 

Levinson went missing after a visit in 2007 to Iran’s Kish Island. 

According to his family, Levinson was researching a cigarette 

smuggling case as a private investigator. Iran denies knowing his 

status or location and refuses to assist efforts to obtain his location. 

In December 2011, Levinson’s family released a one-year- old taped 


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statement by him. On March 9, 2015, the eighth anniversary of 

Levinson’s disappearance, the FBI increased its reward to up to $5 

million for ‘‘information leading directly to his safe location, recovery, and return.’’ 

On June 2, 2015, the committee held a hearing on ‘‘Americans 

Detained in Iran.’’ All four witnesses were close relatives of Americans who were being held in Iran. They included Ali Rezaian, the 

brother of Washington Post correspondent Jason Rezaian; 

Naghmeh Abedini, the wife of Pastor Saeed Abedini; Sarah 

Hekmati, the sister of former U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati; and Daniel Levinson, the son of former FBI agent Robert Levinson. 

After this hearing, the committee considered H. Res. 233, introduced by Rep. Kildee, ‘‘expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Iran should immediately release the three United 

States citizens it holds, as well as provide all known information 

on any United States citizens that have disappeared within its borders.’’ This resolution passed the House on June 15, 2015. 

Prisoner Exchange 

On January 17, 2016, the day after the nuclear deal was officially implemented, President Obama announced that Iran had released four American hostages: Pastor Abedini, former U.S. Marine 

Amir Hekmati, Washington Post correspondent Jason Rezaian, and 

Nosratollah Khosravi-Roodsari—about whom little is known. 

The President also announced that, ‘‘six Iranian–Americans and 

one Iranian serving sentences or awaiting trial in the United 

States are being granted clemency’’ in what he described as ‘‘a reciprocal humanitarian gesture.’’ A State Department spokesman 

has since referred to the events as a ‘‘prisoner swap.’’ Critics noted 

that by exchanging Americans held hostage by Iran for convicted 

and accused criminals, the President violated longstanding U.S. 

policy, as laid out in his own Policy Directive, to deny hostage-takers the benefit of ‘‘prisoner releases.’’ 

While the President claimed that ‘‘these individuals were not 

charged with terrorism or any violent offenses,’’ all had been accused or convicted of serious crimes from sanctions evasion to acquiring equipment for Iran’s illegal weapons programs. In addition, 

The Wall Street Journal reported that ‘‘The U.S. also agreed to 

drop the names of 14 Iranian nationals it has been seeking from 

the watch list of Interpol, the international police agency.’’ 

$1.7 Billion Settlement at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 

In the same January 17, 2016, speech in which he announced implementation of the nuclear deal and the prisoner exchange, President Obama also announced that the United States would pay Iran 

$1.7 billion to settle a decades-old dispute over an aborted arms 

sale that had been called off after the radicals that still rule Iran 

seized power in 1979. 

The Obama Administration contends that the Iran-U.S. Claims 

Tribunal, based in The Hague, was poised to rule against the 

United States in the longstanding contract dispute. This Tribunal 

was created pursuant to the Algiers Accords, which the United 

States and Iran reached in 1981. The Tribunal is designed to resolve contractual disputes caused by the abrupt break in relations 

between the two countries. 


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The Tribunal is divided into three chambers, each consisting of 

an American judge, an Iranian judge, and a third-country judge, 

who serves as the chamber’s chair. Prior to the deadline of January 

1982, 3,844 private claims were filed, of which 2,795 were ‘‘small 

claims’’ of less than $250,000. This resulted in payments of $2.5 billion to American claimants—mostly U.S. companies whose business 

in Iran was interrupted by the revolution. Many of the claims were 

settled prior to judgment, with the Tribunal approving the terms. 

Case B1, which is by far the largest and most complex claim, involves a vast number of disputes arising out of Iran’s purchase of 

military equipment prior to the revolution through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program—of which Iran 

was the largest customer at the time. 

According to the Administration, Iran received the balance of $400 million that it had deposited in the FMS Trust Fund, as well 

as roughly $1.3 billion in interest. The Administration maintains 

that if Iran’s claim had gone to decision, the United States would 

have faced significant exposure in the billions of dollars. However, 

Administration officials refuse to publicly explain how they determined that a decision by the Tribunal was imminent, that the U.S. 

would lose that decision, or how the $1.3 billion in interest was calculated—citing ongoing litigation at the Tribunal. 

Lack of Transparency at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 

The timing of this announcement, combined with the lack of details, immediately led Members of the committee and other observers to express concern that the settlement was reached to provide 

a ransom to secure the release of American hostages. In the wake 

of the prisoner exchange, such a payment would represent a further violation of the longstanding U.S. ‘‘no concessions’’ policy. In 

the weeks leading up to the President’s speech, the Administration 

had repeatedly briefed the committee on the implementation of the 

nuclear deal and a wide range of issues related to Iran, including 

the regime’s ongoing sponsorship of terrorism, dangerous ballistic 

missile and illicit conventional weapons programs, and continued 

efforts to prop up the murderous Assad regime in Syria. However, 

despite having ample opportunity to do so, in both unclassified and 

classified settings, the Obama Administration never raised this potential financial settlement with the committee. 

On February 3, 2016, Chairman Royce wrote to Secretary Kerry 

expressing concern that the dispute over the decades-old arms sale 

was settled to provide Iran with a de facto ransom. The letter included ten questions requesting detailed information on the settlement and its connection to the hostages. 

When the State Department failed to provide a substantive response, Chairman Royce wrote a second letter reiterating his questions and specifically asking how the settlement was paid to Iran. 

The $400 Million Cash Payment 

On August 3, 2016, The Wall Street Journal reported that the 

$400 million held in the FMS Trust Fund was sent to Iran in cash. 

As testimony from a senior Treasury Department official later confirmed, the $400 million was transferred from the United States to 

a European central bank, withdrawn in the banknotes of a European currency, and turned over to an official from the Central 


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Bank of Iran at a European airport on January 17. Closely coordinated, a Swiss military aircraft arrived in Geneva with the American prisoners. 

In the days following the announcement of the settlement payment and the hostage release, the State Department denied the 

connection between the two. Specifically, Department Spokesman 

John Kirby maintained that ‘‘the negotiations over the settlement 

were completely separate from the discussions about returning our 

American citizens home.’’ 

The Administration also rejected any accusations that the settlement amounted to a ransom payment. On February 3, 2016, the 

committee wrote to the Department expressing concern that the 

timing of the settlement could be viewed as such. The Department 

responded on March 17, stating that the ‘‘timing [of the settlement] 

was particularly critical, as hearings on this claim were then being 

considered for scheduling by the Tribunal.’’ This suggested the timing was unrelated to the prisoner exchange. However, after reports 

of the $400 million cash payment surfaced in early August, the 

State Department reversed itself and confirmed that the payment 

was used as ‘‘leverage’’ to secure the American hostages. 

Justice Department Warns about Ransom 

According to press reports, Assistant Attorney General John Carlin, head of the National Security Division of the Justice Department was among several senior officials who believed that the plan 

to deliver a cash payment to Iran would be viewed as a ransom 

payment. Justice Department officials didn’t object to the size of 

the settlement, but rather to the fact that a cash payment could 

send the wrong signal to Iran and the rest of the world about a 

change in U.S. ransom policy. 

The timing and manner of the payment raised alarms at the Justice Department: ‘‘People knew what it was going to look like, and 

there was concern the Iranians probably did consider it a ransom 

payment,’’ said one of those familiar with the discussions. A Justice 

Department spokesman said the agency ‘‘fully supported the ultimate outcome of the Administration’s resolution of several issues 

with Iran,’’ including the settlement of the long-running case at a 

tribunal in The Hague, ‘‘as well as the return of U.S. citizens detained in Iran.’’ 

Though the Obama Administration has clearly stated ‘‘We do not 

pay ransom for hostages,’’ the committee is deeply concerned that 

the consequences will be the same if Iran and other actors viewed 

the payment as such. Indeed, since these cash payments were 

made, Iran has detained several more Americans, as well as 

French, British, and Canadian citizens. The committee is concerned 

that—bolstered by the Obama Administration’s payment –Tehran 

will demand cash for their release. 

$1.3 Billion More in Cash from the Judgment Fund 

The $1.7 billion settlement included $1.3 billion in interest on 

the underlying $400 million claim. This amount, according to the 

Administration, was a ‘‘compromise’’ on the interest initially sought 

by Iran, and that ‘‘the United States could well have faced significant exposure in the billions of dollars.’’ The State Department also 

informed the committee that the settlement avoided ‘‘the potential 


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for a much larger Tribunal award against us, saving the U.S. taxpayers a significant amount of money.’’ Past precedent indicates, 

however, that our maximum exposure could have been much lower. 

The $1.3 billion was paid from the U.S. Government’s Judgement 

Fund, a permanent appropriation available to pay final money 

judgments and awards against the United States in which no other 

appropriated funds are available. 

According to testimony from a senior Treasury Department official, the $1.3 billion was transferred to a second European central 

bank and withdrawn in the banknotes of a second European currency. Given the amount of physical cash involved, the $1.3 billion 

was broken up into two payments which were turned over to officials from the Central Bank of Iran at a second European airport 

on two separate dates, January 22 and February 5. 

The Administration asserts that cash was necessary to facilitate 

payment to Iran given continuing U.S. sanctions. Yet earlier this 

year, the Obama Administration was able to facilitate the purchase 

of Iran’s heavy water for nearly $10 million through the formal financial system. 

Likewise, during the interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the Administration was able to facilitate $700 million back 

to Tehran each month through international banking relationships. 

Further, explicit provisions in existing regulations allow financial 

institutions to provide payments to Iran, through conventional 

banking channels, when those payments are made pursuant to a 

settlement agreement under the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The 

exemptions in the ‘‘Iran Transactions Sanctions Regime’’ for Tribunal settlements would shield any entity involved in such a transaction from liability under U.S. law. 

Use of Cash Raises Concerns 

The committee is deeply concerned that the Obama Administration conducted its $1.7 billion payment to Iran in cash. The United 

States has designated Iran as a ‘‘jurisdiction of primary money 

laundering concern’’ since 2011. In announcing this designation the 

Treasury Department made clear that ‘‘any and every financial 

transaction with Iran poses grave risk of supporting’’ Iran’s ongoing 

illicit activities. The State Department’s 2015 Country Reports on 

Terrorism cites Hezbollah, Hamas, and other radical Shia groups 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as recipients of arms, financing, 

and training from the Iranian Government. 

Organizations can use a variety of money laundering methods to 

disguise funds that were gained though legal or illegal means to facilitate illicit activities. Cash, however, makes the funding of these 

illicit activities that much easier. Because cash does not have an 

electronic signature, the number of steps needed for the money to 

become completely untraceable is drastically reduced. This is problematic for law enforcement agencies and other organizations that 

attempt to monitor and track the funding sources of illegal activities such as terrorism. Indeed, the Financial Action Task Force— 

the international body charged with developing policies to combat 

money laundering and terrorism financing—warns that ‘‘physical 

transportation of currency’’ is ‘‘one of the main methods used to 

move criminal assets, launder money and finance terrorism.’’ 


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Longstanding U.S policy against Paying Ransom and Releasing 

Prisoners 

The United States has long maintained a ‘‘no concessions’’ policy 

when responding to American citizens taken hostage while abroad. 

Unofficially this dates back to Thomas Jefferson’s belief that the 

tribute demands by the Barbary States would never end, which led 

to the cessation of this payment policy and the subsequent War 

with Tripoli. More formally, it wasn’t until the Nixon Administration when Palestinian terrorists kidnapped two senior U.S. diplomats in Khartoum, Sudan that this policy was solidified. President Nixon in response stated, ‘‘We will do everything we can to 

get them released but we will not pay blackmail.’’ 

President Obama himself embraced this policy in June 2015, 

when the White House released Presidential Policy Directive 30. 

PPD–30 ‘‘reaffirms our longstanding commitment to make no concessions to individuals or groups holding U.S. nationals hostage. 

This policy protects U.S. nationals and strengthens national security by removing a key incentive for hostage-takers to target U.S. 

nationals and by helping to deny terrorists and other malicious actors the resources they need to conduct attacks against the United 

States, its nationals, its allies, and its interests.’’ 

By Law, Money Was Supposed to Leverage Reimbursement for U.S. 

Terror Victims 

In past decades, Americans directly harmed by Iranian terrorism 

had sued Iran in U.S. courts and won, but hadn’t seen a penny because Iran avoided paying those judgments. 

In response, in 2000, Congress passed a law (Sec. 2002 of Public 

Law 106–386) that authorized funding to pay those judgments, in 

an amount equal to the assets then frozen in Iran’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) account held by the U.S.—around 400 million dollars—the very amounts recently handed over to Iran. 

When the American victims accepted those payments, their 

claims were subrogated to the United States, meaning that their 

claims against Iran became the United States Government’s claims 

against Iran. Although the immediate funding came from American 

taxpayers, Congress required the President to go after Iran for reimbursement of those hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars, 

using the FMS balance as leverage. 

Section 2002(c) of Public Law106–386 clearly states that ‘‘no 

funds shall be paid to Iran, or released to Iran . . . from the Foreign Military Sales Fund, until such subrogated claims have been 

dealt with to the satisfaction of the United States.’’ However the 

Administration appears to have wiped away the claims against 

Iran for those funds as part of this settlement, letting Iran off the 

hook for those hundreds of millions of dollars. 

HEARINGS

During the 114th Congress, the committee has continued its active oversight regarding Iran, including numerous hearings related 

to Iran’s support for terrorism, regional destabilization, proliferation and missile activities, and detention of American citizens, including but not limited to: 


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May 12, 2016—Full Committee: ‘‘Terrorism, Missiles, and 

Corruption: The Risks of Economic Engagement with Iran.’’ 

Hon. Juan C. Zarate, Chairman, Financial Integrity Network; 

Mr. Mark Dubowitz, Executive Director, Foundation for the 

Defense of Democracies; Ms. Elizabeth Rosenberg, Senior Fellow and Director, Energy, Economics, and Security Program, 

Center for a New American Security. 

February 11, 2016—Full Committee: ‘‘Iran Nuclear Deal 

Oversight: Implementation and Its Consequences.’’ Hon. Stephen D. Mull, Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation, U.S. Department of State; Mr. John Smith, Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the 

Treasury. 

December 2, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Fueling Middle East Turmoil.’’ Mr. Ali 

Alfoneh, Senior Fellow, Foundation Defense of Democracies; 

Mr. Scott Modell, Managing Director, The Rapidan Group; Mr. 

Daniel Benjamin, Norman E. McCulloch Jr. Director, The John 

Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College (former Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator 

for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State). 

July 28, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Iran Nuclear Agreement: 

The Administration’s Case.’’ The Honorable John F. Kerry, 

Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State; The Honorable 

Jacob Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, U.S. Department of the 

Treasury; The Honorable Ernest Moniz, Secretary of Energy, 

U.S. Department of Energy. 

June 2, 2015—Full Committee: ‘‘Americans Detained in 

Iran.’’ Mr. Ali Rezaian (brother of Jason Rezaian); Mrs. 

Naghmeh Abedini (wife of Saeed Abedini); Ms. Sarah Hekmati 

(sister of Amir Hekmati); Mr. Daniel Levinson (son of Robert 

Levinson). 

June 9, 2016—Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade and the Committee on Armed 

Services’ Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: 

‘‘Stopping the Money Flow: The War on Terror Finance.’’ Hon. 

Daniel Glaser, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, 

U.S. Department of the Treasury; Mr. Andrew Keller, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Counter Threat Finance and Sanctions, 

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of 

State; Ms. Theresa Whelan, Acting Assistant Secretary for 

Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department of 

Defense; Mr. William Woody, Chief of Law Enforcement, U.S. 

Fish and Wildlife Service. 

March 22, 2016—Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa: ‘‘Hezbollah’s Growing Threat Against U.S. National Security Interests in the Middle East.’’ Matthew Levitt, 

Ph.D., Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Mr. Tony 

Badran, Research Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., Professor, Security Studies 

Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 

September 17, 2015—Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa: ‘‘Major Beneficiaries of the Iran Deal: IRGC and 


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Hezbollah.’’ Emanuele Ottolenghi, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., 

Fromer-Wexler Fellow, Director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy; Suzanne Maloney, Ph.D., Interim Deputy Director, Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. 

July 28, 2015—Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on Asia and the 

Pacific, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade, and Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa: ‘‘The Iran-North Korea Strategic Alliance.’’ Mr. Ilan Berman, Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council; Ms. 

Claudia Rosett, Journalist-in-Residence, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Larry Niksch, Ph.D., Senior Associate, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jim Walsh, 

Ph.D., Research Associate, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

June 10, 2015—Joint Hearing: Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and 

Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces: ‘‘Iran’s Enduring Ballistic Missile Threat.’’ Lieutenant 

General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Retired (former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency); The Honorable Robert Joseph, 

Ph.D., Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy 

(former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security); David A. Cooper, Ph.D., James V. Forrestal 

Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College; Anthony H. Cordesman, Ph.D., 

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. 

March 18, 2015—Joint Hearing: Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and Subcommittee on the Western 

Hemisphere: ‘‘Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere.’’ 

Mr. Joseph Humire, Author; Mr. Dardo Lopez-Dolz (former 

Vice Minister of Interior of Peru); Mr. Scott Modell, Senior Advisor, The Rapidan Group; and Mr. Michael Shifter, President, 

Inter-American Dialogue. 

February 11, 2015—Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: ‘‘State Sponsor of Terror: The Global 

Threat of Iran.’’ Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D., Christopher 

DeMuth Chair and Director, Critical Threats Project, American 

Enterprise Institute; Mr. Ilan I. Berman, Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council; Mr. Tony Badran, Research Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; and Daniel L. 

Byman, Ph.D., Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund 

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

On September 14, 2016, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

marked up H.R. 5931 in open session, pursuant to notice. 

1) Rep. Engel offered an amendment, Engel 291 (in the nature 

of a substitute), which was not agreed to, by a roll call vote 

of 16 ayes and 21 noes. 


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Voting YES: Engel, Sherman, Meeks, Sires, Connolly, Higgins, Keating, Grayson, Bera, Lowenthal, Meng, Frankel, 

Gabbard, Castro, Kelly, Boyle. 

Voting NO: Royce, Smith (NJ), Ros-Lehtinen, Chabot, Wilson, McCaul, Salmon, Issa, Marino, Duncan, Brooks, Cook, 

Weber, Perry, DeSantis, Meadows, Yoho, Ribble, Trott, 

Zeldin, Donovan. 

2) Rep. Zeldin offered an amendment, Zeldin 46 (augmenting 

reporting requirements for future U.S. settlements with 

Iran), which was agreed to by voice vote. 

H.R. 5931, as amended, was agreed to by a roll call vote of 21 

ayes and 16 noes. 

Voting YES: Royce, Smith (NJ), Ros-Lehtinen, Chabot, Wilson, McCaul, Salmon, Issa, Marino, Duncan, Brooks, Cook, 

Weber, Perry, DeSantis, Meadows, Yoho, Ribble, Trott, Zeldin, 

Donovan. 

Voting NO: Engel, Sherman, Meeks, Sires, Connolly, Higgins, Keating, Grayson, Bera, Lowenthal, Meng, Frankel, 

Gabbard, Castro, Kelly, Boyle. 

H.R. 5931, as amended, was ordered favorably reported to the 

House, by voice vote. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The performance goals and objectives of H.R. 5931 are: 

• To prohibit the payment of ransom to Iran to secure the release of hostages; 

• To prohibit the United States Government from making payments to Iran in cash or other hard to trace, cash-like forms 

of exchange, such as bearer bonds, so long as Iran remains designated as a state sponsor of terrorism or primary money laundering concern; 

• To ensure that Congress has greater insight and transparency 

regarding outstanding claims and likely settlements before the 

Iran-United States Claims Tribunal; 

• To ensure that Congress receives substantial advance notice of: 

future settlement payments to Iran; claims, counter-claims, 

and subrogated claims affected by such settlements; and recipients of settlement payments; and 

• To ensure that future settlement payments to Iran are in the 

best interests of the United States. 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee reports that findings and 

recommendations of the committee, based on oversight activities 

under clause 2(b)(1) of House Rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report, particularly in the ‘‘Background 

and Purpose’’ and ‘‘Section-by-Section Analysis’’ sections. 


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NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND FEDERAL

MANDATES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104–4), the committee adopts as 

its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, tax expenditure or revenues, and Federal mandates contained 

in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional 

Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget 

Act of 1974. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, September 16, 2016. 

Hon. EDWARD R. ROYCE, Chairman, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5931, the Prohibiting Future Ransom Payments to Iran Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita D’Monte, who can 

be reached at 226–2840. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure 

cc: Honorable Eliot L. Engel 

Ranking Member 

H.R. 5931—Prohibiting Future Ransom Payments to Iran Act. 

As reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 14, 2016. 

H.R. 5931 would prohibit the Government of the United States 

from making payments to the Government of Iran through promissory notes (including currency) issued by the United States or any 

foreign government. In addition, the bill would require that payments to settle any claim being considered by the special tribunal 

to resolve disputes between Iran and the United States be made 

pursuant to a license from the Department of the Treasury and 

after providing certain notifications to the Congress. Finally, the 

legislation would require the President to report to the Congress on 

outstanding claims before the tribunal. 

Based on an analysis of information from the Department of 

State, CBO expects that there will be no payments made to Iran 

in the near future resulting from cases being considered by the tribunal. However, it is possible that payments related to such cases 

might be made later in the 2017–2026 period; those payments 

would be treated as direct spending. Enacting the bill would impose limitations on the ability of the Federal Government to make 

such payments to Iran and thus could reduce direct spending; 

therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. However, CBO has no 


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basis for estimating the timing or amounts of those effects, if any. 

Enacting the bill would not affect revenues. 

In addition, CBO estimates that implementing the reporting and 

notification requirements under H.R. 5931 would cost less than 

$500,000 over the 2017–2021 period; such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5931 would not increase net 

direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 

10-year periods beginning in 2027. 

H.R. 5931 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Sunita D’Monte. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

DIRECTED RULE MAKING

Pursuant to clause 3(c) of House Rule XIII, as modified by section 3(i) of H. Res. 5 during the 114th Congress, the committee 

notes that H.R. 5931 contains no directed rule-making provisions. 

NON-DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to clause 3(c) of House Rule XIII, as modified by section 3(g)(2) of H. Res. 5 during the 114th Congress, the committee 

states that no provision of this bill establishes or reauthorizes a 

program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included in any report 

from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to 

section 21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

H.R. 5931 does not apply to terms and conditions of employment 

or to access to public services or accommodations within the legislative branch. 

NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES

H.R. 5931 does not establish or authorize any new advisory committees. 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

H.R. 5931 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses 9(e), 9(f), and 

9(g) of House Rule XXI. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short Title. The ‘‘Prohibiting Future Ransom Payments to Iran Act.’’ 

Section 2. Findings. Cites concerns that the Obama Administration violated longstanding U.S. policy by releasing prisoners and 

paying ransom for the return of Americans held hostage by Iran, 


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a designated state sponsor of terrorism and primary money laundering concern. 

Section 3. Statement of Policy. States that it remains U.S. policy 

not to pay ransom or release prisoners in order to obtain the release of U.S. citizens taken hostage abroad. 

Section 4. Prohibition on Cash Payments to the Government of 

Iran. Prohibits the U.S. Government from making any direct or indirect payments to Iran in U.S. or foreign currency, as well as 

cash-like forms of exchange, such as bearer bonds. 

Provides for greater transparency by requiring that any payment 

to fulfill claims brought before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal be 

made in accordance with the prohibition on cash payments, and be 

made pursuant to a specific license by the Department of Treasury, 

with the payment amount and method published in the Federal 

Register. 

Maintains these restrictions until Iran is no longer designated as 

a state sponsor of terrorism or primary money laundering concern. 

Section 5. Report on Outstanding Claims before the Iran-United 

States Claims Tribunal. Requires the Administration to regularly 

report to Congress on the status of any claims pending before the 

Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, including the likelihood that the claims 

will be resolved. 

Section 6. Notification and Certification Relating to Settlements 

of Outstanding Claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Requires the President to notify Congress at least 30 days 

before making a payment to Iran to settle a claim brought before 

the tribunal. 

The notification must include: (1) the total amount of the payment and how any interest on the payment was calculated, (2) a 

legal analysis of why the settlement was agreed to, and description 

of all the claims and counter-claims it covers, (3) a certification 

that the payment is not a ransom to secure the release of hostages 

held by Iran, (4) an identification of the Iranian Government entity 

that will receive the payment, (5) a certification that the payment 

will not support foreign terrorist organizations or the regime of 

Bashar al-Assad in Syria, (6) whether an equal amount of Iranian 

funds are available in the U.S. to satisfy judgments against Iran 

by victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism, (7) a copy of the settlement agreement, (8) a description of the disposition of any related 

claims that had been subrogated to the U.S. Government, and (9) 

a certification that the settlement is in the best interests of the 

United States. 

Section 7. Exclusion of Certain Activities. Ensures that this Act 

does not negatively impact the work of U.S. intelligence agencies. 

Section 8. Rules of Construction. Clarifies that nothing in this 

Act should be construed to authorize any payment by the Government of the United States to the Government of Iran. 

Section 9. Definitions. Defines ‘‘Government of Iran’’ and ‘‘IranUnited States Claims Tribunal.’’ 


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DISSENTING VIEWS

H.R. 5931, the Prohibiting Future Ransom Payments to Iran Act, 

continues the Majority’s false narrative that the United States Government paid a ransom for four American prisoners who were held 

in Iran. Moreover, several of the ‘‘findings’’ are inaccurate and the 

key provision is inappropriate. 

For those of us who are deeply concerned about Iran, there is a 

need to clarify and strengthen the Congressional oversight role regarding United States policy toward Iran. Unfortunately, this partisan bill, about which Democrats were never consulted during the 

drafting, does not meet that need. 

In December 2015, the United States Government settled a longstanding claim with the Government of Iran regarding weapons 

sales to Iran which were never delivered due to the 1979 Iranian 

revolution. The principal of the claim was $400 million, and in the 

recent settlement the parties agreed that the United States would 

also pay $1.3 billion in accrued interest (for a total of $1.7 billion).The settlement was announced on January 17, 2016. 

The 1981 Algiers Accords, which freed 52 American hostages 

trapped in Iran for 444 days, created the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal 

to resolve outstanding claims between the two countries. There are 

still over one thousand Iranian claims that have yet to be resolved 

at the Tribunal. All U.S. citizen claims against Iran that were registered under the Algiers Accords have been resolved, resulting in 

approximately $2.5 billion in payments to Americans. 

Payment of the $1.7 billion to Iran under the settlement coincided with Implementation Day (January 16, 2016), the day that 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that 

Iran had implemented the JCPOA nuclear deal and the United 

States and others would lift nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. The 

payment also coincided with the release of four Iranian-American 

prisoners. 

The Administration has categorically denied that this payment 

was a ransom (which would, almost by definition, be a payment of 

U.S. money, not Iranian money in exchange for the 4 American detainees). The Administration acknowledges that it used the payment that the U.S. owed Iran as leverage to ensure that the prisoner release went smoothly. 

Last month, a Wall Street Journal article revealed that the payment was made in cash. Although the Administration had, indeed, 

briefed Congressional leaders about the $1.7 billion settlement, the 

modality of the payment—in cash—was not made clear at the time 

that the payment was made in January. A cash transaction was 

not required in this settlement; however the settlement reportedly 

required immediate payment, which would have been exceedingly 

difficult to execute by wire transfer, considering the slow pace of 

Iranian access to banks, even to its own assets. 


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Further, the Administration argues that Iran is having difficulty 

using its financial assets due to fear within the banking sector of 

running afoul of U.S. sanctions. Members of Congress on both sides 

of the aisle are concerned about cash transactions with Iran because Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern. However, it is important to note 

that after Iran takes possession of the money—whether provided in 

cash, check or wire transfer—it is impossible to know where and 

how the money is allocated, so it could be argued that the type of 

transaction is immaterial. 

Additionally, the bill does not accomplish what it sets out to do. 

It does not restrict cash payments to Iran. Section 4 of the bill prohibits the United States from providing directly or indirectly 

‘‘promissory notes’’ including currency issued by the U.S. Government or a foreign government to the Government of Iran. The term 

‘‘promissory note’’ is not defined in this legislation. It could be defined as a written agreement between two parties that relates to 

the payment of an obligation. A promissory note contains the 

names of parties, an amount due, an interest rate to be applied and 

a payment schedule. 

Although the United States did not give Iran a promissory note 

in this instance, nevertheless the definition of ‘‘promissory note’’ in 

this legislation could be interpreted broadly as including cash, wire 

transfer or check, or it could be interpreted so narrowly as to not 

even include cash—the purported purpose of the bill. If applied 

broadly, the prohibition would bar virtually any payment from the 

United States to the Government of Iran, thus putting the United 

States in violation of the Algiers Accords. 

The bill would effectively remove the President’s ability to settle 

Hague Tribunal claims with Iran for the foreseeable and indefinite 

future by requiring certification and notifications that the President cannot realistically make. Under the bill, payments pursuant 

to a settlement would only be allowed if the President certified that 

that, among other things, the settlement is not a ransom for individuals held hostage by Iran and that the funds provided by the 

settlement would not be used to fund terrorism or support the 

Assad regime. The President would also be required to identify 

whether an equal amount of Iranian funds would be available and 

accessible in the United States to satisfy judgments against Iran 

by victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism. Not only does this saddle settlements or judgments reached under the Algiers Accords 

with a heavy new burden, preventing settlements with Iran is, in 

many cases, to Iran’s benefit, since settling prevents cases from 

going to judgment, where the U.S. taxpayer could face even greater 

liability. 

We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s behavior. According to 

the State Department, Iran remains the leading State Sponsor of 

Terrorism. President Obama said in August 2015, ‘‘We have no illusions about the Iranian Government, or the significance of the Revolutionary Guard and the Quds Force. Iran supports terrorist organizations like Hezbollah. It supports proxy groups that threaten 

our interests and the interests of our allies—including proxy 

groups who killed our troops in Iraq. They try to destabilize our 

Gulf partners.’’ Our focus must remain at preventing and conVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:07 Sep 21, 2016 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR767.XXX HR767

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fronting Iran’s malign activities. However, this bill is not a serious 

effort at affecting U.S. policy toward Iran. Without any input from 

the minority, we are left to conclude that this is a partisan stunt. 

Therefore, we are opposing this bill with the hopes that the Majority will return Iran policy and foreign policy back to its bipartisan roots. Our country is stronger when we work together to affect change in these urgent national security issues. 

ELIOT L. ENGEL. 

BRAD SHERMAN. 

GREGORY W. MEEKS. 

ALBIO SIRES. 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY. 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH. 

BRIAN HIGGINS. 

KAREN BASS. 

WILLIAM KEATING. 

DAVID CICILLINE. 

ALAN GRAYSON. 

AMI BERA. 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL. 

GRACE MENG. 

LOIS FRANKEL. 

TULSI GABBARD. 

JOAQUIN CASTRO. 

ROBIN L. KELLY. 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE. 

Æ 


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