COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00186-CR

HAIDAR KADHIM SHUKAYE AL-SAADY APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1249107D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Haidar Kadhim Shukaye Al-Saady appeals from his conviction 

for possession of a controlled substance. In two points, Appellant argues that the 

trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

I. BACKGROUND

A. PRETRIAL

On September 14, 2011, Appellant was indicted for the possession of 4 

grams or more, but less than 200 grams, of methamphetamine. See Tex. Health 

& Safety Code Ann. § 481.115 (West 2010). On August 12, 2012, Appellant filed

a pretrial motion to suppress, arguing that he was arrested and searched without 

probable cause or a warrant and that his truck was searched without probable 

cause or a warrant, which required the suppression of the methamphetamine 

found on Appellant and in his truck. Appellant agreed to have the trial court 

determine the motion during the trial. See generally Black v. State, 362 S.W.3d 

626, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (recognizing pretrial motion to suppress is a 

specialized admissibility objection that may or may not be heard before trial);

Roberts v. State, 545 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding 

defendant may either file pretrial motion to suppress or wait to object at trial to 

admission of unlawfully-obtained evidence).

B. TRIAL AND MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The trial was held on April 24, 2013. Michael Morelli, an aircraft mechanic 

at Arlington Municipal Airport, testified that on August 2, 2011, he was returning 

to work after his lunch break. After entering his security code at the gate to drive 

into a secured area of the airport, Morelli noticed a truck follow him into the 

restricted area. He parked and walked back to the truck, which had parked 

directly behind Morelli. The lone occupant of the truck was Appellant, a “Middle 
3

Eastern guy” who was sweating,2had bloodshot eyes, and was “a little 

disoriented.” Morelli had a difficult time talking to Appellant because of a 

presumed language barrier. When Morelli asked Appellant what he needed, 

Appellant said that he was looking for his friend and asked for some water while 

holding up a Prestone Anti-Freeze gallon jug. Morelli became “uneasy” and left 

Appellant to alert his supervisors.

When Morelli’s supervisors arrived, Appellant asked “if he could get some 

gasoline” while holding up the Prestone jug. The supervisors immediately told 

Appellant he had to leave the secured area, left Appellant in his truck, and called 

“airport authorities.” The airport authorities contacted local police. Corporal Dale 

Horton with the Arlington Police Department was dispatched to the airport to 

investigate a report that an unauthorized vehicle had entered the airport and had 

parked in a restricted area. When Horton arrived, Appellant was no longer in the 

truck, and a witness told him that Appellant had fled to a nearby rental-car 

building.

Horton found Appellant in the rental-car building and noted that Appellant 

was “sweating profusely, appeared to be very disoriented,” had glassy eyes, and 

smelled of marijuana. Based on his training and experience, Horton “believed 

that [Appellant] was on some kind of drug.” Horton searched Appellant and 

found a clear plastic baggie containing .63 grams of methamphetamine, another 

 

2Morelli stated it was understandable that Appellant was sweating on a hot 

August day in Texas.
4

clear plastic baggie filled with a “green leafy substance” that Horton believed to 

be marijuana, and a small marijuana cigarette. Horton also found a pocket scale 

with marijuana residue. Horton arrested Appellant and reported what he had 

found to other officers at the scene. Horton then told two officers to secure the 

airport and separately secure the truck. Horton left for the jail with Appellant, and 

Lieutenant Jeff Pugh3took “control” of the scene.

Pugh instructed Arlington Officer Brian Hamilton to search Appellant’s 

truck. Pugh explained to Hamilton that Appellant had driven the truck into a 

restricted area and was in custody for possession of a controlled substance. 

Hamilton and Officer Ray Morales, a police officer for the City of Arlington, 

searched the truck and found a nylon shaving kit on the floorboard behind the 

passenger seat, containing Appellant’s wallet and a pill bottle for an expired 

prescription for “Charles Bednar.” Hamilton could see baggies in the bottle. 

When he opened the bottle, Hamilton found two empty baggies, one baggie 

containing 11.48 grams of methamphetamine, and one baggie containing .50 

grams of methamphetamine.

During the trial but outside the presence of the jury, Appellant raised his 

motion to suppress, initially arguing that the drugs found in the truck should be 

suppressed. The trial court denied the motion:

 

3

It appears Pugh was also with the Arlington Police Department.
5

With the totality of the circumstances involved in this matter, the 

Court is going to find that the officer did have probable cause to 

search the vehicle. 

Again, this is not a search incident to arrest, but the Court 

independently finds from all the circumstances involved that 

probable cause exists for the search of the vehicle.

So I’m going to deny the motion to suppress that’s been filed 

at this time.

Appellant then argued that because Morelli testified that he had seized the drugs 

from Appellant before the arrest, those drugs and the scale should have been 

suppressed. The trial court denied that motion as well with no explanatory 

comments. Appellant did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 

none were entered. See generally State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006) (recognizing trial court must make findings and conclusions 

regarding motion to suppress upon request of the losing party).

The jury found Appellant guilty, and he elected to have the trial court 

assess his punishment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 2 (West 

Supp. 2013). The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at twelve years’ 

confinement. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a subsequent motion for new 

trial. The new-trial motion summarily asserted that the judgment was “contrary to 

the law and the evidence” and that “the evidence [was] insufficient to establish 

the Defendant’s gu[i]lt.” The motion for new trial was overruled by operation of 

law. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(c).
6

II. LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE

In two issues, Appellant argues that the drugs found on him before his 

arrest and the drugs found in the truck should have been suppressed. 

Specifically, he contends that (1) the search of his person was not based on 

probable cause because he was “lawfully in the Enterprise rental car building 

when he was first accosted by law enforcement” and (2) the search of his truck 

was not based on probable cause because any probable cause to search 

Appellant did not extend to Appellant’s truck and because there were no facts to 

support an exception to the warrant requirement.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

We give almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical fact 

because it is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence, but 

review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those facts. Amador, 221 

S.W.3d at 673; Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); 

Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 

68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Because the trial was not 

requested to enter and did not enter explicit findings of historical fact, we review 

the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. GarciaCantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Weide, 214 S.W.3d at 
7

25. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo. State v. Kelly, 204 

S.W.3d 808, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We must uphold the trial court’s ruling 

if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to 

the case, even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. 

Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 

S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 

seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 

24. To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, 

the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the 

presumption of proper police conduct. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672; see Young 

v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1093

(2009). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure 

occurred without a warrant. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672. Once the defendant 

has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then 

required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a 

warrant or was reasonable. Id. at 672–73; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005).

Whether a search is reasonable is a question of law that we review 

de novo. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

Reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances. Id.
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at 63. It requires a balancing of the public interest and the individual’s right to be 

free from arbitrary detentions and intrusions. Id.

B. SEARCH OF APPELLANT

Appellant argues that there was no probable cause to search him because 

he was not in the restricted area when he was found and that the search could 

not have been incident to his arrest because he was searched before he was 

arrested. The State seems to agree that there was no warrant to search 

Appellant and that the burden shifted to the State to establish an exception to the 

warrant requirement. See Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007) (noting warrantless search of a person may be justified “if police have 

probable cause coupled with an exigent circumstance, or they have obtained 

voluntary consent, or they conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest”).

The totality of the circumstances showed that Morelli reasonably could 

have concluded that an offense was or would be committed and that Appellant 

was in a suspicious place, which is an exception to the warrant requirement for 

making an arrest. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 

2013). Indeed, probable cause to search exists when reasonably trustworthy 

facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would 

lead persons of reasonable prudence to believe that an instrumentality of a crime 

or evidence pertaining to a crime will be found. Dahlem v. State, 322 S.W.3d 

685, 689 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d). At the time Morelli searched 

Appellant, Morelli knew that Appellant had driven onto a restricted area of the 
9

airport, asked for water and gasoline, left his truck unattended, appeared 

disoriented, and reeked of marijuana. The totality of the circumstances 

established sufficient probable cause to search Appellant. See Jordan v. State, 

394 S.W.3d 58, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (recognizing 

smell of marijuana emanating from defendant sufficient probable cause to justify 

search). Further, the facts known to police indicating that Appellant possessed 

contraband, had prior access to the truck, had left his truck in a restricted area of 

an airport, and had asked for gasoline—an explosive—established the presence 

of exigent circumstances that, when coupled with probable cause, sufficiently 

excused the warrant requirement. See Foster v. State, 101 S.W.3d 490, 496 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Perez v. State, 514 

S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Fineron v. State, 201 S.W.3d 361, 366–

67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.). Thus, the State established that the 

warrantless search of Appellant was reasonable under a well-recognized 

exception to the warrant requirement.

Additionally, because the totality of the circumstances known by Morelli 

before the search would have caused a prudent person to believe Appellant, who 

was found in a suspicious place, had committed or was committing an offense, 

the search was lawful as incident to the subsequent arrest. See State v. Ballard, 

987 S.W.2d 889, 893 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 

and Seizure § 5.4(a) (5th ed. 2012). It is irrelevant that the arrest occurred 

immediately after the search because sufficient probable cause existed for 
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Morelli to arrest Appellant before the search. See Ballard, 987 S.W.2d at 892; 

Branch v. State, 335 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d), cert. 

denied, 132 S. Ct. 1548 (2012). Because the search was incident to a lawful 

arrest supported by probable cause, the State met its burden to establish the 

search was reasonable under this exception to the warrant requirement.4 See 

generally Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87, 89 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (listing five 

exceptions to the warrant requirement, including search incident to a lawful 

arrest).

C. SEARCH OF THE TRUCK

Appellant next contends that the search of his truck was unlawful because 

neither exigent circumstances nor any other exception to the warrant requirement 

existed. The focus of his argument appears to be that the probable cause 

justifying his arrest and the search of his person cannot be extended to justify the 

warrantless search of his truck. Once again, the State recognizes that a warrant 

was not procured, shifting the burden to the State to establish the 

reasonableness of the search under an exception to the warrant requirement.

One exception to the warrant requirement is the so-called automobile 

exception. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. 

denied, 555 U.S. 1154 (2009). Under this exception, if probable cause to search 

 

4

Indeed, Appellant seems to recognize that the search of his person was 

lawful by acknowledging the presence of articulable facts indicating Appellant 

had committed criminal trespass and appeared to be intoxicated.
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a vehicle exists, a showing of exigent circumstances authorizing a warrantless 

search is not required. Id. at 283 & n.68; see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 

347, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (“If there is probable cause to believe a 

vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, [Court precedent] authorizes a 

[broad] search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.”); 

Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Under the 

automobile exception, law enforcement officials may conduct a warrantless 

search of a vehicle if it is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe 

that it contains contraband.”).

The totality of the circumstances shows that probable cause existed to 

justify the search of Appellant’s truck: Appellant had parked his truck in a 

restricted area of the airport, asked for water and gasoline, left his truck 

unattended after being told to move it, and was noticeably under the influence of 

drugs.5 The facts within the knowledge of the officers would have led them to 

believe the instrumentalities of a crime would be discovered in the truck. Cf. 

State v. Ogeda, 315 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. ref’d) 

 

5We note that even if exigent circumstances were required to justify the 

search of the truck, these facts would certainly establish such an emergency. A 

disoriented person leaving a truck unattended in a restricted area of an airport 

after asking for gasoline would indicate such an emergency and a possible public 

danger justifying a search of the truck. See United States v. Boettger, 71 F.3d 

1410, 1413–17 (8th Cir. 1995); Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 805, 810–11 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d); 3 LaFave, supra, at § 7.4(c).
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(delineating facts supporting probable cause to justify search of car without a 

warrant based on defendant’s public intoxication).

III. CONCLUSION

Implying the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court’s 

rulings and reviewing the legal rulings de novo, we conclude that the State met 

its burden to justify the warrantless searches of Appellant and his truck. Thus, 

the motion to suppress was correctly denied. We overrule Appellant’s issues and 

affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Lee Gabriel

LEE GABRIEL

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 17, 2014