[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-10023

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A095-226-437

FNU LENA, 

a.k.a. Sari Wati,

 Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

________________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(August 21, 2014)

Before PRYOR, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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FNU Lena, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) 

denial of asylum.

1

 Lena had been granted asylum previously in 2002, but the 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) terminated that 

asylum because her previous application, prepared by someone else, contained 

fraudulent information. After review,2 we deny Lena’s petition for review in part 

and dismiss in part. 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Eligibility for Asylum

Lena asserts that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s 

determination she was ineligible for asylum. She contends she established past 

persecution and a well-founded fear of persecution on account of being an ethnic 

Chinese and a Christian. 

 1

 The order also affirmed the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal and relief under the 

United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). However, Lena has abandoned any 

challenge to the denial of her application for withholding of removal or CAT relief. See 

Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (“When an appellant fails 

to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned.”). 

2

 We review legal determinations de novo, Alturo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 716 F.3d 1310, 

1313 (11th Cir. 2013), and review factual determinations under the substantial evidence test, 

Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “We must affirm the 

BIA’s decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 

considered as a whole.” Id. at 1027 (quotations omitted). To reverse factual findings, we must 

find that the record not only supports reversal, but compels it. Id.

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An applicant for asylum must meet the definition of a refugee. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1). The definition of “refugee” includes:

any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . 

and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling 

to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To establish eligibility, the applicant must, “with 

specific and credible evidence, demonstrate (1) past persecution on account of a 

statutorily listed factor, or (2) a ‘well-founded fear’ that the statutorily listed factor 

will cause future persecution.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th 

Cir. 2006). 

The record does not compel a finding that Lena suffered past persecution on 

account of being an ethnic Chinese and Christian. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Persecution is an extreme concept, 

requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, 

and . . . mere harassment does not amount to persecution.” (quotations omitted)). 

While the BIA did not state explicitly that it was considering the alleged incidents 

of past persecution cumulatively, it noted its agreement with the IJ’s determination 

that Lena did not establish past persecution. The IJ considered the cumulative 

impact of the events Lena experienced, which included being (1) called derogatory 

names on multiple occasions, (2) assaulted during a Muslim fasting period because 

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she was drinking a beverage, (3) scared to leave her house for two days during the 

1998 riots in which Chinese were killed, raped, and robbed, and (4) robbed and 

assaulted on her way to church on Christmas day. When compared to our 

precedent, this mistreatment does not constitute persecution. Compare Delgado v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 859, 861-62 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding past 

persecution based on the cumulative effects of (1) an attack where masked men 

fired unloaded weapons at the aliens, (2) an attack that included a severe beating, 

(3) the continued phone threats, and (4) two occasions where one of the alien’s car 

brakes were cut), with Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (concluding a four-day detention, including a five-hour interrogation 

and beating that did not result in any physical harm, accompanied by postincarceration monitoring, did not compel a conclusion of persecution), Djonda v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding a 36-hour 

detention in a small cell shared by 12 people, as well as multiple beatings, one of 

which involved a belt and resulted in scratches and bruises, did not compel the 

conclusion the petitioner suffered persecution), and Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 

(holding the bombing of the restaurant at which the alien worked and telephone 

calls and threats made to the alien, alien’s brother, and other members of a 

university group did not compel a finding of past persecution). 

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Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that 

Lena did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution because her fear was 

not objectively reasonable. See Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1257 (explaining if an applicant 

cannot demonstrate past persecution, eligibility for asylum may be established by 

showing a well-founded fear of future persecution that is subjectively genuine and 

objectively reasonable). The 2011 Religious Freedom Report states the 

government protects religious freedom and recognizes Protestantism as an official 

religion. While there have been instances of religious intolerance against 

Christians, the Issue Paper showed the government was taking steps to bring those 

responsible to justice. In recent years, there has been a dramatic drop in 

religiously-motivated violence against Christians. While the articles Lena 

submitted showed evidence of instances of religious intolerance, they do not 

compel a finding of a well-founded fear of persecution. The 2011 State 

Department materials acknowledge such instances of religiously-motivated 

violence while indicating that religious intolerance has decreased in recent years. 

Lena did not submit any materials that showed recent mistreatment of Chinese 

Christians. Moreover, Lena’s testimony that her mother, a Chinese Christian 

woman, continues to live in the country, supports the BIA’s decision.3

 

 3

 Lena’s argument that the BIA failed to apply the “disfavored group” analysis to 

Chinese Indonesians in determining whether there was a pattern or practice of persecution was 

raised for the first time on appeal, and therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review it. See AmayaCase: 14-10023 Date Filed: 08/21/2014 Page: 5 of 9 
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B. Termination of Asylum

Lena also asserts the BIA erred in its conclusion that the USCIS had the 

authority to terminate her prior grant of asylum. She bases this argument on the 

differing language of the statutes addressing the grant or termination of asylum. 

The statue providing for a grant of asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A),

provides “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant 

asylum to an alien” if the alien has properly applied for asylum and is a refugee as 

defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).” (Emphasis added). The statute providing 

for termination of asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2), provides that a grant of asylum 

“may be terminated if the Attorney General determines that” any of several 

conditions are met, including if the alien no longer meets the conditions described 

in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). (Emphasis added). The regulation addressing 

termination of asylum states, however, that “[a]n asylum officer [of the USCIS] 

may terminate a grant of asylum made under the jurisdiction of [the] USCIS if, 

following an interview, the asylum officer determines” that “[t]here is a showing of 

fraud in the alien’s application such that he or she was not eligible for asylum at 

the time it was granted.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a)(1). Lena argues that, looking to the 

plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2), only the Attorney General has the 

 

Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating if a petitioner has 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, we lack jurisdiction to consider the claim). 

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authority to terminate her prior grant of asylum. She finds support for this 

argument in Nijjar v. Holder, 689 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012), which holds

that “Congress did not confer the authority to terminate asylum on the Department 

of Homeland Security [DHS]. Congress conferred that authority exclusively on 

the Department of Justice.”

Prior to the inception of the DHS, the Attorney General delegated the 

authority over asylum claims, including the termination of grants of asylum, to the 

Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the 

Executive Office for Immigration Review. Nijjar, 689 F.3d at 1078; see also

Pierre v. Rivkind, 825 F.2d 1501, 1504 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[the] INS, under 

authority delegated to it by the Attorney General, may, in its discretion, grant an 

alien asylum”); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 32 n.9 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting the 

Attorney General’s authority in asylum matters was delegated to the INS). 

In 2003, the power formerly exercised by the INS Commissioner over 

“[a]djudications of asylum and refugee applications,” was transferred to the USCIS 

by section 451 of the Homeland Security Act. See 6 U.S.C. § 271(b) (providing 

“there are transferred from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to 

the Director of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services the following 

functions . . . (3) Adjudications of asylum and refugee applications . . . . [and] 

(5) All other adjudications performed by the [INS] immediately before [the 

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Homeland Security Act’s effective date]”). Additionally, in transferring functions 

from the INS to the DHS, 6 U.S.C. § 557 provided:

With respect to any function transferred by or under this chapter . . . , 

reference in any other Federal law to any department, commission, or 

agency or any officer or office the functions of which are so 

transferred shall be deemed to refer to the Secretary, other official, or 

component of [DHS] to which such function is so transferred. 

In Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., we held that, while the language of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1255(a) gave the authority to adjust the status of a nonimmigrant to that of a 

permanent resident to the Attorney General, Congress had “allocated jurisdiction 

over adjustment applications to both [the] DHS and the Department of Justice.” 

513 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). In making this

determination, we noted:

Section 1255(a) refers only to adjustment of status “by the Attorney 

General,” but Congress has transferred the adjudication functions of 

the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and his delegate in USCIS. 6 U.S.C. 

§ 271(b)(5); see also 6 U.S.C. § 577 (providing that references in 

federal law to any officer whose functions have been transferred to 

DHS shall be deemed to refer to DHS Secretary or other official). 

Id. at 1251 n.6. 

The BIA did not err in holding the USCIS had the authority to terminate 

Lena’s asylum status. Like the statute at issue in Scheerer, the language of the 

statute at issue here expressly delegated the authority to act only to the Attorney 

General. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2). However, as 

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was the case in Scheerer, this language does not limit the authority to act solely to 

the Attorney General. In reaching our conclusion in Scheerer, we specifically 

examined the transfer and statutory construction provisions of 6 U.S.C. §§ 271(b) 

and 557, concluding that “Congress has transferred the adjudication functions of 

the former [INS] to the Secretary of [the DHS] and his delegate in [the] USCIS.” 

513 F.3d at 1251 n.6. The adjudication functions of the INS included the 

adjudication of asylum. See Rivkind, 825 F.2d at 1504; Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 

32 n.9. Scheerer controls this case, and thus our precedent supports that the 

authority to terminate asylum transferred to the USCIS. See Scheerer, 513 F.3d at 

1251-52 & n.6. 

PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.

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