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DEMOCRACY SUPPORT STRATEGIES IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 18, 2016

Serial No. 114–216

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. D. Bruce Wharton, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................... 4

Mr. Thomas Staal, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development .............................................................................................................. 16

Mr. Steven Feldstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State ...................................... 26

Mr. Rushdi Nackerdien, regional director for Africa, International Foundation 

for Electoral Systems ........................................................................................... 44

Mr. Patrick Merloe, senior associate and director of election programs, National Democratic Institute ................................................................................. 64

Mr. John Tomaszewski, acting regional director for Africa, International Republican Institute ................................................................................................. 72

Mr. Nii Akuetteh, executive director, The African Immigrant Caucus ............... 85

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. D. Bruce Wharton: Prepared statement ......................................................... 6

Mr. Thomas Staal: Prepared statement ................................................................. 18

Mr. Steven Feldstein: Prepared statement ............................................................ 29

Mr. Rushdi Nackerdien: Prepared statement ....................................................... 46

Mr. Patrick Merloe: Prepared statement ............................................................... 67

Mr. John Tomaszewski: Prepared statement ........................................................ 74

Mr. Nii Akuetteh: Prepared statement .................................................................. 88

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 100

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 101

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York 102

(1)

DEMOCRACY SUPPORT STRATEGIES IN 

AFRICA 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order and first of all 

I want to say to our distinguished witness I apologize—and to our 

guests who are here—that we do have a series of votes that have 

just been called. 

But I would like to get my opening comments. My good friend 

and colleague, Karen Bass, the ranking member, will join us immediately after the votes and then we’ll just proceed with the hearing. 

But thank you for being here. Thank you for your patience with 

this delay while floor votes occur. 

The administration has increased funding for democracy in governance in Africa in the 2017 proposed budget by more than $168 

million from the actual Fiscal Year 2015 funding. 

Many of us in Congress, realizing the importance of helping to 

facilitate free, fair and transparent elections in Africa, have long 

supported funding increases in this area. So it’s very much welcomed. 

However, there are questions concerning the effective use of 

funds. According to the administration’s budget explanation for Fiscal Year 2017, ‘‘priority countries in Africa are falling behind in democracy, human rights, and governance, showing the deepest declines compared to other regions in the past 5 years.’’

The administration seems to have declined to intervene significantly in countries important to the U.S. interests such as Ghana, 

Equatorial Guinea, and Djibouti. Using Ghana as an example 

where the democracy funding request dipped slightly for Fiscal 

Year 2017, this hearing will examine U.S. electoral policy moving 

forward. 

In recent years, there has been a troubling trend in Africa toward leaders changing constitutions to allow them to run for a 

third term, not previously provided for in the law. 

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The administration indeed has urged the Presidents of Burundi 

and Rwanda, for example, not to go for a third term. Neither leader 

heeded the call for restraint in this regard. 

In Burundi, the third term has caused serious upheaval and violence, resulting in an attempted coup, killing dozens of people, a 

crackdown on civil liberties and nearly 484,000 people internally 

displaced or seeking asylum in other countries. This situation was 

caused by an election many felt was unacceptable. 

Other leaders, taking the Burundi and Rwanda example, are trying to seek extensions of their term in office as well. For example, 

Democratic Republic of the Congo’s President Joseph Kabila is 

faced with a Constitution that not only limits him to two terms but 

prevents him from changing the Constitution to accommodate extending his rule. 

However, President Kabila’s government is taking it slow in preparing for scheduled elections in November and is trying to undo 

the Constitution by requiring his continuing in office past the December 19 expiration of his mandate despite the constitutional restrictions. 

There was violence caused by an earlier Kabila attempt to 

change the Constitution and it has been widely predicted including 

by our own U.S. Department of State that even greater violence 

would result if the Kabila term is extended despite the constitutional bar for a third term. 

Even when election processes improve, problems can develop that 

cause mistrust which can lead to rejection of an election results 

and to more violence. 

Such results don’t fade away easily. In Ghana, extremely close 

elections in 2008 led to mistrust of the process, especially when one 

district had to revote and held the key to who would be President. 

Four years later, advanced biometric technology failed, casting 

further doubt in the minds of some voters. As one of our witnesses 

today will share with us, there are concerns for the elections later 

this year based on an accumulation of suspicions from past elections, even though the 2008 and 2012 were not judged by international observers to be particularly problematic. 

The case of Ghana points out key questions. When does the 

international community enter an election process and when does 

it exit? When do we know whether elections in a particular country 

need no further intervention? Does intervention have to be massive 

or are there tweaks in capacity building we can provide that will 

help make all the difference between an acceptable election or one 

in which voters refuse to accept the outcome? 

Election support is not merely a matter of money. It involves 

faith in the transparency and the fairness of the election process 

itself. The international community cannot achieve such trust 

among voters on our own. 

The country in question must experience a meeting of the minds 

between the ruling party and the government and the political opposition. 

There must be clear effective rules for elections that create a 

level playing field for all candidates and parties involved in the 

election process. Whatever flaws there may be in any election, the 

3

losing candidate must accept a legitimate loss and prepare for the 

next election. 

We look forward to hearing from our distinguished government 

witnesses about their strategies to effectively help governments 

hold free, fair, and transparent elections, and we look forward to 

our private witnesses as well to tell us how our strategies are 

working, what their recommendations are on how to make it even 

better. 

Again, we do have votes and the subcommittee will stand in recess for a brief period of time. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. DONOVAN [presiding]. I apologize to our witnesses and our 

guests. We just finished voting. Chairman Smith had another obligation. So my name is Dan Donovan. I’m a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and a member of the Subcommittee on 

Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizatons and I’ll be conducting the hearing. 

Let me introduce our first panel of witnesses. Ambassador Bruce 

Wharton, United States Department of State. Ambassador Bruce 

Wharton joined the African Bureau as Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary in December 2015. 

In his last assignment he served as the U.S. Ambassador to 

Zimbabwe from September 2012 to November 2015. He has served 

in several other positions with the African Bureau and in the Bureau of International Information Programs. 

Ambassador Wharton entered the Foreign Services in 1985 and 

has served in U.S. Embassies in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, South 

Africa, Guatemala, and Zimbabwe. In Africa he has also worked in 

Tanzania, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana. 

Mr. Thomas Staal is currently the acting Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 

Assistance at USAID. 

He has worked for USAID since 1988, beginning in Sudan as an 

emergency program officer, and has worked in the USAID regional 

office in Kenya managing food aid and project development 

throughout eastern and southern Africa. 

Most recently, Mr. Staal served as the USAID Mission Director 

in Ethiopia. Before joining USAID he worked with World Vision as 

their country representative in Sudan. 

Our third panelist is Mr. Steven Feldstein, U.S. Department of 

State. He is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau 

of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor where his primary responsibility is for work in Africa on international labor affairs and 

international religious freedom. 

Previously, Mr. Feldstein served as the director of the Office of 

Policy in the Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning at USAID 

and served as counsel on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations where he oversaw a portfolio that included oversight over all 

U.S. foreign assistance agencies, budgets and programs, State Department management and operations, and international organizations. 

I welcome all our panelists today and I thank you for your testimony you’re about to give. So we’ll start. Mr. Wharton, if you 

4

would give your remarks for the 5 minutes, Ambassador. Thank 

you very much. 

STATEMENT OF MR. D. BRUCE WHARTON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador WHARTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify 

today on democracy support strategies for Africa. 

While the people and governments of Africa have made significant strides in recent years, they and we must still address the 

challenges associated with the closing of political space in certain 

countries. 

Over the next few minutes I would like to talk about both the 

progress that’s been made and where more work still remains to 

be done. 

Our country has long been committed across administrations and 

party lines to partnering with the people and governments of Africa 

to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance. 

Strengthening democratic institutions is in fact the first pillar of 

President Obama’s 2012 Presidential Policy Directive for Africa. 

Now, in the past year there have been political openings and 

electoral successes in countries ranging in size from Cape Verde to 

Nigeria and including Burkina Faso, Senegal and Benin. 

I have had the honor of being part of U.S. delegations to several 

of the recent Presidential inaugurations. An election itself, though, 

is neither the beginning nor the end of democratic process. 

Even the democratically-elected leader may choose to ignore term 

limits, may manipulate the electoral process for personal advantage or may impose restrictions that impede opposition. 

We face such situations in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda, just 

to name a few. It’s vital that the United States stay the course 

with policies and programs that foster democracy in the long run, 

no matter how great the challenge. 

And democracy does not happen overnight. Instability, insecurity, corruption, and inequality stand in the way and that is why 

we must engage in aggressive diplomatic and assistance efforts to 

help resolve conflicts, implement peace agreements, support elections, and preserve democratic space and we have seen some successes. 

In the Central African Republic, for example, the recent peaceful 

election of President Touadera and the continuing democratic transition are positive steps. But sustained international attention is 

essential to ending the cycle of violence and helping create longterm stability. 

We are helping to build CAR’s judicial structure including development of its special criminal court. We are focusing on community-level peace and reconciliation and expanding access to justice 

through legal training and mobile courts. 

Nigeria’s 2015 elections were historic not just for sub-Saharan 

Africa’s most populous country and largest economy but for the entire continent. 

5

We work very hard up front at the highest levels of the administration to impress upon all parties the need for an election that 

was free, fair, credible, and peaceful and this is what Nigeria delivered. 

People showed up early to vote, stayed late to ensure their votes 

were counted, and ultimately elected a new government. This was 

the first peaceful democratic transfer of power to an opposition 

party in Nigeria in history and U.S.-Nigerian relations are stronger 

today than they have been in many years. 

Now we stand ready to support the commitments Nigeria made 

this month at the UK Anti-Corruption Summit on issues such as 

beneficial ownership, fiscal and tax transparency, asset recovery 

and open contracting. 

Opportunities and challenges abound. No fewer than 16 African 

countries have national elections this year. We will continue to 

support regular democratic transitions of power and speak out 

against those in power who seek to change constitutions to extend 

their own tenure. 

Regular democratic transitions provide opportunities for Africans 

to participate in the political process and hold their governments 

accountable while contributing to the stability across the continent. 

Transparent and credible elections help prevent feelings of injustice and alienation that can lead some to extremism and violence. 

In advance of elections, we support programs to counter violence 

and promote reconciliation, working with leaders from diverse political, religious, and ethnic groups to promote tolerance, respect, 

and reform. It is clear that those investments pay dividends. 

We greatly appreciate the subcommittee’s recognition of the fundamental importance of democracy in Africa and again ask your 

help in supporting our relevant funding requests. 

We are working to ensure that the fiscal 2016 allocations for democracy, rights, and governance in Africa reflect the most strategic 

allocation of scarce resources. We know the challenges are great 

but believe that the comprehensive approach we are pursuing is 

making progress and this will ultimately benefit the people of the 

United States as well as the people of Africa. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wharton follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Staal, the Chair recognizes you for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS STAAL, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. STAAL. Thank you, Chairman Donovan, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 

As part of our mission to end extreme poverty and promote 

democratic resilient societies, USAID is a leader in democracy assistance around the world including in Africa. 

Several countries saw progress in the conduct of elections since 

the subcommittee held a hearing on this subject last year including 

in Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and the Central African 

Republic. 

Many national and regional institutions have improved their capacity to facilitate credible elections including electoral bodies we 

supported in Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire. Citizens are more engaged 

and connected than ever. 

With our support, domestic election observers are leveraging innovative technology and carrying out advanced parallel vote tabulations—PVTs—to confirm election results. 

In Nigeria, we trained 3,000 domestic monitors to do PVTs and 

also in Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire. Yet, Africa still faces important 

challenges. The youth desperately want the chance to have a say 

in their future. But several African leaders refuse to pass the 

baton. 

The average age of the 10 oldest African leaders is 781⁄2 years 

old while the average age of an African citizen is just 191⁄2. 

The trend of abolishing or extending term limits continues and 

incumbents are employing tactics to create an uneven playing field 

long before they face the election. 

Leaders are, unfortunately, sharing worst practices including 

using surveillance technologies and imposing complex legal and fiscal restrictions on civil society and the media. 

As more citizens go online, authorities are restricting Internet access, as we saw last week during Uganda’s Presidential inauguration. Recent crackdowns like the ones we’ve seen in Burundi, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not only a threat 

to democracy but to regional security. 

For decades, USAID has supported African reformers and citizens who seek to promote good governance and democratic processes. Our support helps build the enabling conditions for credible 

elections to take place—strong judiciary and legislature, competitive parties, a free press and free Internet and an engaged civil society. 

These efforts would not be possible without our partners including those testifying later today and our local African partners play 

a critical role in sustaining democratic gains as well. 

Our strategic approach to electoral assistance is informed by several lessons learned over the last number of years. 

17

First, USAID’s electoral investments are tailored to the specific 

political context in and out of the country and informed by longterm partnerships with the host government and civil society to 

support the foundations of a democratic movement and a democratic government. 

For instance, the positive impact of our electoral efforts in Nigeria and Zambia were the result of many years of sustained engagement in broader democracy assistance in both countries. 

USAID’s democracy officers across our missions in Africa help us 

maximize the opportunity to expand democratic gains and overcome challenges. 

Second, our long-term electoral assistance is coupled with flexibility to respond to unforeseen challenges and windows of opportunity. For example, in Guinea’s elections we quickly mobilized our 

elections and political processes funds to keep reporters broadcasting the vote count. This reassured the public and opposition 

parties that the process was fair. 

Third, our early and robust conflict mitigation efforts have made 

a difference in averting electoral violence. For example, we supported the West Africa Network for Peace Building’s early warning 

system to mitigate trigger points for electoral violence, for instance, 

in Burkina Faso. 

In Cote D’Ivoire, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives mobilized a successful arts campaign to promote peaceful political participation and in Nigeria, we integrated conflict mitigation across 

all of our multi-year programs. 

And fourth, we proactively empower political parties, civil society 

and the media to combat efforts by incumbents to close the space 

for political engagement. 

As part of President Obama’s Stand With Civil Society Initiative 

we are creating a hub for African civil society to share tactics and 

successes to overcome common restrictions that they face. 

Our global Information Security Coalition has trained and 

mentored African organizations and individuals in digital and mobile security. 

And then, finally, we coordinate closely with our diplomatic and 

donor partners to maximize impact as we did in Nigeria to ensure 

that displaced populations could vote and CAR to promote local 

peace building before the elections. 

So as we look ahead, we will seek to sustain democratic gains in 

Ghana, in Zambia, and other countries; promote peaceful and inclusive elections, in Kenya; and encourage a timely and credible election timetable in the DRC, in partnership with democratic reformers. 

Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Staal follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much for your opening statement, 

Mr. Staal. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Feldstein for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN FELDSTEIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. FELDSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Bass and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today. 

Advancing democracy in Africa is a top priority for the administration. In the last year we have seen significant democratic advances in several countries. 

Nigeria, for example, held successful elections last year that led 

to the country’s first democratic transition between parties since 

the end of military rule. 

Similarly, I just returned from a trip to Burkina Faso and the 

Central African Republic where both countries elected reformminded Presidents. Each country now has a moment of opportunity 

to enact bold reforms and build democratic foundations. 

Despite these positive developments, democracy in other parts of 

Africa has deteriorated. In too many places the pre-electoral environment and the space available for civic participation remains restrictive and flawed. 

Too many entrenched leaders continue to manipulate their countries’ constitutions, judiciaries and electoral processes to indefinitely extend their time in office. 

They systematically thwart citizens’ rights to choose their leaders 

without pressure or fear and those who protest in the street are arrested, detained, tortured and beaten. 

Recent events in Uganda illustrate how a government can curb 

fundamental freedoms and eviscerate the credibility of an electoral 

process. Leading up to and following the February 18th elections, 

the Government of Uganda harassed and arrested opposition supporters, restricted media, and pressured civil society. 

During the contest itself, Uganda blocked social media and limited communications. In the days following the elections, security 

forces held opposition candidate Besigye under house arrest for 42 

days. The government arrested Mr. Besigye again last week, the 

day before President Museveni’s inauguration. 

He has reportedly been charged with treason and transferred to 

a maximum security prison in part because of his demand for an 

independent international audit of the election. 

Uganda has banned all live reporting of opposition party protests 

and arrested dozens of others. The government has also put forward a bill that would give it outright power to control communications. 

We have repeatedly urged the government to protect and preserve the basic freedoms of citizens and will continue to do so. 

I recently visited Burkina Faso, which is an example of a country 

where a leader’s overreach led to unrest and ultimately his removal 

from power but also where we are partnering with new leadership 

to chart a more democratic way forward. 

27

A vibrant civil society led by an energized youth movement of artisan musicians—Le Balai Citoyen or Citizen’s Broom—broke 27 

years of one-man rule and gave rise to the country’s first democratic elections since 1978. 

As Burkina Faso takes a step forward, other leaders in the region continue to undermine democracy by changing constitutions 

and using additional means to extend their stay in office. 

For example, Rwanda President Paul Kagame has repeatedly 

stated his commitment to respect constitutional term limits and to 

mentor a new generation of leaders. We were deeply disappointed 

when earlier this year Kagame announced his intent to stand for 

a third term and held a snap constitutional referendum to cement 

this decision. 

In making this choice, he missed a significant opportunity to 

deepen democracy in Rwanda and demonstrate global leadership. 

The violence currently afflicting Burundi is a revealing example 

of how anti-democratic policies, namely violating the Arusha Accords by running for a third term, can rapidly lead to widespread 

human rights violations, civilian casualties and increased risk of 

mass atrocities. 

The ongoing crisis in Burundi has resulted in hundreds of lives 

lost and over 260,000 refugees fleeing the country. Burundi has experienced 10 years of progress in reconciliation and development 

but is now deeply destabilized and struggling with a crumbling 

economy. 

Burundi is a cautionary tale for the unfolding political crisis in 

the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to the 

DRC’s Constitution, the President is limited to two terms in office. 

Elections are scheduled for November 2016 at which point the 

DRC should experience its first democratic transition in power 

which would mark a monumental step toward solidifying the DRC’s 

fragile democratic progress. 

Instead, President Kabila is delaying elections through a strategy 

of ‘‘glissement,’’ or slippage, and refusing to announce his intention 

to step down at the end of his term. 

The government continues to undermine the democratic process 

by harassing, arresting and intimidating civil society and opposition leaders. 

Security forces are increasingly willing to use excessive force including against peaceful protestors. This combustible combination 

threatens the security of the DRC and the broader stability of central Africa. 

We believe that officials within the DRC Government have the 

individual responsibility to uphold human rights. We have repeatedly made clear that the U.S. is prepared to impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations or propagating violence and we do believe the voices of the Congolese people should determine the future of the Congo. 

I’d like to highlight a final issue: Fighting corruption and 

kleptocracy. In too many countries, the rent-seeking opportunities 

of elected office provide a lucrative incentive for entrenched leaders 

to steal from state coffers and cling to power. 

28

Unfettered access to state resources personally enriches rulers 

with ill-gotten gains and provides leaders with the means to buy 

the loyalty needed to sustain power. 

In conclusion, we will continue to advance a democracy strategy 

with a strong emphasis on respect for the rule of law, human rights 

and civil society. 

To be successful, we need sufficient resources to support our efforts and we appreciate your support. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee today 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldstein follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you for your statement, Mr. Feldstein. 

Before I ask my questions I’d also like to recognize the opposition 

leaders from the Democratic Republic of the Congo who are with 

us here today. Welcome. 

I’ll begin the questioning by asking maybe Ambassador Wharton, 

the United States has strategic interest in Africa and sometimes 

they seem to overcome the commitments to democracy in various 

countries. 

How can there be a consistency in U.S. policy for democracy in 

Africa if strategic countries aren’t sanctioned for violations and at 

times less strategic countries are sanctioned for the same behavior? 

Ambassador WHARTON. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. 

It is a difficult balance. We have to pursue in one moment 

though a broad variety of our interests and concerns in Africa and 

I believe that in countries where we have an bimportant security 

relationship could include Uganda, could include Rwanda, could include Ethiopia. 

We can actually use that opening—the points of contact and the 

points of discussion on security—as a means of raising our broader 

concerns about human rights, citizen rights, rule of law, electoral 

process. So we need to be able to pursue these things simultaneously. 

But as I said, it does require a balanced nuanced approach. 

Mr. DONOVAN. One question, Ambassador. 

Do the countries give us any reasons for these violations? Do 

they violate their own agreements with us or their own constitutions when it’s brought to their attention? 

Ambassador WHARTON. One of the characteristics that I have noticed among certain African leaders is this huge emphasis on stability and what I believe is a mistaken assumption that lack of 

change equals stability. 

But in a country like the DRC, for example, that has a terrible 

history of bloodshed and violence, I think that there is at least 

among some of the current leadership the idea that maintaining 

things under control and maintaining stability is the best way to 

ensure progress into the future. 

Again, I think that’s a mistaken assumption and that’s one of the 

talking points—one of the messages that we seek to relay to counterparts in countries like the DRC. We do believe that the democratic process which, of course, is much more than elections, is the 

surest way toward bringing citizens into political life and ensuring 

progress and stability. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Staal, I’d like to ask, in the omnibus bill that we passed last 

year, Congress legislated that USAID shall implement civil society 

and political competition and consensus-building programs abroad 

in a manner that recognizes the unique benefits of grants and cooperation agreements. 

To what extent has USAID followed this mandate to date? 

Mr. STAAL. Thank you for that question. It’s a critical issue that 

we do take very seriously and in fact we’re in consultations right 

now with members of the committee and our implementing partners to look at this balance of grants and cooperative agreements, 

37

with contracts, to make sure that it’s meeting the needs of everybody involved. 

Each country we look at specific conditions in that country to 

make sure that the programs that we have are relevant to, and appropriate to and meeting the needs there. 

Overall, our balance has been about two-thirds have gone to 

grants and about one-third to cooperative agreements—to contracts, and what we’re doing is working on some supplemental 

guidance for our contract officers who would do the awards to make 

sure that it’s clear exactly what the standards are and that it’s consistent and that it’s—and we’re doing that in a consultative fashion 

with our implementing partners. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. The clock hasn’t started so I don’t 

know if my time is nearly up. So let me just ask Mr. Feldstein a 

question before we move on. 

You mentioned providing funding for election observations in IRI 

and NDI. Since the wave of democracy in the 1990s fewer U.S. 

election observer missions have been supported. 

How critical are these observation missions at this point since it’s 

been reported that there’s a backsliding on democratic election 

process in many African countries? 

Mr. FELDSTEIN. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that the process supporting electoral observation issues 

is a critical part to supporting our democracy efforts in several 

ways. 

First of all, I think it signals very specifically that the international community is paying particular attention to a given situation. It also is able to get a wider array of eyes on the ground to 

observe a particular situation, especially in the area of a contested 

election, where we believe there is risk of instability or risk of violence. 

So a good example is where we did fund a successful electoral observation mission recently was Nigeria where I think there were 

significant concerns about the potential for violence breaking out in 

the country but I think in part because of strong messaging, a diplomatic strategy paired with eyes on the ground we were able to 

work with all sides and actually lead to a very successful outcome. 

Not all situations warrant this type of investment. It is expensive 

and is something that takes a certain commitment. But I think in 

places where there is a viable contested election and there is the 

potential for some problems I think this can be a very important 

tool for us to continue using. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much. My time has had to have 

expired by now. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of 

the subcommittee, my friend, Congresswoman Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to follow up on a couple of questions with Mr. Staal. 

The chair was asking you questions about some of the contracts 

and all democracy related and I just wanted to ask you if we give 

any contracts to for-profit organizations to help with democracy 

and election U.S.-based and also do we provide any contracts to indigenous groups in various countries where we’re working? 

Mr. STAAL. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member Bass. 

38

I can get you some details of specific contracts. I have to admit 

I don’t have them off the top of my head. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. THOMAS STAAL TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE KAREN BASS

To answer this question, we analyzed total USAID assistance for elections held 

in calendar year 2015 in sub-Saharan Africa. USAID provided $31.4 million in assistance for elections to seven countries in Africa with 2015 elections—Nigeria, Tanzania, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Zambia, and Guinea. One hundred percent of the $31.4 million in total assistance was provided through assistance agreements, which by their very nature do not permit the implementing organizations to 

take a profit. Additionally, USAID provided 35 percent—or $11.1 million—of the 

total elections assistance for these seven countries to local host country organizations through sub-grants.

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Mr. STAAL. We do some contracting in individual cases in certain 

countries. As I mentioned, the majority—about two-thirds of our 

programs are done through grants and cooperative agreements. 

But in certain circumstances——

Ms. BASS. But grants—so tell me a little bit about that. Grants 

and cooperative agreements with who or what? 

Mr. STAAL. Those are primarily with nonprofit organizations. 

Ms. BASS. U.S.-based? 

Mr. STAAL. U.S.-based, yeah. And then in certain cases we do 

provide direct funding to local organizations in given countries 

where they have the capacity. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. STAAL. So, for instance, in Ghana which is further along 

than some others we’re able to work directly with civil society organizations and give them assistance. 

Ms. BASS. I attended the summit last year, especially the YALI 

part of it where President Obama was in a townhall meeting with 

the YALI participants and one of them stood up and said that they 

wished that some of the millions of dollars that we provide in Africa could actually go to African organizations. 

And to me, when I think of leadership development, I think of 

it at a lot of different levels. So we worry about elections but what 

about all of the leadership so that people develop the capacity to 

run for office and wondering what level of investment we have 

there? 

Mr. STAAL. That’s a critical question. Thank you very much, and 

we believe very strongly in that as well and we can do that, we 

feel, through a variety of mechanisms. 

Sometimes it’s through a U.S., usually a nonprofit organization, 

who in turn then can provide support to a number of indigenous 

organizations and in some cases where the indigenous organizations have the capability, the management and financial capability 

we’re able to provide funding directly to them. 

Ms. BASS. And the question is what is our investment in helping 

them obtain that capacity? 

Mr. STAAL. Absolutely. That is part of our civil society strengthening programs to build that capacity management, accounting and 

so on and, frankly, for instance, in Kenya we have a program working with the women voters to build their capacity to vote, to run 

39

as candidates and even after they become leaders to do that. 

There’s a whole process of work through that. 

Ms. BASS. So if you would, I would appreciate you providing a 

breakdown. I would like to know how much funding goes to for 

profit U.S.-based organizations, nonprofits and then how much goes 

to indigenous groups and what is our funding for capacity building. 

Mr. STAAL. Sure. 

Ms. BASS. You know, just like with Feed the Future——

Mr. STAAL. Yes. 

Ms. BASS [continuing]. The goal is for Africans to feed Africans. 

Mr. STAAL. That’s right. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. THOMAS STAAL TO QUESTION ASKED

DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE KAREN BASS

In answer to your question, and as described previously, an analysis of USAID’s 

support for elections in calendar year 2015 in sub Saharan Africa across seven countries (Nigeria, Tanzania, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Zambia, and Guinea), reveals USAID provided 65 percent or $20.3 million to U.S. based organizations 

to manage electoral assistance programs, while the remaining 35 percent ($11.1 million) was managed by local host country organizations through sub-grants.

Ms. BASS. And so, to me, while we focus on elections, let’s focus 

on building the capacity as well. 

Ambassador Wharton, you mentioned that sometimes stability 

can be confused with not changing leadership. 

I do worry sometimes though in those countries where from the 

U.S. perspective we push term limits and want people to step 

down. But I worry sometimes as to whether or not there really is 

the leadership there. Given that we have so many experiences 

around the continent—the failed states that sometimes in our urgency for turnover in leadership we can wind up with that. 

So I’m wondering what your thoughts are. DRC, for example, Liberia, any number of countries where elections are pending and 

where we’re nervous. I don’t think we’re nervous about Liberia in 

terms of the President staying there but we certainly are in DRC. 

What is your concern or your opinion about leadership potential 

there? 

Ambassador WHARTON. Well, two or three thoughts come to 

mind. Thank you for the question, of course. 

The first is is that we’re not in this alone—that we need to seek 

coalitions of African partners that share our concerns. This should 

not be the United States versus the DRC or the United States 

versus Liberia. 

This should be something that the AU takes on as they had with 

Burundi, for example. I think we’ll be much more effective if we approach these problems of governance and term limits from that 

broader perspective. 

Ultimately, I believe that democracy is a process. An election is 

part of that process. It’s our view that when someone stays in 

power for a long, long time that process slows down and stops. 

Ms. BASS. Sure. 

Ambassador WHARTON. So one of the responses to that is to look 

at how we build stronger institutions that are stronger than individuals, to paraphrase what President Obama said in Ghana, and 

that includes military institutions, frankly. 

40

A military that responds to civilian control is an important part 

of the democratic process—a free media—civil society that’s strong 

and capable of taking off the sorts of work that civil society does 

in our country, for example. So those are partial responses to this 

longer problem. 

I think that several African leaders have said to me, you need 

to give us time, we’re young democracies, we’re still maturing, and 

there’s some point to that. But I would love to be able to watch African political systems skip generations the way some of their technical adaptations have skipped generations and move ahead more 

quickly so we will work on that. 

Ms. BASS. I think that’s a good point. I often register that point 

as to look where we were 50 years into the United States. 

Things were a mess, and we have expectations that countries 

will establish a democracy and 2 years later they’re going to function like us as though we don’t have any warts here, as though our 

elections go off with no problems. 

Mr. Staal, with everything I would like to ask you about also and 

that is support that we might have to the AU. So in other words, 

it’s one thing for us to support individual countries but given that 

this is a priority of the AU, you know, what level of support do we 

provide to the AU for capacity building leadership development? 

And then finally, for Mr. Feldstein, there are 54 countries on the 

continent—some would argue 55, if you want to get into that. 

There are a lot of elections that happen peacefully, orderly. A lot 

of transitions of power. Oftentimes we just focus on the problem. 

So maybe you could speak to the elections that went well. 

Why did they go well? Why was there a peaceful transition in 

Namibia, for example? Several countries on the continent had elections that were run well, peaceful transitions of power and we gave 

them very little attention. 

Mr. STAAL. Thank you for the question about the support to the 

AU. We actually have a USAID Foreign Service Officer based in 

Ethiopia who sits with the Ambassador to the AU—a USAID staff 

person managing several programs, actually providing capacity 

building to the AU on a number of things based on their request 

for assistance on the peace building, on other things. 

And then, of course, we also have support to many of the regional 

organizations—ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD. That’s a critical part 

of our support. 

Ms. BASS. In terms of the AU I was thinking specifically on the 

democracy leadership development, and I appreciate that. 

Mr. STAAL. Right. Okay. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. FELDSTEIN. Thank you for the question regarding good as 

well as bad elections, and I fully agree with you that there are 

many instances of places that had good elections in the past year. 

I would add to Burkina Faso and Central African Republic, 

Benin, Cote D’Ivoire, and Namibia, as you mentioned as well, and 

I think those are not only good examples and models for the region 

but I think there’s a lot of lessons learned that can be implanted. 

One of the things that I find interesting is that just as you sometimes see modelling of certain types of bad laws like NGO-restrictive laws or modelling when it comes to the term limits issue, you 

41

can also see positive modelling the other way where countries like 

Senegal, which have made great strides when it comes to solidifying and consolidating democracy are able to talk to and do exchanges with other countries and say this is how it can be done 

better—this is how you build political institutions and so forth. 

So I agree that sometimes we do have a tendency to focus on the 

problems. I think that’s part of the human rights community. It’s 

part of what we tend to really concentrate on and we say where 

are there issues, where are there atrocities, where is there a risk 

of something bad happening and we throw all our resources and attention there. 

But it is important to recognize that there is a lot of progress 

being made on the continent and that gives me hope. Coming back 

from this last trip to Central African Republic and Burkina Faso 

I saw a lot of that and it really has given me a positive more optimistic viewpoint about where things potentially can go as we continue heading into the year. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Congresswoman Bass. 

Now I turn to my friend from Florida, the gentleman Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Lost in thought. From a 30,000 foot level, seems 

to me that assistance for the continent for medical care: Ebola, malaria, all the mosquito-borne stuff—sounds like that’s something 

America would do. Europeans step up. I like that. Anything that 

could protect property rights and therefore induce investment. That 

sounds like a long putt but good idea because if we don’t get investment because everybody just makes off with the cash the average 

person is never going to get a lot better life. I think you all agree 

with that too. 

American money for elections, I remember living in Europe and 

in France in the 1990s and looking down at the continent. I remember doing business on the continent and always saying what 

a mess in terms of elections. Human rights, kleptocracy. 

Do we get our bang for our buck on that part of it? If I said to 

you all show me the money we spent in the 1990s, Ambassador—

we spent a lot of money in the 1990s in places that aren’t any better and sometimes worse, right? Am I right or wrong about that? 

Are we really getting better, given all the American tax money? 

No one likes a zero return on investment. What matters to me is 

a net gain and I feel like we do net gain on healthcare and other 

direct assistance for people that really need it. 

But I’m not so sure that in the dictators we’ve supported or elections that we’ve tried to help that we really get a direct return on 

that. Am I right or wrong? And I’m sure you’re going to tell me I’m 

wrong and I’ll accept your answer. 

Ambassador WHARTON. Congressman, I would never tell you that 

you were wrong but I could beg——

Mr. CLAWSON. Everybody else does. 

Ambassador WHARTON. I could beg to differ. No. Look, you raise 

a very important point. I feel the same way sometimes on a day 

to day basis or a weekly basis. I feel like I’m banging my head 

against the wall. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Is Nigeria really any better than it was 20 years 

ago? 

42

Ambassador WHARTON. Absolutely. Yes, sir. Absolutely. 

In 1985 when I joined the Foreign Service there were two democratic governments in Africa. Today, there are, arguably, 25 or 30. 

I do believe that democracies don’t go to war with one another 

the way authoritarian states do. So that’s a plus for us. 

The rise of the African middle class—you’ve got 1 billion people 

today, 2 billion people by 2050. That is an enormous market for 

American goods and services. 

We need to be there now to help establish clear rule of law court 

systems, legal systems that will protect American investors and 

American businesses when we’re able to more fully take advantage 

of the rising middle class in Africa. 

You rightly point out the work that we do on public health—we 

should be extremely proud of that. We have saved literally millions 

of lives at, you know, tremendous expense to us as taxpayers but 

also tremendous benefit to the United States in terms of helping 

to keep our own country healthy—helping keep disease away from 

our door. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Like everything you’re telling me, how often do we 

support people that end up being crooks? 

Ambassador WHARTON. I could not give you an exact percentage. 

It does happen. 

Mr. STAAL. If I could add also, a recent study done by Mercy 

Corps on violent extremism in several countries showed that the 

primary drivers of violent extremism were injustice and a sense of 

unfairness, corruption and police or military brutality—all issues of 

democracy and good governance. 

And it’s in those countries where either there’s poor governance 

and bad practice—undemocratic practices or maybe a lack of ability 

to control certain parts of their country that these violent extremists come from. 

And so it’s in our own personal interest as the United States to 

promote good solid democracy that’s transparent, that’s fair, that’s 

reducing corruption and that’s why it’s so important that we have 

a good election in a place like Nigeria and so that they can then 

spread their good governance into the parts of the country where 

we’re seeing violent extremists up in the Boko Haram area. 

Mr. FELDSTEIN. I would just add to what my colleagues said in 

particular that I believe there’s a nexus between good governance 

and a lack of humanitarian crises in places that are able to feed 

their own people and withstand and be resilient to disaster. 

And I think if you look at the many of the places that have suffered crises, whether it’s Ethiopia several decades ago, whether it’s 

looking at South Sudan more recently, the amount of money that 

ultimately entails the international community putting forth to 

protect lives, to deal with refugee flows, to help people avoid starvation, malnourishment and so forth, runs into the billions—the 

amount of money that peacekeeping forces cost once civil war 

breaks out runs into the billions. 

And so the idea, I think, for us is that if we can use an ounce 

of prevention in terms of good elections and helping to provide for 

better governance that will help forestall some of the larger crises 

at which point then there’s little choice but to act. 

43

Mr. CLAWSON. Agree with all that. Just hope we get it right. Because if we support the bad guys it’s the big men or the strong 

men, they make off with the cash then you got a whole bunch of 

people that aren’t getting food and blame it on the U.S. because 

we’re propping up crooks and I don’t think that helps us either. 

So, you know, this is a tough task you all got. Humanitarian, private property, investment—I’m all for that. Thank you. I yield 

back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields. 

I’d like to thank our witnesses for your attendance, your testimony and certainly for your honest answers. 

I invite the second panel. I thank you, gentlemen. I invite the 

second panel to take their positions. 

I welcome our second panel. Mr. Rushdi Nackerdien is the regional director for Africa at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 

With more than 20 years of experience in democracy and elections, he has led and pioneered complex international and national 

programs. 

Mr. Nackerdien has focused on electoral reform, capacity development, strategic planning, project and program evaluation, and 

expert advice in elections and development of e-learning materials 

with a special focus on Africa. 

He has advised the African Union in revising their election observation approach to incorporate a more comprehensive long-term 

framework and worked in a wide range of African countries. Welcome, sir. 

Mr. Patrick Merloe is a senior associate and director of election 

programs at the National Democratic Institute. He has more than 

30 years of experience in promoting citizen empowerment, governmental accountability and public policy advocacy and oversees 

many of the institute’s programs. 

Mr. Merloe has participated in more than 150 international missions for NDI to more than 65 countries, concentrating on conflictsensitive states and countries that are vulnerable to authoritarian 

tendencies and has produced a dozen publications on comprehensive law, human rights, and elections. 

John Tomaszewski—and I am Polish, sir, I don’t know if you are, 

but you have to be a landsman—currently serves as an acting regional director for Africa. Prior to assuming his current post in 

May 2016 he served as IRI’s deputy regional director for Africa in 

Washington, DC. 

Before returning to headquarters, Mr. Tomaszewski spent several years living on the African continent and managing various 

projects for IRI, focussing on political party strengthening, local 

governance, and civil society development, youth and gender initiatives and civic education in many African countries. He has also 

worked for two Members of Congress including on their campaigns. 

Mr. Nii Akuetteh serves as the founding executive director of the 

African Immigrant Caucus. He has lived in Nigeria and contributed 

to the strengthening of democracy across West Africa. 

He has also founded the Democracy and Conflict Research Institute, an NGO that focuses on fighting dictatorship and repression 

in Africa. Mr. Akuetteh worked on a anti-apartheid movement in 

44

the U.S., which led to the sanctions imposed against apartheid 

South Africa. 

He has taught at Georgetown University and served as the editor 

of a quarterly journal on U.S. relations with Africa and the Caribbean. Gentlemen, thank you. 

I now invite our first witness, Mr. Nackerdien, to give his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RUSHDI NACKERDIEN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 

Mr. NACKERDIEN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the 

International Foundation for Electoral Systems, I deeply appreciate 

this opportunity to discuss U.S. electoral support in sub-Saharan 

Africa. 

Since 1997, IFES has worked in more than 145 countries worldwide to support inclusive citizen participation and credible elections. In many parts of the world, IFES works with its partners, 

IRI, and NDI, and the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening, commonly known as CEPPS, on democracy, 

human rights, and governance programming. 

With support from USAID and several international partners, 

IFES has supported electoral processes across the subregion with 

11 active programs in Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, 

Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 

Mr. Chairman, in the last decade policy makers worldwide have 

come to understand that elections are much more than just election 

day and this has resulted in an important shift in the policy process. 

I draw your attention to one of the poster boards that I’ve 

brought along, particularly the colored wheel. It’s commonly referred to as the electoral process and today we understand the 

process to break down into three broad phases—namely, the preelectoral, the electoral, and the post-electoral period. 

Typically, this process often runs 3 to 5 years and is a lengthy 

endeavor. Mr. Chairman, elections have been described as the biggest logistical exercise a country can undertake during peacetime. 

In most African countries, this exercise is done by a single election management body operating independently from party influence. 

If one takes the example of Nigeria, which is the poster board 

just being turned right now. For the 2015 polls the Independent 

National Election Commission employed more than 12,000 permanent members of staff and more than 700,000 temporary staff. 

All of these helped serve more than 6 to 8 million citizens that 

had to be registered, that had to be verified and they had to cast 

a vote on election day. 

This huge logistical and political exercise cannot be executed 

overnight. INEC was preparing for this since 2011, 4 years in the 

making across the electoral cycle. 

This work was done in close partnership with organizations like 

IFES and all this occurred under the threat of attacks by Boko 

Haram. 

45

Mr. Chairman, IFES believes the following four areas are pivotal 

when it comes to election assistance. Number one, due to the complexity of organizing an election, targeted resource support must 

take place early in the electoral cycle—several years before election 

day. 

Number two, just as we combat extremism on a regional basis, 

so we should invest regionally in capacity building and building in 

particular election networks among election professionals. 

Number three, working with civil society is equally essential. 

Civil society plays an important role in the electoral cycle not only 

for carrying out civic and voter education activities but also for 

holding governments and electoral institutions accountable. 

Number four, in recent years DRC funding has either been redirected toward other priorities or has been increasingly divided 

across smaller sub parts, leaving decreasing investments for election and political process programming. 

IFES believes that the U.S. Government should reverse this 

trend, amplifying investments in election assistance as a cost effective way to pursue additional development objectives. 

Mr. Chairman, the electoral cycle approach can make election 

international assistance seem never ending. However, three critical 

points of exit or graduation from support do exist. 

Technical sustainability is considered the easiest to achieve. It 

describes a time when a country requires no further external assistance for the conduct of elections. 

Financial sustainability is the second component and the second 

hardest to achieve. This is achieved only when the funds for elections are derived from in-country sources. And lastly, political sustainability is the most difficult to achieve. 

It is based on the legitimacy of the entire process as well as the 

institution when both the outcome and the process are viewed as 

credible by all stakeholders both foreign and domestic. 

Mr. Chairman, a number of critical upcoming elections in Cote 

D’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Ghana, 

Kenya, and Zambia will help shape democracy on the continent. 

We respectfully recommend that the U.S. Government prioritize 

electoral assistance that is locally contextualized, is inclusive of 

women, people with disabilities, ethnic and religious minorities and 

other underrepresented groups, develops local expertise and consistently invests early and throughout the electoral cycle. 

Such assistance will not only facilitate Africa’s navigation of very 

difficult times but might prove foundational to improve development outcomes in women’s empowerment, health, economic growth, 

and food security. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify. On behalf of IFES we are honored to partner with the U.S. 

Government and Congress, international aid organizations, our 

CEPPS partners, and of course the people of Africa in support of 

a more democratic and prosperous continent. I’m happy to answer 

any questions stemming from my testimony. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nackerdien follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Merloe for a 5-minute opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PATRICK MERLOE, SENIOR ASSOCIATE 

AND DIRECTOR OF ELECTION PROGRAMS, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. MERLOE. Thank you, Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member Bass. I’d like to also thank Chairman Smith for his opening remarks which demonstrate the leadership of this subcommittee in 

expressing the concerns of the American people for the development of democracy and honest elections in Africa. 

Our time is short so I’d like to start with one thing that illustrates the points that I would like to make today. Two weeks ago 

I was the fortunate party to an exchange between former President 

Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mr. Kofi Annan, and I could summarize 

it more or less as follows. 

It’s not so much that poor elections give a bad name to democracy as it is that political violence and undemocratic practices give 

elections a bad name. 

That quip encapsulates two of the most fundamental things 

about elections as far as I can see. The first is it captures the essence of elections—the two purposes that are interrelated—that 

they should resolve peacefully the competition for governmental office and political power. And, they should provide the citizens with 

the avenue, the vehicle, through which they express their will 

about who is going to have the authority to legitimately occupy 

governmental offices. 

These are not easy things, particularly in countries that have 

less than a longstanding democratic history and that have a proclivity among the political competitors toward using political violence to achieve their goals. 

We see that too often in Africa and around the world. Elections 

that are democratic really establish public confidence, and they 

also reduce and mitigate the potentials for political conflict. In that 

respect they help the realization of political rights of sovereign people. 

They also are important for international peace and security, and 

both of these are vital to the interests of the American people and 

people around the world, which is why today’s hearing I think is 

so important to public concern. 

The second point that that quip illustrates is that elections are 

all about context. As you know, elections really are a barometer of 

the political climate in a given country as is illustrated even in our 

own circumstance. 

Elections are multi-dimensional reflections of social and political 

dynamics within a country, and in that sense electoral assistance 

should help to infuse democratic political culture. 

Three principals in electoral assistance are very important then 

to encapsulate. The first is inclusiveness. Political systems and 

electoral processes should help to guarantee universal and equal 

suffrage. They also should move political systems beyond winner 

take all politics and give the opposition, the losers, a stake in sustaining and building effective governance. 

65

The second principle is transparency. People have a right to general elections. They also have a right to know that their elections 

are genuine, and that requires that there be access to key political 

processes, key electoral processes and the data which are generated 

by them, so that they can independently verify for themselves the 

integrity of elections. 

And the third principal is accountability. There has to be, to be 

credible, accountability in election administration, in political competition and also in the electoral justice system so that the competitors who have a grievance have a reason to turn to peaceful redress 

rather than to actions that might lead to violence. 

These principles reinforce the potentials for sustained and positive democratic progress. They should be signposts for our engagements. Strengthening them should be a means of evaluating our 

success. 

In my written statement I mention three countries that illustrate 

how these principles have been integrated into electoral assistance 

in recent years. 

In particular, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria stand out. There 

are many others but they are worthy of consideration. I won’t mention details here, but I will be happy to go into during questions. 

They each give positive examples of where U.S. support was complemented by assistance from other nations from the EU, the U.N. 

and others, and as my colleague from IFES mentioned, they each 

illustrate early targeted engagement, and they each illustrate that 

follow-up made a big difference. 

Mr. Chairman, not all countries receive adequate funding to address the needed and pressing causes around elections. Democracy 

and governance funding has faced several years of cutbacks, as you 

well know—particularly in Africa which was reduced by more than 

40 percent last year. 

Those cuts have impacted the ability to respond to requests to 

monitor elections, to help develop civil society and political parties 

and to strengthen the fragile parliaments in those countries. 

Hopefully, these cuts can be restored in Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond as Congress has sought to do through the omnibus appropriations bill. 

Citizens across the world have been putting themselves on the 

line, demanding honest elections and responsible and responsive 

governance. They have been asking for our assistance which demonstrates that democracy is coming—the demand for it is coming—

from within. It’s not being imposed. 

A number of cost-effective means of engagements have proven to 

be effective in promoting credible peaceful elections in Africa. In 

my written statement I identify 10 of those, and let me please 

highlight three this afternoon. 

The first is supporting indigenous efforts to remove barriers to 

political participation of women, including young women, young 

men and disabled people and other populations. 

Second is building cohorts of citizen election monitoring experts 

who can move across borders and through the regions, helping each 

other, building the impartiality and the systematic nature of election monitoring. 

66

As was mentioned by our colleagues from USAID, parallel vote 

tabulations—that is, an independent verification using statistical 

methods of election day processes and the vote count—have been 

critical in reducing tensions around elections—the potential for violence, and in building public confidence in elections. That’s one illustration. 

But, of course, the voter registry in other areas are growingly important to verify as well. 

The third is to advance principles and standards through networks of the EMBs, election monitoring organizations, political parties and others, including through open electoral data and other 

principles that reinforce the integrity of elections. 

Constitutional issues that have been mentioned concerning the 

term limits, the dispersing of powers among branches of government also are important to give people stakes and to be inclusive 

in governance. 

All of these issues are related to circumstances where power is 

abused, where decks are stacked, where corruption subverts government’s ability to improve citizens’ lives, and these turn citizens 

away from government toward apathy, toward authoritarianism 

and toward extremism. 

It’s therefore, in conclusion, in our common interest, to help 

homegrown efforts to address electoral integrity. 

Mr. Chairman, among the numerous elections in Africa that are 

on the horizon, I would highlight five that merit further consideration perhaps in questions. 

Zambia and Ghana, which have been mentioned. I’m departing 

on Friday for Zambia. I’m going later in the month with Mr. Kofi 

Annan to Ghana because of his concerns around developments in 

that country. Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya, where we have invested so 

much, where electoral violence has cost the people so much, and 

where these investments really can be threatened—particularly in 

Kenya with the crisis that’s been developing. 

And of course, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where 

in a sense a perfect political storm has been brewing, as been mentioned by my colleagues earlier. 

In all of these countries, developing democratic political processes 

is key to achieving credible peaceful elections, and engagements 

that promote inclusiveness, transparency and accountability must 

be tailored to their context. Those principles are central for successful democracy support strategies in Africa. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Merloe follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Merloe. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Tomaszewski for a 5-minute opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN TOMASZEWSKI, ACTING REGIONAL 

DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Bass, 

thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on effective democracy assistance on the African continent. 

IRI currently works in 14 sub-Saharan African countries with 

grants from USAID, State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy. 

IRI is also a partner of the CEPPS consortium, which you’ve 

heard about today. As a former country director for IRI’s Kenya office and a deputy country director in South Sudan and Egypt, I’ve 

seen firsthand the impact of democracy assistance. Direct impact. 

Mr. Chairman, Africans today are largely committed to democracy over other forms of government. According to a 2014 analysis, 

Biafra barometer, 7 in 10 Africans prefer democracy and a proportion of those rejecting alternatives rose steadily over the past decade. 

African nations that remain undemocratic grappled with protracted conflict, transnational migration, corruption and leaders 

who, despite the outward appearance of being democratic, maintain 

their hold on power to the detriment of their population. 

We must fully appreciate the link between failures of governance, refugee flows and the draw of extremist groups like ISIS, alShabaab, Boko Haram across the continent. A secure and stable Africa is of paramount national security to the United States. 

The development of functional and institutionalized democratic 

systems is the only way to ensure that in the long term African 

countries will be equipped to meet the needs and expectations of 

their rapidly growing populations. 

Nigeria, for example—and it’s an example we’ve talked a lot 

about today—is of great strategic importance to the United States. 

The country’s 2015 elections are a good case study indeed for effective U.S. democracy assistance. 

Since Nigeria’s 1999 return to citizen rule, IRI and its CEPPS 

partners have implemented DRG programs to strengthen capacity 

of the ruling and opposition parties, election management bodies, 

civil society, the media and, most importantly, the voters. 

In the end, and despite some of its shortcomings, the election resulted in the peaceful handover of power from the incumbent President Jonathan to the now-President Buhari. 

Mr. Chairman, the importance of this outcome for Africa’s most 

populous country cannot be overstated. This peaceful transfer of 

power was not the result of a single election but a series of regular 

and sustained electoral contests for President that enabled the system to mature and become more democratic over time. 

U.S. assistance through IRI, NDI, IFES, and our local partners 

has made a significant contribution to this successful outcome. 

Mr. Chairman, in spite of these successful programs, however, 

the environment in which we operate—our organizations—includVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:54 Sep 27, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\_AGH\051816\20175 SHIRL
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ing the political and operating context, funding levels and administrative landscape presents substantial challenges. 

Our experience shows that DRG funding for Africa ramps up in 

advance of elections. Of IRI’s current USAID and State Department funded programs in Africa, 80 percent focus substantially on 

support to electoral processes. 

In each case, funding for the inner electoral period is uncertain. 

Elections are seminal events indeed in democratic societies, and we 

must recognize that fundamental democratic deficits in political 

systems lie in the day-to-day business of governments and their relationships with citizens between elections. 

Where democracy assistance is limited to electoral processes, the 

funding often becomes available to implementers late in the preelection period. For instance, in Tanzania the CEPPS partnership 

received funding in June 2015, only 5 months prior to the October 

2015 elections. 

Similarly, in Uganda, where we’ve just had a very interesting 

election, the CEPPS partners received funding in late May 2015 for 

February 2016 elections. In both cases, DRG support in the postelection period has not yet been determined, though it is critically 

needed for both countries, I think we would all agree. 

Furthermore, over the last few years, IRI has experienced firsthand the realities of a challenging funding landscape. DRG programs account for only 4.7 percent of overall foreign assistance. 

Total U.S. Government support for DRG programs has been on 

the decline, falling by 38 percent between 2009 and 2015, with Africa receiving a 44 percent cut during that period, according to an 

analysis by InterAction. 

At this important juncture in Africa’s development, now is the 

time to reinforce our commitment to resilient democracies by funding DRG programs at robust levels. 

Finally, and this is something that’s been commented on already, 

selecting the appropriate procurement mechanism for DRG awards 

is an essential component to achieving impactful sustainable results. 

USAID has released a revised ADS Chapter 304 and we understand we’ll be providing USAID employees with amplifying guidance on the applicability of ADS 304 to DRG awards. 

We commend USAID for taking this action and urge that USAID 

Missions implement the new regulations as intended and that both 

USAID and Congress conduct applicable oversight. 

Mr. Chairman, in his historic 1982 Westminster speech—and I 

have to talk about President Reagan—and at the height of the Cold 

War, President Ronald Reagan said of democracies, ‘‘Day by day, 

democracy is proving itself to be a not at all fragile flower.’’

I share President Reagan’s optimism that with effective U.S. assistance, IRI and its partners, can have a large impact in consolidating democracy in Africa. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tomaszewski follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Tomaszewski. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Akuetteh for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MR. NII AKUETTEH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

THE AFRICAN IMMIGRANT CAUCUS 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Thank you very much, Chairman Donovan and 

Ranking Member Bass. I really appreciate not just being included 

in this panel but as always for all the work that this committee 

and subcommittee does. 

This time, particularly, I’m extremely happy for two reasons—because of the focus on democracy and U.S. democracy assistance programs in Africa it’s very dear to my heart and, of course, I have 

been included to talk a little bit more about the country where I 

was born—Ghana. 

Now, Ghana has enjoyed a lot of kudos and praise, particularly 

when it comes to elections and turning over power peacefully to 

parties that are out of power who win elections and I think those 

kudos are well earned. 

The question that has been raised, especially when it’s been mentioned that DRG programs have been cut, is that there have been 

times when the thinking is that Ghana does a good job and therefore U.S. assistance should focus on more challenged countries on 

the continent. 

It is true there are countries that are not doing as good a job. 

But I am here to make the case why attention should not be shifted from Ghana and where it has been shifted it should be refocused 

back particularly for the upcoming elections which happen a day 

before the U.S. elections in November. Ghana votes on November 

7. 

And there are a couple of reasons that I want to cite. In my own 

lifetime, I have seen political violence in Ghana in the early 1960s 

and 1970s and therefore nobody should think that electoral political violence Ghana is immune to those. They are not. 

What will make them immune is good processes and transparency. Now, when it comes to what are the actual reasons for focusing and looking at Ghana now, which is what I was asked to 

address, I focus on five reasons. 

President Clinton visited Ghana. So did President Bush and 

then, of course, President Obama visited Ghana. All of these point 

to the fact that Ghana and the U.S. now are friendly countries and 

therefore I think supporting elections in Ghana I would cite as 

something that friends with capacity help other friends do. 

Secondly, Ghana does enjoy sort of immortal status in Africa on 

a few issues, from independence but also on holding elections and 

therefore it seems to me that whatever gains Ghana has made 

when it is assisted to maintain those gains the news spreads in Africa. 

Other African countries do look at Ghana and therefore supporting Ghana’s electoral processes will be a way for the U.S. to 

spread the word for democracy across the continent. 

But there is another reason why. The previous elections in 

Ghana and what has been called the Fourth Republic, which started in 1992, 24 years ago, there have been six elections. 

86

The one in November will be number seven. All six have been 

peaceful pretty much and power has been turned over to the party 

out of power on two occasions. 

However, those have been very close elections and they have 

been disputed. Now, at the time they were called free and fair elections. We have had some instances where American experts have 

gone back, looked at some of the things and said well, maybe we 

missed this or that and therefore there is a strong case for making 

sure that now we look at the elections closely and don’t miss any 

weaknesses that might be there. 

A further reason is that 6 months away from Ghana’s election if 

you look at what is happening on the ground now, there is heated 

campaigning. There are even people who have already said and 

have even complained to units like USAID offices and the Embassy 

that look, if things don’t go well there might be violence. 

Given that that has been said and given that Ghana has known 

political violence in its history this adds to the argument for saying 

that despite the reduction of looking at Ghana because of good elections this particular election needs assistance and attention from 

the United States. And the final argument that I make is this. The 

shifting resources and attention from Ghana to other African countries can be justified when they have greater needs. But another 

way of looking at it is that it is important to stay with Ghana and 

provide assistance in order to protect the investment and the gains 

that have already been made. So that is a final argument for that. 

Now, I also took the liberty of suggesting a few ways for improving electoral assistance in Ghana. My colleague mentioned how late 

sometimes the funding comes. In my work in west Africa in promoting democracy we actually made the point that watching elections and balloting is important. But Ghana, for instance, has a 4-

year cycle. 

A lot of things happen before and after the balloting and therefore a key recommendation is projects have to be designed and 

have to be included in budgets to make sure that there are things 

being done both before and after elections, sometimes years before. 

If you look at how elections are compromised in different countries including African ones, those who compromise elections are 

getting smarter by the day. So they don’t steal the elections. They 

don’t stuff the ballots so much. They can do things before we arrive 

at the elections. So it means that electoral programs should also be 

done during periods and looking at the processes before we actually 

vote. 

And the final recommendation I will make, when you look at 

Ghana there are a number of competent NGOs and many of them 

are run by people who are friends of mine. 

But I do think that the assistance to NGOs in Ghana needs to 

be diversified so that only a few favorite NGOs do not get all the 

assistance. Earlier, when the first panel discussed their submissions I noticed they talk about both IRI and NDI doing democracy 

work. I think that kind of ideological balance is also needed in 

countries including Ghana. 

And I thank you again for doing this hearing on democracy including Ghana and inviting my views. I will be happy to answer 

any questions. 

87

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akuetteh follows:]

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Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

I’m going to allow myself 5 minutes. I promised the witnesses 

and I promised my friend from California we’d be out of here by 

5 o’clock. So allow me 5 minutes. 

Mr. Nackerdien, you answered both of my questions that I had 

for you during your testimony. Either you read my notes or you 

were incredibly well prepared. So please don’t be excited that I 

don’t ask you a question. I had two questions for you. You answered both of them. Thank you. 

No reflection on you, Mr. Merloe. I do have a question for you. 

It means that you didn’t address it in your testimony. You talked 

about inclusiveness and I was concerned about women and minority ethnic groups that are being marginalized in many elections on 

the continent today. 

Is progress being made in the area, particularly for women? 

Mr. MERLOE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The answer is both no and yes. In one sense, there’s not enough 

progress being made. There’s no question about that, and that 

would be the answer practically in 95 percent of the countries 

around the world where we were discussing this topic. 

The answer is yes in this sense. There is a mobilization and the 

waking of people around the world including women, including 

young women when we talk about youth, to step forward and take 

their place in public affairs. That’s happening in every country 

around the world. And donors and people like ourselves who are 

not donors but who are activists who choose to leave our own countries and go across borders and join hands in association with our 

friends or reformers have recognized this as well. 

So there are places. There are many places. The African Union, 

for example—Ranking Member Bass, you asked about the AU—the 

African Union’s political division is headed by a group of people including women who recognize the importance of expanding the 

franchise of women and youth both as participants in the process 

and as candidates and as political leaders. 

NDI, just speaking for my own organization, has a memorandum 

of understanding with the AU to work on youth participation 

across the continent. We have money from USAID in certain countries to work in training women political candidates. Kenya was 

mentioned by the USAID representative. 

We have civil society activities where we do this. Certainly, with 

the millions of citizens who have come forward to monitor the integrity of their own elections, something that we don’t see so much 

in the United States but elsewhere in the world, it takes place. 

These are young people and women who are represented in proportion to the population. 

So there are things that are happening that are very encouraging. I think the awareness among organizations on the ground—

homegrown organizations and international organizations—is also 

increasing. Donors and others are getting with it. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Tomaszewski, I don’t know if it was in your written testimony or your oral testimony. You were talking about 7 in 10 Africans in about 28 different countries view the elections as either 

completely fair, fair, or fair with only minor problems. 

94

Is their perception correct and if it is that’s great. If it’s not, why 

do you think their perception is that way? 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. Well, I think that the very important aspect 

here is that there are more elections and they’re happening more 

frequently, and when you have that happen you have more and 

more of an opportunity to get it right. 

Additionally, when we talk about 7 in 10 Africans, we’re talking 

about people who are participating in a process and learning how 

to become more involved in their government. I think this goes 

back to part of the testimony that I was talking about where elections are something, when done over and over again, more people 

feel a part of the process. 

We often talk about one activity we’re doing in one country for 

one election like civic and voter education. That education process 

is certainly something that has to be done, but much more deeply 

than just how to vote. In a lot of these countries—I know in 

Kenya—people know how to vote. They know how to do it. But it’s 

all the things around the election that really concern them. 

And, of course, Kenya is one example where perhaps it’s a little 

more polarized about the opinion of whether or not those elections 

are free and fair or not, and it’s often tied to the outcome more 

than just the operation and the process. 

So it’s a little bit of a mix of everything. But I think the trend 

is that it’s a sign that more elections are happening and there’s 

more opportunities for people to participate, so they feel more engaged. 

When you feel more engaged, you have a stake to play, and you 

certainly have a more enlightened view about the election itself, 

and you look at it as something—well, it happened—I participated. 

It may not be perfect but I feel like I was a part of it. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Akuetteh, your country has a special place in my heart. My 

mother passed away last month and for the last 4 years of her life 

she was cared for in her home by a woman from Ghana who treated my mother as if she were her own. 

So I just wanted to ask you, you spoke about the peaceful transfer of power in many of your elections. I believe you said the last 

two elections. Ghana seems unique in that sense. 

There’s others, I think, that you all mentioned. I’m hanging 

around with the people from Mississippi too much. I just said you 

all. But it seems that Ghana is unique in that facet of the elections. 

Why do you think that is? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. Well, first of all, I’m sorry for your loss. But I’m 

also glad that somebody born in the same country—a sister of mine 

contributed. 

It is hard for me to say because I look at Africa and the countries. They are artificial creations by the Europeans and therefore 

in many cases I don’t think that one African country is that different from another. 

It may be the experiences both during colonialism and then 

since. In the case of Ghana in particular, when I look at, you know, 

that there is less polarization politically and ethnically than other 

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portance of his and building a country where people see themselves 

as Ghanaian first. So that has to do with—I mean, that is one explanation. 

In terms of turning power over peacefully, Ghana did have a lot 

of coups. In fact, that President was overthrown in 1966. We had 

lots and lots and lots of coups and attempted coups, and when I 

talk to Ghanaians and in my own thinking Ghanaians tried everything else. You know, colonialism was imposed on us. Then we had 

one-party system. Then we had coups, and Ghanaians came to the 

realization that the best form of government that will work for us 

is a leader that we choose and if we don’t like them we throw them 

out. 

By the way, in Ghana these days when people stick out their 

thumb it’s not the American way of saying ‘‘okay.’’ It’s just warning 

politicians that we will be voting. Because in Ghana when you vote 

your thumb is stuck in ink and so when they hold it up it’s like 

well, we see what you are doing—don’t forget elections are coming. 

But whatever it is, I’m saying that I think those are in other African countries too and it would be good to find out how to bring 

it to the fore. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

American voters hold up a finger too but it’s not their thumb. 

The Chair recognizes the ranking member from California, Congresswoman Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Well, first of all, let me thank all of you for your patience, first of all, and your testimony. 

I just have a couple of questions. 

Mr. Tomaszewski. You mentioned about how funding ramps up 

right before an election and I wanted you to talk a little bit more 

about that because I was under the assumption that funding is 

given out in a calendar year or fiscal year. 

So are RFPs put out or something? Explain what you meant by 

that. 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. Well, the procurement process depending on 

the mission, depending on the funder, certainly has a role to play 

in that. Also, you have situations like you have in DRC right now 

where funders are waiting to see what’s happening, right? 

You don’t want to go down a road of funding a certain set of priorities in an election program when you may need to go in another 

way. So I think that plays a role in it. 

More concerning for us, though, is that when we treat elections 

as an episode——

Ms. BASS. Right. Right. 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI [continuing]. As a thing that happens once we 

don’t realize—and we asked some questions about historically 

marginalized groups, women and youth—how do you impact them 

and empower them if 6 months before an election you’re just touching them—you’re just starting to engage them. 

You’re just starting to talk to a woman and help her to prepare 

herself to run for a competitive election in a landscape that’s tilted 

against her from the beginning. You can’t do that 6 months out. 

Ms. BASS. So and I’m asking and speaking about the U.S. funding—our side—especially since, as I understand it, the democracy 

96

rights and governance funding has been decreased 44 percent, 

which is huge. 

So in terms of our funding, though, is that the way it’s distributed? DRC, for example, I would think there would be a whole rush 

of funding to try to prevent something as opposed to holding back 

and waiting to see whether it’s going to collapse or not. 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. Well, I can cite the example I used in my testimony regarding Tanzania. To have an elections program or elections assistance, which we received from USAID funding through 

our CEPPS partnership just 5 months to the election. 

And when we were asked to submit a proposal for this project, 

we were given a very short time line to come up with the projects, 

to put them down in time, to bring the partners together, to engage 

about what was our strategy, what was our entry point. 

And to do that with such a close time to elections it’s very hard. 

You’ve got to really stretch yourself very thin just to make the impact that you need to get the right assistance that’s needed on the 

ground. 

Ms. BASS. So I guess your point is that—because I just totally 

assumed that the funding was ongoing and——

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. It may be ongoing. It may be available. But, 

certainly, it has to go through that process of putting the RFP out 

there, of putting the—coming up with the funding mechanism and 

the timing for it. These are things, of course, we would like to see 

happen a lot earlier in the process. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. So the next election in Tanzania is in 4 or 5 

years? 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. Yes. 

Ms. BASS. 4 years? So is there an RFP now for that election? 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. No. 

Ms. BASS. There should be an RFP now for that election. 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. Let’s look at Tanzania. For the first time we 

saw a really strong competitive election from the opposition 

through Ukawa. 

We saw many, many youth who were never involved in elections 

get inspired and be involved in elections. We have many, many 

youth and women who have been elected to Parliament and other 

positions in government, and they need our help now so, one, they 

can get elected. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. Two, so the youth—the civil society youth networks that were built pre-election can be continued and strengthened. I think we go back to our question of Ghana. We do our victory dance. They have peaceful transfers of power, successful elections and then all of a sudden we think well, we’re good—let’s go 

home. 

Ms. BASS. Right 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. And now what we’re seeing in a place like 

Ghana today, we’ve kind of left our foot off the gas and now we’re 

moving into a possible crisis. 

Ms. BASS. So you would say then it’s just the general procurement process? 

Mr. TOMASZEWSKI. And planning on the part of U.S. assistance 

providers. 

97

Ms. BASS. Really not a good use of money to do that that way, 

and that you two were exchanging glances so it looked like you 

wanted to comment about that, Mr. Merloe and Mr. Nackerdien. 

Mr. MERLOE. Thank you, Representative Bass. Yes, the first I 

think it comes from a question of understanding. As Rushdi pointed out, elections are not an event. We all agree. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. MERLOE. When you look at elections as a cycle and you start 

with the pre-elections and all the things that happen post-elections—they connect up. 

But what I think we’re really saying is that elections are not 

even two-dimensional. They really go into the political fabric and 

culture of a country. 

So if you want to help people who have been marginalized become part of a process it’s an ongoing activity that has a lot of dimensions and takes a lot of time. 

Two things that I would just re-emphasize. One is funding is 

scarce, and so when USAID or State Department’s DRL are looking 

at these things, they’re husbanding their resources and trying to 

decide what to do. They hedge their bets in part because of that. 

But they also, I think, see this problem of understanding elections as being something that really is a political dynamic; it’s part 

of building democracy—it’s not just part of casting ballots. 

Limiting that understanding takes away from the opportunities, 

and that diminishes the effectiveness of the kinds of programming 

that are done, which need to be around the calendar and need to 

be over a large arc of time. 

The second thing is elections are volatile—so attention tends to 

be directed when volatility goes up. We’re talking about Ghana 

today. We weren’t talking about Ghana in November or in October 

of last year, except the insiders, and that’s because volatility has 

gone up. 

But it was very clear at the end of the last election that, first, 

it was a razor-thin decision. Second, the election commission itself 

was under attack. Its credibility had been diminished somewhat 

because of the controversy. 

Third, the Supreme Court—and the commission and the court 

are the two interlocutors in the circumstance—the decision of the 

court took a very long time, which stretched out the volatility and 

the tensions in the country. 

As a consequence, there’s a new commission. The new commission doesn’t have the history of the last commission. Public confidence has been shown in all of the opinion polls in that body and 

in the courts, which were very high, now to have diminished a lot. 

The resources are up and the stakes are higher because of the 

age of the people who are contesting and a number of other factors. 

It’s not hard to figure out that Ghana needed attention 6 months 

ago. There’s 6 months to go. 

We now are talking about doing this, and a lot of people are reacting. I mean, I do want to give credit where credit is due. A lot 

of people are reacting but it’s late in the game. We need to——

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. MERLOE [continuing]. Look at these things from a much 

more strategic and a much more holistic and fulsome view. 

98

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. NACKERDIEN. Thank you. We talk about the electoral cycle 

and getting involved early. I think one of the great benefits of having more democracies on the African continent is the fact that it’s 

actually quite predictable. 

We know in Tanzania there will be an election in 4 years’ time. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. NACKERDIEN. We know in Ghana the election is happening 

now but it will happen in another cycle and we can plan accordingly. In many of the countries where we’ve had tremendous impact it’s where we’ve maybe been 10, 15 years and it’s not with a 

huge amounts of funding that might be required in places like the 

DRC where the infrastructure is low. 

But it’s in places where we’re able to sustain through innovative 

programming and working at the core with different groups whether it is with election commissions and helping them develop their 

process and building trust or with political parties or with civil society organizations, systematically building capacity and ramping 

up over a period of time, not just 6 months before the election. We 

talk about the electoral cycle but there’s a predictability about elections often crafted constitutions and that’s what we must work 

with. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. And Mr. Akuetteh, why don’t you close us 

out? 

Mr. AKUETTEH. I do want to thank you again for holding this. 

I share everything that has been said. In fact, I think because 

the level of English is better here it’s been said more elegantly. 

But I do support that when we—because elections are cycles the 

funding and the planning should be adjusted so that there is attention to various things that need to be done before balloting arrives 

and even following the balloting that there will be things to do. 

And I will cite the example that Kofi Annan and I share a country of birth and if he thinks that Ghana needs attention and he’s 

turning his attention to it again I think it is good that this hearing 

is being held and that the agencies that fund elections will look at 

Ghana again not from a negative point of view but to consolidate 

the real progress that has been made so that this passage of elections, clean elections, and peaceful handover. 

If it is necessitated—if the opposition does win, and I’m not saying they will win, we don’t know yet, but if they do win that will 

continue the pattern of peaceful transfer. Thank you again. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. I’d like to 

thank our panelists for your presence today, for your testimony and 

for your honest answers to our questions. I’d ask all our visitors at 

the conclusion of the hearing to clear the room. They need the room 

for another event that’s coming, following right behind us. 

This subcommittee having no further business, this hearing is 

now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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