U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

21–528 PDF 2016

FOOD FOR THOUGHT: EFFORTS TO DEFEND THE 

NATION’S AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

Serial No. 114–56 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JOHN DICKHAUS, Subcommittee Clerk 

MOIRA BERGIN, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Dr. R. Douglas Meckes, State Veterinarian, North Carolina Department of 

Agriculture and Consumer Services, Veterinary Division: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Dr. Tammy R. Beckham, Dean, College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State 

University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Mr. Bobby Acord, Former Administrator, Animal Plant Health Inspection 

Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Testifying on Behalf of the National Pork Producers Council: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

Mr. Brian R. Williams, Assistant Extension Professor, Mississippi State University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 34 

(1) 

FOOD FOR THOUGHT: EFFORTS TO DEFEND 

THE NATION’S AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 

Friday, February 26, 2016 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McSally, Walker, Loudermilk, Donovan, 

Payne, and Watson Coleman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness 

Response and Communications will come to order. 

The subcommittee’s meeting today to receive testimony regarding 

the efforts to defend our Nation’s food and agriculture sector. I now 

recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Let me first say this is my last subcommittee hearing that I will 

be chairing. Technically, I have actually handed over the gavel to 

my good colleague here, Mr. Donovan from New York, but since we 

had planned this hearing, we decided to do our change of command 

ceremony at the end of the hearing. So, it is an absolute honor to 

have been chairing this subcommittee and working with my colleagues and my Ranking Member, Mr. Payne. I will be remaining 

on the subcommittee, but I will be chairing the Border and Maritime Subcommittee now, which is, obviously, quite important for 

my district, and looking forward to continued leadership opportunities. 

Anyway back to the topic at hand. Throughout this Congress, the 

Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications has taken a deep dive into the world of biological terrorism. We have held hearings to assess the biological threat, understand the scope of the biodefense problem, and examine Federal 

programs aimed at tackling some of the biodefense challenges. Our 

oversight thus far has primarily been on the human impacts of biological terrorism. 

Today we are going to take a different perspective, and look at 

the impacts to the Nation from a terrorist attack on, or natural disruption of, our agricultural or food systems. An agroterrorism attack would impact the most basic of human needs: The food we eat. 

Furthermore, the food and agricultural sector is critically important to our Nation’s economy. U.S. food and agriculture accounts 

for roughly one-fifth of the Nation’s economic activity, contributing 
2 

$835 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product in 2014, and is responsible for 1 out of every 12 U.S. jobs. 

In my home State of Arizona, ranching and agriculture contrib- utes around $10 billion a year to the State’s economy. An intentional attack on, or natural disruption of, U.S. agriculture, or food, 

therefore, would present a serious threat to this Nation and cause 

major economic damage on a number of levels. 

There will be costs related to containing disease, and destruction 

of livestock, compensating farmers for loss of agriculture commodities, and losses in other related industries, and trade embargoes 

imposed by other nations. 

Intelligence indicates that terrorists have discussed 

vulnerabilities in various components of this sector. Food and agriculture is an attractive target to terrorists, because many agents 

are easy to obtain; minimal technology is required to execute an attack, and our food travels across the country and world quickly and 

efficiently. 

Furthermore, even if there are few human casualties, an 

agroterrorism attack would also undermine public confidence in the 

Government, increasing general concerns about the safety of our 

food supply, as well as the effectiveness of biological defense planning. This goes to the heart of what we know groups like ISIS are 

trying to do, terrorize by all means possible. 

We all need to look at the impacts of the highly pathogenic avian 

influenza, or HPAI, a natural event to see how devastating an intentional act against our food or agriculture could be. Last year’s 

outbreak of HPAI was the largest animal health incident in U.S. 

history, resulting in over $3 billion in economic losses, and the 

slaughtering of 48 million birds to stem the spread of the disease. 

Eighteen trading partners banned all imports of U.S. poultry and 

products, and an additional 28 trading partners imposed partial 

bans. This outbreak, and its rapid farm-to-farm spread, highlighted 

the challenge the sector faces related to effective biosecurity, especially during a large-scale response. 

We must ensure we are able to assess our level of preparedness 

for any type of major disruption to U.S. food or agriculture. Our 

goal today is to gain a better understanding of what Government, 

along with academia and the private sector, are doing to reduce 

vulnerabilities of the food and agriculture sector to a terrorist attack. 

We hope to gain a better understanding of the scope of the problem, and identify ways in which we, as Members of Congress focused on Homeland Security issues, can help prevent attacks, and 

improve our readiness and our ability to respond. 

I hope to hear about information sharing with the Government. 

Is food and agriculture engaged in our process, including things 

like the fusion centers? Are you getting the threat and risk information that you need? I also want to understand your connectedness to the human health side of things. Are our current biosurveillance systems integrating the human, animal, and plant data to 

form one true, ‘‘One Health’’ picture? 

With that, I welcome our witnesses, and I look forward to your 

testimony. 

[The statement of Chairman McSally follows:] 
3 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MARTHA MCSALLY

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

Throughout this Congress, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications has taken a deep dive into the world of biological terrorism. We have held hearings to assess the biological threat, understand the scope 

of the biodefense problem, and examine Federal programs aimed at tackling some 

of the biodefense challenges. 

Our oversight thus far has primarily been on the human impacts of biological terrorism. Today we are going to take a different perspective and look at the impacts 

to the Nation from a terrorist attack on, or natural disruption of, our agricultural 

or food systems. 

An agroterrorism attack would impact the most basic of human needs—the food 

we eat. Furthermore, the food and agriculture sector is critically important to our 

nation’s economy. U.S. food and agriculture accounts for roughly one-fifth of the Nation’s economic activity, contributed $835 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product 

(GDP) in 2014, and is responsible for one out of every 12 U.S. jobs. In my home 

State of Arizona, ranching and agriculture contributes around $10 billion a year to 

the State’s economy. 

An intentional attack or natural disruption of U.S. agriculture or food, therefore, 

would present a serious threat to this Nation and cause major economic damages 

on a number of levels. There will be costs related to containing disease and destruction of livestock, compensating farmers for loss of agricultural commodities and 

losses in other related industries, and trade embargoes imposed by other nations. 

Intelligence indicates that terrorists have discussed vulnerabilities in various components of the sector. Food and agriculture is an attractive target to terrorists because many agents are easy to obtain, minimal technology is required to execute an 

attack, and our food travels across the country and world quickly and efficiently. 

Furthermore, even if there are few human casualties, an agroterrorism attack 

would also undermine public confidence in Government, increasing general concerns 

about the safety of our food supply as well as the effectiveness of biological defense 

planning. This goes to the heart of what we know groups like ISIS are trying to 

do—terrorize by any means possible. 

We need only look at the impacts of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), 

a natural event, to see how devastating an intentional act against our food or agriculture could be. Last year’s outbreak of HPAI was the largest animal health incident in U.S. history, resulting in over $3 billion in economic losses and the slaughtering of 48 million birds to stem the spread of disease. Eighteen trading partners 

banned all imports of U.S. poultry and products and an additional 28 trading partners imposed partial bans. 

This outbreak and its rapid farm-to-farm spread highlighted the challenges the 

sector faces related to effective biosecurity, especially during a large-scale response. 

We must ensure we are able to assess our level of preparedness for any type of 

major disruption to U.S. food or agriculture. Our goal today is to gain a better understanding of what Government, along with academia and the private sector, are 

doing to reduce vulnerabilities of the food and agricultural sector to a terrorist attack. 

We hope to gain a better understanding of the scope of the problem, and identify 

ways in which we as Members of Congress focused on homeland security issues can 

help prevent attacks and improve our readiness and ability to respond. 

I hope to hear about information sharing with Government. Is food and agriculture engaged in our processes including fusion centers? Are you getting the 

threat and risk information you need? I also want to understand your connectedness 

to the human health side of things—are our current biosurveillance systems integrating the human, animal, and plant data to form a true ‘‘One Health’’ picture? 

With that, I welcome our witnesses. I look forward to your testimony. 

Ms. MCSALLY. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for any opening statement he may have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning to all here. 

I would like to thank subcommittee Chair, Ms. McSally, for holding 

today’s chair. Madam Chair, I wish you the best of luck as you take 

over the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 
4 

Mr. PAYNE. Biological threats are evolving. As these threats 

evolve, so does our perspective about how we can best protect 

against the damage that they can inflict. This subcommittee has 

historically focused on the human health impact of the biological 

threats. I am pleased that we are expanding the scope of our oversight to include the impact to U.S. agriculture and food supply. 

I represent the 10th Congressional District of the State of New 

Jersey. Now, my district is not known for its rolling fields of corn, 

hog pens or open cattle ranges. It is, however, home of the Port of 

Newark, and Newark Liberty International Airport. Customs and 

Border Protection agriculture specialists at the airport clear up to 

20,000 passengers every day. At Port Newark, one of the busiest 

ports on the East Coast, specialists inspect imported food, items, 

marble slabs, tiles, and wood-packing material, all of which can 

carry insects and other snails that could harm our domestic agriculture. Yet, just this week, I heard the CPB employees in my district about insufficient agriculture specialist staffing. 

The Port of Newark and Newark International Airport are top 

performing ports, with top interception numbers and several firstin-the-Nation insect finds. But I am concerned that unless the 

staffing challenges are resolved, there is a risk that a new foreign 

insect could go undetected and do harm to the agriculture industry 

and the safety of the food supply. 

Although I recognize that we may not be able to stop every dangerous insect or pathogen from entering our borders, we must be 

vigilant. With that said, I also recognize that there are domestic 

risks to agriculture—the agriculture industry and the food supply 

related to natural disasters and emerging disease, diseasing and 

bad actors. 

Last year, for example, an avian influenza outbreak was responsible for nearly $400 million in losses to the egg and poultry industry, and consumers paid the price at the grocery store. Although 

the Avian influenza was a naturally-occurring event, the financial 

losses sustained served as a sobering example of the economic damage that a significant agriculture incident could inflict. 

The food and agricultural industry is valued at nearly $1 trillion 

in the United States, and its criticality to the American people is 

without question. That is why the Federal Government has designated the food and agriculture sector a critical infrastructure sector since 2003. 

Although there are multiple efforts to enhance the security of the 

agriculture industry underway at the Federal and State level, as 

well as within industry, significant challenges remain. For example, earlier this month, this subcommittee held a hearing on the 

Department of Homeland Security’s struggle to achieve a National 

biosurveillance capability to collect and analyze biosurveillance 

data related to human health, animal health, and plant health. 

Unfortunately, this DHS National Biosurveillance Integration 

Center has struggled to effectively execute its mission for nearly a 

decade to the detriment of efforts to improve the agricultural biosurveillance capabilities. I will be interested to know what, if any, 

recommendations the witnesses have to improve the National biosurveillance capability in that regard. 
5 

Additionally, I will be interested in understanding how information related to emerging diseases, emergency planning for natural 

disasters, and terrorist threats is shared with stakeholders in the 

agricultural industry, and whether the information is actionable. 

Finally, I am eager to learn from our witnesses how the private 

sector, educational institutions, and non-Government entities can 

play an active role in developing and enhancing biosecurity protocols for the agriculture industry as a whole. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I look forward 

to hearing your testimony. Madam Chair, with that, I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DONALD M. PAYNE JR. 

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

Biological threats are evolving. As these threats evolve, so does our perspective 

about how we can best protect against the damage they can inflict. This subcommittee has historically focused on the human health impact of the biological 

threats. I am pleased that we are expanding the scope of our oversight to include 

the impact to U.S. agriculture and food supply. 

I represent the 10th Congressional district of New Jersey. My district is not 

known for its rolling fields of corn, hog pens, or open cattle ranges. It is, however, 

home of the Port of Newark and Newark Liberty International Airport. 

Customs and Border Protection Agriculture Specialists at that airport clear up to 

20,000 passengers every day. At Port Newark—one of the busiest ports on the East 

Coast—specialists inspect imported food items, marble slabs, tiles, and wood-packing material, all of which can carry insects or other snails that could harm domestic 

agriculture. 

Yet, just this week, I heard from CBP employees in my district about insufficient 

Agriculture Specialist staffing. The Port of Newark and Newark Liberty International Airport are top performing ports, with top interception numbers, and several ‘‘First-in-Nation’’ insect finds. 

But I am concerned that unless the staffing challenges are resolved, there’s a risk 

that a new foreign insect could go undetected and do harm to the agriculture industry and the safety of the food supply. Although I recognize that we may not be able 

to stop every dangerous insect or pathogen from entering our borders, we must be 

vigilant. 

With that said, I also recognize that there are domestic risks to the agriculture 

industry and food supply—related to natural disasters, emerging disease, and bad 

actors. Last year, for example, an avian influenza outbreak was responsible for 

nearly $400 million in losses to the egg and poultry industry. 

And consumers paid the price at the grocery store. Although avian influenza was 

a naturally-occurring event, the financial losses sustained served as a sobering example of the economic damage that a significant agricultural incident could inflict. 

The food and agriculture industry is valued at nearly a trillion dollars in the 

United States, and its criticality to the American people is without question. That 

is why the Federal Government has designated the Food and Agriculture Sector a 

critical infrastructure sector since 2003. Although there are multiple efforts to enhance the security of the agriculture industry underway at the Federal and State 

level, as well as within industry, significant challenges remain. 

For example, earlier this month, this subcommittee held a hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s struggle to achieve a National biosurveillance capability to collect and analyze biosurveillance data related to human health, animal 

health, and plant health. Unfortunately, this DHS’s National Biosurveillance Integration Center has struggled to effectively execute its mission for nearly a decade, 

to the detriment of efforts to improve agriculture biosurveillance capabilities. I will 

be interested to know what, if any, recommendations the witnesses have to improve 

the National biosurveillance capability in that regard. 

Additionally, I will be interested in understanding how information related to 

emerging diseases, emergency planning for natural disasters, and terrorist threats 

is shared with stakeholders in the agriculture industry and whether the information 

is actionable. 
6 

Finally, I am eager to learn from our witnesses how the private sector, educational institutions, and other non-Government entities can play an active role in 

developing and enhancing biosecurity protocols for the agriculture industry as a 

whole. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Ranking Member Payne. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements 

may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

Before we begin, I would like to thank all of the witnesses for being here today, 

especially Professor Brian Williams from Mississippi State University. Mr. Williams 

is a professor at Mississippi State’s College of Agriculture Economics and will provide important insight into the economic effects of an agro-event—whether manmade or naturally-occurring. I would like to thank him for making the trip to Washington to share his important insights with us today. I represent a district in Mississippi where agriculture is the No. 1 source of income. 

From catfish and poultry to hogs and rice, agriculture accounts for $10.6 billion 

in annual revenue—or over 15 percent—of the State’s income. Any significant disruption to the agriculture industry there—whether at the hands of terrorist actors, 

emerging diseases, or natural disasters—would have devastating rippling effects 

throughout the State and the Nation. That is why I have worked hard to advance 

programs that improve the National capability to prevent—and mitigate the impact 

of—biological events affecting agriculture and improve resiliency within the industry. 

I am interested in hearing our witness’ assessment of Federal efforts to protect 

the Nation’s food supply and to better understand the risks to our agriculture sector. Late last year, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense released a report 

that identified capability gaps across the National biodefense enterprise. The Panel’s 

report focused on biodefense efforts associated with protecting human health. It also 

addressed bio-threats to agriculture. 

An important recommendation from the report called for enhanced surveillance 

and detection of biological threats to animal health. This would be achieved through 

the establishment of a ‘‘Nationally notifiable animal disease system’’ modeled after 

the existing system for identifying human disease outbreaks. 

Too often, we find that information sharing does not take place across units of 

Government and the private sector. Hopefully, our witnesses can shed light on 

whether the Federal Government is doing enough to identify international threats 

to the agriculture industry. I believe these actions must be timely and fact-based 

to protect domestic livestock and crops. Domestically, we should examine whether 

animal disease reporting requirements ensure that emerging diseases are identified. 

That information is central to the ability of health and safety officials to contain an 

outbreak. 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture has proposed the creation of a National List 

of Reportable Animal Diseases. I would be interested to hear whether the existence 

of such a list would be helpful to agricultural stakeholders and whether it could be 

designed in a way where States and other owners of disease information could willingly and comfortably report disease incidence? 

Moreover, I want to understand the extent to which the agriculture industry has 

been included in emergency planning activities so that it is resilient in the wake 

of a natural disaster. Now that NBAF has received its construction funding, I want 

to learn about the research that will be conducted on biological threats to livestock 

and animal diseases that can impact human health. To that end, I would like to 

learn more about Kansas State’s partnership with NBAF, the research that will be 

pursued, and how its work will advance National agro-defense capabilities. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel 

before us today on this important topic. Dr. Doug Meckes is the 

North Carolina State veterinarian, a position he has held since 

2014. Prior to that, Dr. Meckes served as the branch chief for Food, 

Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense at the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, where he provided oversight and management 
7 

of the Department’s implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive–9, Defense of the United States Agriculture and 

Food, Integrating the efforts of other DHS components, and coordinating those efforts with appropriate Federal departments and 

agencies, Tribal, State, and local governments, and the private sector. 

Dr. Tammy Beckham is dean of the College of Veterinary Medicine at Kansas State University, a position she assumed in August 

2015. Prior to her current position, Dr. Beckham served as the director of the Institute for Infectious Animal Diseases, or IIAD, a 

Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence in College 

Station, Texas, where she led the IIAD’s effort to perform research 

and develop products to defend the Nation from high consequence, 

foreign, animal, emerging, and zoonotic diseases. Did I say that 

right? 

Dr. BECKHAM. Excellent. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I was a premed biology major in college. My professors would not be proud of me. 

Anyway, Dr. Beckham also served as director of the Texas A&M 

Veterinary Medical Diagnostic laboratory, where she provided leadership for its two full-service laboratories and two poultry laboratories, and directs one of the highest-volume animal diagnostic labs 

in the country. 

Previously, Dr. Beckham was director of the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic laboratory, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York. Her responsibilities included managing the diagnosis of animal diseases; 

overseeing diagnostic test development for a Nation-wide animal 

health diagnostic system; and coordinating efforts with the Department of Homeland Security and National Animal Health Laboratory Network and other entities. 

Mr. Bobby Acord has been a consultant for the National Pork 

Producers Council since 2004. Prior to that, Mr. Acord served as 

administrator for the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Services from 2001 to 2004. As APHIS’s— 

is that how you pronounce it—administrator, Mr. Acord was responsible for protecting U.S. agricultural health from exotic pests 

and diseases, administering the Animal Welfare Act, and carrying 

out wildlife damage management activities. Mr. Acord served as 

APHIS’s associate administrator from 1999 to 2001. Prior to that, 

he served nearly a decade as deputy administrator for APHIS’s 

wildlife services program. 

Dr. Brian Williams is an assistant extension professor at the 

Mississippi State University, Department of Agricultural Economics. Dr. Williams focuses on the primary areas of commodity marketing, farm management, production economics, and agricultural 

policy. Since joining the department, he has served as a member 

of the Mississippi University disaster response team, where he has 

focused on assessing damage to the agricultural academic sector 

after natural disasters. The witnesses’ full written statements will 

appear in the record. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Meckes for 5 minutes. 
8 

STATEMENT OF R. DOUGLAS MECKES, D.V.M., STATE VETERINARIAN, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

AND CONSUMER SERVICES, VETERINARY DIVISION 

Dr. MECKES. Red light. Chairman McSally, Ranking Member 

Payne, Members of the House Subcommittee on Preparedness, Response, and Communications. My name is Doug Meckes, and I am 

the State veterinarian and the director of the veterinary division 

in North Carolina’s Department of Agriculture and consumer services. The division serves the poultry industry, the livestock industry, and manages and operates 4 veterinary diagnostic laboratories 

in North Carolina. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today about North Carolina’s on-going efforts to prepare for, respond to, and communicate 

with stakeholders during agricultural emergencies. 

North Carolina and Georgia’s robust agriculture and agri- business industry, which contributes nearly $80 billion annually to 

North Carolina’s economy. Sixty-seven percent of that figure is associated animal agriculture. The industry accounts for 17 percent 

of State’s income and employs 16 percent of the workforce. 

Chairman McSally and Ranking Member Payne have spoken 

knowledgeably about the food and ag sectors writ large, and I will 

not speak to that. But mindful of the contributions of the food and 

ag sector to the Nation, in January 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Directive–9 was released and established a National policy 

to defend agriculture food and food systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 

Included in HSPD–9 were 18 line items which provide guidance 

to address then-identified gaps in our Nation’s ability to identify 

agriculture and food. Twelve years, later, gaps remain in our efforts to fulfill the HSPD–9 directives. 

I will speak to North Carolina’s concerns over 3 of those gaps 

today. Federal, State, and local responses capabilities, availability 

of vaccine for foot-and-mouth disease, and the National Animal 

Health Laboratory Network resources. Line item 14 of HSPD–9 directs participating departments and agencies to ensure that the 

Federal, State, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond effectively to a terrorist attack, to major disease outbreaks, 

or other disaster. 

Even before HSPD–9, my predecessors in North Carolina recognized the need for such capability. That need was precipitated by 

a series of events in the State, in the Nation, and internationally. 

In September 1999, Hurricane Floyd made landfall in North Carolina, and that resulted in $813 million in agriculture losses. 

In February 2001, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the 

United Kingdom caused a crisis in agriculture and tourism. 

Finally, 9/11 brought new concerns of attacks on our agriculture 

and food systems. The likelihood of agroterrorism, the deliberate 

introduction of animal plant disease for the purpose of generating 

fear, and causing economic losses, and undermining social stability 

took on new meaning. 

In the midst of these events, North Carolina’s veterinary division 

launched an effort to meet the challenges of agriculture and food 

in the 21st Century. As a result, the emergency programs division 

was created within the department to reduce the vulnerability, 
9 

minimize the impact of any natural or man-made disaster, disease, 

or terrorist attack, and to facilitate a rapid return to normalcy. 

Today, the emergency programs division within North Carolina 

has reached maturity and has more than fulfilled its all hazards 

response mission. Development of this capability has been funded 

by State and various Federal grants: $18 million in State funds, 

$7.3 million in Federal funds, a relatively small investment over 

the years. 

Consider what similar investments might have meant to States 

so profoundly affected by HPAI. Iowa and Minnesota experienced 

$1.6–1.8 billion in economic losses as a result of HPAI on 180 

premises. 

Continued Federal, State funding will be necessary to maintain 

current capability to develop new capability to train, to exercise, to 

replace equipment as needed. Unfortunately, funding for North 

Carolina’s emergency program division continues to decline, and 

places the State’s preparedness and response capability at risk. 

North Carolina’s second concern, line item 18(a) of HSPD–9, 

speaks to the necessity of developing a National Veterinary Stockpile, containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine antivirals, 

therapeutic products to appropriately respond to the most damaging animal diseases. 

Foremost in the minds with States with significant animal agriculture production is the possibility of a foot-and-mouth disease 

outbreak. Certainly, that is the case in North Carolina, home to 9 

million hogs. The size, the structure, the efficiency, and the extensive movement inherent in U.S. livestock industry, will present unprecedented challenges in the event of an FMD outbreak. Control 

of such an outbreak in livestock-dense areas will require tens of 

millions of doses of foot-and-mouth disease vaccine. 

However, there are not tens of millions of doses of foot-andmouth disease available, not anywhere in the world, because there 

is no excess production capacity. Current production meets daily 

needs, and there is no excess capacity. The reality has been evident 

since 2004, when the National Veterinary Stockpile was created, 

but there has never been sufficient funding to stockpile foot-andmouth disease vaccines. 

FMD remains North Carolina’s animal agriculture’s greatest 

threat. The pork industry, the economy, communities, businesses, 

and families in North Carolina would be devastated by a foot-andmouth disease outbreak. A cooperative collaborative effort, which 

includes all stakeholders must be initiated to develop and implement a plan for establishing an effective FMD stockpile. 

North Carolina’s third concern is veterinary diagnostic laboratory 

capability. Line item 8, HSPD–9, directs departments and agencies 

to develop a Nation-wide laboratory network for food, veterinary, 

plant, health, and water resources that integrate Federal and State 

laboratory resources. The National Animal Health Laboratory Network was created as a result of this directive, and is now a part 

of the Nation-wide strategy to coordinate the work of all organizations providing animal disease surveillance and testing services. 

North Carolina’s veterinary diagnostic laboratory system is a 

part of NAHLN, effectively surveils for and diagnoses animals’ 

zoonotic diseases every day. However, State and Federal support of 
10 

1Mike Walden, Reynolds Professor and Extension Economist, NC State University’s College 

of Agriculture and Life Sciences. 2Food and Agriculture Sector-Specific Plan (SSP) 2015. 

and full funding for the Nation’s NAHLN laboratory system are 

necessary to optimize capability. 

The absence of full funding for the NAHLN was recently noted 

in the bipartisan report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, which stated: ‘‘The NAHLN has struggled to maintain 

even $10 million of annual funding. Its appropriations cut over the 

years to pay for other programs. As a result, laboratories are unable to meet the threat and at times eliminate positions and testing capacity for foreign animal diseases.’’ 

After struggling for years to obtain sufficient funding, Congress, in 2014, authorized the specific funding line for NAHLN at $15 

million. NAHLN must be funded at this authorized level in order 

to meet the need. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of North 

Carolina, about issues of concern related to the defense in food and 

agriculture. I am happy to address any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Meckes follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. DOUGLAS MECKES

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the House Subcommittee on Preparedness, Response, and Communications, my name is Doug 

Meckes and I am the State veterinarian and the director of the Veterinary Division 

in North Carolina’s Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. The division 

includes 150 employees that serve the poultry industry and the livestock industry, 

that manage and operate the State’s 4 veterinary diagnostic laboratories, and that 

are charged with oversight of 866 kennels and shelters caring for companion animals in North Carolina. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about matters of 

concern in North Carolina’s on-going efforts to prepare for, respond to, and communicate with stakeholders during agricultural emergencies. 

North Carolina enjoys a robust agriculture and agribusiness industry which con- tributes nearly $80 billion on an annual basis to North Carolina’s economy; 66% of 

that figure is associated with animal agriculture and North Carolina ranks second 

in hog production and third in overall poultry production in the Nation. On an annual basis, the industry accounts for 17% of the State’s income and employs 16% 

of the workforce. North Carolina’s agriculture/agribusiness industry is part of the 

greater Food and Agriculture Sector (FA Sector), designated by Homeland Security 

a critical infrastructure sector in 2003 thus recognizing its significant contribution 

to National security and the economy.1

The FA Sector is composed of complex production, processing, and delivery systems and has the capacity to feed people and animals both within and beyond the 

boundaries of the United States. These food and agriculture systems are almost entirely under private ownership, operate in highly competitive global markets, strive 

to operate in harmony with the environment, and provide economic opportunities 

and an improved quality of life for American citizens and others world-wide. The 

FA Sector accounts for roughly one-fifth of the Nation’s economic activity. In 2012, 

total agricultural product sales amounted to $400 billion, with crops and livestock 

each accounting for roughly half of those sales. One-fifth of U.S. agricultural production is exported, generating $144.1 billion in 2013, creating a positive trade balance 

of roughly $40 billion, and thereby fueling the U.S. economy.2

In January 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Directive–9 (HSPD–9) ‘‘established a National policy to defend the agriculture system against terrorists’ attack, 

major disasters, and other emergencies.’’ Included in HSPD–9 were 18 ‘‘line items’’ 

which provide guidance to address then-identified gaps in the Nation’s ability to defend agriculture and food. Twelve years later, progress has been made in addressing 

some of the gaps including a star in the crown of agriculture and food defense: Line 

Item 24 in HSPD–9—the design and initiation of construction for ‘‘safe, secure, and 

state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop 
11 

3 North Carolina State Animal Response Team (SART) Animal Burial Guidelines 2003. 

diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases,’’ the National AgroBiodefense facility in Manhattan, Kansas. This achievement notwithstanding, other 

gaps in HSPD–9 have not been sufficiently addressed. 

In the interest of full disclosure, prior to accepting my position in North Carolina, 

I was fully engaged in ‘‘providing oversight and management of the Department’s 

(DHS’s) implementation of HSPD–9’’ in my role as branch chief, Food, Agriculture 

and Veterinary Defense Branch of the Office of Health Affairs, Department of 

Homeland Security. Thus, through my experiences with DHS and now as State veterinarian, I have gained unique insight into what is/should be required at the State 

level to defend agriculture and food. I will speak to 3 of North Carolina’s concerns 

today: Federal, State, and local response capabilities, availability of vaccine for Footand-Mouth disease, and National Animal Health Laboratory Network resources. 

Line Item 14 of HSPD–9 directs the participating Departments/Agencies to ensure 

‘‘that the combined Federal, State, and local response capabilities are adequate to 

respond quickly and effectively to a terrorist attack, major disease outbreak, or 

other disaster affecting the National agriculture or food infrastructure.’’ Even before 

HSPD–9, members of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer 

Services (NCDA&CS), my predecessors, recognized the need for such a capability. 

Today, as the North Carolina State Veterinarian, I am the fortunate benefactor of 

their insight, vision, and planning to prepare for and respond to agriculture and 

food incidents of any magnitude. The need for this capability was precipitated by 

a series of events in the State, in the Nation, and internationally. In September 

1999, Hurricane Floyd made landfall in North Carolina. The hurricane, and associated weather conditions before and after, resulted in the most severe flooding and 

devastation in North Carolina’s history. That flooding resulted in an estimated $813 

million in agricultural losses affecting 32,000 farmers. In addition to crop losses, 

livestock losses—almost 3 million poultry, 28,000 swine, and 600 hundred cattle— 

created problems associated with disposal of the carcasses of the animals.3 In February 2001, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom caused 

a crisis in British agriculture and tourism. This epizootic saw 2,000 cases of the disease in farms across most of the British countryside. Over 10 million sheep and cattle were depopulated in an eventually successful attempt to halt the disease. By the 

time that the disease was controlled, in October 2001, the crisis was estimated to 

have cost the United Kingdom over US$6 billion. Finally, the attacks of 9/11 and 

the subsequent 2001 anthrax attacks, also known as Amerithrax, brought new concerns of attacks on our agricultural and food systems. The likelihood of 

‘‘agroterrorism,’’ ‘‘the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease for the 

purpose of generating fear, causing economic losses, or undermining social stability,’’ 

took on new meaning. 

In the midst of these events, the director of the Veterinary Division in NCDA&CS 

took on the task of developing capabilities to better protect North Carolina’s animal 

health and to formulate a plan to meet the challenges of agriculture and food in 

the 21st Century. The sum of the director’s efforts in this regard created the Emergency Programs Division within the Department. The mission of the Division is to: 

‘‘Reduce the vulnerability and minimize the impact from any natural or man-made 

disaster, disease outbreak, or terrorist attack for the Department, the people and 

the agricultural interest of the State and to facilitate a rapid return to normalcy.’’ 

Obviously, given the possible origins of a disaster, a broad spectrum of multi-hazard 

events must be considered. 

In 2002, the Agricultural Emergency Operations Center (AgEOC) was completed 

and 4 primary activities were identified: 

1. Continuation of the threat assessment and threat reduction efforts within the 

Department and the agriculture community. 

2. Training of AgEOC staff in operations and conduct of exercises for Multi-Hazard events. 

3. Completion of the Multi-Hazard Response Plan. 

4. Securing adequate funding for the continued development of the Multi-Hazard Threat Database (MHTD), and full implementation of the NC Threat Reduction Plan. 

The MHTD built by and for the use of the NCDA&CS, is a collection of both secure and public facing web-based applications. It provides detailed situational 

awareness in all events; examples would include: Flooding and wind projections during hurricanes for the FA Sector; visualization of disease spread; premises and facility locations for isolation/quarantine within a control area; vehicle routing during 

disease outbreaks; and food and feed firm’s activities during recalls/food illness outbreaks. Additionally, the MHTD facilitates and supports all activities associated 
12 

with strategic planning, emergency response, incident command structure, and resource management during events. NCDA&CS is currently in the process of developing a 5-year plan to retool and bolster the effectiveness and complete integration 

of MHTD into the North Carolina FA Sector; the end-product of this effort—a 

MHTD tool capable of successfully guiding North Carolina through any all-hazards 

event and returning/restoring the economy, the environment, and the citizens to 

pre-event status. 

Today, the Emergency Programs Division (EP Division) has reached maturity and 

its sphere of operation is considered All-Hazards in nature; as such, the EP Division 

is actively engaged in the support of other divisions within the Department, collaborates and coordinates with other departments and agencies across local, State, and 

Federal government, with industry and academia, and has rendered assistance to 

other States in a variety of instances. The EP Division’s mission and goals are now 

well-defined. 

MISSION

The NCDA&CS Emergency Programs Division’s mission is to reduce the vulnerability to or the impact from, any disaster, disease, or terrorist attack on the agriculture community of North Carolina. The Division serves in a leadership capacity 

within the Department and works closely with local communities to support 

agrosecurity, agricultural emergency preparedness and recovery, and rapid response 

technology efforts. The EP Division establishes public-private partnerships between 

vital government agencies, industry, and volunteers to carry out this mission. 

GOALS

• Preserve the ability of the N.C. agriculture community to produce stable supplies of food and other agricultural products. • Diagnose and investigate infectious animal and livestock diseases, intentional 

plant pest introductions, unauthorized biological control agent releases, and environmental health problems and health hazards in the N.C. agriculture community. • Provide the full resources of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture & 

Consumer Services to support the State of North Carolina in any emergency situation. • Reduce the vulnerability of the staff, vital assets, services, and operations of the 

North Carolina Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services. • Reduce the vulnerability of State animal, livestock, plant, crop, and other beneficial organism populations from the effect of a Multi-Hazard emergency event. • Support the partners and customers of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services in reducing their vulnerability to and recovery 

from the effect of a Multi-Hazard emergency event. • Inform, educate, and empower people to respond to specific agricultural community issues pertaining to a threatened or actual Multi-Hazard emergency event. • Enforce laws and regulations that protect public, animal, livestock, plant, crop, 

and other beneficial organism’s health and ensure their general safety in case 

of a Multi-Hazard emergency event. • Evaluate the effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of departmental and community-based agricultural services available to respond to a Multi-Hazard emergency event. 

The measure of success of the EP Division’s efforts to accomplish its All-Hazards 

Response mission is best characterized by the breadth of its activities. 

THE CASTLEBERRY FOOD RECALL IN NORTH CAROLINA

On July 18, 2007, Castleberry’s Food Company announced that it was voluntarily 

recalling several products and working with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to investigate possible contamination of these 

products with Clostridium Botulinum, a bacterium which can cause botulism, a lifethreatening illness. Upon notification of this recall, NCDA&CS Food and Drug Protection Division and Meat and Poultry Inspection Division jointly initiated response 

actions on July 20, 2007 and began to monitor the situation. At the time there was 

little data known about the recall. As the seriousness of the situation became clearer through communications with FDA, NCDA&CS initiated the formation of the 

Castleberry Recall Incident Management Team (IMT) and activated the Joint Food 

Emergency Operations Command Center. Food and Drug Protection Division became the multi-agency coordinator for North Carolina food defense agencies and set 

up the command center at the NCDA&CS Constable Laboratory, in Raleigh, NC. 
13 

The director instituted the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage 

the incident on July 25, 2007 and began development of daily Incident Action Plans. 

The initial planning process incorporated the Food and Drug Protection Division, 

Meat and Poultry Inspection Division, Public Affairs Division, Agricultural Statistics 

Division, and EP Division into the event operations. 

The early implementation of the ICS by the NCDA&CS and other State agencies 

to manage the event was seen by all responding agencies as one of the keys to the 

overall success of the operation. The activation of the Joint Food Emergency Operations Command Center allowed the various State and local agencies with response 

authority and capability to act in a uniform and consistent manner, which contributed to the success and positive mission outcomes of the operation. At the end of 

the recall, over 35,000 cans of product were removed from outlets across North 

Carolina, more that the total of all products collected by the rest of the United 

States agencies engaged in the recall. 

EVANS ROAD FIRE

In June of 2008 a wildfire broke out in Eastern North Carolina consuming over 

40,000 acres. Utilizing the web-based Emergency Operations Center (WebEOC), EP 

Division coordinated the NCDA&CS response and support activities for this event. 

Logistical support was provided in the form of a loan of 320 gallons of fire suppression foam from EP Division’s Avian Influenza (AI) response inventory, pumps, and 

hoses. The Department also provided 2 trucks for dust abatement as well as personnel from Plant Industries Division. Food distribution was also supplied in the 

form of 2 refrigerated trailers to support food service for the fire fighters. 

TOMATO AND PEPPER SALMONELLA INVESTIGATION

The NCDA&CS Emergency Program Division assisted the Food and Drug Protection Division in its response to a National Salmonella outbreak in various fresh 

produce products in the late summer 2008. Due to the complexity of the event and 

potential serious consequences for consumers and producers alike, EP Division assisted in the establishment of a Multi-Agency Joint Operation Center at the Food 

and Drug Division’s Constable Laboratory. Specifically EP Division: Developed and 

distributed daily Incident Action Plans; refined procedures to address personnel, 

equipment, and safety issues; facilitated daily conference calls; gathered, recorded, 

and disseminated event documentation; developed and distributed daily situation reports; provided secure web-based data and information-gathering tools to facilitate 

situational awareness and operational planning processes; implemented a web-based 

field reporting and time and mileage websites; and acted as liaison to involved agency administrators and North Carolina Emergency Management. 

OPERATION RESTORE (PEANUT BUTTER RECALL)

In the winter of 2009 the U.S. FDA issued a peanut butter recall due to the recent 

outbreaks of Salmonella linked to peanut paste. The North Carolina Food and Drug 

Protection Division conducted 569 checks evaluating over 2,000 products subject to 

the recall with an effectiveness rate in excess of 68%. The EP Division supported 

the Food and Drug Division technologically with the creation of a web-based data 

entry and reporting tools. These tools allowed inspectors in the field to rapidly 

upload critical time-sensitive data which assisted decision makers, allowing them to 

make informed choices quickly. Additionally, websites were also developed for workers involved in the recall to record time and mileage, allowing rapid accounting for 

reimbursement, and an ‘‘after-action’’ website to gather feedback from participants. 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT (EMAC) REQUESTED BY THE ALABAMA

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY TO ASSIST DAMAGED PRODUCER FACILITIES

A poultry depopulation task force consisting of 6 NCDA&CS personnel, resources 

including 2 foam depopulation units, supplies, and materials deployed to Alabama 

on May 1, 2011. The focus of this event was response to tornado-damaged poultry 

producer houses. The task force traveled to Decatur, Alabama and reported to its 

assigned point of contact. Team A encountered water delivery issues which limited 

operations to 1 location for the day. This team was operating in concert with a team 

deployed by others. Two and one-half houses in partial collapse with approximately 

24,000 birds were depopulated on this site. Team B was better supplied with water 

and was able to perform operations on 2 different farms. Two houses in partial collapse on 2 sites with approximately 24,000 birds were depopulated. Operations in 
14 

4 After a 2004 outbreak of E. Coli affected 27 people at the North Carolina State Fair, North 

Carolina legislators passed Aedin’s Law, which placed new regulations on petting zoos and animal contact exhibits at agricultural fairs. 

both cases resulted in 100% depopulation of houses with no injury to personnel or 

damage to the equipment. 

On day 3 (5/3/2011) the task force was re-assigned to the Alabama Department 

of Agriculture and Industry. Both teams were directed to a farm on which 4 houses 

were in total destruction. One pump unit was used to generate foam to depopulate 

approximately 7,000 birds located in 2 of the houses. 

NCDA&CS EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION 11 HURRICANE IRENE RESPONSE

Hurricane Irene was a large and powerful Atlantic hurricane that left extensive 

flood and wind damage along its path through the Caribbean, the U.S. East Coast 

and as far north as Atlantic Canada in 2011. 

In North Carolina, tropical storm force winds began to affect the coastal communities and the Outer Banks hours before landfall, producing waves of 6–9 feet. In 

addition to the gales, Irene spawned several tornadoes early on August 27 while approaching the coast. Precipitation totals from Irene in the region were particularly 

high, ranging between 10–14 inches. 

Prior to landfall and in anticipation of evacuation in select counties, NCDA&CS 

EP Division opened the Agriculture Emergency Operations Center and formally established its incident command structure on August 25, 2011, which mirrored the 

N.C. Emergency Management’s activation level. An initial Incident Action Plan was 

produced and distributed for the operational period beginning at 0700 hrs August 

26, 2011 by the NC Agriculture Incident Management Team with the pre-landfall 

focus of actions centered on public information to protect agricultural infrastructure 

and farms, the safety of NCDA&CS staff and facilities, operational support of sheltering for animals, and planning of proactive coordination of response actions following landfall. 

It’s important to note that in April 2011, N.C. Agriculture had another brutal assault by tornadoes that ripped through highly-productive crop land which was just 

being planted. Agricultural structures and equipment were damaged. These two events in 2011 resulted in estimated damages of over $450 million to 

crops and infrastructure; much of which was either not insured at all, or underinsured. 

2014 NCDA&CS EMERGENCY PROGRAMS DIVISION ACCOMPLISHMENTS

• Internal focus on how to be better prepared as a division to work across lines 

with sister divisions and across State borders with other agencies to improve 

capacity in the event of natural or radiological disasters or a food illness outbreak. • Internally, the division identified an Incident Management Team and invited 

the Food and Drug Protection Division to join in team training specifically to 

build capability for managing a large event affecting the food supply. • North Carolina hosted a training with the USDA APHIS National Veterinary 

Stockpile team to improve collaboration during disease outbreaks. • Early in the summer, with news of the West African Ebola Virus (EVD) outbreak and the consequences of managing companion animals of infected individuals coming to North Carolina, EP division began internal discussions while 

working closely with N.C. Division of Public Health on a strategy for responding 

to a mission of this type. Through a formal agreement with N.C. Department 

of Public Health, the EP division is the lead for companion animal care for animals whose owners are exposed to EVD. • EP division worked collaboratively with the National Alliance for State Animal 

and Agricultural Emergency Programs (NASAAEP) and the National Animal 

Rescue and Sheltering Coalition to host their annual meeting and to co-join 

venues with the 11th Annual One Medicine Symposium. • EP division staff inspected animal contact exhibits at sanctioned agricultural 

fairs for compliance with Aedin’s Law,4 while also continuing their educational 

efforts with fair managers and exhibitors regarding non-contact animal exhibits. 

2015 NCDA&CS EMERGENCY PROGRAMS DIVISION ACCOMPLISHMENTS

• Chief among the 2015 accomplishments are the multiple deployments of depopulation task forces to Minnesota and Iowa to assist in the depopulation of 

poultry infected with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). Early in the 

outbreak of HPAI (March, April, and May 2015), both States found themselves 
15 

in desperate straits as the disease spread rapidly throughout their States; 

North Carolina’s assistance was sought and provided and the State’s task forces 

were able to provide capable assistance to aid in the depopulation of infected 

poultry/infected premise poultry enabling the spread of the disease to be controlled. 

• In offering his thanks to North Carolina, the Minnesota Incident Commander 

stated with certainty that North Carolina’s assistance had ‘‘saved the poultry 

industry in Minnesota.’’ 

In reference to North Carolina’s second concern, Line Item 18(a) of HSPD–9 

speaks to the necessity of developing ‘‘A National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to 

appropriately respond to the most damaging animal diseases affecting human 

health and the economy and that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours of 

an outbreak. The NVS shall leverage where appropriate the mechanisms and infrastructure that have been developed for the management, storage, and distribution 

of the Strategic National Stockpile.’’ 

Foremost in the minds of States in which animal agriculture production is of significant consequence is the possibility of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak. 

That is certainly the case in North Carolina, home to 9 million hogs. 

‘‘Foot and mouth disease is the most important animal disease in the world capable 

of crossing National boundaries and devastating animal agriculture (a transboundary disease). FMD affects cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, deer, elk, and other wildlife. 

Ninety-six countries are either endemically or sporadically infected with the disease, 

therefore there is a constant threat that it will be introduced into the United States 

either accidentally or intentionally. FMD is extremely contagious and can spread 

rapidly with devastating consequences. You probably remember the outbreak in the 

United Kingdom in 2001 which is estimated to have cost approximately $6 billion. 

The number of livestock and the agriculture economy is much smaller in the United 

Kingdom than the United States. We learned from their outbreak that we cannot 

depend on stamping out the disease by killing all infected and exposed animals. 

‘‘The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the United 

States livestock industry will present unprecedented challenges in the event of an 

FMD outbreak. No country with a livestock industry comparable to that of the 

United States has had to deal with an outbreak of FMD, and the impact would extend far beyond animal agriculture. 

‘‘Once FMD is detected, an essential tool for control is to stop all animal movement 

in the affected area. Livestock production in the United States depends on extensive 

movement of animals. Approximately 400,000 cattle and 1 million swine are estimated to be on the road in trucks each day, either being delivered to packing plants 

or to other stages of production. Approximately 40 million swine are shipped into 

a new State each year (∼110,000 each day). Many of those cross multiple State lines. 

In an FMD outbreak, State Animal Health Officials may prohibit animals from an 

FMD positive area from entering their State. Modern swine production depends on 

extensive animal movement on a regular basis. If animal movement is stopped, animals will need to be euthanized for welfare reasons because facilities will rapidly 

become overcrowded. 

‘‘An outbreak of FMD will shut down exports of fresh beef, pork, or dairy products. 

In 2014, beef exports totaled $7.1 billion, pork exports $6.7 billion and dairy exports 

totaled $7.1 billion. Approximately 11% of U.S. beef production and 22% of U.S. 

pork production are exported. In 2003, beef exports dropped due to a single case of 

mad cow disease (BSE); the cumulative loss in U.S. beef trade is estimated to have 

been $16 billion. The increasing export of beef and pork products in recent years 

significantly contributes to the value of cattle and swine. As exports increase, the 

industry becomes more vulnerable to the sudden and extended loss of exports that 

would result from an FMD outbreak. The price for pork and beef will drop dramatically due to the excess product on the domestic market. That will also impact the 

price of poultry products and the price of grain. 

‘‘In 2011, Dr. Dermot Hayes and colleagues at the Center for Agricultural and Rural 

Development at Iowa State University published ‘‘Economy Wide Impacts of a Foreign Animal Disease in the United States’’ which had been funded by the National 

Pork Board. They estimated that over 10 years, the cumulative loss due to an uncontrolled FMD outbreak would be $199.8 billion. Losses estimated include: Pork— 

$57 billion; Beef—$71 billion; Poultry—$1 billion; Corn—$44 billion; Soybeans—$25 

billion; Wheat—$1.8 billion. The impact would likely be larger now because of the 

increase in the value of exports since 2011. Agriculture is a critical infrastructure 

in the United States and is severely threatened by the potential of an FMD outbreak. 
16 

5Testimony submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives Agriculture Subcommittee on 

Livestock and Foreign Agriculture: ‘‘Impact of an Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 

in the United States and the Urgent Need for an Adequate Stockpile of FMD Vaccine.’’ Submitted by James A. Roth, DVM, PhD, Director of the Center for Food Security and Public 

Health, College of Veterinary Medicine, Iowa State University, February 11, 2016. 

‘‘The USDA, along with many state and industry officials, recognized that the approach of stamping out and stop movement of animals is simply not possible given 

the realities of animal agriculture in the United States. The USDA document ‘Footand-Mouth Disease Vaccination Policy in the United States’ (September 2014) illustrates the current capacity of the United States to effectively implement vaccination 

strategy for control of different types of FMD outbreaks (available upon request). 

It clearly indicates that there is not sufficient vaccine capacity to assist in controlling an FMD outbreak. 

‘‘Fully appreciating the size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement in the 

United States livestock industry demonstrates the unprecedented challenges an 

FMD outbreak would bring about. Control of an FMD outbreak in livestock dense 

areas without the rapid use of tens of millions of doses of FMD vaccine will be impossible.’’5

That conclusion brings us face-to-face with the dilemma faced by our Nation and 

our Nation’s animal agriculture industry—there are not tens of millions of doses of 

FMD vaccine available, not anywhere in the world because there is no excess capacity for additional vaccine production—current production capacity meets current 

day-to-day market needs for FMD vaccine. This same reality was recognized in 2004 

when HSPD–9 directed the creation of the National Veterinary Stockpile to respond 

to the most damaging animal diseases (including FMD) affecting human health and 

the economy, but NVS has never received sufficient funding to stockpile FMD vaccines. 

‘‘It is possible to have an FMD vaccine stockpile available for immediate use. However, establishing and maintaining an FMD vaccine bank is complex. There are 7 

distinct serotypes of the virus that are not cross-protective and approximately 65 

subtypes. The World Reference Laboratory for FMD recommends that FMD vaccine 

banks maintain 23 strains of FMD virus in the vaccine bank. Once the virus in the 

outbreak is isolated, the serotype can be identified and the correct vaccine selected 

for use. 

‘‘A plan to ensure that adequate supplies of FMD vaccine with multiple strains of 

FMD virus are available in the event of an accidental or intentional introduction 

of FMD virus into the United States is urgently needed. 

‘‘At the request of the National Pork Board, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, 

and National Milk Producers Federation I produced a white paper entitled ‘FMD 

Vaccine Surge Capacity for Emergency Use in the United States’ outlining a potential plan to develop a National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) with sufficient quantities 

of FMD vaccine to protect U.S. agriculture, food systems, and the economy. The 

white paper is available at: www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/fmd-vaccine-surge-capacityfor-emergency-use-in-the-US.’’5

Finally, I will address North Carolina’s third concern, the issue of veterinary diagnostic laboratory capacity in North Carolina and across the Nation. Line Item 8 of 

HSPD–9 states ‘‘the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human 

Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads 

of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies shall build upon and expand 

current monitoring and surveillance programs to: 

‘‘(c) Develop nation-wide laboratory networks for food, veterinary, plant health, and 

water quality that integrate existing Federal and State laboratory resources, are 

interconnected, and utilize standardized diagnostic protocols and procedures.’’ 

The National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) was developed as a 

result of this directive and is now part of a Nation-wide strategy to coordinate the 

work of all organizations providing animal disease surveillance and testing services. 

NAHLN is an early warning system for emerging and foreign animal diseases and 

provides surge capacity for the necessary testing during disease outbreaks and during the recovery phase. This surveillance and emergency response system provides 

critical and on-going resources for laboratory testing, information management, 

quality assurance and the development and validation of new tests. During the recovery phase testing is necessary to establish a ‘‘disease-free status’’ which also ensures international trading partners of that status. 
17 

NAHLN’s importance was amply demonstrated during the HPAI outbreaks where 

thousands of samples were tested within hours in an effort to achieve depopulation 

of infected flocks within 24 hours. NAHLN performed surveillance in surrounding 

areas to halt disease spread, to test premises to determine freedom of disease before 

repopulation could occur, and allow resumption of international trade. 

North Carolina’s Rollins Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory, in Raleigh, is one of 

12 NAHLN ‘‘core laboratories,’’ (so designated because it is one of the original 12 

participating laboratories). A Core Member Laboratory receives significant infrastructure support from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and conducts 

fee-for-service testing for USDA. Their funding level enables these laboratories to 

be fully committed to the NAHLN mission and able to respond to domestic or foreign animal disease emergencies on a 24/7 basis. 

NAHLN support comes from USDA–NIFA Food and Agro-Defense Initiative and USDA APHIS. Note: 34 NAHLN labs receive direct State appropriations of $100 

million toward total National laboratory operation expenses of $186 million. 

As stated at the beginning of the discussion regarding ‘‘Efforts to Defend the Nation’s Agriculture and Food,’’ I have spoken to 3 HSPD–9 ‘‘line items’’ that are of 

importance to North Carolina. The first, concerned Line Item 14 of HSPD–9 which 

directs the participating Departments/agencies to ensure ‘‘that the combined Federal, State, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond quickly and 

effectively... ’’. I trust this testimony allows you to appreciate the wisdom of 

those in North Carolina who had the foresight to develop the capability that has 

enabled the State to respond to the myriad events that have transpired over the 

intervening years—floods, fires, animal disease, human disease, food contamination, 

drought, and hurricanes, our Emergency Programs Division has been on the forefront of them all—we have been well-served by their efforts. That said, it is also 

important to note the development of that capability has been funded by the State 

and through various Federal grants—some $7.3 million in Federal money and $18 

million in State money. It is appropriate to note that a remarkable capability, and 

perhaps a unique capability relative to other States, has been created for a relatively small investment over the years. Consider what similar investments might 

have meant to states so profoundly affected by HPAI—Iowa and Minnesota experienced as much as $1.6–1.8 billion in economic losses as a result of HPAI on 180 

premises. Going forward, continued State and Federal funding will be necessary to 

maintain current capability, develop new capability, train, exercise, and replace 

equipment as needed. Unfortunately, funding for North Carolina’s Emergency Programs Division continues to decline and places the State’s preparedness and response capability at risk. 

Of greatest concern for North Carolina is the matter of Line Item 18(a) which 

speaks to the necessity of developing a National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of animal vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to 

appropriately respond to the most damaging animal diseases—FMD stands alone as 

North Carolina’s greatest threat. The pork industry, the economy, communities, 

businesses, and families of North Carolina would be devastated by an FMD outbreak; recovery, if a recovery is possible, would be years in the making. A cooperative, collaborative effort, which includes all stakeholders—industry, Federal, State, 

and academic partners, must be initiated in short order to develop and implement 

a plan for establishing an effective FMD vaccine stockpile to protect American agriculture. 

Lastly, Line Item 8 of HSPD–9 directs the responsible departments and agencies 

‘‘to develop Nation-wide laboratory networks for food, veterinary, plant health, and 

water quality that integrate existing Federal and State laboratory resources, are 

interconnected, and utilize standardized diagnostic protocols and procedures.’’ North 

Carolina’s Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory System, as a part of the NAHLN, effectively surveilles for and diagnoses animal and zoonotic diseases. However, State and 

Federal support of and full funding for the Nation’s NAHLN laboratory system are 

necessary to optimize service to stakeholders and the Nation. The absence of full 

funding was recently noted in the Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel 

on Biodefense. The Report states ‘‘The National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN), an effort to detect biological threats to the Nation’s food animals, is necessary for effective biosurveillance. The NAHLN is a public-private cooperative effort between the USDA, the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, and publicly-funded State veterinary diagnostic laboratories. The collective and integrated work of its members allows for improved detection of emerging 

and zoonotic diseases, which helps protect animal health, public health, and the food 

supply. The veterinary diagnostic labs that are members are quite literally on the 

front lines of disease detection. Established in 2002, the NAHLN is funded through 

a combination of grants, fee-for-testing services, and administrative support from 
18 

USDA. It has struggled to maintain even $10 million worth of annual funding, its 

appropriations cut over the years to pay for other programs. As a result, the laboratories are unable to meet the threat and have at times eliminated positions and 

testing capacity for foreign animal diseases. Ten million dollars is a very small price 

to pay to protect one of America’s major industries and portals for disease emergence. After the NAHLN struggled for years to obtain sufficient funding, in 2014 

Congress authorized a specific funding line at $15 million per year. NAHLN must 

be funded to this authorized level in order to meet the need.’’ It is important to note 

that $5 million was added to NAHLN’s budget in 2016 to aid in the response to 

HPAI; that additional funding was not in the proposed budget for 2017. The request 

for NAHLN in 2017 remains at $10 million. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today, on behalf of North Carolina, about 

issues of concern related to the defense of agriculture and food. I am happy to address any questions you might have. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Dr. Meckes. The Chair now recognizes 

Dr. Beckham for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TAMMY R. BECKHAM, D.V.M., PH.D., DEAN, 

COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE, KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. BECKHAM. Good morning, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the House Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and Communication. My name is Tammy 

Beckham, and I am the dean of the Kansas State College of Veterinary Medicine. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you 

today about the role that academia plays in defending our Nation’s 

agriculture and food. 

As I testify before you today, U.S. citizens reap the benefits of 

a robust agricultural industry that provides them with access to a 

safe, abundant, and affordable food supply. The very elements that 

make the U.S. agricultural system robust and productive also make 

it more vulnerable to a natural or intentional introduction of a biological agent. In fact, perhaps now more than ever in any time in 

our history, our agricultural industries are at risk from a variety 

of threats that have the potential to severely disrupt our economy, 

our food supply, and cause great harm to our public health sector. 

Threats to our U.S. agricultural sector can come in a variety of 

forms to include a natural or intentional introduction of a foreign 

animal emerging and/or a zoonotic disease. Many of the agents that 

are on the list of those most likely to be utilized execute an 

agroterror event, such as foot-and-mouth disease, African swine 

fever or Ebola are readily available in countries throughout the 

world, and, in particular, in countries in which terrorist groups, 

such as the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and 

others who intend to harm the United States, operate. 

Studies indicate the impacts from a natural intentional introduction of any of these agents could lead to devastating economic and 

public health implications, with the most recent study that was 

completed by researchers at Kansas State University predicting 

that the cost associated with foot-and-mouth disease outbreak 

could result in a total of $188 billion in losses. 

Our ability to defend the U.S. livestock industries from these 

threats is heavily dependent on a coordinated, collaborative, and 

comprehensive approach involving State and Federal Government, 

law enforcement industry, both biopharma, and livestock, and academia. Since 2002, with the formation of DHS and the release of 
19 

HSPD–9 and HSPD–10, the role of academia and supporting the 

Homeland Security mission has broadened. 

Academia, and, in particular, Land Grand Universities play a 

very unique and critical role in supporting the agricultural defense 

mission. Working with our stakeholders and Federal partners, we 

perform cutting-edge research, we innovate, we develop countermeasures, and solutions, and technologies, that can support our industry during peace time, as well as during a disease outbreak. 

Our ability to work in each segment of the development pipeline 

provides subject-matter expertise, perform research to address specific questions, and act as a hub for reach-back capabilities are just 

some of the attributes that make academia such a strong and vital 

partner. 

Through our outreach mission, we work diligently to educate producers, stakeholders, and the public about novel technologies, policies, biosecurity practices, and threats to the sector. We have 

strong relationships with our stakeholders that are built on trust 

and understanding. Perhaps most importantly, to Homeland Security, provide a venue for a brokered, unbiased discussion and communication between the State and Federal Government and our agriculture sector. 

Academia is in a unique position to facilitate discussions between 

the public and private sector, and oftentimes, works to bridge the 

communication trust gap so that solutions to complex challenges 

can be found. Simply stated, we are capable of acting as a trusted 

partner in what can sometimes be a very complex relationship. 

Colleges of veterinary medicine and agriculture across the United 

States are applying what is arguably their most important role in 

Homeland Security, and that is teaching, training, and preparing 

the next generation of Homeland Security workforce. Our graduates do, indeed, understand the role of animal health and success 

of an agent’s agricultural system. Further recognize that veterinarians serve as the first line of defense in identifying incursions of 

transboundary, emerging, and zoonotic diseases. 

I would be remiss not to mention that on a site adjacent to the 

Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine, DHS is 

currently constructing the National Bio and Agro-Defense facility. 

Needless to say, close collaboration between NBAF and the KSU 

CVM and its allied partners presents an inestimal opportunity to 

further strengthen resources for addressing the threats to the U.S. 

agriculture and food systems. 

There is a need to allocate adequate resources as well to address 

the Nation’s vulnerability in this area. Efforts such as the DHS 

Centers of Excellence should receive additional resourcing. Additional funds should be provided for agro-defense-focused research 

through avenues, such as the USDA National Institute for Food 

and Ag, or NIFA, the National Institutes of Health. 

Last, but certainty not least, through increased funding for programs that will be housed within the National bio and agro-defense 

facility. Indeed, with construction of a state-of-the-art $1.25 billion 

facility, it is critical to ensure a stable and appropriate level of resources and funding for the research, training, and diagnostic missions that will be housed within it. 
20 

1Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7. 2 USDA Economic Research Service. http://ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statisticscharting-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy.aspx. 3 Economic benefits of the Livestock Industry. iGrow, South Dakota State University Extension. July 2014. 4 USDA Economic Research Service. http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-expenditures.aspx#.UuE9EHn0Ay5. 

Current budgets for the USDA APHIS, ARS, and DHS S&T at 

Plum Island do not account for the planned expansion of the programs in research, diagnostic, and training that will occur in the 

new NBAF facility. 

So, I urge you today to increase agency programmatic budgets in 

the future for the NBAF mission so that the full potential of the 

facility and its DHS and USDA programs and partnerships to include the National Animal Health Laboratory Network can be 

achieved. 

In summary, addressing the threat posed by the intentional or 

unintentional introduction of a high-consequence disease is a collaborative process. The role of academia in this challenge is but one 

component of a much broader solution. Preparedness is and will be 

dependent on a holistic, all-of-enterprise approach in solving this 

sector’s complex problems, and supporting our livestock in allied industries will depend on a strong public-private partnership that is 

built on trust, collaboration, and resolve. 

Finally, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity 

to speak to you today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Beckham follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TAMMY R. BECKHAM

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

Thank you Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee for the honor of addressing you today. 

As the dean of the College of Veterinary Medicine at Kansas State University, I 

am pleased to speak with you regarding ‘‘Efforts to Defend the Nation’s Agriculture 

and Food.’’ 

U.S. AGRICULTURE: STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

As first designated in 2003 through Homeland Security Presidential Directive–7, 

the Food and Agriculture Sector is 1 of 16 critical infrastructures whose assets, systems, and networks are considered to be so vital to the United States that its incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, the National 

and global economy, public health and safety, or any combination thereof.1

The U.S. Agricultural sector is a diverse, complex, and highly-integrated enterprise whose health and productivity is vital to the National economy. Agriculture 

in the United States is a $1 trillion business and this sector alone employs approximately 9.2% of American workers. In 2013, agriculture and agricultural-related industries contributed $789 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), and in 

2012 domestic animal agriculture (e.g., livestock and poultry production) produced 

approximately 1.8 million jobs, $346 billion in total economic output, and $60 billion 

in household income.2 3 Furthermore, in the United States, consumers spend on average, approximately 6.4% of their annual expenditures on food. This percentage is 

extremely low when compared to other countries whose expenditures range from 

11% (Switzerland) to 47% (Pakistan).4 U.S. farmers and ranchers work hard to keep 

food prices low and are only able to accomplish this through increased efficiencies 

in production, achieved through technological advancements in industrial food production. Threats that jeopardize our production and the security and affordability 
21 

5 Economic impact of alternative FMD emergency vaccination strategies in the Midwestern 

United States. Ted C. Schroeder, Dustin L. Pendell, Michael W. Sanderson, and Sara 

McReynolds. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. Volume 47, Issue 01, Feb. 2015. 

PP 47–78. 6PEDv Dominates the Pig World. Gene Johnston. September 11, 2014. http:// 

www.agriculture.com/livestock/hogs/health/pedv-dominates-pig-wldl284-ar45068. 

of the U.S. food system have the potential to disrupt our social structure and cause 

political instability. 

The bulk of the agricultural enterprise is almost solely owned and operated by the 

private sector, and the United States is currently the world’s leading exporter of 

food. When evaluating the impact on the economy, the food supply and the Nation’s 

jobs, it is clearly evident why this industry is deemed a U.S. critical infrastructure. 

Any disruption to the daily operations and/or productivity of this enterprise would 

have significant impacts on Americans’ livelihoods, our food supply, the economy 

and our public health. Simply said, U.S. agricultural security is National security. 

THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM

As I testify before you today, U.S. citizens reap the benefits of a robust agricultural industry that provides them with access to a safe, abundant, and affordable 

food supply that is readily available on the shelves of grocery stores Nation-wide. 

This is indeed a privilege that as you well know, does not exist globally. However, 

the very elements that make the U.S. agricultural sector robust and productive also 

make it vulnerable to a natural or intentional introduction of a biological agent. In 

fact, perhaps now, more than anytime in our history, the agricultural industries are 

at risk from a variety of threats that have the potential to severely disrupt our economy, our food supply, and cause great harm to our public health sector. 

Threats to our U.S. agricultural sector can come in a variety of forms, to include 

a natural introduction of a foreign (transboundary) animal, emerging, and/or 

zoonotic disease or an intentional introduction of a biological agent (agroterrorism) 

into our agricultural systems. These threats would result in significant morbidity 

and/or mortality among livestock or poultry, cause great economic harm, adversely 

impact and/or disrupt our food supply, and/or contribute to an adverse public health 

event. Many of these agents do not require weaponization, can be easily obtained, 

and exist naturally in areas where terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS), 

al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and others who intend to harm the United 

States operate. In addition, the risk from emerging infectious and/or zoonotic diseases continues to threaten our animal, plant, and public health sectors. 

The U.S. agricultural and public health systems, while free from devastating diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD, since 1929), African Swine Fever 

(ASFV), Rift Valley Fever (RVF), and other highly pathogenic livestock and zoonotic 

diseases, are becoming increasingly at risk for an introduction of these and/or other 

emerging and/or zoonotic diseases. Impacts resulting from an introduction of a highconsequence disease, agro-terrorist and/or bioterrorist agent into U.S. agricultural 

systems have been studied and published in peer-reviewed journals. Studies indicate 

that the magnitude and severity of an introduction of a high-consequence disease 

into U.S. livestock or poultry herds/flocks would be large. For example, the authors 

of a study recently completed by Kansas State University predicted that costs associated with an FMD outbreak in the Midwestern United States could result in a 

total of $188 billion in losses to the livestock and allied industries and up to $11 

billion to the U.S. Government.5

In addition to publications highlighting the economic and social impacts of a disease incursion, we have learned first-hand from recent experiences that the social, 

economic, and political fall-out from emerging disease incursions can be devastating. 

Most recently, the United States has witnessed incursions of porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) in our swine populations (2013) and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in our poultry populations (2015), as well as Ebola virus (EBOV; 

2014) and Zika virus (2016) outbreaks in our public health sector. Each of these 

events further demonstrates our vulnerability to newly emerging and re-emerging 

pathogens that can be naturally or intentionally introduced. 

In the case of PEDV, the cause and route of introduction into the U.S. swine population has still not clearly been elucidated. Nevertheless, over half of the U.S. sow 

population was infected with PEDV, and the industry lost 10% (7 million) of the piglets born to these sows during this outbreak.6 More recently, the introduction of 

HPAI virus into the U.S. poultry population resulted in the destruction of approximately 7.5 million (7.5%) of the U.S. turkey population and 41.1 million (10%) of 

the commercial chicken population. The total indemnity cost for this outbreak was 
22 

7 Update on H5Nx, Mia Torchetti, U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, National Veterinary Services Laobratories, August 18, 2015. 8Global trends in emerging infectious diseases. Nature. Kate E. Jones, Nikkita G Patel, Marc 

A Levy, Adam Storeygard, Deborah Balk, John L Gittleman, Peter Daszak. Volume 451; 

21FEB2008. 9Taylor, L.H., Latham, S.M., Woolhouse, M.E. 2001. Risk factors for human disease emergence. Phil Trans R Soc Lond 356:983–989. 10 Anthony, S.J., et. al. 2013. A strategy to estimate unknown viral diversity in mammals. 

MBio 4:e00598–13; doi: 10.1128/mBio.00598–13. 

approximately $191 million.7 The PEDV and HPAI outbreaks have reminded us 

that although we have made significant progress as a Nation and as a sector in preparing for both natural and intentional introductions of transboundary, emerging, 

and zoonotic diseases, they remain continual threats to the U.S. agricultural system 

and we still have a tremendous amount of work to accomplish. 

The increased risk of the above-mentioned threats to the U.S. agricultural and 

public health systems can be attributed to several social, environmental, and economic factors. First, there is increased movement of people, animals, plants, and 

products globally. Global commerce and air traffic moves at speeds that defy the 

ability to detect and prevent movement of diseases from their source in the early 

stages before detection. Indeed, animals and people can move and travel prior to 

clinical signs of a disease, thus arriving in another country already infected and able 

to spread the disease to people or animals they may contact. Second, trends in livestock production in the United States have resulted in more specialized, intensive, 

and concentrated farming practices, where large numbers of animals are produced 

on a much smaller number of premises. These vertically-integrated systems manage 

movements of animals and animal products to ensure a ‘‘just-in-time’’ delivery to the 

next location (e.g., feedlot, finisher, packer, and retailer) in the food production system. Our livestock production systems execute a large number of animal movements 

daily. As an example, it is estimated that approximately 1 million swine and 

400,000 cattle are in transit to the next location in the production system at any 

one time during the day. An introduction of an agent, either naturally or intentionally, into these intensive farming systems could lead to wide-spread distribution 

through these movements within hours of its introduction. Furthermore, in the 

event of a disease outbreak in which a ‘‘standstill’’ or quarantine of animal premises 

is implemented as the primary control strategy, maintaining business continuity 

through the controlled movements of animals is critical for food security and animal 

health and welfare. 

Next, advanced technical capabilities are not required to obtain agents that can 

be utilized to promulgate an agro-terrorist event and/or a bioterrorist event against 

our agriculture and public health systems. Many of the agents on the list of those 

most likely to be utilized to execute an agro-terrorist and/or bioterrorist event (such 

as FMDV, ASFV, and Ebola) are readily-available in countries throughout the world 

and do not need special handling or weaponization. As mentioned previously, these 

agents are readily available in countries in which terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (ISIS), al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and others who intend to 

harm the United States operate. Last but certainly not least, we must not overlook 

the natural occurrence and emergence of diseases whether agricultural or zoonotic. 

Factors that lead to the emergence of disease include changes in socio-economic, environmental, and/or ecological circumstances.8 It has been estimated that over 75% 

of all emerging pathogens are zoonotic and that zoonotic pathogens are twice as 

likely to be associated with an emerging disease than non-zoonotic pathogens.9 In 

addition, there are approximately 320,000 unknown viruses that infect mammals 

and that have not yet been identified and/or characterized.10

Over the last decade, members of the agricultural sector have made tremendous 

progress in preparing for a natural and/or intentional introduction of a transboundary, emerging and/or high-consequence disease agent. Public and private partnerships have been forged that have paved the way for significant advancements in the 

development of countermeasures (vaccines, immunomodulators, and diagnostic assays) for high-risk/high-priority agro-terror agents. For example, through a public/ 

private partnership led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) Agriculture Defense Branch, a conditional U.S. 

license for the first FMD vaccine that can be manufactured in the United States 

has been obtained. In addition, we have developed, validated, and deployed (to the 

National Animal Health Laboratory Network [NAHLN]) molecular assays that are 

capable of supporting early detection and response for many of the high-risk agroterror agents. And last, but certainly not least, Federal, State, academic, and private partners have worked collaboratively to identify and prioritize risks, scan the 

global environment, perform comprehensive pathways analysis, and exercise disease 
23 

11Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act, 2002. http:// 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ188/pdf/PLAW-107publ188.pdf. 

outbreak response plans, all in an effort to enhance resiliency within each component of the sector. 

While each of these accomplishments are noteworthy because of their ability to 

better position our sector to respond to an agro-terror event, they are perhaps more 

noteworthy because of the breadth of partners that were assembled and worked together collaboratively to accomplish each and every milestone. In the case of the 

FMD vaccine, DHS S&T, U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service (USDA APHIS) and Agricultural Research Service (USDA ARS), 

biopharma, the livestock industries, and academia were all essential players in ensuring development, transition, and ultimate licensure of this product. Indeed, many 

more of these unique partnerships are needed and are, in fact, critical to ensuring 

our success. We have enjoyed many successes, but still have much to accomplish if 

we are to be fully prepared when, not if, a devastating natural or intentional introduction of one of these agents occurs. 

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR PREVENTION, PLANNING & PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES: THE ACADEMIC ROLE

Our ability to defend U.S. Agriculture and Food from the threat of intentional, 

unintentional, or inadvertent introduction of high-consequence disease is heavily dependent on a coordinated, collaborative, and comprehensive approach involving both 

State and Federal government, law enforcement, industry (biopharma and animal 

producers), and academia. We must work together as members of the agricultural 

enterprise to leverage expertise, develop technologies and networks and/or systems 

that will ultimately produce a more resilient agriculture and food system. 

Building on my previous roles with the Federal Government and academia, and 

in my current role as the dean of the KSU College of Veterinary Medicine, I take 

the security of our livestock and poultry systems very seriously, and respect the role 

of academia in this broader partnership. Furthermore, I know that preparedness 

stems from true partnerships and collaborations across the enterprise and it is only 

through leveraging expertise throughout all levels of the sector that we will meet 

the challenge of securing our Nation’s agriculture and food supply. 

Since the formation of DHS in 2002, and with the release of Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (HSPD–9), 

DHS has assumed the responsibility to coordinate the overall National effort to protect the critical infrastructure and key resources of the United States, which includes agriculture. However, the USDA still has the primary responsibility for protecting the agricultural sector 11 and does so with support from additional agencies 

to include the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department 

of Interior (DOI), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Attorney General (AG). 

Academia, and in particular the Land Grant Universities, play a very unique and 

critical role in supporting the agricultural defense mission. Working with our stakeholders and Federal partners (USDA, DHS, and other State and Federal agencies), 

we perform cutting-edge and innovative research to develop countermeasures (e.g., 

vaccines, diagnostics, and immunomodulators), solutions, and technologies that can 

support our industry during peacetime, as well as in the event of a high-consequence disease and/or agro-terror event. Furthermore, through our teaching and 

outreach missions, we work diligently to train the next generation workforce and 

educate producers, stakeholders, and the public about novel technologies, policies, 

biosecurity practices, animal welfare, threats to the agricultural sector and much 

more. It is through these activities that our faculty and staff have developed strong 

relationships with producers, stakeholders, livestock owners, the allied industries 

and other National associations (e.g., National Pork Board, National Cattlemen’s 

Beef Association). These relationships are built on trust and understanding and perhaps most importantly to homeland security and protection of the agricultural sector, provide a venue for a brokered, unbiased discussion and communication between the State and Federal Government and our agricultural sector. Academia is 

in a unique position to facilitate discussion between the public and private sector 

and oftentimes works to bridge the communication and trust gap so that solutions 

to complex challenges can be found. Simply stated, we are capable of acting as a 

‘‘trusted partner’’ in what can sometimes be a complex relationship. 

Since 2002, with the formation of DHS and the release of HSPD–9 (Defense of 

the United States Agriculture and Food) and HSPD–10 (Biodefense for the 21st 
24 

Century), the role of academia in supporting the homeland security mission and, 

more specifically in protecting our agriculture and food sector from an agro-terror 

threat, has broadened. HSPD–9 not only called for DHS to accelerate and expand 

development of current and new countermeasures against the intentional introduction or natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant and zoonotic diseases, it also 

called for the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture to establish university-based Centers of Excellence (COEs) in agriculture and food security. As a result 

of this directive, there are two COEs within the DHS S&T Office of University Programs (OUP) that are focused on agriculture and food security: The Zoonotic and 

Animal Disease Defense (ZADD), co-led by Kansas State University and Texas A&M 

University, and the Food Protection and Defense Institute (FPDI), formerly the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), led by the University of 

Minnesota. The primary mission of each of these Centers is to work across the agricultural enterprise to create novel solutions to homeland security challenges. Each 

of these Centers works closely with State and Federal partners, as well as the industries to ensure portfolio alignment with Nationally-identified priorities. Each 

COE has a robust set of partner universities, National and international collaborators and stakeholders that are routinely brought together in multi-institutional, 

multi-disciplinary teams to address the complex challenges that face our industries 

today. 

In light of the aforementioned roles and responsibilities, and in the context of a 

broadening academic presence in supporting homeland security, I would like to 

highlight a few instances in which academia has worked with other members of the 

agricultural enterprise to deliver products and/or technologies that have strengthened our Nation’s ability to respond to and recover from a potential agro-terror 

event. In addition, I would like to touch on several on-going activities, each with 

a strong academic role, that demonstrate the power of partnerships and strength 

of a holistic approach to combatting a potential terror event. 

Over the past decade, the University COEs have worked closely with DHS S&T, 

USDA (APHIS and ARS), State Animal Health Officials (SAHOs), biopharma, and 

our livestock industries to identify and address National gaps in agriculture and 

food security. In particular DHS has sponsored multiple COE-led workshops that 

have convened producers, livestock owners, National organizations, State and Federal agencies, as well as industry and academia to identify and prioritize gaps, provide recommendations for addressing those gaps and help set National priorities for 

policy development and funding. For example, the agricultural screening tools workshops, designed to identify gaps in screening tools and diagnostics for high consequence agro-terror agents, helped develop and guide a robust program in diagnostic assay development. As a result of this program, multiple assays for early detection and/or recovery were developed, validated, and either accepted by the 

NAHLN for use during an animal disease event (FMD bulk tank milk assay), or 

transitioned to an industry partner for production and licensure (3B FMD ELISA). 

It was through intensive planning and partnership that each of the steps in development of these assays was accomplished. Academia, and in particular the COEs 

worked with DHS, USDA APHIS, and ARS, the livestock industry and biopharma 

to lead the development and transition of each assay, working diligently to ensure 

the assays met each of their requirements. 

The role that academia plays in the development, piloting, and transitioning of 

veterinary countermeasures and/or technologies cannot be overstated. Our ability to 

work in each segment of the development pipeline makes us unique in our capability to support the homeland security enterprise. During the last 6 years, the 

ZADD Center has enjoyed tremendous success in working with our Federal and 

State partners, biopharma, and the livestock industries to develop, transition, pilot, 

and ultimately license multiple products to aid in the detection or response to an 

agro-terror event. For example, the Center of Excellence in Emerging and Zoonotic 

Animal Diseases (CEEZAD), which is housed within the CVM at Kansas State University, is currently working with an animal health company to develop, test, and 

evaluate a novel recombinant vaccine for Rift Valley Fever virus (RVFV), a highconsequence transboundary/zoonotic disease agent. If successful, this product will be 

produced, licensed, and available for purchase by the USDA APHIS National Veterinary Stockpile, should the need arise. CEEZAD’s unique relationships with the biopharmaceutical industry allows for early input and buy-in regarding the products 

being developed within the Center. This increases the likelihood of acceptance, production, and eventual licensure of DHS S&T OUP sponsored research. 

In addition, the DHS S&T Agriculture Defense Branch has engaged the COE at 

Texas A&M University, the Institute for Infectious Animal Diseases (IIAD), and 

tasked them with working to develop a template, obtain permits, and forge relationships that will allow for the first-ever international field trial of the newly-licensed 
25 

12Kansas Department of Agriculture. Kansas Farm Facts. http://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/ 

default-source/Kansas-Farm-Facts-2015/kansasfarmfacts2014final.pdf?sfvrsn=4. 

FMD vaccine. If successful, this template will provide a robust guideline for performing a successful field trial, but more than that, it will provide a template, 

standard operating procedures, and solidify relationships that will be critical for 

supporting additional testing of future DHS S&T products in an international fieldtrial setting. Both of the aforementioned projects are excellent examples of how the 

DHS S&T Chemical and Biological Division (CBD) and DHS S&T OUP are working 

with a broad spectrum of partners, both individually and through academia, to enhance our Nation’s agriculture and food security. 

Next, the USDA APHIS has worked closely with the Center for Food Security and 

Public Health (CFSPH) at Iowa State University to develop the Secure Food Supply 

Plans (eggs, turkeys, milk, pork, and beef). In the event of an animal disease outbreak, our industries must be able to resume movements from disease-free premises 

within a short amount of time. Any delay in this ability will result not only in product shortages but also in serious animal welfare issues. Supported by the USDA 

APHIS and led by an academic partner (CFSPH), the livestock and poultry industry, 

allied industries, State and Federal partners, and other stakeholders worked cooperatively to develop and vet each individual sector-specific plan. This multi-partner 

effort has resulted in the development of robust templates and guidance documents 

that can be utilized by State animal health officials for permitting movements of 

animals and animal products from disease-free premises in the event of an animal 

disease emergency. 

In addition to the examples given above, DHS S&T, SAHOs and the USDA engage academia for expertise in epidemiology, modeling, surveillance, pathology, immunology, and many other fields. Our ability to provide subject-matter expertise, 

perform research to address specific questions, and act as a hub for reach-back capabilities are just some of the attributes that make us a strong and vital partner. 

Last but certainly not least, Colleges of Veterinary Medicine and Agriculture 

across the United States are playing what is arguably their most important role in 

homeland security, and that is: Teaching, training, and preparing the next-generation homeland security workforce. 

The State of Kansas has a proud history of agricultural production, and it continues to be among the leading States in the Nation for crop and animal industry. 

For example, in 2014, Kansas ranked first among the States for production of sorghum for grain (200 million bushels), second for wheat (250 million bushels), third 

for commercial red meat production (5 billion pounds), and third in production of 

cattle and calves (6 million head).12 At K-State’s College of Veterinary Medicine, we 

instill a respect for this agricultural enterprise and its relevance in feeding our Nation and the world among our students. The KSU CVM is one of the oldest veterinary colleges in the United States, and has graduated more than 5,000 men and 

women veterinarians. As opposed to many other veterinary schools, where the majority of students pursue small animal medicine, KSU prides itself on a strong focus 

on production animal medicine, which is put into practice by our Department of 

Clinical Sciences. Indeed, these graduates understand the role of animal health in 

the success of the Nation’s agricultural system, and further recognize that veterinarians serve as the first line of defense in identifying incursions of transboundary, 

emerging, and zoonotic diseases. 

In the interest of developing the next generation of animal health professionals, 

the KSU CVM maintains a number of educational programs, including those in veterinary medicine, advanced clinical training, and research in animal health and related disciplines. The CVM’s Department of Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology encompasses a number of research program thrusts that are directly relevant to defense of U.S. Agriculture. For example, a number of programs are focused on all aspects of infectious disease and include viral and bacterial pathogenesis of endemic 

and emerging diseases, vaccine and antiviral development and evaluation, diagnostic assay development and validation, epidemiology and ecology of infectious disease, and the study of vector-borne diseases. Researchers within the CVM also work 

closely with the KSU Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI), a biocontainment research and education facility. The BRI supports comprehensive ‘‘farm-to-fork’’ infectious disease research programs that address threats to plant, animal, and human 

health. The BRI facilitates diverse and multidisciplinary research and training opportunities, with the capability for research on foreign animal diseases in both large 

and small animal models, and basic and applied research. Faculty at the KSU CVM 

are working collaboratively with the BRI on projects addressing many of the highest-threat disease agents (e.g., Classical Swine Fever, African Swine Fever, and Rift 

Valley Fever). 
26 

13Department of Homeland Security. National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. http:// 

www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility. 14Sell, T.K. and Watson, M. Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2013–FY2014. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. Volume 11, Number 2, 2013. 

PP 196–216. 15State Public Health Laboratories: Sustaining Preparedness in an Unstable Environment. 

March 2009, Association of Public Health Laboratories. 

On a site adjacent to the KSU CVM and BRI, DHS is currently constructing the 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility will serve to replace 

and augment the mission currently being performed by the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. The NBAF will ‘‘be a state-of-the-art biocontainment laboratory for the 

study of diseases that threaten both America’s animal agricultural industry and 

public health... [offering capabilities] to conduct research, develop vaccines, diagnose emerging diseases, and train veterinarians.’’13 Needless to say, close collaboration between the NBAF and the KSU CVM and its allied partner programs, presents inestimable opportunities to further strengthen local and regional resources 

for addressing threats to U.S. Agriculture and Food. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As I’ve described, addressing the threat posed by the intentional or unintentional 

introduction of a high-consequence disease is a collaborative process. The role of academia is only part of a much broader solution. Across the Federal Government, programs in agencies such as Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of 

Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Geological Survey, and 

the Environmental Protection Agency must come together with USDA (APHIS and 

ARS) and DHS. Similarly, engagement of industry stakeholders from dairy, pork, 

beef, and poultry, as well as the allied industries, must occur to ensure that technological solutions and operational response measures are viable. Given the availability of high-consequence infectious agents abroad, a holistic approach to bio- and 

agro-defense must also involve threat reduction at the global level. This should involve multi-national collaborators such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (UN FAO) 

and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) to name a few. 

In addition to the need for collaboration there is also a need to allocate adequate 

resources to address the Nation’s vulnerability in this area. Considering the significance of agriculture to the American public’s well-being, measures should be taken 

to correct the drastic imbalance in research and countermeasure funding for agriculturally-focused threats, versus human-centric ones. For example, during fiscal 

year 2014, 61% of Federal funding for biodefense was allocated to HHS, while USDA 

received only 1%.14 Similarly, the Strategic National Stockpile, which houses the 

Nation’s repository of antibiotics, vaccines, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, and other 

critical medical equipment and supplies, received approximately $510 million, while 

the National Veterinary Stockpile received approximately $4 million. As further evidence of this imbalance, in 2007, the Laboratory Response Network, an integrated 

network of State and local public health, Federal, military, and international laboratories that can respond to bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and other public health 

emergencies, had an annual budget of approximately $50 million15 while the 

NAHLN receives only $6 million dollars annually to support its operations. 

There is also a need to increase emphasis on educational programs to further support U.S. Agriculture and Food. Efforts such as the DHS Centers of Excellence 

should receive additional resourcing, and U.S. veterinary curricula should emphasize the changing role of the veterinarian as part of a global defense against highconsequence transboundary, emerging, and/or zoonotic diseases. Additional funds 

should be provided for agro-defense-focused research, through avenues such as the 

USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA), the National Institutes 

of Health (NIH) and lastly but not least, through increased funding for programs 

that will be housed within the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). Indeed, with construction of a state-of-the-art $1.25 billion facility, it is critical to ensure a stable and appropriate level of resources and funding for the research, training and diagnostic missions that will be housed within it. Currently, budgets for the 

USDA APHIS, ARS, and DHS S&T at PIADC do not account for the planned expansion of research/diagnostic/training programs that will occur in the new NBAF facility. I urge you to increase agency programmatic budgets for the NBAF mission, so 

that the full potential of the facility, and its DHS and USDA programs, can be 

achieved. 

Preparedness for a natural or intentional introduction of a high-consequence agricultural event is dependent on a holistic, all-of-enterprise approach. Solving this sec-
27 

tor’s complex problems and supporting our industries will depend on a strong public/ 

private partnership that is built on trust, collaboration, and resolve. 

Finally, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you regarding efforts to defend the Nation’s agriculture and food. I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Mr. Acord for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF BOBBY ACORD, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, 

ANIMAL PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE 

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL 

Mr. ACORD. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Payne, Members of the subcommittee, the U.S. Department of Agriculture industry and the U.S. food supply always have been at great risk 

from pest and disease. That risk has continued to increase over the 

years because of increases in travel, tourism, and trade, each passenger handbag, each piece of luggage brought into the United 

States poses a risk. Every parcel mailed to the United States poses 

a risk. Large volumes of commodities and products from a wide 

range of countries are transported legally, and some illegally, to 

the United States every year by different conveyances, all of which 

may be carrying a disease or hitchhiking pest. 

Now the country faces a new risk: Terrorists weaponizing disease 

to inflict harm on the U.S. economy. Of particular concerns of the 

livestock industry is foot-and-mouth disease. It is a highly contagious viral disease affecting all cloven-hoofed animals. The structure of the U.S. livestock industry makes the United States particularly vulnerable to a large-scale foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. There are an estimated 1 million pigs and 400,000 cattle 

moved daily in the United States, some over long distances. There 

are numerous auctions, fairs, exhibits that concentrate large numbers of animals in a single location. Those movements and concentrations provide opportunities for just one infected or exposed 

animal to infect many others. 

The U.S. industry is also concerned about African swine fever 

that has reared its ugly head in Russia, Belarus, and eastern European countries that border Russia and those other countries. It is 

a disease for which there is no means of control. As Dr. Meckes 

mentioned, there is an insufficient quantity of foot-and-mouth vaccine. With support of the livestock industry, APHIS changed its 

policy on managing a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak from culling 

all infected and exposed animals to one of vaccination in all but the 

smallest of outbreaks. 

When discussing how this policy would be implemented, it became apparent that there is not enough vaccine to deal with an 

outbreak, and there is no capability of producing a sufficient quantity to deal with an outbreak in the United States. 

The livestock industry has made it clear that a solution to the 

vaccine shortage must include a contract for an offshore vendormaintained bank that includes antigen for all 23 FMD types that 

are currently circulating in the world, and that a contract be 

awarded for surge capacity to produce sufficient quantities of vaccine in the event of an outbreak in the livestock herd. 
28 

There are gaps in the U.S. biosecurity system. Most outbreaks, 

the first problem encountered is the lack of biosecurity, which contributes to the spread of the disease. One solution to this problem 

is that in addition to test exercises, the Federal and State agencies 

need a more robust review of biosecurity measures in each section 

of the agriculture industry. 

We need more robust scrutiny of imports. Federal agencies are 

relying too much on the ports of entry as the first line of defense 

against pest disease introduction. More emphasis must be placed 

on what happens during processing production of products in the 

countries of origin. 

We had an outbreak of Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea in the United 

States in 2013, and the means and the method by which that introduction was brought to the United States has never been discovered. If that gap in the security system is still open, then it is open 

for FMD and all other diseases as well. 

We have a serious problem with animal traceability in this country. It is inadequate for the use in an animal disease outbreak. In 

fact, it is not even recognized as adequate to meet the requirements of some of the major U.S. trading partners. Many of the 

shortfalls identified today are the result of lack of adequate resources, risks to U.S. agriculture and the U.S. food supply have increased dramatically over the last few years, and have now been 

exacerbated by the threat of terrorist targeting agriculture production. At the same time, funding provided to maintain the country’s 

safeguarding system has been reduced. We simply can’t have it 

both ways. 

In conclusion, there seems to be a growing consensus that there 

are serious flaws in the country’s preparedness to deal with threats 

to the U.S. agriculture and the food supply. The bipartisan report 

of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense highlighted the need 

for improvements in the system for protecting U.S. livestock herd 

in the Nation’s food supply. 

A lot of information has been gathered from that report, from the 

hearings that you have held, from hearings that have been held at 

the Department of Agriculture—excuse me, by the Committee on 

Agriculture. There is a lot of information that has now been developed, and it seems that from the perspective of the National Pork 

Producers Council and probably, more largely, the livestock industry, it is now time to catch and to work with the Obama administration to let’s fill these gaps, and let’s not continue to just look, 

let’s act at this point. Thank you, and I would be happy to answer 

any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Acord follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BOBBY ACORD

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

INTRODUCTION

The National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) is an association of 43 State pork 

producer organizations that serves as the global voice in Washington, DC, for the 

Nation’s pork producers. The U.S. pork industry represents a significant valueadded activity in the agricultural economy and the overall U.S. economy. Nationwide, more than 68,000 pork producers marketed more than 110 million hogs in 

2014, and those animals provided total gross receipts of $23.4 billion. Overall, an 
29 

estimated $22.3 billion of personal income and $39 billion of Gross National Product 

are supported by the U.S. pork industry. 

Economists Daniel Otto, Lee Schulz, and Mark Imerman at Iowa State University 

estimate that the U.S. pork industry is directly responsible for the creation of more 

than 37,000 full-time equivalent pork-producing jobs and generates about 128,000 

jobs in the rest of agriculture. It is responsible for approximately 102,000 jobs in 

the manufacturing sector, mostly in the packing industry, and 65,000 jobs in professional services such as veterinarians, real estate agents, and bankers. All told, the 

U.S. pork industry is responsible for nearly 550,000 mostly rural jobs in the United 

States, and U.S. pork producers today provide 23 billion pounds of safe, wholesome, 

and nutritious meat protein to consumers world-wide. 

DISEASE AND PEST INTRODUCTIONS

The U.S. agriculture industry and the U.S. food supply always have been at great 

risk from pests and disease. That risk has continued to increase over the years because of increases in travel, tourism, and trade. Each passenger handbag and piece 

of luggage brought into the United States and every parcel mailed to this country 

presents a risk of transporting disease to some sector of the agriculture industry. 

Large volumes of commodities and products from a wide range of countries are 

transported legally and illegally to the United States each year by different conveyances, all of which may be carrying a disease or hitchhiking pest. Now the country 

faces a new risk: Terrorists weaponizing disease as a means of inflicting harm on 

the U.S. economy. Whether by accident or deliberate introduction, the impact of a 

disease or pest on U.S. agriculture and the food supply could be devastating. 

Over the last few years, the United States has seen numerous introductions of 

pests and diseases that have affected agriculture production. Citrus Canker and Citrus Greening are wrecking havoc on the Florida citrus industry. Other pests that 

serve as disease vectors have had a serious impact on fruit and vegetable production 

in other parts of the country, particularly California. In April 2013, Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea infected a swine herd in Ohio, and it spread rapidly through most 

of the U.S. swine industry, resulting in an estimated loss of more than 8 million 

newborn pigs, which took an emotional toll on producers and ultimately increased 

prices to consumers. Subsequently 2 other swine diseases of Asian origin were discovered, Delta Corona Virus and Orthoreovirus. In 2015, High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) was discovered in poultry flocks in the Midwest, resulting in the 

culling of millions of turkeys and laying hens, particularly in Iowa and Minnesota. 

CURRENT THREATS

When compared with many countries in the world, U.S. agriculture is relatively 

free of pests and disease. Through cooperation between the Government and agriculture industries, some of the most serious pests and diseases have been eradicated. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), Pseudorabies 

in swine, Screwworm, Cotton Boll Weevil, and numerous fruit fly infestations have 

all been successfully eradicated but at great cost to taxpayers and the affected industries. Yet all these diseases and pests still lurk around the world, some very 

close to the U.S. mainland, and are still serious threats. 

Of particular concern to the livestock industry is FMD, a highly contagious viral 

disease affecting all cloven-hoofed animals. FMD is easily spread by livestock movement, wind currents, on vehicles that have traveled to and from infected farms and 

on inanimate objects that have come in contact with the virus. This economically 

devastating disease is endemic in 113 countries around the world. In 2014, the 

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) reported 779 FMD outbreaks in member countries. The structure of the U.S. livestock industry makes the United States 

particularly vulnerable to a large-scale FMD outbreak. There are an estimated 1 

million pigs and 400,000 cattle moved daily in the United States, some over long 

distances, and there are numerous auctions, fairs, and exhibits that concentrate 

large numbers of animals in a single location. Those movements and concentrations 

provide opportunities for 1 infected or exposed animal to spread disease to a large 

number of animals and over long distances. 

The U.S. swine industry also is very concerned about the emergence of African 

Swine Fever (ASF) in Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, and the Eastern European 

countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. ASF is a highly contagious viral 

disease for which there is no vaccine or method of control except strict biosecurity 

and culling of infected animals. The disease has become endemic in those countries’ 

feral swine populations, with occasional spread to backyard pigs and commercial 

production. An ASF introduction in the United States would be devastating to the 

U.S. pork industry. 
30 

Also of great concern is CSF. Previously eradicated from the United States, it 

lurks very close to the U.S. mainland in Hispaniola. It is also prevalent in Central 

and South America and other countries around the world. Vaccines are available 

and stockpiled for use, but an outbreak in the United States would have serious economic consequences. 

While the above highlighted diseases are the livestock industry’s worst fears, the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

(APHIS) focuses on preventing 160 animal diseases from entering the United States. 

Animal and plant diseases can be devastating to agriculture production, but the 

high value of animal agriculture makes introduction of animal diseases far more 

economically significant. Pests and diseases of concern are monitored by U.S. authorities through port-of-entry inspections and surveillance by APHIS and State departments of agriculture. 

CONSEQUENCES OF PEST AND DISEASE INTRODUCTION

Introduction of pests and diseases can have severe economic consequences for agriculture production, consumer prices and, potentially, food availability. Also of 

great concern is the loss of export markets. The United States is required by the 

International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and the OIE to report pest and 

disease introductions that are listed by those international bodies as economically 

significant or trade limiting or that are new or emerging diseases. In most cases, 

such reporting would result in an immediate loss of exports for the affected commodity or products, causing a precipitous drop in U.S. market prices. 

The economic consequences of disease introduction are often not limited to just 

one agriculture sector. Iowa State University economist Dermot Hayes estimates 

that an FMD outbreak in the United States would result in revenue losses to the 

beef and pork industries of $12.9 billion per year over a 10-year period; the corn 

and soybean industries are estimated to lose $44 billion and $24.9 billion, respectively. These estimates do not include losses to the dairy industry. Also, they do not 

include the costs, which are likely to be millions of dollars, to the Federal and State 

governments for culling, vaccinating, and other activities associated with controlling 

the disease. 

IMPROVED PROTECTION

There have been several improvements in the systems to safeguard U.S. agriculture. Creating the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) and combining APHIS’s agriculture inspectors into that single agency has been a positive 

development. In the early stages of the reorganization, there appeared to be a lack 

of focus by BCBP on the importance of agriculture inspections, but pressure from 

the agriculture industries and Members of Congress resulted in significant improvements over time. Anecdotal evidence gathered through interviews with agriculture 

inspectors formerly housed in APHIS suggests improved enforcement of agriculture 

regulations through use of the broader enforcement authority of BCBP. However, 

much remains to be done to improve the ability of the United States to exclude 

plant and animal pests and diseases from entering the country. 

APHIS has worked with the animal agriculture industries to develop Secure Food 

Supply Plans for pork, beef, milk, turkeys, and eggs. The plans, which are in various 

stages of development, focus on tightened biosecurity and compartmentalization of 

diseases to allow movement of animals to slaughter and products to the marketplace. They also allow for movement of live animals within a compartment. If the 

United States can gain acceptance of these plans by its trading partners, it will lessen the economic impact of a disease. 

Communications among State and Federal agencies also have improved, and the 

Department of Homeland Security has assisted with exercises to test the country’s 

preparedness for disease outbreaks. Additionally, creation of the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council has raised awareness of the need for biosecurity 

throughout the food chain. 

VULNERABILITIES

Even though there have been significant improvements in the systems for safeguarding U.S. agriculture and the Nation’s food supply, there are still significant 

vulnerabilities and challenges that must be addressed. They include: 

An insufficient quantity of FMD vaccine.—With support of the livestock industry, 

APHIS changed its policy on managing an FMD outbreak from culling all infected 

and exposed animals to one of vaccination in all but the smallest of outbreaks. 

Based on experience with outbreaks in the United Kingdom and Korea, the United 

States simply cannot euthanize its way out of an outbreak; vaccination is the only 
31 

realistic alternative. When discussing how this policy would be implemented, it became apparent that to deal with an outbreak there was not enough vaccine available nor could a sufficient quantity be obtained in time to implement an effective 

control program. 

The United States is the only country in the world that maintains its own vaccine 

antigen bank, and it serves all of North America. The bank is maintained at the 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) on Plum Island, NY, and has a limited 

number of antigens. Under the current manufacturer(s)’ contract, antigen is shipped 

to Europe where it is made into finished vaccine that then is shipped back to the 

United States. After 3 weeks, this process would produce only 2.5 million doses of 

vaccine. Dr. James Roth, professor and researcher at Iowa State University, estimates that at least 10 million doses would be needed during the first 2 weeks of 

an outbreak. Currently, there is no surge capacity to produce additional doses of 

vaccine. All the vaccine production capacity in the world is currently in use by other 

countries. 

Current law prohibits live FMD virus from being introduced onto the U.S. mainland, so foreign production companies are the only source of finished vaccine. It has 

been suggested that recombinant DNA vaccines that do not use live FMD virus can 

be produced in the United States, thus avoiding the legal prohibition of having live 

virus on the mainland. However, current data is not sufficient to determine how 

quickly, and indeed whether, such vaccines provide protection outside the laboratory 

environment and for all species. The United States is likely years away from the 

development and commercialization of such novel vaccines. While developing such 

a vaccine would be a positive move, the reality is that the U.S. livestock industry 

must have vaccines that are protective against the strain of FMD that might be in 

a sample sitting at the PIADC for analysis at this very moment! 

The House Agriculture Committee’s Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture held a hearing Feb. 11, 2015, on the FMD vaccine shortage. The livestock 

industry made it clear that a solution to the vaccine shortage must include a contract for an offshore, vendor-maintained bank that includes antigen for all 23 FMD 

types that are currently circulating in the world and that a contract be awarded for 

surge capacity to produce sufficient quantities of vaccine for an outbreak in the U.S. 

livestock herd. 

Gaps in U.S. biosecurity.—Both USDA and DHS focus a lot of attention on test 

exercises, and those are very beneficial activities. In most outbreaks, the first problem encountered is the lack of biosecurity, which contributes to the spread of disease. By the time adequate biosecurity is established the disease has been spread 

over much larger areas and control becomes much more challenging and costly. Test 

exercises do not accurately reveal what happens during an actual outbreak. 

Current pork production methods concentrate large numbers of animals in a single location, and the pork industry has always prided itself on having a robust biosecurity system. However, during the PEDv outbreak in 2013, the industry discovered serious gaps in biosecurity that contributed to spreading the disease. The same 

problem was also identified in the HPAI outbreak in 2015. 

One solution to this problem is that, in addition to test exercises, Federal and 

State agencies need a more robust review of biosecurity measures in each sector of 

the agriculture industry. Producers and their allied industries should be provided 

resources to increase training on the importance of biosecurity and how to identify 

gaps in their systems. While this would require additional resources, the potential 

savings to the Government are significant, providing a very favorable cost/benefit 

ratio. 

More robust scrutiny of imports.—Federal agencies are relying too much on the 

ports of entry as the first line of defense against pest and disease introduction. More 

emphasis must be placed on what happens during processing and production of 

products in the countries of origin. With most cargo being moved in containers, thorough inspection at the port of entry is virtually impossible. APHIS prepares risk assessments for all plant- and animal-origin products moving into U.S. territory, and 

in many cases those assessments are based on information supplied by Government 

officials and do not always include a site visit. Further, because of resource constraints, there is not enough follow up to assure that risk mitigations are being followed. 

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is responsible for inspection of feed and 

feed ingredients produced in foreign countries and in the United States. Not enough 

resources are being made available to APHIS and FDA to do a thorough inspection 

of foreign manufacturers to determine if they are following good manufacturing 

practices and if Government regulation and oversight are effective. That shortfall 

increases the risk to U.S. agriculture of disease introduction. 
32 

The strain of the PED virus introduced into the United States was determined 

to be of Chinese origin. But Government officials responsible for overseeing port-ofentry inspections and disease risk management have been unable to specifically 

identify the source or means of introduction of the virus even though APHIS conducted a root cause investigation. If there were a gap in the U.S. safety net that 

allowed the recent introduction of PEDv and Delta Corona virus, it also remains 

open for FMD! 

Traceability.—The U.S. pork industry has been a vocal advocate for a robust Nationally-standardized mandatory system for animal traceability. APHIS spent years 

working on a system of individual animal identification to allow accurate tracing of 

the movement of livestock, which is an absolutely critical component of any system 

for managing disease. Unfortunately, opposition from some sectors of the livestock 

community resulted in a compromise that provided only a State-based system that 

requires each State to be able to trace livestock movements within its State. The 

current traceability system is inadequate for use in a disease outbreak. In fact, it 

is not even recognized as adequate to meet the requirements of some major U.S. 

trading partners. 

Resource constraints.—Many of the shortfalls identified in this testimony result 

from of a lack of adequate resources. Risks to U.S. agriculture and the U.S. food 

supply have increased dramatically over the last few years and have now been exacerbated by the threat of terrorists targeting agriculture production. At the same 

time, funding provided to maintain the country’s safeguarding systems have been 

reduced. It is hard to conceive that enough efficiencies can be found to address an 

increasing threat and save money at the same time. Collectively, the agriculture industry, the Obama administration and Congress must face the reality that addressing these serious shortcomings in the U.S. safety net will require a significant outlay of additional funds. We can’t have it both ways! The history of Government involvement in disasters such as disease outbreaks is that once an outbreak occurs 

unlimited resources are committed to getting control of the situation. The savings 

everyone wants to make can be achieved by investing now in the Nation’s preparedness and avoiding a more costly disease eradication program in the future. 

Gaps in early detection.—Early disease detection and rapid response to any outbreak provide the best opportunity to limit the spread of Foreign Animal Diseases 

(FADs). Even though there is surveillance in place for CSF, ASF, and FMD, it is 

apparent that the funding is wholly inadequate to provide a high level of confidence 

that one of these trade-limiting FADs will be rapidly detected in time to make a 

difference. This is evidenced by the discontinuation in 2015 because of a lack of 

funding of a pilot project conducted by USDA’s Veterinary Services, using the surveillance infrastructure built for CSF to actively detect ASF and FMD. 

Data sharing for regulated diseases.—As evidenced during the HPAI outbreak, the 

amount of movement, testing, and premises data that needs to be captured, analyzed, and visualized by the APHIS incident command—responsible for dealing with 

animals disease outbreaks—to support disease response and business continuity activities is staggering. While the various pieces of this type of data exist, much of 

it resides in disparate databases that do not readily and easily communicate, which 

hinders the response and jeopardizes animal welfare. The industry is very concerned 

that this lack of connectivity will have direct and negative effects that will hinder 

the response to a foreign animal disease of swine. 

CONCLUSION

There seems to be a growing consensus that there are serious flaws in the country’s preparedness to deal with threats to U.S. agriculture and the U.S. food supply. 

The Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, co-chaired 

by former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge and former Sen. Joe Lieberman and released 

Oct. 28, 2015, highlighted the need for improvements in the system for protecting 

the U.S. livestock herd and the Nation’s food supply. Concerns about the adequacy 

of the country’s preparedness also were raised in a Nov. 4, 2015, hearing of the 

House Agriculture Committee. 

NPPC urges Congress to use the information gathered in that hearing and in the 

Blue Ribbon Study Panel report to work with the Obama administration on finding 

solutions to improve the preparedness of the United States to deal with any pest 

or disease outbreak. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Acord. The Chair now recognizes 

Dr. Williams for 5 minutes. 
33 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN R. WILLIAMS, ASSISTANT EXTENSION 

PROFESSOR, MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Chairman McSally and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to talk 

about the risk that our Nation faces from agroterrorism. As an ag 

economist from Mississippi State University, I spend a large portion of my time researching ag markets and the impacts that 

shocks can have to those markets. Our country’s ag and food production system faces many challenges today, one of which is a risk 

of major disruption to the system. It is essential that we be prepared to face these threats to prevent and/or minimize the impacts 

they may have on our food system. 

As mentioned by my fellow witnesses, our poultry industry faces 

devastating Avian influenza outbreak in 2015. In Iowa alone, 30 

million layers were lost, and 1.5 million turkeys were lost, resulting in a direct impact of $658 million. 

Other industries are also impacted. This is known as a multiplier 

effect, and that multiplier effect resulted in a total economic impact 

of $1.2 billion, and more than 8,000 jobs lost. 

On a positive note, some of those losses in Iowa were partially 

offset with increases in sales in other States. Mississippi alone, ag 

producers in the State saw 40 percent year-over-year increase in 

sales. Keep in mind, those increased egg prices were also passed 

on to consumers. So there is a negative on that side as well. 

Prior to the Avian influenza outbreak, the poultry industry already had several biosecurity measures put in place by companies 

such as Sanderson Farms and Tyson, who owned the birds and 

contract the producers to grow and raise those birds. The State and 

Federal agencies also helped to develop those guidelines. 

Despite all of these measures that were already in place, the industry was not prepared for an outbreak when disasters strike. In 

the time since the outbreak, industry leaders, State agencies and 

Federal agencies have all come together to develop a plan to quickly and efficiently address future outbreaks. This can also be applied 

to agroterrorism and provides an excellent framework for other industry to work from. 

One benefit of agriculture is that production is spread over a 

wide area. As a result, natural disasters and other disruptions are 

quite common, but typically have minimal impacts. For example, 

the snowstorm about a month ago that hit the States of Nebraska, 

Iowa, Colorado, and Kansas, all but shut down the meat-packing 

industry for nearly 2 days. Yet the markets didn’t respond to that 

shock. 

Another example, a similar snowstorm earlier this year in Texas 

and New Mexico, killed more than 30,000 dairy cows, and caused 

significant damage on a local level. Yet Nationally, the milk futures 

only increased for a week before returning to their previous levels. 

One of the greatest threats from agroterrorism that we face is an 

introduction of something that could shut down our export industry. An example of this is in 2003 when had a BSE, a cow test positive for BSE in Washington State that shut down our export industry on our beef cattle. It took 7 years for exports to return back to 

the level that they were before that positive test of BSE. But de-
34 

spite that shutdown in exports, the cattle markets really were not 

impacted on a large scale. 

Moving on to our crop industry. With fruits and vegetables, the 

biggest threat that we really face is something that can potentially 

harm us as humans: The introduction of E. Coli, or salmonella. Our 

fruits and vegetables are typically grown outdoors, in the ground, 

many of them very close to the ground so they are susceptible to 

contamination, whether it be natural from birds or introduced from 

terrorists. While there is a system in place to detect and track 

these introductions, there is still definitely room for improvement 

in that area. 

Row crops are much less susceptible to agroterrorism and natural disasters. The damage must be on a large scale to have a significant impact on the Nation’s economy. The biggest threat that 

we face right now is drought, a wide-spread drought as we saw in 

2012. The 2012 drought took nearly 3 years for our Nation’s row 

crop industry to really get back to normal levels. 

The other thing to keep in mind on that side of things is the conditions have to be nearly perfect at the field level for a terrorist to 

introduce a pathogen that would really take hold and spread. So, 

the likelihood of that is not very high. 

In conclusion, past incidences of disruption have shown the U.S. 

ag sector is remarkably resilient. In most cases, it would be difficult for a producer to inflict damage on a large enough scale, with 

the exception of possibly our foot-and-mouth disease, and some of 

these diseases in the livestock sector, to cause a National impact. 

What is really key to minimizing these effects is to take measures 

to keep them at a localized level. If these impacts are at a localized 

level, our ag sector has shown a remarkable ability to bounce back 

from these types of incidences. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN R. WILLIAMS

FEBRUARY 26, 2016 

Chairman Donovan and Members of the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to 

talk about the risk that our Nation faces from individuals or organizations who wish 

to disrupt our agricultural and food system. I am an agricultural economist from 

Mississippi State University and spend a large portion of my time researching agricultural markets and the impacts of various shocks to the markets. Our country’s 

agricultural and food production system faces many challenges today, one of which 

is the risk of a major disruption to the system; whether it be in the form of a terrorist attack or from a natural disruption. It is essential that we be prepared to face 

these threats to prevent and/or minimize the impacts they may have on our food 

system. 

LEARNING FROM RECENT EVENTS

In August of 2015, an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) hit 

several States in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest, inflicting a significant amount 

of damage in its path. Iowa alone lost 30 million layers and pullets as well as 1.5 

million turkeys with direct impact of just over $658 million (Iowa Farm Bureau, 

2015). In addition to the direct impact of lost production, there are also indirect impacts that need to be considered. For example, suppliers and vendors that normally 

market goods and services to the poultry operations will see reduced income. As a 

result, they will make fewer household purchases, hurting the sales of additional 

businesses; creating a multiplier effect. According to a study commissioned by Iowa 

Farm Bureau, this multiplier effect resulted in a total economic impact of $1.2 billion to the State of Iowa’s economy, including 8,444 lost jobs. 
35 

Agricultural production in the United States is dispersed across a large area, 

which helps to mitigate impacts on a National level. In the case of egg production, 

while Iowa saw significantly reduced production, other States saw increases in their 

sales. I have estimated that the State of Mississippi alone, egg producers benefited 

from an increase of $93.6 million in production, a 40 percent year-over-year increase, as a result of increased egg prices. It is highly likely that several other 

States experienced similar increases in egg sales. Of course, the increased egg prices 

are ultimately passed on to consumers, increasing the average American’s grocery 

bill. This phenomenon is also pointed out by Pendell et al. in their study of the potential release of foot-and-mouth disease from the future National Bio and Agro Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. 

Much can be learned from the HPAI outbreak in the spring of 2015. Prior to the 

outbreak, the poultry industry already had several bio-security measures in place. 

Many of those measures had been put into place by companies such as Sanderson 

Farms and Tyson, who own the birds but are contracting producers to grow and 

raise them, as a protection for their investment. Many of the protocols already in 

place by the bird owners were developed with the assistant of State agencies. The 

USDA and APHIS also had several simple, commonsense guidelines in place. Despite all of these measures that were already in place, the industry was ill-prepared 

for actually dealing with a disastrous event such as HPAI. In the time since the 

outbreak in 2015, industry leaders, State agencies, and Federal agencies have all 

come together to develop an elaborate plan to quickly and efficiently address future 

outbreaks. The plan includes a quarantine of the infected area, testing of all birds 

within a 3-mile radius, and requiring a written permit for anyone entering and/or 

exiting the area. The model that the poultry industry has put into place can easily 

be applied even in the case of agro-terrorism and provides an excellent framework 

for other industries as well. 

ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE

There are several things to consider when trying to estimate the economic impact 

of a terrorist attack on animal agriculture. First, how wide-spread is the damage? 

If the damage is localized to a single county or even multi-county area, the impact 

will likely be minimal. In some cases, insurance will pay indemnities to producers 

for the value of the animals that are lost. Indemnities may also be paid by the 

USDA. If facilities must be quarantined or sterilized before introducing new animals, insurance will not reimburse producers for lost future production. That could 

compound the economic impact of a disease outbreak, whether natural or introduced 

by terrorists. As mentioned above, there are also multiplier effects that must be 

factored in. For example, in the State of Mississippi the multiplier effect for jobs 

is 2.32 (Henderson et al. 2015). In other words, for every job lost in the agricultural 

sector there are 1.32 additional jobs lost in the rest of the economy. 

One benefit of agriculture is that production is spread over a wide area. As a result, natural disasters and other disruptions to production are quite common but 

typically have minimal impacts on the economy and markets. For example, the February 2, 2016 snowstorm that hit much of Nebraska and Iowa prevented many cattle from being transported from feedlots to packers and all but shut down the meat 

packing industry for 2 days, but the Fed Cattle markets did not deviate from their 

normal patterns. A similar early January snowstorm in Texas and New Mexico 

killed more than 30,000 dairy cows, and caused significant local damage. Market 

fundamentals tell us that when supply is decreased, prices should shift higher, yet 

milk futures only increased slightly and the higher prices lasted less than a week 

before declining again. The impact of the Texas snowstorm was only temporary because although the storm brought significant local damage, 30,000 head of dairy cattle is relatively small when compared to the more than 9.3 million head of dairy 

cattle in the entire United States. 

One of the greatest threats from agro-terrorism that we face is the introduction 

of a disease or pathogen that causes our export markets to be shut down. We saw 

one such incident in 2003 when a cow from Washington State was found to be infected with BSE, shutting down the majority of our beef exports (See figures 1 and 

2 below). It took over 7 years for U.S. beef exports to return to levels seen before 

the first BSE case was discovered. Despite a complete shutdown in U.S. beef exports 

that took several years to recover, cattle prices showed little-to-no impact as shown 

in figure 3 below. 

IMPACTS IN PLANT-BASED AGRICULTURE

Plant-based agriculture can be broken down into two general groups: Fruits and 

vegetables that are grown for direct human consumption and row crops that are 
36 

typically grown for animal consumption or for additional processing that ultimately 

leads to human consumption. In the fruit and vegetable category, the biggest threat 

we face is the introduction of food-borne illnesses such as e-coli or salmonella. Leafy 

greens are of particular vulnerability due to their fragile nature that makes them 

difficult to clean as well as a consumer’s tendency to eat them uncooked. Many 

fruits and vegetables are grown outdoors in the ground, where they are susceptible 

to contamination from natural sources such as birds, but are also easy to access by 

terrorists interested in introducing food-borne illnesses into the food system. While 

there is a system in place to detect, track, and recall contaminated foods, there is 

still room for improvement (Coates and Trounce, 2011). 

Row crop agriculture may also be susceptible to agro-terrorism and natural disasters, however the damage must be on a wide scale to have a significant impact on 

the economy. The biggest threat to our row crops is a wide-spread drought such as 

the one experienced in 2012. As shown in figure 4, the 2011 drought that hit the 

Southern Plains and then the 2012 drought that swept through much of the Corn 

Belt and Southern Plains caused a substantial drop in corn production as well as 

a spike in corn prices. It took U.S. corn producers nearly 3 years to rebuild corn 

stocks to the point where markets have returned to a new equilibrium. The high 

grain prices caused by the 2011–2012 droughts were also responsible for the agricultural boom that the United States experienced in 2013 and into 2014. Farm incomes 

hit a record high in 2013, which provided a boost to other agricultural businesses, 

caused farmland values to rise, and boosted the economies in several rural States. 

While the impact of the 2012 drought help some in the agricultural industry, others 

were harmed. Higher corn prices drove up costs for livestock producers, the ethanol 

industry, and ultimately it drove up food prices for consumers. While unlikely, a terrorist attack that can reduce production any individual row crop could cause similar 

impacts as the 2012 drought. However, if harm is inflicted on only one crop I would 

expect markets to return to normal much more quickly than they did following a 

drought that impacts the production of not just one crop, but several. 

In conclusion, upon examining past incidences of disruptions in production and 

trade across a variety of commodities, the U.S. agricultural sector has demonstrated 

a remarkable resilience. In most cases, it would be difficult for a terrorist to inflict 

damage on a large enough scale to have a lasting detrimental impact on the U.S. 

economy. If a terrorist were to succeed in inflicting damage on a large scale, the 

agricultural industry has proven that it can recover quickly from most threats. With 

the cooperation of individual industry groups, State governments, and the Federal 

Government in devising plans to respond to potential terror attacks or natural disasters, evidence suggests that damage from such disasters can be mitigated. 

REFERENCES

Coates, A. and M. B. Trounce. ‘‘FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Is it Enough?’’ 

Journal of Bioterrorism and Biodefense. 2:109. 2011. 

Decision Innovative Solutions, ‘‘Economic Impact of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza on Poultry in Iowa.’’ Prepared for Iowa Farm Bureau. August 17, 2015. 

Henderson, James E., James N. Barnes, and Lawrence L. Falconer. ‘‘The Economic 

Contribution of Agriculture and Forestry Production and Processing in Mississippi.’’ 

Mississippi State University Extension Service. Publication No. 2879. 

Pendell, Dustin L., Thomas L. Marsh, Keith H. Coble, Jayson L. Lusk, and Sara 

C. Szmania. ‘‘Economic Assessment of FMDv Releases from the National Bio and 

Agro Defense Facility.’’ PLoS ONE 10(6): June 2015. 
37 
38 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thank you, Dr. Williams. As Chair, I now 

recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. A lot of them stewing 

here, but I want to be efficient with my time and give my colleagues the opportunity to ask questions. 

This committee has very much been focusing on fusion centers 

and information sharing, not just between Federal partners, but 

between Federal, State, and local; not just on the Government side, 

but with private sector and others that would need a place, or 

maybe can be a place, regionally or State-wide, to come together 

and get the information that they need on threats and sharing information in both directions. 

I would love to hear perspectives from any of the witnesses on 

whether you have been invited or involved in any of the fusion cen-
39 

ters, or whether that is an area that we also need to be improve 

to be inviting members related to the agriculture industry to address the agroterrorism threat, to have that information be shared 

at the fusion centers. 

Dr. MECKES. Chairman McSally, I will speak to our situation in 

North Carolina. As I indicated, the emergency programs division 

came into being in 2002, and they have been intimately involved 

with law enforcement, with our emergency management response 

teams all across the State of North Carolina with the fusion centers. Again, I would suggest that the emergency programs division 

model might be something that other States would consider, because it has taken the burden of trying to manage that piece of agriculture and food defense off of our veterinary division, in that this 

group focuses solely on what is needed for response. Of course, we 

are integrated with them on a day-to-day basis in all the activities. 

So yes, in answer to your question, North Carolina does have input 

and does receive input from the fusion centers and the emergency 

management. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Is that all virtual, or do you have somebody who 

is invited there or sits there if something were to break out? Are 

there tactics, techniques, and procedures, TTPs, for you to have 

somebody there or how does that work? 

Dr. MECKES. In our planning for high-pathogen influenza, we actively engaged immediately our emergency operations center for 

the State of North Carolina, and we would have run the incident 

out of that emergency operations center. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, great. Any other witnesses care to comment 

on the fusion center? Mr. Acord. 

Mr. ACORD. To my knowledge, there has been no discussion or 

contact from those centers with the pork industry. I haven’t heard 

of any. 

I can make you aware of one circumstance where communication 

is not good, and that is with the National Animal Health Laboratory Network. The challenge that we have there is that most of the 

laboratories can’t communicate with each other, and that is a serious, serious consequence of not being able to immediately post 

what you find in a laboratory in Minnesota, in Iowa, in Kansas, 

and that has to be fixed if we are going to have an effective system, 

and it currently doesn’t work. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Interesting. Dr. Beckham. 

Dr. BECKHAM. That goes back to biosurveillance and having the 

ability for systems to communicate with each other to include the 

laboratory systems. As currently stands right now, the ability for 

those labs to message test results and communicate with one another, as Dr. Acord says, is not as robust as it could be. In addition, 

getting information from the field, from the veterinarians to the 

State animal health official, or to other officials who need to have 

that information, right now there is not a really robust system out 

there for that. There are some efforts underway that are all-of-enterprise efforts from the industry to the State animal health official, to the Federal Government that have been funded by the Department of Homeland Security and that are being coordinated 

with USDA to develop surveillance systems that ultimately can 

talk between each other in the diagnostic labs, but to date, obvi-
40 

ously that is still underway, and that has not reached its full potential, much less even broached the idea of communicating with 

our public health sector. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So, we had a hearing about 2 weeks ago taking 

a look at biosurveillance systems, and particularly, looking at the 

National Biosurveillance Integration Center. So is that a place 

where—I mean, there is a lot of shortfalls and shortcomings to 

that, but in Nirvana, in a perfect world, is that a place that should 

be integrating this information in a two-way, and across regionally 

as well? 

Dr. BECKHAM. So I think there are some challenges associated 

with that. I think some of the challenges are the willingness to 

share information. Someone has to act as a trusted agent, which 

is kind of what I alluded to in my testimony. The industries, I believe, are willing to share information, but that information has to 

be protected, and there has to be clear policies and procedures on 

how one will react to certain types of information. 

So those things need to be worked out, and, I think, you know, 

one of the projects that I had previously worked on in academia 

with industry was really headed that way so that you could get 

people to share information. But more importantly than getting 

them to share, you have to give them something back for it. They 

can’t just give you information and you not give anything back. 

So, it is a two-way street, there has to be good communication 

and there has to be trust, and I am not sure that NBAF is the 

place for that. I would let my other witnesses up here comment on 

that. I think Doug is ready to do that. But I can sure tell you that 

academia is a good place, or maybe another third party that can 

act as a trusted agent would be a great place to hold information, 

or to share information. 

I will say one more thing, and the unique thing about some of 

the systems out there now is that you actually don’t even have to 

hold the information, you can reach back to that information and 

gather that information and only use it when you need to use it; 

therefore, it stays with the owner, the actual owner of the information. So that is another way getting access to information and 

being able to utilize information, but not storing information in big 

databases, which can sometimes be very vicarious. 

Ms. MCSALLY. When you were saying that, it made me think of 

a parallel that we had with a cybersecurity and information sharing among the private sector and with the Government, and we actually passed legislation out of this committee providing some protections to the private sector to build that trust in liability issues 

so that there could be sharing of what the appropriate threat information is. So I wonder if that is a model to look at for a similar 

challenge within this industry. I have some more questions but I 

am out of time. So I will go on a second round here. So I want to 

give some time to Ranking Member Payne for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

This question is for all the witnesses. What is the biggest gap in 

our ability to prevent and mitigate the effects of an agroterrorism 

event? What is the most critical investment we can make to prevent such an event? 
41 

Dr. BECKHAM. Early detection, early detection is key, right? So 

we have got to know something is here. We have got to be able to 

localize it, keep it localized. So early detection, biosurveillance, the 

National Animal Health Laboratory Network, the investment on 

these laboratories, the investment of that infrastructure is absolutely critical. 

You heard earlier today vaccines are an issue for foot-and-mouth 

disease. I will take that one step further: Look at the funding we 

put into HHS and the funding in the Strategic National Stockpile, 

and then compare that to what we put into the National Veterinary 

Stockpile. We do not have the funding to prepare this Nation to respond to with vaccines and diagnostics that we need. So I would 

say that is a large gap as well. 

So for me, it is early detection and then the countermeasures to 

respond, but the funding has to be there similar to what we see on 

the human side of the house. We have a zoonotic disease incursion, 

we have got to have the capabilities to respond. In order to do that, 

we have to have the resources allocated before. We cannot be reactive, we have to be proactive. 

Dr. MECKES. Just to provide an order of magnitude of the fund- ing for the National Veterinary Stockpile, $1–2 million per year, 

contrast that to the strategic National stockpile, which is $3–4 billion a year. I suspect the strategic National stockpile throws away 

more drugs that are expired on an annual basis than the entire 

budget of the National veterinary stockpile. We have to begin to 

address that issue. Foot-and-mouth disease is the barbarians at the 

gate. It is just a matter of time before it is introduced into this 

country, and we cannot stop the spread of that disease. 

Mr. ACORD. For the livestock industry, I think it would have to 

be an adequate supply of foot-and-mouth disease vaccine, that is 

really the thing that scares us the most. I agree with Dr. Beckham 

that early detection and rapid response is the mantra that we have 

to follow. But we know right now that we do not have an adequate 

supply of FMD vaccine, nor do we even have a vaccine for something like African swine fever that has spread rapidly through Russia and into eastern Europe. It is only a matter of time before it 

moves elsewhere. We have to address those things. We can’t continue to talk about it. USDA puts in about $1.9 million into the 

vaccine bank. That is a pittance compared to the loss that we 

would suffer with a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I would mirror what Dr. Beckham and Mr. Acord 

have said. The key is early detection and taking care of things as 

soon and as quickly as possible. The quicker that we stop the 

spread of any such disease, the less economic impact that we are 

going to have. So, that is, to me, really the key, is getting on top 

of this as quickly as possible and doing everything we can to have 

a response plan in place, whether its vaccination, or other measures, to really get on top of this and prevent it from spreading. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Mr. Acord, in your testimony, you acknowledge that every passenger and handbag entering the United 

States has a potential to import a disease that could harm the agriculture industry. In your opinion, is the United States doing 

enough to keep diseases and pests out of the United States? What 

should be done—what more should be done? 
42 

Mr. ACORD. Well, I think the effort has improved dramatically to 

address this issue. We are looking at an almost impossible job 

when you—I have spent a lot of time at the Miami International 

Airport, and I take pork producers there all the time so that they 

can see what is intercepted at the Port of Miami. In a few days, 

in a few days, you have a mountain of intercepted material, and 

it is unbelievable what people want to bring in, and they have all 

kinds of opportunity to declare that they have something, but they 

don’t. I saw one passenger from Venezuela was literally bringing 

a grocery store in a suitcase, and said they have nothing. Thank 

goodness for the dogs. 

One of positive things that has happened, and I never thought 

I would say this at the time, but moving the agriculture inspectors 

to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection was a very, very 

smart move. When I talked to those inspectors now, they tell me 

that the improved enforcement authority that they have through 

the Customs laws has contributed immensely to their ability to do 

their job. We have to spend more time at the country of origin, and 

the country of departure rather than the border. That is literally 

our second line of defense. 

We are going to have to put more people in these countries if we 

expect to have any possibility of finding out what is going into 

these products in the first place that is, like I say, about the PED, 

however that got in, that same pathway is still open for FMD for 

which we have no vaccine. So we just have to direct more resources 

to country of origin, I think. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Ranking Member Payne. The Chair 

now recognizes Mr. Donovan from New York for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Acord, Mr. Payne, 

and I would like you to visit Newark International Airport as well, 

please, that is our airport. 

Everyone here has spoken about early detection, and it is so 

multifaceted when you think about home-grown products and livestock, imported products and livestock. How are we doing this early 

detection? First, maybe we could do it domestically. Are the people 

on the ground trained to detect, or do we wait until someone gets 

sick and then try and find out the origin of that illness? How is 

it that we are doing early detection? Certainly, if we are doing it, 

whatever methods we are using now, how can they be improved? 

I open that up to the panel. 

Dr. MECKES. Member Donovan, I would suggest that that takes 

place at the State and local level. The State animal health officials, 

my team within the veterinary division that is on the ground every 

day with pork producers, with poultry producers, with beef and 

dairy producers, we are out there seeing animals, we are talking 

to the producers, we are working closely with private practitioners. 

That is where we will detect the disease. Rightly, that should be 

the case. We are in touch with everything that goes on in our respective States. 

Dr. Beckham worked closely to develop a program 3 years ago 

called enhanced passive surveillance, which was a means of identifying diseases early in animal agricultural production. It was al-
43 

most like emergency room visits that were recorded and tracked on 

a day-to-day basis. 

So, we have to make sure that capability exists. I am going to 

suggest that DHS has a unique role in all of this, and, of course, 

I draw upon my 7 years in the Office of Health Affairs, but USDA 

has a significant regulatory responsibility. DHS has a significant 

threat reduction responsibility, and it should work to enhance capabilities all across the country in preparedness and response. 

A perfect example of that would have been the Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama. The Ag Earth program, the 

Ag Emergency Response Training Program. After 5 years of successful operation, FEMA discontinued funding for that program because it was perceived as a non-issue for our country. 

Obviously, it remains an issue and will be an issue. So DHS 

should step up, and appropriately so, work on the threat side, work 

on the preparedness side, and work on the response side with 

States all over the country. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Doctor. 

Dr. BECKHAM. I would just echo what Dr. Meckes said, and say 

that, of the veterinarians we are training every day, and the colleges of veterinary medicine, and the ones that are out practicing, 

are really the first line of response. 

Early detection is multifaceted, so it is heavily dependent on the 

producers recognizing there is something wrong, calling that veterinarian, getting them out there. Then through this system, that Dr. 

Meckes mentioned, we have the capability of collecting that information on multiple devices and bringing that in and having veterinarians have the capability to share that through multiple devices 

as well, so if they are seeing something that is unusual in one area, 

they can share it with each other and say: Hey, is anybody else 

seeing this? 

Those are the kinds of systems we have to develop, and those are 

the kinds of systems we have to implement if we are going to have 

a comprehensive program for early detection that really relies on 

the first responders, the veterinarians, and the producers that then 

works with our State veterinarians to and get all that information 

back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Is it more difficult to detect a disease in our 

grown products, our agriculture products, than it is livestock? It 

sounds like, not that it is easy to detect with livestock, but it seems 

like there may be more signs. 

Dr. BECKHAM. You will see clinical signs, right, exactly. 

Mr. ACORD. I would agree with Dr. Beckham and Dr. Meckes. I 

think the private practitioner is the first person that is going to be 

the one to find a foreign animal disease in the United States. 

The pork industry spends a great deal of time talking to our producers. We have educational material, that they were provided, 

that encourages them to report any unusual conditions, that they 

observe, to both their local veterinarian and subsequent to their 

veterinarian, to the State veterinarian. 

We have a foreign animal disease diagnostic training program, at 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center, where foreign animal disease 

diagnosticians are trained to recognize the symptoms of disease. 

That certainly could be expanded to include a larger number of 
44 

people because it is very unique training where they actually get 

to see the disease. These animals are infected with foot-and-mouth 

disease, so they can see first-hand the symptoms. I think we have 

a start, I guess that is how I would characterize it. 

Mr. DONOVAN. My time is expired. I would like to, if we do a second round, ask you about how we do this detection for things that 

we import. But, Madam Chair, I yield the rest of my time, which 

isn’t any. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Watson Coleman from New Jersey for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much. I have a number 

of questions which have been prompted from just listening in and 

out. We talked about detection, and we are talking about elimination, and we are talking about vaccines. I want to go before that. 

Are there standards that people who grow crops have to follow, 

people who grow livestock have to follow? 

Are there standards to ensure that these products are being 

grown and these livestock are being bred and surviving under certain standards for safety? Is there such a thing, and if so, who is 

responsible for policing that or monitoring that? What is the process for that? 

Dr. MECKES. Well, I will say first and foremost that the marketplace drives those standards. If you are a producer of pork, if you 

are a beef producer, if you are a dairyman producing milk every 

day, you want to meet those market standards to be assured that 

your product can go to market. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Yeah, that is taste and stuff. I am talking about are there standards that you can only grow in this kind 

of soil this? You have to do this in order to protect a plant that is 

growing. If it is livestock, it can only be bred under certain circumstances. They can only be fed under certain circumstances. 

Ways that you would prevent diseases and things of that nature, 

as opposed to waiting until something happens and then having 

the capacity to detect it. I just want to know if there is any such 

thing? 

Mr. ACORD. Well, in the pork industry, we have the Pork Quality 

Assurance Program, which sets some standards that determine 

issues like animal welfare, animal health monitoring, those kind of 

things. That does exist, and there is a great deal of education of 

producers that goes into implementing that program. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Who monitors that that is actually happening? Are those Federal standards? 

Mr. ACORD. No, ma’am. They are not Federal standards. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. They are industry standards? 

Mr. ACORD. They are industry standards. I would suggest to you 

that there would be a great reluctance, and an absolute opposition, 

by producers to be confined by any kind of Federal standards as 

to how they raise livestock and produce crops. I think the industry 

would view that as probably un-American, quite honestly, to see 

that. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Even if the goal is to make sure that 

livestock and veggies and whatever are produced in a healthy way 

so that you don’t have these various diseases? 
45 

Mr. ACORD. I don’t think you can regulate industry or production 

of anything to that extent. There aren’t enough resources to monitor how that is done and, quite honestly, we can pass all kinds of 

regulations. It is the ability to enforce those regulations that makes 

a difference. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Yeah. I was kind of trying to get at that 

also. Are there standards? Who monitors? Should there be monitoring? You are saying that such a thing isn’t very viable in the industry. I know that the producers would probably resist it, but I 

am just wondering, does Government have a role in that, and if so, 

what would it be? 

I can go on to some other areas because—and I think it was you, 

Mr. Acord, I think you said that there is no FMD vaccine? Does 

that mean you have none stockpiled or that none exists because 

there is no vaccine? I don’t know. 

Mr. ACORD. Well, there is a limited availability of vaccine. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So there is a vaccine, but it is not available? 

Mr. ACORD. At Plum Island Animal Disease Center is where the 

United States maintains its bank. That is the bank for North 

America. You know, Canada, Mexico, and United States, all would 

use it. The antigen is stored there because the law prohibits live 

FMD virus on the U.S. mainland. That antigen is shipped to Europe where it is manufactured into finished vaccine and shipped 

back to the United States, but it has such few strains. The problem 

with it is that the antigen has a shelf life. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. That is what I was going to ask you. 

Does it have a shelf life? 

Mr. ACORD. After 5 years, the potency of vaccine starts to go 

down, and after 10 years it is not all that effective quite honestly, 

and the companies don’t even want to touch the manufacture at 

that point. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So one thing that I read, is that, there 

are so many entities and agencies involved in this whole discussion 

that we are having today, Madam Chairman, and I need to understand what would be the most efficient involvement of agencies and 

the most efficient collaboration that could take place that is information sharing and facilitated and not impeding and not delayed 

because there are just so many cooks in that pot. 

I guess I will have to wait until the next round to hear the answer to that, but that certainly is something that I think we need 

to be exploring. Thank you very much. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. The gentle lady yields back. The Chair 

now recognizes Mr. Walker from North Carolina. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Insider threat, 

seems to be a significant danger. If there was an attack, would it 

be able to establish a chain of command? Is there any kind of protocol? Maybe, Dr. Beckham, would you touch on that, or Dr. 

Meckes, either one—— 

Dr. BECKHAM. I am going to let Dr. Meckes because they handle 

it at the State level typically. 

Dr. MECKES. We follow the incident command structure to respond to any incident, whether it is a hurricane, a tornado. We 

have just spent the last 7 months preparing for the introduction of 
46 

High Path AI in North Carolina, which thankfully has not come to 

pass; but we developed our entire incident command structure to 

address every issue associated with an outbreak of High Path 

Avian Influenza. 

Everything from burial and disposal to the movement of samples 

to the laboratory for testing, routing of vehicles to make certain 

that we can effectively continue to move product and maintain 

some continuity of business, even in the face of a disease outbreak. 

So FEMA’s incident command structure is the hierarchy by which 

we will operate, and practically speaking, every Department of ag 

across the country is familiar at some level with this incident command structure. 

Mr. WALKER. Being a little privileged to the North Carolina situation, being your home base, North Carolina is ranked at the top, 

or at least in the top 5, really in all areas of this emergency preparedness. I commend your work on behalf of doing your part in 

the agriculture side to keep it so highly ranked. 

Dr. MECKES. Well, it hasn’t been my work. It has been my predecessors’. I thankfully walked into a well-oiled machine to respond 

to incidents. 

Mr. WALKER. Well as we have seen around here at the State 

level, you have to have good people to keep those machines going. 

Otherwise they can end abruptly. 

Getting outside of North Carolina, are you familiar—does anybody want to address that—across the country, in our Agriculture 

Emergency Operations Center, are we seeing good capability across 

the country? Are we being followed as a model—can anybody address that? 

Dr. MECKES. There is a spectrum of capability across the country, a wide spectrum. I think, again, that is where DHS has a role 

in working towards, with USDA—now when I say DHS, we always 

were diligent in making sure that we cooperated, cooperated, coordinated, and collaborated with our sister departments and agencies in addressing any of these issues. So we held a Foot-andMouth Disease outbreak with FEMA Region 7 in December 2013, 

and every player was at the table, the States, the locals, and DHS, 

and HHS for that matter. 

So it has to be an integrated effort, but DHS does have a significant role and an important role in driving preparedness and response capability. 

Mr. WALKER. I have a final question, but I am not so sure I want 

to ask it publicly. It may come back with you. Where it talks about 

America’s food, agricultural sector, where is the most vulnerable 

target that we have to agroterrorism, but that may be a question 

better not shared publicly. 

So with that I am going to I yield back the balance of my time, 

back to you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. We will, 

I think, be voting soon, but I want to give an opportunity for second round here until votes are called. I appreciate the thoughtful 

questions and discussion so far. 

One concern we have seen across many industries with the rise 

of terrorism, and ISIS, and the home-grown extremism, is the potential use of drones for some sort of attack, and it doesn’t take 
47 

much imagination to consider how, I mean, people are getting these 

for Christmas, and they are much cheaper and easier to buy now, 

how that could be used in such a way to deliver something to a 

crop or to a farm to have an agroterrorism attack. 

Is that something that is even being looked at, at all by any of 

you, and any ideas and considerations for addressing this difficult 

threat? 

Mr. ACORD. While it is an additional potential for introduction of 

disease, I don’t see it creating anything new, because agriculture 

is so open. Animal production is so open. There is access to farmland and to barns rather easily, so I don’t think that is going to 

pose anything additional in terms of worry for the agriculture industry. 

Dr. MECKES. Chairwoman, I will share with you that during the 

past virus outbreak which began in April 2013, and arrived in 

North Carolina shortly thereafter, that our colleagues in the environmental realm used drones to surveil disposal of piglets that had 

died all throughout eastern North Carolina, so that was a concern. 

We obviously did our best to make certain that we didn’t create 

an environmental problem associated with an agricultural disease 

outbreak, but who knows where this goes in the future. It may well 

be a concern. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I mean, they can be used positively as well obviously for surveillance. 

One question, Dr. Beckham. I have a lot of friends who are veterinarians, so this is more anecdotal, both small animal and large 

animal, but one thing they share is there are fewer and fewer people that are choosing that field of work. It is becoming more and 

more expensive. They are going, like a lot of higher education, but 

they are going significantly into debt, and so it is a bit of a deterrent to even choose the field. So part of making sure that we are 

ready in this area is making sure that we have the next generation 

being trained up. 

I know at the University of Arizona anyway, they are trying to 

do a bit of an innovative program to compress the number of years 

for the Bachelor’s and moving on from there, and also something 

innovative that would impact rural communities where an individual would graduate as a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine, but also 

have a Nurse Practitioner license so that the human-animal bridge 

could be addressed in some of these rural areas. I think some of 

those innovations would actually help in this area as well. 

Are there any other innovative ideas out there? I think that is 

an interesting model perhaps. Are you concerned about the pipeline 

and training of the next generation? 

Dr. BECKHAM. So I am incredibly concerned about it, which is actually why I went to Kansas State University to be the dean there. 

I think it is something as a profession we have to address. We are 

producing about 80 percent small animal veterinarians for a variety of reasons, and we are losing the expertise that is going back 

to detect the work in the livestock systems and production animal 

medicine. There is a whole host of reasons why that is happening. 

We as a profession have to come together and look at novel, innovative ways to get students in and out with less student loan debt. 

We have to give them additional skill sets, like you mentioned the 
48 

nurse practitioner. We at Kansas State University pride ourselves 

on the fact that we still have one of the locations that produce 

quite a bit of students that go out into production animal medicine. 

We have a rural veterinary loan program where we will pay tuition 

for those that agree to go back into Kansas and work in rural 

areas. We have to continue to look at novel, innovative ways to do 

that. 

So we are starting to look at that as well; how do you compress 

the time it takes a student to get in and then get out; are there 

ways that we can do it more efficiently, and those types of things. 

But we as a profession have to take a look at that across the 

United States. That is something I think we are starting to do, but 

I don’t know that we have done that aggressively enough. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I encourage you to take a look at what they are 

doing from the bottom up, you know, groundbreaking, at the University of Arizona, because it seems likes it is pretty innovative. 

Where a program doesn’t exist, it is easier to create an innovative 

one as opposed to trying to change a program, so that kind of sharing best practices I think would help. 

I know we are going to vote, so I yield back the balance of my 

time, and I will recognize Mr. Payne for another 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Williams, you mentioned biosecurity measures developed by the poultry industry following the Avian Flu outbreak and how the model developed by the 

poultry industry can be applied across various agriculture industries. Can you elaborate on the best way for the public and the private sectors to help drive participation and adopt biosecurity measures that are mutually beneficial to each other? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, just to kind of talk a little bit more about 

what I have seen in the State of Mississippi. After the Avian Influenza outbreak a year ago, producers were incredibly concerned and 

so they were very willing to come to the table and to work with 

the State veterinarian, to work with the USDA, to work with 

APHIS, in developing these plans. 

I think really what it comes down to is we need a boots-on-theground approach. These producers that we were talking to, that we 

were discussing this with over the summer, we were giving them 

signs to look for. That is something that our veterinarians can really help with, is not only with poultry, but with beef cattle, with the 

pork industry, tell them and inform them, what do we need to look 

for, for signs of a potential outbreak? Then when you see these 

signs, when you see these symptoms, report them immediately to 

your State veterinarian, to your local veterinarian, and have it investigated. 

We were even talking about backyard birds, backyard poultry 

farmers, or backyard poultry operations, if you see something, report it immediately. That is really the system that they have started to get in place to recognize things as quickly as we possibly can, 

to get on top of it, to quarantine the area, and to localize it as 

much as possible. 

Mr. PAYNE. So if you see something, say something, right? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Exactly. 

Mr. ACORD. May I comment, sir? 

Mr. PAYNE. Sure. 
49 

Mr. ACORD. The pork industry has always prided itself on having 

a very good biosecurity system. That is because of the structure of 

the industry, we know that we are more vulnerable to disease. But 

at the same time, while we thought we had the perfect system, 

when we had the PED outbreak, we discovered a lot of holes in 

that system, and we have begun working on those. 

The other point I want to make, and it hasn’t been brought up 

here, is we have a huge threat from urban animal agriculture. It 

is unbelievable how much poultry, even now into potbelly pigs, to 

sheep and goats in some places are kept in urban environments. 

They totally escape the animal health network, and are the most 

vulnerable to disease introduction, and that is an area that we 

have to start paying much more attention to than we have up to 

this point. 

We have had problems with live bird markets in New York and 

places like that, but that is nothing compared to what we saw in 

Los Angeles when we had exotic Newcastle disease in poultry 

there. So that is another vulnerability that we haven’t looked at 

hard enough. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Dr. Beckham, it is my understanding 

that Kansas State partnered with FEMA to develop an animal disease outbreak training course. Can you describe how KSU is working with FEMA to push out this training opportunity? 

Dr. BECKHAM. I think that falls under the Biosecurity Research 

Institute, where they are actually using that facility to train veterinarians on signs and clinical symptoms for foreign animal diseases, 

and so it is a novel use of that facility to be able to bring veterinarians in and provide that kind of training there in Kansas, so it is 

really unique, and it aligns closely obviously with what happens at 

the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. 

So the more we can do those kinds of things outside of containment in Plum Island and demonstrate those types of diseases and 

whether it is using plasticized material or tissues to do that, that 

is at least one component of training a cadre of veterinarians that 

can go out there and do that. There are many of those foreign animal disease diagnostic practitioner courses that happen at Colorado State as well. So they also happen other places in the United 

States, so there is the FADD course, the Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnostician course at Plum Island; and then there is other 

courses that happen around the United States, at K State, at Colorado State, that use different technologies to teach the same type 

of information. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Donovan from New York. 

Mr. DONOVAN. We are being told votes are going to be in about 

2 minutes, so let me just ask the question I wanted to ask in the 

first round. We spoke about domestic protection. Since we import 

so many products, where is our importation detection? Where are 

we making the detections internationally for products being 

brought into the country? 

Mr. ACORD. I can speak from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service standpoint that a risk assessment is done anytime 

there is a request to import or to export a commodity from another 
50 

country to the United States. They are asked to provide a lot of information about the existence of disease within their country. What 

kind of surveillance do they have, do they have competent authority, do they have enough veterinarians to deal with disease? Those 

kind of fundamental questions. Sometimes it results in a site visit, 

most often actually it is a site visit to go look at the country and 

see if what they are telling the United States is true, and then 

there is a formal risk assessment that is done. 

But there are a lot of products, that are getting into this country, 

that are not getting the kind of review in country that they need 

from the standpoint of the manufacture of those products. So we 

have a gap in that area and not enough is being done. We cannot 

rely on the port of entry as being the first line of defense. That is 

not going to work. We have proven that. 

Mr. DONOVAN. You are speaking about cooperative countries. If 

something is introduced into our imported foods purposefully, all 

the help, with the exporting country, isn’t going to help, so are we 

doing any detection methods for products coming in aside from relying on the exporting country, that you are aware of? 

Dr. MECKES. There is a group within DHS that, as Bobby mentioned, reviews product shipping invoices on a day-to-day basis and 

inspects those that have the greatest risk or the greatest perceived 

risk. But that being said, less than 2 percent of all products imported in the United States are physically inspected in any form 

or fashion. 

So Mr. Donovan, you are correct, that someone with less than 

stellar intent could intentionally bring something into this country 

that would never be physically observed. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Maybe as my colleague, Mark Walker said, maybe 

we shouldn’t have said that publicly. Madam Chair, I think that 

was the roll call. I will waive the remainder of my time. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Great, Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields 

back. 

Just in closing, in my time in the military, we always would talk 

about threat equals capability plus intent. Clearly we have heard 

today from our witnesses the capabilities are there. We do also 

know that the intent is there for potential agroterrorism attack. 

We do know, I was looking back at my notes, in 2002 we had a 

Navy SEAL team raid al-Qaeda storehouse caves in Afghanistan, 

finding documents how to carry out a terror attack on America’s 

agriculture. As you mentioned, Dr. Beckham, these types of agents 

naturally exist in places controlled by ISIS, Boko Haram, alShabab, and others. I quote former Secretary of Health and Human 

Services, Tommy Thompson, when he, in his farewell address, 

when he left in 2004, which is 12 years ago, he said: ‘‘For the life 

of me I cannot understand why the terrorists have not targeted our 

food supply, because it is so easy to do.’’ Again, we hold this hearing not to instill fear in the American public, but to raise awareness on what the threats are, what the capabilities are, and what 

the intent is, and identify what we can do as a Federal Government, but working closely with the private sector, States, local authorities, and academia in order to address these vulnerabilities 

and these threats in order to keep our country, our food supply, our 

agricultural system, safe and secure from these types of threats. 
51 

That was a great hearing, and I appreciate all the witnesses’ testimony today. 

I do want to say, closing out my final hearing here, you are all 

in good hands. I am handing over the gavel to Mr. Donovan. It has 

been a pleasure to be chairing the subcommittee. I enjoyed working 

with Ranking Member Payne. Again, I will be remaining on the 

subcommittee, but we will continue to move forward on some of 

these really pressing issues. 

I want to thank all the witness for their expertise in this area 

and your hard work and your testimony today. The Members of the 

subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses. We will ask that you respond to these in writing. Pursuant 

to Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record will be open for 10 

days. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ