Special Inspector Genera

Iraq Reconstruction

Iraq Reconstru

Lessons in Inspections of U.S

Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Decem

226-826 Report.indd 3 
226-826 Report.indd 4 
Contents

Part I: 

Background ........................................................................

Part II: 

Best Practices Developed from SIGIR’s Inspections Progra

Part III: 

Lessons Learned from Inspecting Projects

in a Contingency Environment ...........................................

Part IV: 

Effects of SIGIR Inspections ...............................................

Part V: 

Selected Project Inspections .............................................

Appendix A: 

Breakdown of Inspections by Sector, Location, Contracting 

Funding Source, and Type of Assessment ..........................

Appendix B: 

Completed SIGIR Inspections .............................................

Appendix C: 

Acronyms ...........................................................................

*Th e offi cial version of this report, including any corrections, is av

SIGIR website: www.sigir.mil.

226-826 Report.indd 5 
226-826 Report.indd 6 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RE

at : acgoud

Th e early phase of the U.S. reconstruction eff ort in Iraq emph

construction of large capital projects to help restore infrastru

return service delivery to pre-war levels. To provide independ

objective oversight of these eff orts, the U.S. Congress, in Nov

established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspec

(IG). In October 2004, the Congress redesignated the CPA-IG 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), s

giving it oversight of all reconstruction funding in Iraq. 

During his initial visits to Iraq in the early months of 200

Inspector General heard confl icting stories about U.S.-fund

tion and reconstruction projects. On the one hand, U.S. age

private construction companies reported that renovation an

tion projects were already improving the lives of millions of 

many Iraqis and some U.S. military and civilian personnel r

numerous complaints about the program. Th ey pointed to 

unwanted projects and to equipment that was either too sop

of very poor quality. 

Over the next year, SIGIR auditors uncovered many proj

inadequately designed, constructed, or sustainable. With bi

payer dollars at stake, the Inspector General took action to 

manifold defi ciencies and to inform the Congress about the 

status of the overall reconstruction program. 

In June 2005, the Inspector General created the Inspectio

ate to provide rapid reporting on reconstruction work being 

at project sites. Th e new Inspections Directorate would com

augment SIGIR’s Audits and Investigations Directorates.

Over the succeeding fi ve years, SIGIR inspection teams v

project sites throughout the country to determine the follow

• Were projects properly designed?

• Were projects built in accordance with contract specifi 

• Were adequate contractor quality control (QC) and gov

quality assurance (QA) in place?

• Was Iraqi sustainability considered and planned for?

• Were projects likely to meet their stated objectives? 

SIGIR’s inspectors focused on whether the projects they v

provide the GOI the results anticipated in the original contr

inspectors selected projects from across the various reconst

226-826 Report.indd 1 
2 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND RE

tos, oage ad sacotactos (cudg U.S., aq

country contractors), from diff erent geographic areas, from 

major U.S. agencies, and from diff erent funding sources. SIG

inspected projects at the direct request of Department of St

military commanders, and Iraqi offi cials. 

Security conditions on the ground sometimes limited SIG

to conduct on-site project assessments. For example, becau

threats, SIGIR had to cancel visits to 18 project sites betwee

and August 2008. In 2008, General David Petraeus, the Mu

Force-Iraq Commanding General, authorized SIGIR inspec

under fragmentary orders, which ensured access and transp

sites selected for inspection. 

In all, SIGIR issued 170 reports, providing detailed snaps

wide spectrum of reconstruction projects valued at $2.1 bill

projects, 116 were ongoing at the time of the site visit, while 

completed. SIGIR also issued two summary reports coverin

inspections performed for SIGIR by contractors and one su

report of SIGIR inspections issued from July 2005 through 

Th ese reports are all found at www.sigir.mil. Appendix A of 

provides details on SIGIR’s inspections by location, reconstr

tor, funding source, and type of inspection. Appendix B list

projects SIGIR inspected.

SIGIR referred design, construction, QC and QA, and su

defi ciencies identifi ed in its inspections to the appropriate r

reconstruction agencies for corrective action. Potentially fra

matters were referred to SIGIR investigators for analysis, inv

and possible action by the Department of Justice. In 2008, f

SIGIR’s inspections at the Sarwaran Primary School and the 

Middle School revealed illegal activity on the part of two Ko

offi cers who had authorized terms in a contract to require t

prohibited Iranian plumbing parts. Th e matter was referred 

Investigations, and the two offi cers were eventually prosecu

convicted in a Korean military court. 

226-826 ReportCX.indd 2 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ REC

at : est actces eveloped o

SIGIR’s Inspections Program 

Much of the reconstruction program in Iraq was carried ou

under fi re. Projects were frequently inhibited by the violent 

those who wanted the fl edgling democracy in Iraq to fail. 

Project sites and Iraqi workers throughout the country w

by Shia extremists, Saddam loyalists, terrorists, al-Qaeda, ro

and wanton criminals. Th e project site for the Basrah Child

tal became a locus for threats, intimidation, kidnapping, an

least 24 Iraqi construction workers were killed while buildin

intended to be a pediatric oncology hospital.

Like many of the war-zone reporting systems that SIGIR d

the Inspections Directorate was without precedent in the U.S

General community. Th e following are some best practices i

SIGIR for conducting inspections in a contingency environm

1. Provide reconstruction offi cials with near real-time 

Traditional audit agencies generally perform audits at the co

of a program or project. Consequently, these reports docum

problems without providing an opportunity for in-progress 

Time moves fast in war zones. Reconstruction offi cials cann

for published reports to correct defi ciencies. SIGIR sought t

need by rapidly producing a high volume of inspection repo

At the beginning of the Iraq reconstruction eff ort, the U.S

was on putting Iraqis to work and completing projects quic

reconstruction offi cials benefi ted little from being told, aft e

was completed and turned over to the GOI, that the design 

quate or that construction defi ciencies existed. With this in 

sought an approach that provided nearly real-time reportin

its inspectors to give on-the-spot guidance to management 

problems were discovered. 

SIGIR’s inspection reports identifi ed defi ciencies, but al

details of corrective actions already taken as a result of the 

between SIGIR and reconstruction managers. For exampl

of SIGIR’s fi rst site visit at the Abu Ghraib Dairy project, in

identifi ed serious design and construction defi ciencies (w

was only about 30% complete). SIGIR immediately raised 

with the offi cials overseeing construction, and they quickl

stop-work order, requiring the contractor to correct the d

226-826 Report.indd 3 
4 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND RE

SGR coducted a oowup ste vst, docuetg te c

corrective actions.

2. Team engineers with auditors. 

A comprehensive review of contingency brick-and-mortar 

tion projects requires experienced engineers and auditors. W

SIGIR’s project inspection regime, engineers were responsib

technical aspects of the project—reviewing statements of w

tractor design submittals and evaluating the adequacy of co

quality—while auditors focused on contract costs and proje

Because Iraq’s reconstruction program presented a wide 

of projects—including hospitals, police stations, schools, p

dams, and water treatment plants—SIGIR sought professi

neers with construction backgrounds who understood de

ings, construction practices, and the interdependencies of 

systems. Auditors needed expertise in contract manageme

ministration—including specifi c experience with various 

vehicles (such as fi rm-fi xed-price and cost-plus contracts)

Acquisition Regulation requirements, and contractor QC 

Th e teaming proved quite eff ective.

3. Report on complex technical topics in accessible lan

Reports must be written for readers who do not have an e

or construction background. Most people, for example, w

an explanation for construction terms such as “honeycom

refers to the formation of air pockets in concrete because 

placement technique—specifi cally, the lack of proper vibr

and immediately following the actual pour. Engineers and 

should write assessment reports in a non-technical manne

tors providing a readability check. Real-time reporting is n

use if text is inscrutable. 

4. Use graphics to explain complex engineering issues. 

Project photographs and diagrams can help document the q

construction and aid in the explanation of complex enginee

For example, SIGIR identifi ed concrete quality as a signifi ca

with several Iraqi contractors and subcontractors, especially 

fi ve Kirkuk primary healthcare centers and the Baghdad Po

lege project site. In addition to providing descriptions of co

terms, such as honeycombing, segregation, voids, and reinf

226-826 Report.indd 4 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ REC

exposure, inspection reports included photos of potentially 

structural concerns, clearly illustrating the problems being 

5. Prepare for rapid but eff ective inspections. 

Inspectors in the United States can spend weeks performing 

of construction projects, but contingency operations require 

and quicker production. In most cases, because of the secur

tion, SIGIR inspectors had between 30 minutes and 2 hours 

perform expedited inspections. Instead of searching every n

cranny, inspectors focused on ensuring that a facility was st

sound and constructed according to the established design. 

its time at the project site to speak to the contractor, tour th

ask pertinent, project-specifi c questions. Prior to visiting th

site, SIGIR engineers created detailed checklists of specifi c f

inspected (such as generators; heating, ventilating, and air-c

systems; and completed concrete pours), which increased th

of the site visit. 

6. Whenever possible, visit project sites in person. 

To report fully on the condition of a construction project, a

to the project site is essential. Physical inspection can reveal 

problems that cannot be determined simply from an exami

project fi le. For example, according to the project fi le docum

Reinforcem

Areas of honeycombing, 

voids, and segregation

Evidence of reinforcement bar rust 

and large voids at load transfer 

bearing in column

An example of SIGIR report illustrations: honeycombing, segregation, voids, and 

bar exposure within the central laundry facility at the Baghdad Police College.

226-826 Report.indd 5 
6 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND RE

ad epesetatves ote U.S. y Cops ogees (U

Region Division, the Baghdad Police College was a successf

with thousands of satisfi ed police cadets living in the barrac

site visit, however, identifi ed a very poorly constructed proj

exposed cadets to diluted urine and fecal matter fl owing fro

fl oor, presenting a serious health risk.

7. Visit as many projects as possible early in the construc

Th e Inspections Directorate focused on promoting eff ective 

at-risk, ongoing projects. Th erefore, SIGIR determined that 

vide high value by assessing projects still being constructed

the design and early construction phase (approximately 30% 

were the ideal choices because there was still time for recon

offi cials to take corrective actions to resolve critical problem

8. Develop alternative approaches to executing inspect

Some of the projects SIGIR chose to evaluate were located i

dangerous areas. Th e Inspections Directorate established a 

to assess these projects through use of aerial imagery. SIGIR 

with the National Ground Intelligence Center and National 

Intelligence Agency to obtain imagery, imagery analysis cap

and equipment, and to establish its own capabilities. SIGIR 

employed satellite imagery to document the location of a sp

in relation to a village, town, or city to visually demonstrate 

of the project to the local community. In some instances, SI

satellite imagery to show the lack of proper planning for a p

Satellite imagery can also illustrate the condition of a s

ect before, during, and aft er construction, providing:

• maximum coverage, with limited oversight resources

• ability to triage high-risk targets

• increased safety, minimizing the amount of in-country 

the risk to contractors from hostile action that could re

high-visibility site visits by inspection teams and their a

ing security details

To ensure the broadest possible coverage of all constructi

in Iraq, SIGIR also used local Iraqi engineers to visit remote 

sites. Because of their familiarity with the country, the Iraqi

project sites in an unobtrusive or clandestine manner. Th ey 

96 limited on-site inspections of remote and dangerous pro

226-826 Report.indd 6 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ REC

nationwide and identifi ed and documented plumbing, elect

ing, and other types of construction defi ciencies. Th e Iraqi 

also conducted general inspections of project construction 

ing defi ciencies, assessing progress, and taking photographs

engineer-auditor teams then reviewed this documentation 

compliance and construction quality. 

9. Support the host government’s IG system. 

From its origin, SIGIR has been a key supporter of the Iraqi 

General system. Prior to 2003, Iraq lacked an independent 

Th us, the new IGs came to their posts without any prior exp

To familiarize them with the roles and responsibilities of an 

Inspections Directorate provided mentoring and training to 

IGs from the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Oil, and Health

met with Ministry of Defense IG staff to explain its project 

methodology and, together with ministry IG offi cials, cond

inspection” of a U.S.-funded renovation of a Ministry of De

In addition, SIGIR attended and made training presentation

Iraqi IG meetings.

Aerial view of the water lines to be run from the river intake to the Missan Surgic

(National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency photo)

226-826 Report.indd 7 
8 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND RE

0. ways cosdesustaabty assessg ecost

projects. 

A host nation’s capacity to operate and sustain projects is key 

all success of a reconstruction program. In late 2006, as the I

struction program matured and thousands of projects were 

over to the GOI, SIGIR began conducting sustainment asses

of completed projects to determine whether the GOI was ad

operating and sustaining them. SIGIR inspected completed 

determine if the projects were at full capability or capacity w

from the contractor by the U.S. government, when transferr

GOI, and when observed by SIGIR inspectors during site vi

SIGIR performed 54 sustainment assessments with a tota

value of approximately $900 million. Of these 54 projects, S

fi ed 42 projects with defi ciencies, including 14 having what 

considered “major” defi ciencies that—if left unaddressed—

projects in jeopardy of failure. 

11. Engage with host-country end users and governmen

when developing the reconstruction program. 

GOI offi cials repeatedly expressed to SIGIR frustration that 

government had constructed facilities that Iraq did not wan

or that training, operation manuals, and spare parts were no

SIGIR interacted regularly with GOI offi cials to determine t

ernment’s interest and satisfaction levels with specifi c projec

learned from this exercise was the need to have GOI offi cia

in the decision-making process. Th e U.S. government need

coordinate with the GOI on the types and locations of facili

constructed and on the planning to provide training and eq

operate and sustain the projects. 

12. Establish working relationships with all parties inv

the reconstruction eff ort.

SIGIR established good working relationships with the De

of State, Department of Defense, USACE, and other Coali

Ambassadors Ryan Crocker, Christopher Hill, and James 

Commanding Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Od

various USACE commanding generals supported SIGIR b

transport to and security at construction sites. General Pe

so far as to tell SIGIR, “you pick the project and we [the U

will get you there.” 

226-826 Report.indd 8 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ REC

Over the course of visiting hundreds of project sites, SIGI

logistical support in strategic locations throughout Iraq from 

U.S. military and also from Coalition partners, such as the B

in the southern locales of Basrah and Umm Qasr. Th ese rel

fostered a sense of community and saved U.S. taxpayers a si

amount of money.

13. Become an informational resource for reconstruct

Multiple U.S. ambassadors in Iraq utilized SIGIR’s capacity to 

tion on projects. For example, in late 2008, Ambassador Croc

increasingly frustrated about the lack of progress with the Mi

Hospital. Considering the cost and signifi cance of this projec

sador Crocker was concerned about the contractor’s commit

plete the project on time and the GOI’s ability to properly equ

and maintain the facility once it was transferred to GOI contr

Th e Ambassador requested that SIGIR perform an assess

cluding visiting the project site to determine construction p

quality and meeting with U.S. and GOI offi cials to determin

of the GOI to operate and maintain the facility. SIGIR’s asse

identifi ed critical shortcomings, including lack of construct

construction defi ciencies, signifi cant design defi ciencies an

and the GOI’s inability to equip and operate the facility onc

tion was completed. SIGIR’s analysis provided reconstructio

the opportunity to take corrective actions to save this critica

from failure.

Construction offi cial briefs Inspector General Bowen on the status of construction at th

226-826 Report.indd 9 
10 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND R

14. Perform assessments in all sectors throughout the 

Th e United States spent billions of dollars attempting to reh

reconstruct Iraq’s critical infrastructure, especially the elect

health, and educational sectors. Instead of focusing attentio

specifi c sector, SIGIR diversifi ed its selection of sites for asse

deliver real-time information on all sectors to reconstructio

offi cials. Th is approach also allowed engineers to improve t

of inspection observations through greater familiarization w

Iraqi and Middle Eastern design and construction practices

15. Complement and augment existing audit and inve

functions. 

Project assessments can play a key supporting role in audit 

gative work. For example, in 2004, SIGIR initiated an audit 

if disbursing offi cers in the South Central Region of Iraq co

applicable guidance and properly accounted for reconstruct

SIGIR auditors visited two project sites in late 2004 and earl

documenting contractor performance at a library in Kerbal

police academy in Babylon. 

SIGIR auditors identifi ed indications of potential fraud an

the matter to the Investigations Directorate. One of the area

SIGIR inspection team with British escort for project inspections in Basrah and U

226-826 Report.indd 10 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

fraud included the contractor billing the U.S. government fo

performed or products not delivered. 

SIGIR Investigations requested that the Inspections Direc

perform an assessment of the contractor’s projects to determ

contractor performed to contract requirements. SIGIR insp

ducted follow-up reviews of these two project sites in Decem

and found that the contractor had not met contract require

collaborative eff orts of SIGIR’s Audits, Investigations, and In

Directorates resulted in the conviction for fraud of eight ind

sociated with the award, construction, or oversight of these 

forfeiture of approximately $14.9 million. 

Plastic chairs provided to the Kerbala Library 

in place of metal, upholstered chairs required 

by the contract. 

Empty site at the Babylon Pol

where a 1-megawatt generato

be installed by the contractor

226-826 Report.indd 11 
12 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND R

at : essos eaed ospectg o

in a Contingency Environment

During the course of its 170 project assessments, SIGIR’s In

Directorate identifi ed 13 essential lessons about project plan

tion, and oversight in a stabilization and reconstruction ope

more details on many of the specifi c projects mentioned in 

see Part V of this report. All projects are listed in Appendix 

1. Achieve a secure environment before initiating majo

reconstruction activities. 

In 2003, the United States initiated an ambitious reconstruc

program in post-war Iraq. But large-scale construction proj

gan before the country was stabilized. Th is forced the U.S. m

simultaneously confront a growing insurgency while also su

burgeoning reconstruction operation.

Iraq’s security environment posed lethal challenges for U

contractors. It sometimes was diffi cult or impossible for con

carry out projects in confl ict areas. For example, aside from 

than $165 million spent to construct and equip the Basrah 

Hospital, the human cost of the project was grievous. More 

contractors were killed during the course of the project. Th 

senior Bechtel Iraqi engineer resigned aft er his daughter wa

Numerous threats and intimidation, as well as poor security

resignation of other workers and the boycotting of the proje

subcontractor personnel. Th e working environment becam

ous that one subcontractor believed it necessary to use loca

controlled gangs to protect his travel to and from the projec

Craft ing well-defi ned statements of work oft en was stym

contracting personnel could not safely visit sites. For instan

government awarded the Falluja Waste Water Treatment Sy

in June 2004, during the middle of intense military confl ict 

alition Forces and insurgents in the city of Falluja itself. Init

attempts to control the area had failed, and the city fell into 

Th is complex project required the design and construction 

prehensive sewer network throughout the entire urban sett

contractor responsible for conducting geotechnical and sur

the initial design repeatedly confronted local resistance. Mo

volatile security situation prevented U.S. quality assurance p

from eff ectively monitoring construction progress and qual

226-826 Report.indd 12 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

from one of USACE’s Construction Quality Assurance Ope

reported the situation candidly: 

Th e diffi culty with providing QA services within a war 

recognized. Safety and security for our employees must come fi 

access to some sites is not possible. Th erefore, the extent of QA a

that can be performed at a site may be limited due to these facto

SIGIR’s 2006 inspection of fi ve primary healthcare center

revealed similar QA limitations. SIGIR found that, from De

to February 2006, the USACE QA representative made only 

to the fi ve project sites because of security problems. SIGIR

ment report of the projects identifi ed numerous constructio

shortfalls, cost overruns, and schedule delays resulting from 

on-site management and the lack of adequate government o

Th e escalation of violence in Iraq forced the U.S. governm

evidence of any project’s U.S. provenance. But this confl icte

with one of the objectives of the U.S. reconstruction progra

to win the “hearts and minds” of Iraqis by providing essenti

Th e U.S. government’s main goal for the primary healthcare 

was to increase Iraqi access to good healthcare services and 

ner the appreciation of Iraqi citizens. But in 2006, when SIG

the Kirkuk project sites, a Sadrist fl ag, associated with Shia 

ary cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, fl ew outside each facility. Accor

Condition of the city streets in Falluja in November 2004. (USACE photo)

226-826 Report.indd 13 
14 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND R

USACE Gulf Region North District personnel, “if the locals 

USG funded this project, they would blow it up. We let Sad

for these projects in order for them to be built without incid

In areas where security was not a factor, projects were gen

constructed. Specifi cally, SIGIR found some of the best-con

projects in provinces in the Kurdistan Region: Erbil, Dahuk

maniyah. Th e Erbil Orphanage and Senior Assisted Living 

without question, the best project SIGIR inspected. U.S. and 

sentatives directly credited the higher construction quality o

the Kurdistan Region to the low security threat in the area a

the Kurds’ strong work ethic. 

Th e lesson learned is that reconstruction in a stabilization 

ment cannot proceed on a large scale without the requisite 

needed to protect those carrying out the projects. If that sec

ther unavailable or too expensive, then large-scale reconstru

not to occur until the setting is stabilized. 

2. Enforce contracts to reward good performance and 

performers accountable.

SIGIR found many instances in which contractors were rew

instead of penalized—for poor performance. For example, 

assessments of the Baghdad Police College project identifi e

construction defi ciencies by the contractor, Parsons Delawa

whose construction practices were so poor that water and o

materials continually drained through the top fl oor down in

fl oor and ground-fl oor rooms.

Parsons performed this construction under a cost-plus-a

contract and thus was eligible to receive a base fee and an aw

the project. Under cost-plus contracts, the base fee is always 

while the merit-based award fees are granted for performan

ceeds contract expectations. For the police college project, t

established a base fee of 3% and a merit award fee pool of 1

Award fees are determined based on an Award Fee Deter

fi cial’s evaluation of the contractor’s performance at regular

intervals. For the period October–December 2004, the U.S. 

oversight offi cial noted that:

Schedule was not adhered to as well as it should be. Th e mil

slipped on the major structure schedule... Parsons’ critical ac

have not met established milestones deadlines. Parsons ha

226-826 Report.indd 14 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

slow in mobilizing utilities... Th e DFAC [dining facility] wa

to be delivered as a warm lit shell and not a usable facility...

Drawings submitted generated major comments fro

technical staff . For example, Parsons was to design a DFAC t

service hundreds of soldiers. Yet, the layout seemed to hav

designed without much thought or consideration for fl ow or 

Essentially, they designed to sub-par standards.

Daily reports met minimal expectations.

Even though the written justifi cation documented many d

the U.S. government awarded Parsons 85% of the available 

award fee (approximately $1.3 million), which equated to 

rating of “Above Average.” 

At the time of SIGIR’s assessment of the Baghdad Police C

U.S. government had already awarded Parsons more than $

in fees for this severely defi cient project—a base fee of $1,77

an award fee of $3,568,303.

3. Design projects in accord with the host nation’s capa

maintain and sustain them.

During the early stages of the Iraq reconstruction program, 

tion Provisional Authority—the post-war governing author

lished under the United Nations’ mandate—adopted a strat

Urine-fi lled light fi xture in cadet barracks bathroom at the Baghdad Police Colleg

226-826 Report.indd 15 
16 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND R

evsoed budg stateoteat, agescae captapoj

these projects oft en turned out to be too sophisticated for th

Iraqi capacity. 

For example, one of the largest U.S.-funded projects in Ir

$277 million Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant, which was d

to produce 10,000 cubic meters of potable water each hour. 

the project was well constructed by FluorAMEC, the Iraqis 

suffi ciently sustain its operation. In December 2007, SIGIR 

Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant and found it operating at j

capacity. In addition, the plant staff had removed the fl ow m

cal equipment for measuring actual total water output—bec

did not know how to operate them. During a 2010 follow-u

the plant, SIGIR determined that Iraqi personnel had disco

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System because 

know how to operate or maintain it. 

4. If a project requires sophisticated equipment, encou

host nation to contract for operations and maintenanc

qualifi ed contractor until organic capacity is establish

Th e United States planned the Basrah Children’s Hospital as a 

art pediatric oncology hospital. Th is required the procureme

and installation of 8,000 pieces of equipment, including six p

sophisticated medical equipment. Before delivery and installa

advanced and very expensive equipment, the U.S. governmen

HOPE (Health Opportunities for People Everywhere)—the c

ing the equipment—required the Iraqi Ministry of Health to 

conditions, including establishing service and maintenance c

ensuring a dedicated power supply, a wastewater treatment p

suitable training for all staff . Th e absence of any of these cond

result in signifi cant damage to technical equipment, valued in 

of dollars. At the time of SIGIR’s inspection, the U.S. governm

Project HOPE refused to provide the equipment until the Ira

of Health met the pre-established conditions. Although the m

to meet this requirement, the equipment was eventually deliv

5. Base project reporting on actual construction progr

on the amount that the contractor has been paid to da

Th e U.S. and Iraqi governments identifi ed the 50-kilometer 

product pipeline from Kirkuk to Baiji as a critical project. Th 

objective was to replace the existing (and leaking) 40-inch-d

226-826 ReportCX.indd 16 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

ppee. s poject voved tee caacossgs (kuk 

Canal, Zegeton, and Riyadh). Th e U.S. government awarde

tract to Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. (KBR), but ter

before project completion. Subsequently, the U.S. governme

another contract to Parsons Iraq Joint Venture to complete 

tal-directional drilling for the pipe under the Tigris River at 

and the three canal crossings. 

During SIGIR’s assessment, U.S. representatives stated th

Irrigation Canal was almost complete and that the Riyadh a

Canal Crossings were both 80% complete. However, accord

USACE’s Resident Management System, the Riyadh and Ze

Crossings were only 40% and 38% complete, respectively. A

personnel at USACE’s Kirkuk Area Offi ce who had recently 

Zegeton Canal Crossing, that project was only 10% comple

Th e USACE representative stated that the report of 80% c

was based on the amount of money expended, not the amo

completed. Reporting of actual construction progress is crit

construction offi cials to make informed decisions about the 

of limited fi nancial resources.

6. Ensure that contractor invoices are reviewed by U.S

tion management before payment is made.

SIGIR inspectors visited projects where contractor invoices 

submitted for payment without being reviewed by the cons

Example of poor block laying at primary healthcare center in Kirkuk. (USACE pho

226-826 Report.indd 17 
18 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND R

aage. USCepesetatves tod SGR tat te cota

cost-plus-award-fee contract is “entitled to reimbursement 

plus their base and award fee. Payment is not dependent on 

complete, but cost incurred,” and “all invoices are reviewed 

Project Manager, who compares the invoices to the submitt

documentation, prior to payment.” But SIGIR found that th

invoice review was commonly not done.

SIGIR inspection reports noted many instances in which 

were paid for work that did not meet contract standards. Fo

the contractor for the Baghdad Police College was paid for 

that was so poorly constructed that sewage drained through 

while the contractor for the Kirkuk primary healthcare cent

for work that had to be redone. In addition, in both cases, U

resentatives responsible for the projects stated that they nev

any invoices prior to payment.

7. Do not allow construction activities to begin before 

drawings have been prepared and approved.

According to U.S. government documents, the Missan Surg

tal project was 26% complete at the time of SIGIR’s site visit 

ary 2009. However, SIGIR found the project lacking comple

drawings showing how water would be provided to the hos

how wastewater generated by the hospital would be dischar

the water supply and wastewater system designs lacked imp

tails. At best, they were conceptual designs, without detail o

USACE responded to SIGIR’s concerns, saying that the co

coordinating with the local municipality for water and elect

ever, the fact remains that the U.S. government allowed the 

begin construction on a major hospital project without fi rst 

a water source for it. Axiomatically, planning for a water sou

the river intake, and routing the water pipelines must be do

outset of a project like this—not 20 months into it. 

8. Design projects that anticipate potential limitations 

electrical power and potable water sources.

In countries that do not have access to reliable power or pot

design considerations must address alternative sources for t

Water supplies can come from raw water, municipal water l

site water tanks. In the case of power, projects should be des

backup generator capacity to operate the entire facility cont

226-826 Report.indd 18 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

s eques pag oaadequate suppy oueecess

ate those generators.

From the early days of the reconstruction program, the U

Iraq possessed a reliable power supply system for all newly 

projects. For example, in 2004, the CPA awarded the contra

Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant believing that it could be a

supported by the national grid. Th e CPA thus approved a d

required only limited backup power. During SIGIR’s 2007, 2

2010 site visits to the plant, reliable power was still not avail

national grid, causing the plant to operate at levels well belo

pacity. In addition, electrical surges from the national grid h

the electrical induction motors of the expensive operationa

SIGIR similarly found that the U.S. government awarded 

for construction of the Basrah Modern Slaughterhouse, ass

permanent, reliable power and access to water supply would 

able. Th is facility required a signifi cant amount of electricity 

ate the new equipment and a consistent supply of potable w

cleaning. Th e lack of either service would render the slaugh

inoperable. As of April 2010, more than 19 months aft er the 

the contract, neither USACE nor the contractor had found 

source of permanent power or potable water for the slaught

9. Require oversight managers to regularly visit sites a

project’s quality assurance program.

SIGIR’s inspection work revealed a simple axiom: eff ective Q

carried out by the U.S. government, complemented by eff ec

grams performed by contractors, usually yield successful pr

For example, USACE’s vigorous QA program at the Anb

Law Complex produced an excellent result. Th e single mo

aspect of a good QA program is the simple assurance that 

ect engineer visits the work site regularly. For the Anbar R

Complex, the project engineer visited the site three or fou

week for approximately six hours per visit. Th e routine vis

project site allowed the project engineer to interact with th

tor and mentor the local national QA representatives. In o

the contractor submitted incomplete design drawings. Th 

engineer visited the project site to discuss the designs dire

the contractor. Th ese visits corrected the incomplete desig

ultimately led to resolution of the issue and the successful 

of the project.

226-826 Report.indd 19 
20 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

WeSGR oud sevee dececes at poject stes, a w

program was usually the culprit. For example, the U.S. gove

no eff ective QA program for the Baghdad Police College. U

assigned two QA representatives to perform construction o

of the $73 million project, but they were assigned simply to 

progress of a project rather than to identify quality issues. Th 

sentatives failed to identify any construction defi ciencies in 

QA reports, though such problems manifestly were there. A

USACE personnel, the daily QA reports given to the QA re

did not even contain a block for reporting quality issues. Co

USACE was left unaware of signifi cant construction defi cie

10. When designing projects, work with host-nation u

create eff ective, usable, and culturally sensitive faciliti

SIGIR inspected various reconstruction projects in which th

government and contractor failed to interact with the event

during the planning and design phase, which inadvertently 

the construction of culturally insensitive facilities. For exam

Parsons nor the U.S. government requested input from Iraq

of Interior when designing the Baghdad Police College. As 

urinals were installed in the bathrooms of every cadet barra

semi-enclosed area just outside the toilet and shower area. H

GOI offi cials told SIGIR that Iraqis do not use urinals. Whi

ing the bathrooms, SIGIR observed urinals used as ashtrays 

dumps instead of their intended purpose. In one particular 

the entire urinal area was full of discarded water bottles.

11. Enhance coordination and decision making by con

all project data in a unifi ed information management 

In the early stages of the reconstruction program, at least 62 

agencies played some role in planning and managing projec

no interagency project management and information system 

integrate the activities of the hundreds of fi rms operating at 

of sites across Iraq. Contracting entities in Iraq thus develop

operating systems and procedures, limiting effi ciency and l

inconsistent contracting documentation. Integrated system

helped to ensure that programs and projects were planned a

pleted with eff ective communication, control, and cooperat

In late 2004, the USACE Gulf Region Division and the Pr

Contracting Offi ce developed the Iraq Reconstruction Man

226-826 Report.indd 20 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

Syste(RS) to povde a ued oatotecoogy 

all U.S. agencies could use to track and manage U.S.-sponso

struction projects. Th e shared information within the IRMS 

to provide a common operating picture of the reconstructio

to avoid duplication of eff ort, to assist decision making, and 

Embassy and congressional reporting requirements. Howev

struction program offi cials did not adopt a proactive role in 

that all government implementing agencies input project an

information into the IRMS. As a result, the IRMS was incom

thus inaccurate), took longer than necessary to develop, and 

meet its full potential.

When SIGIR used the IRMS database to select projects for 

assessments, it oft en found information, such as the grid coo

identifying the location of the project and project completion 

was inaccurate. For example, SIGIR selected several projects 

that IRMS identifi ed as 100% complete. However, aft er anno

project, USACE informed SIGIR that the projects had been t

before completion. When SIGIR inquired why the projects w

IRMS as 100% complete, U.S. reconstruction offi cials stated t

ernment paid 100% of the terminated contract cost; therefore

was “technically” 100% complete. SIGIR believed this reporti

sented the actual number of projects completed by the U.S. g

12. Do not underestimate the importance of relatively s

mile” projects to the success of large-scale reconstructio

Th e results of large reconstruction projects oft en depend on 

smaller “last-mile” projects to provide services to the people

generation plants and water treatment plants are only as go

distribution network that carries the electricity and water to 

businesses where they are used. Without the “last-mile” com

larger capital projects will not be able to benefi t the end use

will not provide a positive and measurable impact on their 

Th e Falluja Waste Water Treatment System project comp

components, such as the treatment facility, pump stations, t

and collection areas. Wastewater travels from individual ho

the neighborhood collection areas, pump stations, and trun

reach the treatment facility for proper treatment and dispos

connection pipes were placed within one meter of the prop

Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works responsible fo

connections from each house to the collection system. How

226-826 Report.indd 21 
22 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

SGRs 008 specto, te sty dd ot ave avaabe 

perform the work. Without house connections to the collec

there was no method of transferring wastewater from indiv

to the treatment facility. Until house connections were mad

investment of $98 million to design and construct the rema

system provided no benefi t to Falluja residents.

13. Minimize use of “nested tiers” of subcontractors in 

stabilization and reconstruction operations.

SIGIR oft en inspected work on reconstruction sites that wa

by subcontractors to the prime contractors or to other subc

From a construction management perspective, the system o

tiers” of subcontractors proved to be problematic for both the 

tor and the U.S. government. For example, SIGIR’s assessmen

Kirkuk primary healthcare centers determined that Parsons (

contractor) subcontracted the work to an Iraqi fi rm that subs

subcontracted the work to other local Iraqi companies. Argu

resulted between the subcontractor and the local Iraqi compa

ing payment for work performed. Th e local Iraqi companies 

subcontractor of not paying for materials and work performe

refused to continue working. Neither Parsons, the subcontra

local Iraqi companies, nor the U.S. government moved expe

to resolve this issue, resulting in numerous delays. For these 

facilities, SIGIR determined that the multiple tiers of contra

the principal reason for construction falling behind schedu

nifi cantly exceeding projected costs. 

Quality control in these cases becomes more challenging 

countability is more diffi cult to achieve because the layering 

contractors makes it diffi cult for oversight agencies to deter

assurance which tasks are the responsibility of which contra

226-826 Report.indd 22 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

at V: ects oSGspectos

Identifying Defi ciencies and Fostering Improvements

SIGIR’s Inspections Directorate identifi ed 94 projects (cum

valued at $1.27 billion) that had either signifi cant or minor 

and 76 projects (cumulatively valued at $0.82 billion) that m

specifi cations and project objectives. 

Of the 116 in-progress projects that SIGIR inspected, 52 

not meet the contract specifi cations and had major defi cien

the 54 completed projects assessed, 42 (78%) had defi cienci

14 having major defi ciencies that, if left unaddressed, would 

those projects in jeopardy. Figure 1 displays the number of 

(construction) projects with defi ciencies and the number o

(sustainment) projects with defi ciencies. Figure 2 summari

cies identifi ed by reconstruction sector.

A common theme among projects with defi ciencies was 

contractors to meet contract specifi cations. Inadequately tra

qualifi ed contractor personnel, inferior materials, and the la

sight on the part of the contractor and government led to su

project results. In some instances, SIGIR’s inspectors found 

of potential fraud, and those matters were then turned over 

Investigations Directorate for further action. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Construction Sustainment

Major Minor 

Figure 1

Breakdown of Construction and Sustainment Project 

Assessments, by Severity of Deficiencies 

Number of Projects

52

14

31

28

33

226-826 Report.indd 23 
24 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

SIGIR’s early identifi cation of defi ciencies during the cou

inspections frequently enabled reconstruction offi cials to im

corrective actions prior to completing these projects. SIGIR 

vided reconstruction offi cials information that was used to 

design, construction, quality assurance, sustainability, and a

of project objectives for other Iraq relief and reconstruction 

highlighting defi ciencies and recommending corrective act

helped improve performance in each of the objectives inclu

assessments.

Ensuring Design Adequacy

Design defi ciencies identifi ed in various SIGIR inspection r

included the lack of: 

• required design drawings

• electrical plans and diagrams 

• schematic diagrams identifying the electricity, water, and s

• diagrams providing clarity on the location and function 

pieces of equipment

In the U.S.-funded Basrah Courthouse project, the contra

provided with a preliminary design in the form of governm

nished drawings. Th e U.S. government wanted the contract

the drawings to create a model courthouse that could be du

0

3

6

9

12

15

Energy Health Military Security &

Justice

Transportation & 

Communications

Water

Deficiencies for Projects SIGIR Assessed, 

by Reconstruction Sector 

Major Deficiencies Minor Deficiencies No Deficiencies

15 15

14

12 12

8 8

6

5 5

6

5

2

10 10 10 10

226-826 ReportCX.indd 24 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

povces tougout aq. SGR deted a desgeo

government-furnished drawings with regard to the spiral st

overhead clearance between the steps and the ceiling was n

and resulted in a potential hazard to people using the stairs

cluded this occurred because the drawings did not take into 

loss in headroom due to the false-ceiling installation. Before 

draft report, SIGIR brought this design error to the attentio

struction offi cials, resulting in the correction of the design.

Ensuring Construction Quality and Contract Complia

Construction-quality and contract-compliance problems id

SIGIR included:

• contractor substitution of roof braces with substandard 

• poor quality concrete work, such as honeycombing, seg

voids, and reinforcement bar exposure

• concrete anchorages for fence posts not dug to the dep

by contract specifi cations

• foundation bolts not properly secured

• beams not constructed in accordance with approved d

ings and not suffi cient to brace the associated columns

In October 2005, SIGIR performed assessments of four b

posts (border forts), located in Sulaymaniyah province. Th e 

the border forts required specifi c security measures be put i

New perimeter security structures shall be built to a height of 2 

Installation of barbed wire or concertina wire in one to three row

toward the exterior shall be standard. Perimeter wall should be 

the property line, or as reasonably far away from the central b

as practical. Th e goal of the perimeter wall is to provide a spac

between the high value target and an intruder or threat at the wall

In addition, the contract required a four-meter-wide solid (

locking vehicle gate and guard towers placed on the corners 

perimeter wall.

During the site visit, SIGIR found that the contractor had f

struct the contract-required perimeter security walls, berms, 

wire, and entrance gates at the four border forts. Th e Iraqi Bo

Director General listed perimeter security as a mandatory re

for force protection. Reconstruction offi cials told SIGIR that 

tor did not plan on installing perimeter security at these bord

226-826 Report.indd 25 
26 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

addto, te cotactos desgs equed te staatoo

entrance doors with dimensions of 78.7 inches by 108.2 inch

ing the site visit, SIGIR measured the entrance doors at the fo

forts and found them to be 59 inches wide by 108 inches tall. 

installed were 20 inches narrower than the design required. S

mended changes to the reconstruction offi cials responsible fo

forts, and those changes were implemented. 

Promoting Contractor Quality Control 

and Government Quality Assurance

SIGIR reports identifi ed contractor QC and government Q

including:

• Th e contractor failed to identify safety issues at a projec

• Th e contractor’s weekly progress reports and constru

inspection reports provided did not document signi

struction activity.

• Th e contractor’s QC reports did not identify inferior w

at a project site.

• QA reports did not document dangerous electrical installat

• Th e QA representative was unaware that contractor pe

had been overstated by as much as 80%.

• Th e QA representative did not enforce contractor QC r

requirements.

SIGIR’s assessment reports included recommendations m

improve oversight, such as the need for increasing staff lev

project sites, annotating defi ciency logs, and documenting 

actions taken. By 2010, several U.S. government QA progr

implemented many of SIGIR’s recommendations, which r

improved QA and better constructed projects. 

Improving Project Sustainability and Operational Eff e

SIGIR reports identifi ed project sustainability and operation

ness issues, including: 

• not obtaining advance assurance of GOI funding to main

• not providing Iraqi personnel with training in operatin

taining equipment

• using fi xtures more appropriate for limited-use environ

heavily used projects 

• installing Western-style toilets initially that were dama

used by individuals accustomed to Eastern-style toilets 

226-826 Report.indd 26 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

ot pag oa pojects poweeeds

For example, each primary healthcare center was to includ

and dental equipment, such as x-ray machines. At four cente

in 2008, SIGIR observed that the x-ray equipment had been 

However, because the contractor did not provide training an

ity’s staff did not have the capability to operate the x-ray equ

of these facilities off ered x-ray services to its patients. Th e US

atlantic Programs Center responded by initiating a $16.5 mi

for the sustainment of healthcare projects funded by the U.S

that included training on equipment such as x-ray machines

Achieving Project Objectives

SIGIR reports identifi ed instances in which achievement of 

jectives was not assured at the time of the site visit because o

cies identifi ed in project design, construction quality, and p

sustainability. SIGIR notifi ed reconstruction offi cials of thes

both verbally during the course of its inspections and in its 

fi nal reports, oft en enabling corrective actions to be taken b

fi nal reports were issued. For example, aft er twice visiting th

Water Treatment Plant, SIGIR determined that the plant wa

at approximately 20% of its design capacity. SIGIR brought 

tention of reconstruction offi cials and recommended corre

to increase fi nished water production. Within four weeks o

second site visit, the Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant had tr

ished water production (Figure 3). By implementing correc

the U.S. government protected its $277 million investment. 

Highlighting Best Practices

During the course of SIGIR inspections, several projects sta

successful examples of well-designed and well-planned proj

good quality construction, eff ective quality oversight by the 

and the U.S. government, proper sustainment planning, and 

cooperation between the United States and GOI:

• Th e Ministry of Defense Building project was success

the design was adequate prior to construction, quality 

workmanship was accomplished, and adequate quality 

ment oversight was performed. In addition, post-turno

tions and maintenance management and building-mai

practices were eff ective. 

226-826 Report.indd 27 
28 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

• Th e Kirkuk-to-Baiji Pipeline Exclusion Zone project 

signed and constructed in accordance with contract re

and verifi ed that the Infrastructure Security Program—

tive eff ort between the Iraq Transition Assistance Offi c

Gulf Region Division, and the Energy Fusion Cell—pr

protection and security to critical oil pipeline corridors

• Th e Kurdistan Ministry of Interior Complex exhibite

ect planning, design, and construction. Th e partnershi

the U.S. government, the Kurdistan Regional Governm

contractor provided an eff ective management team tha

quality contract execution. 

• Th e Th i-Qar Bee Farm project demonstrated good con

that was in compliance with the design. Success of the pr

driven by the GOI’s active participation—providing loca

with beehive management training, supplying training m

distributing beehives to the fi ve districts within Th i-Qar 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

3

Finished Water Produced at the Nassiriya Water Treatm

2/7/2008–3/19/2008

Cubic Meters per Hour

Note: The chart shows the average of the daily finished water output claimed on the daily 

acceptance reports. For most days, output was measured at two-hour intervals, four times 

assumed output was constant during each two-hour interval throughout the day.

Source: USACE data.

Design capacity – 10,000 m3/hour

2/7 2/21 

Date of site visit – 

2,300 m3

/hour

226-826 Report.indd 28 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

at V: Selected oject spectos 

At the inception of the Inspections Directorate in 2005, hund

individual projects had been completed and turned over to th

thousands more were completed over the fi ve-year life of the 

Th e following are summaries of SIGIR’s most signifi cant 

project assessments. For a listing of all SIGIR project assessm

Appendix B.

Al Fatah River Crossing

Pipeline River Crossing, Al Fatah, Iraq (SA-05-001), 1/27/2006 

Th e purpose of the Tigris River crossing project, located ne

of al-Fatah, was to replace 15 oil and gas product pipelines t

contained in a bridge over the Tigris River. Coalition bomb

on the bridge during the war severed the lines. Th e CPA ide

repair of the severed pipelines as critical to Iraq’s oil produc

they provide crude oil and gas products to the Baiji refi nery 

Iraq-Turkey pipeline.

Based on their June 8, 2003, site visit to the bridge, USAC

in coordination with KBR, the U.S. Agency for Internationa

ment (USAID), and Bechtel, Inc., recommended repair of t

and re-routing of the pipelines across it. Engineers from all 

ties agreed that USAID would contract with Bechtel to repa

and KBR would accomplish the pipe repairs. Completion o

and routing of the pipes was expected to take two months.

Th e Iraqi Ministry of Oil and CPA representatives believe

ing the pipes across the bridge created an unacceptable secu

Th e CPA’s subject matter expert for oil transportation sugge

temporary repair of critical lines over the damaged bridge a

of horizontal directional drilling (HDD) as a permanent so

CPA believed that HDD was the best permanent solution b

pipelines would be routed safely under the river, would requ

long-term maintenance, and could be installed quickly. At t

HDD concept was being considered, the CPA had no availa

tion indicating issues with soil or geology.

SIGIR responded to a Hotline referral that questioned USA

sion to use HDD for routing the pipelines under the Tigris R

predictions from a geologist that soil conditions underneath 

River might not be conducive to drilling. SIGIR performed th

assessment to determine why the HDD project achieved only 

226-826 Report.indd 29 
30 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

planned pipeline throughput. SIGIR focused on the processe

CPA and USACE to arrive at the HDD decision, award the su

develop the construction design, and manage project perform

SIGIR determined that this project failed because subsur

conditions—such as loose, unconsolidated gravels and cobb

impossible to retain open boreholes for large-diameter pipe

soils—such as sand, gravel, and cobble—pose structural pro

which become more signifi cant as the granularity of the soi

coarser and the size of the hole becomes larger. In addition, 

highly unstable and diffi cult to maintain while it was being 

SIGIR believed the geological complexities that caused th

to fail were foreseeable. Important engineering studies and 

recommended by a geological consultant hired by KBR, we

performed. KBR and USACE ignored recommendations m

Cross section of al-Fatah bridge showing melted oil pipes. (USAID photo)

226-826 Report.indd 30 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

the consultant in order to meet unrealistic completion goal

USACE nor the contractor acted on the consultant’s recomm

perform additional research, which would have prevented f

SIGIR also identifi ed other contributing factors to the pro

• fl awed construction design

• a subcontract that had no performance requirements

• a compartmentalized project management structure th

communication

• inadequate oversight by USACE and KBR 

As a result of the government and contractor’s failure to a

research, plan, design, and manage the project, $75 million 

the project was exhausted aft er only 28% of the drilling scop

pleted. Th e U.S. government discontinued the HDD projec

2004 and subsequently replaced it with a task order to Parso

Venture at a cost of $29.7 million.

Primary Healthcare Centers

Primary Health Care Centers Numbered KE-01, KE-02, KE-03, K

KE-05, Kirkuk, Iraq (PA-06-042, PA-06-043, PA-06-044, PA-06-

PA-06-046), 4/25/2006 

On March 25, 2004, the CPA awarded Parsons Delaware, Inc

award-fee contract to construct 150 primary healthcare cente

Iraq for approximately $243 million. Th e original objective w

HDD rig with backreamer.

226-826 Report.indd 31 
32 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

public health facilities and employment to the Iraqi people an

specifi cally, to increase health care to the Iraqi population. 

In February 2006, SIGIR assessed fi ve partially completed 

healthcare centers in Kirkuk. Although the contract require

complete these fi ve centers by January 2006, the centers wer

38% and 58% complete at the time of SIGIR’s site visit. Dur

course of the inspection, the U.S. government decided to te

primary healthcare center contract with Parsons, with only 

centers to be completed under the original contract. 

SIGIR’s inspection determined that the fi ve facilities we

constructed and raised questions about the safety of occup

the structures. For example, reinforced concrete did not ap

be constructed according to contract specifi cations and ne

evaluated to determine if corrective actions were required

SIGIR documented several indicators of poor constructio

ing concrete segregation and voids; rebar exposure on the 

load-bearing, reinforced concrete ceiling beams; and colu

chipped concrete. Inadequate QC on the part of the contr

inadequate QA on the part of the U.S. government preven

tifi cation and correction of such construction defi ciencies

SIGIR found that the completion percentages entered into 

database for each of the fi ve inspected centers were grossly ov

Because only a fraction of the original number of primary he

ters were to be completed, accurate completion percentages w

been essential to choosing the best candidates for completion

Improper support for a load-bearing lintel at a primary healthcare center during 

(USACE photo)

226-826 Report.indd 32 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

e USCed oce dd ot evew te cotactos 

payment. USACE Kirkuk Area Offi ce personnel responsibl

construction management of the primary healthcare center

requested to review or approve the invoices to validate work 

the contractor. As a result, the potential existed for paymen

contractor for work that was not performed, or as in the cas

fi ve primary healthcare centers, payment for work that did 

contract specifi cations.

Baghdad Police College

Quick Reaction Report on the Baghdad Police College, Baghda

(PA-06-078.1 and 079.1), 9/27/2006; Baghdad Police College, 

Iraq (PA-06-078.2 and 079.2), 1/29/2007

In 2004, the CPA wanted to usher in a new era for the Iraqi 

and determined that 135,000 “trained and equipped” police

required to restore law and order. However, Iraq’s only exist

facility, a three-year college in downtown Baghdad, was dee

fi cient to meet the CPA’s offi cer-training goal. Constructed 

50 years earlier, the old Baghdad Police College was in deca

capacity to house and train only about 1,200 to 1,500 cadets

On March 26, 2004, the CPA awarded a cost-plus-award

tract to Parsons Delaware, Inc., to renovate the existing fa

also to design and construct new facilities for the Baghdad 

lege on the grounds of the old academy. Th e goal of the pr

provide housing and training facilities—including classro

tories, dining facilities, administrative offi ces, and fi ring ra

approximately 4,000 cadets and 500 instructors. Parsons c

construction of the new college in June 2006 at a total cost 

mately $73 million: $29 million in Iraqi funds from the D

Fund for Iraq and $44 million in U.S. funding from the Ira

Reconstruction Fund. U.S. military leaders declared 2006 

the police” and called the Baghdad Police College the “mo

security project” in Iraq. 

Aft er receiving a Hotline complaint alleging poor constru

performed a site inspection of the college on August 22, 200

immediately observed that diluted feces and urine drained 

ceilings in the cadet barracks, light fi xtures were fi lled with 

fl oors bowed inches off the ground, cracking apart. 

Th e seriousness of the plumbing problems identifi ed durin

visit prompted SIGIR to issue a Quick Reaction Report in Sep

226-826 Report.indd 33 
34 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

ber 2006. In that report, SIGIR recommended that an indepe

ment of all wastewater plumbing installations in the newly co

buildings be performed and that critical studies of the concre

of the cadet buildings be carried out to determine their struct

rity, load-carrying capacity, and the potential environmental 

hazards posed by rust, mold, and the presence of urine and fe

USACE’s Gulf Region Division, the construction manage

Baghdad Police College project, tasked Stanley Baker Hill, L

conduct a comprehensive assessment of Parsons’s construct

tices. Stanley Baker Hill’s October 2006 assessment describe

method of joining pipes—“abnormal fi ttings connected by 

in polyvinyl chloride pipes and connecting them with anoth

“not an acceptable method of construction.” In addition, th

concluded that the “concrete slabs under the bathrooms are 

sound,” but recommended the repair of any sewer leakage t

modate the structure’s intended use and to maintain the ove

tural stability with time.” Th e U.S. government terminated P

“convenience” in May 2006; Parsons promised to repair the 

issues at no additional cost to the government. 

SIGIR subsequently re-inspected the Baghdad Police Col

times between September and December 2006, identifying 

remaining construction issues throughout the entire campu

issued a fi nal, comprehensive report on the entire project, w

cluded that the “construction and renovation results were n

with the original contract objectives and task order objectiv

Effl uent leaking from pipes at the newly constructed Baghdad Police College.

226-826 Report.indd 34 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

te poject was pooy desged ad costucted, ad te c

and USACE Gulf Region Central Project Engineer and QA 

tives did not eff ectively manage the project.” Specifi cally:

• Not all project components were adequately designed p

construction. Th e contractor did not provide and the g

did not review the required number of design drawing

design drawings that were reviewed, the government d

the submittals were generally incomplete and inadequa

• Th e construction and equipment installation was of low 

did not comply with the international standards requir

contract. Signifi cant construction defi ciencies were ide

as poor plumbing installation, expansion cracks, concr

tion and honeycombing, reinforcement bar exposure, a

brickwork. Th e improperly fabricated wastewater plum

the student barracks could potentially result in a reduc

structural slabs’ load-carrying capacity as well as presen

mental and health hazards to the students, instructors, 

at the college. 

• Th e contractor’s QC program implementation failed to 

signifi cant construction defi ciencies, such as poor plum

lation practices and substandard expansion joints. Th e 

ment’s QA program was essentially nonexistent in mon

contractor’s QC program. Neither the project engineer 

representative reviewed the contractor’s daily reports. 

• Sustainability was addressed in the contract requireme

adequately administered by the U.S. government. Most 

were transferred to the GOI without being tested for ad

functionality of the basic utilities installed. At the time 

fer, the electrical, fi re alarm, and communication system

the plumbing for the potable and the wastewater system

tested in several of the buildings.

SIGIR inspectors found the construction of the Baghdad Po

so egregiously poor that they referred the matter to SIGIR’s 

tions Directorate. 

Qudas Power Plant

Qudas Power Plant Turbine Restoration Project and Qudas Pow

Expansion Project, Baghdad, Iraq (PA-07-101 and PA-07-104), 1

Iraq’s government invested heavily in electric power generati

1980s. By 1990, the total installed generating capacity in Iraq 

226-826 Report.indd 35 
36 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

9,295 megawatts (MW), with a peak demand of approximate

Approximately 87% of the population had access to electricit

During the 1991 Gulf War, the generation stations were s

aged, and generation capacity was reduced to 2,325 MW. Su

repairs to the system raised the capacity to 4,500 MW just b

Coalition invasion in 2003. 

In 2006, the U.S. government awarded two contracts—th

Power Plant Turbine Restoration and the Qudas Power Plan

sion, worth a combined $238 million—to restore and start u

General Electric (GE) combustion-turbine units and to ma

deliver, and turn over two new GE turbine units. Th e object

Frame 9E and LM-600 generator units at the Qudas Power Plant.

226-826 Report.indd 36 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

ot oy to stegtete agdad Rgby ceasg t

available electricity by as much as 584 MW, but also to ensu

to sustain operations and maintenance of the restored turbi

expanded capacity of the Qudas Power Plant. 

SIGIR visited the plant in May 2007. Prior to the site visit

reviewed the contractor’s design package for the turbine res

tion, which was suffi ciently detailed for the contractor to pe

required work. In addition, the contract requirement to exp

capacity by more than 200 MW (by installing two new GE 

consistent with the objectives. As a result, approximately 58

additional electricity would be available to the power grid.

SIGIR’s review determined that sustainability for the appl

contracts was adequately planned. Th e U.S. government dem

a strong commitment to programs designed to mentor GO

of Electricity personnel and to sustain operations in the sho

However, SIGIR noted that the long-term sustainability of p

generating assets would depend primarily on whether the G

implement and fund an eff ective operations and maintenan

at the Qudas Power Plant. Otherwise, the U.S. government’

investment could be wasted.

Mosul Dam

Relief and Reconstruction Funded Work at the Mosul Dam, Mos

(PA-07-105), 10/29/2007

Mosul Dam, located on the Tigris River in northern Iraq, wa

in June 1984. It is the largest dam in Iraq and the fourth larg

Middle East. Th e dam provides fl ood control and serves the 

and power-generation needs of approximately 9.3 million p

along the Tigris River valley from Mosul to Baghdad. Th e m

is a 113-meter-high, 3.4-kilometer-long zoned earthen-fi lle

ment with concrete reinforcement. Th e embankment conta

fi lters on the upstream and downstream side of the central 

inclined chimney and blanket drain. 

According to experts, the “decision to locate such a major 

important dam on the foundation rock mass which exists a

Dam site was fundamentally fl awed.” Th e dam’s foundation 

a layered sequence of rocks (including calcium carbonate m

chalky limestone, gypsum, and anhydrite rocks) below the 

is susceptible to the development of cavities within the gyps

hydrite layers. Since 1988, signifi cant voids have continued 

226-826 Report.indd 37 
38 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

within the foundation, requiring large volumes of cement-b

Th e dissolution and erosion of gypsum by water seeping un

is believed to be the main cause of the development of void

continuous grouting. Since the 1980s, a continuous groutin

implemented 24 hours per day, six days per week—has con

primary and ongoing measure for mitigating risk. 

Figures 4 and 5 provide monthly drilling and grouting pr

from 1986 to 2007. Figure 4 indicates that the average drilli

tion over the years is generally less than one-half of that atta

1987. Figure 5 appears to show a general trend of decreasin

injection over the years. Although Figure 5 seems to indicat

grouting may have some success in sealing karst channels a

erosion or solution, a signifi cant amount of grout and mass

required to fi ll large voids.

USACE expressed concern about a catastrophic failure of 

Dam. Its Board of Experts determined that a total failure w

in a wave of water measuring approximately 23.2–24.2 met

the city of Mosul in about three hours. Th is wave would sw

hundreds of small towns and villages en route to Baghdad. 

predicted the loss of basic services along the Tigris River va

uncountable damage to roads and bridges, railways, power 

industrial plants, farms, and archeological sites. Th e GOI an

of Water Resources representatives contested USACE’s repo

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Figure 4

Drilling at Mosul Dam, by Year, 1986−2007

Thousand Meters

Source: Data provided by Mosul Dam management.

‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 

226-826 Report.indd 38 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

Th e U.S. government awarded a task order and associated 

conduct studies specifi cally related to Mosul Dam’s problem

the most critical of those problems, develop solutions, and i

those solutions. Th e United States funded short-term soluti

Mosul Dam problem, while the Iraqi Ministry of Water Res

responsible for implementing a long-term solution. Th e sho

lutions included the most critically needed replacement and 

assistance with the massive grouting program, and enhance

to augment the ministry’s grouting eff orts. Starting in 2005, 

government funded 21 contracts, worth approximately $27

help with the short-term solutions for the Mosul Dam. 

SIGIR visited the Mosul Dam twice in September 2007. P

ing the dam, SIGIR reviewed the design drawings and spec

for all non-procurement contracts associated with the proje

determined that no comprehensive and relational diagram 

drawings existed for the Intelligrout system or the enhanced 

equipment used inside and outside the Mosul Dam gallery.

Review of the available design drawings revealed several 

and SIGIR voiced a number of safety concerns. For exampl

drawings for the stationary silos lacked critical details, such 

support for the entire height of the silos and instructions di

the Ministry of Water Resources personnel would deposit c

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

Figure 5

Solids Injected at Mosul Dam, per Year, 1986−2007

Metric Tons

Source: Data provided by Mosul Dam management.

‘86 ‘87 ‘88 ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘0

Massive Grout

Injected Grout

226-826 Report.indd 39 
40 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

the silos. Additionally, the design drawings clearly indicated 

contractor was off ering concrete-mixing plants instead of th

grout-mixing plants. 

SIGIR identifi ed instances of inadequate construction. Fo

SIGIR observed that 43 (30%) of the 144 foundation bolts c

concrete columns had insuffi cient thread to properly fasten 

(Figure 6). In addition, the installation of the foundation bo

tradicted the contractor’s own design construction techniqu

required bolt threads to extend higher than the nut. Each st

silo would hold approximately 1,500 tons of cement, and SI

lieved that the inadequate installation of the foundation bol

structures in a potentially dangerous condition. Th e U.S. go

subsequently terminated the contractor for default and reis

contract to construct new stationary silos at a diff erent loca

Mosul Dam property; however, the terminated contractor h

been paid $635,138 for the potentially unsafe silo framewor

Th e U.S. government awarded multiple contracts to prov

materials and equipment at the dam, and, in several instanc

delivered did not meet contract specifi cations. In addition, 

U.S. representative was on site to verify the delivery of the m

equipment, SIGIR could not assure that all of the required e

was delivered to the work site. 

Contractor’s design drawings 

required bolt threads extend beyond 

the nut and washer.

Poor installation technique (use of 

seven washers).

Example where one foundation bolt extends bey

another bolt does not.

gu6

Requirements of the Design Drawings versus Actua

Installation Techniques at Mosul Dam

226-826 Report.indd 40 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

Th e Advanced Grouting System—a signifi cant portion of t

grouting program—was non-operational. Th e system compr

Intelligrout system and enhanced grouting equipment, value

mately $16.4 million. Th e three Integrated Analytical System 

ued to experience a variety of signifi cant problems that delay

and the enhanced grouting equipment remained unused bec

of comprehensive and relational diagrams or schematic draw

tify how the components were to be completely assembled an

As a result, at the time of SIGIR’s site visits, approximately $1

worth of equipment and materials delivered to the Mosul Da

implementation of the massive and enhanced grouting opera

provide benefi t to the Ministry of Water Resources. 

Aft er SIGIR’s site visits, the U.S. government fi nalized a d

to provide the required equipment and materials to improv

grouting operations and fully implement the enhanced grou

tion. For example, this plan called for making the Integrated 

System units fully operational and procuring additional gro

plants. SIGIR concurred with the plan and recommended i

implementation.

Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant

Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassiriya, Iraq (PA-07-116), 4/

Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries supp

mately two-thirds of the raw water that is treated and used f

Grouting equipment in the tunnel under the Mosul Dam during SIGIR inspection

226-826 Report.indd 41 
42 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

sevces aq. e ves geeay cay sgcat eves 

erosion, blown sands, and agricultural runoff , which necess

of water treatment processes that typically include treatmen

mixing, fl occulation, and sedimentation to remove some of 

and sand fi ltration to remove the remaining solids prior to 

and transportation through the distribution system to the e

Th e water network for Th i-Qar province, including its exis

treatment plants and compact units, was approximately 50 ye

According to a survey of the province, the existing water trea

were ineffi cient and overloaded, while the distribution pipes 

to substantial leakage. By 2003, a critical situation developed 

and southern Iraq in terms of the number of cases of water-b

nesses, such as typhoid, cholera, and malaria. Th ese diseases 

to the absence of clean water supply and adequate sanitation 

In March 2004, the U.S. government awarded a contract to F

to increase the quantity and quality of potable water availab

citizens living in Nassiriya through the construction of a ne

supply system. Th e $277 million Nassiriya Water Supply pr

included the Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant, 110 kilomete

mission piping, three booster pump stations, and fi ve elevat

tanks, was one of the largest U.S.-funded reconstruction pro

Th is project was originally conceived as a cost-sharing pr

the GOI. Th e U.S. government would fund the water supply 

and the GOI would fund the permanent power required to 

repair the leaks in the distribution system to allow potable w

from the conveyance lines to the end user, and provide a qu

motivated staff to be trained by the contractor to operate an

the facility aft er the project was turned over to the GOI. 

Th e Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant was designed to op

hours per day, with a total capacity output of 10,000 cubic m

of potable water per hour, and serve fi ve cities. Constructio

in August 2004, commissioning was completed in June 200

project was offi cially turned over to the GOI on September 

However, at the time of turnover, the GOI had failed to prov

power from the national grid, repair the leaks in the distrib

and provide qualifi ed and motivated staff to be trained to o

maintain the system.

SIGIR visited the Nassiriya Water Treatment Plant twi

December 2007 and February 2008. During both site visits

was operating only one shift of eight hours per day and pro

226-826 Report.indd 42 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

2,000–2,300 m3/hour of potable water (20% of its design ou

addition, the amount of fi nished water was provided to only 

fi ve cities. Th is situation resulted from a number of factors, 

• lack of reliable power from the national grid

• an old distribution system that was affl icted with leaka

able to withstand the higher pressures and fl ows

• illegal taps in the water transmission line to Diwayah 

• unqualifi ed and unmotivated Ministry of Municipalitie

Works staff unwilling to consistently attend the contrac

training

SIGIR’s site visits revealed deterioration of the water treat

which was just more than one year old. For example, plant p

claimed that they did not know how to operate the fl ow me

therefore removed them. In addition, the on-site laboratory 

necessary to perform the required testing was missing, alth

plant’s daily report for the day of SIGIR’s site visit stated test

formed and the results were within World Health Organiza

ances. Because of the lack of appropriate laboratory equipm

questioned the validity of the reported results.

SIGIR determined that, for almost four years, the GOI ha

dressed these issues. As a result of GOI delays, potable wate

ing only a fraction of the Iraqi people whom it was intended 

SIGIR recommended that the U.S. government continue 

to infl uence the GOI to increase operational output and ave

deterioration of plant equipment—actions key to saving the 

investment made for the benefi t of the Iraqi people. As a res

eff orts of the U.S. government—specifi cally the U.S. Ambas

Iraq Transition Assistance Offi ce, and USACE—to infl uenc

Illegal taps in the transmission 

and distribution lines, which 

reduce the water pressure and 

amount of water available to 

residents. (USAID photo)

The disabled fl ow meter for 

the high-service pump station 

meter vault.

WTP laborato

inventory did 

items necess

performing j

226-826 Report.indd 43 
44 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

some improvements have occurred since SIGIR’s site visits. 

the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works reported t

siriya Water Treatment Plant had increased fi nished water p

from 2,300 m3/hour to 6,000 m3/hour. While SIGIR viewed 

encouraging sign, it also noted that the GOI still needed to 

term solutions to the issues of reliable power from the natio

leaking distribution lines, and qualifi ed and motivated staff 

and maintain the plant 24 hours per day, seven days per we

Pipeline Exclusion Zone

Kirkuk to Baiji Pipeline Exclusion Zone—Phase 3, Kirkuk, Iraq (P

7/24/2008

Iraq’s proved reserves of crude oil are among the largest in t

Oil exports provide more than 90% of the country’s revenu

critical to the successful funding of the Iraqi government. W

tion capacity of approximately 900,000 barrels per day, the K

fi elds dominate production in northern Iraq. Th ese fi elds p

crude oil processed at the Baiji Refi nery, 40% to 45% of the 

the Doura Refi nery, and most of the crude oil piped to Turk

Ceyhan for export. 

Aft er the 2003 Coalition invasion, Iraq’s 4,300-mile netw

pipelines became a continuous target for interdictions and s

Turbidity 

measure

2.8, and 

Water p

2,300, 2

2,300m3

Daily process acceptance report for February 21, 2008, the day of SIGIR’s site visit. (C

226-826 Report.indd 44 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

By 2008, there had been more than 400 reports of either sab

violence against Iraq’s oil infrastructure, resulting in the pot

millions of dollars for the GOI. 

Th e Infrastructure Security Program, a collaborative eff o

various U.S. government entities in Iraq, was initiated to red

incidence of insurgent damage to the oil pipeline system, el

distribution system, and other important infrastructure thr

Iraq. To protect critical oil pipeline corridors, this program 

the concept of the pipeline exclusion zone (PEZ). Th e PEZ 

cant example of the GOI’s increasing desire to take responsi

security of its oil pipelines and of an eff ective cost-sharing p

between the U.S. government and the GOI. 

SIGIR inspected the Kirkuk-to-Baiji PEZ, which is approx

lometers long and provides physical barriers to prevent the in

destruction of the oil pipeline or the tapping of the pipeline to 

tract the oil. To complement the approximately $34.4 million 

ment, the GOI committed its own resources to the project, b

and military, to enhance the overall eff ectiveness of the PEZ. 

the GOI awarded a contract worth approximately $12.3 milli

extra security in the form of 185 guard towers, 16 company h

ters, and 4 battalion headquarters buildings along the entire l

Kirkuk-to-Baiji PEZ, while also supplying 762 Iraqi Army tro

guard towers and patrol the entire length of the PEZ. 

Th e PEZ provides physical and visible protection through 

ditches, chain-link fences, berms and channels, concertina w

Chain-link fence and barbed wire along Phase 3 of the pipeline exclusion zone f

Baiji pipeline.

226-826 Report.indd 45 
46 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

guard houses (Figure 7). Th e Infrastructure Security Program 

and provided the original design to the contractor, who was e

to improve upon the furnished design. SIGIR reviewed the co

fi nal design submittal package and determined that it was ad

construct the various barriers and guard houses for the PEZ.

In an attempt to complete the entire length of the Kirkuk

PEZ expeditiously, the project was divided into seven phase

segment awarded to a diff erent contractor. In June 2008, SIG

the Phase 3 segment, which is at the northern end of the PE

rounded by farmland and small, scattered villages on both s

found the fences, berms, ditches, concertina wire, and guar

be in compliance with contract designs and specifi cations. 

At the time of the inspection, U.S. government and milita

sentatives reported that there had been no pipeline interdic

the area since installation of the Kirkuk-to-Baiji PEZ. Th e d

interdictions along the PEZ directly resulted in a substantia

northern crude oil exports. In the 11-month period from Ju

May 2008, average northern monthly exports were more th

barrels higher than they were during the preceding 18 mon

senting a revenue increase of approximately $8.215 billion.

Considering that the U.S. investment for the entire length 

Kirkuk-to-Baiji PEZ, when completed, was expected to be a

mately $34.4 million, the additional $8.215 billion in crude 

provided a 239:1 return on investment in only 11 months. 

Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility

Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility, Kahn Bani Sa’ad, Iraq (PA

7/25/2008

Before 2003, years of neglect led to a deteriorated prison in

in Iraq. Prisons previously used for maximum security we

for no more than medium security by international standa

Pipeline

Fence Berm

Ditch

Cherry North

Road Inside PEZ R

Concertina 

Wire

3m

min 3mmin 3m

min

2m

min

5m

max

Source: Based on USACE illustration.

gu7

Side View of the Pipeline Exclusion Zone

226-826 Report.indd 46 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

prison facilities in Diyala province were damaged during t

invasion and looted and vandalized aft erward. To address 

ceptable conditions of Diyala’s correctional facilities, the C

to increase the overall bed count of the Iraq Corrections S

the Ministry of Justice through the construction of a new 

prison that would house a total of 3,600 inmates in three t

facilities: segregation, maximum-security, and medium-se

Th e Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility project was des

two-phase construction. 

In May 2004, the CPA awarded the fi rst phase, which w

commodate 1,800 inmates, to Parsons Delaware, Inc., with 

completion date of November 12, 2005. However, by June 

facility had been only partially completed, and the U.S. gov

notifi ed Parsons that it would be terminated for default. Su

the U.S. government awarded three successor contracts to 

work; but in June 2007, citing security issues, it terminated 

ing work on the project and authorized leaving more than 

worth of materials at the site. By that time, the U.S. govern

expended approximately $40 million on the project. 

U.S. offi cials met with Ministry of Justice representative

cuss plans to use the partially completed facility. Th e depu

stated that the ministry had no plans to “complete, occupy

security for this facility.” U.S. offi cials concluded that “subs

1 August 2007, Kahn Bani Sa’ad will be under the ownersh

Government of Iraq and will no longer be secured.”

During an on-site assessment of the facility in June 2008, 

mately one year aft er the termination, SIGIR found the proj

neither secured nor occupied by the GOI. SIGIR confi rmed 

Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility. (USACE photo)

226-826 Report.indd 47 
48 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

facility remained in the same condition it was in when the U

ment unilaterally transferred it to the GOI in August 2007. 

construction defi ciencies remained:

• areas of severe exposure of the reinforcement bar on th

the load-bearing concrete ceiling beams

• concrete segregation and honeycombing

• potentially dangerous building columns

• generally poor workmanship

Th e U.S. government commissioned an engineering asse

pany to inspect the partially completed facility. Th e resultin

report stated the facility had “numerous defi ciencies in con

include, but not limited to, poorly mixed concrete, insuffi ci

over reinforcement, cracking, and poor concrete placement

instances, the thickness of selected concrete cores was less t

limeters, which is far less than the design thickness of 150 m

Th e assessment recommended demolishing one medium-s

building and signifi cant portions of the other two medium-

buildings, as well as demolishing all non-reinforced walls. 

SIGIR also searched the entire site for the $1.2 million in 

that the contractor reported as “abandoned” when the cont

terminated. SIGIR observed several stacks of cement blocks 

dozen rolls of chain-link fence; however, most of the report

were missing from the site.

Measurement of a concrete core sample that did not meet contract specifi cation

226-826 Report.indd 48 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

SGR beeved te U.S. goveet ad te GOsoud 

eff ort to use the $40 million investment that the U.S. govern

made in the Kahn Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility. SIGIR b

costly portions of the facility were functional, and, with add

investment, other portions could be used. SIGIR discussed 

mendation with U.S. government and military representativ

agreed to work with the appropriate GOI and Diyala provin

ment representatives to make use of the facility.

Falluja Waste Water Treatment System

Falluja Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq (PA-08-144

PA-08-146, PA-08-147, and PA-08-148), 10/27/2008

In June 2004, the CPA issued a task order to FluorAMEC to 

construct a new wastewater treatment system to serve the the

24,400 homes in the entire city of Falluja. At the time, the ci

have a comprehensive wastewater system, and the U.S. gove

GOI identifi ed this project as a priority because it would pr

treatment for a predominantly Sunni area. 

Th e system was to include eight sewer collection network

and force-main pipelines, seven pump stations, a wastewate

plant, and an effl uent pump station with outfall to the Euph

Th e project was to start on July 1, 2004, and was scheduled 

pleted in 18 months. In September 2005, aft er the project ex

schedule delays and cost growth of approximately $25.8 mi

government terminated the original contract. At the time, o

tion of one collection network was complete. Over the next 

45 separate contracts were awarded to Iraqi contractors to c

portions of the wastewater treatment system and provide n

ment and supplies. 

In July 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq became “extrem

cerned” that the Falluja Waste Water Treatment System had 

far off track and for so long”—specifi cally, that the project w

expected to cost $98 million, be only partially completed by 

(56 months aft er the original start date), and serve only 9,30

(approximately 38% of the city of Falluja). 

SIGIR performed this assessment to address the Ambass

cerns about costs, timeliness, and extent of completion. Aft 

ing project fi le documentation, SIGIR determined that seve

contributed to the schedule slippage and escalating costs:

226-826 Report.indd 49 
50 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

• unrealistic expectations by the U.S. government with re

schedule and cost estimates, given the unpredictable se

tion in the area

• the decision to redesign the treatment plant from a lago

to an activated-sludge system

• funding and contracting issues

• indecision by the U.S. government with regard to ident

forward for this project

• quality issues arising from a limited contractor and subco

• workplace safety issues at the project sites

SIGIR chose fi ve contracts to review in its assessment rep

selected contracts provided coverage of all three funding so

multiple facets of the project, including sewer collection Ar

force main, and the wastewater treatment plant. 

Because the work site was located in a dangerous area, SI

tors only had time to inspect the wastewater treatment plan

Station 1. At the treatment plant, they found no signifi cant 

cies; however, at Pump Station 1, they observed an area of i

Original design for the entire Falluja Waste Water Treatment System. (Courtesy o

226-826 Report.indd 50 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

poured concrete. USACE had previously identifi ed the una

concrete work on a defi ciency list, which it required the con

replace before issuing fi nal payment.

SIGIR determined that sustainability was not adequately ad

this project. At the inception of the project, the U.S. governm

the treatment plant to use a lagoon system because it required 

no skilled personnel, and little maintenance to operate. Howev

try of Municipalities and Public Works rejected the lagoon syst

it was “for third-world countries.” Instead, the ministry request

of a mechanical (activated-sludge unit) system, and the U.S. go

accepted the ministry’s proposal to use such a system. Th is dec

signifi cant, irreversible, and long-term ramifi cations on the fu

tion and maintenance of the treatment plant and associated f

When the original task order was awarded in mid-2004

permanent power was required at the facility because the 

ter treatment plant was designed with a lagoon system. In 

ber 2005, when the U.S. government agreed to the redesign

for permanent, reliable power became critical. In July 200

government realized that the Iraqi national grid would not 

“any signifi cant improvements [for permanent power] in t

able future.” As a result, the plant was further redesigned t

continuous-use generators, instead of standby generators. 

require approximately 520 gallons of fuel per hour to oper

generators for the full running of the wastewater treatmen

Pump station under construction at the Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant.

226-826 Report.indd 51 
52 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

200–250 gallons of fuel per hour to operate the limited ser

of the project. At the time, no contract existed to provide t

fuel. According to U.S. representatives, the Ministry of Mu

and Public Works would be responsible for providing the 

ever, the ministry had not yet committed to providing the 

would be required to run the treatment plant and three pu

SIGIR determined that the results of the Falluja Waste Wat

ment System project would not be consistent with either the 

revised project objectives. Originally, the project objective wa

a comprehensive wastewater treatment system for the entire 

however, due to signifi cantly increased costs and project dela

tive was modifi ed to provide the backbone to the wastewater 

system (that is, the treatment plant, pump stations, and trunk 

make it available to only three of Falluja’s eight collection area

nal intent was to provide house-connection pipes to within o

the property line, and the Ministry of Municipalities and Pub

would then be responsible for making the connections from 

the collection system. In a cost-saving measure, the ministry 

lowing each homeowner to make the connection to the colle

USACE representatives were concerned about this proposal; 

they believed that homeowners would simply knock a hole th

manhole walls, damaging the collection system. Without hou

tions to the collection systems, there would be no method of 

wastewater from individual houses to the wastewater treatme

Unacceptable cement pour at a Falluja Waste Water Treatment System pump sta

226-826 Report.indd 52 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

te te oSGRs assesset, etete U.S. goveet 

had funding in place to perform the house-connection work

no Falluja residents would benefi t from the wastewater treatm

To protect the $98 million U.S. investment, SIGIR recom

that U.S. representatives coordinate with the GOI to ensur

equate amount of fuel would be provided until permanen

power was available; to ensure a solution to permanent po

the treatment plant and pump stations; and to guarantee t

connections were made to tie the three collection areas in

network system. 

Abu Ghraib Dairy

Abu Ghraib Dairy, Abu Ghraib, Iraq (PA-09-172), 1/14/2010

Iraq does not have the resources necessary to provide dairy 

its increasing population. According to the Iraqi Ministry o

ture, in 2008 Iraq had 1,064,404 head of cattle, 146,092 head 

buff alo, 13,793,789 sheep, and 645,662 goats, which produc

mately 165,000 tons of fresh milk annually. Th is liquid “read

milk accounted for about one-third of the total consumptio

remaining two-thirds came from reconstituted powdered m

Iraq’s State Company for Dairy Products produces milk-b

ucts, such as bottled milk, yogurt, cheese, cream, and butter

this state-owned company suff ered for years from lack of in

new machinery and in regular maintenance of the existing 

which resulted in the “newest machinery” being more than 

A manual glass-bottle-fi lling machine was more than 50 ye

the homogenizer had been out of order for several years. 

In August 2002, the Saddam Hussein government entered 

contract with a Lebanese company for the delivery and instal

line equipment to produce 10 tons of milk per hour in high-d

ethylene bottles. Th is equipment, earmarked for the Abu Ghr

Plant, was delivered in crates in 2002 to a warehouse within t

of Industry and Minerals compound because the dairy plant 

room to store it. Before a new facility could be constructed, th

States and its Coalition partners had begun Operation Iraqi F

postponing the project and leaving the equipment to sit idle i

At the request of the Multi-National Division-Baghdad 

Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) 

rebuild the production capability of the Abu Ghraib Dairy 

ing the previously purchased equipment. Th e U.S. governm

226-826 Report.indd 53 
54 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

into a $3.4 million cooperative agreement with the State C

for Dairy Products to rebuild the Abu Ghraib Dairy factor

tion capability, satisfy the local market, and support the M

Education’s school nutrition program of providing Iraqi ch

pasteurized milk.

SIGIR reviewed the contractor’s designs and specifi cation

them insuffi cient to adequately construct the facility and th

systems within the facility. Specifi cally, the contractor’s desi

lacked signifi cant details for site utilities, such as a potable w

water supply and treatment, sewage treatment, and electrica

and distribution. For example, due to the lack of informatio

regarding the existing potable water system, SIGIR could no

if the contractor had verifi ed that the existing potable water 

could provide the required pressure or quantity of water for 

SIGIR reviewed the contractor’s design calculations for th

umns and continuous truss of a typical building section and 

the following signifi cant issues with the integrity of the stru

• Th e allowable roof load used in the analysis was 8 poun

square foot; International Building Code required a mi

load of 12 pounds per square foot for the design of roo

• Th e calculations did not account for lateral loads on th

including high winds and seismic loading.

• Based on the contractor’s calculations, fi ve members of 

were designated as failing the American Institute of Ste

Deformation (lateral bow) in lower roof truss chords at the Abu Ghraib Dairy.

226-826 Report.indd 54 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

tocode ceck. wo ote ebes aed te code c

than three times the allowable limit. Failing by a factor 

nitude indicates that the members could yield and poss

under the design load.

• Th e analysis did not consider knee braces. Th e size and 

of knee braces will signifi cantly aff ect the performance 

ture and may result in the failure of the lower truss cho

SIGIR immediately brought these concerns to the attenti

offi cials and TFBSO. Th e contracting offi cer issued a partia

order and requested that the contractor submit a proposed 

remedy the issues. TFBSO retained USACE to provide over

performance of the contractor’s corrective actions and QA o

construction. 

SIGIR made two visits to the project site. During the fi rst 

SIGIR observed construction defi ciencies: anchor bolts wer

equately protected, the concrete masonry unit wall was not 

on the exterior of the steel framing, the fl oor slab was poorly 

and several of the roof tresses were deformed. SIGIR’s secon

performed aft er TFBSO had retained USACE, confi rmed th

contractor had corrected several of the defi ciencies SIGIR h

during the initial site visit. In addition, SIGIR noticed the co

construction quality improved aft er USACE’s involvement 

tion oversight. 

Even aft er the completion of the building, the production c

of the Abu Ghraib Dairy would depend on the condition of t

ing milk-line equipment. Th e U.S. government awarded the 

agreement before the equipment had been tested to confi rm 

operational. SIGIR was concerned that, aft er sitting idle in a l

house for more than seven years, the equipment would not b

which would require the procurement of new equipment and 

delay the opening of the Abu Ghraib Dairy.

Missan Surgical Hospital

Missan Surgical Hospital, Al-Amarah, Iraq (PA-08-165 and 167)

Among the poorest of Iraq’s 18 provinces, Missan has suff ere

of the most concerning health problems in Iraq and from ina

healthcare facilities. Th e GOI requested the U.S. government 

of-the-art 100-bed surgical hospital and training facility for m

dents from Missan University Medical College. At a cost of $

226-826 Report.indd 55 
56 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

the Missan Surgical Hospital was the largest U.S.-funded hea

for this province. Th is project would directly benefi t more th

Iraqi citizens, and the Iraqi Minister of Health viewed it as th

important development in Missan province. 

By late 2008, the U.S. Ambassador became increasingly fr

concerned about the lack of progress with the construction 

pital and asked SIGIR to perform an assessment. SIGIR’s re

contractor’s design drawings identifi ed that, almost two yea

notice to proceed was issued, neither the contractor nor the 

ment had determined how water would be provided to the 

how wastewater from the hospital would be disposed of. 

SIGIR inspected the construction site in January 2009 an

a partial skeleton of the project completed—concrete formw

preparation for concrete placement. SIGIR determined that 

complete” reported by various U.S. agencies was overly opti

main hospital portion of this project, scheduled to be comp

March 2009, was more realistically about 10%–15% comple

observed construction defi ciencies, such as a poorly constru

curity wall, areas of reinforcing steel with a coating of ceme

a reinforcing confi guration used in the construction of the r

concrete columns that varied from the confi guration specifi 

design drawings, and several examples of concrete honeyco

ranging from slight to moderate to severe.

Unacceptable cement pour with honeycombing and exposed rebar at the Missan S

226-826 Report.indd 56 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

SGR ecoeded tat te USCGuRegovs

the design defi ciencies, omissions, and areas of concern, sp

suring complete design drawings for water and wastewater 

lines to and from the hospital, with the contractor to guaran

project was adequately designed. Th e Gulf Region Division 

SIGIR’s recommendation and began working with the cont

the local municipality for both water and electrical requirem

Th e GOI’s lack of planning was also cause for concern. W

ing this project, the U.S. government promised to construc

hospital and ancillary facilities, and the GOI committed in w

provide all the medical equipment, furniture, and personne

operate, and maintain the project, as well as start-up and an

ing budgets. Yet, as of May 2009 (21 months aft er the GOI’s 

fund this project), the GOI had not procured any equipmen

any of the specialized doctors and nurses needed to staff the 

allocated any funding for this project. 

SIGIR briefed the Deputy Chief of Mission on the results 

sessment and noted that the hospital would serve no benefi 

until the issues that SIGIR identifi ed were resolved. 

Basrah Children’s Hospital

Basrah Children’s Hospital, Basrah, Iraq (PA-08-160), 7/28/20

Over the past 35 years, Iraq’s healthcare system deteriorated 

best in the Middle East to that of a third-world developing c

primarily because of a lack of investment in health care for c

in modern training for healthcare providers. In 2003, First La

Bush expressed concern about the deteriorating Iraqi healthc

and, particularly, the need to support children suff ering from 

of 2003, childhood cancers were 8–10 times more common i

in the western world; the incident rate in Iraq was 8% compa

0.5%–1% in developed countries. Children under the age of fi 

for approximately 56% of the registered cancer cases. Because 

of adequate healthcare services, most cancer cases were not d

the disease reached the advanced stages, when even the bes

cannot provide a cure. Approximately 8% of Iraqi children 

mia survived, compared with 80% in the United States. 

Project HOPE—an international nonprofi t health, educa

humanitarian assistance organization—made a fact-fi nding 

to Iraq in 2003 and found “deplorable health care condition

Iraqi society.” Project HOPE identifi ed a very high child-m

226-826 Report.indd 57 
58 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

in southern Iraq, where 150 out of 1,000 children were dyin

reaching the age of fi ve; most died before their fi rst birthday

tion, cancer is almost fi ve times more prevalent in southern 

the national average. 

To combat the alarming rate of child mortality in souther

USAID and Project HOPE formed a public-private partner

establish a “state of the art” pediatric specialist hospital in B

Specifi cally, USAID was responsible for the construction of 

160,000-square-foot, 94-bed acute- and referral-care center

HOPE was responsible for providing medical equipment an

Iraqi doctors and nurses. Th e focus of this hospital was to b

oncology, and early projections called for annual pediatric a

360 cancer patients, 468 intensive-care patients, 354 neonat

care patients, and 2,230 acute-care patients. In addition, thi

was intended to lead the southern province in meeting the 

Health’s goal to reduce child mortality by 50% over the next 

Th e U.S. government envisioned a signature project to meet 

medical needs of Iraqis, especially the needs of critically ill c

project eventually became known as the Basrah Children’s H

referred to as the Laura Bush Children’s Hospital.

Originally scheduled to be completed by December 2005 

estimated cost of $50 million, by June 2006 the project had 

signifi cant cost growth and repeated schedule delays prima

of poor subcontractor performance and limited oversight b

Signage at the entrance of the Basrah Children’s Hospital.

226-826 Report.indd 58 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

cotacto. t te te oSGRs ste vst Jauay009, 

tion of the facility was still ongoing, and the total cost of the 

reached $165.7 million (including construction, medical eq

training, and consumables). Th e project cost more than $10

U.S. funding alone. SIGIR did not observe signifi cant const

ciencies or any noticeable defects associated with the quality 

manship, and the facility appeared to meet the standards of 

However, several factors contributed to the escalation of the 

costs and the slippage of its schedule, including:

• unrealistic time frames for designing and constructing 

hospital, including determining the scope/size of the fa

integrating more than 8,000 pieces of equipment, furni

computers

• poor soil condition at the project site

• the unpredictable security situation in and around the 

where 24 workers were murdered during construction

• multiple partners and funding sources

• GOI diffi culty in supporting the assigned tasks of cons

operation of the hospital

Th roughout the course of this project, the U.S. governmen

HOPE outlined the Ministry of Health’s responsibilities for t

this project. However, as of June 2009, the GOI had diffi culty 

these assigned tasks of construction and operation of the ho

• providing qualifi ed candidates for critical training cour

radiation therapy

• allocating funding for an annual operating budget

• allocating funding, advertising, or awarding service con

(housekeeping, laundry, food service, cleaning) or mai

contracts for high-end medical equipment

• advertising or awarding the wastewater treatment plan

• developing, advertising, or awarding the medical fl uid 

ment contract

• providing dedicated electrical power

Each of these GOI items was essential for completion of the 

successful operation of the facility. 

Although the Basrah Children’s Hospital was originally c

to provide southern Iraq with a state-of-the-art pediatric-sp

hospital, by February 2009 the U.S. government, Project HO

GOI had signed a memorandum of understanding that red

226-826 Report.indd 59 
60 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

a odepedatc osptaasa.y deto, state

refers to the latest and most sophisticated or advanced stage 

ogy, whereas Project HOPE would be providing medical tec

circa 2005.

Chamchamal Correctional Facility

Renovate and Expand Chamchamal Correctional Facility, Cham

(PA-09-177), 10/22/2009

In 2007, the Iraqi penal system did not have a suffi cient num

rectional facilities to adequately house the growing number 

terrorists and criminals. In addition, the existing Iraqi priso

meet the human rights standards prescribed by the United 

At the request of the Kurdistan Regional Government, th

government funded a $28.7 million project to increase the b

of the Iraq Corrections Service of the Ministry of Justice by 

expanding, and converting the 30-year-old Chamchamal Fo

safe, secure, and humane correctional facility. Located in Su

province, this poorly maintained fort was partially destroye

by Coalition forces, and the remnants were subsequently lo

renovated, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility would pr

proximately 2,000 medium-security, dormitory-style adult 

beds, and 1,000 high-security, cell-style adult prison beds to 

ate overcrowding in the Iraqi prison system. In March 2009

Chamchamal Correctional Facility. (USACE photo)

226-826 Report.indd 60 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

te costuctoaage, tued ovete CacaaCo

Facility to the Iraq Corrections Service. 

Prior to visiting the project site, SIGIR reviewed the con

tor’s design submittals. Although the contractor’s design s

adequately met the requirements of the contract’s stateme

SIGIR noticed that the statement of work did not address 

facility’s external expansion joints. Considering that the ex

are exposed to extreme climatic conditions (excessive hea

mer and snow in the winter), SIGIR’s opinion was that ext

sion joints should have been part of the statement of work

In June 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site assessment of t

tional facility. Due to the size of the site (approximately 20,0

meters), the complexity of the project, and time limitations 

mately two hours on site), SIGIR performed an expedited a

of the project. Specifi cally, SIGIR inspected several medium

dormitory-style cells (50 or fewer prisoners per cell) and hi

cells (1–4 prisoners per cell). 

Th e U.S. government was responsible for the construction 

correctional facility, and the Kurdistan Regional Governme

responsible for an operational budget to provide for a staff a

power to run the facility. At the time of SIGIR’s site visit, the 

mal Correctional Facility did not house any prisoners or gu

not operational, which prevented inspectors from being abl

assess the buildings’ systems, including:

• potable water distribution

• wastewater conveyance/disposal

• electrical power production and distribution

• voice and data communication

• external security lighting system

SIGIR’s site visit identifi ed only minor construction defi c

as an incomplete expansion joint system and a tripping haz

the kitchen building. Aside from these minor construction 

concluded that the construction of the Chamchamal Corre

ity was adequate. 

At the time of the assessment, U.S. representatives were c

about the Kurdistan Regional Government’s inability to pro

staffi ng, and an operational budget for this project. Approxi

of the contractor’s one-year warranty for any construction d

expired without a single prisoner or guard using the facilitie

226-826 Report.indd 61 
62 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

toets, sowes, eectcagts ad outetsto dety ate

SIGIR met with various U.S. offi cials in an eff ort to resolve t

with the Kurdistan Regional Government’s inability to oper

ity. Representatives of the Department of State’s Bureau of I

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Aff airs took prompt action 

age the GOI to use this facility.

In September 2009, a prisoner riot at the Baghdad Centra

resulted in the death of one prisoner, various injuries to as m

40 prisoners, and fi re damage that left the prison facility “un

Th e Ministry of Justice relocated 360 inmates and 10 Iraqi c

offi cers from the Baghdad Central Prison to the Chamcham

tional Facility. Over the next week, the ministry continued t

additional inmates to the Chamchamal Correctional Facilit

ate overcrowding in Baghdad prisons. According to the Ch

Correctional Facility’s provisional warden, as of October 12

were 2,637 inmates and 240 Iraqi correctional offi cers at the 

addition, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance had allocated 13 bill

dinars ($11.1 million) per month to the Iraq Corrections Se

facility’s operation and sustainment.

Erbil Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Ce

Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center, Erbil, Ira

(PA-09-178), 10/21/2009

In August 2007, the U.S. government awarded a $3.7 milli

tract for a fi rst-of-its-kind facility in Iraq—a combined orp

and senior center. Th e project involved the demolition of t

orphanage, which the facility manager had likened to a pr

ruary 2009, the U.S. government offi cially turned over the 

and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center project to the D

the Ministry of Social Aff airs in Erbil province. Th e facilit

to provide a safe home for 345 children (165 boys and 180

60 senior citizens.

SIGIR reviewed the contractor’s design package, which 

the architectural layout and building designs. Th e contra

ings contained specifi c information regarding the structu

building mechanical systems, site utilities, site drainage, 

collection system, and other project features. Based on th

statement of work and the inclusion by reference of othe

codes and standards, adequate information was provided 

specifi cations for the contractor to complete the fi nal desi

226-826 Report.indd 62 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

struct the facility. In addition, although not required by t

the contractor supplied a geotechnical report, which was 

by a local construction laboratory. Th e report contained 

on the borings, physical and chemical properties of the s

lowable soil-bearing capacity.

In July 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site assessment of th

age and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center, which was o

functioning. Aside from a few minor safety concerns, SIGIR 

that the quality of work by the contractor was the best SIGI

observed in more than fi ve years of performing project asse

Exterior of dorm buildings at the Erbil Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living 

Interior view of a dorm room.

226-826 Report.indd 63 
64 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

Speccay, te adstatobudg cuded aequs

spiral staircase, and decorative interior fl oor tile. A balcony 

the rotunda on the second level, complete with decorative b

stainless steel handrails. In addition, the contractor had ma

the effi cient use of space in the design. For example, the kitc

provided signifi cant open space for food preparation and co

commercial-grade appliances, and the walls and fl oor were 

with ceramic tiles, which allowed for easy cleaning.

SIGIR also found the facility to be in immaculate conditi

fi ve months of continuous operation. Th e individual bedroo

rooms, kitchen, and dining areas were spotless. Th e facility 

aged the children to keep their rooms neat and tidy, with to

away under their beds. SIGIR concluded that the operation 

nance of this facility by the staff was the best SIGIR had see

Basrah Modern Slaughterhouse

Basrah Modern Slaughterhouse, Basrah, Iraq (PA-09-189), 4/2

Because Basrah province did not have an adequate number 

terhouses to kill and process meat in a safe and sanitary env

the U.S. government in August 2008 awarded a $5.6 million 

to design and construct a modern slaughterhouse in the pro

Zubair district. 

SIGIR found the contract and its statement of work to be 

written and confusing, which prevented four USACE repre

including the project’s construction representative, from un

the requirements. One USACE representative stated that “th

fusion regarding what is actually required for the project.” I

the contractor designed the slaughterhouse facility signifi ca

than the statement of work required. Th e contract and state

work called for a 6,000-square-meter slaughtering facility fo

cattle. However, within USACE, there was confusion as to t

tion of “facility.” For example, four USACE representatives, 

the construction representative responsible for the project, 

the contract and statement of work and determined that th

required the contractor to construct a slaughterhouse with 

tional area of 1,728 square meters and a perimeter fence of 

But when the contractor submitted designs providing an op

area of 840 square meters and a perimeter fence of 320 met

approved the designs. In addition, USACE did not attempt 

ate an equitable price adjustment for the signifi cant amount 

226-826 Report.indd 64 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

de-scoped from the project. Consequently, it appears that th

was overpaid. 

SIGIR reviewed the contractor’s 100% design drawings an

construction documentation and found them to be inadequ

initiating construction. Specifi cally, the 100% drawings wer

and contained many inaccuracies, omissions, and unapprov

SIGIR also determined that the project fi le did not include 

tions, such as the anticipated number of sheep and cattle to 

in the summer/winter halls prior to slaughtering, the daily n

sheep and cattle to be slaughtered, or the daily requirement

cal power, potable water, and wastewater. Without these ass

SIGIR could not determine if the contractor had adequately 

the facility for the anticipated operational requirements. 

SIGIR visited the project site in September 2009, which w

proximately fi ve weeks aft er the August 2009 deadline to co

project. SIGIR found the facility to be approximately 45% c

None of the building systems, such as potable water storage 

bution, wastewater conveyance/disposal, or electrical powe

and distribution, were in place. During the site visit, SIGIR 

instances of construction not in accordance with the contra

such as the placement of lintels, tie beams, and intermediate 

Basrah Modern Slaughterhouse under construction, showing upper-level concre

(cross) beams improperly supported by brick façade.

226-826 Report.indd 65 
66 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

We te cotact addessed sustaabty ocostuct

ties and spare parts, the remainder of the project suff ered fr

of adequate planning. Th is facility, when completed, would 

signifi cant amount of electricity, potable water, and sewage 

disposal. Reliable, permanent power is essential for operatin

ous pieces of slaughtering equipment, as well as the cold sto

waste processing equipment, laboratory, and miscellaneous 

facilities. An adequate supply of potable water is critical to o

the slaughterhouse in a hygienic manner. Th e treatment an

waste products, such as wastewater and animal blood, is vit

the slaughterhouse operating sanitarily. Th e lack of any one 

utilities would render the slaughterhouse inoperable. 

As of the time that SIGIR issued its report in April 2010, 

more than 19 months aft er award of the contract, neither U

the contractor knew of a potential source of permanent pow

water, or sewage and blood disposal for the slaughterhouse. 

representative stated that “the Iraqi government has not ma

ther commitments to provide utilities to the site.”

226-826 Report.indd 66 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

pped: eadowospectos by Secto, 

Contracting Agency, Funding Source, and Type of A

Th e vast number of reconstruction projects carried out by t

government in Iraq made it impossible for the Special Inspe

for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to assess all of them. Th at t

being carried out in a war zone made it unfeasible to rando

projects for assessment. Instead, SIGIR sought to focus on a 

tive cross section. SIGIR selected projects from each sector, 

and small contractors, in diff erent geographic areas of Iraq, 

each of the major U.S. agencies and diff erent funding sourc

from projects at varying stages of execution—ongoing to co

considered in the selection of projects for inspections were 

of military commanders and Department of State offi cials; 

cance of the project; the likelihood of fraud or waste; and al

about specifi c projects, sites, and contractors. 

From June 2005 through April 2010, SIGIR issued reports 

ects, providing snapshots of reconstruction activities valued 

$2.1 billion.

Sectors

SIGIR conducted assessments in six reconstruction sectors

• Security and Justice—36 reports ($363 million) 

• Energy—33 reports, including one special assessment (

• Transportation and Communications—33 reports ($65 

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

Energy Health Military Security

& Justice

Transportation 

Communicatio

705

116

325

363

65

Figure 8

Contract Value of Projects Inspected, by Reconstructi

$ Millions

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

226-826 Report.indd 67 
68 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

eatepots ($6 o)

• Water—25 reports ($516 million)

• Military—19 reports ($325 million)

Figure 8 shows the sector breakdown by contract value.

Locations

Figure 9 shows the locations, 

by province, where SIGIR 

conducted inspections.

Contracting Agencies

U.S. agencies involved in Iraq 

relief and reconstruction efforts included the Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA) 

and its Program Management 

Offi ce; the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (USACE) and 

its Gulf Region Division1 

and Project and Contracting 

Offi ce; the Department of 

State and its Iraq Reconstruction Management Offi ce, Iraq 

Transition Assistance Offi ce, 

and Iraq Strategic Partnership Offi ce; and the U.S. Agency f

tional Development. Th e CPA’s Program Management Offi 

most of the relief and reconstruction contracts in 2003 and 

the Program Management Offi ce was disestablished in 2004

reconstruction contracts were awarded either by USACE’s G

Division or the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanis

16

1

10

1

1 16 

17

3

9

Figure 9

Locations of On-site Pro

Assessments Completed 

1 Th e USACE organization in Iraq initially comprised three districts under the Gulf Regio

Region North, Gulf Region Central, and Gulf Region South. Each of the districts had loc

and project offi ces. Th e designation of a local offi ce as an area, resident, or project offi ce d

number of reconstruction projects that it was responsible for overseeing. Since July 2009

reorganized to downsize as the number of reconstruction projects has diminished. Th e G

was disestablished, and the three districts were combined to form the Gulf Region Distri

number of reconstruction projects has also resulted in the closing or reduction in size of 

area, resident, and project offi ces. In the body of this report, the names of USACE organi

of the actions cited are used.

226-826 Report.indd 68 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

utNatoaoceaq, wcwas subsued to te U

Iraq in January 2010.2 

Most contracts were administered by the Gulf Region Di

through its Gulf Region North, Gulf Region Central, or Gu

South Districts. Other agencies that administered relief and 

tion contracts included the Air Force Center for Engineerin

Environment and Multi-National Force-Iraq (which includ

National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Multi-Nation

Iraq, and Multi-National Division-Iraq).

Funding Sources

Diff erent types of funds have 

been used to reconstruct Iraq. 

Th e majority of the projects 

assessed by SIGIR’s Inspections 

Directorate were funded by 

the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Th e 

other projects reviewed were 

funded by the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program 

(CERP), Iraq Security Forces 

Fund (ISFF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF), Iraqi Interim 

Government Fund (IIGF), the 

Department of State’s Bureau 

of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Aff airs 

(INL), the Development 

Fund for Iraq (DFI), and the 

Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program (I-CERP). 

summarizes the dollar value of projects SIGIR assessed, by fun

In-progress Projects versus Completed Projects

SIGIR issued reports on 116 projects still under constructio

of SIGIR’s site visit and 54 sustainment assessments of proje

completed by the time of the site visit. 

I-CER

CERP $23.66

DFI $29.42

ESF $37.40

ISFF $45.07

IIGF $21.46 IFF $

INL $

Figure 10

Cost of Projects SIGIR A

by Fund

$ Millions

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affec

2 Th e U.S. Forces-Iraq replaced and absorbed the former Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Mult

Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. In the body of this rep

U.S. Forces-Iraq organizations at the time of the actions cited are used.

226-826 Report.indd 69 
70 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

pped: Copleted SGspecto

Th is appendix contains a list of completed inspections on Ir

struction activities by the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

tion (SIGIR). 

Assessment 

Number Project Name Province Total Cost 

Executing 

Agency 

PA-05-001 Al Wahda Water 

Treatment Plant

Baghdad $7,464,685 PCO 

PA-05-002 Al Wathba Water 

Treatment Plant

Baghdad $7,464,685 PCO 

PA-05-003 Al Nahrwan Water 

Supply Project

Baghdad $289,980 GRD 

PA-05-004 Al Sumelat Water 

Network

Baghdad $743,650 PCO 

PA-05-005 Al Hakamia 

Substation

Basrah $5,933,973 PCO 

PA-05-006 Hamdan Substation Basrah $5,000,933 PCO 

PA-05-007 Al Kaffat Substation Basrah $5,933,973 PCO 

PA-05-008 Al Seraji Substation Basrah $5,709,225 PCO 

PA-05-009 Shatt al Arab 

Substation

Basrah $5,298,324 PCO 

PA-05-010 Al Fatah Pipe River 

Crossing

Tameem $29,715,425 PCO 

PA-05-011 Kirkuk Canal Crossing Tameem $2,087,890 PCO 

PA-05-012 Al Fatah River 

Crossing Tie-ins

Tameem $8,156,284 PCO 

PA-05-013 Kirkuk to Baiji 

Pipeline Project

Tameem $635,500 GRD-PCO 

PA-05-014 Kirkuk to Baiji 

Pipeline Project

Tameem $658,100 GRD-PCO 

PA-05-015 Al Balda Police 

Station

Babylon $134,655 GRD 

PA-05-016 Hilla Maternity and 

Children’s Hospital

Babylon $7,414,096 PCO 

PA-05-017 Hai Al Imam Clinic Babylon $441,625 PCO 

PA-05-018 Special Weapons and 

Tactics (SWAT) Police 

Station

Babylon $2,219,092 GRD 

PA-05-019 Babil Railway Station 

Rehabilitation

Babylon $273,931 PCO 

PA-05-020 Seif Sa’ad Police 

Station

Babylon $153,000 GRD 

Co

226-826 ReportCX.indd 70 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-05-021 Border Forts 

Numbered 602, 604, 

628, and 634

Sulaymaniyah $271,912 GRD 

PA-05-022 Border Forts 

Numbered 602, 604, 

628, and 634

Sulaymaniyah $274,632 GRD 

PA-05-023 Border Forts 

Numbered 602, 604, 

628, and 634

Sulaymaniyah $271,912 GRD 

PA-05-024 Border Forts 

Numbered 602, 604, 

628, and 634

Sulaymaniyah $271,912 GRD 

PA-05-025 Ammo Supply Point Basrah $252,650 GRD 

PA-05-026 Operation Center 

& Security Facilities 

Construction

Basrah $408,433 GRD 

PA-05-027 Security Upgrades 

for the Port of Umm 

Qasr 

Basrah $3,698,515 GRD 

PA-05-028 Umm Qasr Water 

Scheme

Basrah $15,600,000 GRD-PCO 

PA-05-029 Project Phoenix 

Restore Qudas Gas 

Turbine Units to 

Operation

Baghdad $12,685,332 PCO 

PA-05-032 Police Academy Hilla Babylon $23,554,376 JCC-I/A 

PA-05-033 Kerbala Library Kerbala $1,293,810 CPA (South 

Central)

PA-06-034 Air Traffi c Control 

Tower and 

Navigational Aids

Ninewa $10,329,474 GRD 

PA-06-035 Ninewa Village 

Roads Segment 3

Ninewa $1,119,476 GRD 

PA-06-036 Fire Station 

Construction 

Ainkawa

Erbil $1,355,857 GRD 

PA-06-037 Erbil City 

Transformers

Erbil $3,372,288 GRD 

PA-06-038 Sheile Primary School Dahuk $460,438 GRD 

PA-06-039 Zakho Military 

Academy

Dahuk $5,814,033 GRD 

PA-06-040 Aviation Base 

Building

Tameem $13,199,923 AFCEE 

Co

226-826 Report.indd 71 
72 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-06-041 New Second Brigade 

Base

Tameem $44,657,392 AFCEE 

PA-06-042 Primary Health Care 

Centers Numbered 

KE–1 through KE–05

Tameem $612,885 GRD 

PA-06-043 Primary Health Care 

Centers Numbered 

KE–1 through KE–05

Tameem $533,447 GRD 

PA-06-044 Primary Health Care 

Centers Numbered 

KE–1 through KE–05

Tameem $533,447 GRD 

PA-06-045 Primary Health Care 

Centers Numbered 

KE–1 through KE–05

Tameem $533,447 GRD 

PA-06-046 Primary Health Care 

Centers Numbered 

KE–1 through KE–05

Tameem $533,447 GRD 

PA-06-049 Basrah International 

Airport–Terminal and 

Tower Renovation

Basrah $5,044,988 GRD-PCO 

PA-06-050 Basrah International 

Airport-Air Side 

Power Supply 

to NAVAIDS and 

VISAIDS

Basrah $383,043 GRD-PCO 

PA-06-051 Police Station–

Safwan IHP 404

Basrah $2,550,841 GRD-PCO 

PA-06-053 Nasiriyah Fire Station Thi-Qar $508,800 GRD-PCO 

PA-06-054 Nasiriyah Prison 

Facility

Thi-Qar $49,087,462 GRD-PCO 

PA-06-055 Muthanna Village 

Roads Segment 4

Muthanna $2,939,268 GRD-PCO 

PA-06-056 609th Iraqi National 

Guard Battalion 

Garrison

Thi-Qar $10,665,485 GRD 

PA-06-057 Baghdad 

Railway Station 

Rehabilitation

Baghdad $5,910,741 GRD-PCO 

PA-06-058 Baghdad Al Karkh 

Courthouse

Baghdad $10,315,012 GRD 

PA-06-059 Thi-Qar Village 

Roads Segment 3

Thi-Qar $1,441,858 GRD 

PA-06-063 Kirkuk to Baiji 

Pipeline Project

Tameem $86,900,000 Multiple 

PA-06-064 Al Alwaiya Maternity 

Hospital

Baghdad $1,986,462 GRD 

PA-06-065 Al Alwaiya Children’s 

Hospital

Baghdad $1,288,000 GRD 

Co

226-826 Report.indd 72 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-06-066 Critical Care Unit Ibn 

Al Bitar Hospital

Baghdad $579,285 GRD 

PA-06-067 Baghdad Municipal 

Solid Waste Landfi ll

Baghdad $28,849,930 GRD 

PA-06-069 Al Kut Training 

Academy

Wassit $22,958,920 GRD 

PA-06-070 Dahuk Rehabilitation 

Center

Dahuk $5,633,803 GRD 

PA-06-071 Al Kasik Water 

Storage Tanks 

Al Kasik Military 

Training Base

Ninewa $4,900,000 AFCEE 

PA-06-072 Ninewa Provincial 

Police Headquarters

Ninewa $988,178 GRD 

PA-06-073 Bab Eshtar 

Substation 11 kV 

Feeder Cable

Ninewa $1,221,000 GRD 

PA-06-074 Waste Water 

Treatment Plant 

Al Kasik Military 

Training Base

Ninewa $2,700,000 AFCEE 

PA-06-075 51st Brigade Iraqi 

Army Barracks

Babylon $999,298 GRD 

PA-06-076 Al Hillah Police Firing 

Range

Babylon $434,057 GRD 

PA-06-077 402nd Battalion Iraqi 

Army Headquarters 

Barracks

Babylon $736,939 GRD 

PA-06-078.1 & 

079.1

Quick Reaction 

Report on the 

Baghdad Police 

College

Baghdad $42,909,000 & 

$29,345,000

GRD 

PA-06-078.2 & 

079.2

Baghdad Police 

College

Baghdad $72,250,000 GRD 

PA-06-080 Al Basrah Oil 

Terminal

Basrah $48,239,066 GRC 

PA-06-082 Electrical Substation 

Sustainment

Basrah $5,677,575 GRD 

PA-06-083 Electrical Substation 

Sustainment

Basrah $5,718,727 GRD 

PA-06-084 Electrical Substation 

Sustainment

Basrah $5,438,408 GRD 

PA-06-085 Electrical Substation 

Sustainment

Basrah $5,717,727 GRD 

PA-06-086 Electrical Substation 

Sustainment

Basrah $5,724,335 GRD 

PA-06-087 Tallil Military Base 

Camp Ur

Thi-Qar $59,750,000 AFCEE 

Co

226-826 Report.indd 73 
74 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND R

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-06-088 Tallil Military Base 

Camp Ur

Thi-Qar $59,750,000 AFCEE 

PA-06-089 Recruiting (Babil 

Volunteer) Center

Babylon $1,823,731 AFCEE 

PA-06-090 Iraqi Civil Defense 

Headquarters

Baghdad $3,000,064 GRC 

PA-06-091 Bab Shams Police 

Station

Ninewa $353,400 GRN 

PA-06-092 Gaugli Ashur Police 

Station

Ninewa $881,188 GRN 

PA-06-094 Erbil Maternity and 

Pediatric Hospital

Erbil $6,832,360 GRN 

PA-07-096 Sadr City Al Qana'at 

Raw Water Pump 

Station

Baghdad $4,230,000 GRC 

PA-07-097 Baghdad 

International Airport 

Power System 

Enhancement

Baghdad $11,792,479 USAID 

PA-07-098 Al Rasheed Brigade 

Set

Baghdad $64,008,857 AFCEE 

PA-07-099 Iraqi C-130 Base Baghdad $30,801,495 AFCEE 

PA-07-100 West Baghdad 

International Airport 

Special Forces 

Barracks

Baghdad $5,205,003 GRC 

PA-07-101 Qudas Power Plant 

Turbine Restoration 

Project and Qudas 

Power Plant 

Expansion Project

Baghdad $90,600,000 GRD 

PA-07-102 Ministry of Defense 

Headquarters 

Building

Babylon $31,465,205 MNSTC-I 

PA-07-103 Doura Power Station 

Units 5 and 6

Baghdad $90,800,000 GRD 

PA-07-104 Qudas Power Plant 

Turbine Restoration 

Project and Qudas 

Power Plant 

Expansion Project

Baghdad $147,400,000 GRD 

PA-07-105 Relief and 

Reconstruction 

Funded Work at the 

Mosul Dam

Ninewa $27,114,874 GRD 

Co

226-826 Report.indd 74 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-07-106 Right Bank Drinking 

Water Treatment 

Plant Rehabilitation

Ninewa $1,714,233 GRN 

PA-07-107 Showairrej to Tak 

Harb Road Paving

Ninewa $1,439,175 GRN 

PA-07-108 Bartilla New Road 

Paving

Ninewa $147,560 GRN 

PA-07-109 Bartilla Booster 

Pump Station Repair

Ninewa $237,500 GRN 

PA-07-110 Al Escanddrona 

School

Baghdad $86,615 GRD 

PA-07-111 Rehabilitation of 

the Mansour Pump 

Station

Baghdad $122,950 GRD 

PA-07-112 Mahalla 824 Sewer 

Collapse Project

Baghdad $724,350 GRD 

PA-07-114 Iraqi Army Facilities Erbil $9,300,000 AFCEE 

PA-07-115 Erbil Police Academy Erbil $10,006,379 GRN 

PA-07-116 Nassiriya Water 

Treatment Plant

Thi-Qar $277,000,000 GRD 

PA-07-118 Repair of the 

Ghazaliyah G-7 

Sewage Lift Station

Baghdad $253,246 GRD 

PA-07-118.1 Repair of the Al 

Ghazaliyah G-6 

Sewage Lift Station

Baghdad See above GRD 

PA-08-119 Refurbishment of the 

Kurdistan Regional 

Government Ministry 

of Interior Complex

Erbil $5,896,011 GRN 

PA-08-120 Sarwaran Primary 

School

Erbil $693,631 GRN 

PA-08-121 Binaslawa Middle 

School

Erbil $601,611 GRN 

PA-08-123 Nassiriya Prison 

Expansion

Thi-Qar $6,263,042 GRS 

PA-08-124 Al Shofa Water 

Facility

Thi-Qar $348,850 GRS 

PA-08-125 Al Kazim Water 

Supply

Thi-Qar $492,800 GRS 

PA-08-127 Nassiriya 33-kV 

Power line

Thi-Qar $1,537,560 GRS 

PA-08-129 Al Ager Water 

Compact Unit

Thi-Qar $650,000 GRS 

PA-08-131 Follow-up on the 

Nassiriya Prison 

Facility

Thi-Qar $15,523,772 GRS 

Co

226-826 Report.indd 75 
76 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-08-132 Haditha General 

Hospital

Anbar $5,033,791 GRC 

PA-08-133 Heet Primary 

Healthcare Center

Anbar $412,130 GRC 

PA-08-134 Haditha Primary 

Healthcare Center

Anbar $537,780 GRC 

PA-08-135 Rehabilitation of the 

Suroor Elementary 

School

Baghdad $245,535 GRC 

PA-08-136 Renovations of 

the Khandek 

Intermediate School

Baghdad $295,840 GRC 

PA-08-137 Kirkuk to Baiji PEZ 

Phase 3

Kirkuk $3,838,308 GRN 

PA-08-138 Kahn Bani-Sa’ad 

Correctional Facility

Diyala $40,497,030 GRD 

PA-08-140 Rebuilding of the 

Sagrah School

Anbar $399,050 MNF-West 

PA-08-141 Al Iqitadar School Anbar $251,915 MNC-I 

PA-08-142 Al Shurhabil School Anbar $268,000 MNC-I 

PA-08-143 Sadr City R3 Water 

Treatment Plant

Baghdad $65,848,442 GRC 

PA-08-144 Falluja WWTP Anbar $83,297,392 GRC 

PA-08-145 Falluja Sewer--Area 

A Construction and 

Repair

Anbar $2,906,420 GRC 

PA-08-146 Falluja Sewer--Pump 

Station 1&2

Anbar $7,223,472 GRC 

PA-08-147 Falluja Sewer--Force 

Main

Anbar $1,803,949 GRC 

PA-08-148 Falluja Sewer--

Earthwork for the 

WWTP

Anbar $2,768,887 GRC 

PA-08-149 Al Quds School Baghdad $419,700 MNC-I 

PA-08-150 Al Mualameen 

School

Baghdad $389,200 MNC-I 

PA-08-151 Al Faoo School Baghdad $441,000 MNC-I 

PA-08-152 Anbar Rule of Law/

Judicial Complex

Anbar $21,461,905 GRC 

PA-08-153 Ramadi 132-kV 

Substation

Anbar $28,789,029 GRC 

Co

226-826 Report.indd 76 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-08-154 Plumbing Repairs at 

the Baghdad Police 

College

Baghdad $3,182,659 AFCEE & 

MNSTC-I

PA-08-155 Plumbing Repairs at 

the Baghdad Police 

College

Baghdad See above AFCEE & 

MNSTC-I

PA-08-156 Plumbing Repairs at 

the Baghdad Police 

College

Baghdad See above AFCEE & 

MNSTC-I

PA-08-157 Shiqaq Hai Musalla 

Primary Healthcare 

Center

Tameem $304,540 GRN 

PA-08-158 Hai Tiseen Primary 

Healthcare Center

Tameem $465,015 GRN 

PA-08-159 Basrah Courthouse 

Construction

Basrah $8,780,942 GRS 

PA-08-160 Basrah Children’s 

Hospital

Basrah $37,682,169 GRS 

PA-08-162 Roll-on/Roll-off 

Berth in the Port of 

Umm Qasr

Basrah $2,734,500 GRS 

PA-08-164 4th Brigade, 10th 

Infantry Division Iraqi 

Army HQ Barracks

Missan $1,253,096 GRS 

PA-08-165 Missan Surgical 

Hospital, Phase 2

Missan $6,800,000 GRS 

PA-08-166 Secure Document 

Storage Facility

Baghdad $1,535,006 GRC 

PA-08-167 Missan Surgical 

Hospital, Phase 1

Missan $5,900,000 GRS 

PA-08-168 Renovation of 

the Tomb of the 

Unknown Soldier

Baghdad $1,740,772 MNC-I 

PA-09-169 Basrah Courthouse 

Witness Protection 

Facility

Basrah $2,195,235 GRS 

PA-09-170 Mujarrah Canal 

Bridge

Anbar $1,261,500 GRC 

PA-09-171 Ammana Market 

Renovation

Baghdad $596,360 GRC 

PA-09-172 Abu Ghraib Dairy Baghdad $3,400,000 TFBSO 

PA-09-173 Rabeaa Point of 

Entry Screening 

Facility

Ninewa $3,109,588 GRN 

PA-09-174 Hammam Al Alil 

Division Training 

Center

Ninewa $3,573,708 GRN 

Co

226-826 Report.indd 77 
78 I IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS IN INSPECTIONS OF U.S.-FUNDED STABILIZATION AND 

Number Project Name Province Total Cost Agency 

PA-09-177 Renovate and 

Expand Chamchamal 

Correctional Facility

Sulaymaniyah $28,691,150 GRN 

PA-09-178 Orphanage and 

Senior Citizen 

Assisted Living 

Center

Erbil $3,725,000 GRN 

PA-09-179 Abattoir 

(Slaughterhouse) in 

Qaladze

Sulaymaniyah $1,100,000 GRN 

PA-09-182 Al Kasik Location 

Command

Ninewa $6,311,861 GRN 

PA-09-183 Hammam Al Alil 

Regional Training 

Center

Ninewa $5,028,566 GRN 

PA-09-186 Humer Kwer Health 

Center

Sulaymaniyah $547,257 GRN 

PA-09-188 Thi Qar Bee Farm Thi-Qar $254,960 GRS 

PA-09-189 Basrah Modern 

Slaughterhouse

Basrah $5,635,000 GRS 

PA-09-190 Al Hadi Permanent 

Police Station

Basrah $1,274,339 MNSTC-I 

PA-09-191 Al Qaim 33/11kV 

Electrical Mobile 

Substation

Anbar $6,460,630 GRC 

PA-09-192 Haditha Dam 

Perimeter Security

Anbar $997,500 GRC 

SA-05-001 Pipeline River 

Crossing

Salah Al-Din $75,700,000 USACE 

226-826 Report.indd 78 
DECEMBER 2011 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECO

ppedC: coys

Acronym Defi nition

AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 

DFAC Dining Facility

DFI Development Fund for Iraq 

ESF Economic Support Fund

GE General Electric

GOI Government of Iraq

GRC Gulf Region Central 

GRD Gulf Region Division

GRN Gulf Region North 

GRS Gulf Region South 

HDD horizontal directional drilling 

HOPE Health Opportunities for People Everywhere

I-CERP Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program

IFF Iraq Freedom Fund

IG inspector general 

IIGF Iraqi Interim Government Fund

INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

KBR Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.

m3 cubic meters

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq

MNF-West Multi-National Force-West

MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

MW megawatt

PCO Project Contracting Offi ce

PEZ pipeline exclusion zone

PIJV Parsons Iraq Joint Venture 

QA quality assurance

QC quality control

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

226-826 Report.indd 79 
226-826 Report.indd 80