David R. Ruby (VSB #22703)

William D. Prince IV (VSB #77209)

Michael G. Matheson (VSB #82391)

ThompsonMcMullan, P.C.

100 Shockoe Slip, Third Floor

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Telephone: (804) 698-6220

Facsimile: (804) 780-1813

Email: druby@t-mlaw.com

Email: wprince@t-mlaw.com

Email: mmatheson@t-mlaw.com

Counsel for Allied Title Lending, LLC d/b/a Allied Cash Advance

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Richmond Division

)

In re: ) Chapter 13

)

SHIRLEY DEAN TAYLOR, ) Case No. 17-30142-KRH

)

Debtor. )

)

SHIRLEY DEAN TAYLOR, )

) Adv. Proc. No. 18-03003-KRH

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

ALLIED TITLE LENDING, LLC d/b/a )

ALLIED CASH ADVANCE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER OF CERTIFICATION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond 

Division, pursuant to Rule 5:40 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, certifies two 

questions of law to the Supreme Court of Virginia because the questions of law are determinative 

in a pending action and there is no controlling Virginia precedent on point.

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 1 of 16
2

I. The Nature of the Controversy in Which the Questions Arise

Debtor Shirley Taylor (“Taylor”) has filed an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy 

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking relief against Allied Title Lending LLC d/b/a 

Allied Cash Advance (“Allied”). Under Count II and Count III of her Amended Complaint, 

Taylor contends that Allied’s “Line of Credit Agreement and Plan” violates Virginia consumer 

finance law so as to entitle her to relief under Virginia Code §§ 6.2-305 and -1541. Taylor seeks 

such relief on behalf of herself and a putative class of other debtors in bankruptcy proceedings.

Specifically, Taylor contends that Allied’s Line of Credit Agreement and Plan does not 

qualify for the statutory usury and licensure exemption for open-end credit products stated in 

Virginia Code § 6.2-312(A). According to the Amended Complaint, Allied allegedly does not 

meet this exemption, and Allied’s Line of Credit Agreement and Plan is unlawful and void,

because: (1) Allied charges interest in excess of 12 percent per year in violation of Code § 6.2-

303; and (2) Allied is unlicensed in violation of Code § 6.2-1501. It is undisputed that Allied 

charges interest in excess of 12 percent per year and that Allied is unlicensed. Allied contends 

that, under Virginia law, it is not bound by the 12 percent interest cap and is not required to have 

a license.

Taylor and the putative class of debtors seek disallowance of Allied’s proofs of claim, a 

declaration that Allied’s products are void, monetary damages as provided under Code §§ 6.2-

305 and -1541, and injunctive relief. Whether Allied’s Line of Credit Agreement and Plan meets 

the exemption criteria stated in Code § 6.2-312(A) is consequently determinative of Taylor’s 

claims in Count II and Count III of the Amended Complaint.

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 2 of 16
3

The following procedural history has given rise to this Order:

a. On July 25, 2016, Taylor entered into a “Line of Credit Agreement and Plan” (the 

“Agreement”) with Allied Title Lending LLC d/b/a Allied Cash Advance (“Allied”) with a stated 

“credit limit” of $1,500.00.

b. In extending credit to Virginia consumers, Allied repeatedly used the same Line 

of Credit Agreement and Plan used with Taylor, but with individualized credit limits at or below 

$1,500. 

c. On January 11, 2017, Taylor filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Case 

No. 17-30142. 

d. On March 21, 2017, Allied filed Proof of Claim No. 8-1 (“Claim 8-1”) for the 

unsecured amount of $2,756.92. Allied cites the Agreement as the basis for its claim.

e. On August 29, 2017, Taylor filed an Objection to Claim No. 8-1. The basis for 

Taylor’s objection is her allegation that no debt is owed because the Agreement is void and 

unenforceable.

f. On September 28, 2017, defendant Cerastes, LLC (“Cerastes”) filed an Original 

Transfer of Claim, asserting that it had acquired this debt from Allied. The same day, Cerastes 

filed Amended Proof of Claim No. 8-2 (“Claim 8-2”) for the unsecured amount of $2,756.92. 1

g. Cerastes subsequently transferred the claim back to Allied. Thus, as the case 

presently stands, Allied is the holder of Claim 8-2.

h. On January 15, 2018, Taylor filed Adversary Proceeding No. 18-03003 against 

Allied and Cerastes. 

 1Claim 8-2 amended and replaced the original Claim 8-1.

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 3 of 16
4

i. On March 15, 2018, Taylor filed an Amended Complaint as of right as permitted 

by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Amended Complaint asserts five (5) 

counts. Of these, only Count II and Count III involve issues related to the certified questions 

presented in this Order.2

j. Count II seeks disallowance of Allied’s claims against her in the bankruptcy 

proceeding as well as monetary damages under Code §§ 6.2-305 and -1541. In addition, with 

respect to the class action aspect of her Amended Complaint, Count II seeks disallowance of all 

proofs of claim that Allied filed in each putative class member’s bankruptcy case as well as 

monetary relief.

3

k. Count III seeks a declaration that the Agreement is void under Virginia law as 

well as monetary relief under Virginia Code §§ 6.2-305 and -1541. In addition, with respect to 

the class action aspect of her Amended Complaint, Taylor seeks comparable relief. 4

 2 Count I and Count V seek the disallowance of Claim 8-2 for violation of the Bankruptcy Rules 

and corresponding injunctive relief under Bankruptcy Rule 3001 and 11 U.S.C. § 105. Count IV 

only seeks relief against Cerastes.

3 Count II seeks the certification of the following class of debtors:

All debtors in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia who, 

before filing bankruptcy, entered into a credit agreement with Allied based upon a 

purportedly open-end credit basis, and a claim was filed regarding that agreement.

4 Count III seeks the certification of the following class of debtors:

All debtors in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia who, 

before filing bankruptcy, entered into a credit agreement with Allied based upon a 

purportedly open-end credit basis.

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 4 of 16
5

l. Finally, the Amended Complaint generally seeks “[a] Declaration that [Allied] 

violated the law and an injunction against [Allied] filing any further Proofs of Claim to collect 

debts based on Allied extensions of credit made in violation of Virginia’s open-end credit 

statutes.”

m. On March 29, 2018, Allied filed several responsive pleadings and motions, 

including a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure (“Motion to Dismiss”). The Motion to Dismiss seeks the dismissal of Count II 

and Count III on the asserted grounds that, inter alia, the Amended Complaint fails to adequately 

allege that Allied’s line of credit product violates Virginia consumer finance law. 

n. On July 9, 2018, Allied filed a Motion for Certification of Questions of State Law 

(“Motion to Certify”) asking this Court to certify to the Supreme Court of Virginia the same 

questions of Virginia law raised in the Motion to Dismiss.

o. On July 24, 2018, the parties, by counsel, appeared before this Court for a hearing 

on, inter alia, the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Certify. At the conclusion of the hearing, this 

Court granted the Motion to Certify and entered a stay of all proceedings pending resolution of 

the issues presented in this Order by the Supreme Court of Virginia.

II. The Questions of Law to Be Answered

1. Is the “Origination Fee” in the Agreement between Allied and Taylor a “finance 

charge” as that term is used in Virginia Code § 6.2-312? 

2. If so, does Virginia Code § 6.2-312 require that no such finance charge be 

imposed upon the obligor if payment in full of the unpaid balance is received by the creditor 

prior to the next billing date?

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 5 of 16
6

III. Statement of All Facts Relevant to the Certified Question

The below facts are not in dispute. Instead, disputed questions of Virginia statutory law

are determinative of the issues raised in Allied’s motion to dismiss Taylor’s Virginia statutory 

claims in Counts II and III in the Amended Complaint. Taylor contends, at bottom, that the 

Agreement is unlawful and void under Virginia law. A copy of the Agreement appears as Exhibit 

1 to the Amended Complaint, and is incorporated into this Order by reference. 

The Agreement provides a $1,500.00 credit limit at the stated interest rate of 273.75%. It 

is undisputed that the Agreement charges the consumer a one-time, $100 “Origination Fee” at 

the time credit is extended. The $100 fee, which is not owed until the end of the first billing 

cycle, is imposed regardless of the amount of credit extended and regardless of whether the 

obligor has repaid the amount of credit extended before the next billing date. On page 2 of the 

Agreement, under the header “Origination Fee,” the Agreement states:

You will be charged an origination fee in the amount listed on page 1 of this Line 

of Credit Agreement and Plan for the availability of credit under this plan (the 

“Origination Fee”), which will be billed to your account when you open this Line 

of Credit.

Allied and Taylor entered into the Agreement on July 25, 2016. The Agreement was for 

personal, family, household or other non-business purpose. Allied is not a licensed consumer 

finance company with the State Corporation Commission.

IV. The Names of the Parties and Their Counsel

Shirley Taylor is the plaintiff-appellee. She is represented by the following counsel:

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 6 of 16
7

Mark C. Leffler (VSB # 40712)

Emily Connor Kennedy (VSB # 83889)

Boleman Law Firm, P.C.

2104 W. Laburnum Ave., Suite 201

Richmond, VA 23227

Tel: (804) 358-9900

Email: mcleffler@boelmanlaw.com

Email: eckennedy@bolemanlaw.com

Dale W. Pittman (VSB #15673)

The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C.

The Eliza Spotswood House

112-A West Tabb Street

Petersburg, VA 23803

Tel: (804) 861-6000

Email: dale@pittmanlawoffice.com

Thomas D. Domonoske (VSB #35434)

Elizabeth W. Hanes (VSB #75574)

Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C.

763 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Suite 1A

Newport News, VA 23601

Tel: (540) 442-7706

Email: tom@clalegal.com

Email: elizabeth@clalegal.com

Allied Title Lending, LLC d/b/a Allied Cash Advance is the defendant-appellant. It is 

represented by the following counsel:

David R. Ruby (VSB No. 22703)

William D. Prince IV (VSB No. 77209)

Michael G. Matheson (VSB No. 82391)

ThompsonMcMullan, P.C.

100 Shockoe Slip, Third Floor

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Tel.: (804) 698-6220

Fax: (804) 780-1813

Email: druby@t-mlaw.com

Email: wprince@t-mlaw.com

Email: mmatheson@t-mlaw.com

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 7 of 16
8

Allied will also be represented before the Supreme Court of Virginia by:

William H. Hurd (VSB No. 16967)

Troutman Sanders LLP

1001 Haxall Point

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Tel.: (804) 697-1335

Fax: (804) 698-6058

Email: William.hurd@troutman.com

Cerastes, LLC is a defendant that is represented by the following counsel:

Daniel Ross, Esq. (VSB #79727)

Weinstein & Riley, P.S.

2001 Western Ave., Suite 400

Seattle, WA 98121

Tel: (206) 269-3490

Fax: (206) 269-3493

Email: DanielR@w-legal.com

Charles H. Jeanfreau, Jr., Esq.

Weinstein & Riley, P.S.

11 Broadway, Suite 615

New York, NY 10004

Tel: (212) 268-5540 

Email: charlesj@w-legal.com

Michael B. Ballato (VSB #19603)

Ballato Law Firm, P.C.

3721 Westerre Parkway, Suite A

Richmond, VA 23233

Tel: (804) 433-1060

Email: mbb@ballatolaw.com

V. The Certified Questions Are Determinative of Claims in Shirley Taylor’s 

Bankruptcy Proceeding

Taylor alleges that the Agreement violates Virginia Code § 6.2-303. That section

provides that “[n]o contract shall be made for the payment of interest on a loan at a rate that 

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 8 of 16
9

exceeds 12 percent per year.” Taylor also alleges that the Agreement violates Virginia Code §

6.2-1501(A), which states:

No person shall engage in the business of making loans to individuals for 

personal, family, household, or other nonbusiness purposes, and charge, contract 

for, or receive, directly or indirectly, on or in connection with any loan interest, 

charges, compensation, consideration, or expense that in the aggregate is greater 

than the interest permitted by § 6.2-303, except as provided in and authorized by 

this chapter or Chapter 22 (§ 6.2-2200 et seq.) and without first having obtained a 

license from the Commission.

However, Code § 6.2-1501(B)(3) states that Subsection A does not prohibit the “[e]xtending of 

credit as described in § 6.2-312 in any amount.” Code § 6.2-312(A) reads:

Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter other than § 6.2-327, and except as 

provided in subsection C, a seller or lender engaged in extending credit under an 

open-end credit plan may impose, on credit extended under the plan, finance 

charges and other charges and fees at such rates and in such amounts and manner 

as may be agreed upon by the creditor and the obligor, if under the plan a finance 

charge is imposed upon the obligor if payment in full of the unpaid balance is not 

received at the place designated by the creditor prior to the next billing date, 

which shall be at least 25 days later than the prior billing date.

Thus, it is not disputed that a consumer finance company offering open-ended credit products in 

the manner provided under Code § 6.2-312 is exempt both from the interest rate limitations 

stated in Code § 6.2-303 as well as the licensure requirements stated in Code § 6.2-1501. At 

issue is what Code § 6.2-312 requires in order for a consumer finance company to be entitled to 

the exemption.

Taylor contends that Allied’s line of credit product does not meet the exemption criteria 

under Code § 6.2-312. Specifically, Taylor contends: (1) that the Origination Fee is a finance 

charge as that term is used in Code § 6.2-312(A); and (2) that, to qualify for the exemption

thereunder, Allied must not impose a finance charge if payment in full of the unpaid balance is 

received by Allied prior to the next billing date (which must be at least 25 days following the 

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 9 of 16
10

prior billing date.) Because the Origination Fee is assessed at the time credit is extended, Taylor 

contends that it is an impermissible charge under Code § 6.2-312(A). If both of Taylor’s 

contentions are correct, the Agreement does not qualify for the exemption under Code § 6.2-

312(A), and the Agreement is thereby unlawful under Code §§ 6.2-303 and -1501.

On the other hand, Allied contends: (1) that the Origination Fee is not a finance charge as 

that term is used in Code § 6.2-312(A) and elsewhere in Title 6.2; and (2) that, regardless, Code 

§ 6.2-312(A) is not a limitation on the imposition of finance charges, as Taylor contends. On 

these legal grounds, Allied argues that Taylor has failed to state a claim and Counts II and III of 

her Amended Complaint should be dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Virginia’s resolution of the certified questions of Virginia law are 

determinative of Count II and Count III. If the Court were to determine either: (1) that the 

Origination Fee is not a “finance charge” for purposes of Code § 6.2-312(A); or (2) that the 

Origination Fee is a permissible finance charge under Code § 6.2-312(A), such ruling would be 

determinative of Taylor’s claims in Count II and Count III. There would also cease to be any 

legal basis for an award of declaratory and injunctive relief predicated upon these alleged 

violations of Virginia’s open-end credit statutes.

VI. Relevant Decisions

There is no decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the Court of Appeals of Virginia 

construing these questions under Virginia Code § 6.2-312 and, more specifically, the issues 

presented in the certified questions.

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 10 of 16
11

VII. Order

Pursuant to Rule 5:40 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia relating to the 

certification of questions of law, it is hereby ordered:

A. That the questions stated in Part II above be, and the same hereby are, certified to 

the Supreme Court of Virginia for answers;

B. That the Clerk of this court forward to the Supreme Court of Virginia, under 

official seal of this court, a copy of this Certification Order, together with the original or copies

of all or of any portion of the record before this court deemed necessary by the Supreme Court of 

Virginia to answer the certified questions; and

C. That any request for all or part of the record be fulfilled by the Clerk of this court 

simply upon notification from the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: August 20, 2018 /s/ Kevin R. Huennekens

United States Bankruptcy Judge

Entered on Docket:

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 11 of 16
12

We ask for this:

By: /s/ William D. Prince IV

David R. Ruby (VSB # 22703)

William D. Prince IV (VSB # 77209)

Michael G. Matheson (VSB # 82391)

Thompson McMullan, P.C.

100 Shockoe Slip, Third Floor

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Telephone: (804) 698-6254

Facsimile: (804) 780-1813

Email: druby@t-mlaw.com

Email: wprince@t-mlaw.com

Email: mmatheson@t-mlaw.com

Counsel for Allied Title Lending, LLC d/b/a Allied Cash Advance

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 12 of 16
13

Seen and disagreed with the Court’s decision for the reasons in the record, and with this Order 

for not stating all relevant facts and for not stating that Plaintiff has alleged alternative basis for 

Count 2 and 3:

By: /s/ Mark C. Leffler (with permission by email dated 08/15/2018)

Mark C. Leffler (VSB # 40712)

Emily Connor Kennedy (VSB # 83889)

Boleman Law Firm, P.C.

2104 W. Laburnum Ave., Suite 201

Richmond, VA 23227

Tel: (804) 358-9900

Email: mcleffler@boelmanlaw.com

Email: eckennedy@bolemanlaw.com

Dale W. Pittman (VSB #15673)

The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C.

The Eliza Spotswood House

112-A West Tabb Street

Petersburg, VA 23803

Tel: (804) 861-6000

Email: dale@pittmanlawoffice.com

Thomas D. Domonoske (VSB #35434)

Elizabeth W. Hanes (VSB #75574)

Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C.

763 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Suite 1A

Newport News, VA 23601

Tel: (540) 442-7706

Email: tom@clalegal.com

Email: elizabeth@clalegal.com

Counsel for Plaintiff Shirley Dean Taylor

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 13 of 16
14

By: /s/ Daniel Ross (with permission by email dated 08/15/2018)

Daniel Ross, Esq. (VSB #79727)

Weinstein & Riley, P.S.

2001 Western Ave., Suite 400

Seattle, WA 98121

Tel: (206) 269-3490

Fax: (206) 269-3493

Email: DanielR@w-legal.com

Charles H. Jeanfreau, Jr., Esq.

Weinstein & Riley, P.S.

11 Broadway, Suite 615

New York, NY 10004

Tel: (212) 268-5540 

Email: charlesj@w-legal.com

Michael B. Ballato (VSB #19603)

Ballato Law Firm, P.C.

3721 Westerre Parkway, Suite A

Richmond, VA 23233

Tel: (804) 433-1060

Email: mbb@ballatolaw.com

Counsel for Cerastes, LLC

LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9022-1 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9022-1(C), I hereby certify that the foregoing 

proposed order has been endorsed by and/or served upon all necessary parties. 

/s/ William D. Prince IV

Counsel

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 14 of 16
15

Certified Copy to:

Supreme Court of Virginia 

Attn: Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk of the Court

P.O. Box 1315 

100 North Ninth Street, 5th Floor

Richmond, VA 23219-1315

Copies to:

Mark C. Leffler, Esq.

Emily Connor Kennedy, Esq.

Boleman Law Firm, P.C.

2104 W. Laburnum Ave., Suite 201

Richmond, VA 23227

Dale W. Pittman, Esq.

The Law Office of Dale W. Pittman, P.C.

The Eliza Spotswood House

112-A West Tabb Street

Petersburg, VA 23803

Thomas D. Domonoske, Esq.

Elizabeth W. Hanes, Esq.

Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C.

763 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Suite 1A

Newport News, VA 23601

David R. Ruby, Esq.

William D. Prince IV, Esq.

Michael G. Matheson, Esq.

ThompsonMcMullan, P.C.

100 Shockoe Slip, Third Floor

Richmond, Virginia 23219

William H. Hurd, Esq.

Troutman Sanders LLP

1001 Haxall Point

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Daniel Ross, Esq.

Weinstein & Riley, P.S.

2001 Western Ave., Suite 400

Seattle, WA 98121

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 15 of 16
16

Charles H. Jeanfreau, Jr., Esq.

Weinstein & Riley, P.S.

11 Broadway, Suite 615

New York, NY 10004

Michael B. Ballato, Esq.

Ballato Law Firm, P.C.

3721 Westerre Parkway, Suite A

Richmond, VA 23233

David B. Irvin, Esq.

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Consumer Protection Section

Predatory Lending Unit

202 North Ninth Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Erin E. Witte, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General

Consumer Protection Section

Predatory Lending Unit

202 North Ninth Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

James E. Scott, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General

Consumer Protection Section

Predatory Lending Unit

202 North Ninth Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Case 18-03003-KRH Doc 78 Filed 08/20/18 Entered 08/20/18 13:37:24 Desc Main

 Document Page 16 of 16