IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2018-CP-00453-COA LORANZ Y JENKINS A/K/A LORANZ Y EUGENE JENKINS A/K/A LORANZ Y E. JENKINS APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W ILLIAM E. CHAPMAN III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LORANZY JENKINS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LISA L. BLOUNT NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/02/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ. McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Loranzy Jenkins appeals the circuit court’s denial of his m otion f

or post-conviction relief (PCR). In his PCR m otion, J enkins a sserted that the indictm e nt a gainst h im was f atally def ective f o r f a i lure to include essential elem ents of the crim e of gratif i cation of lust—to which he pleaded guilty

. Finding that no essential e lem ents were om itted in the indictm ent or other reversible error, we af f i rm the circuit court’s denial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. J e n k i n s p l e a d e d g u i l t y i n t h e Rankin County Circuit C ourt to t w o c o u n t s o f
gr a t i f i cation of lust. The circuit court sentenced J enkins to f if t een y e a rs f

or each count,s u s p e n ded nine y ears f rom e ach count, and im

posed f ive y ears o f p ost-release supervis e d probation. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively

. ¶3. Jenkins tim ely f

i led a m o t i o n f

o r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i on relief

. H e claim ed that the indictm ent was f

atally def e ctive, resulting i n “an illegal sentence, plain error, and the denial of d ue p r ocess during [ h is] prosecution and sentencing.” He com plained in his PCR m otion that his indictm e nt did n ot use the word “f eloniously ” i n either count and that each count did
not conclude with the language “against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.” ¶4. The c ircuit court denied Jenkins’s PCR m otion, s t ating that “f or the r easons argued by the State, the petition is not well taken.” From this order, Jenkins now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5. “W hen reviewing a trial court’s denial o r dism issal of a P C R mo t ion, we will only disturb the trial court’s f

actual f indings if t hey a re clearly erroneous; however, we r eview the trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.” B a ss v. State , 237 So.
3 d 1 7 2 , 1 7 3 ( ¶ 4 ) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “W h ether an i ndictm ent is f atally def ective is a question of law that we review de novo.” Bryant v. State , 238 So. 3d 1 213, 1216 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
DISCUSSION ¶6. “The chief objective of an indictm ent i s to provide a def endant f air n otice of the crim e charged.” Id. at 1216 (¶8). Unif orm Rule of Circuit and C ounty Court 7 .06 1 provided that

1 T h e U n if

o rm R u les o f

C ircu it an d C o u n ty C o u rt w ere rep laced b y th e M ississip p i R u les o f C rim in a l P ro ced u re, w h i ch w ere m ad e ef f ectiv e Ju ly 1 , 2 0 1 7

. Jen k i n s’s in d ictm en t an d p lea p reced e d th is ch an g e. 2an indictm ent m ust set f orth t hat “the essential f

acts constituting the of

f ense charged and shall f ully notif y the def endant o f the nature and cause of the a ccusation.” Bryant , 238 So. 3d at 1216 (¶8). Specif

ically , “an indictm ent m

ust c ontain (1) the essential elem e nts of the

o f f ense charged, (2) suf

f icient f acts t o f airly inf o rm the def

endant of the charge against which he m

ust def end, and (3) suf

f icient f acts t o enable h im to plead double jeopardy in the
event of a f

uture prosecution f

or the sam e of

f ense.” Id

. (quoting Gilmer v. State , 955 So. 2d 829, 836-37 (¶24) (Miss. 2 0 07)). The Mississippi Suprem e Court h as held that an indictm ent is legally suf

f icient “so long as f

rom a f air reading of

the indictm ent, taken as a whole, the
nature and c ause of the charge against the accused are cle a r . ” I d

. ( q u oting Henderson v. State , 445 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Miss. 1984)). ¶7. W e f

irst note that Jenkins pleaded guilty and was represented by counsel during his plea. G enerally , a know i n g a n d v o luntary guilty plea serves as a waiver t o i nsuf f iciencies

or def e cts in the indictm ent. Jones v. State , 2 15 So. 3d 508, 510 ( ¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). However, “a guilty p lea does not waive a n indictm e nt’s f ailure to charge an essential elem ent of the crim e.” Id

. J e nkins s pecif ically com

p lains t h a t h i s i n d i ctm ent (1) f ailed t o use the word “f eloniously ” and (2) f

ailed to conclude each count with the words “against the peace and dignity

of the State,” claim ing these om issions are essential elem ents.
I

. The w ord “feloniously ” is not an essential elem ent of the crim e. ¶8. J e n k i ns was indicted under and pleaded guilty to s ection 97-5-23(1) (Rev. 2 0 1 4 ) , which states: Any person above the age of eighteen (18) y e ars , who, f or the purpose of gratif y ing his or her lust, o r i ndulging h is or her d epraved licent i o u s sexual

3desires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or her body or

any m em ber thereof

, o r with any object, any child under t he a g e of sixteen (16) y ears, with or without the child’s consent . . . shall be guilty of a f elony

. . . . In relevant part, Counts I and II of the indictm ent c harged J enkins with the f ollowing allegation: [ F]or the purpose o f g r a tif y ing his lust or indulging his depraved l icentious sexual desires, did willf

ully , unlawf

ully , and intentionally handle, touch or r ub with his hands or any p art o f his body , t he body of S .P., a m inor f em ale child under the age o f sixteen (16) y ears, whose date of birth is June 10, 2000, all within the jurisdiction of this court, in violation of Missis sippi Code Annotated Section 97-5-23(1) (1972, as am ended) . . . . ¶9. Section 97-5-23(1) d o es n ot contain the term “f eloniously .” W ith r egard to intent, the
statute c r i mi n a l i z e s the act when done “f o r the p urpose of g ratif

y ing his or her lust, or indulging his or h e r depraved licentious sexual desires.” § 97-5-23(1). Jenkins’s indictm ent tracked the statute’s language exactly

. It also charged that he com m i tted the act “ willf ully , unlawf ully , and intentionally .” “Indictm ents that track the language of the Mississippi Code

are suf f icient to p rovide n otice o f the crim e charged.” Pitts v. State , 249 So. 3d 472, 475 (¶8) (Miss. C t. App. 2018) (quoting G raves v. State , 216 So. 3d 1152, 1158 (¶12) ( Miss. 2016)).
Because it tracked the language of the statute, Jenkins’s indictm ent did not om it a n essential elem ent of

the crim e. ¶10. Jenkins f

urther arg u e d t h a t f

ailure t o use the word “f e l oniously ” deprived him of notice of whether he w as being charged with a f elony or a m isdem eanor. H owever, there is

no crim e of m isdem eanor g ratif ication of lust that would require dif f erentiation through the

use of the word “f

e loniously .” Further , t h e r e c o r d shows that in his plea petition, Jenkins af f irm ed t he f

ollowing: “My

attorney advises m e a n d I understand that the elem ents of the

4charge to whi c h I a m p l e a ding guilty are as f ollows: that I d id willingly , unlawf ully , feloniously , knowingly , [ t]ouch a m inor under the age o f s i xteen f or the purpose o f gratif

y ing lust.” (Em

phasis added). ¶11. Jenkins’s indictm e nt tracked the language of the statute and was not f atally def ective
f or f ailure to use the word “f

eloniously .” This issue is without m erit.
II. Jenkins’s indictm ent properly concludes w ith the p hrase “against the peace and dignity of the State.” ¶12. Jenkins also argues that h is indictm ent w as f atally def ective f or f ailure t o conclude Count I with the language “against the peace and dignity of t he State” bef

ore Count II. ¶13. Our Mississippi Constitution of 1 8 9 0 r e q u i r es that “all i ndictm ents shall conclude ‘against the peace and d ignity of the state.’” Miss. C onst. art. 6 , § 169. Jenkins’s indictm ent does conclude with the statem e nt: “All of the a bove, Count I a n d Count II, being against the
peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.” That t he phr a s e c o n c l u d e s the e nd of the indictm ent as t o both counts rather than af ter each count is not erroneous. Mississippi case law has long held that the words “ against the peace and dignity of the state of Mississippi”

are only required to appear at the conclusion of the indictm ent. S tarling v. State , 90 Miss. 255, 266-67, 43 So. 952, 9 53 ( 1907). Repeating the language throughout the indictm ent is not required, as “redundancy is unnecessary .” Pegues v State , 2 14 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “All counts of the indictm ent m eet constitutional m uster so long as the i ndictm ent concludes with the m agic words, which this one does.” I d

. And “[ w]hile the concluding statem ent i s , i n f act, required, it is a m atter of t he f orm of the indictm ent.” Id

. at (¶5). A valid guilty plea waives such claim s. Id . Jenkins pleaded guilty and, theref

ore,

5has waived this claim . This issue is without m erit.

III. The issue raised in Jenkins’s reply brief is barred. ¶14. This Co urt does “not consider issues raised f o r the f irst tim e in an a

ppellant’s reply brief .” Moore v
. State , 250 So. 3d 521, 526 ( ¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2 0 1 8 )

. Jenkins raises a

n e w i ssue in his reply brief , stating his indictm ent was f atally def ective because it om itted the language “with or without c o n s e n t .” The issue is procedurally barred. Jenkins also waived the issue when he pleaded guilty

. CONCLUSION ¶15. Jenkins’s indictm e nt contained all the essential elem ents of the c rim e and adequately placed him on notice of t he n a ture of the charges he f aced so that he could p r e p a r e an adequate def

ense. W e af

f i rm the circuit court’s denial of Jenkins’s PCR m otion. ¶16. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, M c DONALD, LAWRENCE AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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