UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION,

1617 JFK Blvd, Suite 520 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Plaintiff,

v. 

XUE SAMUEL LEE,

 a/k/a “Sam” LEE, 

 573 Glen Huntly Road 

 Elsternwick, VIC 3185, Australia1

and 

BRENDA INDAH CHUNGA, 

 a/k/a “Bitcoin Beautee,” 

 336 Sherer Lane, Severna Park, Anne 

 Arundel County, MD 211462

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-cv-00296

COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL 

DEMANDED 

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or the “SEC”) files 

this Complaint against Defendants Xue Samuel Lee a/k/a “Sam” Lee (“Lee”) and Brenda Indah 

Chunga a/k/a “Bitcoin Beautee” (“Chunga”), and alleges as follows: 

SUMMARY

1. This case involves a global, crypto asset-related, multi-level marketing pyramid

and Ponzi scheme that raised over $1.7 billion from victims worldwide, including millions from 

U.S. investors. Defendants and others operated the scheme through a series of projects referred 

to collectively herein as “HyperFund.” 

1 The address for Defendant Lee reflects his last known address in Australia. As indicated infra, we believe 

Defendant Lee currently resides in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 2 The address for Defendant Chunga reflects her known address during the actions set forth in the 

Complaint. Ms. Chunga can be reached through her counsel: Jonathan P. Van Hoven, 36 South Charles Street, 

Suite 901, Baltimore, MD 21201. 

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2. The HyperTech Group, a purported blockchain technology conglomerate 

founded by Lee and others (collectively, the “Founders”) launched HyperFund in June 2020. At 

the outset, HyperFund claimed to be a project dedicated to creating a so-called “decentralized 

finance (DeFi) ecosystem” for crypto asset market participants. Over time, the project’s stated

goals evolved and utilized various names in an effort to capitalize on the buzz words and 

zeitgeist of the day, including rebranding itself as “HyperVerse” and, later, as “HyperNation,” a 

version of the project which featured an individual in a mask discussing creating a decentralized 

government to escape the societal bonds of inequality and injustice through blockchain 

technology. HyperFund, including its subsequent rebranded iterations, is now defunct. 

3. From June 2020 through May 2022, HyperFund offered so-called “membership” 

packages promising exorbitant passive returns, supposedly derived in part from HyperFund’s 

crypto asset mining operations. For example, HyperFund promised returns of 0.5% to 1% per 

day, with the prospect of tripling ones’ initial investment in 600 days. HyperFund also 

implemented a pyramid scheme-like referral system to reward existing members for recruiting 

new investors. 

4. HyperFund’s membership packages were offered and sold as investment 

contracts, and therefore, securities under the federal securities laws, because investors made an 

investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits from the 

efforts of Defendants or third parties. The membership packages were offered and sold without 

registration, and without qualifying for any exemption from registration.

5. Lee was centrally involved with HyperFund throughout its lifecycle. Lee was a 

co-founder of HyperTech Group, which claimed to be involved in “Large Scale Crypto Mining,” 

including bitcoin, that promoters asserted was a key revenue source for HyperFund. However, 

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Lee later admitted that HyperTech Group was not engaged in large-scale bitcoin mining. Lee

was also featured prominently during HyperVerse’s launch event, and he even claimed to be 

helping to resurrect HyperVerse after its collapse, as a way of recouping investor losses. 

6. Chunga (known online by her nickname “Bitcoin Beautee”) was one of 

HyperFund’s top promoters and arguably the face of its United States presence. Chunga’s 

recruitment efforts through online seminars and videos included the typical promotional ruses 

associated with fraudulent multi-level marketing schemes. Here, that included focusing on 

investors’ supposed ability to make money via daily passive rewards, and also via so-called 

“accelerated” rewards if investors convinced others to join. Chunga’s pitch was successful. 

Within six months, Chunga earned the highest level a HyperFund promoter could achieve, 

which, according to promotional materials, required at least $5 million in new investments, 

which were referred to as “sales,” and she continued to generate additional new investments long 

after that. Chunga received over $3.7 million, both from the platform and directly from 

investors. She used her earnings to fund extravagant personal expenses and help recruit others 

into the scheme by showing off the potential wealth to be earned through HyperFund. 

7. HyperFund, however, was a pyramid and Ponzi scheme. HyperFund had no 

real source of revenue other than funds received from investors, and Defendants had no basis for 

the promised returns. HyperFund did not engage in large-scale crypto asset mining, despite the 

claims by promoters like Chunga that the investors’ passive rewards were being paid by such 

efforts. HyperFund even hired an actor to pretend to be the new CEO when HyperVerse was 

launched. With no apparent legitimate source of revenues, investor withdrawals were paid with 

new investor deposits. 

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8. Chunga ignored red flags about HyperFund and made several misrepresentations 

to investors to convince them to join. Lee knew or recklessly disregarded that the presentations 

used by the promoters, like Chunga, included false statements. Lee also made statements to 

investors that were misleading by omitting material information about the nature of the business. 

Ultimately, the scheme collapsed in 2022 when investors were no longer able to make 

withdrawals. 

9. From approximately June 2020 to approximately November 2022, Defendants (1) 

raised millions of dollars from retail investors in the United States, and several other countries, 

through the unregistered offer and sale of securities styled as membership interests in 

HyperFund; and (2) made materially false and misleading statements about the investments and 

knowingly or recklessly engaged in a scheme to defraud investors—bilking the investors out of 

over $1.7 billion—by enticing them with the false promise of guaranteed, high returns from 

investments in securities.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 

20(b), 20(d), and 22(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d), and 77v(a); and 

Sections 21(d) and 27(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d) and 78aa(a). 

11. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants and venue is proper in 

this District pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a), and Section 

27(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a), because, among other things, Chunga resided 

and/or listed her legal residence in Maryland for all or a substantial portion of the time she was

engaged in promoting the scheme, many of the Defendants’ acts and transactions constituting 

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violations of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act occurred in this District, and many of the 

harmed victim investors resided in this District during the relevant time. 

12. In addition, this Court has jurisdiction because some or all of the Defendants 

engaged in conduct within the United States that constituted significant steps in furtherance of 

the violations of the federal securities laws alleged in this Complaint.

13. In connection with the conduct alleged in this Complaint, Defendants, directly 

and indirectly, singly or in concert with others, have made use of the means or instrumentalities 

of interstate commerce, the means or instruments of transportation or communication in 

interstate commerce, the mails, and/or the facilities of a national securities exchange – namely, 

through the Defendants’ use of the Internet when engaging in the acts and transactions described 

herein.

DEFENDANTS

14. Xue Samuel Lee a/k/a Sam Lee, age 35, an Australian national, resides in Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates. In addition to HyperFund, Lee purports to be the co-founder and CEO of 

Blockchain Global Ltd., which is part of the HyperTech Group conglomerate. Lee has never 

been associated with a registered entity and has no disciplinary history with the Commission. 

15. Brenda Indah Chunga a/k/a/ “Bitcoin Beautee,” age 43, resided in Severna 

Park, Maryland during the relevant period. Chunga has never been associated with a registered 

entity and has no disciplinary history with the Commission.

RELATED ENTITIES

16. Group Limited (the “HyperTech Group”) was incorporated on April 1, 2020, in 

the Seychelles, and purportedly operated in Hong Kong. HyperTech Group was advertised in 

multiple promotional videos made public during the relevant period as a conglomerate of four 

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blockchain companies controlled by Lee and others: Blockchain Global Ltd., HyperCash 

(formerly known as Hcash), CollinStar Capital, and DigitalX. In or about June 2020, HyperTech 

Group launched HyperFund. HyperTech Group was featured in presentations as the business 

experience and expertise behind the project to give HyperFund credibility for prospective 

investors and was advertised as the alleged source of the rewards investors earned. 

17. HyperFund is the name of the multi-level marketing project launched by 

HyperTech Group in June 2020 that claimed to be building a so-called decentralized finance 

ecosystem. HyperFund was subsequently rebranded to HyperVerse in or about December 2021, 

and then rebranded to HyperNation in or about May 2022. 

FACTS

A. Chunga and Lee Offered and Sold Securities Through HyperFund

The Global Launch of HyperFund 

18. On June 11, 2020, in a press release issued through a paid service, the 

HyperTech Group announced that it was launching HyperFund. The press release billed 

HyperFund as an “upgrade of HyperCapital,” a similar multi-level marketing project one of 

HyperFund’s Founders attempted to launch six months earlier, in January 2020. 

19. The press release described Lee as the founder and Chairman of HyperFund and 

listed Lee as the “contact” for inquiries. 

20. In the press release, Lee was quoted as saying that the upgrade reflected a change 

in the strategic focus and development plans of the company. The press release claimed 

HyperFund would be “more streamlined and better equipped to handle the challenges and 

opportunities in the traditional finance and cryptocurrency market” and would have three key 

focus areas: tech incubation, investment and funding, and community building. 

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21. The press release also claimed that HyperTech Group planned to be listed on the 

Hong Kong Stock Exchange by 2022 and that it intended to launch products such as HyperNews, 

HyperTalk, and HyperShow, supposedly blockchain-based social networking platforms. 

22. The presentations Chunga later used to recruit investors similarly prominently 

featured these and other details about the Founders, including Lee, and the entities that 

purportedly comprised the HyperFund Group on slides that were labeled “Credibility,” including 

slides featuring screenshots of Lee appearing on CNN and other media outlets. One of the 

details Chunga touted was the fact that Lee and another one of the Founders were featured and 

interviewed in an episode of an Amazon Prime documentary series called “Next: Blockchain.” 

23. In one presentation, Chunga leveraged HyperFund’s Founders’ public-facing 

profiles in order to persuade investors that there was no risk in investing with the HyperTech 

Group: 

Some people say things, how do we know they won’t just take our money and 

disappear? Well, ladies and gents, they have more to lose than to gain. They’re 

all over CNN. They have publicly traded companies, they are on Amazon Prime, 

their faces are everywhere. They have more to lose than to gain. 

24. As Chunga emphasized in other presentations: “[L]adies and gents, this is not a 

company that needs your money. . . . He doesn’t need us.” (emphasis added). 

25. On information and belief, Lee was not only a co-founder of HyperFund, but he 

maintained control over HyperFund throughout its existence. Lee’s background and role as cofounder of HyperFund was a prominent feature of the marketing and promotional materials used 

by promoters to attract new investors. Lee was aware or recklessly disregarded that 

HyperFunds’s marketing materials used to recruit investors contained material misstatements

because he admitted as much during a call with an investor. Lee also recorded a message that 

was released as part of the launch of HyperVerse in December 2021, and later appeared in videoCase 1:24-cv-00296-RDB Document 1 Filed 01/29/24 Page 7 of 31
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teleconference calls with promoters and others to attempt to assuage the concerns of 

HyperFund’s investors. 

HyperFund’s “Membership Rewards” Program 

26. Investors purchased “memberships” in HyperFund at various levels using the 

crypto asset Tether (USDT). For example, in her HyperFund videos, Chunga encouraged 

investors to “Choose Your Membership” level: $300, $500, $1,000, or $10,000. Typically 

HyperFund promoters, including Chunga, gave a link to investors through which the investors 

would use Tether to purchase the package. On the HyperFund platform, the value of the 

individual’s membership level was reflected in the form of an internal value called HyperUnits, 

or HU. For example, a $300 membership was reflected as 300 HyperUnits. 

27. Chunga told investors who purchased a membership that they would receive: (1) 

access to a crypto asset educational platform; (2) exclusive pre-sale offerings of future crypto 

asset projects, such as, initial coin offerings (“ICOs”) at 20%-30% below market value; and (3) 

automatic returns on their investment, which were called “rewards.” 

28. HyperFund offered two ways for members to make money: passive rewards, 

which promised investors a daily return of 0.5% to 1% of the value of their investment until they 

earned triple the value of their initial investment, and leveraged or accelerated rewards. 

29. As Chunga explained in a promotional video recorded on or about February 9, 

2021, “[Y]ou will receive your initial membership in 6.5 months, lets round it up to 7 months. . . 

You now have your initial investment amount back in your pocket. And then what happens after 

that? Everything else that’s coming to you every day after that, what is that? That is pure profit. 

You did not have to work for it.” 

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30. According to Chunga, “here, with HyperFund, your money is doing all of the 

work for you and you don’t even have to get out of bed.” 

31. Investors could supposedly also earn “accelerated” rewards by recruiting new 

investors which promoters, like Chunga, encouraged HyperFund investors to do. 

32. HyperFund offered three types of leveraged rewards: Community Rewards, VIP 

Rewards, and Global Rewards. First, with respect to Community Rewards, Chunga explained in 

her presentations that, in exchange for building the community by referring HyperFund to friends 

and family, HyperFund would supposedly pay investors 20% of their downline’s membership 

value every day up to 20 levels. HyperFund’s “COMMUNITY REWARD” program was 

detailed in this illustration from a presentation recorded on or about March 9, 2021 and posted to 

YouTube:

33. Second, the VIP Reward provided further incentive to recruit more investors. 

As Chunga explained: 

The company says in your team, in your group, if you guys have $50,000 in 

membership sales outside of your largest team, we’re going to give you an 

additional half-a-percent every single day on top of everything else they’ve been 

giving you. They also said, if you make it to Pro, which is $100,000 in 

membership in your entire team, they are going to now pay you an additional one 

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percent every single day through infinity . . . of your entire organization minus 

your largest leg. 

34. HyperFund’s VIP Rewards Program is illustrated in this presentation recorded on 

or about February 9, 2021 and posted on YouTube: 

35. Third, highly successful recruiters also supposedly qualified for Global Rewards, 

which were to be paid monthly. HyperFund claimed that under the Global Rewards program, 

HyperFund took 4% of all company sales—in other words, pooled the funds—and divided them 

among its top promoters. As a “VIP 5 STAR,” which is the highest level a promoter could 

achieve, Chunga qualified for Global Rewards. 

36. Chunga frequently encouraged investors to increase their membership value by 

reinvesting their rewards through so-called “rebuys” instead of withdrawing them, including in 

the March 9, 2021 presentation recorded and posted on YouTube. 

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37. HyperFund’s structure further discouraged withdrawals. The only way to 

withdraw the rewards was to convert the internal HyperUnits to so-called “Molecular Future” 

(MOF)—a crypto asset issued, in part, by another founder of HyperFund (“Founder B”)—and 

then transfer the MOF from the HyperFund platform to the HOO Exchange, which was a digital 

asset platform also purportedly owned by Founder B of HyperFund. From there, the investor 

would need to convert MOF to other crypto assets and transfer them out of the HOO Exchange 

in order to exchange them for fiat currency.

38. Although the so-called HyperUnits were reflected on the HyperFund platform as 

being pegged at $1 when an investor deposited money (e.g., a $300 membership was equal to 

300 HyperUnits), that was not the case when the HyperUnits were withdrawn after being 

converted to MOF. In other words, the conversion of HyperUnits to MOF was not pegged $1 

USD, or any price for that matter, because MOF was a crypto asset that actively traded and, as 

such, its price fluctuated. 

39. Currently, MOF does not appear to be actively traded, and as of September 4, 

2023, the last day for which at least one crypto asset platform has price data on MOF, it was 

quoted at $0.00001949 USD. Thus, attempts to withdraw funds generally would have been far 

less than the “face” value that HyperFund and Chunga claimed. 

 Chunga Profited from HyperFund 

40. Another HyperFund promoter recruited Chunga into HyperFund on or about 

September 28, 2020. Chunga invested approximately $5,000 in HyperFund through this other 

HyperFund promoter and invited people to join presentations hosted by others. 

41. In late 2020 and early 2021, Chunga began to host her own presentations, which 

were periodic Zoom calls on which she narrated PowerPoint slide decks she obtained from the 

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HyperFund website. Many of these presentations were recorded and publicly posted on 

YouTube and Vimeo around the time the presentations were made. Chunga eventually became 

one of only six “corporate” presenters for HyperFund, and one of only two in the U.S. Chunga 

knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that these presentations contained materially false and 

misleading statements and omissions. 

42. Chunga was successful at recruiting people to invest in HyperFund. In one of her 

early videos, Chunga claimed to have generated $1 million in new investments in HyperFund in 

only six weeks. By March 31, 2021—only approximately six months after she joined 

HyperFund—Chunga reached the level of “VIP 5 STAR,” which was the highest level a 

HyperFund promoter could achieve and required at least $5 million in “sales.” 

43. Between September 2020 when Chunga joined HyperFund and approximately 

March 2022 when the HyperFund platform stopped permitting withdrawals, Chunga withdrew 

approximately $2.5 million from the HyperFund platform. 

44. In addition to those withdrawals, however, Chunga also took money directly from 

HyperFund investors. Chunga often accepted U.S. currency directly from investors who

transferred funds to her personal bank account via check or wire. In exchange, Chunga either 

transferred Tether to the investor for the investor to send to HyperFund or she transferred

HyperUnits to the investor from one of her own HyperFund accounts. For these “services,” 

Chunga charged the investor a fee of between 1% and 3%. Chunga received an additional 

approximately $1.1 million by accepting funds directly from HyperFund investors. 

45. In addition, after Chunga reached VIP 5 STAR status, HyperFund paid Chunga’s 

rewards at a higher rate, but she could only withdraw 0.25% per day. At that point, transferring 

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her HyperUnits to new investors for cash they deposited with Chunga facilitated her withdrawal 

of funds from HyperFund. 

46. Collectively, through withdrawals from the HyperFund platform and by taking 

funds directly from HyperFund investors, Chunga received approximately $3.7 million. Among 

other things, Chunga spent that money on a lavish birthday party that doubled as a HyperFund 

recruitment event, as well as expensive custom-made jewelry and clothing, a BMW, designer 

handbags, a $1.2 million home in Severna Park, Maryland, and a $1.1 million condominium in 

Dubai. 

47. Although Chunga’s ill-gotten gains were considerable, she embellished them 

further to recruit investors. For example, in October 2021, she wrote to a prospective investor: 

“I’m making over 5 million a year with my one crypto platform and I’ve helped 7 people make 2 

million and 100’s make 6 figures within the past 10months. So whenever your [sic] ready I’ll 

give you the blueprint.” The investor later followed up asking for a link for HyperFund. 

However, Chunga statements were false. She did not actually make $5 million through 

HyperFund, as she knew or recklessly disregarded.

B. The Rebrandings and Collapse of HyperFund

HyperFund to HyperVerse 

48. In the fall of 2021, HyperFund rebranded itself as HyperVerse. HyperVerse was

officially launched on December 5, 2021. Part of the new HyperVerse narrative was that the 

HyperTech Group was creating a virtual world to connect people in the HyperVerse Ecosystem, 

which you would enter using your virtual avatar. 

49. During this launch event, which took place live online and was recorded and then 

made available publicly online, HyperVerse presented a new supposed CEO of HyperVerse, 

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“Steven Reece Lewis.” In a recorded video played during the launch event, Lewis thanked 

everyone for their participation and for giving him “the chance to share more about HyperVerse, 

our operations, and future direction . . . . ” After repeatedly invoking a prominent social media 

company’s rebranding, “CEO Lewis” explained that HyperVerse offered a “virtual world” with 

“new business opportunities” and the development of a crypto asset, characterized as a “native 

token,” called “HVT.” In reality, the person presented as Lewis was an actor playing a role of a 

fabricated character. He was not the CEO of HyperVerse. 

50. As with HyperFund, Lee was still at the forefront of the management of the new 

HyperVerse iteration. Lee knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the person presented as 

Lewis was not actual Steven Lewis and was not the actual CEO of HyperVerse. 

51. The launch event also featured a recording of statements by Lee wherein he 

introduced himself as the CEO and founder of Blockchain Global and Chairman of the 

HyperTech Group; discussed his background, including being one of the first miners of bitcoin; 

and explained that the advent of “metaverse” was a “new way of having everyone participate and 

be a creator.” Lee closed by saying that it was, “very exciting to be a part of a team to provide 

my knowledge to this ecosystem and I look forward to a great 2022.” 

52. HyperVerse presentations posted online and presented on Zoom attempted to tie 

the project directly to the metaverse and discussed creating an avatar to live inside a new virtual 

financial world. 

53. Mechanically, the back-office transition from HyperFund to HyperVerse appears 

to have been automatic for HyperFund investors, though the HyperFund website itself was 

disabled and investors were required to use the new HyperVerse website. 

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54. The HyperVerse 1.0 rewards program made similar promises to HyperFund—one 

could supposedly earn 0.5% per day up to three times your initial investment in 600 days. It also 

offered “a university-level blockchain education.” 

55. When HyperVerse 2.0 was launched in or about April 2022, the membership 

package changed to supposedly earning 0.3% per day up to four times your initial investment, 

but it would now take 1,333 days to reach that goal instead of 600. 

56. Notably, in or about November/December 2021, during the transition process 

from HyperFund to HyperVerse, investors were experiencing difficulties withdrawing their 

rewards. By February/March 2022, investors were not able to make withdrawals at all. 

Promoters attempted to explain away the withdrawal problems as technological issues with the 

new HyperVerse back-office platform. 

HyperVerse to HyperNation. 

57. In late May 2022, HyperVerse was rebranded as HyperNation. The new narrative 

claimed that blockchain technology would help to combat inequality and injustice in 

HyperNation’s new decentralized government. The narrator was a person in a hooded suit 

wearing black gloves and a gold mask who called himself “Mr. H.” 

58. In HyperNation, the membership packages were labeled as so-called “nonfungible tokens” or “NFTs,” with each membership level represented as a different colored 

“NFT” box: Yellow; Green; Purple; and Platinum. Investors could use a limited percentage of 

their HyperVerse rewards to purchase the NFT, but they would be forced to surrender the rest of 

the previously-earned rewards. And to transfer an investors’ multi-level marketing “downline” 

from HyperVerse to the HyperNation platform, the investor was required to buy the $10,000 soCase 1:24-cv-00296-RDB Document 1 Filed 01/29/24 Page 15 of 31
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called NFT. On September 30, 2022, HyperNation announced to investors that Chunga was 

appointed to be the HyperNation Sales Manager for the U.S. 

The Collapse of HyperFund. 

59. The challenges HyperVerse investors had withdrawing funds in February/March 

2022 were never resolved. 

60. In June 2022, the HOO Exchange announced it had suspended withdrawals from 

HyperVerse after receiving a heavy volume of withdrawal requests and stated that it intended to 

restart transactions within 72 hours. 

61. While it is not clear if investors were able to make withdrawals after the 

announced 72-hour window, by November 2022, the HOO Exchange stopped working 

altogether, which effectively ended HyperFund as that was the only possible way HyperFund 

investors could make withdrawals. Investors were not able to redeem investments after 

November 2022. 

62. From inception to collapse, HyperFund raised over $1.7 billion worldwide. 

 Subsequent events. 

63. Lee continued to be centrally involved with HyperFund in all of its iterations— 

even after it collapsed. 

64. In early 2023, Lee began appearing on videos with former HyperFund 

promoters to meet with HyperFund investors who were expecting to learn details about 

the recovery plan for them to receive their “1x” (i.e., their initial investment amount). 

65. In July 2023, Lee appeared on a video with a former HyperFund promoter 

announcing he was planning to rebuild HyperVerse—in his words—“For realz this time! For

realz this time!” 

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66. To date, it does not appear as though Lee has relaunched HyperVerse. 

C. Defendants Disseminated Material Misrepresentations In Connection with 

the Offer and Sale of HyperFund Memberships

67. While the very nature of HyperFund was a fraud in which the entity lacked any 

reasonable basis to pay the promised returns, many of the specific representations proliferated by 

HyperFund and repeated by Chunga and others used to lure investors to join HyperFund were 

also false. These false representations were statements regarding, among other things: (1) 

HyperFund’s supposed affiliation with DigitalX; (2) Lee’s success with Blockchain Global and 

its ties to HyperFund; (3) HyperFund’s affiliation with IBM; (4) revenue generated from largescale crypto asset mining; and (5) HyperVerse CEO “Steven Reece Lewis.” 

HyperFund’s affiliation with DigitalX

68. The slide decks that HyperFund created that Chunga and others used to promote 

HyperFund prominently featured DigitalX, a company that provides access to crypto assets to 

wholesale investors, as one of the four companies that comprised the HyperTech Group 

conglomerate. One example of HyperFund’s claimed affiliation with DigitalX is the following 

slide which appeared in a presentation Chunga recorded on or about January 16, 20213: 

 

3 The upper right portion of the image was redacted to remove Defendant Chunga’s image. 

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69. Indeed, in the same January 16, 2021 presentation that featured this slide, Chunga 

said: “The HyperTech Group is comprised by four amazing, successful companies. The first 

company is Digital X . . . Our company owns . . . DigitalX . . . .” (emphasis added). 

70. However, the HyperTech Group was not in fact affiliated with Digital X and, on 

February 15, 2021, DigitalX disavowed any association with the HyperTech Group by issuing a 

“Notice of non-affiliation with HyperTech Group and its directors, related entities and affiliates.” 

Specifically, DigitalX stated:

DigitalX has recently become aware that HyperTech Group Co Ltd and/or its 

directors, related entities and affiliates, is using the DigitalX brand to promote 

and/or provide digital asset management products and services to global 

consumers over the internet, through such websites as hypertechgrp.com, 

hypertechtrading.wordpress.com, youtube.com and facebook.com. DigitalX is 

not affiliated, associated, or connected with HyperTech Group Co Ltd in any 

way, or any of its directors, related entities, affiliates, businesses or products 

(including HyperFund Global, [and] the HyperCommunity .... (emphasis in 

original). 

Lee’s success with Blockchain Global and its ties to HyperFund 

71. Repeatedly in presentations throughout 2021, promotional materials generated by 

HyperFund and used by Chunga touted HyperFund’s strong connection with Blockchain Global, 

the Australian company Lee founded and served at as CEO. During the HyperVerse launch 

event on or about December 5, 2021, Lee introduced himself as the CEO of Blockchain Global. 

72. In HyperVerse presentations that followed, Chunga continued to stress the 

connection with Blockchain Global and why this connection supposedly gave credibility to the 

HyperFund project and increased the safety of the investment. For example, during a 

promotional video recorded on or about December 13, 2021, while displaying a PowerPoint slide 

titled, “Credibility,” Chunga discussed Blockchain Global’s: 

[P]artnerships with governments and Fortune 500 companies around the world, 

they established a $300 million plus fund to assist over eighty blockchain 

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projects. Now, why are they doing that? Because their goal is to spread the right 

message, to do things the right way, and educate the masses. So who wouldn’t 

want to align themselves with people who truly want to educate the masses on our 

future? 

73. In reality, as reported in a November 2021 article, Blockchain Global had entered 

“voluntary administration” (a self-administered restructuring procedure), owing creditors a 

reported $21 million, an estimate that was later increased to approximately $50 million. The 

article stated that Lee had “stepped down as a director” in March 2019. 

HyperFund’s affiliation with IBM

74. Materials used to promote HyperFund also touted that the last of the four 

entities that comprised the HyperFund Group—Hcash—was engaged in “Quantum Resistant 

Security projects with IBM.” Chunga featured this alleged relationship prominently during her 

presentation, including presentations she made after the transition to HyperVerse. In a 

presentation she gave on February 9, 2021, Chunga told investors: “Our next successful entity is 

Hcash . . . They focus on quantum resistance, we’re talking strictly about quantum computers. 

They’re one of the fastest computers in the worlds. They are working alongside IBM.” 

However, IBM was not involved with Hcash.

Revenue generated from large-scale crypto asset mining

75. Chunga anticipated investors asking how HyperFund could pay rewards every 

day. The slide decks Chunga used to promote HyperFund addressed this issue. One of the 

purported sources of the funds to fuel the daily rewards was the HyperTech Group’s “Large 

Scale Crypto Mining.” 

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76. In a presentation recorded on or about January 16, 2021, Chunga explained the 

mining operations to prospective investors as follows: 

It means our owner has warehouses upon warehouses that mine crypto. And when 

we say, mine crypto, we’re not just talking about bitcoin, we’re talking about the 

cryptocurrencies that are out here, the top 20: you’re talking Ethereum; you’re 

talking TRON; you’re talking -- there are so many, USDT, so many different 

cryptocurrencies that they’re mining. Again, this is one way revenue is coming 

into the HyperTech Group. 

77. In another presentation, Chunga emphasized that large-scale crypto asset mining 

not only happened in real time, but claimed they were making so much money doing it that the 

rewards would keep flowing: 

And now today, ladies and gents, he does it on a large scale. What does that 

mean? Large scale simply means he has warehouses all around the world that’s 

constantly mining crypto, constantly, around the clock. So just that alone is 

bringing in millions, without us. That’s without us. 

78. However, in a recorded audio call a HyperFund investor had with Lee in early 

2023, Lee admitted that the HyperTech Group exited the bitcoin mining business in 2019—

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which was long before HyperFund was even launched in the U.S.—and that they did so because 

“mining’s not profitable.” Lee explained:

From 2019 onwards, all we did was sell shovels. We didn’t even own one single 

machine, because it just doesn’t make any sense. In a bull market, the mining 

machines are overpriced, in a bear market they’re worthless. Alright? And there 

is no gauge to make sure that you’re able to guarantee profit, unless you have free 

electricity, which no one in this world has. 

79. Further, Lee admitted that he knew the representations the promoters, like 

Chunga, were making about the HyperTech Group’s bitcoin mining activities were false: 

... a lot of the narrative that was promoted to the HyperCommunity is inaccurate 

because, sure, it was great demonstrating that, yeah, we were the fourth largest 

miner in the world, you know, but it -- does it mean anything when we had to sell 

all our bitcoins for a couple hundred dollars just to pay electricity? The answer is 

no. Right? (Laughs). 

80. Despite knowing that the HyperFund promoters’ representations about large 

scale-crypto asset mining were false, Lee allowed the representations to continue and did not 

alter the messaging made available for HyperFund presentations. 

HyperVerse CEO “Steven Reece Lewis” 

81. As noted above, in the fall of 2021, HyperFund rebranded to become HyperVerse. 

During the December 5, 2021 launch of HyperVerse, they unveiled a new CEO—“Steven Reece 

Lewis”—who delivered a speech during the launch event. 

82. In her HyperVerse presentation, Chunga walked through Lewis’s resume, 

including highlighting that he started his career as a derivatives trader at a prominent investment 

bank. 

83. According to this investment bank, there is no record of a “Steven Reece Lewis” 

ever being a derivatives trader at the firm. The individual featured as “Steven Reece Lewis” was 

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really a paid actor who worked as a “TV presenter working alongside international businesses, 

helping front their products and services,” and resides in Bangkok City, Thailand. 

HYPERFUND’S MEMBERSHIPS WERE SECURITIES

84. The HyperFund memberships are investment contracts and therefore securities 

pursuant to Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act. An 

investment contract involves: (1) the investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with 

a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J. Howey 

Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). 

85. HyperFund memberships were typically offered and sold in exchange for money 

in the form of the crypto asset called Tether. Additionally, some investors purchased HyperFund 

memberships by paying Chunga in fiat currency—i.e., the U.S. dollar. 

86. HyperFund membership investments were investments in a “common enterprise.” 

All HyperFund membership investors’ funds were pooled by HyperFund, and each HyperFund 

membership investor at the same “rewards level” was to be paid pro rata returns in direct 

proportion to the number of HyperFund memberships purchased, in the form of fixed interest 

payments or “rewards”. 

87. HyperFund membership investors were led to expect profits from purchasing the 

HyperFund membership and those profits were to be derived from the efforts of third parties—

HyperFund and its agents. Specifically, in promotional materials and elsewhere, HyperFund and 

its promoters like Chunga promised that HyperFund would use investor proceeds to operate a 

large-scale crypto asset mining venture from which investors would passively earn their profits 

(or “rewards”). Although the investors could earn leveraged or accelerated rewards through the 

optional referral program, HyperFund promoters emphasized that investors could remain passive 

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to earn rewards, and that these rewards would be stable specifically because of the work of 

others, including HyperFund’s supposed large-scale crypto asset mining, among other things. 

UNREGISTERED SALE OF SECURITIES

88. Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act require that an issuer like HyperFund 

register the offer or sale of securities with the SEC. Similarly, those provisions prohibit 

individuals, like Chunga and Lee, from engaging in unregistered offers or sales of securities. 

89. No registration statement was in effect or had been filed as to the offer or sale of

HyperFund memberships, which were securities. 

90. Defendants, directly or indirectly, offered or sold HyperFund memberships, 

through the use of interstate facilities or the mails and interstate commerce.

91. Defendants’ offers and sales of HyperFund memberships did not qualify for an 

exemption from registration. 

92. Chunga violated Section 5 by playing an integral role in the distribution of 

HyperFund memberships. For example, she used social media to publicize and promote 

HyperFund memberships and actively recruited investors into purchasing HyperFund 

memberships through periodic Zoom presentations, and directly sold memberships to investors, 

including by providing interested investors with referral links and by directly accepting proceeds 

from investors. 

93. Lee violated Section 5 by playing an integral role in the distribution of the 

HyperFund memberships. As a founder, Lee created and launched HyperFund. Importantly, the 

descriptions of his business experience and media appearances that appeared in the slide decks of 

PowerPoint presentations during the Zoom presentations used to recruit investors were critical 

elements of the offers and sales of HyperFund memberships. 

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94. Lee’s appearance and speech during the launch of HyperVerse was an offer of 

securities. Lee’s reputation and public-facing crypto asset persona deceived investors into 

believing that HyperFund was not a scam because it was backed by a known crypto asset 

entrepreneur. Those details were used to add legitimacy and credibility to the scheme, and to 

convince investors that their money was not only safe, but that the money they expected to make 

was coming from purportedly legitimate sources. 

THE DEFENDANTS VIOLATED THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS

95. Lee, as one of the Founders of HyperFund, knew, or was reckless in not knowing, 

that HyperFund did not generate revenue sufficient to be able to reasonably expect to meet its 

payment obligations to investors, other than income generated from the sales of new HyperFund 

memberships, and therefore was a Ponzi scheme. 

96. Lee knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that HyperFund could not reasonably 

expect to generate the returns that the HyperFund membership promotional materials promised 

investors, including the returns promised via the so-called “rewards program,” which was 

nothing but a pyramid scheme recruiting tool. 

97. Lee’s role in the HyperFund membership scheme was critical, from its inception 

to long after its collapse. Lee was a co-founder of HyperFund and was, marketed to investors as 

a key aspect of the enterprise. In presentation slides labeled “Credibility,” HyperFund detailed 

Lee’s purported various roles and accomplishments, suggesting an investment in HyperFund was 

a good idea because Lee was the architect. 

98. Lee’s involvement did not stop there. Lee was a prominently featured speaker for 

the launch of HyperVerse—the supposed rebrand of HyperFund after its first collapse—on or 

about December 5, 2021. And again Lee’s role was key: as a founder, his presence allowed the 

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HyperFund scheme to transition to HyperVerse with continuity. During this speech, Lee made at 

least two statements that were misleading because he omitted certain key facts. 

99. Lee touted his business prowess by introducing himself as the CEO of Blockchain 

Global. At that time, however, that statement omitted information that would have been material 

to investors given the context in which it was made—namely, Blockchain Global had ceased 

business operations, a fact Lee knew or recklessly disregarded. Lee also failed to mention that 

he stepped down from Blockchain Global as a director, and that the company no longer had any 

operations. 

100. Moreover, during the HyperVerse launch speech, Lee also specifically discussed 

his purported success as one of the first miners of bitcoin, not only as an illustration of his 

business acumen, but also seemingly as a parallel to suggest that the opportunity the rebranded 

HyperVerse presented to investors was just as big as investing in bitcoin. However, despite 

raising his supposed experience in bitcoin mining, Lee failed to add that HyperTech Group’s 

large-scale mining operations ended in 2019, as Lee again knew or recklessly disregarded, and as 

reasonable investors would have wanted to know in the context of Lee touting his supposed 

bitcoin mining prowess. 

101. Lee’s statements were particularly misleading for two reasons. First, he knew 

prospective HyperFund memberships investors were told by HyperFund that the large-scale 

mining operations and the revenues from Blockchain Global were sources of the passive rewards 

they would receive. Second, he knew the purportedly robust viability of those business 

operations were used to imply that because HyperTech Group had numerous independent 

revenue streams, it was not a scam. Indeed, Chunga punctuated this message in her presentations 

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by saying “they have more to lose than to gain,” and “this is not a company that needs your 

money.” 

102. Lee closed his December 5, 2021 speech by emphasizing his direct involvement 

in HyperVerse, saying that it was “very exciting to be a part of a team to provide my knowledge 

to this ecosystem and I look forward to a great 2022.” 

103. After HyperFund’s total collapse, Lee was the only founder who surfaced on 

videos with promoters, including Chunga, teasing investors with the hope of a possible recovery 

plan. 

104. Lee obtained money through HyperFund, including, but not limited to, 

approximately $140,000 sent to a digital wallet in Lee’s custody or control in a series of 

transactions occurring on or about or between February 23, 2023 and May 8, 2023. 

105. Chunga, as one of the top U.S. promoters, knew, or was reckless in not knowing, 

that HyperFund was being promoted through misleading statements and false promises. 

106. Chunga ignored numerous red flags about HyperFund. For example, in March 

2021, the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) issued a scam warning

regarding HyperFund, a warning Chunga knew about or recklessly disregarded.

107. In December 2021, Chunga also learned that Blockchain Global—one of the 

companies that was purportedly feeding revenue into the HyperFund project—had collapsed. 

Yet, even as late as March 2022, after HyperFund rebranded to HyperVerse, Chunga was still 

touting Blockchain Global as part of the project’s “credibility.” 

108. In December 2021, Chunga learned about an online article labeling HyperFund as 

a Ponzi scheme. Chunga ignored it. 

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109. Chunga ignored withdrawal issues regarding HyperFund when investors raised 

them to her (which occurred with regularity during the relevant period), and especially when 

those challenges became more significant starting in November/December 2021. 

110. As alleged above, Defendants raised funds from retail investors in the United 

States and across the world through the unregistered offer and sale of securities—HyperFund 

memberships. In connection with the offer and sale of those securities, the Defendants engaged 

in a scheme to defraud investors and further engaged in practices that operated as a fraud or 

deceit upon those investors. To date, HyperFund raised over $1.7 billion. 

111. Defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that their statements about 

HyperFund’s returns and profits were materially false and misleading. Defendants further knew, 

or were reckless in not knowing, that they were operating a scheme to defraud investors in 

HyperFund’s securities. 

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Unregistered Offers and Sales of Securities in Violation of

Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act

(Against Both Defendants) 

112. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 111 of its Complaint.

113. The offer and sale of HyperFund memberships was an offer and sale of securities.

114. Defendants directly or indirectly, singly or in concert, 

(a) made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in 

interstate commerce or of the mails to sell, through the use or medium of a 

prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no registration statement 

was in effect; 

(b) for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, carried or caused to be 

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carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or 

instruments of transportation, securities as to which no registration 

statement was in effect; and/or 

(c) made use of means or instruments of transportation or communication in 

interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy, through 

the use or medium of a prospectus or otherwise, securities as to which no 

registration statement had been filed.

115. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and, unless enjoined, are 

reasonably likely to continue to violate, Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 

§§ 77e(a) and (c)]. 

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Fraud in Violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act

(Against Both Defendants)

116. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 111 of its Complaint.

117. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendants, directly or indirectly, 

singly or in concert, in the offer or sale of securities and by the use of the means or instruments 

of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or the mails, knowingly, recklessly, 

or negligently, 

(a) employed one or more devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; 

(b) obtained money or property by means of one or more untrue statements of 

material fact or omitted to state one or more material facts necessary in 

order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 

which they were made, not misleading; and/or 

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(c) engaged in one or more transactions, practices or courses of business 

which operate or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser. 

118. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and, unless enjoined, are 

reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)]. 

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and Rules 10b-5 of the Exchange Act 

(Against Both Defendants)

119. The Commission repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 111 of its Complaint.

120. Defendants directly or indirectly, singly or in concert, by the use of the means or 

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or the facilities of a national securities 

exchange, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, knowingly or recklessly, 

(a) employed one or more devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud; 

(b) made one or more untrue statements of a material fact or omitted to state 

one or more material facts necessary in order to make the statements 

made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 

misleading; and/or 

(c) engaged in one or more acts, practices, or courses of business which 

operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon other persons, 

including purchasers and sellers of securities. 

121. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants violated, and, unless enjoined, are 

reasonably likely to continue to violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] 

and Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5] thereunder. 

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RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court find the 

Defendants committed the violations alleged and enter a final judgment: 

Permanent Injunctions

Permanently restraining and enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, 

employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, and each of 

them, from directly or indirectly violating the federal securities laws alleged in this Complaint;

and further permanently restraining and enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, 

employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them, and each of 

them, from directly or indirectly (1) offering, operating, or participating in any marketing or 

sales program in which the participant is compensated or promised compensation solely or 

primarily for (a) inducing another person to become a participant in the program; or (b) if such 

induced person induces another to become a participant in the program; and (2) participating 

directly or indirectly in any offering of crypto asset securities; provided, however, that, such 

injunction shall not prevent Defendants from purchasing or selling crypto asset securities for 

their own personal accounts. 

Disgorgement and Prejudgment Interest

Ordering Defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains they received directly or indirectly, 

with prejudgment interest thereon, as a result of the alleged violations, pursuant to Section 

21(d)(3), (5) and (7) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), (5) and (7)]. 

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Civil Penalty

Ordering Defendants to pay civil money penalties pursuant to Section 20(d) of the 

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)]; and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 

78u(d)(3)]. 

Further Relief

Granting any other and further relief this Court may deem just and proper. 

Retention of Jurisdiction

Further, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court retain jurisdiction over this 

action and Defendants in order to implement and carry out the terms of all orders and decrees 

that it may enter, or to entertain any suitable application or motion by the Commission for 

additional relief within the jurisdiction of this Court.

Demand for Jury Trial 

The Commission hereby demands a trial by jury on any and all issues in this action so 

triable.

Dated: January 29, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

/s/Judson T. Mihok 

Judson T. Mihok 

U.S. District Court of Maryland Bar No. 92737 

Gregory R. Bockin 

David Snyder 

Assunta Vivolo 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION

 Philadelphia Regional Office 

 1617 JFK Boulevard, Suite 520 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Phone: 215-597-6500 

 Fax: 215-597-2740 

 Email: MihokJ@sec.gov

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