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i 

98–960 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–93] 

ASSESSING THE DEVELOPMENT 

OF AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL 

SECURITY FORCES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

KATY QUINN, Professional Staff Member 

ABIGAIL GAGE, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 1 

Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Abizaid, Christine S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, 

Pakistan and Central Asia .................................................................................. 4 

Breedlove, Kent A., Senior Defense Analyst–Afghanistan, Defense Intelligence 

Agency ................................................................................................................... 9 

Child, Michael S., Deputy Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, Department of Defense ............................................................................ 13 

Michael, COL Stephen, USA, Joint Staff J5 Transregional Threat Coordination Cell ................................................................................................................. 7 

Sopko, Hon. John F., Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ........................................................................................................................ 11

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Abizaid, Christine S. ........................................................................................ 37 

Breedlove, Kent A. ............................................................................................ 60 

Child, Michael S. .............................................................................................. 80 

Michael, COL Stephen ..................................................................................... 50 

Sopko, Hon. John F. ......................................................................................... 63 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 99 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 103 

(1) 

ASSESSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFGHANISTAN 

NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Friday, February 12, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Welcome. I am delighted to convene this hearing. This is a very important topic and one I know that Ranking 

Member Speier finds especially significant. I am happy to partner 

with her in exploring this subject. 

I also note that the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Jones, 

is attending the hearing with us today. Therefore, I ask unanimous 

consent that Mr. Jones and any other committee members not assigned to this subcommittee be permitted to participate in this 

hearing with the understanding that all subcommittee members 

will be recognized for questions prior to those not sitting on the 

subcommittee. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

This morning, we continue the committee’s oversight dialogue 

with the Department that began last week with the foundational 

testimony that General Campbell laid out before the full committee. General Campbell testified about the evolving security situation in Afghanistan, and the policy, strategy, and posture required 

from our Nation in order to develop, sustain, and support the people and unity government of Afghanistan well into the future. 

The goal of our hearing is to learn about and assess the Department’s efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghanistan security 

forces as we and our coalition partners strive to build a capable 

and lethal Afghan security force. Afghanistan needs to maintain its 

sovereignty and protect its population. And for the benefit of Afghanistan, the United States, and international community, it 

must also deny terrorist safe havens. 

In reading the recent Congressional Report submitted by our witnesses and listening to testimony from General Campbell, the subcommittee understands that the Afghan security forces are still in 

their nascent stages of becoming a professionalized, self-sustaining, 

and capable institution. But there is still various shortfalls and insufficient capabilities and important functions hindering these 
2 

goals. The Afghan forces do not have enough airplanes or helicopters, especially those capable of providing close air support. 

While there clearly has been improvement, the ability to collect 

and disseminate ample intelligence is lacking, as is the ability to 

maintain and account for equipment. Even the bread-and-butter 

administrative issues such as paid leave and medical services for 

Afghan forces need attention. 

According to last week’s testimony, these challenges are compounded by the fact that 70 percent of the problems facing Afghan 

security forces result from poor senior leadership within the Afghan Ministries of Defense and the Interior. The Taliban are 

emboldened. The Haqqani Network continues to sponsor terrorist 

attacks, and there is a growing Islamic State presence in Afghanistan. Thus, it is essential that we ensure that the Afghan security 

forces and their civilian leadership are properly positioned on the 

critical path of success. 

However, I am concerned that the President’s current budget request for aiding the Afghan forces is $200 million less than last 

year’s amount. And the administration plans to withdraw U.S. 

forces down to 5,500 beginning as soon as April of this year. We 

must not prematurely reduce our commitment to the people of Afghanistan. All one needs to do is to look at the results of premature 

withdrawal in Iraq to determine what will happen if we repeat 

near history and prematurely leave Afghanistan. 

General Campbell noted last week the devotion of the Afghan 

people in fighting for their country. This is a positive sign. While 

the material and support is something the American people can assist with, having the heart and willingness to fight is something 

the Afghan people must offer. He also suggested last week that the 

U.S. should begin instituting a 5-year planning cycle for the region 

instead of the unpredictable, 1-year-at-a-time approach that tends 

to foster instability, uncertainty, and insecurity. 

General Campbell also readily acknowledged that our sustained 

engagement in Afghanistan will continue through 2024, further 

strategic partnership agreements signed by the Governments of Afghanistan and the United States. We must also ensure there are 

appropriate mechanisms and governance structures in place that 

provide for effective insight in order to oversee, account for, and 

safeguard the security assistance the U.S. and our international 

partners are contributing to the Afghans. 

We need to limit, as much as possible, opportunities and activities or operations that would encourage or enable individuals to exploit or conduct any fraud, waste, or abuse activities. Activities of 

this nature can undercut the trust of the American people, impedes 

morale of our troops, and fuels skepticism that we are not seriously 

committed to effective and efficient use of our resources. 

I look forward to discussing the Department’s strategy for addressing the issues I have outlined, and to hear from some who 

have conducted their own assessment of these activities. 

But before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to the Oversight and 

Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks she would wish to make. Representative Speier. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I thank you for joining me in seeking this particular hearing. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today. 

Our troops are in Afghanistan performing an important mission, 

which includes training, advising, and equipping the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces [ANDSF] so that they can 

sustainably defend themselves against insurgent groups, such the 

Taliban. Having said that, I am concerned that our strategy hasn’t 

yield the positive results that would inspire confidence that the Afghan security forces can go it alone any time in the foreseeable future, which leads to the obvious question, Will we ever leave? Can 

we ever leave? I am not convinced that our existing plan is one 

that we can take to the American people and assure them that our 

presence in Afghanistan is worth the cost in money and in lives. 

By many accounts, 2015 was the worst year for security instability in Afghanistan since 2001. 2015 was the first year that the 

Afghan forces took the lead, meaning some level of instability was 

expected, but it was alarming, nonetheless. And I am not convinced 

that 2016 will be any better. Is there a clear strategy to support 

our troops and accomplish our goals? Or are we just moving chess 

pieces around the board because we are forced to make a move? 

Underpinning these concerns, I don’t get a sense that we are, 

frankly, addressing the fundamental challenges we face in Afghanistan. Corruption, weak Afghan military leadership, and a tenacious 

insurgency, which seems to be only getting stronger, are undermining our efforts there, and I would like to know how these issues 

get resolved in a way that allows us to leave in a timely manner 

without creating a security vacuum. 

Again, the question is, do we ever leave? The American public 

has a right to know. One thing is for sure, Congress needs highquality information to understand the situation we are confronting, 

and effective oversight from inspectors general is essential to our 

ability to understand these issues. 

Some might argue that this is one of the world’s greatest producers of sheep. I just want to make sure we are not getting the 

wool pulled over our eyes. 

We need to make sure that the information we are receiving is 

reliable, that we are asking the right questions, and are able to 

travel the country to assess the conditions. 

Here are some bedrock issues that require far more clarity. We 

need to know how the Afghan forces’ progress is being measured, 

what we have learned from the challenges of the last year, and how 

gaps in the ANDSF capabilities will be addressed going forward. 

Are the Afghan forces on a positive trajectory for meeting and sustaining their capability objectives? For now, it is apparent that our 

assistance is still needed to build and sustain ministerial institutions to lead the Afghan forces. They also need a capable Air Force 

and other key enablers, including sound operational planning, logistics, and maintenance systems. Just this week, it was reported 

that the U.S. military advisers are being sent to southern Afghanistan to give additional support to the Afghan National Army in 
4 

that region. In short, the Afghans are not yet ready to secure their 

own country without assistance from the U.S. and our coalition 

partners. And if recent experience is any indication, it could be 

years until they are. 

We need to be clear-eyed and better informed about the Afghan 

forces’ abilities, now and in the future, to secure the country and 

to reliably prevent extremists from, once again, using Afghanistan 

as a safe haven for terrorists to threaten the United States. We 

need to make sure we have realistic goals and a plausible strategy 

that fits our goals. Above all, we need to make sure we are telling 

ourselves the full story about our situation so that we could figure 

out where to go next. 

I look forward to all of your testimony and assessments about the 

developments of the Afghan forces, which, I hope, will provide us 

a fuller picture of the forces’ progress, performance, and capabilities. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Ms. Speier. 

I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today, and I want to 

thank them for taking the time to be with us. 

We have Ms. Christine Abizaid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Colonel Stephen Michael, Deputy 

Director for the Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Transregional Threats 

Coordination Cell from the Office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff; Mr. Kent Breedlove, Senior Defense Analyst for Afghanistan with the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Honorable John 

Sopko of the presidentially appointed Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction; and Mr. Michael Child, Deputy Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations from the Department of Defense. 

Thank you, all, again, for being with us today. And we will now 

begin with our opening statements. 

Ms. Abizaid, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE S. ABIZAID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN 

AND CENTRAL ASIA 

Ms. ABIZAID. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, members of the 

subcommittee, Congressman Jones, thank you for your steadfast 

support for our efforts in Afghanistan, and for inviting me to discuss the Department of Defense’s efforts to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, the ANDSF. 

I am honored to have the opportunity to update you alongside my 

colleagues from the Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

the Office of the DOD [Department of Defense] Inspector General 

[DOD IG], and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR]. 

All of the witnesses before you today take very seriously our responsibility to ensure that U.S. personnel in Afghanistan have the 

resources, authorities, and guidance they need to accomplish their 

mission. 
5 

I would also like to acknowledge the 2,236 U.S. service members 

who lost their lives while serving in Afghanistan, the 20,115 military personnel who have been wounded in that country, and the 

thousands of families who have also sacrificed for this important 

mission. Their efforts represent a strategically significant contribution to the security of our homeland. 

Now, within the Department of Defense, my office provides overall policy guidance for and oversight of the mission in Afghanistan, 

including DOD-funded security assistance for the ANDSF. We have 

daily contacts with key theater and person—key personnel in theater at the Combined Security Transition Assistance Command, Afghanistan, or CSTC–A, which has primary responsibility for the 

execution of the DOD security assistance mission. 

We also work closely with other offices within DOD, the intelligence community, and the Department of State, as we continually 

assess the status of our efforts in Afghanistan. 

My office also supports the efforts of the DOD IG and those of 

SIGAR, ensuring they have the information and, importantly, the 

context required to fulfill their mandates to review our efforts. 

Now, our priority in Afghanistan remains to prevent it from, once 

again, becoming a safe haven from which terrorists can plan attacks against the United States homeland, U.S. interests abroad, 

and our international partners. In pursuit of this objective, we are 

conducting two complementary missions in Afghanistan: our counterterrorism mission against the remnants of Al Qaeda and other 

extremist groups that threaten the United States, such as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province; and the NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization]-led train, advise, and assist mission with the 

ANDSF, known as Resolute Support. 

In October 2015, following a comprehensive review of the mission, President Obama announced that we would retain up to 9,800 

U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan throughout most of 2016, 

drawing down to 5,500 personnel by January 2017. Importantly, 

this presence will not just be based in Kabul, but also in other locations, including Bagram Air Base, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. This 

decision provides U.S. forces with sufficient capabilities to continue 

the development of Afghan ministerial capacities, along with key 

ANDSF capabilities in aviation, intelligence, special operations, logistics, and maintenance. 

This presence will also allow the United States to both pursue 

counterterrorism targets, and to assist the ANDSF in further developing those critical counterterrorism capabilities that we know 

are critical to our mutual security interests. The financial support 

of the United States and the international community is critical to 

sustaining the ANDSF. Over the last decade, congressional appropriations for the Afghan Security Forces Fund, or ASFF, have been 

key to the development of Afghan security forces responsible for 

the security of Afghanistan. As we develop the ANDSF, our support 

is focused on ensuring that they are able to counter and degrade 

the Taliban, and establish a baseline level of security that benefits 

not only the Afghan people, but also the international community. 

For more than a year, the mission of providing security for all 

of Afghanistan has been the sole responsibility of the Afghan Government. While the security situation remains fragile and Afghan 
6 

forces will continue to require U.S. and coalition assistance for 

many years, we have witnessed important progress in their development over the years. 

As General Campbell noted in his testimony last week, the 

ANDSF have demonstrated the ability to conduct effective, largescale, multi-pillar clearing operations against the country, and 

when insurgents attempted strategic advances in places like 

Kunduz, Ghazni, and elsewhere, the ANDSF proved able to rally 

and recapture those areas. 

Significant challenges do remain, and our train, advise, and assist mission is focused on helping the Afghans overcome them. And 

it is notable that even in the midst of fighting a war, the ANDSF 

and Afghan security ministries continue to develop their capacities 

to manage complex tasks such as budgeting, personnel management, and to address key capability gaps in aviation and intelligence. 

Now, U.S. taxpayers have been generous and patient with the 

ANDSF’s development, and it is our responsibility to review carefully how best and most efficiently we can assist our Afghan partners. Finding the right balance between the effectiveness and affordability of the ANDSF is a key effort of this Department. 

I would like to highlight a few areas where we think progress is 

being made. First, we continue to focus on the development of the 

ANDSF’s aviation capabilities, including by addressing their critical close air support needs as well as their long-term lift requirements. This is very complex, and represents a significant portion 

of our investment in the ANDSF now and going forward. Of note, 

in 2016, the Afghan aerial fires capability will nearly triple compared to last year. Second, we are spending a significant amount 

on ground forces equipment, which has relatively high sustainment 

costs. We fielded significant numbers of up-armored Humvees and 

other vehicles to the ANDSF to improve combat survivability. 

Third, Afghan security ministry pay and personnel expenses are 

a major cost driver, about 20 percent of the roughly $5 billion total 

costs for the ANDSF. DOD funds the majority of this cost for the 

Afghan Government, and we have been working with their security 

ministries to develop an integrated pay and personnel system that 

will ensure we can verify that we are paying the right people for 

the right jobs. 

And, finally, corruption is a critical issue, and President Ghani 

is a great partner in addressing its impacts. He has made procurement reforms to address corruption in MOD [Ministry of Defense] 

and MOI [Ministry of Interior], and after we helped him identify 

corruption in fuel contracting processes, he fired those responsible, 

and now new contracts are in place. He also pulled up responsibility for procurement to a national level authority, demonstrating 

the seriousness with which he takes these issues. In each of these 

areas, as well as many others, DOD IG and SIGAR have helpfully 

informed our efforts to protect taxpayers’ money and ensure we can 

achieve our goals in developing the ANDSF. 

In closing, I want to, again, thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to discuss our efforts to develop the ANDSF, and to ensure that we are doing so responsibly. 
7 

The Afghan Government will continue to rely on large amounts 

of financial assistance to the ANDSF until such time as fighting 

significantly diminishes. We are in the process of working with our 

allies and partners to extend international funding commitments 

through at least 2020, and we look forward to working with Congress to ensure effective oversight of these efforts to achieve our 

national objectives in Afghanistan. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Colonel Michael. 

STATEMENT OF COL STEPHEN MICHAEL, USA, JOINT STAFF J5 

TRANSREGIONAL THREAT COORDINATION CELL 

Colonel MICHAEL. Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, 

I am grateful for this opportunity to, you know, talk to yourself and 

this subcommittee and provide you information on the development 

of the ANDSF. I would ask that you submit my full statement to 

the record, and I would like to focus on some key and essential 

points. 

The first bit is talking about the Chairman’s perspective. So as 

the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] looks at Afghanistan, 

he looks at it through a couple lenses. First of all, Afghanistan is 

important to us, because it intersects vital national interests, and 

the key one, as we highlighted, is ensuring that nothing that happens there, nothing that emanates from Afghanistan, threatens the 

homeland or threatens our interests. And that is really one of the 

primary lenses that the Chairman views this mission. 

The second, he looks at the ANDSF, the resiliency of the ANDSF 

in its leadership. Is this—is this force well led? Are they willing, 

you know, to do what it takes? Are they willing to sacrifice? Do 

they want this more than we do? Do they understand that they 

serve the people, that they serve the civilian government? Do they 

understand that you cannot harm the people, you know, whom you 

are trying to protect? Do they understand how to lead, you know, 

how to lead, you know, a force? So the resiliency of the ANDSF, 

the ability to fight back in adversity, the ability to lead the—you 

know, at the appropriate level, the ability to make the right decisions, those are all critical to him. So he assesses whether we 

should be committed to Afghanistan or not. Those are the questions 

that he consistently asks of us. 

The second bit that the Chairman looks at is the viability of the 

government. Now, the military—the military mission sets the conditions, you know, for everything else. So all we do is set the conditions for the political piece, for the whole of government pieces to 

work. 

So from the Chairman’s perspective, understanding whether this 

government is viable or not, the same thing, are they well led? Are 

they corrupt? Is this government that the people believe? And those 

are all the questions that he consistently asks himself to inform his 

best military advice. And his current assessment is that the 

ANDSF leadership is resilient. This is a force that we should partner with. This is a force that deserves our support. And, likewise, 

he sees in President Ghani, you know, partner for the nation. So 
8 

as we look at Afghanistan and the region, the Chairman’s assessment is a stable Afghanistan meets and supports our interests, and 

a stable Afghanistan also lends, you know, to stability in the region. 

As we look at the ANDSF development, so, really, beginning in 

2013, the ANDSF were in the lead, but in 2015 is the first year 

they were fully responsible for the security. Our strategy is focused 

on they own the tactical fight, and we are focusing on the things 

that really guarantee, you know, long-term sustainability, longterm viability to the force. So the institutional level, do they have 

the ability to man, train, and equip, and field a professional force? 

Do they have the ability to sustain that force, direct that force in 

the counterinsurgency fight? The tactical fight, they own. And this 

has been a pretty tough and contested year. 

Probably the biggest difference is they are operating in areas 

that cater to the areas that the coalition has been operating in. So 

they are fighting all across the country. And across the board, they 

are doing well. They are getting their noses bloodied, but they are 

also—they are also doing a great job in securing Afghanistan. And 

as we look at it across the board, we can clearly say that most of 

the major population centers are secured and controlled by the 

ANDSF, and that there are some rural areas that are either controlled by the Taliban and the insurgency or under the influence 

of the Taliban and the insurgency. There are a total of 407 districts, and eight of those, about 2 percent we can say is under the 

insurgents’ control, and about 18 of those, or 4 percent, we can say 

is under the influence of the Taliban. 

This year has also seen an increased amount of casualties in the 

ANDSF. And as we look at the numbers, it is probably about a 26 

percent increase. Much of that is felt by the police. And also, as we 

look at the numbers, most of the increases came in some of their 

directed multi—multicorps operations, much of it down in the 

south in their operations in Helmand, and then there was multicorps operations further to the north, in Zabul and Ghazni, then 

in the east, and also centrally in support of securing the capital in 

Kabul. 

The other impact of their operations is that there is also an increased amount of casualties that the Taliban has taken. By conservative estimates, the conservative estimates are that the 

Taliban has sustained some of their highest casualties since their 

high point in 2011, casualties at a rate two times of that of the 

ANDSF. 

Our assessment is they own the tactical fight. Our job is, really, 

to support and enable them in the tactical fight. But really we have 

to focus on the pieces that will sustain us long term, their leadership, their ability to man, field, and equip this force and direct this 

force. The gaps that you highlighted, close air supports, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], and things that are essential to keeping this force, you know, viable in the long term. 

As we look at—you know, at fighting season—at this current 

fighting season, as Ms. Abizaid says, we have a dual focus to train, 

advise, and assist, and separately, our counterterrorism mission. 

Both of those are tied to our interest. Training this force and making sure they can secure Afghanistan is critical to securing our in-
9 

terests, and then, separately, the counterterrorism mission gives us 

the ability to do things that the Afghan force has not—doesn’t have 

the capability or the resources to do or things that we see that directly impact our interests. 

And as we look at the—at kind of the long term, so the President 

made the decision about 5,500 footprint going forward, and that decision was informed, you know, by the best military advice of the 

Chairman, of, you know, the CENTCOM [Central Command] commander, of the commander in the field, and that mission, and the 

critical thing about that mission is one of the first times the decision was made to where it was really not necessarily tied, you 

know, to timeframe. It is an enduring mission. It is tied to our enduring partnership in Afghanistan, and to cover and address our 

strategic interests in the region. 

Additionally, as you all know, you know, we are going through 

the leadership transition in Afghanistan. General Nicholson was 

confirmed by the Senate, and over the next period of months, he 

will transition into Afghanistan. And as he said in his testimony, 

as he comes in, he will do an assessment, and then based on his 

assessment, he will recommend, you know, his best military advice. 

And both the outgoing Chairman, General Dempsey, has said he 

has access and influence in his ability to present his best military 

advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President and, likewise, 

General Dempsey has said the same thing. So as we transition 

leadership, if General Nicholson, you know, assesses any requirements or any adjustments that are needed to be made, he has the 

latitude to bring that forward and for the Chairman to present that 

as his best military advice. 

Thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Michael can be found in the 

Appendix on page 50.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Breedlove. 

STATEMENT OF KENT A. BREEDLOVE, SENIOR DEFENSE 

ANALYST–AFGHANISTAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. BREEDLOVE. Thank you. Madam Chair, Ranking Member 

Speier, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss this important topic. My comments this morning will be brief and build upon 

my written statement and the previous opening statements from 

my colleagues. 

Afghanistan continues to face a diverse collective of threats from 

insurgent groups to extremist networks, and from terrorist groups 

to narcocriminal networks. This includes names we are familiar 

with, like the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Al Qaeda, as well 

as the emergence of groups like the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, or IS–K, and Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS. 

This menagerie of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals constitute a 

resilient and persistent threat to Afghanistan’s stability and general stability in the region. 

Their activities range from opium trafficking, extortion and kidnapping that fuels the insurgency to high-profile attacks in populated areas and improvised explosive attacks along road networks 
10 

that both typically result in high Afghan civilian casualties. Rural 

areas of Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions 

remains a sanctuary for these various groups, and the remote and 

rugged terrain of these areas only adds to security challenges they 

pose. 

In the first fighting season against an Afghan-led counterinsurgency, Taliban-led insurgents remain resilient. Fighting has been 

nearly continuous since last February, resulting in increased casualties among both Afghan security forces and insurgents themselves. The Taliban have proven cable of taking rural ground and 

contesting key terrain in areas such as Helmand and Kunduz provinces while continuing to conduct high-profile attacks in the capital 

city, Kabul. 

These high-profile attacks, in particular, achieve one of the 

Taliban’s main objectives of garnering media attention and creating 

a sense of insecurity that undercuts perceptions of the Afghan government’s ability to provide security. 

Following Pakistani military operations in north Waziristan last 

year, many out-of-area fighters, to include some Al Qaeda leaders, 

were displaced in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda activities remain focused 

on survival, regeneration, and planning future attacks. The organization has a sustained presence in Afghanistan, primarily concentrated in the east and northeast of the country. 

Other groups involved in Taliban-led insurgency, the Haqqani 

Network remains the greatest threat to the U.S. coalition and Afghan forces, particularly with the demonstrated capacity and intent 

to support and launch these high-profile, complex attacks across 

the country, and in particular, the Kabul region. Haqqani Network 

leader Siraj Haqqani’s elevation as the new deputy for the Taliban 

leader, Mullah Mansour, has further strengthened the network’s 

role in the insurgency. 

Over this past year, the Taliban-led insurgency remained determined, maintained or consolidated its influence in traditionally 

rural strongholds, dominated the information space, and carried 

out attacks with an increased frequency compared to last year. 

These attacks range from small-scale checkpoint overruns to the 

temporary capture of Kunduz City, and their efforts forced Afghan 

security forces into a more reactive, rather than proactive, posture. 

However, I want to emphasize that the insurgency is not immune 

to its environment and faces similar challenges that my colleagues 

highlighted with Afghan forces. The announcement of former leader Mullah Omar’s death last July, and the contentious accession of 

its new leader, Mullah Mansour, led to the emergence of a Taliban 

opposition faction in late 2015. Infighting between Mansour’s supporters and this opposition is ongoing, and the Taliban has faced 

competition from the emergence of ISIL’s [Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant] regional affiliate in the region, the IS–K. 

While the insurgency mounted larger coordinated attacks, they 

were generally outmatched when engaged with Afghan security 

forces. They also could not capture or defend key targets they may 

have captured, and unable to hold some of these key areas of terrain for extended period of time, such as we saw in Kunduz. They 

also suffered high levels of reported casualties as well as resource 

shortfalls. 
11 

Let me close with a brief outlook to the coming fight this year. 

We expect the Taliban-led insurgency will try to build on its temporary victory in Kunduz last year by attempting to surround and 

pressure other population centers, exploit vulnerabilities in Afghan 

security force posture by conducting mass attacks against vulnerable checkpoints and district centers, primarily in more remote or 

isolated rural areas, and attempt to impede ground lines of communication ahead of these attacks in these population centers. They 

will also seek to continue high-profile attacks against government 

and civilian targets in key populated areas, such as Kabul. 

Thank you, again, for this opportunity, and I look forward to 

your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Breedlove can be found in the 

Appendix on page 60.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Breedlove. 

Mr. Sopko. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR 

GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you very much, and good morning. 

Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and members of 

the subcommittee, I am very pleased to be here today to discuss 

the development of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces, 

or ANDSF. SIGAR has produced a substantial body of work on the 

ANDSF over the past 8 years, and has more work in progress. 

In addition to audits, inspections, investigations, and special 

project reports, SIGAR publishes a quarterly report that continues 

to be the single most comprehensive and detailed source of information on the ANDSF specifically, and on Afghanistan reconstruction in general. 

To conduct this work, SIGAR has the largest single, investigative, and auditing presence in Afghanistan with more people on the 

ground than all other U.S. oversight bodies combined, and enjoys 

a unique, direct oversight relationship with the Afghan Government, and the personal support of President Ghani and CEO [Chief 

Executive Officer] Abdullah, who I meet with on a regular basis. 

As we all know, Afghanistan is one of the most difficult places 

in the world in which to work and to do business. The dangers 

there are very real. And our military, civilians, and contractors— 

and we can’t forget the contractors—have accomplished so much 

over the past 14-plus years that it is impossible not to be proud 

and humbled by their efforts and great sacrifice. Nevertheless, 

based on our work, we see five major challenges that could have 

a significant effect on whether the United States is able to achieve 

its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. We believe that the five 

questions provoked by these challenges should be at the center of 

yours and other policymakers’ discussions. 

The first challenge is that the drawdown of troops has imperiled 

the U.S. ability to monitor and mentor the ANDSF. 

U.S. military advisers and their coalition partners now have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below the Army corps 

and regional police headquarters level. This provokes the obvious 

question, is the current level of U.S. military personnel in Afghani-
12 

stan adequate to ensure that the ANDSF do not fail in their mission? 

The second question, the reported floor strength of the ANDSF 

is questionable. The U.S. now has no option but to rely on the Afghans to report on the number of troops and police in the field. Yet, 

SIGAR audits indicate that recordkeeping in the field by the Afghans is generally poor or nonexistent. We continue to see repeated 

reports of ghost soldiers, ghost police, as well as ghost teachers, 

ghost schools, ghost clinics throughout Afghanistan, and these are 

even reported by the Afghan leadership. This leads to the next 

question, does the United States have an adequate understanding 

of the number of ANDSF troops and police? 

Thirdly, assessments of the ANDSF’s capability and effectiveness 

have never been reliable, and appear to be getting worse. SIGAR 

audits show that over time, U.S. capability ratings of Afghan military units have become progressively less demanding and more 

vague. For example, only a few years ago, the top rating was, 

quote, unquote, ‘‘fully capable,’’ which was later changed to, quote, 

‘‘effective with ambassadors,’’ and has now declined to, quote, 

‘‘independent with advisers,’’ the latter being something of a headscratching oxymoron. 

This leads to our third question, does the U.S. have a realistic 

understanding of the ANDSF’s real capabilities? 

Fourthly, the Afghan ministries of defense and interior obviously 

lack the capability to account for on-budget assistance, and this is 

important. Because since 2010, our government, as well as our allies, have gradually increased, based upon promises at international meetings, the level of direct on-budget funding to the Afghan Government. Yet, there is less U.S. visibility and control over 

those funds. SIGAR’s work has uncovered several cases in which 

the MOD and MOI were incapable of properly managing on-budget 

assistance. The question, therefore, is if MOD and MOI lack the capability to manage on-budget assistance, does CSTC–A [Combined 

Security Transition Command–Afghanistan] need to resume more 

control of more assistance to the ANDSF? 

Now, lastly, a year after the coalition drawdown, the ANDSF is 

still far from being sustainable. And remember, that is our goal, 

sustainability. The Afghan Government simply does not generate 

enough revenue to sustain the ANDSF, or even the rest of their 

government now, or at any time in the foreseeable future. 

At the same time, SIGAR’s work reveals that the accountability 

for funding is lacking in many areas. This leads us to our last question for you, is the U.S. Government conducting adequate oversight 

and management of the billions of dollars promised in the future 

to fund the ANDSF? 

Now, in recent testimony just this week before the U.S. Senate, 

the Director of the National Intelligence predicted that, quote, 

‘‘Fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015, continuing a decade-long trend of deteriorating security,’’ unquote. 

He went on to say that the ANDSF will, quote, ‘‘probably maintain control of major population centers; however, it will cede control of various rural areas.’’ 

He ended by saying, ‘‘Without international funding, the ANSF 

will probably not remain a cohesive or viable force,’’ unquote. 
13 

Now, I think his statement highlights the importance of honestly 

answering these five questions and taking realistic action accordingly. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sopko can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right. Votes are being carried out right now. 

We have 11 minutes left, so I am feeling like we probably ought 

to suspend the hearing at this point and go vote, it is supposed to 

take about 40 minutes, and then come back and reconvene for your 

testimony and questions, Mr. Child. 

So I apologize for the delay, but thank you for understanding. We 

will look forward to hearing you soon. 

Mr. CHILD. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much for your patience and for 

waiting until we got done with votes. So, Mr. Child, let’s hear your 

testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL S. CHILD, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. CHILD. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss capabilities gaps in the Afghan National Security 

Forces. As the Deputy Inspector General for Overseas Contingency 

Operations, I manage DOD IG oversight for Operation Freedom’s 

Sentinel in Afghanistan. And as the chair of the interagency Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, I help coordinate oversight among 

the several inspectors general in Afghanistan. 

I serve a similar role for Operation Inherent Resolve, the IraqSyria counter-ISIL mission. And I describe that coordinating role 

in more detail in my written statement. Regarding Afghan security 

forces, my observations are based on our oversight work and recent 

published reports. We view the challenge of developing sustainable 

Afghan fighting forces as twofold, balancing the requirement to 

provide near-term fighting capability against a longer-term need to 

build the Afghans’ capacity to sustain their fighting forces, and 

building effective national institutions where those have not previously existed. 

Shortcomings in Afghan sustainment capacity are a recurrent 

theme in our oversight work. I would like to highlight three examples: supply and maintenance, property accountability, and key 

commodities. As the supply and maintenance for many years of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. and NATO partners emphasized 

rapidly growing the army and police forces. And they robustly supported them in combat operations, and, therefore, pushed supplies 

to Afghan units rather than requiring units to pull supplies based 

on need and validated requirements. The result is, the Afghans 

have little experience with demand-driven support systems. 

A recent DOD IG assessment found that the Afghan National 

Army was unable to properly forecast their material requirements. 
14 

Regarding property accountability, we reported in April of 2015 

that the Ministries of Defense and Interior did not have effective 

controls to manage the 95,000 vehicles procured by the U.S. and 

coalition partners. The long-term solution to equipment readiness 

and maintenance should be the implementation of the Afghan national maintenance strategy. This strategy will place contractors at 

23 key locations to maintain equipment and train the Afghans to 

conduct their own maintenance. The goal is to achieve full Afghan 

responsibility for maintenance by 2021. 

Regarding key commodities, our oversight has found significant 

issues in the management of fuel and ammunition. In April 2015, 

we found a lack of adequate internal controls to manage both fuel 

and ammunition. Last month, we reported deficiencies in controls 

involving fuel procured for the Interior Ministry. We found that coalition advisers had no reasonable assurance that all U.S.-funded 

fuel, valued at $438 million, was used for its intended purpose. 

We will conduct a similar audit of fuel procurement for the Ministry of Defense later this year. Future DOD IG work in 2016 will 

include assessments of U.S. efforts to build an independent Afghan 

special forces and intelligence capability. We will soon evaluate the 

progress of U.S. Special Operation Forces in training, advising, and 

assisting the Afghan special forces. 

And this month, we will send a team of intelligence specialists 

to assess progress in developing effective Afghan intelligence operations. Looking forward, my office is engaged in a review of current 

programs and operations to identify future oversight work as the 

lead inspector general for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. As you 

may recall, Congress created the lead IG (Inspector General) for 

Overseas Contingency Operations in the fiscal year 2013 National 

Defense Authorization Act. The IGs of the Department of Defense, 

Department of State, and United States Agency for International 

Development, execute the lead IG mandate which was enacted to 

provide improved, coordinated, whole-of-government oversight in 

overseas contingency operations. We appreciate the support of this 

committee, subcommittee as we discharge our oversight responsibilities. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Child can be found in the Appendix on page 80.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Child. I will start the questions. 

Ms. Abizaid, I was wondering, what is the rationale for beginning 

the drawdown before the upcoming summer fighting season, and 

before a new U.S. administration has an opportunity to conduct its 

own assessment of the mission and needed troop levels? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So my understanding of the drawdown timeline is 

not that it will begin in the summer of 2016. The President has directed that General Campbell try and keep at the 9,800 level 

through as much as 2016 as possible so we can do what we can in 

both our train, advise, and assist mission and our CT [counterterrorism] mission to get the most out of our relationship with the Afghans as they improve throughout fighting season 2016. The rationale for the drawdown to the 5,500 is about how we set ourselves up for a future, sustainable presence in the country at key 

locations outside of Kabul. 
15 

The fact that we will maintain facilities in Jalalabad, in 

Kandahar, in Bagram, are key differences between the plan that 

was originally approved and the one that President Obama revised, 

that, I think, provide us the kind of flexibility we need to adjust 

the mission accordingly. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. Thank you. Colonel Michael, Afghan 

security forces have capability gaps, as we have heard you testify, 

in helicopter/airplane capabilities. These include the essential 

foundational activities and missions that professional militaries 

need in order to be efficient, effective, and lethal. So what limiting 

factors are precluding the ANDSF from sufficiently and effectively 

establishing these capabilities? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Ma’am, I wouldn’t say that there’s anything 

specifically that’s limiting them. To build this capability just takes 

time. First is the time to get the material and then time in the 

training process. So we look specifically at the CAS [close air support], we’re fielding the A–29s. There are four platforms that are 

already in country. There is four more that will be there by April. 

And then there is a total of six—correction, eight more that will 

show up after that. 

So part of it is procuring the equipment on time. And then the 

other part is training that capability. As you know, developing pilots, you know, is something that takes, you know, it takes a lot 

of specificity and time. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. How will the development of these capabilities 

be affected by the upcoming drawdown to 5,500 U.S. troops? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Ma’am, as we—the 5,500 also has the capacity 

to maintain train, advise, and assist for the Afghan Air Force. And, 

in addition, we are also specifically focused on train, advise, and 

assist to the Afghan special security forces. So both of those components will maintain train, advise, and assist oversight. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Mr. Breedlove, in your professional opinion, how do you believe the Afghan Taliban would react if the U.S. 

and coalition forces were able to target the Afghan Taliban directly 

as part of the counterterrorism mission, and outside the commander’s current ability in only extremis-type situations? 

Mr. BREEDLOVE. I think the best way I would phrase it is, we 

saw—we have seen how the insurgents, and particularly the 

Taliban, do react when we were under the surge, when we had 

U.S. and coalition forces in the fight, backed up by their own air 

support, as you know. And we saw adjustments in how they approached their tactics. What your specific questions, I don’t think 

we would see much of a change as far as the fight on the ground. 

I think the fighters on the ground will adjust. They are an adaptable enemy. They will adjust to their environment, as we saw this 

year, same as we saw them adjust when U.S. combat forces were 

much larger and much more aggressive than previous years. But 

it doesn’t stop them from fighting. 

So at best, we may see hesitation among some operations. We 

may see changes in how they maneuver. But I think at a tactical 

level, that would be the most we would expect to see. At a senior 

level, I don’t think it would have much of an impact. Most of the 

senior leaders are not in the country anyways. 
16 

Mrs. HARTZLER. So would direct targeting bring the Afghan 

Taliban to the negotiating table quicker and provide additional 

breathing room to the ANDSF and the Afghan unity government? 

Mr. BREEDLOVE. Ma’am, in my opinion, I think that would be a— 

it could be a factor, one of many tools that could be applied, but 

in and of itself, I don’t think that’s enough. It would have to be one 

of many tools to help change their belief that they’re still, they still 

have the time to win this fight. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you. And Mr. Sopko and Mr. Child, 

in your professional opinions, has the Department of Defense made 

adequate progress in establishing sufficient oversight and accountability mechanisms within its command and governance architectures to minimize opportunities, or identify quickly, if they occur, 

fraud, waste, and abuse activities that have plagued certain aspects of the Department’s mission execution over the recent years? 

Mr. SOPKO. Very briefly, no. And part of it is because they don’t 

have the resources for doing so. I think I noted in my longer statement, which I offer to be made part of the record, that we have 

even noted some of the task forces set up to fight and combat corruption have had to be abolished because there are no resources. 

So I would say no. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Mr. Child. 

Mr. CHILD. Ma’am, I believe, from our oversight, that they have 

established systems. The challenge is properly and fully implementing the systems. And I would offer three examples: They have 

begun the process of moving the Afghans to electronic pay and information system; they have—the Department improved the process for identifying, training the proper, both military and civilian 

advisers to conduct the train, advise, and assist; and they have increased the enforcement of the commitment letters which apply 

conditionality to the funds that have been applied. 

But, again, I would not say that they have adequately progressed 

in that. This is part of a process. And I think there are also complicating factors it is real important to consider. You have got illiteracy, endemic corruption. You have got the political tribal decisions for selecting commanders. General Campbell said that 70 percent of the problems that he saw was based on leadership. Both selecting and being able to relieve commanders and senior leaders is 

too often based on these other factors rather than competency. And 

I think for understandable reasons, we don’t have the stability of 

advisers because the tours are 9 months to a year, it is very difficult to have that kind of relationship over time. Instead, the contractor force is really the institutional memory in Afghanistan. And 

that is a challenge. 

And, finally, as Mr. Sopko very properly pointed out, the insecurity of Afghanistan to have both the Department and oversight 

agencies check, kick the tires, be downrange properly at the proper 

level to check, we really are dependent on the Afghans and their 

reporting. So without implementing those types of systems where 

we can better detect that the money is being properly used, there 

is not adequate progress. But I do believe the systems that have 

been identified and properly put in place will provide that kind of 

progress. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. Ranking Member Speier, questions? 
17 

Ms. SPEIER. Madam Chair, thank you. I want to apologize to all 

of the witnesses. Many of the members who were here earlier 

wanted to be able to stay. But because this is a getaway day, people’s schedules are such that they have to make planes. I think this 

hearing is so important that it should be held as a full committee 

hearing. 

We are spending so much money in Afghanistan. And from the 

testimony we have heard today, there is virtually no accountability. 

But let’s get to a couple of the points that you have made. Colonel 

Michael, you said in your statement significant, long-term capability gaps remain in the areas of ANDSF leadership, rotary-wing 

aviation, combined arms operation, intelligence collection and dissemination, close air support, and maintenance. So that is a pretty 

significant indictment. If it is not improved in 2016, what are you 

going to do differently? Or what are you going to recommend that 

be done differently. 

Colonel MICHAEL. Ma’am, the key thing to highlight is that it is 

a process. So we talk about, you know, there is capability gaps in 

leadership. But it is something that is being developed, you know, 

developed over time, both at the tactical level and the corps level. 

The main thing to reinforce, you know, we have really been building this force since 2009. Initially, when we started off, this was 

an American fight. We were in the lead. We were pulling—— 

Ms. SPEIER. I know all of that. 

Colonel Michael. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. The question is, though, we have been there for a 

very long time now. At some point, if we don’t put conditions on 

money coming in, the spigot always being turned on and never 

being turned off, then we are not going to get the kind of results 

we are looking for. And if you don’t develop a plan and specific expectations that are going to take place in 2016, or else funds aren’t 

going to available in 2017, we will be there indefinitely with no 

success and with the American people literally pulling out their 

hair saying what are we doing here? That is more rhetorical than 

anything else. But I don’t think your answer, frankly, is adequate. 

Let me ask all of the others of you: If 2016 is as bad as 2015, what 

would you recommend be done differently? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Ma’am, first, thanks for the question. I would start 

by saying, you know, the capability gaps that you have identified, 

that we have all identified in our statements, are those capability 

gaps that are among the most sophisticated aspects of the force 

that we are still trying to build. We have always planned for those 

to be the focus of the long-term relationship with the Afghan Government and the ANDSF. And the President’s decision to maintain 

a presence at 5,500 will allow us to really focus on especially the 

aviation, the special operations, the intel development. 

So that is an investment that we think is really important for 

the long-term future of not only the ANDSF, but the partnership 

between the United States and the Afghan Government on key CT 

relevant capabilities in that force. 

Ms. SPEIER. Do you anticipate there will be at least 5,000 troops 

in Afghanistan indefinitely? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I wouldn’t say indefinitely. I think that the plan is 

to ensure that they progress. And as they progress, we can have 
18 

more and more confidence in reducing our own troop level, which 

is part of how we got to the drawdown that we are currently planning on now. The 30,000 to 9,800 did assume that the Afghans 

could assume full responsibility for the security environment in 

2015. And despite very real challenges that we mostly anticipated, 

they have performed as expected. 

Now, the drawdown to 5,500 does anticipate that capability gaps 

will remain, but that we are going to be able to invest to make up 

those gaps over time. I don’t have a good estimate for how much 

time that will take. But I do not think it is an indefinite investment. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Sopko, what do you think we should do differently in 2017 if 2016 is as bad as 2015? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, I think 2016 will be as bad as 2015. I support 

the judgment of the head of National Intelligence who predicted 

that. I would say if things look bad, and I think they do, I would 

have four suggestions to you. Number one, fully support and ensure that General Nicholson actually has the resources and the 

time to conduct that 90-day assessment, a true 90-day assessment 

of what is going on and what his needs are. And bring him back 

and have him explain to this committee and other committees as 

to what those needs are. He is the person who is going to be on 

the ground. He has got to get out there with his people and see 

what is going on. 

The second thing is I think this Congress should require USAID 

[U.S. Agency for International Development] and DOD and the Department of State to actually rate and rack and stack their programs as to what succeeded, what hasn’t, and what do you want 

to get rid of in light of we have a fiscal crisis in the government. 

Why are we paying for some programs that make no sense anymore? 

They have never really done that. You know, I sent a letter to 

the head of AID, State Department, and the Secretary of Defense 

after I was on the job for 1 year, that is 3 years ago, and asked 

them to rack and stack all of their programs; at a minimum, just 

give me some of your success stories and why. And they weren’t 

able to do it. All I got back was, you know, balloons and kites and 

happy talk. 

You know, we are helping the Afghan military. Well, great. What 

program helped the Afghan military? If you have an unlimited 

budget, you can fund everything, but if you have a limited budget, 

limited time, and limited security, which programs are the most 

important programs? I would think that is something Congress 

needs to do. And going into 2016, that is what you really need to 

do. And they have to come up with real measurements of success. 

Right now, the measurement of success seems to be do you spend 

the appropriations? I am not seeing real measurements of success 

in the work I do not only with DOD, but with AID and State. And 

I think that is something Congress needs to hold somebody’s feet 

to the fire on. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Child. 

Mr. CHILD. Ma’am, I can’t argue what Mr. Sopko has said, I 

think particularly in terms of the agencies. But I do believe it is 

beyond my expertise as an oversight organization to address the 
19 

actual policy and the prescriptions. When policy is decided and objectives are declared, I see it as our job as oversight to see how that 

is being implemented. But the idea of providing General Nicholson 

the opportunity to come back and to—after his assessment, to 

make clear what he thinks he needs to properly do his job, I think 

that is a proper way forward. And, likewise, I think it is very important that the agencies, as they discharge their responsibilities, 

they will assess what works. And they may then change their policy. When they do, I think it is my job, representing the oversight 

community, to see how that is being implemented. Thank you. 

Ms. SPEIER. So there were two issues that were brought up this 

morning, one was ghost troops and fuel, that I would think we 

should be able to get our handle on; $438 million being spent on 

U.S. fuel to Afghanistan. And, Mr. Child, you testified that there 

really is no accountability. Is this fuel being sold on the black market? Is that a potential effect of what is going on? 

Mr. CHILD. Ma’am, to be precise, we found that there was no reasonable assurance that all of the fuel was being used for its proper 

purpose. We couldn’t pin down more precisely. And as to the ghost 

soldiers, we have a direct funding audit that, in part, concerns the 

pay system. And that will address some portion of the concern that 

we are paying for troops that are not actually there. 

Ms. SPEIER. So these troops that could be in provinces that we 

don’t have the ability because it is so unsafe to send personnel to 

audit would suggest that we really have no way of knowing whether these troops exist or don’t exist and whether they are functioning as members of the Afghan armed services, correct? 

Mr. CHILD. It is, it is certainly the fact that we can’t properly assess. They clearly have troops in the roll, or on the rolls, because 

it has been a tough fighting year, and they were able to hold their 

own. So, in fact, they do have, the question is how many others are 

we paying for that are not on the rolls. And that is in part what 

the pay systems are designed to address. And as I was saying, I 

believe we have established, the Department has established that 

type of mechanism to address, but it hasn’t been fully implemented. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Sopko is shaking his head. 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, I mean, I think the, I think my colleague mentioned it, we have got a program out there. We have got a contract 

we have let. But it hasn’t been implemented. I mean, we even 

tried, and I mentioned it in my statement, to ping the system, 

which is supposed to have all this great data now, and they 

couldn’t give us any answers from it. So that is the big problem. 

The ultimate thing is we are relying still on the Afghans who 

have an incentive to lie because they can collect the money to fill 

in the data cells. We don’t have the people on the ground. Remember, we are at the level of the corps. We are not at the level of the 

brigade or the kandak or the Tooley. We have no visibility. So at 

the corps level, it may look good. I mean, that is like measuring 

our effectiveness by going over to the Pentagon or going over to Ms. 

Abizaid’s office and understanding what is going on in Afghanistan. 

You have got to have people out on the ground. And that is the inherent problem with this. 
20 

I don’t care how many IT [information technology] systems you 

put into place, if the data going in is garbage in, it is garbage out. 

And that is what we are seeing, particularly in a country, in Afghanistan, where there is an incentive. My concern is we saw in 

Iraq where there were paper divisions. And, apparently, if you listen to the reporting coming out of Helmand by Afghan officials, 

there were paper units in Helmand which may explain what the 

problem is. My concern is how many of those units are actually just 

paper units? 

Ms. SPEIER. And we are paying for the salaries of each and every 

Afghan soldier. Is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. We and our allies, yes. We are paying the bulk of it. 

Ms. SPEIER. And the police force as well? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. I have many more questions but I will yield back. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sure. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ma’am, gentlemen, thank 

you for your service. Colonel Michael, I know we are discussing Afghanistan today. But King Abdullah was here 1 month ago today 

and discussed that whole region of the world, if you will, including 

Libya and the Saudi and Iran situation. You are in charge of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan and the transregional threat. How do 

you assess the region as a whole right now? The threat level? 

Colonel MICHAEL. I think if you look regionally, the threat level 

is fairly high. That is one of the reasons we are there. We are there 

to make sure that we set conditions so that what is happening 

there doesn’t emanate and touch here. So from that perspective, 

the fact that we are present, you know, reinforces the threat level 

is high. As we look at IS–KP [Islamic State-Khorasan Province], 

and you heard Mr. Breedlove’s assessment, and General Campbell 

himself said IS–KP was operationally emergent. And we have the, 

and he has the targeting authority to target them. And primarily 

looking at IS–KP from a global perspective, given the fact that we 

are fighting the core in Iraq and Syria, we are making sure we 

have the ability to engage and defeat them wherever, wherever 

they show up. 

Mr. SCOTT. And today we are talking about an individual country, but it is a regional issue to me. And when you look across that 

whole spectrum, Libya, from what I understand, is in worse shape 

than Syria. It is just that there is not much reporting there because the press can’t get in there. King Abdullah was pretty blunt 

with his statement that the volatility, I am paraphrasing a little 

bit, in that part of the world cannot be overexaggerated, and that 

the whole region is very close to, potentially, an all-out war. And 

that is very concerning to me. And we need to make sure that we 

keep our friends as strong as they can possibly be in that whole 

region, I would think, to hopefully bring about some stability. 

Mr. Sopko and Mr. Child, this may be more of a statement than 

a question, but we talk a lot about individual things, but it seems 

we waste a lot of money on not just the process that seems to be 

broken, but a procurement system that seems to be broken. Colonel 

Michael mentioned earlier the A–29 program. I am somewhat familiar with that as they are trained at Moody Air Force Base in 
21 

my district. And if things had gone as planned, they would be in 

country right now. Is that correct? And so where we sit today, is 

that they should be there 3 years from now. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sir, there is four A–29s in country. The rest will 

wait until 2018 to be fully—— 

Mr. SCOTT. I am talking about the completion of the system, of 

the whole, they should all be there right now? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Yes. Contract delays did delay the arrival of the A– 

29s. 

Mr. SCOTT. And it will take 3 years from now, because of those 

contract delays, to get the rest of the pilots trained and the units 

actually in country so they can help carry out the fight. So that 

delay came as a result of a lawsuit from Beechcraft Defense, if I 

am not mistaken. Is that correct? 

Mr. SOPKO. I think that is my understanding. It was a lawsuit. 

I believe that was the company. 

Mr. SCOTT. In your—in the written statement, it names them in 

the footnotes. Is it possible to calculate how much that lawsuit cost 

us, cost the United States by delaying that program for 3 years? 

Mr. SOPKO. You know, I would have to check on that. I assume 

there are some costs involved. But I really don’t know. We could 

take a look at that if you would like us to, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. My point is the situation on the ground may be very 

different and may be very much more in our favor if we had been 

able to get the equipment in that our soldiers and our friends need 

to carry out the fight. And this isn’t just with this situation. It is 

with situations all across the DOD where contractors are suing us. 

And those lawsuits are preventing us from getting the men and 

women that are out there carrying out the fight the equipment that 

they need. And Colonel Michael, if you had the A–29 that you are 

supposed to have today, would it change the fight? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Sir, absolutely. The maneuver operations on 

the ground that the ANDSF is doing is greatly enhanced by close 

air support. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is it possible that what happened on September 28 

may have had a different outcome if we had been able to provide 

that air support? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Sir, I couldn’t necessarily, you know, guarantee the outcome. But the bottom line is that the maneuver operations on the ground is much better and enhanced with proper 

close air support. 

Mr. SCOTT. So these lawsuits that are delaying our ability to 

carry out the mission are costing us more than the legal cost of the 

suit is my point. And it is costing us in lives as well. 

One last question that I have, if I may, Madam Chair, before I 

turn it back over, when we pull down from approximately 10,000 

troops to 5,500 or 6,000, whatever it may be, when we pull our soldiers out, are we, how many of those men and women are being 

replaced with contractors? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Sir, it is not a one-for-one exchange. I think 

right now the level of contractors are almost about the same. I 

think when we go down to 5,500, there will probably be an increased number of contractors. But if you look at what they are 
22 

doing, they are not necessarily, you know, a lot of it is support capability. 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. 

Colonel MICHAEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Maintenance on aircraft, maintenance on helicopters. 

And my point is, it seems to me that we have this number that we 

say well, we are going to pull this down because we have this perception that as long as we have fewer men and women in uniform 

in the country, that we are not spending as much, and that we are 

not engaged as much. But when we pull down a maintenance unit, 

for example, and we turn around and we send contractors back in 

to do that exact same maintenance, and we pay those contractors 

three or four times as much as we are paying U.S. service personnel, we are not, we are not being honest, really, about the cost 

of things. And I would ask Mr. Sopko, is it possible to calculate 

how much more, I would think it would be, we are spending on 

contractors as we draw down than we were spending on U.S. 

troops? 

Mr. SOPKO. We have not done that type of assessment. But I am 

certain we could test that. We could take a specific contract or a 

specific program that was run by the military and then compare 

the cost. That is something we could do. We have not done it. 

Mr. SCOTT. If I could make one final point. Colonel, in talking 

with soldiers, it creates a problem when you have a United States 

soldier who is making a couple of thousand dollars a month sitting 

right next to a contractor who is making $10,000 a month doing 

the exact same job. And the soldiers that I talk to, when you get 

to the point that you have enough trust that we are honest with 

each other, that creates some strife in an operation, because our 

soldiers are not treated as well as the contractors are if we are 

honest about it. And so that is more of a point than a question, but 

something that I am very concerned about and making sure that 

we take care of our soldiers. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is very good point, gentlemen. Now, Ms. 

Speier, have some more questions? 

Ms. SPEIER. I do. I think in the last round, Ms. Abizaid, you 

wanted to say something. Because I thought my time should be 

shifted to someone else, I did not give you the opportunity to speak. 

So if you have a comment on that last round? 

Ms. ABIZAID. Sure. I appreciate the opportunity to come back to 

it. First of all, I think that the, the ghost soldiers problem, the 

problem with accountability for Afghan soldiers that we are paying 

for is a real problem and one that, you know, we worked closely 

with Mr. Child, Mr. Sopko to understand. We also worked closely 

with them to develop a comprehensive solution to address it. And 

while it is not fully in place yet, we are working toward an integrated pay and personnel system that will mitigate opportunities 

for corruption in the system. 

I think it is a really important initiative that we are putting in 

place. It is one that we are focused on. And it has taken a while 

to develop, given the unique terrain that is Afghanistan. But it is 

something that we are absolutely focused on and think is an important aspect of the mission. In terms of what the difference between 

fighting season 2015 and fighting season 2016 and how we are try-
23 

ing to account for those, I do want to assure you that General 

Campbell, in speaking with the Secretary of Defense, with the National Security interagency, has communicated the work that he is 

doing already to evaluate fighting season 2015, and what changes 

not only the Afghan National Security Forces need to make to improve for fighting season 2016, but that we need to make in our 

train, advise, assist mission. 

So it is a clear focus that we are not sort of blindly following the 

template that we started with in fighting season 2015. We are actually looking to improve upon and progress in the development of 

the ANDSF, so we do set ourselves up for success in fighting season 2016 and set the conditions for the long-term mission in Afghanistan. Thank you. 

Ms. SPEIER. So as it relates to ghost troops, can we be competent 

that by the end of 2016, there will be a system in place that will 

have retina detection or something so that we will have a confident 

understanding of how many troops the Afghan military service 

has? 

Ms. ABIZAID. We will certainly have greater confidence. We are 

instituting a biometric ID [identification] card system and issuing 

those to all MOD and Afghanistan National Army elements. 

Ms. SPEIER. So when will they all be distributed? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I believe by the middle of this year. The integrated 

pay and personnel system will be fully implemented I believe for 

the MOI in the middle of this year as well. And by early 2017, we 

will be transitioning it to the MOD as well. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Breedlove, in terms of our 

intelligence capability there, we were surprised with the death of 

Mullah Omar, and didn’t know that he had been dead for some 

time. Is that correct? 

Mr. BREEDLOVE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. So with that knowledge, what can you tell us about 

what we need to do to have better intelligence? 

Mr. BREEDLOVE. Well, I think it is illustrative on that particular 

account that we need to keep in mind that somebody like Mullah 

Omar was basically in self-exile. He wasn’t out there. He had always been that way. So trying to get at it from an intelligence perspective, that is going to be, if somebody wants to stay hidden, and 

he is surrounded by people that want to stay hidden, and he 

doesn’t communicate, and he doesn’t move, it makes it very difficult to try to find that needle in that haystack. And I think that 

was illustrative of this particular situation, as well as a conspiracy 

to perpetuate the fact that he was alive. 

Ms. SPEIER. I guess my question, though, is, are you comfortable 

that we have enough resources being extended on intelligence in 

the region, particularly in Afghanistan? 

Mr. BREEDLOVE. I am. It is never perfect. It is never enough. You 

are asking an intelligence professional if we have enough information. We can never have enough information. We are always going 

to want more information. Our gaps are always large. In this particular case, they have grown since we have reduced our footprint. 

But I think we are adequate to get after what we need to do. And 

speaking for my agency, I think we are sufficient in order to do our 

mission set, which is support the warfighter in theater. 
24 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Mr. Sopko, is it true that we just built a new 

headquarters facility for the Ministry of Defense? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. What was the cost of that facility? 

Mr. SOPKO. I think the project cost was $155 million. It was $100 

million over budget, and completed 5 years late. 

Ms. SPEIER. Who is the contractor on that? 

Mr. SOPKO. I don’t have that data handy. But I will have to get 

back to you. 

Ms. SPEIER. $100 million over budget? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct. 

Ms. SPEIER. And who was watching the store on that one? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, I think it was the, and I have to double-check, 

maybe Ms. Abizaid would know who was responsible. It was either 

an Air Force contract or the Corps of Engineers, I don’t know who 

in the military—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Could you get back to us on that? 

Mr. SOPKO. Oh, absolutely. Happy to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

Ms. SPEIER. The maintenance cost, is that going to be able to be 

supported? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, I wouldn’t know since the Afghan national, I 

mean, the Afghan Government can’t pay for their military, I don’t 

know if they can pay for the O&M [operation and maintenance] 

costs which are about $2.6, $3 million a year to maintain that 

building. That is our best estimate. 

Ms. SPEIER. So if they don’t have the money to maintain that 

building, the building will be a white elephant in short order? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, we will pay for it, like we are paying for most 

of the other O&M. 

Ms. SPEIER. How about the Ministry of Interior, did we just build 

them a new facility? 

Mr. SOPKO. We are in the process of building them a brand new 

facility which I visited. And that should be completed soon, I think 

at the cost of about $100 million. 

Ms. SPEIER. And is that on budget? 

Mr. SOPKO. No. But I don’t have those exact figures since it is 

not finished. 

Ms. SPEIER. So the ministries, the ministers want lavish facilities. And so we say, okay. And we build them. Do we condition the 

construction of these buildings on any accountability? 

Mr. SOPKO. Not that I know of. And that is an issue. I remember 

having a lengthy conversation with General Semonite who ran 

CSTC–A, who said that prior to 2013, we did not have any conditionality on the money that CSTC–A was spending or giving to 

GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]. So I 

think basically 2013 and then he was a big advocate of conditionality. But I think these buildings, the construction started before 

he got there. 

Ms. SPEIER. So moving forward, would you recommend that there 

be conditionality on the construction of any palace for—— 

Mr. SOPKO. I agree fully with that. And, again, this is something 

I have had long conversations with General Semonite who used to 
25 

run CSTC–A, he has now been replaced. And it was the whole 

issue he had, and I thought it was very good, called smart conditionality. You can’t stop giving the Afghan National Security Forces 

guns or bullets because they will lose the war. But identify the 

shiny objects that the local official wants, and then focus on that 

as your condition. That was General Semonite’s approach to smart 

conditionality. And I think it is something we should continue following. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if you intend to 

do another round. I don’t want to continue to ask questions without 

giving you the opportunity to—— 

Mr. SCOTT [presiding.] I have a couple brief ones, but I don’t 

have anything long. I will be happy to go briefly and then turn it 

back over to you. And then we will close out. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Sopko, Mr. Child, this may be more along the 

lines of suggestions that you could make. But in most vehicles in 

America that you buy now, you can call the manufacturers, if the 

vehicle is stolen, and they can tell you exactly where it is. And they 

can actually shut the vehicle down so that it can be recovered. It 

seems to me that we could use the same types of technology in 

some of our military equipment, that if the equipment ends up in 

the hands of somebody we don’t want to have it, that we can stop 

that equipment from being used against us with stuff that we have 

in every GM or Ford vehicle in the country right now. 

Just a suggestion from someone it bothers greatly to see our enemies riding around in vehicles that the United States purchased. 

We are going to be pulling from 9,800 down to 5,500 uniformed 

personnel over the next 101⁄2 months. That is the current plan. Is 

that correct? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. That is approximately 50 percent of the men and 

women that we have in uniform. I want to go back to the issue of 

the contractors. How many contractors do we intend to hire over 

the next 11 months to replace the work that our men and women 

in uniform are performing? And will those contractors be predominantly from the United States? Or will they be local? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Sir, we don’t have an exact number of contractors we are looking to hire. And it is not, you know, to replace, you 

know, the 5,500 is really designed to accomplish exactly what we 

need from our military. So as we draw down, we are not just increasing contractors to replace the fact that we have drawn down 

the military. The assessment is as we go forward, we need to focus 

on a regional counterterrorism platform, as you talked about, a regional threat. It has regional, is based out of Kabul in the south, 

in the east. And that gives us the capability to surge capacity if we 

need to. And it gives us the capability to address any threats. 

In addition, it focuses advise and assist at the ministerial level 

and at the Afghan security institutions, that focuses advise and assist at the critical capabilities that we think we need long-term 

CAS, the Afghan Air Force, and then also the Afghan special security forces. 

So the number of military is, the assessment is that is exactly 

what we need. Obviously, we will also be able to leverage contrac-
26 

tors. But the intent was not to draw down military and just to replace them with contractors, the number of military’s assessment 

of what we think we will need. 

Mr. SCOTT. But you understand the point. I mean, soldiers that 

I talk with were like, you know, they say we are drawing down, 

we are losing uniform personnel. But in the end, we are putting 

other people in there doing the exact same job. And contractors 

aren’t necessarily carrying rifles. Many of them are operating on 

the equipment, maintenance, and other things. But I think the soldiers who are flying the aircraft prefer to have the men and women 

that are taking care of them in the United States. And I would 

point out on the A–29 program, it is not just training the pilots. 

When they come to the United States, they bring the maintenance 

people as well. And so we are sending the whole crew back to take 

care of that system. I hope we get it to you sooner rather than 

later. I don’t have any further questions. I will turn it back over 

to Ms. Speier if she has any. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Scott. One of the issues that many 

of you have raised, that General Campbell raised, was the fact that 

the ANDSF have fallen short in terms of their aviation capabilities. 

Part of it was referenced by Mr. Scott in terms of getting the actual 

platforms there. But it appears that part of the problem is that you 

are dealing with a population that, for the most part, is illiterate. 

So I would like your thoughts on whether or not we are bringing 

in equipment that is too sophisticated for the population that we 

are trying to train in terms of the air force to be able to commandeer these aircraft. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Thanks for the question, ma’am. Human capital 

shortages are significant when we talk about the aviation capability that the Afghan Air Force needs. And it is one of the drivers 

as we look at how we should build a force that the Afghan Government can actually afford. We do focus literacy training, we do focus 

technical training an those high-end skills that are associated with 

aviation maintenance, that are associated with the piloting of the 

aircraft to the key population that we think is going to be necessary for the Afghans to be able to operate the air force that they 

need. But in terms of the sophistication of the system, I think what 

we are trying to do is establish a contracted logistics support system that both incorporates, you know, contracted maintenance that 

we, the United States military, often uses for our own sophisticated 

systems; but also increases the training of Afghans to be able to 

increasingly do the maintenance on their own, so it becomes a more 

organic capability. We are aware, again, of those human capital 

shortages. And that is a key driving factor in how we balance and 

plan for the air force that is actually absorbable. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Sopko. 

Mr. SOPKO. Congresswoman, I think you are raising a really critical point. And it goes beyond just literacy. It goes back to the sufficiency of our resources that General Campbell and General Nicholson have. Due to a lack of data, we do not know right now how 

many ANDSF personnel are literate. Our best estimate is it is less 

than 30 percent. And why? Because even though we spent $200 

million in literacy training, CSTC–A does not have the ability because they don’t have the resources to measure the effectiveness of 
27 

the literacy program and determine the extent to which overall literacy in ANDSF has improved. Remember, we transitioned the literacy program to the Afghans. And once we did that, we lost all 

visibility. So we don’t know how many people have been trained, 

but, more importantly, how many of those soldiers and police we 

trained are still in the military. 

And we make, as you know, our quarterly report is the largest 

data call that goes out every year to the U.S. Government, or every 

quarter, on what is going on. And when we ask these questions, we 

are not getting answers anymore because CSTC–A, because our resources in the field are not there to answer them. 

So you are on to a very important point that goes beyond just 

the literacy issue. It goes to the heart of the issue and that is, do 

we have adequate resources to understand the capabilities of the 

ANDSF? 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. Anyone else want to comment on that? 

All right. Compared to 2 years ago, I think the threat to our personnel who are serving in Afghanistan has grown. And I am particularly concerned about our embassy and the inability of our personnel to move around the city of Kabul or anywhere else. So my 

first question is, do you think that the danger there has increased? 

And what, if anything, can we do to mitigate those concerns? 

Ms. ABIZAID. So since the drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces, 

the security environment in Kabul I think in general has decreased. Some of that is the withdrawal also came with it a lack 

of capital going into the city. And so some of the security environment is influenced not by the insurgent threat, but sort of the economic instability and, you know, increased threats of kidnappings 

and other things in country. So no question, the security environment is diminished in Kabul. There are different statistics that indicate that the high profile attacks are actually down overall from 

last year to this year. But, you know, what we are very focused on, 

from the DOD perspective, but I think it also affects State, is taking the precautionary measures to ensure that those that are serving in Afghanistan on our behalf are adequately protected. 

There are different costs associated with ground movements that 

we can defray by doing more air movements. And so that is one of 

the calculations that we make in terms of how much access and 

how much freedom of movement we ask those personnel that are 

serving in country to sort of take when they are moving around the 

city. But no question, it is a difficult security environment and one 

that we are very focused, as a first order of business, on ensuring 

the force protection of those that are serving there 

Ms. SPEIER. Colonel Michael, are people in the embassy moving 

outside the embassy on foot at all? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Primarily when they move, it is by vehicles. 

There are a couple spots close to the embassy where people walk. 

But for the most part, if you are moving out of the embassy or you 

are moving out of any military compound, it is by vehicles. 

Ms. SPEIER. Is it by vehicles? 

Colonel MICHAEL. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. ABIZAID. Ma’am, it is both vehicles and air movements, 

though the air movements have increased over the last year. 
28 

Ms. SPEIER. So the question becomes, what can they do if they 

are really isolated within the embassy compound? And are we placing them at risk by keeping them there? 

Ms. ABIZAID. I would defer to State. They are going to be able 

to tell you the frequency of their movements. I would say they are 

not isolated. We at RS, in Resolute Support and USFOR–A [United 

States Forces–Afghanistan] are not isolated at Resolute Support 

headquarters. The embassy is not isolated at the embassy. A lot of 

the government facilities that they need to visit are within the 

Green Zone, the International Zone, where there is a good deal of 

safety and ability to move around, to go to the MOD headquarters 

building, to go to the MOI headquarters building. So our advisers 

are getting out and about. My understanding is that State Department employees are getting out and about and engaging with their 

Afghan partners on those aspects of our relationship that are most 

critical. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Sopko. 

Mr. SOPKO. I would beg to differ a little bit with my colleague 

in one respect. They are getting about but it is very limited. And 

we don’t really have an embassy presence to a great extent outside 

of Kabul. We used to have senior civilian representatives located 

around the country. We no longer have those people there. We still 

may have a military presence in some of these bases. But we don’t 

have the civilian presence. 

I go there on a regular basis. And I talk to my colleagues, not 

only my staff, we have about 50, but also talking to State and AID 

officials. And they are not getting out. There are people who are 

assigned to our embassy who never leave the embassy, except to 

go for R&R [rest and recuperation] because they can’t get out. 

The last time I was in country, went over to the ministry of narcotics. And the State Department officials from I&L [Installations 

and Logistics] have never gotten to the ministry of narcotics because of the security situation. Now, I don’t want to criticize our 

security people. As Ms. Abizaid has said, they are very concerned 

about the safety of our American troops, our American civilians, 

our American contractors. And I defer to them on security. 

So I am not questioning these security things. But the reality of 

the situation is you can get assigned to Afghanistan in the embassy 

or AID, and you never leave the embassy. Now, that doesn’t mean 

we should shut down, because doing diplomacy is not risk free. 

Just like a soldier takes a risk when he puts that uniform on and 

goes overseas, the same thing for AID and State employees, and 

DOD IG people and my staff, it is not risk free. You want to try 

to measure that risk. But the risk is taking its toll on the ability 

to advise and assist, to train, and to get out and oversee the 

money. That is the reality of the situation there. 

Ms. SPEIER. I really appreciate your candor. Because I think for 

many of our colleagues, there is an expectation that there is movement and that it is less dire, frankly, than I think it is. And the 

fact that so many of our personnel there are really not able to move 

outside of being transferred by air is, should be of deep concern to 

us. Mr. Child, do you have any further comments on that? 

Mr. CHILD. I think Mr. Sopko explained it very well. That has 

certainly been my experience and our staff. 
29 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, I have one last question but it is a 

big one. I would like to ask each member of the panel to give me 

two examples of success in Afghanistan, and two examples of failure. 

Ms. ABIZAID. I will start. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. 

Ms. ABIZAID. So two examples of success, first of all, I think that 

this fighting season, we have talked a lot about the problems that 

we are seeing in Helmand with the 215th Corps. We have talked 

a lot about the concerns that we saw in Kunduz when it temporarily fell to the Taliban. What we talked less about is the successes that we have seen from other elements of the Afghan National Security Forces. The 203rd Corps, importantly, one of the 

corps that we don’t cover in as a matter of sort of daily contact—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Could you repeat that again? What is it called? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The 203rd Corps, which operates in eastern and 

southeastern Afghanistan, did a very good job this fighting season 

addressing what is a dynamic security environment. They had ISIL 

threats to deal with, Al Qaeda threats to deal with. They had 

Taliban threats to deal with. They conducted a number of clearing 

operations that were multi-pillar, you know, cross, across multiple 

different aspects of the complicated force. And they did quite well— 

in Operation Iron Triangle, specifically. 

I would also say that the special operations capability that the 

Afghan National Security Forces are displaying and, in particular, 

their aviation capability that supports it has been a critical aspect 

of this fighting season, and the one place where we are sure that 

that investment is paying off. They have, they were critical in retaking Kunduz after it temporarily fell to the Taliban. And they 

have been critical in partnered operations like that, which we 

partnered with them in Kandahar to disrupt a very significantly 

sized Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent training facility. 

So showing the investment in that partnership, we really do see 

that displayed by that core capability and the special operations capability and the aviation capability in particular. Now, I have mentioned some of the difficulties that we experienced this fighting season. I think that other aspects of what we do in Afghanistan are 

also a mixed bag. 

There have been very big successes, I think, in our relationship 

with the Afghan Government to counter corruption. I think we 

have a partner in President Ghani who is very focused on being 

able to have control over those aspects of the government that are 

prone to corruption. And he wants us to work together to figure out 

how to discipline the system. 

That being said, as we have seen in places like Helmand, corruption is a significant problem. As we see with things like ghost soldiers, that is a problem. And so we are all focused together and I 

think for the first time in a very real way with our Afghan partners 

in addressing that challenge. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. Mr. Breedlove. 

Mr. BREEDLOVE. It is a great question, ma’am. Thank you. I 

would keep this very simple. So two examples of success, I will 

take this at a strategic and a more operational level. At the strategic level, I think a measure of success would be seeing the frac-
30 

ture of the Taliban leadership. And that may also be precipitated, 

for example, by peace talks or negotiations between Afghans. Operationally, it would be a very public, or publicized operational defeats of the insurgency in the field by Afghan security forces. 

My two examples of failure would just be the exact opposite of 

those two coins I just highlighted to you. So at the operational 

level, that would be the capture, or multiple captures of several 

provincial capitals inside Afghanistan. And at a strategic level, that 

would be seeing the fracture of the political elites, that destabilizes 

the government, and may be a presage to civil conflict again. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. Colonel Michael. 

Colonel MICHAEL. Ma’am, as soon as we look at successes, I 

would say one success is just the ownership that the ANDSF has 

taken. As we said, this is a force here that is fully responsible. You 

know, the primary land force and the ownership that they took, I 

think, and effects that they have had this year. Not a key success, 

I would say, would be the ALP [Afghan Local Police] program. 

Even though it is not perfect and there are areas of the ALP program that we have to work, we have seen some key successes 

there. One of the things that is significant about the ALP program 

is that the folks are from the local area. 

So wherever you find ALP, they are properly secured and tied in 

with the rest of the Afghan security. You almost find green bubbles 

are created because they know who should be there, who shouldn’t. 

And it displaces the enemy. The enemy is no longer [able] to hide 

in plain sight. 

One of the things I think that, failures and things that they have 

got to work on, you know, the ability to maintain some of the small 

persistent operations that is required to put pressure on the 

Taliban. 

So to do well in the big multicorps operations, but the ones that 

are really, that have the most impact are the ones that are really 

being done at the district level by kandak and the ones that are 

not telegraphed. In big operations, a lot of times the enemy can understand that it is coming and have the ability to shift. 

And then the final thing, I think, that they need to—that they 

can improve and do better is anticipating where the enemy is going 

to be. So, for example, you know, we do well by typically defending 

in the east and the south. What we saw this year, you know, some 

attacks in the north, Kunduz was an example and some attacks in 

the west. So being able to anticipate and then responding and reacting a little bit quicker, you know, when the enemy does something that is not telegraphed or unexpected. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Mr. Sopko. 

Mr. SOPKO. I would like to follow up on Assistant Secretary 

Abizaid’s comments. And I think the two successes that I would 

like to highlight actually deal with the cooperation with the new, 

or national unity government. And one has to do with conditionality. General Semonite, General Davis, and General Campbell 

have insisted upon conditionality. They have worked very closely 

with the new unity government. And I actually met with President 
31 

Ghani, and he says, I accept conditionality. I want conditionality. 

Let’s work together. And I think that is a great success. 

The prior regime wasn’t interested in conditionality, but the new 

regime is. And so General Davis, General Semonite, and General 

Campbell have really stepped up to the plate and hit a home run 

on that. The second success is along the same line, and I think it 

is when we work together, we really do succeed. And that is when 

my agents uncovered the price-fixing for the $1 billion MOD fuel 

case, we immediately went to General Campbell, we went to General Semonite, we explained what we had uncovered, because we 

actually had information of the conspiracy in Dubai to rig the price, 

which was going to cost the Afghans an extra $250 million, which 

means it was going to cost the U.S. 

They went over as a team. General Semonite and my investigators briefed the President. The President merely shut down the 

contract, fired some generals, did an investigation, and then set up 

a procurement commission that they are looking at other questionable direct assistance contracts, and that is fantastic. That is a success. 

On the failures, Madam Congresswoman, there are so many. But 

I think one we have ignored up to now and is the 800-pound gorilla 

in the room, and that is the $8 billion we have spent on counternarcotics, and it has been a total abject failure. The only reason the 

amount of narcotics coming out of Afghanistan are lower this year 

than last year, has absolutely nothing to do with any of our programs or that $8 billion. It has to do with disease and weather. 

And that is the 800-pound gorilla. If we ignore that, what will 

happen is what Ashraf Ghani warned us about years ago, Afghanistan will become a narcoterrorist state. And I have not seen anything announced by the embassy that would somehow stop that. 

The other issue, which I think is an abject failure, and that is, 

we really don’t know what capabilities are of the Afghan National 

Security Forces. We are guessing. And those are two serious failures and serious concerns. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Mr. CHILD. Ma’am, I would discuss as success the intersection of 

what I think is a strategic improvement based on oversight, and 

that is beginning with Major General Michael Williamson, as to 

CSTC–A, sought out from our organization a look, a hard look, at 

both the NATO trust fund and the initial direct funding challenge. 

And the surprising thing, he was able to see, and General Dunford 

as well, President Ghani has said, the Taliban is not an existential 

threat. What is an existential threat is a loss of confidence by the 

contributing nations. And General Williamson took our report, 

which was quite negative, identified many, many problems, but the 

fact that the United States has a system of an independent IG outside the chain of command reporting only to the Secretary of Defense and to Congress that could, therefore, independently assess 

the problems, General Williamson took that to NATO and met with 

contributing nation partners, and it had an impact that they could 

then feel at least there is some independent look, and despite the 

fact that it was bad, it would mean some attempt at improvement, 

and that has continued. 
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And Mr. Sopko is a very big part of that, but it has continued 

to the extent of translating our reports into the languages—the 

language of the Afghans, so that they would be outbriefed along 

with the command, and is not simply the command saying, this is 

a problem, and it has to be improved, but this is a report that is 

going to the United States Congress that appropriates the fund. So 

we have had several reports like that. We continue the direct funding. That is what I would say, two positives. 

I would speak only to one negative, and I think it is dramatic. 

It is an example of the tragedy there, all the attempts to do good 

things and to improve. 

On August 5, 2014, I was serving in Bagram and learned that 

Major General Harold Green had been killed. He was trying to 

demonstrate his confidence in the Afghans, did not wear the protective equipment. He was meeting with Afghan officials. He was a 

follow-on to General Williamson, who was followed by General 

Semonite, and now to General Davis. And so attempting to make 

a big difference, and he was, in trying to place beginning conditionality on matters, he lost his life. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. Thank you, all, very much for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Ma’am, Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I can’t 

speak to everyone that we are training, but I can speak to the men 

that we are training in the A–29 mission. I have been down there. 

I have met with them. I can assure you that people that are coming 

through there that are vetted, they are educated, and they are capable of carrying out that mission. That is one mission. 

But I will speak for that one. And one other suggestion might be 

working with the people in that country, the leadership of that 

country, the drug—the best way to handle that drug issue is probably to get some crop dusters over there and to spray the crops. 

And if we want to be careful about how much we spend, come to 

south Georgia. We will sell you one and ship it over there at the 

right price. 

Thank you for being here and for your service. 

[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Mr. SOPKO. Contract was issued on April 21, 2009 by the Air Force Civil Engineer 

Center (AFCEC), previously the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, for $48.7 million to Innovative Technical Solutions, Inc (ISTI). After 14 modifications, the contract cost was raised to $107.3 million. Construction work was halted due to lack of funds on December 31, 2013. 

On July 30, 2014, AFCEC awarded Gilbane Federal (the new name for ITSI) a 

second $47.4 million contract for building completion by July 31, 2015. [See page 

24.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 12, 2016 

(103) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In the funding we provide to Afghanistan, $2.1 billion has been 

designated for Foreign Military Sales. Since American taxpayers are providing these 

funds, are there protocols or instructions which ensure these funds will provide opportunities for United States manufacturers and workers? What weapons platforms 

are being sold to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces and how 

does the procurement process work? 

Ms. ABIZAID. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes requirements to procure defense articles for the Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces (ANDSF) using the Title 10 funds provided by Congress for the Afghanistan 

Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in the annual defense appropriations bill. $2.5B of the 

$3.3B in ASFF available to the Department of Defense (DOD) in Fiscal Year (FY) 

2015 is being executed by DSCA. ASFF procurements are accomplished primarily 

by the Military Departments and the Defense Logistics Agency. These procurements 

include defense articles as well as services such as training, advising, and maintenance, and are governed by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 

(DFARS), which generally requires full and open competition for contracts. 

Equipment procurements for the ANDSF using ASFF are largely for U.S.-made 

end items. For example, AM General is currently manufacturing new up-armored 

HMMWVs for the Afghan Army to replace battle losses and for the Afghan police 

to provide combat power; more than 300 have been delivered in recent months and 

at least 1,300 more will be delivered this year. Other US-made equipment procured 

using ASFF includes Navistar and Oshkosh trucks; Caterpillar tractors; Textron 

Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; MD Helicopters MD530s; Harris and Datron radios; 

uniforms; boots; M4 and M16 rifles; 60 and 81 mm mortars; Mk 19 grenade launchers; M240 machine guns; M203 grenade launchers; and ammunition for these weapons. 

To clarify, DOD does not ‘‘sell’’ defense articles to the Afghan government. Instead, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A), in coordination with the leadership of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, identifies 

and validates ANDSF capabilities and requirements, which are transmitted to 

DSCA in a CSTC–A-endorsed Memorandum of Request (MoR). DSCA then assigns 

the MoR to the appropriate implementing agency to undertake contracting for the 

requirements by either using existing or awarding new DOD contracts. The items 

are then procured, delivered to Afghanistan, and transferred by CSTC–A to the Afghan government for employment by their forces in combat operations. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In light of serious issues concerning the abuse of children, there 

have been statements by DOD indicating protocols have been put in place for handling reports of child sexual abuse. Would you please explain the protocols and procedures which will prevent these incidents from going unreported in the future? 

Does a soldier have the authority to help a child if they have direct knowledge 

abuse is occurring at the time? 

Have incidents occurred on U.S. property? 

Colonel MICHAEL. On September 22, 2015, General Campbell publicly stated that 

he expects that any suspicions of sexual abuse will be reported immediately to the 

chain of command, regardless of who the alleged perpetrators or victims are. He further directed that if there are any indications that the abuse involves Afghans, a 

report must be forwarded to him through operational channels and copied to the 

Staff Judge Advocate, so that the Afghan government can be advised and requested 

to take action to investigate the allegations. These policies and procedures will remain in place under the new Commander, USFOR–A, General Nicholson. 

We continue to work to ensure that all U.S. forces in Afghanistan understand 

their responsibilities to report human rights violations, and that Afghan leaders understand their responsibilities to develop a professional force and hold perpetrators 

accountable for their actions. DOD mandates training for U.S. service members to 

ensure that they clearly understand their obligations to respect human dignity and 

to take appropriate action when confronted with suspected violations of human 

rights. Under long-standing principles of law and policy, U.S. service members may 

choose but are not required to intervene in the commission of an imminent or ongo-
104 

ing serious offense which they observe, including if they witness child abuse, as legally appropriate. 

DOD has and continues to review historical reports to identify any allegations of 

sexual abuse by ANDSF personnel. In this review, DOD has not uncovered any alleged incidents that were directly witnessed by U.S. forces or had occurred on U.S. 

or coalition facilities. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In the funding we provide to Afghanistan, $2.1 billion has been 

designated for Foreign Military Sales. Since American tax payers are providing 

these funds, are there protocols or instructions which ensure these funds will provide opportunities for United States manufacturers and workers? What weapons 

platforms are being sold to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces 

and how does the procurement process work? 

Colonel MICHAEL. The pseudo-Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process to procure defense articles for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) is governed by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, which generally 

requires full and open competition for contracts. 

FMS cases are typically funded either with the participating countries’ organic resources or by Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds that are subject to Title 22 

requirements. Title 22 funding must be spent on U.S. materiel and services, with 

limited waiver authority, whereas host nations determine how their funds will be 

spent within the FMS process. Equipment procurements for the ANDSF using Afghanistan Security Forces Fund are largely for US-produced end items. Examples 

include AM General HMMWVs; Navistar and Oshkosh trucks; Caterpillar tractors; 

Textron Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; MD530s Helicopters; Harris and Datron radios; uniforms; boots; M4 and M16 rifles; 60 mm and 81 mm mortars; Mk 19 grenade launchers; M240 machine guns; M203 grenade launchers; and ammunition. 

The pseudo-FMS process through which these procurements are made does not 

involve ‘‘selling’’ defense articles to the Afghan government. Instead, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A,) in coordination with the leadership of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, identifies and validates 

ANDSF capabilities and/or requirements, which are transmitted to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in a CSTC–A-endorsed Memoranda of Request 

(MoR). DSCA then assigns the MoR to the appropriate Service Component Implementing Agency to undertake contracting requirements. It is important to note that 

the pseudo-FMS process is not limited to the procurement of defense articles or enditems but also includes requirements related to training, maintenance, spare parts, 

and other long-term sustainment. 

Since 2009, the Afghan security forces have spent almost $1.5 billion in FMF 

funds, all of which were spent on U.S. defense articles and services. The Afghan 

government currently has $25 million in uncommitted FMF funds available. 

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