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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 32772 

STATE OF IDAHO, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

BENNY DALE COFFIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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2008 Opinion No. 76 

Filed: July 24, 2008 

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 

County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of ten years, with five years 

determinate, for felony domestic violence, affirmed. 

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Diane M. Walker, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

______________________________________________ 

GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge 

 Bennie Dale Coffin appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered upon 

the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic violence. We affirm. 

I. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURE 

 On June 1, 2005, police twice responded to Coffin’s residence to investigate two separate 

reports of domestic violence. The first report was made by Coffin’s live-in girlfriend, Kalee 

Chandler, who called 911 reporting that she and Coffin had been in an altercation. After arriving 

at the residence to investigate, an officer suggested to Coffin, who was “clearly intoxicated,” that 

he leave the residence. No arrests were made at the time. 

 Approximately a half-hour after the officers left the residence, Chandler fled to a nearby 

house screaming and told her neighbor that Coffin had hit and kicked her and thrown her to the 
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ground. Chandler spoke to a 911 operator, telling her that Coffin had returned to the house 

wanting a ring and that Chandler had put the ring in her mouth. She stated that Coffin then put 

his fingers in her mouth, she bit them, and he threw her on the ground and kicked her in the head. 

 When the officers returned to Coffin’s residence, he was not there. They interviewed 

Chandler and took photographs of her injuries which included a scratch and bruise on her arm, 

bite marks on her forehead, a noticeable bump on the back of her head, and lacerations under her 

tongue. The police then left the residence in search of Coffin who they found several blocks 

away. He told the officers that when Chandler would not give him the ring, he had pried her 

mouth open and attempted to retrieve the ring. She then bit down on his fingers, causing Coffin 

to press his teeth against her forehead and to hit the back of her head in an attempt, he claimed, 

to have her release her bite. He also admitted to pushing her to the ground to free himself but 

denied kicking her in the head as she had claimed. 

 Coffin was charged with felony domestic violence, Idaho Code §§ 18-903, 18-918(2). 

Following a jury trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to ten years, with five years 

determinate. The court, however, suspended the sentence, placing Coffin on probation for ten 

years. Coffin now appeals. 

II. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Jury Instructions 

For the first time on appeal, Coffin contends that the district court committed reversible 

error when it instructed the jury with regard to the definition of “willfully” for the purpose of the 

“willful infliction of a traumatic injury” element of the domestic violence charge (jury 

instruction no. 10). 

 The question whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over 

which we exercise free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d 691, 694 (1992). 

When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not 

individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 

866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct. App. 1993). 

 Ordinarily, a party may not claim that a jury instruction was erroneous unless the party 

objected prior to the jury beginning to deliberate. Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b). However, even 

absent a timely objection to the trial court, some claims of instructional error are reviewable for 
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the first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 

748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). Fundamental error has been defined as error that “so profoundly 

distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental 

right to due process.” Anderson, 144 Idaho at 748, 170 P.3d at 891; State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 

842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). 

Coffin contends the instruction given by the court on the “willful” element of infliction of 

traumatic injury for domestic violence was an erroneous statement of the law that was prejudicial 

to him. Specifically, he argues that the court instructed the jury on “willfulness” by giving “the 

less culpable conduct-oriented meaning” of the term and thereby reducing the state’s burden of 

proof in regard to the mental element of the offense. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that in a criminal trial, “the State must prove 

every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to 

that requirement.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 

170 P.3d at 892. 

The applicable code section which Coffin was charged with violating, I.C. § 18-

918(2)(a),1

 stated that: 

Any household member who commits a battery, as defined in section 18-903, 

Idaho Code, and willfully and unlawfully inflicts a traumatic injury upon any other 

household member is guilty of a felony. 

(Emphasis added). 

In State v. Sohm, 140 Idaho 458, 95 P.3d 76 (Ct. App. 2004), the lower court used the 

definition of “willfully” in Idaho Code § 18-101(1)2

 in instructing the jury on a domestic 

 

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 The acts in question occurred on June 1, 2005, before the 2005 amendment to the statute 

which deleted the words “willfully and unlawfully” from the substantive section at issue in this 

appeal. 2005 IDAHO SESS. LAWS ch. 158, § 1, pp. 488-90. As currently in effect, I.C. § 18-

918(2)(a) provides: 

Any household member who in committing a battery, as defined in section 18-

903, Idaho Code, inflicts a traumatic injury upon any other household member is 

guilty of a felony. 

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 Idaho Code Section 18-101(1) provides: 

 The word “willfully,” when applied to the intent with which an act is done 

or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the 
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violence charge. The instruction stated that “[a]n act is ‘willful’ or ‘done willfully’ when done 

on purpose. One can act willfully without intending to violate the law, to injure another, or to 

acquire any advantage.” (Emphasis added). We held that in light of State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 

502, 80 P.3d 1103 (Ct. App. 2003), where this Court had held that to establish a violation of I.C. 

§ 18-918(3), the state must prove that the defendant willfully inflicted injury, it was error for the 

lower court to instruct the jury on the definition of “willfulness” in I.C. § 18-101(1). The 

erroneous instruction would have allowed the jury in Sohm to find the defendant guilty even if he 

had not intended to injure the victim with his actions, because the instruction had defined 

“willful” as a state of mind not necessarily requiring an intent to injure another. The error was 

held to be not harmless because the instruction was confusing and misleading. We concluded, 

“[t]here can be no doubt that this error was prejudicial because it diminished the state’s burden of 

proof on the mental element of the offense.” Sohm, 140 Idaho at 461, 95 P.3d at 79. 

Similarly, in State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 64 P.3d 296 (2002), the Idaho Supreme 

Court rejected the use of a jury instruction utilizing the I.C. § 18-101(1) definition of “willfully” 

in the context of the charge of felony injury to a child. The court held that the error was not 

harmless because “[a]t best, [the erroneous instruction] is confusing. At worst, it misstates the 

law . . . .” Young, 138 Idaho at 373, 64 P.3d at 299. See also State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 72-73, 

122 P.3d 1170, 1172-73 (Ct. App. 2005) (relying on Sohm to find that the “willful” instruction 

was erroneous as given in the context of a felony domestic battery charge). 

Here, jury instruction no. 10 regarding willfulness consisted of the first half of I.C. § 18-

101, stating that: 

“Willfully” when applied to the intent with which an act is done or 

omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the 

omission referred to. 

The state argues that the court’s deletion of the last sentence of the “willfulness” definition as 

articulated in I.C. § 18-101(1) was sufficient to distinguish the case from Sohm and Young. 

Specifically, the state argues that unlike in Sohm, instruction no. 10 in this case did not define the 

term “willfully” in such a manner that the jury could find Coffin guilty of domestic violence 

 

omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure 

another, or to acquire any advantage. 

 
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even if he did not intend to injure the victim. The state asserts that when considered together 

with instruction no. 7, which instructed the jury that Coffin must have “willfully” inflicted a 

traumatic injury, the effect of instruction no. 10 was “simply to convey to the jury that Coffin 

must have purposely inflicted a traumatic injury, i.e., that he intentionally injured the victim.” 

Coffin, however, argues that despite the fact the instruction consisted of only the first sentence of 

the instructions at issue in the cases discussed above, it still operated to reduce the state’s burden 

of proof in regard to the mental element of the offense. 

 Examining the instructions as a whole, we conclude that instruction no. 10 was not an 

erroneous statement of the law. In Sohm and Young it was the second sentence of the 

instructions which the courts focused on as operating to reduce the state’s burden of proof in 

regard to a mental element of the offense. We agree with the state that without the second 

sentence, the instruction merely conveys that an act is done “willfully” when it is done on 

purpose. Read in concert with instruction no. 7, that the defendant must have “willfully . . . 

inflicted[ed] a traumatic injury upon [the victim],” instruction no. 10 was sufficient to convey the 

requirement Coffin must have intended to injure the victim when he struck her. Thus, we 

conclude the court did not err in giving instruction no. 10. 

Coffin also contends the district court erred in its actions taken to correct instruction no. 7 

after it was read to the jury. After the prosecutor alerted the court to an error, the court instructed 

that each juror take out their writing instruments and make the corrections on their individual 

copies of the instruction. Coffin argues that the court’s failure to give the jurors a clear, 

corrected version of the instruction was apt to mislead and confuse them. However, Coffin cites 

no authority for the proposition that each juror is required to have a “clean” copy of an 

instruction, and we note that the judge read the corrected version of the instruction to the jury in 

its entirety prior to releasing them for deliberations. The trial judge instructed that: 

I will repeat instruction number 7. In order for the defendant to be guilty of 

domestic violence, the State must prove each of the following: 

 (1) on or about June 1, 2002; 

 (2) in the State of Idaho; 

 (3) the defendant, Benny Dale Coffin; 

 (3)(a) did commit a battery upon Kalee Chandler; 

 (4) did willfully and unlawfully inflict a traumatic injury upon 

 Kalee Chandler; 

(5) while the defendant and Kalee Chandler were household 

members. 
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 If each of the above elements have been proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of domestic violence. If any of the 

above elements has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 

find the defendant not guilty of domestic violence. 

Under the circumstances we find no error in the procedure. 

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

 Coffin also argues that his right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecutor 

committed misconduct by misstating the law during his closing arguments. He contends that the 

prosecutor’s statement of the law was erroneous in that it lowered the state’s burden of proof 

regarding the willfulness of Coffin’s conduct. Specifically, the prosecutor stated that: 

I want you to flip to . . . instruction number 10; willfully. It’s important to 

understand the meaning of the word willful because it is employed in instruction 

number 7. 

 [Instruction number 10] states: “Willfully, when applied to the intent with 

which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to 

commit the act or omission referred to.” 

 So when [Coffin] put his hands into [Chandler’s] mouth, his intention was 

probably to get the ring. What resulted from the act, there were some cuts in her 

mouth. 

 Even if you assume, as was suggested, that perhaps the ring sitting in her 

mouth by itself caused the harm, we know that [Coffin’s] hand went into that 

mouth. And perhaps he didn’t intend to cut her mouth, but his act was to get his 

hand in there and get that ring. So the act was willful, although he may not have 

intended the specific result. . . . 

(Emphasis added). No objection was stated by the defense or ruling made at the time the 

challenged statements were made by the prosecutor. 

It is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law in closing arguments. 

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). However, where there is 

no contemporaneous objection, a conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if 

the conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 

559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 

(2003); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999). Prosecutorial 

misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the comments 

were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not have been remedied 

by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded. 

Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969; State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 

(Ct. App. 2001). 
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We conclude the prosecutor did commit misconduct as his argument during closing was a 

misstatement of the law. While the state attempts to provide another interpretation, the only 

plausible reasoning is that the prosecutor was arguing that the jury could convict Coffin for 

injuring Chandler’s mouth even if it only found that he willfully put his hand in Chandler’s 

mouth without intending to injure her. In other words, the prosecutor was arguing that Coffin 

could be found guilty even if the jury found that he put his hand in her mouth out of his own free 

will, but his intention was to retrieve the ring and not to cause injury. This is in direct 

contravention to jury instructions no. 10 and 7 as well as the requirement of the domestic 

violence statute. 

A reversal of Coffin’s conviction, however, is not warranted, as we conclude that the 

error was not so egregious that a curative admonition from the court at the time could not have 

remedied any consequent prejudice. Therefore, although the prosecutor’s comments were a 

misstatement of the law, they do not constitute fundamental error necessitating a reversal of 

Coffin’s conviction. 

C. Sentence Review 

Upon Coffin’s conviction for domestic violence, the court sentenced him to a unified 

term of ten years with five years determinate, but suspended the sentence and placed him on 

probation. Coffin argues that given any view of the facts, this sentence is excessive. 

 An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. 

Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, 

the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. 

State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such 

an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it 

appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary “to accomplish the primary 

objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 

rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case.” State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 

P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed 

an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard 

for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public 

interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When 
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reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 

144 Idaho 722, 170 P.3d 387 (2007). 

Coffin points to several mitigating circumstances that he contends rendered his sentence 

unreasonably long. These include his expression of remorse for his conduct, the family support 

that he still retains, the part that his being under the influence of alcohol played in the incident, 

and his willingness to seek treatment for an alcohol problem. He also contends the sentencing 

court failed to give sufficient weight to the “nature of the offense” which he characterizes as 

merely “a physical dispute about an engagement ring that resulted in scratch[es] to the mouth 

. . . .” 

Upon a review of the record, we conclude the court took the “mitigating circumstances” 

that Coffin asserts into account and that the sentence imposed is not excessive. In sentencing 

Coffin, the court specifically noted that it had reviewed the presentence report and its addendum 

and an evaluation of Coffin for substance abuse and anger issues, and had considered the nature 

of the offense, the character of the offender, the mitigating and aggravating factors present, and 

the objectives of sentencing. The court explicitly noted that a rider was not appropriate because 

the rider program did not offer the type of programs (including anger management) that the 

defendant required and that given his history of alcohol abuse and resulting domestic violence 

towards his “female relationships,” a significant underlying sentence and period of probation was 

necessary. Despite Coffin’s attempt to minimize the seriousness of the altercation, it is 

undisputed that he was intoxicated at the time and that his victim suffered various physical 

injuries. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the sentence imposed was excessive. 

III. 

CONCLUSION 

 Jury instruction no. 10 was not an erroneous statement of the law in regard to the 

“willfulness” element of the domestic violence statute. And while the prosecutor did commit 

misconduct by misstating the law in closing arguments, Coffin did not object at the time, and we 

conclude that the misconduct does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Finally, the 

sentence imposed by the district court is not excessive. Accordingly, we affirm Coffin’s 

judgment of conviction and sentence for felony domestic violence. 

 Judge LANSING and Judge PERRY CONCUR.