SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

17 CFR Parts 275 

[Release No. IA-2628; File No. S7-25-06] 

RIN 3235-AJ67 

Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles 

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission is adopting a new rule that prohibits 

advisers to pooled investment vehicles from making false or misleading statements to, or 

otherwise defrauding, investors or prospective investors in those pooled vehicles. This rule is 

designed to clarify, in light of a recent court opinion, the Commission’s ability to bring 

enforcement actions under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 against investment advisers who 

defraud investors or prospective investors in a hedge fund or other pooled investment vehicle. 

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 10, 2007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David W. Blass, Assistant Director, Daniel 

S. Kahl, Branch Chief, or Vivien Liu, Senior Counsel, at 202-551-6787, Division of Investment 

Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-

5041. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is adopting new rule 206(4)-8 

under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).1 

15 U.S.C. 80b. Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to the Advisers Act, or any paragraph of 

the Advisers Act, we are referring to 15 U.S.C. 80b of the United States Code, at which the 

Advisers Act is codified. 

1 
2

I. INTRODUCTION 

On December 13, 2006, we proposed a new rule under the Advisers Act that would 

prohibit advisers to pooled investment vehicles from defrauding investors or prospective 

investors in pooled investment vehicles they advise.2 We proposed the rule in response to the 

opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Goldstein v. SEC, which 

created some uncertainty regarding the application of sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers 

Act in certain cases where investors in a pool are defrauded by an investment adviser to that 

pool.3

 In addressing the scope of the exemption from registration in section 203(b)(3) of the 

Advisers Act and the meaning of “client” as used in that section, the Court of Appeals expressed 

the view that, for purposes of sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act, the “client” of an 

investment adviser managing a pool is the pool itself, not an investor in the pool. As a result, it 

was unclear whether the Commission could continue to rely on sections 206(1) and (2) of the 

Advisers Act to bring enforcement actions in certain cases where investors in a pool are 

defrauded by an investment adviser to that pool.4 

2 Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in 

Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2576 (Dec. 27, 2006) 

[72 FR 400 (Jan. 4, 2007)] (the “Proposing Release”). In the Proposing Release, we also 

proposed two new rules that would define the term “accredited natural person” under Regulation 

D and section 4(6) of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 USC 77d(6)] (“Securities Act”). As 

proposed, these rules would add to the existing definition of “accredited investor” and apply to 

private offerings of certain unregistered investment pools. On May 23, 2007, we voted to 

propose more general amendments to the definition of accredited investor. Proposed 

Modernization of Smaller Company Capital-Raising and Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act 

Release No. ( , 2007) [72 FR ( , 2007)]. We plan to defer consideration of our 

proposal to define the term accredited natural person until we have had the opportunity to 

evaluate fully the comments we received on that proposal together with those we receive on our 

May 2007 proposal. 

3 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Goldstein”). 

4 Prior to the issuance of the Goldstein decision, we brought enforcement actions against advisers 

alleging false and misleading statements to investors under sections 206(1) and (2) of the 

Advisers Act. See, e.g., SEC v. Kirk S. Wright, International Management Associates, LLC, 

Litigation Release No. 19581 (Feb. 28, 2006); SEC v. Wood River Capital Management, LLC, 
3 

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals distinguished sections 206(1) and (2) from section 

206(4) of the Advisers Act, which is not limited to conduct aimed at clients or prospective clients 

of investment advisers.5 Section 206(4) provides us with rulemaking authority to define, and 

prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, fraud by advisers.6 We proposed rule 206(4)-8 

under this authority. 

We received 45 comment letters in response to our proposal.7 Most commenters 

generally supported the proposal. Eighteen endorsed the rule as proposed, noting that the rule 

would strengthen the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act or that the rule would clarify the 

Commission’s enforcement authority with respect to advisers.8 Others, however, urged that we 

Litigation Release No. 19428 (Oct. 13, 2005); SEC v. Samuel Israel III; Daniel E. Marino; Bayou 

Management, LLC; Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC; Bayou Affiliates Fund, LLC; Bayou No 

Leverage Fund, LLC; and Bayou Superfund, LLC, Litigation Release No. 19406 (Sept. 29, 

2005); SEC v. Beacon Hill Asset Management LLC, Litigation Release No. 18745A (June 16, 

2004). 

5 See Goldstein, supra note 3, at note 6. See also United States v. Elliott, 62 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th 

Cir. 1995). 

6 Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act makes it unlawful for an investment adviser to “engage in any 

act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative” and 

authorizes us “by rules and regulations [to] define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to 

prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or 

manipulative.” 

7 We received over 600 comment letters that addressed the proposed amendments to the term 

“accredited natural person” under Regulation D and section 4(6) of the Securities Act. All of the 

public comments we received are available for inspection in our Public Reference Room at 100 F 

Street, NE, Washington DC, 20549 in File No. S7-25-06, or may be viewed at 

www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506.shtml. 

8 E.g., Letter of the Alternative Investments Compliance Association (Mar. 5, 2007); Letter of the 

CFA Center for Financial Market Integrity (Mar. 9, 2007) (“CFA Center Letter”); Letter of the 

Coalition of Private Investment Companies (Mar. 9, 2007); Letter of the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts (Mar. 9, 2007) (“Massachusetts Letter”); Letter of the Department of Banking of 

the State of Connecticut (Mar. 8, 2007); Letter of the North America Securities Administrators 

Association (Apr. 2, 2007) (“NASAA Letter”); and Letter of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

(Mar. 9, 2007). Another commenter observed that the proposed rules are broadly similar to 

current U.K. legislation and regulations. See Letter of Alternative Investment Management 

Association (Mar. 9, 2007) (“AIMA Letter”). 
4

make revisions that would restrict the scope of the rule to more narrowly define the conduct or 

acts it prohibits.9 

Today, we are adopting new rule 206(4)-8 as proposed. The rule prohibits advisers from 

(i) making false or misleading statements to investors or prospective investors in hedge funds 

and other pooled investment vehicles they advise, or (ii) otherwise defrauding these investors. 

The rule clarifies that an adviser’s duty to refrain from fraudulent conduct under the federal 

securities laws extends to the relationship with ultimate investors and that the Commission may 

bring enforcement actions under the Advisers Act against investment advisers who defraud 

investors or prospective investors in those pooled investment vehicles. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits advisers to pooled investment vehicles from (i) making false or 

misleading statements to investors or prospective investors in those pools or (ii) otherwise 

defrauding those investors or prospective investors. We will enforce the rule through civil and 

administrative enforcement actions against advisers who violate it. 

Section 206(4) authorizes the Commission to adopt rules and regulations that “define, 

and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business 

as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” In adopting rule 206(4)-8, we intend to employ 

all of the broad authority that Congress provided us in section 206(4) and direct it at adviser 

conduct affecting an investor or potential investor in a pooled investment vehicle. 

E.g., Letter of American Bar Association (Mar. 12, 2007) (“ABA Letter”); Letter of Davis Polk & 

Wardwell (Mar. 9, 2007) (“Davis Polk Letter”); Letter of Dechert LLP (Mar. 8, 2007) (“Dechert 

Letter”); Letter of New York City Bar (Mar. 8, 2007) (“NYCB Letter”); Letter of Schulte Roth & 

Zabel LLP (Mar. 9, 2007) (“Schulte Roth Letter”); and Letter of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Mar. 

9, 2007) (“Sullivan & Cromwell Letter”). 

9 
5 

A. Scope of Rule 206(4)-8 

Some commenters questioned the scope of the rule, arguing that the Commission should 

define fraud.10 We believe that we have done so, only more broadly than some commenters 

would have us do. As the Proposing Release indicated, our intent is to prohibit all fraud on 

investors in pools managed by investment advisers. Congress expected that we would use the 

authority provided by section 206(4) to “promulgate general antifraud rules capable of 

flexibility.”11 The terms material false statements or omissions and “acts, practices, and courses 

of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative” encompass the well-developed body of 

law under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The legal authorities 

identifying the types of acts, practices, and courses of business that are fraudulent, deceptive, or 

manipulative under the federal securities laws are numerous, and we believe that the conduct 

prohibited by rule 206(4)-8 is sufficiently clear and well understood.12 

10 E.g., ABA Letter, supra note 9; Letter of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Mar. 14, 2007); and NYCB 

Letter, supra note 9. 

11 S.Rep. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 28, 1960) at 4. See rule 206(4)-1(a)(5) [17 CFR. 

275.206(4)-1(a)(5)] under the Advisers Act; rule 17j-1(b) [17 CFR 270.17j-1(b)] under the 

Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a-1] (“Investment Company Act”); and rule 13e3(b)(1) [17 CFR 240.13e-3(b)(1)] under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U.S.C. 77a] 

(“Exchange Act”). 

12 Loss, Seligman, & Paredes, Securities Regulation, Chap. 9 (Fraud) (Fourth Ed. 2006); Hazen, 

Treatise on The Law of Securities Regulation, Vol. 3, Ch. 12 (Manipulation and Fraud – Civil 

Liability; Implied Private Remedies; SEC Rule 10b-5; Fraud in Connection With the Purchase or 

Sale of Securities; Improper Trading on Nonpublic Material Information) (Fifth Ed. 2005). See, 

e.g., Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n. 

7 (1971) (“‘We believe that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in 

connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a 

garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical methods 

should not provide immunity from the securities laws.’” (quoting A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 

375 F.2d 393, 397 (CA2 1967))); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) 

(“No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to 

manipulate securities prices.”). Moreover, the established legal principles are sufficiently flexible 

to encompass future novel factual scenarios. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339-40 (2d 

Cir. 1977) (“The fact that there is no litigated fact pattern precisely in point may constitute a 

tribute to the cupidity and ingenuity of the malefactors involved but hardly provides an escape 

from the penal sanctions of the securities fraud provisions here involved.”). 
6

1. Investors and Prospective Investors 

Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits investment advisers from making false or misleading statements 

to, or engaging in other fraud on, investors or prospective investors in a pooled investment 

vehicle they manage. The scope of the rule is modeled on that of sections 206(1) and (2) of the 

Advisers Act, which make unlawful fraud by advisers against clients or prospective clients. Rule 

206(4)-8 prohibits false or misleading statements made, for example, to existing investors in 

account statements as well as to prospective investors in private placement memoranda, offering 

circulars, or responses to “requests for proposals,” electronic solicitations, and personal meetings 

arranged through capital introduction services. 

Some commenters argued that the rule should not prohibit fraud against prospective 

investors in a pooled investment vehicle, asserting that such fraud does not actually harm 

investors until they, in fact, make an investment.13 We disagree. False or misleading statements 

and other frauds by advisers are no less objectionable when made in an attempt to draw in new 

investors than when made to existing investors.

14 For similar policy reasons that we believe led 

Congress to apply the protections of sections 206(1) and (2) to prospective clients, we have 

decided to apply those of rule 206(4)-8 to prospective investors.15 We believe that prohibiting 

false or misleading statements made to, or other fraud on, any prospective investors is a means 

reasonably designed to prevent fraud. 

13 Davis Polk Letter, supra note 9; Dechert Letter, supra note 9; NYCB Letter, supra note 9; Letter 

of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Mar. 9, 2007); Sullivan & 

Cromwell Letter, supra note 9. 

14 See CFA Center Letter, supra note 8. 

15 We have used the term “prospective investor” to give the term similar scope to the term 

“prospective client” in sections 206(1) and (2). See, e.g., In the Matter of Ralph Harold Seipel, 

38 S.E.C. 256, 257-58 (1958) (the solicitation of clients is part of the activity of an investment 

adviser and it is immaterial for purposes of an enforcement action under sections 206(1) and (2) 

that an adviser engaging in fraudulent solicitations was not successful in his efforts to obtain 

clients). 
7 

2. Unregistered Investment Advisers 

Rule 206(4)-8 applies to both registered and unregistered investment advisers.16 As we 

noted in the Proposing Release, many of our enforcement cases against advisers to pooled 

investment vehicles have been brought against advisers that are not registered under the Advisers 

Act, and we believe it is critical that we continue to be in a position to bring actions against 

unregistered advisers that manage pools and that defraud investors in those pools.17 The two 

commenters that expressed an explicit view on this aspect of the proposal supported our 

application of the rule to advisers that are not registered with the Commission.18 

3. Pooled Investment Vehicles 

The rule we are adopting today applies to investment advisers with respect to any “pooled 

investment vehicle” they advise. The rule defines a pooled investment vehicle19 as any 

investment company defined in section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act20 and any privately 

offered pooled investment vehicle that is excluded from the definition of investment company by 

reason of either section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act.21 As a result, the rule 

16 A few commenters requested that we clarify how we intend to apply rule 206(4)-8 to offshore 

advisers’ interaction with non-U.S. investors. See AIMA Letter, supra note 8; Letter of Jones 

Day (Mar. 9, 2007); Sullivan & Cromwell Letter, supra note 9. Our adoption of this rule will not 

alter our jurisdictional authority. 

17 Proposing Release, supra note 2, at note 14. 

18 Massachusetts Letter, supra note 8; NASAA Letter, supra note 8. 

19 Rule 206(4)-8(b). 

20 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(a). Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to the Investment Company Act, or 

any paragraph of the Investment Company Act, we are referring to 15 U.S.C. 80a of the United 

States Code, at which the Company Act is codified. 

21 Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act excludes from the definition of investment 

company an issuer the securities (other than short-term paper) of which are beneficially owned by 

not more than 100 persons and that is not making or proposing to make a public offering of its 

securities. Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act excludes from the definition of 

investment company an issuer the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by 

persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are “qualified purchasers” and that is 

not making or proposing to make a public offering of its securities. “Qualified purchaser” is 
8

applies to advisers to hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, and other types of 

privately offered pools that invest in securities, as well as advisers to investment companies that 

are registered with us.22 

Several commenters supported applying the protection of the new antifraud rule to 

investors in all these kinds of pooled investment vehicles, noting, for example, that every 

investor, not just the wealthy or sophisticated that typically invest in private pools, should be 

protected from fraud.23 Some other commenters urged us not to apply the rule to advisers to 

registered investment companies, arguing that the rule is unnecessary because other provisions of 

the federal securities laws prohibiting fraud are available to the Commission to address these 

matters.24 They expressed concern that application of another antifraud provision with different 

elements would be burdensome. These commenters claimed that the rule would, for example, 

make it necessary for advisers to conduct extensive reviews of all communications with clients. 

But the other antifraud provisions available to us contain different elements because they were 

not specifically designed to address frauds by investment advisers with respect to investors in 

pooled investment vehicles. In some cases, the other antifraud provisions may not permit us to 

defined in section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act generally to include a natural person 

(or a company owned by two or more related natural persons) who owns not less than $5,000,000 

in investments; a person, acting for its own account or accounts of other qualified purchasers, 

who owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not less than $25,000,000; and a trust whose 

trustee, and each of its settlors, is a qualified purchaser. 

22 We have brought enforcement actions under the Advisers Act against advisers to these types of 

funds. See, e.g., In the Matter of Askin Capital Management, L.P and David J. Askin, Investment 

Advisers Act Release No. 1492 (May 23, 1995) (hedge fund); In the Matter of Thayer Capital 

Partners, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2276 (Aug. 12, 2004) (private equity fund); SEC 

v. Michael A. Liberty, Litigation Release No. 19601 (Mar. 8, 2006) (venture capital fund). 

23 E.g., NASAA Letter, supra note 8. 

24 E.g., ABA Letter, supra note 9; Letter of Investment Adviser Association (Mar. 9, 2007); Letter 

of Investment Company Institute (Mar. 9, 2007) (“ICI Letter”); Sullivan & Cromwell Letter, 

supra note 9. Commenters noted in particular that section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act 

already prohibits an adviser from making fraudulent material statements or omissions in a fund’s 

registration statement or in required records. 
9

proceed against the adviser.25 As a result, the existing antifraud provisions may not be available 

to us in all cases. As we discussed above, before the Goldstein decision we had brought actions 

against advisers to mutual funds under sections 206(1) and (2) for defrauding investors in mutual 

funds.26 Because, before the Goldstein decision, advisers to pooled investment vehicles operated 

with the understanding that the Advisers Act prohibited the conduct that this rule prohibits, we 

believe that advisers that are attentive to their traditional compliance responsibilities will not 

need to alter their business practices or take additional steps and incur new costs as a result of 

this rule’s adoption. 

B. Prohibition on False or Misleading Statements 

Rule 206(4)-8(a)(1) prohibits any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle from 

making an untrue statement of a material fact to any investor or prospective investor in the 

pooled investment vehicle, or omitting to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 

statements made to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle, in the 

light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.27 

The provision is very similar to those in many of our antifraud laws and rules that, 

depending upon the circumstances, may also be applicable to the same investor 

25 This may be the case with respect to section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act, for example, 

if the adviser’s fraudulent statements are not made in a document described in that section, or 

with respect to rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act, where the fraudulent conduct does not relate 

to a misstatement or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 

26 See, e.g., In the Matter of Van Kampen Investment Advisory Corp., Investment Advisers Act 

Release No. 1819 (Sept. 8, 1999); In the Matter of The Dreyfus Corporation, Investment 

Advisers Act Release No. 1870 (May 10, 2000); In the Matter of Federated Investment 

Management Company, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2448 (Nov. 28, 2005). 

27 A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor in making an 

investment decision would consider it as having significantly altered the total mix of information 

available. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); TSC Industries, Inc. v. 

Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also In the Matter of Van Kampen Investment 

Advisory Corp., supra note 26; In the Matter of the Dreyfus Corporation, supra note 26. 
10

communications.28 Sections 206(1) and (2) have imposed similar obligations on advisers since 

1940 and, before Goldstein, were commonly accepted as imposing similar requirements on 

communications with investors in a fund. For these reasons, and because the nature of the duty 

to communicate without false statements is so well developed in current law, we believe that 

commenters’ concerns about the breadth of the prohibition or any chilling effect the new rule 

might have on investor communications are misplaced.29 Advisers to pooled investment vehicles 

attentive to their traditional compliance responsibilities will not need to alter their 

communications with investors. 

Rule 206(4)-8(a)(1) prohibits advisers to pooled investment vehicles from making any 

materially false or misleading statements to investors in the pool regardless of whether the pool 

is offering, selling, or redeeming securities. While the new rule differs in this aspect from rule 

10b-5 under the Exchange Act, the conduct prohibited is similar. The new rule prohibits, for 

example, materially false or misleading statements regarding investment strategies the pooled 

investment vehicle will pursue, the experience and credentials of the adviser (or its associated 

persons), the risks associated with an investment in the pool, the performance of the pool or other 

funds advised by the adviser, the valuation of the pool or investor accounts in it, and practices 

28 See, e.g., sections 12 and 17 of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. 77l, 77q]; section 14 of the 

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78n]; section 34 of the Investment Company Act; rules 156, 159, and 

610 under the Securities Act [17 CFR 230.156, 230.159, 230.610]; rules 10b-5, 13e-3, 13e-4, and 

15c1-2 under the Exchange Act [17 CFR 240.10b-5, 240.13e-3, 240.13e-4, 240.15c1-2]; and rule 

17j-1 under the Investment Company Act [17 CFR 270.17j-1]). 

29 Letter of Managed Funds Association (Mar. 9, 2007) (“MFA Letter”); NYCB Letter, supra note 

9; Davis Polk Letter, supra note 9; Dechert Letter, supra note 9; Letter of Seward & Kissel LLP 

(Mar. 8, 2007) (“Seward & Kissel Letter”). 
11

the adviser follows in the operation of its advisory business such as how the adviser allocates 

investment opportunities.30 

C. Prohibition of Other Frauds 

Rule 206(4)-8(a)(2) makes it a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or 

course of business for any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to “otherwise 

engage in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative 

with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle.”31 As we 

noted in the Proposing Release, the wording of this provision is drawn from the first sentence of 

section 206(4) and is designed to apply more broadly to deceptive conduct that may not involve 

statements.32 

Some commenters asserted that section 206(4) provides us authority only to adopt 

prophylactic rules that explicitly identify conduct that would be fraudulent under the new rule.33 

We believe our authority is broader. We do not believe that the commenters’ suggested 

approach would be consistent with the purposes of the Advisers Act or the protection of 

investors. That approach would have us adopt the rule prohibiting fraudulent communications 

but not fraudulent conduct.34 But, section 206(4) itself specifically authorizes us to adopt rules 

defining and prescribing “acts, practices and courses of business,” (i.e., conduct), and does not 

explicitly refer to communications, which, nonetheless, represent a form of an act, practice, or 

30 We have previously brought enforcement actions alleging these or similar types of frauds. See 

Proposing Release, supra note 2, at note 29. 

31 Rule 206(4)-8(a)(2). 

32 See Section II.C of the Proposing Release, supra note 2. 

33 ABA Letter, supra note 9; ICI Letter, supra note 24; Schulte Roth Letter, supra note 9; Sullivan & 

Cromwell Letter, supra note 9. 

34 See, e.g., ABA Letter, supra note 9. 
12

course of business. In addition, rule 206(4)-8 as adopted would provide greater protection to 

investors in pooled investment vehicles. 

Alternatively, commenters would have us adopt a rule prohibiting identified known 

fraudulent conduct or would have us provide detailed commentary describing specific forms of 

fraudulent conduct that the rule would prohibit.35 Either approach would fail to prohibit 

fraudulent conduct we did not identify, and could provide a roadmap for those wishing to engage 

in fraudulent conduct. This approach would be inconsistent with our historical application of the 

federal securities laws under which broad prohibitions have been applied against specific 

harmful activity. 

D. Other Matters 

We noted in the Proposing Release that, unlike violations of rule 10b-5 under the 

Exchange Act, the Commission would not need to demonstrate that an adviser violating rule 

206(4)-8 acted with scienter.36 Commenters questioned whether the rule should encompass 

negligent conduct, arguing that it would “expand the concept of fraud itself beyond its original 

meaning.”37 We read the language of section 206(4) as not by its terms limited to knowing or 

deliberate conduct. For example, section 206(4) encompasses “acts, practices, and courses of 

business as are . . . deceptive,” thereby reaching conduct that is negligently deceptive as well as 

conduct that is recklessly or deliberately deceptive. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit concluded that “scienter is not required under section 206(4).”38 

35 Id. 

36 Section II.B of the Proposing Release, supra note 2. 

37 See ABA Letter, supra note 9 at page 3. 

38 SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, at 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court in Steadman analogized 

section 206(4) of the Advisers Act to section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, which the Supreme 

Court had held did not require a finding of scienter, id. (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 

(1980)). In discussing section 17(a)(3) and its lack of a scienter requirement, the Steadman court 
13

We believe use of a negligence standard also is appropriate as a method reasonably designed to 

prevent fraud. As the Supreme Court noted in U.S. v. O’Hagan, “[a] prophylactic measure, 

because its mission is to prevent, typically encompasses more than the core activity 

prohibited.”39 In O’Hagan, the Court held that under section 14(e) “the Commission may 

prohibit acts, not themselves fraudulent under the common law or §10(b), if the prohibition is 

‘reasonably designed to prevent . . . acts and practices [that] are fraudulent.’”40 Along these 

lines, the prohibitions in rule 206(4)-8 are reasonably designed to prevent fraud. We believe 

that, by taking sufficient care to avoid negligent conduct, advisers will be more likely to avoid 

reckless deception. Since the Commission clearly is authorized to prescribe conduct that goes 

beyond fraud as a means reasonably designed to prevent fraud, prohibiting deceptive conduct 

done negligently is a way to accomplish this objective. 

Rule 206(4)-8 does not create under the Advisers Act a fiduciary duty to investors or 

prospective investors in a pooled investment vehicle not otherwise imposed by law. Nor does 

the rule alter any duty or obligation an adviser has under the Advisers Act, any other federal law 

or regulation, or any state law or regulation (including state securities laws) to investors in a 

pooled investment vehicle it advises.41 The rule, for example, will permit us to bring an 

enforcement action against an investment adviser that violates a fiduciary duty imposed by other 

law if the violation of such law or obligation also constitutes an act, practice, or course of 

observed that, similarly, a violation of section 206(2) of the Advisers Act could rest on a finding 

of simple negligence. Id. at 643, note 5. But see Aaron at 690-91 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. 

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)); cf. S. Rep. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 28, 

1960) at 8 and H. R. Rep. 2179, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 26, 1960) at 8 (comparing section 

206(4) to section 15(c)(2) of the Exchange Act). 

39 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672-73 (1997). 

40 Id. at 673. 

41 For example, under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, advisers who serve as general partners 

owe fiduciary duties to the limited partners. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 408 (2001). 
14

business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative within the meaning of the rule and section 

206(4).42 

Finally, the rule does not create a private right of action.43 

III. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 does not apply because rule 206(4)-8 does not 

impose a new “collection of information” within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995. The rule does not create any filing, reporting, recordkeeping, or disclosure requirements 

for investment advisers subject to the rule. Accordingly, there is no “collection of information” 

under the Paperwork Reduction Act that requires the approval of the Office of Management and 

Budget under 44 U.S.C. 3501. 

 IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 

The Commission is sensitive to costs imposed by our rules and the benefits that derive 

from them. In the Proposing Release, we encouraged commenters to discuss any potential costs 

and benefits that we did not consider in our discussion. Three commenters addressed the issue of 

cost. Two of them stated their belief that the rule would increase advisers’ costs of compliance, 

by, for example, making it necessary for advisers to conduct extensive reviews of all 

communications with clients.44 One stated that the rule would achieve a reasonable balance of 

42 For example, if an adviser has a duty from a source other than the rule to make a material 

disclosure to an investor in a fund and negligently or deliberately fails to make the disclosure, the 

rule would apply to the failure. 

43 The Supreme Court has held that “there exists a limited private remedy under the Investment 

Advisers Act of 1940 to void an investment adviser’s contract, but that the Act confers no other 

private causes of action, legal or equitable.” Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 

U.S. 11 at 24 (1979) (footnote omitted). 

44 NYCB Letter, supra note 9; Seward & Kissel Letter, supra note 29. 
15

providing important benefits to investors at an acceptable cost.45 None of the three commenters, 

however, provided analysis or empirical data in connection with their statements. 

The rule makes it a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course of 

business within the meaning of section 206(4) for any investment adviser to a pooled investment 

vehicle to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 

necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 

they were made, not misleading, to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment 

vehicle. The rule also makes it a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course 

of business within the meaning of section 206(4) for any investment adviser to a pooled 

investment vehicle to otherwise engage in any act, practice, or course of business that is 

fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the 

pooled investment vehicle. For the reasons discussed, we do not believe that the rule will require 

advisers to incur new or additional costs. 

Investment advisers to pooled investment vehicles should not be making untrue 

statements or omitting material facts or otherwise be engaged in fraud with respect to investors 

or prospective investors in pooled investment vehicles today, because federal authorities, state 

authorities, and private litigants often can, and do, seek redress from the adviser for the untrue 

statements or omissions or other frauds. In most cases, the conduct that the rule prohibits is 

already prohibited by federal securities statutes,46 other federal statutes (including federal wire 

fraud statutes),47 as well as state law.48 

45 CFA Center Letter, supra note 8. 

46 See, e.g., section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78j(b)] and section 17(a) of the Securities 

Act [15 U.S.C. 77q] which would apply when the false statements are made “in connection with 

the purchase or sale of a security” or involve the “offer or sale” of a security, and section 34(b) of 

the Investment Company Act which makes it unlawful “to make any untrue statement of a 
16

We recognize that there are costs involved in assuring that communications to investors 

and prospective investors do not contain untrue or misleading statements and preventing other 

frauds. Advisers have incurred, and will continue to incur, these costs due to the prohibitions 

and deterrent effect of the law and rules that apply under these circumstances. While each of the 

provisions noted above may have different limitation periods, apply in different factual 

circumstances, or require the government (or a private litigant) to prove different states of mind 

than the rule, as discussed above we believe that the multiple prohibitions against fraud, and the 

consequences under both criminal and civil law for fraud, should currently cause an adviser to 

take the precautions it deems necessary to refrain from such conduct. 

Furthermore, prior to Goldstein, advisers operated with the understanding that the 

Advisers Act prohibited the same conduct that would be prohibited by the rule. Accordingly, we 

do not believe that advisers to pooled investment vehicles attentive to their traditional 

compliance responsibilities will need to take steps or alter their business practices in such a way 

that will require them to incur new or additional costs as a result of the adoption of the rule. 

material fact in any registration statement, application, report, account, record, or other document 

filed or transmitted pursuant to [the Investment Company Act] . . . . ” 

47 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1341 (Frauds and Swindles) and 18 U.S.C. 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or 

television) which make it a criminal offense to use the mails or to communicate by means of wire, 

having devised a scheme to defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 

fraudulent pretenses, and 18 U.S.C. 1957 (Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived 

from specified unlawful activity) which makes it a criminal racketeering offense to engage or 

attempt to engage in a transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000. 

48 See, e.g., Metro Communications Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Technologies, 854 A.2d 

121, 156 (Del. Ch. 2004) (court held that plaintiff-former member of LLC had sufficiently 

alleged a common law fraud claim based on allegation that a series of reports by LLC’s managers 

contained misleading statements; court stated that “[i]n the usual fraud case, the speaking party 

who is subject to an accusation of fraud is on the opposite side of a commercial transaction from 

the plaintiff, who alleges that but for the material misstatements or omissions of the speaking 

party he would not have contracted with the speaking party”). 
17 

We also recognize that the rule may cause some advisers to pay more attention to the 

information they present to better guard against making an untrue or misleading statement to an 

investor or prospective investor and to reevaluate measures that are intended to prevent fraud. 

As a consequence, some advisers might seek guidance, legal or otherwise, and more closely 

review the information that they disseminate to investors and prospective investors and the 

antifraud related policies and procedures they have implemented. While increased concern about 

making false statements or committing fraud could be attributable to the new rule, advisers 

should already be incurring these costs to ensure truthfulness and prevent fraud, regardless of the 

rule, because of the myriad of laws or regulations that may already apply. 

The principal benefit of the rule is that it clearly enables the Commission to bring 

enforcement actions under the Advisers Act, if an adviser to a pooled investment vehicle 

disseminates false or misleading information to investors or prospective investors or otherwise 

commits fraud with respect to any investor or prospective investor. As noted above, the existing 

antifraud provisions may not be available to us in all cases. Through our enforcement actions we 

are able to protect fund investor assets by stopping ongoing frauds,49 barring persons that have 

committed certain specified violations or offenses from being associated with an investment 

adviser,50 imposing penalties,51 seeking court orders to protect fund assets,52 and to order 

disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.53 Moreover, we believe that rule 206(4)-8 will deter advisers to 

pooled investment vehicles from engaging in fraudulent conduct with respect to investors in 

49 See section 203(k) of the Advisers Act (Commission authority to issue cease and desist orders). 

50 See section 203(f) of the Advisers Act (Commission authority to bar a person from being 

associated with an investment adviser). 

51 See section 203(i) of the Advisers Act (Commission authority to impose civil penalties). 

52 See section 209(d) of the Advisers Act (Commission authority to seek injunctions and restraining 

orders in federal court). 

53 See section 203(j) of the Advisers Act (Commission authority to order disgorgement). 
18

those pools and will provide investors with greater confidence when investing in pooled 

investment vehicles. 

V. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT ANALYSIS 

The Commission certified, pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 

that rule 206(4)-8 will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 

entities.54 This certification was included in the Proposing Release.55 While we encouraged 

written comment regarding this certification, none of the commenters responded to this request. 

VI. STATUTORY AUTHORITY 

We are adopting new rule 206(4)-8 pursuant to our authority set forth in sections 206(4) 

and 211(a) of the Advisers Act (15 U.S.C. 80b-6(4) and 80b-11(a)). 

List of Subjects 

17 CFR Part 275 

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities. 

VII. TEXT OF RULES 

For the reasons set out in the preamble, Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of Federal 

Regulations is amended as follows: 

PART 275 – RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 

1. The authority citation for Part 275 continues to read in part as follows: 

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)(F), 80b-2(a)(17), 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-4a, 80b-6(4), 80b6a, and 80b-11, unless otherwise noted. 

* * * * * 

54 5 U.S.C. 605(b). 

55 Section VII.A of the Proposing Release, supra note 2. 
19

2. Section 275.206(4)-8 is added to read as follows: 

§206(4)-8 Pooled investment vehicles. 

(a) Prohibition. It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, 

practice, or course of business within the meaning of section 206(4) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80b6(4)) for any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to: 

(1) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 

necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 

made, not misleading, to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle; 

or 

(2) Otherwise engage in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, 

deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled 

investment vehicle. 

(b) Definition. For purposes of this section “pooled investment vehicle” means any 

investment company as defined in section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 

U.S.C. 80a-3(a)) or any company that would be an investment company under section 3(a) of 

that Act but for the exclusion provided from that definition by either section 3(c)(1) or section 

3(c)(7) of that Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1) or (7)). 

By the Commission. 

Nancy M. Morris 

Secretary 

August 3, 2007