Minneapolis Park and 

Recreation Board Did Not 

Follow All Federal 

Procurement Standards 

for $5.1 Million in 

Contracts 

March 16, 2017 

OIG-17-46-D 
 

 

 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board

 Did Not Follow All Federal Procurement 

 Standards for $5.1 Million in Contracts 

March 16, 2017 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

The Minneapolis Park and 

Recreation Board (Board) 

received an $8.4 million 

award in Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) 

grant funds for damages in 

Minneapolis, Minnesota from 

severe storms in June and 

July 2014. Our audit 

objective was to determine 

whether the Board accounted 

for and expended FEMA 

funds according to Federal 

regulations and FEMA 

guidelines. 

What We 

Recommend 

FEMA should recover $5.3 

million of grant funds and 

direct Minnesota to provide 

technical assistance and 

monitoring to ensure the 

Board complies with Federal 

procurement regulations for 

the remaining $2.6 million 

FEMA approved for two 

uncompleted projects. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

The Board did not follow all Federal procurement 

standards in awarding contracts for disaster work 

totaling $5.1 million. As a result, full and open 

competition did not always occur, and FEMA has 

no assurance that costs were reasonable or that 

disadvantaged businesses received sufficient 

opportunities to bid on federally funded work. In 

addition, FEMA inadvertently over-obligated one 

project; and the Board did not complete work on 

all projects. Therefore, we recommend FEMA 

recover the following amounts totaling more than 

$5.3 million: 

x $4,786,736 in ineligible contract costs for 

work that was not exigent, 

x $508,884 in excessive obligations, and 

x $18,782 in unused funds. 

The majority of these unallowable costs occurred 

because Board officials were not fully aware of 

procurement standards for Federal grants. 

However, as FEMA’s grantee, Minnesota was 

responsible for ensuring that the Board was 

aware of and followed Federal regulations. 

Therefore, with Minnesota’s assistance the Board 

should be able to properly spend the remaining 

$2.6 million in grant funds. 

FEMA Response 

FEMA officials generally agreed with our findings 

and recommendations. FEMA’s written response 

is included at appendix C. 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-46-D 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 


March 16, 2017 


MEMORANDUM FOR: Janet M. Odeshoo 

Acting Regional Administrator, Region V 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

~~·~ FROM: 	 Thomas M. Salmon 

Assistant Inspector General 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight 

SUBJECT: 	 Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board Did Not 

Follow All Federal Procurement Standards for 

$5.1 Million in Contracts 

Audit Report Number OIG-17-46-D 

We audited Public Assistance grant funds awarded to the Minneapolis Park 

and Recreation Board in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Board). The Minnesota 

Department of Public Safety, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Management (Minnesota), a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

grantee, awarded the Board $8.4 million for damages resulting from severe 

storms, straight-line winds, and flooding in June and July 2014. The award 

provided 75 percent Federal funding. We audited 10 projects totaling 

$8.4 million, or 100 percent of the total award (see table 2 in appendix B). The 

damage to insurable facilities did not exceed the Board's insurance deductible; 

therefore, the Board did not receive any insurance proceeds or need to obtain 

insurance to cover damages resulting from this disaster. As of April 27, 2016, 

the cutoff date of our audit, the Board contracted for $5.1 million and incurred 

$3.4 million in disaster-related costs but had not submitted all cost 

reimbursement claims to Minnesota or completed any large projects. 

Background 

The Board owns and maintains parks, parkways, lakes, and waterways in and 

adjacent to the City of Minneapolis (City). The Board has control over the 

shores and waterways adjacent to any lake, waterway, or other body of water 

that it owns or governs. The Board is a semi-autonomous political subdivision 

of the City and may act on its behalf. 

In June and July 2014, severe storms, straight-line winds, and flooding caused 

a mudslide and severe damage to two golf courses. The mudslide caused 

damage to the property of Fairview Hospital (Hospital), another FEMA 

applicant. The mudslide also caused slope failure that threatened additional 

www.oig.dhs.gov 	 OIG-17-46-D 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

damage to Hospital property requiring the Board to respond quickly. As a 

result, the Board and the Hospital entered into a memorandum of 

understanding to share costs related to the slope repair. The President declared 

the major disaster on July 21, 2014, and amended the declaration on 

August 21, 2014, to include Hennepin County, where the Board’s damaged 

properties are located. 

Figure 1: Minneapolis Slope Failure 

Source: Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board 

Results of Audit 

Although the Board accounted for disaster-related costs on a project-by-project 

basis, it did not always comply with Federal procurement standards in 

awarding 15 contracts totaling $5.1 million. As a result, full and open 

competition did not always occur, and FEMA has no assurance that costs were 

reasonable or that small and minority firms, women’s business enterprises, 

and labor surplus area firms received sufficient opportunities to bid on 

federally funded work. We generally do not question costs for work during 

exigent circumstances when lives and property are at risk. Therefore, we did 

not question $324,473 the Board expended for work performed to stabilize a 

slope failure during exigent conditions. However, we do question $4.8 million 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the Board claimed for non-exigent contract work.1 Minnesota, as the grantee, 

should have done more to ensure that the Board was aware of these standards. 

It is the grantee’s responsibility to ensure that its subgrantees are aware of and 

comply with Federal requirements. Therefore, Minnesota should provide 

technical assistance and monitoring to the Board to ensure it complies with 

Federal procurement regulations, as well as reasonable assurance that the 

Board will spend the remaining $2,550,092 for eligible disaster work according 

to Federal procurement standards. 

In addition, FEMA obligated $508,884 on one project for work that was the 

responsibility of the Hospital and for costs that were allocable to other projects. 

Further, the Board did not complete $18,782 of work on one small project.2 

Finding A: Improper Procurement 

The Board did not follow all Federal procurement standards in awarding 

15 disaster-related contracts totaling $5.1 million. The 15 contracts included 2 

large contracts totaling $4.6 million and 13 contracts totaling $515,591 that 

were under the small acquisition threshold.3 Federal regulations at 44 Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR) 13.36, in part, require that subgrantees — 

1. conduct procurement transactions in a manner providing full and open 

competition except under certain circumstances. One acceptable 

circumstance is when the public exigency or emergency for the 

requirement will not permit a delay resulting from competitive solicitation 

(44 CFR13.36(c) and (d)(4)(i)); 

2. prepare and document some form of cost or price analysis in connection 

with every procurement action including contract modifications (44 CFR 

13.36(f)(1)); 

3. include required provisions in all their contracts and subcontracts 

(44 CFR 13.36(i)); and 

4. take all necessary affirmative steps to assure the use of small and 

minority firms, women’s business enterprises, and labor surplus area 

firms when possible (44 CFR 13.36(e)). 

1 The exigency period ended when the Board finished installation of a temporary slope cover on 

November 6, 2014, before the winter season halted construction.
 2 Federal regulations in effect at the time of the disaster set the large project threshold 

at greater than $120,000. See Federal Register, Volume 79, Number 38, page 10685,
 

Amendment to the Public Assistance Program’s Simplified Procedures Project Thresholds (Feb.
 

26, 2014).
 3 For procurements less than the simplified acquisition threshold ($150,000 at the time of the 

disaster), subgrantees must obtain price or rate quotes from an adequate number of qualified 

sources (44 CFR 13.36(d)(1)). See 75 Federal Register, 53,130 (2010), as authorized under the
 

Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, Public Law (Pub. L.) No. 

108-375, § 807, modifying 41 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 403(11).
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

As a result, FEMA has no assurance that costs were reasonable and all 

potential contractors received an opportunity to bid, including small 

businesses, minority-owned firms, and women’s business enterprises. We 

question $4,786,736 of the $5,111,209 in contract costs as ineligible. However, 

we did not question $324,473 in contract cost the Board spent for exigent work 

to remove debris and stabilize the slope failure. 

Table 1 summarizes the 15 contracts the Board awarded and identifies 

applicable non-compliance with the 4 procurement standards previously listed. 

Table 1: Noncompliance with Procurement Standards 1–4 Listed Above 

Contract and 

Scope of Work 

Number of 

Contracts 

Contract 

Award 

Amount 

Exigent 

Work 

Amount 

Questioned 

Noncompliance 

with Procurement 

Standards 1–4 

1 2 3 4 

Large Contracts 

A&E Work Slope Failure 1 $1,275,854 $127,418 $1,148,436 X X X X 

Slope Repair and Clean-up 1 3,319,764 0 3,319,764 X X 

Total Large Contracts 2 $4,595,618 $127,418 $4,468,200 1 1 2 2 

Small Contracts 

Server Hardware Purchase 1 $ 4,401 $ 4,401 $ 0 X X X X* 

A&E Work Slope Failure 1 49,000 49,000 0 X X X X 

Golf Course Work 5 119,240 0 119,240 X X X X* 

A&E Work Slope Failure 1 41,000 0 41,000 X X X* 

Slope Repair Street Signs 1 150,000 44,980 105,020 X X* 

Slope Repair and Clean-up 4 151,950 98,674 53,276 X X 

Total Small Contracts 13 $ 515,591 $197,055 $ 318,536 8 7 13 13 

Total Contracts 15 $5,111,209 $324,473 $4,786,736 9 8 15 15 

Source: Board procurement records and Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis 

* Although the Board did not make a positive effort to award contracts to disadvantaged 

firms, it did award these eight contracts totaling $314,641 to small and minority firms. In 

addition, the prime contractor identified $64,970 in work for three minority and womenowned subcontractors to secure the $3.3 million slope repair contract award. 

Full and Open Competition — The Board awarded one large professional 

service Architectural and Engineering (A&E) contract for $1.3 million and eight 

small contracts for $213,641 without full and open competition. Small 

acquisitions require price or rate quotations be obtained from an adequate 

number of qualified sources whereas large purchases require some form of 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

public advertising for solicitations. Full and open competition usually increases 

the number of bids received and thereby increases the opportunity for 

obtaining reasonable pricing from the most qualified contractors. 

The Board awarded the $1.3 million A&E contract, without advertising for 

proposals or qualifications, to a contractor it used previously for non-disaster 

work. The Board also non-competitively awarded three amendments to the A&E 

contract that exceeded the small acquisition threshold, increasing the original 

award of $634,000 to $1.3 million. Board officials said they followed their own 

procurement procedures for awarding professional service contracts, which did 

not require advertising for proposals or qualifications. Board officials said they 

could not stop stabilization work on a damaged slope to compete the A&E 

contract. However, the Board stopped stabilization work on the slope in 

November 2014 when the slope was covered for winter. The Board expended 

$127,418 for this exigent work. Once the work stopped, the exigent period 

ended. The Board did not restart work until June 2015. This 7-month break in 

the work allowed the Board time to compete for the remaining $1.1 million of 

non-exigent work. Therefore, the Board should have competed the remaining 

$1.1 million of non-exigent A&E work and we questioned all but the $127,418 

that the Board expended during exigent circumstances. 

Additionally, the A&E firm billed $4,795 in prohibited cost-plus-percentage-ofcost markups. Federal regulations prohibit the use of cost-plus-percentage-ofcost contracts (44 CFR 13.36(f)(4)). Because we are questioning all of the cost of 

the A&E contract we will not question the $4,795 again as a prohibited 

markup. 

Cost or Price Analysis — The Board awarded $1.4 million for eight contracts 

without performing a cost or price analysis. Performing a cost or price analysis 

decreases the risk of unreasonable contract costs and misinterpretations or 

errors in pricing relative to scopes of work. 

Contract Provisions — The Board did not include all required provisions in 

any of the 15 contracts it awarded totaling $5.1 million. Required provisions 

include those for remedies and termination, non-discrimination, compliance 

with labor laws, and prohibitions of “kickbacks.” These provisions describe the 

rights and responsibilities of the parties and minimize the risk of 

misinterpretations and disputes. 

Disadvantaged Businesses — The Board did not take all required affirmative 

steps to ensure the use of small and minority firms, and women’s business 

enterprises whenever possible for any of the 15 contracts it awarded totaling 

$5.1 million. The required steps include placing qualified small and minority 

businesses and women’s business enterprises on solicitation lists and using 

the services and assistance of agencies such as the Small Business 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Administration and the Minority Business Development Agency of the 

Department of Commerce to solicit and use these firms. As a result, FEMA has 

no assurance that small and minority firms, women’s business enterprises, 

and labor surplus area firms received sufficient opportunities to bid on 

federally funded work. 

While the Board did not actively consider these types of businesses, it did 

award eight contracts totaling $314,641 (6.2 percent of total contract awards) 

to small and minority firms and women’s business enterprises. In addition, the 

City’s Small Underutilized Business Program required the prime contractor to 

utilize disadvantaged firms as subcontractors. The prime contractor identified 

$64,970 in work for three minority and women-owned subcontractors to secure 

the $3.3 million slope repair contract award from the Board. Therefore, 

although the Board did not take all the specific steps Federal regulations 

require, it did take other steps to provide opportunities for disadvantaged 

businesses to bid on disaster work. 

Finding B: Duplicate Obligations 

FEMA inadvertently obligated an additional $508,884 for contract costs that 

were the responsibility of the Hospital or were applicable to other Board 

projects. FEMA obligated contract costs to one project for repair and 

engineering work that included $354,947 for work that was the responsibility 

of the Hospital. Additionally, FEMA obligated $153,937 for work already 

obligated on other projects. Federal regulation at 44 CFR 204.62(a) states that 

FEMA may not duplicate benefits received by or available to the applicant from 

insurance, other assistance programs, legal awards, or any other source to 

address the same purpose. Therefore, we question $508,884 of ineligible 

duplicate obligated costs. 

Finding C: Uncompleted Work 

FEMA awarded $18,782 for repairs to a baseball complex that the Board did 

not complete. Board officials said they did not complete the work because it 

would have been too time consuming. FEMA provides funding to the 

subgrantee for small projects; and the Grantee pays the subgrantee for the 

project before completing work on the project. According to 44 CFR 206.205(a), 

failure to complete a project may require a refund of Federal payments. 

Therefore, because the Board chose not to repair the baseball complex, FEMA 

should deobligate $18,782 in unused funds and put those funds to better use. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Finding D: Grant Management 

Minnesota should have done more as FEMA’s grantee to ensure the Board was 

aware of and complied with Federal procurement standards. In report OIG-15-

132-D, issued August 24, 2015, we recommended that FEMA educate 

Minnesota officials on Federal grant contracting requirements. In response to 

our report, Minnesota officials said their staff attended presentations and 

received training on Federal procurement standards, including a presentation 

by FEMA’s Procurement Disaster Assistance Team in March 2015. In addition, 

as part of its program delivery, Minnesota began performing “transition briefs” 

to help identify and address program compliance issues. 

However, in spite of the steps taken, Minnesota did not ensure that the Board 

was aware of and complied with requirements under Federal regulations. Board 

officials said they were unaware of the requirements related to procurement in 

44 CFR Part 13. As a result, the Board did not comply with Federal regulations 

for the 15 contracts we reviewed (finding A). 

The Board could have benefited from additional technical advice from 

Minnesota. Federal regulations at 44 CFR 13.37(a)(2) and 13.40(a) require 

grantees to (1) ensure that subgrantees are aware of Federal regulations, 

(2) manage the operations of subgrant activity, and (3) monitor subgrant 

activity to ensure compliance. Providing additional technical assistance and 

monitoring to the Board should provide reasonable assurance that the Board 

will spend the remaining $2,550,092 of disaster-related procurements 

according to Federal procurement standards. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region V: 

Recommendation 1: Disallow as ineligible $4,786,736 ($3,590,052 Federal 

share) for contracts that did not comply with Federal procurement standards 

unless FEMA decides to grant an exception for all or part of the costs as 

2 CFR 215.4 allows and determines that the costs are reasonable (finding A). If 

FEMA officials determine the contract costs are reasonable, they should still 

disallow the $4,795 in prohibited cost-plus-percentage-of-cost markups. 

Recommendation 2: Disallow as ineligible $508,884 ($381,663 Federal share) 

of ineligible costs for duplicate obligations (finding B). 

Recommendation 3: Deobligate $18,782 ($14,087 Federal share) of unused 

Federal funds and put those funds to better use (finding C). 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation 4: Direct Minnesota to provide technical assistance and 

monitoring to the Board to ensure it complies with Federal procurement 

regulations for awarding disaster contracts that the Board currently estimates 

to be $2,550,092 ($1,912,569 Federal share) (finding D). 

Discussion with Management and Audit Follow-up 

We discussed the results of our audit with Board officials during and after our 

audit and included their comments in this report, as appropriate. We also 

provided a draft report in advance to FEMA, Minnesota, and Board officials and 

discussed it at exit conferences with FEMA officials on January 12, 2017, 

Minnesota on January 10, 2017, and Board officials on January 24, 2017. We 

considered their comments in developing our final report and incorporated 

their comments as appropriate. 

Board officials provided a written response to the draft of this report on 

February 10, 2017. The Board agreed that our report was factual, but stated 

that the report did not capture the magnitude of the damage and the efforts the 

Board took to protect the Hospital. We reviewed the Board’s response and 

incorporated comments as considered appropriate. 

FEMA Region V officials also provided a written response to the draft of this 

report on February 10, 2017, and concurred with our findings and 

recommendations (see appendix C). However, FEMA did not provide target 

completion dates to address the recommendations. Therefore, we consider the 

report recommendations open and unresolved. 

Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with 

a written response that includes your target completion date for each 

recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other 

supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of 

each recommendation. Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and 

closeout requests to Paige.Hamrick@oig.dhs.gov. Until your response is 

received and evaluated, the recommendations will be considered open and 

unresolved. 

The Office of Emergency Management Oversight major contributors to this 

report were Paige Hamrick, Director; John Polledo, Audit Manager; 

Jeffrey Campora, Auditor-In-Charge, and Heather Hubbard, Auditor. 

Please call me with any questions at (202) 254-4100, or your staff may contact 

Paige Hamrick, Director, Central Regional Office - North, at (214) 436-5200. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

We audited FEMA Public Assistance grant funds awarded to the Board (Public 

Assistance Identification Number 053-43000-02). Our audit objective was to 

determine whether the Board accounted for and expended Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) grant funds according to Federal regulations and 

FEMA guidelines. Minnesota awarded the Board $8.4 million for damages 

resulting from severe storms and flooding during June 11, through July 11, 

2014 (FEMA Disaster Number 4182-DR-MN). The audit covered the period 

July 21, 2014, through April 27, 2016, the cutoff date of our audit. The award 

provided 75 percent FEMA funding for 5 large and 5 small projects and the 

Board incurred $3.4 million for the 10 projects. We audited all 10 projects 

including $5.1 million in 15 disaster-related contracts. Table 2 (in appendix B) 

describes the 10 projects we audited and the amounts we question under each 

project. 

We interviewed FEMA, Minnesota, City, and Board officials; gained an 

understanding of the Board’s method of accounting for disaster-related costs; 

reviewed the Board’s procurement policies and procedures; judgmentally 

selected (generally based on dollar value) and reviewed project costs and 

procurement transactions for the projects in our scope; reviewed applicable 

Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines; and performed other procedures 

considered necessary to accomplish our objective. We did not perform a 

detailed assessment of the Board’s internal controls over its grant activities 

because it was not necessary to accomplish our audit objective. 

We conducted this performance audit between June 2016 and February 2017, 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objective. We 

conducted this audit by applying the statutes, regulations, and FEMA policies 

and guidelines in effect at the time of the disaster. 

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Project 

Number 

523 

524 

749 

814 

885 

930 

953 

997 

998 

1000

Total 

FEMA 

Category 

of 

Work** 

G 

G 

E 

A 

G 

A 

B 

G 

G 

G 

Award 

Amount 

$1,480,803 

1,188,529 

4,575 

71,926 

18,782 

82,002 

644,503 

6,475 

125,594

4,823,826 

$8,447,015 

Questioned 

Costs 

(Finding A) 

$23,020 

96,220 

0 

6,800 

0 

0 

289,300 

0 

62,177 

4,309,219 

$4,786,736 

Questioned 

Costs 

(Finding B) 

$ 0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

508,884 

$508,884 

Total 

Questioned 

Costs 

$23,020 

96,220 

0 

6,800 

0 

0 

289,300 

0 

62,177 

4,818,103 

$5,295,620 

FPTBU 

(Finding

 C & D) 

$1,457,783 

1,092,309

0

0

18,782

0

0

0

0

0 

$2,568,874 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Potential Monetary Benefits 

Table 2: Projects Audited, Questioned Costs, and Cost Avoidance 

Source: FEMA project worksheets Board records and OIG analysis 

** FEMA classifies disaster-related work by type: debris removal (Category A), emergency 

protective measures (Category B), and permanent work (Categories C through G). 

Table 3: Summary of Potential Monetary Benefits 

Type of Potential Monetary Benefit Amount Federal 

Share 

Questioned Costs – Ineligible $ 5,295,620 $ 3,971,715 

Questioned Costs – Unsupported 0 0 

Funds Put to Better Use (Unused Funds) 18,782 14,087 

Funds Put to Better Use (Cost Avoidance)*** 2,550,092 1,912,569 

Totals $7,864,494 $5,898,371 

Source: OIG analysis of report findings 

*** This is the remaining amount of obligated funds the Board has left to complete disasterrelated projects 523 and 524. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

FEMA’s Response to Draft Report 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C (continued)
 

FEMA’s Response to Draft Report
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Chief Financial Officer 

Under Secretary for Management 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Audit Liaison, DHS 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Administrator 

Chief of Staff 

Chief Financial Officer 

Chief Counsel 

Chief Procurement Officer 

Director, Risk Management and Compliance 

Audit Liaison. FEMA Region V 

Audit Liaison, FEMA (Job Code G-16-040) 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

External 

Director, Minnesota Governor’s Office of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Preparedness 

State Auditor, Minnesota Office of State Auditor 

Chief Operating Officer, Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board 

Chief Financial Officer, Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board 

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