UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4695

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EMORY MAURICE WILLIAMS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:18-cr-00427-H-1)

Submitted: June 18, 2020 Decided: June 22, 2020

Before FLOYD, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Wayne Buchanan Eads, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., 

United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Emory Maurice Williams appeals the 87-month upward departure sentence imposed 

following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a 

quantity of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2018), and distribution of 

a quantity of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). For the reasons set forth 

below, we affirm.

The lone argument Williams presses on appeal challenges the substantive 

reasonableness of the upward departure sentence. We review the sentence imposed by the 

district court, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[,]” 

for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Our reasonableness review involves assessment of both 

the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the federal sentence. United States v. 

Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). We first examine the sentence for “significant 

procedural error,” such as improperly calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range, 

insufficiently considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) factors, or inadequately 

explaining the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is free of procedural 

error, then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality 

of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id.

To be substantively reasonable, the sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater 

than necessary,” to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In 

assessing the substantive reasonableness of an upward departure, we must “consider 

whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose 
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such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” 

United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “The farther the court diverges from the advisory guideline range, the more 

compelling the reasons for the divergence must be.” United States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 

556, 561 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is tempered by the 

equally established principle that we must “give due deference to the district court’s 

decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the [departure].” United 

States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Although Williams does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his 

sentence, we have reviewed that aspect of his sentence and discern no procedural defect. 

See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that appellate 

court must review sentence for procedural reasonableness before considering its 

substantive reasonableness). We also conclude the selected 87-month sentence is 

substantively reasonable. The record confirms that the district court linked both its 

decision to upwardly depart and, importantly, the extent of that departure, to the facts of 

this case as established at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. In granting the 

Government’s departure motion, the court found that an upward departure was warranted 

under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.21, p.s. (2016), to account for “the actual 

seriousness of the offense based on conduct” that was related to a dismissed count that did 

not otherwise affect the computation of Williams’ Guidelines range. Here, although later 

dismissed pursuant to Williams’ plea agreement, Williams also was charged with 

distributing a detectable amount of fentanyl on or about December 1, 2016, with serious 
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bodily injury and death of a person resulting from use of that fentanyl, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

After hearing considerable evidence about the facts relevant to this dismissed count, 

the court upwardly departed from the total adjusted offense level of 12, which was 

recommended in Williams’ presentence report, to offense level 23. This, taken in 

conjunction with Williams’ placement in criminal history category IV, yielded a sentencing 

range of 70-87 months’ imprisonment, which, in the court’s view, was reflective of the 

severity and seriousness of the dismissed count. The court additionally observed that 

various § 3553(a) sentencing factors—including Williams’ criminal history and personal 

characteristics; the need for the sentence to provide adequate deterrence and to protect the 

public from future crimes by Williams; and the need for the sentence to promote respect 

for the law—likewise justified the selected sentence. 

Williams argues on appeal that the court did not balance the mitigating factors 

advanced at sentencing with the aggravating factors relied on by the Government. But the 

facts underlying the mitigation argument—particularly that Williams was honorably 

discharged from the U.S. Army Reserves more than 20 years before the events at issue and 

professed his intent to relocate and live a law-abiding life upon his release—paled in 

comparison to the aggravated nature of Williams’ actual conduct. The court squarely 

addressed Williams’ main argument in support of a lower departure sentence and, as such, 

these contentions simply did not warrant particularized mention. See United States v. 

Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining that, when the sentencing court has 

addressed the defendant’s “central thesis” for his sentencing position, it need not “address 
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separately each supporting data point marshalled on its behalf”); accord United States v. 

Lee, 897 F.3d 870, 873 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court need not offer a reason for 

rejecting every one of the defendant’s contentions.”). And despite Williams’ suggestion 

to the contrary, when upwardly departing pursuant to USSG § 5K2.21, p.s., the court was 

not obligated to explain why each interval between the starting offense level of 12 and the 

ultimate departure level of 23 was inadequate. We thus conclude that the selected upward 

departure sentence is substantively reasonable. See Nance, 957 F.3d at 215-17 (affirming 

the substantive reasonableness of upward variant sentence that was 36 months longer than 

called for under the Guidelines because the record confirmed that “the district court 

conducted a thorough, individualized assessment of [defendant] and his offense conduct in 

light of the § 3553(a) factors”).

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED