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*********************************************** 
SOPHIE BLONDEAU v. MICHAEL BALTIERRA

(SC 20282)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to vacate, and the defendant sought to confirm, an

arbitration award dividing the parties’ equity in their marital home and

allocating various child support expenses in connection with the parties’

marital dissolution. The parties, who were married in France, had

entered into a premarital agreement that ‘‘designate[d], as the law to

be applicable to their matrimonial regime, the French law . . . .’’ That

agreement also provided that, in the event of divorce, each party’s

separate property would remain the separate property of its owner, and

that any property acquired in both parties’ names was presumed to

belong to them jointly, in the absence of proof to the contrary. While

married, the parties purchased their marital home in Westport, Connecticut. The plaintiff provided most of the down payment using funds her

father had given her, but the parties took title to the home jointly, and

the defendant made all of the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments.

The plaintiff thereafter commenced the present action to dissolve the

marriage. Both parties sought to enforce the premarital agreement, and

the trial court approved their agreement to submit the matter to arbitration. The arbitration agreement contained a choice of law provision

providing that substantive issues would be governed by Connecticut

law but that the arbitrator shall apply the French Civil Code ‘‘with

regard to any claim by the parties that the [a]rbitrator either vacate

[the] premarital agreement or effectuate [the] premarital agreement and

if effectuated determine what property is included within the scope of

the premarital agreement pursuant to [the] French Civil Code.’’ The

arbitrator issued a written award, finding that, pursuant to the premarital

agreement, the marital home constituted joint property because it was

acquired in both parties’ names and neither party had presented evidence

to rebut the presumption of joint ownership. The arbitrator also determined that the choice of law provision in the premarital agreement

designating French law as the law applicable to the parties’ ‘‘matrimonial

regime’’ did not govern the distribution of joint property in the event

of divorce. Instead, the arbitrator determined that Connecticut law,

under which joint assets may be divided equitably in the discretion of

the tribunal, rather than French law, under which a party recovers his

or her contribution to the joint asset, governed the distribution of the

equity in the home. Explaining that the award reflected the parties’

respective contributions to the home and protected the defendant from

the vagaries of the real estate market, the arbitrator awarded the marital

home to the plaintiff but ordered that she pay the defendant $212,000

for his share of the equity. The arbitrator also issued orders regarding

the payment of child support, as well as other expenses related to the

care of the parties’ children. The trial court denied the defendant’s

application to confirm the arbitration award and granted the plaintiff’s

motion to vacate the award, concluding that the arbitrator had exceeded

her authority under the arbitration agreement and manifestly disregarded the law by ignoring the clear choice of law provisions in the

premarital agreement and by dividing the equity in the marital home

pursuant to Connecticut law rather than French law. The trial court

also concluded that the arbitration award improperly included issues

relating to child support. On the defendant’s appeal, held:

1. There was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that this court lacked appellate

jurisdiction on the ground that there was no final judgment from which

to appeal insofar as the statute (§ 52-423) providing a right of appeal

from an order vacating an arbitration award is inapplicable to arbitration

awards that include issues related to child support; § 52-423 expressly

confers on parties the right to appeal from orders related to the judicial

enforcement of arbitration awards, the fact that the arbitration at issue

involved a marital dissolution was of no consequence, and the statute
(§ 46b-66 (c)) limiting the applicability of § 52-423 with respect to orders

vacating or confirming an arbitration award that include issues related

to child support did not place a categorical condition on a party’s right

to appeal from such orders but, rather, limited the enforceable scope

of the arbitration agreement and award.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s motion to vacate

on the ground that the plaintiff failed to identify a factual basis for

that motion within the statutory (§ 52-420 (b)) limitation period; the

defendant conceded that the plaintiff filed the motion within the limitation period specified in § 52-420 (b), and, although the plaintiff’s motion

did not articulate a specific factual basis for vacating the award, nothing

in § 52-420 requires the movant to set forth the factual basis for his or

her motion.

3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s arguments in her

motion to vacate pertaining to child support on the grounds that the

plaintiff was not aggrieved by that portion of the award and that the

issue of child support had been rendered moot by the parties’ pendente

lite stipulations addressing that issue: the plain language of the statute

(§ 52-418 (a)) authorizing the court to vacate an arbitration award

expressly confers on any party to the litigation the right to move to

vacate the award, regardless of whether the party is aggrieved by that

award, and this court declined to import the requirement of aggrievement

into the statute; moreover, the fact that the parties had entered into

pendente lite stipulations regarding the issue of child support did not

render that issue moot, as pendente lite orders are not permanent but

terminate with the conclusion of litigation, and, accordingly, the court

was still obligated to make a final child support determination.

4. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the arbitrator’s award exceeded

the scope of the parties’ submission; the issue on appeal was not whether

the arbitrator resolved the issues presented correctly but simply whether

the issues had been submitted to the arbitrator to decide, which they

clearly had been; moreover, in light of the arbitrator’s having clearly

fulfilled her obligation to interpret and to apply the arbitration agreement, this court would not substitute its own interpretation for that of

the arbitrator.

5. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the choice of law provision in the premarital agreement by

distributing the equity in the marital home in accordance with Connecticut law; in light of the ambiguities in the premarital agreement, which

declared that French law governed the parties’ ‘‘matrimonial regime’’

without defining that term, and which provided for the distribution upon

divorce of separate property and property for which ownership could

not be established but not for the distribution of joint property, this

court could not conclude that any error that the arbitrator may have

made in distributing the equity in the marital home amounted to an

egregious or patently irrational rejection of clearly controlling legal

principles that would permit a court to vacate the arbitration award

under the highly deferential standard governing the manifest disregard

of law inquiry.

6. The trial court correctly determined that the arbitrator’s award included

issues related to child support in violation of § 46b-66 (c) and the statute

(§ 52-408) generally governing agreements to arbitrate, but this court

concluded that the portion of the award related to the health care,

childcare, and extracurricular activity expenses of the parties’ children

was severable from the remainder of the award: in light of the well

established purpose of the child support statutes to protect the rights

of children who are not parties to the dissolution matter, this court

concluded that a party cannot waive the statutory prohibition against

the arbitration of issues related to child support, as that issue is reserved

for the trial court, which must by law consider the child support guidelines; accordingly, this court remanded the case with direction to render

judgment granting the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award

insofar as it included orders related to child support but denying the

motion to vacate the award in all other respects, and denying the application to confirm that portion of the arbitration award relating to child

support but granting the application to confirm the award in all other

respects.

Argued January 21—officially released September 24, 2020**
Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Colin, J.,

approved the parties’ agreement to engage in arbitration; thereafter, the defendant filed an application to

confirm the arbitration award, and the plaintiff filed a

motion to vacate the arbitration award; subsequently,

the case was tried to the court, Heller, J.; judgment

denying the defendant’s application to confirm and

granting the plaintiff’s motion to vacate, from which

the defendant appealed. Reversed in part; judgment

directed.

Peter J. Zarella, with whom, on the brief, was Gary

I. Cohen, for the appellant (defendant).

Scott T. Garosshen, with whom were Kenneth J.

Bartschi and, on the brief, Michael T. Meehan, for the

plaintiff (appellee).
Opinion

ECKER, J. This appeal requires the resolution of a

series of jurisdictional and merits related issues arising

from the arbitration of a marital dissolution action

involving an unusual choice of law provision contained

in the parties’ arbitration agreement. The dispute

focuses primarily on the validity of the arbitrator’s

award dividing the equity in the parties’ marital home

and assigning responsibility for certain expenses

related to child support. The defendant, Michael Baltierra, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

granting the motion of the plaintiff, Sophie Blondeau,

to vacate the arbitration award and denying the defendant’s corresponding application to confirm the award.

The trial court’s decision rests on its determination

that (1) the arbitrator exceeded her authority under

the arbitration agreement by dividing the equity in the

marital home under Connecticut law rather than French

law, as prescribed by the parties’ premarital agreement,

(2) the arbitrator, for the same reasons, also manifestly

disregarded the law controlling her decision making,

and (3) the award improperly included issues related

to child support. We conclude that the arbitrator did not

exceed her authority under the arbitration agreement

or manifestly disregard the law, but we agree with the

trial court that the inclusion of issues related to child

support in the award was improper. Accordingly, we

reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the issues on appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were married on June 23, 1999, in Paris, France.

The parties executed a premarital agreement providing

in relevant part that ‘‘the future spouses . . . designate, as the law to be applicable to their matrimonial

regime, the French law, as being the law of the state

of the wife’s nationality. . . . The [f]uture [s]pouses

declare that they are adopting as the basis for their

union the regime of the separation of property, as such

is established by Articles 1536 to 1543 of the [French]

Civil Code . . . .’’ The premarital agreement also provided that ‘‘[e]ach one of the spouses shall establish

the ownership of his or her property by all means of

proof provided by the [l]aw. However, unless there is

legal proof to the contrary . . . [r]eal property and

business assets shall be presumed to belong to the one

of the spouses in whose name the acquisition is made,

and to both, if the acquisition is made in both of their

names.’’1

The plaintiff and the defendant had three children

during their marriage. In 2008, the parties purchased a

home in Westport with title held jointly in both of their

names. The plaintiff commenced the present action to

dissolve the marriage in January, 2016. Both parties

sought to enforce the premarital agreement. On August

31, 2017, the parties executed a binding agreement to
arbitrate the dissolution action, which the trial court

approved. The parties agreed to appoint a retired judge

of the Superior Court, Lynda B. Munro, as the arbitrator.

Among its provisions, the arbitration agreement provided: ‘‘The parties agree to be guided by the laws . . .

of Connecticut during the arbitration process and with

respect to the substantive issues submitted for resolution by the [a]rbitrator, except that the [a]rbitrator shall

be guided by the French Civil Code with regard to any

claim by the parties that the [a]rbitrator either vacate

their premarital agreement or effectuate their premarital agreement and if effectuated determine what property

is included within the scope of the premarital agreement

pursuant to [the] French Civil Code.’’ The arbitration

agreement further provided: ‘‘The parties shall arbitrate

the dissolution of marriage action, including, but not

limited to issues of . . . property division for both

assets and liabilities, [and] . . . determine the validity

and effectuation of the parties’ premarital agreement;

and if effectuated determine what property is included

within the scope of the premarital agreement pursuant

to [the] French Civil Code . . . .’’

After arbitration hearings, the arbitrator issued the

written arbitration award. As we discuss in greater

detail later in this opinion, the arbitrator’s award designated the parties’ Westport home as joint property and

then applied Connecticut law to determine how the

equity in the home would be distributed between the

parties. See part III A of this opinion. The arbitrator

awarded the home to the plaintiff and ordered her to

pay the defendant $212,000, an amount representing

approximately 40 percent of the equity in the home.2

The arbitrator also issued orders regarding the payment

of child care expenses, health insurance and expenses

for the children, and ordered the defendant to maintain

life insurance for the benefit of the children.

On January 4, 2018, the plaintiff submitted a motion

for ‘‘articulation/clarification/reargument’’ of the arbitration award, in which she argued, inter alia, that the

arbitration award violated the terms of the premarital

agreement by ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant $212,000 of the equity in the home. Specifically, the

plaintiff argued that the arbitrator should have applied

French law to determine that she owned, as separate

property, equity equal to her original contribution of

$429,000 used to purchase the home, which would have

resulted in a substantially lower amount subject to equitable distribution. The arbitrator denied the plaintiff’s

motion.3

On January 9, 2018, the defendant filed an application

to confirm the arbitration award. Two days later, on

January 11, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate

the award. On December 17, 2018, the trial court granted

the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award

and denied the defendant’s application to confirm the
award. The court concluded that, pursuant to General

Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4),4

‘‘the arbitrator exceeded her

powers and failed to issue an arbitration award that

conformed to the parties’ arbitration agreement. . . .

The arbitration agreement directed the arbitrator to

‘determine the validity and effectuation of the parties’

premarital agreement; and if effectuated determine

what property is included within the scope of the premarital agreement pursuant to [the] French Civil Code.’

The arbitrator instead applied Connecticut law and

awarded a property distribution payment to the defendant that contravened the provisions of the arbitration

agreement.’’ (Citation omitted.) The trial court also concluded that ‘‘the arbitration award failed to effectuate

the parties’ premarital agreement, which provided that

each party’s separate property would remain his or her

separate property in the event of a dissolution of the

marriage,’’ and that ‘‘the arbitration award violated General Statutes §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408 (c), which specifically prohibit the arbitration of issues relating to child

support.’’ The defendant appealed, and we transferred

the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes

§ 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the

plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award

because it was untimely, (2) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s arguments regarding child support because the plaintiff was

not aggrieved and her arguments were moot, (3) the

trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award

under § 52-418 (a) (4) because the arbitrator neither

exceeded her authority under the arbitration agreement

nor manifestly disregarded the law, and (4) the trial

court improperly vacated the arbitration award on the

ground that the award arbitrated issues related to child

support in violation of § 46b-66 (c) or, alternatively, that

the portion of the award containing orders related to

child support was severable. The plaintiff disputes each

of the defendant’s claims and also argues that the defendant’s appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final

judgment.

I

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

We must first address the plaintiff’s contention that

we lack appellate jurisdiction over the present appeal.

The plaintiff claims that there is no final judgment from

which to appeal because General Statutes § 52-423,5

which provides a statutory right of appeal from an order

vacating an arbitration award, is inapplicable to arbitration awards that include ‘‘issues related to child support’’ pursuant to § 46b-66 (c).6 This argument is without merit.

Underlying our analysis is the fundamental precept
that ‘‘[t]he right of appeal is purely statutory. It is

accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the

rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are

met. . . . The statutory right to appeal is limited to

appeals by aggrieved parties from final judgments.’’

(Citations omitted.) State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30,

463 A.2d 566 (1983). ‘‘The lack of a final judgment is a

jurisdictional defect that mandates dismissal.’’ In re

Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 625, 784 A.2d 317 (2001).

This limitation would not appear to present an obstacle

to the defendant’s ability to obtain appellate review in

the present case because § 52-423 expressly confers on

parties the right to appeal from orders related to the

judicial enforcement of arbitration awards: ‘‘An appeal

may be taken from an order confirming, vacating, modifying or correcting an award, or from a judgment or

decree upon an award, as in ordinary civil actions.’’

General Statutes § 52-423. We have explained that ‘‘[t]he

final judgment in an arbitration proceeding is ordinarily

an order of the court vacating, modifying or confirming

the arbitrator’s award.’’ Daginella v. Foremost Ins. Co.,

197 Conn. 26, 30, 495 A.2d 709 (1985).

The fact that the arbitration at issue involves a marital

dissolution is of no consequence. Section 46b-66 (c)

provides in relevant part: ‘‘The provisions of chapter

909 [which include the right to appeal conferred by § 52-

423] shall be applicable to any agreement to arbitrate in

an action for dissolution of marriage under this chapter,

provided . . . such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues related

to child support, visitation and custody. An arbitration

award in such action shall be confirmed, modified or

vacated in accordance with the provisions of chapter

909.’’

The plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument seizes on the

proviso in § 46b-66 (c) stating that the arbitration statutes, including the right to appeal under § 52-423 of

chapter 909, are applicable in a marital dissolution

action ‘‘provided . . . such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues

related to child support, visitation and custody.’’ The

plaintiff contends, in other words, that § 46b-66 (c) contains a condition precedent categorically excluding

from the scope of cases subject to appeal any trial court

order vacating or confirming an arbitration award that

includes ‘‘issues related to child support, visitation and

custody.’’ We reject the plaintiff’s strained construction

of the statute. The restriction contained in § 46b-66 (c)

does not operate as a categorical condition on a party’s

right of appeal but, instead, merely limits the enforceable scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement and

award under chapter 909.

Our review of this issue is conducted under the familiar rules of statutory construction. ‘‘[I]ssues of statutory

construction raise questions of law, over which we exer-
cise plenary review. . . . The process of statutory

interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of

the case, including the question of whether the language

does so apply. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other

words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner,

the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the

facts of [the] case, including the question of whether

the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to

determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs

us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boisvert v. Gavis,

332 Conn. 115, 141–42, 210 A.3d 1 (2019).

The plain language of § 46b-66 (c), read in a vacuum,

perhaps could be viewed to support the plaintiff’s construction. But context matters in statutory construction,

as do practical consequences, and these considerations

lead quickly and definitively to a contrary result. The

pertinent context here is found in § 52-4087 of chapter

909, which ‘‘explains what agreements to arbitrate are

governed by its provisions.’’ LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322

Conn. 828, 837, 144 A.3d 373 (2016); see id., 838 (reading

§§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408 ‘‘to operate harmoniously’’

because they ‘‘are designed to relate to the same subject

matter’’). Section 52-408 provides in relevant part that

‘‘an agreement in writing between the parties to a marriage to submit to arbitration any controversy between

them with respect to the dissolution of their marriage,

except issues related to child support, visitation and

custody, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,

except when there exists sufficient cause at law or in

equity for the avoidance of written contracts generally.’’

(Emphasis added.)

The plain language of § 52-408 demonstrates that the

exception for ‘‘issues related to child support, visitation

and custody’’ operates as a limitation on the enforceable

scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate and, by

extension, the arbitration award, rather than as a condition precedent to the applicability of chapter 909 itself.

See LaFrance v. Lodmell, supra, 322 Conn. 836 (recognizing that legislature ‘‘use[d] limiting language . . . in

§ 46b-66 (c), when it provided that ‘such agreement and

an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not

include issues related to child support, visitation and

custody’ ’’). Stated another way, a fair and equitable

agreement to arbitrate a marital dissolution action is

‘‘valid, irrevocable and enforceable,’’ except insofar as

it includes ‘‘issues related to child support, visitation

and custody’’; General Statutes § 52-408; which ‘‘must
be resolved only by a court.’’ Kirwan v. Kirwan, 185

Conn. App. 713, 733, 197 A.3d 1000 (2018). Thus, ‘‘if a

court finds an agreement to arbitrate fair and equitable,

it will be subject to the provisions of chapter 909.’’8

LaFrance v. Lodmell, supra, 838.

This construction comports with common sense. To

construe § 46b-66 (c) to impose, as a condition precedent to the applicability of chapter 909, the exclusion

of issues related to child support, custody, and visitation, as the plaintiff suggests, would yield absurd and

unworkable results. Under the plaintiff’s proposed

interpretation of the statute, the parties could have a

perfectly valid and binding arbitration agreement under

§ 52-408 but nonetheless be unable to obtain judicial

relief to confirm, vacate, correct, or modify the subsequent arbitration award under chapter 909 if it erroneously included even a single, isolated order related to

child support, visitation, or custody. A party in that

circumstance would be left in limbo and without legal

recourse, contractually bound to arbitrate the dissolution action but unable to enforce, modify or vacate the

subsequent arbitration award.9 We do not believe that

the legislature intended such a bizarre result. See id.,

839 (rejecting interpretation of § 46b-66 (c) that would

produce absurd and unworkable results). We conclude

that we have jurisdiction over the defendant’s appeal

pursuant to § 52-423.

II

TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION

A

Timeliness Under General Statutes § 52-420

The defendant advances a number of jurisdictional

claims of his own. First, the defendant claims that the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider

the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitration award

because the motion was untimely under § 52-420 (b).10

He concedes that the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate

within the time limit set by § 52-420 (b) but argues that

the motion was deficient because it failed to identify

any particularized factual grounds for vacating the

award. We disagree.

The following additional procedural history is relevant to our resolution of this issue. The arbitrator issued

the award on December 15, 2017. The plaintiff filed a

one paragraph motion to vacate the award on January

11, 2018, well within the statutory thirty day time limit.

The motion, without elaboration, provided that ‘‘[t]he

plaintiff submits that the arbitrator exceeded her powers and so imperfectly executed them that no mutual,

final and definite award [on] the subject matter was

made. As a result, the arbitrator failed to satisfy her

duties under . . . § 52-418 and the arbitration agreement.’’ For reasons not apparent from the record, argument on the plaintiff’s motion was scheduled for August
10, 2018, seven months after it was filed. On June 7,

2018, the defendant filed an objection to the motion,

arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion to vacate because the

plaintiff had failed to identify a factual basis for vacating

the arbitrator’s award within the thirty day time period

provided by § 52-420 (b).11 The day before argument

on the plaintiff’s motion to vacate, the plaintiff filed a

detailed memorandum of law in support of her motion,

in which she argued that the award should be vacated

because (1) the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the

arbitration agreement and exhibited a manifest disregard of the law in violation of § 52-418 (a) (4), (2) the

arbitration award included issues related to child support in violation of § 46b-66 (c), and (3) the award

violated Connecticut public policy in favor of the

enforcement of premarital agreements.

At the hearing on the motion to vacate, the defendant

again raised his timeliness challenge, pointing out that

he had not received the plaintiff’s memorandum of law

in support of the motion to vacate until the day before.

The trial court offered the defendant a second hearing

and an opportunity to file a responsive brief, stating:

‘‘I don’t want anyone to feel that they were blindsided.

So, if we take evidence today and you would like to have

a second hearing date after you’ve had an opportunity,

if you feel you did not have adequate notice, I will

absolutely give you an opportunity to do that.’’12 The

court then heard argument on the plaintiff’s motion

to vacate. On August 17, 2018, the defendant filed a

supplemental memorandum of law in opposition to the

motion to vacate, in which he again raised his jurisdictional challenges to the plaintiff’s motion.

The defendant’s claim requires us to determine the

necessary degree of specificity that a party must provide

in a motion to vacate under § 52-420. This is an issue of

statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary

review. See Wu v. Chang, 264 Conn. 307, 310, 823 A.2d

1197 (2003) (exercising plenary review over issue

regarding thirty day time period in § 52-420 (b)). Section

52-420 (b) provides: ‘‘No motion to vacate, modify or

correct an award may be made after thirty days from

the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration

who makes the motion.’’ We have previously explained

that the failure to comply with this thirty day time limit

implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

See Wu v. Chang, supra, 312 (‘‘[i]f the motion is not

filed within the thirty day time limit [under § 52-420 (b)],

the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over the motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 52-420, however, does not contain any language

requiring the moving party to set forth any particularized grounds in support of a timely filed motion to

vacate an arbitration award. Cf. Morris v. Hartford

Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 683 n.5, 513 A.2d 66 (1986)

(observing that motion to strike would be fatally defec-
tive if it failed to comply with then Practice Book § 154,

which required that motion to strike based on legal

insufficiency ‘‘distinctly specify the reason or reasons

for each such claimed insufficiency’’). We ‘‘must construe a statute as written. . . . Courts may not by construction supply omissions . . . or add exceptions

merely because it appears that good reasons exist for

adding them. . . . It is axiomatic that the court itself

cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular

result. That is a function of the legislature.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, 285

Conn. 778, 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008).

Nothing in § 52-420 requires a movant to articulate the

factual basis for a motion to vacate, modify or correct

an arbitration award.13 The statute simply requires the

motion to be filed within thirty days of the date on

which notice of the arbitration award was received, and

it is undisputed that the plaintiff’s motion was filed

within the thirty day statutory time period. If the opposing party wishes to obtain greater specificity prior to

responding to such a motion or requires additional time

to respond after receiving a belated memorandum in

support of the motion, it is easy enough for the party

seeking more time to make such a request, and presumably the trial court will enter an appropriate scheduling

order.14 Although it would be useful if the initial motion

contained as much pertinent information as possible,

including its factual grounds, the statute does not

require it. We conclude that the plaintiff’s motion to

vacate was timely filed under § 52-420 and that the trial

court had subject matter jurisdiction over the motion.15

B

Aggrievement and Mootness

Next, the defendant claims that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to consider the child support

arguments in the plaintiff’s motion to vacate because

the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the child support

portion of the award and her arguments were moot.

We again disagree.

Because questions of aggrievement and mootness

implicate subject matter jurisdiction, our review over

both is plenary. See, e.g., Andross v. West Hartford,

285 Conn. 309, 321–22, 939 A.2d 1146 (2008). With two

exceptions16 inapplicable here, judicial review of arbitration awards is governed by § 52-418. Garrity v.

McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 6, 612 A.2d 742 (1992). Section

52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court

. . . shall make an order vacating the award if it finds

any of the following defects . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

This language has the dual effect of both limiting the

subject right, by providing that only parties to an arbitration may move to vacate an arbitration award,17 and

simultaneously conferring that right on any party, with-
out qualification. In particular, § 52-418 contains no

requirement that a party moving to vacate an arbitration

award must have been aggrieved by the award, and we

have never held that to be a requirement under the

statute. Cf. Dillon v. American Brass Co., 135 Conn.

10, 16, 60 A.2d 661 (1948) (upholding trial court’s order

dismissing application to vacate arbitration award but

clarifying that proper ground for dismissal was not that

moving parties were not aggrieved but, rather, that they

‘‘were not parties to the arbitration who had any standing to apply to have it vacated’’).

The absence of any language in § 52-418 requiring

aggrievement is made conspicuous by comparison with

General Statutes § 52-263, which provides the statutory

right to appeal in civil actions. That section provides

in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the trial of all matters of fact

in any cause or action in the Superior Court . . . if

either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court

or judge upon any question or questions of law arising

in the trial . . . he may appeal to the court having

jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-263; see also

General Statutes § 8-7 (‘‘[a]n appeal may be taken to

the zoning board of appeals by any person aggrieved’’

(emphasis added)); General Statutes (Supp. 2020) § 45a186 (b) (‘‘[a]ny person aggrieved by an order, denial

or decree of a Probate Court may appeal therefrom to

the Superior Court’’ (emphasis added)). The aggrievement requirement in civil actions is set forth in the plain

language of § 52-263. See State v. Salmon, 250 Conn.

147, 153, 735 A.2d 333 (1999) (‘‘[o]n its face, [§ 52-263]

explicitly sets out three criteria that must be met in

order to establish subject matter jurisdiction for appellate review: (1) the appellant must be a party; (2) the

appellant must be aggrieved by the trial court’s decision;

and (3) the appeal must be taken from a final judgment’’).

Section 52-418, in contrast, has no aggrievement requirement and explicitly provides that ‘‘any party to an arbitration’’ may apply for vacatur of an arbitration award.18

(Emphasis added.) General Statutes 52-418 (a). As a

party to the arbitration proceedings, the statute permitted the plaintiff to move to vacate the arbitration award.

We decline the defendant’s request to import an aggrievement requirement into § 52-418 when the legislature has

chosen not to do so.

The defendant also claims that the elements of the

arbitration award related to child support had become

moot by the time the motion to vacate was adjudicated

in the trial court because those issues had been resolved

by the stipulation of the parties. ‘‘It is a [well settled]

general rule that the existence of an actual controversy

is an essential requisite to . . . jurisdiction . . . .

When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have

occurred that preclude [a] . . . court from granting

any practical relief through its disposition of the merits,

a case has become moot.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193, 201, 856

A.2d 997 (2004). The defendant points out that the parties had entered into two pendente lite stipulations

regarding child support, which already had been

approved by the court by the time that the motion

to vacate was heard.19 The defendant also argues that

vacating the award related to child support could not

have provided the plaintiff with any practical relief

because the defendant would still be obligated to pay

child support to the plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-84 (a)20 and § 46b-215a-2c (f) (1) (A)21 and

(g)22 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.

We reject the defendant’s claim that the parties’ pendente lite stipulations rendered the issue of child support moot. Pendente lite orders are not permanent

orders but, instead, terminate with the conclusion of

litigation. LaBow v. LaBow, 171 Conn. 433, 443, 370

A.2d 990 (1976). Thus, the issue of final orders involving

child support—those contained in the arbitration

award—was not resolved by the pendente lite stipulations.

Nor were the child support issues rendered moot

by virtue of the fact that the defendant still would be

obligated by statute and regulation to pay child support

if the award were vacated. The amount of child support

owed by a party to a dissolution action is an issue to

be determined by the trial court in light of the child

support guidelines. See General Statutes § 46b-215b (a)

(‘‘[t]he child support and arrearage guidelines issued

pursuant to section 46b-215a, adopted as regulations

pursuant to section 46b-215c . . . shall be considered

in all determinations of child support award amounts’’);

Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 205, 61 A.3d 449

(2013) (‘‘the legislature has thrown its full support

behind the guidelines, expressly declaring that [t]he

. . . guidelines established pursuant to [General Statutes §] 46b-215a and in effect on the date of the support

determination shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts’’ (emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted)); Kirwan v. Kirwan,

supra, 185 Conn. App. 733 (‘‘the legislature concluded,

as a matter of public policy, that issues involving custody, visitation, and child support must be resolved only

by a court’’). The court may, in its discretion, deviate

from the child support guidelines in determining the

correct amount of child support in any particular case,

but ‘‘any deviation from the schedule or the principles

on which the guidelines are based must be accompanied

by the court’s explanation as to why the guidelines are

inequitable or inappropriate and why the deviation is

necessary to meet the needs of the child.’’ Maturo v.

Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 95–96, 995 A.2d 1 (2010). The

fact that the parties stipulated after arbitration to child

support payments based on their consideration of the

child support guidelines in no way resolved the issue

of child support or released the trial court from the
obligation to make a child support determination on

the record. See Favrow v. Vargas, 231 Conn. 1, 25, 647

A.2d 731 (1994) (trial court ‘‘must . . . determine on

the record the amount of support indicated by the guidelines schedule’’). Child support was a determination to

be made by the trial court after and separate from the

arbitration proceeding, and it was unresolved when the

trial court considered the motion to vacate the arbitration award. Therefore, the issue of child support was

not moot.

III

ARBITRATION AWARD

A

Additional Facts and Standard of Review

The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to vacate

the arbitration award on the grounds that (1) the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the arbitration agreement

because the parties bargained for the arbitration of their

dissolution action to be governed by French law, but

the arbitrator applied Connecticut law to divide the

equity in the marital home, and (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by ignoring the clear choice

of law provisions in the arbitration agreement and the

premarital agreement. The defendant challenges both

conclusions.

We begin by setting forth additional facts and procedural history relevant to the defendant’s claims. The

parties purchased their home in 2008 for $1,145,000.

The parties made a down payment in the amount of

$444,000, largely through funds provided by the plaintiff’s father. Whether as a loan or a gift,23 the plaintiff’s

father sent the plaintiff approximately $479,000 prior

to the purchase, and the plaintiff contributed approximately $429,000 of that amount toward the purchase

price of the home. The balance of the down payment,

approximately $15,000, was provided by the defendant.

Title to the home was taken in both of the parties’

names. Over the ensuing years, the defendant made all

of the mortgage, tax, and insurance payments on the

home, which totaled more than $600,000. The arbitrator

determined the fair market value of the home at the

time of dissolution to be $1,150,000 and the equity in

the home to be $531,000.

In allocating the equity in the parties’ home, the arbitrator began with the provisions of the premarital agreement. The arbitrator explained: ‘‘The parties’ [premarital] agreement contemplates that the parties may own

both separate and joint property. On the one hand,

[that] agreement provided that each party’s separate

property would remain the separate property of its

owner and belong exclusively to that party in the event

of a dissolution of marriage. . . . The [premarital]

agreement’s treatment of separate property applies to

all such property—whether owned at the time of the
marriage or acquired after the marriage by a party solely

in his or her name. . . . On the other hand, the [premarital] agreement provides that property acquired by parties in their joint names shall belong to both, absent

proof to the contrary.’’ (Citations omitted.) The arbitrator also recognized that the $429,000 the plaintiff had

contributed to the purchase of the home had been the

separate property of the plaintiff when she received

those funds from her father. To determine how the

equity in the home should be distributed under these

circumstances, the arbitrator explained that ‘‘[t]he

answer turns on (1) whether the home is separate or

joint property and, if joint property, (2) whether Connecticut law or French law determines this distribution.

The [premarital] agreement answers the first question,

and well established choice of law principles answer

the second. The [premarital] agreement provides that

the parties’ home is joint property. Article III of [that]

agreement states that, ‘unless there is legal proof to the

contrary . . . [r]eal property . . . shall be presumed

to belong to the one of the spouses in whose name the

acquisition is made, and to both, if the acquisition is

made in both of their names.’ Here, the parties took title

to the marital home jointly. The [premarital] agreement

thus presumes that the marital home belongs to both

parties, and neither party presented evidence sufficient

to rebut this clear presumption.’’

The arbitrator then addressed how to divide the

equity in the marital home. ‘‘Though the [premarital]

agreement provides that the marital home is joint property, it does not dictate how such joint property is to

be divided—a point on which the parties now disagree.

The plaintiff contends that French law should determine the division, [whereas] the defendant contends

that Connecticut law controls. Under French law, each

party would recover his or her contribution to the joint

asset and would receive any return on investment or

profit thereon in proportion to the contribution made.

. . . Under Connecticut law, the joint asset may be

divided in the discretion of the tribunal.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) The arbitrator applied the ‘‘most

significant relationship approach’’ of § 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to resolve the conflict of laws. The arbitrator first determined that the

parties had not explicitly chosen a particular rule of

law to govern their contractual rights and duties as to

jointly owned property in the event of divorce. Specifically, the arbitrator determined that ‘‘[t]he [premarital]

agreement does . . . explicitly choose French law to

govern the parties’ relationship during the term of their

marriage. In article I of [that] agreement, the parties

‘designate[d], as the law to be applicable to their matrimonial regime, the French law,’ and ‘adopt[ed] as the

basis for their union the regime of the separation of

property, as . . . established by [the French Civil

Code].’ . . . During their marriage, the parties were to
manage their property and answer for their own debts

under the French regime of separation. . . . The [premarital] agreement does not, however, include a similar

choice of law provision to govern the parties’ joint property in the event of divorce.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Having concluded that the parties had

not designated a particular rule of law to govern the distribution of the equity in the home, the arbitrator applied

the most significant relationship approach and determined that Connecticut law should govern the division

of the equity in the home.

Applying Connecticut law to distribute the equity in

the home, the arbitrator awarded title of the home to

the plaintiff and ordered her to pay $212,000 to the

defendant. The arbitrator explained: ‘‘The payment to

be made by the plaintiff to the defendant . . . is a

reflection that the parties have both contributed to the

ownership of [the home]. Further, it provides that the

defendant will receive his equitable share without concern to the vagaries of the real estate market. Finally,

it is a part of the crafted mosaic intended to adequately

address both the statutory criteria for the division of

joint property and the award of spousal support.’’

The principles governing our review of the defendant’s claims are well established. ‘‘Because we favor

arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we

undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a

manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution. . . . Furthermore, in applying this general rule

of deference to an arbitrator’s award, [e]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor

of the [arbitration] award and of the arbitrators’ acts

and proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Connecticut State Employees Assn., SEI Local

2001, 287 Conn. 258, 270, 947 A.2d 928 (2008). ‘‘Judicial

review of [arbitration] decisions is narrowly confined.

. . . When the parties agree to arbitration and establish

the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their

submission, the extent of our judicial review of the

award is delineated by the scope of the parties’ [arbitration] agreement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80,

881 A.2d 139 (2005). This is because ‘‘[a]rbitration is a

creature of contract and the parties themselves, by the

terms of their submission, define the powers of the

arbitrators.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

LaFrance v. Lodmell, supra, 322 Conn. 850.

The standard of review in this context depends on

whether the submission to the arbitrator is restricted or

unrestricted. A restricted submission, which expressly

‘‘restrict[s] the breadth of the issues [to be resolved by

the arbitrator], reserv[es] explicit rights, or condition[s]

the award on court review,’’ is subject to de novo

review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Office of
Labor Relations v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, 288 Conn. 223,

229, 951 A.2d 1249 (2008). The arbitrator’s award in

an unrestricted submission, by contrast, is considered

‘‘final and binding; thus the courts will not review the

. . . award for errors of law or fact.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.,

supra, 275 Conn. 80. ‘‘Where the submission does not

otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to

decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot

be vacated on the grounds that . . . the interpretation

of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous.

Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the

submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators’ decision of the legal questions involved.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The parties have not addressed in their briefs whether

the submission to the arbitrator was restricted; nor have

they asked us to review de novo the award’s division

of the home equity. Instead, both parties present their

competing arguments using the ‘‘scope of the submission’’ and ‘‘manifest disregard of the law’’ grounds to

vacate an award under § 52-418 (a) (4). That presentation presupposes an unrestricted submission. See

Toland v. Toland, 179 Conn. App. 800, 807 n.5, 182 A.3d

651 (‘‘analysis under § 52-418 . . . applies when a party

attempts to vacate unrestricted submissions’’ (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 935, 183 A.3d

1174 (2018). We will address the parties’ claims as they

have been presented to us and, therefore, apply the

standard of review applicable to unrestricted submissions.24 See, e.g., Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford

Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101, 112,

779 A.2d 737 (2001) (‘‘[a] submission is unrestricted

unless otherwise agreed by the parties’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Maluszewski v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

34 Conn. App. 27, 36, 640 A.2d 129 (‘‘[T]he parties easily

could have provided that the arbitrators’ conclusions

of law would be subject to de novo review. The failure

explicitly to do so in this case leaves the submission

unrestricted.’’), cert. denied, 229 Conn. 921, 642 A.2d

1214 (1994).

The consequence of this limitation is significant

because it means that judicial review is confined to

determining only whether the arbitrator exceeded her

authority under § 52-418. ‘‘[A] claim that the arbitrators

have ‘exceeded their powers’ may be established under

§ 52-418 in either one of two ways: (1) the award fails

to conform to the submission, or, in other words, falls

outside the scope of the submission; or (2) the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.’’ Harty v. Cantor

Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 85. Contrary to the

trial court’s ruling, neither ground for judicial intervention exists here.

B
Scope of the Award

‘‘The standard for reviewing a claim that the award

does not conform to the submission requires what we

have termed ‘in effect, de novo judicial review.’ ’’ Id.,

84. The de novo label in this context means something

very different from typical de novo review because

review under this standard and in this setting ‘‘is limited

to a comparison of the award to the submission. Our

inquiry generally is limited to a determination as to

whether the parties have vested the arbitrators with

the authority to decide the issue presented or to award

the relief conferred. With respect to the latter, we have

explained that, as long as the arbitrator’s remedies were

consistent with the agreement they were within the

scope of the submission. . . . In making this determination, the court may not engage in fact-finding by providing an independent interpretation of the contract,

but simply is charged with determining if the arbitrators

have ignored their obligation to interpret and to apply

the contract as written.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 85–86;

see also AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663 v. Dept. of

Children & Families, 317 Conn. 238, 252 n.8, 117 A.3d

470 (2015) (‘‘although this court has stated that a court’s

review of an arbitration award is in effect, de novo

judicial review, this means only that we draw our own

conclusions regarding whether an arbitration award

conforms to the submission’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). To justify vacating an award on the ground

that the award exceeds the scope of the submission,

‘‘we must determine that the award necessarily falls

outside the scope of the submission.’’ (Emphasis in

original.) Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275

Conn. 98; see also United Paperworkers International

Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.

Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1987) (‘‘as long as the arbitrator

is even arguably construing or applying the contract

and acting within the scope of his authority, that a

court is convinced he committed serious error does not

suffice to overturn his decision’’); AFSCME, Council 4,

Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, 309 Conn. 767, 780, 75

A.3d 1 (2013) (‘‘It is not [the court’s] role to determine

whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective

bargaining agreement was correct. It is enough to

uphold the judgment of the court, denying the [union’s]

application to vacate the award, that such interpretation

was a good faith effort to interpret the terms of the

collective bargaining agreement.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)).

To determine whether the arbitrator’s award necessarily fell outside the scope of the submission, we begin

with the language of the arbitration agreement. The

parties’ disagreement is centered on two of its provisions. The first provides in relevant part: ‘‘The parties

agree to be guided by the laws . . . of Connecticut
during the arbitration process and with respect to the

substantive issues submitted for resolution by the

[a]rbitrator, except that the [a]rbitrator shall be guided

by the French Civil Code with regard to any claim by

the parties that the [a]rbitrator either vacate their premarital agreement or effectuate their premarital agreement and if effectuated determine what property is

included within the scope of the premarital agreement

pursuant to [the] French Civil Code.’’ The second provision provides in relevant part: ‘‘The parties shall arbitrate the dissolution of marriage action, including, but

not limited to issues of’’ how to ‘‘determine the validity

and effectuation of the parties’ premarital agreement;

and if effectuated determine what property is included

within the scope of the premarital agreement pursuant

to [the] French Civil Code . . . .’’

The plaintiff argues that these provisions required the

arbitrator to apply the French Civil Code to determine

whether property was joint or separate and to allocate

property between the parties in accordance with that

law. The defendant advocates a narrower construction,

under which the arbitration agreement required French

law to be applied to only two issues: (1) whether the

premarital agreement would be enforced, and (2) what

property came within the scope of the premarital agreement. The defendant contends that, because there ultimately was no dispute between the parties over either

the enforceability of the premarital agreement or the

inclusion of the marital home within the scope of the

assets subject to the premarital agreement, the arbitrator’s award plainly conformed to the scope of the submission.

The language of the arbitration agreement is unclear

at best with regard to the issues in the present case.25

We need not, however, choose between the parties’

competing interpretations of these specific provisions

contained in the arbitration agreement. The question

for this court is not whether the arbitrator decided

the issues correctly but only whether the issues were

submitted for her to decide. ‘‘In determining whether

an arbitrator has exceeded the authority granted under

the contract, a court cannot base the decision on

whether the court would have ordered the same relief,

or whether . . . the arbitrator correctly interpreted the

contract. The court must instead focus on whether the

[arbitrator] had authority to reach a certain issue . . . .

[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing

or applying the contract and acting within the scope of

authority, the award must be enforced. The arbitrator’s

decision cannot be overturned even if the court is convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Comprehensive

Orthopaedics & Musculoskeletal Care, LLC v. Axtmayer, 293 Conn. 748, 755, 980 A.2d 297 (2009). ‘‘[A]s

long as the arbitrator’s remedies were consistent with

the agreement they were within the scope of the submis-
sion. . . . [T]he court may not engage in fact-finding by

providing an independent interpretation of the contract,

but simply is charged with determining if the arbitrators

have ignored their obligation to interpret and to apply

the contract as written.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Harty v.Cantor Fitzgerald &

Co., supra, 275 Conn. 86; see also Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998, 248

Conn. 108, 116, 728 A.2d 1063 (1999) (‘‘it is the arbitrator’s judgment that was bargained for and contracted

for by the parties, and we do not substitute our own

judgment merely because our interpretation of the

agreement or contract at issue might differ from that

of the arbitrator’’).

We have no difficulty answering this question in the

affirmative. There is no evidence that the arbitrator

ignored her obligation to interpret and to apply the

arbitration agreement. The arbitrator carefully considered the arbitration submission in reaching her award,

as demonstrated by her reference to the contested language in the arbitration agreement and her explanation

that ‘‘both parties are asking this arbitrator and the

court to enforce the premarital agreement in accordance with its terms. Therefore, the controversy

between them is not as to whether the premarital agreement should be enforced but, instead, what the reach

of its terms [is] regarding assets, and, as to certain

issues, whether French law or Connecticut law applies.’’

The arbitrator determined that the home equity fell

within the scope of the premarital agreement, as evidenced by the arbitrator’s reliance on the premarital

agreement to reach her determination that the home

was joint property because it was held in both parties’ names.

In comparing the award to the submission, it is clear

that the arbitrator fulfilled her obligation to interpret

and to apply the arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Harty

v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 85–86.

Although the plaintiff challenges the correctness of the

arbitrator’s interpretation of the arbitration agreement,

it is beyond the scope of our review to substitute our

own interpretation of the contract for the arbitrator’s

when the arbitrator had fulfilled her obligation to interpret and to apply the agreement. See AFSCME, Council

4, Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, supra, 309 Conn. 780;

Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 85–86. We

agree with the defendant that the arbitrator’s award did

not exceed the scope of the parties’ submission, and

the trial court erred in ruling that it did.

C

Manifest Disregard of the Law

The defendant next claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law when she distributed the equity in the
marital home pursuant to Connecticut law. In response,

the plaintiff argues that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by not adhering to the choice of law

provision in the premarital agreement, which she argues

designated French law as governing the distribution of

joint property. Because the arbitrator’s determination

was not an ‘‘egregious or patently irrational misperformance of duty’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)

Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., 238

Conn. 293, 308, 680 A.2d 1274 (1996); we agree with

the defendant that the arbitrator did not manifestly

disregard the law.

Manifest disregard of the law is an extremely deferential standard of review. ‘‘[T]he manifest disregard of

the law ground for vacating an arbitration award is

narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an

arbitrator’s extraordinary lack of fidelity to established

legal principles.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 10. This level of

deference is appropriate because the parties voluntarily

have chosen arbitration as a means to resolve their

legal dispute. See id., 4 (‘‘[w]hen the parties agree to

arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator

through the terms of their submission, the extent of

our judicial review of the award is delineated by the

scope of the parties’ agreement’’); see also Groton v.

United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35, 51–52,

757 A.2d 501 (2000) (‘‘Voluntary arbitration is a method

by which parties freely determine that their disputes

will be resolved, at least in the first instance, not by

public officials such as judges or administrators, but

by arbitrators. Our legal system encourages that determination by ordinarily giving great deference to . . .

both the factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators.’’ (Citation omitted.)). As an essential component

of that choice, they have agreed to bypass the usual

adjudicative apparatus, including its conventional

appellate features, for the advantages that accompany

private arbitration. To borrow a phrase from the marriage ceremony, that choice is made ‘‘for better or for

worse,’’ which, in this context, means that the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding unless it is manifestly,

obviously, and indisputably wrong. Review by a judicial

authority is not forfeited entirely, but it is conducted

under a different and far less rigorous level of scrutiny.

Under this ‘‘highly deferential standard’’; Harty v.

Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 102; our

precedent instructs that three elements must be satisfied before we will ‘‘vacate an arbitration award on the

ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded

the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being

readily and instantly perceived by the average person

qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration

panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing

legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the

governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbi-
tration panel is [well-defined], explicit, and clearly

applicable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norwalk Police Union, Local 1727, Council 15, AFSCME,

AFL-CIO v. Norwalk, 324 Conn. 618, 629, 153 A.3d 1280

(2017). ‘‘[E]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the [arbitration] award

and of the arbitrators’ acts and proceedings.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connecticut State

Employees Assn., SEIU Local 2001, supra, 287 Conn.

270.

These elements are not satisfied in the present case.

This should come as no surprise to the parties in light

of the nature of the legal issues that they agreed to have

determined by the arbitrator—which include questions

requiring the interpretation of an opaquely worded,

French matrimonial contract that incorporates unfamiliar provisions of French law submitted to a sole arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration agreement, which itself

employed inexact language providing that the arbitrator

shall be ‘‘guided’’ by the relevant French law only in

limited respects. Under these circumstances, each of

the parties—knowing that litigation was impending—

voluntarily accepted a real and substantial risk of being

disappointed by an outcome with very limited opportunity for judicial review under the manifest disregard

standard.

The premarital agreement provides that, ‘‘unless

there is legal proof to the contrary . . . [r]eal property

and business assets shall be presumed to belong to the

one of the spouses in whose name the acquisition is

made, and to both, if the acquisition is made in both

of their names.’’ The arbitrator found that the parties’

marital home was joint property under the premarital

agreement because it was acquired in both parties’ names

and neither party had presented evidence to rebut the

presumption of joint ownership. Because we do not

review an arbitrator’s award under an unrestricted submission for errors of law or fact; Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 80; we will not disturb

the arbitrator’s finding, uncontested by the parties, that

there was no evidence directly or expressly rebutting

the agreement’s presumption of joint ownership; nor

will we disturb the arbitrator’s resulting classification of

the home as joint property under the premarital agreement. The arbitrator’s determination that the home

equity was joint property under the premarital agreement demonstrated careful consideration of the terms

of the agreement, aided, as the arbitrator deemed pertinent, by the testimony of the parties’ expert witnesses

on French law. The arbitration award did not constitute

an ‘‘egregious or patently irrational rejection of clearly

controlling legal principles’’ constituting a manifest disregard of the law. Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223

Conn. 11.

The plaintiff argues that the arbitrator manifestly dis-
regarded the choice of law provision in the premarital

agreement, which ‘‘designate[d], as the law to be applicable to their matrimonial regime, the French law

. . . .’’26 Typically, a claim that the arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the law depends on some applicable

statutory provision or common-law rule that the arbitrator is claimed to have egregiously ignored. See, e.g.,

Board of Education v. New Milford Education Assn.,

331 Conn. 524, 531, 205 A.3d 552 (2019) (claimed manifest disregard of collateral estoppel and res judicata

doctrines); Economos v. Liljedahl Bros., Inc., 279 Conn.

300, 308, 901 A.2d 1198 (2006) (claimed manifest disregard of Home Improvement Act, General Statutes § 20-

429 (a)); Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing

Co., supra, 238 Conn. 305–306 (claimed manifest disregard of statutory notice requirement under General Statutes § 49-41a); Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn.

11–12 (claimed manifest disregard of federal and state

statutes of limitations). Here, the plaintiff argues that

the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a binding, contractual choice of law provision in the premarital agreement

executed by the parties. We disagree that ‘‘[t]he exceptionally high burden for proving a claim of manifest

disregard of the law under § 52-418 (a) (4)’’ is met in

the present case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Connecticut State Employees Assn., SEIU Local

2001, supra, 287 Conn. 280.

The arbitrator’s decision to distribute the home equity

pursuant to Connecticut law was based on two related

determinations, namely, (1) her interpretation and

application of the provisions in the premarital agreement governing the classification of the home as joint

property, and (2) her conclusion that the separation of

property ‘‘matrimonial regime’’ chosen by the parties

did not designate French law to govern the distribution

of joint property. The arbitrator identified a number of

gaps in the premarital agreement that led her to conclude that it did not explicitly designate the law governing the distribution of joint property. The arbitrator

noted that the premarital agreement specifically provided that ‘‘each party’s separate property would remain

the separate property of its owner and belong exclusively to that party in the event of a dissolution of

[the] marriage.’’ The agreement, however, contained

no equally explicit provision for the division of joint

property. Indeed, the only other mention in the premarital agreement of how property would be treated upon

the dissolution of the marriage appeared in a single

paragraph, which provided: ‘‘At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the spouses or their heirs and

representatives shall take back all items for which they

can prove being the owners by title, use, mark or

invoice. All items over which no right of ownership can

be proven shall be deemed to belong automatically and

indivisibly to each one of the spouses, in equal parts.’’

Thus, the premarital agreement provided for the distri-
bution upon divorce of separate property and property

for which no owner could be established but contained

no similar provision regarding joint property.

Finding no explicit directive in the premarital agreement for the distribution of joint property upon divorce,

the arbitrator then queried whether the agreement provided for a choice of law governing the distribution of

joint property. The arbitrator explained: ‘‘The [premarital] agreement does . . . explicitly choose French law

to govern the parties’ relationship during the term of

their marriage. In article I of [that] agreement, the parties ‘designate[d], as the law to be applicable to their

matrimonial regime, the French law,’ and ‘adopt[ed]

as the basis for their union the regime of the separation

of property, as . . . established by [the French Civil

Code].’ . . . During their marriage, the parties were to

manage their property and answer for their own debts

under the French regime of separation. . . . The [premarital] agreement does not, however, include a similar

choice of law provision to govern the parties’ joint property in the event of divorce.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) The arbitrator’s conclusion that the distribution of joint property upon dissolution was not a

subject within the ‘‘matrimonial regime’’ referred to by

the premarital agreement was supported in part by her

finding that, ‘‘[h]istorically, [a French marital contract’s]

purpose was to govern the relationship of the spouses

during their marriage and to make provisions for the

eventuality of death—not the eventuality of divorce.

Only in more recent times have French marital contracts also been used to define the rights of the spouses

in the event of either death or divorce.’’ The uncertainty

of the historical tradition, when combined with the textual ambiguity in the premarital agreement itself, undermines the plaintiff’s claim of manifest error.

The plaintiff claims that the arbitrator improperly

construed the choice of law provision in the premarital

agreement to be inapplicable to the distribution of joint

property upon dissolution of the parties’ marriage.

Essentially, the plaintiff takes issue with the arbitrator’s

interpretation of the meaning and extent of the ‘‘matrimonial regime’’ by which the parties intended to be

governed under the premarital agreement. It is well

established, however, that mere disagreement with the

arbitrator’s interpretation of an agreement falls far short

of establishing a manifest disregard of the law. See

Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn.

103–104 (‘‘[T]he defendant’s claim is predicated largely

on the arbitrators’ interpretation of the agreement and

factual findings . . . . [T]hese issues are beyond the

scope of our review.’’ (Footnote omitted.)); Saturn

Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., supra, 238

Conn. 308 (‘‘[a] party’s mere disagreement with the panel’s interpretation and application of established legal

principles is a far cry from the egregious or patently

irrational misperformance of duty that must be shown
in order to prove a manifest disregard of the law under

§ 52-418 (a) (4)’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The deference owed to the arbitrator’s decision is

not defeated, even if the losing party’s preferred interpretation finds substantial support upon a close analysis

of the controlling legal principles at issue. In other

words, the plaintiff does not satisfy the manifest disregard standard simply by persuading us that the arbitrator misinterpreted the choice of law provision in the

premarital agreement.27 See State v. Connecticut State

Employees Assn., SEIU Local 2001, supra, 287 Conn.

281 (‘‘even if the arbitrator’s decision constitutes a misapplication of the relevant law, we are not at liberty to

set aside an [arbitrator’s] award because of an arguable

difference regarding the meaning or applicability of

laws’’ (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted)); Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 11–12

(‘‘[W]e do not review an arbitrator’s decision merely

for errors of law . . . . Even if the arbitrators were to

have misapplied the [applicable law], such a misconstruction of the law would not demonstrate the arbitrators’ egregious or patently irrational rejection of clearly

controlling legal principles.’’). This deference follows

from our narrowly confined review of arbitration

awards. Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275

Conn. 80. The parties bargained for arbitration and

established the authority of the arbitrator through their

submission. We will not substitute our interpretation

of the premarital agreement for that of the arbitrator.

See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S.

564, 573, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013) (‘‘The

arbitrator did what the parties requested: He provided

an interpretation of the contract resolving [their dispute]. His interpretation went against [the petitioner],

maybe mistakenly so. But still, [the petitioner] does not

get to rerun the matter in a court. . . . [T]he question

for a judge is not whether the arbitrator construed the

parties’ contract correctly, but whether he construed

it at all.’’); State v. New England Health Care Employees

Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, 265 Conn. 771, 780,

830 A.2d 729 (2003) (‘‘[I]t was incumbent upon the arbitrator to interpret the relevant language. Although the

plaintiff and the trial court may disagree with the arbitrator’s ultimate interpretation of that section . . . it

is the arbitrator’s judgment that was bargained for . . .

and we do not substitute our own judgment merely

because our interpretation of the agreement or contract

at issue might differ from that of the arbitrator.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

To meet the applicable standard, the error must be

obvious by reference to explicit and clearly applicable

law. Norwalk Police Union, Local 1727, Council 15,

AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Norwalk, supra, 324 Conn. 629.

The plaintiff’s preferred interpretation in this case may

be correct, but it is not obviously correct based on the

explicit requirements of the premarital agreement or
French law. The ambiguities in the premarital agreement go to the heart of the required distribution of joint

property upon divorce, making the proper distribution

of that property far from obvious. To summarize, the

premarital agreement explicitly provided for the distribution upon divorce of separate property and property

for which ownership could not be established, but it

was conspicuously silent on the distribution of joint

property upon divorce. The premarital agreement

declared that French law governed their ‘‘matrimonial

regime’’ but left the meaning of this critical term undefined. In light of these ambiguities, any error that may

have been made by the arbitrator in distributing the

equity in the marital home did not amount to an ‘‘egregious or patently irrational misperformance of duty’’;

(internal quotation marks omitted) Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., supra, 238 Conn. 308;

that would permit a court to vacate the arbitration

award.

IV

ISSUES RELATED TO CHILD SUPPORT

Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court

improperly vacated the arbitration award on the ground

that the award included issues related to child support

in violation of §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408. See footnotes

6 and 7 of this opinion. Alternatively, the defendant

claims that, even if the trial court correctly concluded

that the award violated §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408, the

portion of the award related to child support was severable from the remainder of the award. The plaintiff

responds that the trial court correctly concluded that

the award violated §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408 and argues

that the portion of the award related to child support

was not severable. We agree with the plaintiff that the

trial court correctly determined that the award violated

§§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408 but conclude that the portion

of the award related to child support was severable

from the remainder of the award.

A number of the provisions in the award directly

concerned the care and support of the parties’ children.28 The award allocated the payment of child care

expenses, health insurance and health expenses for the

children, and the children’s extracurricular expenses,

and required the defendant to maintain life insurance

for the benefit of the children.29 The defendant does

not claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that

these were ‘‘issues related to child support’’ prohibited

under §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408. Instead, the defendant

claims that the inclusion of issues related to child support could be challenged only under the common-law,

public policy grounds for vacating an award and that

the plaintiff waived and should be estopped from challenging the award on those grounds. We are not persuaded.
To address the defendant’s argument, we must determine whether the prohibition on the inclusion of child

support in arbitration awards under §§ 46b-66 (c) and

52-408 is capable of being waived by a party to an

arbitration. ‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment

or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . As

a general rule, both statutory and constitutional rights

and privileges may be waived.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pereira v. State Board

of Education, 304 Conn. 1, 39–40, 37 A.3d 625 (2012).

However, ‘‘only the party who benefits from or is protected by the right may waive that right. . . . Parties

may not waive statutory rights [when] a question of

public policy is involved. Likewise, a law established

for a public reason cannot be waived or circumvented

by a private act or agreement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 40.

As we stated in part I of this opinion, §§ 46b-66 (c)

and 52-408 prohibit the inclusion of issues related to

child support in arbitration awards. On the face of these

statutes, it is clear that the prohibition is not intended

to safeguard the rights of the parties to the arbitration

in a marital dissolution action but to protect the rights

of their nonparty children. ‘‘[T]he fundamental purpose

of child support . . . is to provide for the care and

well-being of minor children . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn.

539, 555, 46 A.3d 112 (2012). Thus, the ‘‘[statutory] duty

on divorced parents to support the minor children of

their marriage . . . creates a corresponding right in

the children to such support.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. By reserving the issue

of child support for determination by the trial court,

which must by law consider the state’s child support

guidelines; Tuckman v. Tuckman, supra, 308 Conn. 205;

the legislature ensured fidelity to these vital interests.

See, e.g., Kirwan v. Kirwan, supra, 185 Conn. App. 733

(‘‘although binding arbitration may be utilized to resolve

many types of issues arising in the course of civil litigation, including in a marital dissolution action, the legislature concluded, as a matter of public policy, that

issues involving custody, visitation, and child support

must be resolved only by a court’’).

In light of these well established purposes behind the

child support statutes, the statutory prohibition on the

arbitration of issues related to child support ‘‘serves

important public and institutional policy objectives that

are independent of, and perhaps even paramount to,

[the plaintiff’s] interest as a party to the litigation.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Santiago v. State, 261 Conn. 533,

543–44, 804 A.2d 801 (2002). The right to a child support

determination that ‘‘provide[s] for the care and wellbeing of minor children’’; (internal quotation marks

omitted) Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, supra, 305 Conn.

555; was not the plaintiff’s to waive. Cf. State v. Banks,
321 Conn. 821, 856, 146 A.3d 1 (2016) (Rogers, C. J.,

concurring) (‘‘I find it extremely doubtful . . . that the

state could waive the [statutory] requirement that [currently incarcerated felons] submit to the taking of a

DNA sample, which serves important public . . . policy objectives’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The

plaintiff did not, and could not, waive the statutory

prohibition against the arbitration of issues related to

child support.

Even so, the portion of the award that included issues

related to child support was severable from the remainder of the award. ‘‘We previously have characterized

the financial orders in dissolution proceedings as

resembling a mosaic, in which all the various financial

components are carefully interwoven with one another.

. . . Accordingly, when an appellate court reverses a

trial court judgment based on an improper alimony,

property distribution, or child support award, the appellate court’s remand typically authorizes the trial court

to reconsider all of the financial orders. . . . We also

have stated, however, that [e]very improper order . . .

does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of

the trial court’s financial orders. A financial order is

severable when it is not in any way interdependent with

other orders and is not improperly based on a factor

that is linked to other factors. . . . In other words, an

order is severable if its impropriety does not place the

correctness of the other orders in question. . . .

Determining whether an order is severable from the

other financial orders in a dissolution case is a highly

fact bound inquiry.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuckman v. Tuckman, supra, 308

Conn. 214. We previously have explained that an invalid

portion of an arbitration award may be severed from the

remainder of the award. See Bodner v. United Services

Automobile Assn., 222 Conn. 480, 489, 610 A.2d 1212

(1992) (‘‘[when] specific questions have been submitted

to the arbitrators, we have held that the portion of the

arbitrators’ award that was entirely outside the submission was void’’); Local 63, Textile Workers Union of

America, C.I.O. v. Cheney Bros., 141 Conn. 606, 619,

109 A.2d 240 (1954) (‘‘when an arbitrator exceeds his

authority, the award is void only to the extent that he

does so, if the part [that] is void can be separated from

the rest without injustice and without affecting the merits of the part of the award [that] is within the submission’’), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959, 75 S. Ct. 449, 99 L.

Ed. 748 (1955), and cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959, 75 S. Ct.

450, 99 L. Ed. 478 (1955); Parmelee v. Allen, 32 Conn.

115, 116 (1864) (‘‘[i]f several distinct matters are submitted [to arbitration], the award as to some of them may

be good while it is void as to the residue’’).

Nothing in the arbitrator’s award indicates that the

orders related to child support are interdependent with

the other financial orders. Indeed, the parties stipulated

to a child support presumptive minimum before entering
arbitration and had this amount entered as a separate

order of the court, as the arbitrator referenced in her

award. We conclude that the portion of the arbitration

award pertaining to child care expenses, child related

health expenses, extracurricular expenses, and the

maintenance of life insurance for the benefit of the

children is severable from the alimony, property division, and other unrelated financial orders in the award.

See Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 390,

999 A.2d 721 (2010) (remanding for reconsideration of

child support orders alone); Maturo v. Maturo, supra,

296 Conn. 125 (same); Kavanah v. Kavanah, 142 Conn.

App. 775, 785, 66 A.3d 922 (2013) (same).

The judgment is reversed insofar as the trial court

granted the plaintiff’s motion to vacate and denied the

defendant’s application to confirm that portion of the

arbitration award relating to the division between the

parties of the equity in the marital home; the judgment is

affirmed insofar as the trial court granted the plaintiff’s

motion to vacate and denied the defendant’s application

to confirm that portion of the arbitration award relating

to child support; the case is remanded with direction

to render judgment (1) granting the plaintiff’s motion

to vacate the arbitration award insofar as it included

orders related to child support but denying the motion

to vacate the award in all other respects, and (2) denying

the application to confirm that portion of the arbitration

award relating to child support but granting the application to confirm the award in all other respects.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

** September 24, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 All references in this opinion to the premarital agreement are to the

certified English translation of the agreement provided by the plaintiff. The

accuracy of this translation is uncontested.

2 The arbitrator determined the total equity in the home to be $531,000.

That factual finding has not been challenged.

3 The arbitrator corrected a scrivener’s error that the plaintiff had identified in her motion.

4 General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district

in which one of the parties resides . . . shall make an order vacating the

award if it finds any of the following defects: . . . (4) if the arbitrators have

exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final

and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’’

5 General Statutes § 52-423 provides: ‘‘An appeal may be taken from an

order confirming, vacating, modifying or correcting an award, or from a

judgment or decree upon an award, as in ordinary civil actions.’’

6 General Statutes § 46b-66 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The provisions

of chapter 909 shall be applicable to any agreement to arbitrate in an action

for dissolution of marriage under this chapter, provided . . . such agreement and an arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall not include issues

related to child support, visitation and custody. An arbitration award in

such action shall be confirmed, modified or vacated in accordance with the

provisions of chapter 909.’’

7 General Statutes § 52-408 provides: ‘‘An agreement in any written contract, or in a separate writing executed by the parties to any written contract,

to settle by arbitration any controversy thereafter arising out of such contract, or out of the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part

thereof, or a written provision in the articles of association or bylaws of
an association or corporation of which both parties are members to arbitrate

any controversy which may arise between them in the future, or an agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit to arbitration any

controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement to submit,

or an agreement in writing between the parties to a marriage to submit to

arbitration any controversy between them with respect to the dissolution

of their marriage, except issues related to child support, visitation and

custody, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, except when there

exists sufficient cause at law or in equity for the avoidance of written

contracts generally.’’

8 We recognize that, in LaFrance, we stated that, ‘‘before chapter 909 can

apply to an agreement to arbitrate between parties to a marriage, it must

meet the requirements set forth in § 46b-66 (c).’’ LaFrance v. Lodmell, supra,

322 Conn. 837. At the same time, however, we stated that §§ 46b-66 (c) and

52-408 must be ‘‘read . . . to operate harmoniously. Indeed, it is important

to note that the relevant provisions within §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408 were

both adopted by the legislature in 2005. See Public Acts 2005, No. 05-258,

§§ 1 and 2.’’ LaFrance v. Lodmell, supra, 838. We therefore construed § 46b66 (c) to provide that, ‘‘if a court finds an agreement to arbitrate fair and

equitable, it will be subject to the provisions of chapter 909. In turn, § 52-

408 includes agreements to arbitrate between parties to a marriage in those

agreements to arbitrate that are governed by chapter 909, subject to the

court’s finding that the agreement to arbitrate is fair and equitable.’’ Id. In

the present case, it is undisputed that the parties’ agreement to arbitrate is

fair and equitable; therefore, pursuant to LaFrance, we conclude that it is

‘‘subject to the provisions of chapter 909.’’ Id.

9 The plaintiff ignores the self-regarding consequences of her own argument. If chapter 909 is inapplicable to the present case, the trial court

necessarily lacked the authority to grant her motion to vacate the arbitration

award under § 52-418.

10 General Statutes § 52-420 (b) provides: ‘‘No motion to vacate, modify

or correct an award may be made after thirty days from the notice of the

award to the party to the arbitration who makes the motion.’’

11 The defendant filed a supplemental memorandum of law in opposition

to the motion to vacate and in support of the application to confirm the

award on August 7, 2018. In this supplemental memorandum of law, the

defendant reiterated his claim that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award and also

argued that there was no basis under § 52-418 (a) (4) to vacate the award.

12 The court and the defendant’s counsel discussed responsive briefing at

the end of the August 10, 2018 hearing:

‘‘The Court: Okay. So . . . you wanted time to file a supplemental memorandum?

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. I believe I could file it this

afternoon. I just wanted to provide the town of Marlborough case—

‘‘The Court: Sure.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: —that I cited for you.

‘‘The Court: Yeah. That’s fine. So it can be next week, whatever works

for you. . . . So, what would be—and what would be the timing that would

work for you?

* * *

‘‘The Court: So, shall we just say by next Friday?

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. I will certainly endeavor

to have it sooner.’’

13 The defendant argues that a motion to vacate is functionally equivalent

to a complaint and, therefore, must state the essential factual allegations

necessary to confer jurisdiction. The analogy is inapt. Unlike the fact pleading requirements for complaints in civil actions; see General Statutes § 52-

91 (‘‘[t]he first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the

complaint and shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause

of action and, on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for the relief,

which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought’’); § 52-420

does not require a movant to file a ‘‘statement of the facts constituting’’ the

basis for the motion. General Statutes § 52-91. We also decline the defendant’s invitation to amend § 52-420 by judicial construction to achieve what

he argues would be a more efficient, economical, and expeditious procedure

for the judicial consideration of arbitration awards.

14 Indeed, the trial court in the present case took care to ensure that the

defendant was not prejudiced by the plaintiff’s belated submission. When

the defendant raised the issue of the plaintiff’s last minute filing, the trial
court offered the defendant a second hearing and an opportunity to file a

responsive brief at a ‘‘[time] that would work for’’ him. Footnote 12 of

this opinion.

15 Alternatively, the defendant argues that, ‘‘[e]ven if the . . . plaintiff’s

reference to § 52-418 (a) (4)’’ in her motion to vacate ‘‘was sufficient to give

the trial court jurisdiction to consider such grounds for vacatur,’’ the trial

court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims that the award (1) impermissibly included issues related to child support, and (2) violated the public

policy favoring the enforcement of premarital agreements. We are not persuaded. Subdivision (4) of § 52-418 (a) provides that an arbitration award

may be vacated ‘‘if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject

matter submitted was not made.’’ This ground for vacatur clearly includes

a claim that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by including in the award

issues related to child support in violation of §§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408. As

for the plaintiff’s claim based on public policy, there is no need for us to

address the jurisdictional issue raised by the defendant because the trial

court did not discuss that claim in its order vacating the award and did not

rely on that ground in granting the plaintiff’s motion to vacate.

16 In Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 612 A.2d 742 (1992), we explained

that, in addition to the statutory grounds set forth in § 52-418, two commonlaw grounds also exist for vacating an arbitration award: (1) ‘‘the award

rules on the constitutionality of a statute,’’ and (2) ‘‘the award violates clear

public policy . . . .’’ Id., 6.

17 See McCaffrey v. United Aircraft Corp., 147 Conn. 139, 142, 157 A.2d

920 (‘‘[a]ction in the courts to compel compliance with the arbitration provisions of the agreement can be taken only by the parties as determined in

the agreement’’), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 854, 80 S. Ct. 1636, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1736

(1960); Colleran v. Cassidento, 27 Conn. App. 386, 394 n.7, 607 A.2d 434

(1992) (‘‘§ 52-418 provides that only a ‘party’ to an arbitration may make an

application to [the] Superior Court to vacate the arbitration award’’).

18 Virtually identical language appears in General Statutes § 52-417, which

provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[a]t any time within one year after an award

has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any

party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court . . .

for an order confirming the award. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) It would make

no sense, of course, to require that a party must be aggrieved by an arbitration

award before moving to confirm the award. We will not construe the very

same language used in § 52-418 to require aggrievement in connection with

a motion to vacate the award.

19 On January 8, 2018, the parties entered into a stipulation pendente lite

providing that (1) the defendant would pay the plaintiff child support in the

amount of $714 per week, and (2) the defendant would pay 73 percent and

the plaintiff would pay 27 percent of the children’s health expenses not

covered by insurance and extracurricular expenses. On August 10, 2018,

the parties entered into an additional stipulation pendente lite that essentially

reaffirmed the provisions of the January 8, 2018 stipulation and required

the defendant to pay all past due support amounts.

20 General Statutes § 46b-84 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon or subsequent to the annulment or dissolution of any marriage or the entry of a

decree of legal separation or divorce, the parents of a minor child of the

marriage, shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities, if

the child is in need of maintenance. . . .’’

21 Section 46b-215a-2c (f) (1) (A) of the Regulations of Connecticut State

Agencies provides: ‘‘An order under this subparagraph shall direct either

parent to name the child as a beneficiary of any medical or dental insurance

or benefit plan carried by or available to such parent at reasonable cost.’’

22 Section 46b-215a-2c (g) (1) of the Regulations of Connecticut State

Agencies provides: ‘‘Subject to section 46b-215a-5c of the Regulations of

Connecticut State Agencies, the noncustodial parent shall be ordered to pay

the custodial parent a child care contribution as part of each child support

award entered under this section. Such contribution shall be for the purpose

of reimbursing the custodial parent for a portion of the child care costs

incurred on behalf of the subject child.’’

23 It was disputed whether the funds received by the plaintiff from her

father were a loan or a gift. The proper characterization does not matter

for present purposes.

24 The plaintiff argued in the trial court that the submission was restricted

but invoked, as she does here, the ‘‘scope of the submission’’ and ‘‘manifest

disregard of the law’’ grounds to vacate under § 52-418 (a) (4), which apply
to unrestricted submissions. The trial court’s order granting the plaintiff’s

motion to vacate the award did not explicitly address whether the submission

was restricted, but, as requested, the trial court invoked § 52-418 (a) (4) in

granting the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award.

25 The arbitration agreement contains a number of perplexing word choices

that create difficulty for the plaintiff’s argument that the parties intended

to require the arbitrator to apply French law to determine how to distribute

the property after classifying it as separate or joint property. First, the

arbitration agreement provides that the arbitrator will be ‘‘guided’’ by the

French Civil Code in certain specified respects. Choice of law provisions

typically do not employ such gentle language but, instead, state unequivocally what law will govern or control. Second, the irregular use of the word

‘‘effectuate’’ in the agreement leads to further ambiguity. The plaintiff argues

that ‘‘effectuating’’ the premarital agreement means carrying out the substantive provisions of that agreement, an interpretation that would have substantial force if it did not fight against the peculiar phrasing of the arbitration

agreement, which provides that the arbitrator ‘‘shall be guided by the French

Civil Code with regard to any claim by the parties that the [a]rbitrator either

vacate their premarital agreement or effectuate their premarital agreement

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The parallel structure employed by the parties

suggests that ‘‘effectuate’’ is intended to mean the opposite of ‘‘vacate,’’ i.e.,

‘‘enforce.’’ This ambiguity leads to a lack of clarity that, in our view, is

never removed: Does the arbitrator effectuate the premarital agreement by

upholding its validity and applying its terms only to ‘‘determine what property

is included within the scope of the premarital agreement pursuant to [the]

French Civil Code,’’ as the defendant argues, or did the parties intend that

the effectuation of the premarital agreement would require the arbitrator

to apply French law in all respects when carrying out the substantive provisions of that agreement? This question points to further confusion sowed

by the provision in the arbitration agreement stating that the arbitrator shall

‘‘determine what property is included within the scope of the premarital

agreement pursuant to [the] French Civil Code . . . .’’ Does this provision

mean, as the defendant argues, that the French Civil Code will be used only

to determine the proper categorization of property as separate or joint, or

does it mean, as the plaintiff argues, that the arbitrator also must apply

French law to the distribution of all property, whether joint or separate,

once a determination is made to effectuate the premarital agreement? The

plaintiff’s construction ultimately may be the better one, but the lack of

clarity makes it virtually impossible to argue that the arbitrator’s efforts to

untangle this knotty language exceeded the scope of the submission.

26 The plaintiff also argues that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the

choice of law provision in the arbitration agreement. As we discussed in

part III B of this opinion, the choice of law provision in the arbitration

agreement was ambiguous and arguably inapplicable to the question of how

to distribute joint property. For this reason, the provision was not ‘‘[welldefined], explicit, and clearly applicable’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)

Norwalk Police Union, Local 1727, Council 15, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Norwalk, supra, 324 Conn. 629; and any misapplication of the provision will

not constitute a manifest disregard of the law. See Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 103–105 (arbitrator’s interpretation of ‘‘patent

ambiguity’’ in contract could not establish manifest disregard of law).

27 Although it is not the case here, a situation could arise in which an

arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract provision constitutes a manifest

disregard of the law. See, e.g., Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,

Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2002) (‘‘[u]nless [the respondent] can show

that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a clearly applicable and explicit

principle of contract construction in reading [the contract], we will not

disturb the arbitrator’s contractual interpretation’’); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys ‘‘R’’ Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 25 (2d Cir. 1997)

(‘‘[w]e will overturn an award [when] the arbitrator merely mak[es] the right

noises—noises of contract interpretation—while ignoring the clear meaning

of contract terms’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 1111, 118 S. Ct. 1042, 140 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1998).

28 We do not suggest that it was the arbitrator’s intention to disregard the

statutes prohibiting the arbitration of issues related to child support. It

appears from the record that the parties actually induced this error, if

inadvertently so. The parties initially desired an unallocated award of alimony and child support and, therefore, requested the arbitrator to include

child support in an unallocated award in a manner that would not violate

§§ 46b-66 (c) and 52-408. To that end, on October 13, 2017, the parties
submitted a stipulation to the court in which they recognized that ‘‘§ 46b66 (c) (2) provides that the arbitrator may not arbitrate child support.’’ The

stipulation also provided that the parties had filed financial affidavits and

calculated the child support presumptive minimum to be $714 per week

paid by the defendant to the plaintiff pursuant to the state’s child support

guidelines. The stipulation further provided: ‘‘The parties agree to this child

support minimum and to submit the balance of the issues (except for child

support) to the arbitrator to include [in] her issuance of orders regarding

the parties’ incomes and an unallocated alimony and child support order

that shall not be less than the child support minimum pursuant to the child

support guidelines referenced herein and in the guidelines attached hereto.’’

In attempting to explain this unusual stipulation to the trial court, the

following colloquy took place:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: This is an agreement that the parties have

reached . . . along with [the arbitrator’s] help because we cannot, under

the statute, arbitrate issues of child support. So, we’ve reached an agreement

in regards to what at least the presumptive minimum of child support is.

We’re asking the court to accept that. This way, [the arbitrator] doesn’t have

to get into that area of inquiry.

* * *

‘‘The Court: You know, I don’t understand this because you’re reserving

the right to go back to square one in the first place.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: We’re going—we’re moving forward on an

unallocated order, Judge. And this allows us to—

‘‘The Court: No, I understand. But you’re reserving the right—you understand what I’m saying? . . .

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Our expectation is that [the arbitrator is] going

to assist [the] parties in making determinations of income [that] ultimately

will be binding on them to be able to plug the income in the child support

guideline calculation. . . .

‘‘The Court: Oh, I see. Because she’s going to do an unallocated order.

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Correct.

* * *

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: [W]e’re trying to eliminate the arbitrator [from

having] anything to do with child support. That’s why we’re providing the

stipulation to the court. . . .

‘‘The Court: I’m not going to debate it with you. I don’t see any real

problem except down the road, maybe. Because it’s an unallocated order,

so [the arbitrator] is ordering child support.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Not necessarily, because she’s going to take the

presumptive minimum that we’re asking the court to . . . order right now.

‘‘The Court: That doesn’t shield her from—protect her from entering an

unallocated order, does it?

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: No, but she’s going to take this child support

order, which we’re asking the court to approve and make an order of the

court, and apply that into her order. So, she herself is not making any child

support determination.

‘‘The Court: Yeah. Oh, so, when she gives the unallocated order of alimony

and child support, it’s known because of your stipulation here that it’s really

an alimony order.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Correct.

* * *

‘‘The Court: Well, for the record, for what it’s worth, the court accepts

the stipulation pendente lite but makes no indication that it will be supported

if it’s appealed. . . .

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: All we need is . . . an order of the court, Your

Honor. That’s all we’re asking for at this point in time.

‘‘The Court: Fine. So ordered.’’

29 The award provided in relevant part: ‘‘17. The plaintiff shall pay 27

percent and the defendant shall pay 73 percent of the minor children’s

health expenses not paid by insurance. Health expenditures shall be broadly

construed to include medical, dental, orthodontics, optical and optometric

and mental health care. All nonemergency, elective care shall be agreed to

in writing in advance. In-network providers shall be used unless the parties

agree otherwise.

‘‘18. The plaintiff shall pay 27 percent and the defendant shall pay 73

percent of qualifying child care necessary for the plaintiff’s employment.

‘‘19. The minor children’s extracurricular expenses that are agreed to in

writing by the parties before they are incurred or committed to shall be

divided 73 percent to be paid by the defendant and 27 percent to be paid
by the plaintiff.

* * *

‘‘27. The defendant shall maintain $600,000 life insurance for the benefit

of the plaintiff to secure his alimony obligation; he may reduce it by onesixth every year commencing January 1, 2019. The defendant shall maintain

$400,000 life insurance for the benefit of the minor children so long as

he has a child support obligation; he may reduce it by $40,000 annually

commencing January 1, 2019. The children or a trust benefitting the children

shall be named the death benefit beneficiary. Inasmuch as no educational

support order is issuing at this time, no life insurance is currently required

of either party to secure the same. . . .’’