In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

____________________ 

No. 22-2014 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

KEITH WHITE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:17CR00135-001 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 12, 2023 — DECIDED APRIL 2, 2024 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE,

Circuit Judges. 

SYKES, Chief Judge. While serving a state sentence at the 

Pendleton Correctional Facility in Indiana, Keith White and 

another inmate ran a heroin-distribution ring inside the 

prison. After three inmates fatally overdosed, the FBI 

launched an investigation, and White and three accomplices 

were indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin. White
2 No. 22-2014 

pleaded guilty; this is his second appeal challenging his 

sentence. 

White’s criminal history includes two Indiana felony 

convictions for cocaine dealing, which raised the statutory 

penalties for his heroin conviction, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(B)(i), and increased his base offense level under the

career-offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, see

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1–.2. In his first appeal, White successfully 

challenged the statutory enhancement under United States v. 

Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020). But Ruth did not affect his 

status as a career offender under the Guidelines. 

At his resentencing hearing, White raised a new objection

to the career-offender guideline based on the Supreme 

Court’s intervening decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 

(2019). As relevant here, the guideline applies when a defendant is convicted of a felony “controlled substance offense” and has two or more prior felony convictions for a 

“controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Under

the version of the Guidelines then in effect, the definition of 

“controlled substance offense” did not address inchoate 

offenses like conspiracy. See id. § 4B1.2(b) (Nov. 1, 2021). But 

the commentary did: Application Note 1 explained that the 

term “controlled substance offense” includes “aiding and 

abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.” Id. cmt. n.1. 

Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Stinson v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), we have repeatedly deferred 

to Application Note 1 as the Sentencing Commission’s 

authoritative interpretation of the career-offender guideline. 

See United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 583–85 (7th Cir. 2021); 

United States v. Adams, 934 F.3d 720, 727–30 (7th Cir. 2019); 
No. 22-2014 3 

United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2012)

(overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 

737, 743 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). Bound by circuit precedent, the district judge rejected White’s argument and again 

applied the career-offender guideline. 

White now asks us to overrule this circuit caselaw and 

remand for resentencing without the career-offender enhancement. Relying on Kisor, he argues that the definition of 

“controlled substance offense” in § 4B1.2(b) is clear on its

face and does not mention inchoate offenses. It follows, he 

says, that Application Note 1 deserves no deference because

the guideline’s text unambiguously excludes inchoate 

offenses. As we noted in Smith, this question has divided the 

circuits, see 989 F.3d at 584, and the disagreement has only 

deepened since then. In Smith we declined to switch sides in 

the circuit split. Id. We do so again here. Kisor did not disturb Stinson or our circuit precedent.1

White argues in the alternative that Application Note 1 is 

invalid under the “major questions doctrine” and the 

Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 

697 (2022). This argument is meritless. The major questions 

doctrine does not apply. We therefore affirm the judgment.

I. Background

In 2014 White was serving a state sentence for cocaine

trafficking at the Pendleton Correctional Facility in Indiana. 

He and fellow inmate Elonzo Williams operated a longrunning drug-trafficking ring inside the prison, distributing 

1 As we explain later in this opinion, the Sentencing Commission 

recently amended § 4B1.2, moving Application Note 1 to the text of the 

guideline. 
4 No. 22-2014 

heroin to other inmates. Williams’s sister Lettie served as the 

courier; she picked up distribution quantities of heroin from 

White’s sources in Chicago and delivered the drugs to Karen 

Jennings, a prison kitchen worker. Jennings smuggled the 

drugs into the prison, and White and Williams distributed 

user quantities to inmates. 

After a series of overdoses—three of them fatal—the FBI 

opened an investigation. Inmates identified White and 

Williams as their heroin sources. Investigators then reviewed recorded phone calls and discovered that White had 

used prison phones to organize the pickup and delivery of 

multiple batches of heroin between 2014 and 2015. 

White and his three accomplices were indicted in 2017 for 

conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Based on his history of drug 

offenses—specifically, his two Indiana convictions for

cocaine dealing—the government filed an information under 

21 U.S.C. § 851, which raised the statutory penalties to a

minimum of 10 years in prison and a maximum of life (up 

from the baseline of 5 to 40 years). See § 841(b)(1)(B)(i). 

White’s case was dormant for more than a year, but he 

eventually pleaded guilty. In addition to the elevated statutory penalties, he faced an enhanced offense level under the 

career-offender guideline based on his prior drug convictions. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1–.2. With a final offense level of 34 

and a criminal history category of VI, his advisory Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months in prison. In 2019 the

district judge imposed a sentence of 12 years—2 years above

the statutory minimum but well below the Guidelines range. 
No. 22-2014 5 

White asked his lawyer to file an appeal, but she did not 

follow through. Based on his lawyer’s error, the judge 

granted White’s motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 

permitted him to file a late appeal. 

In the meantime, we issued our decision in Ruth, which 

held that an Illinois conviction for cocaine dealing is not a 

predicate for enhanced penalties under §§ 841(b)(1) and 851 

because Illinois’s statutory definition of cocaine is categorically broader than the parallel definition under federal law. 

Ruth, 966 F.3d at 646–50. The government conceded that

under Ruth, White’s convictions under Indiana’s cocainetrafficking statute could not support the statutory enhancement under § 841(b)(1)(B). That concession had the effect of 

dropping the statutory penalties to the baseline of 5 to 

40 years, so the parties filed a joint motion to vacate the 

sentence. We granted the motion and remanded for resentencing. 

Ruth did not eliminate White’s designation as a career

offender, but the change in the statutory maximum reduced

his base offense level from 37 to 34, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). 

That, in turn, resulted in a new adjusted offense level of 31. 

Because he remained a career offender, his criminal-history 

category did not change. With the recalculated total offense 

level of 31 and the same criminal-history category of VI, 

White’s new Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months in 

prison.

Back before the district judge, White raised a new objection to the career-offender enhancement based on the 

Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Kisor. To understand his argument requires a brief explanation of how this 

familiar provision works. As its name implies, the guideline
6 No. 22-2014 

applies to recidivists; it raises the base offense level for 

defendants who repeatedly commit certain kinds of felony 

offenses. The guideline applies when (1) the offense of 

conviction is a felony “crime of violence” or “controlled 

substance offense” and (2) the defendant has two or more 

prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense.” Id. § 4B1.1(a). 

Until very recently, the definitions of “crime of violence” 

and “controlled substance offense” in the career-offender 

guideline did not address inchoate offenses like conspiracy. 

Id. § 4B1.2(a)–(b) (Nov. 1, 2021). But the Sentencing Commission explained in the commentary that the terms “crime of 

violence” and “controlled substance offense” include “the 

offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting 

to commit such offenses.” § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. Based on the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38, we have 

long deferred to Application Note 1 as the Sentencing Commission’s authoritative interpretation of the career-offender 

guideline. See Smith, 989 F.3d at 583–85; Adams, 934 F.3d at 

727–30; Raupp, 677 F.3d at 758–59. 

At resentencing White argued that the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in Kisor unsettled our circuit caselaw regarding the validity of Application Note 1. Drawing on Kisor’s 

less deferential approach to agencies’ interpretations of their

own rules, White maintained that because the definition of 

“controlled substance offense” in § 4B1.2(b) does not itself 

mention inchoate offenses, the guideline is clear on its face

and courts may not consider—much less defer to—

Application Note 1. 

Bound by circuit precedent, the judge rejected White’s

argument and once again applied the career-offender Guide-
No. 22-2014 7 

line. But she also determined that its effect on White’s guidelines range may have overstated his culpability. For that 

reason and several others, she imposed a below-Guidelines 

sentence of 10 years.

II. Discussion

On appeal White challenges his career-offender designation on two grounds, both centering on the validity of Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. (The Sentencing Commission 

recently amended § 4B1.2; we refer here to the November 1, 

2021 version of the Guidelines.) White’s main argument 

reiterates his contention that Kisor’s modification of agency 

deference implicates Stinson and unsettles our circuit 

caselaw deferring to Application Note 1. In the alternative, 

he argues that the application note is invalid under the 

“major questions doctrine” and the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697. 

A. Kisor and Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 

Until recently, § 4B1.2—which defines the terms “crime 

of violence” and “controlled substance offense” as used in

the career-offender guideline—was silent on whether convictions for inchoate offenses count as career-offender predicates. Instead, the Sentencing Commission addressed the 

subject of inchoate offenses in the commentary. In Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2, the Commission instructed sentencing 

courts that the terms “‘[c]rime of violence’ and ‘controlled 

substance offense’ include the offenses of aiding and abetting, 

conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.” 

§ 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 

Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Stinson, the 

Commission’s commentary interpreting or explaining a 
8 No. 22-2014 

guideline is authoritative and entitled to controlling weight 

“unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 

inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that 

guideline.” 508 U.S. at 38. Applying Stinson, we have repeatedly given Application Note 1 controlling weight as an 

authoritative interpretation of the term “controlled substance offense” in § 4B1.2. Smith, 989 F.3d at 585; see also 

Adams, 934 F.3d at 729 (finding no conflict between the 

“application note’s inclusion of conspiracy” and the “text of 

the Guideline itself”); Raupp, 677 F.3d at 759. Most other 

circuits agreed.

In Smith—the most recent in this line of cases— we 

acknowledged a newly emerging circuit split on the validity 

of Application Note 1 but declined an invitation to change 

our position. 989 F.3d at 584–85. The disagreement among 

the circuits has widened since Smith as more courts of 

appeals have reconsidered their Stinson-based precedents 

deferring to Application Note 1. Some of these shifts were 

occasioned by the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Kisor; 

others slightly predated it.

Here’s the current lineup: Six circuits have held that Application Note 1 impermissibly expands § 4B1.2’s definition 

of “controlled substance offense.” See United States v. Castillo, 

69 F.4th 648 (9th Cir. 2023); United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 

1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc); United States v. Campbell, 

22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 

144 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 

142 S. Ct. 56 (2021) (mem.)); United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 

382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. 

Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
No. 22-2014 9 

Six circuits (including ours) have declined to reconsider 

circuit precedent deferring to Application Note 1. See United 

States v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673, 689–90 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) 

(holding that Stinson governs and “requires us to defer” to 

Application Note 1); United States v. Maloid, 71 F.4th 795, 805

(10th Cir. 2023) (affirming precedent upholding the validity 

of Application Note 1’s inclusion of conspiracy in the definition of “crime of violence”); Smith, 989 F.3d at 585 (noting the 

emerging circuit split but adhering to circuit precedent, 

seeing “no reason here to diverge from it”); United States v. 

Jefferson, 975 F.3d 700, 708 (8th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging 

Winstead and Havis but adhering to circuit precedent holding

Application Note 1 valid); United States v. Lewis, 963 F.3d 16, 

18, 25 (1st Cir. 2020) (adhering to circuit precedent finding

Application Note 1 “authoritative” while acknowledging the 

“question is close”); United States v. Richardson, 958 F.3d 151, 

154 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Application Note 1 is not ‘inconsistent 

with, or a plainly erroneous reading of[,]’ § 4B1.2.” (quoting 

Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38)). 

We require a compelling reason to overrule circuit precedent. Campbell v. Kallas, 936 F.3d 536, 544 (7th Cir. 2019).

White urges us to change course based on the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which clarified the deference owed to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations under the rule of Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 

325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945). 

In Kisor the Court considered whether to overrule Seminole Rock and “discard[] the deference” it “give[s] to agencies.”2 139 S. Ct. at 2408. The Court declined to do so but 

2 The deference doctrine announced in Seminole Rock is also referred to as

“Auer deference.” See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). The Supreme 
10 No. 22-2014 

“reinforce[d]” Seminole Rock’s limitations. Id. Specifically, the 

Court held that courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation only in cases of “genuine ambiguity” 

after first “exhaust[ing] all the traditional tools of construction.” Id. at 2415 (quotation marks omitted). If a regulation is 

genuinely ambiguous, the court should defer to the agency’s 

interpretation only if it is reasonable—that is, only if the 

interpretation “come[s] within the zone of ambiguity the 

court has identified.” Id. at 2415–16. Finally, the court must 

determine “whether the character and context of the agency 

interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.” Id. at 2416. 

Kisor identified some factors that inform this last step in the 

restated deference formula. First, the interpretation “must be 

the agency’s authoritative or official position” rather than an 

“ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s views.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted). Second, the interpretation “must 

in some way implicate [the agency’s] substantive expertise.” 

Id. at 2417. And third, the agency’s reading “must reflect fair 

and considered judgment.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

It’s fair to say that Kisor’s refinement of Seminole Rock reduced the level of deference owed to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. But Kisor’s effect on Stinson is

unclear. Stinson borrowed from Seminole Rock because the 

Court viewed the Guidelines commentary as in some respects “akin to an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rules.” 508 U.S. at 45. But the Court also cautioned that

“the analogy is not precise.” Id. at 44. The Sentencing Commission is not an executive agency; it is an independent 

commission within the judicial branch. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). 

Court discussed Auer and Seminole Rock interchangeably in Kisor, so the 

terminology makes no difference here. 
No. 22-2014 11 

And its statutory charge is unique in ways that affect the 

deference calculus. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44–45; Vargas,

74 F.4th at 682–83; Maloid, 71 F.4th at 806–07. 

Perhaps most importantly, the Court said nothing in Kisor 

to suggest that it was altering Stinson. Indeed, Stinson is cited 

only in a footnote along with 16 other cases as examples of 

“decisions applying Seminole Rock deference.” Kisor, 

139 S. Ct. at 2411 n.3. Because Kisor did not address Stinson 

in any meaningful way, we do not see a compelling reason to 

reconsider our circuit precedent treating Application Note 1 

as authoritative gloss on the career-offender guideline. 

Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed us to resist invitations to find its decisions overruled by implication. 

Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 143 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 (2023). Kisor 

did not purport to modify Stinson (much less overrule it). 

That’s reason enough for us to stay the course. When a 

Supreme Court decision is directly controlling, our job is to 

follow it, “leaving to th[e] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). That’s 

true even if “intervening decisions have eroded [its] foundation.” Price v. City of Chicago, 915 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 

2019). 

The disagreement among the circuits—now quite entrenched—is another reason not to change positions. Unless 

our circuit is an outlier, “it makes little sense for us to jump

from one side of the circuit split to the other.” A.C. by M.C. v. 

Metro. Sch. Dist. of Martinsville, 75 F.4th 760, 771 (7th Cir.

2023). As we explained in another case asking us to switch 

sides in a pronounced circuit split: 
12 No. 22-2014 

Precedents are not sacrosanct; we have overruled many. But when the issue is closely balanced (the 5 to 4 division among the circuits 

reveals at least that much), there is less reason 

to think that a shift will undo rather than create 

an error. ... When one circuit’s overruling 

would convert a 5–4 conflict into a 4–5 conflict, 

it is best to leave well enough alone.

Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561, 565–66 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(en banc).

Because Kisor did not unsettle Stinson, we decline to reconsider our circuit caselaw deferring to Application Note 1. 

B. “Major Questions Doctrine”

Alternatively, White invokes the “major questions doctrine” and the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia, 

arguing that the Sentencing Commission lacked clear congressional authorization to include inchoate offenses as 

career-offender predicates.3 This argument requires only 

brief treatment: the major questions doctrine does not apply

here. 

3 White did not raise this argument below. His failure to do so is in a 

sense understandable because the Supreme Court’s decision in West 

Virginia was issued about a month after his resentencing hearing. On the 

other hand, the major questions doctrine is not new, so he could have 

raised an argument along these lines at his resentencing hearing—or at 

his initial sentencing in 2019, for that matter. But the government has not 

raised waiver or forfeiture, choosing instead to address the argument on 

the merits. See United States v. Stapleton, 56 F.4th 532, 541 (7th Cir. 2022) 

(explaining that a party can “waive waiver” by failing to assert it).
No. 22-2014 13 

The doctrine derives from the basic principle that statutory texts “must be read in their context and with a view to 

their place in the overall statutory scheme.” West Virginia, 

597 U.S. at 721 (quotation marks omitted). When a statute 

“confers authority upon an administrative agency,” the 

judiciary’s interpretive task “must be ‘shaped, at least in 

some measure, by the nature of the question presented’—

whether Congress in fact meant to confer the power the 

agency has asserted.” Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). In the “ordinary 

case,” the question of the scope of the agency’s authority 

“has no great effect on the appropriate analysis.” Id. But in 

certain “extraordinary cases,” a “different approach” may 

apply. Id.

When does a case qualify as extraordinary enough to 

bring the major questions doctrine into play? The Court 

explained in West Virginia: the doctrine applies when an 

agency has adopted a regulatory scheme of great economic 

and political significance, and the “history and the breadth” 

of its assertion of authority “provide a reason to hesitate 

before concluding that Congress meant to confer such 

authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In this 

limited category of cases, the government must “point to 

clear congressional authorization” to justify the agency’s 

power “to regulate in that manner.” Id. at 732 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Though the precise contours of the doctrine remain hazy, 

see Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2376 (2023) (Barrett, J., 

concurring), White’s case plainly lacks the hallmarks of the 

truly extraordinary cases that have triggered it. West Virginia, 

597 U.S. at 721–23. Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 can hardly 
14 No. 22-2014 

be characterized as a “transformative expansion” of the 

Sentencing Commission’s statutory authority. Id. at 724. The 

Commission has not “claim[ed] to discover in a long-extant 

statute an unheralded power” to regulate in an unprecedented way. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Nor has the 

Commission attempted to use vague language in the governing statute to “adopt a regulatory program that Congress 

ha[s] conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself.” 

Id.

On the contrary, the Sentencing Reform Act specifically 

authorizes the Commission to make decisions like this one 

concerning sentencing policy. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (empowering the Commission to “establish sentencing policies 

and practices for the Federal criminal justice system”); see 

also id. § 994(a)–(b) (empowering the Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines and “general policy statements 

regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect 

of sentencing or sentence implementation”). The Act gives 

the Commission “significant discretion in formulating 

guidelines,” “assess[ing] the relative weight of [certain] 

offender characteristics,” and “exercis[ing] its judgment 

about which types of crimes and which types of criminals 

are to be considered similar for the purposes of sentencing.” 

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 377–78 (1989). And the 

Commission has addressed the issue of inchoate offenses in 

the commentary to the career-offender guideline ever since it 

promulgated the first Guidelines Manual in 1987. See 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.2 (1987) (explaining that the definition of “controlled substance offense” in the career-offender 

guideline “includes aiding and abetting, conspiring, or 

attempting to commit such offenses”).
No. 22-2014 15 

Indeed, we held 30 years ago that the Commission’s 

broad statutory power to promulgate sentencing guidelines 

includes the authority to issue commentary treating inchoate 

offenses as career-offender predicates. United States v. 

Damerville, 27 F.3d 254, 256–57 (7th Cir. 1994). Though the 

issue was not framed in terms of the present-day major 

questions doctrine, Damerville forecloses White’s argument.

* * *

Before closing, we note that the Sentencing Commission 

recently addressed the circuit split regarding Application 

Note 1. The Commission amended § 4B1.2 to add inchoate 

offenses to the definitions of “crime of violence” and “controlled substance offense,” moving the text of Application 

Note 1 to the guideline itself. The amendment became

effective on November 1, 2023. 

AFFIRMED