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TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC DECLINE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 13, 2016

Serial No. 114–196

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Henri J. Barkey, Ph.D., director, Middle East Program, The Wilson Center .... 6

Fevzi Bilgin, Ph.D., president, Rethink Institute ................................................. 13

Mr. Alan Makovsky, senior fellow, Center for American Progress ...................... 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Henri J. Barkey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 8

Fevzi Bilgin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 15

Mr. Alan Makovsky: Prepared statement .............................................................. 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats: Material submitted for the record ...................................... 58

(1)

TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC DECLINE 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:54 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call the subcommittee to order. This is our 

second subcommittee event of 2016 focused on the development of 

the situation in Turkey. And as we continue to watch with concern, 

I have titled today’s hearing, ‘‘Turkey’s Democratic Decline.’’

Let me say from the offset that our comments, and even our criticisms, of the Turkish Government are predicated on a deep respect 

for Turkey and the Turkish people. Turkey and America have been 

and are friends. Friends speak plainly to one another about problems. That is what you will hear today. 

I would like to take this opportunity to extend my condolences 

to the families of all the victims of last month’s terrorist attack at 

Istanbul’s airport. It was a cowardly attack by radical Muslim extremists. And traveling through that region, I was able to personally pay a tribute to the victims of this horrendous massacre just 

a few days after the tragic event had occurred. 

Our expressions reflected those of sorrow, expressed and reflected those of the American people. Turkish victims are no different than American victims. These people have been murdered in 

recent months and recent years by radical extremists, represent an 

evil force on this planet that must be defeated and destroyed. And 

both of our countries, Turkey and the United States, will be a safer 

people and place when that happens. 

Those of you who have observed this subcommittee know, that 

while wishing the best for Turkey, we have concerns about actions 

taken by President Erdogan that may put his people at risk and 

weaken the strong ties between our countries. Our hope for a better situation and things would turn around has not happened, and 

we have been disappointed. And there is a mounting body of evidence suggesting that President Erdogan’s party and his regime 

seems to be involved with corruption and misrule that is taking 

Turkey in exactly the wrong direction. 

President Erdogan’s party has used the levers of power to limit 

dissent and to crack down on free journalism. Thousands of judges 

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nations. And immunity from parliamentarians have been lifted, 

opening the way for charges to be used against them in order to 

sideline opposition, especially those in the HDP. 

Seemingly erratic, Erdogan has officially designated the followers 

of Mr. Gulen as a terrorist group, and this group was once, of 

course, a lynchpin of his political coalition. So he has gone from a 

relationship with a group that has been very important to his success to now declaring them as enemies and declaring them the enemies of his country. They helped bring him to power and now he 

has targeted them for repression. 

These kind of steps have taken Turkey further away from the 

shared values at the heart of our American-Turkish alliance. While 

a representative from the Committee to Protect Journalists couldn’t 

be here today in person, they did send a written statement, and I 

will be submitting the entire statement for the record. But I wanted to read a short excerpt from it now. 

The Committee to Protect Journalists reports that over the past 

2 years the Turkish Government, and I quote,

‘‘Increased its repressive action against the press through 

using vague, broadly worded antiterrorist laws, bringing 

charges under an archaic law that carries jail terms for insulting the President, replacing the editorial management of opposition media outlets and firing their staff, routinely imposing 

bans on the reporting of sensitive stories, and prosecuting and 

imprisoning journalists on antistate charges in retaliation for 

their work.’’

That is, indeed, a sad description for the state of free media in 

Turkey. It is a sad description of how Turkey has changed in these 

last 5 years and has gone in the wrong direction. While I have always strived to maintain a balanced perspective, it is clear to me 

that Erdogan’s actions have hobbled Turkey’s democracy at home 

and left his country more isolated in the region than at any other 

time in recent memory. 

I have many questions for our witnesses today, but I especially 

look forward to their views on the recent rapprochement between 

Turkey, Russia, and Israel. While such developments are, of course, 

welcome, I can’t help but wonder if this is merely a momentary 

change of attitude or something more durable. We can get into that 

during the testimony. 

With that said, I thank our witnesses. And without objection, all 

members will have at least until the end of this week to submit additional written questions for extraneous material for the record. 

I now turn to Mr. Meeks, the ranking member, to have whatever 

opening statement he would like. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher. And thank you 

for your remarks and organizing today’s subcommittee hearing on 

the political trends in Turkey. 

As we all know, and as, I guess, clearly indicated even by the 

number of individuals that is in this room, Turkey is our important 

ally in an increasingly complex region. And, you know, I am grateful, especially grateful for the opportunity to take a look at Turkey 

again and again and again because that is how important our relationship is with Turkey. 

3

You know, when I first came into Congress, I looked at the number of countries around and the various regions, Turkey is truly an 

important ally and a country that I think that we have got to work 

with. And when you have friends, you should be able to talk honest 

and open with your friends. You know, it reminds me of some of 

the dialogue that we have here in the United States currently that 

is going on around our country and the talk is let’s have a dialogue, 

and dialogue at times has to be frank. 

So when we look at some of the trends in Turkey, we see that 

some remain the same since our last hearing. Domestically President Erdogan continues to enjoy strong support but has not veered 

from his push toward the presidential system. The domestic conflict 

with the Kurds has not abated and is closely linked with the conflict in Syria. And as a result of the Syrian war, the refugee crisis 

in agreement with the EU has also remained a source of strain. 

On the other hand, there have been some other changes, some 

significant. A Prime Minister resigned in May. Terror attacks have 

struck the cord of fear, detracting tourists from visiting Turkey and 

further crippling their economy. These attacks test our resolve, our 

common values in an open society, and tip the balance between liberty and security. 

On the international front, Turkey and Israel recently signed a 

broad agreement to restore ties after a 6-year break, a step that 

I say that I welcome. Furthermore, Turkey’s looking to restore relations with Russia, reopening a needed source of tourism. And yesterday, Prime Minister Yildilrum announced efforts to seek normalization with Syria, possibly presenting new opportunities for peace 

building and cooperation. 

Yet, where does that leave Turkish-U.S. and Turkish-NATO relations? And what can we do in Congress to make sure Turkey remains an ally and a friend and a trusted partner in the region? I 

believe it begins and ends with our commitment to our common 

principles and shared interests, and that brings us back to the 

democratic space in Turkey. 

We, in Congress, are indeed concerned with democratic progress 

in Turkey. I inquire about its state, as a concerned friend, as I 

said. I want to make sure—it is imperative to discuss the recent 

crackdown on the freedom of speech in Turkish universities and in 

the press. Tolerance in the face of domestic criticism is difficult, 

and regional events further complicate the situation. 

But nevertheless, we must fully defend the fight for academic 

freedom, for freedom of the press, and for the right of individuals 

to critique their governments, as difficult as that may be to hear. 

I say that here in the United States for the people of the United 

States, and I say that there for the people of Turkey, that they 

must have the freedom to express themselves. 

As we all know too well here in America, suppressing these 

voices only leads to an erosion of democracy, a hollowing out of society, and even an eruption of conflict. And as violence spreads 

across southeastern Turkey and into beautiful Istanbul, we are reminded of the delicate balance between security and liberty. Tragically, these are not isolated incidents. They serve to highlight the 

need for a path to peace in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. 

4

So I too want, as the chairman indicated, send my condolences 

out to those who suffered losses at the recent attacks at the Turkish airport. We all looked with harrowing eyes as terror attacks 

took place there, and we wish and hope that the families—I know 

that they are undergoing tremendous loss and pain, and our prayers go up to them and their families. 

So I think that, Mr. Chairman, as I yield back to you, I hope that 

this hearing helps us to understand and bring a peace that is closer 

to our reality and help strengthen our relationship while we have 

some frank conversation and dialogue. I look forward to listening 

to the witnesses, because your testimony is important to me understanding and learning, and I think that, you know, those who are 

listening to this hearing, so that we can get information out, we 

can share and work together. 

Because the idea here is, when we have to be critical, let’s be 

critical. But it is not just for the sake of being critical; it is for the 

sake of trying to make sure that we are all going to have a better 

tomorrow and better relationships between our countries and we 

can only do that with honest dialogue. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well said. 

Mr. Trott, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. TROTT. I would like to thank the chairman and ranking 

member for holding this timely and important hearing. 

I would also like to thank the witnesses for taking time to be 

here today. 

It seems like every time we try and hold Turkey accountable for 

their actions, their response is, but we are a NATO ally. Turkey 

certainly remains one of our allies, but that does not make them 

immune to honest and fair criticism. Turkey’s insouciance to democracy and human rights under President Erdogan is disturbing. 

Just a couple days ago, Human Rights Watch reported that the 

Turkish Government is blocking independent investigations into alleged mass abuses against civilians across southeast Turkey. These 

abuses include heinous crimes like unlawful killings of civilians 

and mass force civilian displacement. 

I also remain concerned about the seizing of various Armenian 

churches in Turkey, including Surp Giragos in April. This is reminiscent of the events that led to the Armenian genocide over 100 

years ago. And while I am discussing the genocide, I would like to 

applaud the German Parliament for overwhelmingly adopting a 

resolution calling the coordinated campaign to exterminate the Armenians in 1915 a genocide. 

All of us on this panel are lucky to be able to express our ideas 

freely and without fear of repercussions. Ordinary citizens and 

journalists in Turkey, however, do not have this privilege. Turkey 

remains one of the worst countries in the world when it comes to 

freedom of the press, and we got to see that firsthand in April 

when the President came to Brookings and his security repeatedly 

harassed, assaulted, and even reportedly tried to throw out media 

that they did not like. 

If this is how Erdogan’s police act in Washington, one can only 

imagine how they act in Turkey. Mr. Chairman, Turkey’s progress 

toward democracy is on a downward spiral. They are a country facVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:48 Sep 01, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\071316\20746 SHIRL
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ing a myriad of issues, both domestically and internationally. Continuing down this disturbing path, when they are denying history, 

expropriating land, and severely restricting freedom of the speech, 

is not the answer. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Gabbard, do you have an opening statement? 

Let me just note that tomorrow I will be submitting a Sense of 

the House resolution based on today’s testimony and some of the 

statements that you have heard in working with my colleagues, a 

Sense of the House resolution expressing concern about the direction of various societal trends and governmental trends in Turkey. 

And so today, I would invite my colleagues to, at the end of this 

hearing, work with me on developing that particular Sense of the 

House resolution. 

Now with that said, I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. We have three distinguished witnesses. Dr. Henri 

Barkey was the director of Middle East Program at the Woodrow 

Wilson Center here in Washington. Formally, he was a professor 

at Lehigh—is it Lehigh?—Lehigh University and authored several 

books on Turkey and Kurdish issues and served as a member of 

the State Department’s policy planning staff. 

We have Dr.—I am really bad at names—Fevzi? 

Mr. BILGIN. Fevzi. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And——

Mr. BILGIN. Fevzi Bilgin. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There it is, okay. And is the founding president of Rethink Institute, a Washington-based think tank. He is an 

expert in the areas of constitutional and Turkish politics. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Pittsburgh and has taught politics in both the United States and Turkey in addition to being a published author. 

And Alan Makovsky, I remember you. Makovsky, I have known 

that name before. There you go. A senior fellow at the Center for 

American Progress, a private think tank in Washington, DC. And 

from 2001 to 2013, he served as the senior professional member of 

staff here in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. We were just 

reflecting on how neither one of us have changed over those 20 

years. He helped us cover the Middle East and Turkey when he 

worked before us, and today he is here to, again, give us advice and 

some direction as to what our policies should be toward this situation now in Turkey. 

Before, of course, he did all this, he directed the Washington’s Institute’s Turkish research program and was an employee of the 

State Department. 

So we have three expert witnesses. And, Dr. Barkey, I would 

suggest we start with you. And I would request that, if we could, 

keep it down to about 5 minutes. All the rest of your statement will 

be part of the record for people to read, and if you could keep it 

down to the 5 minutes, we then could have a dialogue once all the 

witnesses have testified. 

Dr. Barkey. 

6

STATEMENT OF HENRI J. BARKEY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MIDDLE 

EAST PROGRAM, THE WILSON CENTER 

Mr. BARKEY. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to testify today, and I ask that my written testimony be admitted into 

the record, please. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection. 

Mr. BARKEY. There is no question that when it comes to issues 

of free speech, due process, individual and civil rights, the situation 

in Turkey, has deteriorated significantly over the last 3 years. The 

atmosphere created by the ruling justice and development party 

and President Erdogan is not conducive to free discussion of ideas, 

policies, and politics. 

What I will try and do is give you essentially in bullet points 

what has happened and then try to offer you an explanation. First 

of all, you have all already alluded to the press. The press is under 

a tremendous pressure. It is a twofold sets of pressures: One is that 

you see journalists being fired, newspapers being closed, taken 

over, same thing happening to television stations, as well as social 

media. That is one aspect of it. 

The other aspect is that there is also simultaneously an attempt 

to build a parallel, if you want, press that is completely subservient 

to the President and the party. And it is essentially, when you look 

at that press on a daily basis, as I do, all you see is essentially the 

legal education of official propaganda, if you want, but most importantly, what you see is that there is no room for any discussion of 

any opposing ideas in that place. 

So the press is under enormous pressure, and it is not surprising 

that Freedom House has downgraded Turkey’s status from partially free to not free, which is actually quite damning for a country 

that is a member of the NATO alliance. 

But the press is not the only one, and this is important to understand. Every institution of civil society in the State is also under 

attack with an effort to dominate. It is true for business associations. It is true for academia. Thirty-seven academics have been 

fired so far. But I know a lot of friends of mine who are under investigation, and more will be fired as time goes by, eventually to 

be replaced with people who are more conducive to the official position. 

Similarly, the judiciary is being revamped and to make it much 

closer to the government. Even individuals are not immune; 1,845 

individuals have been charged for insulting the President, some of 

the penalties are dire. So far nobody has gone to jail. And even 

former allies of Mr. Erdogan are under the same oppression. 

So why is this change? I mean, the interesting thing is that Mr. 

Erdogan and his party came to power, and in a paradoxical way 

it was the biggest and most important opening of the Turkish political system ever, since 1923, I would say. They came out against 

the military, they came out against traditional ruling elites, and for 

a while they ruled in that way. 

But they changed. They changed, I would argue, for two reasons: 

One is Mr. Erdogan has won victory after victory and he thinks he 

is invincible, but most importantly, he actually does feel vulnerable. He feels vulnerable because Turkish civil society is still quite 

7

dynamic, can resist, can disagree, and, as we saw in elections in 

2015, actually defeat Mr. Erdogan. But Mr. Erdogan is the President not the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has all the legal 

powers that the constitution gives, so he feels vulnerable in the 

Presidential powers, so to say. 

But fundamentally, I would argue, the real reason for the change 

is Mr. Erdogan’s decision to not make peace with the Kurdish—the 

PKK and with the Kurds. In fact, he was making enormous 

progress in that direction, commendable progress. And he 

scuppered the peace negotiations after his own people had signed 

the document. And the reason he did it—and this also—we won’t 

have time for this—but explains the changes in foreign policy. The 

reason he did it is because of the threat it perceives from the Syrian Kurds, in Syria, as the Syrian Kurds, who have aligned themselves with the United States, make progress and move against 

ISIS. 

In the process, what he is afraid of is that a Syrian Kurdish entity that is closely aligned with the Turkish Kurds will emerge and 

therefore pose a strategic threat to Turkey. And he decided—this 

is the reason why he decided to essentially go on that rampage 

against the press, against the Kurds. 

And in some ways, it also explains the changes that you see 

today in foreign policy because, as he finds himself isolated, he is 

trying to reconfigure his friendships, or so he thinks, with the idea 

that he will come up with a common, shall we say, cause against 

the Kurds. 

And I will stop here. The red light has gone on. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barkey follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Bilgin. 

STATEMENT OF FEVZI BILGIN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, RETHINK 

INSTITUTE 

Mr. BILGIN. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, 

and the members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify before you today on Turkey’s democratic decline. And I 

ask that my full written testimony be admitted into the record. 

It is fair to say that all the major political developments in Turkey in the last 5 years can be attributed to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 

presidential aspirations. A de facto Turkish-style presidential system is already in place, where Erdogan appoints and dismisses 

Prime Ministers, shapes the cabinet, packs the court in bureaucracy with sworn loyalists. 

The final step is to make a constitutional amendment that will 

set the new regime in stone. Freedom of speech and freedom of 

press is under fire. Thousands of journalists were already fired 

since 2013. There is no mainstream media left, only a few daring 

but small outlets for dissent. Independent media outlets are seized 

or censured, and social media is routinely blocked. 

An important casualty of the Erdogan’s political aspirations and 

Turkey’s democratic decline is the community known as the Gulen 

or Hizmet movement. The government has targeted the movement 

especially since the outbreak of the corruption scandal in Turkey 

in December 2013. 

According to Erdogan and his lieutenants, the corruption allegations brought forward were, in fact, an insidious attempt to topple 

the AKP government. They claim that this was orchestrated by 

Gulen movement affiliates nested in the judiciary and police forces. 

The Gulen movement on the other hand has vehemently denied 

these allegations, calling them baseless accusations serving to 

cover up the corruption. 

The movement essentially is a faith-based network of individuals, organizations, institutions, inspired by the ideas of TurkishIslamic scholar Fethullah Gulen, who is now residing in the United 

States. It subscribes to a moderate, Sufi version of Islam, along 

with emphasis on interfaith dialogue. 

In Turkey, the movement established private high schools in 

every town, mostly which became nationally ranked institutions. 

Graduates of these schools moved onto both the public and private 

sectors, many joined the government bureaucracy. The movement 

also launched influential media outlets in Turkey. The network 

showed noticeable efficiency, dynamism, defying the traditionally 

introverted and subdued culture of Turkish conservatism. 

However, the movement quickly overreached itself in Turkey. 

The sheer size of the network exposed it to the ill intentions of 

those who sought influence and leverage. A penchant for high politics in some circles seemingly undermined the message of tolerance 

and inclusion that characterizes the larger movement. 

The media affiliated with the movement, on the other hand, 

while promoting democratization, demilitarization of politics, and 

EU membership, alienated the foes of the AKP government, which 

in better days was pursuing those very same objectives. The reputation of the movement media was also tainted when they underVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:48 Sep 01, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\071316\20746 SHIRL
14

emphasized the irregularities and misconduct during the coup 

trials several years ago of military officers, journalists, and academics. 

The movement in Turkey now faces blanket persecution. According to the news, state news agency, as of July 2016, more than 

4,000 individuals have been detained and about 1,000 have been 

sent to jail. The detainees are from all walks of life and include 

businessmen, doctors, teachers, journalists, academics, philanthropists, and even housewives. In addition, the government is taking over privatized schools and colleges, and charity organizations 

that were established by the movement participants. 

Businesses that have financially supported those initiatives are 

seized on a daily basis. Many have had to flee the country to avoid 

detention. The remaining hundreds of thousands of individuals 

that are ordinary citizens dedicated to education, charity, and service, and unrelated to the so-called political struggle are awaiting 

their fate. The movement-affiliated media has been subjected to a 

violent and illegal takeover, including the highly circulated 

‘‘Zaman’’ and ‘‘Bugun’’ newspapers, and several TV stations, resulting in the firing of thousands. 

As an annual report published by the U.S. Department of State 

attests, Turkish courts have been going through political pressure 

in the last few years. As a result, people in the movement, as well 

as other dissidents, will not have a chance to stand a fair trial, despite very serious accusations leveled against them. 

Human Rights Watch stated that the persecutions for membership of an alleged Fethullah Gulen terrorist organization are ongoing, although there is no evidence to date that the Gulen movement 

has engaged in violence or other activities that could reasonably be 

described as terrorism. But the lack of evidence of criminal activity 

did not prevent the government from designating the movement as 

a terrorist organization. This move allows the government to implement harsher antiterrorism laws for Gulen movement cases. 

The Turkish Government also continues to harass the movement 

outside Turkey. The foreign governments are pressured to shut 

down schools and other institutions affiliated with the movement 

in their countries. The Turkish Government has long sought 

Gulen’s extradition to Turkey from the United States. Thus, they 

launched a litigation campaign against the movements affiliates in 

the United States, and most recently, a U.S. Federal judge dismissed such a lawsuit in Pennsylvania. 

And thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilgin follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are next. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALAN MAKOVSKY, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor for me to testify before you today. As you 

said in your introduction, I worked here for 12 years as a staffer, 

from 2001 to 2013. And knowing the——

Mr. MEEKS. Is your mike on? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Oh, I am sorry. Now it is. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You should have known that more than anybody. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I have never been on this side of the table before, sir. I was always a quiet staffer in the background. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go ahead Alan. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Anyway, I just wanted to say that as a former 

staffer and knowing the great importance accorded hearings such 

as these, I am deeply privileged to have been invited to testify and 

I thank you. 

I respectfully request that my written testimony, as submitted, 

be entered into the record. 

And I would like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in the condolences 

you offered to the Turkish people on the June 28 attack on the 

Ataturk Airport. 

The title of this hearing, ‘‘Turkey’s Democratic Decline,’’ sets out 

the problem: Turkey’s democracy, never as good as it should have 

been, is indeed rapidly deteriorating. On virtually every front, 

media, judiciary, political governance, Kurdish rights, private business, universities, as my colleagues here have all detailed, freedom 

is diminishing and power is being concentrated in President 

Erdogan’s hands. Arguably not since the death of Turkey’s founder, 

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and certainly not since the advent of free 

elections in Turkey in 1950, has one man held so much power in 

the Turkish system. 

President Erdogan’s primary focus, perhaps more correctly his 

obsession these days, is to formalize a Presidency-based system in 

Turkey in place of the longstanding parliamentary system. His second and third-ranking priorities, probably in that order, are ridding 

Turkey of any Gulenist influence, real or imagined, and defeating 

the PKK and, related to that, quashing any Kurdish movement for 

collective rights. 

Certainly, because of the horrific terrorism staged by ISIS over 

the past year in Turkey, I have no doubt that fighting ISIS has 

also become more of a priority for Turkey, and Turkish officials 

now speak of the importance of fighting ISIS and the PKK simultaneously. But I don’t believe that President Erdogan yet sees ISIS 

as quite as serious a threat to his power and to Turkey as he sees 

the Gulenists and the PKK. 

I know there is already a lot of overlap in this testimony, and 

I don’t want to do another catalogue of all the human rights 

abuses. Let me throw out, on freedom of the press, yet another 

NGO’s report. Reporters Without Borders, in its 2016 World Press 

Freedom Index, actually ranks Turkey just 151st out of 180 counVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:48 Sep 01, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\071316\20746 SHIRL
22

tries—three slots behind Russia, by the way. So it is not a positive 

record. Another study has said that 70 percent of the Turkish print 

media, and a similar portion of the electronic media, is now a 

mouthpiece of the government, either owned directly or slavishly 

supportive of the government. 

I know my time is rapidly diminishing here, so maybe—look, you 

know, I would like to say a little more about what is going on with 

the Kurds. I think——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You have time. Please do. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Ranking Member Meeks, you very specifically in 

the last hearing in February—you talked about the importance of 

dialogue today and you analogized it to the civil rights movement 

in this country, which I am certainly old enough to remember and 

to have been a small part of. 

Look, I think what is going on—the assault on the Kurds in the 

southeast is a terrible mistake. The PKK is not blameless. It was 

a mistake for them to declare autonomy in various zones, to goad 

the Turks. It was a mistake for them to build up their weapons 

during the ceasefire. 

But the response of the Turkish military, I think, has really 

caused tremendous destruction, dislocation that at one point created several hundred thousand displaced persons within Turkey. 

That fact got very little publicity. And we saw some of the pictures, 

such as from Cizre that reminded us of pictures from Kobani. 

Again, I don’t think the PKK is blameless, but I think the approach 

that Turkey has taken is completely wrong and has alienated the 

Kurdish population and made it more difficult to enter into that 

dialogue that you spoke about. 

In my written testimony, I speak a bit about what the future 

should be of U.S.-Turkish relations. And I don’t have time—I don’t 

know if I have time to just quickly list a couple of the principles, 

but——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will get it in the questions. There you go. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Okay. I will be happy to end it there. Thank you 

very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. My first question is, what were you 

just going to say? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, first and foremost, Turkey has always been 

an ally valued for its strategic location, which has been the centerpiece of our bilateral relationship. The more pressing our need for 

access to Turkish bases, most famously Incirlik Air Force Base, the 

greater Turkey’s leverage in our bilateral relationship. 

And of course, when we are fighting a war, as we are now 

against ISIS, that need for access is quite pressing. It can be 

tempting therefore not to say much publicly about Turkey’s democratic shortcomings out of concern that Ankara’s response will be 

to deny us access. 

It is important to do our best not to give in to that temptation, 

lest we appear cynical about our own values, lest we de-spirit those 

many Turks who look to us for support on legitimate issues of freedom. At the same time, when we criticize, we should criticize as a 

friend, as you said, Mr. Chairman, not as an antagonist. 

Perhaps we might think of the following principles: First of all, 

we should be fully supportive of Turkey regarding external threats. 

I think it was a mistake for us to withdraw Patriots from southern 

Turkey last fall just as the Russian buildup in Syria was starting. 

I think we should make more port visits in the Mediterranean, as 

I have heard requested from Turkish officials. 

Second of all, we should be supportive in principle, as we already 

are, of Turkey’s right to defend itself against the PKK, which is on 

our terrorism list because it has killed civilians. 

But the Turkish assault on several cities and towns in its southeast, as I said, has created mass suffering and deep alienation that 

only complicates Turkey’s relations with its Kurdish population 

now and in the future. We should speak out strongly against 

abuses of freedom of the press and politically motivated arrests in 

Turkey. I know President Obama and Vice President Biden have 

made important gestures in that regard this year. 

And thirdly, we should also strongly support the right of the 

Kurds to cultural freedom and democratic expression. That means 

speaking out about all Turkish Government efforts to quash the 

Kurdish movement by criminalizing freedom of speech, removing 

the Kurdish presence in Parliament, again, as we have heard already, and by using excessive force that amounts to collective punishment. 

If I could, Mr. Chairman, just quickly add, I do think we have 

to prepare for a better day also. I know that NDI and IRI have 

some important freedom-supporting programs in Turkey, and I 

think it is important that those be supported. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will note that. And I think that it is always important for us when we are dealing with a country that has 

been so close to us, and such a friend, that whenever there are 

some very noticeable areas of conflict where we disagree now and 

we are not operating, that we make sure we do our very best to 

confront those issues in a way that will facilitate more friendship 

rather than driving a country away. And that is hopefully what we 

are doing today. 

Where does the panel come down on this, the fact that Turkey 

now has apologized to Russia on shooting down the plane? Let me 

37

just note that I was horrified that they shot the plane down in the 

first place, and now they are apologizing for it. What is that all 

about? And what is all this about where we have—Turkey has 

made very, how do you say, hostile moves toward Israel in the last 

few years and now it seems to be reaching out to go the opposite 

direction. What is the take of the panel on those two things, Doctor? 

Mr. BARKEY. Well, first of all, I would say that in the Russia case 

it was very clear that they had made a huge mistake and they had 

paid a very big price economically with the collapse of tourism. 

Tourism collapsed because of the violence and the terrorism but 

also because of the Russians. 

The deal with Israel is actually more interesting. I don’t think 

it is a real warming up of relations. It is more cosmetic. But fundamentally, it is not about improving diplomatic relations but it is 

about gas. Eventually, the Turks want—and the Israelis also very 

much are pushing for a gas pipeline from the Israeli gas fields, 

which will go through Cyprus and then to Europe. And, in fact, 

there is a way in which this is a good sign, because that means 

that maybe the Cyprus is—there will be a deal in Cyprus, that we 

will be moving toward a Cyprus settlement. 

But the unfortunate aspect of this is that this charm offensive 

has, especially with Syria now, has another downside. It has a 

major downside to it. And it is possible that he is—Erdogan is 

going to double down on the PYD in Syria and on the PKK in Turkey in a way in which he—Erdogan sees the PYD as essentially the 

most important threat to Turkey, because he thinks because the 

PYD is a creation of the PKK, that you will have essentially a 

front, a Kurdish front. 

Paradoxically, the Turks, who used to be very opposed to the 

KRG, to the Iraqi Kurdish movement, are now very close to it. 

They could have done the same thing with the PYD. The PYD was 

looking to establish relationship with the Turks. But for Erdogan, 

he made a strategic decision, and all this charm offensive now, all 

this moving on, I fear, is for a doubling down on the anti-PYD policy. 

And I think that is going to be problematic for us given the fact 

that we have now a relatively robust alliance with the PYD in 

fighting against ISIS. And that is the thing we need to watch, I 

think, much more carefully than anything else which have immediate repercussions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. My time is used up now, and we will have 

a second round. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

And I just want to see if I can get some further understanding 

domestically what is going. And you are right, as I was trying to 

identify in the past, talking about some of the lessons learned from 

us in the United States and what has taken place, it is the prism 

from which I work. 

So for example, when someone tells me that the Turks are trying 

to pack the court, I don’t get too upset at that because we are trying to pack the courts here also, you know. That has been the big 

38

issue here, who is going to win this election so that the Supreme 

Court—it makes a difference. So that I am not upset about. 

But I am upset about when there are journalists and others who 

want to express what their views are and that they are incarcerated as a result of that. And/or when there is the big debate, which 

my question is now, that is taking place about constitutional reform process of which I am not clear on. 

So I know that there is some renewed talks about the constitutional reform process. I know it took place there prior, in 2012, and 

things broke down. So my question is, where are we now, and what 

is at stake in regards to this dialogue internally in the prospects 

for greater instability internally in Turkey, and how will that affect 

us as an ally? 

Mr. BILGIN. Well, let me just interject here. The constitutional 

reform is an important aspect of the last really several years of 

Turkish politics, as I mentioned, that it has all started with 

Erdogan’s presidential aspirations. Technically, nobody understands why presidentialism is needed in Turkey. 

But the first attempt to reform constitution in 2012 collapsed because of that interjection of presidentialism as an AKP proposal. 

And, now after that, several other elections that AKP and Erdogan 

won and now it is on the table again. And what is being demanded 

or what is being aimed is to build a regime, which is called presidential regime, but in actuality it is a one-man rule where, you 

know, somebody will be an elected autocrat with unbridled executive power. That is what it will end up with, and that is why it 

is very controversial. 

So the system is parliamentary system at the moment. And normally, as we heard before, the Prime Minister is the executive, 

chief executive of the government. But there was just a switch of 

Prime Ministers last month, and everybody forgot about that already, I think, because everybody knows who is pulling the 

threads. 

And people are afraid, are concerned that, you know, as 

Erdogan—as powerful as he is now, how is he going to be when he 

is an elected President with all these powers. So that is a major 

concern. And the timeline goes, either we need a constitutional 

amendment in the Parliament or a referendum. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just ask then maybe, Mr. Barkey, given 

that—could there be—if, you know, there is talk about a constitutional reform process, you know, could it be a fair election or not? 

I mean, I have recently just seen what took place in the U.K, 

whether they are going to, you know, stay into the EU or not. But 

that seemed to be an open and a fair election. 

So are you saying that there cannot be an open and fair expression of the people of Turkey, that it will be so weighted down because of the heavy handedness of Mr. Erdogan that it won’t be 

transparent and clear? Is that——

Mr. BARKEY. Look, in Turkey, historically, elections have been 

clean and people have enormous amount of trust in the electoral 

process. But for the first time now, that faith in the electoral system is disappearing very quickly, and it is clear now that you will 

not get fair elections anymore. There are enough people who are 

now saying that the system is rigged. 

39

The AKP gets enormous amount of money from contributions 

from businesses that get funneled so that it can use for elective 

purposes. The difficulty with press is completely controlled now. 

[Microphone off.] You have 70 percent of that being even higher, 

but by the government and its allies, therefore you cannot have 

free elections or should we say fair elections. Free elections, yes, 

but fair elections, which is really contrary to—since 1950 a process 

of free and fair elections. 

Mr. MEEKS. My last question on this round then would be, would 

you say that is the fact that the outside, what is going on in Syria, 

what is going on with the PKK, what is going on with the PYD, 

does that have an effect domestically also on whether or not the 

Turkish people allow, you know—well, the authoritarian policies to 

increase that it seems to be happening now in regards to Mr. 

Erdogan? 

Mr. BARKEY. Well, unquestionably. Whenever you have—you can 

pose the PKK, the Kurdish threat as an alien threat, and that allows you to clamp down obviously on freedom of speech; therefore, 

that affects the elections, I mean, by definition. And if you go to 

the southeast, I mean, in the Kurdish areas, you have this amazing 

military presence, you have this amazing oppression that you see. 

So yes, I mean, the notion of—plus people have been displaced, 

500,000 people have been displaced. When are they going to vote? 

How are they going to vote? Are they going to be able to vote? 

What happens to the Syrian refugees? Will they be able to vote? 

I mean, there is all these things now going on that has undermined 

people’s confidence in the electoral process. 

Mr. MEEKS. I have a question for you in the next round. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Trott. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you, Chairman. 

My questions are to the entire panel, and anyone can feel free 

to opine. I wonder if anyone could give me insight into what the 

status of the Armenian churches that were seized by the Turkish 

Government and what the status of the churches are at this point. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Congressman, the only one that I am personally 

familiar with—maybe my colleagues know more—is the one that is 

located in the Sur district of Diyarbakir. Right now the whole district is essentially closed, so no one can have access to the church, 

including worshipers. 

Mr. TROTT. Okay. Thank you. 

With respect to the Muslim brotherhood, so they have been 

shunned by much of the Middle East, but the President has chosen 

to embrace them and is still controlling channels on television. 

What is the reason behind that, and why shouldn’t we be concerned by that? 

Mr. BILGIN. The Muslim brothers, there was a support for Muslim brothers, it was a part of a general policy of the Turkey’s Middle East policy to basically support these opposition elements that 

kind of seem a little—look like AKP. And now, as you said, some 

Equfan elements were residing in Turkey. And now it seems that 

Turkey’s ready to make a shift again, making a peace with General 

Sisi so that it is likely that they will be kicked out soon, I mean, 

of Turkey. 

40

Mr. BARKEY. I don’t think ideologically that Mr. Erdogan has 

changed his mind about the Muslim brotherhood. I think he is very 

sympathetic to them. He is very quick on his feet. I mean, he 

changes policies when those policies don’t work for him, and clearly 

he has decided now a rapprochement with Egypt and with Israel, 

given that Hamas is also part of the brotherhood is convenient for 

him. 

But I would say that fundamentally, in terms of where his loyalties and where his preferences lie, they are with the Muslim brotherhood. So what you will see is probably policies of dissimulation 

other than real change when it comes to this issue. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Just as a historical matter, when the Sisi takeover happened, it was in the middle of major demonstrations going 

on in Turkey. I think it brought out Erdogan’s paranoia, both in 

terms of his fear that something immediate from these demonstrations might happen and also based on Turkey’s history. I think he 

has always been concerned about the possibility of a military coup. 

And so I think that is what it reflected. But I do agree with 

Henri that I don’t think we are likely to see him change his spots 

anytime soon. And I am skeptical that things will move forward on 

relations with Egypt anytime soon. His foreign minister has talked 

about it, but Erdogan made some very strong anti-Sisi statements 

after the foreign minister spoke. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you. 

And then lastly, with respect to Turkey’s priorities in Syria, and 

how do they align with the United States and where do they diverge generally? 

Mr. BARKEY. Well, they have—at the beginning, we were on the 

same page. We both thought that Assad would leave in 6 months. 

When that failed and when the opposition failed to come up with 

serious resistance to Assad, you saw Turkey’s support for Jabhat 

al-Nusra increase. And this came to a boil in 2013 when President 

Erdogan visited the White House. He was confronted with that. He 

was asked to stop supporting Jabhat al-Nusra. 

The problem is that in the process of supporting Jabhat alNusra, a major infrastructure of jihadist supporters was created in 

Turkey, who funneled people and arms to Jabhat al-Nusra with 

government support but also people who went to ISIS. 

But where we are now today, for us, priority number one is ISIS; 

for Erdogan it is the PYD then Assad, and then ISIS. So in that 

sense, in there, we are not on the same page. For him, both the 

PYD and Assad, even though he is talking about overtures to 

Assad, are far more important and far more than the jihadist 

threat. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Just to elaborate a bit, I agree on the 

divergences. His primary focus is the Syrian Kurds and Assad. 

Ours is defeating ISIS. He wouldn’t mind if ISIS is defeated in the 

process, but it is not his priority. 

Second of all, and I think it is the number one issue in U.S.-

Turkish relations right now, is the fact that we are working closely 

with the YPG, with the Syrian Kurds, which he considers part of 

the PKK. And indeed, he has some reason to see their origins in 

the PKK. And from his point of view, it is U.S. support for a terrorism group. 

41

And, as I say, I noticed in a respected Turkish polling company 

survey this month, Metropoll, 73 percent of Turks said that the 

U.S. sides with terrorists against Turkey. It is a very disturbing 

kind of answer, but I am certain that what it is about is this disagreement about the YPG. 

Mr. BILGIN. Yeah. Congressman, despite repeated bombings committed by ISIS in Turkey, an enormous threat that is posed by the 

domestic operatives, which may number to like in thousands, so far 

very few ISIS members were arrested and no one has been convicted out of terrorism or something so far. So this is kind of unbelievable basically, given the fact that, you know, Turkey has been 

bombed like one after another, latest in Istanbul Airport. Maybe 

Istanbul Airport may change the situation. 

Mr. TROTT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And now Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Makovsky, your last comment about the poll is interesting, 

because as we look at Dr. Barkey’s comments about Turkey arming 

and directly aiding al-Nusra, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, this 

goes to the crux of the question of our relationship with Turkey, 

as our number one priority is, and should be, defeating ISIS, alQaeda, and these other jihadist groups. Turkey is directly and has 

indirectly been supporting them now for years. 

So, you know, each of you in your opening remarks spoke about 

Turkey’s democratic shortcomings, lack of freedom of the press, 

lack of due process, freedom of speech, individual and civil rights 

violations. We saw last year how the election went and really how 

the process was manipulated to benefit Erdogan. 

We see a direct contradiction in Syria with Erdogan’s continued 

fixation on getting rid of Assad, bombing the Kurds who have been 

without dispute our most loyal, dependable partners on the ground 

fighting against ISIS. Turkey’s actions have directly strengthened 

groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra. 

The question is, you know, Turkey is a NATO partner and they 

claim to be an ally. When you look at all of these issues, both with 

democratic values as well as objectives that are directly counterproductive to ours and threaten our security, how can you make 

the argument for NATO—for Turkey to maintain its status as an 

ally? 

And the follow-up to that is, do you see the current government—do you see a path forward for Turkey being capable of or 

even interested in changing their policy so that they can actually 

truly be an ally and a partner? 

Mr. BARKEY. This is the $64,000 question. It depends a little bit 

on the position we take in U.S. Government. Look, I spent time in 

U.S. Government and I follow U.S. policy carefully. We tend to always shy away of pushing very hard with the Turks. 

Because we are always afraid that because we have so many 

issues on a daily basis, Turkish and American bureaucrats talk on 

1,000 different issues. We are very close allies, and there is a constituency for this alliance in Turkey. 

But the problem, I think, is that before Erdogan and with 

Erdogan, we have very early stood our line. Let me just say, look 

at Putin. Not that I want to place Putin here. But he stood his 

42

ground with Erdogan and Erdogan had to essentially capitulate. It 

reminds me what an Arab diplomat told me in Iraq, this year, he 

said, we hate what Putin does, but we love the way he does it. 

Ms. GABBARD. Can I just ask you a follow-up. You said we have 

very rarely, if ever, stood our ground against Turkey. 

Mr. BARKEY. Right. 

Ms. GABBARD. What is this source of this great fear that would 

cause the United States of America to cower in fear and not standing our ground? 

Mr. BARKEY. Look, there is always the basis. There is the NATO 

relationship. There is the ability of—I mean, we are too integrated 

with Turkey. And in general, the bureaucracy is very much afraid. 

The decision to support the Kurds, in Syria, at the time of 

Kobani, was taken by the President against the position of his—

the State Department and the White House allies—aides, right. 

They were saying, oh, the Turks will be very upset. He did it. And 

look at the benefits because the Turks were not opening the bases 

to the U.S. until then. Once they realized that we were aligning 

ourselves with the YPG, suddenly they opened the bases. 

So there is a way in which we can send Erdogan a message. 

Look, if Turkey is an ally, even if Erdogan is problematic, even if 

there are lots of people in Turkey—but at the core, this is a longterm relationship which we have not known how to manage well. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I think the reason for U.S. reticence is because 

Turkey is such a strategic ally, because of its location. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is your mike on? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. It is. 

I think we have been concerned that if we speak out, that we will 

lose access to important assets like Incirlik Air Force Base. And I 

think that is what has inhibited us. Just the same way the EU, 

which used to be the strongest advocate of human rights in Turkey, 

has largely been silenced because of its concern about the refugee 

issue and Turkey’s ability to manipulate that. 

I think we have been, over the years, concerned about Turkey’s 

ability to manipulate our access to what is, after all, its sovereign 

territory, Incirlik Air Force Base and other facilities. I think we do 

have to consider—I hope this is going on somewhere in the government—whether there are other assets in the region that at least 

over the long term could be employed in the way that Incirlik is 

now, almost solely is in Turkey, and so that we could lessen our 

dependence on Turkey. 

You asked will they change? I don’t think that is the trend. I 

think the trend is toward greater independence, partly because if 

you look at the whole history of our alliance with Turkey, it has 

been one of growing Turkish independence. They started off as a 

very impoverished Third World country and now they are an upper 

middle income country, as classified by the World Bank. So there 

has been a normal trend whatever the government. 

Second of all, you have a government which is right now—which 

is very critical of us, and of the West, and has shown very anti U.S. 

reflexes. I don’t think we are going to get—I don’t think we are 

going to see any change under this government. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Weber. 

43

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, can we turn the air-conditioner down or on? Apparently this is a hot topic. Gosh, where 

do we start? Mr. Makovsky. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. It is fine. Alan would be sufficient. 

Mr. WEBER. You don’t care what we call you, just call you for 

dinner. 

So you said something about the Syrian—his main concern—

Erdogan’s, was the Syrian Kurds, was it ISIL or Assad you said? 

Mr. MARKOLSKY. Erdogan’s main concern? 

Mr. WEBER. Correct. 

Mr. MARKOLSKY. Erdogan’s main concern right now is the Syrian 

Kurdish movement. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. But closely related to that, it is getting rid of 

Assad. 

Mr. WEBER. It is Assad. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Assad, yeah. And that is really—the Syrian 

Kurdish problem is something new, but our divergence over whether it should be Assad or ISIL as a priority has been going now for 

several years. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And I came in late, so some of this may be 

redundant. Forgive me. One of you said, and I think it was you 

that said a respectable poling institution in Turkey was Metropoll? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Give me the results of that poll again. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes, they asked—I am getting this approximately right, in the fight with terrorism, who do Western countries 

like the U.S. and Germany side with, Turkey or the terrorists? And 

73 percent said——

Mr. WEBER. This was in Turkey? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Inside Turkey? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes. Seventy-three percent said the West side 

with the terrorists. 

Mr. WEBER. So much of I am reading is about how he has done 

away with opponents, starting with Fethullah Gulen and the press, 

and he has, you know, put a lot of them in prison. He just seems 

to oppress everybody who disagrees with him. How does this polling organization get to apply its trade about him with them under 

his thumb? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, I think there are still pockets of independent expression in Turkey. As far as I am aware, these polls 

are done independently. I could see why you might think from that 

question that it was manipulated, but if you went through the 

whole survey you might not think that. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So, so far you don’t believe that they are 

under his thumb? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. This particular polling company? Look, I don’t 

think so because they called the 2015 elections essentially correctly. I think they have shown themselves over the years to be essentially——

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Over how many years? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, they have been at it that I have been 

aware of for at least, I think, a dozen years. 

44

Mr. WEBER. He has let them continue even in that length of 

time? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes. I mean people say different things about 

these polling companies whether they are closer to or further from 

the regime. People do not currently say that this polling company 

is close to the regime. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Okay, fair enough. I think you said in your 

comments one of you did, I have been reading through the comments that he probably more closely wanted a Putin style system. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That was me. 

Mr. WEBER. That was you, okay. And then you also said I think 

it was Dr. Barkey that Turkey has been busy, or maybe it was in 

response to my colleague down on the left, from Hawaii, that Turkey has been arming al-Nusrah. 

Mr. BARKEY. Was. 

Mr. WEBER. When did that stop? 

Mr. BARKEY. It is not completely clear. I mean we asked them 

in 2013 to stop, but it took a while for them to stop. But it is a 

lot of informal networks that are independent of the government 

that still continue to support both al-Nusrah and ISIS. I mean 

when you think of the bombing in Istanbul the other day, it could 

not have happen if they did not have domestic help. 

Mr. WEBER. Right. 

Mr. BARKEY. But that is not the government. That is networks 

that were created at some time, at some point with the government. 

Mr. WEBER. But if the government turns a blind eye he is so 

busy after the news stations and the people like the Gulen and others, then those who are perpetrating this kind of violence kind of 

run amok, doesn’t they? 

This is a question for all three of you really, are there any other 

countries that you know of NATO, EU or in the United Nations, 

who you see this kind of power grab going on in any other country? 

Power grab, in other words, where they are shutting down the 

press, they are dealing with all the dissidents, they are——

Mr. BARKEY. Unfortunately the list is quite long. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Nothing in the list is quite long of people or 

countries? 

Mr. BARKEY. Countries. I mean, of leaders in countries where 

you see this. 

Mr. WEBER. You see this same kind of action that you see from 

Erdogan in other countries. Name one. 

Mr. BARKEY. Hungary. 

Mr. WEBER. Hungary. There is one. Name two. 

Mr. BILGEN. Venezuela during Chavez. 

Mr. WEBER. Venezuela, okay. Don’t miss my question. In the EU, 

in the U.N. or in—NATO, EU or U.N., any of those countries? 

Mr. BARKEY. U.N. includes everybody so you can go Zimbabwe, 

you can go Ethiopia. There is a whole series of countries. You are 

not going to run out of countries. 

Mr. WEBER. This level of corruption you would equate those? 

Mr. BARKEY. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. That is interesting. 

45

Mr. BILGEN. There is rising trend of authoritarianism in the 

world at the moment too. So that means Turkey is part of that, it 

extends even to Hungary, which is part of the European Union. 

Mr. WEBER. So you all’s testimony today is that you don’t put 

Turkey at the top of that. You can equate those with other countries. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I think, Congressman, if I could——

Mr. WEBER. Yes, this is a question for all three. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I think that the Reporters Without Borders 

ranking that I mentioned is very useful in that regard. There is no 

other NATO or EU country listed below Turkey. They listed them 

151st out of the 180——

Mr. WEBER. Yeah, three behind Russia. I came in late so I didn’t 

hear you testimony. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That is correct, three behind Russia. 

Mr. WEBER. Three behind Russia 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes. 

I am not an expert on Hungary and no doubt I have read enough 

about it to know though there are some authoritarian trends going 

on there, but in Turkey I think it has reached very severe proportions, particularly recently with new laws that will increase his 

power over the judiciary and possibly over private enterprise as 

well. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. If you 

are in a hurry I have one other question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. WEBER. Actually, I have three other questions, since you 

opened the door. He was easy, wasn’t he? 

So there was a 16-year-old in one of your notes, a 16-year-old 

boy, who called him a criminal or something? A 15-year-old boy? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. A thief, 16. 

Mr. WEBER. A 16-year-old called Erdogan a thief and he wound 

up in jail. What is his status? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. He was released. If I recall correctly, he was 

never—it never actually came to trial, but I believe he was held in 

jail for 4 days. 

Mr. WEBER. Are the two of you aware of that case? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes. Am I right, 4 days? 

Mr. BILGEN. Yes. 

Mr. BARKEY. I don’t know that case. I know——

Mr. WEBER. You don’t know that case. So from what you heard 

Mr. Makovsky say is that a travesty? 

Mr. BARKEY. Oh, yes. I mean 1,825 people have been prosecuted 

for insulting the President. 

Mr. WEBER. Eighteen-hundred forty-five—now I also read a 

quote where who was it, Erdogan said to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Istanbul, and you may have quoted 

this Mr. Makovsky so forgive me if it is redundant, he said that 

Westerners ‘‘Look like friends but they want us,’’ speaking about 

Muslims, ‘‘dead. They like seeing our children die.’’ Is that on 

video? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That is a good question. I have not seen it. I read 

it in the Turkish press, in both Turkish and English. The English 

46

quote that I used came from the Turkish press—the English-language Turkish press. But I don’t know whether it’s on video or not. 

Mr. WEBER. And does——

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Could I add? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. On the issue of the article 299 which criminalizes insulting the Presidency, I thought maybe, if I could, just 

quickly give you a little context. That is not an Erdogan creation. 

That has been there since the 1920s. That law has been forever in 

the books, but it does seem that Erdogan has used it far more frequently than any other President. And just as a point of comparison—and this is based on another NGO study—his predecessor 

used it 139 times. His predecessor save one, 26 times. He has been 

using it an average of over three times a day, through March 1st. 

That 1,845 figure was through March 1st and that is the Turkish 

Government figure. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you very much for your answer. 

Mr. Chairman I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. It is th intent of the chair to have 

a sound round. And I will proceed. 

And let me just note so far, and what we came into this room 

understanding, there seems to be a very negative trend going on 

in Turkey. We have tried we had several hearings, trying our best 

to reach out and try to let the people of Turkey know, the Government of Turkey know that the United States and the people of 

United States are grateful for the friendship that they have shown 

and really are grateful for the role that Turkey has played over the 

last several decades. However, that trend is very easy to see. There 

is a cycle of tyranny and a cycle of radicalization that seems to be 

going on in Turkey that is frightening about where that could lead. 

Take a look at what has happened in Pakistan, another country 

that is strategically located, a friend of ours in the cold war, and 

what has happened in Pakistan? You have a vicious radicalization 

with various elements in their society in which you have terrorists—a home base for terrorism, not only in their own country 

where they are repressing their people with radical Islamists, but 

also engaging in terrorist acts that might even be traced to the 

Istanbul airport for all we know, because they have been immersed 

in this. 

But yet trying to reach out—we still give aid to Pakistan, even 

though they are doing this stuff. So I do not believe that what was 

happening in Turkey is going to lead to a dramatic departure of 

our relations, but it might evolve into something that is a nightmare like as what has happened in Pakistan and our relations 

today. 

Let me ask this question of the panel, does anyone on the panel 

have any information about, or believe, that Turkey was involved 

with taking weapons from Libya and sending them to Syria? Does 

anyone on the panel know anything about that? I am just probing 

here. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I have heard that charge made, but I——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. But nobody has direct information 

about it? 

47

Let me just note that there are other—it would be a disaster for 

us to lose Turkey as a military partner, but there are other countries around that have air bases in that region. I mean Erbil itself 

could serve as a base for military operations so that Kuwait and 

any number of countries right there could provide what now is provided by Turkey. What would be bad is to make sure the dynamics 

that are created by such a large country with significant resources 

and people going in the wrong direction. 

So with that, let me ask this, and one of the things that I find 

just—it is hard for me to understand this but it has happened in 

other countries as well, and that is when you have the President 

of this country, but now the permanent Prime Minister, now the 

President whatever you want to call him, his whole political base 

was established with a Gulen movement. Am I pronouncing it right 

Gulen? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Gulen. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Gulen movement. And as far as I can see 

and I have studied what they believe and I have talked to some 

people in that movement, they tend to be people who have high 

values and are looking for a more open and you say tolerant Islam. 

That would be very admirable type of—by the way, it would be the 

equivalent of the Rotary Club in the United States. In essential 

you have a philosophy of helping other people who also are politically involved and involved in the community efforts to help people. 

How is it that the Gulen movement now has been declared public 

enemy number one by the man who they were actually helped put 

into power, and over the years has been one of the chief sources 

of support. How did that come about? 

Mr. BARKEY. I would like to say something about the Gulen 

movement. I mean the Gulen movement, I agree with you, has an 

image of tolerant Islam. Yes they were allied with Erdogan. When 

Erdogan came to power he did not have the personnel and it was 

the Gulen movement that staffed it. 

But the Gulen movement also, if you ask the Kurds, the Gulen 

movement was very hard on the Kurds, because Gulenist judges 

and prosecutors unleashed lots and lots of cases against Kurds that 

are still continuing today. There are people who went to prison for 

nothing. I just met with one of the most important lawyers in the 

Diyarbakir, a few weeks ago, he spent 41⁄2 years in jail. You know 

why? Because he was at the demonstration, somebody 5,000 people 

behind him opened a flag, a PKK flag and the judges and the prosecutors said, oh, you are a member of the PKK because you were 

standing in front of 5,000 people ahead of you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So is that the Gulen movement? Or is 

that——

Mr. BARKEY. If you go and ask the Kurds, the Gulenists were 

very, very hard on the Kurdish nationalist movement. There were 

many ways it was very good. They brought in very good staff, but 

on one issue they whether very, very hard. So it is not a completely—we have to also acknowledge what was wrong with them. 

The reason he turned on them is because he thinks—probably he 

may be right, that the Gulenists actually exposed the corruption. 

I mean the people who leaked those tapes off Erdogan and the 

money issues he thinks are Gulenists. 

48

And today the irony of course is that when he came to power and 

he aligned himself with Gulen against the military, today it is he 

and the military against Gulen so the alliances have changed, 

but——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the Gulen movement it ended up exposing 

some of the corruption——

Mr. BARKEY. Right. That is what he thinks. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. That was part of his entourage? 

Mr. BILGEN. And it should be added that, we are talking about 

quite a large network, or it was large, in Turkey. It was influential 

especially media for some one of the things that I would like to 

mention is, now that the Cihan news agency, was seized by the 

government, we don’t have a watchdog to actually follow the election. That was the only one, that was the only one. 

Now you are going to go learn the election results from state 

news agency, whatever number they put up it will be the number. 

But it was always checked against Cihan news numbers before. 

Since it is a large network, as I said it has—because of that it has 

usual shortcomings like it’s a diverse network, there are nationalists, there are more biased, less biased people, there are more secular, less secular. And there are people who are just minding their 

business about, like, teaching, opening schools and so on and there 

are others who are more interested in politics. Right? So it is hard 

to define where it ends, where it begins, and how a judge or prosecutor is basically considered a part of it while they themselves are 

rejected and so on. 

So there are all these shortcomings and I think nobody can really 

solve that. And even the movement itself the spokespeople and so 

on, cannot really address some of these questions. 

So in the larger picture especially outside Turkey or something 

the movement is known by more like dialogue activities, education 

activities or something. And that seems to be the core of the movement and movement message rather than what happened in the 

last few years in Turkey in the political scene. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. Comment on that——

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Let me say two good things about the movement 

and raise one questionable thing. 

First of all I have never seen a shred of evidence that they support anything other than peace. So the declaration of the Turkish 

Government that the Gulenists are a terrorist group is absurd. 

Second of all, in their schools they have taught science and mathematics; they have really emphasized what we would think of as 

more traditionally secular subjects like science and math. I can’t 

vouch for exactly how they are taught, but I don’t know of too 

many Islamic movements in the world that emphasize science and 

math. That is a real plus. 

Where I think the failing has been and, again, this is not 

proveable, but I think many followers of Gulen, many Gulenists acknowledge that a significant minority of the police and of the judiciary were Gulenists because they wanted to be part of those organizations and exercise power. 

And I think there is evidence, circumstantial evidence, that they 

did act corporately sometimes and particularly in the anti military 

49

trials that went from 2008 through 2011 with manufactured evidence and——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It seemed to me from just a distance the 

Gulenist movement is somewhat like the Masons were in our country’s history back in the founding of our country, they were idealistic people who had an idealistic philosophy. And again, somewhere between the masons an the Rotary Club. And I think——

Mr. BILGEN. With schools. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just one last note here about Turkey and—

I will have a closing 1-minute statement. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This good conversation and as I am listening I am just thinking 

in my head that things are always complicated. And I always try 

to tell my children sometimes, as we are right now, with what is 

going on in America, trying to look at something from somebody 

else’s point of view, turn it around. 

And as I have said in my initial statement, I am really concerned 

when I see the human rights groups and others denying individuals the opportunity to talk, et cetera. At the same time I understand that some of the interests that the Turks may have is different than what our interest is, because they are in that region 

and we are not. I also understand the Turks not necessarily just 

doing exactly what we tell them because it is just in our interest 

and them not seeing it being in their interest, just as I don’t expect 

someone to tell us to do what is in their interest, if it is not in our 

interest. 

So that happens between countries at times. And so when I listen to the difficulty to the Turks, we talk about the PKK, there, 

to them they are Daesh. That is their number one terrorist group, 

not to us, because they are not to us, but to us it is those folks in 

Syria and Iran who—I call them Daesh because I don’t call them 

an Islamic State they are not an Islamic—they don’t practice Islam 

if you talk to any Muslim. 

So there are conflicting interests that are natural. And so I can’t 

see a head of state of a country saying we are going to forget our 

national interests to go with someone else’s. So our difficulty is is 

trying to figure out how we can bring it together so that both of 

our interests are taken care of. 

So what am I asking? And I go through this with another country all the time. And maybe Mr. Makovsky, we have this dialogue 

with the chairman all the time. 

The other big country that you have got conflicts right now is 

Russia. And Russia has different interests than we do, Russia 

though similar to Turkey had an individual that was the Prime 

Minister that decided he wanted to be the President and all the 

power shifted. Russia is not with us, we are not with them when 

they went into the U.K. 

So the first question is what is the difference, if there is any, because I am trying to figure out both these countries, between Russia and Turkey? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Simply put, Turkey is an ally, Russia isn’t. Turkey is part of the NATO alliance and that alliance is supposed to 

be dedicated to freedom and democracy, a key—a core of that alliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:48 Sep 01, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\071316\20746 SHIRL
50

ance. Russia is not part of that. If you separate that fact and look 

at the trends inside those two countries, they become more similar. 

And I do—Mr. Erdogan has not spelled out exactly what kind of 

Presidency he has in mind, but I do worry. Many people suspect 

that President Putin is his model. 

And so you are right if you look at strictly domestic trends: There 

are a lot of similarities. But if you look at our responsibility, and 

this is my humble opinion, Mr. Ranking Member, if you look at our 

responsibility to speak out, it is much greater when we are talking 

about an ally than when we are not. 

Mr. MEEKS. Anybody differ? 

Mr. BILGEN. Well, I would like to say that when we look at the 

larger picture, the political system of Turkey and the people, the 

public opinion which may be manipulated, but is very much, kind 

of embedded in Western alliance, NATO in European Union. These 

are hard facts, these are difficult to change even for a strong person as you are gone as he is now. 

So there are two ways to look at this. Some time when I follow 

the developments in Turkey I just see symptoms of state tradition 

in Turkey. State tradition in Turkey, is a very powerful tradition 

which was never democratic through addition. It was always bureaucratic, always prioritize state over the individual. So that has 

been going on for hundreds of years. It is not going to change 

quickly as far as I see. 

But we can see the anomaly at the moment we are facing as a 

phase in Turkey’s political advancement or we may see it as a 

breaking point. It didn’t break yet, okay but it may break. I think, 

you know, these next couple of years are critical. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me just ask you this then. So what I am trying 

to get at is there a way just like our priority is to make sure we 

get rid of Daesh, now is it such a priority for the Turks that the 

PKK doesn’t exist? And just as we want to get rid of Daesh they 

went to get rid of PKK. They are saying based upon—that is what 

I am hearing, based upon the poll that you had, they are saying, 

well, we want you United States to help us get rid of the PKK because they are terrorizing us. And so how do we—and so there is 

a balance back and forth as opposed to they are saying, okay, we 

are allies, but we need you to help get rid of our terrorists. 

Now, I am hearing at another point that we need to push back 

so we should side with some of those folks that might be against 

them to shut them up a little bit. Where do we get to a balance? 

Mr. BARKEY. On the PKK issue, I mean, remember the difference 

between Daesh and PKK is in the case of the PKK there is an 

original sin. The original sin is that you had a Kurdish problem in 

Turkey that was unacknowledged, repressed, very, very violently 

over the years nobody talked about it, we never talked about it 

until the PKK emerged and made it essentially an issue. And this 

by the way is something that Erdogan recognized. After he sat 

down—he had his government sit down with the PKK leader who 

was in prison on an island in Turkey and they negotiated a deal. 

So he decided to renege on the deal, and we have been his allies 

in the sense that we have been fighting and helping him on the 

PKK issue and we continue to do so. He essentially reneged on the 

deal. 

51

It is not like Daesh in the sense that he made a deal, he could 

have gone ahead and finished the deal and we would not be talking 

about these problems now. He made his own decision, fair enough. 

That is where I say we should be able to push back and maybe 

help maybe being an intermediary we can push back. The important thing to understand about Turkey though—from the tone of 

the hearing, look this is a country that is very divided at the moment, and it is a country where you still have despite all the pressure, a civil society that is pushing back and fighting back those 

are our allies. 

Mr. MEEKS. All countries are very divided. The United States are 

very divided. 

Mr. BARKEY. I know. But what I am saying to you is the impression we are getting here is the Erdogan has complete control. And 

I am saying he doesn’t have complete control yet. So the fact of the 

matter is we don’t have a substitute, Kuwait and Erbil are not a 

substitute, Congressman Rohrabacher to Turkey. 

I mean Turkey’s embedded in NATO. Nobody else is going to replace Turkey from that perspective. We have allies in Turkey that 

we can work with even if Erdogan is problematic. But we need to 

hold to our principles and to our policies when we deal with 

Erdogan. 

Mr. MEEKS. Similar to we should do in Russia? These are two big 

countries that we can’t ignore. 

Mr. BARKEY. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. MEEKS. We can’t ignore Russia, we can’t ignore Turkey. 

Mr. BARKEY. Right. That is my point. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. The balance is very difficult but you are absolutely right, it has to be a cornerstone principle of ours that we oppose the use of violence for political end so we are correct——

Mr. MEEKS. Absolutely. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY [continuing]. To oppose the PKK in that regard. 

But I think we do have to acknowledge that Erdogan at first—at 

first—Erdogan came around to negotiating with the PKK indirectly, but almost directly, and he seemed to be the one that 

reneged on the deal. That doesn’t justify the PKK use of violence, 

not at all. But I think that context is very important. 

And, maybe if I could add, why did he renege on the deal? In my 

view, the emergence of a Kurdish political party that opposed his 

Presidency plans, I think infuriated him. Just like he felt spurned 

by the Gulenists, he felt spurned by the Kurds who he felt had reason to be grateful to him and in fact made some very important 

gains under him. 

I visited Diyarbakir several times last year, but I had not been 

there for 15 years until then, and—this was before the fighting 

broke out, on my first visit—the gains were immense. He felt they 

owed him gratitude. I think when the party emerged that, contrary 

to his expectations, opposed his Presidency ideas rather than supported it, he decided to unleash the furies. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well thank you very much. And I would like 

to thank the witnesses, I just have a very short observation which 

is of course the prerogative of the chair. 

Mr. MEEKS. Of the chair. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would you like to have a final word? 

52

Mr. MEEKS. Again just thanking you, very insightful and I thank 

the chair for having us here. I think in the next few months we 

should have another one and hopefully in January when I am the 

chair we will have another one. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will be the ranking member, what? 

Mr. MEEKS. But I just want to thank you very much. This kind 

of dialogue is tremendously important for us to air out for us to 

think about as you move forward. This stuff is not easy, it is not 

simple, it is complicated. And as many people as I talk to about—

one side they are on one side or the other, very similar to here in 

the United States. If you come and went to one particular State the 

United States is all one way and talk to someone else and say oh, 

no, it is another way. And this kind of dialogue is very helpful. 

So Mr. Chairman, I think that this commitment to the committee 

and hearing is very timely and very important to looking at what 

we are doing on the Foreign Affairs Committee as far as foreign 

policy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. I think Mr. Meeks and I have a very 

good relationship and I think it is exemplary of our Foreign Affairs 

Committee, and that we are able to do things. I would remind Mr. 

Meeks and other members that we will be trying to put together 

a sense of the House resolution expressing concerns over the trends 

in Turkey, not condemnations but expressing concerns over the 

trends in Turkey. 

When we are analyzing Turkey within the context of what is 

going on in the bigger picture and the EU is falling apart, think 

about this. Britain’s exit of the EU, this is a first huge step—as 

huge, as someone else would say who may end up President—and 

so so we have got some changes. 

And of course in our lifetime Turkey was constantly trying to become part of the EU and part of the common market. And now I 

think that is probably history. And I think that Erdogan represents 

more of a nationalistic Turkey focus rather than Europe focus approach. So these are all major changes that are going on. And let 

us hope that as these changes happen I believe that NATO—if we 

have a new President, if it is Mr. Trump, I would expect that 

NATO and the EU alliances would become less important and that 

individual deals and relationships between countries, respecting 

that each country has its own interest at stake, but trying to find 

the common ground where people can act together, that will replace some of the more systematized approaches that we have had 

since the beginning of the cold war and the cold war is over. 

So with that said, whatever emerges in this new era, Turkey will 

play a very significant role. It is right there in the middle of everything. 

So we have taken very seriously, we respect the people there. We 

are concerned that its trendline—and by the way just one last note, 

it has been my experience that whenever the suppression of the 

press goes up, the level of corruption rises at the same rate. 

And if we have the suppression of various political elements in 

society, in Turkey. And we have the suppression of freedom of the 

press you can expect that there will be corruption as a result and 

it will not bode well for the people of Turkey. We are on their side. 

And I now hold this committee adjourned. 

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[Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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